COPIA VERBORUM: CICERO’S PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSLATIONS

Georgina Frances White

A DISSERTATION
PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY
OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

RECOMMENDED FOR ACCEPTANCE
BY THE DEPARTMENT OF CLASSICS

Advisers: Yelena Baraz and Christian Wildberg

November 2015
ABSTRACT

This dissertation studies Cicero’s translations from Greek within his philosophical texts, with the aim of uncovering the literary and philosophical implications of Cicero’s particular translation choices. The opening chapter considers the methodology by which we might best approach this issue, taking into account Cicero’s own descriptions of his translation project, contemporary Roman approaches to literary translation, as well as contemporary theories of translation. Here it is argued that we must approach Cicero’s translations on three levels, considering the particular vocabulary and syntax selected, the character of the translation produced by these choices, and the intertextual relationship such a translation fosters in respect to its source text. It then turns, in chapter 2, to a consideration of Cicero’s translations of technical, philosophical terminology. Here I suggest, among other things, that Cicero’s use of multiple Latin words to translate a single Greek term is motivated by his desire to reveal complex relationships between various philosophical concepts by employing terminology whose etymological links mirror these conceptual connections. In chapter 3, I discuss the longer passages of translated Greek that are dotted throughout Cicero’s philosophical works. Here I argue that Cicero’s apparent inconsistencies in translation can be explained by the particular philosophical or literary emphasis he wishes to place on particular passages. Finally, in
chapter 4, I turn to a consideration of Cicero’s longest translation of Greek philosophy, his *Timaeus*. Here I show that some of the ways in which Cicero changes the Greek original can be viewed as interpretations or corrections of the original text deriving from the Hellenistic scholarly tradition, and others as reflecting the dramatic context of a new Latin dialogue, modeled after, but not identical to, the Platonic original. In doing so, I consider the political, philosophical, and literary purposes behind this translation, suggesting an answer for the most fundamental question about this text – why did Cicero produce this translation at all?
To my family, for your endless support.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To adequately thank everyone who has helped me in writing this dissertation and throughout my time at Princeton would add more pages to this document than the Mudd library would accept, and exceed the abilities of my prose. The thanks I give here, then, can in no way make up for the many debts of gratitude I owe to everyone involved in the Department of Classics and the Program in Classical Philosophy who has helped me over the last five years. I could not have hoped for a more welcoming, collegial, and stimulating environment in which to complete my PhD studies, and I am incredibly grateful for the tireless support and great kindness that you have offered to me unceasingly over the last five years.

My particular thanks, of course, go to my committee, Yelena Baraz, Christian Wildberg, Denis Feeney, and Robert Kaster, for being so incredibly kind and patient throughout this process. I have learnt so much from each of you, and those errors that remain in this dissertation are entirely my own. It is a sign of the astonishing intellectual generosity that flows through the corridors of East Pyne that I must offer my thanks, too, to the rest of the faculty in the Princeton Classics department for so many invaluable conversations over the years. In particular, I would like to thank Harriet Flower, Michael Flower, Andrew Ford, Joshua Katz, and Nino Luraghi, as discussions with each of them (whether they are aware of it or not) have contributed greatly to my understanding of Cicero’s philosophical translation project; and Andrew Feldherr for his tireless (and often
thankless) work as Director of Graduate Studies. Outside of the Princeton Classics department, I would like to extend my heartfelt gratitude to John Magee and Tobias Reinhardt for discussing the issues within this dissertation with me, and to John Cooper, Hendrick Lorenz, and Benjamin Morison for offering me a home in the Program in Classical Philosophy.

In addition to the faculty at Princeton University, it is the graduate students who make the PhD experience here so unique and rewarding. I am incredibly grateful to each and every student who has been in the Classics department and Program in Classical Philosophy throughout my time at Princeton, for sharing with me their great erudition, support, and friendship. In particular, I would like to thank Emilio Capettini, for being the best housemate and resident Greek advisor anyone could hope for, and everyone else who has listened to me talking about Cicero. My special thanks go to Leon Grec, Katharine P.D. Huemoeller, Aaron Kachuck, Scarlett Kingsley, Simon Shogry, and Mali Skotheim who have endured me talking about my work the longest; and Paul Touyz who has endured this the most, and without whom the process would have been much less enjoyable. My thanks also go to Amanda Klause and Caroline Mann for having helped me through the last few days in the library (and the accompanying IT issues); and, of course, to Stephanie Lewandowski, without whose unerring guidance and aid I would certainly not have made it through this degree.
Finally, I would like to thank my family, who have provided so much support to me over the years, and to whom I dedicate this dissertation. Thank you, so much, for everything you have done for me.
## Table of Contents

ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................ iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................... vi

CONTENTS ......................................................................................................... ix

LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................. xii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................. xiii

Introduction: Translating Untranslatables ............................................................... 1

Chapter 1: Methodological Frameworks ................................................................. 14

I. Introduction: Cicero’s Philosophical Translation .............................................. 14
   a) Representations of Translation in Cicero’s Philosophical Works: Translation as
      Reproduction .................................................................................................. 16
   b) Translation as Replacement ........................................................................... 19
   c) Translation or Selective Rewriting? ................................................................. 22

II: Perspectives on Translation Theory and Practice .......................................... 27
   a) The Contribution of Contemporary Translation Theory ................................. 28
   b) The Perspective of Classical Studies: Roman Traduzione Artistica ............... 38

III. Cicero’s Traduzione Artistica ......................................................................... 48
IV. Intertextual Positioning in Cicero’s Philosophical Translations...............60
a) The patrii sermonis egestas ..................................................................................71

Chapter 2: Cicero’s Translation of Technical Terms...........................................75
I: Earlier Scholarly Approaches ..............................................................................76
II: The Example of κατάληψις..................................................................................86
III: A New Approach to Stoic/Old Academic Epistemological Terms................99
   a) cognitio ..................................................................................................................100
   b) perceptio and comprehensio ..............................................................................105
   c) Translation outcomes .........................................................................................115
   d) Intertextual Outcomes .......................................................................................126
IV: Rewriting the Narrative of patrii sermonis egestas ........................................133

V: Greek Philosophy and Traditional Roman Ethics ............................................139

VI: Epicurean Ethics and Untranslatability ............................................................143

Chapter 3: Cicero’s Translations of Prose Texts.................................................147
I: Creative Rewriting: Variations in Cicero’s Translation Style .........................149
II: Epicurus: The Alterity of Epicurean Philosophy .............................................176
III: Xenophon: Cato’s Favoured Philosopher .........................................................195
IV: Plato: Translation as Philosophical Intervention ..........................................202
V: Aristotle: Cicero’s Translations as a Source for Greek Philosophy .............212

Chapter 4: Cicero’s Timaeus..............................................................................232
I. Introduction.............................................................................................................232
II. Earlier Scholarship (Translation Technique in Cicero’s Timaeus) .............235
III. The Nature of the “Translation” of the Timaeus ..................................................242

IV: Dramatic Setting: Nigidius and Pythagoreanism .............................................257
   a) Nigidian Echoes in Cicero’s Timaeus ...........................................................264
   b) Pythagoreanising Tendencies in Cicero’s Timaeus ........................................283

V: The Nature of the Translation Reconsidered: Why use Plato at all? ................302

VI: The Political Implications of this Work ..........................................................311

Epilogue .................................................................................................................... 323

Conclusions ............................................................................................................ 323

Further Work .......................................................................................................... 329

Appendix A: Cicero’s Prose Translations ............................................................... 338
   I: Epicurus .......................................................................................................... 338
   II: Plato ............................................................................................................... 341
   III. Xenophon ..................................................................................................... 350

Appendix B: Cicero’s Translations of Aristotle in his Philosophical Works ........353

Appendix C: Cicero’s Translations of Phaedrus 245c6-246a1 .............................. 354

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................................... 356
# LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Stoic/Old Academic Epistemological Terms

Table 2: Cicero's Translations of Plato

Table 3: Cicero’s Translations of Epicurus

Table 4: Cicero's Translations of Phaedrus 245c6-246a1
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Classical authors, Greek and Latin works, collections of fragments and inscriptions, titles of modern periodicals, and titles of modern reference works will often be abbreviated according to the system used in the Oxford Classical Dictionary, 4th edn., ed. Simon Hornblower, Antony Spawforth, and Esther Eidinow (Oxford, 2012). Commonly used abbreviations for the works of Cicero (who is himself sometimes abbreviated to Cic.) are as follows:

- **Acad.**  *Academicae quaestiones*
- **Amic.**  *De amicitia*
- **Att.**  *Epistulae ad Atticum*
- **De or.**  *De oratore*
- **Div.**  *De divinatione*
- **Fat.**  *De Fato*
- **Fin.**  *De Finibus*
- **Leg.**  *De legibus*
- **Nat. D.**  *De natura deorum*
- **Off.**  *De officiis*
- **Orat.**  *Orator ad M. Brutum*
- **Rep.**  *De republica*
- **Sen.**  *De senectute*
- **Top.**  *Topica*
- **Tusc.**  *Tusculan disputationes*

In addition, the major Greek and Latin dictionaries referenced in this work are abbreviated as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Dictionary Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LSJ</td>
<td>Greek-English Lexicon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLD</td>
<td>Oxford Latin Dictionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLL</td>
<td>Thesaurus Linguae Latinae</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction: Translating Untranslatables

In May of 45 BC Cicero was in the midst of the flurry of literary activity that would characterise the final years of his life, and result in the composition of the majority of his philosophical works.¹ In a letter to Atticus from this period, in which he deals mainly with financial matters, we find a remark that many scholars have taken to be a reference to these philosophical treatises and their method of production:

ἀπόγραφα sunt, minore labore fiunt; verba tantum adfero, quibus abundo.

They are copies. They are produced with little effort. I only add the words, of which I have an abundance.²

(Cic. Ad Att. 12.52.3)

This single, self-deprecating comment has done much to colour scholarly responses to Cicero’s philosophical works over the years.³ Taking Cicero at his word,

¹ This, at least, is the dating provided by Shackleton-Bailey (2002), following Schmidt (1893) although it is generally acknowledged that the dating of this book and the next are confused – see Ramsey and Licht (1997) 26 who note that this is a “particularly jumbled part of the corpus”.
² The translation of Cicero’s text here, and throughout this dissertation is, unless otherwise noted, the author’s own.
³ See Davies (1971), esp. p.106 on the question of the originality of Cicero’s philosophical works, and the dismissive attitude to this issue that this particular remark has fostered in many scholars. Indeed, Pohlenz (1922) is praised by Davies as giving one of the most balanced earlier readings of this text, and still takes this throwaway remark perilously literally: “Was er mit jenen Worten sagen will, ist nur das: Während er im Werke über den Redner mit berechtigtem Selbstgefühl davon spricht, dass er eigene Gedanken und Höheres als die griechischen technia zu bieten hat, nimmt er das für die philosophischen Werke nicht in Anspruche. Hier sieht er seine eigentliche Aufgabe nur darin, die passenden griechischen Schriften für die
these texts have been viewed as mere copies of Greek originals to which Cicero has contributed only \( \textit{tantum} \) a new Latin vocabulary, and, as such, they have been considered to be devoid of originality and lacking in independent academic interest.\(^4\)

More recent scholarship has begun to challenge this position, emphasising those elements of these texts which reveal Ciceronian innovation. Baraz (2012) has shown how Cicero’s philosophical works create a new space for Greek philosophy within the Roman world; Woolf (2015) has considered the specifically Roman nature of Cicero’s brand of Academic Scepticism;\(^5\) Zarecki (2014) has shown how the philosophical views outlined in the \textit{De Re Publica} can be seen to inform Cicero’s own political life; and Gildenhard (2007) has considered the unique features of Cicero’s dialogue form in the \textit{Tusculan Disputations}. Each of these works, moreover, has emphasised the importance of situating Cicero’s writings within his cultural context, seeing his philosophical texts as peculiarly Roman works, responding to contemporary developments within the Republic.\(^6\) As such, they have all made a significant contribution to our increased appreciation of Cicero’s philosophical project and its originality, and to our

---

\(^4\) Though they may, of course, be valuable as repositories of now-lost Greek texts, and have often been treated as such in the scholarly tradition (as we will examine in more detail in ch. 3, in particular p. 187-204). The sway of this claim over scholarship on these works has been so powerful that Griffin (1991) 196 has described it as “the notorious \textit{apaographa remark}”, and it is still prevalent enough that it needs to be treated too by Zarecki (2014) 29 and Baraz (2012) 119 n. 50 (the latter in response to Robinson (1992) 21, who takes literally Cicero’s claim here that his writings are “mere transcripts of other people’s ideas”).

\(^5\) In this, he has drawn on important earlier work found in Schofield et al. ed. (1980) and Powell ed. (1995).

\(^6\) This is particularly true of the works of Baraz and Gildenhard, both of whom see Cicero’s turn to philosophy at the end of his life as responding to Caesar’s rise to power.
understanding of the literary climate of first century BC Rome. Less attention has been
given, however, to those aspects of Cicero’s philosophical works that seem the most open
to the (self-)criticism of this letter: those passages in which Cicero recasts Greek
philosophical texts or terminology in Latin, replicating the content of an original text in a
manner similar to a copyist producing ἀπόγραφα. These translated elements, where
Cicero brings new Latin verba to pre-existing Greek texts and ideas, will be the subject of
this dissertation. As we shall see, however, in the field of literary production in general,
and of philosophical writing in particular, it is no small feat “only to add the words”.
Cicero here downplays the selectivity and creativity involved in translating Greek into
Latin, emphasising instead the abundant resources of his own Latin vocabulary and the
ease with which he is able to articulate foreign ideas in his native tongue (so hinting at
the copia verborum, or “profusion of words”, of the Latin language, which will be a
recurrent theme of his depictions of his work as a translator). Nevertheless, the status of
these translated sections as much more than mere ἀπόγραφα will be made apparent
throughout the course of this dissertation.

As the recent encyclopedic work, A Dictionary of Untranslatables, has made
clear, articulating foreign concepts in a new language is fraught with difficulties: in the
attempt to translate an original text, a translator has to use words from the target language
which have different meanings, cultural values, and interrelationships from those of the source language, meaning that some aspect of the original is inevitably altered or lost. These issues are, as the hundreds of examples collected in this Dictionary show, particularly apparent in the field of philosophy. In philosophical discourse the concepts articulated are often culturally and linguistically specific, encoding a particular worldview that is difficult to express outside of its original context: the impossibility of expressing the full semantic range of a key philosophical idea such as the German *Geist* in English is only one example of this. Moreover, the use of an approximately rather than an exactly equivalent term in the production of a translation can lead to greater confusion or incomprehensibility in philosophical contexts than in non-philosophical contexts. This is because sentences translated in this approximate way can have different truth conditions from the formulations of the original language: claims made about “spirit” or “mind” may have different truth values from those made about *Geist* precisely because of the different semantic range of these words. Such philosophically significant terms, and the larger utterances which employ them, are, consequently, in the words of Cassin, “untranslatable”. In other words:

7 This awareness of linguistic incommensurability derives from the Structuralism of Saussure and Deconstructionist criticism of Derrida, and will be explored more fully in Ch 1, p.26-8. As Cassin (2014) xvii puts it: even in familiar European languages “the terms we normally consider as immediate equivalents have neither the same meaning, nor the same field of application”, and she cites the translation of *Geist* or *esprit* by the English “mind”, or *pravda* with “justice” or “truth”.

8 As Feeney (forthcoming) 40ff. notes, there are similar issues in translating the body of texts known as “literature”, and the difficulty of replicating these works outside of a particular linguistic and cultural system.
“...their translation, into one language or another, creates a problem, to the extent of sometimes generating a neologism or imposing a new meaning on an old word. It is a sign of the way in which, from one language to another, neither the words nor the conceptual networks can simply be superimposed.”

Cicero’s translations of Greek philosophy into Latin share in this larger problem. However great the abundance of the vocabulary of the translator, or of the target language, this enviable copia verborum cannot eradicate the underlying differences between two languages and the conceptual connections they encode. Far from “only adding the words”, Cicero, like all philosophical translators, has to rewrite these philosophical ideas into his target language – choosing which elements to preserve and which to adapt, so as to make use of the linguistic and cultural resources of his own native tongue.

Seen in this light, as a necessarily selective and creative rewriting of a Greek model, we can see the importance and interest inherent in a study of Cicero’s translations of Greek philosophy. In as far as philosophical translation poses particular difficulties for the translator, its study also has particular value for the intellectual and cultural historian. The very cultural specificity of philosophical language means that we can see, in the

---

9 Cassin (2014) xvii.
10 For the idea of translation as “rewriting” see Lefevere (1992), whose position will be argued for in ch. 1 p.33-4.
imperfection of philosophical translation, key differences in how various languages, and the people who use them, delineate and employ concepts. In studying which elements of the original the translator has opted to retain, we can also discover what elements of the original text he considers valuable and worthy of communication to his audience. Conversely, in isolating those elements that do not survive the process of translation, we can identify what the translator might have considered unimportant, or even problematic, in the original. The author’s selection of the *verba* by which his translation is produced, then, is a complex interpretive and creative activity that can be analysed so as to reveal patterns of selection. These patterns, in turn, can indicate the particular adaptive stance that the translator has taken towards the original text – and this is the case for Cicero as much as for any other translator.

In this way, a study of Cicero’s translations of Greek philosophy can form an important complement to similar studies of Roman adaption and appropriation of other Greek cultural products. An important, and widely studied, example of such cultural appropriation is the adoption of Greek sculptural motifs within Roman art. In this case, it has been convincingly argued that a close study of the selection and adaptation of Greek forms by Roman artists can provide us with important insights into the differences

---

11 For this see Deutscher (2010), who collects the evidence showing that the particular semantic divisions present within a language system (in this case, within colour vocabulary) results in its users a tendency to *think* according to these divisions.
between Roman and Greek culture.\textsuperscript{12} This process has even been envisioned as its own kind of translation, in which the symbols of Greek art are reappropriated and deployed with new meanings in the very different semantic system, or “language”, of Roman art.\textsuperscript{13} Cicero’s philosophical translations, as we shall see, are no more mere copies of Greek originals than Roman sculpture represents mere copies of Greek models. And, just as is the case with Roman sculpture, a consideration of the ways in which Greek originals are adapted to their new cultural context can tell us much about contemporary Roman culture and its relationship to that of Greece.\textsuperscript{14}

However, while the structures of the target language (whether this be Latin or the “language” of Roman art), along with the expectations and needs of a Roman audience, have a profound effect upon the activities of the translator, these are not the only forces determining the form of a translation. There is still space in both the Roman refiguring of

\textsuperscript{12} E.g. Hölscher (2004) 86: “[In Roman adaptation of Greek sculptural iconography] it is not an arbitrary relativism that prevails, nor a pure preference of taste, but a selection, which is geared towards best expressing the message.” For a similar approach, see Kousser (2008) who argues that Roman sculptures “referenced, appropriated, and transformed” their Greek models, and adapted their models for a new, aesthetically sophisticated Roman audience (p.1).

\textsuperscript{13} For the classic treatment of this idea, see Hölscher (2004) 1-2: “Moreover, the common visual language of a society – underlying the thematics of its imagery and regardless of minor temporal and local stylistic differences – is a social fact of the greatest interest. Among the fundamental themes for social history raised by the communicative aspects of the history of images are the following: how a society may coin a means of visual communication, how this language then reacts upon the society as it uses and develops it, what the overall visual system is able to achieve as a result, which structures of meaning are implied in its syntax and repertoire of motifs. All of these are of real importance for social and cultural history.”

\textsuperscript{14} This is the key insight of “Polysystems Theory” which sees language use as simply one element of the complex, inconnecting system known as “culture”. The transfering of new material into a different language, then, both affects the target culture and is affected by it. For further discussion of this, see ch.1, p.30, n.35.
Greek sculptural motifs and the translation of Greek texts into Latin for individual artistic choice, meaning that a study of the way in which a particular translator treats his source texts can also reveal peculiar interests and aims of the individual author.\textsuperscript{15} We will consider more fully the differences between Cicero’s translation of Plato’s \textit{Timaeus} and that of a later author writing in Latin, Chalcidius, in the fourth chapter of this dissertation, and see how these differences serve to reveal the multiple translation strategies available within the Latin language for treating the same material.\textsuperscript{16} For the moment, however, to illustrate this point it is enough to consider the varying approaches taken by Cicero’s contemporaries to translating the same Greek philosophical terms into Latin. Lucretius, writing about Epicurean physics in the same period during which Cicero produced his earliest philosophical works, deals in his epic poem with the Epicurean concept of the \textit{ἄτομος}, or “atom”. His preferred translations for this Greek term are \textit{corpusculum} and \textit{corpus} (often with an adjective such as \textit{parvum} or \textit{genitale}), and he never uses the transliterated term \textit{atomus} - in spite of its attestation in the context of Epicurean philosophy in an earlier satire of Lucilius.\textsuperscript{17} Cicero, on the other hand, although occasionally employing the diminutive \textit{corpusculum}, which he habitually uses to describe

\textsuperscript{15} This is, as we shall see, different from Lefevere. That different artists have different responses to their cultural context and work within it rather than being determined by it is also seen in the field of Roman sculpture – for the possibility of distinguishing different individual sculptors of classicising Roman sarcophagi see e.g. Russell (2015) 198.


\textsuperscript{17} Fr. 28.2 Marx. \textit{e<ph>ebum quendam quem p<q>a>reutacto uocant / e<i>dola atque atomus vincere Epicuri uolam / adde eodem, tristis ac seuerus <ph>ilos<ph>us / Polemon et amaut...} See Sedley (1998) 35-59 for further discussion of Lucretius’ choice of terminology.
the Democritean atom, in his discussions of Epicureanism (e.g. Cic. Acad. 1.6), significantly favours the use of the transliterated term *atomus* in his extended expositions of Epicurean physics. ¹⁸ It is this term that he uses exclusively in the description of Epicurean physics in the *De Fato*, in the first books of both the *De Finibus* and the *De Natura Deorum*, and in the *Tusculan Disputations*. ¹⁹ In making the choice to use the term *atomus*, Cicero, unlike Lucretius, maintains the phonetic value and Greek sound patterns of the original, and retains the original form of the substantive formed from an alpha privative and adjective. He also employs a term that is less natural to Latin discourse, and whose –*us* ending violates the normal patterns for feminine nouns. Lucretius, on the other hand, employs familiar, native Latin terms to describe these Greek concepts. However, in doing so, leaves untranslated the original sense of the Greek term as “that which cannot be cut”. Each of these translators, then, makes different choices from among the various options presented by the Latin language, and, in doing so, privileges particular aspects of the information contained within the original Greek.

Similar, diverse possibilities for the translation of important Greek philosophical terms into Latin can be seen in the differing treatments of the Greek term ἀξιόμα, as evidenced by Cicero and his contemporary Varro. This single term is translated by Cicero as, variously, *quidquid enuntietur* (Acad. 2.95), *pronuntiatum* (Tusc. 1.14), and *enuntiatio* ¹⁸

---

¹⁸ This term is used, too, by Varro in *ARD* 8.5: *ex atomis, ut ait Epicurus*.
(De Fato 1), and by Varro as *proloquium* and *profatum* when used without qualification (Ling. fr. 29 Goetz and Schöll, from book 24), while this same author translates the phrases διεξενημένον ἀξίωμα and συνημμένον ἀξίωμα as *disiunctum* and *adiunctum* or *conexum*, respectively (ibid.). As we can see, then, the Roman translator of Greek philosophy, while working within his culture, has, nevertheless, a wide range of translation possibilities available to him. Our study of Cicero’s philosophical translations will, consequently, reveal how one such Roman Republican author made his selection from within these available options, and so tell us more about the particular literary and philosophical aims with which Cicero composed his philosophical texts, as well as providing us with insights into the culture in which he worked as a valuable case study of Roman translation practice.

In order to perform this kind of study, we will need to have a methodological framework that is both robust enough to provide a convincing account of the complexities of interlinguistic translation, and finely-grained enough to account for all of the subtleties of Cicero’s Latin usage in these contexts. This will be the work of the opening chapter. Here, in order to ensure that we employ the appropriate structures with which we might best understand Ciceronian philosophical translation, we will take into account both Cicero’s own descriptions of his translation project and how these own attitudes fit in with what we know of other contemporary Roman approaches to literary translation, as well as contemporary theories of how translation functions across cultural
and historical boundaries. From these starting points we will formulate a methodological approach which will allow us to analyse, in the first instance, the vocabulary and syntax selected for use in the translation, considering which elements of the original are retained and which are lost (a study of the “translation procedures” employed by the author). We will next consider the kind of translation which is produced by these specific translation choices – whether the work together to produce a text which reads naturally in Latin, or has the foreign feel of the original Greek, and whether the translation expands, explains, or compresses the original in rewriting this text for its new audience (so considering the “translation outcomes”). Finally, we will consider the particular intertextual relationship that such a translation establishes with the original Greek text: whether it presents itself to the reader as, for example, matching or exceeding the original in terms of its philosophical viewpoint or linguistic usage, or what else it might say to the reader about the source text or culture.

With this tripartite methodological system in place, we will go on to consider particular instances of Ciceronian translation, and consider how our new approach might help us to unpick some of the long-standing puzzles regarding these texts. We will turn, firstly, in chapter 2, to a consideration of Cicero’s translations of technical, philosophical terminology. Here we will suggest that Cicero’s puzzling use of multiple Latin words to translate a single Greek term is motivated, at least in part, by his desire to reveal complex relationships between various philosophical concepts by employing terminology whose
etymological links mirror these conceptual connections. We will also see that his choice to translate particular philosophical terms by means of transliterated Greek, rather than native Latin vocabulary, can often be explained by his polemical attitude towards the philosophical views these terms express. Next, in chapter 3, we will discuss the longer passages of translated Greek that are dotted throughout Cicero’s philosophical works. Here we will consider how Cicero’s translational strategies serve to reflect and reinforce his presentation of particular philosophical schools, and particular Greek authors. We will also show that long-standing complaints about Cicero’s inconsistencies in translation can be explained by the particular philosophical or literary emphasis he wishes to place on particular passages. Finally, in chapter 4, we will turn to a consideration of Cicero’s longest translation of Greek philosophy, his *Timaeus*. Here we will argue that some of the ways in which Cicero changes the Greek original can be viewed as interpretations or corrections of the original text deriving from the Hellenistic scholarly tradition, and others as reflecting the dramatic context of a new Latin dialogue, modeled after, but not identical to, the Platonic original. In doing so, we will consider the political, philosophical, and literary purposes behind this translation, suggesting an answer for the most fundamental question about this text – why did Cicero produce this translation at all?

Along the way, we will see a number of important themes and features emerging from our discussion, and which we will be in a position to survey more synoptically when
we reach the concluding epilogue. Among these is the question of how Cicero, in producing his translations, presents the relationship between the Latin and Greek languages, and how this drives his project of (re)writing philosophy in Latin. We will also gain insights into how Cicero uses particular translation strategies and techniques in order to provide support for, or reveal problems with, the philosophical position of his Greek sources, and so to understand how we can use these translations to understand Cicero’s own philosophical thought, as articulated in these texts, more fully. Finally, it will help us to characterise the particular approaches to translation which Cicero habitually employs, which will give us a better sense of how to use Ciceronian translation as a source for earlier Greek philosophy in those cases in which the original text does not survive. The study as a whole should, then, allow us to see the scholarly value in the study of these translations, and the importance of treating them as literary and philosophical products in their own right, rather than dismissing them as mere ἀπόγραφα, devoid of independent interest. It will also, as we see the full extent of the complexity and control with which Cicero positions his new Latin translations against the original Greek texts, bring into question the claim that these were “produced with little effort” (minore labore fiunt as the letter with which we opened this discussion claims), revealing this instead as a rhetorical means by which to further emphasise the author’s linguistic abundance, his copia verborum.
Chapter 1: Methodological Frameworks

I. Introduction: Cicero’s Philosophical Translation

It has often been noted that the translation of Greek texts lies at the foundation – both temporally and figuratively – of Latin literature.¹ This is certainly the case for the genre of epic poetry, which begins its history with Livius Andronicus’ *Odusia*, a Latin language adaptation of Homer’s *Odyssey*.² The Romans also thought translation to lie at the roots of Roman drama, and, by the time of the Late Republic, a tradition had developed which held that the first Latin dramatic texts (also attributed to the prolific Livius) were translations of some kind from Greek sources.³ But this developmental

¹ Mariotti (1952) in his important work on Livius Andronicus which will be discussed at greater length below, p.12ff, notes that, while most Roman literary genres can be seen to derive from Greek literary forms, artistic translation can be seen as a new and purely Roman literary mode (*un’ arte nuova*, as he puts it at p.16), and one which lies at the origins of Roman literature (p.15: *l’iniziatore della loro letteratura era stato l’inventor della traduzione artistica*). For a more extreme view of the centrality of translation, see e.g. Most (2003) 385 who claims that translation of the Greek plays a “virtually constitutive role” in Latin literature.

² The spelling of this work is controversial (and, indeed, *Odusia* is one of the few possibilities not recorded by our later Roman testimonia). However, both for ease of cross-referencing and for differentiation of the Livian work from the Homeric original, I will use the spelling adopted by Blänsdorf (2011) in the most recent edition of the fragments. For a fuller discussion of the orthographic variants see fn 31 below.

³ See Cic. *Brutus* 72-3 for the dating of this first dramatic performance to 240BC. Although we know nothing directly about the nature of this work, it is generally assumed that this putative first dramatic performance was (or was taken by 1st century BC Romans to be) a Latin language version of Greek play, given the Greek titles of those plays of Livius we know, and later references to the Greek nature of early Roman drama (e.g. Cic. *De Opt. Gen.* 18 *idem* [i.e. the Romans] *Andriam et Synephebos nec minus Andromacham aut Antiopam aut Epigonos Latinos recipiunt. Quod igitur est eorum in orationibus e Graeco conversis fastidium, nullum cum sit in versibus?* “The same people accept a (Latin) *Andria* and
story, which locates the origins of Roman literary genres in translation from the Greek, was not limited to the murky beginnings of archaic poetry. When Cicero, who lays claim to the status of author of the foundational *philosophical* texts of Latin literature, speaks of his own activity as a generic founder, it is the language of translation that he consistently employs. As we shall see, however, even as he draws our attention to his philosophical works’ shared status as “translations”, Cicero characterises these translations as functioning in differing ways and producing a variety of complex relationships to their originals. As each of these formulations plays an important role in directing his readers’ response to these texts, the consideration of how Cicero represents the translated elements in these works, along with the activity of philosophical translation itself, is an essential step in furthering our understanding of these.

*Synepeboi*, no less than an *Andromache*, *Antiope*, or a Latin *Epigonoi*. Why, therefore, is there contempt for those speeches translated from the Greek, when there is none for poetry?* (All translations, unless otherwise noted, are my own.). Scholars often, therefore, characterise the early theatre as an important locus for the transferal of Greek literature to the Roman world through translation (e.g. Dupont (2010) “the theatre is a nodal point in the culture of Roman bilingualism”), in spite of Livy’s claims as to the *Etruscan* nature of early theatrical performance (Livy 7.2). Goldberg (2007) warns, however, that the Roman tradition cannot be an accurate record of historical fact: “Roman literature did not simply begin, as Romans apparently believed, in 240BC when a Greek freedman named Livius Andronicus translated and produced Greek plays for the *ludi Romani*”. Regardless of the actual historical reality, however, it is clear that translation from the Greek could be plausibly represented by 1st century BC authors such as Cicero as lying at the beginning of the Roman dramatic tradition.

4 For the *pioneering* nature of the Ciceronian project of reproducing Greek philosophy in the Latin language see e.g. *Tusc.* 1.1 where he claims that his purpose is *Latinis litteris illustrandum* (“illuminating [philosophy] in the Latin language/Latin literary form”); *Tusc.* 1.6 where he claims to be “opening up the springs of philosophy” (*philosophiae fontes aperiemus*) for a Roman audience; and *Tusc.* 2.7 where he claims that philosophy is being born in Latin at this moment, with Cicero figuring himself in the Socratic position of midwife (*philosophia nascatur Latinis quidem litteris ex his temporibus eamque nos aidiuemus*). Those (Epicureans?) who have written on Greek philosophy in Latin before him are summarily dismissed as incompetent at *Tusc.* 1.6, 2.7, and *Fin.* 1.8, allowing Cicero to position himself firmly at the beginnings of Latin language philosophy.
a) Representations of Translation in Cicero’s Philosophical Works: Translation as Reproduction

In the prefaces to his philosophical works, Cicero repeatedly claims to be converting the body of knowledge represented by Greek philosophical works into a form accessible to Latin language users. At *De Div.* 2.4 he describes his project in writing his philosophical works as “laying open” (*patere*) every part of philosophy (leaving out *nullum philosophiae locum*) by illuminating it in the Latin language, and in a Latin literary form (each of these ideas being implied by the ambiguous *Latinis litteris inlustratus*). Meanwhile, at *De Fin.* 1.1 the purpose of this ethical work is described as follows:

*quae summis ingeniis exquisitaque doctrina philosophi Graeco sermone tractavissent, ea Latinis litteris mandaremus…*

That I may entrust to the Latin language/Latin literary form [*Latinis litteris*] those subjects which philosophers have treated in the Greek language with utmost ingenuity and excellent learning…

Similar claims are made in the prefaces to the *Topica*, the *De Partitione Oratoria* and the *Paradoxa Stoicorum.*

---

5 The *Topica* (§2) claims to fulfil the request of Trebatius that Cicero “transmit” (*trado*) the Aristotelian *Topics* to him in a form comprehensible to the Roman juror, relieving them of their current *obscuritas* by
The concept of translation which Cicero invokes here is perhaps that which is most familiar to the modern reader, and one which presents itself as being ideologically neutral: namely, that of the straightforward reproduction of the content of the original in a new “target” language. These works are figured as adequate bearers of the content (doctrina) of Greek-language philosophical discourse, which, through their status as Latin literary texts, allow Roman readers previously unavailable access to the otherwise obscure world of Greek philosophy. In that they replicate the doctrina of the Greeks and make this accessible to readers within a different language community (in this case, Latin language users), then, these texts lay claim to the status of interlinguistic “translations” of Greek philosophical discourse. The status of these texts as “translations” of Greek refiguring them in a Latin literary form (whether or not this is achieved by a faithful rendering of any single Greek original text is, of course, an open question, for which see Reinhardt (2005) 177-80). The De Partitio Oratoria (§1), opens with M. Cicero Junior asking if he may hear from his father in Latin (Latine) those things about the theory of rhetoric (de ratione dicendi) which he usually expounds in Greek (Graece), again, pointing to the educational value of recasting Greek thought in Latin (for an argument for the Ciceronian authorship of this work, see Arweiler (2003)). In the Paradoxa Stoicorum, meanwhile, Cicero claims that he is throwing into “common form” (communes locos) those things which had previously been kept by the Stoics within the confines of their gymnasia (3). Again, then, Cicero portrays his text as opening access to a previous hidden aspect of Greek learning, though the “translation” described in this instance may primarily be that from a less accessible to a more accessible literary style, rather than from a Greek to Latin linguistic context (the Roman Stoic Cato is given as one example of a proponent of the obscure Stoic syllogistic style of exposition).

6 The terminology of “target” and “source” – the former used to denote the language into which something is translated, and the latter from which it is translated – is take from the field of translation studies (e.g. Arduini and Hodgson (2007)).

7 I here use the terminology of Jakobson (1966) 233 (originally published in 1959), and adopt his position that interlinguistic translation is the replication of information present in one language in another language. In this case, this definition of interlinguistic translation fits in with the common colloquial conception of translation as “a version in a different language” (OED “translation” n. 2a).
philosophical discourse in this sense is reinforced throughout these works by the use of
terms, statements, and arguments which are represented as verbatim quotations from
earlier Greek texts or thinkers, yet are expressed in the Latin language. To take a few
examples from the De Finibus: the Latin term *convenientia* is explicitly flagged as a
Latin translation of the term ὀμολογία, as used by the Greek Stoics;\(^8\) the assertion that
eyesight is the most acute sense, meanwhile, is presented as being a direct quotation of
Plato, but is given in Latin, rather than the original Greek;\(^9\) De Finibus 1, meanwhile, is
peppered with extended passages purporting to present the arguments of the Greek
thinker Epicurus, delivered in the eloquent Latin of L. Torquatus, Cicero’s Roman
spokesman for Epicureanism.\(^10\) The ubiquity of elements such as these, which present
themselves as faithful Latin renderings of an originally Greek discourse, to Cicero’s
philosophical texts has exerted a strong influence on the scholarly reception of these
works. This is, in part, what made them so attractive to treatment in the tradition of
Quellenforschung, and what allows them still to be used as sources for lost, Greek
philosophical texts.\(^11\) More recently, these “translated inlays” have formed a key point of

\(^8\) Fin. 3.21: quod ὀμολογίαν Stoici, nos appellemus convenientiam (“what the Stoics call ὀμολογία, we may
call convenientia (conformity)

\(^9\) Fin. 2.52: oculorum, inquit Plato, est in nobis sensus acerrimus (“the sense of eyesight is the most acute
of our senses”).

\(^10\) E.g. Fin. 1.45 which details Epicurus’ classifications of desire and the ethical outcomes of this division
(quae est enim aut utilior aut ad bene vivendum aptior partitio quam illa qua est usus Epicurus? (“What
division could be more useful or more fitting for a good life than that which Epicurus employed?”)).

\(^11\) Important examples of studies of Cicero’s philosophical texts in the hunt for their Greek sources are
Hirzel (1877-83) and Thiaucourt (1885). For a survey of their use in this tradition and a summary of the
methodological problems with this approach, see Colish (1985) i.65-79 and Mannsfield (1999) 13-6. For
departure for a new group of general studies on the topic of Roman translations of Greek. So, Cicero’s repeated claims that his philosophical works replicate in Latin the philosophical content originally expressed in Greek invite us to study these texts through the lens of “translation”, and have contributed to the impression that they can provide us with a direct, unmediated view into the Greek doctrine they purport to relate. These are not, however, the only terms in which Cicero describes his translation project.

b) Translation as Replacement

In addition to the claim that these Latin language texts replicate the *doctrina* found in Greek philosophical discourse, it is also asserted on more than one occasion that, once his philosophical writing project is completed, Cicero’s Latin language texts will constitute a cultural *replacement* for the entirety of Greek language philosophical texts, making their Greek models obsolete in the Roman world. In the programmatic opening of the second book of the *De Divinatione*, Cicero claims that, if his philosophical project is fulfilled, it will have the result that there is no longer any need in the Roman world for

the use of Cicero as a source for Greek philosophical texts, see e.g. the use of Cicero for the reconstruction of Aristotle, which will be discussed in chapter 3, section 5.

12 The frequency of “translated inlays” in the philosophical works has been noted by Seele (1995), who calls them Übersetzungseinlagen (p.8 and passim), and the importance of the conversion from Greek to Latin in Cicero’s philosophical works is also noted by McElduff (2013) 106-7.
Greek writings on philosophy. 13 In Tusc. 2.6, a similar claim is made that the Ciceronian project of Latin language philosophical writing will make redundant all the libraries of the Greeks. 14 Meanwhile, at the opening of the second version of the Academica, the character of “Cicero” presents the upcoming philosophical discussion as being functionally equivalent to the philosophical work of Brutus, which has related philosophical subject matter in Latin (again, Latinis litteris) with such success that there is no more appetite among Romans for this subject in Greek. 15 Far from presenting translation as an ideologically netural activity, then, these claims that Cicero’s Latin language philosophical works will be able to form a replacement in Roman literary culture for their Greek source texts produce, in these instances, a strikingly antagonistic literary stance. These Ciceronian works, by virtue of being written in the Latin language/literary style, are presented as being more fitting for their new Roman literary context than their Greek originals. But they also take advantage of a Roman intellectual context in which the positions of different philosophical schools can be viewed simultaneously and assessed relatively, rather than divided into discrete expositions by

13 De Div. 2.5: magnificum illud etiam Romanisque hominibus gloriósus, ut Graecis de philosophia litteris non egeant; quod adsequar propecto, si instituta perfecero. (“This would also be a great and glorious thing for the Roman people: that they have no need for Greek writings about philosophy – something which I will assuredly obtain if I complete what I have planned.”)
14 Tusc. 2.6 quod si haec studia traducta erunt ad nostros, ne bibliothecis quidem Graecis egebumus (“But if these subjects of study will be transferred to our people, we will have no need at all for the libraries of the Greeks.”)
15 Acad. 1.12 Brutus quidem noster excellens omni genere laudis sic philosophiam Latinis litteris persequitur nihil ut idem de rebus Graecas desideres… (“Our friend Brutus, indeed, outstanding in every kind of praise, pursued philosophy in Latin literary form in such a manner that you might want nothing of these same matters from Greece.”)
partisan authors, and so are depicted as surpassing their originals in their own terms. In one particularly memorable turn of phrase, Cicero describes the reduction of the vast quantities of Greek literature on ethical ends to his five slim books of the *De Finibus* as this previously messy topic becoming *perpurgatus* (thoroughly cleaned up). Ciceronian philosophical translation is, at these points, depicted as surpassing the original text, resulting in the obsolescence of its Greek sources.

Yet, even as these Latin versions are depicted as exceeding their Greek originals, they are still figured as instances of “translation”. The point at which his Latin language philosophical project is completed and Greek learning made redundant is described by Cicero as the time when *haec studia traducta erunt ad nostros* (“these subjects of study will be transferred/translated to our people”), a phrase which employs the technical terminology of interlinguistic translation. At these points, Cicero’s philosophical texts present themselves as constituting a particular (and particularly Roman) kind of

---

16 E.g. *Tusc*. 2.6: …ne bibliothecis quidem Graecis egebimus, in quibus multitudo infinita librorum propter eorum est multitudinem, qui scripserunt… sed eos, si possumus, excitemus, qui liberaliter eruditi adhibita etiam disserendi elegantia ratione et via philosophantur. (“…we will have no need at all for the libraries of the Greeks, in which there is an infinite multitude of books, on account of the multitude of writers… but, if we can, let us rouse up those men who, since they are liberally educated, practice philosophical argumentation by employing even an elegant manner of discussion and [sound] method.”) The same idea that Cicero, in reducing the vast number of Greek writings to a small number of comprehensive writings in Latin is improving on the originals is found throughout his summary of his philosophical works at the beginning of *De Div.* 2.

17 For example, his reduction of the subject of ethical ends to the five books of the *De Finibus*.

18 *Tusc*. 2.5 (see above fl nt 14). Emphasis my own. See McElduff p. 194 for the use of *traduco* to describe interlinguistic translation here in Cicero, and in Gellius (e.g. 1.18.1). c.f. also Att 12.52.3 where Cic self-deprecatingly refers to his works as mere “*apographe*” (transcriptions or copies), as discussed in more detail in the introduction.
translation - one which claims to both substitute for and make obsolete the original text. The origins and cultural status of this form of translation will be discussed in more detail below, and can be viewed as one particular aspect of the typically Roman intertextual stance of *aemulatio*.¹⁹

c) Translation or Selective Rewriting?

Cicero’s philosophical texts, then, as we have seen, self-consciously portray themselves as translations *Latinis litteris* (into the Latin language/literary form) of originally Greek discourse. Rather paradoxically, however, along with these repeated claims that his philosophical works constitute a complete, Latin language substitute for their Greek originals, we also find, and in equally programmatic contexts, claims that the author has not in producing them acted as an *interpres*, or “translator”.²⁰ In the preface to the first book of his *De Finibus* the author states, *in propria persona*, that it has not

---

¹⁹ For this translational *aemulatio* see Seele (1995) 10-11. Seele here also notes that *Tusc.* 1.1 can be seen as important evidence as to the cultural status of this form of *aemulatio*, as an argument given for the recasting of Greek thought in the Latin tongue is that this form of translation *improves* upon the original by adding Roman wisdom to Greek thought: *sed meum semper iudicium fuit omnia nostros aut invenisse per se sapientius quam Graecos aut accepta ab illis fecisse meliora.* (“But it has always been my judgement that our countrymen either discovered everything themselves more wisely than the Greeks, or that they improved whatever they received from them.”) She also notes how foreign this perspective is to later Anglophone concepts of translation as expressed by Samuel Johnson, who famously states that “a translator is to be like his author: it is not his business to excel him” (cited in Savory (1957) *The Art of Translation*).

²⁰ As well as the *De Finibus* passage which will be discussed now, this same point is made at *Off.* 1.6 and *Fin.* 3.15 which will be discussed below at p.17. Outside of the philosophical works, Cicero also claims that he does not act as an *interpres* in his treatment of Aeschines and Demosthenes at *De Opt. Gen.* 14 (*converti enim ex Atticis duorum eloquentissimorum nobilissimas orationes inter seque contrarias, Aeschinis et Demosthenis; nec converti ut interpres, sed ut orator, sententiiis isdem et earum formis tamquam figuris, verbis ad nostram consuetudinem aptis.*)
hitherto been his practice to “translate” (*vertere*) his Greek predecessors in the production of his philosophical works, although he may do this at some point in the future.\(^1\) Instead, rather than performing the role of a translator (*munus interpretum*), his practice has been to use his own *iudicium* (“judgment”) and impose his own *ordo scribendi* (“arrangement of writing”) onto his Greek sources, while remaining faithful to the philosophical content of his originals:

\[\text{si nos non interpretum fungimur munere, sed tuemur ea, quae dicta sunt ab iis, quos probamus, eisque nostrum iudicium et nostrum scribendi ordinem adlungimus, quid habent, cur Graeca anteponant iis, quae et splendide dicta sint neque sint conversa de Graecis?}\]

“And if for our part we do not fill the office of a translator, but, while preserving what has been said by our chosen authorities, add thereto our own criticism and our own arrangement: what ground have these objectors for ranking the writings of Greece above compositions that are at once brilliant in style and not translations from the Greek originals?”

(Cic. *De Fin.* 1.6)

The claim made here that the author is imposing a new, and more judicious, organisational scheme upon his original texts is, of course, related to his claim that he is

\[^1\text{Cic. *Fin.* 1.7 quamquam, si plane sic verterem Platonem aut Aristotelem, ut verterunt nostrí poëtae fabulas, male, credo, mererer de meis civibus, si ad eorum cognitionem divína illa ingenia transferrem. sed id neque feci adhuc nec mihi tamen, ne faciam, interdictum puto. “Yet even supposing I gave a direct translation of Plato or Aristotle, exactly as our poets have done with the plays, would it not, pray, be a patriotic service to introduce those transcendent intellects to the acquaintance of my fellow-countrypeople? As a matter of fact, however, this has not been my procedure hitherto, though I do not feel I am debarred from adopting it.” (This and subsequent translations from the *De Finibus* are adapted from the translation by Rackham. The addition of bold is my own.)}\]
improving his Greek source texts through the translational process of *aemulatio*. From the discussion above, however, we might be surprised that this process of reproduction of, and improvement upon, an original text seems here to be conceptualized as a non-translational activity. This seems to lie in stark contrast to, for example, the *Tusculan Disputations* passage (*Tusc.* 2.5) treated above, in which such an activity is explicitly described as a form of translation. Moreover, the competing claims within this section of *De Finibus* preface itself might appear to be in open tension with each other: Cicero’s philosophical project is presented as adequately “preserving what has been said” (*quae dicta sunt*) in his Greek sources, while nevertheless constituting something other than “translations” of the originals (*neque sint conversa*).\(^{22}\) How exactly we might understand Cicero’s claims to be preserving the content of his Greek source texts *without* acting as an *interpres* will be taken up below at p.44, following a fuller examination of what, exactly, constitutes the “translation” of an original text, in terms of both modern translation theory, and the literary traditions of Republican Rome.

For now, however, it is enough to note that these texts, even while denying their status as translations, self-consciously portray themselves as Latin language replacements for Greek source texts. In making the paradoxical claim that, in spite of this function, they do not fall under the expected category of “translations”, they serve to further draw

\(^{22}\) *Fin.* 1.6
the attention of the reader to the consideration of how, exactly, these Greek *dicta* have been reproduced in Latin and the precise method of rewriting that has been performed. In laying claim to the cultural and communicative functions associated with translation, but suggesting that the author, in doing this, has employed some method other than that of a typical translator, they ask the reader to consider carefully the exact method of interlinguistic transference employed, and how it measure up to typical translational practice.

The reader is asked, then, from the very beginning of each of these philosophical texts, to view them as Latin language replacements for existing Greek source texts – in other words, as some form of translation. When the corpus is viewed as a whole, however, as Cicero often invites us to do, the very concept of translation itself is problematized, and we are asked to consider the unique manner in which the author has converted his Greek content into Latin - in other words, to consider the extent and limits of his translational activity.  

23 This challenge to consider whether or not, and the means by which, Cicero’s Latin texts form an adequate counterpart to their Greek originals is, as we shall see throughout this study, reinforced repeatedly throughout the philosophical

---

23 We are invited to view the philosophical works as a single corpus in the preface of *De Div* 2, where Cicero looks back on his works and shows the contribution that each has made to his overall project of translating Greek philosophy into Latin, ending with the words: *De Div. 2.4 nisi quae causa gravior obstitisset, nullum philosophiae locum esse pateremur, qui non Latinis litteris illustratus pateret.* (“If a weightier cause had not got in the way, I would have allowed no part of philosophy to lie hidden, unilluminated by the Latin language/literary style.”)
texts, as Latin technical terminology, translated aphorisms, and literary excerpts are presented explicitly as versions of Greek originals. To fully understand these texts on their own terms, then, we must consider the form and function of Cicero’s paradoxically unfaithful “translations” of Greek thought into the Latin tongue, and the literary and philosophical effects that these translational choices might have produced for their original readership.

Moreover, as Cicero’s comments on the nature of his translations has shown us, we cannot use a single explanatory model to account for all instances of Ciceronian translation. He presents his translations as having different styles, purposes, and relationships to their original texts. We need, then, to employ a methodology that will allow us to fully assess Cicero’s individual translations, and the various intertextual relationships they construct in regard to their original texts. To do this, we must consider both how contemporary approaches to understanding translation might inform our analysis, and what we know of Roman attitudes to the translation of Greek texts. We will also need a methodology which is finely-tuned enough to account for the many different levels of variation we find within Ciceronian translation – from the particular words chosen, to the character of the translation produced by this word choice, and the role this has in the wider text as a whole.
II: Perspectives on Translation Theory and Practice

There are two important contexts within which to situate our study of Cicero’s translation technique in his philosophical works, both of which contribute valuable, and complementary, perspectives. The first is modern translation theory. This can provide us with a vocabulary with which to talk meaningfully about translation in its different forms, suggests a typology by which we might categorise the various kinds of translation we observe in ancient texts, and emphasises the importance of considering the effect of employing particular types of translation in particular literary contexts. The second is our current understanding of the tradition of Roman translation theory and practice from which Cicero’s philosophical texts emerge. This, in turn, can provide us with an insight into the types of literary activity that might have been considered as “translations” to a Roman Republican reader, and the forms which such a reader’s response to these various types of translation might have taken. These two perspectives, taken together, help us to see the importance of considering both the particular form a translational act takes (i.e. which elements of the information contained in the original are retained, and which are lost, in any given translational act), and the effect produced by this translational choice within its wider context (i.e. what intertextual relationship(s) it establishes with the source, what intratextual meanings it generates through its position within the text itself, and what status it has within a wider cultural context). As we shall see, in order to understand how an instance of translation functions within a literary text as a whole, we
must consider both the form a translation takes (for instance, whether a Greek term such as ἀναλογία is translated synonymously by an equivalent Latin term, such as comparatio or proportio, or transliterated as analogia), and the wider effect produced by the use of this form (for example, whether the choice to employ the synonymous comparatio, rather than the transliterated analogia, works within the text as a whole to make this Greek philosophical concept appear more familiar).  

a) The Contribution of Contemporary Translation Theory

Perhaps the most important contribution that modern translation theory can make to our study of Cicero’s translations from the Greek in his philosophical works is an awareness that interlinguistic translation must always involve some form of selection, as it is impossible for every aspect of the information present within a sign in a source language to be carried over into the target language. This awareness is a result of modern linguists’ conception of what constitutes a complete account of a linguistic sign – 

---

24 As we will go into in greater detail, in our overview of earlier scholarly approaches to Cicero’s translation of technical terminology at the beginning of ch. 2, these two perspectives are rarely treated together by scholars.

25 The alternative to this position is the Deconstructionist view discussed more fully in Appendix A, which claims that true “translation” is only possible in situations in which every aspect of the information of a sign is carried over. Such a position, however, makes interlinguistic translation impossible, and so is unhelpful in any attempt to discuss the familiar phenomenon which we commonly refer to as “translation” (i.e. the replication of some aspects of the information contained in a linguistic sign within a different linguistic system).
a conception which can be traced back to the linguistic Structuralism of Saussure.

Linguistic Structuralism holds that a consideration of both the signified (the concept or object referred to by a word – whether this is an external object or an internal mental construct) and the signifier (the written or spoken word itself or the mental impression of this word) is essential to any complete account of the functioning of a linguistic sign. Consequently, they argue that any change in the signifier (the word picking out an object or idea) represents a change in the sign as a whole. So, then, in translating a Greek term, such as ὁμολογία with a Latin term such as convenientia, the functioning of this new Latin sign will, necessarily, differ from the functioning of the original Greek sign, simply by virtue of the fact that the word denoting this concept (the signifier) takes a different form in the Latin translation than it does in the Greek original. In this kind of interlinguistic translation, then, even if the same concept is referred to by both the Latin and the Greek signifiers, some aspect of the information carried by a sign will always be lost in the translation into Latin – in this instance the appearance, sound, and “Greekness” of the original signifier.

26 Saussure himself considers the key relational link to be between the psychological impression of a spoken or written word (which for him is the “signifier”), and the mental idea or “concept” that it signifies (the “signified”): “a linguistic sign is not a link between a thing and a name, but between a concept [signified] and a sound pattern [signifier]. The sound pattern is not actually a sound; for a sound is something physical. A sound pattern is the hearer’s psychological impression of a sound, as given to him by the evidence of his senses.” Saussure (1983) 66.

27 It would, of course, be possible to transliterate the Greek ὁμολογία in Latin, but in this case, although the sound, appearance, and “Greekness” of the original would be maintained, a new sense of foreignness would be introduced to the signifier which is not present in the original, Greek language discourse, and so the form of the signifier will still, in its new context, differ from the Greek original.
A further Structuralist argument against the possibility of fully replicating the functioning of a linguistic sign in a different language is the claim that it is highly unlikely that signs in different languages will ever pick out truly identical concepts - even in cases in which we conventionally accept a sign in a target language to be an adequate translation of a sign in a source language. The reason for this is that a sign’s full “value” (its semantic limits and reach) is derived from its relationship to other signs within the language, and no two natural languages will display the same relationships between each of its signs. To take a famous example: although the French *mouton* can pick out the same objects as the word “sheep”, and so can be seen to be an adequate translation of the English, the French term can also refer to cooked meat, which the English “sheep” cannot (in English, this linguistic role is performed instead by the terms “lamb” and “mutton”). The semantic range, or “value”, of a given term in a source language, then, often cannot be fully replicated in a target language, because the linguistic economy of the target language as a whole is different – there simply is not an English term which exhibits the linguistic value of the French *mouton* and can refer simultaneously to a live sheep and to a rack of lamb. And while the example of *mouton* shows an obvious mismatch between

---

28 Indeed, the argument goes, while it might be a theoretical possibility that signs in different language could pick out identical concepts in the case where each of these languages are systematically identical, this is never actually the case for any pair of natural languages, as they will always exhibit structural diversity.

29 The “value” of a sign (French: *valeur*) is discussed in Chapter 4 of Saussure’s *Cours de linguistique générale*.

30 This example is given by Saussure (1983) 112 and is further explained in Appendix A.
the values of signs in the source and target languages, more subtle differences in value can be found in the translation of any term from one natural language to another. Any word in a source language, for example Greek, will always bear some connections to other words in that language which are not evidenced in their Latin equivalents, and vice versa. The term ὁμολογία, for example, has connections with the Greek term λόγος which simply cannot be reproduced in the Latin term convenientia; conversely, the Latin term has connections with the verb venio not found in the Greek. A consideration of modern translation theory, then, questions the possibility of any completely “faithful” translation, and suggests that in any act of interlinguistic translation some aspect of the function of the original linguistic sign must be lost, and new elements of value will be produced.\(^\text{31}\)

So, then, modern translation theory can provide us with a theoretical framework that allows us to see the alteration of the functioning of the original sign as an essential part of the translation process, rather than the failure of a particular translator to “faithfully” replicate the original in the target language. This view of translation will allow us to ask new questions of Cicero’s translations, focusing not on the question of how faithful or unfaithful they are, but on the particular elements of the original that are retained or lost in any give translation.\(^\text{32}\) It also helps us to understand Cicero’s varying representations of his translations, as discussed in the previous section. When we

\(^{31}\) See Albir (1990) for the importance of fidelity as a standard of translation in the Western tradition.

\(^{32}\) Poncelet (1952), whose views will be discussed in greater length in chapter 2 and 4, is an example of an influential scholar who has applied the criterion of fidelity to Cicero’s translations of Greek and found them wanting.
consider translation not as aimed at the reproduction of every element of the original text (which is impossible), but as requiring the selection of particular elements for transference into a new language, we can see more clearly how a translator such as Cicero might conceive of various types of translation, doing different things.

In addition to this, contemporary translation studies can also help us to identify and describe the different kinds of change which can occur during the process of interlinguistic translation. Given the understanding that some elements of the value of a sign will always be lost in the process of translation into another language, we can turn our attention to a consideration of what, exactly, is preserved or lost in any given translational act, and the possible motivations for this choice. The key innovator in thinking about the study of translation in this way has been Jakobson, who argues that it is important to consider each of the many elements of a sign which have a communicative and transmissive value in our consideration of how any given sign might be taken to translate another.\textsuperscript{33} When we turn our attention to these various different types of information that can be carried by a sign – for example its expressive, phonetic, semantic, syntactic, metrical, visual, or cultural value – we can see that it is possible for a translator to privilege any given aspect of this information at the potential expense of any

\textsuperscript{33} In Jakobson (1985) in particular, he argues for the importance of a consideration of the “expressive” aspects of a sign in our analysis of poetry – the information a text communicates in terms of the emotional state it evokes which can neither be reduced to the written or spoken form of a word or sentence, not to the objects or states of affairs which constitute their reference.
other.\textsuperscript{34} This, in turn, provides us with a useful way of categorising different forms of translation, as the privileging of a given aspect of the information carried by an original sign (often at the expense of other aspects), can be considered to be a particular “translation procedure” - in other words, a particular kind of \textit{process} by which the discourse of one language is reproduced in another language.\textsuperscript{35} If the retention of the phonetic information of the original language is privileged, for example, we can consider this to be a \textbf{“phonological translation”}, and might note that such a translation procedure often results in the loss of semantic and expressive elements of the original (e.g. the Greek prefix \textit{ὁμο}- can be phonologically translated by the Latin \textit{homo}, such as in the Lucretian \textit{homoeomeria}, but, in retaining the phonetic value of the original, the semantic value is often sacrificed).\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{34} While phonetic, semantic, syntactic, metrical, and visual value should be self-explanatory, expressive and cultural value require a little more discussion. Jakobson makes clear the distinction between expressive value and semantic value with the following illustration: “a man, using expressive features to indicate his angry or ironic attitude, conveys ostensible information, and evidently this verbal behavior cannot be likened to such nonsemiotic, nutritive activities as “eating grapefruit” (Jakobson (1985) 150). Cultural value, on the other hand, is a concept which emerges from the extension of Polysystems Theory to the study of translation. Polysystems theory argues that language (both in its literary and non-literary forms) is one of many elements that constitute and influence “culture” as a whole. So, then, each linguistic sign (or the concatenation of signs we know as a “text”) has its own particular social and cultural position and derives its meaning (in part at least) from this position. For Polysystems theory in general see Even-Zohan (1970), and for further discussion of the application of this theory to translation see Schmidt (1979) 563 ff, Lefevere (1992), Toury (1995), Bassnett (2014).

\textsuperscript{35} The term “translation procedure” is Newmark’s (1988) \textit{passim}, though see p.103 for a complete list of the translation procedures he identifies.

\textsuperscript{36} For the term “phonological translation”, see e.g. Oller et al. (1988). An example of phonological translation, in the form of transliteration, can be seen in Lucretius’ translation of the Greek \textit{ὁμοιομέρεια} as \textit{homoeomeria} at DRN 1.830.
Among the various translation procedures identified by Newman and others which will be analytically useful in our study of Cicero’s translations from Greek to Latin in his philosophical works are the following:

a) “synonymy”: the selection of a word or phrase which has a semantic content as close as possible to that of the original, so producing what is often termed a “literal” translation, in spite of the fact that, as has been noted, other elements of the original are always necessarily lost (Cicero’s translation of ὁμολογία as convenientia at De Fin. 3.21, which we have discussed above, is an example of this);37

b) “transference”: in which a word or phrase from the source language is taken into the target language as a loan word, retaining the original semantic and phonetic value, but appearing noticeably foreign in its new linguistic context. In general, this is most commonly found in the case of proper names, for example the use of the name Aimée, which retains the vowel quality, accentuation, and semantic content of the original French, even if the language of discourse is English. This does not tend to occur in classical Latin translations of Greek proper names, as Latin usually adapts Greek names to fit its own morphology and pronunciation (meaning that at least a small level of “naturalisation” – for which see below - occurs in the translation of Greek names). We

37 The idea of semantic content here can be further broken down into two further elements known as “sense” and “reference” (in German, Sinn and Bedeutung, as described originally by Schleiermacher in his Aphorisms). The use of “synonymy” by modern translation theorists, covers a sharing of one, or both of these elements in the particular context. For further discussion, see Chandler (1997) 60ff.
can, however, see this process being employed in some of Cicero’s personal correspondence, where Greek technical terminology is integrated without any form of adaptation into Latin discourse.\(^{38}\)

c) **“naturalisation”**, in which a term or phrase is transferred from the source to the target language (and so the original phonetic and semantic value maintained) but is then adapted to the morphology and syntax of the target language (an example of this is the Latin *philosophia* which is a naturalised translation of the Greek *φιλοσοφία*);\(^{39}\)

d) grammatical **“transposition”**, which refigures the syntax of the source text from an arrangement which is natural to the source language, to one which is natural to the target language. So, while the syntax of the translation may differ radically from that of the original, it will still, nevertheless, retain the feature of employing a grammatical construction which is natural to its linguistic context (e.g. the replacement of the correlating particles *µέν…, δέ…* with the single connective *autem* in Cic. *Tim*. 10);

\(^{38}\) e.g. Cic. *Att.* 6.2.3: *sed primo me ἀναλογία deceperat…* (“But at first the *analogia* deceived me…”)

\(^{39}\) Interestingly, the inverse of this translation procedure is also visible in our Latin texts, which show words with a Latin root taking on the morphology of their Greek counterparts (e.g. *hamiota* (Plaut. *Rud.* 310, for a fuller discussion of which see Adams (2003) 419).
e) “cultural equivalence” which retains the cultural value a term or text possesses in the source culture within the target culture, even though this may mean that a different referent is picked out (e.g. Cicero’s translation of as Ἑρμῆς as Mercurius in the *Timaeus*, which substitutes for the Greek deity a culturally equivalent Roman deity);\(^{40}\)

f) the production of semantic “calques”, which reproduce the semantic value of each aspect of a set phrase in the source language to produce a lexeme in the target language. An example of this which we will study in greater detail in chapter 2 is Cicero’s use of the Latin *comprehensio* to reproduce each element of the Greek κατάληψις. For a complete list of examples, see Nicolas (1996).\(^ {41}\)

Translation studies, then, provides us both with a framework by means of which we can analyse translations according to the particular kinds of information which are retained or lost, and also with the vocabulary with which to describe these various translation procedures. These concepts and terms can be usefully applied to the description of Cicero’s own interlinguistic translations, as we shall see in this study.

\(^{40}\) In Latin translations of Greek and vice versa, this is often seen in the treatment of political offices. See e.g. Adams (2003).

\(^{41}\) These categories, and others which are less relevant to our study of Ciceronian translation, but to which we may occasionally refer in passing, are more fully discussed in Newmark (1988). The use of calques from the Greek in Latin literature, meanwhile, has been treated in-depth by Nicolas (1996), and will be further discussed in chapter 2, when we consider the translation of technical terms.
Finally, translation theory helps us to consider how the functioning of a translated text in its new linguistic and literary culture may differ from the ways in which its source text functions in its own culture. This, in turn, can allow us to view translated texts as worthy subjects of literary analysis in their own right, which may have unique meanings and literary effects which their source texts do not. The translation theorist Lefevere has been particularly influential in popularising this position, and his conception of literary translation as a creative “rewriting” of the original text is invaluable for anyone approaching the Roman translation of Greek texts.42 By considering the different translation procedures discussed above as contributing to the rewriting of the source text in a different social and cultural context, we can consider how these forms of adaptation of the source text might generate their own unique meanings within their new context, and so begin to consider the effects of any given translation choice. Rather than seeing the necessary loss of some elements of information in interlinguistic translation as a problem for the production of “faithful” translations, then, we can see it as presenting an opportunity for translators to produce translated texts which replicate select elements of the original texts, and so may fulfil a particular function in their new literary context. As we shall see in the next section, the idea that literary translation is best conceived of as a form of creative rewriting which can function within its new literary context in a way

42 Lefevere (1992) vi: “Translation is, of course, a rewriting of an original text.” Some of his other theoretical commitments, such as the claim that the cultural location determines the form of a translation are, as we have discussed in our introduction, problematic.
which differs from its original, has arisen independently in studies of Roman literary translation and so is of fundamental importance to the study of translation in a Roman author such as Cicero.

b) The Perspective of Classical Studies: Roman *Traduzione Artistica*

So, then, translation theory’s claim that the complete reproduction of each aspect of the information present in a sign in the process of interlinguistic translation is impossible has led to a refocusing of discussions of translation upon those elements that a translator may select either for retention or for loss, and the consequences this has for the functioning of this new text within its own literary culture. As such, we are encouraged to view translations as “liberal” translations of an original, or creative “adaptations” of their models, which can generate their own, independent literary effects. As we shall see, although modern translation theory has rarely been invoked in these studies, an awareness of the affinity of translation with adaptation, and of the absence of instances of absolutely faithful rewriting, has also characterised recent trends in scholarly approaches...

---

43 See McElduff (2013) for a current view on Roman ideas of translation.
to our extant Roman translations of Greek texts.44 The difference is that the focus here has been on the consideration of the precise literary effects that Roman authors generated by means of translation. Turning to recent scholarship on Roman translation, then, will provide us with an insight into the different effects that can be produced by the adoption of the particular translation procedures discussed in the previous section.

There are two kinds of literary effect that will be of particular interest to us: in the first place, the immediate effect – in other words, the effect of the choice of particular translation procedures upon the character of a translation within its immediate context; in the second place, the intertextual effect – i.e. the way in which a translation establishes a particular relationship with its source text. The former, immediate effects are most often referred to in the scholarship non-specifically as “types of translation”. In the interests of distinguishing them from the forms of translation we have called “translation procedures”, however, they are perhaps best referred to as “translation outcomes”, as this term serves to differentiate the characteristics of a translation produced by a particular translation procedure from the translation procedure itself (in other words, the outcome achieved by the privileging of particular elements of the information of an original text, rather than the process of privileging these elements itself). For example, as we shall see,  

44 An exception to this is the work of Seele (1995), who combines a study of Roman texts with a consideration of modern linguistic theory to show that “sklavische Übersetzung” was unusual in Roman literary culture (p.17).
the employment of the translation procedure of cultural equivalence, which substitutes a concept in the original text for a native equivalent in the target language culture, tends, in the case of Greek to Roman translation, to result in the translation outcome of the “Latinisation” of the original. The use of transference, on the other hand, often serves to foreignise the translated text, as the preservation of the phonetic value or orthography of the original highlights the foreign nature of the source text. An awareness of the different possible translation outcomes in the case of Greek to Latin translation will, then, form a necessary complement to the taxonomy of the kinds of translation procedures which we have derived from our consideration of modern translation theory, and provide us with the vocabulary to describe the character of the translation produced, as a supplement to those terms which allow us to talk about the means by which it is produced. In the second place, this scholarly tradition has also, and most importantly for our purposes, considered the kinds of intertextual relationships that these forms of adaptive translation might establish with regard to their source texts within the bilingual literary culture of Republican Rome. These observations on the flexible and allusive nature of Roman translation have not, however, for the most part, extended to studies concerning Cicero’s philosophical works. This is an omission which we will challenge in the final sections of this chapter, as we return to our consideration of Cicero’s own, paradoxical statements about his translational practices in his philosophical works, and consider the various ways in which he positions himself within this highly adaptive tradition of literary translation.
Since the time of Mariotti’s classic work on Livius Andronicus, the flexible and creative nature of the tradition of Roman poetic translation, which he dubs traduzione artistica, has been well known to literary historians. Mariotti illustrates clearly the sophisticated and erudite nature of the adaptive translation technique of Rome’s first poet, pointing to moments of scholarly exegesis and poetically significant reworkings of the original Greek texts, which alter the content and form of the Homeric original in ways which he considers to be akin to Hellenistic poets’ treatment of earlier archaic Greek poetry within a monolingual context. Mariotti carefully enumerates and explains the ways in which Livius alters and adapts his original text. This can, for our purposes, be

---

45 Mariotti (1952) 15: l'iniziatore della loro letteratura era stato l'inventor della traduzione artistica, il primo ad usare della traduzione non più, come i greci, a scopi pratici o documentari, ma per un disinteressato fine d'arte. Mariotti is himself heavily indebted, rather confusingly, to the earlier and themselves contemporaneous insights of both Eduard Fraenkel and Hermann Fränkel and his ideas are repeated in the subsequent work of Traina (1970) who takes as his subject this same form of adaptive traduzione artistica, but extends his study beyond Livius up until the time of Cicero. Bettini (2012) builds on Mariotti’s concept of liberal translation, but adds an anthropological perspective, considering the archetypal Roman translation technique (whether literary or non-literary) represented by the term vertere to be derived from oral translation methods, and so to constitute a “retelling” of the original narrative which may involve a radical break in linguistic formulation and focus from the original, e.g. il fatto è che in una cultura che nasce orale, l’atto di tradurre mantiene l’originaria configurazione di un racconto – una rielaborazione prodotto dalla voce, non dai caratteri alfabetici – di ciò che è stato pronunziato in una lingua straniera, p. 33 (for a clear overview of Bettini’s treatment of the subject, see the Peirano (2013) BMCR review). McElduff (2013), meanwhile, employs these ideas of adaptive translation, in particular in her discussion of Roman Comedy (pp.61-96).

46 In fact, he goes as far as to say that it is derived from the Hellenistic literary tradition (ma si poneva d'altra parte, per la stessa "scoperta" viviana della traduzione artistica (anch' essa meglio comprensibile se guardata alla luce dell' esperienza letteraria greca), un insieme di nuovi problemi tecnico-artistici, per cui è giustificato parlare di un original "alessandrinismo" romano. p.10). Skutsch (1954), however, in his review of this work is rightly skeptical as to whether dependence, rather than similarity, can really be proven from our limited evidence. Traina (1970) is less dogmatic in terms of the causal relationship between Hellenistic Greek and early Latin literature, but again points to the marked similarity between the technique of Hellenistic aemulatio and what seems to him to be occurring in the poetry of Livius: “Applicate l’“aemulatio” al bilinguismo e avrete la traduzione artistica. Livio Andronico “interpreta” Omero in latino come lo avevano interpretato Arato e Callimaco.” p.8.
conceived of as a taxonomy of the various “translation outcomes” resulting from Livius’ lexical, syntactical, and metrical choices, and so of the possibilities which might have been available to Cicero in the production of his own translations. Among the examples of adaptive translation that Mariotti marshals from Livius’ *Odusia* are fragments 14 and 6 which, following Fränkel, he takes as instances of the translation outcome of scholarly exegesis, in that they clarify obscurities in the Homeric original and draw on the interpretations of Hellenistic scholars preserved for us in the Homeric scholia. Fr 31, meanwhile, is taken by Mariotti to constitute a Latin language version of Hellenistic literary variation (*variazione letteraria*), in that it takes as its starting point the theme of an earlier work (or, in this case, section of a work) and rewrites this theme with little direct linguistic reliance on the original text. Although he does not systematically define

---

47 The terminology is my own.

48 Mariotti (1952) 28-9 treats Livius’ *Od.* fr 14 which translates the rather baffling description of two men dancing at *Od.* 8.379 as ταρφεῖ ἀλιτεῖβομένοι (meaning something like “often exchanging with each other”) with the words nexebant multa inter se (“weaving among themselves many (knots)”). As he notes, following Fränkel (1932) 306, this translation seems to be derived from the Hellenistic explanation of this Homeric verse which is preserved in the V-scholia as πυκνῶς πλέκοντες εἰς ἀλλήλους ἐναλλασσόμενοι, “exchanging by weaving often into each other” (Dindorf (1962) ad 8.379). Fr 6 also seems to depend on the interpretation of the M-scholia, as Mariotti notes at p.28 fn 2, again, relying on the work of Fränkel (1932) 307. The Homeric original ὁπότε κεν δὴ / μοῖρ' ὀλοὴ καθέλῃσι τανηλεγέος θανάτοι (Od. 3.237-8) which describes death at some unspecified moment in the future is re-envisioned by Livius as a specific day on which death is fated (*quando dies adveniet quem profata Morta est*), which does, indeed, bear some resemblance to the thought behind the scholion on this passage which claims that death will come whenever there is provision for it (οὐδ’ οἱ θεοὶ ἀν ἀκοποβήσεσαν ἄφ’ οἰ βούλοντο, ἀλλὰ τότε ὅπόταν ἣ πεπρομένον τὸ τελευτήσαι αὐτόν (Dindorf (1962) ad 3.321)) and certainly indicates a refiguring of the providential structures present in the Homeric original. The numbering of the fragments of the *Odusia* here and throughout this work is from the edition at the close of Mariotti (1952).

49 Mariotti (1952) 48 reads fr. 31, which translates the Homeric λόστο γοῦνατα καὶ φίλον ἦτορ (Od. 5.297) as cor frixit prae pavore, to be a poetically-motivated variation of imagery which contributes a dipingere più vivamente una difficile situazione di Ulisse. The key example he gives of l’inclinazione alessandrina per la variazione letteraria is the various epigrams on a single theme in the *Anthology* (p.44).
or catalogue these phenomena, in addition to *variazione letteraria* and the clarification of difficult passages through scholarly exegesis, Mariotti also notes in passing a number of other phenomena, already present in Livius, which will be of interest to us in our study of Cicero’s 1st century BC philosophical translations. These include instances in which the Livian translation *Latinises* the original, by substituting Roman deities for Greek;\(^50\) instances in which it *expands* on the original, by adding further explanatory or identifying information;\(^51\) and instances in which it *compresses* the original, by removing information or syntactical complexity.\(^52\) For our own purposes in studying Cicero’s translations, we may want to add to this list the outcome of a *foreignising* translation, which explicitly avoids the substitution of a Roman cultural equivalent for a Greek idea. Although Mariotti does not explicitly mention this, an instance may be found in the very title of Livius’ translation, *Odusia*, which is formed through a transliteration of the traditional Greek name *Ὀδυσσεύς*, rather than the Latin *Ulixes*.

---

\(^{50}\) Mariotti (1952) 30, following the original observation of Fraenkel (1931) 306 notes that fr 15 gives a clear example of an act of Latinisation, in which *Monetas filia* (“daughter” of the Roman goddess “Moneta” – a cult name for Juno) is substituted, according to the translation procedure of “cultural equivalence”, for the Greek *Μοῦσα* (by way, it is argued, of the portrayal of Μνημοσύνη as mother of the muses in the Homeric Hymn to Hermes) The identification of Μνημοσύνη as mother of the Muses is in *HH4* 429-30 (Evelyn-White): Μνημοσύνην μὲν πρώτα θεῶν ἐγέραμεν ἀυτὴ/ἐμπέρ Μουσάον (“First of the gods he honoured in his song Mnemosyne, mother of the Muses.”). See also Livingston (2004) 23 on this translation.

