Abstract

Citizenship is not equal around the world: countries vary widely in the levels of opportunities, security and rights that they offer to their citizens. Traditionally, the only way that was open to individuals who wished to improve their position in the global hierarchy was emigration. Recently, however, a new pathway has opened up. Following the worldwide acceptance of dual citizenship since the 1990s, millions of people in Latin America, Eastern Europe and elsewhere have secured a second citizenship from a Western or European Union country on the basis of their ancestry, ethnicity, place of birth or migration history. I refer to this phenomenon as “compensatory citizenship,” since the second citizenship does not necessarily lead to emigration; instead, it acts as insurance policy, enhancer of opportunities and mobility and even status symbol. The dissertation explores this global phenomenon using two kinds of data. First, I analyze citizenship statistics from over 30 countries and show that demand for dual citizenship is shaped by the global hierarchy of citizenship value. Compensatory citizenship is mostly obtained by citizens of middle-tier countries who have both the opportunity and incentive to obtain a second citizenship from Western/EU countries. Second, I use material from fieldwork and interviews to compare three cases of compensatory citizenship: Hungarian dual citizenship in Serbia (acquired on the basis of ethnic identity), U.S. citizenship in Mexico (acquired through “birth tourism”) and European Union citizenship in Israel (acquired by descendants of emigrants). I analyze the interaction between state classifications and citizenship acquisition strategies and explore the uses and meanings of dual citizenship in each case. The study lays the groundwork for a new approach to citizenship which focuses on its role in setting one’s position in a global hierarchy; within that context, it comparatively analyzes the diffusion of instrumentalist, individualist attitudes to citizenship.
Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction 1

Chapter 2: Dual Nationality as a Strategy of Global Upward Mobility 15

Chapter 3: Hungarian Dual Citizenship in Serbia 52

Chapter 4: U.S. Dual Citizenship in Mexico 110

Chapter 5: European Union Dual Citizenship in Israel 162

Conclusion 212

Appendices and References 221
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Chapter 1: Introduction

For most of the 20th century, citizenship was understood as an exclusive and territorial relationship. Countries generally refused to share their citizens in the same way that they did not share their sovereign territories. Recent global developments represent a major step away from this traditional state of affairs, offering new forms of state membership emerge that are flexible, overlapping and non-territorial. Today, most of the world’s countries allow their citizens to hold a second citizenship from another country (Blätter et al. 2009); many of them provide non-residents with all the rights associated with citizenship, including voting (Ellis et al. 2007; Collyer 2014); and numerous countries are even inviting people outside their borders to take up dual citizenship on the basis of their ancestry, their ethnic identity or simply their willingness to pay (Dzankic 2012; Dumbrava 2014; Harpaz 2015).

The global shift towards the acceptance of dual citizenship might seem at first like a formal, almost technical, change. Upon closer examination, however, it reflects a reconfiguration of state-individual relations that calls for a revision of traditional assumptions about membership and identity. At the moment, dual and multiple citizens are a small percentage of the global population – about 3 percent of residents in Western countries and smaller percentages elsewhere (see Chapter 2; here and in the rest of this
paper, I use the term “Western” to refer to the countries of Western Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand). The number of dual citizens around the world, however, continues to grow as does the number of countries that permit dual citizenship.

This unprecedented phenomenon is already creating new realities on the ground and reshaping patterns of international migration, political participation, global security and ethnic relations (Pogonyi et al. 2010; Tintori 2011; Cook-Martin 2013; Harpaz 2013; Mateos 2015). A better understanding of dual citizenship thus contributes to ongoing debates in the social sciences, including those dealing with post-nationalism (Soysal 1994), transnationalism (Basch, Schiller and Szanton-Blanc 1994; Portes 2001), ethnic politics (Brubaker 1992a, 1996; Joppke 2003; Wimmer 2014) and contemporary reconfigurations of the state and political membership (Ong 1999; Sassen 2006; Shachar and Hirschl 2014). In spite of its key empirical and theoretical relevance, however, the topic of dual citizenship has received relatively little systematic attention in the social science literature.

In this dissertation, I propose a new approach to dual citizenship that focuses on crucial aspects of the phenomenon that have been neglected so far. Dual citizenship was mostly studied in the context of immigration to Western countries. Here, I focus instead on its strategic acquisition by non-immigrants outside the West. This reframing allows us to see an entirely new meaning of dual citizenship. From that perspective, dual citizenship also operates as a strategy of resource accumulation used by members of advantaged groups in middle-tier countries who seek to secure a second citizenship from Western countries (like the U.S. or Germany) or from European Union (EU) member countries (like Hungary or Poland). These individuals acquire their second, Western/EU citizenship by drawing on existing resources such as economic and cultural capital, ancestry or ethnic identity. I call this phenomenon *compensatory citizenship*.

I study the global rise of compensatory citizenship on the basis of original statistical data from multiple countries as well as in-depth studies of three cases: Hungarian dual citizenship in Serbia, U.S. dual citizenship in Mexico and EU dual citizenship in Israel. These cases represent diverse world regions and distinct pathways to compensatory citizenship. I will use them to provide a rich empirical analysis of the dynamics of Western/EU dual citizenship in middle-tier countries. In the remainder of
this introductory chapter, I first present statistics on the dramatic worldwide shift towards the legal toleration of dual citizenship and survey the literature on the phenomenon. I then lay out the questions that this dissertation seeks to answer and the ways that I approach them. Finally, I sketch the key arguments to be made in the coming chapters.

I. The global shift toward dual citizenship

Citizenship refers to the formal status of state membership (also called nationality) as well as to the broad array of relations, rights and benefits that are associated with this status.¹ Starting in World War One, nation-states generally prevented their citizens from holding citizenship in other countries and created multilateral frameworks to monitor and prevent the “bigamous” condition of dual citizenship (Koslowski 2003). Since the 1990s, however, a new permissive approach to multiple citizenships has quickly gained dominance. Figure 1 shows the percentage of countries in selected world regions that permitted dual citizenship in 1990 and 2010.²
Figure 1: Percentage of countries that permitted dual nationality, 1990 and 2010

Note: the columns show the percentage of countries in each world region that permitted dual nationality. The lighter column in the front represents 1990, the darker column in the back represents 2010. Western Europe includes EU15 as well as Switzerland, Norway and Iceland. Latin America group includes South and Central American countries as well as the Dominican Republic, Cuba and Haiti. The number of countries in the sample was 49 in 1990 and 61 in 2010. Source: author’s calculation based on Liebich 2000, Bloemraad 2004, Escobar 2007, Blatter et al. 2009, Pogonyi et al. 2010, Shevel 2010.

Figure 1 confirms the shift in states’ relation to dual nationality: in 1990, only a quarter of countries in Europe, America and Oceania tolerated it; by 2010, it was accepted by three-quarters of those countries. This pattern represents a dramatic change in the relation to a status that until only recently was perceived as illegal and even immoral. The figure also highlights regional differences: in Western Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand, many countries were “early adapters”, and the
post-1990 increase continued an existing trend. In Latin America and Eastern Europe, in contrast, pre-1990 acceptance levels were very low. In those middle-income regions, the permissive shift was sudden and dramatic. Today, dual citizenship policies all over Europe and the Americas appear to be converging: the acceptance of dual nationality is becoming a new global norm (Weil 2011).

Following this sweeping legitimization of dual citizenship – a *post-exclusive turn* in citizenship – tens of millions of persons hold citizenship in more than one country, and the numbers continue to grow. In recent years, many countries also increased the scope of rights that they offer to their citizens abroad, including absentee voting and consular protection (Ellis et al. 2007; Escobar 2007; Lafleur 2011; Collyer 2014). This development can be described as a *post-territorial turn* in citizenship; it is associated with the assumption that one may be a “good citizen” in a country where one does not reside, pay taxes or fulfill civic duties (cf. Anderson 1998; Ong 1999; Brubaker 2005). These two developments are mutually dependent: the vast majority of dual citizens reside in just one country and their second citizenship comes from a country they do not reside in. Here, I will refer to a dual citizen’s resident citizenship as their primary citizenship and to their non-resident citizenship as their secondary citizenship.

II. Existing approaches: a focus on the West

An extensive literature has examined the causes of these global citizenship transformations, focusing on top-down dynamics behind state laws and policies. Some of the key processes that analysts have pointed out include democratization and liberalization, the end of the Cold War and of military conscription, new norms of gender equality, heightened international migration and more (Spiro 1997; Howard 2005; Faist and Gerdes 2008; Sejersen 2008; Weil 2011). It should be clear, however, that countries do not change their citizenship laws in response to some general tolerant ambience. Instead, governments and lawmakers in each country move to permit dual citizenship because they believed that it will further the interests, power or prestige of their nation – or, at the very least, of the political party they identify with.
Different countries may permit dual citizenship for different reasons. Thus, immigrant-receiving countries typically allow dual citizenship in order to facilitate the integration of immigrants (Spiro 1997; Howard 2005; Sassen 2006; Vink and De Groot 2010) whereas sending countries permit it with the aim of encouraging emigrants to naturalize in their destination countries without giving up their original citizenship (and, hopefully, retaining emotional and political ties and continuing to send remittances) (Escobar 2007; Vonk 2014); and countries that had lost territories populated by co-ethnics during the 20th century use dual citizenship to try and bring those ethnic kin back into the national fold (Brubaker 1996; Bauböck 2003; Iordachi 2004; Pogonyi et al. 2010; Ragazzi and Balalovska 2011). This long list of references suggests that the legal and policy dynamics behind the acceptance of dual citizenship have been studied thoroughly.  

In contrast to this extensive literature which adopted a top-down, state-centered approach, relatively few studies have explored the bottom-up implications of dual citizenship for the individuals who seek to acquire and use it. The existing literature is limited first by the lack of demographic data and statistical analysis of dual citizenship. There have been isolated studies using data on dual citizenship from the European Social Survey (Vink et al. 2013), selected censuses and surveys (Jones-Correa 2001; Bloemraad 2004; Simon 2012; Shachter 2015), or official statistics from citizenship-granting countries (Tintori 2011; Izquierdo and Chao 2015; Harpaz 2015). However, due to the difficulty of obtaining comparative cross-national statistics on the phenomenon, researchers have not synthesized data from different sources in a way that might clarify the current global demographics of dual citizenship – where it is most prevalent, where demand is high, and so on.  

A second limitation of the empirical literature has to do with the local and non-comparative perspective of qualitative studies on the subject. A number of works examine specific cases through fieldwork and interviews, including studies in Southeast Asia (Ong 1999), Eastern Europe (Maeva 2005; Neofotistos 2009; Knott 2015; Pogonyi forthcoming), Latin America (Tintori 2011; Cook-Martin 2013; Mateos 2013, 2016), North America (Amit 2014), Turkey (Balta and Altan-Olcay 2015) and Israel (Harpaz 2013). However, these works typically examine their object in isolation, focusing only on
the local context and shying away from undertaking a comparative global analysis of the phenomenon.

Our theoretical understanding of dual citizenship is hindered by the predominance of concepts and theories that were developed to analyze immigration or nationalism as part of the literature on citizenship (cf. Brubaker 1992, 1996; Bauböck 1994; Joppke 2010). This orientation has led scholars to treat dual citizenship as a relationship between an individual and his or her two countries of citizenship. Moreover, most of these studies have focused on the context of the West and studies of dual citizenship have consequently focused on questions of loyalty, identity and mobility between two nations. Without detracting from the valuable contributions of this work, I suggest that the emphasis on the national aspects of citizenship has led scholars to overlook its global features – and, in particular, the context of global inequality within which dual citizenship acquires its practical value. The focus on one or two nations helps to explains why no general theory has been put forward to explain how and why individuals obtain dual citizenship and how the uses and motivations for dual nationality vary across contexts.

III. Formulating a new approach

My aim in this dissertation is to fill these empirical and theoretical lacunae in the study of citizenship. This is done through a combination of two methodologies: statistical-demographic analysis that would give a broad global picture of dual citizenship, and in-depth case studies that would shed light on local dynamics and discourses.

The first step entails the construction of a global census of dual citizenship, which I use to answer two questions: What parts of the world are characterized by a high prevalence of dual citizenship? What drives demand for such citizenship?

To answer those questions, I created two datasets that draw on previously-unanalyzed administrative statistics. The first includes statistics on the prevalence of dual citizenship in 30 countries with a combined population of one billion people, and the second integrates data on the acquisition of ancestry- or ethnicity-based dual citizenship
from eight European Union countries. These two datasets allow us to identify patterns in the prevalence of and demand for dual citizenship.

This dissertation not only creates the first-ever dataset on dual citizenship from around the world but also offers an explanation for the forces that drive demand for it. The analysis makes it clear that alongside dual citizenship in Western nations that is mostly driven by the naturalization of immigrants, there are also millions of non-immigrant dual citizens in countries from the middle of the global distribution of citizenship value. These individuals, who are mostly found in Latin America and Eastern Europe, have usually acquired their secondary citizenship on the basis of their national ancestry or ethnic identity.

The second set of questions that this dissertation aims to answer concerns the way that compensatory dual citizenship operates on the ground. This requires a very different methodology, which would complement the bird’s eye view of global statistics with an in-depth qualitative analysis of Western dual citizenship in middle-tier countries. This part of the inquiry focuses on two questions: What are the expected and actual uses of compensatory citizenship in middle-tier countries? How does the proliferation of dual citizenship interact with existing national, ethnic and class categories and identities?

Compensatory citizenship is not one and the same all over the world. In fact, there is a great diversity of motivations, uses and understandings across cases. Two factors play a particularly crucial role: the pathway that is used by non-immigrants to obtain dual citizenship from Western/EU countries; and the degree of proximity and dependency between the middle-tier residence country and the granting Western bloc. Both of these axes are expected to have a significant effect on the ways in which people obtain and use their secondary citizenship. Below are the pathways to compensatory citizenship that I have identified based on the academic literature and journalistic reports:

1. **Ancestry-based citizenship acquisition.** Descendants of emigrants living in middle-tier countries obtain dual citizenship from Western/EU origin countries. Granting countries are mostly in Southern, Central or Eastern Europe (e.g. Italy, Spain, Poland and Germany) and applicants’ residence countries include Latin American countries (e.g. Argentina, Brazil, Mexico) as well as Israel (Tintori 2011; Harpaz 2013; Izquierdo and Chao 2015; Mateos 2016)
2. **Co-ethnic citizenship acquisition.** Individuals of a particular ethnic identity obtain dual citizenship from countries that are identified with that ethnicity. Such citizenship is mostly offered by Central and Eastern European countries, including Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece and others. Applicants mostly come from other countries in the region, especially those outside the EU such as Serbia, Ukraine, Macedonia and Moldova (Iordachi 2004; Neofotistos 2009; Knott 2015; Pogonyi forthcoming).

3. **Birth tourism.** Individuals from non-Western countries travel to the U.S. or Canada in order to give birth there to children who will enjoy automatic *jus soli* citizenship. Practiced by citizens of Mexico, China, Turkey, Taiwan and other countries (Lien 2006; Balta and Altan-Olcay 2015; Feere 2015; Grant 2015). These are the three principal pathways to compensatory citizenship and this dissertation will focus on them. There are at least three additional pathways to compensatory citizenship which are apparently of lesser demographic importance (precise data, however, are unavailable).

4. **Residence strategies.** Individuals from non-Western countries obtain dual citizenship by naturalizing in Western or EU countries and then returning to their countries of origin. Examples include Latin Americans who benefit from facilitated naturalization in Spain and Middle Easterners who obtained Canadian citizenship through residence fraud (Harder and Zhyznomirska 2012; Mateos 2013).

5. **Matrimonial strategies.** Individuals in middle-tier countries obtain Western/EU dual citizenship through marriage (cf. Curiel 2004).

6. **Investor citizenship.** Wealthy individuals obtain citizenship from some European Union countries in exchange for a hefty investment (Dzankic 2012; Shachar and Bauböck 2014).

In this dissertation, I focus on exploring the first three paths to compensatory citizenship through three case studies. I use the case of Israelis who apply for EU citizenship from as representative of ancestry-based compensatory citizenship. Over 60,000 Israelis have acquired dual citizenship from Central and Eastern European countries (above all, Germany and Poland) since 2000, a controversial trend that some commentators have been quick to condemn as a betrayal of Zionist principles. I focus on the case of
Hungarian dual citizenship in Serbia as representative of co-ethnic citizenship. Over 140,000 Serbian citizens have obtained Hungarian citizenship since 2011, when Hungary invited Hungarian-speakers from the entire region to apply for dual citizenship; interestingly, many of them do not identify as Hungarian and have only studied the language for the sake of obtaining a passport from a European Union country. Finally, I use the case of Mexican birth tourism in the U.S. as representative of that global phenomenon. The number of middle- and upper-class Mexican parents who travel across the border to give birth and thereby secure U.S. citizenship for their children has been growing, and at least 100,000 such births have been reported since 1994.

Beside the intention to represent the three dominant pathways, the choice of cases was shaped by another principle of classification: degree of association with the citizenship-granting Western bloc. Serbia and Mexico physically border the European Union (EU) and the U.S., respectively, and each of them is economically dependent on the relevant bloc. In contrast, Israel does not share a land border with the EU and is not completely dependent on it economically. Serbia and Mexico export larger numbers of emigrants to the EU and U.S., respectively; Israel is a low-emigration country. These considerations led me to focus on birth tourism as practiced by Mexicans rather than birth tourism by Chinese, who are farther away from the U.S. (moreover, Mexican birth tourism has never been studied before, and it can be placed in the context of the crucial phenomenon of Mexico-U.S. migration). I study ancestry-based citizenship in Israel rather than in South America because EU dual citizenship in Argentina already received significant scholarly attention (Tintori 2011; Cook-Martin 2013; Izquierdo and Chao 2015); moreover, I aim to maximize the geographical and cultural diversity of my sample.

The emphasis of this study is on individuals in middle-tier countries who actively draw on the resources at their disposal to strategically acquire dual citizenship from Western or EU countries. This interest dictates a focus on specific subgroups within the larger population of dual citizens. In the Serbian case, I focus on applicants who obtain dual citizenship in spite of the fact that they do not ethnically identify as Hungarian; such individuals study the Hungarian language for the sake of “passing” as Hungarian and obtaining citizenship. In the Mexican case, I concentrate on non-immigrants who
practiced birth tourism or benefitted from it, setting aside dual nationals who were born in the U.S. to immigrant parents who were later deported or returned to Mexico. In other words, the focus is on strategic Hungarians and strategic Americans, who do not have a strong identification with their countries of secondary citizenship. In the Israeli case, all of those who acquired ancestry-based EU citizenship were strategic dual citizens.

In each study case, I collected different types of qualitative and quantitative data in order to present a rounded picture that would include multiple angles. The main methodology consisted of interviews, most of which I carried out during five-month periods that I spent in each country. I conducted research in Serbia between June and October 2015, in northern Mexico from November 2015 to March 2016 and in Israel from April to August 2016. In each study case, I conducted about 50 interviews with dual citizens and applicants and about ten interviews with bureaucrats, consular officials and experts who offer citizenship-related services. I also collected citizenship and immigration statistics from various official and unofficial sources and familiarized myself with the media coverage of those topics. In addition, I carried out ethnographic observation in relevant border crossings, embassies and consulates.

This combination of methodologies and approaches – global-level statistics, country-level statistics, interviews and observations – aims to create a rich foundation of new empirical data on dual citizenship, which will also potentially serve as the foundation for new theoretical concepts and further empirical studies on the subject.

IV. Layout of the chapters

In this dissertation, I propose a new approach to dual citizenship that repositions it in the context of global inequality and focuses on elite strategies of resource accumulation. As dual citizenship becomes legitimate, certain groups discover they have an opportunity to use their pre-existing resources (ethnicity, descent and economic or cultural capital) to acquire a secondary citizenship from a Western country and thereby gain access to new array of social, cultural, and material benefits. Thus, the rise of compensatory citizenship reflects the conversion of local, intra-national advantages into global resources.
In this introductory first chapter, I presented the revolutionary changes in the institution of citizenship and highlighted the new questions that they raise. I then outlined a novel approach to the subject which shifts the focus to global inequality and combines a global census of dual citizenship with an in-depth study of three representative cases.

In Chapter 2, I argue that the focus on immigrants in the West has led students of dual citizenship to overlook the way global inequality shapes patterns of demand and use. I use original statistical data to show that millions of non-immigrants from middle-tier nations in Latin America and Eastern Europe draw on their ancestry or ethnicity to obtain a second citizenship from EU countries. For those individuals, compensatory citizenship is a deliberate strategy of upward mobility in the global hierarchy which is aimed at securing additional rights from first-tier Western countries.

The subsequent chapters explore three cases that demonstrate the dynamics of compensatory citizenship on the ground. Chapter 3 explores the case of Hungarian dual citizenship in Serbia. While the Hungarian government frames its citizenship policy in terms of symbolic ethno-nationalism, I show that the individuals who take up citizenship are often motivated by the restricted opportunities and mobility options of Serbians. Hungary’s co-ethnic citizenship affects two social groups in Serbia. Members of the Hungarian minority are grateful for their enhanced rights in Europe and elevated status in Serbia; at the same time, the new EU passports encourages mass emigration to Western Europe which is rapidly diminishing their numbers. Meanwhile, educated elites in northern Serbia are strategically studying the Hungarian language in the hope of becoming EU citizens; ironically, they are benefitting from Hungary’s ethno-nationalist policies in order to claim a cosmopolitan European-oriented identity.

In Chapter 4, I study the growth in U.S. dual nationality in Mexico, which is partly driven by “birth tourism”. This involves middle-class and upper-class Mexican parents who give birth in the U.S. in order to secure another citizenship would open up educational and business opportunities for their children who are then brought up in Mexico. The privileged families who engage in this practice typically have little interest in migrating to the U.S., which they view above all as a place for prestigious consumption. At the same time that the United States drives out hundreds of thousands of lower-class Mexican immigrants and their children who were born and raised in the
U.S., its citizenship opportunity structure allows upper-class Mexicans to secure nationality for their children who have no emotional or identity ties to the U.S.

In Chapter 5, I study EU citizenship in Israel. Such citizenship is mostly acquired by second- and third-generation descendants of Holocaust survivors. These dual citizens feel such a weak connection to their origin countries that they never refer to themselves as dual citizens of Germany or Poland but rather as “Israelis with a European passport”. I show that citizenship applicants are mainly driven by two motivations drawn from Jewish history: the wish to hold an “insurance policy” against the possibility of Israel being destroyed and the desire for a status symbol that signifies their elitist position in Israel as European (Ashkenazi) Jews. Ironically, the descendants of Jews who left Europe seeking safety and dignity in Israel now seek the fulfillment of those same needs from German or Hungarian passports.

In the conclusion, I discuss the theoretical implications of the phenomenon of compensatory citizenship for understanding current configurations of class, nationality and identity.
Notes

1 Throughout the text, I mainly use the term “citizen” when referring to the more inclusive meaning of status and practice. When referring specifically to citizenship-as-formal-status, I also use the word nationality. Some countries make a clear distinction between citizenship and nationality (FitzGerald 2005) but I will not explore it here.

2 At this point, I have not been able to gather sufficient data on trends in Asia and Africa. Multiple citizenship is not allowed in China, India or Japan. Some Asian countries recently moved to permit dual citizenship in some form, including Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Philippines and South Korea (Bloemraad 2004; Sejersen 2008). Further data on dual citizenship, including in Asian and African countries, can be found on the MACIMIDE Global Dual Citizenship Database compiled by Maarten Peter Vink, Gerard-Rene de Groot and Chun Luk. I am not using that database here. A recent paper that used it to analyze trends in dual citizenship permission (Vink et al. 2015) came up with results that were not very different from the ones presented here.

3 Moreover, the European Union Democracy Observatory on Citizenship has created detail citizenship profiles on every country in Europe and the Americas. They are available at www.eudo-citizenship.eu

4 A preliminary analysis of this kind appears in Harpaz 2015. Some data from that study are reanalyzed in Chapter 2.

5 There are other potential axes of variation, including the residence country’s income level, the historical relations between the countries of residence and eligibility, and more.

6 South Korea and Japan also offer special visas to co-ethnics abroad which in some cases might be used to obtain citizenship and then re-emigrate (Tsuda 2010; Brubaker and Kim 2011; Kim 2016)

7 In terms of residence-country characteristics, Serbia and Mexico have comparable levels of economic development (upper middle income countries according to World Bank classification, with a GDP per capita between a third and a half of European Union average) and high emigration (over 10 percent); each of them is politically and economically dependent on the major Western bloc with which it shares a physical border (US or EU). Israel, in contrast, is a high-income, low-emigration country and is not entirely dependent on either Western bloc – a third of its trade is with the EU and a quarter with the U.S.

8 The U.S. government does not deport U.S. citizens. However, when Mexican immigrant parents are deported, their underage children typically must leave with them (see Mateos 2014, 2016).
Chapter 2: Dual Nationality as a Strategy of Global Upward Mobility

Once dual citizenship became widely available and legitimate, who were the beneficiaries of this new legal situation? A rich literature has sprung up to explain why states are now willing to share their citizens with other states (e.g. Spiro 1997; Koslowski 2003; Howard 2005; Sassen 2006). In contrast, much less attention has been accorded to a question that is no less important: what are the main factors that drive individual-level demand for dual citizenship?

The sociological literature on dual citizenship has so far focused on immigrants who naturalized in Western Europe and North America while retaining their origin-country citizenship, which in turn has led scholars to emphasize questions of identity and assimilation. This chapter offers a different perspective, which is centered on non-immigrants outside the West who acquire dual citizenship on the basis of ancestry or ethnicity. Once we refocus our attention on this population, the practical-instrumental aspects of dual citizenship and the strategic nature of the process of acquiring it come into sharp relief. This change in perspective also highlights the role of global inequality in the value of citizenship, which shapes patterns of use and demand for dual citizenship.

This chapter takes the global hierarchy in citizenship value as its point of departure and analyzes the differential opportunities and incentives for individuals around
the world to acquire a second nationality to support three propositions: first, the attitudes of non-migrants towards dual citizenship are shaped by their position in the global stratification of citizenship value; second, individuals are motivated to acquire second citizenships from a nations that rank higher in the global hierarchy than their primary residence-country citizenship; and third, dual citizenship is most frequent among citizens of countries in the middle of the global distribution – mostly in Eastern Europe and Latin America – who have both a practical incentive and an opportunity to obtain citizenship from a Western or EU member country. In contrast, resident citizens of Western countries typically have a weaker motivation to become dual citizens, while citizens of bottom-tier countries have very strong motives but limited opportunities to do acquire a second passport. I use the term compensatory citizenship to describe dual nationality that is used by individuals in middle-tier citizenship countries to gain additional rights, benefits and opportunities without permanently emigrating.

In the next section, I survey the existing literature on dual citizenship while pointing out its limitations, which stem from the tendency to overlook the context of global inequality within which dual nationality acquires practical value. I then map the global hierarchy of citizenship value and use it to predict levels of demand for dual citizenship. Finally, I use original data to test those predictions and demonstrate the prevalence of and high demand for dual citizenship among non-migrants outside the West.

I. Framing the question: dual citizenship outside the West

The existing sociological literature on the implications of dual citizenship mostly focused on a particular set of cases: immigrants to North America and Western Europe who naturalized while retaining their original citizenship. This focus, I will show, has led to the neglect of crucial empirical and theoretical aspects of the phenomenon of dual citizenship. The literature explored the factors that lead some immigrants in the West to become dual citizens (Bloemraad 2004, 2006; Simon 2012; Vink et al. 2012) as well as the impact of dual citizenship on their social and political integration (Jones-Correa 2001; Mazzolari 2009; Staton, Jackson and Canache 2007; Portes, Escobar and Arana 2008).
The analytic focus was on the decision to acquire resident (i.e. primary) dual citizenship in the country where the immigrant lives. In this context, non-resident dual citizenship (i.e. secondary citizenship) is created passively, through the retention of origin-country citizenship, without requiring any special action on the part of the dual citizen (Jones-Correa 2001; Bloemraad 2004).

Furthermore, for immigrants in the West, the secondary citizenship from their origin country (which is usually poorer than the one they live in) typically carries limited practical value. Only a small minority of immigrants use dual citizenship to engage in transnational entrepreneurship – just 5%, according to a study by Portes, Guarnizo and Haller (2002) – while other economic uses, such as inheriting property or relocating for work or lifestyle, are very specific and remain irrelevant for most immigrants (see Mateos 2013; Amit 2014). Absentee voting in immigrants’ origin country is more common, but it only has a meaning for individuals who have strong emotional or practical ties with their origin country.

Overall, these uses of secondary citizenship are specific and personal: they make it easier for individuals to capitalize on pre-existing economic, political or social connections but do not act as an independent resource. For example, an American who is not of Mexican origin would likely not find any use for a Mexican passport. It is therefore unsurprising that dual citizenship is in relatively low demand among immigrants and their children in the West: in Germany, for example, only 14% of first-generation immigrants and 9% of second-generation immigrants are dual nationals (Statistiches Bundesamt 2012). In the United States, out of 40 million descendants of Mexican and Italian immigrants who are potentially eligible for dual citizenship, only about 110,000 (or 0.3% of the total) applied for one of those citizenships.¹ We can conclude that for most dual citizens in Western countries, origin-country dual citizenship is primarily a symbol of identity and sentimental attachment (Bloemraad 2004; Morawska 2004).²

Dual citizenship among naturalized immigrants in the West and their children can thus be characterized as sentimental dual citizenship – most people who hold such citizenship have acquired it passively, and the value it holds for them is more symbolic than practical.³ This explains why the sociological literature on migration and
transnationalism has not developed a comprehensive theory about the uses and meanings of dual citizenship, and instead continues to use it mainly as an indicator of assimilation and national identity. The focus on dual citizenship in the specific empirical context of immigrants in the West has restricted our understanding of its implications on a global scale.

Beyond the sentimentalist approach

The sentimentalist, non-instrumental approach to dual citizenship is empirically accurate and theoretically valid within the scope of the West. When trying to theorize beyond it, however, this approach becomes limiting. For a person who lives in a Western country and holds citizenship from it, any additional citizenship would not provide access to superior rights or opportunities. Instead, it would provide equivalent or lesser rights and opportunities in a different territory. As a consequence, resident citizens of Western countries are expected to exhibit low demand for dual citizenship; whatever demand exists will be driven mainly by sentimental attachments.

Let us now move down the global hierarchy of citizenship value. Citizens of non-Western countries are expected to view dual citizenship from a Western country as an extremely valuable asset. From their perspective, such citizenship can provide access to better opportunities, more extensive rights, improved security and greater freedom of movement. Therefore, demand for dual citizenship from a Western country would be high; moreover, many people outside the West will be interested in such citizenship even if they have no sentimental or symbolic connection to the granting country.