\(^{51}\) Mariotti (1952) 45-6, shows that fr 8 amplifies the simple πόρυν *Ἡρη of the original, by expanding the original to the more complete onomastic formula sancta puer Saturni filia regina. Here again he follows Fraenkel (1931) 603ff and Leo (1895/1912) 91 in recognising Livius’ alteration of the Homeric original, and takes this to be evidence of the poet’s *tendenza ad ampliare il modello in luoghi determinati.*

\(^{52}\) The vessels in *χέρνιβα δ’ ἀμφίπολος προχό/ἀργυρέοιο λέβητος* (Od. 1.136-7), originally dative and genitive with different roles in the sentence, are syntactically recast as parallel ablatives in *argenteo polubro, aureo eglutro* (fr 26), as Mariotti (1952) 42 notes.
As well as providing us with a useful vocabulary with which to describe some of the types of translation (in our terminology, the “translation outcomes”) that arise from the use of particular translation procedures, perhaps more importantly for our purposes in understanding Cicero’s philosophical translations, Mariotti also considers the literary aims that lie behind Livius’ adaptive translations. Significantly, Mariotti sees the changes that Livius makes to his original text not as errors in the Latin author’s translation, nor as failings in the Latin language itself, but as valid authorial decisions which contribute to Livius’ project of adapting the Homeric *Odyssey* for consumption by a Roman audience. As he says: *italicizzare, romanizzare la poesia di Omero: questo fu il fine dell’opera di Andronico.* As Mariotti notes, Livius selects the language and poetic form of his *traduzione artistica* in order to produce particular poetic effects within the new context of a Roman cultural space and with a view to its reception by a Latin speaking audience. The Latinisation of the Homeric muse as the daughter of the Roman Moneta, for example, endows her (and her work, the *Odusia* itself) with an identity in relation to a specifically Roman religious context and so provides her with all the associations that this native goddess holds for the Roman reader. Livius’ expansion of the simple πότνια "Ηρη to the more weighty *sancta puer Saturni filia regina*, meanwhile, can be taken to

---

53 Mariotti (1952) 34. The claim that we should not consider any changes to the Homeric original to be “errors”, but due, instead, to the poet’s goal in producing his work being different to that which we might assume in a modern translator is found at p. 51-2: *in realtà, nessun vero errore rimane di quelli che gli attribuiva la prevenuta filologia dell’800.*
have a poetic purpose in increasing the tone of solemnity associated with this powerful
goddess.\textsuperscript{54} Rather than viewing early Latin translation as the attempt at the unmediated
reproduction of the content original Greek texts, Mariotti points out ways in which Livius
adapts his poem to fit its new Latin poetic context, in terms of its thought,\textsuperscript{55} its
language,\textsuperscript{56} and its form.\textsuperscript{57} Taken in its entirety, then, Mariotti’s work confirms Fränkel’s
earlier claim that, for Rome’s earliest poetic translator, \textit{Übersetzung ist an sich ein Akt
der Interpretation}, in that it requires him to choose between competing possible
meanings of difficult Homeric passages, but extends this idea to include the claim that it
is also an act of artistic production, in that it involves the artistic enterprise of rewriting
the Homeric text for a Roman audience with unique poetic tastes, and embedded within a
particular cultural context.\textsuperscript{58}

The attitude to Roman \textit{traduzione artistica} exemplified by Mariotti’s work on
Rome’s first literary translator, then, provides three important insights. Firstly, it views
Roman literary translation as taking a flexible and creative approach to original Greek
texts aimed at the production of what we have called particular “translation outcomes”.

\textsuperscript{54} Mariotti (1952) 45
\textsuperscript{55} See e.g. in fr 6 where we find Livius’ introduction of the idea of the predestined nature of human death.
\textsuperscript{56} e.g. fr 26 which, in its reduction of the Homeric original, produces an assonance and alliteration
characteristic of early Latin poetry, but not present in the Homeric original (Mariotti (1952) 43).
\textsuperscript{57} Throughout Livius’ poem the Homeric hexameter is rewritten to fit the native Roman saturnian meter.
Manuwald (2011) 192-3 even suggests that Livius in fact produced tragic plays based on Greek \textit{epic}
models, and so that the importance of his contribution to Roman literature was based on the very fact that
“he was apparently not satisfied with the easiest solution of a simple translation of a Greek model”.
\textsuperscript{58} Fränkel (1932) 307.
Secondly, it seeks explanations for changes made to the Greek original rather than viewing them as “errors”. In addition to these, it also considers the possibility of a significant intertextual relationship between the original Greek text and its Latin adaptation within the context of an at least partially bilingual population (although his claim that the “qualified” reader of the *Odusia* would be bilingual and intimately familiar with the Homeric original is more problematic). These insights have been eagerly adopted by scholars of ancient texts, and fruitfully applied to later Roman authors. Indeed, as Seele notes, there is a much stronger argument to be made for the importance of considering the intertextual positions produced by a translation in respect to its source in later periods, as the familiarity of at least some of the Roman elite audience with the language and literary culture of the original Greek texts is clear. Much of the focus of these discussions has been on Plautus and Terence, where the Roman literary translator’s dispensation to combine multiple original sources in an act known as *contaminatio*, so

59 Mariotti (1952) 22 argues that the Greek form of the title, *Odusia*, indicates a bilingual audience familiar with the Homeric source text, which could be expected to engage in a sophisticated game of intertextual in much the same manner that an educated reader of Hellenistic Greek literature might approach other highly allusive texts. As Skutsch (1954) 253 notes, however, in order to support his claim that this form of reading was available to the “qualified” reader, Mariotti must also rely on the audience’s familiarity with an earlier indigenous poetic tradition of which there is little trace. This he summarily dismisses as indicating in Mariotti’s work “an almost feverish desire to extend our knowledge beyond the limits firmly set by the evidence”.

60 Seele (1995) 17: *denn obwohl aufgrund des antiken literarkritischen Systems, das wegen des unter den gebildeten Römern üblichen Bilingualismus zwischen intralingualen und interlingualen Textoperationen nicht allzu scharf unterschied, auch im interlingualen Bereich aemulatio gefordert und “sklavische Übersetzung” verpönt war, so erkannte doch dasselbe literarkritische System bereits die Schwierigkeit genauer Wiedergabe an.*
producing an innovative, yet translated, work, has been highlighted.\textsuperscript{61} It has also, however, been extended to later authors, including Catullus and Germanicus with important results.\textsuperscript{62} It has even been applied, with great effect, to the philosophical translations of Lucretius, and to Cicero’s youthful poetic translation of the \textit{Aratea}.\textsuperscript{63} There has, however, been greater resistance to the extension of this concept of “artistic translation” to Cicero’s own philosophical prose works, as we shall see when we discuss earlier scholarly responses to particular instances of Ciceronian translations in the upcoming chapter. In those rare instances in which it has been applied to his philosophical texts, meanwhile, there has been a tendency to stereotype the purpose for

\textsuperscript{61} E.g. Fantham 1965, 1968; Zagagi 1980; Lowe 2008; Ludwig 1968. This \textit{contaminatio} has been emphasised by Seele (1995) who, citing the comments on translation in Terence’s \textit{Andria} prologue, notes: \textit{die römischen Komödiendichter waren sich durchaus ihrer Entfernung von den griechischen Vorlagen bewusst und formulierten auch explizit das Postulat der Wirkungsäquivalenz}. Other scholars, such as Dupont (2010), have argued that this level of adaptation of the original texts moves them outside of the category of translations (“Roman theatre is Greek theatre in Latin. The Romans take Roman tragedy and comedy as Latin doublets of Greek plays. These texts are therefore not translations, but the result of a transfer from one cultural and religious context to another.”). However, in terms of modern translation theory, the transferring of a text from one culture to another is a form of translation in that it renders various aspects of the information contained in the original(s) in another language. It is just that, in its use of cultural equivalence, the type of translation produced is a highly Latinised one. Terence’s comments in the \textit{Andria} prologue also suggest that it was anticipated that this work would be received by at least some of the audience as a Latin version of a Greek original – this is why his critics are troubled by the mixing of two sources (by adding aspects from a second text, they complain that it is an inadequate translation of the first), and why his defence against these complaints is that the narrative of his two original Menandrian plays is identical, the only difference between them being the style. Thus his claim seems to be, in effect, that his work can still function as a translation, as it replicates the \textit{plot} of each of the original plays, even if it mixes the style of the two.


\textsuperscript{63} For Lucretius, see the peerless treatment of Sedley (1998). For Cicero’s \textit{Aratea} see Possanza (2004), Siebengartner (2012), and Gee (2001) (updated and integrated into her 2013 monograph) each of whose positions will be examined in greater depth in our discussion of Cicero’s poetic translations in the epiolgue.
which this adaptive translational approach has been employed, ignoring the huge variety of translation procedures, outcomes, and philosophical and literary contexts, at play in these texts. The time has come, then, for us to consider whether Cicero’s prose work is, in fact, amenable to study in this tradition of Roman poetic translation, and what this might mean for our upcoming study of his philosophical translations. This will take us back to the question raised at the beginning of this chapter of how, exactly, we are to understand the apparently contradictory claims of his prefaces, regarding the status of these works as translations of original Greek texts. Finally, at the close of this chapter, we will examine more fully how an awareness of the particular intertextual relationship that a given translation establishes with its source texts may aid us in our reading of Cicero’s philosophical translations.

III. Cicero’s Traduzione Artistica

---

64 For example, McElduff (2013) focuses exclusively upon the power of translation to aid in the post-colonial appropriation of various elements of a conquered culture (“by using military language and insisting on literary translation as a necessary follow-up to military conquest, Cicero infuses translation with imperial meaning and expands it from a personal pursuit into a cultural obligation on the part of the properly educated elite,” p.103). Lambardi, meanwhile, focuses on the ways in which Cicero’s translation of Greek philosophy is adapted to fit the expectations of Latin literary style (a position which we will discuss in greater depth in chapter 4). Similar positions are held by Traina, Traglia, and Moreschini, and will be discussed in the next chapter. Notable exceptions to this, who will be treated in the next section are Bettini (2012) and Seele (1995), but their insights do not seem to have had a substantial impact upon Anglophone treatments of this topic.
So, then, following this examination of the methodology by which we should approach interlinguistic translation in general and Roman literary translation in particular, let us return to a consideration of Cicero’s philosophical texts. Two questions now confront us: in the first place, whether we should read these texts (or particular parts of them) as translations at all; and, in the second whether they are translations in the same creative and adaptive mode as the Roman poetic translations which have been discussed in the preceding section.

To turn to the first of these questions: how are we to understand Cicero’s claims that he is not, in treating his Greek texts, acting as an *interpres*? When, at the opening of the *De Finibus*, the author claims not to be fulfilling the *munus interpretum* (role of a translator), but rather to be preserving the philosophical content of the original and adding his own *iudicium* and *ordo scribendi*, does this amount to the claim that his own creative rewriting of his Greek sources should not be considered to be a translation of these sources? And what of the other similar claims discussed on p.20-2, such as *De Officiis* 1.6, where it is stated that, because the author has employed his customary

---

65 Cic. *Fin.* 1.6: *si nos non interpretum fungimur munere, sed tuemur ea, quae dicta sunt ab iis, quos probamus, eisque nostrum iudicium et nostrum scribendi ordinem adiungimus, quid habent, cur Graeca anteponant iis, quae et splendide dicta sint neque sint conversa de Graecis?* (“And if for our part we do not fill the office of a translator, but, while preserving what has been said by our chosen authorities, add thereto our own criticism and our own arrangement: what ground have these objectors for ranking the writings of Greece above compositions that are at once brilliant in style and not translations from the Greek originals?”)
iudicium and arbitrium in his treatment of his Greek sources, he has treated his texts non ut interpretes (“not as translators do”). In each of these texts, it may seem that Cicero is distancing his own philosophical prose from the Roman literary tradition of translation, by distinguishing his own authorial activity from the work of a translator. A similar passage, which again appears to exclude Cicero’s own liberal, prose adaptations of Greek texts from the category of translation, is also found in the De Optimo Genere Oratorum. This work consists in a surviving preface, which seems originally to have accompanied Latin versions of the works of Aeschines and Demosthenes, although these are no longer extant. It states:

\[\text{Converti enim ex Atticis duorum eloquentissimorum nobilissimas orationes inter seque contrarias, Aeschinis et Demosthenis; nec converti ut interpres, sed ut orator, sententiis isdem et earum formis tamquam figuris, verbis ad nostram consuetudinem aptis. In quibus non verbum pro verbo necesse habui reddere, sed genus omne verborum vimque servavi. Non enim ea me adnumerare lectori putavi oportere, sed tamquam appendere.}\]

---

66 Cic. Off. 1.6: sequimur igitur hoc quidem tempore et hac in quaestione potissimum Stoicos, non ut interpretes, sed, ut solemus, e fontibus eorum iudicio arbitrioque nostro quantum quoque modo videbitur, hauriemus. (“I shall, therefore, at this time and in this investigation follow chiefly the Stoics, not as a translator, but, as is my custom, I shall at my own option and discretion draw from those sources in such measure and in such manner as shall suit my purpose” (Trans. Miller)). Another important example is Cic. Fin. 3.15: nec tamen exprimi verbum e verbo necesse erit, ut interpretes indiserti solent, cum sit verbum, quod idem declaret, magis usitatatum. equidem soleo etiam quod uno Graeci, si aliter non possum, idem pluribus verbis exponere. (“However, it will not be necessary that everything be translated word for word, when there is a more familiar word conveying the same meaning, as is the custom of ineloquent translators. Indeed my own practice is to use several words to give what is expressed in Greek by one, if I cannot otherwise convey the sense.”)

67 Translation C.D. Yonge.
For I have translated the most noble orations of the two most eloquent of the Attic orators, spoken in opposition to one another: Aeschines and Demosthenes. And I have not translated them as a translator, but as an orator: with the same ideas and, as it were, form and shape, in words adapted to our own custom. In doing this, I did not think it necessary to render them word for word, but I have preserved the character and energy of the language throughout. For I did not consider that my duty was to give to the reader the precise number of words, but, as it were, to give him their weight.

(Cic. De Opt. Gen. 14)

Here, too, we find the apparently paradoxical use of translational vocabulary that is present in the philosophical texts: the upcoming speeches are presented as translations of the originals (the term converti, “I have translated”, is used twice), yet this is accompanied by the claim that the author, has not performed the role of a translator but has adapted the Greek original to the customs of Roman oratory.

McElduff suggests that the best way of reconciling these apparently contradictory statements is by focusing on the figure of the interpres, rather than on the activity of translation. Her claim is that Cicero rejects the identification of his own project with that of the interpres not because his task differs from that of the interpres – he is, like the interpres, also translating Greek into Latin – but because the interpres typically held a low social position, and so was not a figure with whom the consular authorial persona
would wish to align himself.\textsuperscript{68} This hypothesis runs into problems not only because it is unclear that the term \textit{interpres} was, in fact, reserved for low level professional translators in this period, but also because Cicero \textit{does}, in fact, claim to be translating as an \textit{interpres} at one point in his philosophical works, and the point here is not one about social class, but about translational style.\textsuperscript{69} In the \textit{Tusculan Disputations} the main speaker claims at one point to be performing the task of an \textit{interpres} (again, \textit{interpretis munus}) in quoting the Greek of Epicurus in Latin:

\begin{quote}
\textit{in eo quidem libro, qui continet omnem disciplinam tuam, – fungar enim iam interpretis munere, ne quis me putet fingere – dicis haec…}
\end{quote}

In that book, which contains all of your teachings (for I will perform the task of a translator so that no-one thinks that I am making things up) you say these things…

(Cic. \textit{Tusc.} 3.41)

\textsuperscript{68} McElduff (2009) 134 “the interpreter of Cicero’s text is symbolic of a set of anxieties which have as much to do with class as they do with linguistics and the potential encroachment of historic interpreters on the literary world.”

\textsuperscript{69} Feeney (forthcoming) 46ff. is right to point out, in his discussion of oral interpretation, the professional status of the interpreter and his relationship of subordination to the higher status speaker whose words he translates: indeed, as he notes, in oral translation in political contexts “the interpreter becomes a visible token of mediation up a hierarchical chain” (p. 47). While this class distinction is certainly present in the paradigmatic case of political translation in the early Republic, however, it is not clear that this nuance is particularly active in the way that Cicero, at this later date, employs this term. At \textit{In Verr.} 2.2.208, for example, he refers to C. Claudius “of the Palatine tribe” as a \textit{interpres}, and extends this term to the interpreters of the laws in the \textit{De Legibus} and the \textit{De Republica} - figures who are clearly conceived of as elite Roman citizens. By the time of Virgil, at any rate, it was certainly possible to apply the term \textit{interpres} to a figure of any social class engaged in the activity of translation, even if that figure was a deity, as Virgil applies the term to Mercury at Virg. \textit{Aen.} 4.356. There may be an implication here that the words of the translator are of a high status, but the emphasis is upon the fidelity with which the \textit{interpres} relates the original.
Whether or not the anonymous speaker is intended to be identified specifically with the author, the dramatic location of this discussion in Cicero’s Tusculan villa means that he is certainly intended to be imagined as a member of the Roman elite, and this figure seems here to have no qualms in taking on the mantle of an \textit{interpres}. The reason he gives for adopting this role, meanwhile, instead makes it clear that it is a particular (and particularly literal) translational style that is being evoked here through the reference to the \textit{interpres}. He will, in adopting the persona of the \textit{interpres}, avoid the charge of fabrication because the task of the \textit{interpres} implies a literal and reliable approach to translation.

The claim that the author of these philosophical texts is, simultaneously, both translating his Greek philosophical sources and rejecting the task of the \textit{interpres} is, then, much easier to explain with the return to an older hypothesis, namely that Cicero’s positioning of his own work against that of the \textit{interpres} is intended to point to a difference in their translational styles, rather than their social positions.\textsuperscript{70} This makes better sense of the opposition which is established in the \textit{De Optimo Genere Oratorum}

\textsuperscript{70} A proponent of this view is Munday (2001) 19: “the ‘‘interpreter’’ of the first line [of the above-quoted passage of the \textit{De Optimo Genere Oratorum}] is the literal (‘‘word-for-word’’) translator, while the ‘‘orator’’ tried to produce a speech that moved the listeners.” Again, this is not to say that their is no implied hierarchical relationship between the interpreter and the author whose words he reproduces – indeed, as Feeney notes, it is, in part, the hierarchical relationship between interpreter and speaker which necessitates this particular form of, literal, translation style: “it is certainly crucial that the interpres should get it absolutely right, and it is a given in Roman discussions of the job of the interpreter that he should be literal and “word for word” (\textit{uerbum e/de/pro uerbo}) in his rendering” (p.47).
passage quoted above, between those who translate word for word (*verbum pro verbo*), and those who instead reproduce the content (*sententiae*) of the original in a manner fit for its new Latin linguistic and literary context (*verbis ad nostram consuetudinem aptis*). This same opposition can be seen in the *De Finibus* 3.15 passage, which identifies this form of word for word translation as the translational style typical of the *interpres*, and contrasts Cicero’s own practice with this (*nec tamen exprimi verbum e verbo necesse erit, ut interpretes indiserti solent,* “however, it will not be necessary that everything be translated word for word, as is the custom of ineloquent translators”). To employ the vocabulary of translation theory and modern literary criticism discussed in the previous section, the *interpres* is presented as relying upon the translation procedure of *synonymy* – selecting a Latin word which has as similar as possible a semantic range to the Greek original, regardless of the effect this has either on the cultural value of the translated text, or on its style or expressive power. In doing this, the technique of the *interpres* is represented as resulting in a translation outcome that we might call *literalism*, in that it replicates as closely as possible the semantic information in each individual lexeme, but, in doing so, loses in its new Latin form the natural expressive qualities, elegance, and even the philosophical clarity it might have had in the Greek.

When we see Cicero’s comments about the *interpres* as referring to a particular translation style, rather than a particular social position, we can better understand the reference to the *interpres* in the *Tusculan Disputations* passage discussed on the previous
page (Tusc. 3.41). Here, the speaker, in claiming to adopt the role of the *interpres*, presents himself as employing a form of translation which is less susceptible to any complaints that the author has distorted the meaning of the original text (no-one will think the author is “making things up” in his translation). This is just as we would expect, if the translation style which is presented as being characteristic of the *interpres* is a literalising form of translation characterised by synonymy, where the semantic range of each individual term is privileged and so possibility of the loss of any relevant semantic element decreased.

Further evidence for the plausibility of this association of the task of the *interpres* with a particular translational style may be found in a consideration of what is meant by *interpretari* and its cognates in other, religious contexts in Cicero’s works. In the *De Divinatione* it seems that an *interpres* (here, an interpreter of portents) is successful only in such cases in which he is able to accurately describe what a portent signifies (an outcome referred to by the term *praedicere* “to say in advance what will occur”).

It is, of course, necessary that a religious *interpres* is as accurate as possible in his predictions because of his subordinate status to the gods (it is because of his relative lack of understanding that he needs to turn to the gods for instructions and information), but it is not the fact that he inhabits this hierarchical location, but that he performs his task that

---

71 For the use of *praedicere* – the saying in advance of what a portent signifies (*significare*) – to describe the successful outcome of the task of the religious *interpres*, see e.g. De Div. 2.20.
Cicero takes to be definitive of his craft. A successful instance of the execution of the role of the religious *interpres*, then, is one in which he accurately articulates in Latin the information signified by a portent – in other words, in which he literally “translates” (in the sense of reproducing information within a different semantic system) the semantic content which the portent carries.\(^{72}\) In that the task of the religious *interpres* is figured as the accurate and unambiguous replication of the full semantic value of a portent in Latin, with no importance attached to the maintenance of any of the expressive, phonetic, or other aspects of the original sign, it has clear similarities to the task of the interlinguistic *interpres* (or “translator”) as described by Cicero in the contexts discussed above. In the case of the interpreter of portents, however, because the original sign is non-linguistic (consisting, instead, in a movement of a physical body, for example a bird, or in a mental image such as a dream) its interpretation in Latin is a case of what Jakobson would call “intersemiotic translation”.\(^{73}\)

The bulk of our evidence, then, seems to support the reading the *interpres* in Cicero’s discussions of interlinguistic translations as a figure who employs a particular

\(^{72}\) That this is the measure of success is perhaps most clearly seen in Marcus’ arguments against the possibility of successful interpretation of portents in the second book of the *De Divinatione*. For example, his discussion of dream interpretation at 2.144ff, where the failure of the task is indicated by the fact that two different, semantically opposed readings can be plausibly given for the same dream. In another context, the claim is also made that a bird is a poor *interpres* of Jove because it does not clearly replicate his meaning 2.73.

\(^{73}\) For a fuller discussion of this, see Appendix A.
kind of word-for-word translational style (in which the translation procedure of synonymy results in a translation outcome of literalism), rather than (primarily) as the representative of a particular social class. The claims in the philosophical works that Cicero is both preserving the philosophical content of his original Greek texts, and rejecting the task of the *interpres*, then, can be taken as the claim that he is translating the argumentative value of his original texts, but employing a more Latinising translation, which does not necessarily maintain the same number of words or semantic value of each individual words as his Greek sources. So, in his claims to Latinise, and the dispensation he allows himself to verbally expand and contract his Greek originals, Cicero presents his translation procedures as bringing about some of the translation outcomes which we have noted to be typical of earlier Roman literary translations, such as Livius’ *Odusia*, rather than of the literal translations he associates with the *interpres*. It also shows Ciceros’ awareness that this is a particular translation *choice*: he has chosen to adapt his source text to fit their new cultural location, rather than treating them in the manner of an *interpres*.

So, to turn now to our second question of whether Cicero’s philosophical translations are located within the tradition of Roman poetic translation, we can see that his usual rejection of the translational style of the *interpres* in fact aligns these works firmly with the adaptive translations of earlier Roman poetry. Just as Terence in his *Andria* prologue claims to preserve the *plot* if not the style of the original Greek play(s)
he adapts, Cicero claims in the prefaces we have discussed in this chapter to preserve the thought of the original, and the character and energy of the original vocabulary, if not the precise semantic value of the original words. Indeed, at least one of Cicero’s philosophical texts explicitly aligns itself with the translation methods of Latin poetic translation: in the preface to the first book of the *De Finibus*, Cicero explicitly compares his project of Latinising Greek texts to that of the earlier Roman dramatists Ennius, Pacuvius, Caecilius, Terence, Attilius, and Afranius. The affinity of Cicero’s philosophical prose translations with the Latin poetic translation tradition can also be seen in their repeated claims to surpass their original texts (as examined above p.17-20), so engaging in *aemulatio* – that antagonistic intertextual positioning which has long been considered to be typical of Roman translation, and which shall be discussed more fully in the final section of this chapter.

From the way in which Cicero’s philosophical texts present their translational activities to the reader, then, it seems that we are being invited to read them as creative adaptations in the Latin poetic tradition, rather than as aiming at a primarily literal

---

74 The relationship of Cicero’s philosophical works to the wider tradition of Roman *traduzione artistica* was emphasized by Italian scholars of the 1970s working in this area, in particular Traina (1970), Traglia (1971), and Moreschini (1979), who notes that these works: *hanno posto in rilievo l’orginalità artistica e i valori cultrali di un lavoro non meccanico o impersonale, da un lato, né arbitrario dall’altro, risolvendo nel termine vertere atto un atteggiamento intellettuale che fu tipico degli scrittori latini nei confronti dei greci e di Cicerone stesso in non piccola misura.* (p.100)

75 Cic. *De Fin* 1.4-7.
translation of their source texts. Although this feature of these texts has been pointed out outside of the Anglophone tradition (in a series of invaluable Italian works culminating in Bettini’s study of Cicero’s place in the tradition of Roman translation, and the recent German treatment of Roman translation practice by Seele), there has, however, as yet, been no extended attempt to consider what this means for our understanding of these texts as literary and philosophical works in their own terms. This dissertation shall aim to correct this omission, and consider the philosophical and literary effects of the creative translations which we find in Cicero’s philosophical works. One important aspect of rehabilitating Cicero’s philosophical translations within the tradition of Roman traduzione artistica will be the consideration of the ways in which each translation positions itself intertextually in terms of its source text(s). In the final section of this chapter, then, we will discuss briefly the various ways in which these intertextual postures may play out within these philosophical texts, showing how these ideas will inform the structure of this dissertation, and how they reflect contemporary Roman thought on the relationship between the Latin and Greek languages.

76 Bettini (2012) 36, in reference to Fin. 7 notes: in reference to De Fin 1.7: tradurre come transferre implica per lui l’atto di “trasferire” dal mondo Greco a quello romano gli “ingegni” dei filosofi ellenici, rendendoli così accessibili alla cognizione dei suoi concittadini. In alter parole Cicerone non sta parlando di mutare la veste linguistica di un testo, ma di “portare al di là” alcuni ingenii, persone e produzioni intellettuali che appartengono a un’altra lingua e a un’altra cultura. Seele (1995) 8 says: Cicero übersetzt seine Vorlagen in der Regel mit starkem literarischen Gestaltungswillen, was durch das literarkritische Konzept der aemulatio, der konkurrierenden Nachbildung bedingt ist. Traglia also nods to the earlier Italian language work on traduzione artistica (e.g. Traglia (1971) 309: “l’esigenza di libertà nel vertere, che è propria della traduzione artistica, è sentita anche – e soprattutto – nelle opera filosofiche [i.e. of Cicero]”), although in his actual analysis of Cicero’s philosophical translations focuses on their failings in terms of what he considers to be the accurate translation of philosophical Greek.
IV. Intertextual Positioning in Cicero’s Philosophical Translations

As has already been noted, if Cicero’s translations are, indeed, in the tradition of Roman *traduzione artistica*, in order to fully understand Cicero’s translation technique and its function within his philosophical works as a whole, we will have to consider not only the form that his translations take (whether, in approaching a given Greek source text, he employs *synonymy, naturalisation, cultural equivalence*, or another of our translation procedures), and the immediate effect this has in producing a particular kind of translation outcome (whether this be a *latinising* translation, a *foreignising* translation, or any one of the other translation outcomes discussed above), but also the kind of *intertextual relationship* which these translational choices establish with their original text.

When Cicero characterises the audience of his philosophical texts, he identifies at least one section of his readership as bilingual Greek and Latin speakers who possess a familiarity with the Greek philosophical tradition that he translates. At the beginning of the second edition of the *Academica*, for example, the character “Cicero” describes the intended audience for a Latin philosophical text, such as the *Academica* itself, as including both those who do not have the necessary language skills to read the Greek
originals, and those who are proficient in Greek. He replies to Varro’s claim that no-one will read philosophy in Latin (as those who have Greek will read the Greek, and those who have no Greek also have no interest in philosophy) with the following words:

_Causam autem probabilem tu quidem affers: aut enim Graeca legere malent qui erunt eruditi, aut ne haec quidem qui illa nescient. sed eam mihi non sane probas; immo vero et haec qui illa non poterunt, et qui Graeca poterunt non contemnent sua._

But you propose, indeed, a reasonable case: for on the one hand those who are learned will prefer to read Greek writings and those who are unfamiliar with those [Greek writings] will not read these [Latin writings]. But, to my mind, you do not prove this sufficiently. The truth rather is that those who are not able to read those [Greek writings] will read these [Latin writings], and those who are able to read the Greek writings will not look down on works of their own language.

_(Cic. Acad. 1.10)_

One element within the _Academica_’s perceived readership, then, is identified as possessing a level of Greek fluent enough to allow them to read Greek philosophical writings in their original form, and this element is described as a constitutive part of the audience of any work of philosophy in Latin.77 When Cicero places the Latin translation of a Greek philosophical term alongside its Greek original within his texts, then, as he often does, it seems to be with the assumption (or, at the very least, the hope) that at least

77 For the historical evidence for levels of elite Greek-Latin bilingualism, see Adams (2003) 9-14, whose results are mainly aporetic, but reveal that some level of bilingualism certainly existed.
some of his readership will be familiar with this Greek term from its original context of Greek philosophical discourse.\footnote{Indeed, Glucker (2012) 51 goes so far as to suggest that “Cicero’s remarks about the Greek terms he translated into Latin were intended mainly for such erudite readers as Brutus, Balbus and Varro (and, indeed, Atticus himself)”, because of the comments such as \textit{Tusc.} 3.61, in which the connection between the Greek \textit{λύπη} and Latin \textit{solutio} seems to be mediated through an implied etymological connection between \textit{λύπη} and \textit{λύω}. While it seems clear that a bilingual Greek-Latin speaker would have access to this etymological connection in a manner in which a non-Greek speaker would not, however, it seems plausible that they would still be able to make sense of Cicero’s comment, simply by virtue of the phonetic connection between the \textit{lu} sound in \textit{solutio} and that in \textit{λύπη}.} Placing the original Greek term side-by-side with its Latin equivalent here invites comparison between the original and its translation, thus generating, for the bilingual reader, an intertextual perspective by which Cicero's work is read against its Greek models. And it is not only the language of Greek philosophical discourse, generally, that is represented as being familiar to a section of Cicero's audience. We also find moments at which specific Greek philosophical works are depicted as being familiar to the educated Roman characters who populate the Ciceronian dialogues. To give an example, in response to the main speaker's claim that all one needs to do to be persuaded of the immortality of the soul is to read Plato's \textit{Phaedo}, the interlocutor replies at \textit{Tusc.} 1.24: \textit{feci mehercule et quidem saepius} (“Of course I have done so, and indeed very often!”). This fictional exchange reflects a historical truth evidenced in Cicero's epistolary exchanges with some of his correspondents: namely, that of the existence of a subset of the Roman elite with a developed interest in, and
familiarity with, Greek philosophical texts.\textsuperscript{79} For this group of readers who were familiar with Cicero's Greek philosophical models, Cicero's Latin adaptations would necessarily be read in light of their knowledge of the Greek originals, producing an intertextual perspective, in which an awareness of the Greek source text influences response to Cicero's Latin text.\textsuperscript{80} Indeed, in many cases, these philosophically informed and fluent readers are presented as being not just one subset of the perceived readership of Cicero's philosophical works, but as the \textit{primary} or ideal readership. The dedicatory addressee, whose persona acts an interpretative proxy for each individual reader, is often a figure who is deeply immersed in the Greek philosophical tradition, and presented in Cicero's work as such (Varro, the dedicatee of the second edition of the \textit{Academica} is presented as excelling in the field of Greek philosophy;\textsuperscript{81} Brutus, addressee of the \textit{Tusculan Disputations} and the \textit{De Finibus} is characterised as an exemplary writer of philosophy;\textsuperscript{82} Atticus, addressee of the \textit{De Senectute} and \textit{De Amicitia} is described as exhibiting a Greek

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{79} In addition to Atticus' assumed familiarity with Cicero's philosophical models, including Aristotle and Heracleides of Ponticus (e.g. Cic. \textit{Att.} 13.19), Griffin (1995) has examined the shared familiarity with Epicureanism playfully invoked in one of Cicero's letters to Cassius (Cic. \textit{Ad Fam.} 15.16).

\textsuperscript{80} In the language of intertextual theory, the Ciceronian text functions as a "hypertext", in that it establishes some form of relationship with an earlier text (the "hypotext"). Genette (1997) 5.

\textsuperscript{81} Cic. \textit{Acad.} 1.3: \textit{quae}ro \textit{quid} sit \textit{cur cum} multa \textit{scribas} \textit{hoc} \textit{genus} \textit{praetermittas}, \textit{praesertim} \textit{cum et} \textit{ipse} \textit{in eo} \textit{excellas} ("I ask why it might be that, although you write many things, you pass over this genre [i.e. philosophy], especially since you yourself excel in this").

\textsuperscript{82} Cic. \textit{Acad.} 1.10: \textit{Brutus quidem} \textit{noster}, \textit{excellens} \textit{omni} \textit{genere} \textit{laudis}, \textit{sic} \textit{philosophiam} \textit{Latinis litteris perseguitur} \textit{nihil} \textit{ut} \textit{iisdem} \textit{de rebus} \textit{Graecae} \textit{desideres}. ("Our friend Brutus, indeed, outstanding in every kind of praise, pursued philosophy in Latin literary form in such a manner that you might want nothing of these same matters from Greece.")
erudition befitting his cognomen). These considerations, taken together, mean that the examination of additional, intertextual perspectives upon Cicero's philosophical translation project is both authorised and invited by the authorial voice.

A study of the intertextual relationships which Cicero’s translations establish with their Greek source text is particularly illuminating for our understanding of Cicero’s philosophical project as a whole, as it provides us with a clear illustration of the various ways in which he treated and represented his Greek philosophical models in the writing of his new, Latin philosophy. We have already mentioned the typically Roman intertextual stance of aemulatio, by which a text is represented as exceeding its source in some way. We have also seen, in section Ib, above, Cicero’s claims that his own translations can replace his Greek models, implying some form of improvement over their source text and placing some of his translations within this aemulative tradition. This antagonist stance of aemulatio can, in the case of Cicero’s philosophical translations, be further divided into a number of common intertextual attitudes, which we shall observe throughout our study of these texts:

a) **philosophical correction**: converting a word or text into Latin while

---

83 Cic. Sen. 1: novi enim moderationem animi tui et aequitatem, teque non cognomen solum Athens deportasse, sed humanitatem et prudentiam intellego. ("For I know the moderation and levelness of your mind, and I understand that you brought back from Athens not only your cognomen, but also your mental cultivation and practical wisdom.")
simultaneously improving upon perceived problems in the original. One obvious case of this, which we will consider more closely in chapter 3, is Cicero’s removal of the redundant premises when translating Plato’s *Phaedrus* at *Tusc.* 1.53-4. This corrective treatment of his Greek original is also apparent in Cicero’s description of his use of his Panaetian original in the first two books of the *De Officiis.* He describes his use of Panaetius as “following with correction”, and *De Off* 1.7 forms a good example of this, when Cicero offers a definition of *officium,* and comments that he is amazed that Panaetius missed out this essential step in his project: “*quod a Panaetio praetermissum esse miror*”.

b) **rhetorical/oratorical elaboration:** improving on the literary style of the original. The importance to some of Cicero’s translations of correcting oratorical style has already been observed in the preface of the *De Opt Gen,* where Cicero claims to have translated his Greek models *nec... ut interpres, sed ut orator.* The role of this idea in his philosophical works will be addressed by us in particular in relationship to Lambardi’s views on his *Timaeus* in chapter 4 of this study. This form of oratorical elaboration will not be a primary concern of this dissertation, as it has already been the subject of much scholarly attention, and so would not contribute greatly to furthering our understanding of the literary or philosophical plan of these particular works.
c) **linguistic or cultural capping**: showing that a concept or term is better described, evidenced, or employed in Roman thought or discourse than by means of the Greek conceptual divisions of the model. An example of this is the technical terminology of the *Academica*, which we will study in greater depth in chapter 2, and we will return to this idea in the context of contemporary Roman linguistic ideology in section IVa of this chapter, below.

Cicero also performs a number of intertextual activities which are, perhaps, less clearly in the tradition of *aemulatio*, but which are, nevertheless, essential to our understanding of the philosophical texts, as they establish a particular relationship between Greek philosophical learning and conventional Roman wisdom. These, while they do not necessarily rely on an antagonistic relationship with the source text, are, nonetheless, consequences of Cicero’s approach to translation as creative rewriting which we have observed in this chapter. These relationships can be established, on the one hand, with reference to the specific philosophical content of the passage, as in the following two cases:

d) **philosophical interpretation**: the authorial decision to read a potentially ambiguous original in a particular way. For example in his literal translation of the *Phaedrus* in *Tusc.* 1.53-4 Cicero chooses to translate the term φύσις as “*propria natura atque vis*”. This *atque* is, seemingly, epexegetical, and so indicates an interpretative
decision by Cicero: namely that, in this context, Plato is using the ambiguous term, φύσις, to indicate an internal motive force.

e) **philosophical adaptation/distortion**: knowingly changing or adapting the Greek original to fit its new literary or argumentative context. Often for Cicero this seems to be in the cause of “eclecticism”. For example, at *De Off.* 1.93 he translates the Greek “πρέπον” as “modestia”, then, at 1.142, he translates “εὐταξία”, the Greek term used by the Stoics for that body of knowledge which deals with practical judgement, using this same Latin term. In linking the narrower, doctrinally circumscribed and specifically Stoic body of work on εὐταξία with his general considerations of the πρέπον, Cicero seems to be attributing to this Stoic science (which, of course, is the basis of his Panaetian model) a wider applicability and de-emphasising any doctrinal affiliation it might otherwise have. Yet Cicero himself seems aware of the distorting effect of this declaration of Latin synonymity between two Greek terms with very different extensions, noting at *De Off.* 1.142 that his current use of the term is not the same as his earlier use of modestia ("non hanc, quam interpretamur modestiam, quo in verbo modus inest") but, nonetheless, treating this second modestia as the scientia of the first.

In addition to this, we also see Cicero establishing, through his translations of Greek philosophy, particular hierarchical relationships between the Greek intellectual culture represented by his source text and the Roman learning represented by his
translation. Interestingly, we see a number of different hierarchical relationships represented in different passages within this text, suggesting that a strictly post-colonial reading of Cicero’s philosophical translations as a form of re-enforcing Roman cultural dominance is artificially limiting. In this multiplicity of attitudes to the Greek cultural origins of his source texts, Cicero’s treatment resembles that of Lucretius, as masterfully analysed by Sedley. Consequently, we will see the instances of the following in this dissertation:

f) **appropriation**: converting Greek knowledge into a Roman form, and, in doing so consciously *adding* something new to the communal store of Roman knowledge. This seems to be the claim made as to the purpose of Cicero’s philosophical translations by *Tusc.* 2.6 “*quod si haec studia traducta erunt ad nostros, ne bibliothecis quidem Graecis egebimus*” – in order for Greek libraries to be deemed obsolete, their store of knowledge must first be added to Roman intellectual culture by a process of translation. We will see instances of this in the next chapter as Cicero points out the need to have recourse to neologism in treating novel, Greek philosophical ideas in Latin.

---

84 As McElduff (2013) comes close to doing at points in her work, for example: her claim that “all translations carry within them an inherent desire to claim authority and status, even at the expense of the original...” (p.14).

85 Sedley (1998) 35-59. For a fuller awareness of the wider impact of Latinising and foreignising translations, and many other issues in the philosophical translations of the Roman Republic, I am deeply indebted to Sedley’s work.
g) **domestication**: claiming synonymity between a Greek concept and a pre-existing Roman concept, and so suggesting that the translation of the Greek material adds nothing substantive to the communal store of Roman knowledge. One example is the claim at *Tusc.* 5.7 that *philosophia* is a “*res antiquissima*”, though “*nomen tamen esse confitemur recens; nam sapientiam quidem ipsam quis negare potest non modo re esse antiquam, verum etiam nomine*”. By equating the Greek term *philosophia* with the older Roman term *sapientia*, Cicero suggests that in translating Greek *philosophia* into the Latin tongue, he is adding no concept that is not natively Roman.

h) **alienation**: making a term, concept, or body of knowledge accessible through translation, yet in such a way that it is not by this act of translation authorised as a form of “Roman” literature or knowledge, but remains markedly “other”. We will see this repeatedly in Cicero’s translations of Epicurus in chapters 2 and 3, and, as we will suggest in the Epilogue, this also seems to be the case for many of Cicero’s translations of Greek Tragedy in his philosophical works.

Each of these intertextual positions, then, figures Cicero’s Latin translation as inhabiting a particular relationship to its Greek model, and so characterises the purpose of this translation, and its role within the text as a whole, in a different way. The purpose of

---

86 “An exceedingly ancient thing”, though “the name, however, we confess to be recent: for who, indeed, would be able to deny that wisdom itself is ancient – not only in essence, but also in name”.

69
this study, then, will be to consider not only the processes by which Cicero translates his originals, and the immediate effects of these translations, but also what intertextual relationships these translations establish and what this means for our understanding of these texts as a whole. As such, it will consider how he appropriates Greek ideas and situates his own thought in relation to Greek philosophy, and how he presents himself as transforming and adapting this thought for Roman use. In addition to the question of how Cicero’s translations portray the relationship between the Greek sources texts and these new Latin works, it will also be of particular interest for us to consider how these translations represent the relationship between the Greek and the Latin languages in which these texts are written. As we have already noted in the introduction, this question is key to our understanding of Cicero’s philosophical translation project as a form of Roman engagement with Greek intellectual culture, and is in play at moments when Cicero describes the abundance of Latin vocabulary available to the translator of philosophical Greek, as in, for example, the letter to Atticus discussed in our Introduction.\(^{87}\) As this issue will be particularly important in the next chapter, where we will be interested in Cicero’s translations of Greek philosophical terminology, it is worth quickly sketching some contemporary attitudes regarding the relationship between these two languages – itself a matter of great interest to Roman authors of this period, and an

\(^{87}\) Cic. Att. 12.52.
important element of the cultural backdrop against which Cicero produces his philosophical translations.

a) The *patrii sermonis egestas*

An important 1st century Roman view of the relationship between the Greek and Latin languages - and one which is particularly relevant to Cicero’s work as it also deals with the possibility of the translation of Greek philosophy into Latin - is that presented in Lucretius’ *De Rerum Natura*. Here, in three separate passages, we find the classic articulation of what Farrell, in his rich discussion of these passages, has called the “poverty topos”. The Lucretian passages focus on the *egestas* (poverty) of the Latin tongue, pointing to semantic deficiencies in the language that prevent the easy articulation of Greek philosophical ideas. At 1.138-9, for instance, Lucretius claims that he has been forced to couch his account of Epicurean philosophy in neologisms because the Latin language, in its existing state, does not have the vocabulary (*verba*) necessary to produce such an account. The idea that Latin is lacking in the semantic resources of Greek, and so less suitable for the exposition of complex subjects such as philosophy, is

---

89 *multa novis verbis præsertim cum sit agendum / propter egestatem linguæ et rerum novitatem.* Even if, as Farrell (2001) 50 claims, Lucretius in fact establishes this apparent linguistic poverty with the aim of that Latin does not succumb as easily as Greek to the foolishness of some elements of pre-Socratic thought (for instance the homoeomerus substance of Anaxagoras as described using transliterated Greek terms at 1.834-42), the fact that the same poverty could prevent ease of exposition of legitimate philosophical ideas is present and is picked up, as Fögen (2000) notes, by the later tradition and is a plausible implication of this text.
picked up by later authors and seems to have become a common trope – a mode of representing the relationship between the Latin and Greek languages with which Cicero would likely have been familiar.\(^\text{90}\) It is this model which, as we shall see in the next chapter, Cicero’s translations at times challenge, by using multiple Latin words to translate a single, Greek philosophical term, thus revealing the copious nature of Latin’s store of vocabulary in comparison to that of Greek. This rejection of the idea that Latin is semantically impoverished in relation to Greek can also be seen in some of Cicero’s comments on his philosophical works as rewritings of original Greek texts, in particular at \textit{DND} 1.8 and \textit{De Fin.} 1.10, which each argue against the common view that Greek has a greater copiousness of vocabulary (\textit{copia verborum}) and is more resourceful (\textit{locupletior}) than Latin.\(^\text{91}\)

Even within the bounds of the “poverty topos”, however, the restricted nature of Latin vocabulary in comparison to Greek is not always presented as a failing which acts as an impediment to the exposition of philosophical ideas. As Farrell has noted, the Latin language’s lack of words for problematic moral concepts can be considered to be one of its virtues, as can be inferred from a study of Valerius Maximus’ claim that Latin has no

\(^{90}\) We know that Cicero had read at least part of Lucretius’ poem from a famous letter to Quintus (\textit{QFr.} 2.10.3). For the widespread nature of this trope, see Ægen (2000), in particular, his discussion of Gellius 19.9, which seems to show that this view was still common, particularly in the climate of 2\textsuperscript{nd} century CE Philhellenism.

\(^{91}\) \textit{Nat. D.} 1.8: \textit{quo in genere tantum profecisse videmur, ut a Graecis ne verborum quidem copia vinceremur}; \textit{De Fin} 1.10: \textit{saep} disserui Latinam linguam non modo non inopem, ut uulgo putarent, sed \textit{locupletiorem etiam esse quam Graecam}. 

72
word for *stratagem* and Cato the statement that there is no Latin translation of *nothus*. The linguistic abundance of Greek in articulating problematic moral concepts reveals it as, paradoxically, less suitable for the articulation of philosophical (in the sense of *moral*) thought, as it can articulate shameful ideas which should be absent from a well-functioning society. As we shall see in the following chapters, Cicero also draws upon these ideas, showing that Latin’s more restricted vocabulary in certain areas actually makes it more suitable than Greek for the production of philosophical discourse. Thus, Cicero turns a common criticism of the Latin language into an opportunity for **linguistic capping**, revealing how the more limited vocabulary of Latin can better articulate philosophical ideas than the (over)abundance of Greek. More generally, however, we can see that Cicero is here working in a cultural environment in which language and thought are conceived of as being deeply intertwined. For Valerius Maximus and Cato the Elder to make the argumentative moves that they do, they must assume that the words that make up a particular language reflect the concepts in use by the society which uses this language. The formulation of the relationship between the Latin and Greek languages, then, is an important part of establishing the relationship between these peoples and their culture, and an act of **linguistic capping** can be more generally conceived of as an act of **cultural capping**.

---

92 Cato fr. 239 Malcovati (= Quintilian *IO* 3.6.97); Valerius Maximus 4 ext. 2. Farrell (2001) p.32: “This commonplace figures Latin culture as morally superior because the Latin language lacks words for certain shameful ideas, and so must borrow from Greek, the linguistic richness of which is a symptom of moral depravity. Poverty, yes; inferiority; no.”
Having now outlined the methodological approach that will be taken by this dissertation, it is time now to turn to Cicero’s philosophical translations themselves. We will begin with a study of individual lexical items – the technical terms from which philosophical discourse is built up. Next, we will consider his translation of extended passages of Greek prose texts, both from works which still survive (such as the dialogues of Plato), and those that are no longer extant (for example, the dialogues of Aristotle). In our final chapter, we will turn to an in-depth study of Cicero’s longest translation, his *Timaeus*. After this, we will conclude with a brief epilogue, which will both look back on the findings of the previous chapters as a whole, and consider how this study might be extended to bring in other aspects of Cicero’s philosophical translations.
Chapter 2: Cicero’s Translation of Technical Terms

Cicero’s translation of the technical terms of Greek philosophy has been, perhaps, the single aspect of his philosophical translation project that has attracted the greatest scholarly interest. An analysis of Cicero’s approach to individual Greek terms, or “lexemes”, is, then, an ideal subject with which to begin our study of his translation technique, and it is one that will allow us to see clearly the new insights that can be provided by employing the methodological approach outlined in the preceding chapter.¹ In doing this, we will integrate a number of scholarly approaches (the linguistic, literary, and philosophical) that have most often been treated in isolation, yet which each have the potential to make a valuable contribution to a more wide-ranging understanding of this subject. This approach will allow us to build upon earlier scholarly findings in each of these areas, while allowing us to move beyond the consideration of the historically popular question of the fidelity or flexibility with which Cicero translates his sources. Instead we will use these perspectives to explore the literary and philosophical

¹ The term “lexeme” in modern linguistics refers to a morpheme with a basic “vocabulary” meaning, referring to things, qualities, and actions (typically corresponding to nouns, adjectives, or verbs). See e.g. Fasold and Connor Linton (2014) 69.
motivations for the attitudes Cicero takes to his translation of particular technical terms, or groups of technical terms.

We will begin with an overview of earlier scholarly approaches, which will allow us to isolate the more problematic features of Ciceronian translation that our own approach in this dissertation will work towards explaining. We will then turn to Cicero’s *Academica* for an extended case study of how our methodology can help to explain why Cicero employs multiple Latin translations for the single, Greek term κατάληψις, and how this fits in with his general construction of the relationship between his own work and its Greek sources in this text. Finally, we will extend our findings to other Ciceronian texts, considering other ways in which Cicero constructs the relationship between his own Latin philosophical works and his Greek sources in his translations of technical, philosophical terminology.

I: Earlier Scholarly Approaches

In a pattern which we will see repeated throughout this dissertation, much of the scholarship that dealt with Cicero’s translation of Greek philosophical terms in the latter half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century focused upon defending the Roman author from the accusations
made in Poncelet’s encyclopedic, yet highly critical, work on Cicero’s translations of Greek philosophy. Poncelet (1957) savaged Cicero’s translation of philosophical terms as being inadequate, both on the grounds of the unsuitability of the Latin language for the articulation of Greek philosophical concepts, and due to the inconsistent approach to the translation of various technical terms employed by the author. Poncelet’s criticisms relied upon the theoretical assumption that adequate philosophical translation could take place only if a) the translation were “mechanical” (there was a one-to-one correspondence between the original, Greek term and its Latin translation, so that a single, given Latin term is always used to translate a single Greek term); and b) the translation was truly synonymous (there was an absolute identity between the semantic range of the original term and its translation). Cicero’s translations of Greek

---

2 A parallel case, in which the response of Italian scholarship to Poncelet’s work was also to invoke the tradition of traduzione artistica, is discussed more fully in chapter 4, where we consider Cicero’s translation of the Timaeus. For an account of the scholarship on this subject before Poncelet, see Hartung (1970) 7-16.

3 Poncelet (1957) 311-2: Toute la différence entre latin et une langue philosophique c'est que, dans l'exposé latin, l'instabilité de la forme reste constante, tandis qu'en grec ou dans une grande langue moderne elle est locale et provisoire... Toutefois, l'instabilité ne relève constitutivement du style philosophique que si elle apparaît comme une réaction contre le danger du maniement automatique des signes. Or, l’instabilité de la forme étant persistante de toute nécessité chez Cícéron, il suit que cet auteur ne présente pratiquement pas de discriminations dont on puisse faire état pour affirmer que notre auteur a créé la langue philosophique moderne.

4 Poncelet (1957) 321 complains of the instability of Cicero’s translations of the Stoic technical term προηγµένα, which he sometime translates as sumenda, and sometimes as praeposita, saying: tout condamne le latin à cette non fixité des références et des localisations. Lambardi (1982) 16 describes this kind of consistent one-to-one correspondence between a word in the source language and that in the target language as a “mechanical” view of what constitutes fidelity to the original.

5 Poncelet (1957) 65 complains regarding the lack of synonymy between the prepositions used in Greek and Cicero’s Latin translation: Le latin omet le plus souvent les rapports prépositionnels abstraits; mais le vide ainsi creusé détermine l’introduction inutile (entendez: du point de vue de l’idée) de rapports concrets dont le modèle grec n’offre pas la trace. Ce renfort abusif risque de masquer à qui n’est point rompu à
philosophical terms, he argued, met neither criteria: Cicero often used a variety of different terms to translate a single, Greek concept, while the poverty of the Latin language meant that there was often a lack of full synonymy between a Greek term and Cicero’s chosen translation of it. Although, the approach of this dissertation, as discussed in the previous chapter, will be to reject Poncelet’s theoretical assumptions, it is, nonetheless, valuable briefly to note some of the features of Ciceronian translation that led Poncelet to condemn it as imprecise and inconsistent.

The work of Poncelet and, later, Hartung, has revealed that there do indeed seem to be instances of Ciceronian translation where the Latin translation falls short of complete synonymy with the original Greek. A philosophically significant example of

---

*confronter les textes grecs et latins, la pénurie de prépositions efficaces qui est un des propres les plus frappants du style philosophique de Ciceron.* It is worth noting here that Poncelet’s approach to Cicero’s translation of prepositions goes against the trend of contemporary linguistics, in that it considers prepositions to be, themselves, important bearers of philosophical meaning. Prepositions are not, in the terms of modern linguistics, true “lexemes”, but instead “grammatical morphemes” which indicate relationships between lexemes, and, as such, are “empty” of meaning until they are included within a syntactical structure (see Fasold and Conor-Linton (2014) 69 and Lyons (1995) 65-70).

6 Sandbach (1959) 144 summarises the conclusions of Poncelet’s work as follows: “Poncelet maintains that Latin vocabulary is marked by a conceptual vagueness and imprecision. There is no attempt to distinguish between concepts by assigning each its own symbol. On the contrary Cicero's principle of identification is *erit notius quale sit pluribus notatum vocabulis idem declarantibus* (not synonyms, but words which give a pointer to the required concept). Now since each of these words can be subsequently used either in its proper sense or as a sign for the new concept, there is no stable vocabulary.”

7 Hartung’s doctoral thesis (Hartung (1970)) does a good job of surveying Cicero’s various translations of the technical terms of Greek epistemology and moral philosophy (with particular strengths in the translation of Stoic terminology). It has, however, a problematic approach to the analysis of these translations, holding that every case of apparent lack of synonymy is, in fact, synonymous – sometimes with absurd conclusions, such as his assertion that Cicero “means” *mens* whenever he translates the Greek *νοῦς* – even at points at which he actually uses the term *animus*. Hartung (1970) 45: [of Cic. *Tusc.*. 1.46] *Cicero habe hier gegenüber Acad. 1.30 inkonsequenterweise νοῦς durch den viel weiteren Begriff animus*
this is the Greek term λόγος. Cicero’s preferred Latin translation, *ratio*, seems to replicate only part of the meaning of this Greek term, failing to capture the idea of “speech” or “utterance” that the Greek word can express. At other points, meanwhile, we can observe Cicero’s variation in the Latin terms Cicero uses to translate a single Greek word: for example the oscillation between *animus* and *mens* in the translation of the Greek νοῦς in the *Tusculan Disputations*. We can also see Cicero employing multiple Latin words in the same breath to translate a single Greek term, for example, in his use of *cognitio*, *comprehensio*, and *perceptio* in combination to translate the Greek κατάληψις at *Academica* 2.17. These are all genuine features of Cicero’s translations of philosophical terminology, and each of them shows the distance of Cicero’s work from Poncelet’s ideal synonymous and mechanical translation. Yet it is these features – the unstable use terminology; the frequent employment of multiple Latin words to translate a single, Greek term; and the selection of Latin terms which often have a different nuance or semantic range from their Greek counterparts – which will be particularly illuminating.

---

8 Hartung (1970) 46ff. The Latin *ratio* translates only the sense corresponding to LSJ λέγω (B) II (“computation” or “reckoning”) and not (B) III (“verbal expression” or “utterance”). Poncelet (1957) 106-25 collects a large number of instances in which the prepositions of Latin fail to, as he claims, match the full force of the Greek prepositions they translate.

9 Hartung (1970) 45. An example of the use of *animus* is at Cic. *Tusc.* 1.46, while the preferred *mens* is found at e.g. Cic. *Tusc.* 1.22, in the discussion of an Aristotelian view of the soul which will be considered in greater detail in ch. 3 p.201-3. Poncelet (1957) collects a large number of instances of variatio sermonis among verbal phrases and prepositions, and summarises his findings at p.360-1.

10 This will be discussed in more detail in section II below.

11 We should not, *pace* Hartung (1970), attempt to explain them away in our defence of Ciceronian translation.
and informative for our understanding of the literary and philosophical implications of Cicero’s translation technique. Once we accept the impossibility of fully synonymous translation and adopt a new conception of translation a creative rewriting, we can see these as departures from the original as representing particular authorial choices. While Cicero’s preferred translation of λόγος, for example, does indeed seem to be ratio, there are also moments at which we find the locution ratio et oratio, which retains the semantic content of the original that is absent from ratio alone. Cicero’s use of the sole term ratio in other contexts, then, can be seen as a choice to leave one semantic possibility of the original Greek untranslated, rather than an inability (either on the part of the author, or of the Latin language) to fully match the semantic range of the original.

Once we reject Poncelet’s theoretical position, and the belief that all translations are aimed at complete synonymy with the original, we are left with the question of what motivations we should attribute to Cicero’s choice of particular Latin words for the translation of Greek terms – if they are not, in every case, guided by absolute fidelity to the original text, what does guide them? The most common response to this question has been that Cicero’s aims in adapting his Greek sources are purely rhetorical. Two

\[\text{12 E.g. Cic. Off. 1.50.}\]
\[\text{13 Frank (1992) 240-277 carefully delineates the different meanings of ratio in philosophical contexts throughout the Ciceronian corpus, including, along with Überlegung (the rational calculation identified by Hartung), Methode (“philosophical method”) (De Orat. 2.147), Theorie (“system of analysis”) (De Orat. 3.195), and Gesetzmäßigkeit (“regularity/order”) (Nat. D. 2.155).}\]
influential scholars who have held this position are Moreschini and Traglia, and it is also
the view of Lambardi, whose work we will consider at greater length in Chapter 4.
Moreschini, whose work provides a comprehensive introduction to the evidence for
Cicero’s translations of Greek philosophical terminology, argues that those who expect a
faithful, mechanical translation from a Roman author are acting anachronistically.\textsuperscript{14} He
advocates, instead, viewing Cicero within the adaptive tradition of \textit{traduzione artistica}, as
suggested in the opening chapter of this dissertation.\textsuperscript{15} The kind of adaptation he
envisages Cicero performing upon his source text, however, is of a purely rhetorical type
\textit{(una rielaborazione retorico-letteraria}) in which the Roman author deviates from the
original Greek in the service of Latin \textit{eloquentia} and its stylistic imperatives.\textsuperscript{16}
Similarly, Traglia, focusing more narrowly on Cicero’s translations of Plato and Epicurus, argues
that Cicero’s frequent claims to be translating “as an orator” should cause us to expect a
form of rhetorical elaboration from his philosophical translations that explains his failure
to provide a mechanical translation.\textsuperscript{17} However, in performing this rhetorical reworking
of the Greek, both Moreschini and Traglia assume that Cicero must necessarily

\textsuperscript{14} Moreschini (1979).
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid. 99-100: \textit{Ora, per quanto riguarda la attività filosofica di Cicerone, siffatti criteri di valutazione sono senza dubbio calzanti: l’Arpinate per primo non nega certo la validità di una rielaborazione retorico-letteraria della sue opere filosofiche.}
\textsuperscript{16} Moreschini (1979) 100. A similar approach is employed by Lambardi (1982), whose work on Cicero’s translation of the \textit{Timaeus} we will explore more fully in Chapter 4, p.208-14.
\textsuperscript{17} Traglia (1971) 309: \textit{Anche qui, dunque, non traduzione alla lettera, ma traduzione di schietto timbro latino, che renda con parole ben rispondenti all’uso della lingua in cui si traduce, gli stessi concetti, le stesse figure che sono nel modello greco.} He here points to Cicero’s claim: \textit{nec converti ut interpres, sed ut orator (De Opt. Gen. Orat. 14).} This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 1, p. 45ff.
compromise the success of the translation of the philosophical concepts expressed by his original Greek texts. As Moreschini puts it:

É necessario, quindi, vedere se questa elaborazione retorica danneggia la precisione del tradurre in lingua latina i concetti e, soprattutto, la terminologia filosofica greca... Da questo punto di vista, si potrebbe dire che la traduzione ciceroniana oscilla da un polo di maggiore elaborazione retorica all’altro polo, di scupolo, di rigore filologico.\textsuperscript{18}

Even while defending Cicero’s rhetorically fluid approach to his source material, then, these scholars accept Poncelet’s view that absolute fidelity to the semantic content of the original is an implicit aim of philosophical translation, and argue that Cicero, in privileging rhetorical elaboration, has lost the one-to-one correspondence and absolute synonymy between technical terms in the original and those in the translated text which would constitute true philosophical “rigour”.\textsuperscript{19} This view has remained for the most part

\textsuperscript{18} Moreschini (1979) 100. His conclusion that this pay-off between accuracy and rhetorical elaboration is found throughout Cicero’s philosophical works comes at p.177-8: La traduzione, a causa della fretta con cui lo scrittore lavorò, mostra qua e là qualche innegabile inesattezza; forse anche a causa della mentalità non rigorosamente filosofica di Cicerone, il quale mirò in primo luogo a rendere in latino il concetto filosofico nel suo nucleo essenziale, senza dedicare particolare attenzione a riprodurre, a mo’ di fotografia, tutti gli aspetti delle definizioni o dei termini tecnici greci.

\textsuperscript{19} Traglia (1979) 313 also laments the inability of Cicero’s Latin to fully match up to its Greek counterpart, due, again, to the lack of “rigour” caused by the absence of a one-to-one correspondence between Greek and Latin technical terms: Ed è vero anche che il latino era privo di quelle risorse espressive di cui era ricco il greco. Ciò ha tanto più valore e tanto più va tenuto presente quando si tratti di un linguaggio tecnico, come quello filosofico, in cui certi concetti e termini erano stati fissati in greco con quel rigore tecnico di cui il latino mancava. He cites as the cause of this lack of philosophical rigour the povertà of the Latin language, as identified by Poncelet.
unchallenged and has been implicitly repeated in more recent scholarship on this subject.\textsuperscript{20}

The aim of this chapter will be to consider whether there might be any wider literary or philosophical aims that can be attributed to Cicero’s particular translation decisions, rather than putting each of Cicero’s translation choices down to the desire for rhetorical elaboration at the expense of coherent thought. There have been a number of recent articles that have employed one or other of these approaches successfully - searching either for a philosophical motivation for Cicero’s choices, or for a literary one. Powell has argued, much in the manner of Moreschini and Traglia, that Cicero often has stylistic reasons for translating particular terms in the way he does in a given context.\textsuperscript{21} He improves on the position of these earlier scholars, however, by suggesting that there might be wider literary implications for particular stylistic choices, for example, the use of difficult vocabulary in translating Epicurean terminology dramatises for the reader Epicurus’ own obscurist prose style.\textsuperscript{22} Michel, meanwhile, highlights instances in which Cicero seems to clarify, disambiguate, and, at times, simplify, the meaning of an original

\textsuperscript{20} See, for example, Glucker (1995) 130 who attributes instances where a Latin term is not fully synonymous to its Greek original to Cicero or his immediate sources being “confused”, rather than considering the possibility that the author might have chosen to employ a different translation procedure in this context and the possible reasons for this choice.

\textsuperscript{21} E.g. Powell (1995) 287 for the translation of νόμος as both lex and mos at Cic. Tim. 38 as demonstrating characteristic Ciceronian abundantia.

\textsuperscript{22} Powell (1995) 282: “Perhaps Cicero also had in mind that Epicurus was not a great stylist, and to render him into less than elegant Latin would therefore be appropriate enough.”
Greek term in the interests of successfully communicating a difficult, Greek, philosophical idea to a new, Roman audience. Finally, Hoenig has argued of Cicero’s *Timaeus* 29b2-d3 that the translation of the Platonic terms εἰκὼς λόγος and εἰκὼς μῦθος as *similitudo veri* and *probabilia*, respectively, works to provide a philosophical interpretation of the original Platonic model. The choice of this Latin terminology, Hoenig argues, shows that Cicero is presenting the Platonic *Timaeus* as written in the sceptical tradition which would later be embraced by Philo, depicting Timaeus’ speech as an attempt to provide a probable account of reality which acts as a starting point for investigation and refutation, rather than as a fictitious myth (as μῦθος might otherwise imply). Each of these approaches has shown the valuable results that a study of the philosophical or literary implications of Cicero’s translation choices can yield, yet the philosophical and literary approaches have rarely been combined together.

---

23 Michel (1990) 83 argues that Cicero often employs familiar Latin terms denoting general categories which would be easily comprehensible to his readers, rather than slavishly attempting to reproduce the subtle nuances of his original. He goes on to claim that, in employing “common language” in this way, Cicero is furthering his aims of popularising Greek philosophy, making this branch of knowledge more accessible to his Roman audience, and, as a consequence, his own work more pedagogically successful. Michel (1990) 81: *Cicéron propose en même temps les éléments d’une pédagogie philosophique*. The specifics of the Ciceronian pedagogical approach envisaged by Michel rely on a particular view of Cicero’s Platonism, and the role of ideal forms in his philosophical system. Even if we do not accept that Cicero sees his philosophical texts as serving to lead his readers towards ideal forms (for a brief discussion of which see Gildenhard (2013) and Chapter 4 p.265ff), Michel nevertheless importantly notes that Cicero adapts the terminology of his Greek models in order to communicate philosophical ideas in a manner which would be more accessible to his Roman audience. This idea is also found in his earlier work (e.g. Michel (1973) 139).

24 Hoenig (2013) 4-7. Hoenig even argues that, in doing this, it also produces a particular intertextual reading, as the translation serves to interpret the original text and to attribute a particular philosophical position to Plato: “[Cicero’s translation] is a contribution to, and an interpretation, of its own accord, of the body of knowledge it is intended to communicate.” p. 1.
These recent approaches have also been aimed at answering very specific questions in terms of the literary and philosophical effects of Cicero’s translation choices, and so have had no need to consider how the particular translation procedures employed by Cicero achieve these effects. We are, however, in a unique position to be able to employ the finding of linguistics and translation theory in our study of Cicero’s philosophical works. A recent work by Nicolas, contains a clear and comprehensive overview of instances of what he calls Graeco-Latin autonymie in Cicero’s philosophical works – a category which picks out those moments of explicitly marked translation from Greek to Latin in these texts.\(^{25}\) This is an invaluable reference work for anyone interested in Cicero’s translations of Greek philosophical terminology, as the appendices conscientiously catalogue every example of marked translation in the corpus. This work catalogues the kinds of procedures which Cicero uses for translating Greek technical terms, but makes no attempt to explain why he employs the particular procedures he does in their individual contexts, being interested in Cicero’s works only as *un inestimable* ...

---

\(^{25}\) Nicolas (2005) xii adopts the definition of *autonomie* of Rey-Debove (1973): *[l’autonomie] est celui par lequel le locuteur utilise un terme (ou un énoncé) en dehors de toute référence extra-linguistique. Il y a autonyme lorsque le terme ainsi utilisé n’a de référent qu’en lui-même, en tant que terme (ou énoncé).* Interlinguistic *autonomie*, then, occurs when a term is referred to as being equivalent to another term in a different language (in statements such as “X in Latin is Y in Greek”). In other words, this covers the class of explicitly marked Greek-to-Latin translations.
In laboratoire de la néologie in which we might study how various Greek morphological forms might be translated into Latin.\(^\text{26}\)

This chapter, then, will attempt to build on these earlier scholarly trends to try to give a more complete picture of Cicero’s translations of technical terms, by considering the relationship between Cicero’s linguistic choices and their literary, philosophical, and intertextual implications. To do this, we will employ the three-fold approach outlined in our opening chapter, considering the translation procedures used by Cicero, the immediate translation outcomes these generate, and the intertextual relationships thereby established. In doing this, we will show that a careful consideration of Cicero’s translations of technical terms in terms of their literary or philosophical effects can provide us with more complete and satisfactory explanations for Cicero’s translation choices, than those of Moreschini, Traglia, and others who claim that Cicero’s translations are aimed at rhetorical elaboration at the expense of philosophical coherence.

II: The Example of \(\kappaατάληψις\)

\(^{26}\) Nicolas (2005) xii. The same focus upon the morphological aspects of Cicero’s translations is shown in Nicolas (2000). His earlier book (Nicolas (1996)) will be of more interest to us in the later sections of this chapter as, although it also has a purely linguistic emphasis, it focuses more upon the ways in which semantic calque of Greek terms can change the semantic range of a Latin term, and less on the morphology by which certain Greek word forms can be translated.
Now, then, let us turn to an in-depth, illustrative example, in order to clarify what is at stake in the methodological debate that we have just outlined, and what new insights the integrated, three-tiered approach we have developed may provide us with. An important instance, which has been treated in a large number of studies dealing with Cicero’s translations of the technical terminology of Greek philosophy, is κατάληψις. The varying methodological approaches to Ciceronian translation, which we have outlined in the preceding section, have resulted in different interpretations of Cicero’s translation of this term. While many of these contribute important insights, individually each of these, as we shall see, either leaves interesting features of Cicero’s translation choice unexplained, or attributes these features to Cicero’s lack of competence as a translator. We will first set out the problem, and then, in the next section, show how the integrated approach adopted in this dissertation can help us to overcome these interpretive issues.

Κατάληψις is a key technical term in Hellenistic epistemology. Its use as an epistemological term seems to originate from the founder of the Stoic school, Zeno, and it came to describe a concept fundamental to the epistemological theories of both the Stoics and the so-called “Old Academy” of Antiochus of Ascalon (who, as Cicero tells us, took over the epistemological system of the Stoics almost wholesale). In Anglophone

27 For Zeno’s role as originator of this theory see Cic. Acad. 1.41; for Antiochus’ adoption of these Stoic ideas see e.g. Cic. Acad. 1.43, 2.69-70. For more on Antiochus and his epistemological borrowings from the Stoics, see Brittain (2006); Allen (2011); Glucker (1978).
scholarship, this term is often translated (in language deriving directly from one of Cicero’s own suggested Latin translations) as “cognition”, and it denotes the epistemic state that is produced, on the Stoic/Old Academic theory, by assent to a particular kind of impression known as a “cognitive impression” (φαντασία καταληπτική). According to this system, a “cognitive impression” is a particularly vivid mental representation which comes from what exists, is stamped in accordance to what exists (so giving an accurate representation of the thing itself), and is produced in such a way that it could not come from anything other than what exists. As such, the causal history and representational content of the cognitive impression guarantees the reality of that which it represents, and so the truth of the cognitive impression itself. The phenomenological quality of the impression, meanwhile, described as its vividness or clarity (ἐνάργεια), serves to indicate the cognitive nature of the impression, and consequently that it is an accurate

28 For a definition of κατάληψις and its role in Stoic epistemology see Frede (1999) 296-300 and Annas (1980) 84-5, the latter of whom translates this term as “apprehension”, rather than “cognition”. Annas relies primarily on the evidence from Sextus Empiricus in her analysis, while Frede leans more heavily on Cicero, but the main features of the account given by each is the same. Annas (1980) 84: “apprehension [i.e. κατάληψις] is assent to an apprehensive impression [i.e. φαντασία καταληπτική]”, citing Sextus Math. 8.397: ἔστε μὲν οὖν ἡ κατάληψις... καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας συγκατάθεσις (“So a cognition is assent to a cognitive impression”). Frede (1999) 297, notes “It is fairly clear that Zeno’s first cautious move was to claim that, beside mere belief or opinion (δόξα) and knowledge (ἐπίστημη), we have to distinguish a third kind of state, namely cognition (κατάληψις)”. In support of this, he cites Cic Acad. 1.41: visis non omnibus adiungebat fidem sed is solum quae propriam quandam haberent declarationem earum rerum quae viderentur; id autem visum cum ipsum per se cerneretur, comprehendibile... sed cum acceptum iam et approbatum esset, comprehensionem appellabat. (“He [i.e. Zeno] did not attach belief to all impressions, but only to those which had a certain peculiar means of denoting the things which were seen – but this impression, when perceived in itself, he called “cognitive”... but when it has been received and assented to, he called this a “cognition””). See Lévy (1992) 223-231 for further discussion of, and bibliography regarding, the original Stoic theory and its Ciceronian presentation.

29 See Sextus Math. 7.248 and Cic. Acad. 2.18 and 77 for definitions of the cognitive impression.
representation of reality.\textsuperscript{30} When someone assents to this kind of cognitive impression, and thus enters into a state of cognition (κατάληψις), they are said to mentally accept this impression as representing the truth, and so to form a belief in its contents.\textsuperscript{31} Because, then, cognition (κατάληψις) is defined as accepting as true an impression which is guaranteed, by its content and causal history, to be true, it is presented by the Stoics/Old Academy as being a third kind of epistemic state which falls in between knowledge and mere opinion.\textsuperscript{32} It is less stable than knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), as it is does not have the necessary dialectical underpinnings to ensure that this assent is fixed and permanent; but it has a higher value than mere opinion, because its content is guaranteed to be true.\textsuperscript{33} This concept of cognition is important for the Stoic/Old Academic epistemological system, because they claim that the existence of this third epistemic state provides a “criterion of truth” which can support our conviction in our ability to get to know facts about reality.\textsuperscript{34} This is because the process of cognition, as they define it, allows us to

\textsuperscript{30} Sextus Math. 7.257, 405 and Cic. Acad. 2.17 talk of the especial clarity or vividness (ἐνάργεια) if these kinds of impression. See Frede (1987) for further discussion.
\textsuperscript{31} See Cic. Acad. 2.34 for a description of assent. Brittain (2014) 333 summarises: “to assent to a rational impression—that is, to a perceptual or non-perceptual thought that something is the case—is to take it to be true and thus to believe it.”
\textsuperscript{32} Cic. Acad. 1.42: sed inter scientiam et inscientiam comprehensionem illum quam dixi collocabat. (“But between knowledge and ignorance he [i.e. Zeno] located that cognition I have spoken of.”).
\textsuperscript{33} See Cic. Acad. 1.41-42, 2.23. Frede (1999) 298: “A belief which is such that one holds the belief that something is the case precisely because it is the case, is guaranteed to be true. Hence we can call it a ‘cognition’.”
\textsuperscript{34} For the idea of cognition as providing the criterion of truth, see Sextus M 7.152 and Cic. Acad. 1.42: e quo sensibus etiam fidem tribuebat, quod ut supra dixi comprehensio facta sensibus et vera esse illi et fidelis videbatur... quodque natura quasi normam scientiae et principium sui dedisset unde postea notiones rerum in animis imprimenterat... (“On the strength of this he attributed trustworthiness to the senses, because, as I said above, the cognition produced by the senses seemed both true and trustworthy... and
directly grasp truths about the world around us without requiring any particular kind of pre-existing knowledge, and so to have faith in the information provided by our senses – provided, of course, that the impressions they produce have the suitable level of vividness.\textsuperscript{35}

Cicero, in each of the two editions of his epistemological treatise, the \textit{Academica}, gives an account of the Stoic/Old Academic epistemological system. In the first edition (of which we have only the 2\textsuperscript{nd} book), this account is presented by the character, Lucullus;\textsuperscript{36} in the second version (of which we only have the 1\textsuperscript{st} book) it is the character of Varro who is the mouthpiece for this system.\textsuperscript{37} In both of these versions of the

\textit{because nature had given, as it were, a criterion of knowledge and first principle of itself, from which afterwards notions of things could be impressed upon the mind...”). It is true that in the majority of our Stoic sources, it is the cognitive impression that is taken to be the criterion of truth, rather than cognition itself (see Striker (1996a) 51ff and (1996b) 157). In spite of this slight different in formulation, however, the use of the cognitive impression as a criterion of truth is still, necessarily, dependent upon the possibility of the epistemic state of cognition, and the value of cognition for guaranteeing truth dependent upon the existence of cognitive impressions, so both cognition and cognitive impressions make essential contributions to the Stoic picture of this criterion.\textsuperscript{35}

Whether, on the orthodox Stoic view, a cognitive impression, by virtue of possessing the requisite level of vividness and so appearing \textit{as} cognitive, naturally \textit{compels} us to assent, or merely strongly moves us to assent, is the subject of some scholarly debate. Annas (1980) 91 and Brittain (2014) argue that it does not compel assent, while Irwin (1983) 129 argues against Annas that it does. Although Brittain gives ingenious hypothetical examples of instances in which the Stoics may not want to hold that a sage would be compelled to assent to a cognitive impression, it is clear that Cicero, at least, is interested in the standard case in which an appreciation of the vividness of a cognitive impression would be causally sufficient for producing assent (see e.g. Cic. \textit{Acad.} 2.36).\textsuperscript{36}

Although it seems that there was also a discussion by Hortensius in the lost first book, which seems to have dealt with the Stoic/Old Academic system in broader outlines (c.f. Cic. \textit{Acad.} 2.10).\textsuperscript{37}

The character of Varro claims his affiliation to the Old Academy at Cic. \textit{Acad.} 1.7, and gives a short account of what is claimed at Cic. \textit{Acad.} 1.43 to be the shared epistemological system of the Stoics and Old Academy \textit{(breviter sane minimeque obscure exposita est... a te Varro et veteris Academiae ratio et Stoicorum. Horum esse autem arbitror, ut Antiocho nostro familiari placebat, correctionem veteris...)}
Academica, then, Cicero must find a way of talking about the important Stoic idea of cognition - a requirement which necessitates the translation of the Greek technical term, κατάληψις, into Latin. Interestingly for our purposes in this study, in each case he employs multiple, Latin terms to translate this single Greek term. Cicero’s earliest, extant translation of the Greek term κατάληψις can be found in Lucullus’ speech in the first edition of the Academica, where we find the term being translated using the three Latin terms cognitio, perceptio, and comprehensio:

nec definiri aiebant necesse esse quid esset cognitio aut perceptio aut, si verbum e verbo volumus, comprehensio, quam κατάληψις illi vocant.