In suggesting this approach, I draw on a number of recent monographs on dual citizenship outside the West. This budding literature includes studies of European Union dual citizenship outside the Union – Bulgarian and Romanian dual citizenship in Macedonia and Moldova (Neofotistos 2009; Knott 2015), Spanish and Italian citizenship in Argentina (Tintori 2011; Cook-Martin 2013) and citizenship from Central and Eastern European countries in Israel (Harpaz 2013). It also includes analyses of practices of strategic birth and residence practiced by Chinese, Taiwanese and Turks who wish to secure U.S., Canadian or Australian citizenship (Ong 1999; Balta and Altan-Olcay 2016;
Individuals in those diverse settings envisioned different uses for dual citizenship and obtained it through different channels. All those cases, however, had this key feature in common: there was high demand for Western dual citizenship and the relation to it was predominantly pragmatic. While some applicants were indeed inspired by sentimental and symbolic motives, most of them were seeking citizenship in countries to which they had no real connection and whose languages they often could not speak.

The evidence from those qualitative studies suggests that citizens of non-Western countries employ an instrumental approach when faced with the possibility of obtaining Western dual citizenship. The wish for dual citizenship does not mean that they necessarily intended to emigrate. Dual citizenship from Western countries is mostly available in Latin American and Eastern European countries that are located in the middle of the global distribution. In those countries, most people who obtain a second citizenship do not emigrate permanently; instead, they find ways of using their secondary, non-resident citizenship to make up for the limitations of their primary citizenship. I will use the term *compensatory citizenship* to refer to non-resident dual citizenship from a Western country that is held by citizens of a middle-tier citizenship country. Compensatory dual citizenship, which is mostly instrumental and strategic, is an understudied type of dual citizenship that differs from the sentimental dual citizenship that is characteristic to the West and which has dominated the sociological literature. In the next section, I will map the global hierarchy of citizenship value and discuss how individuals’ positions within that hierarchy shape their attitude toward dual citizenship. Then, I will present original statistics on dual citizenship in order to evaluate the hypotheses that are derived from the compensatory citizenship approach.

II. The global hierarchy of citizenship value

Nation-state citizenship is a key principle of stratification in today’s world. This point is widely acknowledged: it is a subject of intensive discussion in legal and political philosophy (Macklin 2007; Shachar and Hirschl 2007) and underlies explanations of international migration (Massey et al. 1993) and immigrant naturalization (Vink et al. 2013). To date, however, there has been no systematic attempt to use the global
citizenship hierarchy to explain demand for and use of dual citizenship (except Harpaz 2015). Below, I present an original index that ranks the world’s countries by the value of their citizenship. I suggest that the world’s countries can be roughly divided into three tiers (or classes) of citizenship, and that tier position shapes patterns of dual citizenship acquisition and use.

*Citizenship: the key to global stratification*

The most obvious way of thinking about global inequality in citizenship value is in terms of economic inequality. In 1848, Marx and Engels concluded the Communist Manifesto with the rallying cry, “Workers of the World, Unite!” At the time, the living standards of workers and peasants in England, Russia and India were comparable, hovering around the level of subsistence. The economist Branko Milanovic (2012) argues that in Marx’s time, it was plausible to envision the “workers of the world” as having a shared fate and common interests that might lead them to unite against a supposed common enemy. Over the past century-and-a-half, however, the global distribution of wealth has changed dramatically. We are now living in a “non-Marxian world” (ibid.), in which between-country inequality (citizenship) plays a bigger role than within-inequality inequality (class) in determining one’s life chances.

Milanovic (2012) has demonstrated the magnitude of between-country economic gaps by plotting the income distribution of different countries relative to the income distribution of world population, broken down into percentiles (i.e. the top 1% of humanity – 70 million people – form the 100th percentile, the next 70 million are the 99th percentile, etc). He found that the average annual income of the poorest 5% of Americans placed them in the 60th percentile of the global distribution (2005 data). Thus, the very poorest Americans had an income that was higher than that of 60% of the world’s population – and 95% of India’s population. The average income of the poorest 5% in Denmark placed them in the 90th percentile of world income (ibid:21-23). Since the 1980’s, within-country (class) inequality in the West has been growing (Piketty 2014), while between-country inequality has diminished slightly (Lakner and Milanovic 2013); nevertheless, the gap in living standards between the West and (most of) the rest remains vast.
Global inequality, moreover, is not limited to income. In fact, it extends to almost any conceivable domain of human life, including security, political rights, access to health and social services and even clean air and water. For example, differences in access to education mean that over a third of young women in Pakistan are illiterate compared with practically zero female youth illiteracy in Europe (World Bank 2016). Differences in the quality of healthcare mean that a child in Sierra Leon is 60 times more likely to die before the age of 5 than a child in Norway (UNDP 2013; see Shachar and Hirschl 2007). And differences in crime rates make a resident of Honduras 56 times more likely to be murdered than a resident of Canada (UNODC 2014).

Furthermore, citizenship stratifies the world’s population not only in terms of the relative quality of life in their countries of residence, but also in terms of access to all other national territories. The world’s passports are not equal. Citizens of rich Western countries may travel freely throughout most of the world, while those from poorer countries are usually required to expend time and money on obtaining visas before they may venture abroad (Wang 2004; Shamir 2005; Mau et al. 2015; see Torpey 2000). The ranking of passports can be seen as a kind of “peer review” that states make of one another. The highest-ranking countries (e.g. Finland or Sweden) are perceived as having the lowest likelihood of sending unwanted immigrants, refugees, criminals or terrorists. Citizens of lower-ranked countries, in contrast, are seen as “automatic suspects” and their movement is controlled and restricted. As Audrey Macklin (2007:357) notes, “the heft of citizenship negatively correlates to the incentives to migrate and positively correlates to the legal capacity to migrate”. This global system of citizenship-based mobility restrictions helps explain why, in spite of extremely high global income inequality, no more than 3% of contemporary humans are migrants (Czaika and de Haas 2014).

Within this system of global stratification, then, citizenship from a Western country provides an entry ticket to the elite. Statistically, citizenship is the most important factor that affects one’s life chances – more than class, gender or race (Milanovic 2010; Centeno and Cohen 2010). The legal theorists Ayelet Shachar and Ran Hirschl (2007) described this state of affairs as the “birthright lottery,” arguing that citizenship transmission has become a key mechanism in the intergenerational transfer of wealth. Another legal scholar, Audrey Macklin (2007), proposed the concept “heft of
citize rights and opportunities available to
different individuals. One can imagine a graded spectrum of global citizenship value,
extending from the stateless refugee to the dual citizen in rich and secure countries.

I suggest that the world can be divided roughly into three tiers of citizenship value. Each country’s ranking is determined by combining the value of its resident
citizenship – represented by a Citizenship Quality Index (CQI) that will be introduced
below – together with an index that measures the international freedom of movement that
its passport provides.6

Quantifying resident citizenship: security, opportunity, rights

The world’s countries can be ranked according to their relative success in
realizing a global ideal of citizenship, meaning the rights and benefits that citizens expect
to receive from the state. The institution of citizenship – and the nation-state more
broadly – developed in the West and then diffused to other parts of the world, where it
was emulated with varying degrees of success (Meyer et al. 1997; Wimmer and Feinstein
2010). Therefore, I treat the ideal of citizenship not an abstract vision derived from a
priori reasoning about human nature but as a concrete model that corresponds to the
standard set by rich and democratic Western nations.

I will treat the quality of resident citizenship as the full range of potential benefits
that are derived from the fundamental right to be present in the territory of one’s state of
citizenship (right of abode). There are three main components to resident citizenship:
security, political rights and economic opportunity. Together, these elements constitute
the ideal that modern individuals expect from their state.

Security: this component of citizenship reflects states’ relative success in minimizing the
risk of violence – particularly political violence – in their territory. I measure it using the
State Fragility Index published by the Center for Systemic Peace, which combines
measures of external conflict, internal repression, regime stability and social wellbeing.

Opportunity: this component captures states’ relative ability to assure the prosperity of
the population living in their territory. It is dependent on a range of factors, including
labor markets, possibilities for education and consumption and level of public services. I
measure it using the Human Development Index (HDI) formulated by the United Nations
Development Program, which combines measures of income, life expectancy and educational attainment.

**Rights:** this component captures the relative degree of political rights enjoyed by citizens, including the basic democratic right to elect one’s government, including associated rights like the freedom of expression and assembly. I measure it using the Democracy Index calculated by The Economist Intelligence Unit, which ranks countries using a composite democracy score that includes electoral process, government functioning, political participation, political culture and civil liberties.\(^7\)

These three measures were combined to create the Citizenship Quality Index (CQI), a composite measure of the benefits that accrue from resident citizenship in a country. It was calculated by taking a geometric mean of each country’s ranking in the three indices mentioned above, using the following formula:

**Citizenship Quality Index (CQI)**

\[
\text{CQI} = \sqrt[3]{\text{HD1} \ast \text{HDI} \ast \text{Democracy Index}}
\]

The geometric mean (the root of the product) standardizes the rankings and eliminates differences in scale between them. I use country rankings and not scores because all these indices are relative, meaning that scores have no meaning in themselves. These indicators were highly correlated with each other – rank order correlations (Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients) were between 0.65 and 0.89, at p<0.001.\(^8\)

**Passport worth: a global hierarchy of mobility**

I combine the Citizenship Quality Index with an index that measures the degree of mobility provided by each country’s passport. Global freedom of movement is measured here using a list published by a private consulting company, Henley and Partners, which ranks countries by the number of countries that they may enter without visa. The British, Swedish and Finnish passports top the list with visa-free access to 173 countries (the American followed closely with 172 countries); other countries with relatively strong passports were Hong Kong, Israel, Brazil and Romania, whose citizens had free access to
between 140 and 152 countries. Some countries at the bottom of the list included China (visa-free access to 44 countries), Iran (40 countries) and Afghanistan (28 countries) (Henley and Partners 2013).\textsuperscript{9} Whereas the CQI represents the quality of a country’s citizenship at home, the passport ranking captures the degree of recognition it receives abroad.

*The global hierarchy of citizenship: a three-tiered structure*

Figure 1 plots the CQI and the Passport Index and ranks the world’s countries by their position in both rankings. Their intersection is used to divide the world’s countries into three citizenship tiers which shape the global dynamics of dual citizenship.\textsuperscript{10} The ranking is given here in broad strokes; the location of specific countries is open to potential revisions.
Figure 1: World’s countries by Passport Index and Citizenship Quality Index

![Graph showing the stratified nature of global citizenship and the strong association between a country’s CQI rank and its Passport Index rank.](image)

Note: the x-axis represents the country’s percentile rank in the Citizenship Quality Index. The y-axis represents its percentile rank in Henley’s Passport Index (the number of countries its citizens may enter without visa). The small circle in the upper-right corner represents the first-tier citizenship category. The larger circle below and to the left represents the middle-tier citizenship category, and the bottom circle includes third-tier citizenship countries.

Source: author’s calculation based on Henley & Partners Visa Restrictions Index 2013; State Fragility Index 2012; Human Development Index 2012; Democracy Index 2012.

Figure 1 highlights the stratified nature of global citizenship and the strong association between a country’s CQI rank and its Passport Index rank. There was a rank order correlation (Spearman’s rho) of 0.87 between the two indices at a significance level of p<.0001. This corroborates the intuition that citizenship quality and passport
recognition measure closely-related phenomena. Another pattern that emerges from the figure is the strong correlation between citizenship tier and geographical region: first-tier countries are concentrated in Western Europe and North America, the middle tier is mostly in Latin America and Eastern Europe and the third tier mostly Asian and African. Figure 2 presents the citizenship tier breakdown on a map of the world.

**Figure 2: World’s countries by citizenship tier**

Note: the map shows the world’s countries according to their tier position. The lighter-colored countries are middle-tier citizenship countries, including most Eastern European and Latin American countries, several countries in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, and South Africa. No data were available for the countries colored in grey (e.g. Somalia). Source: see Figure 1.

This, then, is the structure of global citizenship stratification. The basic contours of this ranking are not surprising: it is well-known that Norway is richer than Nicaragua and Canada safer than Cameroon. The original contribution of the approach I propose lies, first of all, in being the first academic attempt to quantify the composite value of
citizenship and not only its separate components such as per capita income (another model was published in 2016 by the citizenship consulting company Henley & Partners together with legal scholar Dimitry Kochenov; its rankings are quite similar to the one proposed here).\textsuperscript{12} In contrast to existing models and rankings, the model I presented here goes beyond merely describing differences in citizenship value. It seeks to identify and predict patterns in the way position in the global hierarchy shapes behavior. In this chapter, I will specifically focus on the way that position in the global hierarchy shapes attitudes towards the possibility of acquiring a second citizenship. In the following chapters, I will also use qualitative data to explore additional implications of global citizenship position in the domains of national identity, elite strategies and more. Let us clarify, then, how tier position is expected to affect the relation to dual citizenship.

**First-tier citizenship (or Western) countries** provide their resident citizens with the full “package” of citizenship entitlements: they are relatively safe and geopolitically secure and offer broad economic opportunities and political rights. In addition, their passports offer near-unlimited travel possibilities. First-tier citizenship countries included Western Europe and North America, in addition to Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea.\textsuperscript{13}

Most first-tier citizenship countries receive immigration and permit dual citizenship. Therefore, we can expect relatively high availability of dual citizenship, driven by immigrants who naturalize while retaining their origin-country citizenship. However, demand is relatively low because citizens in the West do not suffer from citizenship deficits that a second citizenship would alleviate. Therefore, Western citizens would mainly acquire or retain dual citizenship for personal or sentimental reasons.

**Middle-tier citizenship countries** provide their citizens with a package of security, opportunity, rights and travel freedom that is above the global median, but they suffer from citizenship deficits relative to top-tier countries. Most countries in Eastern Europe and Latin America were classified as middle-tier citizenship countries, as were a small number of countries in Asia and Africa: Israel, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, Turkey, South Africa and some Arab Gulf countries.\textsuperscript{14}

Many middle-tier citizenship countries in Central and Eastern Europe are members of the European Union, drawing them into a sphere of interchangeable
citizenship with first-tier Western European countries. While Hungary, for example, remains far less prosperous than Germany or Britain, EU citizenship compensates for this deficit in opportunities, providing Hungarians with access to the attractive labor and education markets of Western Europe. However, most Hungarians (or Poles or Czechs) do not emigrate permanently to Western Europe; rather, they use their EU citizenship to engage in temporary and circular migration or keep it as a “backup plan” (Favell 2008).

I argue that in middle-tier citizenship countries that are not members of the European Union, dual citizenship from a first-tier citizenship country (i.e. compensatory citizenship) operates in a comparable manner to EU citizenship. The crucial difference is that individuals obtain such citizenship individually rather than collectively, typically through deliberate strategies. After 1990, most countries in Eastern Europe and Latin America moved to permit dual nationality (see Chapter 1). This has created new opportunities for citizens of those countries to seek dual citizenship from Western or EU countries. Due to historical and geographical reasons, many middle-tier countries host large numbers of people who are eligible for Western/EU citizenship. These include descendants of European immigrants (mostly in South America and Israel), co-ethnics of EU member countries (mostly in Eastern Europe) and populations with extensive migration ties to the West (especially in Mexico and East Asia). On the other hand, immigration into to middle-tier countries is low and therefore we do not expect to find large numbers of dual citizens who were created through immigrant naturalization.

Therefore, the citizenship stratification approach predicts high availability of dual citizenship in middle-tier citizenship countries, which would be driven by other pathways beside immigrant naturalization. It also predicts high demand and an instrumental approach towards Western/EU dual citizenship. In contrast, there will be low availability and low demand for dual citizenship from middle-tier and third-tier citizenship countries.

Third-tier citizenship countries occupy the bottom half of the world distribution in either citizenship quality or passport mobility, and their citizens suffer from severe citizenship deficits. Almost all Asian and African nations – and a few Eastern European and Latin American ones – were classified as third-tier citizenship countries. Most third-tier citizenship countries were historically subject to European colonialism but did not receive substantial immigration from Europe; therefore; their population has few
ancestral or ethnic ties to Europe. Moreover, they receive little immigration and cannot engage in strategies of circular migration because of the strict visa requirements imposed on them by rich Western countries. Moreover, many of these countries do not permit multiple nationality. Therefore, in third tier countries, demand for higher-tier dual citizenship might be high but, due to low availability, it remains mostly hypothetical.\(^\text{15}\)

In this section, I outlined a three-tiered global hierarchy of citizenship that shapes individuals’ attitudes towards dual citizenship and argued that dual citizenship actually operates differently in the West and outside it: in the West, we would mainly find *sentimental dual citizenship* produced by ongoing immigration. Middle-tier citizenship countries, in contrast, are expected to be characterized by high levels of mainly-instrumental *compensatory dual citizenship* from a Western country. In third-tier countries, dual citizenship would be mostly unavailable.

The citizenship stratification approach could potentially generate numerous different hypotheses. Here, I present on three empirically-testable hypotheses that pertain to middle-tier citizenship countries and which allow us to examine the validity of the approach. Due to data limitations, this paper will not discuss third-tier citizenship countries, and will focus on comparing first-tier and middle-tier citizenship countries. The hypotheses are as follows:

First, *dual citizenship will not be found only in the West, but will also be prevalent in middle-tier citizenship countries* (H1).

Second, *individuals in middle-tier citizenship countries will have acquired dual citizenship in a “long-distance” way – i.e. on the basis of ancestry or ethnicity – rather than through immigrant naturalization* (H2).

Third, *individuals in middle-tier citizenship countries will exhibit higher demand for dual citizenship* (H3).

In the next section, I will test these hypotheses using two different datasets that pertain to the prevalence of dual citizenship and to the acquisition of ancestry- or ethnicity-based citizenship.
III. Dual citizenship statistics: evaluating prevalence and demand

The study of dual citizenship has traditionally been hindered by the absence of comparative statistics. No international database on dual citizenship exists and statistics from specific countries are often difficult to locate. Here, I fill this lacuna by analyzing two original datasets that I constructed from administrative data and existing academic publications. The first dataset includes data on the prevalence of dual citizenship in 30 countries with a total population of one billion persons, 15 million of whom were dual citizens. The second dataset includes statistics on the acquisition of ancestry- or ethnicity-based dual citizenship from eight European countries (a total of 2.5 million citizenship acquisitions). While these datasets are by no means comprehensive, they represent the first attempt to offer a broad and systematic analysis of the global demographics of dual citizenship.\(^{16}\)

Prevalence of dual citizenship

In order to evaluate the prevalence of dual citizenship, I use an original dataset based on statistics from 30 countries with a combined population of one billion. They include 24 European countries and four Latin American countries as well as Canada and Israel. I compiled these data from a variety of sources: national censuses, consular reports and existing academic publications (see Appendix 1 for a full list of sources). The numbers given below should be treated as minimum estimates because of underreporting and because in some countries – especially Britain, Switzerland and Latin American countries – the data capture only part of the dual citizen population.\(^{17}\) In spite of these limitations, the dataset provides the first-ever profile of the prevalence of dual citizenship in Western and middle-tier countries.

Table 1 shows levels of dual citizenship in 23 countries that hosted 50,000 or more dual citizens and leaves out seven countries in Central and Eastern Europe where the number of dual citizens did not reach that number.\(^{18}\) The table also lists the immigration rate and the two leading countries of second citizenship. For example, the largest group of dual citizens in France is Algerian-French and the second largest is Moroccan-French. Country cells are colored to reflect the number of dual citizens: the darkest color represents countries with over 750,000 dual citizens in their resident
population, the light-colored cells represent countries with 250,000 to 750,000 dual citizens and the cells without any color are represent countries with 50,000 to 250,000 dual citizens.
### Table 1: Prevalence and characteristics of dual citizenship in selected countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Dual citizens</td>
<td>% Dual citizens</td>
<td>% Immigrants</td>
<td>Secondary citizenship #1</td>
<td>Secondary citizenship #2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>First-tier citizenship countries</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>4,300,000</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Repatriation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>3,300,000</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Naturalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1,306,274</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Naturalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>944,700</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Naturalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>863,000</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Naturalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>688,561</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Naturalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>613,940</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Return migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>244,745</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>56,745</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Return migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>54,783</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Repatriation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total: First-tier</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>12,372,748</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Middle-tier citizenship countries</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>900,000</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Repatriation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>880,000</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Ancestry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>790,473</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Ancestry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>778,000</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Return migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>441,331</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>401,548</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>327,400</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>303,822</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Ancestry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>190,000</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Repatriation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>88,906</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>Repatriation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>86,404</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>Repatriation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>78,615</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Repatriation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total: Middle-tier</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>6,173,541</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total sample</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>18,546,289</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Note: Columns 2 and 3 present the number of dual citizens in each country in absolute numbers and as a percentage of the total population. Column 4 presents the percentage of foreign-born immigrants in the country’s population. Columns 5 and 6 present the leading countries of secondary citizenship and column 7 present the pathway that characterizes the leading country of secondary citizenship.

n.d. = no data available. Totals also include low-prevalence countries not shown in the table.

Sources: see Appendix 1.

The table allows us to evaluate patterns of dual citizenship in the context of the global citizenship hierarchy. First, consider the size of dual citizen populations and their share of countries’ populations – columns 2 and 3. The total sample includes 18.5 million dual citizens who represent 1.8 percent of the total population included in the sample. The highest numbers of dual citizens in absolute figures are found – unsurprisingly – in Western countries that receive large numbers of immigrants, such as Germany, France and Canada. The share of dual citizens in Western populations is between 1% and 9%, with an average of 3.7%.

When we examine middle-tier citizenship countries, however, we encounter some unexpected findings. First, there are a substantial number of middle-tier citizenship countries with high numbers of dual citizens. Nine middle-tier countries in the sample have over 250,000 dual citizens in their population, compared to only seven Western countries. Those high-dual citizenship countries include Israel, several large Latin American countries, and multiple countries in Central and Eastern Europe, including EU members (like Poland and Romania) and non-members (like Bosnia and Serbia). Furthermore, while the average percentage of dual citizens in middle-tier citizenship countries is only about 1%, in some countries this percentage is extremely high – notably Israel and Bosnia, where over 10% hold a second citizenship. There were almost 6.2 million dual citizens in the middle-tier countries that I sampled, compared with 12.4 million in first-tier countries. We can conclude that there are numerous middle-tier citizenship countries with high levels of dual citizenship (in both absolute and relative terms). This supports Hypothesis 1.
Let us now examine columns 4-7, which provide information on the mechanisms that produce dual citizens. Column 4 shows that the average percentage of immigrants in Western countries is 13%, three times higher than in middle-tier citizenship countries. Unsurprisingly, the largest countries of secondary citizenship for people living in Western countries (columns 5 and 6) are typically among the leading origin countries of immigration – for example, Algeria and Morocco for France or Turkey and Morocco for the Netherlands (United Nations 2013). In first-tier countries of residence, the leading countries of secondary citizenship were typically of a lower citizenship tier than the country of residence (the exceptions were Canada, the UK, Ireland and Switzerland, where the countries of secondary citizenship were also first-tier). This highlights the lack of a strong practical incentive for citizens of Western countries to acquire dual citizenship (cf. Bloemraad 2004; Vink et al. 2013).

When we examine middle-tier citizenship countries, in contrast, we find a very different picture. In general, these countries do not receive many immigrants; nonetheless, in many cases this does not prevent them from having a substantial population of dual citizens. This suggests that dual citizenship in middle-tier citizenship countries is not necessarily a consequence of ongoing immigration. There is another point to be learned from Table 2: in all middle-tier countries with substantial numbers of dual citizens (over 250,000), the leading countries of secondary citizenship (column 5) are first-tier or EU countries. Whereas dual citizens in the West typically hold lower-order second citizenship (e.g. Ecuadorian and Colombian citizenship in Spain), those outside it usually hold higher-order citizenship (e.g. Spanish and Portuguese citizenship in Venezuela). Even more remarkably, the leading countries of secondary citizenship in most middle-tier countries were not major senders of ongoing migration to those countries. While the literature has mostly focused on dual citizenship that was produced through immigrant naturalization, this is apparently only one of the possible pathways to dual citizenship.

Column 7 presents the main pathway that produced dual citizenship in each of the countries in the table. To determine the main pathway, I used the literature on citizenship and migration and identified five avenues that create dual citizen populations. Three of them involve migration: (a) naturalization of immigrants without pre-existing ethnic ties;
(b) ethnic *repatriation* by immigrants selected for ethno-linguistic or ethno-religious affinity (Brubaker 1998; Hansen and Weil 2001; Joppke 2005); and (c) *return migration* of former citizens and their children. Two other pathways – (d) *ancestry* and (e) *ethnicity* – do not involve migration, and pertain to the acquisition of non-resident dual citizenship by the descendants of emigrants (say, from Italy) or co-ethnics (say, ethnic Hungarians). This practice, which I call *long-distance naturalization* (Harpaz 2015), will be analyzed in greater depth in the next subsection.\(^{23}\)

In order to identify the dominant pathway for each host country (column 7 in Table 1), I used migration statistics (United Nations 2013) and country reports produced by the European Union Democracy Observatory on Citizenship (EUDO) (see Appendix 1) to determine the dominant pathway based on the leading country of dual citizenship.\(^{24}\) For example, the largest country of dual citizenship in the Netherlands is Turkey, and migration statistics indicate that Turkish-Dutch dual citizenship is produced as a result of immigrant naturalization; therefore, the dominant pathway to dual citizenship in the Netherlands was naturalization. Table 2 presents the countries in the sample according to their tier position and main pathway to dual citizenship.\(^{25}\)
Table 2: Main pathways to dual citizenship in selected countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Tier</th>
<th>Naturalization</th>
<th>Ethnic Repatriation</th>
<th>Return Migration</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Ancestry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td></td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Tier</td>
<td></td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Color index:</th>
<th>Over 750,000 dual citizens</th>
<th>250,000-750,000 dual citizens</th>
<th>50,000-250,000 dual citizens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Note: The table shows the main pathway to dual citizenship each country (column 7 in Table 2), determined on the basis of the leading country of dual citizenship (column 5 in Table 2). Country cells are colored by the number of dual citizens in the country. Sources: see Table 2.

The table shows that immigrant naturalization is the main pathway that creates dual citizens in most Western countries. Germany and Britain are the only high-dual citizenship countries (over 750,000 dual citizens) in the West where alternative pathways predominate: repatriation of ethnic Germans (*Aussiedler*) in Germany and return migration from the U.S. in Britain. In Finland and Ireland, immigrant naturalization is a new phenomenon and therefore their dual citizen populations are very small. This
demographic profile is entirely consistent with the sociological literature that treated dual citizenship in the West as a byproduct of immigrant naturalization (Jones-Correa 2001; Bloemraad 2004; Mazzolari 2009).

Turning to middle-tier citizenship countries, we find strikingly different patterns. Immigrant naturalization is not the main pathway to dual citizenship in any of those countries. Instead, the leading pathway was long-distance naturalization on the basis of ancestry or ethnicity. This pathway was dominant in seven Latin American and Eastern European countries that together were home to 4 million dual citizens. The vast majority of those dual citizens have never lived in their countries of second citizenship. In the two other high-prevalence countries, dual citizens were mostly ethnic repatriates (Jewish immigrants to Israel) or return migrants (Mexican emigrants and their U.S.-born children who returned to Mexico) who received their Israeli or Mexican citizenship automatically, without having had to naturalize.27 The sample also includes several Central and Eastern European countries where ethnic repatriation was the main pathway, and where levels of dual citizenship were relatively low (under 250,000 dual citizens).

Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate the divergence in the pathways to dual citizenship between first-tier and middle-tier citizenship countries. In the West, dual citizens mostly consist of naturalized immigrants without prior connections to the country. Such immigrants become dual citizens because current legal frameworks allow them to retain their origin-country citizenship when they naturalize (second-generation immigrants become dual citizens through jus sanguinis transmission). In middle-tier citizenship countries, when dual citizenship is associated with immigration, it mainly pertains to ethnic repatriates or returnees (as in Israel and Mexico). In most cases, however, dual citizenship in middle-tier countries does not result from immigration at all: instead, it is created when people draw on their ancestry or ethnicity to secure a second citizenship from an EU country. We see that in contrast to the West, dual citizenship in middle-tier countries is not driven mainly by immigrant naturalization. This corroborates Hypothesis 2.
Demand for dual citizenship

After having established the high prevalence of dual citizenship in middle-tier countries (Hypothesis 1) and the fact that it is created through active acquisition rather than immigrant naturalization (Hypothesis 2), the next step is to compare levels of demand for dual citizenship in Western and middle-tier countries. This would also provide an indication of applicants’ different motivations to become dual citizens. To this end, I analyze data on the acquisition of ancestry- or ethnicity-based dual citizenship (long-distance naturalization) in Western and middle-tier countries. I analyze an original dataset of 2.5 million long-distance naturalizations from eight European countries: Italy, Hungary, Spain, Switzerland, Finland, Germany, Bulgaria and Romania. For the most part, the data consist of administrative statistics that I obtained directly from citizenship-granting countries, as well as some drawn from existing publications.

Long-distance naturalization became a mass phenomenon in the 1990s, as many EU countries began to offer facilitated citizenship acquisition to the descendants of emigrants or co-ethnics, without requiring residence or renunciation of former citizenship (Pogonyi et al. 2010; Dumbrava 2014; Harpaz 2015). For example, descendants of Italian emigrants in Argentina or the U.S. may acquire Italian dual citizenship, and ethnic Hungarians in Serbia or Canada may obtain Hungarian citizenship – without setting foot in Italy or Hungary.

Another paper (Harpaz 2015) analyzed part of that dataset: 1.1 million long-distance naturalizations from six countries. Here, I reanalyze the full dataset. Table 3 presents a summary of the dataset, listing the countries that offer citizenship and the three countries whose citizens were awarded the highest numbers of applications in each granting country.
Table 3: Long-distance naturalization in nine European Union countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Granting country</th>
<th>Long-distance naturalizations</th>
<th>Top origin countries of applicants</th>
<th>Year range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1,003,403</td>
<td>Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay</td>
<td>1998-2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>622,531</td>
<td>Romania, Serbia, Ukraine</td>
<td>2011-2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>491,101</td>
<td>Cuba, Argentina, Mexico</td>
<td>2009-2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>172,965</td>
<td>Moldova, Israel, Ukraine</td>
<td>2000-2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>96,564</td>
<td>Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia</td>
<td>2000-2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>33,213</td>
<td>Israel, USA, Argentina</td>
<td>2000-2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>25,092</td>
<td>France, Italy, Germany</td>
<td>1998-2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>18,372</td>
<td>Sweden, USA, Canada</td>
<td>2003-2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,463,241</td>
<td>Argentina, Romania, Brazil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: the first column lists the country that grants citizenship on the basis of ancestry or ethnicity and the second details the number of long-distance naturalizations (not including ordinary naturalizations). The third column lists, in order, the three leading countries of citizenship for each granting country. For example, Argentineans were the largest group of applicants for Italian citizenship. The fourth column details the years to which the data apply.
Source: author’s calculation based on data from Harpaz 2015 in addition to Bálint 2014; Izquierdo and Chao 2015.

Two patterns can be observed in the table. First, long-distance naturalization is creating large numbers of EU citizens. For example, Italy gave out about an average of
84,000 ancestry-based citizenships per year (mostly to Latin Americans), while approving only 25,700 ordinary immigrant naturalizations per year during the same period (Sartori 2011). Hungary approved close to 170,000 co-ethnic citizenships each year in 2011-2014 – higher than the annual number of naturalizations granted to immigrants by much larger countries such as Germany or France (ibid.; Eurostat 2013, 2014). This shows that long-distance naturalization is a major pathway into EU citizenship that has not yet been properly studied.

The second pattern is the predominance of citizens of middle-tier countries. In the countries that gave out hundreds of thousands of citizenships, the leading origin countries for applicants are middle-tier. There are only two countries where citizenship applicants came mostly from the West – Switzerland and Finland – and these countries gave out a relatively minuscule number of citizenships. Figure 3 presents the distribution of the total sum of 2.5 million long-distance naturalizations in the sample by applicants’ country and region of origin.
Figure 3: Long-distance naturalizations in EU countries by country of origin

Note: the figure shows the breakdown of 2.46 million applications for ancestry-based citizenship in nine European countries by applicants’ country of origin. For example, 5% of all applications in the sample were made by Serbian citizens. Granting countries include Hungary, Italy, Spain, Romania, Bulgaria, Germany, Finland and Switzerland.
Source: see Table 3.

The figure shows that at least 87 percent of all applications in the sample were made by citizens of Latin American and Eastern European countries. Citizens of Western countries – for example, Italian-Americans or Finnish-Canadians – were responsible for no more than 8 percent of all applications. This demonstrates that long-distance naturalization on the basis of ancestry or ethnicity is predominantly a middle-tier phenomenon. In spite of the presence of tens of millions of potentially eligible individuals in Western Europe and North America (Mateos 2013), it seems that few of them actually applied to regain their ancestral citizenship.

It is impossible to construct a reliable dataset about eligible populations that would allow us to directly compare rates of long-distance naturalization because of...
inherent challenges in determining the size of the eligible population. Here, however, I will combine several sources to construct rough estimates of the relative size of the populations that are eligible for Hungarian and Italian citizenship in Western and middle-tier countries. These estimates will allow us to examine the relationship between the value of eligible individuals’ primary citizenship and demand for secondary citizenship from EU countries. The theory of compensatory citizenship predicts that demand for Hungarian or Italian citizenship will be negatively correlated with the value of citizenship in potential applicants’ country of citizenship.

First, let us examine Hungarian citizenship. Since 2011, Hungary, an EU member country, is offering dual citizenship to anyone who is descended from former Hungarian citizens and can speak Hungarian. I combined Hungarian citizenship statistics with census figures from Eastern European countries, the U.S., Canada and Australia in order to calculate the percentage of the potentially eligible population that has acquired Hungarian citizenship between 2011 and 2014. I used census figures on the number of people whose mother tongue was Hungarian (in Eastern Europe) or who spoke Hungarian at home (in the U.S., Canada and Australia). In Eastern European countries, the number of people who identified as Hungarian speakers was almost identical to the number of ethnic Hungarians, reflecting the overlap between language and ethnicity in the region (see Chapter 3). In the U.S., Canada and Australia, the number of people who reported Hungarian ancestry was much higher than those who spoke Hungarian. I used the lower figure on Hungarian-speakers in order to capture only people who can obtain citizenship at a minimal effort and would not need to learn Hungarian especially for that purpose (see more on Hungarian citizenship in Chapter 3).

Acquisition rates differ widely across countries: from 2011 to August 2014, Hungary received 400,000 citizenship applications from Romanians – about 30% of Hungarian-speakers in the country (Romanian National Institute of Statistics 2013; Bálint 2014). Meanwhile, only 1,500 persons in the U.S. applied for Hungarian citizenship – less than 2% of the 93,000 Hungarian speakers in the country (ACS 2013). Figure 4 below plots demand for citizenship (represented by the percent of Hungarian-speakers who obtained Hungarian citizenship from abroad) and citizenship value (represented by a country’s passport index rank).
Figure 4: Acquisition of Hungarian citizenship and passport index ranking

Note: The y-axis represents the number of citizenship acquisitions in 2011-2014 as a percentage of the number of Hungarian speakers in each country. The x-axis presents a country’s passport index rank.

The figure shows the strong connection between the value of a country’s citizenship and its citizens’ level of interest in Hungarian citizenship. The higher a country’s passport ranking (which is very strongly correlated to its overall citizenship quality), the lower the demand for Hungarian/EU dual citizenship is. The correlation between the passport index ranking and the demand for Hungarian citizenship was 0.94, with an R-Squared of 0.89. Demand was practically nonexistent in countries that had a passport ranking equal to or higher than Hungary (the Hungarian passport was ranked 11th in the world). Interest was higher in countries that joined the EU after Hungary (Romania and Croatia) and peaked in countries that were not members of the EU at all
A Hungarian-speaker in Ukraine was 35 times more likely to acquire Hungarian citizenship than a Hungarian-speaker in the U.S.

These results lend support to the theory which views citizenship decisions as shaped by instrumental calculations based on a comparison of the value of the citizenship one already has and the citizenship one stands to gain. Critics could object, however, that Hungarian ethnic identity is stronger in Eastern European countries that border Hungary. In those countries, ethnic Hungarians live in tight Hungarian-speaking communities where Hungarian national identity is strongly preserved. Moreover, ethnic Hungarians in Romania or Serbia do not descend from immigrants; rather, they became citizens of those countries as a result of imposed border changes after World War One. Therefore, it should be no surprise that they are more attached to Hungary than people whose ancestors decided to emigrate to America or Australia.

There are various ways to counter this ethno-nationalist or sentimentalist approach to dual citizenship (above all, the fact that demand correlates citizenship value even when omitting Western immigration countries – see Chapter 3). Here, I will provide further support for the compensatory citizenship approach by conducting a similar analysis of demand for citizenship that will compare uptake of Italian dual citizenship in Western countries and in Latin America. Here, the statistics deal entirely with the descendants of emigrants who have made a decision to leave Italy and did not have a foreign citizenship imposed on them. I use figures on the total number of acquisitions of Italian citizenship between 1998 and 2010 (Tintori 2012) and historical statistics on emigration from Italy (AltreItalie 2014). I calculated an indicator of demand for dual citizenship by dividing the number of citizenship acquisitions in the total number of immigrants from Italy who settled in each country from 1861 to 1980.

The figures on historical migration of Italians do not reflect the total population that is eligible for Italian citizenship but they nonetheless provide a rough sense of the relative size of the “founder populations” of Italians. For example, the U.S. has received 3.1 million Italian immigrants between 1861 and 1980 but only 25,000 Americans applied for Italian citizenship from 1998 to 2010. Argentina received about 2 million Italians over the same period, but its citizens filed 452,000 successful applications for Italian citizenship in 1998-2010. Even without knowing the number of people who are
actually eligible for citizenship – in the U.S., 18 million people reported Italian ancestry (U.S. Census 2012) but for Argentina there is no information – we can see that demand in Argentina is about 27 times higher than in the U.S. (the number of acquisition is 18 times higher out of an eligible population that is about two-thirds the size).

In Figure 5, I plot demand for citizenship (the percentage of citizenship acquisitions out of the number of pre-1980 immigrants) against countries’ passport index ranking. Note that unlike in Figure 4 above, the percentage in the y-axis does not represent the actual share of the eligible population that took up citizenship but only a relative measure that is used for the sake of the comparison.

**Figure 5: Acquisition of Italian citizenship and passport index ranking**

![Figure 5](image_url)

Notes: The y-axis represents the number of citizenship acquisitions in 1998-2010 as a percentage out of the number of Italian immigrants before 1980. The x-axis presents a country’s passport index rank. Sources: Tintori 2012; Henley and Partners 2013; AltreItalie 2014.
As Figure 5 clearly shows, demand for Italian citizenship varied widely between different countries that host descendants of Italian emigrants. Again, middle-tier countries with lower citizenship value exhibited much higher demand. The association of passport index rank and demand for citizenship is again very high: a correlation of 0.94 with an R-Squared of 0.87.

Italy’s passport is ranked 3rd in the world, which might explain why we see some demand among Canadians and Australians (whose passports are ranked 4th and 6th, respectively) whereas citizens of those countries exhibited very low demand for Hungarian citizenship.36 The practically-nonexistent demand for Italian citizenship in France and Switzerland is particularly telling. If the acquisition of Italian citizenship were driven by attachment to Italian identity and the wish to enjoy rights in the “homeland,” Italian descendants in the countries that border Italy would be expected to show much higher demand than third- or fourth generation Brazilians or Argentineans who have never been to their country of origin. In reality, French and Swiss citizens, who already enjoy full rights in all EU countries, feel no need for Italian/EU citizenship, whereas Argentineans and Brazilians, sensing their lower position in the global hierarchy, view such citizenship as a valuable asset.

This comparative analysis of the acquisition of Hungarian and Italian citizenship has demonstrated that levels of demand for dual citizenship are mostly determined by the value of potential applicants’ original citizenship. The same essential patterns are found whenever EU member countries offer an opportunity for long-distance naturalization: eligible individuals in middle-tier countries rush to apply whereas eligible descendants in Western countries remain mostly uninterested (see Table 3 above). This corroborates Hypothesis 3.

The stark variation in demand for long-distance naturalization can also be expected to shape applicants’ motives. The low demand for dual citizenship in Western countries reflects the low practical value of the second citizenship; it also leads us to expect that those individuals who self-select into dual citizenship will be more likely to have sentimental and symbolic attachments to the origin country. Outside the West, in contrast, individuals who were eligible for Western/EU citizenship expected practical
benefits (a pathway to emigration, a high-prestige passport or at least an insurance policy). This meant that demand for citizenship extended beyond the “ideological core” of people who had a strong sentimental interest in their roots. Therefore, the motives of middle-tier applicants would be more instrumental.

This expectation was confirmed in a recent study that analyzed time-dependent changes in citizenship applications – i.e., how demand for citizenship changed between years. That study found that economic conditions had a strong effect on demand in middle-tier countries (e.g. when unemployment rose, more people sought ancestry-based citizenship) but did not have such an effect in Western countries (Harpaz 2015). This supports the idea that citizenship behavior in middle-tier countries is more instrumental whereas demand for ancestry-based citizenship among citizens of Western countries, being limited to a tiny group of people, is more sentimental and detached from direct practical considerations.

IV. Conclusion

In this chapter, I offered a new perspective on the phenomenon of dual citizenship that repositions it within the context of global stratification. My main aim was to point out the emergence of a new and understudied citizenship formation in the middling parts of the global citizenship hierarchy. This is the phenomenon of compensatory dual citizenship, whereby individuals in middle-tier countries hold a second citizenship from a Western/EU country.

The existing literature, which concentrated on dual citizenship produced by immigrant naturalization in the West, mostly neglected the practical value of dual citizenship and the way its meaning is shaped by global inequality. In contrast, the approach I present here argues that individuals’ attitudes towards citizenship are determined by their position within the global citizenship hierarchy. While citizens of Western countries have no strong incentive to seek dual citizenship and citizens of third-tier countries few opportunities to do so, millions of individuals in middle-tier countries have responded to the legal acceptance of dual nationality with a rush to secure another citizenship from a Western/EU country. Outside the West, the acquisition of dual
citizenship is typically an instrumental strategy of upward mobility in a global system that is stratified by citizenship.

I tested three hypotheses that flow from this theory, using data from granting countries and applicants’ residence countries. First, I demonstrated that dual citizenship is not unique to the West, but is also prevalent in middle-tier citizenship countries. Second, I showed that dual citizenship in those countries is not a byproduct of immigrant naturalization; instead, it is mostly the result of deliberate acquisition on the basis of ancestry or ethnicity. Third, I established the significant and negative correlation between the value of a country’s citizenship and its citizens’ interest in obtaining a second passport. Demand for EU citizenship in middle-tier countries like Argentina, Brazil, Serbia or Ukraine was up to 35 times higher than demand for such citizenship in the U.S. (and other rich Western countries). These findings corroborate the compensatory citizenship approach, providing evidence of an instrumentally-motivated scramble for Western/EU dual citizenship in middle-tier countries.

Why do so many individuals in middle-tier countries seek to obtain compensatory citizenship? How do they obtain such citizenship and what do they do with it? In this chapter, I used statistics to identify the phenomenon and establish its general logic; the following chapters will offer in-depth analyses of three study cases that will reveal the dynamics of compensatory citizenship on the ground. These cases will allow us to explore how specific citizenship regimes produce strategic bottom-up responses and the ways in which compensatory citizenship is used and understood in the ground. Thus, it would be possible to go beyond defining and proving the existence of compensatory citizenship – which was my aim in this chapter – and begin moving toward an explanation of this new global phenomenon.
Because the cause of threeillusion. Such people are right to reside in work in other countries (e.g. a Chilean passport allows one to work in Argentina or a 30% of the value of each country's citizenship in the content of citizenship in different countries. Above all, it differs from the index I design here by setting 12 from the top or middle tiers countries that are ranked below the top or the median, respectively, in either of 10 the correlation between each individual variable (state fragility, democracy, HDI) and the Passport Index. I plotted these two indices rather than combine them into a single index in order to exclude from the top or middle tiers countries that are ranked below the top or the median, respectively, in either of these indices. 12 The Henley&Partners and Kochenov index is highly informative and very useful in learning about the content of citizenship in different countries. Above all, it differs from the index I design here by setting 30% of the value of each country’s citizenship in the degree of settlement freedom that it offers, i.e. the right to reside in work in other countries (e.g. a Chilean passport allows one to work in Argentina or a Swedish passport in Spain). I ignored this factor as a component in the value of citizenship because of three
Some authors have contested the distinction between ancestry and descendants reacquired it through long distance naturalization. Return migrants include both first and second generation immigrants, say second generation Moroccans in France. I categorize dual citizenship as ancestry-based when there has been a break in the transmission of citizenship and descendants reacquired it through long-distance naturalization. Some authors have contested the distinction between ancestry-based and co-ethnic acquisition (Pogonyi m.s.).
For the sake of clarity, I determined the main pathway only by the largest country of dual citizenship. In some countries, we can infer a secondary pathway that also produces a large number of dual citizens, based on the second country of dual citizenship (shown in Table 2) and EUDO reports. In Germany and the UK, the secondary pathway to dual citizenship is immigrant naturalization; in Spain, it is ethnic repatriation; in Poland and Greece, return migration (the U.S. is the second country of dual citizenship) and in Israel and Mexico, ancestry (see Table 4).

As in Table 1 above, I excluded countries with less than 50,000 dual citizens.

Turkey is currently the third-largest country of second citizenship in Germany (530,000 dual citizens compared with 570,000 Russian-Germans and 690,000 Polish-Germans) (Göroğlu 2014). Recent trends in German naturalization policy are likely to lead to a rapid increase in the number of dual citizens without ethnic German background (Naujoks 2009). British-Americans and British-Australians are the leading groups in terms of dual passports, not dual citizenship (since only passport data were available). Therefore, it is possible that other groups (say, British-Pakistanis) include more dual citizens, but are less likely to have a valid second passport. Thus, dual citizenship produced by naturalization is strong in both countries.

Israel and Mexico also host large numbers of dual citizens produced through ancestry-based long-distance naturalization (Harpaz 2013, 2015).

The average naturalization was calculated for 1998-2009.

The Other category includes Israel (1.5% of the total sample) and unspecified countries (3%), at least half of which can be assumed to be middle tier. Therefore, we can safely say that 90% of the long-distance naturalizations in the sample were made by citizens of middle-tier countries.

Note, also, the absence of third-tier countries (except Cuba and Moldova), as few European descendants or co-ethnics live in those countries. This corroborates the theory’s prediction regarding the low availability of Western dual citizenship in third-tier countries.

The figure represents 0.1% out of the 1.5 million Americans who reported having Hungarian ancestry (U.S. Census 2012).

Romania and Croatia are both members of the EU but their citizens have lesser rights within the Union relative to Hungarians. One of the reasons for the low demand in Slovakia was its strong ban on dual citizenship (Chapter 3).

Italy also offers dual citizenship to Italian-speakers in territories that it had lost to Yugoslavia, but they are not included in the statistics presented here.

I calculated the number of Italians who settled in each country by deducting the number of return migrants from those who left for the country. The data on return migration is likely to be imperfect – it only lists returnees since 1900 whereas emigration data begin in 1860. When ignoring the statistics on return and counting only emigrants, the results stayed the same.

There are many factors that affect the size of the eligible population beside original population size (Hout and Goldstein 1994). One of the most crucial in this case is that emigration to the U.S., Argentina and Brazil peaked between 1890 and 1920 whereas emigration to Canada, Australia and Western Europe mostly took place in the 1950s and 1960s. This indicator is more effective for comparing demand for citizenship in countries that received Italians around the same time – the U.S. compared to Brazil and Argentina, Canada and Australia compared to Western Europe. In this paper, I will disregard these differences and potential biases.

It might also have to do with the relatively recent timing of Italian immigration to those countries – see Note 35.
Chapter 3: Hungarian Dual Citizenship in Serbia

I. Introduction

European Union (EU) citizenship, which was formally created in the Maastricht Treaty of 1993, allows citizens of any EU country to work and reside anywhere in the Union. The rise of this new supranational status coincided with the post-exclusive and post-territorial turns in citizenship that were discussed in the Introduction. As a result, dual citizenship from European Union countries became available and highly attractive to people living outside the Union. As the EU expanded to include new countries, member countries themselves replicated its expansionistic logic in their own citizenship policies, attracting new citizens (but not necessarily immigrants) thanks to the increased value of their citizenship. Today, the majority of EU countries offer some kind of citizenship acquisition based on ancestry or ethnicity, without requiring residence or renunciation of former citizenship (Dumbrava 2014). Policies of this kind are particularly common in Southern and Eastern Europe, where countries have legacies of mass emigration or territorial changes that left many co-nationals outside their borders. Demand for such citizenship among citizens of middle-tier countries is very high. Four EU countries alone – Italy, Spain, Hungary and Romania – have already approved dual citizenship to more than two million non-residents (Cook-Martin 2013; Harpaz 2015; Pogonyi, forthcoming).

Nowhere is such policy as consequential and contested as in Eastern Europe. In that region, the beneficiaries of dual citizenship policy are not descendants of emigrants
living in faraway countries (like the new Italian dual citizens in Argentina); instead, they typically live just across the border, in territories that the granting country once controlled and lost through war. This applies to the citizenship policies of Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia and Greece (Pogonyi et al. 2010; Dumbrava 2014). In those countries, the offer of dual citizenship is not aimed at the entire population in the targeted territory, but only at the granting country’s co-ethnics. Therefore, citizenship laws specify criteria that exclude potential applicants who are not of the right ethnicity, mother tongue or religion. This practice differs from the policies of Spain or Italy, where citizenship is conditioned on ancestry alone. Dual citizenship policies in Central and Eastern Europe can thus be classified as co-ethnic citizenship policies.¹

Hungarian dual citizenship in Serbia provides a strategic case for the study of the co-ethnic variant of compensatory citizenship. Hungary only began offering co-ethnic dual citizenship in 2011, later than most countries in the region. This policy has met with very high demand: Hungarian citizenship has been taken up by at least 750,000 persons, of whom 140,000 were from Serbia.² Theoretically, we can situate the Hungarian-Serbian case in the context of two literatures: the literature on Hungarian cross-border co-ethnicity and citizenship (Brubaker 1996, 2000, 2006; Iordachi 2004; Pogonyi et al. 2010; Kovacs and Tóth 2013) and the burgeoning literature on citizenship policies and strategies in former Yugoslavia (Jansen 2008; Štiks 2010; Ragazzi and Balalovska 2011; Vasilijević 2014; Krasniqi and Stjepanović 2015). To date, no systematic study has been carried out of this case, which is located at the intersection of two spaces of ethnic citizenship – Hungarian/EU and post-Yugoslav.

Most of the Serbians who take up a second Hungarian citizenship belong to Serbia’s Hungarian minority. However, a significant minority among them not actually identify as ethnically Hungarian. Often, these persons study the Hungarian language specifically for the sake of citizenship. Their goal is not to embrace a new ethnic identity or move to Hungary, but rather to secure a European Union passport. Such a passport would allow them to immigrate to an attractive Western European destination or just hold a “backup plan.” This makes them comparable to Mexican parents who practice birth tourism in the U.S. Whereas Mexicans strategize their children’s place of birth, Serbians
strategize their own ethno-linguistic identity in order to secure compensatory dual citizenship. I will dedicate special attention to this group of strategic dual citizens.

In this chapter, I will draw on a combination of quantitative and qualitative data in order to construct a demographic and social profile of this phenomenon. The chapter will proceed as follows. First, I present the legal and historical background on citizenship in Hungary and Serbia. Then, I offer a demographic analysis of Hungarian-Serbian dual citizenship: I will use Hungarian consular statistics to analyze trends in citizenship uptake and European migration statistics to evaluate the effect of dual citizenship on emigration from Serbia. I then draw on material from interviews conducted in Serbia in order to discuss the dynamics of citizenship acquisition and analyze the motivations and uses that drive Serbians to acquire Hungarian citizenship.

Before proceeding, a terminological note is in order. In Central and Eastern Europe, the distinction between the names of states and ethnic groups is often blurred. To avoid confusion, I will distinguish here between the term “Serbian,” which will refer to citizens of Serbia (regardless of ethnicity), and “Serb” which will pertain specifically to people of Serbian ethnicity. Given that no such distinction exists for “Hungarian”, I will mostly use the term “ethnic Hungarian” when referring to the ethnicity and simply “Hungarian” when referring to the state. However, I will use the term “non-Hungarians” to designate people in Serbia who are not of Hungarian ethnicity.

II. Legal and historical background

Hungarian-Serbian dual citizenship came into existence in the context of the two recent historical shifts that redrew the geopolitical map of Central and Eastern Europe: the fall of communist regimes in the 1990s and the expansion of the European Union in the 2000s. The post-communist transition created the possibility to acquire dual citizenship (communist countries did not permit multiple citizenship) while the expansion of the EU – which led to huge gaps in the value of citizenship between member and non-member countries – created the practical incentive to do so. The connection between Hungary and northern Serbia, however, goes back in time earlier than the 1990s. In this section, I will first sketch the recent history of Vojvodina, the part of Serbia where dual
citizenship is available, and then discuss how changes in the citizenship laws of Hungary and Serbia led to the current situation.

The region on which I focus here, Vojvodina (Vajdaság in Hungarian), was part of Hungary from 1867 to 1918, when it was taken over the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (which became Yugoslavia in 1929). At the time, Vojvodina was an extremely diverse multi-ethnic region: the largest ethnic groups were Serbs and Hungarians, who made up a third and a quarter of the population respectively. Northern Vojdovina (including the region’s two main cities, Novi Sad and Subotica) fell under Hungarian control again in 1941, after Nazi Germany occupied Yugoslavia. In 1944, Yugoslav partisans retook the region and it was reintegrated into Yugoslavia. While there were some atrocities committed by the Hungarian occupiers and by the Yugoslav partisans against Serbs and Hungarians, respectively, overall the region’s World War Two occupation did not lead to wholesale genocidal violence as in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (except against Jews). Partly as a result of that legacy, Vojvodina did not experience major interethnic violence during the Balkans wars of the 1990s (Bieber and Wintergarten 2006). Today, the Hungarian minority in Serbia enjoys relatively developed cultural and linguistic rights, and its cultural and educational institutions receive financial support from both Serbia and Hungary (Boarov 2001; Manic 2011; Sobyak 2012).

Nonetheless, a century of Yugoslav and Serbian rule in Vojvodina has seen the Hungarian demographic presence shrink in both absolute and relative terms. We can track this decline very accurately because countries in Central and Eastern Europe include questions about ethnic identity and mother tongue in their national censuses. The number of self-identified Hungarians dropped in Vojvodina from 420,000 in 1910 to 254,000 in 2011 (Hungary MFA 2002; Serbia Census 2012) – mainly as a result of assimilation, emigration and low birthrates (Ilić 2010). As Vojvodina received significant Serb immigration in the 1940s and again in the 1990s, the proportion of Hungarians in the population of the region shrunk even more rapidly, declining from 28% in 1910 to a mere 13% in 2011.

Let us now consider citizenship policy in Hungary and Serbia. The Kingdom of Hungary, which existed from 1867 to 1918 as part of Austria-Hungary, was a clear example of what the sociologist Rogers Brubaker (1996) calls a “nationalizing nation-
state.” About half of its population of 20 million identified as ethnically Hungarian. The rest of the population – consisting of Romanians, Serbs, Croats, Slovaks, Germans and Jews – was subjected to a policy of “Magyarization” (“Hungarianization”: Magyar means Hungarian). This meant imposing the Hungarian language – and, through it, the ethnic identity – on non-Hungarian minorities. This policy of was mostly unsuccessful and ethnic Hungarians remained a minority in the country’s peripheries. After World War One, the 1920 Treaty of Trianon (part of the Versailles treaties) divided two-thirds of Hungary’s population and three-quarters of its territory among its neighbors Yugoslavia (which took Vojvodina), Romania (which took Transylvania), Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and Austria.9

The loss of these extensive territories – which were home to 3 million ethnic Hungarians – has become a lingering national trauma and a key factor in Hungarian foreign relations and citizenship policy. In World War Two, the aspiration to regain the lost territories led Hungary’s leadership to ally with Nazi Germany. After the war, the Soviets pacified the region by silencing revisionist territorial claims and prohibited multiple citizenship. Soon after the fall of communism, however, Hungary permitted dual citizenship and some Hungarian politicians returned to the interwar discourses that emphasized the ties to ethnic Hungarians across the border. The country did not rush, however, to offer full dual citizenship to co-ethnics abroad. Since 2001, Hungarian ethnics in neighboring countries could obtain a “Hungarian Certificate” which gave them some social, educational and cultural rights in Hungary but was far from full citizenship. Moreover, in 2005, Hungarian voters rejected in a referendum a proposal to offer dual citizenship cross-border Hungarians (Sütő 2012; Kovács and Tóth 2013).10

Only in 2011, under the incumbent prime minister Viktor Orbán, did Hungary offer full dual citizenship to co-ethnics abroad, specifying two criteria: descent from citizens of Hungary (from before 1920 or in 1941-1944) and proficiency in the Hungarian language. Residence in Hungary or renunciation of former citizenship were not required, and neither was a declaration that one self-identifies as Hungarian. The Hungarian language requirement is fulfilled through an informal conversation with a consular official, not a standardized exam. Individuals who fulfill those conditions are eligible for what Hungarian authorities define as “simplified naturalization”: from a legal-technical
point of view, the procedure is defined as acquiring a new citizenship based on cultural or political affinity, not as citizenship restitution.\textsuperscript{11}

While the language of the law is quite technical, we can shed some light on the logic behind it by examining the new constitution that the Hungarian government, led by Orbán and the rightwing Fidesz party, approved in the same year. That new constitution states in its preamble (Article D): “Hungary shall bear responsibility for the fate of Hungarians living beyond its borders, and shall facilitate the survival and development of their communities; it shall support their efforts to preserve their Hungarian identity”.

The Hungarian constitution designates a group of people who are Hungarian not on the basis of their citizenship but on the basis of their culture and identity. This conception of an ethnic nation which exists independently of the formal citizenry is anything but uniquely Hungarian: it is widely-accepted and constitutionally enshrined in most Central and Eastern European countries, as well as in Israel (Liebich 2009). In spite of its ubiquity, this Herderian ethnic ontology (Wimmer 2014) is ill-suited as a basis for a citizenship law because it can be expected to draw criticism from EU legal bodies. The classification of individuals based on their pre-legal ethnic essence would be construed as discriminatory and contradicting liberal principles (Starr 1992; Dumbrava 2014). And while other European countries like Germany and Greece also have ethnically preferential citizenship policies, and others like Spain and Italy have given out hundreds of thousands of citizenships (Joppke 2005; Dumbrava 2014; Chapter 2), the brunt of criticism over such practices has been leveled at Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. These new EU entrants who created about a million new EU citizens were subject to criticism as well as officials in both neighboring countries and officials in Western European countries and the EU (BBC 2009; Bauböck 2010b; EUDO 2010).

For that reason, the citizenship law specifies two objective criteria – descent and language – that were designed to capture the population that Hungary sees as “Hungarians living beyond its border” without making an explicit reference to ethnicity. Using the criterion of descent from Hungarian nationals would not be sufficient for that purpose, because it would offer citizenship to millions of ethnic Serbs, Romanians, Ukrainians, Slovaks and others. Therefore, a second criterion – language – is used to exclude non-Hungarians. Language proficiency might appear as a standard requirement
Thus, Hungarian citizenship law is designed to appear as an ethnically blind law. At the same time, most Hungarians (in Hungary and abroad) understand it as an overtly ethnic law offering “positive discrimination” to Hungarians outside Hungary (Küpper 2006; Bauböck 2010b; Dumbrava 2014; Pogonyi, m.s.). This is also the official discourse used by the Orbán government (Pogonyi 2015). From that ethno-national perspective, the new citizenship law does late justice in a double sense: it “redeems” individual cross-border Hungarians who were abandoned by Hungary; at the same time, it also heals the collective body of the nation, which was allegedly torn at Trianon. A clear expression of this ideology – Hungary as the protector of all Hungarians – can be seen in the deliberate policy of including ethnic Hungarians from Vojvodina and western Ukraine among Hungary’s delegates to the European Parliament. This is meant to demonstrate to cross-border Hungarians outside the EU that – thanks to Orbán – they are members of the EU not just as individual passport holders but also as a political community.