They [i.e. those Stoics who believed that there was no point in trying to refute the Sceptics] also said that there was no need to define the essential nature of the cognitio [“understanding”] or perceptio [“mentally seizing”] or

Academicæ potius quam aliquam novam diciplinam putandum. “The system of the Old Academy and the Stoics has indeed been recounted by you, Varro, briefly and with the least amount of obscurity. However, I think that the [view] of the Stoics must be considered as a correction to the Old Academy, as it seemed right to our friend Antiochus to say, rather than some new system”). Lucullus, meanwhile, adopts the role of speaker for the Old Academy in the part of the first edition which survives (Cic. Acad. 2.10: agam igitur sicut Antiochus agebat. “I will act [i.e. in this discussion] as Antiochus”), and in doing so works to defend the position of the Stoic Zeno from sceptical criticism (Cic. Acad. 2.18). For the two versions see Brittain (2006), Reid (1874) lxii-lxiii, 140-1 Lévy (1992) 137-40, and Gurd (2007). For a full analysis of the Ciceronian account and its relationship to the remaining fragments of the Greek Stoics collected in Arnim (1903-24), see Lišcu (1937) 29-46.


39 Pace Brittain (2006) 138 who records only perceptio and comprehensio as translations of κατάληψις. The final term, comprehensio, is occasionally found in its syncopated form comprensio as a translation of κατάληψις (e.g. Cic. Acad. 1.31). As the shortened form acts consistently as a substitute for the longer form with no difference in meaning, and it is unclear if this orthographic distinction is original, comprehensio and comprensio will be treated as variants of the same term for our purposes.
(if we wish to give a word for word translation) comprehensio [“mentally grasping”], which they call κατάληψις.

(Cic. Acad. 2.17)

Again, we find these same three terms being used to translate this single term, κατάληψις, in the second edition of the Academica. When Varro first describes the Stoic theory of κατάληψις, he refers to this state as comprehensio.40 In Cicero’s reply to Varro’s speech, however, during a speech in which he explicitly adopts the stance of Arcesilas and argues against Zeno using Zeno’s own terms, he uses perceptio, cognitio, and their cognates to refer to the Stoic theory of κατάληψις.41

Moreover, Cicero also uses these three terms in a consistent manner in his later work, the De Finibus, when he has reason to refer to this same idea:

rerum autem cognitiones, quas vel comprehensiones vel perceptiones vel, si haec verba aut minus placent aut minus intelleguntur, καταλήψεις appellemus licet...

---

40 Cic. Acad. 1.40: sed cum acceptum iam et approbatum esset, comprehensio appellabat (“But when it [i.e. a cognitive impression] was assented to and approved of, he called this comprehensio [“understanding”]”).
41 Cic. Acad. 1.45: ...neque hoc quicquam esse turpius quam cognitioni et perceptioni assensionem approbationemque praecurrere. (“and nothing is more disgraceful than that assent and approval exceed understanding and mental seizing.”) Cic. Acad. 1.44: Arcesilas, like many of his philosophical predecessors said: nihil cognosci, nihil percipi, nihil scire posse (“it is possible to understand nothing, to mentally seize nothing, to know nothing”).
Cognitiones [“understandings”] of things, which are either comprehensiones [“mental graspings”] or perceptiones [“mental seizings”], or - if these terms are less pleasing or intelligible – may be called καταλήψεις...

(Cic. De Fin. 3.17)

The translation of the single, Greek term, κατάληψις, by means of three different Latin terms in these passages violates Poncelet’s requirement that there be a one-to-one correspondence between an original Greek philosophical term and its Latin translation. Later scholars have tried to defend Cicero from this criticism or refocus the discussion upon different aspects of the Ciceronian translation project, as we have outlined above, but they have still, nevertheless, had problems in providing a full and satisfactory account explaining Cicero’s choice to use multiple Latin terms to translate a single Greek word.42

Moreschini, who, as we already discussed, accepts that a mechanical, one-to-one terminological correspondence is needed for the production of a rigorous philosophical translation, but sees Cicero’s own work as lying, rather, in the creative tradition of

____________________________

42 I will leave aside here the suggestion of Glucker (2012) 45 that the use of multiple Latin terms and the presence of comments upon his translation choices indicate that Cicero “was not entirely happy with this translation”. While it is, of course, prudent to heed warnings against “excessive reverence for Ciceronian Latin” (1995) 288, this explanation just does not fit with the evidence of the texts. The fact that Cicero repeatedly used these three terms and their cognates in combination, for both the original edition of the Academica and the revised second edition (e.g. Acad. 41-4, 2.23, 2.62), suggests that he saw this collocation as serving a purpose. That this combination was, further, used in the later text De Finibus (3.17) and in a passage which is praised for its lucidity of exposition (3.19), underscores the impression that the use of these terms by Cicero was considered and purposeful. The suggestion of Sandbach (1971) 20 that Cicero has misunderstood the original Greek term because of the speed at which he read his Greek source has been dispensed with by Lévy (1992) 227 and will not be dealt with again here.
Roman traduzione artistica, identifies only one of the Latin terms used by Cicero as the “exact” translation of the philosophical idea of κατάληψις: namely, comprehensio. For this scholar, Cicero includes the two remaining terms (perceptio and cognitio) in his translation in the name of duplicazione retorica, but, in doing so, he obscures the semantic differences between these various Latin terms. Powell, whose reading is more sympathetic towards Cicero as a philosophical thinker, nevertheless, provides, in part, a similar explanation for the Ciceronian translation of κατάληψις, arguing that such translations are in keeping with the abundantia of normal Ciceronian style. For these scholars, then, the translation of this single, Greek term through multiple Latin terms serves an essentially rhetorical purpose. Without any reference to the literary or philosophical context of these translations, however, it is not entirely clear what precisely the proposed rhetorical purpose might be – is it these particular terms, in this particular order that work to produce a sought-for rhetorical effect, or is the sheer piling up of vocabulary is sufficient? Is the use of three words rhetorically effective because it reveals the copiousness of Cicero’s philosophical vocabulary as greater than that of his Greek

43 Moreschini (1979) 109. For the cognate comprehendibile as the traduzione essata of καταληπτικός see p.108.
44 As Moreschini (1979) 108 wryly observes, on his reading, Cicero uses these multiple terms forse con eccessiva profusione.
45 Powell (1995) 193 rejects, for example, the idea that this approach to translation reveals an “untidiness” in Cicero’s practice.
46 Powell (1995) 193. Though Powell gives this only as a partial explanation, pointing also to the importance of translations using multiple words to the articulation of difficult Greek concepts. Lévy (1992) 213 gives a similar explanation for the multiple translations of the technical term φαντασία, saying: il [i.e. Cicero] a cherché à mettre un peu de varietas dans un vocabulaire trop technique.
model (as we will argue is the case), or does a three-term definition hold the same rhetorical value regardless of the form of the original Greek? It is only by studying the contribution that each of these terms makes to the translation of the Greek κατάληψις, and the significance that this has for our reading of the text and its relationship to its Greek sources, that the full rhetorical ramifications of Cicero’s vocabulary choice can be seen.

In addition to the concern that the designation of Cicero’s translation technique as “rhetorical” dismisses, rather than explains, his use of particular terms, the attribution of solely stylistic motivations to Cicero’s translation choice does not (as Powell, if not Moreschini, himself notes) do justice to the author’s own account of his practice of using multiple Latin terms in the translation of single, Greek technical term.\(^47\) Cicero, on more than one occasion, asserts that it is his custom to employ multiple Latin terms which pick out the same Greek, philosophical idea, in order to better articulate this concept. In discussing virtue (the Greek, ἀρετή) in the De Finibus, he uses numerous different Latin terms (virtus, honestum, rectum, laudabile, decorum) to pick out this concept, giving his reason for doing this as follows: “for what it is will be better known if it is denoted by a number of words meaning the same thing”.\(^48\) Cicero’s practice in this example reveals to us exactly how the use of multiple Latin terms can serve to make a concept “better known” to his reader. Although all of these terms pick out the same thing

\(^47\) Powell (1995) 294
\(^48\) Cic. Fin. 3.14: erit enim notius quale sit pluribus notatum vocabulis idem declarantibus
(namely, the Stoic concept of virtue), each does so in a different way, by picking out a different characteristic of this same concept. *Laudabile* picks out virtue under the description of that which is worthy of praise; *decorum* under the description of what is appropriate; *rectum* under the description of that which is directed in the right way; and so on. Each of these terms, then, while picking out the same concept, has a different *sense*, and so makes its own unique contribution to communicating the various features of the Stoic idea of virtue.\(^{49}\) The use of a number of Latin synonyms in order to better communicate a technical, philosophical idea is evidenced again in the *De Finibus*, where this technique is used to more fully specify the characteristics of vice (*κακία*),\(^{50}\) and identified as a customary practice of Ciceronian translation (“I am even *accustomed*, if I am unable to do otherwise, to express using many words what is given in Greek by one”).\(^{51}\) His practice of employing multiple, synonymous terms in order to more clearly articulate a Greek, philosophical concept is once more pointed out by Cicero in the *Tuscan Disputations*, where he again gives multiple Latin terms for virtue (*honestas, dignitas, decus, laus*), explaining his practice as follows: “I intend all of these terms to mean one thing, but I use many so that I may express this thing to the utmost.”\(^{52}\) So, then, 

---

\(^{49}\) See ch.1 p. 31 n. 38 for the difference between reference (the object or concept denoted by a term) and sense (the way in which a term picks out its reference).

\(^{50}\) Cic. Fin. 3.14: *ut hoc quoque pluribus nominibus insigne faciamus* (“so that we may clarify this too by using many terms”)

\(^{51}\) De Fin 3.15: *equidem soleo etiam, quod uno Graeci, si aliter non possum, idem pluribus verbis exponere.* Emphasis my own.

\(^{52}\) Cic. Tusc. 2.46: *hisce ego pluribus nominibus unam rem declarari volo, sed utor, ut quam maxime significem, pluribu
Cicero himself presents his practice of using multiple Latin words to translate a single, Greek technical term as being a matter of philosophical clarification, rather than pure rhetorical elaboration.

Yet even those scholars who have taken Cicero at his word and attributed to his multiple translations the purpose of philosophical clarification have fallen short of providing a full analysis of how, exactly, this clarification might be achieved in a case such as the translation of κατάληψις. Hartung, for example, although he identifies each Ciceronian term as making a contribution to the clarification of this Stoic/Old Academic concept, gives little account of how each of the Latin terms selected might serve this function. 53 The obvious care and attention lavished by Cicero upon his vocabulary choices when he translates such key, Greek, technical terms, however, coupled with the fact that Cicero explicitly points out his translations of κατάληψις as translations, asking the reader to compare his Latin vocabulary choices with the original Greek, suggests that

53 Hartung (1970) 27: Cicero benutzt hier zunächst das schon seit Terenze bekannte Wort ‘cognitio’, das ihm besonders als juristischer Terminus bereits geläufig war... und schließt daran die beiden von ihm selbst abgeleiteten Synonyma ‘perceptio’ und ‘comprehensio’. Er setzt in der Regel, wie erwähnt, mehrere Synonyma dieser Bedeutung eindeutig deshalb nebeneinander, um jedes Mißverständnis auszuschließen. Indeed, since, according to Hartung’s theoretical position (as examined more fully on p.70 n.7), each of the terms Cicero uses to translate a Greek, technical term takes on absolute synonymy with its Greek counterpart, it is unclear what sort of account he might be able to give. If these Latin terms acquire the full semantic range of the original Greek term when they are designated as its translations, they would each also share the same sense and reference as each other. So it is hard to see how, according to this view, each of these terms might contribute something individually to the articulation of this concept.
a more complete analysis would not be in vain.\textsuperscript{54} This would take better account, too, of Cicero’s repeated emphasis in the second edition of the \textit{Academica} on the fact that the audience to Varro’s speech (Cicero and Atticus) \textit{know} the philosophical ideas Varro is recounting in their original Greek form – what they are interested in (and what they draw the reader’s attention to) is how, exactly, Varro translates this into Latin.\textsuperscript{55} Hartung does, however, point out a further issue for anyone trying to interpret this particular Ciceronian translation: in support of his claims that Cicero’s Latin language translations take on the full semantic range of their Greek originals, he notes that \textit{comprehensio} seems here to take on a new, philosophical meaning.\textsuperscript{56} Unlike the cases of \textit{ἀρετή} and \textit{κακία} examined above, then, Cicero is not here only using familiar terms which already have an accepted, relevant sense in Latin, and so might be obvious candidates for picking out a shared referent under different descriptions. Rather he is using a Latin term whose standard sense might seem to be at odds with the technical, philosophical meaning of the Greek

\textsuperscript{54} The evidence for the care and attention that Cicero gives to his translation of Greek philosophical terminology comes both from his remarks on translation within his philosophical texts, for which see Gluck (2012), and from his letters (for example \textit{Att.} 16.14.3 on the translation of \textit{καθῆκον} as \textit{officium} - for what we can learn of the Cicero’s aims in writing his philosophical works more generally, Baraz (2012) 44-95).

\textsuperscript{55} See e.g. Atticus’ comments in \textit{Acad.} 1.14 and \textit{Acad.} 1.18. In the latter of these he responds to Varro’s claim that to try to teach Cicero and Atticus these things is as foolish as trying to teach something to Minerva by saying that he is delighted to hear these ideas expressed in Latin (\textit{Latine}).

\textsuperscript{56} Hartung (1970) 27-8. Lévy (1992) 226 emphasises that the adjective Cicero derives from this term, \textit{comprehensibilis}, seems to be entirely his own creation. Lişcu (1937) 64 even claims that the term \textit{perceptio}, too, is a new, Ciceronian coinage, but its use in the \textit{Rhetorica ad Herennium} (1.3) makes this unlikely (see Achard (1989) and (1994) for the possible dating of this text and its relationship to Cicero’s own \textit{De Inventione}).
term. In order to understand why Cicero is using each of these terms here, therefore, we need to consider the particular translation procedures he uses in generating these different translations, and how they might serve to clarify different nuances of the original concept. After this, we can consider the next two levels of our tripartite methodology, considering firstly what effect these translation procedures have upon our reading of the immediate context, in both rhetorical and philosophical terms; and, finally, how this relates to our wider understanding of this text and the way in which it positions itself in respect to its Greek sources.

III: A New Approach to Stoic/Old Academic Epistemological Terms

Let us now, then, consider the particular translation procedures employed by Cicero in producing his three-word translation of the philosophical term, κατάληψις. We will consider firstly cognitio, which, as we shall see, is a synonymous translation of the Greek term, but does not, prior to its use as a translation of κατάληψις, exhibit a semantic range that is entirely identical to the Greek term. We will then turn to perceptio and

---

Although, as we shall see below, comprehensio had already been used by Cicero in other contexts, and the fact that the noun is derived from a commonly used verb (comprehendo) would, of course, have meant that Latin speakers brought some expectations regarding its meaning to Cicero’s text.
comprehensio, which act as calques of the Greek κατάληψις, and work to communicate elements of the original Greek technical term which cognitio alone does not.

a) cognitio

As Hartung has noted, cognitio, seems to have been in common use before the period in which Cicero began work on his Academica. As we shall see from a brief survey of what evidence we have as to the meaning of this term prior to Cicero’s use of it as a translation for κατάληψις, its semantic range seems to have shared important elements with that of the Greek epistemological term, meaning its use here as a translation should be considered an instance of Cicero’s employment of synonymy.

Before the 1st century BC, we find the use of cognitio not only by Terence, as Hartung observes, but also in Cato’s Origines. In Terence’s Hecyra, the process of recognition described by the term cognitio is presented as being based upon convincing evidence, so as to produce a firm and justified faith in the fact which is recognised. It is

58 For the dates of these texts see Reid (1874) xxxi-xliv. The first edition of Academica seems to have been written in spring/summer 45BC, after Tullia’s death, with the first book of the De Finibus begun around June 45BC, as we can see from the letters in Att. Book 13 (which are surveyed in full by Reid).
59 See Chapter 1 p.31. This is, of course, a case of the kind of limited synonymy possible in interlinguistic translation, in which some, relevant element of the semantic value of the original term is reproduced; rather than the absolute synonymy which is impossible to achieve in the translations of natural language, but is considered necessary for translation to occur according to the Deconstructionist thesis.
this term that Bacchis uses to describe the recognition brought about by the discovery of Philumena’s ring, which provides each of the characters of the play with a clear understanding of each other’s true identity, and so wraps up the plot.\(^{61}\) In its other Terentian use, in the *Eunuchus*, it also seems that this term denotes a reliable understanding of a fact, but here this understanding is, pointedly, one which falls short of actual knowledge. Here, the character of Pythias has a *cognitio* (here perhaps best translated as “correct intuition”) about how she might punish Parmeno, and it is one which turns out to be reliable. But it is not until she begins to test her approach that this *cognitio* can be turned into genuine knowledge. As she says: “I will go inside so that I may make certain of this intuition (*cognitio*)”.\(^{62}\) Although, obviously, these comedies are non-philosophical texts, and so express no formal epistemological system, the Terentian use reveals a semantic range that would allow this term to express the kind of reliable belief in an impression which falls short of true knowledge that is expressed in Stoic/Old Academic epistemology by the term *κατάληψις*. The Catonian usage of *cognitio*, being fragmentary, is harder to assess fully, but it certainly seems to refer to the reliable understanding of some fact, and is employed by Gellius (who is the source for this

\(^{61}\) Ter. *Hec.* 831: *inde est cognitio facta Philumenam compressam esse ab eo et filium inde hunc natum.* (“From this there came about the understanding (*cognitio*) that Philumena had be raped by him, and that his son had been born from this.”).

\(^{62}\) Ter. *Eun.* 921: *ibo intro de cognitione ut certum sciam.* This use is included under TLL *cognitio* 1: *actio recognoscendi.*
fragment) in an attempt to articulate in Latin the epistemological state experienced by the educated reader of Aristotelian texts who can understand their true contents.63

The appropriateness of this term for picking out the kind of reliable belief which, on the Stoic/Old Academic theory, comes from assenting to cognitive impressions, can be further seen from its use in Cicero’s own time in forensic contexts. In this period the term cognitio had developed a technical, legal sense, as the name for a particular kind of judicial inquiry typical of the Roman provinces. In a cognitio, evidence was presented so that the truth of the matter could be ascertained by the presider of the inquiry (usually a provincial governor), and then a verdict was given on this basis.64 It is in this technical, legal sense that we find cognitio used in Cicero’s forensic oratory.65 Its use in this legal context, then, assumes the ability of the process of the cognitio to examine evidence and determine its veracity, so revealing a further connection between the range of meanings

63 Gell. NA, 20.5 (including fr. 662 (Rose) and fr.109 (Peter): Ἀριστοτέλης βασιλεὶ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ εὐ πράττειν. Ἐγραψάς μοι περὶ τῶν ἀκροατικῶν λόγων οἷόμενος δὲν αὐτοῖς φοιλάττειν ἐν ἀπορρήτῳς. Ἡθι οὖν αὐτοῖς καὶ μένους καὶ μὴ ἐκδοδομένους· ξυνετοὶ γάρ εἶσαι μόνοις τοῖς ἡμῶν ἱκοίσασιν. Ἐρρωσο, Ἀλέξανδρε βασιλε. Hoc ego verbum ξυνετοὶ γάρ εἶσαι quaerens uno itidem uerbo dicere aliud non reperti, quam quod est scriptum a M. Catone in sexta origine: 'Itaque ego inquit cognobiliorem cognitionem esse arbitror.' (‘Aristotle to King Alexander, Greeting. You have written to me regarding my acroatic lectures, thinking that I ought to have kept them secret. Know then that they have both been made public and not made public. For they are intelligible (ξυνετοὶ) only to those who have heard me. Farewell, King Alexander.’ When trying, in the phrase ξυνετοὶ γάρ εἶσαι, to express the word ξυνετοὶ by a single Latin term, I found nothing better than what is written by Marcus Cato in the sixth book of his Origins: ‘Therefore I think the understanding (cognitio) is more comprehensible (cognobilior).’” Trans. adapted from Rolfe, 1927).
65 E.g. Cic. De Lege Agraria 2.33, 56, 60, Phil. 2.100, De Haruspicium Responso 14.
of this term and the Stoic/Old Academic theory of κατάληψις, which attributes to this
process of cognition just such a reliable ability to determine the truth. Unlike the
Stoic/Old Academic κατάληψις, however, which reliably guarantees accurate judgment
about the truth value of impressions in all instances, the judicial cognitio is subject to
perversion and error in its real world activities. In Cicero’s description of the historical
Roman institution of the cognitio, then, we see the identity in meaning between the Greek
philosophical term κατάληψις, and the Roman term cognitio begin to break down. In the
De Oratore, meanwhile, we find that in addition to the process of accurately judging
evidence as true without thereby acquiring full knowledge, Cicero also uses the term
cognitio to denote the process of getting to know a discipline in a truly systematic
manner, of the kind which would correspond not to the Stoic/Old Academic concept of
κατάληψις, but to that of ἐπιστήμη. In De Oratore 3.111-4 where Cicero describes the

66 E.g. Cic. De Lege Agraria 2.33, where he complains of miscarriages of justice, in which there has been
cognitio sine consilio (judicial inquiry (cognitio) without counsel).

67 For example, in Cic. De Orat. 3.147 where cognitio is pointedly the accurate, common sense ability to
judge legal and social facts, as opposed to the systematic body of knowledge provided by philosophy: ‘ego
vero,’ inquit ‘Crassae, neque Aristotelem istum neque Carneadem nec philosophorum quemquam desidero...
mihi rerum forensium et communium vulgaris haec cognitio satis magna est ad eam, quam specto,
elloquentiam.’ (‘But I myself, Crassus,’ he [i.e. Sulpicius] said, ‘Want for neither Aristotle himself, nor
Carneades, nor any philosopher... For me, the common understanding (cognitio) of legal and social affairs
is great enough for that eloquence which I have in mind.’)

68 This is classified by the TLL as cognitio IIb2c: a terminus rhetoricus describing the actio cognoscendi of
a particular object (res), as the TLL entry categorises uses of this term according to the identity of the thing
understood, rather than the epistemological status of this act of understanding. The important distinction
between cognition (cognitio-perceptio-comprehensio/κατάληψις) and knowledge (scientia/ἐπιστήμη) on the
Stoic/Old Academic view is clearly articulated at Cic. Acad. 2.23: in quibus solis inesse etiam scientiam
dicimus, quam nos non comprehendensionem modo rerum sed eam stabilem quoque et immutabilem esse
censemus, itemque sapientiam artem vivendi, quae ipsa ex sese habeat constantiam; ea autem constantia si
nihil habeat percepti et cogniti, quauro unde nata sit aut quo modo. (“We say that knowledge consists in
different logical processes by which knowledge (scientia) can be obtained (definition, inference, and deduction), cognitio is the generic term used to cover each of these processes.\textsuperscript{69} In this earlier work, then, Cicero has already employed the term cognitio in the description of Greek philosophy, but he has employed it to denote a wider concept than the Stoic/Old Academic κατάληψις, which encompasses both true belief, and systematic scientific knowledge. We can also see traces of this equivocation in the earlier De Inventione.\textsuperscript{70} So then, Cicero’s own use of this term in legal and rhetorical contexts reveals further semantic overlap between the Latin term cognitio and the Greek term κατάληψις, in that it is used of making accurate judgments of evidence. In addition to this, however, it also shows the moments at which these terms can break apart, with the Latin word being used cover a wider range of epistemic states than the Greek, or referring to legal procedures which ideally involve the production of a state of cognition, but do not always succeed in doing so. This, then, provides one explanation for Cicero’s use of multiple terms to translate the Greek κατάληψις: although there is a significant amount of

\textsuperscript{69} E.g. Cic. De Orat. 3.113: Cognitionis autem tres modi, coniectura, definitio et, ut ita dicam, consecutio. (“However, there are three different kinds of getting to know something (cognitio) – inference, definition, and as I will call it, deduction.”).

\textsuperscript{70} At Cic. De Inv. 1.86: sed eius artificii cognitio eiusmodi est, ut non ad huius artis partem aliquam adiungi possit, sed ipsa separatim longi temporis et magnae atque arduae cognitionis indiget (“but knowledge (cognitio) of that art [i.e. dialectic] is of such a kind so that it is not possible to append it to any part of this art [i.e. rhetoric], but this knowledge (ipsa), itself, requires separately a long period and great effort of getting to know (cognitio)”.) Within this same sentence, then, there seem to be two different uses of the term cognitio, the first denoting full, scientific knowledge, and the second some sort of lower level state or process that leads to knowledge.
semantic overlap between these terms, so that *cognitio* is synonymous with *κατάληψις* in important respects, it does not have an identical semantic scope. Indeed, even within Cicero’s own, earlier, theoretical writings it is used to pick out the very states of knowledge that the Stoics want to differentiate *κατάληψις* from.\(^1\) The use of this term as a translation for the Stoic/Old Academic technical term would seem, then, to require further clarification, which would explain, partially at least, Cicero’s decision to use additional terms, just as we have seen in the cases of ὀρετή and κακία.

b) *perceptio* and *comprehensio*

The two additional terms employed by Cicero in order to further specify the meaning of *κατάληψις*, *perceptio* and *comprehensio*, might initially seem like strange choices to fulfill this role. Each of these terms, in contrast to *cognitio*, can take in a range of meanings which have no obvious connection to epistemology - as we would expect from two nouns which come ultimately from physical verbs of seizing (*capio* and *prehendo/prendo*), rather than a mental verb of knowing (*nosco*). *Perceptio* is used to

\(^1\) Indeed, at occasional moments, such as *Acad.* 2.51, Cicero even employs *cognitio* within a Stoic/Old Academic epistemological context to pick out the mental state of assenting to the *false* impression caused by madness.
describe the taking possession of physical objects, although we also find its use extended figuratively to describe the mental possession of particular facts. Comprehensio, however, is found before the Academica only in Cicero’s rhetorical texts, where it is used to describe two different technical aspects of oratory: the first, the argumentative form known as the “dilemma”; the second, the rhetorical period (a full and well-balanced sentence that, ideally, contains four cola and a particular cadence). In neither of these uses, then, does comprehensio denote a mental activity or state such as the Stoic/Old Academic κατάληψις. The semantic differences apparent in the earlier use of these two terms to that of the Greek philosophical concept may be why scholars have found it hard to specify what contribution they might make to the Ciceronian translation project, other than as empty vessels which might take on an identical meaning of the original Greek term. As we shall see, however, both perceptio and comprehensio add important elements in the Latin articulation of this Greek technical term. Each of these, in reproducing the individual components of the original translates the original term through

---

72 E.g. Cic. Resp. 2.26 and Off. 2.12, where perceptio is used to describe the seizing of crops. TLL perceptio I.A.1.a: actio vel facultas percipiendi in respect to something corporeal.

73 See Cic. De Inv. 1.9 and 1.36. De Inv. 1.9 explicitly specifies that this term is being extended for use in mental situations through use of the term animi: memoria est firma animi rerum ac verborum ad inventionem perceptio (“memory is the firm seizing (perceptio) of the mind of things or words for the sake of rhetorical inventio”). TLL perceptio II.B. 2: actio vel facultas percipiendi, where something is cognitively grasped through learning (discendo).

74 This is an argument which must be accepted as either true or false, also called by Cicero complexio (De Inv. 1.45). For this use see Cic. De Inv. 1.79, 83.

75 For a definition of this period (comprehensio) see Cic. Or. 204, 221-2. See also Cic. Or. 149, 198, 199, 208 (where it is, more generally, the style characterised by the use of these periods which is described), 225, 226.

76 Hartung (1970). This is also implied in the idea of rhetorical elaboration adding no further content to the discussion Moreschini (1979).
semantic calque, and so recreates the physical imagery employed by the Zeno in producing his new Greek epistemological term. Perceptio, meanwhile, in its sense of mental grasping, importantly expands the range of this philosophical idea, revealing the importance of κατάληψις for memory and other epistemological states involving the assent to non-perceptual impressions. So, then, perceptio also contributes to the elucidation of this philosophical concept through its semantic overlap (synonymy) with a sense of the original Greek term that is not found in previous uses of the term cognitio. Comprehensio, on the other hand, precisely because its use is an unusual and unexpected vocabulary choice for the description of a mental state, recreates a further aspect of the original Greek term which Cicero points out to us – namely, the novelty of the terminology it employs. Consequently, we can view this as an interesting instance of the procedure of cultural equivalence, in which Cicero chooses a Latin term which has a similar cultural role to the Greek original, in that its normal use is in non-epistemological contexts.

Let us turn firstly, then, to the function of perceptio and comprehensio as calques of the Greek term κατάληψις. The original Greek term is a compound deriving from two linguistic components: the preposition κατά, which functions as an intensifying prefix, and the noun λήψις, which denotes the activity of taking hold of, or seizing, and comes from the verb λαμβάνω (to take hold of, grasp, or seize). As has been systematically analysed by the linguistic studies of Nicolas, the constituent parts of both perceptio and
comprehensio correspond to the constituent elements of κατάληψις (per- and com- acting as intensifying prefixes deriving from prepositions; while –ceptio and –prehensio denote the activity expressed by the verbs capio and prehendo/prendo respectively), and so these Latin terms serve as calques of the original Greek term. 77 Indeed, the term comprehensio is explicitly picked by Cicero out as a calque during its first extant use as a translation of κατάληψις, where he directs his reader’s attention to the fact that this Latin term reproduces each individual element of the original in a literal (verbum a verbo) translation. 78 In translating the individual elements of the Greek term, rather than reproducing the semantic content of the entire lexeme in its Stoic/Old Academic usage as cognitio does, perceptio and comprehensio point to the original non-philosophical use of the Greek term κατάληψις, in which it indicated seizing or grasping generally. 79 So they reveal the imagery underlying Zeno’s novel use of this Greek term to express an epistemological concept, and thus help to specify another important aspect of its philosophical use: namely, the analogy it draws between the physical act of grasping something and the mental activity of cognition. Cicero himself points out the importance

77 See Nicolas (1996).
78 Cic. Acad. 2.17: cognitio aut perceptio aut, si verbum e verbo volumus, comprehensio, quam κατάληψις illi vocant. (“cognitio [“understanding”] or perceptio [“mentally seizing”] or (if we wish to give a word for word translation) comprehensio [“mentally grasping”, which they call κατάληψις.”) This use of verbum e verbo to translate each of the elements of a single term literally, is an extension of its use to describe the literal translation of each word in extended discourse (see OLD verbum 8b “(in phrs. Indicating the literalness of translation) word for word., or the like”).
of the more general use of κατάληψις for understanding Zeno’s own, technical use of the term, saying:

\[\text{sed cum acceptum iam et approbatum esset, comprehensionem appellabat, similem is rebus quae manu prenderentur; ex quo etiam nomen hoc duxerat, cum eo verbo antea nemo tali in re usus esset, plurimisque idem novis verbis (nova enim dicebat) usus est.}\]

But when it [i.e. the cognitive impression] had been both received and assented to, he called this cognition (comprehensio), similarly to those objects which are seized by a hand – from which [action] he took this name, since no-one before had used the word for such a thing, and the same man [i.e. Zeno] used many new words (for he said new things).

(Cic. Acad. 1.41)

We will discuss the importance of Cicero’s emphasis upon the novelty of the Zenonian use of the term κατάληψις in our specific examination of his use of comprehensio, below. The main focus of this passage, however, is upon the original meaning of κατάληψις as a physical seizing, such as the grabbing of an object by a hand. Cicero goes on to show how an awareness of this original meaning is important for our understanding of the epistemological concept to which Zeno gave this same name.

\[\text{80 There may be a subtle nod here towards the Stoic claim that the mental entities involved in cognition (the mind and the cognitive impression) are themselves, when analysed correctly, corporeal objects, just like the hand and the object it seizes. Whether this materialist psychological system is shared by the Old Academy is, however, unclear. At Acad. 1.6, Varro seems to describe the Antiochean physical system as identical to the Peripatetic (as Atticus notes at Acad. 1.33), which would mean that there was space for a materialist view of the mind, but that such a view was not required (see e.g. Arist. De Anima 412b6–9).}\]

109
In doing this, he clarifies the kind of mental activity designated by the term κατάληψις, by utilising the same analogy employed by the Stoic/Old Academic tradition. As he will later tell us, this mental grasp is analogous to the grasp of a hand over an object in that, although it completely encompasses the thing seized, it does not have contact with every part of the object; so, analogously, κατάληψις represents a genuine cognitive grasp of an object, but the mind does not thereby have cognition of each and every property of an object. In addition to this, it also shows the various other entities that might be involved in this activity. It reveals that, just as the physical grasping of an object by a human being is done through an instrument – the hand –, so, too, is her mental grasping of a sensory (or “perceptual”) impression, which is performed by the senses (sensus). Furthermore, just as the physical seizing performed by the hand has an object (the res seized), so, too, does cognition, namely, “the thing sensed” (sensum). This analogy, then, reveals how cognition functions, by means of the senses, to pick out true impressions concerning objects in the external world. The use of these two calques to translate κατάληψις, then, helps Cicero to pick out more clearly the original information held within this Greek term by reproducing the original imagery employed by the Greek word.

For the replication of the image of the analogy in this translation, see also Hartung (1970) 27. The particular clarification which this analogy makes is described in Cic. Acad. 1.42. Additionally, while the grasp of cognition is relatively firm, it is analogous only to the clasp of a single hand, as opposed to knowledge which is the truly solid grasp of a fact, analogous to both hands holding an object (Cic. Acad. 2.145).

Cic. Acad. 1.41: Quod autem erat sensu comprehensum id ipsum sensum appellabat. (“That, however, which was grasped by the senses, he called the thing sensed”).

Ibid.
This mental grasping of objects by means of the senses, however, is not, on this philosophical theory, the only form of cognition available to us, and this brings us to the question of what each of these terms (perceptio and comprehensio) contributes individually to the specification of the Stoic/Old Academic epistemological concept. Although the cognition of perceptual impressions (i.e. those impressions produced by the senses, known in Greek as αἰσθητικὰς φαντασίας) is the paradigmatic example used in the explication of this concept (and this is true for both Cicero and our Greek sources), it is not the only form of cognition.\textsuperscript{84} It is also possible to have cognition of non-perceptual impressions, for example, in the case of abstract concepts, or of memories - which are, at most, indirectly perceptual.\textsuperscript{85} This ability to experience cognition of facts that are remembered, rather than only of those things which are the subject of immediate sense perception, is vitally important for the Stoic view of how κατάληψις can serve as a basis for knowledge, and for Cicero’s presentation of their position. It is, on the Stoic/Old

\textsuperscript{84} E.g. D.L. 7.52: ἡ δὲ κατάληψις γίνεται κατ’ αὐτοῖς αἰσθήσει μὲν λευκῶν καὶ μελάνων καὶ τραχέων καὶ λείων, λόγῳ δὲ τῶν δι’ ἀποδείξεως συναγεμένων, ὥσπερ τὸ θεοίς εἶναι, καὶ προνοεῖν τούτοις (“According to them, the cognition of black and white, and rough and smooth comes about by perception (aisthesis), and [the cognition] of the conclusions of demonstration (for example the existence of the gods and their providence) comes about through reason.”) For further analysis see Frede (1999) 298: “The Stoics surely do not mean to say that we know the theorems of a science, for instance geometry, as a matter of perceptual cognition. Indeed, they explicitly distinguish (D.L. vii.52) between perceptual and rational or intellectual cognitions. So it certainly is not part of the notion of cognition that a cognition is a perception, even if a perception is the paradigm of a cognition.”

\textsuperscript{85} Ibid and Cic. Ac 2.22: quae potest enim esse memoria falsorum, aut quid quisquam meminit quod non animo comprehendidit et tenet? (“How is it possible to have a memory of what is false? Or what does anyone remember that he does not have a cognition of (comprehendit) and hold in his mind?”) For further discussion of these non-perceptual impressions and their relationship to memory see Rubarth (2015) and the discussion of Stoic concept formation in Sorabji (1990) 308.
Academic view, our ability to reliably trust the facts that we have discovered in the past, by means of the cognition of our memory of them, that we can have faith in our ability to build up from these memories the systematic knowledge known as scientia/ἐπιστήμη. As Cicero tells us, on this theory we rely both on our cognitions of those impressions which are directly derived from our senses (perceptual impressions), as well as our cognitions of remembered facts (non-perceptual impressions), in combination with reason and dialectic, in order to achieve true knowledge.\(^8^6\) The translation of κατάληψις with the term perceptio prepares the reader for the later importance of memory to the Stoic theory, as this term, in contrast to cognitio, has a history of use in cases relating to non-perceptual, remembered impressions. In the De Inventione, a rhetorical work from Cicero’s youth, memory is defined as the mind’s “firm perceptio of things or words”, and we find this usage also in the non-Ciceronian Rhetorica ad Herennium.\(^8^7\) The kind of mental activity denoted by perceptio, then, is associated in the earlier rhetorical tradition with the understanding of facts which are not the direct result of sensory information. So, 

\(^{86}\) Cic. Acad. 2.30: itaque alia visa sic arripit ut iis statim utatur, alia quasi recondit, e quibus memoria oritur; cetera autem similitudinibus construit, ex quibus efficiuntur notitiae rerum, quas Graeci tum ἐννοίας tum προλήψεις vocant; eo cum accessit ratio argumentique conclusio rerumque innumerabilium multitudo, tum et perceptio eorum omnium apparat et eadem ratio perfecta is gradibus ad sapientiam pervenit. (“There for some [perceptual] impressions are thus taken in to be used immediately, others are, as it were, stored away, from which memory comes about. However, the others are brought together through their similarities, from which the concepts of things (notitia rerum), which the Greek call sometimes ἐννοια, sometimes προλήψεις. When reason is added to all of this, along with sound argumentation and a huge multitude of fact, the indeed the cognition (perceptio) of all of these things comes about and this same reason, perfected by all of these stages, arrives at wisdom (sapientia)”). See also Acad. 2.106.

\(^{87}\) Cic. De Inv. 1.9: memoria est firma animi rerum ac verborum ad inventionem perceptio (“memory is the mind’s firm seizing (perceptio) of things or words for the sake of rhetorical inventio”). Rhet Her. 1.3: memoria est firma animi rerum et verborum et dispositionis perceptio (“memory is the mind’s firm seizing (perceptio) of things and words and arrangement”).
then, *perceptio* helps to pick out this further, important sense of *κατάληψις* by *synonymy*, and so complements the use of *cognitio* which, as we have seen above, is typically used only in contexts in which perceptually available evidence is at issue.

This leaves us with *comprehensio*, which is the term least obviously suitable for picking out the mental activity of cognition, having, as far as we know, no previous history of use in similar contexts.\(^{88}\) However, as well as helping, through its status as a calque, to draw out the underlying physical imagery behind the Greek term, *κατάληψις*, as discussed above, the very strangeness of the application of this term to epistemological ideas helps to reproduce the cultural position of the original term. As we have already seen, Cicero notes that Zeno’s own use of the term *κατάληψις* was an unusual extension of its meaning from the physical to the mental realm: he took this word from the physical seizing performed by the hand and employed it in a way that no-one ever had before (*eo verbo antea nemo tali in re usus esset*), using such new terminology (*nova verba*) because his philosophical ideas were new (*nova*).\(^{89}\) This claim is also found in the first edition of the *Academica*.\(^{90}\) Cicero, then, in using a term such as *comprehensio* which has

---

\(^{88}\) See p.87 above.

\(^{89}\) *Cic. Acad.* 1.41: *ex quo etiam nomen hoc duxerat, cum eo verbo antea nemo tali in re usus esset, plurimisque idem novis verbis (nova enim dicebat) usus est.* (“From this [i.e. the action of a hand grasping] he took this name, since no-one before had used the word for such a thing, and the same man [i.e. Zeno] used many new words (for he said new things”)).

\(^{90}\) *Cic. Acad.* 1.145: *qua ex similitudine etiam nomen ei rei, quod ante non fuerat, κατάληψιν imposuit.* (“From this similarity [i.e. to the physical grasp of a hand] he gave to this thing the name κατάληψις, which had not existed before”).

113
no previous use in mental contexts, is performing a similar act of neologism to that performed by Zeno, and thus reproduces the original, unusual use of language in his Latin translation. The use of an unexpected term in a new sense here mirrors the extension of the term to the new cultural context of philosophy that we see in the original, so producing **cultural equivalence** in the Ciceronian translation. The importance to Cicero’s representation of his translation project in maintaining this element of the original Greek is indicated by the fact that the author repeatedly draws our attention to his novel use of vocabulary in adopting *comprehensio* and its cognates as translations of *κατάληψις* and related terms. This use of neologism serves, as we shall examine more closely below, a further, rhetorical purpose, in that it highlights Cicero’s own foundational role in writing his philosophical texts: just as Zeno was the first to bring these ideas to a Greek audience, Cicero figures himself as his Roman equivalent in being the first to bring these ideas to a Roman audience. In doing this, Cicero also presents his translation project as providing an additional benefit to the Roman people by expanding their language (their *copia verborum*) as well as their store of ideas – an important

**91** The importance of such transference of terms from different contexts to a new, philosophical context in both Greek and Latin philosophical discourse is pointed out by Varro at Cic. Acad. 1.25: *aut enim nova sunt rerum novarum facienda nomina aut ex aliis transferenda* (“either new names have to be created for new things, or names have to be transferred from other contexts”).

**92** See Cic. Acad. 1.41 (for both *comprehensio* and *comprehendibile*), 2.31 (where *comprehensio* is again described as a *verbum e verbo* translation etc.)
intertextual outcome of Cicero’s translation choices which we will discuss in more detail below.\footnote{See Cic. Acad. 1.26 where Atticus claims that Varro is doing a service to his fellow citizen in increasing their copia verborum through the development of new, philosophical terms – a passage which will be examined in greater detail on p.116 below.}

So, then, while these terms (\textit{perceptio} and \textit{comprehensio}) do, indeed, act as “semantic calques” (in that they take on the semantic value of the Greek term they translate),\footnote{See Nicolas (1998).} they, nonetheless, still retain features of their original meaning in their use as translations of Greek term κατάληψις which help to further specify the meaning, form, and cultural position of the Stoic/Old Academic term. Far from being chosen simply for the sake of rhetorical elaboration, or as empty holders to take on the semantic content of the Greek term, each of the terms Cicero uses to translate κατάληψις - \textit{cognitio}, \textit{perceptio}, and \textit{comprehensio} – can be seen to be the product of different translation procedures, and to reproduce different, important elements of this original Greek term.

c) Translation outcomes

Having, then, considered the first element in our tripartite methodology (the particular translation procedures used by Cicero in his translation of the Stoic/Old...
Academic term κατάληψις), we may now turn to a consideration of the immediate literary and philosophical effects of these translation choices, or their “translation outcomes”. We have already mentioned the rhetorical effect produced by the new use of the term comprehensio in a mental context, and the contribution this makes to Cicero’s presentation of his philosophical works as innovative and original contributions to Latin literature. Now, however, let us consider the rhetorical impact of this use of neologism more fully, and examine how it relates to Cicero’s claims as to the innovative nature of his philosophical translation project in the Academica as a whole. We will then turn to the impact of the use of perceptio and cognitio, and how these three Latin terms work together with the other technical terms of the Academica to help clarify and schematise the Stoic/Old Academic epistemological system.

As we have discussed, Cicero presents each of his editions of the Academica (as he does his philosophical works in general) as originary and innovative, bringing, for the first time, Greek philosophy into a Roman, literary context. In drawing our attention to his need to use novel language, such as the extended use of the term comprehensio in the articulation of the Stoic/Old Academic concept of κατάληψις (as he also does in the cases of the neologisms qualitas, perspicuitas, and evidentia), Cicero emphasises fact that he is

95 See ch. 1 p.35.
96 Cic. Acad. 1.1-11, 25 and 2.5-7. For the presentation of the philosophical works in general as foundational texts, bringing Greek learning into a Latin literary context, see ch. 1 p.13ff and Baraz (2012) 96-127.
the first to tackle these ideas in his native tongue. Yet, in claiming to be the first to bring these new ideas into the Roman world, Cicero simultaneously emphasises the non-Roman provenance of these ideas. In the first edition of the work, Lucullus’ exposition of the Stoic/Old Academic epistemological theory is prefaced by a discussion of the hostility the author anticipates from his attribution of this markedly Greek philosophical discourse to this esteemed Roman statesman. In the second edition, Varro introduces his own exposition of this epistemological system with a dilemma for Cicero. Who, he asks, will read Latin philosophical works, when everyone who is interested in Greek subjects knows the Greek language, and so is able to read the Greek originals; while those who hate Greek ideas have no interest in a Latin work on a Greek subject such as philosophy, which is inseparable from *eruditio Graeca* (“Greek learning”). Indeed, Varro goes on to

---

97 Cic. *Ac* 1.24-5 and 27 emphasise that the use of *qualitas* to translate the Greek ποιότης is an instance of neologism. Cic. *Acad.* 2.17 talks of the terms *perspicuitas* and *evidentia* as newly created to pick out a Greek concept, and characterises this as a particularly Ciceronian activity: ‘propterea quod nihil esset clarius ἐνάρεια – ut Graeci, perspicuïtatem aut evidentiam nos si placet nominemus fabricemurque si opus erit verba, nec hic sibi’ (me appellabat iocans) ‘hoc licere soli putet.’ (“On account of which, nothing is clearer than ἐνάρεια – as the Greeks call it, *perspicuitas* or *evidentia* if it pleases us to call it, and if there is need to make up words – and so that this man (he addressed me [i.e. the character of Cicero] jokingly) does not think this is permitted only to him”).

98 Cic. *Acad.* 2.5: *sunt enim multi qui omnino Graecas non ament litteras, plus qui philosophiam* (“*`). He then goes on to give Cato the Elder and Publius Africanus as an examples of Roman statesman whose Roman standing was not diminished, through their association with Greek ideas. (For a discussion of the importance of the *exemplum* of Cato, see ch.3 p.173ff).

99 Cic. *Acad.* 1.4: *nam cum philosophiam viderem diligentissime Graecas litteras explicatam, existimavi si qui de nostris etis studio tenerentur, si essent Graecis doctrinis eruditi, Graeca potius quam nostra lecturos, sin a Graecorum aritibus et disciplinis abhorrent, ne haec quidem curaturas, quae sine eruditione Graeca intellegi non possunt.* (“For since I saw that philosophy had been most carefully expounded in Greek literature/language [Graecis litteris], I judged that any of our people who an interest in this, if they were learned in the teachings of the Greeks, would sooner read Greek writings than ours, and if on the other hand they hated the sciences and systems of the Greeks, they would not care even for philosophy, which cannot be understood without Greek learning”).
note, these Greek philosophical ideas are so foreign to Roman thought that the Latin language does not even have the appropriate terminology with which to discuss them, and so a further impediment to philosophical discourse in Latin is that “we are compelled to use new terminology”. So, then, the use of an unfamiliar term, such as qualitas, or of a familiar term in an unexpected way, such as comprehensio, is presented to the reader as an indication that the subject matter itself is unfamiliar to the Latin language and a Roman audience. The translation outcome of these vocabulary choices, then, produces an interesting form of foreignisation – the innovative use of vocabulary emphasises the fact that the concept described is outside the range of traditional Roman discourse, and so highlights its origins in the foreign cultural context of Greek philosophical inquiry. This, in turn, serves to reinforce Cicero’s claims to originality in treating these subjects. How this relates more generally to Cicero’s presentation of the Latin language and its relationship to Greek will be discussed more fully in the next section (p.118ff).

In addition to this, Cicero’s use of the other two terms (perceptio and cognitio) which are synonymous in different ways to the Stoic/Old Academic κατάληψις and so help to specify various aspects of the range of this Greek idea, coupled with his use of

100 Cic. Acad. 1.5: verbis quoque novis cogimur uti. This claim is repeated, with regard to geometry, at Cic. Acad. 1.7: quam quibusnam quisquam enuntiare verbis gur quem ad intellegendum poterit adducere? (“With what words will anyone be able to articulate this subject [i.e. geometry], or who will he be able to bring to understand it?”).

101 As Baraz (2012) 98 notes: “such stretching of language cannot help but have a foreignizing effect on the reader”.

118
calque (in *perceptio* and *comprehensio*) which picks out the analogy of this epistemological process to the physical activity of seizing an object, contributes, as we have seen, to the *exegesis* of this difficult Greek, philosophical idea. Each of the terms that Cicero employs to translate κατάληψις contributes to the unpacking and explication of this Greek technical term for his Roman audience.\(^{102}\) When we consider the relationship of these particular terminological choices to the other selections he makes throughout the *Academica*, however, we can see that they also serve a more wide-ranging exegetical purpose. As we shall see, Cicero, in choosing Latin terms whose linguistic connections reflect their conceptual relationships, schematises and so clarifies the Stoic/Old Academic epistemological system at the verbal level, in a way which the original Greek terminology does not. In contributing to the wider *exegesis* of this philosophical position in this way, Cicero both presents own, Latin language account of this theory as surpassing the original Greek presentation, and is able to show how his own position of Academic Scepticism relates to and improves upon the Stoic/Old Academic view. After discussing these linguistic relationships between Cicero’s chosen Stoic/Old Academic epistemological terms in the remaining pages of this section, we shall move on to the consideration of what this means for Cicero’s portrayal of his own, Latin language account in relation to its Greek model more fully in our discussion of the intertextual

\(^{102}\) As Lévy (1990) 100 points out, the same could be said for his use of *comprehendibile* rather than *comprehensivum* (which would be more) to translate the Greek καταληπτόν, as this makes more clear the fact that, on the Stoic view point, only certain impressions are able to be cognitively apprehended.
position adopted by these texts and the way that this aids in his presentation of his own sceptical position in the next section (p. 111ff).

So, then, let us consider how Cicero’s choice of Latin terminology to translate the Stoic/Old Academic term κατάληψις relates to his larger project of philosophical exegesis in his description of the Stoic/Old Academic epistemological theory as a whole. The Academica provides us, in addition to κατάληψις, with a large number of Greek technical terms and their selected Latin translations, as part of the creation of a Latin philosophical vocabulary for dealing with these new, Greek ideas.103 It also employs a number of Latin terms which may be so-called “silent” translations of Greek terms, where the Greek terms themselves are not immediately identified in the text, but their relationship to Latin terms is clear from our Greek sources.104 Consequently, as befits the Academica’s focus on the production of Latin vocabulary to express Greek, philosophical concepts, the reader is provided with Latin translations for a number of important terms from Stoic/Old

103 As well as qualitas, evidentia, and perspicuitas (which are found at Ac 1.24 and 2.17 and are discussed at p. 103 n.97, above), we find the following: visum for φαντασία (Cic. Acad. 1.40); species for ἱδέα (Cic. Acad. 1.31); dissimilitudo for σιφονία (Cic. Acad. 2.15); that which is not comprehendi posset for ὁκατάληψις (Cic. Acad. 2.18); notitia for ἐννοιο/πρόληψις (Cic. Acad. 2.30); adpetitio for ὀρμή (Cic. Acad. 2.24); conclusio argumenti for ἀπόδειξις (Cic. Acad. 2.26); decreta for δόγματα (Cic. Acad. 2.27, 29); adsensio and adprobatio for συγκατάθεσις (Cic. Acad. 2.37); accommodatum ad naturam for οἰκείον (Cic. Acad. 2.38); incerta for ἀδήλα (Cic. Acad. 2.54); retentio adsensionis for ἐποχή (Cic. Acad. 2.59); conclusivencula for σῷφησις (Cic. Acad. 2.76); quiescere for ἡσυχάζειν (Cic. Acad. 2.93); quidquid enuntietur/effatum for ἀξίωμα (Cic. Acad. 2.94).

104 For the term “silent” translations, see Glucker (2010) ?? For our purposes here, the most important of these is the translation of ἀδήλης as sensus (c.f. Lévy (1992) 228, Nicolas (2005) xviii). The identification between the Greek and Latin term here is likely to have been made at some point in the lost sections of our text (see e.g. Cic. Acad. 2.42 for the extended discussion de sensibus (about the senses) which is said to have been held the day before our fragment of the text begins).
Academic epistemology. These terms, and the passages in which they are introduced are as follows:

Table 1: Stoic/Old Academic Epistemological Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Greek Term</th>
<th>Latin Term</th>
<th>Passage (Cic. Acad.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>κατάληψις</td>
<td>cognitio/perceptio/comprehensio</td>
<td>1.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>καταληψιτών</td>
<td>comprehendibile</td>
<td>1.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἐννοια/ πρόληψις</td>
<td>notitia</td>
<td>2.30 (both), 2.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>φαντασία</td>
<td>visum</td>
<td>1.40, 2.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἐνάργεια</td>
<td>evidentia/perspecuitas</td>
<td>2.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>συγκατάθεσις</td>
<td>adsensio/adprobatio</td>
<td>2.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἐποχή</td>
<td>adsensionis retentio</td>
<td>2.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>αἴσθησις</td>
<td>sensus</td>
<td>1.41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As we can see, the Latin term chosen by Cicero to translate the Greek καταληψιτών ("cognitive") replicates the important linguistic connection of this Greek term to the noun with which it is cognate, (κατάληψις). Just as καταληψιτών is an adjective cognate to the noun κατάληψις (sharing a derivation from καταλαμβάνω), so, too, the translation chosen by Cicero, comprehendibile, is cognate with one of his translations of κατάληψις, comprehensio, in that both adjective and noun derive from the

\[105\] It should be remembered that we only have different fragmentary sections from each of the two editions of this texts, so we can likely assume that those Greek-to-Latin translations which are evidenced in only one edition in our extant fragments would have been treated in the lost sections of the other edition.
verb *comprehendo*. Consequently, just as the linguistic connection between these Greek terms reveals an underlying connection between the concepts they denote (the impression which is subject to cognition, and cognition itself), so, too, the Latin terms employed by Cicero indicate this same relationship between their own referents. Similarly, in the same way that one of the Greek terms for “mental concept” (πρόληψις) is etymologically connected to the term κατάληψις, indicating the relationship between these two ideas, another Ciceronian translation for κατάληψις, *cognitio*, reproduces this linguistic relationship with the Latin translation of πρόληψις, *notitia*. This linguistic relationship also reflects the relationship between the concepts these terms express. As Cicero tells us, these mental concepts (*notitiae*) are built up out of cognitions (*cognitiones/perceptiones/comprehensiones*), and so the process of mentally grasping impressions is a necessary preliminary of the possession of concepts (the “getting to know”, *cognitio*, from cognosco, is essential for the *notitia*, or “things known”, from *nosco*).\(^{106}\) This, then, provides a further explanation for Cicero’s choice of multiple terms to translation the Greek κατάληψις – these different terms, in combination, serve to reproduce the linguistic connections between the original Greek terms, which, in turn, helps in the *exegesis* of the concepts to which these terms refer.

\(^{106}\) Cic. Acad. 2.21: cetera series deinde sequitur maiora nectens, ut haec quae quasi expletam rerum comprehensionem amplectuntur: “si homo est, animal est mortale rationis particeps”. Quo e genere nobis notitiae rerum imprimuntur... (“The rest of the series then follows, linking together a larger group [i.e. of cognitions], just as this one, which contains, as it were, the full cognition (*comprehensio*) of things: “if it is a man, it is a mortal animal, having a share in reason.” From which kind [i.e. of series of cognitions], concepts of things are imprinted upon us...”)
Indeed, Cicero draws his readers’ attention to the importance in the Greek philosophical thought he translates of exactly these types of linguistic connections. Towards the very beginning of Varro’s speech, Cicero emphasises the significance of ἐτυμολογία for the Greek philosophical tradition, stating:

\[
\text{verboram etiam explicatio probabatur, id est qua de causa quaeque essent ita nominata, quam \text{\textit{etymológya\textit{}} appellabant...}
\]

Also the analysis of words was approved [i.e. by the schools deriving from Plato, including the Stoics and Old Academics], that is, the reason why certain things are named the way they are, which they called “etymology”...

(Cic. Acad. 1.32)

Elsewhere, Cicero describes the Greek dialectical method of etymology as \textit{cum ex vi nominis argumentum elicitur} (“when an argument/proof is drawn forth from the properties of a word”).\textsuperscript{107} The connections between words, then, are presented as being important to the Greek philosophical tradition, as the properties of words are taken to be indications of the properties of the concepts to which they refer. It seems, moreover, that Cicero employed exactly this kind of argumentation in one of the lost sections of the second edition of the Academica, as Nonius preserves for us a fragment of the first book in which it seems that an argument is made from the similarity between words to the

\textsuperscript{107} Cic. Top. 35 where ἐτυμολογία is also translated, by means of a calque, as \textit{veriloquium}.}

123
harmony of the concepts that these words represent. In replicating the etymological connections between the Greek terms he translates, then, Cicero is also reproducing an important element of the philosophical argumentation which is at work in his Greek sources.

The etymological links *comprehendibile-comprehensio* and *cognitio-notitia* are not, however, the only connections that are drawn by the language chosen by Cicero to relate the Stoic/Old Academic epistemological theory. As we can see from Table 1, above, the Latin terminology that Cicero employs also draws etymological connections between concepts which are importantly related in the Stoic/Old Academic epistemological system, but which are not similarly linked by the Greek vocabulary used to denote them. *Visum* is linguistically related to *evidentia* in Cicero’s Latin translation (each deriving from the verb *video*), but not in the original Greek, where the terms are (*φαντασία* and *ἐνάργεια*). The linguistic relationship established by these Latin terms reflects an important philosophical relationship between the concepts they denote. The “vividness” designated by the term *evidentia* is a quality of certain impressions (*visa*), and it is this vividness which causes us to assent to some impressions as cognitive.109

108 Rackham (1951) fr. 2 book 1 (= Non. p.43): *quicum similitudine verbi concinere maxime sibi videretur* (“with which, because of the similarity of the word, it seemed to be greatly in harmony”). Lindsay corrects *veri* here to *verbi*, and Plasberg (1922) accepts this emendation. All of the codices, however, have *verbi*, and we can see from this discussion that we can make good sense of this.

109 Cic. Acad. 2.45. Cic. Acad. 2.51 explicitly attributes this vividness to *visa*.
Similarly, συγκατάθεσις, ἐποχή, and αἴσθησις have no linguistic connection in the Greek, but are related in Cicero’s Latin translations (as adsensio, adsensionis retentio, and sensus), as reflects their relatedness within the Stoic/Old Academic philosophical system. The linguistic and philosophical connection between sensus and adsensio is explicitly marked out in the text when the latter term is first introduced in the text, by means of a figura etymologica in which assent (adsensio) is presented as that which is added (ad-\emph{iungit}) to sense perception (sensus).\footnote{Cic. Acad. 1.40: \emph{sed ad quae visa sunt et quasi accepta sensibus adsensionem adiungit animorum...} ("but to these things perceived and, as it were, received by the senses, he [i.e. Zeno] added assent of the mind...").} The withholding of assent (ἐποχή), meanwhile, is, in the Latin translation described explicitly as the activity which is opposed to the giving of assent (retentio adsensio) – a connection which is not found in the Greek terminology, but which represents its function within the epistemological system under discussion.\footnote{For Cicero’s choice of the term \emph{retentio} here see Ad Att 13.20, where he rejects Atticus’ suggestion of \emph{inhibitio (adsensionis)} because the nautical image it invokes implies movement, rather than withholding of motion.}

In each of these cases, then, we can see that Cicero’s terminological choices work to reveal the underlying structure of the Stoic/Old Academic epistemological system to an even greater degree than the Greek vocabulary it translates. This, then, aids in \emph{exegesis}, as his translation further elucidates the relationships between these various Greek, philosophical concepts, by means of the language it employs. It also, however, improves upon the original Greek model, employing the dialectical resource of etymology to a
greater extent than its sources. So, in this respect, the *Academica* develops a particular, emulative intertextual relationship with the Greek philosophy it translates.

**d) Intertextual Outcomes**

Let us conclude our discussion of Cicero’s translations of Stoic/Old Academic epistemological terminology in the *Academica* with a discussion of the intertextual positioning his translation choices perform – the final aspect of our tripartite analysis. In employing the etymologically significant terminology we have examined in the previous sections, Cicero is able to produce two further, important intertextual effects. The first of these is philosophical, in that it allows him to position the Stoic/Old Academic epistemological system against his own, chosen New Academic sceptical theory, and display the weaknesses of the former against the strengths of the latter. The second of these is more literary, as Cicero sets the Latin language against the Greek, so simultaneously showing how his Latin philosophical translations augment the existing Latin lexicon, and rewriting the contemporary narrative concerning the inadequacy of the Latin language for philosophical exposition.

Let us turn firstly, then, to the philosophical outcomes produced by Cicero’s terminological translation choices. In the first place, the etymological connections
established by Cicero’s Latin vocabulary choices (as examined above) represent not only a linguistic improvement upon the Greek, but also a form of philosophical correction, in that they demonstrate a more consistent use of one of the Stoic/Old Academics own dialectical techniques (argument from etymology) than the Greek sources whose terminology they translate. But this is not the only form of philosophical correction exhibited by Cicero’s terminological choices in translating these Greek, epistemological systems. His particular vocabulary choice in translating the Stoic/Old Academic concept of assent (συγκατάθεσις, which Cicero translates using adsensio, adprobatio, and their cognates), also helps to articulate the relationship of the Stoic/Old Academic system to his own, favoured position of Carneadean scepticism. In using these two different terms (adsensio and adprobatio) to translate this single, Greek word, Cicero makes available in his initial exposition of the Stoic/Old Academic position the vocabulary by which the Carneadean sceptic will later reject this view. In each edition of the Academica (though this section survives only for the first edition) the character of Cicero, adopting a Carneadean sceptic position, proceeded to argue against the Stoic/Old Academic epistemological position by analysing the concept of assent into two different mental states: unqualified assent (adsensus) and qualified assent (adprobatio).  

---

112 Cic. Acad. 104: adiungit dupliciter dici adsensus sustinere sapientem, uno modo cum hoc intellegatur, omnino eum rei nulli adsentiri, altero cum se a respondendo ut aut adprobet quid aut improbet sustineat (“He [Clitomachus, recording the views of Carneades] added that “the wise man withholds assent [adsensus]” is said in two ways: in the first way when it is meant that he absolutely assents (omnino adsentiri) to nothing; in the second way, when he holds himself back from replying that he qualifiedly...
assent (adsensus) – the assent to cognitive impressions that the Stoics/Old Academics claim to be the only kind of assent – is, he argues, impossible, as cognitive impressions simply do not exist. So the Stoics/Old Academics are wrong to rely on this for their epistemology. Qualified assent (adprobatio), however, is presented as being the appropriate response to the likely (probabile), and sufficient in and of itself to motivate action. So the Carneadean sceptic, by accepting the possibility of qualified assent, can provide a basis for action without having to rely on the Stoic/Old Academic concept of cognition. In using these two terms, adsensio and adprobatio, to describe Stoic/Old Academic concept of assent, Cicero establishes a syncretic, philosophical vocabulary which both clearly articulates the ideas of Zeno and, later, will also allow him to describe its Carneadean rival, in a way in which the original Greek terminology, with its single term, does not. Indeed, it seems likely that the Greek sceptics themselves had only a single word (ἐποχή) for both the withholding of assent from an unconvincing impression and the weak assent which should be made to a convincing impression. Cicero is here, then, also correcting the Greek vocabulary of New Academic epistemology, dividing the concept of ἐποχή into its two, separate parts. So, then, in initially describing the Stoic/Old Academic position in such a way as to integrate the terminology by which its Carneadean

assents or does not assent (adprobet aut inprobet) to something”). For the terms “unqualified” and “qualified” assent to describe these states, see Stough (1996) 65 and Striker (1996c) 98, who notes that “it is true that Cicero does not always observe the terminological distinction between adsentiri and adprobare but he emphasizes it in crucial passages” (ftnt 23).

113 E.g. Cic. Acad. 2.99.
114 See Striker (1996c) 98 ftnt 22 and Hirzel (1887) 168 ftnt 1.
sceptical rejection can be performed, Cicero’s Latin text acts as a form of philosophical correction upon the Greek philosophical discourse he translates, producing a syncretic, technical vocabulary which allows the clear exposition of the various Hellenistic philosophical schools.

By including within his exposition of the Stoic/Old Academic position the seeds of its later rejection, however, Cicero also rhetorically privileges his own chosen position of Carneadean scepticism in a way that is perhaps best described as philosophical distortion. By using these two terms (adsensio and adprobatio) to describe the Stoic/Old Academic concept of assent (συγκατάθεσις), he is leaving room for the Carneadean division of assent into unqualified and qualified which the Stoics themselves would not accept. Moreover, Cicero, in drawing etymological connections between his technical terminology which reflects the structure of the New Academic sceptical theory, makes the Carneadean position seem more intuitively plausible than its Stoic/Old Academic rival. By translating the Carneadean concept of the πιθανόν or εἰκός (the “convincing” or “persuasive”) as probabilē,\(^{115}\) he presents these convincing impressions as the necessary object of adprobatio (assent) in a way in which the original Greek terminology does not, and which the Stoics/Old Academics (who believe that there should be assent only to the cognitive and not to the persuasive impressions) would reject. It also, perhaps,

\(^{115}\) For which see Glucker (1995).
rhetorically strengthens the character of Cicero’s own presentation of Carneadean scepticism, against the character Catulus’ Philonian interpretation of this (which is, unfortunately, lost to us) in that the wise man is said to *adprobari* the *probabile* on this view, rather than *opinari* the *probabile* on the Philonian view. Consequently, the new etymological connections that Cicero draws in his Latin vocabulary choices, serve to **distort** the original Greek philosophical positions, skewing their articulation so that it seems both the Stoic/Old Academic and Philonian systems fail to account for the logical connection between *adprobatio* and the *probabile*.

Finally, let us turn to the question of how Cicero’s translations of technical, philosophical terminology in the *Academica* contribute to his presentation of the literary and cultural relationship of his own, Latin text in relation to its Greek philosophical models. In the first place, as we have seen, Cicero, in focusing upon the novelty of the language that must be employed in order to express in Latin these new philosophical ideas, is presenting his own Latin works as contributing something new to the store of Roman knowledge in translating these Greek ideas. As Atticus tells us, in response to Varro’s introduction of new terminology and Greek philosophical ideas to Latin literature: “I think you will actually be benefiting your fellow Romans if you not only augment their store of ideas (*copia rerum*), as you have done, but also their store of

---

116 For the Philonian position, presented by the character Catulus, see Cic. *Acad.* 2.148, and, for further analysis Schofield (1995) 335-5 and Brittain (2001) 83-94.
words (*copia verborum*)". So, then, an intertextual relationship of *appropriation* is established, in which the translation of these Greek texts serves to bring new vocabulary and ideas to a Roman audience, which, it is implied, they might then go on to use for their own purposes. In improving upon the terminology of his Greek originals, however, through the production of the syncretic vocabulary discussed above, Cicero simultaneously reveals his Latin texts to be surpassing the Greek philosophical discourse which they take as their source. In this sense, the technical terminology of the *Academica* is also depicted as a form of intertextual *capping*, in that these new Latin translations are presented as surpassing their Greek models. So, then, the “uneasy middle ground of domesticating and foreignising translation” is carefully negotiated by Cicero. The emphasis upon the foreign nature of his translations from Greek means that Cicero is able to lay claim to relationship of *appropriation*, in which he presents himself as performing a service to his countrymen in bringing them new vocabulary and ideas. Simultaneously, in showing the improvements that this new Latin vocabulary makes upon the Greek, he also provides a new, uniquely Roman perspective on these issues.

Cicero’s presentation of his Latin translations of Greek terminology also draws our attention to the relationship between the Latin and the Greek languages more

---

117 Cic. Acad. 1.26: *bene etiam meriturus mihi videris de tuis civibus, si eos non modo copia rerum auxeris, ut effecisti, sed etiam verborum.*  
generally. Atticus’ interest in hearing Varro’s exposition of Stoic/Old Academic epistemology is not, primarily, philosophical – as we are told repeatedly, both Atticus and Cicero already have extensive knowledge of the Hellenistic philosophical systems.\textsuperscript{119} Instead, what he wishes to discover, by listening to Varro’s description of Antiochus’ views, is whether the Latin language is suitable for the articulation of these Greek philosophical ideas: “to see whether it is possible to express these things suitably enough in Latin”.\textsuperscript{120} So, the reader’s attention is directed towards a consideration of how the Latin language fares in relation to the Greek in the upcoming text. This work, then, makes an explicit intervention into the broader cultural concerns, regarding the poverty of the Latin language in relation to Greek (the \emph{patrii sermonis egestas}), which we will examine in more detail in the next section.\textsuperscript{121} Furthermore, it seems that it is intended to show that Latin, while it does not always have the pre-existing vocabulary for the discussion of Greek philosophical ideas, nonetheless has the linguistic resources by which to produce vocabulary which matches, and even goes as far as to \emph{excel} that of the Greeks.\textsuperscript{122} So, then, Cicero’s terminological translation here acts as a contribution to his overturning of this dominant cultural narrative, showing that, while Latin may not already

\hspace{1\textwidth}

\textsuperscript{119} E.g. Cic. Acad. 1.18.
\textsuperscript{120} Cic. Acad. 1.14: \emph{videre satisne ea commode dici possint Latine}.
\textsuperscript{121} For the context of the contemporary perceptions of the Latin language and its relationship to Greek, see ch.1 p.63ff.
\textsuperscript{122} E.g. Atticus’ desire to hear Varro’s Latin exposition (Cic. Acad. 1.18), and then admiration of its clarity (Cic. Acad. 1.33: \emph{praecelare enim explicatur Peripateticorum et Academicorum veteris auctoritas})
have the *copia verborum* of Greek, it has the linguistic potential to fill any lexical gaps, and so to take the place of Greek as a philosophical language.\textsuperscript{123}

The example of the epistemological vocabulary of the *Academica*, then, has revealed the importance of considering Cicero’s translations of Greek technical terminology at each of the three levels proposed in our methodology, and the rich literary and philosophical insights which such an analysis can provide. It is, of course, impossible in the course of a single study to provide a similarly detailed analysis for each Ciceronian translation of Greek, philosophical terminology. The rest of this chapter will, however, go some way towards sketching an outline of the different translation procedures and effects which are employed by Cicero, and the ways in which an awareness of these contribute to our understanding of these texts.

\textbf{IV: Rewriting the Narrative of *patrii sermonis egestas*}

\textsuperscript{123} For this idea, see, too Powell (1995) 290: “Cicero’s expansion of Latin vocabulary may be seen as a sort of linguistic *aemulatio* to complement the literary feat of rivalling Plato’s dialogues. As has been noted, there were Romans (and doubtless, *a fortiori*, Greeks) who thought that Latin simply was not up to the task of philosophical exposition: Cicero was determined to prove them wrong.” The preceding discussion should have contributed sufficient evidence to support this claim.
The epistemological terminology of the *Academica* is not the only context in which Cicero presents his own, chosen, Latin philosophical vocabulary as surpassing that of his Greek models. In other texts, too, Cicero is at pains to point out to the reader moments at which his own philosophical terminology improves upon the Greek, either because it reveals divisions within a concept which Greek presents as unified; or by revealing, through its etymological connections, the philosophical significance of a concept.

We have already seen, in his division of the term συγκατάθεσις into the separate species of *adsentio* (unqualified assent) and *adprobatio* (qualified assent), how Cicero can present his Latin terminology as revealing important distinctions within a concept which is treated by his Old Academic sources as unified. The ability of his new Latin terminology to make significant distinctions that Greek does not is also revealed in other texts. We find it implicitly suggested in cases in which multiple Latin terms are used to translate a single, Greek original - for example the translation of the Greek ἀεί using either *sempiternus* and its cognates, or *perpetuus* and its cognates, depending on whether a temporal beginning is implied by the term (for which see the discussion of Cicero’s *Timaeus* in chapter 4); or the translation of πρόληψις as *praenotio/anticipatio* in Epicurean contexts, as opposed to *notio/notitia* in Stoic/Old Academic contexts, in order
to reflect the distinct uses of this term by each of these schools. The improvement that Latin makes over the Greek is pointed out to the reader more explicitly in the Tusculan Disputations, where we are told that Latin, in using two terms (dolor and labor), isolates two different possible meanings of the single Greek term, πόνος:

interest aliquid inter laborem et dolorem. Sunt finitima omnino, sed tamen differt aliquid. labor est functio quaedam vel animi vel corporis gravioris operis et muneris, dolor autem motus asper in corpore alienus a sensibus. haec duo Graeci illi, quorum copiosior est lingua quam nostra, uno nomine appellant. itaque industrios homines illi studiosos vel potius amantis doloris appellant, nos commodius laboriosos: aliud est enim laborare, aliud dolere. o verborum inops interdum, quibus abundare te semper putas, Graecia! aliud, inquam, est dolere, aliud laborare.

There is a difference between exertion (labor) and pain (dolor). They are extremely close together, but nevertheless they are different. Exertion (labor) is a certain performance of difficult work either in relation to the mind or to the body. Pain (dolor), however, is a harsh motion in the body, hostile to the senses. These two things, the Greeks, whose language is more resourceful (copiosior) than our own, call by a single name [i.e. πόνος]. Therefore, they call industrious men enthusiasts or, rather, lovers of pain (amantis doloris)125; we, however, call them hard-working (laboriosos). For it is something to work hard (laborare), and something different to be in pain (dolere). Oh Greece, sometimes lacking in the words, in which you think yourself always to abound! For it is something, I say, to work hard (laborare), and something different to be in pain (dolere).

(Cic. Tusc. 2.35)

124 For the Epicurean πρόληψης, see Cic. Nat. D. 1.44. For the Stoic/Old Academic, see Ac 2.30. See Moreschini (1979) for further discussion of this issue.
125 As noted by King (1945) 183 fn 5, amans doloris seems to be a translation of the Greek φιλόπονος. We might add that this translates the Greek by means of a calque.
Here, Cicero’s two Latin terms (*dolor* and *labor*) are shown each to be *synonymous* with a particular element of the semantic range of the Greek term *πόνος*, but to have distinct meanings from each other. So, then, the Latin terminology chosen by Cicero reveals an important division within the Greek term, showing how it collapses together two separate phenomena that are, in reality, different from each other (**differt aliquid**). Furthermore, Cicero’s use of Latin philosophical vocabulary is here explicitly marked out as making a contribution towards rectifying what he presents as a wider, cultural misunderstanding: namely, the belief that the Greek language has greater lexical resources than Latin, and so is more appropriate for philosophical exposition. While the Greek language prides itself on being more copious (**copiosior**) than Latin, and having a superfluity of terms (**abundare**), it is here shown to be, in fact, deficient (**inops**) in comparison with Cicero’s own Latin language treatment of this subtle, ethical subject matter. Unlike the Latin, the Greek terminology fails, in that it cannot differentiate between the distinct concepts of (positive) hard work and (negative) pain.