Most scholars who analyzed the 2011 citizenship law suggest that there is another logic at work alongside the official ethno-national discourse. According to these analysts, the creation of hundreds of thousands of new citizens was actually part of a plan to secure votes for Prime Minister Viktor Orbán (Kovács and Tóth 2013; Scheppele 2014a). The plan was successful: over 90% of the votes cast from outside Hungary in the 2014 elections went to Orbán and his party Fidesz, and those votes helped them secure a decisive majority in parliament (Scheppele 2014b). Voter turnout among cross-border Hungarians – in Serbia, about 35% according to Hungarian consular officials – was lower than among Hungary’s resident citizens, but it was actually quite high when compared to other non-resident citizen populations. According to this view, then, the law was driven mainly by political ambition disguised as ethno-national ideals.

We should add that policies for recruiting “new Hungarians” draw some of their acceptability from the demographic crisis that Hungary is in. The last time that the annual number of births exceeded the number of deaths was in 1981. Since then, Hungary’s
population has already shrunk by 10% – one million people. This shrinking – driven mostly by low birthrates – exacerbates centuries-old fears about the survival of the Hungarian nation, a “small people” (Abulof 2009) marked by existential anxiety.¹⁴

While some of Hungary’s neighbors – above all Slovakia – protested its decision to hand out ethnic-kin citizenship (Bauböck 2010b), in Serbia the move met with no opposition. There are three principal reasons for this tolerance: first, the demographic presence of Hungarians in Serbia is too small to pose a real threat to the majority status of ethnic Serbs; second, Serbian-Hungarian diplomatic relations are very good thanks to Hungary’s strong support for Serbia’s bid to join the EU; and third, Serbia has its own co-ethnic citizenship policy that targets ethnic Serbs in Bosnia, Croatia and Montenegro.

The dissolution of communist Yugoslavia created citizenship struggles, migrations of ethnic unmixing and “accidental diasporas” comparable to those that were identified by Rogers Brubaker (1992b, 1998, 2000) in the Soviet case. This has produced complex configurations of dual citizenship produced by forced displacement, cross-border ethnic affinities and “ethnic engineering” by states (Štiks 2010). When Serbia permitted dual citizenship in 2001, the main goal was to facilitate naturalization by Serb refugees from Bosnia and Croatia. In spite of the rivalry between Serbia and Croatia, there are over 120,000 Croatian-Serbian dual citizens in Serbia, including Serb refugees from Croatia as well as ethnic Croats from Serbia and.¹⁵ Since 2006, Serbia also offers dual citizenship to co-ethnics abroad (Vasilijević 2012; Rava 2013; Waterbury 2014).¹⁶ Thus, Serbian toleration for Hungarian dual citizenship is part of the emergence of a region-wide regime in which ethnicity is translated directly into citizenship, without being dependent on territorial residence – so-called “post-territorial nationalism” (Ragazzi and Balalovska 2011; Žilović 2012). Given the legal and political environment in which Serbia operates, Hungarian citizenship policy appears acceptable, even commonsensical, to Serbian elites and lay persons.
III. Data and methods

In this chapter, I combine two sources of data in order to construct a multi-dimensional sociological profile of Hungarian-Serbian dual citizenship. First, I use statistics to analyze patterns in the acquisition of Hungarian dual citizenship, and specifically patterns that can shed light on applicants’ motives. To that end, I draw on citizenship acquisition statistics collected by the Hungarian government. Hungarian official sources did not make these data available in a systematic manner (for example, broken down by month or year). Therefore, I relied on Hungarian academic and media publications that reproduced those figures. In addition, I obtained statistics directly from the Hungarian consulate in Subotica (the second-largest city in Vojvodina and the one with the largest ethnic Hungarian population), which is responsible for the vast majority of citizenship acquisitions in Serbia.
The second component of the study is an analysis of the dynamics of the acquisition and use of citizenship on the ground. The material primarily consists of 48 in-depth interviews with Hungarian-Serbian dual citizens and applicants. The sample is non-random, since random sampling would be technically impossible (there is no list of dual citizens from which one may randomly select). The primary method of selection was strategic sampling: I defined a population of interest and overrepresented it in the sample. This population of interest includes strategic dual citizens, i.e. individuals who do not ethnically identify as Hungarian but acquire Hungarian citizenship. While ethnic Hungarians form an estimated 85-90 percent of citizenship recipients and strategic applicants only 10-15 percent, in the sample these two subgroups were given equal representation.17

Most of the interviews were conducted between June and October 2014. During that time, I resided in Belgrade and made frequent trips around Vojvodina. I conducted 19 interviews in Belgrade and 27 in Vojvodina (15 in and around Subotica and 12 in other towns around the area). I also interviewed two dual citizens who had migrated to Western Europe. In terms of ethnicity, 21 respondents self-identified as ethnic Hungarians and 19 as ethnic Serbs.18 Eight respondents of mixed parentage did not identify themselves as either Hungarian or Serbian.

I recruited respondents using a snowball sampling method. Respondent recruitment was made possible thanks to help from personal acquaintances, local academics and Hungarian language instructors. Interviews were conducted in Serbian or English, according to respondents’ preference. The fact that I cannot speak Hungarian biased the selection of ethnic Hungarian respondents because I only had access to people who spoke Serbian or English and had social ties with Serbs.19 Moreover, the fact that interviews were conducted in Serbian most likely influenced respondents’ self-presentation. However, this should not impact the validity of my findings, because the analysis focuses on non-Hungarians who deliberately strategize their ethnic identity in order to obtain dual citizenship. Interviews with ethnic Hungarians were mainly intended to understand the general framework of the phenomenon and provide a counterpoint to my subpopulation of interest. Furthermore, there are already a number of studies focusing on these “new Hungarians” based on surveys and interviews carried out in the Hungarian
language by numerous researchers including Szabolcs Pogonyi, Attila Papp, Tamás Kiss and Agnes Vass (in English, see Pogonyi, forthcoming; Danero Iglesias, Sata and Vass 2016).

Interviews were 75 to 150 minutes in duration. They included questions about three topics: how respondents obtained (or tried to obtain) dual citizenship, what motivated them to apply and how they evaluated the phenomenon from a normative perspective. I also recorded their life histories in brief. I coded and analyzed the interviews based on pre-defined themes (for example, actual and projected uses of second nationality) as well as themes that emerged inductively from the material (for example, perceptions of ethnic difference between Serbs and Hungarians).

In addition to interviews with dual citizens, I also conducted interviews with officials at the Hungarian consulate in Subotica and the embassy in Belgrade. During those visits to the consulate and the embassy, I also observed the application procedure and carried out informal conversations with applicants. I visited four language schools in Belgrade and Subotica that offered classes in Hungarian and interviewed directors and teachers there. I also attended a Hungarian language course in Belgrade for Serbs who wish to apply for citizenship and observed the dynamics in class.

IV. Hungarian dual citizenship: demographic aspects

In this section, I use statistics to analyze the way eligible individuals in neighboring countries responded to Hungarian citizenship policy. The first finding that can be established right away is that the offer of Hungarian citizenship met with strong demand: from January 2011 to September 2015, no fewer than 750,964 persons obtained Hungarian citizenship through simplified naturalization (Pogonyi, forthcoming). This makes Hungary the country that approved the largest number of co-ethnic naturalizations in Central and Eastern Europe, more than Romania and Bulgaria together (Harpaz 2015). Since 2011, Hungary has granted non-resident dual citizenship to about 150,000 persons every year – more than the annual number of immigrants who naturalize in France or Germany (Eurostat 2015).
The vast majority of applicants for Hungarian non-resident dual citizenship came from just four countries: Romania, Serbia, Ukraine and Slovakia. Citizens of these countries alone were responsible for 733,000 citizenship acquisitions – 98% of the total.\textsuperscript{20} Only a minuscule number of applicants came from countries like the United States, Australia or Canada, which also presumably host substantial eligible populations (see Chapter 2).\textsuperscript{21} When looking at the four countries that host cross-border ethnic Hungarians, we can identify huge variations in the number of people who obtained citizenship. The figure below presents the number of citizenship acquisitions in each country relative to the eligible population.

\textbf{Figure 2: Citizenship acquisitions and ethnic Hungarians by country, 2011-2015}

Notes: For each country, dark bar represents the number of citizenship acquisitions from January 2011 to September 2015 and the lighter bar is the number of individuals who self-identified as ethnic Hungarians in the 2011 censuses. Both bars refer to the axis on left. The floating triangle, which refers to axis on the right, represents the number of acquisitions as a percentage of ethnic Hungarians.

Sources: Pogonyi, forthcoming; national censuses of Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Ukraine.
Figure 2 compares the number of citizenship acquisitions to the number of ethnic Hungarians in each country, making it possible to compare levels of demand for citizenship (see also Pogonyi forthcoming). Overall, thirty-five percent of the total population of cross-border Hungarians in those four countries obtained dual citizenship. Romania hosts the largest Hungarian community. Thirty-eight percent of Hungarians in Romania acquired citizenship (38%), close to the regional average. Other countries diverge widely. While Slovakia hosts the second-largest Hungarian population after Romania – 460,000 persons – less than 1% of them obtained dual citizenship. In the remaining two countries, acquisition rates were much higher: 56% in Serbia and 82% in Ukraine.

What explains this dramatic variation in demand? Scholars who worked on the subject of Hungarian citizenship acquisition typically emphasized the role of symbolic and sentimental motives (Danero Iglesias et al. 2016; Pogonyi, forthcoming). I do not deny the important role of such motives in citizenship applications (moreover, symbolic-sentimental factors also came up in the interviews). Here, however, I will use comparative statistics to show that an instrumental approach, which emphasizes gaps in citizenship value, would be more suitable for explaining patterns in citizenship acquisition (see Chapter 2).

If we embrace the sentimental-symbolic approach, we would be hard pressed to come up with a convincing explanation for the sharp divergence in citizenship uptake rates that are shown in Figure 2. Would we argue that Hungarian identity is strong in Serbia and Ukraine, middling in Romania and very weak in Slovakia? Perhaps Hungarians in Slovakia are more integrated into the mainstream and those in Ukraine the least integrated? These hypotheses find no empirical support. In fact, the basic socio-political parameters of all four minority communities are the same: cross-border ethnic Hungarians live in concentrated settlements close to the border with Hungary, and their ethnic identity is institutionalized in similar ways in all four countries, including through census questions, minority cultural rights, minority organizations and political parties. Whatever potentially identity-relevant variations exist would actually lead us to expect Hungarian identity to be strongest in Romania and Slovakia: Romania hosts the largest
minority Hungarian community in the region while Slovakia is marked by the highest levels of interethnic tension (Danero Iglesias et al. 2016). Hungarian communities in Serbia and Ukraine, being smaller and more accepted, would be expected to have a weaker ethnic identity. Needless to say, the actual figures show opposite results.

The instrumental approach, on the other hand, assumes that individuals take up a second citizenship when it is of higher “value” than their original citizenship, and that identity plays a much smaller role. This approach, which was confirmed in a recent paper that analyzed 1.1 million citizenship acquisitions (Harpaz 2015), predicts that levels of demand will fluctuate over time in response to changes in the relative value between potential applicants’ actual citizenship and the one that they stand to gain. Institutional constraints – above all, restrictions on dual citizenship – would raise the social “costs” of dual citizenship and depress the number of applications.

This results presented in Figure 2 are mostly consistent with the instrumental approach. Serbia and Ukraine exhibit very high levels of demand because these countries are not members of the European Union. For citizens of those countries, Hungarian citizenship operates as EU citizenship. It tremendously expands their opportunities for travel and work. Ukraine does not permit dual citizenship; however, this does not seem to reduce the number of applications because this ban is not strictly enforced (Danero Iglesias et al. 2016).

What explains, however, the gap in demand between Romania and Slovakia, given that they are both EU member-states? First of all, Slovakia does not permit dual citizenship and is strict in enforcing this ban on its citizens. This is not the only factor at work, however. Not all EU citizenships are not equal. Slovakia joined the EU at the same time as Hungary, in 2004, and its citizens enjoy the exact same rights, including visa-free access to the U.S. Romania, on the other hand, joined the EU in 2007 and was subject to many restrictions; until 2014, Romanian citizens were not allowed to work in the most attractive EU countries, including the UK and Germany. Furthermore, Romanians need a visa to enter the U.S., and the Romanian passport is stigmatized in Western Europe. Finally, Romania permits dual citizenship. Therefore, the pattern of demand predicted by the instrumental approach – high demand from non-EU countries, middling demand from
newer EU entrants and practically no demand from established EU members – matches the observed pattern.

We can develop this analysis further by examining the way citizenship acquisition fluctuates over time. As I noted above, Hungarian statistics did not include a detailed breakdown by month or year. However, I have been able to obtain data representing three time points: April 2013, August 2014 and September 2015. For each of these dates, we can determine the total number of acquisitions since January 2011 as well as the number of applications since the previous data point. This allows us to offer a time-dependent analysis of the way demand changed over time, with a special focus on two events: in January 2014, the restrictions on Romanian citizens in the EU were lifted, allowing them to work in Germany, France, Britain and other attractive countries. Two months later, war broke out in Ukraine. The instrumental approach predicts that demand by Romanians would decline and demand by Ukrainians would increase after 2014 (later on, I will also discuss changes in demand by Serbians, which are not captured in these data). Figure 3 below shows the average number of citizenship acquisitions per month by citizens of each country. Those events from early 2014 are expected to start having an effect in the second bar, which refers to the period between April 2013 and August 2014.
The figure shows that since 2011, monthly acquisition rates have been declining rapidly in Romania and increasing rapidly in Ukraine. When war broke out in eastern Ukraine, citizenship applications presumably increased because the value of Ukrainian citizenship declined relative to Hungarian citizenship and furthermore the chaos made it more difficult for Ukraine to enforce its ban on dual citizenship. Acquisition figures in Ukraine in the latest period (August 2014 to September 2015) were 75% higher relative to the earliest period (January 2011 to April 2013). At the same time, the monthly number of applications by Romanians declined by half over the period of observation: a big part of this decline can presumably be explained by the boost in the value of Romanian citizenship in January 2014. These results, however, should be treated with caution because they are based on only three data points.

The analysis of these trends is consistent with the instrumental hypothesis: eligible individuals are more likely to try to acquire Hungarian/EU citizenship when the...
balance in the value between it and their origin-country citizenship shifts. This is not to deny that many applicants also have strong sentimental or identitarian motives that push them to acquire Hungarian citizenship. On the other hand, given that Hungarian citizenship is of high practical value for Romanians (pre-2014), Serbians and Ukrainians (but not Slovaks), we should not be surprised to find that potentially eligible individuals relate to it in a pragmatic manner, in the same way the eligible individuals relate to EU citizenship in countries like Israel, Argentina, Brazil or Moldova (Harpaz 2015).

Having established the general logic of demand for Hungarian dual citizenship, let us now focus on the specific case of Hungarian-Serbian citizenship. The data I analyzed above (Figure 3) did not allow us to identify a clear trend in Serbian citizenship acquisition. However, I obtained data on Serbian citizenship acquisitions from an additional source: the Hungarian consulate in Subotica. Those statistics detail the annual number of acquisitions at the consulate in 2011-2014. The consulate in Subotica is responsible for 93% of all citizenship acquisitions filed from Serbia, while only 7% of applications from Serbia are filed at the embassy in Belgrade. Note, however, that a full third of successful citizenship applications by Serbians were not filed in Serbia, but were submitted either on Hungarian territory or in Hungarian consulates in other countries (such as Austria). These statistics include four data points instead of three and the time intervals are 12 months rather than 13-16 months, therefore they allow for a more precise analysis. Figure 4 below shows the number of applications submitted at the consulate in Subotica each year in 2011-2014.
Figure 4 shows an inverted-U pattern in citizenship applications in Serbia which differs from the patterns of linear decrease or increase that were observed for Romania or Ukraine. This difference can be explained by EU visa policy towards Serbia. In general, Serbian citizens needed a visa to enter EU countries until December 2009; since that date, they may enter all EU countries except the UK without visa, but are not allowed to work there. However, the qualitative data I collected suggest a factor that drove up demand in 2013: starting in January of that year, EU officials expressed growing concern with the high number of Serbian citizens (mostly Roma) who were applying for asylum in Western European countries. The EU threatened to cancel Serbia’s visa-free status if it did not stop its citizens from engaging in “asylum system abuse” (B92 2013; The Economist 2013). This threat was widely covered in the Serbian media. As many Serbians feared losing their visa-free access to the EU, demand for Hungarian citizenship peaked. The Hungarian consul in Subotica reported that “when the EU threatened Serbia
with visa restrictions, this led to a clear increase in the numbers of applicants.” Several
dual citizen respondents said that they were pushed to apply for citizenship because they
feared that the visa regime would be imposed on Serbians once again. Thus, the peak in
2013 was a response to the risk that Serbian citizenship will be devalued by losing visa-
free access to the EU.

This analysis highlights the key importance that Serbians attach to freedom of
movement in Europe, which I will discuss in greater detail below. The inadequacy and
unreliability of the mobility rights provided by the Serbian passport constitute a
“citizenship deficit” that applicants seek to overcome by obtaining a second,
compensatory citizenship. This can be compared to the other cases included in this study,
where demand for compensatory dual citizenship peaked in response to security
concerns: wars and terrorist attacks in Israel and gang-related criminal violence in
Mexico.

We saw above (Figure 2) that 140,000 Serbian citizens acquired Hungarian
citizenship between January 2011 and September 2015. Hungarian consular officials
estimated that 10 to 15 percent of them were not ethnic Hungarians. Thus, an estimated
14,000-21,000 Serbs and mixed-origin persons have acquired Hungarian dual citizenship
– many of them after having studied the Hungarian language expressly for that purpose
(some applicants also engaged in fraud, for example by paying a Hungarian-speaker to
pass the interview for them). Non-Hungarian applicants for Hungarian citizenship
strategize certain relevant characteristics – in this case, ethno-linguistic performance – in
response to the opportunities produced by state policies. This makes them part of the
global phenomenon of compensatory citizenship, comparable to Mexican elites who
strategically give birth in the U.S.

In the next section, I focus on strategic citizens of Hungary – Serbians (whether
ethnic Serbs or mixed ethnics) who acquire Hungarian citizenship without identifying as
Hungarian. I open with two illustrative vignettes. Then, I discuss the pragmatic strategies
that they employ in order to obtain Hungarian citizenship. I then analyze the motivations
for obtaining Hungarian dual citizenship in Serbia and evaluate the ways it is used.
V. Strategies and uses of dual citizenship

Vignette 1: Bojana, 24, and Jelena, 23, ethnic Serbs, applying for Hungarian citizenship

Bojana and Jelena are sisters from a town in northwest Vojvodina. They are ethnic Serbs; their father’s family lived in Vojvodina since Austro-Hungarian times and their mother’s family came from Bosnia. At the time of the interview, both were students in Belgrade. They began to study Hungarian after their father advised them to do so; he was inspired by the example of their cousin who, after “buying” Hungarian citizenship, moved to Sweden and works as an engineer.

The older sister Bojana said she had two motives to apply for citizenship: “first, [Vojvodina] has always been closer culturally to Hungary and Austria. We prefer [Hungarian] goulash over pljeskavica [Serbian burger] [...] Hungarian citizenship was already in my family – so why not return it? And second, being a citizen of the EU would open a lot of doors for me, especially in terms of studying. [...] I want to do a second Master’s degree in Europe”. At the moment, however, she has no concrete plans to leave Serbia.

The younger sister Jelena joined the application at Bojana’s suggestion. She does not have any concrete plans to emigrate either, but would like to do so eventually. “I want this citizenship so I can have a normal life somewhere else”, she said. Jelena complained about the incompetence and corruption in Serbia: “all people in Serbia ever do is drink coffee and smoke cigarettes. I don’t fit within this system”. She added that “[Hungarian citizenship] is just a paper that I need for a better life. [...] I would still feel Serbian in my heart”.

Bojana and Jelena study Hungarian with a private teacher. “We try to speak with each other in Hungarian. Our teacher is sending us episodes of [the American sitcom] ‘Love and Marriage’ in Hungarian. It’s classic [as preparation] because it uses a simple vocabulary and it’s all about family”. They plan to file their applications in Budapest, where they heard that the required level of Hungarian is not as high. The total expenditure involved in obtaining citizenship, Bojana estimated, would amount to 500 Euros for each of them, including the language classes and the trip to Budapest.
Vignette 2: Mladen, 31, mixed Bunjevac-Hungarian origin, triple citizen of Serbia, Croatia and Hungary

Mladen was born in Subotica. His father was Hungarian and his mother is Bunjevac (an ethnic group that both Serbia and Croatia claim as co-ethnics). His first language was Serbian and he went to Serbian-language schools. Until his father died when he was 12, he would usually speak with him in Hungarian. In 1998, Mladen's mother applied for Croatian citizenship for both of them based on her Bunjevac ethnicity (she has never lived in Croatia). Mladen began his university studies in Croatia, where he received a special scholarship for students from the Croatian diaspora. He currently lives in Germany, where he is enrolled in a Ph.D. in program in physics. He and his mother applied for Hungarian citizenship in 2011. The application process was “very easy” because “we both speak Hungarian and have lived here for many generations”. The total expenditure was under 50 Euros.

Mladen’s motivation to obtain Hungarian citizenship, he says, was purely practical: “we have no emotional connection to Hungary […] Actually, I had no extra motive to get the Hungarian [citizenship] because I already had the Croatian [citizenship] which allows me to work outside Serbia. I have it just in case”. His mother, he said, had an additional motive: “to distinguish herself from the Serbs, [to show] that she is not a Serb. She is a little bit nationalist, but not Hungarian nationalist – Bunjevac nationalist. […] Plus she might like to work somewhere in the EU where she retires, so she can live somewhere close to me”. About himself, Mladen says that he does not identify with any nationality: “I don’t have this ethnic thing and I don’t feel like I am Serbian or Croatian or Hungarian or anything else […] If you must ask me, I am Vojvodinian”. If he had to keep just one citizenship, he would keep the Hungarian “because of practical reasons”. Emotionally, however, he feels closer to Serbia. This is expressed, for example, in his support for the national team: “when Hungary or Croatia play against someone else, I am for them. But whenever Serbia plays, I am always for Serbia”.

Strategizing ethnicity and language for citizenship

Two criteria determine who is eligible for simplified naturalization in Hungary: descent and language. We can describe this policy as an evidentiary regime based on ethno-linguistic criteria. This means that the struggle over access to Hungarian citizenship is waged primarily along linguistic lines (cf. Brubaker and Kim 2011; Kim 2011). We saw above that the language criterion is used precisely in order to exclude people who are not ethnic Hungarians. In light of that, and, given the traditional association of ethnic *jus sanguinis* with closure and exclusion (e.g. Brubaker 1992a), we would expect to find a strict ethnocentric application of the law and a determination to exclude strategic applicants.

The findings of my research, however, defy these expectations. Instead, they show a surprising openness on the part of Hungarian authorities which is expressed in multiple ways. The citizenship application in itself does not involve any costs. Applicants only need to obtain their and their parents’ (or grandparents’) birth certificates, which municipalities in Serbia issue for a fee of about 5 Euros. Applicants do not even have to travel to Subotica or Belgrade to file their applications: staff from the consulate in Subotica regularly make the rounds to smaller towns in Vojvodina where Hungarians live in order to reach potential applicants there. Moreover, one can also apply for citizenship at town and village halls all over Hungary. These two characteristics meant that origin from Vojvodina and language proficiency were practically the only barriers to citizenship; money and location were not an issue.

The third dimension of Hungarian simplified naturalization policy is the most relevant to strategic citizens: consular officials made a deliberate effort to keep the application process ethnically neutral. Interviews with applicants as well consular officials suggested that officials ignored the ethnic connotations of applicants’ names when evaluating applications. Dual citizen respondents confirmed that they were not treated differently based on their names and were never asked whether they identified as ethnically Hungarian. Another ethnic marker, religion, did not come up in interviews either (in general, Serbs are Orthodox and Hungarians mostly Catholic). The consul in Subotica said that “we are not allowed to ask about religion.” Thus, applicants were
evaluated solely on the basis of their Hungarian language skills and not on other ethnic characteristics.

Moreover, the use of language alone as a heuristic for ethnicity and nationality seems logical to Hungarian officials because the Hungarian language is both unique and difficult. Hungarian is not an Indo-European language and does not bear any similarities to the languages that are spoken in the neighboring countries. This makes it very difficult to learn. In fact, the teachers of Hungarian that I interviewed said that “Hungarians do not believe that anyone can study Hungarian,” and therefore the assumption was that anyone who exhibited knowledge of the language became familiar with it while growing up.28

At the same time, it is important to note that the level of Hungarian required from applicants grew higher over time. The informal language examination was originally quite lax and, moreover, practically any municipality in Hungary could approve new citizens, opening the door to corruption. This has drawn sharp criticism from Orbán’s domestic opponents (Hungarian Spectrum 2013; Nolan 2014). In response to various scandals and accusations that the policy is mainly producing “fake Hungarians” (as the headline of one critical article suggested (Bálint 2014)), the Hungarian government has been gradually making access to citizenship more restrictive. In 2013, the number of towns in Hungary where one could file applications was cut down and the language requirement was made tougher. However, based on interviews with applicants and consular officials, the procedure remained ethnically neutral.

How should we explain this unexpected ethnic neutrality in the application of a law that is so overtly ethnic? Hungarian consular officials explained that they were not allowed to discriminate because it contradicted European Union laws and practices. The consul in Subotica said, “we only use language [as a criterion]. If you go any other way, you get lost” – by which he presumably meant that decisions become legally indefensible and open to complaints about discrimination (see Pogonyi m.s.). Moreover, the Hungarian government has set target numbers of citizens that it seeks to create. The first goal – half a million by 2014 – was reached and the current goal is to reach one million by 2018 (MTI 2014). Seeing as Hungarian officials were aiming at reaching a certain (ambitious) goal, it is obvious that they could not be overly selective. Moreover, each new citizen is presented by the government as a success. The photograph below (Figure
5) shows Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán congratulating the 500,000th Hungarian citizen created by the new citizenship law. This demonstrates the performative-ideological value of this policy.

**Figure 5: Citizenship ceremony of 500,000th recipient of Hungarian citizenship**

Note: Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán (left) greets the 500,000th person to receive Hungarian citizenship through simplified naturalization – a Franciscan monk from Romania. Photo credit: MTI - Szilárd Koszticsák. Source: Daily New Hungary 2013.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, consular officials did not necessarily view their mission as identifying “true” Hungarians and keeping out “fake” ones (as South Korean officials sought to do vis-à-vis Korean-Chinese visa applicants (Kim 2011, 2016)). Instead, some Hungarian officials saw themselves as charged with reversing a century of Hungarian assimilation and demographic decline in Vojvodina. This demographic decline of Hungarians in Serbia was not, for the most part, a result of
Serbian mistreatment of Hungarians. On the contrary, it reflects a process of voluntary assimilation, the consequence of individuals’ opting out through micro-decisions about who to marry, where to live and how to raise one’s children. The most concrete expression of this process is the high rate of out-marriage among Vojvodina Hungarians, and the fact that children of such mixed unions typically identified as Serbs or Yugoslavs, not as Hungarians (Ilić 2010). Rogers Brubaker (2009) describes this dynamic as “nationalization without nationalism” – the homogenization of the population (nationalization) takes place precisely in the absence of antagonism and coercion (nationalism).

Keenly aware of these sociological processes, Hungarian consular officers treated practically all applicants as potentially Hungarian, assuming that they have some Hungarian ancestry but not asking about it directly. Furthermore, they usually displayed a positive attitude toward applicants who spoke poor Hungarian and did not view studying the language as a kind of fraud (one official even said that “we are proud of these Serbs who speak Hungarian”). When rejecting such applicants, officials typically encouraged them to go study some more and then come back. There was no sanction for failing the language test.

These findings about ethnic neutrality in handling applications reinforce the view that Hungary’s new citizenship policy aims at creating a maximum number of potential Orbán voters rather than bringing in “true” Hungarians (the headline of a report on citizenship applications in a critical opposition website said: “Today, Another Fake Hungarian Came” (Bálint 2014)). On a broader theoretical level, these findings can lead us to reconsider the assumption that ethnic entails exclusive; Hungarian policy, both before 1920 and after 2011, is simultaneously ethnic and inclusive.

Let us now consider the perspective of the main beneficiaries of this openness: non-Hungarian strategic applicants, who made up 10 to 15 percent of the total number of new dual citizens. Some of them could not speak any Hungarian and “bought” their citizenship by fraud (I will not discuss those cases here because of insufficient data). Others had some knowledge of the language, which was produced in one of two ways: having grown up with Hungarian relatives, neighbors or friends (like Mladen and his
mother in Vignette 2) or learning the language from scratch (like Bojana and Jelena in Vignette 1).

What are the conditions that produce a successful strategic applicant for Hungarian citizenship? In contrast to Mexico, where elites engage in a conversion of economic capital into strategic dual citizenship, in Serbia the resources required in order to strategize citizenship are less economic and more social and cultural. First of all, dual citizenship is only available to individuals who fulfill the criterion of descent from families that lived in Vojvodina during Austro-Hungarian times. This excludes Serb families who came after World War Two or during the 1990s – about half of the Serb population in Vojvodina, based on a rough estimate.\(^{31}\) In addition to having the right origin, successful strategic applicants are also required to be in possession of additional resources – economic, social or cultural.

One group of strategic dual citizens obtains their citizenship by fraud, i.e. by going around the criteria set down in Hungarian law. The most common method involved paying a native Hungarian speaker to do the interview for them. I encountered numerous reports of people who used this and other methods to acquire citizenship, spending between 250 and 1,500 Euros on commissions (prices went up with time).\(^ {32} \) This method is available to people who have some economic resources – 1,500 Euros are about 5 months’ average earnings in Serbia – as well as the social connections and know-how that would allow them to locate this kind of broker. I will not discuss citizenship fraud in detail here since I was unable to collect sufficient data on this aspect of the phenomenon.\(^ {33} \)

The case of Serbs or mixed-ethnic persons who acquired Hungarian language skills through family relations or social ties with Hungarians provides an example of a neutral biographical fact that emergent citizenship opportunities charge with new meaning. For those individuals, their ties to Hungarians become a new kind of social capital, in the terms of the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1986).

The third category includes Serbians (mostly ethnic Serbs) who study Hungarian without prior knowledge of the language. Strategic applicants who study Hungarian from scratch will have to spend about 300-600 Euros – one to two average monthly salaries – for the entire procedure. The larger investment, however, includes the time and effort
involved in studying Hungarian, which is considered as one of the world’s most difficult languages. Teachers of Hungarian reported that students had a high dropout rate. Those who followed through all the way to citizenship – which usually required studying for over a year – had to muster a high level of dedication and commitment.

Such a commitment was much easier to achieve for those who developed an interest in Hungarian culture and language. These students would speak Hungarian in their free time and watch Hungarian music videos, cartoons and TV shows (like Bojana and Jelena in Vignette 1). Those who did not enjoy the learning process usually dropped out. Thus, while the initial motivation of strategic applicants to study Hungarian was instrumental, successful applicants very often developed some sentimental attachment to Hungarian culture during the process. Some people even discovered that they had Hungarian relatives and ancestors and grew interested in learning more about that heritage (see more on that below). Thus, the language criterion means that most Serbians who obtain citizenship – except by fraud – are likely to feel some kind of connection to Hungary. This stands in opposition to strategic dual citizens produced by birth tourism, who typically feel no connection to their secondary country of citizenship – a comparison that I will develop further in the Conclusions chapter.

This discussion suggests that strategic applicants who learn Hungarian draw on a composite of resources that correspond to what Bourdieu (1986) has called cultural capital. This includes three components; a) the intellectual ability and academic disposition that make it possible to master a new language; b) the value orientation that would make such a endeavor (which challenges one’s national identity) normatively acceptable; c) the cultural taste that enables applicants to enjoy the learning process and experience it as enriching. These three characteristics – scholastic dispositions, cosmopolitan values and broad cultural taste – correspond to those that are typically identified with the educated middle classes (Bourdieu 1987). Indeed, given the conditions listed above, many of those who stand to benefit from compensatory citizenship belong to Serbia’s educated urban elites, who are armed with a European self-understanding and a disposition to accumulate cultural capital (Lazić 2000; Lazić and Cvejić 2007; Bačević 2014; cf. Eyal, Szelényi and Townsley 1998).
Hungary’s offer of dual citizenship to speakers of Hungarian has created a lively demand for the instruction of Hungarian in Vojvodina and Belgrade. Signs advertising local Hungarian teachers have sprung up in towns all across Vojvodina. In the capital Belgrade, which traditionally has a large number of language schools focusing on languages that are useful to emigrants (e.g. English, German or Swedish), many schools now also offer classes in Hungarian. The director of one Belgrade language school reported that before 2011, the school employed one Hungarian teacher and only a handful of students studied the language. Now, he said, “we have three Hungarian teachers and 50-100 persons are studying it at any given moment. Ninety-nine percent of them are in it for the citizenship.”

Some companies target practical-minded applicants and offer classes that focus exclusively on preparation for the citizenship exam. Instead of teaching grammar, teachers instruct students to memorize the answers to the questions in the citizenship interview. When the students are considered ready, the company arranges a minivan and takes them to file their application in small towns in Hungary, where the required level of Hungarian is believed to be lower. Such companies also market their services to applicants who are already living in Western Europe, and view Hungary’s offer of citizenship as a chance to regularize their status. One of those companies, for examples, operates centers in Belgrade, Subotica and Vienna. Thus, a new “citizenship industry” has emerged that centers on the instruction of Hungarian. It is comparable to the citizenship industries that emerged in other cases of compensatory citizenship, including the birth tourism industry along the Mexico-U.S. border and the industry for locating and translating documents that sprung up in countries like Israel or Argentina (Chapters 4, 5; Cook-Martín 2013).

Uses of compensatory citizenship

The discussion above showed that non-Hungarians who wish to strategically acquire Hungarian dual citizenship must make a rather substantial investment in time and effort. The relatively high cost of entry into strategic Hungarian citizenship would lead us to expect that it would mostly attract individuals with a strong practical incentive. What motivates those applicants?
In this section, I will draw on material from interviews and fieldwork to analyze the motives and uses of Hungarian dual citizenship in Serbia. I will focus on strategic citizens but will also draw on material from the interviews with ethnic Hungarians in order to draw contrasts and comparisons between the groups. The available data do not make it possible to disaggregate motivations (i.e. projected uses) and actual uses of dual citizenship, and they will therefore be discussed together. I will discuss the value of citizenship in four social fields: market, mobility, family and status.

Market

When respondents were asked to explain their own and other Serbians’ interest in Hungarian citizenship, the first and most common motive that they referred to was the wish to emigrate. There was a consensus among practically all respondents that Serbia’s economic situation was hopeless and emigration was the only real way to get ahead. According to this view, whatever few jobs that are available in Serbia are reserved to people with political or family connections. Unfortunately, this is not far from the truth: the unemployment rate in Serbia is about 22 percent and the average household income was 600 USD per month (InSerbia 2014). Wages in Germany or Austria are about four times higher than in Serbia (this is roughly the same wage gap as between Mexico and the United States).

Respondents had a particular way of talking about the gap between Serbia and Western Europe. They were very critical of Serbia and often referred to the concept of normality. This can be seen, for example, in the quotation from Jelena cited above (vignette 1): “I want [Hungarian] citizenship so I can live a normal life somewhere else”. Many respondents were of the opinion that it was impossible to live a “normal life” (normalan život) in Serbia. Another example comes from an interview with Zoran, a 32 year old engineer from Subotica, who made a long list of everything that was wrong in Serbia – low salaries, bad health system, no social security, rampant corruption and a “small town mentality,” in his words. He concluded: “[Serbia] cannot provide me with a lifestyle like in normal countries [...] Therefore I will get the Hungarian passport and go to Sweden.”
In these two typical quotations, it is clear that the word “normal” was not used in its conventional sense of “ordinary, common, prevalent”. What respondents saw as “normal” was not the economic and social standards that are common in Serbia or, for that matter, in former Yugoslav countries or even in Central and Eastern Europe. Instead, “normal” to them meant “conforming to Western European standards.” This raises an interesting question about Serbian respondents’ self-perception: why do they adopt a standard of normality according to which their country and lifestyle are not normal?

On one level, evaluating one’s own society as “not normal” is a rhetorical strategy of distinction: it posits the speaker as superior to the mainstream by implying that he or she has higher standards (for example, morally or economically). Such a discourse was also found among Israeli respondents, many of whom adopted a Western vantage point to criticize Israeli society for being collectivistic, primitive and oriental. On the other hand, respondents in Israel did not believe that they were European and tended to present Western Europe as an ideal, not a standard of normality (Harpaz 2009; 2013). In contrast, the European self-identification of educated Serbians from Vojvodina and Belgrade was not rhetorical or skin-deep. Instead, it reflected a deeply internalized understanding of themselves as Europeans and a deep disappointment with the failure of Serbia to live up to European expectations.

To some extent, this incongruence between expectations and reality can be seen as an aspect of “Yugo-nostalgia” (cf. Volčič 2007). The generation that was born in the 1980s and 1990s was exposed to a great deal of nostalgic discourses about full employment, high standards of living and Western, liberal attitudes in Yugoslavia. This form of nostalgia is particularly strong among the urban, educated middle classes. Part of the ideological justification of Yugoslav socialism came from its ability to offer Yugoslav citizens a Western-level quality of life and allowing them to consume Western products and nurture cultural ties with Western Europe (Lazić 2003). The (very disputable) idea that Yugoslavia was to some extent a Western country powerfully shaped the expectations and self-understanding of its citizens.

Indeed, the complex relation of urban elites to the West – a strong identification coupled with constant disappointment with the failure to catch up – is not new in Serbia. It continues a long historical legacy of uneven modernization in the periphery of Europe.
Whereas in Western Europe, the bourgeoisie was defined by the accumulation of economic capital which allowed it to compete and eventually replace the aristocracy, conditions in Central and Eastern Europe – slow growth, slow modernization and a strong aristocracy – did not permit the growth of a wide bourgeoisie marked by economic capital (Janos 1989; Eyal et al. 1998; cf. Verdery 1979). Urban elites, unable to achieve distinction through material accumulation, directed their efforts toward the accumulation of cultural capital, in Bourdieu’s (1986) terms. This included not only academic credentials and an artistic taste but also a set of liberal and European-oriented values. This social stratum – called Bildungsbürgertum (bourgeoisie of education) in German-speaking areas – saw itself as an elite charged with a historical mission: to spread political and economic liberalism and promote European and Western values among the Eastern European or Balkan masses, which were perceived as uneducated, collectivistic and primitive (Eyal et al. 1998; on Serbia, see Lazić 2003; Lazić and Ćvejić 2007; Lazić and Vuletić 2009; Baćević 2014).

In most Central and Eastern European countries, following the post-communist transition these educated urban classes became the most dedicated advocates of democracy and free markets. The expectation was that they would be able to convert their cultural capital – university diplomas, cultural tastes, knowledge of foreign languages – into economic capital (Eyal et al. 1998). This aspiration was accomplished with some success in countries like Poland or the Czech Republic. Its realization was greatly assisted by membership in the EU, which brought in billions of Euros in aid and investment and opened up opportunities for educated youth, both in their home countries and in Western Europe.

Serbia, in contrast, experienced a “blocked transition” which entirely failed to improve the economic situation of the educated urban class. Not only did the communist party hold onto power for ten years more (until the ousting of Milosevic in 2000), but the economic crises and sanctions that plagued the country during the entire decade of the 1990s led to the pauperization of a broad section of society. Serbia is not a member of the European Union and it is not clear if and when it will join the Union. Thus, avenues for economic advancement for Serbians have been very limited.
Within this general context of blocked economic mobility, acquiring Hungarian dual citizenship appears as an extremely promising opportunity. By strategically manipulating their ethno-linguistic identity, educated persons from the most Europeanized parts of Serbia may convert their cultural capital into European Union citizenship. Thus, Hungary’s dual citizenship policy offers some members of Serbia’s educated classes with a way to catch up with Western Europe and realize their aspirations for integration in Europe. If Milošević supposedly kept Serbia’s educated elites outside of Europe, Orbán is now offering them a way in without intending to.

Concerning the practical use that was envisioned for the second, EU citizenship, the Serbian case is markedly different from the two other cases included in this study. In Israel and Mexico, the individuals who acquired compensatory citizenship led economically comfortable lives and had little incentive to emigrate. When explaining what they expected from the second citizenship, respondents in those countries often used metaphors such as “investment” or “insurance policy”. In Serbia, respondents did not use economic metaphors when discussing citizenship, which is evidence of the weaker penetration of economistic discourses into that post-communist country. More commonly, respondents would say that they wanted citizenship in order to emigrate – if not now, then in some near or distant future.

The idea that dual citizenship was above all a way to emigrate not only reflected Serbian applicants’ actual motivations but was also shaped by the prevalent discourse about emigration in Serbia. Above all, it has to do with the positive view of emigration. Respondents viewed emigrants in a positive light and emphasized their courage, wisdom and success. This perspective seemed to be typical of Serbian society more generally (e.g. Mojić 2012). There was far less resonance in Serbia to the kinds of negative stereotypes on emigrants that were found in Mexico (emigrants as lower-class individuals ready to sell out their race and culture) and in Israel (emigrants as weaklings and defectors). The high individual interest in emigrating, coupled with broad social legitimacy for such a move, leads us to expect that the proliferation of Hungarian dual citizenship would contribute to a growth in emigration from Serbia after 2011. The idea that Hungarian dual citizenship would mainly be used to emigrate to Western Europe was also found in the West: for example, the British Daily Mail (2010) reported on Hungary’s
citizenship law under the following headline: “Two Million More Hungarians Will Have Right to Work Here”. The question is then: did Hungarian citizenship bolster emigration from Serbia to Western Europe?

It is difficult to answer this question definitively because of data limitations and the short time that has elapsed since the policy came into force. Migration in general is notoriously hard to track and this becomes doubly challenging when dealing with the movement of EU citizens within the Schengen zone of free movement. Furthermore, there are different statistics compiled by different authorities and it is impossible to reconcile the discrepancies between them. The estimates I refer to here were produced by cross-tabulating statistics from multiple sources: country data on immigration from Eurostat, the United Nations Population Department (UNPD) and OECD, as well as data obtained directly from national sources and academic publications on the subject.36

Even with these limitations, we can identify some major trends (I will not present precise numbers because figures from different sources vary). Emigration from Serbia to Western Europe peaked in the late 1990s. It began declining in the 2000s, and generally reached a low point in 2007. This was almost certainly the result of the economic crisis, which limited opportunities in the West (Mexican immigration to the U.S. also halted in 2007).37 Around 2010-2011, however, the trend has reversed and Serbian emigration to Western Europe picked up again. This emigration is more diverse in its destinations. The number of Serbian-born in Germany, traditionally the largest destination, did not change after 2011. It is still lower than its pre-2007 level. In contrast, there have been sharp increases in the numbers of Serbian-born in Austria and Switzerland, with smaller increases in Sweden and Norway (as well as Hungary, which is a traditional destination for ethnic Hungarians).38 The proliferation of Hungarian dual citizenship thus coincides with a renewed wave of emigration from Serbia.

Based on this correlation alone, we cannot yet identify a direct contribution of dual citizenship to emigration. It is also conceivable that dual citizenship would not serve as a prelude but as an alternative to emigration, meaning that the possession of a second passport might satisfy the need for additional security or mobility and make emigration unnecessary (as found in Israel – see Chapter 5). Furthermore, from 1981 to 2011 (the last census conducted in Serbia), Vojvodina was actually the region in Serbia whose
residents were least likely to emigrate, and ethnic Hungarians were underrepresented among emigrants (Stanković 2014). The next question, then, is whether we can identify an increase in the number of Serbian-born who are living in Western Europe with a Hungarian passport.

The available data do not allow us to identify this population directly, but they do provide indirect evidence of its existence. This can be inferred by comparing changes in the numbers of Serbian-born and Serbian citizens in the destination countries. According to Eurostat data, in three countries – Germany, Switzerland and Hungary – the number of Serbian citizens dropped by 79,000 between 2011 and 2015, even as the number of Serbian-born in those countries increased by 11,000. Only half of this decline – about 42,000 persons – can be explained by naturalization in the destination countries. This suggests that some Serbian immigrants – potentially numbering tens of thousands – changed the citizenship with which they were registered by a means other than naturalization. Meanwhile, statistics on Hungarian immigration to Western Europe show a complementary trend: the number of Hungarian citizens in Germany and Austria increased significantly faster than the number of Hungarian-born. This potentially suggests that there are many immigrants in those countries who were not born in Hungary but are nonetheless registered as Hungarian citizens. Once again, conflicting figures from different sources make it difficult to set a precise number or to state these results with a high degree of confidence. Moreover, we cannot rule out the possibility that the data are just not reliable enough to make this kind of inferences. If we trust the data, however, we can suggest that the proliferation of Hungarian citizenship not only coincides with increased emigration from Serbia, but also contributes to it directly by allowing thousands of Serbians to emigrate with Hungarian passports.

The vast majority of Serbian citizens who emigrate thanks to their Hungarian dual citizenship are, of course, ethnic Hungarians. The availability of EU citizenship is likely to lead to a surge of emigration among young Hungarians who see few opportunities in Serbia. Let us try and complement the profile of Serbian dual citizen emigration, which I described above using destination-country statistics, with data from the sending country. While there were no reliable official data on emigration from Serbia, the evidence I collected through interviews suggested very high rates of emigration among the
Hungarian minority. In all the interviews I conducted with officials in the Hungarian community, they complained that dual citizenship was leading to a depopulation of their communities. For example, the mayor of a Hungarian village near the Hungarian border said that his village was shrinking rapidly: “all the young people took the citizenship and left for abroad.” The mayor’s son, who studied medicine in Hungary, left for Sweden where wages are far higher. An official at the National Council of the Hungarian National Minority (in short: Hungarian National Council), an organization that represents the Hungarian minority and provides Hungarian-language education and culture, reported that the number of students entering primary school in Hungarian has dropped by 15% from 2011 to 2014, which she explains as a result of the emigration of young parents.

The recurrent complaint of leaders in Vojvodina’s Hungarian community is that Hungary’s dual citizenship policy would eventually contribute to the process of ethnic homogenization that Vojvodina has been undergoing for a century under Serbian/Yugoslav rule. Emigration propelled by dual citizenship might prove to be an even more potent agent of “nationalization without nationalism” (Brubaker 2009) than intermarriage and reidentification. There are two factors beside citizenship that lead us to predict that emigration could dramatically diminish the Hungarian community in Vojvodina. First, the emigration of ethnic Hungarians from Serbia coincides with a massive post-2010 emigration of Hungarians from Hungary, who settle mostly in Germany, Austria and Britain (Moreh 2014). This means that ethnic Hungarian emigrants from Serbia, Romania and Ukraine not only obtain a legal status that permits them to move to Western Europe, but can also find there Hungarian-language job connections, a Hungarian social environment and even Hungarian food and entertainment. Based on the theory of cumulative causation of migration (emigrants decide whether and where to go on the basis of family, local and ethnic ties; each departure makes emigration both easier and more desirable for other members of the community) (Massey et al. 1993), we would expect this process to make the option of emigration even more attractive for Vojvodina Hungarians than it already is.

A second and closely connected factor has to do with a process of “dissimilation” vis-à-vis Serbia (cf. Cook-Martin 2013). As they move through Hungarian-speaking social circles and struggle to master the German (or English) language, emigrants’ ties to
Serbia and their Serbian language skills – which often are not strong to begin with – are expected to decline. Since it is practically impossible to find employment in Serbia without speaking Serbian – it is very difficult even for Serbian-speakers – it is unlikely that those emigrants will eventually return to Serbia. Therefore, in an ironic development, Hungary’s 2011 citizenship law – putatively aimed to fulfill the promise of Hungary’s new Basic Law and “facilitate the survival and development of [cross-border Hungarian] communities” – is actually contributing to the shrinking of those communities through emigration.

The anticipated migration dynamic of non-Hungarian, strategic dual citizens (ethnic Serbs and mixed ethnics) would be somewhat different. Because they are selected into citizenship on other resources alongside ethnicity, this is on average a more highly educated and elite group than ethnic Hungarian dual citizens. Many ethnic Hungarians who obtain citizenship are rural and working-class; they use the citizenship to seek unskilled jobs in Western Europe. In contrast, strategic citizens who have studied Hungarian are more likely to be middle-class, educated individuals. They engage in a conversion of their cultural capital – education, language skills, cultural openness and cosmopolitan values – into European Union citizenship. This citizenship, in turn, provides them with increased global mobility that can be eventually translated into economic advantages: high-paying and high-status employment in Western Europe or an academic degree from a Western European university. Hypothetically, the experience and qualifications earned abroad could eventually be reconverted into the Serbian labor market and allow dual citizen emigrants to return to Serbia in a more advantageous position. Furthermore, the free movement permitted by EU citizenship is expected to facilitate circular movement (cf. Massey, Durand and Pren 2015). Moreover, many of those emigrants will join existing communities of Serbs in Western European destination countries. Therefore, they would show a much lower propensity to “dissimilate” from Serbia relative to ethnic Hungarian emigrants, and a larger share among them may eventually return to Serbia.
Family

Citizenship is an asset held by a family rather than an individual. The “citizenship opportunity structure” (cf. Shachar 2009) faced by each individual is determined to a great extent by his or her parents and grandparents – where they were born, where they lived and how they identified and were classified. Conversely, individuals also take their (actual or projected) progeny into account when making their own citizenship decisions. In the other cases included in this study, the role of family decision-making was predominant: Mexican upper-class parents invest tens of thousands of dollars in obtaining U.S. citizenship for their children without planning to benefit from it themselves; Israeli parents acquire EU citizenship for their children, providing them with opportunities in Europe while at the same time reinforcing the chain of memory linking the young generation to their Holocaust-survivor grandparents. In comparison with those cases, in which a transgenerational family logic is salient, Hungarian-Serbian dual citizenship follows a much more individualistic pattern, especially for strategic applicants.

Family coordination in obtaining Hungarian citizenship is optional, in the sense that different family members are not functionally dependent on each other as in the Mexican and Israeli cases. Since Hungary offers simplified naturalization rather than citizenship restitution, applicants may acquire citizenship individually. There is no need for the original citizens do not need to reacquire their Hungarian citizenship. In contrast, when Israelis seek EU citizenship, they often have to reconstruct the generational chain of citizenship all the way back to the original citizen. Furthermore, it is very easy for applicants in Serbia to obtain documents that prove ancestry. The vital records in most Vojvodina towns and villages have existed uninterrupted since the late 19th century. Birth registration archives are extant and are in an easily-accessible language, and a visit to the archive requires nothing more than a short trip to the city center or the nearby town. This presents a striking contrast to the Israeli case, where the records proving applicants’ original citizenship – if they exist at all – are in another country and in a foreign language. For Israelis, obtaining these documents requires a large expenditure in time and money and calls for expert assistance and family cooperation.

While the intergenerational aspects of citizenship application in the Hungarian-Serbian case did not involve functional interdependence, many ethnic Hungarians did
acquire dual citizenship as a family. Typically, younger people were interested in the practical aspects of citizenship and older Hungarians focused on its symbolic and sentimental aspects. Older ethnic Hungarian applicants were often extremely emotional during the citizenship ceremony and many of them wept. While they usually had no practical uses for citizenship (except one that will be discussed in the next paragraph), older applicants reported feelings of closure and completeness upon becoming Hungarian citizens. Laszlo, a 62-year-old ethnic Hungarian respondent who was born during World War Two, when his home village in northern Vojvodina was occupied by Hungary, said: “I was born as a Hungarian. [So] when I took the oath, it was a wonderful feeling for me: at last, I am once again what I was earlier”. Hungarian citizenship connected older applicants not only to their former selves but also to their deceased parents and grandparents. This connection became especially powerful when those relatives suffered for being Hungarian. Edit, a 59-year-old ethnic Hungarian from Subotica, spoke of her Hungarian citizenship as a “memorial” (spomenik) for her grandfather who was killed by Yugoslav partisans in 1944. “When I got the citizenship I was crying,” she said, “it was as if I took a bouquet of flowers and put it on the grave of my mother and grandfather”.

These sentimental expressions were mostly absent from the discourses of younger Hungarians, who emphasized their practical motives for taking citizenship. Often, applications for citizenship were initiated by practically-minded young Hungarians, and older parents went along with it (keep in mind that for ethnic Hungarians, citizenship is free of cost or effort). For example, Edit did not apply for citizenship of her own initiative but rather followed the initiative of her son, who wishes to emigrate to the United States with his wife. In addition to the sentimental reasons mentioned above, she had a different reason to apply for citizenship: to make sure that she will be able to visit her son and future grandchildren in the U.S. without having to apply for a visa. This motivation is typical: we also saw it in vignette 2, where Mladen’s mother obtained citizenship so that she will be able to live next to him if he ends up living in Western Europe. Thus, while younger Hungarians obtain citizenship in order to emigrate, their parents also apply for citizenship not only for sentimental reasons, but also in order to synchronize their citizenship status and make sure they do not become physically separated by borders.
This suggests that many ethnic Hungarian families are driven to apply for citizenship as a result of a mix of practically motivated and sentimentally motivated applicants – but the practical motivations are usually the necessary condition. Thus, many people would say with great conviction that they became dual citizens due to sentimental reasons, but in fact they went along with another family member’s practical motivations. This finding helps explain the two seemingly contradictory patterns: the well-documented prevalence of sentimental and symbolic discourses around Hungarian citizenship alongside with the instrumental logic that was revealed by the acquisition statistics. While non-Hungarian strategic applicants often develop some sentimental affinity to Hungary as a side consequence of their quest for citizenship, it appears that ethnic Hungarians typically also have instrumental motives – whether their own or their family members’ – that drive them to obtain citizenship. Most applications for co-ethnic dual citizenship involve both instrumental and sentimental components. This finding is consistent with the instrumental hypothesis: sentimental ties are a consequence of instrumental strategies and sentimentally-driven applications follow in the footsteps of instrumentally-driven ones.

In contrast to ethnic Hungarians, strategic applicants of Serb or mixed ethnicity typically acquire citizenship as individuals, not families. There were almost no strategic applicants over the age of 50 since, being unlikely to emigrate, they did not have a strong incentive to learn Hungarian or spend a thousand Euros on buying citizenship. Almost all strategic applicants were in their 20s and 30s. The benefits that they expected from Hungarian citizenship would mostly accrue to themselves (but also to their actual or potential children).

Some strategic applicants underwent a process that can be called “Magyarization in retrospect”. Several Serb or mixed-ethnicity respondents reported that while studying Hungarian and preparing to apply for citizenship, they developed a new awareness of their Hungarian roots – sometimes even discovering or being reminded that their own grandmother spoke Hungarian. The initial motivation to dig into one’s genealogy in search of Hungarians had to do with the biography that applicants had to submit as part of their application. Applicants often felt that they had to emphasize any possible connection that they had to Hungary, which sometimes led them to discover Hungarian
relatives. Let us stress that none of the strategic applicants underwent any kind of identity shift. I did not encounter or hear about anyone who “became” ethnically Hungarian, relinquishing a prior identity as Serb or Yugoslav in the same way that some individuals in post-Soviet countries reidentified as German or Jewish and gained the right to immigrate to Germany or Israel (cf. Brubaker 1998). If these retrospective genealogical discoveries had an effect of identity, it was quite minor and had to do more with an increased sense of belonging to Vojvodina as a multi-ethnic and cosmopolitan – one could say European – region than to the ethnic nation-state of Hungary.

**Mobility**

Global mobility – the ability to cross borders and how one is treated when doing so – is a key aspect of stratification in the contemporary world (Baumann 1998; Shamir 2005; Salter 2006; Urry 2012). Within the global hierarchy of mobility, the most important determinant of rank is the passport, which is a function of citizenship. The hierarchy of passports is an everyday, concrete manifestation of the hierarchy of citizenships. Over the past decades, the selective growth of visa waiver agreements has contributed to the growth of a “mobility divide” between the citizens of rich and poor countries (Mau et al. 2012). While mobility restrictions are basically impersonal (they target categories of citizens rather than individuals), individuals often experience border control in a very personal way that might include a range of intense emotions, including them shame, pride, liberation and entrapment (Jansen 2009; Harpaz 2013).

In Serbia, such sentiments resonate powerfully. Until 2009, restrictions on their freedom of movement provided Serbian citizens with a clear everyday reminder of the dramatic decline in the value of their citizenship. The passport of communist Yugoslavia was a high-value passport that allowed its bearer to move freely around both the capitalist and communist blocs. Citizens of Yugoslavia frequently used that freedom to travel to Western Europe as tourists, shoppers and guest workers (Jansen 2009). In the early 1990s, however, Serbia was plunged into a decade of wars, economic crises and high emigration. EU countries responded by requiring visas from all Serbian visitors. Since 1992, Serbians who wanted to travel abroad have had to wait for hours outside foreign
embassies and provide extensive documentation on their financial, personal and medical condition and travel plans (ibid.).

Serbians experienced this regime of “global immobility” as a painful humiliation. Many people responded by avoiding travel abroad altogether. In the mid-2000s, only 11 percent of Serbian citizens had a valid passport (Tudurić 2008). At the same time that Serbians were becoming increasingly restricted in their movements, citizens of neighboring ex-communist countries such as Hungary – which during communism were much poorer and less free than Yugoslavs – were enjoying ever greater freedom to visit the West. To add insult to injury, one of the first former Yugoslav countries that the EU exempted from tourist visas was Croatia, Serbia’s bitter enemy in the wars of the 1990s.

As the anthropologist Stef Jansen (2009) points out, Serbians did not believe that European travel restrictions as a rational policy move meant to deter immigration; instead, they saw them as a malicious attempt to punish and humiliate Serbia and the Serbs. This view was widely promoted by the Milošević regime because it strengthened Serbs’ sense of victimization and discouraged domestic challenges (Lazić 2000). One of its lasting effects is that people still refer to EU visa requirements as “sanctions” (sankcije).47 Jansen (2009) described this situation as “geopolitical entrapment” in the “immediate outside” of the EU.

Starting in December 2009, Serbian citizens enjoy visa-free access to Schengen countries (they still need a visa to visit the UK). This means that Serbians who are now in their mid-twenties to early forties have spent 17 years – most of their grown-up life – in so-called entrapment in Serbia. This experience produced a trauma that bears heavily on the minds of Serbians – especially urban and educated elites, who used to travel extensively under communist Yugoslavia and who treat visits to Western Europe as constitutive of their identity. The fear of renewed entrapment helps explain the uptick in citizenship applications in 2013, when the EU threatened to reimpose the visa requirement on Serbian citizens (see above, p 14-15).

The topic of cross-border mobility came up in many interviews as a central motivation for obtaining Hungarian citizenship. Respondents often said that they were determined never to be subjected to such restrictions again, and that the Hungarian passport was their way of making sure of that. In the words of one respondent from
Subotica, “I just want [the Hungarian passport] to travel more easily and not be in big shit again”.

To illustrate the experience of travel restriction, consider the following quotation from Gabrijela, a 27-year-old local government official from Novi Sad of mixed Serb-Hungarian origin. She brought up travel freedom to explain why she had applied for a Hungarian passport:

“I visited the Czech Republic in 2008 and I had to wait for a whole day in front of the embassy [to get a visa]. It was so humiliating [...] You had to prove that you had money, say where you will sleep, and pay up front. And then – maybe you will get [the visa], maybe you won’t [...] I hope we don’t have to live through this again”.

In this typical quotation, the seemingly mundane experience of applying for a visa is charged with powerful emotions. Several components in this narrative highlight its traumatic character. In terms of time and space, Gabrijela says that she waited “for a whole day” and “outside the embassy,” highlighting the dismissive and humiliating way in which the Czech embassy supposedly treated her time, comfort and dignity. Another aspect of the humiliation has to do with the flow of information: she had to provide extremely detailed information and answer invasive questions, whereas the embassy is not obliged to provide her with any information (“maybe you will get it, maybe you won’t”).

This multidimensional humiliation expressed in terms of time, space and information is exacerbated because it is delivered by the embassy of the formerly communist Czech Republic – a country that Yugoslav citizens were accustomed to look down on. Requesting a visa to visit such a country provides Serbians a powerful illustration of their fall from grace. In the final sentence, Gabrijela switches to the plural form: “I hope we don’t have to live through this again”. The humiliating experience of visa application is not just her personal experience; instead, it is the collective experience of an entire generation. More specifically, it is the collective experience of the group within her generation (cf. Mannheim 1936): those who viewed travel to Europe as a central part of their identity and lifestyle but were barred from doing so. One reason that the EU’s imposition of visa requirements was so humiliating for
Serbia’s educated elites was that it robbed them of one of their key strategies for social distinction.