The view that Cicero here argues against – i.e. that the Latin language is lexically deficient in relation to Greek – can be found in a number of contemporary and near-contemporary sources, and is, as has been discussed more fully in chapter 1, an important element of the cultural background against which Cicero’s translations of Greek philosophy take place. The “poverty topos”, as it has been called, is most fully articulated
in Lucretius (DRN 1.136-9, 830-33; 3.258-61), where it is specifically the lack of appropriate terminology (verba) that is presented as the primary impediment to writing about philosophical themes in Latin.126 The tendency to analyse larger concepts, picked out by single, Greek terms, into more specific aspects, each denoted by its own, Latin term, can then, be seen as part of Cicero’s strategy to overturn this narrative of linguistic poverty, and supports his claim, at the beginning of the De Finibus, that Latin is even more rich in vocabulary (locupletior) than Greek.127

The suitability of Latin for philosophical analysis is also revealed at other points in Cicero’s texts, but in relation to the Latin lexicon’s ability to more accurately convey the philosophical significance of the concepts that Greek philosophical language picks out, rather than its greater resources in further dividing these concepts. Cicero draws his reader’s attention to points at which Latin reveals features of a concept which the Greek does not, through its etymological connections – just as we have observed him to do in the Academica. Again, the improvements that Latin terminology makes upon the Greek are sometimes left implicit, and sometimes made explicit. Among the examples of the

126 For the term “poverty topos” see Farrell (2001) 28. The Lucretius passages are: . For further discussion of this theme in Latin literature, see Fögen (2000).
127 Cic. Fin. 1.10: non est omnino hic docendi locus; sed ita sentio et saepe disserui, Latinam linguam non modo non inopem, ut vulgo putarent, sed locupletiorum etiam esse quam Graecam. For Latin’s ability also to overcome full lexical gaps in the Greek, see Cic. Leg. 1.27: nam et oculi nimis argute quem ad modum animo affecti simus, loquantur et is qui appellatur uultus, qui nullo in animante esse praeter hominem potest, indicat mores, quoius uim Graeci norunt, nomen omnino non habent. See also Tusc. 3.19 where we are told that the Greeks have no common term for innocentia.
implicit improvement of Latin terminology upon Greek, is the translation of σωφροσύνη as modestia, which Cicero, by means of figura etymologica, shows us has a significant link to the idea of moderatio (“limiting” one’s desires) – a connection not present in the Greek. Among the more explicit is the translation of the Greek συµπόσιον and σύνδειπνον as convivium, which, we are told, reveals the ethical value of these social activities in a way in which the original Greek, with its focus on the bodily pleasures of eating and drinking, does not. Similarly, in the third book of the Tusculan Disputations, Cicero claims that his Latin psychological vocabulary improves upon the original Greek terminology, as the etymological connection between mens and dementia shows how emotional disturbances which overpower the rational faculty of the mind can be viewed as a form of madness, concluding his discussion with the assertion: “these things are much better known by the Latin terms than by the Greek, as will be found also in many other places”.

---

128 See Tusc. 3.16 for the translation of σωφροσύνη as modestia. De Fin 2.60: transfer idem ad modestiam vel temperantiam, quae est moderatio cupiduntum rationi oboediens.
129 Cic. Sen. 45: bene enim maiores accubitionem epularem amicorum, quia vitae coniunctionem haberet, convivium nominaverunt melius quam Graeci, qui hoc idem tum compotationem tum conccnentionem vocant, ut quod in eo genere minimum est, id maxime probare videantur. This point is also made at Cic. Ad Fam. 9.24, and is noted by Kammer (1964) 130: Daß ein convivium nicht nur ein leiblicher Genuß sei, wird durch seine Ableitung von "vita" belegt und als Zeichen verinnerlichter römischer Auffassung von den griechischen Bezeichnungen vorteilhaft abgehoben.
130 Cic. Tusc. 3.10: multoque melius haec notata sunt verbis Latinis quam Graecis, quod alius quoque multis locis reperietur. The claim that “there is nothing better than the common Latin usage” is made again at Tusc. 3.11.
Each of these examples, then, shows the ways in which Cicero challenges the dominant cultural view that Greek vocabulary is more suitable for philosophical discourse than Latin, by capping the original Greek texts in terms of clarity of exposition, or philosophical accuracy.131 This is not, however, the only kind of relationship that Cicero’s terminological translation choices produce with their originals. In the final pages of this chapter, we will briefly survey two other, important intertextual positions which derive from Cicero’s translations of Greek terminology: domestication (in which the Greek philosophical terminology and ideas which Cicero translates are depicted as being identical to pre-existing Latin terminology) and alienation (in which the Greek ideas, while being carried over into Latin discourse, are firmly marked out as foreign to this new Roman context).

V: Greek Philosophy and Traditional Roman Ethics

At other points in his philosophical works, Cicero uses his claims as to the synonymy between Greek philosophical terminology, and Roman ethical terms, in order to represent the Greek philosophical discourse he translates as simply a formal

131 This, in turn, ties in with his larger claim at e.g. Tusc. 1.1 that the Romans improve any aspect of learning they take over from the Greeks: accepta ab illis fecisse meliora (“what was received [from the Greeks] was improved by these men [i.e. the Romans]”).
codification of traditional Roman values. In this way, the translation procedure of synonymy works towards the **domestication** of these foreign, Greek philosophical ideas within their new, Roman context.

One example of this is his treatment of the word *φιλοσοφία* itself. We find this term translated into Latin in a variety of different ways, depending upon Cicero’s immediate literary purpose. In the *Academica*, the consistent translation of the Greek term is the **naturalised** form, *philosophia*, which is transliterated and adapted to the morphology of the Latin language, but still marked out as an original **Greek** term, as Varro notes that he uses this *pro Latino* (“instead of a Latin term”).\(^\text{132}\) This **alienation** of the term – the marking out of the word *philosophia* as essentially foreign to Latin language discourse - befits the text’s focus on its status as an innovative attempt to bring this foreign discipline to a Roman audience. In another context, however, we find the same Greek term translated in such a way that it **domesticates** this foreign body of knowledge, depicting the Greek term as being **synonymous** with the Latin *sapientia*, and so its contents as mapping onto the ideas of conventional Roman wisdom.\(^\text{133}\) Here, this translation procedure supports Cicero’s claim that the subject of philosophy is older than its name, and derives, in its origins, from a traditional wisdom shared by the Greeks and

\(^\text{132}\) Cic. *Acad*. 1.25: *Bene sane facis; sed enitar ut Latine loquar, nisi in huiusce modi verbis ut philosophiam aut rhetoricam aut physicam aut dialecticam appellem, quibus ut aliis multis consuetudo iam utitur pro Latinis*.

\(^\text{133}\) Cic. *Tusc.* 5.7.
the Romans.\textsuperscript{134} Lastly, in the \textit{De Officiis}, we find Cicero negotiating between these two poles of \textbf{domestication} and \textbf{alienation}, through use of the \textit{calque} \textit{studium sapientiae}, which points to the possibility of translating this concept into Latin (it is introduced by the phrase “if you wish to translate it”), so emphasising its foreign origins, while also finding familiar, Latin synonyms for each of its component parts.\textsuperscript{135} \textit{Φιλοσοφία}, then, can be translated in such a way as to emphasise either its foreign origins, or its similarities to Roman conventional wisdom, and Cicero employs this latter strategy of \textbf{domestication} in the case, too, of a number of his other key terms.

In the \textit{De Officiis}, for example, Cicero translates the Greek term \textit{καθῆκον} in such a way as to represent this as an unproblematic synonym for the common, Latin word, \textit{officium}.\textsuperscript{136} We are especially lucky, in regard to the translation of this particular term, in that have an independent insight into Cicero’s intent in selecting this Latin translation from his correspondence with Atticus. From these letters it is clear that Cicero is seeking a \textbf{synonym} to translate this Greek, technical term, but one which appears natural and familiar when used in Latin discourse to take the place of the Greek. Cicero’s concern in these letters is whether the Latin term \textit{officium}, in its customary usage, fits (\textit{convenit}) all of the uses of the Greek term \textit{καθῆκον}, and he chooses to use it (in spite of Atticus’

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid. for the claim that both the Greeks \textit{and} the Romans held the Seven Sages to be wise.  
\textsuperscript{135} Cic. \textit{Off.} 2.5: \textit{Hanc igitur qui expetunt, philosophi nominantur, nec quicquam aliud est philosophia, si interpretari velis, praeter studium sapientiae.}  
\textsuperscript{136} \textit{Off.} 1.8.
\end{flushright}
apparent reservations) because, in his view, it does just this.\textsuperscript{137} This \textit{domestication} befits his presentation in the \textit{De Officiis} of these duties (\textit{officia}) as being both fundamental to philosophy, and also to correct behaviour in the traditional, Roman model.\textsuperscript{138} This is supported by his use of traditional Roman examples to defend his theory of \textit{officia}.\textsuperscript{139} In other passages, the claim that the easy synonymy of Greek philosophical terms with their Latin translations reflects the similarity between Greek philosophical thought and Roman conventional wisdom is made clear within the text itself. In the \textit{Tusculan Disputations}, for example, the fact that Latin already has appropriate names for the psychological concepts being discussed is taken as evidence for the fact that the earlier Romans had already recognised these philosophical truths, many years before Socrates.\textsuperscript{140} This full \textit{domestication} of Greek (in this case, specifically Stoic) psychological vocabulary reflects the larger claim of the prefaces of the \textit{Tusculan Disputations} that conventional Roman wisdom shares its origins with Greek philosophy.\textsuperscript{141} In the case of \textit{virtus}, meanwhile, this Greek, philosophical concept has been so thoroughly \textit{domesticated} that

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{137} Cic. \textit{Att.} 16.14: \textit{Sed, ut aliud ex alio, mihi non est dubium quin quod Graeci καθῆκον, nos 'officium'. id autem quid dubitas quin etiam in rem publicam praeclare caderet? nonne dicimus consulum officium, senatus officium, imperatoris officium? \textit{praeclare convenit}; aut da melius. c.f. also \textit{Att.} 16.11 where the issue is first raised. \\
\textsuperscript{138} As Cicero states at \textit{Off.} 1.4, there is no part of life to which \textit{officium} does not belong, and he expands upon this by invoking the typically Roman example of forensic matters \textit{(nulla enim vitae pars neque publicis neque privatis neque forensibus neque domesticis in rebus...)}.
\\
\textsuperscript{139} For Cicero’s use of Roman exempla in the \textit{De Officiis}, see MacKendrick (1989).
\\
\textsuperscript{140} Cic. \textit{Tusc.} 3.8: \textit{maioribus quoque nostris hoc ita visum intellego multis saeculis ante Socratem.}
\\
\textsuperscript{141} See, for example Cic. \textit{Tusc.} 4.2-3, which emphasises the Italian origins of Pythagoreanism, and the penetration of Pythagoreanism into the Roman world, which led to the (anachronistic) identification of the Roman wisdom of King Numa with that of Pythagoras.
the Greek term ἀρετή, which lies behind Cicero’s treatment of it in the *De Finibus*, has been completely concealed, and is not mentioned even in cases where Cicero purports to be giving a verbatim translation of a Greek philosopher. Instead, this is presented without comment as a native, Roman concept. The same claim could be extended to other “silent” translations, such as honestum for the Greek καλόν, which also serve to disguise the non-Roman origins of the philosophical ideas they convey.

VI: Epicurean Ethics and Untranslatability

Finally, then, let us turn to an important instance of alienation, in which Cicero’s translation of Greek, technical terminology serves to systematically distance the ideas it conveys from his Latin language discourse, so marking it out as foreign. We see the occasional transference of Greek loan words into Cicero’s Latin treatises, or use of a rare and unusual-sounding Latin term, in order to describe a Greek philosophical practice to which Cicero objects. This technique is perhaps most notably employed, however,

142 Cic. *Fin.* 5.79: *cum a Zenone, inquam, hoc magnifice tamquam ex oraculo editur: “virtus ad beate vivendum se ipsa contenta est...”*

143 The domestication of the Greek concept of ἀρετή in its translation by the Latin virtus has also been noted by Michel (1990) 79: *lorsqu’il traduit kalon par honestum, il introduit une nuance très romaine; nul n’ignore la portée d’un tel enrichissement. Cicéron n’est pas seulement un traducteur mais aussi un créateur, qui connaît la vie et la fécondité du bon usage: le dialogue avec les autres langues en fait partie.*

144 For an example of the former, see e.g. physiognomon for φυσιογνώμον in *De Fat* 10. For the latter see e.g. conclusiuncula for σόφισμα in *Acad.* 2.75 and *Tusc.* 2.42.
in Cicero’s rejection of the Epicurean theory of pleasure in the second book of his *De Finibus*.

In this text, Cicero begins his attack upon the Epicurean position by revealing that the term *voluptas* (pleasure), which has been used throughout Torquatus’ exposition of the Epicurean ethical system in book 1, is actually a translation of Epicurus’ Greek term, ἡ δονή. Unusually, given his usual practice of employing only the Latin term once a translation has been established, Cicero uses the Greek term ἡ δονή three times in quick succession at the beginning of this speech, revealing the original Greek terminology underlying the Latin of Torquatus’ speech.\(^{145}\) In transferring the original Greek term into his Latin text in this way (employing it as a loan word within this part of the text), Cicero here effects the alienation of this concept, revealing its origins in the foreign field of Greek philosophy. In addition to this, however, Cicero also rejects Torquatus’ previous translation of the Epicurean concept of ἡ δονή as *voluptas*, arguing that, since the Epicurean usage does not, in fact, match up with the typical Greek understanding of this term, the Latin *voluptas*, while synonymous with the common Greek usage, is not capable of expressing this different, peculiarly Epicurean idea. As he argues: while it is true that the Latin term *voluptas* has an unusually high level of synonymy with the Greek

---

\(^{145}\) The use of the term ἡ δονή comes at *Fin.* 2.8, 12, 13. For Cicero’s common practice of using Latin, rather than Greek, terminology if available, see e.g. *Fin.* 3.15.
Epicurus uses this term in his own peculiar idiom (suo more loquatur) which does not, in fact, match onto the accepted meanings of the Latin voluptas (2.13). Rather, Cicero claims, the Epicurean concept of ἡδονή is untranslatable into Latin – to try to use the Latin term voluptas to denote his idea of ἡδονή would, in fact, be “to tear from our minds our understanding of the words to which we are accustomed”. Moreover, he continues, Epicurus use of the term ἡδονή is untranslatable for the simple reason that it does not, itself, make sense. Epicurus, in employing this technical term, “talks in such a way as not to be understood”, and reveals his inability to “explain” (explicare) the true meanings of the terms he employs, trying to attribute to the concept of pleasure a static property which it simply cannot hold – a failure which Cicero puts down to his contempt for dialectic. So, then, Cicero here adopts his chosen translation technique in order to reveal the incoherence at the heart of Epicurus’ key concept of ἡδονή, presenting the fact that this concept does not map easily onto any idea naturally expressed by the Latin language as a sign of its fundamental philosophical inadequacy.

\[\text{ออกไป (2.13), ut scias me intellegere, primum idem esse dico voluptatem, quod ille ἡδονή. et quidem saepe quaerimus verbum Latinum par Graeco et quod idem valeat; hic nihil fuit, quod quaereremus. nullum inveniri verbum potest quod magis idem declarat Latine, quod Graece, quem declarat voluptas.}\]

\[\text{quamquam non negatis nos intellegere quid sit voluptas, sed quid ille dicat. e quo efficitur, non ut nos non intellegamus quae vis sit istius verbi, sed ut ille suo more loquatur, nostrum neglegat. For the accepted meanings of voluptas as expressing happiness of the mind (laetitia in animo) or a pleasant motion in the body (commotio suavis iucunditatis in corpore) see 2.13.}\]

\[\text{Fin. 2.16: extorquere ex animis cognitiones verborum, quibus inbuti sumus.}\]

\[\text{Fin. 2.15: ita loquatur ut non intellegatur (“he speaks in such a way as not to be understood”); 2.18: aperiendum est igitur, quid sit voluptas; alter enim explicari, quod quaeritur, non potest. quam si explicavisset, non tam haesitaret. (“Therefore, it must be uncovered [i.e. through dialectic] what pleasure [voluptas] is; for otherwise, it is impossible to explain what is sought. And if he [i.e. Epicurus] has explained this, he would not have got so stuck”.)}\]
In this brief survey of Cicero’s translation of Greek, philosophical terminology, then, we have seen the variety of philosophical and literary ends to which Cicero can put the various translation procedures which he employs, and so the importance of considering these translations at the linguistic level, the level of the immediate textual context, and the intertextual level. This methodology, then, should guide us in the rest of this study, in which we will consider Cicero’s translations of extended passages of text within his philosophical works.
Chapter 3: Cicero’s Translations of Prose Texts

It is not just our understanding of Cicero’s development and use of Latin philosophical terminology that can be advanced by a new assessment of Cicero’s translation technique within his philosophical texts. These works are also peppered with moments at which Cicero claims to be directly reporting the statements or arguments (to use the terminology of linguistics, the “utterances”) of earlier Greek philosophers.¹ These “translated inlays”, which recast the words of Greek philosophers in Latin within the context of Cicero’s own Latin language works, will be the subject of this chapter.² Just as we saw to be the case for his translations of technical terms, our analysis here will show that the way in which Cicero translates each of these extended prose passages is dependent upon, and contributes to, the literary and philosophical aims of his own work. Again, we will see the Roman author using different translation procedures to produce varying translation outcomes, ranging from the more to the less literal, which serve particular rhetorical and argumentative ends. Often, as was also the case for Cicero’s translations of technical terminology, these translation choices contribute to the creation of a particular intertextual relationship with the original Greek philosophical texts being

¹ See e.g. Lyons (1968) 172 for the meaning of “utterance” in linguistics. As we shall see, these reports are often introduced by verbs of speaking (e.g. dicit, or inquit), or of writing (e.g. scribit).
² The term is Seele’s (1995). For a fuller discussion see Ch.1, p.17.
translated. We will see **alienation** in Cicero’s treatment of Epicurus’s aphorisms; **domestication** in his approach to Xenophon’s philosophical writings; and instances of **appropriation**, in addition to **capping** and **philosophical correction, interpretation**, and **adaptation**, as he translates excerpts from the works of Plato. These prose translations, then, should, as argued in our opening chapter, be viewed as creative adaptations, fashioned to fit their new Latin, literary context, and Cicero’s own philosophical arguments. This will also be true for Cicero’s translation of the *Timaeus*, which we will turn to in the final chapter, and for Cicero’s translations of Greek poetry, embedded within his philosophical texts, which will be discussed briefly in the epilogue.

In addition to contributing to our understanding of Cicero’s own texts, however, this new study of Cicero’s translations of Greek philosophical prose also has important consequences for our use of Cicero’s writings in the reconstruction of *lost* Greek philosophical texts. As this discussion will show, by moving our focus away from an assumption that Cicero is aiming at absolute fidelity in his treatment of earlier Greek works, and towards a consideration of the ways in which he adapts his Greek sources to fit his own literary ends, we can come to a better understanding of how we might use Cicero as a source for earlier Greek works. Perhaps the most important of these are the dialogues of Aristotle, and so this chapter will conclude with a brief case study showing
the value that a greater awareness of Cicero’s translation practices can bring to our use of the Latin author as evidence for the reconstruction of Aristotle’s lost “exoteric” works.³

Let us turn firstly, though, to an overview of Cicero’s translations of extant Greek philosophical texts. As we shall see from a brief consideration of their general characteristics, these passages further support the made claim in our opening chapter that Cicero’s translations are best understood as creative rewritings of their Greek source texts, and, as such, that we should analyse them to the methodology outlined there.

I: Creative Rewriting: Variations in Cicero’s Translation Style

We have already explored the importance of viewing translation as a necessarily selective and creative activity to our understanding both of the process of interlinguistic translation in general, and to Roman ideas of literary translation in particular (Ch 1). We have also seen how such a perspective can help us to understand Cicero’s presentation of his philosophical works in their prefaces as simultaneously translating and exceeding their Greek originals (Ch 1), and his approach to the translation of the technical terminology of Greek philosophy (Ch 2). It should come as no surprise, then, that we also

³ For a discussion of these works, see p.188ff below.
find this flexible and adaptive approach to translation in Cicero’s treatment of extended passages of Greek philosophical prose.

Although recent scholarship has acknowledged the importance of considering Cicero’s own literary aims in approaching his translations of Greek philosophers, when it comes to analysing these translations on an individual level we still find strong traces of the attitude typified by Poncelet, in the lingering assumption that Cicero’s unvarying goal is the production of literal translations which are as faithful as possible to its Greek original. This assumption is particularly strong among scholars approaching Cicero’s texts from a philosophical, rather than a literary perspective, and is often invoked in the use or rejection of Cicero as a source for the reconstruction of lost or problematic Greek

4 The attitude of Poncelet to Cicero’s translations of philosophical terminology has already been discussed in chapter 2, and his view of Cicero’s extended prose translations of Plato will be discussed more fully in the final chapter in the context of his favoured example, the Timaeus. Remnants of the search in Cicero’s translations for mechanical use of terminology and fully synonymous, “faithful” translation can be seen in e.g. Zetzel (2005) 251: “C’s translation of Phdr. 245c5-246a2 is extremely precise and accurate. For the most part, his equivalents of Plato’s terminology are consistent”. Powell (1995) 238, meanwhile, acknowledges the importance of considering the author’s particular literary purposes in translating these texts: “I have argued that in the case of any piece of translation from Greek in Cicero, we must first of all bear in mind his literary purposes in the particular context.” Yet, when it comes to his discussion of the translations of Plato and Xenophon (p. 282-3) he attributes any deviation from fidelity to (perhaps unconscious) stylistic causes: “On the whole the translations from Plato and Xenophon are introduced for illustrative purposes, and do not play a direct part in philosophical argument. Hence elegance is a primary aim; and we must be on our guard for slight changes of sense or emphasis in translation, perhaps introduced unconsciously, that make the passage illustrate the surrounding context better than an entirely literal translation would have done.”
philosophical texts.\footnote{See, for example, the approach of Bos (1989), von Arnim (1931), Moraux (1973) and others to the reconstruction of the lost works of Aristotle (discussed on p.198), Nikolsky (2001) for Epicurus (discussed on p. 169ff), and Burnet for Plato (for which see p. 186).} It is worth, therefore, beginning our study with a quick overview of the varying approaches taken by Cicero in his translation of a single author, in order to confirm that we are, indeed, correct to view these translations as adaptations which serve Cicero’s own particular literary and philosophical purposes, rather than treating them uniformly as attempts to faithfully replicate the full literary and philosophical content of the original in Latin. Cicero’s translations from the works of Plato provide the most helpful evidence for this type of survey for two reasons. In the first place, the original Greek texts are still extant and in a relatively unproblematic state, meaning that we have a good idea of the contents of those Greek texts which Cicero would have known as Plato’s own.\footnote{For the state of the textual tradition of Plato, see e.g. Irwin (2008) 71-4 (who draws attention to the large number of early testimonia and papyrus fragments attesting to the texts of Plato circulating in antiquity), Pasquali (1952) 247 (who notes that Plato is the ancient author for whom we have the second richest textual tradition, after Homer), Boter (1989), Brumbaugh and Wells (1968), and Reynolds and Wilson (1968). We will, of course, come across some textual issues, and, indeed, one in the \textit{Phaedrus} which Cicero’s own translation has been used to arbitrate over, which we will discuss on p. 186.} Secondly, Cicero translates Plato more often than any other Greek philosopher, so a consideration of his translations from Plato allows us to observe his approach in a variety of different philosophical works and in diverse literary and argumentative contexts.\footnote{Included in this category are a number of texts now considered to be of doubtful authenticity, but which are presented by Cicero as authentic Platonic works: the \textit{Menexenus} and the 7th and 9th \textit{Letters}.} We will begin, then, with a brief overview of the variations in translation style exhibited by Cicero’s translations of Plato, before moving to the question of how this similar, creative approach to translation functions in his less-studied translations of
Epicurus and Xenophon. We will then return to a more in-depth consideration of a number of important Ciceronian translations of Plato, exploring the literary and philosophical aims of his particular translation techniques in these passages.

The passages of Cicero’s philosophical works in which he translates sections of Platonic texts (either explicitly or without comment) are collected in the table below. For ease of reference, each of these passages can be found in its entirety in Appendix A, along with notes on their most important textual variants, their Greek originals, and an English translation (as is also the case for Cicero’s translations from Xenophon and those taken from the extant fragments of Epicurus):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ciceronian Translation</th>
<th>Greek Source</th>
<th>Number in Appendix B</th>
<th>Mode of Reporting</th>
<th>Platonic source text identified?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tusc. 1.53-4</td>
<td>Phaedr. 245c-246a</td>
<td>1a</td>
<td>Direct quotation: ratio nata est Platonis, quae Socrate est in Phaedro explicata</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8 This collection supplements the list given by Powell (1995) 279-80, who misses a number of translations already identified by Clavel (1868). The additional passages missed by Powell are identified in Appendix A. I have here excluded Orat. 41 (= Phaedr. 279), which is included in this list by Powell, as this is in a work which deals primarily with rhetorical theory (according to Cicero’s own categorisation of his works at De Div. 2.4), and so falls outside of the scope of this study.

9 This column records to the way in which the translation is introduced – whether it is presented as a paraphrase, a quotation (and, if so, whether the quotation is given in indirect or direct speech), or a translation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Note</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rep. 6.27</td>
<td>1b</td>
<td>Phaedr. 245c-246a</td>
<td>No indication of source given</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sen. 78</td>
<td>1c</td>
<td>Phaedr. 245c-246a (+<em>Phaedo</em> + <em>Meno</em>)</td>
<td>Close paraphrase: <em>haec Platonis fere</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. 1.66-7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Rep.8.562c</td>
<td>Translation: <em>tum fit illud quod apud Platonem est luculente dictum, si modo id exprimere Latine potuero; difficile factu est, sed conabor tamen.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tusc.. 1.97-9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Apol. 40C-42a</td>
<td>Direct quotation: <em>inquit... inquit... et haec quidem hoc modo</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tusc.. 5.34-5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Gorg. 470d-1a</td>
<td>Direct quotation: <em>velut in Gorgia Socrates... inquit</em> ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tusc.. 5.36</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Menex. 247e-248a</td>
<td>Direct quotation: <em>in Epitapho quo modo idem [i.e. Socrates]?... inquit...</em> ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tusc.. 5.100</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Epist. 7. 326b-c</td>
<td>Close paraphrase: <em>est praeclara epistula Platonis ad Dionis propinquos, in qua scriptum est his fere verbis</em> ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Div. 1.60-1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Rep. 9. 571c-572b</td>
<td>Direct quotation: <em>vide quid Socrates in Platonis Politia loquatur... dicit + haec verba ipsa Platonis expressi</em> ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leg. 2.45</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Leg. 12. 955e-956b</td>
<td>Translation: <em>qui si modo interpretari potuero, his fere verbis utitur</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off. 3.38</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Rep.2.359d-360b</td>
<td>Paraphrase: <em>hinc ille Gyges inducitur a Platone</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leg. 2.67-8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Leg. 12. 958d-e</td>
<td>Direct quotation: <em>Sed videamus Platonem... de sepulcris autem dicit haec</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De Fin 2.45</td>
<td>11a</td>
<td>Epist. 9.358a</td>
<td>Direct quotation: <em>ad Archytam scriptit Plato</em> ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De Off 1.22</td>
<td>11b</td>
<td>Epist. 9.358a</td>
<td>Direct quotation: <em>ut praeclare scriptum est a Platone</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De Fin</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Phaedr. 250d</td>
<td>Direct quotation: <em>inquit Plato</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When all of these translated inlays are considered together, as a group, a number of important features can be observed, and we will consider each of these more closely in the remainder of this section. The first thing to note is that Cicero translates the very same Platonic passage in different ways, depending on the particular context and his rhetorical or philosophical purposes in citing the Platonic text – as we can see from texts 11a and b and 1a, b, and c on our chart. This should, then, confirm for us that Cicero’s translations of earlier Greek philosophers take an adaptive approach to their original texts, following the Roman tradition of *traduzione artistica* (as discussed in our opening chapter), rather than being aimed solely at the production of a faithful Latin translation of the original Greek material. The second feature that can be observed by considering these translational inlays as a group is that the manner in which Cicero presents his translations bears no strict correlation to the level of literalness or flexibility displayed by the translation itself – as we shall see, excerpts presented as direct quotations (introduced by terms such as *scripsit*, *inquit*, or *dicit*) can deviate further from the structure and sense of the original Greek than those which present themselves as paraphrases, or are silent about their relationship to their Platonic source. As the descriptions of his translations as

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Text</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Relation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>De Div 1.52</td>
<td>Crito 44a-b</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Indirect quotation: <em>est apud Platonem Socrates... dicens Critoni...</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tusc. 1.103</td>
<td>Phaedo 115</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Direct quotation: <em>inquit</em></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
conveying either the exact words of the original (e.g. scriptum a Platone (“written by Plato”)), or as approximating the original (scriptum est his fere verbis (“written in almost these words”)) do not consistently reflect differences in the translation procedures used, this suggests that we are right to turn, instead, to a consideration of the purposes which Cicero might have in representing his translations in these various ways – in other words, to the kinds of intertextual relationship that the Latin author establishes with his source texts in presenting his work as replicating the ipsissima verba of the Greek original, as a Latin translation, as an adaptation of a Greek original, or, indeed, in translating a well-known passage without any reference to it status as a translation of an earlier text.10

Finally, as we can see from the data gathered in the chart above, in a significant number of these instances (seven out of eighteen) Cicero indicates the identity of the Platonic text from which these translations derive, while, in another, the fact that the translation derives from Plato’s written words is emphasised, even though a particular text is not named.11 This subset of translations, then, are consciously presented as deriving from a fixed literary source – they are not presented simply as general doxographical accounts of the philosophical ideas of an earlier Greek thinker, but as deriving from particular written texts. The reader educated in Greek philosophy – who, as we have argued in our opening chapter is envisaged as at least one element of Cicero’s ideal audience for these

10 The latter is the case for text 1b, and for Sen. 6-9, will not be treated in full in this chapter, as its treatment of the original lies closer to literary imitation than verbal translation.
11 This is De Officium 1.22 (= 11b in Appendix A), where the reader told that this passage was written (scriptum est) by Plato.
works – is, then, able to return to these Greek texts to verify and compare Cicero’s Latin translations. We should, then, be wary of dismissing any significant deviation from the original text as unwitting or incompetent. This is a feature that we will also observe in Cicero’s translations of Epicurus and Xenophon, where, it seems that the reader is actively encouraged to seek out the original Greek texts for comparison with the Ciceronian version.

Let us turn, then, to our first point – the variability of Cicero’s Latin translation of a single Platonic passage. The clearest instance of this can be found in Cicero’s two translations of a short extract from Plato’s 9th Letter at De Finibus 2.45 and De Officiis 1.22 (11a and 11b, respectively, in Appendix B), neither of which are identified as translations by Powell in his list of Cicero’s translations from an extant philosophical source. The two Ciceronian translations and their Greek source are as follows, with the translated elements shown in bold:

\[
\textit{eademque ratio fecit hominem hominum adpetentem cumque iis natura et sermone et usu congruenter, ut profectus a caritate domesticorum ac suorum serpat longius et se implicet primum civium, deinde omnium mortalium societate atque,}
\]

\[\text{\textit{et unus congruentem, ut profectus a caritate domesticorum ac suorum serpat longius et se implicet primum civium, deinde omnium mortalium societate atque,}}\]

12 For the idea of such changes as unwitting, see Powell’s appeal to Cicero’s “unconscious” changes of his Greek originals (see p. 133 n. 4, above). For the charge of incompetence, see Botter on Aristotle, p.190 below.

13 Powell (1995) 279-80
ut ad Archytam scripsit Plato, *non sibi se soli natum meminerit, sed patriae, sed suis, ut perexigua pars ipsi relinquatur.*\(^{14}\)  

(Cic. De Fin 2.45)

*Sed quoniam, ut praeclare scriptum est a Platone, non nobis solum nati sumus ortusque nostri partem patria vindicat, partem amici, atque, ut placet Stoicis, quae in terris gignantur, ad usum hominum omnia creari, homines autem hominum causa esse generatos, ut ipsi inter se alii alii prodesse possent, in hoc naturam debemus ducem sequi, communes utilitates in medium adferre, mutatione officiorum, dando accipiendo, tum artibus, tum opera, tum facultatibus devincire hominum inter homines societatem.*\(^{15}\)  

(Cic. De Off. 1.22)

\(\text{ἀλλά κάκεῖνο δὲϊ σε ἐνθυμεῖσθαι, ὅτι ἐκαστὸς ἡμῶν οἴχ αὐτῷ μόνον γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ τῆς γενέσεως ἡμῶν τὸ μὲν τι ἡ πατρίς μερίζεται, τὸ δὲ τι οἱ γεννήσαντες, τὸ δὲ οἱ λοιποί φίλοι, πολλά δὲ καὶ τοῖς καιροῖς δίδοσαι τοῖς τὸν βίον ἡμῶν καταλαμβάνουσι.}\(^{16}\)  

(Plato, Ep. 9.358a)

\(^{14}\) “And this same Reason has made man seek after men, and has made him congruent with these naturally, both in language and in habit, so that, setting out from affection for his household and familiaris he spreads out further, and forms social ties first with his fellow citizens, then with all of mankind: and, as Plato wrote to Archytas, she reminds him that he was not born for himself alone but for his fatherland, and for his familiars, so that a small part remains for himself.”

\(^{15}\) “But since, as was excellently written by Plato, we are not born for ourselves and our fatherland claims a part of our birth, our friends claim a part of it; and, as it seems to the Stoics, everything which is produced on the earth it created for the use of man – men, however, are born for the sake of men, so that they may each be able to benefit each other; in this we out to follow nature as our leader, to contribute common acts of usefulness through the exchange of duties by giving and receiving, and to bind the society of men to each other through skills, work, and abilities.”

\(^{16}\) “Yet you ought also to bear in mind that no one of us exists for himself alone, but one share of our existence belongs to our country, another to our parents, a third to the rest of our friends, while a great part is given over to those needs of the hour with which our life is beset.” (Trans. Bury)
When set next to each other like this, we can see that each of these translations, although treating the same Platonic source text, exhibit notable differences, emphasising different aspects of the original and using it for different argumentative purposes. The first passage, from the *De Finibus*, may seem syntactically closer to the Greek original, in that the claim that man is not born for himself alone is introduced by a verb of reminding, which is absent from the *De Officiis* (*meminerit* in the *De Finibus*, reflecting *ἐνθυμεῖσθαι* in the Platonic model). The subject of this reminding, however, is, in the Latin translation of the *De Finibus*, the personified *Ratio*, reminding mankind in general that he is not born for himself. In the Platonic original, in contrast, the necessity of remembering is expressed impersonally (*δεῖ... ἐνθυμεῖσθαι*), while it is the second person *σε* of Archytas who must remember this fact. In addition to this, in the *De Finibus* passage the content of this reminding concerns the nature of man in general (the *se* in *non sibi se soli natum* referring back to *hominem*), while the Platonic original speaks instead of the nature of “each of us” (*ἕκαστος ἡμῶν*), relating this claim to the shared nature of the writer and the reader.

In the *De Officiis* passage, by contrast, the idea of remembering is elided in an act of syntactical compression, but Cicero retains, unlike in the *De Finibus* passage, the reference to first person plural in the Platonic original – although the syntax has again been adapted, so that it is the first person plural “we” which is the grammatical subject of the clause (*nati sumus*), rather than the Greek singular “each of us” (*ἕκαστος ἡμῶν*...
The De Officiis passage also reproduces a further element of the Platonic original that is absent from the De Finibus passage, in that it expresses the idea that our native land and our friends actively lay claim to a part of us through use of the verb *vindico* (*partem... vindicat*). In this way, it reproduces more explicitly the content of the Greek verb *μερίζεται* (“has a share in”) than the De Finibus passage, which indicates the claim of our fatherland and friends to the parts of our lives more succinctly through the dative of advantage (*patriae* and *suis*). Similarly, the De Officiis passage reproduces (rather awkwardly) the Platonic noun *γένεσις* in its use of the term *ortus* – a term which the De Finibus passage omits, relying on the verbal *natum* to express this idea. Yet, the De Officiis passage simultaneously omits the Platonic reference to our duty to our parents (*οἱ γέννήσαντες*), mentioning only our relationship to our fatherland and friends - an idea which the *suis* of the De Finibus (which can indicate *both* friends and family) makes space for. Each of these translations, then, omits and includes elements of the Platonic original that the other does not.

Given the various elisions and adaptations of the original that are present in each of these translations, it would be hard to say which is a more or less “literal” translation of the Platonic original – neither of these passages appears to strive for absolute fidelity to the vocabulary and syntax of the Greek text. Each of these Ciceronian passages, instead, translates those elements of the original that are most relevant for its own particular argumentative purposes. In the De Officiis passage, for example, the Platonic
translation acts as a single premise in a larger argument concerning the natural function of man. The Platonic passage, which states that man is born for those around him as well as himself, is combined with the further Stoic claim that everything is created for the benefit of man in order to conclude that man, too, is born for the benefit of mankind as a whole, meaning that he is naturally social, with innate responsibilities to others in his society.  

This argumentative context explains why man’s responsibility to his parents, which is present in the Platonic original and alluded to in the *De Finibus* translation, is elided in the *De Officiis* translation – Cicero’s focus here is not on man’s natural responsibility to his blood relations, which is (as Cicero presents it) a point of little contention, but on providing Platonic authority for the more surprising Stoic claim that we have a similar responsibility to those around us, with whom we have no direct genealogical link.  

In the *De Finibus* passage, meanwhile, the Platonic text is not employed as a single premise of a larger argument, as it is in the *De Officiis*, but acts as a reiteration of the preceding claim that man’s affections extend from his immediate household (*profectus a caritate domesticorum ac suorum*), to his fellow citizens (*se implicet primum civium*), and finally to humanity as a whole (*deinde omnium mortalium*).

---

17 The fact that this Platonic idea is only a single premise is indicated by the fact that it is introduced by *quoniam* (“since”).

18 Cicero treats as obvious the fact that man, like the other animals, has a natural connection of affection and responsibility to his immediate family: *commune autem animantium omnium est coniunctionis appetitus procreandi causa et cura quaedam eorum, quae procreata sint*. (*Off.* 1.11)
societate), following the famous Stoic process of *οἰκείωσις*. The fact that the Platonic translation acts as a reiteration of the preceding argument may explain why Cicero has chosen to translate the Platonic idea of reminding here (*meminerit*), while the content of the argument explains why Cicero here employs the term *suis* and so picks out those natural ties to our immediate family which are passed over by the *De Officiis* version – our affinity with our close relations is an important stage of the developmental process of *οἰκείωσις* which is here described. Plato’s final claim that the necessities of survival also have a share in human life, meanwhile, has no relevance to the argumentative context of either the *De Officiis* or the *De Finibus* passage – both of which are concerned with an individual man’s relationship with broader human society, rather than to the rest of the natural world. This, then, explains why the concluding words of the Platonic passage are translated in neither of these Ciceronian texts. These paired translations of Plato’s 9th letter, then, illustrate clearly how Cicero selects from and adapts his Platonic model to fit his immediate argumentative purposes. We should, then, bear this tendency towards flexible and adaptive translation in mind when approaching those Ciceronian translations that exist only in a single version, or that lack an extant Greek source, and, rather than assuming that Cicero’s primary purpose in these translations is absolute fidelity to their

---

19 For a recent account of this Stoic theory of the moral and social development of human beings and its place in the wider Stoic ethical system, with comprehensive bibliography on the subject, see Lee (2002).

20 The claim is expressed in the words *πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τοῖς καιροῖς δίδοται τοῖς τὸν βιόν ήμῶν καταλαμβάνονσι*, which conclude the passage quoted above. This idea has already been dealt with by Cicero earlier in *Off.* 1.11, and is not relevant to his current discussion.
originals, consider how Cicero’s translation choices reflect their immediate literary and philosophical contexts.

A second interesting feature, for our purposes, is that each of these Ciceronian passages, although differing significantly both from the original Platonic formulation and from each other, is presented without qualification as a direct transcription of the words of Plato. The *De Finibus* passage is introduced with the words *ut ad Archytam scripsit Plato* (“as Plato wrote to Archytas”), while the *De Officiis* passage has *ut praecclare scriptum est a Platone* (“as was excellently written by Plato”). The specific claims that Cicero’s texts may make as to the direct and unmediated nature of his Platonic quotations, then, do not necessarily reflect the actual status of these translations as faithful or adaptive – even strikingly altered versions, such as these translations of Plato’s 9th letter, can be presented as the *ipsissima verba* of the Greek philosopher. Cicero’s ability to present his Platonic adaptations as unmediated quotations can also be seen in text 7 (*De Div.* 1.60-1), where, in spite of his claim *haec verba ipsa Platonis expressi* (“I have given Plato’s very words themselves”), he extensively rewrites the Platonic original to remove its original dialogue form, and text 14 (*Tusc.* 1.103) which is introduced as if as a direct quotation with the term *inquit*, although it is, in reality, a greatly compressed paraphrase. Conversely, *De Re Publica* 6.27 (text 1a), which is not explicitly acknowledged as deriving from a Platonic source, closely tracks the structure and syntax of its Greek original, as we shall see in the more complete discussion of in section 4 –
indeed, when this translation is reprised with only minor differences in the Tusculan Disputations (text 1b), it is presented as a direct quotation from the Phaedrus (quae Socrate est in Phaedro explicata). Cicero’s own comments on the relationship of his translations to their Greek source texts are anything but a simple indication of the level fidelity or flexibility with which he treats the original texts (in other words, to use the terminology of our methodological introduction, it does not reflect the kinds of translational processes he actually employs and translation outcomes thereby produced).

So, then, since the terms in which Cicero introduces his translations do not reflect the fidelity with which he translates the Greek original, we should consider, instead, as has been argued in the opening chapter of this dissertation, alternative reasons for these claims – in particular, what purposes Cicero may have in representing the relationship of his own text to the original in these particular terms. To return to the two translations of Plato’s 9th letter, in each of these cases the fact that Cicero’s adaptive translations are presented as direct quotations endows his argument with greater authority – by presenting his translations directly as Plato’s own words, Cicero obscures the fact that he has, in reality, adapted and interpreted this passage by editing it and inserting it into different

21 These differences, although minor, are, nonetheless, telling of the importance Cicero attributes to integrating his source texts to his current argumentative context through adaptation. Rep. 6.27, for example, has a nam, translating the Greek γάρ, which is not present in Tusc. 1.53. This connective reflects the fact that the former passage is presented as a continuation of Scipio’s speech, while the latter is marked out as a separate, Platonic, discourse. The similarities, differences, and textual problems exhibited by these two translations can be seen more clearly in table 4 in Appendix C.
argument contexts. Importantly, the presentation of these translations as Plato’s own, original words rather than as translations also serves to draw a particular intertextual relationship between the source text and its translation. In the case of the *De Finibus* passage, by presenting this translation as Plato’s *ipsissima verba*, Cicero downplays its status as a translation, and so suppresses both the linguistic and cultural differences between his own text and his Platonic model and his own role as translator. In this way, Cicero works to domesticate this Greek text, presenting it as if it were simply another Latin work which can be directly quoted in Latin discourse without any modification, as he does the words of Ennius or Terence.22 By presenting this Greek translation as an unproblematic part of his Latin discourse, Cicero here draws the reader’s attention to its philosophical content, rather than its status as a foreign cultural artefact, so focusing the reader’s attention on his argument, rather than his treatment of Plato’s text. Moreover, in the particular case of the *De Finibus*, this domestication of the Greek text fits in with Cicero’s assertion that Plato’s words are simply a reflection of the exhortations of a shared, human ratio, and so are necessarily valid, independent of the cultural or linguistic context in which they are expressed. Cicero’s concealment of both the potential problems of interlinguistic translation and the possible differences between the Greek and Latin languages and Greek and Roman modes of thought, then, reflects and reinforces his philosophical claim in this part of his text: he here emphasises not the differences

---

22 E.g. *Tusc.* 3.28 quotes the *Telamo* of Ennius, while he quotes Terence’s *Phormio* a few paragraphs later (*Tusc.* 30).
between Greek and Roman society, but their similarities, so supporting his claim that human beings share a single, natural *societas*.

The opposite is, however, the case in a number of other Platonic translations that are included in the table above. In texts such as *De Re Publica* 1.66-7 (text 2) and *De Legibus* 2.45 (text 8) the status of these passages as originating from a different cultural and linguistic tradition is, conversely, emphasised, when the author draws our attention to their status as translations. In *Rep.* 1.66, Scipio states that he will try to “express this in Latin” (*id exprimere Latine*), while in *De Leg.* 2.45 this passage is described as an attempt to “translate” (*interpretari*) the Platonic original. Again, the representation of these Platonic translations as non-Roman in origin supports Cicero’s aims in the immediate argumentative context. In the *De Legibus* passage, the emphasis upon the foreign nature of his Platonic source supports Cicero’s claims throughout this text regarding the universal character of the legal system he describes, and that this universal character derives from the relationship of this legal code to natural law.23 By showing, through his translation of Plato, that the Greeks hold the same beliefs as the Romans in regard to burial practices, Cicero provides comparative evidence for his claim that the Roman legal code bears an important relationship to universal, natural law (be this as a 

---

23 See *Leg.* 1.19 for idea that law is a force of nature (*vis naturae*) and represents the rational thought of the wise human being (*mens rationque prudentis*). For a more complete treatments (with varying conclusions) of Cicero’s use of the Stoic idea of natural law in the *De Legibus* and the relationship of this to the Roman law code he describes, see e.g. Caspar (2011), Asmis (2008), Dyck (2004), and Wander Vaerdt (1989).
codification of natural law itself, as Dyck argues; or through participating imperfectly in
natural law, to follow Asmis), as opposed to representing a culturally-determined
convention. Cicero’s appeal to his Platonic model in order to show that the moral norms
he advocates also hold outside of a Roman context, and so that the Roman legal system
reflects a universal, natural law, can also be seen in the other surviving Platonic
translation in the *De Legibus*, which occurs only a few pages later at 2.67-8 (text 10).
Here Plato’s precepts form part of a complex argument in which Cicero claims that
Roman prohibitions regarding funeral monuments are identical to Greek precepts on this
matter, and so conform to natural law (indeed, he even goes as far as to claim that the
formulations in Twelve Tables are *translata de Solonis fere legibus* (“almost translated
from the laws of Solon”).24 Consequently the Greek origins of Plato’s words are
emphasised, as they are introduced alongside the precepts of Demetrius of Phalerum and
Solon who are explicitly described as *Athenienses*.25 The appeal in the *De Legibus* to
Plato as a markedly foreign model, then, authorises Cicero’s claims in this work
regarding the natural foundations of the legal code he describes, as the Platonic intertext
functions as an objective, external authority through which to view the Roman legal

24 *Cic. Leg.* 2.59
25 *Cic. Leg.* 2.67: *haec igitur Athenienses tui* (“your Athenians, therefore [say] these things”).
system. This, in turn, supports Cicero’s repeated claims as to the universal applicability of the (Roman) legal code he describes.26

In the De Re Publica passage (text 2), meanwhile, Cicero similarly emphasises the foreign nature of the Platonic passage by pointing out that this quotation comes from a Greek text that Scipio needs to work to “express in Latin” (exprimere Latine). In this case, however, Cicero does this not to show that Roman ideas are also present in the Greek tradition, but, rather, to articulate concepts which are portrayed as lying outside of Roman experience. In his translation, Cicero presents the Platonic theory of the degeneration of states, focusing on the degeneration of monarchy into ocholocracy when the people overthrow a just king. This picture of the res publica as susceptible to degeneration (and, indeed, to the cyclical revolutions which can result from this, as “the ruling power of the State, like a ball, is snatched from kings by tyrants, from tyrants by aristocrats or the people, and from them again by an oligarchical faction or tyrant, so that no single form of government ever maintains itself very long”)27 is important for the philosophical project of the De Re Publica, in that it reveals the fundamental importance of establishing a stable political system which will not degenerate into any of these lesser

26 E.g. Cic. Leg. 2.35: non enim populo Romano, sed omnibus bonis firmisque populis leges damus (“for we give laws not to the Roman people, but to all good and true peoples”).
27 Cic. Rep. 1.68: tamquam pilam rapiunt inter se rei publicae statum tyranni ab regibus, ab iis autem principes aut populi, a quibus aut factiones aut tyranni, nec diutius umquam tenetur idem rei publicae modus.
forms of government. However, the depiction of the Roman state in this text is such that an awareness of a state’s potential for degeneration could not emerge from the study of Rome itself. Scipio’s presentation of Rome as the ideal state entails that it is, by definition, as insulated as possible from negative change of this kind, being instead stable and balanced. Indeed, the Platonic account of the degeneration of the state is introduced precisely as something that is markedly absent from the ideal state. Scipio’s description of the history of the Roman state in book 2, meanwhile, also leaves no space for a model of degeneration to emerge from the examination of Rome’s past – instead, the history of Rome is presented as an account of positive progress leading teleologically towards a final, perfected form, as we are shown the state “being born, growing, coming to maturity, and now stable and strong”. Scipio’s study of the historical state of Rome, then, while being, for the most part, contrasted positively with Plato’s own theoretical account of the ideal state, cannot reveal these forms of political decline - for the very reason that Rome, his ideal state, does not exhibit such degeneration. For this, he must,

At Rep. 2.42 we are told that the Roman Republic has a unique claim to aequabilitas and stability. At 2.65 we find the concluding assertion that Scipio’s account of Rome has been an account of the ideal state (de optimo statu).

The account of degeneration is introduced at 1.65 with the comment that such changes will be unlikely to occur in the ideal state: minime facile eas [i.e. commutationes rerum publicum] in ea re publica futuras puto (“I think that it will be exceedingly difficult for these [political revolutions] to come about in this state”).

Cic. Rep. 2.3: nascentem et crescentem et adultam et iam firmam atque robustam. Even moments of violent political change, such as the expulsion of the kings at 2.51, are figured in Scipio’s account not as degeneration, but as progress, as they represent the overthrow of unjust rather than just government.

For the comparison of Scipio’s historical account of the ideal state with Plato’s theoretical, “city in speech” see e.g. Rep. 2.3 which claims that Scipio’s account of the foundation of the Roman Republic will
instead, turn to Plato’s theoretical ideal state, which, precisely because of its imaginary status, can be propelled hundreds, thousands, or even millions of years into the future (depending on the value and function given to the infamous “nuptial number”) in order to observe the extremely unlikely circumstances of its eventual, organic decline. That such an account of decline is unfamiliar in the Roman context (and so must be supplemented from the Greek) is made clear when Scipio concludes with this topic at 1.70, and states that he is returning to subjects which are “known to everyone” (quae nota sunt omnibus), implying again the unfamiliar, foreign nature of the content of his Platonic translations - despite the fact that this goes against the text’s widespread conceit that his interlocutors are intimately familiar with the work of Plato and other Greek philosophers. We see here, then, the construction of a relationship of appropriation, as Cicero draws attention to the fact that this narrative of decline comes from outside of the Roman world, and so that his translation from the Greek adds something to the discussion which would be an “easier” route to the establishment of the ideal state than Plato’s imaginary invention. For a more complete discussion of this see Zetzel (1995) 160 who notes: “C. repeatedly contrasts Scipio’s historical reconstruction with Plato’s imaginary and impossible Republic”.

32 It is also worth pointing out here that, although Plato’s main discussion of the degeneration of states regards the eventual degeneration of Kallipolis (his “city in speech”) he also attributes these flawed governmental systems to particular, historical Greek states (Rep. 8.544b-d). For the “nuptial number” of Rep. 8.546b-c, see e.g. Adam (1891) and (1892), Dies (1936), and Reeve (2004) 241 ftnt 10. Allen (1994) 44-80 also has a good summary of the controversy surrounding this number, although focusing on the ancient sources and contemporary ideas that would have been available to Ficino in his interpretation of this “notoriously intractable mathematical passage” (p.ix). Whatever the number is meant to be, to whatever it is meant to be applied, and however great the element of “jest” (Adam (1892) 242) in this description, it is clearly supposed to be a large number, indicating a distant time in the future, and describing the uncommon conditions which will result in this stable city finally succumbing to destruction – not through any fault of its governors, but through the natural tendency to decadence of living organisms. 

33 Indeed, Laelius even comments that this very passage is known to him at Rep. 1.66.
otherwise be unavailable to Roman thought on these issues. So, then, by emphasising the translated nature of the Platonic account of the degeneration of the state, Cicero shows that we must look outside of the Roman state and to the Greek world for such a negative exemplum, allowing him to maintain the picture of Rome as the uncorrupted ideal state while showing why the maintenance of the Roman political system, with its mixed constitution, is so vital.

This process of appropriation, by which Cicero emphasises the Greek origins of the philosophical ideas he describes, yet, in doing so, makes it clear that he is adding a new and valuable perspective to the Roman store of knowledge, has already been identified in the context of Cicero’s translations of technical terms in the previous chapter. Similarly, as we saw in the case of his translation of technical terms, Cicero also draws attention to the translated nature of his quotations from Greek philosophy to the end of alienating the original text, showing that it has origins outside of Roman thought and as such is distanced from his own, Latin philosophical discourse. This is most clearly the case in Cicero’s extended translations from the works of Epicurus – just as it was the Greek philosophical terminology of Epicurus that was shown to be most foreign to Latin vocabulary use in chapter 2. Consequently, this process of intertextual alienation through translation will be examined in the next section, where we will see how Cicero, as well as marking these translations out as translations from the Greek, also uses foreignising translation procedures – employing non-Latinate syntax and favouring synonymy over
cultural equivalence – in order to further underscore the Greek origins of these doctrines, and so to distance these philosophical ideas from his own Latin philosophical discourse.

That Cicero adapts his translations to fit his argumentative and literary goals, and that the way in which he represents the relationship between a Greek original and his own translation (whether as direct quotation, translation, or paraphrase) is determined not simply by the translation technique actually employed, but also by the demands of the literary and philosophical context, should be clear from this brief overview of Cicero’s treatment of his Platonic translations. Before turning to a closer examination of a number of Cicero’s translations and considering how his chosen translation procedures reflect his wider aims, it remains for us to tie up a single loose end from the preceding discussion. While we have explained Cicero’s presentation of the De Finibus’ translation of Plato’s 9th letter as his ipsissima verba through an appeal to the intertextual position of domestication, we have not yet explained the similar claim to direct quotation made by the translation of this same passage, yet in a very different manner, in the De Officiis.

Cicero’s translation of Plato’s 9th letter in the De Officiis constitutes a more complicated example, in that there appears to be a disconnect between the way in which the Platonic translation is represented and the form of the translation itself. While no explicit attention is drawn to the translated nature of Plato’s words, the translation procedures employed by Cicero, nevertheless, produce a somewhat foreignised
translation of the original. The syntax of the Latin translation *ortusque nostri partem patria vindicat* ("our native country lays claim to a part of our birth"), while it mirrors the genitives, accusative, nominative, and verb in Greek original (*τῆς γενέσεως ἡμῶν τὸ μὲν τι ἣ πατρίς μερίζεται*), is rather awkward, requiring, as the *TLL* notes, an unusually extended use of the term *ortus* to match the meaning of the Greek genitive *τῆς γενέσεως*. 34 This unusual use of a Latin term in order to match the semantic range and syntactical role of a Greek original with which it is only partly *synonymous*, results, in the absence of any further description, paraphrase, or *grammatical transposition* to adapt it to the norms of the target language, in a partially *foreignised* translation.

Furthermore, in the next section of this *De Officiis* passage, when Cicero moves from his translation of Plato to a translation of a now lost passage of Chrysippus, we find the repeated use of Greek cognates (*gignantur* and *generatus*, rather than the *nascor/natus* vocabulary of the *De Finibus* translation of Plato’s 9th letter). 35 This use of cognates is unusual in Ciceronian translation: as we will discuss in greater depth in the epilogue, Cicero, unlike Varro, tends to avoid the use of cognates and downplays the linguistic

34 The *TLL* notes this use of *ortus* at Cic. *Off.* 1.22 as "*sensu dilatato*", to match the Greek *γένεσις* (*TLL 2. ortus, us m. 2*). The extension of this term to include “the meaning almost of life itself” (*notione fere de ipsa vita*) matches one of its uses in (philosophical) Greek, where it can indicate the thing produced (for example the sum of created things, or a particular race, species, or type (LSJ *γένεσις* IV and V – the examples come primarily from Plato)) as well as the process of production.

35 Cic. *Off.* 1.22: *atque, ut placet Stoicis, quae in terris gignantur, ad usum hominum omnia creari, homines autem hominum causa esse generatos*. For the attribution of the claim that all animals are born for the sake of man to Chrysippus, in spite of the fact that the original Greek is no longer extant, see Cic. *Fin.* 3.67.
relationship of the Latin and Greek languages. The use of *causa* here, too, is unusual in terms of strict *latinitas*, as it looks not to “the future, and implying a purpose”, but replicates the sense of the Greek ἑνεϰα, which typically has no such restrictions.

Although we cannot be absolutely certain, since the Greek original of this Chrysippan passage no longer survives, it certainly seems as if Cicero is here taking care to replicate the grammatical structures of the original text, and even goes so far as attempting to preserve the phonetic value of the original Greek vocabulary through the use of cognates. Here, too, then, it seems the translation procedures employed by Cicero result in a somewhat foreignising translation outcome, despite the fact that his translations of Plato and Chrysippus in this passage are presented as direct and unmediated quotations from his Greek original. The reason for this apparent mismatch might be found in Cicero’s authorial stance in the *De Officiis*. Here, Cicero presents himself almost as a historian of philosophy, presenting non-Peripatetic views (in particular the Stoic views of Panaetius) for his son’s consideration, and according to his own *arbitrium* and *iudicium*. The foreignising mode of translation here, then, marks these quotations out from the surrounding, Latinate authorial voice, and so supports Cicero’s claim to be accurately

\[\text{\ldots}\]

36 See p.291, below.
37 For this claim that “in the best prose, *causa* almost always referring to the future, and implying a purpose”, see Lewis and Short, *A Latin Dictionary*. For the use of *causa* as a translation of ἑνεϰα see *TLL caus(s)ia* B.
presenting and analysing the ideas of earlier, Greek thinkers. The claim to be directly quoting, rather than translating these Greek texts, meanwhile, allows Cicero to simultaneously present his own Latin version as an unmediated record of the original Greek. It is at points like these, when Cicero reproduces Greek syntactical structures and mimics Greek vocabulary use in order to display his fidelity as a spokesman for the ideas of others and reliability as a historian of philosophy, that he comes closest to the literal, mechanical translation longed for by many modern scholars. Even in these cases, however, his translation technique is only presented as being literal – Cicero still, as we have noted above, adapts his original, selecting for translation only the most relevant sections of the original Platonic text.

This example, then, shows that we cannot be overly schematic in treating these translations, but need to consider the particular interplay between translation procedures and outcomes within their own literary and argumentative context. Indeed, it is not always the case that the status of the source text as culturally and linguistically Greek and the target text as Roman seems to be particularly important for our understanding of Cicero’s translation choices at all. In section 4, we will return to an important example of

39 The accuracy of his presentation of Greek philosophers forms an important aspect of his claim to present to his son precepts undique (i.e. from every other philosophical school, Off. 3.5) to complement his current Peripatetic studies, and Cicero is careful to attribute the views he relates to their sources (e.g. within just a few paragraphs at Off. 1.40-4, we get attributions to Theopompus (40), Herodotus (41), and Socrates (44)). A similar point is made at Off. 3.121, where Cicero ends the work by describing the three books of the De Officiis as hospites (guest friends) presenting a different perspective among the teachings of Cratippus.
Cicero’s translation of Plato, where the foreign nature of the source text seems to be less relevant to our reading of the translation than the contested reading of the Greek text, and this will also be the case (for the most part) for our interpretation of Cicero’s *Timaeus* in the final chapter. Before turning to these texts, however, we will examine Cicero’s treatment of his translations from Epicurus and Xenophon, where the intertextual interplay of the source text and translation as representatives of Greek and Roman literary and philosophical culture is key.

This survey of Cicero’s embedded translations of Plato, then, confirms the importance of considering more fully how and why Cicero adapts his Greek philosophical models, as suggested in our opening chapter – even in instances in which Cicero presents his translations as faithful renditions of Greek originals. It also shows that a consideration of intertextual relationships such as *domestication* and *alienation* can be as important for our understanding Cicero’s translations of extended passages of philosophical prose as it was for our analysis of his translations of philosophical terminology in the preceding chapter. We can now turn to a consider of how Cicero’s literal translations of Epicurus serve to make Epicurean thought seem foreign to and in conflict with traditional Roman values (so *alienating* his ideas). We will then turn to Cicero’s treatment of Xenophon, considering how he selectively translates Xenophon’s words to make them seem appropriate to the Roman character of Cato (*domesticating* these Greek philosophical ideas). After this, we will return to a closer consideration of
texts 1a and 1b of Plato, showing how Cicero interprets and corrects their philosophical form and content, before finally turning to a consideration of what the flexible and creative nature of Ciceronian translation means for our use of the Latin author as a source for the lost works of Aristotle.

II: Epicurus: The Alterity of Epicurean Philosophy

Although we have, up to this point, emphasised the creative nature of Ciceronian translation, this does not prevent the Latin author, at times, from working to produce a translation outcome which we might describe as literal - sticking closely to the syntax and word order of the original, and employing synonymy to translate the individual Greek terms, even at the expense of natural Latin expression. Indeed, this is what we find in many of Cicero’s translations from Epicurus. As our examination of Cicero’s translations from Plato has shown, however, this kind of literal translation is neither the inevitable form of Ciceronian translation, nor is there any evidence that this kind of translation was especially favoured or considered to be paradigmatic by the author. When approaching passages in which Cicero performs this kind of literal translation, then, we must bear in mind that this, too, is a particular translational choice. It is not the case, as

40 This is not, of course, to imply that such a “literal” translation could fully or perfectly translate the source text. As examined in our opening chapter, and further explored in Appendix A, it is simply a case of what aspects of the original are privileged, and in the case of what we commonly call literal translation, the procedures of synonymy and the maintenance of word order are privileged, rather than cultural equivalence or grammatical transposition to produce a natural adaptation in the target language.
some earlier approaches to Ciceronian translation have assumed, that it is only in these moments of literal translation that Cicero is translating his original successfully. Nor is the Roman author, conversely, failing in his role as a Latiniser of the Greek tradition in producing these passages of literal translation, rather than adapting the original to the norms of Latin eloquentia in the tradition of traduzione artistica. Instead, a literal translation outcome is, as we have seen, simply one of many forms of translation that Cicero can employ, depending upon his particular needs at a specific point in a given text. The question then becomes why Cicero might choose this particular form of translation to treat Epicurean source texts, and, as we shall see, an important part of the explanation is that it allows him to distance Epicurus’ words from his own Latin discourse by means of the construction of an intertextual stance of alienation. In this, his treatment of Epicurean texts bears a marked similarity to his translation of Epicurean philosophical terminology, as discussed in the previous chapter.41 So, the alienation of Epicurus’ Greek texts and their contents contributes to Cicero’s wider strategy of portraying the Epicurean philosophical system as incoherent and incompatible with Roman moral thought.

41 See p.127-9, above.
Cicero’s translations from the extant works of Epicurus are collected in full in Appendix B, and are summarised in the table below.⁴²

---

**Table 3: Cicero’s Translations of Epicurus**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ciceronian Translation</th>
<th>Greek Source</th>
<th>Number in Appendix B</th>
<th>Reliability</th>
<th>Direct/Indirect Quotation/Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ND 1.45</td>
<td>KD 1 (DL 10.139)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>Direct quote: <em>vere exposita illa sententia est ab Epicuro</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fin. 1.57</td>
<td>KD 5 (DL 10.140)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>Indirect quote: <em>clamat Epicurus</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fin. 1.63</td>
<td>KD 16 (DL 10.144) &amp; KD 19 (DL 10.145)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>Indirect quote: <em>optime vero Epicurus... dixit</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fin. 1.68</td>
<td>KD 28 (DL 10.148)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Yes: <em>Epicurus his paene verbis... inquit</em></td>
<td>Direct quote: <em>praecclare enim Epicurus his paene verbis... inquit</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fin. 2.7</td>
<td>Peri Telous fr 67 Us. (DL 10.6)</td>
<td>1b</td>
<td>Yes: <em>an haec ab eo [i.e. Epicurus] non dicuntur?</em></td>
<td>Indirect: [<em>Epicurus</em> testificetur]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fin. 2.21</td>
<td>KD 10 (DL 10.142)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Yes: <em>obsecro... Torquate, haec dicit Epicurus?</em></td>
<td>Direct translation: <em>animadverte igitur rectene hanc sententiam interpreter</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fin. 2.96</td>
<td>fr. 138 Us. (DL 10.22)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Yes: <em>epistulam... quam modo totidem fere verbis interpretatus sum...(§100)</em></td>
<td>Direct translation: <em>audi... moriens quid dicat Epicurus</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tusc. 3.41-2</td>
<td>Peri Telous fr 67 Us. (Ath.)</td>
<td>1a</td>
<td>Yes: <em>ne quis me putet fingere...</em></td>
<td>Direct translation: <em>fungar enim iam</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

⁴² Again, this collection supplements the list of Powell (1995) 279-80.
As is the case with Cicero’s translations of Plato (examined in section 1, above), in some passages Cicero draws attention to the translated nature of these Epicurean quotations, while in others he elides the linguistic differences between the source text and his translation, representing his translation as an unmediated account of Epicurus’ words. In the case of Epicurus, however, a clearer pattern emerges. These texts can be divided into passages that are spoken by characters who support Epicureanism (represented by the top half of the table), and those spoken by characters who reject Epicureanism (the bottom half of the table). Of those passages voiced by speakers who are hostile to Epicureanism, only one does not mark itself out explicitly as a translation. Every other passage which is spoken either by the character “Cicero” in *De Finibus* book 2, or by the main speaker of the *Tusculan Disputations*, draws attention to the translated nature of their quotations from Epicurus through use of either a form of the verb *interpretari* (“to translate”) or the noun *interpres* (“translator”). Those passages that are spoken by supporters of Epicureanism, meanwhile, universally elide the translated nature of these quotations, presenting Epicurus’ words as direct or indirect quotations, with no reference

43 The outlier is *Fin.* 2.7 (text 1b). The others, which emphasise the translated nature of the Epicurean quotations, are texts 2 and 4 (spoken by “Cicero” in the *De Finibus*) and 1a (spoken by the main character in the *Tusc.*).

44 The use of *interpretator* and its cognates by Cicero to pick out literal translations is discussed more fully in Ch.1 p.44ff.
to the linguistic change from Greek to Latin. The single exception to this division - *De Fin. 2.7*, text 1b - is also unusual in other ways: it is a shorter paraphrase of the passage of the *Peri Telous* presented in a fuller form as a translation at *Tusc.* 3.41-2 (text 1a), and is found in the part of *De Finibus* book 2 before Torquatus calls for an “end to interrogation”, where the rapid question and answer format means that Cicero’s character cannot fully (“rhetorically”) expand upon his position. The presentation of these quotations from Epicurus as *translatio*, then, seems to occur exclusively in polemical contexts, and, indeed, in almost every relevant polemical context. This is as we would expect from our findings in the previous chapter, since this form of *alienation* serves to emphasise the non-Roman provenance of Epicurus and his philosophical thought, and so helps to reveal the problematic relationship of Epicureanism to traditional Roman morality which is the continuous refrain of Cicero’s non-Epicurean characters. Conversely, in contexts where Cicero gives speeches to partisan Epicureans, the downplaying of Epicurean alterity downplays this problematic aspect of Epicurean thought, and so contributes to the characterisation of these speakers.

This *alienation* of the Greek source text, by which the author reveals its status as a foreign artefact conveying non-Roman ideas, is analogous to Cicero’s treatment of

---

45 These are all the passages spoken by Torquatus in *De Finibus* 1 (texts 6, 7, and 3), and by Velleius in *De Natura Deorum* 1 (text 5).
46 The change from “dialectic” question and answer to “rhetorical” full exposition comes at *Fin.* 2.17.
Epicurean terminology (as examined in the preceding chapter) and contributes in a similar way to his presentation of Epicureanism in the text as a whole. The highlighting of the foreign origins of Epicurean thought is performed by those characters whose positions receive authorial endorsement - the authorial proxy “Cicero” in the De Finibus, and “Cicero’s avatar” in the De Officiis. Consequently, this reinforces Cicero’s consistent portrayal of Epicureanism as being at odds with traditional Roman thought and Latin linguistic usage in these texts. In the second book of the De Finibus, “Cicero” rejects Epicurean philosophy both because its arguments are incoherent, relying on the perversion of the accepted meanings of Latin terms, and because the precepts it teaches are out of keeping with conventional Roman morality. The immediate context of these translations shows that they are introduced in order to further support these claims, and so _

---

47 It is Hanchey (2013) 76 who describes the main character of the Tusc. as “Cicero’s avatar”. Although this character is not explicitly identified as Cicero, he takes on the host’s role of leading the philosophical discussion in the grounds of Cicero’s Tuscan villa, and is often marked in modern editions as “M”, due to editors’ tendency to identify the main speaker with Marcus himself (see Douglas (1985) 16).

48 For the incoherence of Epicurus’ arguments, see e.g. Fin. 2.89: *quid ergo attinet gloriose loqui, nisi constanter loquare?* (“What, therefore, does it achieve to speak pompously, if you do not speak consistently?”). For the perversion of Latin terminology see Ch.2 e.g. Fin. 2.15-6: *quamquam non negatis nos intellegere quid sit voluptas, sed quid ille dicit. e quo efficitur, non ut nos non intellegamus quae vis sit istius verbi, sed ut ille suo more loquatur, nostrum neglegat.* (“And yet you Epicureans do not deny that we understand what pleasure is, but what he [i.e. Epicurus] means by it; which proves not that we do not understand the real force of the word, but that Epicurus is speaking an idiom of his own and ignoring our accepted terminology.”) For the non-Roman nature of the Epicurean focus on pleasure see e.g. Fin. 2.116: *lege laudationes, Torquate, non eorum, qui sunt ab Homero laudati, non Cyri, non Aagesilai, non Aristidi aut Themistocii, non Philippi aut Alexandri, lege nostro-rum hominum, lege vastiae familiae; neminem videbis ita laudatum, ut artifex callidus comparandarum voluptatum dicaret.* (“Read the panegyrics, Torquatus, not of those men who are praised by Homer, nor of Cyrus or Agesilaus, Aristides or Themistocles, Philip or Alexander; but read those of our own countrymen, read those of your own family. You will find no-one praised in this manner, that he is said to be skill and cunning in procuring pleasures.”)
confirms the connection of the presentation of Epicurean texts as translations with Cicero’s strategy of **alienation**. The translation of *Kuriai Doxai* 10 (text 2) is received by the interlocutors of the *De Finibus* in such a way as to reinforce the representation of Epicurean philosophy as abusing the Latin language and deviating from traditional Roman values. Cicero responds to Torquatus’ interpretation of the translated passage by saying “if he means one thing and says another, I never shall understand his meaning!”, highlighting Epicurus’ obscure and unnatural vocabulary use,\(^{49}\) while Triarus’ unmasked surprise that a philosopher could hold such beliefs emphasises the unfamiliar and alien nature of the Epicurean ethical system.\(^{50}\) Epicurus’ letter from his death bed (text 4), meanwhile, is analysed in such a way as to emphasise the incoherence of Epicurus’ thought, showing how Epicurus’ concern for his friend’s children, although complying with the traditional Roman ethical imperatives of *fides* and *officium*, is incompatible with his own hedonistic philosophy.\(^{51}\) The translation of the *Peri Telous* in the *Tusculan Disputations* (text 1a) is also adduced in order to show that the Epicurean view really is, as the speaker claims, repugnant, and the position irrelevant to the furthering of their

\(^{49}\) *Fin.* 2.21: *si alia sentit, inquam, alia loquitur, numquam intellegam quid sentiat.* c.f. Cicero’s earlier claim that Epicurus’ linguistic obscurity is not (as Plato’s *Timaeus*) because the subject is difficult, but because Epicurus “has no intention of not speaking plainly and clearly if he can” (*De Fin* 2.15).

\(^{50}\) *Fin.* 2.21. *Obsecro, inquit, Torquate, haec dicit Epicurus?* (“Goodness me, Torquatus,” he said, “does he [i.e. Epicurus] really say those things?”)

\(^{51}\) *Fin.* 2.99: *huc et illuc, Torquate, vos versetis licet, nihil in hac praeclera epistula scriptum ab Epicuro congruens et conveniens decretis eius reperietis. ita redarguitur ipse a se, convincunturque scripta eius probitate ipsius ac moribus.* (“Yes, Torquatus, you people may turn and twist as you like, but you will not find a line in this famous letter of Epicurus that is not inconsistent and incompatible with his teachings. Hence he is his own refutation; his writings are disproved by the uprightness of his character.”). See ibid. 2.98 for the observation of *officium* and *fides* in the concern for Metrodorus’ children.
current, Latin ethical discussion. So, then, the intertextual stance of alienation with which these translations are introduced contributes to the overall rhetorical strategy of these works, distancing the Greek source text from the Latin discourse of the authorial voice, and making the philosophical position it represents appear unfamiliar and unattractive.

The alienation of Epicurus’ words in polemical contexts is supported by the particular translation procedures employed by Cicero in producing his translations. Cicero’s choices of vocabulary and syntax result, as we shall see, in foreignised translations of these Epicurean texts, which further emphasise their non-Roman origins. Perhaps rather unexpectedly, we also find Cicero placing similar, foreignised translations of Epicurus into the mouths of those characters who speak in favour of Epicureanism. As Powell notes, in each of his translations of Epicurus Cicero “makes a special effort to keep close to the Greek, even to the extent of introducing oddities in the Latin in order to

52 The translated passage is presented to show that Epicurus is incoherent (3.44 “These admissions Epicurus must make or else remove from his book all that I have rendered word for word, or preferably the whole book should be flung away, for it is brimful of pleasures.”), and that his views amount to absurd and unusual practice (3.43: “Is this then the life to which you will “recall” the hero Telamon for the relief of his distress? and, if you find any of your relatives broken down by grief, will you give him a sturgeon rather than a Socratic treatise, will you urge him to listen to the music of a water organ rather than that of Plato, will you set out variegated blooms for him to look at, will you hold a nosegay to his nostrils, burn spices and bid him wreath his head with garlands and roses? If indeed something else—then clearly you will have wiped away all tears from his eyes.”).
reflect the Greek idiom”. While Cicero does not break character, then, by having the supporters of Epicureanism explicitly draw attention to the Greek nature of their doctrinal texts, he is able, even in pro-Epicurean contexts, to subtly draw our attention to the foreign origins of Epicurus’ philosophy by the translation outcomes he employs. In Tusc. 3.42 (text 1a), for example, spoken by a character unsympathetic to Epicureanism, we find Cicero using the accusative plural sapientias – a form of the noun found only here in the extant corpus of classical Latin, where sapientia is usually treated as uncountable, but employed as a synonymous translation for the common Greek plural σοφίας. This violation of Latin linguistic convention can also be seen in the translations made by “Cicero” in De Finibus 2. As Powell has already noted, the translation of De Finibus 2.21 (text 2) displays a number of linguistic peculiarities, perhaps the most notable of which is the use of the participle efficientia as an adjective with sunt, in order to translate the Greek adjective ποιητικά. This use of efficientia fits in with the synonymy which Cicero draws between the Greek and Latin terms in the De Finibus, but is highly unusual in terms of natural, Latin usage. Similar foreignising touches are found in Velleius’ pro-Epicurean speech in De Finibus 1. The synonymous translation procedures employed in

53 Powell (1995) 282. He is not quite right, however, in attributing this to his translations of Epicurus alone (as we have seen in De Off 1.221).
54 c.f. Powell (1988) 255 (ad 78): “the use of the plural [i.e. scientiae] is no doubt a Graecism (= epistēmai), c.f. Cicero’s use of the plural sapientiae in Tusc. 3.42 in a passage directly translated from Epicurus”. The plural forms of σοφία are found at e.g. Euripides Medea 843 and many times in Diogenes Laertius.
55 Powell (1995) 282: “the phrase “ea quae sunt luxuriosis efficientia voluptatum” is certainly not one that is likely to have been heard every day in the streets of Rome.” The synonymy between efficientia and ποιητικά.
Velleius’ translation of Kuriai Doxai 28 (text 3), although providing a literal rendering of every individual word of the Greek in Latin, work together to produce an almost nonsensical Latin sentence. While scientia is an acceptable, synonymous translation the Greek term γνώµη (as the Latin term shares the sense of “knowledge” or “understanding”, which the Greek term can convey), and perspexit an obvious candidate for use as a synonymous translation of κατεἰδε (as both can mean “has discerned” or “has perceived”), the Latin combination scientia... perspexit (“knowledge... has perceived”) is hard to make sense of. To construe the meaning of the Greek original, and make sense of the syntax of the scientia... perspexit construction, the semantic range of the Latin term scientia must be expanded to take in a second meaning of the Greek γνώµη – that of the organ or faculty by which one comes to know something.\(^56\) This stretching of the common Latin sense of the term scientia to match a Greek term it is partially synonymous with, gives the translation a distinctly foreignised complexion, and emphasises the non-Roman origins of the text being translated. These awkward Latin translations also, as Powell has noted, have the benefit of reproducing a further element of Epicurus’ Greek which Cicero is at pains to point out – his inelegant use of language.\(^57\)

\(^{56}\) *LSJ* γνώµη II: “organ by which one perceives or knows, intelligence”.

\(^{57}\) Powell (1995) 282: “Perhaps Cicero also had in mind that Epicurus was not a great stylist, and to render him into less than elegant Latin would therefore be appropriate enough.”
The non-Latinate form of these translations of Epicurus also gives the impression that the Latin closely replicates the syntax and word choice of the original Greek – in other words, the foreignising style ensures that these translations appear literal. The presentation of these translations as literal is reinforced by the surrounding discussion. As we can see from the table above, more than half of these translations are embedded within contexts that emphasise their reliability.\(^{58}\) Claims that Epicurus writes *paene his verbis* ("in almost these words") or *totidem fere verbis* ("in nearly so many words") present these Latin translations as faithful to the content of the original texts.\(^ {59}\) Other passages either request verification from characters who support Epicureanism in order to establish their credentials as authentic representations of Epicurus’ words, or are explicitly marked out as too literal to face accusations of distortion.\(^ {60}\) The portrayal of these translations as faithful accounts of Epicurus’ words is further supported by the focus on their textuality. In these same passages, we also find references to the particular Greek texts in which Epicurus’ original words can be found and to the physical organisation of these works, further emphasising the status of these Ciceronian translations as deriving from an independent (and verifiable) Greek text.\(^ {61}\) As can be seen

---

\(^{58}\) Texts 3, 1b, 2, 4, and 1a.

\(^{59}\) Texts 3 and 4.

\(^{60}\) The requests for verification are found in texts 1b and 2; while the claim that the translation is introduced so that we do not think Cicero invents (fingere) the Epicurean position, is found in text 1a.

\(^{61}\) In text 1a we have a reference to the *librum* in which this Epicurean quotation is found, while in 2 the title of the work (*Kuriae Doxai*) is given, and in 4 the original *epistula* is cited. Text 1a *Tusc.* 3.42 also has a reference to the physical reading of this text, as Cicero describes the contents of various parts of a scroll, pointing out the physical relationship between two sections of the *Peri Telous* through use of the term *infra.*
from the table above, with the exception of text 3, we find this emphasis upon the **literal** nature of Cicero’s translations in polemical contexts where the speaker is engaged in the refutation of Epicurean arguments. This is as we might expect – the presentation of these translations as **literal** pre-empts any criticism that these hostile speakers may be misrepresenting the Epicurean position, and locates the logical inconsistencies they identify firmly within the foundational texts of this philosophical school. It should also be noted, however, that the emphasis on the **literal** nature of the translation also coincides with those passages in which the translated nature of these quotations is emphasised. In the first place, this confirms the connection made by Cicero between the role of the *interpres* and a particular kind of literal translation (as discussed in Ch. 1). More importantly, however, it shows how, by marking out the translated nature of these quotations, Cicero also necessarily reveals the role of the translator in their production. In picking these passages out as translations, the first person of the authorial voice is shown to be *doing something* to the Greek original (*interpreter, interpretatus sum*, or *fungar enim iam interpretis munere* in the passages collected above). This revelation of an intermediary translator, standing between the Greek words of Epicurus and the Latin words we read, may make us suspicious of the accuracy of these translations – particularly when voiced by these hostile characters. Triarius, listening to Torquatus and Cicero’s conversation like the reader himself, articulates these possible concerns that
Cicero’s translation may be distorting the original in some way, asking incredulously: “Goodness me, Torquatus... does [Epicurus] really say those things?” The Epicurean, Torquatus, however, assures us that Epicurus does say these things, and that Cicero has produced a faithful, Latin rendering of his master’s words. The emphasis on the literal nature of the translations in these other polemical contexts, then, can be seen to serve a similar function, assuring the reader that these translations do, in fact, faithfully represent Epicurus’ own words.

It is important to note, however, that, although Cicero’s representation of these translations from Epicurus as literal and so faithful is consistent and rhetorically effective, this is still just a representation. While it is, at times, true that the rhetoric matches the reality and we see the careful replication of the syntax and vocabulary of the original, we can also see in Cicero’s translations of Epicurus the processes of selection and adaptation of his original source. In addition to more benign changes to the Greek original in order to compensate for lexical gaps in Latin (e.g. the substitution of the sense organ aures for the object of the sense organ in text 1b, to make up for the lack of an obvious Latin equivalent for the Greek ἀκροάματα; or the replacement of the abstract ἀσφάλεια with the concrete praesidium in text 3), we also find adaptations which have a

---

62 Fin. 2.21: Obsecro, inquit, Torquate, haec dicit Epicurus?
63 Pace Powell (1995) 282: “[in translating Epicurus] he makes a special effort to keep close to the Greek.”
64 See also Gellius Ν.1 20.5.3 for the issues of translating the cognate ἀκροατικά.
more intrusive function. A number of Cicero’s translations can be seen to significantly
alter the philosophical meaning of the original Greek text. The change of μετέωρον to
deorum in text 2, for example, implies a traditional, Roman view of the gods which
Epicurus himself did not subscribe to. Cicero’s alteration of this reference to “heavenly
bodies” obscures an important feature of Epicurean philosophy - namely, the claim that
the beings we identify as gods do not, in fact, hold the privileged role in our lives which
traditional theology would attribute to them, but should be viewed simply as heavenly
bodies whose actions do not effect us.⁶⁵ So, then, although Cicero gives an appropriate
cultural equivalent here, providing a traditional Roman term for the beings Epicurus
denotes as μετέωροι, he fails to convey the reconceptualisation of the gods which is a
necessary part of the Epicurean ethical therapy, and so presents Epicurus’ position as the
claim that pleasure alone is sufficient for removing the fear of the gods. In text 1a,
meanwhile, the manuscript tradition suggests that Cicero edits the Epicurean original in
the interests of propriety, removing the explicit reference to sex and replacing this with a
veiled reference to “whatever other pleasures may arise from the senses for man in his
entirety”.⁶⁶ In doing this, Cicero also interprets the Epicurean position, emphasising the
sensory nature of these pleasures in a manner which some have argued is out of keeping

⁶⁵ See e.g. Lucretius 5.76-90.
⁶⁶ The corrector of Vat 3246 adds in the reference to sex, but this is not in our oldest MSS (for further
discussion, see Pohlenz (1922) Introduction, who accepts the correction). Meineke (1867) 124 argues
instead that this was later added from the Greek, which seems likely as a corrector (whether this same hand
or another is unclear) of this MS supplements the Latin text by means of Epicurus’ Greek at other points
(see Pohlenz (1922) xvi ftnt 3).
with the Epicurean view of pleasure.\textsuperscript{67} In text 1b, moreover, the comparison with the longer 1a shows that Cicero here provides only a selective translation of the Epicurean original.\textsuperscript{68} Nikolsky has argued that this selection is made in the interests of furthering his own, Academic rejection of Epicurus’ thought, as it allows Cicero to more easily (mis)represent the Epicurean view of pleasure as subject to a twofold division between static and kinetic pleasures.\textsuperscript{69} The \textbf{compression} of his source text that Cicero performs here is thus, Nikolsky argues, in the interests of \textit{philosophical distortion}, as it allows him to provide an inaccurate account of the position which was actually evidenced in Epicurus writings. Here, then, we can begin to see the implications that our readings of Cicero’s translations might have for our reconstruction of Greek philosophy. Cicero is an important source for Epicureanism, and so this kind of study of his philosophical translation technique is key for our understanding of how accurately he represents his source texts. Furthermore, however, as can be seen in Appendix A, Cicero’s translations have been used by editors to argue for emendations to our surviving text, with some scholars advocating changes to the readings of our manuscripts of Cicero in order to

\textsuperscript{67} E.g. Nikolsky (2001) 446-7, who claims that Epicurus, in fact, identified pleasure with the processes by which we restore the body to a healthy state (for example, eating and drinking), and also to this healthy state itself.

\textsuperscript{68} Assuming that Cicero can be trusted in presenting the end of 1a (\textit{nec vero ita dici potest, mentis laetitiam solam esse in bonis. laetantem enim mentem ita novi: spe eorum omnium, quae supra dixi, fore ut natura iis potiens dolore careat}) as a continuation of the Epicurean quotation. If this is a reliable presentation (and it seems unlikely in the context that Cicero would play quite so fast and loose with the Greek text while emphasising the literal form of his translation) the original text does not survive for us.

\textsuperscript{69} Nikolsky p.460: “Cicero had made an incomplete paraphrase of Epicurus' words and thus distorted their meaning”.

190
make the Latin better match the original Greek; while others argue for changes of
Epicurus’ Greek to fit the Ciceronian translations.\textsuperscript{70} An awareness of the flexibility with
which Cicero approaches even his most “literal” translations, however, should make us
wary of such alterations.

Let us turn firstly to the issue of what Cicero’s creative translation technique
means for his use as a source for Epicurean philosophy. A subject of particular scholarly
interest here is the reliability of Cicero’s division of Epicurean pleasures into kinetic and
static. Cicero’s quotation of Epicurus at text 1b seems to support this division, and so
Cicero has been traditionally accepted as reliable source for this dichotomy. However,
recently, Nikolsky has argued that Cicero, in reading Epicurus’ words in light of the
Academic exegetical tradition, \textit{distorts} their philosophical content.\textsuperscript{71} He argues that
Epicurus’ letters and the rest of our sympathetic sources are consistent with the view that
Epicurus identified both the process of the restoration of bodily health, and the state of
bodily health itself with pleasure, and that, in doing so, he considered the motions of the
sense organs and the state resulting from these sense organs as two characteristics of the
phenomenon.\textsuperscript{72} Cicero, in describing kinetic and static pleasures as two very different
phenomena – the former produced by the presence of external stimulus; the latter by the

\textsuperscript{70} See p.170ff below for further discussion.

\textsuperscript{71} Nikolsky (2001).

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid. p.444-5.
absence of disturbance – instead, follows a hostile interpretation of Epicureanism
developed in the Academic tradition, and which can also be found in Diogenes Laertius
and Athenaeus. 73 Considering the conclusions of our analysis in this chapter, Nikolsky’s
position does not seem to be out of keeping with Cicero’s treatment of Epicurean
translation. If he is right, then, we should see Cicero’s presentation of the Epicurean
position on pleasure as recording the Middle Academy’s response to Epicureanism, rather
than the philosophical views of the Epicureans themselves. Consequently, while Cicero
would not represent an unproblematic source for the Epicurean philosophical position, he
would provide us with an insight into the lost Academic tradition. A similar interpretative
translation, which also seems to be informed by the later exegetical tradition, can also
been seen in Cicero’s translation of Plato’s Phaedrus (which we will consider in section
4), and in his translation of Aristotle’s views on the soul (in section 5), which may further
support the plausibility of Nikolsky’s position.

To turn now to what this means for the reconstruction of the Latin text of Cicero
and the Greek text of Epicurus, the adaptive tendencies that we have seen in Cicero’s
treatment of his translations – even where he presents them as literal - should give us
pause before accepting uncritically some scholarly emendations of each of these texts. In
our text 1a, for example, which represents Cicero’s Latin translation of a quotation from

73 Ibid. p.445ff.
Epicurus that survives in Athenaeus, modern editors have advocated both the emendation of the Ciceronian Latin text so that it matches the Greek more closely, and the emendation of the Greek text so that it reflects the Latin. Pohlenz has argued for the emendation of the manuscript reading of the Latin text to make it reflect more closely the Greek fragment of Epicurus, suggesting the addition of the phrase *detrahens eas quae rebus percipiuntur veneris* to match the ἀφαιρῶν δὲ τὰς ἀφροδισίων of the Greek.⁷⁴ It is true that this reading is found in a single corrector to a single manuscript (in a marginal gloss to Vat. 3246), but Pohlenz himself notes that it is difficult to establish the exact date of this correction and points to a similar correction by a 15th century hand, where it seems that the corrector has translated a fragment of Epicurus into Latin himself and inserted this translation into the Ciceronian text.⁷⁵ Other scholars, consequently, have been less keen to adopt this emendation to the text, attributing it to an over-zealous corrector with knowledge of the Greek original attempting to increase the fidelity of Cicero’s translation.⁷⁶ From our discussion above, we may be more inclined to reject Pohlenz’s emendation based on the findings of our study of Cicero’s translations of Epicurus. We have seen from our study the flexibility with which Cicero treats his original Greek text, and, in this particular translation context, we can see a clear reason for Cicero’s omission of this phrase in the original: namely, he is pointedly editing the text for propriety,

---

⁷⁴ Pohlenz (1918) xvi.
⁷⁵ Pohlenz (1918) xvi ftnt 3.
⁷⁶ E.g. Ströbel (1890) 61-2
omitting the explicit mention of the “pleasures of Aphrodite”. Such an alteration would fit with his later, veiled allusion to these activities at Tusc. 3.43 as *aliquid* (“something else”). That Cicero is adapting his translation in order to avoid the explicit mention of sex is made even more likely, as we have seen above, by the fact that this Ciceronian text seems to be compensated for this omission by the inclusion of a suggestive phrase at the end of his translation, which is not found in the Greek original and which alludes slyly to these sexual activities (*sive quae aliae voluptates in toto homine gignuntur quolibet sensu*). Editors of the text of Athenaeus, however, in failing to see how this Ciceronian addition may make up for his earlier failure to translate an element of his Greek source text, have emended their Greek text of Athenaeus in order to reflect the Ciceronian translation, adding in this final, Ciceronian clause – an emendation which, if accepted, also requires the emendation of the Epicurean fragment (fr. 67 Usener) which this passage of Athenaeus contains. Meineke, the editor of the Teubner edition of Athenaeus, having no corrector to rely on for the supplementation of his Greek text, goes so far as to translate the Ciceronian clause into Greek himself and insert this translation into his Greek text of Athenaeus.\(^{77}\) In light of the flexibility with which Cicero treats his translations of Epicurus, and the fact that we can give a plausible explanation for the existence of this additional clause in the Latin which needs no parallel in the Greek source text, such an emendation, with its complete lack of manuscript support, is, 

\(^{77}\) Meineke (1867) 124
obviously, problematic. The close study of Cicero’s translation technique in his philosophical works, which is the goal of this dissertation, can, then, contribute helpfully to our reconstruction of the texts of original Greek and Latin texts.

III: Xenophon: Cato’s Favoured Philosopher

The previous discussion has shown how Cicero constructs an intertextual stance of alienation through his foreignising translations of Epicurus, so supporting his rejection of Epicurean philosophy as incompatible with traditional Roman morality. Just as Cicero’s alienation of Epicurean technical terminology had its counterpart in the domestication of the Stoic concept of the καθῆκον (as we saw in Ch. 2), we find a similar, domesticating treatment in a number of Cicero’s translations of extended passages of Greek philosophy. We have already considered the domesticating elements of Cicero’s translation of Plato’s 9th letter at De Finibus 2.45, but the full effect of such a treatment is perhaps seen most clearly in his use of Xenophon in the De Senectute. Cicero translates passages from Xenophon only twice in this text, at §59 and §79-81 (see Appendix B for the texts in full), but they make an important contribution to his
presentation of the relationship between Greek philosophy and Roman thought, and, despite their significance, have rarely been the subject of scholarly inquiry.\textsuperscript{78}

Each of the translations from Xenophon in the \textit{De Senectute} concerns an anecdote from the life of a Persian ruler: the first concerning Cyrus the Younger’s meeting with Lysander, and taken from Xenophon’s \textit{Oeconomicus} (which Cicero had previously translated in his youth);\textsuperscript{79} the second treating Xenophon’s account of Cyrus the Elder’s death in the \textit{Cyropaedia}.\textsuperscript{80} These translations, although taken from a Greek philosophical source and presenting an ethical \textit{exemplum} from an even more distant historical and geographical context, are presented by the traditional Roman statesman, Cato the Elder, as being useful to his noble, Roman interlocutors, Laelius and Scipio. In introducing the translation from the \textit{Oeconomicus} he even goes as far as to say: “the books of Xenophon are very useful on many matters, and I ask that you keep reading these carefully, as you are doing”.\textsuperscript{81} A statement of this kind by a character such as Cato the Elder is particularly

\begin{flushright}
\textit{Sen. 59: multas ad res perutiles Xenophontis libri sunt, quos legite, quaeso, studiose, ut facitis.}
\end{flushright}

\textsuperscript{78} The most useful studies that I have located on this topic are Kammer (1964) and Krömer (1977), although the subject is also treated in commentaries on the Ciceronian text (e.g. Powell (1988)). Powell (1995) 282 quickly dispenses with these as being “introduced for illustrative purposes, and do not play a direct part in philosophical argument. Hence elegance is a primary aim; and we must be on our guard for slight changes of sense or emphasis in translation, perhaps introduced unconsciously, that make the passage illustrate the surrounding context better than an entirely literal translation would have done.”

\textsuperscript{79} See ch. 4.

\textsuperscript{80} The other mention of Xenophon’s work in the text at §30 also concerns his depiction of the death of Cyrus the Great in his \textit{Cyropaedia}.

\textsuperscript{81}
pointed, as he is often characterised in the tradition as hostile to Greek learning.\(^{82}\) That Cicero presents Xenophon’s moral writings as endorsed by even this paradigmatic Roman (and anti-Greek) moraliser as *perutiles* (“very useful”), is a strong indication that he is working to portray these Greek texts as compatible with traditional Roman thought, and so **domesticating** his Xenophontic model. Cicero’s rhetorical move here is even given some literary historical plausibility by the notable similarity (perhaps even allusion) between a passage from Xenophon’s *Symposium* and a fragment of Cato’s *Origines*.\(^{83}\)

We see this strategy of **domestication** confirmed in the translation choices that Cicero makes when treating these Xenophontic texts. While the meeting of Lysander and Cyrus the Younger is described by Cicero at §59 as taking place “in Sardis”, just as it did in Xenophon, the vocabulary Cicero chooses to narrate the encounter is such that it could just as easily be applied to the Roman countryside. The place of their meeting, described by Xenophon using the exotic παράδεισος (a term first used by Xenophon and produced

\(^{82}\) For this tradition and its basis in historical fact, see Gruen (1992), who summarises: “Cato projected himself as a sharp critic of luxurious habits and lax moral discipline, characteristics conventionally associated with the Greeks - at least by the Romans” (p. 54). Cicero nods to this tradition playfully in his preface where he notes that his Cato may appear out of character with his traditional portrayal, but puts this down to his study of Greek literature in his old age (Cic. *Sen.* 3: qui [i.e. Cato] *si eruditius videbitur disputare quam consuevit ipse in suis libris, attribuito litteris Graecis, quam constat eum perstudiosum fuisse in senectute*), then immediately draws the reader’s attention again to the fact that these Hellenised views are out of keeping with the traditional view of Cato, by breaking the dramatic illusion and refer to the speech of Cato as “all of my own opinions about old age” (*nostram omnem de senectute sententiam*).

\(^{83}\) This is *Origines* fr 1 (Peter). For the scholarly recognition of the possible Catonian allusion here to the opening of Xenophon’s *Symposium*, see Powell (1988) 223.
by transliteration of the Persian word for “enclosure”, from which we get the English “paradise”) is replaced by the common Latin agricultural term *consaeptum*, used in the farming manuals of Varro and Columella.\(^8^4\) The trees Lysander finds here, meanwhile, are described as being *directos in quincuncem ordines* – arranged in the *quincunx* rows that are typical of Roman planting practice.\(^8^5\) The relationships between the characters are, similarly, described in terms of their Roman **cultural equivalents** rather than following the Greek terminology of Xenophon, with the Latin reference to *socii* standing in for the Greek ideas of *συμμαχία* and *ξενία*. Cyrus’ invocation of a Persian god (*tòn Mīθρην*), meanwhile, is left out of the Ciceronian translation, as is the claim by Xenophon that he is wearing the Greek dress of the *ἱμάτιον*. So the Persian nature of the meeting described, and the Greek language it is originally narrated in, is systematically obfuscated in the Ciceronian translation. In the translation of the *Cyropaedia*, meanwhile, Cicero excludes from his translation an entire sentence of the Xenophontic original. This sentence, describing the vengeance that the souls of the dead can exact upon the living, is not just the only part of the text which does not fit in with the Platonic view of immortality advocated by Cato; it is also a passage which points to the Persian theological views held by this character in Xenophon’s original text.\(^8^6\) This also, then,

---

\(^8^4\) For the origins of Xenophon’s term, see Pomeroy (1994) 247. For *consaeptum*, see e.g. Varro R. R. 1.13 and Columella 1.4 and 1.6.

\(^8^5\) See e.g. Varro R. R. 1, 7, 2; Virg. *Georg.* 2.277, and White (1970).

\(^8^6\) Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.7.18: τὰς δὲ τῶν ἀδικα παθόντων ψυχὰς οὐδὲν κατανοήσατε οἶνος μὲν φόβος τοῖς μυαρφόνοις ἐμβάλλουσιν, οἶνος δὲ παλαμανίοις τοῖς ἀνοσίοις ἐπιπέμπουσι.
contributes to the **domestication** of these passages from Xenophon, as Cicero adapts his source text so as to form an example that is more familiar and relatable to his Roman audience.

The adaptations made by Cicero to his original texts in producing these translations does not stop at the suppression of the Greek origins of their original author, and the Persian provenance of his *exempla*. We can also see instances in which Cicero corrects his original, **capping** the original text in much the same manner as we observed in the previous chapter in his treatment of Greek epistemological vocabulary. In respect to the *Oeconomicus* passage, Cicero’s translation removes an ambiguity which has been the subject of long-standing scholarly debate. 87 Xenophon’s text, it has often been noted, leaves unclear the identity of the particular Cyrus which is referred to in this anecdote – indeed, as Pomeroy notes, it seems as if Socrates starts talking about the Elder Cyrus, and then moves on to a discussion of the Younger, with no explicit marking of this change. 88 Cicero’s translation, however, firmly disambiguates this: the Cyrus of the *Oeconomicus* is pointedly referred to as *minor* (§59), while the Cyrus mentioned in the later translation from the *Cyropaedia* is described as *maior* (§79). His translation of the *Oeconomicus* passage also compresses the exchange between Lysander and Cyrus the Younger by

---

87 As far back as Morris (1880) 178 this was acknowledged as a long-standing scholarly issue: “this difficulty has, however, engaged the attention of the commentators before, and been variously dealt with.”
88 Pomeroy (1994) 248: “Xenophon moves from Cyrus the Great (who is designated βασιλεύς in §16) to Cyrus the Younger (who had never reigned as king) without signalling the transition.”
removing part of their conversation which is irrelevant to his own argumentative context, and to the dramatic integrity of this anecdote. The passage at Oec. 4.24, in which Cyrus claims his devotion to the acts of war as well as those of farming, although thematically appropriate in the Xenophontic text, which argues that Cyrus’ twin skills in agriculture and in war are indicative of his laudable priorities as a ruler, is both unmotivated in the dramatic context of his discussion with Lysander, and irrelevant to Cicero’s praise of agriculture. Here too, then, Cicero works to correct his Greek model, while also adapting it for his own, different argumentative use. In the Cyropaedia translation, meanwhile, an extra explanatory element, which has no parallel in the text of Xenophon, is added to the text. At §81 Cicero expands upon the original Greek text with the words: ex quo intellegitur quales futuri sint, cum se plane corporis vinculis relaxaverint. This addition fleshes out the Xenophontic picture, showing how, exactly, sleep is like death (the chains by which the soul is connected with the body are relaxed), and citing this as the reason that we can experience prognostic dreams when asleep. This addition, then, works to provide exegesis for the passages quoted by Xenophon, so clarifying and improving upon the original. Interestingly, as Powell has noted in his commentary on the Ciceronian text notes, this addition to Xenophon’s texts seems itself to derive from an exoteric work of

———

89 Xen. Oec. 4.25: ὃνιμηὶ σοι τὸν Μίθρην, ἀπαντεὶ ὑψαίνοι, μηπώποτε διεπνῆσαι πρὶν ἱδρῶσαι ἢ τῶν πολέμικών τι ἢ τῶν γεωργικῶν ἵργον μελετῶν ἢ ἀεὶ ἐν γέ τι φιλοτιμούμενος. See Xen. Oec. 4.15 for the fundamental importance of farmers and warriors to the state.
Aristotle.\textsuperscript{90} So, then, we here see Cicero providing \textit{exegesis} through the addition of information from a later philosophical text – a case of \textit{exegetical contaminatio} from the later philosophical tradition.\textsuperscript{91} In doing this, Cicero’s translation works to pull the texts of both Xenophon and Aristotle into a single, syncretic Academic-Peripatetic tradition, and so makes the speech of Cyrus the Elder fit more closely with the philosophical position advocated by Cicero through his proxy in this work, Cato.\textsuperscript{92}

Furthermore, however, the \textit{exegesis} of his Xenophontic source through the addition of Aristotelian information, serves to reinforce his portrayal of Cato in this text as the “ideal Academic-Peripatetic type”.\textsuperscript{93} Cicero’s characterisation of Cato the Elder in this work as an advocate not of Greek philosophy in general, but of this particular philosophical position, is startlingly consistent (as Kammer has convincingly argued) with Cicero’s portrayal of this same character in the \textit{Pro Murena}.\textsuperscript{94} As such, Cicero’s enduring portrait of Cato the Elder both as sympathetic to Greek philosophy in general (a

\begin{flushright}
\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{91} For the Roman concept of \textit{contaminatio}, see Ch. 1.
\textsuperscript{92} See Kammer (1964) for Cato’s presentation of a Academic-Peripatetic syncretic philosophy in this text.
\textsuperscript{93} See ibid. for Cato’s presentation here as an “ideal Academic-Peripatetic type”, and its consistency with his presentation in the \textit{Pro Murena}. For the moderation preached by Cato, which is typical of the Academic-Peripatetic tradition as represented by Cicero, see e.g. \textit{Sen.} 65: \textit{severitatem in senectute probo, sed eam, sicut alia, modicam}. (“I approve of some austerity in old age, but only, as with everything else, in moderation.”)
\textsuperscript{94} \textit{Pro Murena} 66 holds Cato the Elder held up as a model of tempering harsh philosophical convictions with \textit{comitas} and \textit{facilitas} in the same manner as Plato and Aristotle who are moderate and temperate men (\textit{moderati homines et temperati}, §63). For a more complete discussion of Cicero’s philosophical position in this speech, see Craig (1986) 237.
\end{flushright}
point which is made again in the *Academica*)⁹⁵ and supporting a particular kind of Greek philosophy serves both to further domesticate Cicero’s philosophical project – showing how Greek philosophical thought can be of use even to the most traditional of Roman statesmen – and provides support to Cicero’s own, favoured Academic position as that which is most compatible with traditional Roman morals.

Cicero’s translations from Xenophon in the *De Senectute* are, then, consistently domesticated, as they portray Xenophon’s philosophical works as important to the formulation of earlier, Roman ethical thought – in this case, that of the paradigmatic Roman moraliser, Cato the Elder. Simultaneously, however, Cicero also corrects and improves his Xenophontic model, exceeding it even as he endorses it. A similar philosophical improvement accompanying endorsement of the original Greek text will be seen on a larger scale in the next section, as we examine our final passage of Plato.

IV: Plato: Translation as Philosophical Intervention

To return, now, to our consideration of Cicero’s translations of Plato, we can see a similar, but more wide-reaching, correction of an original Greek text in Cicero’s

⁹⁵ Cic. *Acad.* 2.5.
treatment of the *Phaedrus*. Cicero’s two translations from *Phaedrus* 245c6-246a1 (at *Rep* 6.27-8 and *Tusc* 1.53-4; texts 1b and 1a respectively in our earlier tabulation of Cicero’s Platonic translations) are presented, alongside their Greek original, in the table which comprises Appendix C of this dissertation (Table 4).

We need firstly to consider the problem of the differences between the two Ciceronian translations, before turning to the differences between the translations and their Greek source text. In the published editions of these two texts, it appears that Cicero has made a number of minor alterations between the first version of the *De Re Publica* and the later version found in the *Tusculan Disputations*, and these have been marked in bold in Table 3 for ease of reference. In reality, however, things are not quite as clear. Although Ziegler has argued that the *Tusculan Disputations* version represents an improvement upon the *De Re Publica* version, and that Cicero reworked his original translation to produce a final, more considered version, there is so much cross-contamination between the two texts that it is impossible to tell which of the variants might derive authentically from either of the two versions.\(^96\) As can be seen from the notes accompanying the texts in Table 3, the numerous textual variants are, for the most part, evidenced in the manuscript traditions of both of these texts. The *se ipsum* of the *Tusc.* is also found in the *Rep.* manuscripts; the contested *et* is found in the manuscripts

\(^{96}\) Ziegler (1931).
of each of these texts (although in differing frequencies); and the *semper* of the final line, although found only in the *Tusc.* passage, is erased by early correctors and expunged by modern editors on suspicion that it is a spurious insertion. So, then, while there may indeed have been some minor differences between Cicero’s two versions of this translation, Zetzel is right to conclude that “the evidence is neither sufficient nor consistent enough” to make any strong claims about what changes Cicero might have made to the *De Re Publica* translation for his *Tusculan Disputations* version, and what significance these might hold.97

The only two textual differences that seem to be relatively secure are the presence of the opening *nam*, which is found only the manuscripts of the *Rep.*, and the change of the phrase *quod a se ipso moveatur* from passive, in the *De Republica* version, to active, in the *Tusculans*, where it is found as *quod se ipsum moveat*. The purpose of the *nam* in the *Rep.* is obvious. The Platonic passage is here inserted simply as a continuation of Scipio’s speech, rather than being marked out as a Platonic translation, and so the *nam* serves to connect this new thought to what has come before. The change from the passive to the active in the *Tusculans*, meanwhile, moves the Latin further from the original Greek in terms of its syntax, but serves to makes the flow of the argument less disjointed, given that both before and after this it is the active “moves itself” formulation, rather than

the passive “is moved by itself” formulation which is employed. This may represent a conscious “improvement” upon the earlier translation, as Zeigler suggests. However, the active formulation is also found in Macrobius’ quotation of the De Republica passage, so we cannot be absolutely certain of the authenticity of this change and so of Cicero’s purposes here. It is perhaps better, then, to treat each of these versions of the translation together, rather than separately, focusing on those elements that are shared by each of these texts.

Let us turn, then, to the specifics of the translation choices employed by Cicero and the way in which these work to adapt his Greek text. Cicero’s translation choices have often been attributed, even by the most perceptive of scholars, to his desire to produce a literal translation that is as faithful as possible to his Platonic original. It is true that there is a notable consistency in Cicero’s use of vocabulary, which comes close to Poncelet’s ideal of mechanical translation. As Zetzel notes, ἀθανάτος is invariably rendered as aeternus, ἀρχή as principium, and κινέω as movere. However, in cases such as Cicero’s translation of the Greek γίγνεσθαι (which oscillates between the use of oriri and that of nasci) we can, in light of the considerations of the previous chapter, go further than stating, as Zetzel does, that “the various meanings of gignomai... cause a variation in

98 E.g. Zetzel 1995 p.251: “C’s translation of Phdr. 245c5-246a2 is extremely precise and accurate. For the most part, his equivalents from Plato’s terminology are consistent.”
99 For which see Ch.2, p.68ff.
C’s terminology.” Instead, we can see Cicero here to be disambiguating between two different senses of the original Greek term, clarifying the meaning of the Platonic original for his Roman audience. When we consider the translation at the higher level of syntax and argumentative structure, meanwhile, we can further observe that Cicero engages in the philosophical interpretation and correction of his original text. His translation choices in these passages work both to interpret the Platonic original, showing how the *Phaedrus* passage fits together with the claims from Plato’s other works, and to adjudicate against Posidonius’ reading of this text. In addition to this we can see Cicero correcting his Platonic original, rephrasing the Platonic model to increase its argumentative clarity and even, at one point, apparently replacing a step in the Platonic argument with a proposition which is more obviously relevant to the argument.

Let us firstly consider how Cicero’s translation serves to interpret the Platonic original. Most notably, Cicero presents this passage as being consistent with, and connected to, the arguments made in other Platonic texts, so interpreting the philosophical significance of this passage in light of his knowledge of the Platonic corpus as a whole. In the *De Re Publica* passage, Cicero shows the connection between Plato’s claims regarding the immortality of the soul in the *Phaedrus* and those made in the *Republic*, by inserting his translation from the *Phaedrus* into the *Somnium Scipionis*,

100 Zetzel 1995 ad *Resp.* 6.27.5
which functions in his text more generally as a rewriting of the Republic’s Myth of Er. In the Tusculan Disputations, meanwhile, Cicero moves straight from his translation of this Phaedrus passage, with its proof for the immortality of the soul, to a discussion of the Platonic theory of recollection in the Meno (Tusc. 1.56-7), so showing how each of these texts works together to build a consistent picture of the immortal soul and its capacities. This interpretative attitude is made even clearer in Cicero’s Latin paraphrase of the Phaedrus passage in the De Senectute (text 1c), which consists of selective excerpts from the translation of the De Re Publica, combined with Latin paraphrases of details taken from other Platonic texts. This compendium of arguments from various Platonic texts on the immortality of the soul is presented as being, in its own right, a translation of Plato (concluding with the words haec Platonis fere), but it is one which is highly interpretive, selecting the key passages from a variety of different Platonic texts and creatively stitching them together.

---

101 Cic. Sen. 78. Sic persuasi mihi, sic sentio, cum tanta celeritas animorum sit, tanta memoria praeteritorum futurorumque prudentia, tot artes, tantae scientiae, tot inventa, non posse eam naturam, quae res eam contineat, esse mortalem, cumque semper agitetur animus nec principium motus habeat, quia se ipse moveat, ne finem quidem habiturum esse motus, quia numquam se ipse sit relicturus [Phaedr. 245c-d = translation in Cic. Rep. 6.27-8]; et, cum simplex animi esset natura, neque haberet in se quicquam admixtum dispar sui atque dissimile, non posse eum dividī [Phaedo 78c]; quod si non posset, non posse interire; magnoque esse argumento homines scire plerque ante quam nati sint, quod iam pueri, cum artis difficilis discant, ita celeriter res innumerabilis arripiant, ut eas non tum primum accipere videantur, sed reminisci et recordari [Phaedo 72e and Meno 83ff]. Haec Platonis fere. See Powell (1988) ad loc. for a further examination of the verbal borrowings of this passage of Cicero from his Platonic source texts.
In addition to Cicero’s presentation of the passage from the *Phaedrus* as a single element of a consistent, Platonic corpus, there is also, perhaps, a further way in which the Ciceronian translation interprets the Platonic text in light of the post-Platonic exegetic tradition. A surviving scholion of Hermias Alexandrinus attests to an interpretive dispute over this passage, claiming that “Posidonius the Stoic” interpreted this section of the *Phaedrus* as a proof for the immortality of the *world soul* (presumably, although Hermias’ language is far from clear, to be identified with the Stoic idea of the immanent divinity which is present throughout the cosmos), rather than for the immortality of individual human souls.\(^{102}\) Clearly, Cicero interprets this passage differently from Posidonius, presenting this passage of the *Phaedrus* as arguing for the immortality of *human souls* as well as divine souls in both the *Tusculan Disputations* and the *De Re Publica*. The urgency with which he makes this point, however, is unmotivated in the literary contexts of his new Latin works, and so may be indicative of the fact that Cicero is aware of the Posidonian reading, and is here emphasising his rejection of this Stoic interpretation.\(^{103}\) This may also explain Cicero’s change of the singular to the plural in

\(^{102}\) Hermias Alexandrinus scholion B’ 45v (= 45 verso) §102 ad 245c (p.107 in the edition by Lucarini and Moreschini)) = Posidonius fr 290 (Edelstein and Kidd): Πρῶτον περὶ ποιάς ψυχῆς ὁ λόγος ζητητέον. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου μόνης φόρμησαν εἶναι τὸν λόγον διὰ τὸ εἰρηκέναι αὐτὸν <πᾶσα> καὶ μει’ ὄλιγα ἔπαγεν ἢ πάντα τα οὐρανόν πᾶσάν τε γένεσιν ἐξισχυσθῆναι στήναι· ὃν ἔστι Ποσειδώνιος ὁ Στοικάς. (“We must first ask what kind of soul he means. One group thought that Plato’s account referred to the world soul, because he said “all” and a little later introduced to his argument “or the whole universe and the whole of that which comes to be would collapse into immobility” [i.e. *Phaedr.* 245d8ff]. The Stoic Posidonius is one of this group.”) (Trans. Edelstein and Kidd).

\(^{103}\) Rep. 6.27 pointedly makes it clear that this proof extends to both the divine and the human soul analogically: “just as the eternal God moves the universe, which is partly mortal, so an immortal spirit
the concluding paragraph of his translation, where Plato’s closing statement about what this argument tells us about the nature of soul (ψυχῆς οὐσία) is rewritten as being an argument about the nature of souls (natura animis). In making this small change to the conclusion, Cicero reveals that he interprets this argument as applying to the multiple human souls, rather than a singular world soul, as Posidonius suggests. Indeed, in the Tusculan Disputations he goes on to complain that the plebeii philosophi do not understand Plato’s meaning in this Phaedrus passage – acknowledging here that his interpretation of this passage is out of keeping with that of some other philosophers, yet nonetheless asserting his own reading as the correct one.\(^\text{104}\) That this rejection of the plebeii philosophi may be a reference to the Stoics, and among them Posidonius, is made likely by Cicero’s complaint at Tusc. 1.79 regarding Posidonius’ teacher Panaetius: namely that, although he claims to follow Plato, he, like the rest of the Stoics, fails to accept the immortality of the human soul.\(^\text{105}\)

Let us turn, now, to a consideration of those points at which Cicero seems, in producing his Latin translation, to be correcting his Greek original, emulatively surpassing his source text in a manner that presents his own text as capping its Greek

---

\(^{104}\) Tusc. 1.55.

\(^{105}\) Tusc. 1.79: credamus igitur Panaetio a Platone suo dissentienti? quem enim omnibus locis divinum, quem sapientissimum, quem sanctissimum, quem Homerum philosophorum appellat, huius hanc unam sententiam de immortalitate animorum non probat.
model. In the first place, Cicero removes the implication that someone might be ashamed to hold this view of the nature of the soul, found in the Platonic text at 245e. In its place, he introduces a rhetorical question, asking “who could deny that this is the nature of the soul?”. In so doing, he puts Plato’s argument more forcefully than Plato himself, and confines his considerations to the argumentative success of this proof, rather than its possible emotional impact. Secondly, he restructures some sections of the argument to reflect the conventions of Hellenistic dialectic, as we find it described in the De Fato. Plato’s causal claim “since [the soul] is ungenerated, it is necessary that it is indestructible”, for example, is rephrased as a temporally universalised “if..., then...” statement (quodsi numquam oritur, ne occidit quidem umquam) – or, as Cicero calls it in the De Fato, an infinita connexa (“indefinite sequence”). So, Cicero updates the Platonic text to match later innovations in dialectic, and recasts a statement that may be taken to express a contingent form of causal necessity as one that describes a relationship of logical necessity, and which reflects his investigations on this subject in his treatise on fate. Finally, and most dramatically, the phrase nec enim esset id principium, quod gigneretur aliunde (“nor would what comes to be from something else be a principle”) seems to carry a completely a different meaning from the Platonic phrase it stands in for,

---

106 The text here argues against the claim that anyone should feel shame at this belief, but, in doing so, it introduces the possibility that this may be a source of shame: ψυχής ούσιαν τε καὶ λόγον τούτον αὐτόν τῆς λέγον ὁδὸν αἰσχροῦται.
107 Phaedr. 246d: ἕπειδὴ δὲ οὐ γίνετον ἔστιν, καὶ ἀδιάφθορον αὐτὸ ἀνάγκη εἶναι.
108 Cic. Fat. 15.
which in our oldest manuscripts, papyrus fragments, and the ancient commentators is: εἰ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ἀρχής γίγνοιτο, οὐκ ἄν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γίγνοιτο (“for if a principle came to be from something, it would not come to be from a principle”).\textsuperscript{109} Importantly, the Ciceronian translation has been seen by modern scholars to provide a reading that better fits the argument at this point, and so has been used to emend the Greek text.\textsuperscript{110} Yet, as de Vries argues, the reading with which these editors wish to emend the Platonic text is highly unlikely to be original, as we have early papyrus fragments that attest to the antiquity of the MSS reading.\textsuperscript{111} Instead, what we see here seems to be a Ciceronian correction of the Platonic original, and it is one which so clearly represents an improvement upon the argumentative structures of the original that modern scholars have adapted the Platonic text in order to match the Ciceronian rewriting. This correction may, of course, have been introduced by one of Cicero’s sources, rather than by Cicero himself. However, given Cicero’s tendency to adapt the text and improve its argumentation, there is no persuasive reason to assume that this could not be a Ciceronian innovation.

Consequently, our understanding of Ciceronian translation as exhibiting the ability to adapt, interpret, and correct its source text, is important here, too, for the

\textsuperscript{109} Phaedr. 245d.  
\textsuperscript{110} E.g. Burnet in the OCT, who emends this to εἰ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ἀρχής γίγνοιτο, οὐκ ἄν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γίγνοιτο. Yunis (2011) ad loc., however, defends the reading of the MSS.  
\textsuperscript{111} See Vries (1969) 122-3, who also notes that “Cicero’s translation... has unduly influenced the attempts at explanation [of this passage].”
question of how to use Cicero as a source in reconstructing earlier Greek philosophy – in this case, in regard to the text of Plato’s *Phaedrus*. This issue is, as we shall see in the next section, even more important in the case of those philosophical texts for which no Greek original survives, for example, the exoteric works of Aristotle.

### V: Aristotle: Cicero’s Translations as a Source for Greek Philosophy

Cicero’s translations of Aristotle pose a different problem for our understanding of Ciceronian translation. We have touched upon the issue of how to use Cicero’s translations as evidence for earlier Greek philosophical texts in our discussions of those passages of Plato and Epicurus where some editors have attempted to change the original Greek text based upon the Ciceronian translation. The use of the Latin, translated text as a source for the reconstruction of a Greek original is more widespread in the case of Cicero’s translations of Aristotle. Although Cicero sees Aristotle as second only to Plato in his importance as a Greek philosophical author, and, accordingly, translates numerous passages from his works throughout his philosophical writings (a list of which can be found in Appendix B), modern readers do not have access to any of the Aristotelian works translated by Cicero in their original form.\(^{112}\) This is the case not only for the

---

\(^{112}\) For Cicero’s respect for Aristotle as a philosopher, see, for example, *Pro Murena* 63, where Plato and Aristotle together are held up as *exempla* of appropriately moderate philosophical thought; *Orator* 5 for
translated inlays, which we will consider in this section, but also for the Ciceronian *Topica*, which claim to be a Latin version of the Aristotelian *Topics*, yet seem to take as their source something other than the Aristotelian text which has come down to us. On the one hand, the fact that Cicero translates only the lost works of Aristotle provides a wonderful opportunity for scholars of Greek philosophy to gain information about these lost texts, by treating Cicero’s translations as fragments of the Aristotelian originals. It also, however, means that it is hard to judge from the consideration of these passages alone how reliable Cicero’s translations are as sources for these Aristotelian texts, as we have no original Aristotelian dialogues against which to compare them. In fact, Cicero also seems to have had access to very few of the works of Aristotle which are now extant (perhaps only a shorter version of the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Magna Moralia*), further complicating this problem, since we cannot appeal to his treatment of the views contained in our surviving texts as a more secure metric by which to measure Cicero’s attitudes to the representation of Aristotelian thought.

---

113 The identity of the Greek text which Cicero relies on for his production of the *Topica* is a long-standing puzzle which is treated in depth in Reinhardt (2005) 177-81.

114 The evidence for Cicero’s knowledge of the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Magna Moralia* is Fin. 5.12, for a discussion of which, and its value for our understanding of the survival and transmission of the Aristotelian texts at Rome, see Sharples (2010) 24-30. For further discussion, see Barnes (1997) and Griffin (2009).
The debate as to whether or not these passages from Cicero can be successfully used to reconstruct Aristotle, then, is the debate as to how, and how reliably, he translates his Aristotelian sources. It is also a debate that has been, to date, conducted primarily with appeal only to those passage in which Cicero translates Aristotelian source texts, without the consideration of Cicero’s practice in translating philosophical works more generally. The resulting conclusions regarding Cicero’s utility as a source have, as one might expect from a project relying on this kind of evidence, differed, with some scholars considering Cicero’s translations to provide a direct path to the reconstruction of the original Aristotelian text, and others claiming that these Ciceronian passages contain fundamental misunderstandings, making them unhelpful for the study of Aristotle. For those who treat Cicero’s translations as faithful renditions of Aristotle, they often rely heavily upon their accuracy in the reconstruction of important elements of Aristotelian thought. For those who reject Cicero’s value as a source, meanwhile, we find echoes of those criticisms that have plagued scholarly responses to Cicero’s translations of Greek

115 Among those who consider Cicero’s translations to provide direct access to the Aristotelian originals, which can be treated as quotations of Aristotle’s original words, are Hutchinson and Ransome Josphson (2015), who rely heavily on Cicero in reconstructing the Aristotelian Protrepticus, and Segev (2014) who similarly relies on Cicero’s translations as a direct witness for Aristotle’s Greek wording. More hesitant is a scholar such as Furley (1989), who analyses the differences between Cicero’s account of Aristotle’s theology in De Natura Deorum and that of our surviving Aristotelian works. Finally, there are scholars such as Botter (2009) who reject Cicero’s value as a source almost completely, reformulating what Cicero records of Aristotle’s views in order to fit the rest of the Aristotelian corpus.

116 A particularly striking instance of this is Bos’ (1989) interpretation of Cic. ND. 1.33 (= Arist. Peri Philosophias fr. 26 Ross). He relies on the hypothesis that Cicero is here directly relating the contents of Aristotle’s Peri Philosophias, without alteration, to argue that Aristotle had a so-called “double theology”, as this passage shows us that “Aristotle awarded the highest degree of divinity to the purely contemplative and perfect Nous; and that he distinguished another divine being, the World-soul, to which he assigned the role of guaranteeing the movement and order of the world.” (p.193).
philosophy more generally (typified, as ever, by the attacks of Poncelet which have been
discussed at various points in this dissertation). Botter, for example, claims that
Cicero’s translations of Greek philosophy suffer from *una certa incoerenza, o meglio, di una leggerezza speculativa* (“a certain incoherence, or rather, an intellectual
carelessness”), due to his privileging of rhetorical elaboration over philosophical rigour,
in an assessment which mirrors many of the criticisms of Poncelet and others which have already been observed. The discussion of whether Cicero’s translations of Aristotle provide good evidence for the lost Aristotelian dialogues, then, is an extension of the issues we have been considering throughout this dissertation, and rests upon questions of the level of fidelity or adaptation (be this rhetorical or otherwise) with which Cicero treats his Greek texts. By integrating the question of Cicero’s value as a source for the lost Aristotelian dialogues into a discussion of Cicero’s philosophical translations in general, then, we can get a better idea of the ways in which the Roman author might have changed or retained aspects of his source texts.

So, then, how reliable are Cicero’s translations as a source for the lost works of Aristotle? To provide a starting point in answering this question, we are now in a position

---

117 For the complaints of Poncelet, see ch 2 p.68ff.
to appeal to the evidence which has been collected in the previous sections of this chapter, concerning Cicero’s translations of extant texts of Plato, Epicurus, and Xenophon. If Cicero’s treatment of Aristotle is similar to his treatment of these other philosophers, we should not expect absolute fidelity to the source text, but instead the adaptation of the original text in order to fit the philosophical and literary aims of the immediate context. In the *De Officiis* 1.22 translation of a passage from Plato’s 9th letter discussed above, for example, the original Platonic idea, which forms part of an argument for political activity, is recast as a defence of the Stoic theory of *οἰκείωσις*. Although, then, we should not expect pure invention on the part of Cicero - as the Roman author always reproduces *some elements* of the original text, even while he adapts the original to fit its new context - it is not necessarily the case that the philosophically relevant content of the original will survive unaltered in the Latin translation. Consequently, while acknowledging that the Ciceronian translation will reproduce some aspect of the original text, we should be wary of attributing the philosophical position expressed in the Latin translation, in its entirety, to the original Greek author – not because these are poor translations, coloured by Ciceronian rhetorical over-exuberance and intellectual deficiency, as Botter suggests, but because the content of the original passage has been selectively reproduced in order to articulate a particular philosophical claim or achieve a literary effect within the context of the new Ciceronian text. A consideration of Cicero’s

\[\text{119 For this discussion, see p.142ff.}\]
other philosophical translations, then, should suggest to us that we take the middle
ground, neither rejecting them as completely incompetent, nor adopting them as entirely
faithful to the words of the Greek originals.

Evidence that these more general characteristics of Ciceronian philosophical
translation also hold in the case of his translations of Aristotle can be found when we turn
our attention to the translations themselves. Just as, in section 1, we compared two
different Ciceronian translations of the same Platonic passage, and saw how each was
adapted to fit Cicero’s immediate argumentative context, so we can do the same with a
passage of Aristotle that Cicero also translates on two separate occasions. The two
versions, probably deriving from Aristotle’s *Protrepticus*, are as follows:120

\[
\text{quo modo igitur iucunda vita potest esse, a qua absit prudentia, absit moderatio? ex}
\]
\[
\text{quo Sardanapalli, opulentissimi Syriae regis, error adgnoscitur, qui incidi iussit in}
\]
\[
busto:}
\]

‘Haec habeo, quae edi, quaeque exsaturata libido

Hausit; at illa iacent multa et praeclara relictā.’

‘quid aliud’ inquit Aristoteles ‘in bovis, non in regis sepulcro inscriberes? haec

habere se mortuam dicit, quae ne vivus quidem diutius habebat quam fruebatur.’

120 Ross (1955) attributes these fragments to the *Protrepticus*, and Hutchinson and Ransome Johnson (2015) 77 follow him in this, suggesting, in addition, that this possibly appeared in the speech of
“Aristotle”. Rose (1886), on the other hand, locates this in the *Peri Dikaiosunēs*. 
How, therefore, can life be pleasant if prudence and moderation are absent? This shows us the mistake of Sardanapalus, the exceptionally wealthy king of Syria, who ordered to be carved on his tomb:

“I possess these things: what I have eaten and whatever satisfied lusts I have tasted; But those other many and excellent things are left behind.”

“What else,” says Aristotle, could one inscribe on the grave of an ox, not on that of a king? He says that in death he possesses the things which even in life he possessed no longer than while he was enjoying them.”

corporis autem voluptas si etiam praeterita delectat, non intellego, cur Aristoteles Sardanapalli epigramma tantopere derideat, in quo ille rex Syriae glorietur se omnis secum libidinum voluptates abstulisse. ‘Quod enim ne vivus quidem’, inquit, ‘diutius sentire poterat, quam dum fruebatur, quo modo id potuit mortuo permanere?’

However if bodily pleasure provides delight, even when it is past, I do not see why Aristotle should be so contemptuous of the epitaph of Sardanapalus. In this that Syrian king boasts that he has taken with him all the sensual pleasures that he has enjoyed. “For how,” asks Aristotle, “is it possible for this feeling to remain for a dead man, which even while alive he could feel for no longer period than while as he was enjoying it?”

---

121 The quotation marks are that of Pohlenz (1918). That the final sentence (haec habere... fruebatur) is also part of the Aristotelian translation is made clear by comparison with the Fin. treatment of this passage, and so that the punctuation of Pohlenz is preferable to that of King.
122 The quotation marks here are my own.
The original Greek of this epigram is preserved in Plutarch, but it is not our current task to analyse the translations of Greek poetry that are scattered by Cicero throughout his philosophical works. Instead, what we should note here is how the Latin translation that Cicero gives of the Aristotelian response to this quotation differs in these two texts. Each of these versions introduces the words of Aristotle with the term *inquit* (“he says”), which is one way, as we have seen from our examination of Cicero’s translations of Plato, of introducing a Latin translation of a passage by a Greek author. Yet the *Tusculan Disputations* passage, in addition to providing an opening sentence that is not included in the *De Finibus* (*quid aliud... inscriberes*?), differs markedly from the earlier text in the way that it treats the shared thought that the sensory pleasures of life are fleeting and cannot be enjoyed after death. In the *De Finibus* passage, this thought is expressed by an incredulous question (“how could a dead man continue to experience a feeling...?”); in the *Tusculan Disputations* passage, by Aristotle’s pointing out the error in Sardanapalus’ thought (i.e. the claim that “in death he possesses things…”). We may never know which of these formulations is closer to the original text. What we should note, however, is that these two formulations slightly alter the philosophical thrust of the passage, and that these alterations match the argumentative needs of the Ciceronian text as a whole. For the *De Finibus* passage, the focus of Cicero’s argument is upon the rejection of the Epicurean idea that the recollection of past bodily pleasure can provide

---

123 Though the implications of our current study for our understanding of these very different translated inlays will be discussed briefly in the epilogue.
happiness, arguing that bodily pleasure cannot persist in the way necessary for this to occur.\textsuperscript{124} Cicero’s move in appealing to Aristotle here is to extend this claim to the point of absurdity, pointing out that past pleasure (even on the Epicurean view) cannot persist indefinitely, and certainly not after death. Consequently, the Aristotelian passage is formulated so as to emphasise the problem of persistence of bodily pleasure, ending with the rhetorical question: “how would this be able to remain for a dead man”.\textsuperscript{125} The \textit{Tusculan Disputations} version of this translation, on the other hand, occurs during an extended discussion of necessary and unnecessary pleasures, in a section about food, whose thrust is to show that moderation in the consumption of food (limiting our intake to match our necessary appetites) leads to greater happiness than excess.\textsuperscript{126} This explains why Cicero has quoted the epigram, with its physical imagery of filling up and draining, in full, and why he focuses upon the Aristotelian claim (absent from the \textit{De Finibus} passage) that such excessive physical appetites are characteristic of an ox than in a king. It also explains why the idea of the persistence of these pleasures (\textit{permanere}), so important to the \textit{Tusculan Disputations} passage, is completely absent from this translation. In the comparison of these two translations, then, we can see that Cicero has adapted his Aristotelian source to fit his own argumentative context, in much the same way that he adapted his translations of Plato’s 9\textsuperscript{th} letter, as we observed above.

\textsuperscript{124} Fin. 2.106: the proposition under discussion is: \textit{voluptatum perceptarum recordatio vitam beatam facit}
\textsuperscript{125} \textit{quo modo id potuit mortuo permanere?}
\textsuperscript{126} Tusc. 1.101: \textit{Quo modo igitur iucunda vita potest esse, a qua absit prudentia, absit moderatio?}
Similarly, we find instances in which it seems that Cicero’s translations of Aristotle employ cultural equivalence in order to better fit the needs of their new Roman context. In such instances, the resulting translations contain information which seems relevant only outside of the original Greek context, meaning that we can see, again, the adaptation of the Aristotelian original and the flexibility with which Cicero treats his source texts. An example of this is De Officiis 2.56-7 (= Arist. Peri Ploutou fr 2 Ross), which, it is claimed by Flashar et al, seems to have been given a “Roman colouring” by Cicero.\(^{127}\) Both the translation, and the argumentative context to which it makes a contribution, are, they argue, decidedly Roman. The focus on the munus populare (“popular games”), in reference to which Aristotle’s rejection of extravagant spending on public entertainments is introduced, is certainly a particularly Roman concern, and presented in typically Roman terms, pointing to gladiatorial shows and wild beast fights as symptoms of this kind of profligacy.\(^ {128}\) In addition to this, they claim, the language of delectatio multitudinis (“the delight of the crowd”), which Cicero employs within his translation, also picks out the satisfaction of a particularly Roman institution, and so should be considered to be a substitution of a Greek view of the non-aristocratic classes.

\(^{127}\) Flashar, Dubielzig, and Breitenberger (2009) p.223: im vorliegenden Fragment is mit Übermalung Ciceros durch römisches Kolorit zu rechnen. Rose (1886) attributes this instead to Aristotle’s Peri Dikaiosunēs, but given that this section follows Cicero’s recording of a discussion of Theophrastus’ Peri Ploutou and treats the same subject, this seems less convincing.

\(^{128}\) See Off. 2.55’s description of lavish men: prodigi, qui epulis et viscerationibus et gladiatorum muneribus, ludorum venationumque apparatu...
with a Roman one – in other words, a form of **cultural equivalence**. Here, then, we can confidently hypothesise a **Latinising** treatment of this Aristotelian text, even though we no longer have the original. Yet, as we know from our earlier study of Cicero’s translations of other philosophical texts, we cannot always judge by looking at the translations themselves what elements of the text have undergone a change during the process of translation. For example, the apparent removal of the reference to sexual pleasure in *Tusculan Disputations* 3.41-2 (our text 1a in the section on Epicurus), is in the interests of the Roman cultural norms of propriety, but there is no way of telling from Cicero’s translated text that a phrase has been left untranslated. It seems, then, that we are right to think that we should be wary of uncritically treating Cicero’s “quotations” of Aristotle as unmediated translations, even when they seem to be neutrally presented as his **ipsissima verba**, wearing on their sleeves no sign of adaptation or interpretation. However, as the conclusion of this chapter will argue, even if they cannot be used to directly read back the philosophical views articulated in Aristotle’s dialogues, these translations can still, nonetheless, constitute useful sources for other aspects of Greek philosophical thought.

An important example of the insights that may be derived from a study of Cicero’s translations of Aristotle can be found in a new examination of *De Natura*

---

129 It should be noted, however, that this passage also include a reference to the Greek *mina*, and so this translation is far from fully Romanised.
Deorum 1.33 (= Arist. *Peri Philosophias* fr 26 Ross). Although the evidence we have considered so far should lead us to be cautious of assuming that this passage provides secure evidence for the theological views expressed in the Aristotelian *Peri Philosophias* (as most scholars do), it can nonetheless, as we shall see, provide us with some evidence for the doxographical traditions of the Epicureans as understood by Cicero. Indeed, it will turn out that this passage is perhaps best conceived of as a translation (in the sense of a Latin rewriting) of the polemical style of the Epicureans, rather than the theological views of Aristotle.

The passage in question is as follows:

Aristotelesque in tertio de philosophia libro multa turbat a magistro suo Platone dissentiens; 130 modo enim menti tribuit omnem divinitatem, modo mundum ipsum deum dicit esse, modo alium quendam praeficit mundo eique eas partis tribuit ut replicatone quadam mundi motum regat atque tueatur, tum caeli ardorem deum dicit esse non intellegens caelum mundi esse partem, quem aliquo loco ipse designariit deum.

Cic. ND 1.33 (= Arist. Peri Philosophias fr 26 Ross)

And Aristotle in the Third Book of his On Philosophy has a great many confused notions, disagreeing with the doctrines of his master Plato; at one moment he assigns all divinity to mind, at another he says that the world is itself a god, then again he puts some other being over the world, and assigns to this being the role of regulating and sustaining the world-motion by means of a sort of inverse rotation;

130 I have followed Furley (1989) 212 in rejecting the suggested addition of *non* in this sentence.
then he says that the celestial heat—is god—not realizing that the heavens are a part of that world which elsewhere he himself has designated god.\textsuperscript{131}

As Bos notes, “of the entire collection of fragments and testimonies related to lost writings of Aristotle, none has provoked so much comment and such heated controversy”.\textsuperscript{132} While the authenticity of this view and its attribution to Aristotle has been accepted by the majority of scholars, others have questioned it, due to its apparent inconsistency with other parts of the Aristotelian corpus - in particular Aristotle’s theory of the divine Unmoved Mover.\textsuperscript{133} This apparent inconsistency has meant that most of those who consider this Ciceronian passage to be a faithful rendition of Aristotle’s position also hold that a different theological picture was presented in this work from that which is found in the extant Aristotelian corpus, namely one in which Aristotle advocates an “immanent theology”, where the divine intellect (mens) is identified with the physical cosmos (mundus), and there is no space for the transcendent Unmoved Mover.\textsuperscript{134} This developmental view, in which the \textit{Peri Philosophias} presents an earlier view held by Aristotle that differs from the position that we see in the surviving treatises, may, of

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{131} In translating this difficult passage, I have relied heavily on the translation by Rackham.
\textsuperscript{132} Bos (1989) 185
\textsuperscript{133} See Bos 185ff for those who have accepted this, including Von Arnim (1931) and Guthrie (1933). For a rejection of this fragment, see Botter; for a reading which assumes that this fragment reflects a view far removed from Aristotle’s true position see Jaeger (1923). The debate centers around whether each of these definitions of god (\textit{deus}) refer to the same thing, as the majority of scholars believe, or to more than one thing, as Bos suggests. Furley (1989) 212 provides another explanation for how we can read this passage without seeing any conflict with the theory of the Unmoved Mover.
\textsuperscript{134} The terminology is from Bos (1989) 190, who disagrees with this position, positing a “double theology” instead. Botter (2009) 61-3 summarises each of the previous scholarly positions on this issue.
\end{footnotesize}
course, be correct. There may also, however, be an alternative explanation for why this translated passage does not fit neatly with surviving Aristotelian doctrine. The literary context of this Ciceronian translation should alert us to the possibility that it has been translated with the intention of distorting the original Aristotelian philosophical position – not because, as Botter claims, Cicero is a poor translator, but because he is here producing a doxographical account in the form of an Epicurean polemic, spoken by the character Velleius, and so is treating Aristotle’s position in the satirical mode characteristic of Epicurean polemic.

As Dyck has noted, the passage in question forms part of an Epicurean polemical doxography, and it is dramatised by Cicero in such a way as to reproduce the rhetorical and argumentative structures of this kind of Epicurean discourse.\textsuperscript{135} We can see a similarly satirical attitude, accompanied by hostility to earlier philosophical positions, in the doxography of the earlier natural philosophers in book 1 of Lucretius’ \textit{De Rerum Natura}.\textsuperscript{136} In addition to this, we have evidence for the existence of an Epicurean polemical doxography on the very subject under consideration in the \textit{De Natura Deorum}.

\textsuperscript{135} Dyck (2002) 8: “C. was well acquainted with and could reproduce the neutral style of doxographical reporting, but in \textit{N.D.} he has presented his doxography with a hostile color, evidently in imitation of what he regarded as the Epicurean style of philosophical polemics.”

\textsuperscript{136} See Lucr. 1.830-90 for the recounting of the views of Anaxagoras and then their satirical rejection.
in Philodemus’ *On Piety*, whose structure Cicero here seems to follow.\(^{137}\) Cicero, then, is translating a common form of Epicurean discourse, and, as we might expect, he seems to take pains to reproduce not only the structure, but also the tone, of these Epicurean texts in Velleius’ speech.\(^{138}\) As we can see from an examination of the manner in which the views of other philosophers are presented in Velleius’ speech, one key feature which Cicero seems to consider to be characteristic of this mode of discourse, is its interest in satirically lampooning the positions of earlier philosophers. To take the example of the presentation of Parmenides, for whom we possess independent testimony as to the nature of the Greek original, we can see that his thought has been selectively reproduced in such a way as to seem as ridiculous as possible.\(^{139}\) What Velleius attributes to Parmenides is not in and of itself without textual support: Parmenides does, indeed, claim that there are a series of cosmic “rings” (στεφάναι) and identifies either the central ring, or what is at the center of these rings, as god.\(^{140}\) But Velleius has compressed Parmenides’ argument in such a way as to sound nonsensical, ignoring Parmenides’ claim that what is at the centre of these circles is responsible for the movement of the cosmos, and it is because of

\(^{137}\) This is the part of Philodemus’ *De Pietate* preserved at PHerc. 1428, and is dealt with more fully by Obbink (1996).

\(^{138}\) For the structure of this account and its similarity to that of Philodemus’ *On Piety*, see Dyck (2003) 7-8, Obbink (2001), and for a table of correspondences, see Obbink (2002) 196-7.

\(^{139}\) *D. Nat.* 1.28. As Velleius comments, the view here presented is *commenticum* (“fanciful”), and the selections made from Parmenides’ poem are designed to produce such an appearance, as he claims that Parmenides calls “god” a crown (corona) enclosing the heavens.

\(^{140}\) Aetius ii.7 (= DK fr.37), reflecting Velleius’ claim: *coronae similem efficit (στεφάνην appellat) continentem ardorum lucis orbem, qui cingit caelum, quem appellat deum.* (*D. Nat.* 1.28.)
this that it deserves the name “god” (δαίμον). Instead, Velleius relates Parmenides’ position in such a way as to make it seem that Parmenides’ simply asserts that there is some kind of cosmic ring that should be considered a god without any argumentation to support this. He also translates στεφάνη in such a way as to make Parmenides’ position appear as fanciful as possible, employing the term corona, which translates not “ring” (one meaning of στεφάνη), but “garland” (another), so making it seem that Parmenides hypothesised some kind of free-floating cosmic garland, rather than a cosmic ring composed of aether. Velleius also attributes contradictory views to Plato, despite the fact that, within Plato’s dialogues, the views are expressed by different characters, rather than the author himself. In these parallel cases, then, we can see that Cicero is not attempting to accurately translate the philosophical position of these earlier Greek thinkers, but is, instead, dramatising the characteristic Epicurean form of polemical doxography, with its satirical tone and uncharitable readings. If he does the same here for Aristotle’s Peri Philosophias - as seems likely - we would expect him to emphasise any possible inconsistencies, and to (mis)represent the philosophical position of the text so as to produce absurdity. In doing so, Cicero, although reproducing a characteristic element of Epicurean polemic, would be intentionally distorting the true Aristotelian philosophical position. So, then, while Cicero’s De Natura Deorum may not be a fully

141 For a more complete account of Parmenides’ position, see Aetius ii.7 (= DK fr.37). For a translation see Coxon (2009).
142 D. Nat. 30. For an analysis of this, see Dyck (2003) 100: “in discussing the Laws Velleius drew no distinction between Plato and a dialogue character.”
reliable source for Aristotle’s lost works, in his translation of Epicurean doxographical style, he may be useful as a source for Epicurean argumentative style, and the later reception of Aristotle’s exoteric works by this school.

There is another passage in which a consideration of Cicero’s translation of Aristotle as recording later responses to the Aristotelian text can also be seen to be fruitful, as it can be brought to bear on a different problem regarding how we use Cicero’s text to reconstruct post-Aristotelian philosophy. In this case, Cicero’s reliability as a source (and competence as a philosophical thinker) has been rejected on the grounds of his quotation and translation of a single word: ἐνδελέχειαν at Tusculan Disputations 1.22. Here, however, there is a slightly different academic debate is in play. In this passage, Cicero gives both the original Greek term, and a Latin translation of this (quasi quandam continuatam motio nem et perennem, “as it were, a certain continuous and everlasting motion”). While Cicero’s translation of this Greek word has received few complaints, it has been argued that Cicero has misread or misremembered the original Greek. It is the soul (animus), which is here said by Cicero to be composed of a fifth element called ἐνδελέχεια (motion). However, such a claim has no parallel in the surviving Aristotelian corpus, while, in De Anima 1.4, the soul is explicitly stated to be
unmoved and unmoving, except incidentally.\textsuperscript{143} This has led scholars such as Moraux to argue that the word that actually appeared in Aristotle’s lost text was ἐντελέχειαν, with a τ rather than a δ, meaning “actuality”, and that the claim originally made by Aristotle (namely, that soul is an actuality) had nothing to do with the material composition of the soul.\textsuperscript{144} So, we have here a very different form of alleged mistranslation – one in which the translation derives from a misreading (and misunderstanding) of an original text. As we shall see, however, it seems that we can attribute the doctrine that Cicero here attributes to Aristotle to the later exegetical tradition. So Cicero’s work can be useful as a source, not for Aristotle directly, but for the reception of Aristotle by the later Peripatetic tradition, and the presence of this tradition in 1\textsuperscript{st} century BC Rome.

The claim that ἐνδελέχεια formed part of Aristotle’s theory of the soul is not found only in Cicero, but survives also in Aetius, Simplicius, Philopponus, and Clement.\textsuperscript{145} Rather than being an idiosyncratic misreading produced by Cicero, then, this seems to have been a widespread interpretation of the Aristotelian view of the soul, presumably deriving from an influential Greek philosophical source. Hirzel has argued convincingly

\textsuperscript{143} Arist. De An. 1.4, 408a29-34: ὅτι μὲν οὖν ὁδὸν ἀρμονίαν οὖν τ' εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ὀστε κύκλῳ περιφέρεσθαι, δὴ λοι ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. κατὰ συμβεβηκὼς δὲ κινεῖσθαι, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, ἄστι, καὶ κινεῖν ἑαυτὴν, οὖν κινεῖσθαι μὲν ἐν ὤ ἄστι, τοῦτο δὲ κινεῖσθαι ἕπο τῆς ψυχῆς· ἄλλως δ' οὐχ οὖν τε κινεῖσθαι κατὰ τόπον ὁπέν. (“It it clear from what has been said that the soul cannot be a harmony, nor can it revolve in a circle. It is, however, possible, as we have said, that it may be moved, and even move itself, incidentally (e.g. that which contains it may be moved, and be moved by the soul); but in no other sense can it move in space.”) (Trans. Hett)

\textsuperscript{144} Moraux (1963).

\textsuperscript{145} For the full references, see Hirzel (1884) 177-9.
that both Cicero and these later commentators were influenced in their accounts of Aristotle by later Peripatetic exegesis. In particular, he attributes this view to the teachings of Critolaus and Diodorus, each of whom seem to have a theory of the ἐνδελέχεια of the soul, and the former of whom was active at Rome in the mid-2nd century, and so likely to have had a profound influence on the Roman reception of Aristotelian thought (indeed, we know Cicero was familiar with his work from De Fin. 5.14). If Hirzel’s findings are correct, then, Cicero’s translations can provide us with a valuable insight into the later exegetical tradition, helping us to see the interpretations of Aristotle’s dialogues available in the 1st century BC.

So, then, we have seen how the general reassessment of Cicero’s translations of passages from Greek philosophy performed in this chapter might help us to more judiciously employ Cicero as a source for Aristotle’s lost dialogues, and have observed that the idea of translation as creative adaptation is also at work in Cicero’s translations of these works. We will now turn to what might, conversely, appear to be Cicero’s most faithful translation of a Greek philosophical translation, his Timaeus. Even here, however, we will see a similar idea of translation as creative rewriting at work, and observe Cicero adapting and disambiguating Plato’s text in light of the later exegetical tradition.

146 Stob. ecl. I 58 Diels 303b 6: (Diogenes 1.1.29b.25 <Κριτόλαος> καὶ <Διόδωρος> ὁ Τύριος νοῦν ἀπ’ αἰθήρος ἀπαθοῦς.)
Chapter 4: Cicero’s Timaeus

I. Introduction

In the preceding chapter, we surveyed Cicero’s translations of passages of Greek philosophical prose within his own, Latin philosophical texts. In this chapter, we will continue this investigation by focusing on Cicero’s longest continuous translation, which extends over 34 pages in its most recent Teubner edition (Ax (1977)): his “Timaeus”.

This work has received surprisingly little scholarly attention given its inclusion in the much-studied Ciceronian corpus, due to a combination of its fragmentary (or unfinished) state, the obscure and difficult nature of its subject matter, and the perceived

---

1 We may doubt the authenticity of this title, which seems to have gained currency due to the fact that this Ciceronian work held a key position for those later thinkers interested in Platonic and Platonist philosophy as the earliest available Latin language version of the Platonic original (see e.g. Aug. Civ Dei 13.16 nempe Platonis haec verba sunt, sicut ea Cicero in Latinum vertit, and the references to the title “Timaeus” in Nonnus e.g. Nonn. 198.30, and Serv. Auct. ad Verg. Georg. 1.31). The alternative titles that are attested in our manuscripts (“de Universalitate” in Rossianus Lat. 559; “de Cosmi sive Mundi Creatione” in Parisinus Lat. 6333; “de Essentia seu Productore Mundi” in Ambrosianus Lat. E 15; and “de Universitate” in a marginal note in Parisinus Lat. 559), however, come from later manuscripts (each being 13th century or later) and display no kind of consensus, suggesting they are the product of revision rather than tradition. We may never know the original, intended title of this work, though, given that the Platonic translation seems to have comprised only the first of a series of projected speeches, it seems likely that it would have referred to the dialogue’s dramatic location, as in the case of the Tusculanae Disputationes (giving us something like “Ephesiae Disputationes”); the philosophical school(s) treated, in the manner of the Academica (giving us the “Pythagoria” or “Peripatetica”); the main speaker, as in the case of the Hortensius (giving us the “Nigidius” or the “Cratippus”); or the philosophical content, in the manner of the De Finibus, and each of the guesses made as to the original title in the manuscript tradition; rather than to the original speaker of the Platonic text with which it opened. For full information on the manuscript tradition, we must look to the older Teubner of Giomini (1975) 177 and his studies on the text (1967) 6.
derivative, and so uninteresting, nature of translations in general. Yet, as we shall see, there are a number of reasons why this text is worthy of consideration as a unique and important literary product in its own right – regardless of whether the text as we have it represents the remaining fragments of a finished work, or the beginnings of a project left incomplete at Cicero’s death. The translation, as we have it, is embedded within a dialogue that has a completely different dramatic setting and form from its Platonic original. It also reproduces only a portion of Timaeus’ speech, which seems carefully selected so as to form an independent and coherent whole, and has a different scope and emphasis from its Platonic source-text. The embedded and selective nature of the translation should, then, lead us to consider this work as another example of creative rewriting, rather than an attempt at a faithful, word-for-word Latin language reproduction of a Greek original. As such, it is open to the same kind of analysis to which we

2 Even those scholars who are particularly interested in the fairly obscure sub-field of Cicero’s fragmentary philosophical works have been known to dismiss the Timaeus out of hand, due to its difficulty and status as a translation. Coleman-Norton’s judgement (1939) 216 is fairly typical of 20th century scholarship on the subject: “of the fourteen fragmentary treatises five remain in considerable bulk: the De Re Publica, the De Legibus, the Academica, the De Fato, and the Timaeus. With the exception of the last all these may be read with profit. It must be admitted that the appeal of the Timaeus (whose fifty-two sections extend through sixteen pages of Teubner text) is not great, since even in the original Greek Plato’s dialogue is obscure - a circumstance which Cicero claims is due to the abstruseness of the subject and not of the style (Fin. II, 5, 15)”.

3 In this I follow the recent work of Sedley (2013) 200, rather than the suggestion of Jones (1959) 27 that “it may be one of the translations of his youth, resuscitated for later use like the extracts from the Aratea in N.D.II. In the latter case Cicero may have translated the whole Timaeus at about the same time as the Protagoras and Xenophon's Oeconomicus”. I shall discuss the reasoning behind this below at p.13-4.

4 Indeed, the realisation that Cicero may not have been solely concerned with the production of a faithful, verbatim translation but that a translation may also have the potential to, in some way, interpret or elucidate the Platonic original goes as far back as St. Jerome (who hints at the possibility of an interpretive translation, when he calls Plato’s Timaeus an obscurissimus... liber... qui ne Ciceronis quidem aureo ore fit
subjected his other embedded prose translations - an analysis that can provide us with an insight into Cicero’s aims and strategies in carrying out his philosophical project, the intellectual climate in which he was writing, and the state and form of the original Greek texts to which Cicero and his readership might have had access.