Gabrijela continued: “after 2009, we could travel with the Serbian passport everywhere, so I didn’t need a Hungarian passport. But [in 2013] was some political problem [...] and they said Serbians might need visas, and I panicked and ran to do the [Hungarian] passport”. She is referring, of course, to the EU threat to return the visa requirement which was discussed above. Interestingly, she describes the feeling that drove her to acquire Hungarian citizenship as “panic,” even though it would be equally logical to say that she made a rational, calculated decision. The choice of terms has to do with the trauma that was described in the previous paragraph: the experience of life under visa restrictions was so bad that she would do anything to avoid it being repeated. Thus, attempts to avoid it have an irrational element to them. We can make a parallel to the Israeli case: some Israeli applicants for EU citizenship were driven to acquire citizenship by existential fear that draws its power from the traumatic experience of the Holocaust. In a similar manner, Serbians who are traumatized by visa restrictions anxiously rush to secure Hungarian passports when their mobility rights are put in question.

Respondents who obtained a Hungarian passport and used it for travel abroad reported a liberating experience which stood in stark contrast to their experience when using the Serbian passport. The gap between the treatment they received when crossing borders as Serbians and Hungarians was so dramatic subjectively that it evoked feelings of absurdity and even guilt. For example, Janos, a 34 year old mixed-origin dual citizen from Vojvodina who is now a student in the Netherlands, said:

“If you come to the EU with a Serbian passport you have to show them how much money you have, where you’re going and for how long. After I got the Hungarian citizenship, they don’t inspect me anymore. I just go. Which is really funny because I am still Serbian. It’s just a piece of paper”.

The Hungarian passport provides a feeling of liberation – “I just go” – in contrast to the difficulty of traveling with the Serbian passport. At the time of the interview, Janos has had his Hungarian citizenship for under a year, and was still struck by the novel experience provided by the EU passport. This novel experience leads him to point out the
absurd situation in which the same person receives a radically different treatment depending on which passport they use.48

The disparity between the Hungarian and Serbian passports came up in the narratives of several additional respondents, who reported the same sense of liberation but were often conflicted about it. While Janos – a new dual citizen – emphasizes the absurdity of one person having two passports of divergent value, respondents who had the Hungarian passport for a longer time confess that it became part of their self-understanding and identity to a degree that they did not anticipate. This can be illustrated by a quotation from Maria, a 32 year old ethnic Hungarian who held a passport since 2011:

“Once I got the Hungarian [passport], I forgot all about this visa shit, I can’t relate to it anymore. It was a different me who had to stand in all these lines. This is huge. It’s even a bit unfair. [I can enter the U.S. without visa while] my friend who applied for a U.S. visa just got rejected because they thought she was going to stay there”

In this quotation, the possession of a different passport leads, over time, to a deep change in the person’s self-understanding. The references to her experiences when traveling with the Serbian passport – “I forgot all about it”, “can’t relate to it”, “a different me” – illustrate that freedom of movement is experienced as something deep and intimate. This is reminiscent of the discourses that people use to speak of dramatic changes in their lives, such as emerging out of poverty or emigrating to another country. It is therefore surprising to find such language being used to describe something that is supposedly so technical as changing one’s travel document. Maria’s narrative suggests that there is an existential gulf between travelers who use the Serbian passport (especially before 2009) and those using the Hungarian passport. This gulf was opened not only relative to Maria’s former self but also relative to her mono-citizen coevals in Serbia. She feels guilty vis-à-vis her friends because the gap in terms of global mobility and status is experienced as unjustified and unfair. Maria sees no justified reason why she should be allowed into the U.S. without visa while her friend would apply and be denied it.

These quotations provide evidence of the importance that people in Serbia attribute to freedom of movement. This can be compared with the joy of EU-Israeli dual
citizens who earn the right to use the EU-nationals line while other Israelis stand in the longer non-nationals line (see Chapter 5). In this subsection, we saw how a range of powerful emotions – humiliation, panic, liberation and even guilt – can be associated with the mundane act of crossing borders. These findings demonstrate how global mobility acquires subjective value – not only (perhaps even not primarily) for its practical implications, but as a marker of status and source of dignity.

Status

Serbian society is marked by relatively low levels of economic inequality – lower than most Western European countries, and much lower than the United States, Mexico or Israel (World Bank 2016). This is not just an outcome of Serbia’s recent communist history but is also a product of the country’s economic development since the 19th century, which did not create the conditions for the kind of encompassing economic stratification that is found in the West. Serbia’s urban elite – which developed mostly in Vojvodina and Belgrade – is defined primarily by the possession of cultural capital (above all, education) and adherence to European and cosmopolitan values (Lazić 2003; Baćević 2014). Thus, cultural capital is expected to play an important role in the way individuals experience their place in society. At the same time, Serbia is an ethnic nation-state where minorities make up a significant percentage (14%) of the population and where interethnic relations have historically been dynamic and volatile. Therefore, we can also expect status hierarchies to interact with ethnic hierarchies (as they do in almost every human society). I will discuss here both aspects of status: prestige defined by individual cultural capital and prestige tied to collective ethnic identity.

We have seen that most strategic citizens come from the ranks of northern urban elites, a group that prides itself on having a special connection to Europe and being the agents of “Europeanization” in Serbia. Given this context, one would expect that obtaining European Union citizenship would become a status symbol. Such citizenship could embody the values of the educated elite in several ways – displaying open-mindedness and anti-nationalism, proving intellectual prowess and furnishing objective proof that its bearer is “truly” European. In Mexico and Israel, European Union
citizenship operates as a status symbol (U.S. dual citizenship, on the other hand, is not a status symbol in Mexico) (Chapter 4; Harpaz 2013; Mateos 2016). Contrary to expectations, however, the interviews did not lend any support to the idea that Hungarian dual citizenship is a status symbol in Serbia. Respondents often discussed their second citizenship in a detached, almost apologetic manner that was very different from the way Israeli respondents, for example, spoke about their EU citizenship (when discussing their plans of emigration, however, Serbian respondents spoke with excitement and pride).

How should we explain this unexpected finding? Part of the explanation has to do with the communist legacy and the strong egalitarian tradition that makes Serbians less attuned to the acquisition and display of status symbols. Another – and probably more important – reason is the following: in Mexico and Israel, European-origin elites are economically and politically dominant in society. Therefore, they are in a position to impose their view of the world – what Pierre Bourdieu (1989) called the “vision of divisions” – on other, less dominant, social groups. In those countries, having EU citizenship denotes elite membership ipso facto. A Mexican with Spanish citizenship holds objective proof of recent European ancestry, securing his or her place in the country’s mostly-white elite. Israelis of European ancestry generally enjoy a higher socio-economic position than Israelis of Middle-Eastern or Russian-speaking origin and their families have been in Israel longer (another source of pride). Therefore, in those countries a European Union passport signifies high status independently of any actual use. The association with elite groups means that EU dual citizenship is to some degree impervious to criticism.

In Serbia, the conditions are very different. Ethnic Hungarians are usually worse off than the general population and the economic situation in Vojvodina is only slightly better than the rest of Serbia. Hungary itself – which during communism was much poorer than Yugoslavia – is perceived as a low-status country and there is no special pride in being its citizen. Moreover, Serbia’s liberal, European-oriented educated classes do not have any clear economic or political advantage over the rest of society (Ramet 1996; Lazić 2000) and are not in a position to impose their vision on them. Instead, the dominant group with the power to define the agenda was and remains – except a short interlude in the early 2000s – the communist-turned-nationalist elites that have thrived
since the time of Milošević. These elites – led by current Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić – promote a nationalist-collectivist ideology that shapes public discourse in Serbia in a way that might potentially mark seekers of dual citizenship as targets for criticism.

As I noted above, the Hungarian offer of dual citizenship did not evoke a strong negative reaction in Serbia, and nationalist politicians and intellectuals mostly kept silent on the topic. Nonetheless, citizenship applicants were concerned that they might be criticized by nationalists (this is particularly relevant in Belgrade, and much less in Vojvodina). To understand the basis for that criticism, we should keep in mind that the principle of non-assimilation has been the hallmark of Serbian identity for centuries, and it guaranteed the survival of that identity under Ottoman and Habsburg rule (Lazić 2003). Many elements in the folk culture retain this emphasis, providing a ready vocabulary of criticisms against Serbs who adopt other identities for the sake of expediency.

Wary of such criticism, strategic applicants often kept a low profile. Bojana, who was quoted above (vignette 1), did not tell people in Belgrade she was seeking dual citizenship because she didn’t want to be criticized. Nobody has ever actually criticized her for applying for citizenship, but she could easily imagine what hypothetical critics – people she described as “conservative and closed” – would say: “that you’re acting elitist because you’re from the north, that you don’t like Serbia, even that you don’t like Russia. [They would say] that you’re not a real Serb, you’re giving up your Serbian identity”. In the context of Serb-nationalist discourse, Serbs from Vojvodina are seen as lesser Serbs than people from central Serbia – less proud of being Serbian, less committed to preserving Serbian traditions, suspected of being elitists and having a pro-German instead of a pro-Russian orientation. By taking up Hungarian citizenship, Vojvodina Serbs confirm these suspicions and expose themselves to censure.

Furthermore, numerous respondents pointed out that Hungary’s policy of giving out passports in Vojvodina arouses concerns that it might have territorial designs on the region. Biljana, a 32-year old Serb engineer from Belgrade said, “some people say that Vojvodina will end up like Kosovo. I will not support such a thing”. The reference to Kosovo alludes to this region’s 2008 declaration of independence from Serbia after decades of bloody conflict, which included NATO intervention against Serbia in 1999. In spite of her concerns about a Kosovo-like scenario, she went ahead with the citizenship
application because “I am selfish [...] I always tell myself that one more passport won’t make a difference”. This quotation was typical in the sense that many strategic applicants thought that there was something selfish or fake involved in taking dual citizenship. Usually, they would justify their decision to seek another citizenship by criticizing Serbia and the sub-standard “citizenship package” it offers, rather than defending dual citizenship in principle. We see, then, that there is a certain sense of shame associated with Hungarian dual citizenship, which makes it unsuitable for use as a status symbol.

Hungarian citizenship, then, did not become a status symbol at the individual level among non-Hungarian strategic applicants. Note that I did not study its effect on status within the Hungarian community. Let us now switch to another level of analysis: the collective status associated with different ethnic identities. Here, dual citizenship clearly has the effect of increasing the status and prestige of Hungarian language and ethnic identity. When thinking about the relative status of ethnic identities, I will use an analytical framework that draws on Andreas Wimmer’s (2014) approach to ethnic boundary making. This approach posits that the most important sociological object of analysis when trying to understand ethnicity is not the ethnic “content” but rather the boundary that it marks between individuals and social groups (see also Barth 1969). The ethnic boundary as a social object can be analyzed using a neo-institutional approach that inquires about the contexts and manners in which it is reinforced or blurred, contracted or expanded.

The most important actor with the power to cement ethnic and social categories and charge them with practical meaning is the state (Wimmer 2014). Therefore, the account below will focus on variations in the symbolic and practical value of Hungarian and Serbian ethnic identities in Vojvodina in relation to political structures, including Yugoslavia, Hungary, Serbia and the EU. This region has changed many hands over the 20th century: a Vojvodinian person who is now 80 years old would have been born in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, lived as a young child under Hungarian occupation, grown into adulthood in communist Yugoslavia and spent her old age in Serbia. Each change of government also entailed a shift in the structure of ethnic relations and in the relative prestige of different identities. Since the most important component of ethnicity in
Central and Eastern Europe is language, I will focus on changes in the relative standing of the Hungarian and Serbian/Serbo-Croatian language.

Historically, ethnicity in Central and Eastern Europe was very strongly correlated with social class. In the pre-1918 Kingdom of Hungary, Hungarians were strongly overrepresented among the nobility and landholders, Germans and Jews among city dwellers and other ethnic groups – Serbs, Croats, Romanians, Slovaks – among the peasantry (Verdery 1979). This socio-economic situation, coupled with the official policy of Magyarization mentioned before, meant that Hungarian culture and language enjoyed higher status. When Vojvodina became part of the (Serb-dominated) Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1918, numerous policies were enacted to eliminate the economic privilege of formerly dominant ethnic groups and to shift power to Serbs (Boarov 2001). The brief Hungarian occupation during World War Two signaled a return to the policy of “Magyarization” and an attempt to impose Hungarian language and identity.

Communist Yugoslavia which was established after the war replaced Serbian nationalism with the principle of “brotherhood and unity” (bratstvo i jedinstvo), which entailed ethnic neutrality and made nationalist discourse taboo (Laszak 2010). The hierarchy of social status in communist Yugoslavia was based mostly on political identification and relation to the state and not on ethnic identity. Within that system, many Serbs still enjoyed relatively higher status – not qua Serbs, but rather as good communists, patriotic Yugoslavs and well-connected state employees (Ludanyi 1979; Roshwald 2002). Nevertheless, communist Yugoslavia was generally successful in creating an ethnically neutral environment that was open to Hungarians who accepted the “rules of the game,” including communism, use of Serbo-Croatian and identification with the state. Furthermore, communist Yugoslavia had – especially after 1974 – a well-developed system of minority rights, including state support for Hungarian-language education, culture and media (Huszka 2007; Manić 2011). In spite of these minority rights, it was clear that the Serbo-Croatian language dominated public life and public spaces and all Hungarians (except those in small villages) had to master it, while the Hungarian language was restricted to the ethnic community and to private and domestic settings.
Serbia’s gradual shift from a multi-ethnic communist country to an ethnic nation-state since the 1990s did not lead to violent conflict between the Hungarian minority and the majority population (Bieber and Wintergarten 2006). Even though Milošević abolished Vojvodina’s autonomous status, Serbia officially continued to guarantee minority rights and institutionalized multilingualism (for example, all official signs in Subotica are written in Serbian, Hungarian and Croatian) (Racz 2012). However, the status of Vojvodina Hungarians did in fact decline in the 1990s. They became a smaller minority in Vojvodina, as many Hungarians emigrated and Serb refugees from Bosnia and Croatia came in. Moreover, it seems that some members of the Serb majority felt legitimated to uphold the dominance of the Serbian language and the dominated position of Hungarian through an array of implicit everyday strategies. For example, people who spoke Hungarian loudly on the street or in the bus would occasionally get shouted at, and drunk Serb youth would sometimes pick bar fights with Hungarians. Beyond these sporadic – albeit traumatic – events, the most significant mechanism for the preservation of the dominance of the Serbian language was the fact that the vast majority of Serbs in Vojvodina could not speak any Hungarian and had no interest in learning it. Since most local and state officials – including police, municipal staff, magistrates and so on – are Serbs who cannot provide services in Hungarian, the official policy of multilingualism remains on paper only (ibid.).

Thus, in communist Yugoslavia and nationalist Serbia, the Hungarian language had a low status not because of any special animus against Hungarians but because it was detached from the state, which is the main source of economic and social goods. This made Hungarian a language of low practical value, mostly associated with the domestic sphere. This explains the process of assimilation that is of such concern to Hungarian policy makers. The linguistic structure of opportunity was such that children who did not acquire a high level of Serbo-Croatian or Serbian would be disadvantaged for the rest of their lives. This led couples of mixed ethnicity (Hungarian and Serb, Hungarian and Croat and so on) to send their children to schools where the language of instruction was Serbo-Croatian or Serbian; those children then developed a corresponding ethnic identity as Yugoslavs or Serbs (Ilić 2010).
The new Hungarian citizenship law caused yet another shift in the linguistic opportunity structure that residents of Vojvodina are faced with – this time in the opposite direction. Today, the Hungarian language acquires practical value once again, as it offers its speakers to access a political-economic entity that is much larger and richer than Serbia: the European Union. Serbs whose family roots are from Vojvodina are well aware that the only thing standing between them and EU citizenship is knowledge of Hungarian. This cannot but change their relation to the language, which becomes associated with opportunities, freedom and wealth.52

Above, I discussed the surge in demand for the study of Hungarian by people who hope to secure citizenship. There is evidence that even individuals who are not making a systematic effort to apply for citizenship develop a new appreciation for Hungarian. Many ethnic Hungarians reported that their Serbian friends and neighbors now show greater interest in and respect toward the Hungarian language.53 Some were even approached by Serbs who asked them to teach them Hungarian, and a fair number of Hungarians – especially retired teachers – began giving informal classes. Hungarian shopkeepers are surprised to find longtime customers, with whom they always communicated in Serbian, suddenly asking them to speak to them in Hungarian “so I can practice”. Potentially, there was even an effect on the educational choices of mixed couples: according to an analysis made by the Hungarian National Council, there has been a 25% increase in the number of children from mixed families who attend schools where the medium of instruction is Hungarian.54

The higher visibility (and audibility) of Hungarian is not just a function of citizenship policy: Hungary has dramatically increased its financial support for Hungarian-language education and culture in Serbia and for promoting the accessibility of public services in the Hungarian language. Local Hungarian leaders report relatively high responsiveness on the part of Serbian public servants to this policy, which they attribute in part to the new prestige and usefulness of Hungarian. While it might be an exaggeration to speak of a “return to Magyarization,” we can definitely conclude that Hungary’s combined policy of offering dual citizenship conditional on language and putting funds into cross-border Hungarian culture has been successful in stopping the drift towards Serbianization of the Hungarian and mixed-origin population in Vojvodina.
This development, however, is highly ironic: Hungary is bolstering the prestige of Hungarian language and culture in its former territories even as its citizenship policy is leading to a dramatic decline in the number of actual Hungarians living there.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I analyzed Hungary’s dual citizenship policy and the way that it is received on the ground in Serbia. This case exhibits the basic characteristics of the global phenomenon of compensatory citizenship: a granting state that permits external dual citizenship as a result of domestic political processes, an eligible population in a middle-tier country that rushes at the opportunity to acquire Western/EU citizenship, and a population of strategic applicants who modify relevant characteristics in order to gain citizenship. We see, moreover, that the opportunity to obtain compensatory citizenship interacts with domestic structures of inequality: there are specific types of pre-existing capital that can be converted into a second citizenship.

The case of Hungarian-Serbian dual citizenship is characterized by an ethno-linguistic evidentiary regime, which is consistent with the dominant mode of population classification in Central and Eastern Europe. This means that the resources that can be converted into dual citizenship are ethnicity (being a native Hungarian speaker) or cultural capital (being able to learn Hungarian). Hungarian citizenship policy, even though formulated in strongly ethnic terms, shows surprising openness toward individuals who have studied the language even if they do not identify as Hungarians. This highlights the inherent paradox in the way ethnicity is politicized in Central and Eastern Europe: on the one hand, ethnic identities provide the taken-for-granted principle of political legitimacy – including, historically, the legitimization of brutal war and ethnic cleansing – but at the same time, ethnic identification is a performative practice that individuals may fashion and modify for strategic purposes.

In terms of its interaction with local structures of inequality in Serbia, we can identify two effects of Hungarian citizenship policy. On the level of ethnic identities, the availability of dual citizenship conditioned on knowledge of Hungarian has bolstered the prestige and practical value of this language, signaling – one could say – a soft return to
the policy of Magyarization which Hungary enacted when the area was under its control. Another effect can be seen at the level of individual strategic citizens – non-Hungarians who studied the Hungarian language to acquire citizenship. For those individuals, mostly members of Serbia’s northern urban elites, the opportunity to obtain Hungarian citizenship as a reward for studying a foreign language appears as a way out of their predicament. To some degree, it can even be seen as a way to compensate for Serbia’s blocked transition and stuck EU accession process by obtaining individual EU citizenship.

Placing the Hungarian-Serbian case within the comparative framework of this study, two main points seem to come up. First, this is the only case in which the granting country is actively promoting non-resident dual citizenship (Mexican birth tourists and Israeli citizenship applicants are to a degree exploiting a loophole). This has to do with the fact that the Hungarian government actually expects to gain something from its dual citizens abroad: in the short run, votes; in the long run, reintegration into the Hungarian nation across borders. Second, this is the only case in which dual citizenship might actually be associated with dissimilation, meaning that dual citizens shift away from their original national identity. This process is certainly present among ethnic Hungarian dual citizens who see European perspectives open up to them thanks to the Hungarian passport. It might also be found among some strategic dual citizens: there is no question of them reidentifying as Hungarians, but their Vojvodianian and especially European self-identifications are reinforced at the expense of their Serbian identity.

Both these features – Hungary’s supposed gain and Serbia’s alleged loss – have to do with the evidentiary regime that Hungary uses to determine eligibility for citizenship. The language criterion touches at the heart of national identity in Central and Eastern Europe. Speaking Hungarian is almost never a trivial biographical fact – rather, it is an identity-defining characteristic. Even if their motivation was primarily instrumental, almost all of the dual citizens who fulfilled the language requirement do in fact feel some kind of connection to Hungary and have made a small step away from identifying with Serbia. This is very different from the situation in the Mexican and Israeli cases. The birthplace and ancestry criteria, far from being identity-shaping, might actually be seen as trivial: simply having been born in the U.S. without growing up there, or having had a
German-Jewish grandfather do not make one American or German. Furthermore, the criteria for citizenship set by the granting country are not in direct competition with the way the primary residence country defines its citizenry: children of Mexican parents are still recognized as Mexican even if born abroad and having grandparents from Europe does not make one any less Israeli. This reinforces the point with which this chapter opened: dual citizenship policies in Central and Eastern Europe are particularly controversial and consequential, and might potentially carry significant geopolitical and ethno-demographic consequences.

This chapter also seeks to contribute to the literature on ethnic minorities and disputed territories in Central and Eastern Europe (e.g. Weiner 1971; Brubaker 1996). In recent years, there has been growing interest in the role that citizenship policy – and especially co-ethnic dual citizenship – play in these dynamics (Štiks 2010; Ragazzi and Balalovska’s 2011; Stjepanovic 2015; Knott 2015). While that literature focused on the role of nationalism in those policies and the ways that they are received on the ground, the findings from the present study highlight the role of the European Union, which is a silent but extremely powerful partner in many of those cases. The inclusion of some countries in the European Union enables them to bolster the status and attractiveness of the ethnic identity they are associated with in all of the neighboring countries, reshaping ethnic hierarchies in them. The bottom-up responses to such policies illustrate the flexible and often strategic nature of ethno-linguistic identity in the region.
Notes

1 For a discussion of the complexity of distinguishing co-ethnic from ancestry-based citizenship policies, see Pogonyi, m.s.
2 In demographic terms, Hungarian-Serbian dual citizenship is the second-largest case of Eastern Europeans acquiring EU citizenship (after Romanian citizenship in Moldova). It is also surpassed by the number of Romanians who took up Hungarian citizenship but that case does not involve granting EU citizenship to non-EU citizens.
3 The common usage of “nation” in Central and Eastern Europe is different from its usage in the English-speaking world: in the latter case, “nation” roughly correlates with “country”, whereas in the former it is usually synonymous to “ethnic group” (Verdery 1998). Similarly, “nationality” in Central and Eastern Europe correlates with “ethnic identity” and not, as in the West, with “citizenship”. For example, the Serbian census includes a question about citizens’ “national belonging” (nacionalna pripadnost) which relates to what English-speakers would refer to as “ethnicity” (this is also how the Serbian census translates the term).
4 This distinction between Serbian ethnics and Serbian citizens is not usually made in the Serbian language, and I introduce it here for the sake of clarity. Most people will like refer to Serbian Hungarians as Mađari iz Srbije – Hungarians from Serbia – and they refer to themselves in the same way. The underlying assumption is that only ethnicity is strong enough to be represented with a noun, while citizenship is not.
5 In 1918, the Kingdom of Serbia (which existed formally since 1882) expanded its territory at the expense of Austria-Hungary and united with Montenegro. It then became the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, which in 1929 was renamed Yugoslavia. The name Yugoslavia survived until 2004, by which point it included only the republics of Serbia and Montenegro. It was succeeded by the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro which existed until 2006. On that year, Montenegro seceded and Serbia became a separate country once again.
6 Vojvodina actually comprises three geographical regions: Bačka, Banat and Srem. Historically, only Bačka (the largest and most populous subregion) had a strong Hungarian presence. Moreover, during World War Two, only Bačka was under Hungarian occupation while Banat and Srem were under German and Croatian control. For the sake of simplicity and clarity, however, I will refer in this text to Vojvodina, which includes the entire area that Hungary lost to Serbia after World War One and which remains a distinct administrative unit within Serbia.
7 There was no systematic attempt by Serbs and Hungarians to exterminate each other. There was, however, a number of atrocities, including massacres and deportations of Serbs by Hungarians and Hungarians by partisans. During the war, the Jews of Vojvodina (about 17,000 people) were exterminated by Hungarians and Germans; after the war, about 500,000 ethnic Germans were expelled (Ludanyi 1979; Boarov 2001; Bieber and Wintergarten 2006; Laszak 2010).
8 The demographic weight of minorities in Vojvodina was diluted through massive resettlements of Serbs from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia in the 1940s and 1990s (Boarov 2001).
9 The territory of Vojvodina slipped out of Hungarian control in 1918 but the transfer was only recognized officially in 1920. Beside Vojvodina, Yugoslavia also took tiny pieces of territory that are now part of Croatia and Slovenia.
10 The reluctance to offer dual citizenship presumably had to do with a wish to avoid conflict with neighboring countries (above all Slovakia) and a reluctance to share the country’s scant resources with new citizens from poorer countries. Moreover, the socialist party, which was in power for most of the early 2000s, suspected that the new citizens might be more supportive of the rightwing (which they were).
11 It is not defined as a reacquisition of the Hungarian citizenship that applicants’ ancestors when the territories they lived in were taken from Hungary (such reacquisition could potentially be in violation of the Treaty of Trianon).
12 This hypothesis is further reinforced by the way the Hungarian government aggressively promoted non-resident voting among transborder “new Hungarians” while at the same time making voting difficult for Hungarian emigrants in Western Europe, who are expected to lean towards opposition parties (Scheppele 2014a).
For example, only about 11 percent of Australian citizens abroad voted in 2010 (Southern Cross Group 2011), and under 6 percent of Americans abroad did so (Smith 2010).

As far back as the 18th century, the German philosopher J. G. Herder predicted the extinction of the Hungarian language and the assimilation of Hungarians into the so-called sea of Germanics and Slavs that surrounds them (Verdery 1979).

Data are for 2011. Source: data received upon request from Serbian census.

In a manner that is consistent with the compensatory citizenship hypothesis, the number of ethnic Serbs from Bosnia, Croatia and Montenegro who have taken up Serbian citizenship is not high.

Estimates given by Hungarian consul officials in Serbia.

Some of the people who identified as Serbs also had some Hungarian, Croatian, German or Slovak ancestry.

This meant that almost all my Hungarian interviewees were urban and relatively educated, while the general Hungarian population is more rural and less educated than the national average.

Some of the applicants – potentially up to a third – filed their applications in Hungary, either because they lived there or because they preferred to apply in Hungary.

There were five countries where between 1,000 and 3,000 people applied for citizenship: Croatia, Russia, Israel, Australia and the United States (Bálint 2014). Croatia borders Hungary and actually has a small Hungarian community of 15,000. By August 2014, eleven percent of them gained Hungarian citizenship. Croatia is excluded from the following analysis because data for it were not available for 2015.

Ethnic Hungarians are those who identified in the national census as being of Hungarian ethnicity. There are also non-ethnic Hungarians who obtain citizenship – in fact, they will stand at the focus of the next section. However, since they constitute only about 10-15% of applicants, we can set them aside for now.

Part of the decline can be explained by demographic depletion, meaning the shrinking of the pool of eligible individuals as more of them acquire citizenship.

This was calculated in the following manner: a total of 118,936 Serbian citizens acquired Hungarian citizenship from January 2011 to August 2014. Of them, about 80,000 acquired their citizenship in Subotica and 5,839 at the embassy in Belgrade (personal communication with officials at the embassy on August 28, 2014). The remaining 32,000 new dual citizens can be assumed to have filed their application in Hungary or elsewhere. The April 2013 data show that more than 200,000 citizenship applications were filed in the territory of Hungary.

The names of all respondents were changed to protect their privacy.

_Bunjevac_ (plural of _Bunjevac_) are a small ethnic group (about 20,000 persons) found almost exclusively in Vojvodina. Bunjevci are Catholic and speak Serbo-Croatian, and until 1991 most of them identified as Croatian. In 1991, Serbia introduced a Bunjevac ethnic category in the census (Serbia Census 2011). Most people who identify as Bunjevac in Serbia today would say _Bunjevac_ are distinct from Croats and some even argue that _Bunjevac_ are Catholic Serbs. Croatia, for its part, recognizes them as Croatian and offers them citizenship (cf. Stjepanovic 2015).

As in many other parts of the world, in former Yugoslavia names (both given and last names) are the most accessible ethnic identifier.

Serbs actually have the same assumption, and are very surprised to meet foreigners who can speak Serbian. Many respondents assumed initially that I could speak the language because I had Serbian or Croatian ancestry.

Views of the Hungarian minority in Serbia is positive and there is almost no antagonism towards them (Bieber and Wintergarten 2006:20; Pavasovic-Trošt 2013).

On the other hand, new Hungarian citizens were sometimes questioned by Hungarian border guards and, if they could not speak proper Hungarian, their passports would be taken away. However, I have not actually spoken to anyone to whom this actually happened, and neither have any of my respondents. While the risk of having one’s passport taken away might be more myth than reality, this prevalent perception is a cause of great fear among strategic Hungarian-Serbian dual citizens and leads many of them to avoid any travel to Hungary. This is another example of the kind of ironic, even comical consequences that dual citizenship sometimes leads to; it can be compared to the finding that some German-Israeli dual citizens from Holocaust survivor families still boycott German products and refuse to visit Germany or even use their own German passport (Harpaz 2013).

In 2011, eighteen percent of Vojvodina’s population were born outside Serbia (mostly from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina). If we assume that all foreign-born are Serbs, then up to 24% of Serbs in Vojvodina...
are foreign-born, and almost all of them would be refugees from the 1990s (Ipsos 2011). The number of Serbs who were settled in Vojvodina after World War Two is estimated at about 225,000 (Boarov 2011) and they joined a population of about 580,000 Serbs. Based on these figures, we can make a rough estimate that roughly a half of ethnic Serbs in Vojvodina have pre-1920 Vojvodinian ancestry and are therefore potentially eligible for citizenship.

32 Other options included bribing the Hungarian official making the citizenship decision, concluding a fictitious marriage with a Hungarian citizen or procuring fake papers proving Hungarian ancestry. See Gergő 2013; Bálint 2014; Nolan 2014; Glas Dijaspore 2015.

Dual citizens who obtained citizenship by fraud were very suspicious and usually refused to be interviewed. Therefore, I managed to conduct only one interview with such a person and they are not included in the study.

33 I conducted only two interviews with respondents who obtained or tried to obtain Hungarian citizenship through fraud. Other potential respondents that I approached (through their friends their relatives) declined to be interviewed. Hopefully future studies will be able to study this important phenomenon.