This chapter will consider the literary, philosophical, and political implications of Cicero’s adaptation of his Platonic original, examining the philosophical and political meanings generated by placing the speech of Timaeus into the mouth of the Roman Republican figure Nigidius Figulus; the ways in which Cicero’s translation choices reflect contemporary, 1st century BC philosophical debates and Cicero’s own, ongoing Academic sceptic project; and the particular relationship between Greek and Roman language and culture which Cicero establishes by his treatment of this Greek original text. We will turn firstly to earlier scholarly approaches to Cicero’s Timaeus, arguing that a new approach to this work is needed, which takes seriously the position argued for in this dissertation: namely, the ability of a creative translation to communicate different philosophical ideas and have a distinct literary purpose from its source text. We will then consider the dramatic setting of the dialogue, examining how the choice of Nigidius Figulus (himself an important Roman author and Pythagorean philosopher) may have influenced the vocabulary choice and philosophical emphasis of the translation produced.

planior, “an exceedingly obscure book, which is not made clearer even with Cicero’s golden tongue” (Comm. in Amos II, 5, 283)).
Finally we will turn to the question of why Cicero might have chosen to embark upon this work, with its extended translation of a Platonic text, at all, considering both the contributions it makes to his project of Latinising the intellectual achievements of the Greeks, and the political implications that the choice to popularise these aspects of Greek philosophy at this particular moment in Rome’s transition from Republic to Empire may have held. In doing this, we will be interested less in picking out the various types of translation procedures and revealing their presence in the text (as Cicero’s range and control in this area has been sufficiently illustrated in our earlier chapters), than in considering the effect produced by using each of these translation techniques in combination at various points of a sustained and complex translation project.

II. Earlier Scholarship (Translation Technique in Cicero’s Timaeus)

Although there has not been a great deal of previous scholarly interest in Cicero’s Timaeus, what work there has been is, for the most part, of direct relevance to the topic of this investigation, focusing, as it does, on how the Ciceronian text compares to its Platonic models, and what might account for the differences between the Latin translation and its Greek source. The two major, modern works to deal with Cicero’s translation of Plato’s Timaeus are Poncelet’s encyclopaedic, but theoretically problematic linguistic comparison of the Greek and Latin versions (which has been referred to throughout this
dissertation); and Lambardi’s more nuanced, but still narrowly-focused, response.\(^5\)

Poncelet’s theoretical commitment to the inferiority of the Latin language in regards to the articulation of philosophical ideas has already been noted,\(^6\) but it is in his treatment of Cicero’s *Timaeus* that we can see how this commitment influences his reading of a complete Ciceronian text, leading him to view the work as a failed attempt at a faithful, word-for-word translation of a Platonic original, frustrated by the inadequacies of the Latin language in replicating the content of its source material. Lambardi’s response to Poncelet gives a more sympathetic view of Cicero’s translation, seeing its alteration of the wording of the Greek original to fit the syntactical forms and rhetorical style of the target language as a translational virtue rather than a failing. Yet Lambardi still accepts Poncelet’s implicit assumption that Cicero’s translation aims at the highest possible level of fidelity to the sense of the original text (albeit within the constraints of the Latin literary tradition) - an assumption which a closer examination of the Ciceronian text should lead us to question.

We have already discussed the objections that can be made to Poncelet’s theoretical commitments: in the first place, it is unclear that the kind of syntactically and semantically faithful translation of Plato that would satisfy him is possible into *any*

\(^5\) Poncelet (1957); Lambardi (1982). The earlier work of Hermann (1842) is also important, and, indeed, often more illuminating than its 20\(^{th}\) century successors, and will be considered where relevant later on.

\(^6\) See chapter 2, p.68ff.
language; and, in the second, his claim that there are certain conceptual relations that can only be articulated in particular languages is highly contentious, and requires heavy qualification, if not complete rejection, in the light of contemporary translation studies.\(^7\)

There is, however, a more specific issue to be taken with Poncelet’s appeal to Cicero’s *Timaeus* as his main source of evidence for the failures of Ciceronian translation. In the case of the *Timaeus*, the sort of faithful replication of the sense and linguistic structures of the Platonic source text that Poncelet takes to be the aim of successful translation just does not seem to be Cicero’s intended product.

As Lambardi notes in her even-handed response to Poncelet, the assumption that Cicero is attempting to produce a “technical” translation of Plato’s *Timaeus*, characterised by a “mechanical fidelity” to the terminology of the original text, seems to be incorrect.\(^8\) Cicero’s text is not concerned with the faithful reproduction of Platonic vocabulary usage, nor its syntactical structures. As we shall later discuss in more detail,

\(^7\) E.g. Hjelmslev (1963) claims that “no language is linked to a dominant conceptual system, a determinate ambience, or a determinate mode of civilisation” (p.44 in the 1970 Italian translation); and Benveniste (1958) who makes language prior to thought, but only in the sense that language *in general* is required for thought rather than any *particular* language being required for particular structures of thought, so, again, he does not preclude speakers of any particular language from having any logically possible mode of thought available to them. See also Jakobson (1959). Poncelet does, interestingly, think that there are indeed some modern European languages (namely German and French) which are fit for the reproduction of Platonic philosophical thought, and consequently is led to the rather bizarre conclusion that French did not inherit its suitability for abstract discourse from its classical Latin ancestor (e.g. p.350: *Les langues romanes ne sortent pas du latin classique, qui a coexistant intact dans son statisme à côté de la langue vulgaire... La fin du latin classique ne peut être qu’un éclatement, non une metamorphose. C’est parce que la langue de Rome est inchangeable qu’elle reste impérissable.*).

\(^8\) For the rejection of “tecnicismo” in the philosophical language of Cicero see Lambardi (1982) 16 and *passim*.
Cicero’s text uses six different Latin terms to translate the single Greek word, \( \delta \eta \mu \iota \upsilon \rho \gamma \omicron \zeta \). This cannot be an essential failing of the Latin language, as the later Latin translator Chalcidius had no trouble employing the single term, \( \text{opifex} \), to cover each use of \( \delta \eta \mu \iota \upsilon \rho \gamma \omicron \zeta \), and this word was certainly available to Cicero – indeed it is used by him in the roughly contemporaneous \textit{De Natura Deorum} to translate Plato’s term.\(^9\) Instead, Cicero must have been motivated in this variation of word choice by something other than strict linguistic fidelity to the Platonic original. Nor, as Lambardi has detailed extensively, does Cicero always employ the same Latin grammatical structures to translate parallel, Greek linguistic forms, showing that the consistency of translational strategy typical of a “technical” translation cannot be the determining factor in Cicero’s grammatical usage.\(^10\) Instead, as Lambardi has observed, we must seek other explanations for Cicero’s translational choices - explanations which see him as a “\textit{traduttore-artisti}” (”translator-artist”) producing a work of literary craftsmanship, rather than attributing the final form of the translation, and the differences it displays to the Platonic original, solely to the inadequacies of the Latin language.\(^11\)

---

\(^9\) Cic, \textit{Nat. D.} 1.18: …\textit{opificem aedificatoremque mundi, Platonis de Timaeo deum}…, “the artisan and builder of the cosmos, the god of the \textit{Timaeus} of Plato”. Interestingly, at 28C Chalcidius also uses \textit{opifex} when the Greek \( \delta \eta \mu \iota \upsilon \rho \gamma \omicron \zeta \) is not used, but the Demiurge is being referred to. The \textit{Timaeus} and the \textit{De Natura Deorum} both seem to have been written in the summer of 45BC, though it is a matter of scholarly debate which was produced first (see Fries (1900) 18, Della Casa (1962) 37, Lévy (2003) 96-7, Sedley (2013) 189, Giomini (1975) xiii-xiv, and Ax (1977) vi).

\(^10\) See Lambardi (1982) 28-34 for a detailed discussion of the various translations of the Greek present participle employed in Cicero’s \textit{Timaeus}.

\(^11\) Lambardi (1982) 143
In her own work, Lambardi focuses on an important explanation for the “nontechnical” (i.e. flexible, rather than mechanical) nature of Cicero’s translation of Plato’s *Timaeus*. She points out that the literary form of a Greek original is not replicated simply by the mechanical reproduction of the original Greek syntax or word choice, but by recreating the sense of the original in a manner that reflects the literary conventions of the target language.\(^\text{12}\) This observation takes account of contemporary views as to what constitutes a successful literary translation and is explanatorily useful for Cicero’s treatment of his Platonic original, which does, indeed, seem to favour *latinitas* (the adoption of a fluid Latin prose style) over grammatical fidelity to the original text.\(^\text{13}\) However, although Lambardi provides an important corrective to the views of Poncelet, in that she considers Cicero as an artistic translator, attempting to produce a literary product that conforms to the stylistic conventions of the Latin language, she, too, appears

---

\(^{12}\) Lambardi argues that, for Cicero, an essential element of a philosophical work is its ability to affect and persuade the reader. So, in his attempt to translate a Greek philosophical work into a Latin philosophical work, he must produce a rhetorically effective, Latin language product. We would, then, expect a certain amount of departure from the grammatical structures and word-choice of the Greek original, as the original text must be adapted to the rhetorical conventions of the target language. Lambardi (1982) 19: “*Cicerone cerca di coinvolgere le facoltà emotive e sentimentali, non solo intellettive, del lettore. In questo modo l’Arpinate contempora il proprio gusto stilistico con una riflessione sulle qualità letterarie ed artistiche che reputa necessarie allo stile filosofico, sì che l’assunto concettuale persuada profondamente il lettore, e per indurre in esso la persuasione filosofica ricorre a mezzi espressivi complessi, dalla chiarezza e lucidità formale a tutti i procedimenti retorici, i più atti di volta in volta a stupire, commuovere, toccare sensibilità e immaginazione.*” The evidence that Lambardi adduces for Cicero’s belief that a philosophical work must *emotionally* move its reader is not itself particularly persuasive, but the observation that important aspects of a text such as rhetorical power cannot usually be replicated in a target language while maintaining grammatical fidelity to the original is important.

\(^{13}\) We only need to look at Poncelet’s section recording the use of the relative (1957) 158-168 to see that Cicero favours the production of a periodic sentence of the kind used in his other philosophical works over the emulation of the linguistic style of his Greek model.
implicitly to make a potentially problematic assumption about Cicero’s purpose in translating the *Timaeus*. Like Poncelet, Lambardi δημιουργός, sees Cicero’s translation as, fundamentally, an attempt to reproduce in Latin the original sense of the Platonic text, although she appreciates that this replication of sense entails adapting the literary style and rhetorical power of the original to its new linguistic context.14 Consequently, Lambardi pays little attention to those passages in which it really does seem that the underlying sense of the original has been noticeably altered, in spite of the fact that these sorts of alterations occur in passages of great philosophical significance.15 Even while Lambardi identifies Cicero as a “traduttore-artista”, then, the focus is very much on the “traduttore”, as she sees his communicative aims to align, for the most part uncomplicatedly, with that of the Platonic original, with any change in sense being the _______________________

14 Where there is expansion, compression, or paraphrase, she sees the emphasis to have been changed for rhetorical purposes, or to conform to the conventions of Latin literary style, but that the sense of the original has been maintained as far as possible (she claims that the translation of each linguistic unit must be examined on its own terms, but that the primary reasons she can see for the alteration of the Platonic model are “per resistenza della lingua al dato concettuale estraneo o per scelta ciceroniana di adattare il testo secondo un colorito particolare” (p.40)). She complains that Poncelet does not appreciate that competition with the model is typical of the ancient translational act: “essa gareggi col modello, secondo le modalità della traduzione artistica antica” (p.41). For a full discussion of the ancient understanding of translation, again, see the introductory chapter.

15 Where she does deal with the possible changes in the philosophical content that are present in the Ciceronian translation, this seems to be taken as an inevitable product of Cicero’s historical situation, or as a consequence of purely stylistic considerations. For example, she says of the omission of the reference to τύχη at Cic. *Tim*. 7 (= Plat. *Tim*. 34c) “è forse di matrice stoica il rifiuto di ammettere che l’uomo è soggetto al caso” (p.44); while the syntactic abbreviation of Cic. *Tim*. 50 (= Plat. *Tim*. 46d) is seen to violate the “intelligibility” of the original, but no reason other than Cicero’s rhetorical tendency towards simplification is given (p.35-7) (in other places, of course, his rhetorical tendency to amplify is the only explanatory factor invoked). The only point at which Lambardi seems explicitly to attribute an intentional philosophical motivation to Cicero’s translational choice is where she follows Hermann (1842) in attributing Cicero’s polysemantic use of the term *materia* both to his historical location and to his own personal interpretation of Greek philosophy (“all’epoca di Cicerone e attraverso la sua personale interpretazione delle culture filosofiche del suo tempo” (p.139))
product of rhetorical embellishment or the concession to the generic conventions of Latin philosophical literature and translation practice.

Each of the two major, modern works on Cicero’s translation technique in the *Timaeus*, then, considers the text as an attempt at a translation which replicates, as far as possible, the sense of the Platonic original, given the morpho-syntactical limitations of the Latin language (Poncelet), or the rhetorical conventions of Latin literary style (Lambardi). More recent scholars who have studied this work in connection with the reception of Plato’s *Timaeus* in Hellenistic philosophy, as opposed to treating the Ciceronian philosophical translation project in and of itself, also tend to accept this premise.\(^\text{16}\) Sedley’s recent work on this text, which sees it as exhibiting a different philosophical position and literary purpose to the original, is the notable exception to this trend, and his important findings will be treated in more detail later in this chapter.\(^\text{17}\) Since, however, Sedley gives little space to supporting his decision to read the *Timaeus* as an independent work, worthy of philosophical analysis in its own right, I will treat this

\(^{16}\) As we shall see, Lévy (2003) sees this work as Cicero’s attempt to leave Hellenistic philosophy behind and “return to the sources of classical philosophy” (p.97) by expressing Platonic “transcendence” in Latin (p.98) (though the attempt is a failure, as Cicero, steeped as he is in Stoic thought, “confuses Plato's careful distinctions and associates nature with the noetic world, because it is almost impossible for him to admit that there is something beyond nature” (p.104)). Meanwhile Reydams-Schils (1999), astonishingly, does not treat the Ciceronian translation as a moment of reception in her study of 1\(^\text{st}\) century BC Stoic and Platonist responses to Plato’s *Timaeus* – even though Cicero is the primary source for her treatment of Antiochus’ use of the *Timaeus* –, presumably because a translation, when viewed as a straightforward attempt to recreate the sense of the original, would not constitute a reception, but instead a reproduction, of the Platonic source text.

\(^{17}\) Sedley (2013) will be discussed in more detail on p.20ff.
issue in some depth. As we shall see, there are a number of good reasons for questioning, with Sedley, the enduring assumption that Cicero was aiming at unwavering fidelity to the Platonic text in the production of his own version of the *Timaeus*.

### III. The Nature of the “Translation” of the *Timaeus*

One reason that has often been adduced for treating Cicero’s translation of the *Timaeus* as an attempt at a faithful (if artistic) translation of the sense of the Platonic original is the existence of the following passage from the *De Finibus* which deals with his use of Greek source material:

> quamquam, si plane sic verterem Platonem aut Aristotelem, ut verterunt nostri poetae fabulas, male, credo, mererer de meis civibus, si ad eorum cognitionem divina illa ingenia transferrem. sed id neque feci adhuc nec mihi tamen, ne faciam, interdictum puto. locos quidem quosdam, si videbitur, transferam, et maxime ab iis, quos modo nominavi, cum inciderit, ut id apte fieri possit, ut ab Homero Ennius, Afranius a Menandro solet.

*De Fin. 1.7)*

Yet even supposing I gave a direct translation of Plato or Aristotle, exactly as our poets have done with the plays, surely I would not be doing a disservice to my fellow-countrymen to introduce those transcendent intellects to their acquaintance? As a matter of fact, however, this has not been my procedure up to this point, though I do not feel I am debarred from adopting it. Indeed I expressly reserve the right of borrowing certain passages, if I think fit, and particularly from the philosophers just
mentioned, when an appropriate occasion offers for doing so; just as Ennius
regularly borrows from Homer, and Afranius from Menander.  

In this passage, Cicero claims that, although he has not, up to this point, attempted
to translate (vertere) the works of Plato and Aristotle into Latin, there is nothing to
prevent him from doing this in the future in places where he considers it to be
appropriate. Indeed, he suggests that there might be a positive benefit to his Roman
audience in the translation of such texts in this way (the ironical male, credo, mererer de
meis civibus, si ad eorum cognitionem divina illa ingenia transferrem). The argument
runs, then, that it is in his Timaeus that Cicero fulfils this promise, performing the
interpretum munus (“task of translators”) by converting into Latin an important work of
Plato and bringing the philosopher’s divinum ingenium (“transcendent intellect”) into
Cicero’s target language.

Yet, as we shall see, the maintenance of sense of the original (conceived of as
unwavering fidelity to its content, if not its linguistic style) that Cicero associates with the
task of the interpres does not seem to be his primary concern in his treatment of this

---

18 Translation adapted from Rackham (1999).
19 “surely I would not be doing a disservice to my fellow-countrymen to introduce those transcendent
intellecets to their acquaintance”.
20 e.g. Ax (1977) vi. Cicero claims nos non interpretum fungimus munere of his work up to this point at
Fin. 1.6
Either, then, the *Timaeus* is not the place in which Cicero fulfils his promise, or, by “translating” (*vertere*) in the manner of Ennius and Afranius Cicero does not mean the straightforward replication of the sense of his Greek source in the Latin language, but a creative adaptation of the original text.22

In the first place, the dramatic setting of the Ciceronian text is completely different from its Platonic original. The surviving fragment of the prologue, often overlooked as it does not translate any part of the Greek original, is worth quoting here in full, as it will be of great importance to our later discussion:

1) Multa sunt a nobis et in Academicis conscripta contra physicos et saepe <cum> P. Nigidio Carneadeo more et modo disputata. Fuit enim vir ille cum ceteris artibus, quae quidem dignae libero essent, ornatus omnibus, tum acer investigator et diligens earum rerum, quae a natura involutae videntur; denique sic iudico, post illos nobiles Pythagoreos, quorum disciplina extincta est quodam modo, cum aliquot saecla in Italia Siciliaque vignet, hunc exitisse, qui illam renovaret. 2) Qui cum me in Ciliciam proficisceret Ephesi expectavit Romam ex legatione ipse decedens, venissetque eodem Mytilenis mei salutant et visendi causa Cratippus, Peripateticorum omnium, quos quidem ego audierim, meo iudicio facile princeps, perlibenter et Nigidium vidi et

21 See ch. 1 for a discussion of the fidelity of the *interpres*.
22 The nature of earlier literary translation has, again, been treated more fully in the introduction. From that discussion, it is clear that there are good arguments for accepting either of these options: earlier poetic translations are famously fluid and open to contamination from other source texts (just as Cicero’s philosophical text exhibits the contamination from other philosophical schools typical of his eclecticism); yet it is also hard to see how this eclectic interpretation could be seen as a concerted effort to replicate the “ingenium” of Plato as it resides in the Greek source, and the change of the identity of the characters performed by Cicero in his *Timaeus* seems out of keeping with standard Roman translation technique (either of the Homeric poems or the *palliatae* (for which see Hermann (1842) 7), both of which are mentioned as Cicero’s translational models).
cognovi Cratippum. Ac primum quidem tempus salutationis in percontatione consumpsimus...

(Cic. Tim. 1-2)

1) There are many things which I have both written up against the physicists in my Academic Books and often argued about with Publius Nigidius [Figulus] in the Carneadean manner and style. For he [Nigidius] was a man equipped not only with all those other arts which are worthy of a free man, but also a keen and meticulous investigator of those things that seem to have been concealed by nature. Indeed I think that, after those noble Pythagoreans, whose creed had somehow faded away although it had thrived in Italy and Sicily for so many centuries, that man had appeared to revive it.

2) When that man [Nigidius] had awaited me at Ephesus, as I was on my way to Cilicia, himself returning to Rome after his legateship, and Cratippus, easily the leading figure among of the Peripatetics I had heard, in my opinion, had come to the same place from Mytilene to greet me and pay a visit, I was delighted both to see Nigidius, and to recognise Cratippus. And the initial period of greeting we spent in asking questions.23

Rather than purporting to describe a conversation taking place in Athens at the time of the Panathenaea festival in around 429BC, then, the prologue of Cicero’s Timaeus places the action in Ephesus during Cicero’s journey to his proconsular province of Cilicia in 51BC (Cic. Tim. 2).24 With this change in setting, we also see a change in the characters of the dialogue. The conversation between Socrates and his three companions,

23 Translation adapted from Sedley (2013) 194.
24 The setting of the Panathenaea is mentioned at Plat. Tim. 26e. For a discussion of year in which the Timaeus is set, see Welliver (1977) 44. For the dramatic date of Cicero’s Timaeus see, e.g. Lévy (2003) 96. Della Casa (1962) 28, perhaps taking the fiction of the dramatic setting a little too literally, narrows this down to a period of 3 days in from the 23rd to 26th of July when Cicero was in Ephesus (Cic. Ad Fam. 3.5).
Critias, Hermocrates, and Timaeus, has been replaced by a discussion between Cicero himself and two contemporary philosophers: Nigidius Figulus, and Cratippus. Nigidius Figulus, that *acer investigator et diligens earum rerum, quae a natura involutae videntur*, seems to have been the intended speaker of Cicero’s translation of the Platonic Timaeus’ speech - an association which seems to have been motivated, as we will later discuss, by Timaeus’ post-Platonic association with Pythagoreanism, and which is likely given a number of allusions to Nigidius’ own literary output which will be examined in detail below (p.18ff). The other character is the Peripatetic philosopher, Cratippus, who would, presumably, have given a Peripatetic response to Nigidius’ speech, in a manner consistent with Aristotle’s own reply to the original Platonic text. The role of the character of Cicero himself in the dialogue can only be the subject of surmise, but, as the Peripatetics held a position which they took to be directly responding to and corrective of Plato’s *Timeaus*, perhaps he was simply an interested observer to the dialectical exchange of Nigidius and Cratippus (a role he casts himself in also in the *De Natura Deorum*),

---

25 “keen and meticulous investigator of those things that seem to have been concealed by nature”.
26 In attributing the translation of the *Timaeus* to the speech of Nigidius Figulus, I agree with Hermann (1842), Giomini (1975), Lévy (2003), and Sedley (2013) among others. For the association of the Platonic character Timaeus with Pythagoreanism in the later tradition, see the following section (p.28).
27 In this reconstruction, I follow the important work of Hermann (1842). The Aristotelian response to Plato’s *Timeaus at Met. N.3.1091a18* will be discussed in greater detail below (p.29-8). It would be interesting to know how Cicero was able to make use of the character of a Greek-speaking, Peripatetic philosopher as a character in his Latin language dialogue, but, unfortunately we have nothing left of Cratippus’ speech if, indeed, it was ever started. Perhaps Sedley (2013) 195 is right in suggesting that “the role of delivering a Latinised Aristotelian passage was to be assigned either to a minor Roman speaker, or possibly to Cicero himself, but that Cratippus was present both to give the enterprise his blessing and to provide a suitably august counterweight to Nigidius.”
rather than actively engaged in the philosophical discussion (as we see him doing in books 2 and 4 of the *De Finibus*).  

The intended form, then, of the Ciceronian work seems also to have been very different from the Platonic original, including, as it did, a response to the Timaean speech which is not present in the Greek model. Indeed, the claim that Nigidius and Cicero were accustomed to debating *Carneado more* (that is, “in the manner of Carneades”, whose New Academic scepticism Cicero himself follows) explicitly points to such a change of form: from the more monologic philosophical exposition employed in Timaeus’ extended and continuous narration of his *εἰκόνας μὴθος* (“likely story”), to the more dialogic form of hypothesis and refutation favoured by the academic sceptics. This is underscored by the opening reference to Cicero’s *Academica*, both versions of which reinforce the philosophical position of their author, by adopting this dialogic and discursive quality. The change in setting, and with it a change in character and dialogue form, then, should constitute a compelling reason for questioning the commonly held assumption that

---

28 This would also, interestingly, allow Cicero to adopt a role in his own dialogue similar to that held by Socrates in the Platonic dialogue.

29 The first version seems to have centred around paired speeches by Catulus and Lucullus, in which Lucullus responded to and argued against the (sceptical) epistemological claims of Catulus by upholding the position of the Old Academy; the second version probably inverted this form, with Varro first arguing for the Old Academic position of Lucullus, and Cicero responding to this in the sceptical manner of Catulus. See Brittain (2000) for a more detailed discussion of the probable form of the two versions of the *Academica*. 
Cicero’s primary aim in his translation of Plato’s *Timaeus* is the faithful replication of the Platonic original for his Roman audience.

The change in setting and character leads to a second important difference between the Ciceronian version and its Greek model. It is not just the dramatic setting and dialogue form that are updated and changed to reflect Cicero’s historical location. The content of the Platonic speech itself is thoroughly *latinised* in order to reflect the operative language of the discussion and the character of its speaker (and perhaps also, as we shall later discuss, to make a point about the native, Italian nature of Pythagorean philosophy). The names of the Greek gods are substituted for their Roman *cultural equivalents*. Yet, in addition to the standard *cultural equivalences* of *Saturnus* for *Kpόνος* and Iuppiter for *Zeύς*, we also get the unusual hyper-*latinisation* of *Salacia* for *Tηθύς* – in spite of the fact that the transliteration, *Tethys*, seems to be a perfectly acceptable Latin vocabulary item, which predates Cicero and is used by Chalcidius in his own translation. This rejection of a commonly used transliteration in favour of an uncommon (or, in this case, newly coined) Latinate term also occurs in the translation of

30 Again, the concept of a “domesticating” as opposed to “foreignising” translation will be discussed in the introduction.
31 For example, *Ἑρµῆς* is rendered *Mercurius* at Cic. *Tim*. 29 (= Plat. *Tim*. 38d), and the Greek, *δαίµονες*, at 38 is translated using the highly culturally Roman *Lares*.
32 These translations are at Cic. *Tim*.39 (= Plat. *Tim*. 40e = Chalc. *Tim*. 43). *Tethys* is used by Catullus in 64.29 and 88.5, and later also by Virgil in *Georg*. 1.31 (at which point in his commentary Servius quotes the Latin equivalent given by Cicero in his translation). “*Salacia*” is, however, also used by Varro at *De Ling. Lat* 5.72, so it is an acceptable Latin name, if one that seems to have been considered by Varro obscure enough to merit elucidation.
the Greek term ἀναλογία at Cic. *Tim.* 13. This term was common enough in its transliterated form, *analogia*, for Caesar to have written an entire treatise about it, but Cicero instead chooses to avoid the transliteration of the Greek original by employing the apparent neologisms *comparatio* and *proportio*, produced by means of *calque* from the Greek original.\(^3\) In addition to this concerted avoidance of vocabulary taken directly from the Platonic model, the Ciceronian translation also firmly identifies the Greeks and their language as other, *alienating* the cultural context from which his source text derives. The Greeks are invoked as a foreign people with different linguistic usages at 17 (*Graeci vocant*), 21 (*Graeci appellant*), 35 (*Graeci... nominant*), and 38 (*Graeci appellant*), in each of which cases they are contrasted with the “*nos*” (“*we*”) of the Roman people. This pointed *latinisation* of the Greek original is a far cry from the kind of translation typical of Roman comedy, in which the illusion that the speakers are speaking the language of the original Greek text is maintained.\(^4\) This systematic distancing of the translation from the context and language of the original might, again, lead us to reconsider whether Cicero’s main aim is to uncomplicatedly communicate the sense of his Platonic model, or whether, by setting this text up as an explicitly and

---

\(^3\) For further discussion of Caesar’s *De Analogia* see Garcia (2012). Fries (1900) 24 records other contemporary uses of the Latin term *analogia*, including Varro *De. Ling. Lat.* 9.4, and 10.3. All of these employ the same, grammatical meaning of this polyvalent Greek term, rather than the geometric sense in which it is used in Plato’s *Timaeus*, but that does not mean that this Latin term, in spite of its commonality as a technical, grammatical term, could not have been semantically expanded to cover the same range as its Greek parent.

\(^4\) See McElduff (2013) 61-95 on Roman translation of Greek comedy.
emphatically Latinised version of the original text, he generates new meaning not present in the original text.

A third important consideration, which would argue against a reductionist reading of Cicero’s translation as a straightforward attempt to reproduce the content of the Greek original in the Latin language, is the highly selective nature of his translation, and the way in which this contrasts with Cicero’s earlier technique in the translation of other Platonic works. Although we have a lacuna between our fragment of the prologue and the translation of Timaeus’ speech, it seems likely that Cicero’s translation began at the point at which our manuscripts pick up the text again (Cic. Tim. 2 = Plat. Tim. 27e), and that the opening of the Platonic original (Plat. Tim. 17a-27e) was never translated.\(^{35}\) As such, the Ciceronian translation passes over the opening speech of Socrates, which summarises the previous days’ conclusions regarding the “best kind of political constitution (πολιτεία)” (Plat. Tim. 17c), and that of Critias, which describes the fate of Atlantis, treating only the speech of Timaeus, which it excerpted from its original context. This act of excerption and transplantation into a new dialogue context cannot but change the

\(^{35}\) This is supported by the fact that a) we have absolutely no evidence of earlier parts of the translation, b) the Platonic translation seems to have been the part of the Ciceronian text which was of greatest interest to later readers, so most likely to be preserved in full, c) this beginning forms a natural opening of an embedded speech, beginning, as it does, at the very opening of Timaeus’ speech, and d) it is hard to imagine how Cicero could have translated the dramatic setting of the Platonic original in a way which was consistent with his own, very different dramatic setting, or what purpose this Chinese box structure might have served.
emphasis (and perhaps also the meaning) of the Platonic original. While Plato’s *Timaeus* purports itself to be some kind of sequel to his political work, the *Republic* (or Πολιτεία, in Greek), Cicero’s *Timaeus*, rather than being explicitly related to his own *De Re Publica*, is associated with his *Academica* and other works which deal with Physics (*multa sunt a nobis et in Academicis conscripta contra physicos* (Cic. *Tim*. 1)).

This change in emphasis is also reflected in the point at which the translation of the Platonic text breaks off (Cic. *Tim*. 52 = Plat. *Tim*. 47b). Again, the lack of any suggestion in the tradition of a lost section of the translation beyond this point suggests that Cicero’s translation ended where our manuscript attestation also ends. As Sedley notes, taking this particular section from Plato’s *Timaeus* results in the formation of a coherent whole; yet it is one that only tells half of the Platonic story. By leaving out the second half of the Platonic text (Plat. *Tim*. 47e-92c), Cicero gives only what we might call the “top down” explanation of the nature of the universe, which deals with the

36 “There are many things which I have also written up against the physicists in my *Academic Books*…”.
The other works which may be intended to be classed with these other Ciceronian works on Physics are, presumably, the roughly contemporaneous *De Natura Deorum*, and the upcoming *De Divinatione* and *De Fato*. The exact nature of the relationship of Plato’s *Timaeus* to the *Republic* is hotly contested (see Gregory (2008) xii), but the content of books 2-5 of the earlier Platonic text is certainly evoked in Socrates’ speech. Although Cicero’s version of the text is explicitly related to his *Academica*, we will discuss whether Cicero may implicitly employ the Platonic text’s association with Plato’s *Republic* to his own ends later in this chapter (p.41ff).

37 The only word attributed to Cicero’s *Timaeus* that is not in the text as we have it is *defenstrix* (Prisc. G.L.K. III 463, 19) which, if a correct attribution, may fall in the lacuna we have in the Ciceronian translation from Plat. *Tim*. 43b-46a.

38 Sedley (2013) 200-1
organizing effect of the νοῦς (“intellect”) of the Demiurge upon the structure of the universe, and leaves out the “bottom up” account, which relates how constraints of necessity (as found in the limited physical possibilities admitted by “receptacle”, in which and by means of which all perceptible phenomena occur) affect the work of the Demiurge. 39 This selection of only the first half of Timaeus’ speech for translation serves to alter dramatically the focus of the account. Rather than focusing on the relationship between metaphysical and material explanatory systems, 40 Cicero’s text focuses almost exclusively on the metaphysical and the divine. Consequently it does not, as does the Platonic original, purport to give a complete account of the nature of human beings (i.e. as products of both a divine plan and material necessity, Plat. Tim.69c), but instead focuses on the creation of the cosmos, the nature of the divine, and the functioning of teleology in the natural world. As such, the Ciceronian translation does not explicitly claim to fulfill Timaeus’ promise in Plato’s text that he will begin the task of populating

39 As Plato states, we need both of these accounts to fully explain the nature of the cosmos, μεμεγιμένη γάρ οὖν ἡ τοῦτο τοῦ κόσμου γένεσις ἐξ ἀνάγκης τε καὶ νοῦ συστάσεως ἐγεννήθη; “for, in truth, this cosmos in its origin was generated as a compound, from the combination of necessity and intellect” (Plat. Tim. 48a, trans. Bury). The nature of the “receptacle” (the common English term for the τρίτον γένος spoken of by Plato, which exists alongside the forms and their imitations) is yet another contentious aspect of the Timaeus, but it is perhaps best thought of as a combination of space (that in which perceptible phenomena exist) and matter (the substrate out of which perceptible phenomena are produce) (Gregory (2008) xlix). See also Cornford (1937) 177ff, Taylor (1928) 312ff, and Zeyl (2013), who describes the receptacle as “filled space” and “an enduring substratum, neutral in itself but temporarily taking on the various characterizations”.

40 The “two kinds of cause” examined in Plato’s Timaeus (διό δὴ χρῆ δι’ αἰτίας εἶδος διορίζεσθαι, τὸ μὲν ἀναγκαίον, τὸ δὲ θειόν; “because of this, it is necessary to distinguish two kinds of causes, the necessary and the divine” (68e), trans. adapted from Bury).
Socrates’ ideal city by describing the origins of the human beings which will inhabit it, and, overtly at least, sets itself up as a contribution primarily to debates in the fields of Physics, rather than as a preliminary investigation relevant to the subject of Politics. Thus the decision by Cicero to excerpt a passage of the Platonic original for translation, rather than comprehensively treating the entirety of his model, reveals his work to have a significantly different focus and apparent purpose to its Platonic model.

Importantly, this highly selective translational technique is very different from what we see both in Chalcidius’ translation of Plato’s *Timaeus*, and in Cicero’s earlier translation of Plato’s *Protagoras*. While Cicero’s version of the text of the *Timaeus* takes greater liberties with the content of his Platonic model, translating only a carefully selected portion and editing out those sections that do not fit into his new dramatic setting, Chalcidius carefully maintains the structure of the original. For example, where Cicero passes over the speeches of Socrates and Critias, Chalcidius chooses in all this to follow the Greek original - not, of course, in the manner of a mechanical, word-for-word translation (Chalcidius is as subject to the linguistic possibilities and literary conventions of the Latin tongue as Cicero, and so often employs *variatio sermonis* where the Greek...

---

41 τοὺς δὲ πολίτας καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἢν χθές ἦμιν ώς ἐν μόθῳ δήμεσθα σύ, νῦν μετενεργόντες ἐπὶ τάληθες δείχρο θήσομεν ὡς ἡκίνην τὴν ὁδόν; “and the city and its citizens which you described to us yesterday, as it were in a story, we will now transport here into the realm of fact, assuming that this is the same city” (Plat. *Tim*. 26c, trans. adapted from Bury); the part Timaeus’ speech will play in this by relating the origins of mankind is given at 27a.
uses repetition, and periodic sentences where the Greek has a more simple sentence structure), but, nevertheless, with the obvious intention of communicating accurately the form and content of the Platonic source text in a manner which is not present in the Ciceronian version. The literary structure of the Platonic source text is thus maintained in the Chalcidian version, as are the identities of the original Platonic characters.

Meanwhile, where the Ciceronian text removes Timaeus’ appeals to Socrates and his audience, and Socrates’ responses to Timaeus’ speech, thereby compressing the original, the Chalcidian text retains these. The retention of the original Greek dramatic setting, and of the vocatives interspersed in these speeches reminding us of the Greek character of the interlocutors, creates the illusion that we are reading a conversation taking place in the Greek language, in the 5th century BC, rather than a Latin language translation of the 4th century AD. This is more typical of the translation technique of early Roman comedy, in that the Greek characters and setting are maintained along with the

---

42 See also the introduction to Bakhouche (2011) which treats the differences between in Cicero and Chalcidius’ translation technique, and Dutton (2003) which considers the scope and intention of Chalcidius’ translation.

43 At Plat. Tim. 29c Timaeus’ interjection, ὦ Σώκρατες, is left untranslated by Cicero, but rendered with the vocative Socrate in the Chaldician version (Chal. Tim. 25). Socrates’ response to Timaeus at 29d (Ἀριστα, ὦ Τίμαι, παντάπασι τε ἐς κελεύεις ἀποδεκτόν· τὸ μὲν οὖν προοίμον θαυμασίου ἀπεδώκετδα σου, τὸν δὲ δὴ νόμον ἡμῖν ἐφεξῆς πέραινε. “Excellent, Timaeus! We must by all means accept it as you suggest; and certainly we have most cordially accepted your prelude, but now we beg you to proceed straight on with the main theme”. Trans. adapted from Bury) is similarly absent from the Ciceronian version, while Chaldidius translates it as follows: omnes tibi, o Timae, veniam largimus volentes, et tamen prinnipium orationis admirar; superest, ut leges quoque sacri certaminis exequaris. From this passage it should be clear that Chaldidius’ translation is not slavishly literal (the grammatical form of the opening clause, for example, is changed from the passive to the active), yet that it attempts to replicate certain elements of the Platonic original which the Ciceronian version simply is not concerned with transmitting.
illusion that these characters are conversing in Greek, and there is none of the distancing of the Greek model from its Latin language adaptation which occurs in the Ciceronian version. In this the translation of Chalcidius also, importantly, follows Cicero’s own translation technique in his youthful version of Plato’s *Protagoras*. We have only a few fragments of the earlier Ciceronian translation, but even from these it is clear that, in this text, Cicero retained the characters and dramatic setting of the original, and followed the conversational pattern of his Platonic model. If Cicero had wanted to produce a rhetorically successful, yet faithful, Latin language translation of the *Timaeus*, undertaken for the sole purpose of communicating the content of the Platonic original to his Roman audience, he could have done so: he had certainly done so before. We should, then, in analysing this text, make an effort to account for Cicero’s divergence from his earlier translational style.

---

44 For example, see Plautus *Men*. 11-2, which plays on the conceit that the actors in Roman Comedy are in a Greek dramatic setting, speaking Greek, by claiming that this plot *sicilicissitat* (speaks Sicilian dialect), rather than *atticissat* (speaks Attic dialect).

45 The differences outlined between the Chalcidian and Ciceronian translations of the *Timaeus* are, therefore, also very good reasons for thinking that the translated parts of Cicero’s *Timaeus* were not, as Jones (1959) 27 suggests, recycled from one of Cicero’s earlier attempts at Platonic translation, but specifically produced for his projected dialogue on Physics as part of the Latin philosophical project he undertook at the end of his life.

46 The key fragments are Schoell, 1918 vol. 8, fr. *Prot*. 2 (= Priscian. 6.11.63) and fr. *Prot* 3 (= Hippiae verba 8.7.35), where we can see the Ciceronian characters address each other using their Platonic names: *Quid tu? unde tandem appares, o Socrate? * ¿an quidem non dubium est, quin ab Alcibiade?* (fr. 2.2, which translates Plat. *Prot*. 309a); *Nunc a vobis, o Protagora et Socrates, postulo, ut de isto concedatis alter alteri et inter vos de huiusce modi rebus controversymini, non concertetis* (fr 2.3, which translates Plat. *Prot*. 337a-b). Hermann (1842) 7 also notes this difference in translation technique between this earlier text and Cicero’s *Timaeus*. 

255
These more general considerations, then, should be enough to prompt us to adopt the stance of Sedley and undertake a reconsideration of Cicero’s translation of the *Timaeus*, free from the traditional assumption that his main aim in this project is the faithful and unmediated communication of the sense of the Platonic original. Moreover, as we shall see when we examine the translated text more closely, there just seem to be too many changes, and philosophically *significant* changes at that, to continue to maintain the hypothesis that Cicero’s primary goal was the unmediated transmission of Platonic thought. As well as removing the key elements of the causal importance of necessity and the role of the receptacle from his version of the *Timaeus* by treating only the first half of Timaeus’ speech, Cicero also downplays the presence of the Platonic theory of the Forms, and distorts the consistent terminology associated with the Demiurge. These are not minor aspects of the Platonic original, but key features which were fundamental to the text’s reception in the later tradition, and it seems gratuitously unsympathetic to maintain the position of other recent scholars, such as Lévy, and dismiss any alterations they undergo in the Ciceronian version as attributable to the author’s inability to understand Plato’s work if they can be explained in another way. Indeed, once we start considering the possible motivations behind Cicero’s translational decisions we can

47 As will be discussed below p.31
48 e.g. Lévy (2003) 104: “Cicero… confuses Plato’s careful distinctions and associates nature with the noetic world, because it is almost impossible for him to admit that there is something beyond nature” and “Cicero made a mistake and connected τῶν νοητῶν ἀκί τε ὄντων [Plat. *Tim.* 37a] to ἄριστος instead of to τοῦ ἄριστον, which, given his perfect knowledge of Greek, can be interpreted as a sign of his difficulty to perceive this world of the intelligibles in its specificity.”
easily find a plausible explanation for those alterations in the sense of the Platonic original that have provoked the most scholarly derision and dismissal.

We must, then, begin to treat the Ciceronian text, not as a failed, literal translation, but as a creative adaptation, in the manner of the embedded prose translations we considered in the preceding chapter. This will, in turn, allow us to start thinking about why Cicero might have made these changes to his Platonic original, and what role this excerpt from the *Timaeus* was intended to play, both literarily and philosophically, in his projected dialogue. To do this we will consider firstly how Cicero’s transference of Timaeus’ speech to the mouth of the Roman intellectual and Pythagorean Nigidius Figulus might have affected his translational choices; then how the Stoic and Peripatetic treatment of the *Timaeus* might have impacted the Ciceronian version of Timaeus’ speech; after which we will turn to a consideration of the philosophical and political meanings Cicero generates through the use of his Platonic source text as the basis for this kind of creative adaptation.

**IV: Dramatic Setting: Nigidius and Pythagoreanism**

Assuming that we are right in assigning the translated section of Timaeus’ speech to the Ciceronian character, Nigidius Figulus, it should prove valuable to perform a mode
of analysis that does not yet seem to have been seriously attempted, and consider whether the identity of the speaker can explain some of the features of the Ciceronian translation.\textsuperscript{49} If such an analysis turns out to be explanatorily useful - and it is the contention of this dissertation that it does - this will in turn lend further support to the hypothesis that Nigidius was the intended speaker of this translation. We shall, then, firstly consider in brief what we know of Nigidius as a historical and literary figure, before outlining the various ways in which an appreciation of the Nigidian background may help in our understanding of Cicero’s translational choices.

Nigidius Figulus was a Roman grammarian, philosopher/astrologer, politician, and friend of Cicero. Of his political career, we know a few major incidents, primarily through Cicero’s own testimony. He supported Cicero in the Catilinarian conspiracy of 63BC, as we learn from Cicero’s \textit{Pro Sulla} and from Plutarch, who highlights the philosophical and political relationship between the two men.\textsuperscript{50} He was then made praetor

\textsuperscript{49} That the exposition of Pythagorean doctrine may have been the motivation for Cicero’s inclusion of a speech by Nigidius in this work is suggested by Gionini (1977) xvi, but he does not appear to have taken this idea any further. Fries (1900) 30 suggests that the choice of the term \textit{lares} to translate \textit{δαίμονες} at Cic. \textit{Tim.} 11 (= Plat. \textit{Tim.} 40d) may have something to do with Nigidius’ own Latin language work on this topic and Lambardi (1982) 85 accepts this as a possibility, but suggests that, instead, a Varronian influence might be seen here. Again, she gives no suggestion as to what the presence of either of these influences might mean for Cicero’s translation project.

\textsuperscript{50} Cic. \textit{Pro Sulla}. 42 includes Nigidius among those men \textit{summa virtute et fide} who Cicero appointed to help take down the statements of the informers during the Catilinarian conspiracy. Plutarch, Cicero, 20 describes Nigidius as τῶν ἄπο φιλοσοφίας ἐταίρων Πόλιος Νιγίδιος, ὃ τὰ πλείστα καὶ μέγιστα παρὰ τὰς πολιτικὰς έχρητο πράξεις. “Publius Nigidius, one of his philosophical companions, of whom he made the
in 58BC, in an election of which Cicero wrote: *praetores habemus amicissimos et acerrimos cives, Domitium Nigidium Memmius Lentulum*. The next probable attestation of his political movements is the claim in the prologue of Cicero’s *Timaeus* itself that he was active as a legate in Asia Minor in 51BC - if, as seems likely, Cicero is relying upon historical fact to make plausible his imagined meeting of his characters at Ephesus. We then hear, in a letter of Cicero to Atticus on 11 Feb 49BC, of Nigidius’ ill-fated manoeuvres in the service of Pompey in the civil war, as he brings the news to Capua of the weakness of the Pompeian position. Next, at the end of summer 46BC, we have a letter written by Cicero to the now-exiled Nigidius, in which Cicero promises that he will do all he can to ingratiate himself to Caesar and work for Nigidius’ recall to Rome. Finally, we have a notice in Jerome’s *Chronicle*, possibly taken from Suetonius, that Nigidius died in exile in 45BC.

most and greatest use in his political undertakings”. For an overview of the sources for Nigidius’ political career see Della Casa (1962) 9-37, and Swoboda (1964) 134-7.

51 “As praetors we have the dearest and fiercest men: Domitius, Nigidius, Memmius, and Lentulus” (Cic. *Ad Quint. Fr.* 1.2.16). Trans. my own.

52 Della Casa (1962) 28 also thinks that Cicero is appealing to historical record in placing Nigidius in Asia Minor at this time.

53 *ecce postridie Cassio litterae Capua a Lucretio, familiaris eius, Nigidium a Domitio Capuam venisse; eum dicere Vibullium cum paucis militibus e Piceno currere ad Gnaeum, confestim insequi Caesarem, Domitium non habere militum VI milia.”* Then next day comes a letter from Capua to Cassius from his friend Lucretius, stating that Nigidius has arrived at Capua from Domitius and that according to him Vibullius is scurrying to Gnaeus from Picenum with a handful of troops and with Caesar in close persuit. Domitius is said not to have 6,000 men.” (Cic. *Att.* 7.24), trans. Shackleton Bailey. Della Casa (1962) 28-31 goes to a great deal of effort in the speculative attempt to reconstruct the military strategies that led to Nigidius appearing at Capua in this way.

54 Cic. *Ad Fam.* 4.13. In this letter, too, Cicero restates the two men’s friendship and Nigidius’ learning: *nunc P. Nigidio, uni omnium doctissimo et sanctissimo et maxima quondam gratia et mihi certe amicissimo*
In addition to his political career, we know something about Nigidius’ literary and philosophical endeavours. He was known by Aulus Gellius as one of the exceptionally learned men of his age, second only to Varro.\textsuperscript{56} Those fragments and testimonia of his work which are still extant show a strong interest in grammar: he wrote at least 29 books of \textit{Commentarii Grammatici} which dealt with etymologies and common Latin linguistic usage, apparently covering roughly the same kind of content as Varro’s \textit{De Lingua Latina}.\textsuperscript{57} They also show an interest in the natural world, and forms of divination relying upon observation of the natural world, including augury, haruspicy, and astrology. As well as titles dealing with natural philosophy, such as \textit{De Vento}, \textit{De Hominum Naturalibus}, \textit{De Diis}, and \textit{De Animalibus}; we also find titles concerning divination such as \textit{De Augurio Privato}, and \textit{De Extis}; and two rather mysterious, but seemingly important, works on astrology known as the \textit{Sphaera Graecanica} and the \textit{Sphaera}

---

\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Nigidius Figulus Pythagoricus et magus in exilio moritur} (“Nigidius Figulus, Pythagorean and mage, died in exile”) (Hieron. Ad Eus. Chron. Ol. 183.4 = Suet. Fr. 85\* Reiff.), trans. my own. This notice, incidently, is the most important piece of evidence for our dating of Cicero’s \textit{Timaeus}. The perfect \textit{fuit} of Nigidius in the prologue, and its encomiastic nature, indicates that Nigidius was dead by the time of writing, so Jerome’s notice gives us a datable \textit{terminus post quem}.

\textsuperscript{56} E.g. \textit{Nigidius Figulus homo, ut ego arbitror, iuxta M. Varronem doctissimus}. “Nigidius Figulus, as I think, the most learned man, together with M. Varro” (Aul. Gell. 4.9.1), trans. my own. See also Aul. Gell. 4.16.1, 10.11.1, 13.10.4, 15.3.5, and 17.7.4.

\textsuperscript{57} The reference to the 29\textsuperscript{th} book is at Aul. Gell. 10.5.1. = Swoboda fr. 30.

260
Barbarica, the first of which is an major source for the scholia on Germanicus’ Aratea. His interest in, and high literary output concerning, divination – along with his strong Republican credentials – seem to have been the factors that inspired his cameo appearance in book 1 of Lucan’s Bellum Civile. In this poem it is his great learning and knowledge of natural philosophy that are again invoked (Figulus cui cura deos secretaque caeli / nosse fuit 1.639-40). Lucan has him firstly expound the belief that the movements of heavenly bodies can portend human disaster (aut hic errat, ait, ulla sine lege per aevum / mundus et incerto discurrunt sidera motu: / aut, si fata movent, orbi generique paratur / humano matura lues 1.642-5), before consequently prophesying the downfall of the Republic. In addition to his general reputation for erudition and interest in philosophy (including membership of Cicero’s own philosophical circle, for which see Plutarch, above, p.229 n 50), he seems to have been known, in the later tradition, for a more specific association with Pythagoreanism, leading Jerome to describe him as Pythagoricus et magus.

---

58 See Swodoba (1964) for the attestations of these titles and esp. p.110-27 for the use of Nigidius’ Sphaera Graecanica in the scholia to Germanicus, and Della Casa (1962) 21-2 for the complete list.
59 “Figulus, to whom it was a concern to know the gods and the secrets of the heavens”. Trans. my own.
60 “‘Either’, said he, ‘this cosmos wanders forever, with no law, and the stars run around in an uncertain motion, or, if fate moves them, imminent destruction is prepared for Rome and for mankind’”. Trans. my own.
61 A “Pythagorean and mage”, see ftnt 59.
The prologue of the Ciceronian *Timaeus*, then, picks up on many of the characteristics for which the historical Nigidius was known. It invokes his famous erudition (*fuit enim vir ille cum ceteris artibus, quae quidem dignae libero essent, ornatus omnibus...* Cic. *Tim*. 1); it acknowledges his particular interest in natural philosophy, and his perceived ability to divine truths from observation of the natural world which others cannot (*acer investigator et diligens earum rerum, quae a natura involutae videntur* ibid.); and it depicts him as a follower of Pythagoras (even attributing to him the resurgence of Pythagorean ideas in the Roman world)\(^{62}\). The work then proceeds, with the translation of Plato’s *Timaeus*, to discuss the fundamental issues of natural philosophy with which the historical Nigidius was himself concerned: the creation of the cosmos, and the role of the divine in the world. Cicero’s character, Nigidius Figulus, then, seems to reflect the interests and personality of the historical figure upon whom he is based.\(^{63}\) Moreover, as we shall see, Cicero’s attempt to produce a convincing

---

\(^{62}\) *denique sic iudico, post illos nobiles Pythagoreos, quorum disciplina extincta est quodam modo, cum aliquot saecula in Italia Siciliaque vigisset, hunc extitisse, qui illam renovaret.* (Cic. *Tim*. 1)

\(^{63}\) For Cicero’s desire to ensure that the characters in his dialogues appear to be credible representations of the historical figures they purport to be, see e.g. *Att*. 13.19, which deals with the changes he has made to the *Academica* in the production of its second edition, and his improvement of the work through the attribution to the pro-Antiochan position to Varro, a more plausible spokesman for these views: *haec Academica, ut scis, †cum† Catulo, Lucullo, Hortensio contuleram, sane in personas non cadebant; erant enim λογικότερα quam ut illi de iis somnisasse umquam viderentur. itaque ut legi tuas de Varrone, tamquam ἥρµαιον adripui. aptius esse nihil potuit ad id philosophiae genus, quo ille maxime mihi defectari videtur, eaeque partes ut non sim consecutus ut superior mea causa videatur.* “This *Academica*, as you know, I had given to Catulus, Lucullus, and Hortensius. It must be confessed that the subject matter did not fit the persons, who could not be supposed ever to have dreams of such abstrusities. So when I read your letter about Varro I seized upon it as a godsend. Nothing could have been netter suited to that brand of philosophy, in which he seems to me to take a particular pleasure; and his role is such that I have not succeeded in making my own case appear the stronger”. Trans. adapted from Shackleton Bailey.
representation of his recently deceased friend extends to his translational choices in his
treatment of Plato’s *Timaeus*, replicating features both of Nigidius’ own literary output,
and of the doctrines of Roman Pythagoreanism, to which Cicero claims Nigidius
ascribed.64 These references to Nigidius’ own literary works and philosophical beliefs not
only add to the success of Cicero’s characterisation, but also support the claim of the
prologue that Nigidius was uniquely knowledgeable on matters of natural philosophy,
and contribute to the status of this work as an act of commemoration of the recently-
deceased Republican thinker. This faithful reproduction of the character traits of the
historical Nigidius, peppered with allusions to Nigidius’ own literary output, may also
serve to invoke implicitly the other famous aspects of the character of the historical
Nigidius – namely, that he died in exile as a political enemy of Caesar, and was an ardent
supporter of the Republican cause. As we shall discuss in the final section of this chapter,
these characteristics, though not explicitly mentioned in the prologue of Cicero’s
*Timaeus*, may, nevertheless, be important for our understanding of the historical and
literary significance of this text.

Firstly, then, let us turn to an examination of the allusions made by Cicero to his
friend Nigidius’ literary output in his translation of the *Timaeus*.

---

64 The other facts for which the historical Nigidius was remembered in the later tradition – namely, that he
died in exile as a political enemy of Caesar, and was an ardent supporter of the Republican cause - are not
explicitly mentioned in the prologue of Cicero’s *Timaeus*. It may, however, still be relevant for our reading
of the text, as we shall see in the final section of this chapter.
a) Nigidian Echoes in Cicero’s Timaeus

It has been noted by earlier scholars that the choice of the term lares to translate the Greek, δαίμονες, at Cic. Tim. 38 (= Plat. Tim. 40d) reflects Nigidius’ own interest in the lares. Arnobius tells us that Nigidus dealt with these gods in diversis...scriptis, suggesting that the nature and identity of these deities was a subject that he treated repeatedly, in multiple works. Yet Cicero’s use of the term lares in his Timaeus seems to go beyond the simple nod towards his friend’s scholarly interests which has been identified by earlier scholars. His use of the Latin term in this context mimics a typically Nigidian usage, which is out of keeping with Cicero’s own usual linguistic practice. The full description of Nigidius’ treatment of these divinities, as given by Arnobius, is as follows:

Possumus, si videtur, summatim aliquid et de Laribus dicere, quos arbitratur vulgus vicorum atque itinerum deos esse ex eo quod Graecia vicos cognominat λαυρας. In diversis Nigidius scriptis modo tectorum domumque custodes, modo Curetas <aī> illos, qui occultasse perhiventur Iovis aeribus aliquando vagitum, modo Digitos Samothracios, quos quinque indicant Graeci Idaeos Dactylos nuncupari.

(Arn. Adv. Nat. 3.41)

65 See e.g. Fries (1900).
We can, if it is thought proper, speak briefly of the Lares also, whom the mass think to be the gods of streets and ways, because the Greeks name streets λαυρας. In different parts of his writings, Nigidius [speaks of them] now as the guardians of houses and dwellings; now as the Curetes, who are said to have once concealed, by the clashing of cymbals, the infantile cries of Jupiter; now the five Digiti Samothracii, who, the Greeks tell [us], were named Idaei Dactyi. 67

Nigidius, then, seems to have used the term lares to denote a large variety of minor deities with disanalogous cultic and mythic roles, in addition to those who guarded each individual household. This broad, Nigidian use of the term is exactly that which must be adopted if the Latin term is to successfully translate the Greek term, δαίμονες (which the Ciceronian formulation quos Graeci δαίμονας appellant, nostri opinor Lares tells us it must be intended to). 68 Indeed the Platonic context, as translated by Cicero, makes it clear that this broad, Nigidian sense must be the sense in which it is meant in his Timaeus. The text tells us it is all those remaining gods (reliqui) who are not responsible for the movements of the astronomical bodies which are to be grouped under the Latin term, lares. 69 This is particularly interesting as, in the Greek original, the syntax leaves open the possibility that the term δαίμονες may be applicable to both the astronomical and the secondary deities (περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων δαίμονων 40d). In Cicero’s Latin translation,

67 Trans. adapted from Bryce and Campbell (1871).
68 “What the Greeks call the δαίμονες I think are our Lares”, Cic. Tim. 38. Trans. my own.
69 One difference, then, between the sense of lares in the Nigidian works and in Cicero’s Timaeus seems to be the extension of the genus of these minor deities. For Nigidius, the Olympian gods seem not to have been included under this category but in the Timaeus, as the Olympian gods are subordinate deities secondary to the pure and spherical astronomical deities, they too can be grouped under the term, lares.
however, the use of the term *lares* is firmly limited to the secondary deities, in a manner that reflects Nigidius’ own classification (*reliquorum autem, quos Graeci δαιμονας appellant, nostri opinor Lares*, Cic. Tim. 38).

This Nigidian use of the term *lares* to denote a broad category of minor deities, is in stark contrast to the typical Ciceronian usage. Elsewhere in the Ciceronian corpus, we find the use of this term restricted solely to the denotation of the household gods. In the rhetorical works, the term *lares* is often accompanied by the adjective *familiaris* (e.g. *In Verrem* 2.3.27 *relinquent arationes, relinquent Larem familiarem suum*?), either picking out directly the protective deities of a particular household, or using the reference to these deities, with their strong associations with the domestic context, as metonymy for home or household. In *De Domo Sua*, for example, Cicero’s loss of his house is (melodramatically described as his political enemies expelling *familiaris meos lares*.

This use of the term *lares* to pick out specifically these household gods continues even when the adjective *familiaris* is lacking. *Ad Fam* 1.9.20 talks of Crassus leaving Rome almost directly from Cicero’s house as his setting out *paene a meis laribus*, while *Ad Att*

---

70 *De Domo Sua* 108: *ista tua pulchra Libertas deos penatis et familiaris meos lares expulit, ut se ipsa tamquam in captivis sedibus conlocaret?* Other places in which this usage occurs are Phil. 2.75: *repetebant praeterea deos patrisios, aras, focos, larem suum familiarem, in quae tu invaseras*; Phil. 14.10: *quis domum, quis tecta, quis larem familiarem?*; Pro Quin. 85.9; Pro Sest. 30.4. This is also the case in the philosophical works, predating the probable production of the *Timaeus, Leg.* 2.42.2 and Rep. 5.7.3
16.4.2 speaks of Sextus’ return home as a return ad larem suum. The specifically domestic character of the lares is also maintained in Cicero’s earlier philosophical works. In the formulation of religious law in the De Legibus, the lares are physically located in the home (2.42), to be honoured in the mourning of a deceased family member (2.55), and, even when found in the countryside (as at 2.19 and 2.27), are located within sight of the domestic locality of a farm or villa (posita in fundi uillaeque conspectu).

The use of the term lares in this decidedly atypical manner in the Timaeus seems, then, best explained as Cicero’s intentional appropriation of Nigidian vocabulary in order to add vividness to his characterization of the speaker. This may explain the restricting opinor which follows the suggestion made by the speaker of Cic. Tim. 38 that δαίµονες be translated by lares. The first person singular here really does point to the opinion of the character of Nigidius Figulus himself, giving the preferred terminological usage of the historical figure, rather than functioning as a veiled expression of the vocabulary

71 Crassusque, ut quasi testate populo Romano esset nostra gratia, paene a meis laribus in provinciam est profectus... (Ad Fam 1.9.20); ad ipsum autem Libonem scripsit nihil esse nisi ad larem suum liceret (Att. 16.4.2)
72 De Leg 2.42: <c>um perditorum ciuitum scelere diessus meo religionum iura polluta sunt, uexati nostri Lares familiares, in eorum sedibus exaedificatum templum Licentiae; 2.55: neque necesse est edisseri a nobis, quae finis funestae familiae, quod genus sacrificii Lari uerucibus fiat; 2.19: Lucos in agris habento et Larum sedes; 2.27: neque ea quae a maioribus prodita est cum dominis tum famulis, posita in fundi uillaeque conspectu, religio Larum repudianda est.
choice favoured by the Ciceronian author in the way familiar from earlier dialogues such as the *Academica*.\(^{73}\)

A second apparently strange Ciceronian translation choice, which can be better understood by accepting the hypothesis that Nigidius Figulus is its intended speaker, is the translation of *σφαιροειδής* as *globosus* at Cic. *Tim*. 17 (= Plat. *Tim*. 33b) in describing the shape of the cosmos created by the Demiurge. This translation is particularly unexpected because *sphaera* was a perfectly intelligible Latin word, which Cicero considered appropriate for the communication of Greek philosophical ideas in Latin literary discourse, as we can see from the account of Chrysippus’ views on fate in the *De Fato*.\(^{74}\) Sedley has argued that the reason behind the translation of *σφαιροειδής* as *globosus* here is Cicero’s concern in this work to develop a Latin mathematical vocabulary – an area in which Sedley believes Cicero felt his mother tongue to be lacking.\(^{75}\) It is, indeed, doubtless the case that the pointed replacement of the common Greek transliteration, *sphaera*, by the more Latinate term, *globus*, in the formation of this

---

\(^{73}\) For example, the character, Atticus’, approval of the character, Varro’s, translation of the Greek *ποιότητας* as *qualitates* at *Acad*. 1.25 indicates the implicit support of the author for this translational choices, as can be seen by Cicero’s employment of this same translation in another context at *Nat. D*. 2.94 (*non qualitate aliqua (quam ποιότητα Graeci vocant)*).

\(^{74}\) Cic. *De Fat*. 15-6: *itemque geometres non ita dicet: “in sphaera maximorum orbes medii inter se dividuntur”, sed potius illo modo: “non et sunt in sphaera maximorum orbes, et iī non medii inter se dividuntur.”* As such, it is one of those admissible transliterated terms, such as *philosophia* itself, that Cicero points out in the *Fin*. 3.5, which, although originally Greek, have been made Latin (*nostra*, “our own”) by frequent use.

\(^{75}\) Sedley (2013) 191: “Here we can see Cicero seeking in his *Timaeus* translation to rectify the poverty of the Latin mathematical vocabulary, which he had made Varro lament at the beginning of the *Academic Books* (1.6).”
adjective plays some role in Cicero’s project of establishing a Latin philosophical vocabulary, and demonstrating the fitness of the Latin tongue for philosophical discourse without the need for dependence upon Greek borrowings. Yet, as we shall see, Sedley’s explanation of the peculiar emphasis given to the term *globosum* in Cicero’s *Timaeus* cannot be the whole story, and there is good reason to believe that Nigidius’ astrological interests and grammatical prescriptions might have influenced the Ciceronian translation at this point.

Cicero’s translation of *σφαιροειδής* as *globosus* is accompanied by an expansion of the original Platonic text. The Platonic text reads:

... *σφαιροειδής, ἐκ μέσου πάντη πρὸς τάς τελευτάς ἰσον ἀπέχον, κυκλοτερές αὐτὸ ἐπορεύσατο, πάντων τελεύτατων ὑμοιότατων τε αὐτῷ ἐαυτῷ σχῆματων, νομίσας μορίῳ κάλλιον ὁμοίον ἄνωμοιον.*

(Plat. *Tim.* 33b4-7)

... spherelike, having extremities equidistant from the centre in every direction, he [the Demiurge] turned this [the spherelike thing, i.e. the cosmos] in a circle, the most perfect and most similar to itself of all shapes; since he judged the similar to be

76 As the passage that Sedley points to at *Academica* 1.6 notes, for the presentation of the views of the Old Academy at least, a mathematical vocabulary seems to be important: *nōstra tu physica nosti; quae cumcontineantur ex effectione et ex materia ea quam fingit et format effectio, adhibenda etiam geometria est; quam quibusnam quisquam enuntiare verbis aut quem ad intellegendum poterit adducere?* Though it is important to note that in other contexts the field of mathematics is importantly differentiated from that of philosophy (e.g. *Tusc.* 5.18: *verum tamen mathematicorum iste mos est, non est philosophorum*). The particular importance of the *Timaeus* in the production of this Latin philosophical vocabulary will be further examined in the concluding chapter of this dissertation.
immeasurably finer than the different.\textsuperscript{77}

The Ciceronian text, however, contains an additional elaborative expansion, shown in bold:

\begin{quote}
... globosum... quod \textit{σφαιροειδὲς} Graeci vocant, cuius omnis extremitas paribus a medio radiis attingitur, idque ita tornavit, ut nihil efficere posset rotundius, \textit{nihil asperitatis ut haberet, nihil offensionis, nihil incisum angulis, nihil anfractibus, nihil eminens, nihil lacunosum}, omnesque partes simillimas omnium, quod eius iudicio praestabat dissimilitudini similitudo.
\end{quote}

(Cic. \textit{Tim.} 17)

… globular… which the Greeks call “spherelike” \textit{[σφαιροειδὲς]}, each extremity of which is arrived at by an equal length from the centre, and thus he \textit{[the Demiurge]} turned it, so that he was unable to produce anything rounder, \textit{so that it have no roughness, nothing to cause aversion, no sharp corners, nothing crooked, nothing protruding, no gaps}, and each part be the most similar \textit{[i.e. to each other]} of all shapes, because in his judgement similarity was superior to difference.\textsuperscript{78}

Sedley claims that Cicero’s expansion of the Platonic original, serves to fix the unfamiliar, technical reference of his newly adopted term, \textit{globosus}. In Sedley’s view, since the Latin term \textit{globus} (from which the adjective \textit{globosus} is derived) would in everyday language pick out something roughly globe-shaped but not necessarily regularly so, Cicero needed to include this explanatory gloss in order to show that the term is here

\textsuperscript{77} Translation my own.
\textsuperscript{78} Translation my own. My translation of \textit{nihil offensionis} differs here significantly from Sedley’s (2013) 190, who gives “no resistance”. Given that the passage goes on to claim that it is because of these features that the Demiurge judged this to be the superior shape, there seems no problem with letting the standard Ciceronian meaning of “offense” or “aversion” stand. Incidentally, the Ciceronian “correction” of the Platonic text here so that the world is made round (\textit{rotundius}), a feature properly held by a solid, rather than circular (\textit{κυκλοτερὲς}), a property of a plane figure, is also interesting.
being employed in a new, more narrow, geometrical usage to denote a perfect sphere.\textsuperscript{79}

There are, however, two problems with this interpretation. In the first place, the “expansion” identified by Sedley does not, in fact, serve to tie the reference of the Latin term \textit{globosum} to the denotation of a perfect geometrical sphere. Rather, the emphatic specification of this term as referring to a perfect, geometrical shape (as opposed to the everyday use of the term to refer to something roughly spherical) is already present in the Platonic original (\textit{ἐκ μέσου πάντη πρός τὰς τελευτάς ἴσον ἀπέχον}) and is merely repeated in the translation.\textsuperscript{80} The Latin expansion itself, as can be seen when the passage is laid out in full as it is above, serves instead to support the \textit{subsequent} claim of the Platonic text - namely, that the cosmos was fashioned as a sphere because is the \textit{most} regular of shapes, and so was especially favoured by the Demiurge.\textsuperscript{81} In the second place, from Cicero’s other uses of the term \textit{globum} to translate \textit{σφαῖρα}, it is clear that the geometrical usage of the Greek term (which had by now, of course, become part of the Latin language in its transliterated form) to denote a perfect geometrical sphere is so common that no specification is required to fix the meaning of the Latin except to say it is synonymous with the Greek (just as, for instance, no further explanation would be needed of the

\textsuperscript{79} Sedley (2013) 191: “Hence [Cicero’s] speaker’s expansion of the Platonic text, to emphasise that he is recruiting \textit{globus} to mean a perfect geometrical sphere.”

\textsuperscript{80} Plat. \textit{Tim.} 33b4: “having extremities equidistant from the centre in every direction”.

\textsuperscript{81} The “\textit{ut haberet}” in the Ciceronian expansion indicates the result of the cosmos being a perfect sphere, namely that “it have no roughness, nothing to cause aversion, no sharp corners, nothing crooked, nothing protruding, no gaps”, attributes which neatly support the following claim (which directly translates the Platonic text) \textit{omnesque partes simillimas omnium, quod eius iudicio praestabat dissimilitudini similitudo} (“and each part the most similar [i.e. to each other] of all shapes, because in his judgement similarity was superior to difference”).
meaning of a new, more Anglicised term for the commonly-used, though originally Italian word, *pasta*, except to say that it is an English translation of *pasta*). At *DND* 2.47, as in the *De Fato*, the term *sphaera* is introduced in its technical, geometrical sense, with no need for further specification, and the meaning of its Latinised rendering, *globus*, is presented as being apparent simply from its identification with the Greek, with no more need for additional comment than that of *circulus*, whose technical, geometrical meaning is similarly fixed by its identification with the Greek, *κύκλος*. Importantly, this passage goes on to repeat the expansion added to Cicero’s translation of Plato’s *Timaeus* at Cic. *Tim*. 17, again using these features of the sphere as support for the claim that the sphere is the most regular, and so the most beautiful, of shapes, rather than to specify the geometrical shape to which the term *σφαῖρα/sphaera* refers. The fixing of the technical, geometrical reference of the term *globosus* cannot, then, fully explain Cicero’s decision to expand his Platonic original’s description of the perfect, spherical shape of the cosmos.

Instead, as we shall see, there seems to be good reason for thinking that further allusions to Nigidius’ own work may lie behind this elaborative expansion on the perfection and beauty of the sphere. The single work of Nigidius that seems to have had

---

82 *Cic. Nat. D.* 2.47 *conum tibi ais et cylindrum et pyramidem pulchriorem quam sphaeram videri. Novum etiam oculorum iudicium habetis... cumque duae formae praestantissimae sint, ex solidis globus (sic enim σφαῖρα interpretari placet), ex planis autem circulus aut orbis, qui κύκλος Graece dicitur.*

83 *Ibid.*... *quid enim pulchrior ea figura quae sola omnis alias figuram长城 continet, quaeque nihil asperitatis habere nihil offensionis potest, nihil incisum angulis nihil anfractibus, nihil eminens nihil lacunosum...* The words which repeat those of Cicero’s *Timaeus* are here underlined.
the most enduring Nachleben, and to have been popular enough in the generation immediately succeeding him to have a strong influence upon Germanicus’ Aratea is the (puzzlingly named) Sphaera Graecanica. By having Nigidius quote the word, σφαιροειδής, as it appears in the Platonic original, Cicero is able to allude to the title of Nigidius’ most famous work, which itself made use of the Greek transliteration sphaerae, invoking his mastery of the movements of astronomical bodies within the very cosmic sphere whose creation he is now describing. By having him translate the Greek term, meanwhile, Cicero dramatically replays Nigidius’ own translation of these elements of Greek astrological knowledge for the Latin-speaking world. The elaborative addition found in the Latin, meanwhile, further adds to Cicero’s characterisation of Nigidius. Here we see the speaker waxing lyrical about the perfection and beauty of the sphere, breaking out of his Platonic model and letting his own enthusiasm for the subject matter take over, in a manner that reflects the interests of the historical Nigidius, who wrote a number of works on this subject. The expansion of the idea of the natural perfection of the sphere also lends further support to the original Platonic position that the cosmos is indeed spherical (a position for which the De Natura Deorum passage in which this expansion is repeated also argues). The claim that the heavens are spherical, which the Timaeus here develops, seems to have been fundamental to Nigidian thought – his astrological

84 For the attestation of this work, see Swodoba (1889) 106-28.
predictions seem to have been based on theories about the movements of astronomical bodies within the cosmic sphere.\textsuperscript{85}

Nigidius’ grammatical ideas, meanwhile, can help to explain the unusual form of the adjective \textit{globosus} itself. The adjectival ending –\textit{osus} is, in and of itself, unusual in polished, Ciceronian prose, being usually reserved for poetic or colloquial contexts.\textsuperscript{86} It also (perhaps intentionally, as we will consider below) does not do a particularly good job of translating the meaning of the –\textit{ειδης} suffix of the Greek. Furthermore, Cicero elsewhere in the work uses different linguistic resources to translate this Greek suffix, employing either the Latin suffix \textit{-eus} or the abstract noun in \textit{-itas}.\textsuperscript{87} The reason for this unusual word choice can perhaps be found in a passage from the 11\textsuperscript{th} book of Nigidius Figulus’ \textit{Commentarii Grammatici}, which comes down to us through Gellius, who tells

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item As we can see clearly from the Lucanic passage quoted above at p. 16-7.
\item See e.g. Knox (1986) for the status of adjectives in –\textit{osus} as either poetic or colloquial lexical items. The term \textit{globosus} itself has already been used once before by Cicero, in the \textit{Somnium Scipionis} at Rep. 6.15. This passage is, however, self-consciously poetic, as it is introduced at Rep. 6.10 as part of a dream \textit{tale quale de Homero scribit Ennius}, and does not stand on its own, but along with its synonym \textit{rotundus}. In the \textit{Tusculan Disputations}, a more recent philosophical work, Cicero clearly prefers \textit{rotundus}/\textit{rutundus} to \textit{globosus}. Again, after the \textit{Timaeus}, in the \textit{Nat. D.} however, we find both \textit{globosus} and \textit{rotundus} being used, the usage of the former in this polished prose perhaps being authorised by its innovative use here in the earlier work.
\item \textit{σωματοειδης} Pl. \textit{Tim.} 31b/36d = \textit{corporeum} Cic. \textit{Tim.} 13/26 and \textit{στερεοειδη} Pl. Tim. 32b = \textit{soliditas} Cic. \textit{Tim.} 15
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
us that Nigidius took the -osus adjectival suffix to be indicative of the unlimited (immodice) possession of a particular characteristic: 88

‘Hoc’ inquit ‘inclinamentum semper huiuscemodi uerborum, ut “uinosus”, “mulierosus”, “religiosus”, significat copiam quandam inmodicam rei...’

(Nigidius Figulus, Swodoba fr. 4)

“This suffix [i.e. -osus],” [Nigidius] says, “always of this kind of word, just like “excessively fond of wine” [vinosus], “excessively womanly” [mulierosus], and “excessively religious” [religiosus], signifies a certain unbounded abundance of a quality.” 89

As we have noted, Cicero is here using the adjective globosus to translate a part of Plato’s Timaeus in which a perfect sphere is clearly meant. As a perfect, geometrical sphere is one which, by its very nature, possesses the quality of sphericity to an unlimited extent, the -osus suffix is here applied, in accordance with Nigidian specifications. The use of globosus in this Nigidian manner to denote a perfect sphere, is peculiar to the translation of the Timaeus, and is not maintained by Cicero in later texts which are not placed in the mouth of Nigidius. In the De Natura Deorum, the Earth, with all of its

88 Swodoba fr. 4 = Gellius NA 4.9.1-2: Nigidius Figulus, homo, ut ego arbitror, iuxta M. Varronem doctissimus, in undecimo commentariorum grammaticorum uersum ex antiquo carmine refert memoria hercle dignum:

   religentem esse oportet, religiosus ne faus,

89 Translation my own.
irregular ridges and valleys is nevertheless described as *solida et globosa*.\textsuperscript{90} The adherence to the Nigidian usage of the suffix in this work may, then, be another touch of Nigidian colouring in the translation to aid the characterization of its speaker. It is also particularly telling that in the *Timaeus* translation it is only in this particular situation, where the *unlimited possession* of a given characteristic is meant, that the -*osus* suffix is used to translate a Greek adjective ending in -ειδης. At Cic. *Tim.* 13 and 26, the Greek –ειδης suffix is translated using the Latin –*eus* where the bodily nature of the cosmos is referred to (importantly here, it is not wholly or unlimitedly bodily, as the world soul permeates it fully).\textsuperscript{91} At Cic. *Tim.* 15 meanwhile, the abstract noun *soliditas* is used for the Greek, στερεοειδη, where the property of 3-dimensionality held by both solid and liquid substances, rather than perfect hardness, is meant. Throughout the text, then, the Nigidian use of the -*osus* suffix is maintained, even when it requires deviation from the language of the Platonic original.