34 Source: http://www.centarzaedukaciju.com/madjarski.php

35 These educated but economically deprived elites also played a key role in the evolution of national movements in Central and Eastern Europe, according to Ernst Gellner (1983).

36 Eurostat: “Population on 1 January by five year age group, sex and country of birth”, “Population on 1 January by five age group, sex and citizenship”. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/population-demography-migration-projections/population-data/database


37 According to World Bank statistics, Serbia’s migration balance was -324,000 between 1997 and 2002 (meaning that there were 324,000 more emigrants than immigrants), -241,000 in 2002-2007 and only -100,000 in 2007-2012. The same trend is seen in the different databases that provide country-specific data.

38 Consistent statistics on Serbian immigration to the UK and France were unavailable. Anyway, these countries are not major destinations.

39 This is the increase in Serbian-born in Hungary and Switzerland, according to Eurostat. According to UNPD statistics, the increases were much larger: up to 40,000 immigrants in both countries combined. I assumed no change in Serbian-born for Germany, for which Eurostat had no data, OECD showed conflicting results and UNPD showed a negligible increase of 3,500.

40 The maximum estimate of “missing” Serbians who might potentially be dual citizens can be up to 48,000 (11,000+79,000-42,000). This figure is of course much too high (only 140,000 Serbians got Hungarian citizenship in total), suggesting that some of the gap might be due to methodological inconsistencies and errors.

We cannot know how much of this change is explained by Serbian mono-citizens obtaining a second citizenship and using it to re-register in their destination country, and how much is due to mono-citizens returning to Serbia and being “replaced” in the destination by a new immigrant with dual citizenship.

41 When measuring 2011-2015 changes in the number of Hungarian citizens vs. Hungarian-born, we find that the “surplus” of Hungarian citizens in Switzerland is about 2,000 (Eurostat data) and in Germany between 20,000-30,000 (OECD data). By 2015, all but a few of the 25,000-35,000 Serbian-born persons living in Hungary have obtained Hungarian citizenship (as these are mostly ethnic Hungarians, they have easy access to dual citizenship thanks to the new law).

42 Similar results were reported by Judit Molnár, a geographer who conducted a series of research interviews with Hungarian political elites in Vojvodina. Most of her respondents spontaneously brought the subject of emigration (see also Németh 2013).

43 Personal communications, September 2014. A report detailing those trends (in Hungarian) can be found at http://www.mnt.org.rs/22-Kiemelt-kozlemenyek/1043-Beszamolo-az-MNT-4-eves-tevekenysegerol

44 The preservation of records has to do with the fact that Hungarian authorities never attempted to exterminate Serbs. In contrast, in the parts of Vojvodina that were under Croatian control in World War Two, birth records in many Serbian communities were destroyed.

45 This does not mean that younger ethnic Hungarians did not express a strong ethnic identity – many of them did. A typical quotation was from Agnes, 28 year old ethnic Hungarian from Subotica: “[of course] I
am Hungarian. But identity was not part of my motivation. I don’t belong [in Hungary]. [...] I just want the passport”.

36 The case of Mladen (vignette 2), whose mother also applied for citizenship, is atypical in this sense. It is significant that they applied in 2011 – if they applied in 2013 or later, it would have been more difficult for his mother to obtain citizenship because the required level of Hungarian would be higher.

37 The view of visa restrictions as sanctions is probably inaccurate – the visa requirement was kept even after Milošević was replaced by a pro-European government in 2000, and Western-backed Bosnia-Herzegovina was subject to the same visa regime as Serbia. Interestingly, many Bosnian Muslims also believe that the visa requirement imposed on them until 2010 were motivated by vindictive discrimination (this time anti-Muslim).

38 This mirrors Bertolt Brecht’s ironic observation in the book “Conversations in Exile”, to the effect that “the passport is the most noble part of a human being” because “it is therefore recognized when it is good, whereas a human being can be ever so good and still not be recognized”.

39 Income inequality is usually represented using the Gini index, which calculates the gaps between a country’s actual income distribution and perfect equality. A higher number represents higher inequality. In 2010, Serbia’s Gini index was 29.7, similar to Hungary’s (29.4) and lower than that of Germany (31.1) or France (33.8). In the same year, the Gini index of the United States was 40.5, of Israel 42.8 and of Mexico 48.1.

40 U.S. dual citizenship does not provide a status symbol in Mexico because most of the people who hold it are lower-class.

41 Szabolcs Pogonyi (forthcoming), in his study on the subject, found that Hungarians in Transylvania felt that dual citizenship raised their status vis-à-vis majority Romanians, and specifically blunted the common insult “bozgor” meaning “without homeland”, which Romanians hurl at Hungarians. I did not encounter evidence of this in my interviews in Vojvodina – which had to do either with the fact that I interviewed in Serbian rather than Hungarian, or with the less antagonistic character of ethnic relations in Vojvodina compared to Transylvania.

42 The German minority in Hungary experienced a comparable revalorization of its hitherto-suppressed language after the post-communist transition in the 1990s (Gal 1993).

43 The same point came up in interviews that Szabolcs Pogonyi conducted among Vojvodina Hungarians. See Pogonyi, forthcoming.

44 Personal communication, Katinka Beretka, Hungarian National Council.
Chapter 4: U.S. dual citizenship in Mexico

I. Introduction

Immigration from Mexico to the United States is one of the largest and longest-lasting migrations in the contemporary world (Durand, Massey and Zenteno 2001; Alarcon 2011). It is also one of the most thoroughly studied migrations: research on Mexicans in the United States has played a paradigmatic role in understanding phenomena like immigrant integration (e.g. Telles and Ortiz 2008) and transnationalism (e.g. Smith 2005) as well as the causes of migration (e.g. Massey and Espinosa 1997) and the effect of receiving-country and sending-country policy (e.g. Massey, Durand and Malone 2002; FitzGerald 2009). One key dimension that has been relatively neglected within this extensive literature, however, concerned nationality (or citizenship). This disregard has to do with the United States’ policy of automatic birthright citizenship to those born in its territory and Mexico’s traditional limited interest in the children of Mexican emigrants – two policies that together created a relatively neat division of North America’s population by citizenship. For most of the 20th century, migration between Mexico and the U.S. produced few dual nationals, few stateless persons and very little of the struggles over political boundaries that have made citizenship into such a contested issue in Europe.

In recent years, however, two trends – one legal and the other demographic – have combined to reshape the “citizenship constellation” (Bauböck 2010a) involving Mexico
and the United States. In 1998, Mexican law was changed to permit dual nationality, and Mexico invited former nationals and their children to regain their Mexican nationality; and since 2007, Mexican migration to the U.S. leveled off, and record numbers of people are actually moving back to Mexico (Massey, Durand and Pren 2014; Gonzalez-Barrera 2015).³ Mass return migration –driven in part by deportations – means that there are now millions of people in Mexico who have spent extended periods in the U.S. or were born there. Together, these legal and demographic changes blur the once-solid boundary between the citizenries of the U.S. and Mexico. As of now, we know remarkably little about this dual national population that straddles the political boundary between the U.S. and Mexico. A small number of studies have begun to explore some aspects of U.S.-Mexican dual nationality, including its political aspects (FitzGerald 2009), demographic proportions (Mateos 2015) and legal codification (Escobar 2015; Hoyo 2015a).

Three groups of potential dual nationals may be in a position to claim rights from both the U.S. and Mexico. Mexican immigrants in the U.S. and their U.S.-born offspring number together some 24 million persons (Mateos 2015). This population generally shows little interest in dual nationality: first-generation immigrants often retain their legal permanent resident (LPR) status for years without naturalizing in the U.S., while second-generation Mexican-Americans are usually content with the U.S. citizenship and do not seek Mexican citizenship. Considering U.S.-Mexican dual nationals in Mexico – a population estimated at about 2 million (see below) – they can be divided into two categories.

The first category of dual nationals in Mexico includes returnee and deportee families. Many of these families include children who were born and raised in the U.S., and now find themselves having to adapt to life in Mexico. Often, these children actually find themselves at a disadvantage because of their poor Spanish skills and a stigma against Mexican-Americans; in addition, they often face bureaucratic difficulties in proving their identity and citizenship in Mexico (Mateos 2014, 2016; Jacobo and Espinosa 2015).

The other category of U.S. dual nationals in Mexico shows markedly different geographic and socio-economic characteristics than the former two. It includes middle-class and upper-class northern Mexicans who engage in birth tourism to secure
compensatory citizenship from the U.S. for their children. Mexicans from the north enjoy privileged access to the United States relative to Mexicans from the center and south. Not only is northern Mexico wealthier than other parts of Mexico and geographically closer to the U.S., but Mexicans from the north (norteños) also perceive themselves as closer to Anglo-Americans in terms of culture and even phenotype. These resources allow middle- and upper-class norteños to establish a much more flexible relation to the U.S. than the “classic” trajectory of a migrant from central or southern Mexico, who enter the U.S. illegally and stay there for years on end. Northern elites have complex transnational ties with the U.S. that do not typically involve immigration, but rather focus on consumption, tourism and education in the U.S. (Sarabia 2015). Dual citizenship and birth tourism are integrated into this pattern of practices and relations.

In this chapter, I will focus on this category of middle- and upper-class norteños who practice birth tourism. Dual nationals living in the U.S. find low practical value and exhibit low demand for dual citizenship (in other words, this is sentimental citizenship – see Chapter 2), while returnees and deportees in Mexico had dual nationality imposed on them. These two populations – the United States’ sentimental Mexicans and Mexico’s ejected Americans – are of course interesting in themselves and important for the future of U.S.-Mexico relations. However, they do not form part of the global vanguard that participates in the phenomenon of compensatory dual citizenship. In contrast, elite norteños who practice and benefit from birth tourism represent an important change in the relation to citizenship and allow us to examine the local dynamics involved in the strategic acquisition of compensatory citizenship by middle-tier country elites. While Israelis and Argentines use their ancestry to obtain European Union citizenship, and Serbs and Ukrainians draw on their ethnicity, norteños capitalize on their financial resources and proximity to the U.S. to secure first-tier dual citizenship.

By birth tourism, I refer to parents who travel to the U.S. with the express purpose of giving birth there and securing American citizenship for their children; following the birth, they return to their countries of origin (cf. Lien 2006; Balta and Altan-Olcay 2016; Grant 2015). Birth tourism differs from the two other major pathways to compensatory citizenship in two key dimensions. First, ancestry-based or ethnicity-based citizenship reacquisition are the dominant pathways used by middle-tier applicants seeking
citizenship from EU countries, who are marked by *jus sanguinis* transmission and ethnically preferential policies. In contrast, birth tourism by its very definition can only be used to acquire citizenship from Western countries that have an automatic *jus soli* regime (also called “birthright citizenship”). There are only two Western countries with such a regime: the U.S. and Canada. Second, whereas applicants for ancestry- or ethnicity-based citizenship capitalize on pre-existing links with the granting country, parents who practice birth tourism are creating their second citizenship *ex nihilo*. Typically, the economic expenditure required is much higher and that the scope of potential birth tourists is much broader and even extends to third-tier countries like China.

In this chapter, I combine demographic data with material from interviews in order to explore birth tourism among elites in northern Mexico. I study birth tourism by Mexicans rather than by, say, Chinese or Taiwanese in order to place this understudied phenomenon in the context of Mexican migration and the dynamics of the U.S.-Mexico border. As millions of Mexicans expose themselves to risk and uncertainty by living illegally in the U.S., we find many thousands in the north of Mexico who invest substantial resources to obtain U.S. citizenship but actually prefer to continue living in Mexico. Thus, this case raises a sociological puzzle: what is the meaning and use of U.S. citizenship for people who do not identify as American and do not wish to immigrate to the U.S.?

The chapter will proceed as follows. First, I present the legal and historical background on citizenship in the U.S. and Mexico. Then, I estimate the size of the dual national population in Mexico and the number of tourist births in the U.S. These data demonstrate a dramatic increase in the number of U.S.-born dual nationals living in Mexico and a growth in the number of Mexicans who practice birth tourism. Then, I use material from interviews in northern Mexico to explore the perspective of the people who practice birth tourism, exploring the way in which they acquire U.S. nationality for their children and the motivations and uses associated with dual nationality.
II. Legal and historical background

In the past two decades, a new “citizenship constellation” (Bauböck 2010a) has emerged between the United States and Mexico that allows individuals to belong to both countries simultaneously. In Chapters 3 and 5, I discuss compensatory dual citizenship that emerged in response to the consolidation and expansion of the European Union, which enticed the descendants of co-ethnics and emigrants to reestablish ties with countries that their ancestors previously belonged to. Here, in contrast, we are dealing with compensatory citizenship that emerged in the context of a liberalizing trend in the countries that are involved: the gradual and informal acceptance of dual nationality in the U.S. since the 1960s and its formal acceptance by Mexico in 1998.

The United States’ legislation on citizenship is guided by its self-definition as a country of immigrants (Hansen and Weil 2001), leading to the creation of a relatively open citizenship regime. Anyone born in U.S. territory is automatically a citizen (according to the principle of “right of soil” or jus soli) and naturalization is relatively easy. Natural-born American citizens – those who became citizens through birth in the territory or to U.S. citizen parents – are legally privileged over naturalized citizens. Not only is the position of U.S. President reserved exclusively for natural-born Americans, but naturalized citizens were traditionally at a much higher risk of being stripped of their citizenship. For most of the 20th century, the regime of easy entry into U.S. citizenship was supplemented by a regime of easy – and often involuntary – exit from citizenship. Between 1906 and 1977, almost 150,000 Americans – most of them naturalized citizens – were stripped of their nationality on various grounds, including having served in a foreign military, having voted in a foreign election or just having been away from the U.S. for too long (Weil 2012).

In 1967, however, the Supreme Court made a first ruling that limited the State Department’s authority to expatriate Americans against their will. Since then, a gradual process has led to the elimination of involuntary expatriation (Spiro 1997, 2015; Weil 2012). This new approach that sees citizenship as irrevocable – which Patrick Weil (2012) has called the rise of the “sovereign citizen” – has been upheld by the U.S. in recent years, even as other Western countries like the UK and Canada have reinstated citizenship stripping (Spiro 2014; Joppke 2016). The retreat from citizenship stripping
entailed the informal acceptance of dual nationality in the United States. At the same time, dual nationals are still subjected to numerous restrictions and barred from many sensitive security and government posts in the U.S.

As the United States’ nationality regime was liberalized, new opportunities emerged for strategizing U.S. citizenship. One of the key strategies concerns the practice of birth tourism, which takes advantage of the combination of automatic *jus soli* and the practice of not revoking citizenship. Due to lack of data, it is impossible to determine when exactly foreigners began to practice birth tourism in the U.S. and which origin countries produce the most birth tourist parents. There is evidence, however, that birth tourism is practiced by wealthy individuals from Mexico, China, Taiwan, South Korea, Turkey and Nigeria, among other countries (Feere 2015). Chinese birth tourism in particular has gained notoriety because of controversies over maternity homes for Chinese women in California (Yan 2015). While Mexican birth tourism is not as visible and conspicuous as Chinese birth tourism, we can safely assume that Mexico is one of the leading origin countries for birth tourists in the U.S.

Mexico, like the United States, automatically grants citizenship to anyone born on its territory. Mexican nationality law, however, diverges from American law in its commitment to a discriminatory hierarchy of nationality. Only native-born Mexicans enjoy full political rights, while Mexicans by naturalization are barred from influential positions in politics, the economy, the military and even academia (Hoyo 2015a,b). Furthermore, Mexico makes a distinction between nationals (members of the state) and citizens (full political members), and it is relatively easy to lose one’s citizen status and the right to vote (FitzGerald 2005). The restrictive approach towards naturalized citizens is conditioned by Mexico’s history: not only did the country gain its independence (in 1821) through fierce struggle against Spanish colonial domination, but the following decades were marked by repeated foreign invasions. The most traumatic conflict was with the United States, a series of wars that resulted in the loss of half of Mexico’s territory in 1846-1848. The loss of these vast and valuable territories was partly the result of Anglo-Americans settling in the territory and then rebelling against Mexican authorities. Only 13 years later, in 1861, Mexico was invaded again. This time the invader was France, with the support of several other European nations and some of the
Europeans living in Mexico. Given this history of colonialism and foreign interventions, it is no surprise that Mexico traditionally banned dual nationality, which was seen as a potential avenue that would allow foreign governments to control Mexican politics. Eventually, however, the reality of mass immigration to the U.S., along with growing democratization, pushed the Mexican government to permit dual nationality.

Immigrants from Mexico began arriving in the U.S. in the 1880’s, driven by demand for labor in railroads, agriculture and construction. For several decades, this immigration was mostly circular; typically, men from rural communities in central-western Mexico would come to the U.S. for temporary or seasonal work and then go back to their communities (Durand, Massey and Zenteno 2001; Alarcon 2011). Few immigrants took up U.S. citizenship or had children north of the border. Only in the 1970’s did Mexican migration start changing from circular movement to permanent settlement, reinforced by new U.S. policies. The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 led to the legalization of two million undocumented Mexican immigrants, opening a path to naturalization (UNPD 2005); this was followed in 1996 by a tightening of border controls and by legislation that stripped non-citizens of rights and entitlements (Durand, Massey and Zenteno 2001; Massey, Durand and Pren 2014). By blocking the traditional circular movement and penalizing non-citizens (including both legal and illegal immigrants), these steps pushed many immigrants to take up U.S. citizenship. Whereas in 1995, only 20% of eligible Mexican immigrants have naturalized in the U.S., by 2011 this percentage climbed to 36%. Nonetheless, Mexicans are still less likely to naturalize than any other immigrant group (the average naturalization rate for all immigrants was 61% in 2011) (Gonzalez-Barrera et al. 2013).

It is against this background that the Mexican parliament revised its traditional position and decided to allow dual nationality in 1998. Also referred to as the “law of no-loss” (ley de no-perdida), the new law dictated that Mexican nationality gained at birth was permanent and irrevocable. The law aimed to achieve two purposes: encouraging Mexicans to naturalize in the U.S. while making it easier for them to retain their political and economic ties to Mexico (FitzGerald 2005, 2009; Escobar 2015; Hoyo 2015a; see Escobar 2007). This inclusive intention did not stop Mexican legislators from stipulating a long list of restrictions that limit the access of dual nationals (even those who were born
in Mexico) to most sensitive or influential positions (Hoyo 2015b). As I will show below, Mexico’s 1998 law of no-loss was not a great success in terms of promoting dual nationality among (mostly lower-class) Mexicans in the U.S. and their children; it did, however, have the unintended consequence of increasing the legitimacy and subsequently the prevalence of dual nationality among (mostly upper-class) Mexicans in Mexico. This unintended consequence will stand at the focus of this chapter.

Figure 1: Map of Mexico

III. Data and methods

In this chapter, I will analyze the phenomenon of U.S. dual nationality in Mexico by drawing on two kinds of data. First, I will use statistics from four administrative sources to estimate the number of U.S.-Mexican dual nationals in Mexico and identify recent trends in demand for dual nationality. Those sources include census data from
Mexico’s *Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía* (INEGI) and consular statistics from the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs (*Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores*) as well as immigration statistics from the American Community Survey (ACS) and birth data from the National Center for Health Studies (NCHS).

The second part of the analysis will draw on 46 in-depth interviews with dual nationals and with Mexicans who engaged in birth tourism in the United States. They included 36 respondents who have been born in the U.S. themselves and 10 who had children who were born in the U.S. The bulk of the interviews were conducted between November 2014 and April 2015, during which period I resided in Monterrey, the largest city in northeastern Mexico (see map above). About half of the interviews (21) were carried out in Monterrey and 15 others were conducted in cross-border cities – Reynosa-McAllen and Nuevo Laredo-Laredo and Tijuana-San Diego. Ten other interviews were conducted with dual nationals who were living in Mexico City, in the state of Colima or in the United States.

I recruited respondents using a snowball sampling method; random sampling was impossible given the absence of any database of dual nationals to draw on. However, I employed strategic sub-sampling, meaning that sufficient numbers of respondents were recruited to represent each relevant subpopulation: Monterrey birth tourists and dual nationals, border-town birth tourists and dual nationals, and U.S.-born return migrants. The recruitment of respondents was significantly more challenging than in the other cases. Most potential respondents did not find the topic of dual nationality interesting (unlike Israelis) nor did they feel compelled to help because of a cultural code of hospitality towards foreigners (unlike Serbians). Typically, they displayed a suspicious and uncooperative attitude, which made it very difficult to secure interviews. Respondent recruitment was made possible thanks to the help of personal acquaintances and local academics in Monterrey.

The resulting sample should be representative of middle-class and upper-class individuals in Monterrey and the Texas-Tamaulipas border. This region is similar to other border regions – El Paso-Ciudad Juarez and San Diego-Tijuana – in the tight interconnection between the two sides of the border and in the extreme levels of crime and insecurity on the Mexican side. On the other hand, Monterrey is much richer than
other border cities – in 2012, the city’s GDP per capita ($17,661) was 75% to 85% higher than in Tijuana or Ciudad Juarez (Franco 2014). This difference in economic terms might limit the generalizability of some of the findings.

The interviews were conducted in Spanish or English, according to each respondent’s preference. The duration of each interview was between 75 and 150 minutes. The interviews included questions about three topics: how respondents obtained dual nationality, how they used their second nationality (or how they envisioned their children using it) and how they viewed dual nationality and birth tourism more generally (for example, whether they considered them as positive phenomena). I coded and analyzed the interviews based on pre-defined themes (for example, actual and projected uses of U.S. nationality) as well as themes that emerged inductively from the material (for example, references to undocumented immigrants).

In addition, I conducted interviews with Mexican and American consular staff at the Mexican consulates in McAllen, TX and San Diego, CA and the U.S. consulate in Monterrey. I also interviewed providers of medical insurance that was used to cover births in the U.S.

IV. Demographic profile of U.S. dual nationality in Mexico

Mass immigration from Mexico, which has been a taken-for-granted aspect of U.S. society for more than a generation, is now in decline. In recent years, more people have been moving to Mexico from the U.S. than the other way around – a million Mexicans and their family members returned to Mexico in 2009-2014 compared with only 870,000 new arrivals in the United States (Gonzalez-Barrera 2015). In 2013, China replaced Mexico as the top sending country of immigrants to the U.S., and India might soon push it to the third place (Jensen 2015). Even the immigrants who cross the U.S.-Mexico border illegally are increasingly coming from Honduras, Guatemala, Salvador or Nicaragua rather than from Mexico (Massey, Durand and Pren 2014). This decline in Mexican immigration coincides with developments like declining fertility, improved education and intensified industrialization that suggest that Mexico has moved past its “migration hump” (Skeldon 2013) – a term that describes a period of peak emigration
that accompanies a country’s transition into lower fertility and higher development. In other words, the volume of Mexican immigration to the U.S. is not expected to go back up. We are thus entering a new phase in the history of Mexico-U.S. migration, which is marked by the rise of new demographic, economic and political processes that connect the two nations. A key element in this new, post-mass immigration configuration is the growth of dual nationality.

In this chapter, I will not deal with U.S.-Mexican dual nationals in the United States (see Mateos 2015). Instead, I will focus on dual nationals who live in Mexico, whose numbers have been growing through two processes: return migration (either voluntary or as a result of deportation) which involves the movement of migrant families back to Mexico along with children who were born in the U.S. and are therefore American citizens; and birth tourism, which refers to non-immigrant parents who enter the U.S. in order to give birth and secure U.S. nationality for their children, whom they go on to raise in Mexico. Below, I use data collected from different governmental sources to construct a demographic portrait of U.S.-Mexican dual nationals in Mexico. Then, I focus on dual nationality in northern Mexico and use Mexican consular statistics and U.S. birth statistics to estimate the scope of birth tourism.

The total number of U.S. citizens residing permanently in Mexico can be estimated at between 1.75 and 2 million, almost all of them dual citizens. This is a rough estimate: precise figures are unavailable because neither Mexico nor the U.S. include questions on nationality in their census or official surveys. I will therefore focus on an important subpopulation for which data were available: residents of Mexico who were born in the U.S.

The Mexican census gathers information on respondents’ country of birth. Census results show that in 2010, no fewer than 738,000 persons were been born in the United States. Due to the United States’ jus soli policy, we can be sure that they are all American citizens. Since the number of U.S. mono-citizens residing in Mexico is very low – under 60,000 in 2009 (Chavez and Cobo 2012) – we can infer that almost all of the U.S.-born in Mexico were dual nationals. For the sake of simplicity, in the following discussion I will treat all U.S.-born that were identified by the census as dual nationals.
Figure 2 shows the growth in the number of U.S.-born in Mexico between 1970 and 2010.

**Figure 2: U.S.-Born Population in Mexico, 1970-2010**

Note: the figure shows the number of persons who were reported in the census as having been born in the United States.
Sources: Chavez 2010, Chavez 2013.

Figure 2 demonstrates the dramatic growth in the number of U.S.-born individuals in Mexico, which reached 738,000 persons in 2010 – double than the figure in 2000 and more than 7 times the number in 1970. This finding is surprising: given the high volume of Mexican immigration to the U.S. since the 1980s, we would expect to find large numbers of return migrants who were born in Mexico, spent some time in the U.S. and then returned to Mexico. Here, however, we are dealing with persons who were born in the United States, enjoy all the rights of U.S. citizens, and nonetheless live in Mexico. What explains this massive flow of U.S. citizens to Mexico?
We can shed light on this question by adding another piece of information: the age composition of this population. Immigrants all over the world are typically working-age individuals. Indeed, the population of foreign immigrants in Mexico (those registered with the National Institute of Migration) is mostly composed of men and women between the ages of 25 and 50 (Chavez and Cobo 2012:29).\textsuperscript{11} The population of U.S.-born in Mexico, however has a very different age composition. Census data shows that 81\% of the U.S.-born in Mexico were children under the age of 20 (Chavez 2013). We can infer that these dual nationals did not immigrate on their own, but were taken to Mexico by their families. We see, then, that the number of Mexican families who take their U.S.-born children into Mexico has dramatically increased since 1990, and especially after 2000. This is mainly the result of two processes – return migration (including deportation) and birth tourism.

Census statistics do not include information about the context of arrival in Mexico and therefore do not allow us to disaggregate these two pathways directly. There is, however, another way to estimate the relative weight of these different pathways. Drawing on the existing knowledge on mobility patterns in different parts of Mexico, we can use region as a proxy for pathway to U.S. dual nationality. First, let us look at a map representing the prevalence of U.S.-born dual nationals around the territory of Mexico. Figure 3, which is reproduced from a paper by the geographer Pablo Mateos (2016), shows the distribution of the U.S.-born in Mexico according to municipio, an administrative unit that is roughly equivalent to U.S. county. Darker areas have a higher proportion of U.S.-born in the population relative to the national average, whereas lighter ones are below national average (see index under the map).
As can be seen in the figure, most (75%) of the U.S.-born in Mexico are concentrated in two regions: the central-western part of the country, which is the traditional emigration-sending region; and the area along Mexico’s northern border, which is richer than the rest of the country and less involved in migration to the U.S. We can expect that a different pathway to dual nationality will be dominant in each of these regions: dual nationals in Central-Western Mexico would mostly be children of returnees and deportees, while those along the northern border will mostly be beneficiaries of birth
tourism. Table 1 below summarizes the share of Mexico’s different regions in emigration, return migration and dual nationality, as well as the number of U.S.-born dual nationals and their percentage in the region’s population.

Table 1: Regions of Mexico by Population, Migration and U.S. Birth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
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<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Border States</td>
<td>$11,893</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>330,262</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central-Western States</td>
<td>$6,970</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>213,312</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Country</td>
<td>$9,963</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>194,529</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>$9,235</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>738,103</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: column 1 presents each region’s GDP per capita in 2011 (nominal, not PPP-adjusted). Column 2 notes each region’s share out of the total Mexican population. Column 3 show each region’s share out of the population of Mexican emigrants in the U.S. in 2003 and the column 4 out of the emigrants who returned between 2005 and 2010. Columns 5 and 6 pertain to the distribution and numbers of U.S.-born in 2010. Column 7 presents the number of U.S.-born as a percentage of the region’s total population.

Sources: Albo and Luiz 2011; CONAPO 2014; Chavez 2013.

Table 1 highlights the differences between the northern border and the central-western region and shows that the presence of U.S.-born dual nationals is not just a consequence of return migration. Central-Western Mexico – defined here as the states of Jalisco, Michoacán, Guanajuato, State of Mexico, Guerrero and Puebla – is relatively poor and has traditionally been the primary source of emigration to the United States. As
the table shows, these six states supplied almost half of all Mexican emigrants in the U.S. and received 40% of the Mexicans who returned between 2005 and 2010. However, they were home to only 29% of the U.S.-born in Mexico – smaller than their proportional share in migration. Because of the high intensity of return migration, and because there are few indications of birth tourism there, we can safely assume that most of these dual nationals are the family members of return migrants and deportees. Overall, less than 0.5% of the total population in those states was born in the U.S.

The six states along Mexico’s northern border – Baja California, Chihuahua, Nuevo Leon, Sonora, Tamaulipas and Coahuila – present a different picture altogether. As the table shows, Mexico’s north is significantly richer than the central-western region and its residents are much less likely to emigrate to the United States. Border states sent only 20% of Mexico’s emigrants to the U.S. and received 19% of return migrants. Nevertheless, the north was home to the largest concentration of dual nationals: 45% of Mexico’s U.S.-born population (330,000 persons) lives along the border, and dual nationals make up 1.6% of the region’s total population. Furthermore, between 2000 and 2010, the number of U.S.-born in border states grew even faster than in other parts of Mexico (Chavez 2013). Keep in mind that the total number of U.S. citizens is approximately 2 to 3 times higher than the number of U.S.-born – meaning that there might be up to one million U.S.-Mexican dual nationals in northern border states alone.

Based on this analysis of Mexican census data, we can establish three points: first, the largest and fastest-growing concentration of U.S.-born dual nationals is found along Mexico’s northern border; second, the prevalence of U.S. birth in the northern population – 1.6% – is at least three times higher than in the rest of the country; and third, return migration cannot explain the disproportionately high number of U.S.-born in the north. These findings suggest that residents in northern Mexico have alternative pathways to birth in the U.S. beside return migration, providing indirect evidence of birth tourism.

Is there a more direct way to learn about Mexican birth tourism? As I noted above, birth tourism is not a uniquely Mexican phenomenon. There have been several attempts in the past to determine the number of tourist births in the United States, but none of them came up with a robust and reliable figure. Here, I will not attempt the impossible task of estimating the total number of tourist births made in the U.S. every
year. Instead, I combine two sources of data – U.S. birth statistics and Mexican consular statistics – and use them to establish a minimum estimate of Mexican birth tourism and to demonstrate its growth in recent years.