From this examination of the language adopted in the translation, it should be clear that Cicero uses Nigidian vocabulary, even when this departs from his own typical

\textsuperscript{90} Cic. *Nat. D.* 2.98
\textsuperscript{91} Ψυχὴν δ' ἐν σώματι σωματάς τὸ πάν συνεκτείνετο. “He [the Demiurge] contrived soul in body, combining everything” (Pl. *Tim.* 30b5). *Corporosus*, although not attested in Classical Latin, is used by the 5th century CE writer Caelius Aurelianus to mean “grossly corpulent”. Given the above discussion, however, there seems no reason that Cicero could not himself have adopted this neologism if he had desired to maintain a consistent translation for the –ειδης suffix, particularly given the apparent rarity of *corporeus* before Cicero himself – its first attestation being in Lucretius.
usage. That this is clear even from the few fragments we have left of Nigidius is striking – who knows how many other allusions, to which we no longer have access, are hidden within the text? Yet this adherence to Nigidian word choice has an effect that reaches beyond linguistic style alone: it also gives the thought communicated by this text a Nigidian spin. By employing the Nigidian usage of the term, lares, for example, Cicero invokes a peculiarly Nigidian metaphysical taxonomy in which the minor gods are not divided strictly into their different powers, but are grouped together as one under a single genus. The sense conveyed by this translation, then, constitutes a Nigidian interpretation of the Platonic original, rather than a purely Ciceronian one. The Nigidian tint of this translation can help to explain a number of other features of the Ciceronian translation which may seem to be puzzling – we will look at one more important instance of how an awareness of Cicero’s allusive appeals to Nigidius’ own thought can help us to understand the philosophical content of his Timaeus, before moving on to consider the importance of Cicero’s characterisation of Nigidius as a spokesman for Roman Pythagoreanism for our understanding of the philosophical position conveyed by this text.

One feature of the Ciceronian translation which previous scholars have tended to find particularly insupportable is Cicero’s tendency to use different Latin words (and,
indeed, words with different semantic nuances) to translate the same, repeated Greek term.\textsuperscript{92} Lambardi, as noted above, excuses this variation through an appeal to purely rhetorical and stylistic features: Cicero’s translation makes a more pleasing Latinate prose work precisely because it employs a more expansive vocabulary than the Greek.\textsuperscript{93} But it may be the case that this variation is not only stylistic, but reflects an interpretive reading of the Platonic text whose colouring can, again, be explained by the character of its speaker. Cicero’s various translations of the Greek term \textit{ἀέι} and its cognates in this text, for example, can perhaps be explained by Nigidius’ own, etymologically-driven, distinction between Latin terms that pick out necessarily eternal beings or states, and those that denote contingently eternal beings or states.

Nigidius’ distinction is as follows:

\begin{quote}
\textit{sempiternum inmortalium rerum, perpetuum mortalium est; perpetuitas enim in nostra natura est, quae perpeti accidentia potest, sempiternitas infinita est, eo quod semper.}\textsuperscript{94}
\end{quote}

“\textit{sempiternum}” is of immortal things, “\textit{perpetuum}” is of mortal things. For “\textit{perpetuitas}” is in our nature, which is able to suffer (\textit{perpeti}) accidents;

\textsuperscript{92} This is the “\textit{vague}” of Latin philosophical discourse which Poncelet identifies throughout the Ciceronian corpus (\textit{que Cicéron confirme à chaque pas le caractère provisoire de l’expression choisie, que le choix soit lié au moment où l’on parle, que, par définition, le choix ne puisse être réglé par une principe général, mais par l’intérêt exclusif d’un passage unique (et cet intérêt varie dans chaque texte), n’est-ce pas une évidence?}) and condemns absolutely (Poncelet (1957) 357).

\textsuperscript{93} See Lambardi (1982) on variation sermonis for a fuller exploration of this.

\textsuperscript{94} Swodoba fr. 1 = Suetonii Prat.: \textit{verborum differentiae} p.289, 1
“sempiternitas” is infinite, in that which is always.\textsuperscript{95}

For Nigidius, then, it seems that a subject can exhibit \textit{perpetuitas} if it is the kind of thing which happens always to be, but which \textit{could} be otherwise – i.e. if it has the kind accidental or contingent eternity exemplified by those beings who are essentially mortal, and so subject to death (whose nature is to be “able to suffer accidents”), but which nevertheless happen to endure (\textit{perpeti}) for all time. In contrast, however, it seems that something can only exhibit \textit{sempiternitas} if it is not subject to the possibility of this kind destruction, but rather is necessarily immortal (\textit{sempiternum immortalium rerum... est}).

Consequently, it is interesting that, in Cicero’s \textit{Timaeus} as we have it, the only times that the terms \textit{sempiternitas}, \textit{perpetuitas}, or their cognates appear is consistent with this Nigidian distinction. In the instances in which the adjective, \textit{sempiternus}, is used, it is applied to the world soul and the eternal, intelligible paradigm which the world soul has as its model.\textsuperscript{96} The paradigm, being outside of the cosmos and everlasting is, of course, completely insusceptible to any kind of dissolution or decay and so necessarily, rather than contingently, eternal. Precisely what kind of necessity the world soul has is a subject

\textsuperscript{95} Translation my own.
\textsuperscript{96} Cic. Tim. 28 = Plat. Tim. 37a: \textit{[the world soul] est autem unus ex omnibus rationis conceptionisque, quae \\\! ἁρµονία Graece, \textit{sempiternarum rerum} et sub intellectuam cadentium compos et particeps; Cic. Tim. 26 = Plat. Tim. 36D: sic animus a medio profectus extremitatem caeli a suprema regione rotundo ambitu circumiecit sesseque ipse versans divinum \textit{sempiternae} sapientisque vitae induxit exordium.}
of ancient and modern debate but it is certainly impossible for the movements of the world soul to cease while the cosmos continues to exist (as they themselves constitute the existence of the cosmos), and it is, in an indirect sense, the rotations of the cosmos which produce time itself. The world soul, then, may not have the same sort of necessary eternity as the eternal model, but it certainly is not susceptible to the kind of change or decay (where it could be altered or destroyed, and the cosmos still exist and continue in time after this alteration or destruction) that the other divine elements of the cosmos are.

It is to these other divine elements exclusively that the feature of perpetuitas is attributed. As we learn at Cic. Tim. 40, the gods are eternal contingently, through the dispensation of the demiurge, rather than through necessity and so will survive ad perpetuitatem. At 36, meanwhile, having learned that the heavenly bodies have the possibility to be either fixed or in motion, we are told that those that are fixed remain in place perpetuo – a choice of terminology which fits perfectly with Nigidius’ formulation, as we have just learned that

97 See below on the question of whether the cosmos could have had any beginning or necessarily always existed.
98 Pl. Tim. 38b-c: Χρόνος δ’ οὖν μετ’ οὕρανον γέγονεν, ίνα ἁμα γεννηθέντως ἁμα καὶ λιθδεσιν, ἵν ποτε λόσες τις αὑτῶν γίγνηται, καὶ κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα τῆς διανοιας φόσσως, ἵν’ ὁς ὅμοιότατος αὑτῷ κατὰ δόναμιν ἦ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὅ παράδειγμα πάντα αἰώνα ἐστιν ὄν, ὅ δ’ αὖ διὰ τέλους τὸν ἀπαντα χρόνον γεγονός τι καὶ ὅν καὶ ἐσόμενος. "In any case, time was created along with the universe, and since they were created together, they will also perish together, if they ever do perish. And the creation of the universe conformed to the model of eternity, so as to be as similar as possible. For the model exists for all eternity, while the universe was and is and alwayy will be for all time” (Trans. Waterfield (2008)). Unfortunately, we have lost Cicero’s translation of the section of the text concerning the production of time, which would doubtless have served to further elucidate his use of this terminology.
99 Sed quoniam estis orti, immortales vos quidem esse et indissolubiles non potestis, nequitiam tamen dissolvemini, neque vos ulla mortis fata periment nec fraud versilior quam consilium meum, quod maius est vinculum ad perpetuitatem vestram quam illa, quibus estis tum, cum gigneamini, conligati.
it is also possible for these same kinds of bodies to undergo locomotion. Indeed, Cicero, if not Plato, makes it clear that the world soul is the *only* thing (*unus*) in the *mundum* (created cosmos) which shares in the necessary eternity of *sempiternitas* characteristic of the intelligible realm and the creator god (or Demiurge).

This distinction between *sempiternitas* and *perpetuitas* is also interesting for Cicero’s translation of the Greek word apauston at Cic. *Tim.* 26 = Pl. *Tim.* 36e. While Plato describes the life of the world soul as ἄπαυστος, which could mean either “unable to be stopped” (i.e. necessarily unstopping), or “unstopped” (i.e. contingently unstopped), Cicero describes it as *sempiterna*. In doing this he uses the Nigidian distinction between *sempiternus* and *perpetuus* to interpret the Platonic original, disambiguating the bivalent adjective, ἄπαυστος, and showing by means of his Latin translation that the claim here is consistent with his other descriptions of the world soul as *necessarily* eternal (*sempiternus*). The apparent inconsistency of Cicero’s translation – using both *sempiternus* and *perpetuus* to translate ἄει, and *sempiternus* to translate ἄπαυστος as well as ἄει - can, then, be read as an interpretative clarification of the equivocations found in the original Greek text, yet one which also serves in his characterisation of his speaker by employing typically Nigidian linguistic distinctions.

---

100 quo genere ea sunt sidera, quae infixa caelo non moventur loco, quae sunt animantia, eaque divina, ob eamque causam suis sedibus inhaerent et perpetuo (here translating ἄει) manent.
101 Cic. *Tim.* 28 = Plat. *Tim.* 37a: [*the world soul*] est autem *unus* ex omnibus rationis conceptionisque, quae ἀρμοσία Graece, *sempiternarum* rerum et sub intellgentiam cadentium composit et particeps
In this case, then, Cicero seems to employ different Latin terms to translate the Greek ἀεί precisely because they have different nuances, and, consequently, they can elucidate ambiguities in the Platonic original. Again, however, this clarifying interpretation seems to rely upon the linguistic ideas of the account’s speaker, Nigidius Figulus. What we see in the Timaeus is notably different from Cicero’s usual use of these terms, where this distinction is not present. For example, De Amicitia 35 has odia sempiterna to describe a hatred which happens to be everlasting, although the context makes clear that hatred is not necessarily everlasting (and, indeed, should not be perpetually maintained). 102 At De Natura Deorum 1.40, meanwhile, law is described as both perpetua and aeterna (a term which in the Timaeus is interchangeable with sempiterna), with no distinction being made between the mutually exclusive categories of contingent and necessary eternity. 103 When Cicero crafts the speeches of other characters in these dialogues, then, the Nigidian distinction is not employed.

So, then, as we have seen, Cicero’s translation of the Timaeus adopts a number of Nigidian linguistic uses which are not typically found in Ciceronian prose. This supports our hypothesis that Nigidius was intended to be the speaker of this translation, as the

---

102 Eorum querela inveterata non modo familiaritates exstingui solere, sed odia etiam gigni sempiterna. “By their ceaseless recriminations not only are social intimacies usually destroyed, but also everlasting enmities are produced.” (Trans. Falconer).

prologue itself suggests, and that Cicero was at pains to aid the characterization of his speaker by producing a translation with Nigidian colouring, through allusion to the work and thought of his recently-deceased friend. Interestingly, the use of Nigidian language and concepts affects the philosophical thought conveyed in the Ciceronian text, allowing Cicero to disambiguate important aspects of the Platonic original. The translation, then, acts as an interpretive adaptation of the original text. As we shall see, however, it is not only the choice of particular vocabulary items which is influenced by Cicero’s choice of Nigidius as speaker of this translation. Nigidius is, pointedly, painted in the prologue not as a Platonist, but as a Pythagorean, and an attempt to adapt the original Platonic text so that it is in keeping with the doctrines of Roman Pythagoreanism can also be seen in Cicero’s translation.

b) Pythagoreanising Tendencies in Cicero’s Timaeus

So, then, it seems that Cicero’s decision to adhere to some of the linguistic precepts laid out in Nigidius Figulus’ learned writings can give us an insight into the philosophical interpretation he gave to the Platonic text. Yet, even where it is not clear that he is appealing to Nigidian linguistic uses in order to disambiguate the Greek source text, the characterization of the speaker as Nigidius may still be important for our understanding of why Cicero makes particular translation choices at philosophically
important points. As noted in our discussion of the prologue, Cicero characterizes Nigidius, the likely speaker of this translation, not just as an incredibly learned man, but as a Pythagorean. Indeed, the opening description of Nigidius culminates in the claim that he was the man responsible for the restoration of the age-old doctrines of Pythagoreanism to Italy and Sicily.\textsuperscript{104} It is this claim to expertise in Pythagoreanism in particular which makes Nigidius an appropriate interlocutor for the famous Peripatetic philosopher, Cratippus. It may also explain, in part, Cicero’s decision to translate this particular Greek philosophical text in this dialogic context. As we shall discuss in greater depth below, Plato’s \textit{Timeaus} seems to have been interpreted in the Hellenistic period as a record of Pythagorean thought, and the Sicilian speaker, Timaeus, taken to be a historical follower of Pythagorean teachings. In painting a Roman Pythagorean, Nigidius, as the speaker of Pythagoreanised doctrine in this text, then, Cicero is, in a sense, distorting the philosophical position of the Platonic original by providing it with a Pythagorean veneer. But he is also reading the original Platonic text according to a popular interpretative strategy. Hellenistic authors, such as the author of the \textit{Timaeus Locrus}, had already appropriated and adapted this Platonic text in the production of their own pseudo-

\textsuperscript{104} Cic. \textit{Tim.} 1: \textit{denique sic iudico, post illos nobiles Pythagoreos, quorum disciplina extincta est quodam modo, cum aliquot saecula in Italia Siciliaque vigisset, hunc extitisse, qui illam renovaret. “Indeed I think that, after those noble Pythagoreans, whose creed had somehow faded away although it had thrived in Italy and Sicily for so many centuries, that man had appeared to revive it.”

284
Pythagorean writings, which may have influenced Cicero’s own view of this text as a open to use for his own creative adaptation.  

Let us turn now, then, to a consideration of those aspects of Cicero’s translation whose interpretive position with regard to the Platonic original can be explained with reference to the doctrines of Pythagoreanism, and the Pythagorean character of the probable speaker.

As Sedley has already noted in his comprehensive and convincing treatment of the subject, “the world’s createdness is a point on which Cicero is visibly most eager to disambiguate Plato’s text”. As Sedley concisely recounts, the question of whether Plato’s Timaeus was intended to present the cosmos as literally created in time, or should be read non-literally in a way that reveals the metaphysical structures of the universe and their relative logical or causal priority, without committing itself to the position that the cosmos has a beginning in time, was hotly debated in antiquity. This anti-literalist reading was championed by the immediate successors of Plato in the Academy (Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Crantor), and seems to have been carried down into

105 For the Timaeus Locrus and other Hellenistic uses of the Timaeus in Pythagorean works, see Marg (1972), Thesleff (1961) and (1965), and Baltes (1972).
106 Sedley (2013) 196
107 Sedley (ibid.) gives a full survey of the ancient sources.
Cicero’s day by his near-contemporary, Eudorus. Cicero, meanwhile, shows in his other works that the literal interpretation, which goes back to Aristotle, was also current in the philosophical circles of late Republican Rome. As Sedley notes, Cicero’s translation of the *Timaeus* avoids the ambiguity of the Greek, requiring a literal reading of the world’s beginning in time, and establishing an interpretation of the Platonic text which matches Aristotle’s own. From the very beginning of the text, the ambiguous “some beginning” of the cosmos (ἄρχη τις in Greek) is cast as explicitly a beginning *in time* (*alia temporis principipatu*):

\[σκεπτέον δὲν περὶ αὐτοῦ πρώτον, ὅπερ ὑπόκειται περὶ παντὸς ἐν ἄρχῃ δεῖν σκοπεῖν, πόστερον ἣν δεί, γενέσεως ἄρχὴν ἔχων οὐδεμίαν, ἢ γέγονεν, ἀπ' ἄρχῆς τίνος ἄρξαινος, γέγονεν·\]

(Plat. *Tim.* 28b4-5)

\[de quo id primum consideremus, quod principio est in omni quaestione considerandum, semperne fuerit nullo generatus ortu, an ortus sit ab aliquo temporis principipatu.\]

(Cic. *Tim.* 5)

---

108 Plut. *An. Procr.* 1013b. Though for the dating and doctrinal affiliation of Eudorus see Bonazzi (2013) who thinks that Eudorus may actually himself have been a Pythagoreanising Platonist from the generation after Cicero.

109 E.g. Cic. *Acad.* 2.119: has Aristotle arguing, against Plato and the Pythagoreans, that “the world never had a beginning” (*neque enim ortum esse umquam mundum*).

110 And, as Sedley (2013) 197 notes this idea of temporal creation is maintained throughout the text as Cicero continues to use the verb *oriri* at its cognates which (as here) suggest temporal birth to translate the more general Greek verb *γίγνεσθαι*. 
As Sedley points out, by disambiguating the text in this way, and firmly adopting the Aristotelian interpretation of the *Timaeus*, Cicero allows his Peripatetic speaker, Cratippus, to echo the Aristotelian objections to this position. But Sedley is, perhaps, too narrow in his explanatory picture, in considering the only factors which contributed to Cicero’s decision to disambiguate the text in this way to be debates internal to the Academy. While Sedley accepts that the Platonic *Timaeus* is here framed by Cicero as a Pythagorean text, he locates Cicero’s interpretative move as an attempt to reject the positions of Xenocrates, Speusippus, and their followers, in order to enable fruitful dialogue with the Peripatetic position, rather than as being in any way influenced by the Pythagorean character of the speaker. Importantly, however, by interpreting this ambiguous text as implying the literal creation of the world, in time, Cicero is also aligning the Platonic text with the Pythagorean position on this issue.

In an important passage in *Met. N*, Aristotle talks about the “natural philosophy” of the Pythagoreans, and presents them as holding that the One has a beginning in time, and so that the cosmos dependent upon the principle of the One must also have a beginning in time:

111 Sedley (2013) 201: the translation is “cited as Pythagorean in content”, but the interpretive position taken by Cicero is put down as “a blocking move against those, from Speusippus to Eudorus, who sought to reinterpret the *Timaeus* as excluding an actual temporal act of creation” (p.196).
It is strange also to attribute generation to things that are eternal, or rather this is one of the things that are impossible. There need be no doubt whether the Pythagoreans attribute generation to them or not; for they say plainly that when the one had been constructed, whether out of planes or of surface or of seed or of elements which they cannot express, immediately the nearest part of the unlimited began to be constrained and limited by the limit. But since they are constructing a cosmos and wish to speak the language of natural science, it is fair to make some examination of their physical theorics, but to let them off from the present inquiry; for we are investigating the principles at work in unchangeable things, so that it is numbers of this kind whose genesis we must study.\footnote{Trans. adapted from Ross (1929).}

In Aristotle’s view then, the derivation of number was, for the Pythagoreans, a temporal process, and, as their cosmos was in turn generated from number, their cosmos too had a beginning in time.\footnote{For this view see also Annas (1979) 211 on this passage.} This same characterization of the Pythagorean cosmos as originating from number (presumably temporally, as it is later contrasted with Aristotle’s own view of an ungenerated cosmos) is also clearly known to Cicero, and is found in his
Academica, the work whose treatment of Physics is explicitly referred to in the prologue as a comparandum for the Timaeus. So, then, in describing the generation of the cosmos at the opening of the Timaeus as a literal beginning in time, rather than a metaphorical description of ontological priority, Cicero’s translation not only fits in with the Peripatetic objection to Plato, but also with Pythagorean doctrine. In addition to adopting an interpretation of his Platonic source text which will and allow his Peripatetic second speaker to engage in dialectic counterargument, Cicero is also producing a Pythagoreanised version of this text, inkeeping with the Pythagorean character of the probable speaker.

Sedley, with his focus on the Academic debates surrounding this text, also passes over the other Pythagoreanising aspects of the Ciceronian translation, which would have been out of keeping with the dogmatic Middle Platonist position. While the presentation of the speech of the Timaeus is, as we shall see, out of keeping with important elements of dogmatic Platonism, avoiding the technical terminology for the Platonic Demiurge, obscuring the Theory of Ideas, and giving a reading of the movement of the earth which directly contradicts the position of other Platonic texts, it is consistent

114 Cic. Acad. 2.118: Pythagorei e numeris et mathematicorum initiis proficisci volunt omnia. “The Pythagoreans want everything to originate from numbers and the principles of the mathematicians” (Trans. my own). The reference to Aristotle’s own view of the ungenerated cosmos (neque enim ortum esse unquam mundum) is at 2.119.

115 For this, see Dillon (1977).
with what we know of Pythagorean cosmology, and, in particular, with Cicero’s own presentation of their beliefs in the *De Natura Deorum* 1.\(^{116}\)

As we have already noted earlier in this chapter, in our discussion of the artistic and adaptive nature of the Ciceronian translation, Cicero’s translation of the *Timaeus* is interesting (and, to some, objectionable) in that it uses multiple Latin terms for the single, Platonic term, \(\delta\eta\mu\omega\nu\rho\gamma\omicron\varsigma\). There are, in fact, 6 different terms used at various points by Cicero to translate this single, Platonic term.\(^{117}\) A possible explanation for this may be found in the Pythagoreanising nature of Cicero’s translation. The figure of the Demiurge was considered by the Middle Platonists to be an important element of the Platonic doctrine that could be found in the *Timaeus*, as Cicero himself would have been aware.\(^{118}\) Indeed, in the two parts of his *philosophica* where he gives a brief characterisation of the aspects of Platonic thought present in the *Timaeus*, the figure of the Demiurge is given an important position.\(^{119}\) A world-building god of this kind does not, however, seem to be a part of the Pythagorean cosmogony. In fact, as we can see from the passage of *Met. M*

\(^{116}\) As noted above, ch. 3 p.199ff, although the account given in Velleius’ speech may be hostile it nonetheless, *does* seem to pick out genuine elements of the doctrine of the philosophers it treats.

\(^{117}\) These different terms, collected by both Lambardi (1982) and Lévy (2003), are: *is qui aliquod munus efficere molitur, artifex, effectrix, effector, genitor et effector, and efficiens*.

\(^{118}\) For the importance of the Demiurge to the Middle Platonic tradition, see e.g. Dillon (1977) 7, where the intra-scholastic arguments about the precise nature of this obviously important figure are laid out.

\(^{119}\) *Nat. D. 1.18* speaks of *opificem aedificatoremque mundi, Platonis de Timaeo deum*, “the god from Plato’s *Timaeus*, the artisan and world-builder”; while at *Acad. 2.118* we are told: *Plato ex material in se omnia recipiente mundum factum esse censet a deo sempiternum*. “Plato thinks that the eternal world was made by a god from the all-containing substance”
quoted above, Aristotle presents the primary causes to which the Pythagoreans attributed
the creation of the world as being deeply mysterious: while the One is the principle from
which the cosmos is derived, the origin of the One itself is unclear, coming, as it does
either “from planes or from surface or from seed or from elements which they cannot
express”. Whatever we make of this rather confused picture, there is certainly no
single, creative divine force, in the manner of the Platonic Demiurge. Meanwhile, from
Cicero’s other work it seems that his own picture of Pythagorean theology was consistent
with the rest of the picture given by the Timaeus – he presents at DND 1.27-8 the
Pythagoreans as believing in a divine, all-permeating world soul, while the vignette of
Pythagoras sacrificing a bull to the Muses whenever he discovered a geometrical truth at
DND 3.88 also leaves space for the more minor deities of the Timaeus – but there is no
mention of any originary divine figure such as the Deimurge. In failing to give a
consistent name for the creator god, then, Cicero may be de-emphasising the doctrinal
importance of this figure, and so dissociating his own account from the interpretations
given by the Middle Platonists. Rather than employing a single, technical term for the
Demiurge’s role in the creation of the world, as Plato does to indicate his fixed position
in the Timaean cosmogony, Cicero gives him a series of different terms which describe
his role, and so, perhaps, ask us to consider this account independently from the familiar,
doctrinal reading of the Platonists. This refusal to adopt Platonic technical terminology

120 Arist. Met. 1091a15-7: …ἐτε' ἐξ ἐπιπέδων ἐτε' ἐκ χροιάς ἐτε' ἐκ σπέρματος ἐτε' ἐξ ὧν ἀπορροήν εἰπέν...
may make it easier to read this in a manner different from the disciples of Plato who approach the *Timaeus* looking for Plato’s authentic thought, and instead to see this in a Pythagorean light, where the Demiurge is simply a mythic personification to fill the role of their mysterious and amorphous first cause in this *eikōς μύθος*. If it does not do this, at the very least it may indicate a lack of familiarity on the part of the Pythagorean speaker with this particular aspect of the doctrine of Plato’s *Timaeus*, which would explain his failure to adhere to the standard, consistent, Platonic terminology.

A further important part of the text, in which we can see Cicero treating an ambiguous formulation in his Platonic source in a way that allows it to fit in with Pythagorean doctrine, is in his description of the motion of the earth. Interestingly, here we have external evidence that Cicero was aware of the interpretive problems surrounding this part of the text, and the possibility of giving this text a peculiarly *Pythagorean* reading. The Platonic passage in question, which has given rise, as Taylor notes, to “the most famous controversy ever raised about the interpretation of the *Timaeus*” is as follows:\footnote{\textsuperscript{121}}

\footnotesize
\begin{verbatim}
γὴν δὲ τροφὸν μὲν ἡμετέραν, ἵλλομένην\textsuperscript{122} δὲ τὴν περὶ τὸν διὰ παντὸς πόλον
tεταμένον, φύλακα καὶ δημιουργὸν νυκτὸς τε καὶ ἡμέρας ἐμπεριστατο.
\end{verbatim}

---

\textsuperscript{121} Taylor (1928) 226
\textsuperscript{122} Here I am keeping the manuscript reading, which is also the reading taken by Aristotle in the *De Caelo* 293b31.
The earth, which is our nurse, revolving [or orbiting?] around the pole which is extended through the universe, he framed to be the guardian and artificer of night and day.\textsuperscript{123}

We have evidence of a heated controversy from the time of Aristotle onwards as to exactly what form of planetary motion Plato meant to indicate by this passage and, in particular, by the obscure term ἴλλομένην: a) the rotation of the Earth, which remains otherwise stationary on the cosmos’ central axis; b) some other kind of (non-rotational) movement along this pole at the centre of the universe,\textsuperscript{124} or c) locomotion orbiting this central pole? According to the first two possible pictures, the Earth would be placed firmly at the centre of the cosmos, maintaining the standard, 5\textsuperscript{th} century picture of a geocentric cosmos; the final reading, however, would give a more modern, Copernican structure, with the Earth circling around the cosmic centre - a structure which reflects the Pythagorean doctrine of the Earth orbiting around an invisible, central fire.\textsuperscript{125}

\textsuperscript{123} Trans. adapted from Jowett.
\textsuperscript{124} Taylor (1928) 232 attributes this interpretation to Aristotle in De Caelo 293b30-2 (’Ἐνιοί δὲ καὶ κειμένην ἐπὶ τοῦ κέντρου φασίν αὐτήν ἔλεγον καὶ κινεῖσθαι περὶ τὸν διὰ παντὸς τεταμένον πόλον, ὡσπερ ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ γέγραμαι), and conceives of it as a sort of wobbling about the pole, as the Earth makes short excursions from the cosmos’ centre point, so that the Earth still “lies at the center” (κειμένην ἐπὶ τοῦ κέντρου), even if it has some, non-circular movement away from this point.
\textsuperscript{125} For the fullest exposition of this view, see Aristotle De Caelo 293a15ff, esp. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ μέσου πᾶρ εἶναι φασία τὴν δὲ γῆν, ἐν τῶν ἀστρῶν οὖσαν, κύκλω ψευδομένην περὶ τὸ μέσον νύκτα τε καὶ ἡμέραν ποιεῖν. “They [the Pythagoreans] say that a fire is in the middle, and that the Earth, which is one of the planes, is borne in a circle about the centre and produces night and day.” (292a1-3). The importance of this cosmological picture for Roman Pythagoreanism, meanwhile, is indicated by Plutarch’s reference to it in the Life of Numa 11.
This ancient debate, which is interesting in its own right, has been amply documented by Taylor.\textsuperscript{126} What is important for our purposes, however, is simply to note that Cicero himself was aware of the interpretive controversy surrounding this section, and that one of these interpretive possibilities aligned the Platonic passage with the doctrine of the Pythagoreans. As he says in the \textit{Academica}:

\begin{quote}
\textit{Hicetas Syracosius, ut ait Theophrastus, caelum solem lunam stellas supera denique omnia stare censet, neque praeter terram rem ullam in mundo moveri; quae cum circum axem se summa celeritate convertat et torqueat, eadem effici omnia quasi stante terra caelum moveretur. atque hoc etiam Platonem in \textit{Timaeo} dicere quidam arbitrantur, sed paulo obscurius.}

(Cic. Acad. 2.123)
\end{quote}

Hicetas the Syracusean, as Theophrastus says, thinks that the Sun, the Moon, the stars, and in short all heavenly bodies stand still, and nothing in the cosmos is moved except for the Earth. This, since it turns and twists itself around its axis with extreme speed, produces all the same effects, as if the sky were moved while the Earth stood still. And certain people think that Plato also says this in the \textit{Timaeus}, but a little obscurely.\textsuperscript{127}

It is a little unclear exactly what cosmological picture Cicero is intending to depict here. It seems that this might be a version of interpretive option a), that the Earth is stationary and rotates (\textit{se convertat}) around a central axis.\textsuperscript{128} But he here claims to be giving the view of Hicetas the Syracusean, a Pythagorean astronomer, who is elsewhere said to have held the common Pythagorean cosmological view (famously, also held by

\textsuperscript{126} Taylor (1928) 226-240
\textsuperscript{127} Trans. my own.
\textsuperscript{128} This is how Taylor (1928) 227 takes it.
Philolaus), that the Earth moved around a central (invisible) fire. The idea Cicero means to convey here could, then, be that of the Earth simultaneously both orbiting around a central axis, which the Pythagoreans took to be produced by an invisible fire, (*circum axem se... convertat*, taking *circum* in a common sense indicating motion around) and rotating (*se... torqueat*). In this case, the picture given would match up with the typical Pythagorean picture of option c), that the Earth is in motion, orbiting around a central point. Whatever is meant, Cicero is clearly aware of both the controversy surrounding the Platonic passage, and of the fact that one of the interpretive possibilities matches up with the cosmology of the Pythagorean, Hicetas. The reference to the fact that this is only the opinion that “certain people” (*quidam*) hold about the *Timaeus*, and that Plato’s view is put “a little obscurely” (*paulo obscurius*), shows that Cicero was aware that this was not the only interpretive possibility for this confusing and controversial passage. The fact that Plato is taken by these people to be echoing the views of the Pythagorean, Hicetas, meanwhile, shows that Cicero was aware that this passage could be read as being in keeping with the Pythagorean position.

---

129 *DL.* 8.85: καὶ τὴν γῆν κινεῖσθαι κατὰ κύκλον πρῶτον εἰπεῖν· οἱ δ’ Ἰκέταν <τόν> Συρακόσιον φασίν. “He [Philolaus] was the first to declare that the earth moves in a circle [i.e. about the central fire], though some say that it was Hicetas of Syracuse.” For the evidence that Diogenes meant by this Philolaus’ claim that the Earth moved around a central fire, see Heath (1913) 187ff.

130 This interpretation would also clear up the problem identified Toomer (2005), that on the stationary Earth reading of this passage of Cicero, Hicetas is taken to hold two, inconsistent views of planetary motion.
When we turn to Cicero’s translation of the Platonic text in his *Timaeus*, we see that he keeps open this, Pythagoreanising, possibility that the Earth is in motion about a central point, while simultaneously being subject to rotation on its own axis. Cicero translates this passage:

\[ \textit{iam vero terram, altricem nostram, quae traicto axi sustinetur, diei noctisque} \\
\textit{effectricem eademque custodem} \]

(Cic. *Tim.* 37)

But now the Earth, our nurse, which is sustained by the hyperbolic [or pierced] axis, and is the creator and at the same time the guardian of day and night.\(^\text{131}\)

Again, the picture Cicero gives of the motion of the Earth is, perhaps in a nod to the obscurity of the Platonic text, not entirely clear. He does, however, make some interesting alterations to the Platonic text. Firstly, he removes the reference to the pole passing through the entire cosmos (which Aristotle took in his interpretation to be the central, cosmic pole). By removing the specification that the axis on which the Earth turns is the central axis, he does not commit the Earth to being in the centre of the cosmos – a move which keeps open the Pythagorean position which places the central fire, rather than the Earth, in the centre of the cosmos. Cicero further adapts the Platonic original by stating that the axis on which the Earth is sustained is *traiectus*. This could simply mean that it is “pierced”, because the axle around which the Earth spins pierces

\(^\text{131}\) Trans. my own.
through the Earth itself, but in all other cases, the past participle is used to refer to the thing *pierced* (which would, in this case, be the Earth), rather than the thing which *does the piercing* (in this case, the axle). Instead, it is perhaps more likely that the word is intended to be understood in a peculiarly astronomical sense, in the same sense in which Cicero uses its cognate noun, *traiectio* in the *De Divinatioe*. In this work, the term *traiectio* indicates the hyperbolic movements of the heavenly bodies across the sky, and so the past participle *traiectus* could indicate that the axis of the Earth has been placed by the Demiurge on this kind of hyperbolic course. If this is the case, the Ciceronian translation would be in keeping with the Pythagorean picture, as the Earth would be presented as rotating on its axis, while its axis itself moves – a hyperbolic movement consistent with movement around the central fire -, and takes the Earth along with it. The fact that Cicero in the first place leaves room in his translation for the central fire, by removing the Earth from the centre of the cosmos, and in the second hints at the possible hyperbolic movement of the Earth, would likely have been highly significant to his readers, given what we know of Roman Pythagoreanism. This unique cosmological picture, which rejected the standard geocentric view, seems to have been a key feature which the Romans connected the Pythagoreans, and Plutarch even relates a

---

132 E.g. Cic. *De Div.* 1.2 *traiectiones motusque stellarum observitaverunt*, and 2.16 *nondum dico, quam haec signa nulla sint, fissum iecoris, corvi cantus, volatus aquilae, stellae traiectio*, voces furentium, sortes, *somnia*. Incidentally, this same term is often used in the rhetorical works to mean linguistic hyperbole.
A final important Pythagoreanising translation decision that Cicero makes in his *Timaeus* is the obfuscation of the full importance of the Theory of the Forms to the Platonic source text. The Theory of the Forms, while being a key element of Middle Platonism, did not, as we shall see, have the same obvious role in Hellenistic Pythagoreanism. By downplaying this aspect of the text, then, Cicero is able to again tailor Nigidius’ speech so that it fits the character of his speaker, and to make his Platonic translation fit in its new dialogic context, in which Pythagorean views seem to have been a subject of discussion. By considering what purpose this de-emphasising of the Theory of the Forms might have in the context of the dialogue as a whole, we can also reach a more sympathetic reading of the Ciceronian translation than that of scholars such as Lévy, who see in his treatment of the Forms, evidence of Cicero’s failure to understand the Platonic source text and “difficulty to perceive this world of the intelligibles in its specificity”.  

133 Plutarch *Life of Numa* 11: “Furthermore, it is said that Numa built the temple of Vesta, where the perpetual fire was kept, of a circular form, not in imitation of the shape of the earth, believing Vesta to be the earth, but of the entire universe, at the centre of which the Pythagoreans place the element of fire, and call it Vesta and Unit.”

134 Lévy (2003) 104
Lévy, although he does not give a great deal of evidence for his claim, makes an important observation when he notes that Cicero’s interest in the transcendental aspects of the *Timaeus* – the elements of the text which deal with the realm of the Forms – is notably less developed than that of his source text. The key Platonic technical term, εἰδος, is left variously untranslated (as at Cic. *Tim*. 11 = Pl. *Tim*. 30c)\textsuperscript{135}, or translated by the Latin term *genus* (as at = Pl. *Tim*. 35a), a very general term which Cicero does not, elsewhere, associate with the technical terminology of the Platonic forms. As noted above, meanwhile, in our discussion of the term, σφαιρειδής, the suffix –ειδής (literally meaning “-formed”) is translated inconsistently, and using Latin terms which remove the association of these qualities with any single form (*globosus*, for example, is just “globular”, as opposed to the Greek “sphere-formed”). The term, ἰδέα, meanwhile, is, in every case except one, translated as *species* - a term which emphasises the role of the Forms as the *visual pattern* for the perceptibles - rather than the more common *forma*, which Cicero generally uses to pick out the full power of the Platonic Forms.\textsuperscript{136} The reference to the Demiurge’s imitation not just of the appearance of the Forms, but also of their power (δύναμις) in his creation of the perceptibles, meanwhile, is removed, relegating the role of the Forms to the level of that of the world model, which seems to be the *pattern* for the cosmos, but not to explain any qualities of the cosmos through the

\textsuperscript{135} This is also the case of the use of this term at Pl. *Tim*. 40a and 42d
\textsuperscript{136} E.g. Pl. *Tim*. 28a, 35a, 40a, and 46c. For the association of the term *forma* with situations in which peculiarly Platonic forms (rather than Stoic or Peripatetic immanent forms) are being discussed, see the Ciceronian passages collected by Gersh (1986) 145-54.
cosmos’ participation in it.\textsuperscript{137}

The reason for this downplaying of the ontologically explanatory power of the Forms, cannot, however, be, as Lévy claims, that Cicero found it “almost impossible… to admit that there is something beyond nature”.\textsuperscript{138} From the \textit{Orator}, it is clear that Cicero was aware of Plato as the philosopher of the Theory of the Forms, and that he had a clear enough grasp of the fundamental aspects of this theory – both that the Forms act as a model for the perceptibles (the orator must look towards the ideal Form of the orator and model himself on this, \textit{Or} 10); and that the perceptibles possessed qualities through participation in these Forms (it is by possessing this Form that the orator can have the quality of eloquence, \textit{Or} 101).\textsuperscript{139} In his \textit{Timaeus}, however, while the idea of the Forms as a model to be copied by the Demiurge remains, the idea of participation of perceptibles in

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{137} Pl. \textit{Tim.} 28a
\textsuperscript{138} Lévy (2003) 104
\textsuperscript{139} Cic. \textit{Or}. 10: \textit{has rerum formas appellat ἴδιας ille non intellegendi solum sed etiam dicendi gravissimus auctor et magister Plato easque gigni negat et ait semper esse ac ratione et intellegentia contineri; cetera nasci occidere, fluere labi nec diutius esse uno et eodem statu. quicquid est igitur de quo ratione et via disputetur, id est ad ultimam sui generis formam speciemque redigendum. “Now Plato, that greatest of all authors and teachers, not only of understanding, but also of speaking, calls those forms of things ideas; and he affirms that they are not created, but that they exist from everlasting, and are kept in their places by reason and intelligence: that all other things have their rising and setting, their ebb and flow, and cannot continue long in the same condition. Whatever there is, therefore, which can become a subject of discussion as to its principle and method, is to be reduced to the ultimate form and species of its class.” Cic. \textit{Or}. 101 ...redeoque ad illam Platonis de qua dixeram ret formam et speciem, quam etsi non cernimus, tamen animo tenere possimus. Non enim eloquentem quaero neque quicquam mortale et caducum, \textit{sed illud ipsum, cuius qui sit compon, sit eloquens}. “And I come back to that sketch and idea of Plato’s which I mentioned before; and although we do not see it, yet we can comprehend it in our mind. For I am not looking for an eloquent man, or for any other mortal or transitory thing; but \textit{for that particular quality which whoever is master of is an eloquent man}”. See Gildenhard (2013) on Platonic Forms in the \textit{Orator}.\end{footnotesize}
these Forms is removed, and so the part of the Theory of the Forms which is important
for other Platonic texts which deal with ontology, rather than cosmogony. The reason
for this treatment of the Platonic text could, again, be to allow it to be consistent with
Pythagorean metaphysics, in which it is less clear that there is any room for the Forms,
and they certainly did not have the central ontological position that they have in Plato’s
later thought. The specifics of the Pythagorean position is the subject of a great deal of
continued scholarly debate, but one possible interpretation is that Philolaus and those
who followed him identified intelligible objects, such as the One, with physical objects,
such as the Sun - a possibility which leaves no space for a separate intelligible realm,
with reference to which perceptibles derive their qualities, as we find in Plato’s Theory of
the Forms. Cicero’s translation of the Timaeus, then, in downplaying the metaphysical
role of the Forms, keeps his account consistent with this possible Pythagorean position,
and reflects the fact that the Hellenistic Pythagoreans do not seem to have explicitly (or,
at least, unanimously) relied on a transcendental realm of the Forms to explain the
properties of physical things in the manner of the Middle Platonists.

140 C.f. Plato Parmenides 132d especially, for the problems of the Theory of the Forms if the Forms are
limited to having the function of a paradigm, rather than explaining perceptibles’ possession of attributes
through participation.
141 As Kahn (2001) 27 notes, this certainly seems to be the most natural interpretation of Aristotle’s
representation of the Pythagorean position; though Huffman thinks that Aristotle’s presentation of the
Pythagorean position is uncharitable and that it is “impossible to imagine that [Philolaus] confused the
arithmetical unit with the central fire. For if he did, his arithmetical unit is more than a bare monad with
position; it is also fiery and orbited by ten bodies.” (Huffman (1993) 205)
From this brief overview it should be clear that at key points Cicero seems careful to adopt an interpretive position in his translation which is in keeping with the doctrines of Pythagoreanism – even where, as in the case of the Theory of the Forms or the figure of the Demiurge, this obscures important aspects of the original text which were fundamental to the dogmatic position formulated by the Middle Platonists. In Pythagoreanising his Platonic source Cicero follows the patter of the pseudo-Pythagorica, such as the *Timaeus Locrus*, which claims to be the source text from which the Platonic *Timaeus* is derived, written by the character Timaeus of Locrus.\(^{142}\) Cicero is, then, doing nothing unique in giving a Pythagoreanised reading of this Platonic text. Yet Cicero’s work is importantly different from these texts, in that it is still, clearly a translation – however creative it may be - and so has a unique relationship with the Platonic source text. The question then becomes, why, if Cicero intended to write a dialogue involving a Pythagorean speaker, give a translation of a Platonic text at all?

V: The Nature of the Translation Reconsidered: Why use Plato at all?

If we are right in attributing this amount of importance to the character of the speaker in Cicero’s *Timaeus* translation, and his Pythagorean philosophical beliefs, we

\(^{142}\) For discussion of this work and its relationship to the Platonic *Timaeus*, see Marg (1972), Thesleff (1961) and (1965), and Baltes (1972)
are left with the need to explain what purpose there might have been for giving Nigidius a Platonic speech in this dialogue. If Cicero wanted to discuss Pythagoreanism and pay tribute to his recently-deceased friend, Nigidius Figulus, what value might he have derived from doing this by means of a Platonic text? The simplest explanation might be that Cicero himself read the Platonic work as being Pythagorean in nature, and the speech of Timaeus as conveying the Pythagorean cosmological views of a Pythagorean character. Although this view has its attractions - and is not out of keeping with Cicero’s recognition, at other points, that the views given by the Platonic character, Socrates, may be those of the historical figure, Socrates, rather than the author, Plato\textsuperscript{143} - the number of adaptive changes Cicero needs to make to the Platonic text in order to maintain its consistency with the Pythagorean position (in particular the downplaying of the importance of the Forms and the Demiurge) tells against this reading. Instead, it seems likely that Cicero used his Platonic source text for a number of complementary ends: 1) his translation shows the possible influence of Pythagoreanism on Plato, and so the importance of native Italian thought to the Greek philosophical tradition (so domesticating Platonic thought); 2) it allows Cicero to emulate and exceed the work of great philosopher, Plato, elevating his own Latin, philosophical project to the level of the Plato’s own Greek corpus and surpassing it in its breadth of treatment (thus capping the original); 3) it allows him to more powerfully commemorate Nigidius by association with

\textsuperscript{143} E.g. Rep. 1.16 quem enim auctorem de illo locupletiorem Platone laudare possumus. “For what more trustworthy authority on that man [i.e. Socrates] can we cite than Plato?”
the highly-esteemed works of Plato, and reflects Nigidius’ own interest in the translation of Greek knowledge into Latin, and belief that the Latin language is in no way inferior to the Greek; 4) it allows Cicero to implicitly draw a relationship between this dialogue and his other works, by relying on connections explicitly drawn by Plato himself between their Platonic models.

1) Even if Cicero is not, in his Pythagoreanised translation, necessarily endorsing the position that the Platonic original really constitutes a presentation of authentic Pythagorean doctrine, as Greek works such as the Timaeus Locrus suggest, he is certainly showing the possibility of reading this text as a Pythagorean tract, just as he earlier showed an awareness of the possibility of reading the movement of the Earth in Plato’s Timaeus as being consistent with Hicetas’ the Pythagorean’s cosmology in the Academica.144 By presenting this Pythagoreanised exposition of the Timaeus as a translation, rather than using any other kind of exegesis, meanwhile, Cicero is able to emphasise how plausible it is to read the text in this way – the translation he ends up with looks very much like a faithful version of the Platonic original, with no obvious abuse having been done to it, but it is nevertheless consistent with the key features of Pythagoreanism. So, by giving a translation of the Timaeus to a Pythagorean speaker, therefore, Cicero is able to subtly manipulate the original Platonic source text to

144 As discussed above, p.33
emphasise the similarity of its thought to the doctrines of Pythagoreanism. The decision to embed this translation within a dialogue, meanwhile, authorises the Pythagorean translational bias, while protecting the author from the need to defend any of his interpretations as the authentic, Platonic reading of the text – the translational decisions made reflect the character of the Pythagorean speaker, they do not necessarily represent the beliefs of the author.

Cicero’s ability to give a Pythagoreanised version of Plato’s *Timaeus*, which still looks like a close translation, emphatically demonstrates the plausibility of a claim made elsewhere in Cicero’s works, namely that Plato’s thought was heavily influenced by Pythagoreanism. For instance, at *De Republica* 1.16 Cicero has Scipio argue that Plato travelled to Italy and Sicily in order to learn from the Pythagorean philosopher Archytas, Philolaus, and Timaeus of Locri himself, and was so taken with their philosophical position that he covertly smuggled their doctrine into his Socratic dialogues:

“sed audisse te credo, Tubero, Platonem Socrate mortuo primum in Aegyptum discendi causa, post in Italiam et in Siciliam contendisse, ut Pythagorae inventa perdisceret, eumque et cum Archyta Tarentino et cum Timaeo Locro multumuisse et Philoleo commentarios esse nactum, cumque eo tempore in iis locis Pythagorae nomen vigeret, illum se et hominibus Pythagoreis et studiis illis dedisse. Itaque cum Socratem unice dilexiisset eique omnia tribuere voluisset, leporem Socraticum subtilitatemque sermonis cum obscuritate Pythagorae et cum illa plurimarum artium gravitate contexuit.”

(Cic. *De Rep.* 1.16)
“But I suppose you have heard, Tubero, that after Socrates death Plato went on journeys, first to Egypt for purposes of study, and later to Italy and Sicily in order to become acquainted with the discoveries of Pythagoras; and that he spent a great deal of time in the company of Archytas of Tarentum and Timaeus of Locri, and also got possession of Philolaus’ notes. And as Pythagoras’ reputation was then great in that country, he devoted himself entirely to that teacher’s disciples and doctrines. And so, as he loved Socrates with singular affection and wished to give him credit for everything, he interwove Socrates’ charm and subtlety in argument with the obscurity and ponderous learning of Pythagoras in so many branches of knowledge.”

This then, in turn, supports his repeated claim that Greek philosophy is natively, in a sense, Roman, as it has its roots in Italy, and that it is an appropriate (and indeed, necessary) activity for elite Romans to participate in – a claim which is at the very foundation of his philosophical project.

Pythagoreanism is repeatedly depicted by Cicero as a natively Italian philosophy, which held an important foundational role in the establishment of the Roman Republican state and so is, in a sense, a naturalised part of traditional Roman thought. As can be seen from the quotation of the De Republica above, Plato’s travels to learn Pythagorean doctrine are travels to Italy and Sicily – the Italian world of Magna Graecia, rather than Greece proper. This association of Pythagoreanism with the geographical origins and contemporary centre of the Roman world is further developed in Cicero’s later works,

145 Trans. adapted from Keyes.
where he figures this philosophical doctrine as being present at the very foundations of the Roman state, and so, in a sense, natively Roman:

\[\textit{Nec vero Pythagoras nominis solum inventor, sed rerum etiam ipsarum amplificator fuit. qui... in Italiam venisset, exornavit eam Graeciam, quae magna dicta est, et privatim et publice praestantissumis et institutis et artibus.}\]

(Cic. Tusc. Disp. 5.10)

Nor was Pythagoras by any means simply the discoverer of the name [i.e. of philosophy], but he extended the actual content of philosophy as well. After his arrival in Italy… he enriched the private and public life of Magna Graecia with the most excellent institutions and arts.

In the introduction to Book 4 of the Tusculans, meanwhile, Cicero points to the many aspects of Roman institutions (\textit{in nostris institutis}) that have been taken over from Pythagorean teachings.\(^\text{146}\) In this exposition he even goes as far as to claim that Roman literature, and the Roman political system were heavily influenced by the Pythagorean presence in Italy. The famous archaic song of Appius Caecus seems, we are told, to be “\textit{Pythagoreum}” (Tusc. 4.4), while the doctrine of Pythagoreanism is said to have penetrated the \textit{civitas} (citizen body, or constitution) of Rome itself:

\[\textit{Pythagorae autem doctrina cum longe lateque fluoret, permanavisse mihi videtur in hanc civitatem...}\]

(Cic. Tusc. Disp. 4.2)

\(^{146}\) Cic. \textit{Tusc.}, 4.4.
Now, as the teaching of Pythagoras spread far and wide, it penetrated, as I think, into our state.

This claim is recalled and repeated at the opening of Cicero’s *Timaeus*, as we are told that the doctrine of the Pythagoreans was originally Italian (having “thrived in Italy and Sicily for so many centuries”), and that Nigidius, in bringing this back to the Romans with his work in the Latin language was not innovating, but simply *restoring* (*renovare*) Pythagoreanism to its original cultural position.

So, by painting the Platonic text of the *Timaeus* as Pythagorean, in the manner in which we have observed above, Cicero is able to support his claim that Platonic philosophy is, ultimately, derived from Pythagorean thought, which is native to an Italian context and fundamental to Rome’s own constitution and *mores*. In Italianising Platonic thought in this way (by painting it as Pythagorean), Cicero serves to elevate the status of native Roman thought – it has the same origins as Platonic thought, that jewel of Greek philosophy -, and so to justify Cicero’s Latin philosophical project. Philosophy, and, in particular, Platonic philosophy, is not just a Greek discipline of interest only to the Greeks; these works are also importantly Italian and can give us an insight into the Roman state and the Roman experience. It also makes a claim to ownership of Greek philosophy, which reflects Rome’s colonial activities, and the anxiety felt by elite

---

147 Cic. *Tim. 1*: *aliquot saecla in Italia Siciliaque vigisset.*
Romans concerning Rome’s military and political primacy, but apparent literary and philosophical dependence on Greece.¹⁴⁸

2) The translation of the Timaeus also serves to elevate Cicero’s own philosophical discourse to the status of the Greeks whose work he translates. As the De Finibus passage we started with at page 7 (De Fin. 1.7) notes, it is Aristotle and Plato who are the greats of Greek philosophy who Cicero would wish to bring to the Roman people. By repeating the words of Plato (albeit in Latin, and with his own interpretive spin) Cicero is able to present himself as the Roman Plato, matching the authorial feats of the Greek master. But Cicero, in changing the dialogue form of the original so that it contains paired speeches by a Pythagorean and a Peripatetic, is able to go one better: by including the space for a speech giving the views of Cratippus he can, in a sing work, match the intellectual achievements of that other great, Greek philosopher, Aristotle, as well. The translation, then, acts as a direct emulation of Plato, placing Cicero’s authorial act on a par with the giant of Greek philosophy; while the interpretive changes made by Cicero to the Platonic text display Cicero’s own independent philosophical acumen, and his “updating” of the older Platonic text to fit in with more recent debates as to the cosmos’ creation in time, and to take account also of the Aristotelian position. The act of translation then, allows Cicero to imitate and surpass his model.

3) The equation of Cicero’s translation with the high literary and philosophical status of the Platonic original also serves to elevate the status of the character, Nigidius. If we read this as an act of commemoration to the recently-deceased philosopher (which the eulogy-like opening suggests that we should), by giving a Platonic speech to the Roman philosopher, Cicero is able to pay an implicit compliment to the literary and philosophical skills of his friend. He is a philosopher of such great value that he is a worthy mouthpiece of Platonic thought transferred into the Roman world. In effect, Cicero paints Nigidius as a Roman Timaeus.

But, in addition to this, Cicero also, by giving Nigidius a translation as part of his speech, is able to allude to and endorse Nigidius’ own views on translation, and translation technique – which, as we shall see, are very similar to Cicero’s own. We know from Nigidius’ remaining fragments that his work involved the translation of Greek technical knowledge into Latin, in much the manner of Cicero’s own.149 Giving Nigidius a translation from the Greek, then, again alludes to his friend’s methods of literary production, and serves to endow his character with the traits of the historical personality on whom it is modeled. It also reflects the Nigidian belief that Greek is not superior to

149 See e.g. Swodoba fr. 10: uti facit ποιεῖται, i>ta facitur ποιεῖται [or τιμᾶται] est; fr. 62: φορβή <herba>. sed antea fibra dicta est, ut nunc etiam rustici dicunt; fr.114: hie apud Graecos prius myops vocabatur, postea <a> magnitudine incommodi oestrum appellantur.
Latin in the presentation of technical knowledge – rather, the two languages naturally pick out concepts in the same way, and have the same natural gestures as their basis. For Nigidius then, as for Cicero, Greek is not innately better suited to philosophical discourse than Latin, and the Latin project of Cicero’s *Timaeus*, and his philosophical works in general, is both necessary and legitimate.

4) Finally, and importantly, the translation of the Platonic text also allows Cicero to invoke the position of Plato’s *Timaeus* within the Platonic corpus in relation to his own corpus. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the relationship between Plato’s *Timaeus* and his *Republic* allows the drawing of an implicit relationship between Cicero’s *Timaeus* and his own *Republic*, which may allow for interesting political readings of this text, as we will discuss in the final section of this chapter.

VI: The Political Implications of this Work

150 Swodoba fr. 41 cum sermocinamur, intendimus. at contra cum dicimus nos, neque profuso intentoque flatu vocis neque proiectis labris pronuntiamus, sed et spiritum et labes quasi intra nosmet ipsos coercemus. hoc idem fit et in eo, quod dicimus tu ego et tibi et mihi. nam sicuti, cum adnuimus et abnuimus, motus quidam ille vel capitis vel oculorum a natura rei quam significat non abhorret, ita in his vocibus quasi gestus quidam oris et spiritus naturalis est. eadem ratio est in Graecis quoque vocibus, quam esse in nostris animadvertimus.
As has been mentioned briefly above, the original Platonic *Timaeus* presents Timaeus’ speech as a continuation of the political programme presented in Plato’s *Republic*. After a selective repetition of the key doctrines of the *Republic*, which is presented as a brief account of the discussion the characters had held the day before, Critias states:

... τοὺς δὲ πολίτας καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἢν χθές ἦμιν ὡς ἐν μέθῳ δημιουσά σύ, νῦν μετεπερρούντες ἐπὶ τάληθες δέορο θῆσαμεν ὡς ἑκεῖνη τὴν ὡς ὑδάδον (Plat. Tim. 26c)

... and the city and its citizens which you described to us yesterday [i.e. in the *Republic*], as it were in a story, we will now transport here into the realm of fact, assuming that this is the same city.¹⁵¹

The particular role that the Timaean speech will play in this continued political investigation, in which the fantastical political system of the *Republic* is tested in the context of the real world, is, we are told, that of relating “the origin of the universe and... the creation of human beings” (Plat. Tim. 27a). The idea seems to be that, by giving a full examination of human nature and its role in the cosmos, Timaeus’ speech will allow us insight into what kind of political system might be best for beings of this kind, living under these kinds of cosmological constraints. Such an examination will, in turn, help us to see whether the political system described in the *Republic* would indeed meet this

¹⁵¹ trans. adapted from Bury
criterion adequately, and so whether it would be the most fitting for living human beings to adopt.

So, then, given the intertextual relationship between the Ciceronian dialogue and his original Platonic source text from which he draws his translation, Cicero’s text too, by implication, asks its reader to relate the description of human nature and the position of humanity in the cosmos to the political realm, and to Cicero’s own description of the ideal constitution in order to test its adequacy. It asks us, in other words, to consider how the view given in Nigidius’ speech on the cosmic order and the nature of humanity, should influence our position on the most appropriate human, political organisation, and, in particular, how it might support the political system presented as ideal in Cicero’s own Republic (the De Republica) - namely, that of Republican Rome.

The political importance of the cosmological and physiological account provided by this Ciceronian translation, although not explicit in the text as we have it, is strongly implied by the Platonic intertext. This strong intertextual relationship, meanwhile, is created by the choice to give Nigidius a speech deriving from a translation of this well-known, Greek text. The potential for a pro-Republican, political reading of this text is further increased by the choice of Nigidius as speaker. As noted above, Nigidius’ characterisation in the tradition is as not just a learned Pythagorean, but also as a staunch Republican, committed to the struggle of Pompey against Caesar and, eventually,
destined to die in exile for his political beliefs.\textsuperscript{152} He is then, a natural choice for a speech on natural philosophy which would support the political system embodied in the Roman Republic, as described in Cicero’s \textit{De Republica}, just as Timaeus’ speech supports the political system of Plato’s \textit{Republic} in the Platonic dialogue.

Indeed, the possible political implications of the description of human nature given in the \textit{Timaeus}, which, as we shall see, draws a sharp, ontological distinction between the human and the divine, may have been a further reason for Cicero to choose to produce a translation, rather than an original text. By translating a Platonic text, Cicero is able to allude to the political implications of his subject matter which are made explicit in the original text, without ever explicitly articulating them himself. Thus he can make a veiled argument for Republicanism, at the time, just months before Caesar’s death in 44BC when his autocratic rule seemed to be solidfying, and opposition to him most dangerous. It may even be the case that this triangulation of meaning with the original Platonic text allows Cicero to make an implicit criticism of Caesar’s attempts to violate the ontological limits of human nature, by laying claim to quasi-divine status, without ever having to openly make this dangerous accusation.

\textsuperscript{152} Why, exactly, Nigidius should have been denied the infamous Caesarian clemency is unclear from our sources, as Della Casa (1962) notes. But we can imagine that his death in exile could have been one of the reasons why he quickly became famed as a Republican martyr.
Let us now, then, consider how the cosmological and physiological content of the Ciceronian *Timaeus* may serve to support Cicero’s (and his character, Nigidius’) Republican cause, in the historical context of Caesar’s enduring dictatorship, by revealing Republicanism as the constitution best-fitted for the natural, human condition, and Caesar’s own autocratic rule as an illegitimate attempt to violate humanity’s physical constitution and metaphysical status.

Both Plato’s original *Timaeus*, and Cicero’s Latin language version give a picture of the cosmos in which the different kinds of living entities are clearly delineated and shown to be categorically distinct, both in terms of their creation, and in terms of their defining nature. In addition to the Demiurge himself, who has the unique ability to generate the entire cosmos, there is the cosmos itself, created by the cosmos and animated by the world soul (Cic. *Tim*. 26 = Plat. *Tim*. 36d-e), which acts as a deity engaged in never-ending intelligent activity (Cic. *Tim*. 27 = Plat. *Tim*. 37a). The cosmos, with its soul in the process of ever-lasting activity, and whose body is the cause of time, is the only one of those beings generated by the Demiurge that will necessarily last for all time (Plato. *Tim*. 38b).\(^\text{153}\) Next, the texts describe the creation of the lesser deities within the cosmos. These are divine living beings, composed of soul and body, and include both the heavenly gods (Cic. *Tim*. 36 = Plat. *Tim*. 40b) and the other gods (Cic. *Tim*. 37-8 = Plat.  

\[^{153}\] There is a lacuna here in the Ciceronian text. For further discussion of this, see p.25ff above.
Tim. 40d). As we learn at Cic. Tim. 40 (= Plat. Tim. 41a), these gods are not necessarily immortal, but are made immortal by the will of the Demiurge, who also has the power to destroy them at any point. Finally, at Cic. Tim. 35 (= Plat. Tim. 40a) we learn that there remain three further kinds of living being in the cosmos: 1) winged creatures that travel through the air; 2) those that live in water; 3) those that go on foot on dry land, a category which includes humans. These three final groups of creatures are fundamentally different, both in the process of their creation and in their nature, from the previous categories of being. As we learn from the Demiurge’s speech at Cic. Tim. 41 (= Plat. Tim. 41c), in order to ensure that these remaining three kinds of being are necessarily mortal, the Demiurge himself will not create their bodies, but will leave this to the deities of his newly-created cosmos. Instead, he will create only the divine part of these beings, their souls, but even these will be of a fundamentally different kind from the souls of the cosmic deities, being produced using materials “of the second and third quality” (ab iis secundum sumebat atque etiam tertium) (Cic. Tim. 42 = Plat. Tim. 41d).

The human being, then, is presented in each version of the Timaeus as being emphatically ontologically distinct from the higher living beings – the Demiurge, the cosmos itself, and the gods. Unlike these higher beings which are everlasting (although they differ in whether this is a necessary or a contingent fact of their existence), human beings, when viewed as a composite of body and soul, are mortal. Moreover, like dogs, horses, and other land animals, they are in created in such a way as to be necessarily
mortal, using the secondary creative powers of the created gods, rather than the primary
powers of the Demiurge himself. Even the immortal part of the humans, the soul, is
materially different from the higher beings, such as the gods. As is the case with other
animals, the human soul is of a fundamentally lower quality, being produced from
different ingredients. On the model of the Timaeus, then, human beings and gods are
essentially ontologically distinct – they are made in different ways, of different stuff,
which gives their beings essentially different attributes. Membership of both of these
categories (the human and the divine) seems ontologically inadmissible, and moving
between these categories metaphysically impossible. The description of human nature
given in the Timaeus is presented, as we have noted, as illuminating what kind of
political structure might be most appropriate for us. And this nature is emphatically
described as one which, although it shares in divinity in the possession of a soul, is
essentially distinct from that possessed by the gods themselves.

Yet it is exactly this distinction between the human and the divine that Cicero
considers Caesar to be undermining, through his adoption of divine iconography and cult.
Cicero complains in a letter to Atticus, dated May 45BC – so, at the same time as, or only
shortly before, the probable date of composition of his Timaeus translation – that Caesar,
in overturning the Republican constitution and setting himself up as a “king” in the style
of Alexander the Great, is no longer able to take to advice from his fellow man but places himself, instead, on the level of a god:154

Why, don't you see that even that famous pupil of Aristotle [i.e. Alexander], distinguished for the very best ability and the most perfect conduct, no sooner got the title of king than he became haughty, cruel, and ungovernable? Well now, do you think that this man in the procession [i.e. Caesar, described here as having a place among the processional images of the gods], this messmate of Quirinus [i.e. the deified Romulus], is likely to be gratified by temperate letters such as I should write?

There has, of course, been an extended scholarly debate regarding whether or not Caesar’s presentation of himself as a god in his own lifetime was intentional or unusual.155 Cicero’s letter, however, shows that, whether intentional or not, the public references to the dictator’s purported more-than-human status were worthy of note and threatening to the other members of the elite.156 By reading Cicero’s Timaeus in the context of these elite complaints at Caesar’s divine posturing, we can see an implicit criticism both of Caesar’s blurring of the line between human and divine, and of any

154 The reference here, as we know from Dio, is to the presentation of a statue of Caesar labeled as a “hemitheos” (half god) in the triumphal procession after the Battle of Munda.
155 See Koortbojian (2013) for a recent overview of this debate and the evidence.
156 For a fuller account of how Cicero negotiates Caesar’s claims to divinity in this period and earlier, attempting to limit any divine honours to being granted postumously, see Cole (2013) 111-34.
political system which derives from this, and so fails to take account for the true nature of man. The *Timaeus* shows us that any human claim to divinity is fundamentally misguided, and so that Caesar’s claim to, even partial godhood, is the claim to hold a privileged metaphysical position which is simply inadmissible in the cosmology of the *Timaeus*. The implication, when we consider the political importance of this ontological division, is that, if Caesar’s dictatorship in any way relies on these claims to more than human status, it is predicated on a misunderstanding of human nature and so cannot be the ideal political form for a community of men.

Conversely, the view of human nature given in his translation of the *Timaeus* enforces and supports Cicero’s earlier claims in his *De Republica* that the Roman Republican constitution is the ideal human political system. In addition to the relationship drawn between his *Timaeus* and his *De Republica* by analogy with the Platonic works they take as their models (the Platonic *Timaeus* and the *Republic*, respectively), the picture of humanity presented in the *Timaeus* is inkeeping with that given in a famous passage of Cicero’s *De Republica*, the *Somnium Scipionis*. Yet, while the *Timaeus* focuses on the causes of the peculiar nature of the human, with its combination of divine soul and perishable body, the *Somnium* focuses on what this means for human political affairs. The Ciceronian *Timaeus*, then, looks back to and supplements this earlier Ciceronian text, and together they produce a consistent picture of human nature and the implications this has for political life. When these two texts are read together, a clear
Republican message emerges, yet it is one which the *Timaeus* itself, giving only the cosmological and physiological view of man without explicitly spelling out the importance this has for our political lives, only hints at.

The view of human nature given in the *Timaeus* repeats that given in the *Somnium Scipionis* of the *De Republica* in significant ways. In the *Somnium*, we see this same cosmological picture of the heavenly bodies as divine intelligences, and the human soul as a divine element housed in a mortal body:

_Homines enim sunt hac lege generati, qui tuerentur illum globum, quem in hoc templo medium vides, quae terra dicitur, isisque animus datus est ex illis sempiternis ignibus, quae sidera et stellas vocatis, quae globosae et rotundae, divinis animatae mentibus, circulos suos orbesque conficiunt celeritate mirabili. Quare et tibi, Publi, et piis omnibus retinendus animus est in custodia corporis nec iniussu eius, a quo ille est vobis datu hominum vita migrandum est, ne munus humanum adsignatum a deo defugisse videamini._

(Cic. *Somnium* 7 = De Rep 6.15)

For men were created subject to this law, to keep to that globe, which you see in the centre of this region and which is called the Earth; and to them a soul was given formed from those everlasting fires, which you mortals call constellations and stars, that, round and spherical in form, alive with divine intelligences, complete their orbits and circles with marvellous swiftness. So, my Publius, you and all good men must allow the soul to remain in the keeping of the body, nor without his command, by whom it was given to you, must you leave your human life, lest you should appear to have deserted the post assigned to men by God.

While the Ciceronian *Timaeus* only hints, however, at the moral implications that the human soul’s divinity has for us, telling us that “any soul who made good use of its allotted time would return to dwell once more on the star with which it had been paired,
to live a blessed life in keeping with his character” (Cic. *Tim.* 45 = Plat. *Tim.* 42a), the *De Republica* spells out the political implications of the human soul’s cosmological role.

But still, Africanus, so that you may be more ready to defend the Republic, know this: for all who have preserved their fatherland, furthered it, enriched it, there is in heaven a sure and allotted abode, where they may enjoy an immortality of happiness. For nothing happens in the world more pleasing to that supreme Deity, who governs all the universe, than those gatherings and unions of men allied by common laws, which are called states. From this place do their rulers and guardians set out, and to this place do they return.

While the *Timaeus* talks about the happiness awaiting the soul after death, then, the *Somnium* spells out how we might attain this: namely, through good political practice. The part of human activity most pleasing to the deity of the *Somnium* (whose role matches that of the *Timaeus*’ Demiurge) is the political union of men through “common laws” into “states”. As well as the encouragement to defend the explicitly *Republican* constitution in the *De Republica* passage above (*tutandam rem publicam*), we further learn that it is a peculiarly Roman Republican constitution, with Senate, citizens, and allies, which the Demiurge favours, and that Scipio himself, in his defence of this constitution, is the exemplary model for the well-lived human life. Indeed, the qualities

---

*Cic. Somnium 5 = De Rep 6.13*
that will lead to Scipio’s eventual shaking off of his bodily confines and enjoying the happiness that lies in store for good men after death are described as follows:

...in te unum atque in tuum nomen se tota convertet civitas, te senatus, te omnes boni, te socii, te Latini intuebuntur, tu eris unus, in quo nitatur civitatis salus.
(Cic. Somnium 4 = De Rep 6.12)

…the Senate, all right-thinking citizens, the allies and the Latins will fix their eyes on you alone; you will be the one man on whom the community can lean for safety.

Cicero’s Timaeus, then, is not just abstract theoretical discussion for the sake of discovering the truths about nature: it also, through an intertextual allusion to his earlier, political philosophy text, the De Republica, serves to implicitly challenge Caesar’s claims to divinity and to hold up the Roman Republican constitution as the ideal political structure. And it is through his translation of an earlier Platonic text, and the intertextual appropriation of its own connections to the rest of Plato’s corpus, that allows him to do this. Moreover, by employing a translation – and, indeed, a translation of a Greek text on the subject of Physics – any possible political ramifications are able to remain implicit, yet accessible to those who were familiar with Plato’s corpus. Cicero’s choice to translate the Timaeus at this point in his life, then, and to cast the staunch Republican Nigidius as its speaker, is further explained.
Epilogue

Conclusions

We have now come to the end of our examination of Cicero’s philosophical translations. We have seen how they adapt and rewrite their original source texts in order to produce a particular philosophical interpretation, and observed their ability to represent the thought and language of the original in a variety of different ways – as alien, or as familiar; as identical to, or different from their Latin translations; and as valuable, neutral, or positively harmful to Roman culture. In doing so, we have been able to gain a deeper insight into the texts themselves, both in terms of the philosophical views they convey, and the literary aims they represent, and have observed a paradigmatic example of the flexibility of Roman Republican translation, and the various ways in which it can treat its source texts. It is now time, then, briefly to summarise a number of the most important findings that the study of Cicero’s philosophical translations has provided us with.

In the first place, this study has provided us with a new perspective on Cicero’s philosophical thought, which can act as a useful supplement to more conventional studies
of the philosophical positions advocated by Cicero in these texts.\textsuperscript{1} We have observed not only how his philosophical affiliation informs his translations of earlier Greek texts – positively portraying the Academic works of Plato and Xenophon, and negatively representing those of Epicurus (Ch. 3) – but also more specific aspects of his philosophical views and concerns. This study has shown us more clearly, for example, the precise issues that Cicero takes with Epicureanism. Past approaches have focused on Cicero’s complaints about Epicurean ethical and political precepts, and their incompatibility with traditional Roman morality.\textsuperscript{2} In our study of his translation of Epicurean philosophical vocabulary in Ch. 2, however, we have seen that it is not simply the practical results of Epicurean philosophy that he finds problematic, but its very foundations. Cicero strikes right to the heart of the Epicurean system by challenging its very conception of its guiding principle, pleasure, and it is through the process of translation (or, rather, the failure of translation) that he reveals this incoherence.

Similarly, our study of Cicero’s translations has provided us with a deeper insight into how he interprets Platonic thought and its value for contemporary Roman society. In our examination of Cicero’s translations of the proof for the immortality of the soul in Plato’s Phaedrus (Ch. 3), for example, we have seen that the Roman author presents this element of Platonic thought not as an allegory or hypothesis, designed to inspire moral behaviour,

\textsuperscript{1} For example, the recent treatment by Woolf (2015).

\textsuperscript{2} For Cicero’s rejection of Epicurean ethical and political precepts, see Radford (2002) 22. For a consideration of the letter to Trebatius (Fam.7.12) in which Cicero criticises his adoption of Epicureanism in light of its advocacy of political non-involvement, see Fish (2011) 94.
but as a genuine element of Platonic doctrine. This fact tells us both about how Cicero reads Plato, and about Cicero’s particular brand of Academic Scepticism. In attributing particular doctrines to Plato, Cicero is departing from the position of Arcesilaus, who held that Plato, just as Socrates before him, was a Sceptic in the strongest sense, in that he argued for no positive philosophical positions in his works.\(^3\) In Cicero’s use of Plato at \textit{Tusc.} 1.53-4 (Plato text 1a), in contrast, we have seen the Roman author present Plato’s work as arguing seriously for the soul’s immortality, and condemning later thinkers (in particular Panaetius) for ignoring the force these arguments.\(^4\) The kinds of translation techniques he employs in treating this Platonic passage, meanwhile, reveal that he takes Plato’s arguments to be persuasive. They are also presented as being consistent with Roman morality, as this same passage is given, in other works (text 1b and 1c), to Scipio and Cato. Scepticism, then, is necessarily a very personal philosophy, as it requires the practitioner to weigh each argument himself rather than following the authority of a teacher.\(^5\) It is through Cicero’s translations that we are able to see more clearly his own,

---

\(^3\) For a full discussion of the New Academy’s claims to Platonic precedent, see Annas (1992) 61-72. The claim that Plato “affirms nothing in his books” (\textit{in libris nihil adfirmatur}) is made by Cicero too at \textit{Acad.} 1.46.

\(^4\) For the particular criticism of Panaetius, see \textit{Tusc.} 1.79 and Dillon (1977) 101, who notes that here “the Stoics, and in particular Panaetius, are roundly condemned for denying immortality”. Dillon also suggests (p.101) that Cicero in this book may be borrowing from an Antiochean \textit{On Death}, meaning that this view of Plato would be taken from the Antiochean Old Academy, but there is (as Dillon admits) no evidence to support this claim.

\(^5\) See Cic. \textit{Acad.} 2.8: \textit{hoc autem liberiores et solutiores sumus quod integra nobis est iduicandi potestas nec ut omnia quae praescripta a quibusdam et quasi imperata sint defendamus necessitate ulla cogimur.} “In this, however, we are more free and unfettered in that the power of judgement is uncurtailed for us; nor are we forced by any compulsion to defend all of the precepts set down by certain people as if as orders”. See
individual approach to Academic Scepticism, and those arguments of earlier philosophers that he takes to be persuasive or problematic.

The openness to a variety of different arguments and authorities, which is inherent in Academic Scepticism, is an invitation towards eclecticism, and this study has provided us with a further window into how Cicero’s own philosophical eclecticism functions. We have seen clearly how deeply he engages not only with his source texts (for example, those of Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle) but also with the Hellenistic exegetical tradition which studied them.\(^6\) We have also seen, in his wide range of sources (for which see Appendix A), how widely read Cicero was in the discipline of philosophy, and the variety of different perspectives he drew upon to inform his own Sceptical inquiries.\(^7\) Most importantly, we have seen how these synthesising tendencies can be seen in his creation of a new Latin philosophical vocabulary (ch. 2), as he pulls together a wide range of philosophical views and shows their relationship to each other by means of a unified terminology. This dissertation has just scratched the surface of Cicero’s synthetic vocabulary-building, and an appreciation of the full extent by which Cicero’s new

\(^{10}\) See D. Nat. 1.10 for the rejection of taking authority, rather than one’s own ratio as the guiding principle for one’s philosophical beliefs.
\(^6\) See ch. 3 for his engagement with later Peripatetic exegesis, and ch. 4 for his engagement with later debates on the meaning of Plato’s Timaeus.
\(^7\) As Lefèvre (2008) 283 puts it: *Cicero ist ein exzellenter Kenner der griechischen Philosophie.*
vocabulary brings together and structures diverse aspects of Greek philosophical thought would require its own study.

In addition to this, we have learnt much about the ways in which Cicero translates philosophy, and the kind of literary meanings he generates by means of particular translation procedures. One of the more surprising findings of this study may be the mode in which Cicero presents Epicureanism, and how his privileging of literal translation procedures such as synonymy results in the alienation of Epicurean thought (ch. 3). In this, Cicero’s approach is in stark contrast to that identified by Sedley in the philosophical translation project of Lucretius.\(^8\) Whereas Lucretius Latinises Epicurus’ philosophical doctrine and emphasises the foreign nature of his Greek cultural context, Cicero reveals the alien nature of Epicurean philosophy, too.\(^9\) Cicero’s work, then, presents an important counterpart to the Roman philosophical project of Lucretius, and reveals an alternative approach to the appropriation of Greek philosophical thought which was available in the Roman world of the late Republic. As such, then, it forms an important case study of the means by which Greek philosophy could be represented and characterised by means of translation. It also further highlights the importance of translation to the Roman articulation of their new relationship to Greek intellectual culture in this period. As Cicero himself points out, when he claims that “Cato’s” Latin

\(^9\) Ibid. p.59.
treatment has, as it were, given Roman citizenship to the foreign ideas of Stoicism, translation is an important aspect of making Greek ideas Roman.\textsuperscript{10}

All of this has, as explored in the final section of chapter 3, revealed to us more clearly how we might responsibly use Cicero as a source for the reconstruction of earlier Greek philosophy. Although our results have been primarily negative, arguing for increased caution when employing Cicero’s translations as evidence for Greek philosophers’ substantive views, they are, nonetheless, important, and it is hoped that they will inform future investigations in this area.

Finally, we have observed a number of more specific features of Cicero’s philosophical works, which will contribute to our general understanding of these texts. We have seen, in Cicero’s presentation of the Latin language of his translations in relation to the Greek of his originals, how he regularly rejects earlier claims as to the linguistic poverty of his native tongue, highlighting its \textit{copia verborum} and suitability for philosophical exposition (ch. 2). A further avenue for future investigation is Cicero’s general avoidance of cognates in his translations of Greek.\textsuperscript{11} This tendency emphasises

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{10} \textit{De Fin.} 3.40: \textit{itaque mihi videris Latine docere philosophiam et ei quasi civitatem dare; quae quidem adhuc peregrinari Romae videbatur nec offerre sese nostris sermonibus...} (“Therefore it seems to be that you are teaching Philosophy to speak Latin, and giving here, as it were, Roman citizenship, who before, indeed, seemed to be a foreigner at Roman and not to offer herself to our language…”).
\textsuperscript{11} For a rare occasion on which he \textit{does} use a cognate in his translation of Plato, see ch. 3 p.152.
\end{flushleft}
the difference between the Greek and Latin languages, and, as such, runs counter to the assimilating tendencies that we find in, for example, Varro’s *De Lingua Latina*, which presents the vocabulary of Latin as deriving, in a large part, from Greek.\footnote{For example, Varro *Ling.* 1.19ff for the numerous Latin words that derive from the Greek *chaos*, and 1.21 for the claim that Latin terminology may have developed directly from Greek through the Greek founder of Rome, Evander. In this sense, then, Varro’s approach to the relationship between the Latin and Greek languages is similar to the theory of Aeolicism, as presented in Dionysius of Halicarnassus, which considers Latin to be just another one of the many Greek dialects (for a more complete examination of this, see Stevens (2006/7)).} Cicero, then, while bringing new philosophical ideas to the Latin language, nonetheless still marks out the languages of Rome and Greece, and so a fundamental aspect of their culture, as distinct. We have also seen how the translation of Greek texts can be use as a veil for dangerous political polemic, and the communication of old philosophical ideas to develop new meanings in their new political context.\footnote{See ch. 4.} This study, then, has provided an additional insight into the political role that these philosophical texts might have, so provided further support to an important trend in the interpretation of Cicero’s philosophical works, which sees them as influenced by, and speaking to, the contemporary political situation.\footnote{For the relationship of these texts to the contemporary political situation see Baraz (2012), Gildenhard (2007), esp. p.225-9}

Further Work
The approach of this study, which has focused on Cicero’s translation of Greek philosophical vocabulary and prose, can be valuably extended to cover other important instances of translation in Cicero’s philosophical works. In the first place, it can be valuably directed towards a consideration of the embedded translations of poetry that we find in these works, and which, in spite of their philosophical context, have been almost universally excluded from the study of Cicero’s philosophical translations.¹⁵ In the second, it can be used to consider Cicero’s reproduction of the argumentative styles of the Greek philosophical schools he treats – another element of the information contained within his source texts, which is of philosophical significance and available for translation. Of particular interest here may be those sections of the *De Natura Deorum* and *De Finibus* in which he gives extended speeches to spokesmen for particular philosophical schools.

Although, then, the study of Cicero’s translations of Greek poetry have often been studied independently from the philosophical works in which they are embedded, the integration of this material into our study of Cicero’s philosophical translations has the ability to complement the findings in this dissertation, and provide a deeper insight into

¹⁵ See, for example, Powell (1995), who does not consider poetic texts in surveying Cicero’s philosophical translations (p. 273 fn 1: “in this work I have disregarded the poetic translations which Cicero includes in the philosophical works”). Jones (1959) is a notable exception to this tendency to treat Cicero’s poetic and prose translations separately. For Cicero’s tendency to translate these Greek poetic texts himself when there is no existing Latin translation, see *Tusc.* 3.29.
the philosophical and literary goals of these texts. That these poetic passages are amenable to study in these terms can be shown by means of a short example. A particularly illustrative instance is the Tusculan Disputations 2.20-1 translation of Herakles’ speech at Sophocles’ Trachiniae 1046ff. Here we can see a clear example of Cicero’s adaptation of the Sophoclean source material in order to fit in with the philosophical argumentation of the text as a whole. Cicero retains Sophocles’ thematic emphasis on Herakles’ feminisation in these scene, but he rewrites this so that it reflects the claims made in the rest of the Tusculans concerning the virtue of courage, and its relationship to masculinity. The Sophoclean model is as follows:

... οἰκτιρόν τέ με
πολλοίαν οἰκτρόν, δόσις ὡστε παρθένος
βέβηρος κλαίον· καὶ τόδ' οὐδ' ἄν εἶς ποτὲ
tόνδ' ἀνήρ φαίη πρόσθ' ἤδειν δεδρακότα,
ἀλλ' ἀσπένακτος αἰεὶν εἰπόμην κακοῖς:
νὸν δ' ἐκ τοιοῦτον θήλυς ἦρημαι τάλας.

(Soph. Trach. 1070-5)
Pity me, pitiable in many ways, I who am crying out, weeping like a girl, and no one can say he saw this man do such a thing before, but though racked with torments I never would lament! But now such a thing has shown me as a womanish creature.17

Cicero’s Latin translation, however, introduces the idea that Herakles, in succumbing to this pain, has had his peculiarly masculine strength (virtus) broken and made effeminate:

16 For a useful collection of the Ciceronian translations from the Greek in the Tusc., along with their Greek sources, see King (2001), Appendix I.
17 Trans. Lloyd-Jones.
Miserère: gentes nóstras flebunt miserias.
Heu, virginalem me óre ploratum édere,
Quem vidit nemo ulli ingemescentém malo!

Ecféminata virtus adflcta òccidit.

(Cic. Tusc. 2.21.)

Have pity! Nations will weep these miseries.
Alas! That my lips utter girlish laments,
Whom none saw groaning over any ill.

My manhood is ruined, made feminine and shattered.\(^\text{18}\)

As the Tusculan Disputations continues, however, we will see that the virtus that Herkales has here lost is not simply the manly characteristic of endurance of pain, but also the moral virtue of courage. As Cicero tells us at Tusc. 2.43, the term “virtue” (virtus) derives from the term man (vir) because the virtue of courage (fortitudo), which is the peculiar domain of men, is the paradigmatic example of a moral virtue.\(^\text{19}\) So, we can see in Cicero’s translation his adaptation of his Greek model so that it functions as an exemplum for a philosophical point that he will make at a later part of the text, namely that a lapse in manly endurance (one sense of the Latin term virtus) is equally a lapse in ethical virtue (another sense of the term). From this example alone, we can see the importance of studying these translations in light of their context, and as integral parts of

---

\(^\text{18}\) Trans. adapted from King.
\(^\text{19}\) atqui vide ne, cum omnes rectae animi affectiones virtutes appellentur, non sit hoc proprium nomen omnium, sed ab ea quae eeteris excellebat omnes nominatae sint. appellata est enim ex viro virtus; viri autem propria maxime est fortitudo, cuibus munera duo sunt maxima: mortis dolorisque contemptio. utendum est igitur his, si virtutis compotes vel potius si viri volumus esse, quoniam a viris virtus nomen est mutuata.
Cicero’s philosophical texts – it is only by doing this that we can fully understand the significance of Cicero’s translation choices.\(^\text{20}\)

Moreover, we can also see in this example the value of applying the methodological approach we have adopted in this dissertation, and considering Cicero’s intertextual positioning of his Latin translations against their Greek source texts. Just as the author often invites comparison of his Latin translations of Greek prose texts with their models, we find the same in his treatment of his poetic translations.\(^\text{21}\) In the case of Cicero’s translation of the Sophoclean speech of Herakles, when considered in light of our earlier findings we can see that the author is here employing the intertextual stance of alienation, and that this is employed in order to reinforce the philosophical position articulated in this work. Even within this highly adaptive and selective translation, Cicero retains all of the markers of the geographical and chronological location of Herakles’ sufferings, marking him out as a Greek from the mythological past.\(^\text{22}\) In firmly representing this poetic example of capitulation to pain as non-Roman, Cicero is able to mark it out as a negative exemplum which should not be followed by his Roman reader –

\(^{20}\) Pace Soubiran (1972) and Traglia (1963) whose treatments, although of vital importance for our understanding of Cicero’s poetic techniques, do not consider these embedded translations in context.

\(^{21}\) E.g. De Fin. 2.105, where he claims that his audience already knows the original Greek: *concludam, si potero, Latine; Graecum enim hunc versum nostis omnes* (“I will end, if I am able, in Latin, for this Greek verse is known to all of you”).

\(^{22}\) E.g. he mentions Eurystheus, Oeneus, the Giants, the Centaurs, the Nemean lion, the Hydra, and Lerna. However, Cicero does refigure Hera as Juno in an instance of cultural equivalence.
indeed, he notes the problematic models represented by such representations of effeminised men in Greek poetry immediately following his translations. This, in turn, fits in with his wider characterisation of the Greek race in this text as congenitally lacking in the virtue of courage (*Tusc*. 2.65), and so as not to be imitated. This is in stark contrast to his treatment of Roman historical exempla in this work, which function as positive models of courageous behaviour to be emulated. So, then, this instance of Ciceronian poetic translation maps onto the more general model that we have developed, and feeds into the themes that we have examined in this dissertation.

A further important instance of Cicero’s poetic translation within his philosophical texts is his use of his youthful translation of Aratus in the *De Natura Deorum*. As has been noted by Bishop, Cicero’s translation takes on a new meaning within this new context, and, as Gee has noted, it functions as a proxy for the Stoic use of Aratus, presenting itself as a Roman cultural replacement for this important Greek text. The consideration of Cicero’s use of his own translated text within its new, philosophical context, then, will repay further study. In particular, it is possible that we can here, just as in his translation of the *Timaeus*, see Cicero’s use of a translated Greek text to make a

---

23 *Tusc*. 1.27: *sed videsne poetae quid mali adferant? lamentantes indicunt fortissimos viros, mollient animos nostros...* (“But do you see what harm the poets do? They show brave men weeping and so soften our souls...

24 See e.g. the example of Marius at *Tusc*. 2.53 who, Cicero claims, endured the pain of surgery without needing to be tied down.

politically sensitive point. If Holleman and Frazer are correct in seeing an error in Caesar’s calendar reform concerning the date of the rising of the constellation Lyra, then the selections Cicero quotes from his Aratea in the De Natura Deorum, written just a few months after the calendar reform was instigated, is telling. Cicero integrates only a small section of his translation into the De Natura Deorum, but he includes the section on the constellation Lyra, which is located at D. Nat. 2. 112, exactly where it should be, and where it was in Aratus’ original: before Cygnus. Could we here, then, see a subtle jibe at Caesar’s calendar reform, as Cicero asserts his own superior astronomical knowledge, as evidenced in his translation of Aratus? If this is, indeed, the case, the anecdote which comes down to us in Plutarch is even more pointed than Holleman supposes, as it points out not only an error in the Caesarian calendar reform, but also a locus of contention between Caesar and Cicero and a point of competition over claims to astronomical (and so cultural) authority. It will take further work, however, to unpack fully the

26 Holleman (1978) passim and Frazer (1929) vol II, 137. Frazer claims: “Caesar, or rather the astronomer on whom he depended, erred egregiously in his calculation; for the apparent rising of the constellation at morning fell two months earlier, on the fifth of November, and the true rising still earlier.” January 5th is the date recorded for the rising of this constellation in Pliny, Ovid, and Columella (Nat. Hist. 18.234; Fast. 1.315-16; and R. Rust. 11.2.97), although the constellation actually rises in November, and so this error has been generally attributed to Caesar’s calendar reforms. The De Natura Deorum was written in the summer of 45BC, with the calendar reforms having been instigated that January.

27 The anecdote is Plutarch Caes. 59.3, which recounts that the calendar reform was “an occasion for blame to those who envied Caesar and disliked his power. At any rate, Cicero the orator, we are told, when someone remarked that Lyra would rise on the morrow, said: ‘Yes, by decree’, implying that men were compelled to accept even this dispensation” (trans. Perrin) (οὐ μὴν ἄλλα καὶ τόσα τοῖς βασιλεύσει καὶ βαριομένοις την δύναμιν αἴτιας παρείχεν: Κικέρων γοῦν ὁ μήτωρ ὡς ἔοικε, φθάναντας τινὸς αὕρου ἐπιτελεῖν Λύραν, “ναῖ” ἐπεν, ἐκ διατάξηματος ὡς καὶ τόσο πρῶς ἀνάγκην τῶν ἀνθρώπων δεχομένων). Holleman p.497: “Cicero's comment appears to be much more caustic and revealing than modern historiography generally presents it to be”.

335
astronomical problems associated with the various references at work here, and determine that the references in Pliny, Columella, and Ovid which Frazer and Holleman rely on really are intended to refer to the date of the heliacal rising of Lyra, rather than being contaminated by a different astronomical dating system. 28

This study of Cicero’s poetic translation connects to the second area in which further research would be profitable – the translation of argumentative form. In the De Divinatione’s translations of Homer, for example, we can see Cicero’s the mimicking of earlier, Greek philosophical argumentative technique. 29 At other points it has also been noted that Cicero is at pains to reproduce Stoic dialectic style; while we have already observed an instance in which Cicero reformulates Plato’s argumentative style in rewriting a passage from his Phaedrus. 30 It would be useful to integrate these considerations into the study of Cicero’s philosophical translations, as they represent another area in which Cicero reproduces the information contained in his source texts in Latin discourse – in other words a form of translation. We might consider the wider effects of Cicero’s translations of argumentative style by comparing a text in which he is at pains to reproduce Stoic argumentative form (for example, Cato’s speech in book 3 of

28 See Ramsay and Wilkins (1901) 255-6 for the problem of the various definitions of “rising” and “setting” used in the ancient world.
29 See Long (1992) for the use of Homer by the Stoics. See Tusc. 2.26 for Cicero’s claim that, in quoting poetry, he is following the example of Philo.
30 Powell (1995); Ch.3, section IV, above.
the *De Finibus*) with a text in which he covers the same material, but casts this into non-Stoic style – namely, the *Paradoxa Stoicorum*. Again, then, this is an important subject and a key aspect of how Cicero responds to his Greek source texts, which is worthy of further study.

There is, then, much more to consider on this subject. However, this current study has been sufficient to shown that Cicero’s philosophical translations are worthy of scholarly attention in their own right, as creative rewritings of their original texts which can provide us with important information concerning Cicero’s philosophical and literary goals, as well as about the culture in which he was writing. There is a rich seam still to be mined in the study of Cicero’s philosophical translation, and it is hoped that this work has gone some way towards uncovering it, and preparing the way for future excavations.
Appendix A: Cicero’s Prose Translations

I: Epicurus

A: Direct Speech

1a. Tuscal. 3. 41-2 = Epicurus, Peri Telous fr. 67 Us. (Athenaeus 12.546e)

Tuscal. 3. 41-2: [41] quid tergiversamur, Epicure, nec fatemur eam nos dicere voluptatem, quam tu idem. cum os perfricuisti, soles dicere? sunt haec tua verba necene? in eo quidem libro, qui continet omnem disciplinam tuam, fungar enim iam interpretis munere, ne quis me putet fingere—dicis haec: “nec quidem habeo, quod intellegam bonum illud, detrahens eas voluptates quae sapore percipiuntur, [detrahens eas quae rebus percipiuntur verneris]31, detrahens eas quae auditu e canibus, detrahens eas etiam quae ex formis percipiuntur oculis suavis motiones, sive quae aliae voluptates in toto homine gignuntur quolibet sensu. nec vero ita dici potest, mentis laetitiam solam esse in bonis. laetantem enim mentem ita novi: spe eorum omnium, quae supra dixit, fore ut natura ipsis potiens dolore careat.”

[42] atque haec quidem his verbis, quivis ut intellegat, quam voluptatem norit Epicurus. deinde paulo infra: “saeppe quaesivi” inquit “ex is qui appellabantur sapientes, quid haberent quod in bonis relinquuerent, si illa detraxissent, nisi si vellent voces inanis fundere: nihil ab is potui cognoscere. qui si virtutes ebullire volent et sapientias, nihil aliud dicent nisi eam viam, qua efficiantur eae voluptates quas supra dixi.” quae secuntur, in eadem sententia sunt, totusque liber, qui est de summodata refferus est et verbis et sententiis talibus.

Athenaeus 12.546e (fr. 67 Us.): κ' ἀντῷ περὶ τέλους δέ φησιν οὕτω προσ· ὅπ γὰρ ἔρωσις δύναμε νοῆσαι τάσασθαι ἄφαιρόν μὲν τάς διὰ χωλόν ἡμονάζῃ, ἄφαιρόν δ' τάς δί' ἀφροδίσιον, ἄφαιρόν δὲ τάς δί' ἀκροαμάτων, ἄφαιρόν δὲ τάς διὰ μορφής κατ' ὅμην ἡδείας κινήσεις.

c.f. 1b (shorted version of 1 in indirect speech) De Fin. 2.7 = Epicurus, Peri Telous fr. 67 Us. (DL 10.6)

De Fin. 2.7: quippe qui testificetur ne intellegere quidem se posse ubi sit aut quod sit ullam bonum praeter illud, quod cibo et potione et aurium delectatione et obscena voluptate capiatur. an haec ab eo non dicuntur?

31 This is found in a marginal gloss in only one copy of the text (Vat. 3246). Pohlenz (1918) xvi accepts this as present in the original, having been transferred from a now lost copy of the text. Ströbel (1890) 61-2, however, is less enthusiastic about the reliability of this insertion, and of the correctors of this MS in general.
DL 10.6 (also fr. 67 Us.) γράφειν: ἐν τῇ τῷ Περὶ τέλους οὕτως: Ὡδ γὰρ ἔχειτε ἔχω τί νοησιόν τάγμαθαν, ἀφαίρετον μὲν τάς ὀλυσίας ἄφαρετον δὲ τάς ὃς ἀφοδίσιον καὶ τάς ὃς ἀφροδίσιον καὶ τάς ὃς ἀμφοτέρως.

2. Fin. 2.21 = Epicurus, KD10 in Diogenes Laertius 10.142.

in alio vero libro, in quo breviter comprehensis gravissimis sententias quasi oracula edidisse sapientiae dicitur, scribit his verbis, quae nota tibi profecto, Torquate, sunt – quis enim vestrum non edidit Epicuri κυρίας δεινός, id est quasi maxime ratis, quia gravissimae sint ad beate vivendum breviter edidisse sapientiae sententiae? – animadverte igitur recte hanc sententiam interpreten: [21] “si ea, quae sunt luxuriosis efficientia voluptatum, liberarent eos deorum et mortis et doloris metu docerentque qui essent fines cupiditatum, nihil haberemus <quod reprehenderemus>32, cum undique comperentur voluptatibus nec haberent una ex parte aliquid aut dolens aut aegrum, id est autem malum.” hoc loco tenere se Triarius non potuit. obsecro, inquit, Torquate, haec dicit Epicurus? quod mihi quidem visus est, cum sciret, velle tamen confitentem audire Torquantum. at ille non pertinuit saneque fidenter: istis quidem ipsis verbis, inquit; sed quid sentiat, non videtis.

DL 10.142.5 = KD10: Ei τὰ ποιητικὰ τῶν περὶ τούς ἀσώτους ἄδονν ἐνε τοὺς φόβους τῆς διανοίας τοὺς τῇ περὶ μετεώρον καὶ θανάτου καὶ ἀληθοῦν, ἢ τὸ τὸ πέρας τῶν ἐπιθυμίων ἐδίδοικαν, οὐκ ἦν τὸ ποτὲ ἐξέμεν ὁ τι μερῷθεν αὐτοῖς πανταχόθεν ἐκπληροῦμενοι τῶν ἄδονν καὶ οὐθαμόθεν οὔτε τὸ ἀλγον οὔτε τὸ λυπόμενον ἔχουσιν, ὥσπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κακὸν.

3. Fin. 1.68 (=KD28 in Diogenes Laertius 10. 148)

[68] quocirca eodem modo sapiens erit affectus erga amicum, quod in se ipsum, quosque labores propter suam voluptatem susciperet, eodem suscipiet propter amici voluptatem. quaeque de virtutibus dicta sunt, quem ad modum eae semper volupitantibus inhaerent, eadem de amicitia dicenda sunt. praecclare enim Epicurus his paene verbis: “eadem”, inquit, “scientia confirmavit animum, ne quod aut sempiternum aut diuturnum timeret malum, quae perspetit in hoc ipso vitae spatii amicitiae praesidium esse firmissimum.”

KD28 in Diogenes Laertius 10. 148: Ἡ αὖτη γνώμη θαρρεῖ φερεῖν τὸν ηθονίν τῷ ηθονίν ηθονίν νῦν πολυχρόνιον, καὶ τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὄρισμένοις ἀσφάλειαν φιλίας μάλιστα κατείδει συντελεσμένην.

4. Fin 2. 96 (=Diogenes Laertius 10. 22).

[96] audi, ne longe abeam, moriens quid dicat Epicurus, ut intellegas facta eius cum dictis discrepare: “Epicurus Hermarcho salutem. cum ageremus”, inquit, “vitae beatum et eundem supremum diem, scribemus haec. tanti autem aderant vesicae et torrimum morbi, ut nihil ad eorum magnitudinem

32 Added by Madvig.
posset accedere.” miserum hominem! si dolor summum malum est, dici aliter non potest. sed audiamus ipsum: “compensabatur”, inquit, “tamen cum his omnibus animi laetitia, quam capiebamus memoria rationum inventorumque nostrorum. sed tu, ut dignum est tua erga me et philosophiam voluntate ab adolescentulo suscepta, fac ut Metrodori tueare liberos.”

Diogenes Laertius 10. 22: ‘Ἡνὶ δὲ τελευτῶν γράφει πρὸς Ἰδρυμένα τῆν ἔπιστολήν (fr. 138 Us.): “Τὴν μακαρίαν ἄγοντες καὶ ἀμα τελευταίαν ἡμέραν τοῦ βίου ἐγράφομεν ὡμὴν ταύτην. στραγγορικά τε παρηκολούθει καὶ ὀδυνετικά πάθη ὑπερβολὴν οὐκ ἀπολείποντα τοῦ ἐν εαυτοῖς μεγέθους, ἀντιπαρατάττετο δὲ πάσιν τούτοις τὸ κατά ψυχῆν χαῖρον ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν γεγονότων ἡμῖν διαλογισμὸν μνήμη. σὺ δ’ ἁξίος τῆς ἕκ μειρακίων παραστάσεως πρός ἐμὲ καὶ φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιμελεῖ τῶν παίδων Μητροδόρου.”

5. ND I . 45 = Epicurus, KD 1 (DL10. 139)

[45] quae enim nobis natura informationem ipsorum deorum dedit, eadem insculpsit in mentibus, ut eos aeternos et beatos habemur, quod si ita est, vere exposita illa sententia est ab Epicuro, “quod beatum aeternumque sit, id nec habere ipsum negotii quicquam nec exhibere alteri, itaque neque ira neque gratia teneri, quod, quae talia essent, inbecilla essent omnia.”

Τὸ μακάριον καὶ ὅφθαιρον οὗτο αὐτὸ πράξατα ἔχει οὗτο ἄλλο παρέχει, οὕτω οὗτο ὅργας οὗτο χάρισι συνέχεται· ἐν ἀσθενεί γὰρ πάν τὸ τοιοῦτον, ἐν ἄλλοις (fg. 355 Us.) δὲ φησὶ τοὺς θεοὺς λόγῳ θεωρητικῶς, οὐχί μὸν καὶ ἄριστον ὑφιστάτος, οὐχὶ καὶ ἄλευσθεν εἰ συνεχεῖς ἐπιμέλειας τῶν ὑμῶν εἰδώλων ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποτελεσματών, ἀνθρωποειδείς.

B: Indirect Speech

6. Fin. I. 57 = ibid. 5 (DL10. 140)

eum enim certe nihil homini possit melius esse quam vacare omni dolore et molestia perfruuique maximis et animi et corporis voluptatibus, videtisne quam nihil praetermittatur quod vitam adiuver, quo facilius id, quod propositum est, summum bonum consequamur? clamat Epicurus, is quem vos nimis voluptatibus esse deditum dicitis; non posse iucunde vivi, nisi sapienter, honeste iustique vivatur, nec sapienter, honeste, iust, nisi iucunde.

Ὀδὶ έστιν ἡδεός ἦν ἄνευ τοῦ φρονίμου καὶ καλός καὶ δικαίος, <οὐδὲ> φρονίμως καὶ καλὸς καὶ δικαίως>33 ἄνευ τοῦ ἡδεός, ὅτε δὲ τοῦτο μὴ υπάρχει εἰς οὗ ἦν φρονίμως, καὶ καλὸς καὶ δικαίως υπάρχει, οὐκ ἔστι τοῦτον ἡδέος ζῆν.

33 This is added by Gassendus in order to make the Greek match the Ciceronian translation, and is accepted by many editors.
7. Fin. I. 63 = ibid. 16 (DL.10.144) and 19 (DL.10.144)\textsuperscript{34}

[63] Optime vero Epicurus, quod exiguum dixit fortunam intervenire sapienti maximasque ab eo et gravissimas res consilia ipsius et ratione administrari neque maorem voluptatem ex infinito tempore aetatis percipi posse, quam ex hoc perciatur, quod videamus esse finitum.

KD 16: Βραχέα σοφῷ τύχη παρεμπίπτει, τὰ δὲ μέγιστα καὶ κυριώτατα ὁ λογισμὸς διώκητε καὶ κατὰ τὸν συνεχῆ χρόνον τὸ διὸ διοικεῖ καὶ διοικήσε.

KD 19: Ὁ ἀπερώς χρόνος ἵσην ἔχει τὴν ἠδονήν καὶ ὁ πεπερασμένος, ἐὰν τις αὐτῆς τὰ πέρατα καταμετρήσῃ τῷ λογισμῷ.

II: Plato

1a. Tusc. I. 53-4 = Phaedr. 245c-246a

[53] Sed si, quals sit animus, ipse animus nesciet, dic queso, ne esse quidem se sciet, ne moveri quidem se? ex quo illa ratio nata est Platonis, quae a Socrate est in Phaedro explicata, a me autem posita est in sexto libro de re publica: XXIII. 'Quod semper movetur, aeternum est; quod autem motum aequat, aeternum est; neque igitur aeternum id esse, quod se ipsum nasci potest nec mori, vel concidat omne caelum omnisque natura <et> consistat necesse est nec vim necesse est a principio oriri omnia. ita fit, ut motus principium ex eo sit, quod ipsum a se movetur; id autem tamen nullum est principium, quod sinece est a principio oriri omnia. ita fit, ut motus principium ex eo sit, quod ipsum a se movetur; id autem neque nascitum nec mori vel concidat omne caelum omnisque natura <et> consistat necesse est nec vim ullam nasciscatur, quia a primo inpulsa movatur. cum pateat igitur aeternum id esse, quod semper moveat, quis est qui hanc naturam animis esse tributam neget? inanimum est enim omne, quod pulsu agitatur externo; quod autem est animal, id motu cietur interiore et suo; nam haec est propria natura animi atque vis. quae si est una ex omnibus quae se ipsa [semper] moveat, neque nata certe est et aeterna est'.

Ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἀθάνατος. τὸ γὰρ ἀεικίνητον ἀθάνατον· τὸ δ' ἄλλο κινοῦν καὶ ὑπ' ἄλλου κινούμενον, παῖδιν ἔχει ζωῆς, μόνον δὴ τὸ αὐτὸ κινοῦν. ἄτε οὐκ ἀπολέσθων έαυτό, οὔποτε λύγιζε κινούμενον, ἄλλα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις διὰ καίνεται τοῦτον πηγὴ καὶ ἀρχής κινήσεως. ἀρχὴ δὲ ἀγάνητην· ἦς ἀρχὴς γὰρ ἀνάγκη πάν τὸ γεγονόν πάν γίγνεσθαι, αὕτη δὲ μηδ' ἦς ένος· εἰ γὰρ ἐκ του ἀρχής γίγνοτο, οὐκ ἄν ἔτι ἀρχής γίγνοτο. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀρχήν ἐσιν, καὶ ἀδιάφθορον αὐτὸν ἀνάγκη ἐνα. ἀρχής γὰρ δὴ ἀπολομηνής οὔτε αὐτή ποτε ὥς ἐκ τοῦ ὁδός ἄλλο εξ έκείνης γίγνεται, ἐπεὶ εὖ ἀρχής δὲ τὰ πάντα γίγνεσθαι. οὕτω δὴ κινήσεως μὲν ἀρχή τὸ αὐτὸ αὐτὸ κινοῦν. τοῦτο δὲ οὔτε ἀπόλλυσθαι οὔτε γίγνεσθαι δυνατόν, ἢ πάντα τε οὐρανόν πᾶσάν τε γῆν εἰς ἔν

\textsuperscript{34} Pace Powell (1995), who attributes the original of this passage to KD 15.

341
c.f. 1b Rep. 6. 27 = Phaedr. 245c-246a (no acknowledgement of translation)

[27] Nam quod semper movetur, aeternum est. Quod autem motum affert alicui, quodque ipsum agitatur aliunde, quando finem habet motus, vivendi finem habeat necesse est. Solum igitur, quod se movet, quia numquam deseritur a se, numquam ne moveri quidem desinit. Quin etiam ceteris, quae moventur, hoc fons, hoc principium est movendi. Principii autem nulla est origo; nam ex principio oriturum omnia, ipsum autem nulla ex re alia nasci potest; nec enim esset id principium, quod gigneretur aliunde. Quodsi numquam oritur, ne cessisset quidem omnia. Nam principium extinctum nec ipsum ab alio renascetur nec ex se aliius creabit, si quidem necesse est a principio oritur omnia. Ita fit, ut motus principium ex eo sit, quod ipsum a se movetur. Id autem nec nasci potest nec mori; vel concidat omne caelum omnisque natura et consistat necesse est nec vim ullam nanciscatur, qua a primo impulsa moveatur. (28) Cum pateat igitur aeternum id esse, quod a se ipso moveatur, quis est, qui hanc naturam animis esse tributam neget? Inanimum est enim omne, quod pulsu agitatur externo; quod autem est animal, id motu cietur interno et suo; nam haec est propria natura animi atque vis. Quae si est una ex omnibus, quae sese moveat, neque nata certe est et aeterna est.

c.f. 1c Cato Maior 78

78. Audiebam Pythagoram Pythagoreosque, incolas paene nostros, qui essent Italici philosophi quondam nominati, numquam, dubitasse, quin ex universa mente divina deliberatos animos haberemus. Demonstrabatur mihi praeterea, quae Socrates supremo vitae die de immortalitate animorum disseruisset, is qui esset omnium sapientissimus oraculo Apollinis iudicatus. Quid multa? Sic persuasi mihi, sic sentio, cum tanta celeritas animorum sit, tanta memoria praeteritorum futurorumque prudentia, tot artes, tantae scientiae, tot inventa, non posse eam naturam, quae res eas contineat, esse mortalem, cum semper agitetur animus nec principium motus habeat, quia se ipse moveat, ne numquam habiturum esse motus, quia numquam se ipse sit relicturus; et, cum simplex animi esset natura, neque haberet in se quicquam admiuam dispensat atque dissimiliter, non posse eum dividi; quod si non posset, non posse interire; magnoque esse argumento homines scire plerique ante quam nati sint, quod iam pueri, cum artis difficilis discant, ita celeriter res innumerabilis arripiant, ut eas non tum primum accipere videantur, sed reminisci et recordari. Haec Platonis fere.


(66) "Cum" enim inquit "inexplebiles populi fauces exaruerunt libertatis siti, malisque usus ille ministris

---

35 Not included by Powell (1995) in his list of translations.

36 Powell includes this in “passages freely adapted or summarized in indirect speech”, but this is clearly not the way it is presented.
non modice temperatam sed nimis meracam libertatem sitiens hausit, tum magistratus et principes, nisi valde lenes et remissi sint et large sibi libertatem ministrant, inequitavit insulam aut arguit, praepotentes reges tyrannos vocant. *puto enim tibi haec esse nota.* [vetro mihi] inquit ille (Laelius) *notissima.* (67) (Scipio) 'ergo illa sequuntur, *eos qui parent principibus agitari ab eo populo et servos voluntarios appellari; eos autem qui in magistratu privato similis esse velit, eosque privatos qui efficiant ne quid inter privatum et magistratum differat, <ef>-ferunt laudibus, [et] maectant honoribus, ut necesse sit in eius modi re publica plena libertatis esse omnia, ut et privata domus omnis vacet dominatione, et hoc malum ad bestias perveniat, denique ut pater filium metuat, filius patrem neclegat, absit omnis pudor, ut plane liberi sint, nihil intersit civis an peregrinus, magister ut discipulos metuat et iis blandiatur, spennantque discipli magistro, adulenses ut semin siibi pondus adsumant, senes autem ad ludum adulcescentum descended, ne sint iis odiosi et graves; ex quo fit ut etiam servi se liberius gerant, uxor eodem iure sint quo viri, inque tanta libertate canes etiam et equi, aselli denique libere [sint] sic incurrant ut iis de via decedendum sit. ergo ex hac infinita," inquit, "licentia haec summa cogitum, ut ita fastidiosae mollesque mentes evadant civium, ut si minima vis adhibeatur imperii, irascantur et perferre nequeant; ex quo leges quoque incipiant neclegere, ut plane sine ullo domino sint.'"
3. Tusc. I. 97-9 = Apol. 40C-42a

quae est igitur eius oratio, qua facit cum Plato usum apud iudices iam morte multatum? 'Magna me' inquit 'spes tenet, iudices, bene mihi evenire, quod mittar ad mortem. necesse est enim sit alterum de duobus, ut aut sensus omnino omnes mors auferat aut in alium quandam locum ex his locis migretur. quam ob rem, sive sensus extinguitur quoque eo somno similis est, qui non numquam etiam sine visis somniorum placatissimam quietem adfert, di boni, quid luceri est emori! aut quam multi dies reperiri possunt, qui tali nocti anteponantur! cui si similis est perpetuas omnis consequentis temporis, quis me beatior?

[98] sin vera sunt quae dicuntur, migrationem esse mortem in eas oras, quis qui e vita excesserunt incolunt, id multo iam beatius est. tene, cum ab is, qui se iudicum numero haberi volunt, evaseris, ad eos venire, qui vere iudices appellentur. Minoem Rhadamanthum Aeacum Triptolemum, convenireque eos qui iuste <et> cum fide vixerint —haec peregrinatio mediocris vobis videri potest? ut vero conloqui cum Orpheo Musaeo Homero Hesiodo Iliceat, quanti tandem aestimatis? equidem saepe emori, si fieri posset, vellem, ut ea quae dico mihi liceret invidius. quanta delectatione autem adfererem, cum Palamedem, cum Aiacam, cum alios iudicio iniquo circumventos convenirem! temptare etiam summis regis, qui maximas copias duxit ad Troiam, et Ulxi Silisquhique prudentiam, nec ob eam rem, cum haec exquererem sic ut hie faciebam, capite damnamer.— Ne vos quidem, iudices i qui me absolvisistis, mortem timueritis.

[99] nec enim cuiquam bono mali quicquum evenire potest nec vivo nec mortuo, nec unquam eius res a dis

immortali neglegentur, nec mihi ipsi hoc accidit fortuito. nec vero ego is, qui a quibus accusatus aut a quibus condemnatus sum, habeo quod succenseam, nisi quod mihi nocere se crediderunt. et haec quidem hoc modo; nihil alterum melius extremo: 'sed tempus est inquit 'iam hinc abire, me, ut moriar, vos, ut vitam agatis. utrum autem sit sicut di, inmortales scint, hominem quidem scire arbitror neminem.'

Ἐννοήσωμεν δὲ καὶ τῆς ὡς πολλή ἑλπὶς ἐστίν ἀγαθὸν αὐτόν εἶναι. διὸν γὰρ θάτερον ἐστὶν τὸ τεθνάναι ἤ γὰρ οὖν οἷον μηδὲν ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ ἀδιόθεν ἀλλὰ ἀμβędον ἑχειν τὸν τεθνήσασα, ἢ κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα μεταβολὴ τῆς τυχαίας οὐσίας καὶ μετοίκησις τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἐνθέδεν εἰς ἄλλον τόπον, καὶ εἶ δὴ μηδὲνα ἀσθήσεις ἐστὶν ἀλλ’ οὖν ἐπειδὴ τὰς καθοδόν μηδ’ ἄνωρ μηδὲν ἀρμ. θανάσιον κήρος ἐν εἴ ὁ θάνατος — ἡγό γὰρ ἂν οἷα ἐτίνα κόκκυκων δέος ταῦτα τὴν νῦκτα ἐν ἡ οὔτως καταδρόν οὖν μηδὲν ἄνωρ ἄθετα, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας τὰς τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἀπεγείραντο τῇ τή νυκτί δέος αἰχμήμων ἐπεῖν πόσας ἀμείων ἄμφοτέρως νῦκτας ταύτα τῆς νῦκτος βεβιώκει τὸ ἕν τοῦ ἐαυτοῦ βίο, οἴμαι ὁ μὴ ὁτι ἰδίον την ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα ὑπερθύμβου ἐν αὐτὸν τοῖς τῆς ἄλλας ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας — ἐν οἷν τοιοῦτον ὁ θάνατος ἐστίν, κήρος ἐς τάς λεγόμενα, ὡς ἐκεῖ ἐς αὐτὰς τὰς τεθνεύσεις, τί μεῖζον οὔτως τοῦτο εἴ ὁ, ὃ άνθρωπος ἀδιακατά, εἰ γὰρ τὰς ἀρχόμενας εἰς Ἀττιδόν, ἀπαλλαγές τούτων τὸν φασκόντων δικαστῶν εἶναι, εἴρησεν τοῖς ὡς ἀληθοὺς δικαστῶν, οὔτε καὶ λέγων ἐκεὶ δικάζων, Μίνως τούς καὶ Ραδάμανθος καὶ Λάμακος καὶ Τριπόλεμος καὶ ἄλλους ὅσιον τὸν ἡμέραν δικαίον ἔγενοτο εἰς τὸ ἐαυτῶν βίο, ἀποθείετο ἐν εἴ ἡ ἀποθείετο; ὁ ἀφθονεῖσθαι καὶ Μουσαίων καὶ Ἡσίοδο καὶ Ομήρου ἐπὶ ὀπόσο ἐν ταῖς δέξιαις ἂν οἷα; ἢ ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ πολλάκις ἀδέλφω τεθνάναι εἰ ταῦτα ἐστὶν ἠληθί. ἐπι τοῦ ἐματρότητος καὶ αὐτὸ τὴν θαυμαστὶν ἐν εἴ ἡ διαστήματι αὐτόθι, ὅπως ἀντίγομον Παλαμηδῆς καὶ Λιαντὶ τὸν Δελφόνων καὶ εἰ τὰς ἄλλος τοῖς τοιοῦτον διὰ κρίνει ὁδὸν τῆς ἡμέρας, ἀντιπαραβάλλειν τὰ ἑμαυτῶν πάντα πρὸς τὰ ἐκεῖνον — ὡς ἐς αὐτὰς, ἐν ἡ ἀράτος καὶ ἡ ἡ ὁ μέγιστος, τοις ἐκεὶ ἐξετάζονται καὶ ἐρευνοῦνται ὡσπερ τοῖς ἑνενεία διαήγεσθαι, τὰς τοῖς σφόδρας ἐστὶν καὶ τὰς ἐστίν μὲν, ἐστὶν δ’ οὖ. ἐπὶ πόσον δ’ ἂν τοῖς ὁ άνθρωπος δικαστά, δεξιάτερον ἐξεπάνω τοῖς ἀπ’ ἥδεο ἀναγόμενον τὴν πολλὰ στρατιάν ἢ ὁμοσσιατίκην ἢ ἅλλος μιρίας ἂν τοῖς εἴπο τοῖς άνθρωπος καὶ γυναῖκας, οἷς ἐκεῖ διαλέξεσθαι καὶ συνενεία καὶ ἐξεκτείνεται ἀμέλειαν ἐν εἴ ἀδεμονίας; πάντως ὁ δήμον τοῦτο γε ἕνακα νο ἐκεῖ ἀποκτείνοντας τα  ὁρὰ ἀλλὰ ἀδεμονεταρίων εἴπον ὁ οὖτος τὸν ἐνδεχεσθε, ἢ ἡ ἡ τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἀθάνατοι εἴπον, ἐκεῖ γάρ τὰ λεγόμενα ἠληθής. Ἑλλα καὶ ὁμοίως χρήθ, ὁ άνθρωπος δικασταὶ, εὐθυλίπδας εἴπον πρὸς τὸν θάνατον,
4. Tusc. 5. 34-5 = Gorg. 470d-1a

Et si Zeno Citiæus, advena quidam et ignobilis verborum opifex, insinuasse se in antiquam philosophiam videtur, huius sententiae gravitas a Platonis auctoritate repetatur, apud quem saepe haec oratio usurpata est, ut nihil praeter virtutem diceretur bonum.

[35] Velut in Gorgia Socrates, cum esset ex eo quaesitum, Archelaum Perdicca filium, qui tum τε τα κα τοια λοποντες ἂπερ ἐγὼ ἡμας ἐλπζων, ἔνων ὑμιν δοκοσιν ἡ χρηματον ἢ ἄλλον τον προτερον ἐπιμελειζθαι ἢ ἀρτης, και ἐν δοκοσι τι ειναι μηδεν οντες, ονειδιζεται αυτοσ εςπερ ἐγω ὑμαν, ότι ουκ ἐπιμελοιζαται ὅν δει, και ολονα τι ειναι οντες οιδενοι αζειοι. και ἐν ταυτα ποιητε, δικαια πεπονθως ἐγω ἔσωμαι ὅτι υμον αυτος τε και οι υς ἄλλα γαρ ὑδη ώρα απειναι, ἐμιν μεν ἀποθανομενοι ἡμιν δε βιοσομενοι ὁπατεροι δε ἡμων ἐρχονται επι ομοιων πράξεια, ἀληθον παντι πλην ὅ το θεό.

5. Tusc. 5. 36 = Menex. 247e-248a

Quid vero? in Epitaphio quo modo idem? “Nam cui vīro” inquit “ex se ipso apta sunt omnia, quae ad beate vivendum ferunt, nec suspensa aliorum aut bono casu aut contrario pendere ex alterius eventis et errare coguntur, huic optime vivendi ratio comparata est. Hic est ille moderatus, hic fortis, hic sapiens, hic et nascentibus et cadentibus cum reliquis commodis, tum maxime liberis parebit et boaediet praecepto illi veteri; neque enim laetus habebat unquam nec maeret nīmis, quod semper in se ipso omnem spatium reponet sui.” Ex hoc igitur Platonis quasi quodam sancto augustoque fonte nostra omnis manabit oratio.
6. Tusc. 5. 100 = Epist. 7. 326b-c 'his fere verbis'

est praecella epistula Platonis ad Dionis propinquos, in qua scriptum est his fere verbis: "quou cum venisset, vita illa beata, quae ferebatur, piena Italicarum Syracusiarumque mensarum, nullo modo mihi placuit, his in die saturnum fieri nec unquam pernoctaret solum ceteraque, quae comitantur huic vitae, in qua sapiens nemo efficietium unquam, moderatus vero multo minus. quae enim natura tam mirabiliter temperari potest?"

εἰλίναν δε με ὑ ταύτη λεγόμεναι αὐτί βίος εὐδαιμονίας. Ἡταλιστικὸν τε καὶ Συρακουσιον τραπεζῶν πλήρης, οὐδέμια οὐδαμῶς ἤρειν, δὲς τῆς ἤμερας ἐμπεπλημμένων ἐμη καὶ μηδέποτε κοιμώμενων μόνω βίκτωρ, καὶ δοὰ τούτω ἐπιτρέπομεται συνέπεται τοῦ βίου· ἐκ γὰρ τούτων τῶν ἔθνον οὔτ' ἀν φρονίμους ὁδοὺς ποτε γενέσθαι τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν οὐρανῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐκ νέου ἐπιτρέποντος δύναται — οὔτ' οὖτος θαυμαστή φύσει κράτησται — σώφρον δε οὐδ' ἄν μελλῆσαι ποτὲ γενέσθαι...

7. Div. 1. 60-1 = Rep. 9. 571c-572b 'verba ipsa Platonis expressi'

Nunc onusti cibo et vino perturbata et confusa cernimus. Vide quid Socrates in Platonis Politia loquatur. Dicit enim cum dormientibus ea pars animi quae mentis et rationis sit particeps sopita langueat, illa autem

τῇ γὰρ ὄτι εἰ ἄνω τῆς ἐν ηλικίας ἡμέρας ἡγεῖται, ἢ ψυχῆς ἐνεδίων, ἤςον λογιστικῶν καὶ ἠμερῶν καὶ ἀρχῶν εὐκαίρων, τὸ δὲ θυρωδοῖς τε καὶ ἄρουρον, ὡς πέφρασιν, προκειμένων τῆς ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἀνθρώπους, τοῖς δὲ προσφώνοντες, μικρὸν τε ἐφ' ἄλλου ἀνθρώποι καὶ θεῶν καὶ θερίων, μικράντων καὶ ζητοῦν, βρωμάτως τε ἀπέχεσθαι καὶ ἐπεί γενέσθαι ἐν ᾧ ἄνωτας οὐδέν αὐτόν ἕλειται ἐν ἄνασκομνής. Ἀλλὰ ἐπειδή, ἐφ' ἀλληλείπην. Ὅταν δὲ τοῖς οἰμιᾳ διαπέδωτος τῇ θρίσκοντας καὶ καταφρόνοντας, καὶ εἰς τὸν ἔπεμον ἣ τὸ λογιστικὸν μὲν ἐγείρας ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀταίρεσις λόγων καὶ τάκτων, εἰς σὺνοικίαν αὐτῶν ἀφικομένος, τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν δὲ μῆτε ἐνεδίων τοῖς ἀρχῶν θεοῦν καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις οὕτω πληρωμῇ, ὡς ἐν κοιμηθῇ καὶ μῆ παρεξή θόρυβον τὸ βελτίστορ χαιρόν καὶ ἐν ἔγειρας, ἀλλ' ἐὰν αὐτό καθ' ἀυτὸ μόνον καθαρὸν σκοπεῖν καὶ ἀρέσεσθαι τοῖς ἀιθήναις δὲ μὴ οὖν, ἢ τί
τὸν γεγονότων ἢ ὄντων ἢ καὶ μελλόντων, ὦσαίτος δὲ καὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς πραᾶνας καὶ μὴ τισιν εἰς ὅργας ἔλθον κεκινημένον τῷ θυμῷ καθεδρῷ, ἀλλὰ ἔστινσα καὶ τὸ δόξο εἶδός, τὸ μετὰ τὴν κεύσην ἐν ὄ εἰ τὸ φρονεῖν ἐγένεται, οὕτως ἀναπαύονται, οἷοθ' ἃτις τε ἀληθείας ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ μάλλης ἀπετεί καὶ ἠκάστα παράνομοι τότε καὶ ὅρες φαντάζονται τῶν ἐνυπνίων.

8. Leg. 2. 45 = Leg. 12. 955e-956b 'si modo interpretari potero'

Marcus: [45] Agri autem ne consecrentur, Platoni prorsus adsentior, qui si modo interpretari potuero, his fere verbis utitur: Terru iuatu t focus domiciliorum sacra deorum omnium est. Quocirca ne quis iterum idem consecrato. Aurum autem et argentum in urbis et privatis et in fanis invidiosa res est. Tum ebor ex inani<mi> corpore extractum haud satís castum donum deo. Iam color albus praecepue decorus in delubris idem consecrato. Aurum autem et argentum in urbibus et privatim et in fanis invidiosa res est. Tum ebor ex inani<mi> corpore extractum haud satís castum donum deo. Iam color albus praecepue decorus

Atticus: Habeo ista. Nunc de sacris perpetuis et de Manium iure restat.

Marcus: O miram memoriam Pomponii tuam! At mihi ista exciderant.

9. Off. 3.38=Plato,Rep.2.359d-360b

[38] Atque etiam ex omni deliberatione celandi et occultandi spes opinioque removenda est; satis enim nobis, si modo in philosophia aliquid profecimur, persuasum esse debet, si omnes deos hominesque celare possimus, nihil tamen avare, nihil inustae, nihil libidinose, nihil incontinenter esse faciendum. Hinc ille Gyges inducit a Platone, qui cum terra discississet magnis quibusdam imbris, descendit in illum hiatum aeneumque equum, ut ferunt fabulae, animadverterit, cujus in lateribus fores essent; quibus apertis corpus hominis mortui vidit magnitudine invisitata anulumque aurum in digito; quem ut detraxis, ipse induit (erat autem regius pastor), tum in concilium se pastorum receptit. Ibi cum palam eius anuli ad palmam converterat, a nullo videbatur, ipse autem omnia videbat; idem rursus videbatur, cum in locum anulum insererat. Itaque hac opportunitate anuli usus reginae stuprum intulit evque adiuatrice regem dominum interemt, sustulit quos obstare arbitrabantur, nec in his eum facinoribus quisquam potuit videre. Sic repente anuli beneficio rex exortus est Lydiae. Hunc igitur ipsum anulum si habeat sapiens, nihil plus sibi licere putet peccare, quam si non haberet; honesta enim bonis viris, non occulta quaeruntur.
θήκας a quo item funerum sumptus praefinitur ex censibus a minis quinque usque ad minam. Deinceps dicit extrui autem vetat sepulcrum altius, quam quod quinque homines quinque diebus absolverint, nec religionum; quem nos morem tenemus. De sepulcris autem dicit haec: vetat ex agro culto, eove qui coli πράττειν κατασχε ἔθαυγενείον τον δακτυλίόν· καθήμενον oũn metà τῶν ἄλλων τυχέν τῆν σφενόνην τοῦ δακτυλίου περιαγγόντα πρὸς ἑαυτόν ἐς τὸ εἶπον τῆς χειρός, τοῦτο δὲ γενομένου αὐτὸν γενέσθαι τοῖς παρακαθημένοις, καὶ διαλέγεσθαι ὡς περὶ οἰχομένου. καὶ τὸν θαυμάζων τε καὶ πάλιν ἐπιθη-λαφώντα τὸν δακτυλίον στρέφει ἕξω τῆν σφενόνην, καὶ στρέφεται πάλιν τῆν σφενόνην καὶ τοῦτο ἐννοεῖ σαθημέραθαι τοῦ δακτυλίου εἰ ταύτην ἔχου τῆν δύναμιν, καὶ αὐτῷ οὕτω συμβίαινει, στρέφοντι μὲν ἑπάντω τὴν σφενόνην ἀδίλλῳ γίγνεσθαι, ἐξω δὲ δήλῳ—αἰσθήμενον δὲ εὖθες διαπράξατο σοῖς ἐσπευότας τῶν ἐξόλων γενέσθαι τὸν παρὰ τὸν βασιλέα, ὕλόντα δὲ καὶ τὴν γνώμα τούτοις μοχύσασα, μετ’ ἐκείνης ἐπιθήμενν τὸν βασιλέα ἀποκείσθαι καὶ τὴν ἀρχήν οὕτω κατασχεῖν. εἰ οὖν δόλω τοῦτοι δακτυλίῳ γενόθηναι, καὶ τὸν μὲν ὁ δίκαιος περιθέτω, τὸν δὲ ὁ ἅδικος, ὡδεὶς ἄν γενότω, ὡς δόξειν, οὕτως ἀδαμάντιος, ὃς ἂν μείνειν ἐν τῇ δίκαιοιν καὶ τολμήσαν ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἄλλων καὶ μὴ ἄπεσθαι, ἐξων αὐτῷ καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἁγορᾶς ἁδεύς ὅτι βούλιοτο λαμβάνειν, καὶ εἰςοίντι εἰς τὰς οἰκίας συγγίνεσθαι ὅτι βούλιοτο, καὶ ἀποκείσθαι καὶ ἐκ δεσμῶν λιείν οἰκίσαις βούλιοτο, καὶ τάλλα πράπεται ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἰδιότειν ὅντα.

10. Leg. 2. 67-8 = Plato, Leg. 12. 958d-e

[67] Haec igitur Athenienses tui. Sed videamus Platonem, qui iusta funerum reicit ad interpretes religionum; quem nos morem tenemus. De sepulceris autem dicit haec: vetat ex agro culto, eove qui coli possit, ullam partem sumi sepulcro; sed quae natura agri tantum modo efficere possit, ut mortuorum corpora sine detrimento vivorum recipiat, ea potissimum ut compleatur; quae autem terra fruges ferre et ut mater cibos suppditate possit, eam ne quis nobis minuat neve vivos neve mortuos.

[68] Extrui autem vetat sepulcrum altius, quam quod <quinque homines> quinque diebus absolverint, nec e lapide excitari plus nec inponi, quam quod capiat laudem mortui incisam ne plus quattuor herois versibus, quos longos appellat Ennius. Habemus igitur huius quoque auctoritate de sepulcris summi viri, a quo item funerum sumptus praefinitur ex censibus a minus quinque usque ad minam. Deinceps dicit eadem illa de immortalitate animorum et reliqua post mortem tranquillitate honorum, poenis impiorum.

θήκας d’ eína τῶν χωρίων ὑπόσα μὲν ἐγράφαμα μηδαμοὶ, μῆτε τι μέγα μῆτε τι σμικρὸν μηδαμα, ἢ δὲ ἡ χώρα πρὸς τούτ’ αὐτὸ μοῦν μῆν ἔχει, τὰ τῶν τετελευτηκότων σώματα μάλιστα ἀληθῆς τούτους τὸς ζῶος δεχομένη κράτητε, ταῦτα ἐκπληροῦν, τοῖς δὲ ἀνθρώποις δὲα τροφὴν μὴν οὖσα ἡ γῆ πρὸς ταῦτα πέρυτεν βοώσθησαι φέρειν, μῆτε ζῶον μῆτε τις ἀποθανόν σταυρεῖτο τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἡμῶν. χώρα δὲ μη χοῦν ψυχότερον πέντε ἀνθρώπων ἐργον, ἐν πέντε ἡμέραις ἀποτελομένων· λίθων δὲ ἐπιστήματα μὴ μείζων ποτεν ἢ δὲα δέχεσθαι τῶν τοῦ τετελευτηκότος ἐγκόμια βίων μὴ πλίων τετάρων ἱροικῶν στίχων.

348
11a. De Fin 2.45 = Epist. 9.358a

eademque ratio fecit hominem hominum adpetentem cumque iis natura et sermone et usu congruentem, ut
profectus a caritate domesticorum ac suorum serpat longius et se implicet primum civium, deinde omnium
mortalium societate atque, ut ad Archytam scriptit Plato, non sibi se soli natum meminerit, sed patriae,
sed suis, ut perexigua pars ipsi reliquatur.

ἀλλὰ κάκεϊν δὲι σε ἐνθημεσθαι, ὅτι ἐκαστὸς ἦμων οὐχ αὐτὸ μόνον γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ τῆς γενέσεως
ημῶν τὸ μὲν τὶ ἡ πατρίς μερίζεται, τὸ δὲ τι ἡ γεννήσαντες, τὸ δὲ οἱ λοιποὶ φίλοι, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τοῖς καιροῖς
dioται τοῖς τὸν βίον ἦμων καταλαμβάνωσι.

c.f. 11b. De Off 1.22 = Epist. 9.358a

[22] Sed quoniam, ut praecclare scriptum est a Platone
non nobis solum nati sumus ortusque nostri
partem patria vindicat, partem amici
atque, ut placet Stoicis, quae in terris gignantur, ad usum hominum
omnia creari, homines autem hominum causa esse generatos, ut ipsi inter s
se aliis aliī prodesse possent, in
hoc naturam debemus ducem sequi, communes utilitates in medium adferre, mutatione officiorum, dando
accipiendo, tum artibus, tum opera, tum facultatis hominum inter homines societatem.

12. De Fin 2.52 = Phaedr. 250d

[52] “ocularum,” inquit Plato, “est in nobis sensus acerrimus, quibus sapientiam non cernimus. quam illa
ardentis amores excitaret sui!”

13. De Div 1.52 = Crito 44a-b

est apud Platonem Socrates, cum esset in custodia publica, dicens Critoni, suo familiari, sibi post tertium
die esse moriendum; vidisse se in somnis
Homericum quendam eius modi versum:
"Tertia te Phthiae tempestas laeta locabit."

Neither 11a, nor 11b are included by Powell (1995).


14. Tusc. 1.103 = Phaedo 115

de qua Socrates quidem quid senserit, apparent in eo libro in quo moritur, de quo iam tam multa diximus.

[103] cum enim de immortalitate animorum disputavisset et iam moriendi tempus urgeret, rogatus a Critone, quem ad modum sepeliri vellet, 'multam vero' inquit 'operam, amici, frustra consumpsi; Critoni enim nostro non persuasi me hinc avolatum neque mei quicquam relicturum. verum tamen, Crito, si me adsequi potueris aut sicubi nactus eris, ut tibi videbitur, sepelito. sed, mihi crede, nemo me vestrum, cum hinc excerseret, consequetur.'

[KP.] Taetit mi ctoioin prothompmemba, ephe, ohoti poieiv- thpoomen de s in hoppovn;

[2Ω.] Opoc o Un, ephe, boilhsethe, oovpn ge iaphite te me kai mi efkipwv hymaz. Gelasias de oma hspuha kai prwz hymaz apofwvews eipwv. Oe peitho, o anwres, Kritovna, ows egw othi othi Sokratizh, o vni diwalegionvos kai diatpntov ekastov onn lewennv, all oitei me ekivn w ihywv einai o dheti elivn astepon vekron, kai eorwta de polw me thept. eti de egw paiai polw lwon peusewma, ows, epeidh nivo to fwrmacovn, oikh ovm paramevov, all olykoomai apioin eis makaron dh tinas evdaiimovias, taetit mi dokeo autw allwv legein, paramevngmenos oma v wv hymaz, oma d' euanovn. engipwswse othi me prwz Kritovna, ephe, tin einantiai egrwv dh ni othi prwz toiv dikastov egrvatw. ohoti mwn xap h ni paramevnein hymaz de h mnh ni paramevnein engipwswse epeidh anpouhvw, all olykoomai apinonta, lwa Kritovn ridon fipw, kai mi orwvn mou to soimi h koymenon h katorowptunovon anganakht epwr eimov ows deinw paschontos, mnh de liph en tis taphe ows ni protisteta Sokratiz h ekfpvri h katorwpteta. ei xap xapthe, o d' de, o oivste Kritovn, to mi kalvov legein oth mwnon eis autov toth plemvlev, alla kai kaonov ti eipouet taws wnavis, alla thpren te chre kai panai toymon soima thpente, kai thpente othwv deko othi apo fision h ni maliota hppovmov einai.

c.f. also Cat. Mai 6-9 = Rep. 1 328e-330a, which does not explicitely translate, but takes the Platonic passage as a clear model

III. Xenophon

A Direct Speech

1. Cato Maior 79 = Xen. Cyrop. 8. 7 . 1 7-22

[79] Apud Xenophonem autem moriens Cyrus maior haec dicit: 'Nolite arbitrari, O mihi carissimi filii, me, cum a vobis discessero, nusquam aut nullum fore. Nec enim, dum eram vobiscum, animum meum videbatis, sed eum esse in hoc corpore ex eis rebus quas gerebam intellegebatis. Eundem igitur esse credito, etiamsi nullum videbatis. Nec vero clarorum virorum post mortem honores permanerent, si nihil eorum ipsorum animi efficerent, quo diutius memoriam sui teneremus. Mihi quidem numquam persuaderi

potuit animos dum in corporibus essent mortalis vivere, cum excessissent ex eis emori; nec vero tum animum esse insipientem cum ex insipiente corpore evasisset, sed cum omni admissione corporis liberatus purus et integer esse coepisset, tum esse sapientem. Atque etiam, cum hominis natura morte dissolvitur, ceterarum rerum perspicuum est quo quaque discedat, abeunt enim illuc omnia, unde orta sunt; animus autem solus nec cum adeo nec cum discernist apparatus. iam vero videtis nihil esse morti tam simile quam somnum. [81] Atqui dormientium animi maxime declarant divinitatem suam; multa enim, cum remissi et liberi sunt, futura conspicunt; ex quo intellegitur quales futuri sint, cum se plane corporis vinculis relaxaverint. Quia re, si haec ita sunt, sic me collitote, "inquit, "ut deum, sin una est iteritur amicus cum corpore, vos tamen, deos verentes, qui hanc omnem pulchritudinem tuentur et regunt, memoriae nostri pie inviolateque servabitis."

XXIII. Cyrus quidem haec moriens; nos, si placet, nostra videamus.

où γὰρ δήποτε τοῦτο γε σαφῶς δοκεῖται εἰδέναι ὡς οὕδεν ἔτι ἐγὼ ἐσομαι, ἐπειδὰν τὸν ἀνθρωπίνου βίου τελευτήσαο; οὐδὲ γὰρ νῦν τοι τὴν γ’ ἐμὴν ψυχὴν ἐσώμετε, ἀλλ’ οἷς διεπράττετο, τούτους αὐτὸν ὡς οὕδαν κατεφράτηο. τάς δὲ τὸν ἄθαντα παθόντων ψυχὰς οὕδον κατενοησάτε οἷος μὲν φόβος τοὺς μιαφώνοις ἐμβάλλουσιν, οἷος δὲ παλιμναίας τοῖς ἀνόσιοις ἐπεμπούσας; τοῖς δὲ φθείονοις τὰς τιμὰς διαμένειν ἐτι ἂν δοκεῖτε, εἰ μηδὲνας αὐτὸν εἰς ψυχαὶ κύρια ἱπατείαν; οὐδὲν ἔγγειο, ὁ παῖδες, οὐδὲ τοῦτο πότωτε ἐπείδαθν ὡς ἡ ψυχὴ ἔος μὲν ἐν ἑνθεώ τὸ σώματι ἂν ὅτι ὅτι καὶ τὰ θυγατρὶα σώματα ὅσον ἐν ἑνὶ χρόνῳ ἢ ἡ ψυχή, ἐξεπήδητα. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὅπως ἀφρόν ἐστι ἡ ψυχή, ἐπειδὰν τὸν ἀφρόνος σώματος δύχα γένειτα, οὐδὲ τοῦτο πέσεισα; τοῦ ἀφρόνος σώματος δύχα γένειτα, οὐδὲ τοῦτο πέσεισα; ἀλλ’ ὅταν ζῶσθαις καὶ καθαρῶς ὁ νοῦς ἐκκριθή, τότε καὶ θρονὶσσάμοι τούτων εἰκὸς ἔγνω. διαλογισμὸν δὲ ἀνθρώπου δήδα ἐστιν ἑλκία ἐπὶ τύν ἐκάντων πρὸς τὸ ὁμόφωλον πλὴν τῆς ψυχῆς- αὕτη δὲ μόνη οὕτε παροῦσα οὔτε ἑποίσα ἄραται; ἑνοήσατε δ’, δήθη ὅτι ἑγγύτερον μὲν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων θεαμάτων οὐδὲν ἔστων ἔπονεν δ’ ἢ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς τότε δήποτε θεοτάτη καταφαινεται καὶ τότε τοῦ μελλόντων προορίζετο τότε γὰρ, ὡς δική, μᾶλλον ἐξερευνηται. εἰ μέν οὖν οὕτως ἐχεῖ τάδα ὅσπερ ἐγὼ οἴσαι καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ καταλάβεται τὸ σῶμα, καὶ τὴν ἐμὴν ψυχὴν καταδεδομένην ποιεῖτε ἐν ἐνόμο δέομα.

B. Indirect Speech

2. Cato Maior 59 = Xen. Oecon. 4. 20-5 (the original here is also in indirect speech)

[59] Multas ad res perutiles Xenophontis libri sunt, quos legite, quaeo, studiote, ut facitis. Quam copiose ab eo agri cultura laudatur in eo libro, qui est de tuenda re familiaris, qui Oeconomicus inscribitur! Atque ut intellegatis nihil ei tam regale videri quam studium agri colendi. Socrates in eo libro loquitur cum Critobulo Cyrum minorem. Persarum regem, praestantem ingenio atque imperio gloriam, cum Lysander Lacedaemonius, vir summae virtutis, venisset ad eum Sardis sieque dona a sociis adulsisset, et ceteris in rebus communem erga Lysandrum atque humano fusisse et ei quendam consaepsum agrum diligenter consitum ostendisse. Cum autem admiraretur Lysander et proceritatis arborem et directos in quinquencem ordines et humum subactam atque purum et suavitatem odorum, qui adflarentur ex floribus, tum eum dixisse mirari se non modo diligentiarn, sed etiam sollertia eius, a quo essent illa dimens atque discripta; et Cyrum respondisse: 'Atqui ego ista sum omnia dimens; mei sunt ordines, mea discriptio, multae etiam istorum arborum mea manu sunt satae.' Tum Lysandrum intuentem purpuram eius et nitorem corporis ornatunquie Persicum multo auro multisque gemmis dixisse; 'Recte vero te, Cyre, beatum ferunt, quoniam virtuti tuae fortuna coniuncta est.'

οὗτος τοῖνοι ὁ Κύρος λέγεται Λυσάνδρος, ὅτε ἦλθεν ἄγνω αὐτῷ τά παρά τῶν συμμάχων ἀνὴρ, ἀλλὰ τὸ φιλοφρόνεισθαι, ὡς αὐτὸς ἦρη ὁ Λυσάνδρος ἔμνευσεν ποτὲ τίνι ἐν Μεγάροις δηροίμενος, καὶ τὸν ἐν Σάρδην
παράδεισον ἐπιδεικνύναι αὐτὸν ἔφη, ἔπει δὲ ἐθαύμαζεν αὐτὸν ὁ Λύσανδρος ὡς καλὰ μὲν τὰ δένδρα εἶχ, δὴ Ἰσοῦ δὲ τὰ περιπετειμένα, ὅρθοὶ δὲ οἱ στίχοι τῶν δένδρων, εὐχόντες δὲ πάντα καλῶς εἶχ, σομαὶ δὲ πολλά καὶ ἡδεῖα συμπαρωματοῖν αὐτοῖς περιπατοῦσι, καὶ ταῦτα θαυμάζουν εἴπεν· Ἄλλ᾽ ἐγὼ τοι, ὁ Κῦρε, πάντα μὲν <ταῦτα> θαυμάζω ἐπὶ τῷ κάλλει, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον ὧν γὰρ τοῦ καταμετρήσαντός σοι καὶ διατάζαντος ἐκαστὰ τοῦτον ἀκούσαντα δὲ ταῦτα τὸν Κῦρον ήσθηναι τε καὶ εἰσεῖν· Ταῦτα τοίνυν, ὁ Λύσανδρος, ἐγὼ πάντα καὶ διεξέρχεσαι καὶ διέταξαι, ἦστι δ᾽ αὐτὸν, φανεῖ, ᾧ καὶ ἐφότευσα αὐτὸς. καὶ ὁ Λύσανδρος ἔφη, ἀποβλέψας εἰς αὐτὸν καὶ ἱδὼν τὸν τε ἱματίων τὸ κάλλος ὃν ἔχε καὶ τῆς ὁμής αἰσθήμανος καὶ τὸν στρεπτῶν καὶ τὸν ψελίον τὸ κάλλος καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου κόσμου οὐ εἴχεν, εἰπεῖν· Τί λέγεις, φάνει, ὁ Κῦρε; ἢ γὰρ σὺ ταῖς σαῖς χερσὶ τούτον τι ἐφότευσας; καὶ τὸν Κῦρον ἀποκρίνασθαί· Θαυμάζεις τοῦτο, [ἔφη.] ὁ Λύσανδρος; ὁμοιός σοι τὸν Μίθυρην, ὅπως δὲ ἡ σαφῆς πρὸς τὸν ἱδρύσας τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τοῖς γεωργικοῖς τοῖς, τοῖς δὲ τοῖς κασταλίοις, τοῖς δὲ τοῖς καταβρέσας τοῖς, τοῖς δὲ τοῖς ἀναβρέσας τοῖς, τοῖς δὲ τοῖς ἀναβρέσας εἰς αὐτὸν καὶ εἰσεῖν· Λύδιος μοι δοκεῖς, ὁ Κῦρε, εὐδαίμων εἰναὶ· ἀγαθὸς γὰρ ὃν ἁμὴρ εὐδαίμονες.
Appendix B: Cicero’s Translations of Aristotle in his Philosophical Works

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fr. in Rose (1886)</th>
<th>Fr. in Ross (1955)</th>
<th>Reference in Cicero</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td><em>Peri Philosophias</em> fr. 20; p. 89</td>
<td><em>Acad.</em> 2.119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td><em>Protrepticus</em> fr. 10c; p. 42</td>
<td><em>De Fin.</em> 2.39-40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td><em>Protrepticus</em> fr. 16; p. 52</td>
<td><em>Tusc.</em> 5.101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td><em>Protrepticus</em> fr. 8; p. 37</td>
<td><em>Tusc.</em> 3.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td><em>Peri Philosophias</em> fr. 26; p. 94</td>
<td><em>D. Nat.</em> 1.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td><em>Peri Philosophias</em> fr. 7; p. 75</td>
<td><em>D. Nat.</em> 1.107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td><em>Peri Philosophias</em> fr. 21; p. 90</td>
<td><em>D. Nat.</em> 2.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td><em>Peri Philosophias</em> fr. 21; p. 90</td>
<td><em>D. Nat.</em> 2.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td><em>Peri Philosophias</em> fr. 13; p.81</td>
<td><em>D. Nat.</em> 2.95-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td><em>Eudemus</em> fr. 1; p. 16</td>
<td><em>Div.</em> 1.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td><em>Peri Ploutou</em> fr. 2; p.56</td>
<td><em>Off.</em> 2.56-7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C: Cicero's Translations of Phaedrus 245c6-246a1

Table 4: Cicero's Translations of Phaedrus 245c6-246a1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tusc. I. 53-4 (Heine ed.)</th>
<th>Rep. 6.27-8 (Bréguet ed.)</th>
<th>Phaedrus 245c6-246a1 (Yunis ed.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[53] sed si, quales sit animus, ipse animus nesciet, dic quaeo, ne esse quidem se sciet, ne moveri quidem se? ex quo illa ratio nata est Platonis, quae a Socrate est in Phaedro explicata, a me autem posita est in sexto libro de re publica:</td>
<td>[27] nam quod semper movetur, aeternum est. quod autem motum affert alciui, quodque ipsum agitaturi aliiunde, quando finem habet motus, vivendi finem habebat necesse est. solum igitur, quod se ipsum movetur, quia numquam deseritur a se, numquam ne moveri quidem desinit; quin etiam ceteris quae moventer hic fons, hoc principium est movendi.</td>
<td>Ψυχή πάσα ἀθάνατος.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>principii autem nulla est origo; nam e principio oriuntur omnia, ipsum autem nulla ex re alia nasci potest; nec enim esset id principium, quod gigneretur aliiunde. quod si numquam oritur, ne occidit quidem umquam; nam principium extinctum nec ipsum ab alio renascetur, nec ex se aliud creabit, siquidem necesse est a principio oriri omnia. ita fit, ut motus principii ex eo sit, quod ipsum a se movetur; id autem nec nasci potest nec mori, vel concidat omne caelum omnisque natura &lt;et&gt; consistat necesse est nec vim ullam nanciscatur, qua a primo impulsa moveatur.</td>
<td>principii autem nulla est origo; nam ex principio oriuntur omnia, ipsum autem nulla ex re alia nasci potest; nec enim esset id principium, quod gigneretur aliiunde. quodsi numquam oritur, ne occidit quidem umquam. nam principium extinctum nec ipsum ab alio renascetur nec ex se aliud creabit, si quidem necesse est a principio oriri omnia. ita fit, ut motus principii ex eo sit, quod ipsum a se movetur. id autem nec nasci potest nec mori; vel concidat omne caelum omnisque natura et consisit necesse est nec vim ullam nanciscatur, qua a primo impulsa moveatur.</td>
<td>τὸ γὰρ ἀεικίνητον ἀθάνατον· τὸ δ΄ ἄλλο κινοῦν καὶ ὑπ α´ ἄλλου κινούμενον, παῦλον ἔχουν κινήσεως, παῦλον ἔχει ζωής.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[54] principii autem nulla est origo; nam e principio oriuntur omnia, ipsum autem nulla ex re alia nasci potest; nec enim esset id principium, quod gigneretur aliiunde. quod si numquam oritur, ne occidit quidem umquam; nam principium extinctum nec ipsum ab alio renascetur, nec ex se aliud creabit, siquidem necesse est a principio oriri omnia. ita fit, ut motus principii ex eo sit, quod ipsum a se movetur; id autem nec nasci potest nec mori, vel concidat omne caelum omnisque natura &lt;et&gt; consistat necesse est nec vim ullam nanciscatur, qua a primo impulsa moveatur.</td>
<td></td>
<td>μόνον δὴ τὸ αὐτὸ κινοῦν, ἢτο οὐκ ἀπολείπον ἐαυτὸ, οὔπωτε λύγει κινούμενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁσα κινεῖται τοῦτο πιγή καὶ ἀρχή κινήσεως.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

354
cum pateat igitur aeternum id esse, *quod se ipsum moveat*, quis est qui hanc naturam animis esse tributam neget? inanimum est enim omne, quod pulsu agitatur externo: quod autem est animal, id motu cietur interiore et suo; nam haec est propria natura animi atque vis. quae si est una ex omnibus quae se ipsa moveat, neque natuma certe est et aeterna est'.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a</th>
<th><em>se ipsum</em> no variants recorded in the major editions.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td><em>sese</em> found in most MSS, but Ambrosianus H. 3 sup and Macrobius have <em>se ipsum</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td><em>et</em> found in a single MS (Palatinus 1514)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td><em>et</em> omitted by two MSS and some MSS of Macrobius</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e</td>
<td><em>quod se ipsum moveat</em> no variants recorded in the major editions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f</td>
<td><em>quod a se ipso moveatur</em> found in most MSS, but Ambrosianus H. 3 sup and Macrobius have <em>quod se ipsum moveat</em>, and this reading is adopted by Ziegler and Castiglioni.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g</td>
<td><em>semper</em> found in all MSS, but deleted by correctors of Vaticanus 3246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h</td>
<td><em>se ipsa codd. have sese</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i</td>
<td><em>ἀεικίνητον</em> found in all MSS, and is translated by Cicero, but P. Oxy. 1017 has <em>αὐτοκίνητον</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j</td>
<td>This is the reading of the oldest MSS, the papyri, Simplicius and Stobaeus. Many editors, however, including Burnet, follow Muretus in reading <em>οὐκ ἐν ἔτι ἄρχῃ γίγνοιτο</em>, influenced by Vind. 89 (which has <em>οὐκ ἐν ἄρχῃ γίγνοιτο</em> and the Ciceronian translations in question.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k</td>
<td><em>γένεσιν</em> found in medieval MSS. Burnet has Philoponus’ γῆν εἰς ἐν, but Cicero is clearly translating the manuscript reading. See Vries (1969) 124 for further discussion.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
BIBLIOGRAPHY


--------- 2004. *A Commentary on Cicero, De legibus*. Ann Arbor


----- 1967. Richerche sul testo del Timeo Ciceroniano Rome: A. Signorelli


------- 2012. “Cicero’s Remarks on Translating Philosophical Terms”, in J. Glucker and C. Burnett (eds), Greek into Latin from Antiquity until the Nineteenth Century. London; Turin.


Stevens, B. 2006/7. “Aeolism: Latin as a Dialect of Greek”, in *CJ* 102:2, pp. 115-144.


Ströbel, E. 1890. “Die Tusculanen im Cod. Vaticanus 3246”, *Philologus* 49, pp. 49-64