The first source of data includes previously-unanalyzed statistics that I obtained directly from Mexico’s Secretary of Foreign Relations (Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores) on the basis of Mexico’s freedom of information law. This dataset reports registrations for Mexican nationality in each of Mexico’s 51 consulates around the United States between 2012 and 2014. The data also include the ages of each person who registered for dual nationality. For the Mexican consulate in El Paso, I managed to obtain more extensive data which pertain to the years 1994-2014 (but without ages). Citizenship registrations pertain to individuals who were born in the U.S. to Mexican parents and request to be recognized as nationals of Mexico. This procedure is usually referred to as inscripción (registration or inscription) of birth abroad and it can be done either at Mexican consulates in the U.S. or in Mexico (see below, pp. 137-8). Here, I use statistics on consular registrations to evaluate demand for Mexican dual nationality in the U.S. and detect evidence of birth tourism. Keep in mind that the figures on consular citizenship registrations that are analyzed here represent only part of the total number of dual citizenship registrations, since an unknown number of registrations are done in Mexico.

The consular statistics indicate that between 2012 and 2014, a total of 114,019 U.S.-born persons registered to have Mexican dual nationality. This rate – almost 40,000 registrations a year on average – is higher than previously thought. However, it is not a very high figure overall, given that the potentially eligible population numbers about 12 million (Mateos 2015). About 10% of the U.S.-born persons who were registered as Mexican nationals in 2012-2014 – 11,398 persons, to be exact – were under one year old. This represents parents who register their newborn babies, and might therefore include many cases of birth tourism. When we break down the data by location in the U.S., we find that border consulates were strongly overrepresented in registrations – and especially in registrations of newborn babies. By border consulates, I refer to Mexican consulates whose jurisdiction included parts of the U.S.-Mexico border, from San Diego in the west to Brownsville in the east. Table 2 below summarizes the differences between border
and non-border consulates while also providing detailed information on two key consulates in each category – El Paso and Los Angeles.

Table 2: Registration for Mexican Dual Citizenship in the U.S., 2012-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Citizenship Registrations (of Newborns)</th>
<th>% of Mexican Migrants in the US</th>
<th>% of Citizenship Registrations</th>
<th>% of Newborn Registrations</th>
<th>Change in Registrations 2012-2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Border Consulates</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Paso</td>
<td>5,837 (1,432)</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>+70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Border Consulates</td>
<td>90,806 (7,101)</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>-35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>5,557 (222)</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>-42%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: author’s calculation based on data from Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores.17

Levels of demand for dual nationality from Mexico diverge sharply between border and non-border consulates. Only about 10% of Mexicans in the U.S. live near the border, but border consulates were responsible for 20% of all registrations – and 38% of all registrations of newborn babies. Three border consulates alone – El Paso, McAllen and San Diego – are responsible for almost a quarter of all newborn citizenship registrations. Demand for dual nationality in other parts of the U.S. was significantly lower than along the border. It was particularly low in the big cities where Mexican immigrants are concentrated, such as Los Angeles, Chicago and Dallas. Furthermore, trends in demand for dual nationality went in opposite directions over the period of observation: citizenship registrations in border consulates increased by 17% between 2012 and 2014 whereas registrations in non-border consulates dropped by 35%. We can
infer that demand for dual nationality – especially for registering newborns – is much higher along the border and has been growing since 2012.

The figures on Mexican nationality in the U.S. present a mirror-image to the statistics on the U.S.-born in Mexico, which were discussed above. In both countries, demand for dual nationality increases as one nears the border. In the case of Mexican nationality in the U.S., part of the gap between border and non-border consulates can be explained by the greater usefulness of dual nationality near the border, as well as the recent increase in Mexican immigration to U.S. border towns (see below, p. 146). Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that not all border-consulate registrations were actually made by Mexican immigrants living in the U.S. Instead, it is likely that many of those registrations were made by people coming in from Mexico, and especially parents who engage in birth tourism. Such parents would cross over to El Paso, San Diego or McAllen to give birth, and obtain both a U.S. birth certificate and a registration of Mexican nationality before returning to Mexico.

We can test this assumption using data from an additional source: statistics from the Natality Public Use Files for 1994-2014 published by the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) at the United States’ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The data are based on reports from Vital Statistics registration offices that issue birth certificates. For each birth in the dataset, information is available on the mother’s residence status (as well as on many other factors). The mother might be a “resident” (same county), “intrastate resident” (same state, different county), “interstate nonresident” (different state) or “foreign resident” (place of residence outside the U.S.). The last category will be used as an indicator of birth tourism (cf. Camarota 2015; Feere 2015).

Between 1994 and 2014, there were 130,671 births to foreign-resident mothers – of which 106,723 (or 82%) were to Mexican mothers. This represents only 0.15% of all U.S. births during those 20 years. These low figures – an average of 6,222 foreign-residents births a year – should be treated as a bare minimum estimate, since it is relatively easy to provide a temporary or fake address, and there is evidence that many birth tourists do so. Consistent with the intuition that birth tourism is an elite practice, the data show that the foreign-resident mothers’ levels of education were significantly
above average: in 2013, forty-two percent of foreign-resident Mexican mothers had a Bachelor’s degree or higher, compared with only 9% of all Mexican mothers. Sixty-nine percent of foreign-resident mothers paid for the births themselves without benefitting from Medicaid or private insurance, compared with only four percent of total births that were self-paid.  

When we examine time-varying trends, the data show a clear growth in Mexican foreign-resident births between 1994 and 2014 – from 2,500-3,000 a year in the mid-1990’s to over 6,500 a year in 2013-2014 (see below – Figure 4). Further corroboration is needed, however, to make sure that this trend represents a growth in tourist births and not, for example, a change in the procedures for registering mothers’ place of residence. In order to test the validity of NCHS birth data as a measure of birth tourism, I analyze it alongside statistics on acquisition of dual nationality that are available from the Mexican consulate in El Paso, Texas for the years 1994-2014 (unfortunately, data for the entire series are unavailable for other consulates). El Paso is the leading border consulate in terms of citizenship registrations and a well-known center of birth tourism. Therefore, at least some of the fluctuations in registration should represent birth tourism. Figure 4 below shows trends in foreign-resident births in the U.S. and registrations for Mexican citizenship in El Paso.
The two graphs in Figure 4 follow a remarkably similar pattern. Non-resident births by Mexicans in the U.S. and citizenship registrations at the El Paso consulate were highly correlated (a correlation of 0.89 at p<0.00001). While each of these measures has only limited validity as a measure of birth tourism when taken by itself (many birth tourists register the birth with a fake address or take care of their dual citizenship from Mexico), the strong correlation between them lends support to the hypothesis that they are in fact measuring the same thing, i.e. birth tourism. These findings provide seemingly clear evidence that Mexican birth tourism has been increasing over the past two decades.
The figure also make is possible to hypothesize about the causes that drive trends in birth tourism. Both graphs show an increasing trend that starts in 1998, the year Mexico approved dual nationality, and lasts several years: the number of foreign-resident births across the nation increased through 2007, while El Paso registrations stopped increasing in 2003 for unknown reasons. In 2007, both measures experienced a temporary decline, which can be attributed to the economic crisis, which led people to cut unnecessary spending (birth tourism, which only produces benefits 18 or 21 years down the line, is an extremely long-term investment). Births and registrations picked up again after 2011, as part of a broader increase in citizenship registrations in all Mexican border consulates, which I showed above (Table 2). The post-2011 surge in birth tourism can be attributed to at least two factors: a return to the increasing trend that was interrupted in 2007, as well as – more importantly – a response to the drug-related violence that has plagued northern Mexico since 2010.^^22^.

The effect of insecurity can also help explain why registrations in El Paso grew much faster than non-resident births all over the U.S. (a 94% increase in El Paso registrations from 2011 to 2014, compared to only 24% for non-resident births). The graph below plots citizenship registrations in El Paso (also shown in the previous graph) together with the number of homicides in the Mexican state of Chihuahua, which houses Ciudad Juarez, the Mexican twin city of El Paso.^^23^.
Figure 5: Homicides in Chihuahua and Registrations in El Paso, 1994-2014

Source: data received from Mexico’s Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores; homicide data from INEGI online database (see also http://mexicomexico.org/Voto/Homicidios100MEstados.htm)

Figure 5 suggests that there is indeed an association between the rise of insecurity in northern Mexico and the incidence of birth tourism in El Paso. Violence in Chihuahua reached a peak in 2010, when over 6,000 people were murdered in a state of 3.4 million residents. At the time, Ciudad Juarez held the unsavory title of murder capital of the world. Tens of thousands of Mexicans from the region crossed over to El Paso to avoid the violence (McKinley 2010). The number of Mexican-born in El Paso grew from 179,000 in 2007 to 214,000 in 2014 (an increase of 35,000 persons or 20%) (ACS 2007, 2014; and see below). Presumably, some of those new arrivals already had U.S. citizenship after having been born in the U.S.

Starting in 2011, citizenship registrations in El Paso began a rapid and continuous increase, after almost a decade in which they remained stable. We can hypothesize that there are two reasons for this increase: first, El Paso became home to many middle-class
and upper-class Mexicans who expect to return to Ciudad Juárez once the violence calms down, leading them to register their children who are born in the meantime as dual citizens. Second, Mexicans who lived through the lawless years in Chihuahua internalized the message about the precariousness of Mexican citizenship and therefore were presumed to make more efforts to secure U.S. citizenship for their children. This can be compared to Israelis who were seeking EU passports: many applicants made references to their parents’ experiences during the Holocaust to explain how they learned that “having the right papers can save your life” (see Chapter 5).

The association between insecurity and interest in birth tourism leads us to reflect on the future direction that the phenomenon will take. It is possible – albeit unlikely – that birth tourism, which has become popular in the context of gang-related violence, will decline when this wave of insecurity abets. A more likely scenario, however, sees demand continuing to grow or at least holding steady. Citizenship strategies, like migration, obey a logic of cumulative causation (Massey et al. 1993) – every new applicant contributes to the strategy’s social legitimacy and makes the corresponding citizenship industry (in this case, of U.S. births by non-residents) more lucrative. These processes typically lower the social and financial costs for subsequent applicants (see Harpaz 2015) (of course, there might be a restrictive policy response by the citizenship-granting state, as we saw in the Hungarian case in the previous chapter). Thus, assuming no drastic policy move from the United States to block birth tourism, we should expect this practice to become more common in the coming years, although it will be kept exclusive by the hefty price tag. This would be consistent with the patterns found for EU citizenship in Israel, where demand for dual citizenship surged in a time of economic difficulty and insecurity, but remained high even after the situation stabilized (see Chapter 5). Keep in mind that for Mexicans – as for citizens of other middle-tier countries – the second nationality can act as insurance against a range of negative eventualities beside criminal insecurity, including severe economic crises, devaluations of the peso or political instability.

In this section, I have combined evidence from several administrative sources in the U.S. and Mexico to provide an estimate of the scope of dual nationality between the two nations and the impact of birth tourism. The data showed that the number of U.S.-
Mexican dual nationals living in Mexico has been growing rapidly; and about half of these dual nationals live along the border. U.S.-born individuals already form at least 1.6% of the population in Mexico’s northern states and the total percentage of dual nationals might be as high as 5%. While some dual nationals in the north are children from returnee and deportee families, a large percentage among them were created through the deliberate strategy of birth tourism. U.S. birth statistics lead to a minimum estimate of 106,000 Mexican non-resident births since 1994. U.S. and Mexican sources show that birth tourism has been growing steadily since Mexico permitted dual nationality in 1998, and that it received a significant boost after 2011, possibly as an effect of the insecurity (*inseguridad*) in northern Mexico.
V. Strategies and Uses of Dual Citizenship

Vignette 1: Ricardo, 37 year-old, upper-class from Monterrey, had children in the U.S.\textsuperscript{24}

Ricardo was born in Monterrey in 1979 and lives there with his wife and their three daughters who were all born in the United States. An entrepreneur from a wealthy family, he spent four years in the United States studying for a Master’s in business administration (M.B.A.) and working for an American firm. “My eldest daughter was born in Michigan because we were there at the time, and the younger ones, now 5 and 3, were born in McAllen of our own choice [...] My wife is now pregnant with our fourth child and he will be born in McAllen too”.

Each birth in McAllen cost $18,000-20,000, including regular trips across the border for checkups during the pregnancy and a month-long stay for the birth itself. Ricardo lists three motives for giving birth in McAllen: “first, to give them equal status with [the eldest]; second, to give them optionality [sic – originally in English] so that they can choose where to live, study and work [...] And third, we had a big security crisis here, and many people went to live abroad. So we wanted to give [our daughters] more flexibility, so they can move between the territories seamlessly”.

Ricardo was never interested in obtaining a U.S. green card or citizenship for himself because “it implies stringent fiscal liabilities and you’re taxed on your global income”. The family has no plans leave Monterrey in the foreseeable future. Ricardo’s daughters attend a bilingual American School but, he explains, this has nothing to do with their citizenship: “English is necessary for anybody who lives in Monterrey, [because] this city is so connected to the U.S.”

Vignette 2: Carmen, 30 year old, middle-class from a border town, born in the U.S.

Carmen was born in 1986 in Harlingen, TX, near McAllen. She grew up in a small Mexican border town where her father grows corn and cotton. She now lives in Monterrey with her husband and works in finance. Carmen is the eldest of four siblings; all of them were all born in the same Harlingen hospital and all are dual nationals. Carmen’s mother (who I also interviewed) said that they had decided to have her in Harlingen because it had the nearest modern hospital and also “so that [Carmen and her
siblings] could study in the United States without problems, [so] that they won’t need a visa, [so] that they will never stay without work”.

Carmen was planning to study in the United States. However, she was offered a scholarship at a prestigious university in Monterrey and ended up studying and working there. In 2011, as violence in the border region escalated, Carmen moved to McAllen and lived there for several months in order to sponsor U.S. residency for her parents. Carmen’s parents now spend two days a week in Mexico and five in McAllen. Her three younger siblings live in McAllen.

Carmen has an authentic U.S. birth certificate but her Mexican birth certificate is fraudulent and says she had been born in Mexico. “My identity is completely Mexican, but I have no legal way to prove that I am Mexican”, she says. She is trying to fix her status in Mexico with the help of a lawyer. She has an American passport and uses it for international travel. When she will have children, she plans to give birth in the United States “for the same reasons [that my parents had me there]: so that if things are bad here, [my children] can go live there”.

In this section, I describe the practices, perceptions and discourses of norteños who engage in birth tourism or benefit from it. I will first offer a brief discussion of the pragmatic strategies that Mexicans use to secure dual nationality. Then, I will discuss the dominant motivations for obtaining compensatory dual citizenship and the ways that it is used and understood, focusing on the domains of market, family, status and mobility.

Birth tourism as Strategy and Industry

Mexican birth tourism is a strategy of compensatory citizenship that developed in response to loopholes in the United States’ evidentiary regime (in other words, its system for citizenship allocation). Within this jus soli regime, place of birth is the master principle that provides automatic, undisputed membership in the political community. Accordingly, the key document that establishes U.S. nationality is the birth certificate. Birth tourism is aimed at securing this document, which draws on two sources of
authority: a medical professional at the hospital or birth clinic and an official at the county’s vital statistics office. After having obtained an American birth certificate, birth tourist parents must also secure their child’s Mexican nationality. This is necessary because Mexican law and institutions maintain a highly exclusionary position against non-citizens, and children without Mexican citizenship cannot access public education and health services in Mexico (Escobar 2015; Hoyo 2015a; Jacobo and Espinosa 2015).

Traditionally, the prime method for securing dual nationality was simple fraud. Before 1998, in the period when Mexico prohibited dual nationality, birth tourist parents would show up at their local civil registry (registro civil) office with their U.S.-born baby and use their connections – or a small bribe – to obtain a birth certificate that stated that he or she had been born in Mexico. With the acceptance of dual nationality and the tightening of control over personal identification in Mexico, this kind of fraud is becoming less common. However, many dual nationals – including Carmen in the vignette above – still have two separate legal personalities: a legitimate one in the U.S. and a fake one in Mexico. Ironically, it is their primary citizenship, the one they use in their everyday lives, which is fraudulent, while their secondary citizenship from the U.S. is authentic. Many individuals who were born before 1998 now turn to lawyers to legalize their status in Mexico.

There are two legal ways to obtain Mexican nationality for a baby who was born in the U.S. The first method – which is simpler but requires planning ahead – is to register the child at a Mexican consulate in the United States. This is done on the spot and carries a very low cost. Parents who follow this method return to Mexico with their child already fitted with a U.S. birth certificate, an American passport and a confirmation of Mexican nationality.

In contrast, parents who did not register their child while in the U.S. – and this includes almost all deportee and returnee families – must do so at the registro civil after their arrival in Mexico. The Mexican registro civil does not accept documents in English, meaning that the U.S. birth certificate must be apostille-approved by the U.S. state where it was issued, then translated by a certified translator. This procedure takes an average of five months and costs over $130 – a hefty sum in rural Mexico (Jacobo and Espinosa 2015). The process becomes even more challenging when applicants cannot enter the
United States – as is the situation of deportees – in which case they must go through the procedure by mail. Often, children of deportees must wait for months in a state of practical statelessness before their status in Mexico is recognized.

This gap between two types of dual nationals, who share the same legal status but dramatically diverge in their ability to realize their citizenship rights, highlights the class aspect of birth tourism (cf. Mateos 2016). Middle-class and upper-class individuals secure official recognition for dual nationality through a relatively simple and painless procedure; working-class individuals find themselves in much more complicated circumstances and often spend months or years in an uncertain citizenship status. Access to dual nationality depends not just on ties to the U.S. or on money, but also on bureaucratic know-how and strategic planning ahead – two skills that were identified in the sociological literature as characteristic of a middle-class habitus that sets them apart from working-class or rural groups (Bernstein 1975; Bourdieu 1986). Birth tourism, then, is an elite strategy practiced mainly by middle-class and upper-class families.

Having discussed the bureaucratic aspect of registration, let us consider the U.S. birth itself. Mexican non-immigrants who wish to give birth in the United States must first have the means to pay for the birth. The typical expenditure involved in giving birth in the U.S. – including the birth itself, doctor visits and check-ups during pregnancy and accommodation in the U.S. during the final months – ranges between $6,000 and $20,000. These sums represent a very big expense given that average yearly salaries in northern Mexico range from about $7,500 to $9,000. Another condition for practicing birth tourism is holding a visa, which is only available to applicants who can prove they have strong ties to Mexico in the form of real-estate or a steady job. These conditions make birth tourism a highly exclusive and elitist strategy.

For those who can afford birth tourism, this practice forms part of a broader pattern of status-oriented consumption. Residents of Monterrey (regios) regularly visit the U.S. for shopping and vacations. Some Texas locations – McAllen, San Antonio, South Padre Island – figure on the mental map of middle- and upper-class regios as designated locations for high-prestige consumption (Sandoval 2008; Sarabia 2015). Accordingly, middle- and upper-class Mexicans have a big impact on the economy of U.S. border towns. For example, high-spending Mexican shoppers are responsible for
making McAllen’s La Plaza Mall one of the most profitable malls in the United States.\textsuperscript{27} Residents of Tijuana cross over to San Diego in order to visit the city’s malls, parks and restaurants and even to buy groceries at the local Trader Joe’s. Opportunities for birth tourism are concentrated in locations already identified with high-prestige consumption, such as McAllen, San Diego and El Paso. Indeed, many elite Mexicans who practice birth tourism feel that they are acquiring more than citizenship: they also wish to receive high-quality medical service and a gratifying consumer experience, perhaps even the prestige that comes with having had an expensive birth in the U.S.

The decision by thousands of Mexican families each year to invest in acquiring U.S. citizenship for their children has led to the rise of a “citizenship industry” which is comparable to the well-known concept of migration industry (Castles 2004; cf. Cook-Martin 2013; Harpaz 2013). The professionals who are positioned to take advantage of these opportunities include OBGYN specialists in U.S. hospitals and birth clinics, as well as lawyers and insurers in Mexico. For example, the Spanish-language website of a company called Doctores Para Ti invites parents from outside the U.S. to give birth in El Paso, assuring them that their children will have a guaranteed constitutional right for citizenship (see also Durand 2015). Such online advertisements are rare: the interviews I conducted suggest that most would-be birth tourists pick a doctor based on personal acquaintance or reputation, which is consistent with the tendency of Mexicans to rely on personal networks when seeking trust-sensitive services. Birth tourists also showed a strong preference for doctors and nurses of Mexican or Hispanic origin. This had to do not only with the convenience of communicating in Spanish, but also because with the wish to receive “Mexican-style” care, which respondents described as warm, patient and attentive, in contrast to the brisk and direct attitude of American staff.

In some respects, then, birth tourism is remarkably similar to other kinds of cross-border consumption. There are, however, special complexities involved in this practice – above all, its controversial nature. There is no law that prohibits non-residents from giving birth in the United States, and the U.S. government has not carried out any systematic effort to eliminate birth tourism.\textsuperscript{28} However, would-be birth tourists must cross an international border, which is a site of heightened surveillance where the rights of foreigners seeking entry are suspended (Salter 2006). Based on respondents’ reports, it
seemed that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agents occasionally refuse entry to women in a visible state of pregnancy. Therefore, many would-be birth tourists conceal their pregnancy by wearing a coat and carrying a bag on their lap. Furthermore, Mexican parents who cross the border with a U.S.-born baby are often asked to provide proof that they paid for its birth and vaccinations out of pocket. If it is found that they drew on government assistance – for example, by having Medicaid pay for the birth – their visas might be withdrawn. For several years after the birth, then, every border crossing comes with the risk of having one’s U.S. visa withdrawn.

These aspects of risk and borderline illegality – which are mostly absent in other cases of compensatory citizenship – highlight a parallel between birth tourism and undocumented immigration (Chávez 2011). Both strategies have produced their industries: while coyotes or polleros (human smugglers) help lower-class Mexicans make the clandestine and often-dangerous crossing into the United States, medical practitioners and legal professionals assist upper-middle-class Mexicans in securing U.S. nationality for their children. Contrary to what one would expect, the fees charged by ragged coyotes who lead immigrants through scorching, snake-infested deserts are not that much lower than those charged by doctors in spotless clinics. The cost of an illegal border crossing has risen dramatically in recent years, as border enforcement got tougher. It now entails an average expenditure of about $3,000 (Massey 2013), sometimes even reaching $10,000 for a single crossing (Univision 2014). This price increase (along with other factors) helps explain the decline in Mexican undocumented crossings that was mentioned before.

If we focus on those who decide to cross illegally and compare them to birth tourists, it seems that the main difference between the people who practice each strategy is not just the ability to muster this amount of money, but rather its relation to projected future benefits. For lower-class Mexicans, the coyote fee represents a very big expenditure which they can only expect to repay on the basis of their future earnings in the U.S. Furthermore, they are usually “stuck” on one side of the border: once in the U.S., they do not cross to Mexico for fear of not being let back in; if deported to Mexico, they face imprisonment if they try to reenter the U.S. (Massey, Durand and Pren 2015). Therefore, the weak financial position of would-be immigrants (and their lack of a visa)
pushes them to give up some of their citizenship rights by leaving their country of citizenship and violating U.S. laws. By giving up on some of their rights as citizens, undocumented immigrants to the U.S. hope to gain access to superior economic opportunities (as well as unite with family members and other goals).

Middle- or upper-class birth tourists convert economic capital and citizenship rights in the opposite direction: their strong financial position in Mexico makes it possible for them to invest thousands of dollars in obtaining U.S. citizenship without expecting any immediate reward. The projected returns – which do not accrue to the investors but to their children – are extremely long-term (at least 18 years into the future) and mostly include enhanced mobility and citizenship rights. Thus, socio-economic differences not only stratify Mexicans inside Mexico but also create inequality in terms of access to the United States. Dual citizenship from U.S. can then be reconverted to gain further advantages relative to other Mexicans in the form of educational and employment opportunities, mobility, security and more.

The Uses of Compensatory Citizenship

What, then, are the main motives that drive middle-and upper-class Mexicans to give birth in the United States? How do people actually use compensatory citizenship in the U.S.-Mexican case? This section will seek to answer these questions, drawing mostly from the interviews and fieldwork that I conducted in Monterrey and the towns around it.

Before proceeding, I should note two limitations of these data. First, I discuss projected uses (motivations) and actual uses together because there were not enough data to analyze them separately. Second, my data mostly includes respondents’ self-reports. This type of data allow us to map the main discourses and motives associated with dual nationality, but not to determine their relative impact objectively (for example, are birth tourists motivated more by the hope of broader opportunities or by fear of insecurity?). There is no reliable way to determine applicants’ motives except through large-N quantitative analysis that test the correlation between various economic and political conditions and demand for dual citizenship (see Harpaz 2015). The available data do not make it possible to carry out a regression analysis of this kind. As I showed above,
however, there is evidence that suggests that insecurity contributes to increasing interest in birth tourism. This is comparable to the effect we identified in Serbia, where threats by EU countries to reimpose visa restrictions on Serbian citizens led to an increase in the applications for Hungarian citizenship (in Israel, I will show in the next chapter, demand for citizenship was responsive to terrorism). Below, I will discuss the value of citizenship in four social fields market, mobility, family and class.30

Market

U.S.-Mexican dual nationals, like all American citizens, have an unqualified right to reside and work in the United States. Given that the U.S. is the world’s most attractive destination for immigrants, that 1 in 10 Mexicans already lives there and that U.S. wages are on average about four times higher than in Mexico, it would be entirely logical to assume that birth tourist parents want to help their children immigrate. In the previous chapter I discussed the surge in emigration from Serbia that followed the mass acquisition of Hungarian/EU citizenship. While the increase in birth tourism obvious cannot have such a direct, short-term effect on emigration (it has a delay of 18 to 21 years), we would expect that having the option to emigrate to the U.S. will figure high on the list of motivations for acquiring U.S. nationality.

In fact, however, very few of the respondents from Monterrey said that they intended their U.S.-born children to live in the U.S. (birth tourists from border towns, however, were more likely to see citizenship as a pathway to immigration). Focusing on those regios who practiced or benefitted from birth tourism – most of them upper-class like Ricardo in Vignette 1 – we are faced with the question: how to explain this paradoxical finding in which people that seem perfectly positioned to immigrate to the U.S. and, moreover, invest in obtaining its citizenship, show no interest in doing so?

The fact is that immigration is not particularly attractive to middle-class or upper-middle-class regio families. Even when setting aside identity and sentimental attachments, there were at least three practical-economic reasons that came up in the interviews. First, a big part of their “wealth” in Mexico takes the form of connections, friendships and a reputation – in other words, social capital (Bourdieu 1986) that does not travel well across borders. This is consistent with the findings of a recent study, which
showed that millionaires in the U.S. were unlikely to move in response to tax increases, even when this only entailed a short move to a nearby state (e.g. from New Jersey to Pennsylvania) (Young, Varner and Lurie 2016).

Second, numerous respondents explained that from their perspective Mexico offered a superior quality of life relative to the U.S.: housing was cheaper, domestic help was more affordable and there was much more leisure time. Saul, 28-year-old dual national from Monterrey who works in a successful family business established by his grandfather, explained (text without Italic was originally said in English):

“For some people have the American Dream [...] but I have the Mexican Dream. Compared to the middle class in the U.S., I live much better. As middle-class here, I earn a lot more relative to the country. And I enjoy luxuries that [Americans] do not have [or] that are expensive there, like servants, personal drivers, [good service at] restaurants and bars”

This quotation was typical of upper-middle-class respondents, who emphasized the affordability of luxuries and high-quality service in Mexico. Other respondents, especially those of less elite background, focused more on the ability to balance life and work better. They argued that life in the U.S. was boring compared to Mexico, because “all you do there is work” (as some respondents put it) and because of overly strict laws and lack of social life.

A third reason for preferring Mexico was cited by the more entrepreneurial respondents: they argued that Mexico offered more business opportunities because of its high growth and flexible rules. Saul continued: “In Mexico, if you have contacts, it’s much easier to do business here. You can avoid paying taxes, you can do things ‘incorrectly’ [use bribery] and you can start many businesses that don’t exist here yet”. This quotation was typical of elite regios, who seemed to view Mexico as a high-risk business environment, rife with crime and corruption, but one in which they could reap high profits thanks to their strong starting position. Alfredo, 31, a real-estate developer who had his children in the U.S. said: “Mexico is now where the U.S. was fifty or a hundred years ago. Things are less expensive so there are more opportunities [...] Here I can get much higher returns on my investment than in the U.S., where there is more
competition and more information on the market”. According to this quotation, business in Mexico is more profitable not only because Mexico is less developed (and therefore enjoys higher rates of growth) but also because the market is more skewed in terms of information and less carefully regulated than in the U.S. From this perspective, which saw Mexico as a high-risk, high-opportunity environment, U.S. citizenship was understood as a valuable risk-mitigating strategy. I will discuss this point further in the next section.

While norteño elites were mostly uninterested in immigrating to the U.S. for work, many parents were eager to help their children secure a U.S. education. In fact, this was the main motive that respondents cited when asked why they decided to give birth in the United States. Having American nationality made studying in the U.S. easier in many ways – dual nationals did not have to apply for a student visa, they could work during their studies, and were even eligible for reduced in-state tuition if they studied in Texas. Some of the birth tourist fathers I interviewed had in fact gone to college in the U.S. (without having citizenship), and their express motive was to make sure that their children had an easier time. This interest in American-style and English-language education was in no way restricted to dual nationals. In northern Mexico, having American or at least American-style education was an indispensable part of being elite. Some of the most prestigious private schools in Monterrey are bilingual; teenagers from elite Monterrey families often spend a year in the U.S. or Canada as exchange students or au-pairs; and many children in border cities commute every day to schools on the U.S. side of the border. For members of the Monterrey middle class, having a U.S. or English-language education was not necessarily an avenue for emigration; instead, it was first and foremost a key enhancer of opportunities and an indicator of elite social status.

**Mobility**

We saw that economically-motivated immigration was not high on the list of motives for obtaining dual nationality in Mexico. Numerous birth tourist parents, however, said that a major consideration in deciding to give birth in the U.S. was the wish to provide their children with mobility. As Ricardo (vignette 1) said, “We wanted to give [our daughters] more flexibility, so they can move between the territories
seamlessly”. Keep in mind that many Mexicans from the northeast do not see Texas as a foreign country exactly: it is geographically very close and boasts the same landscapes, there are many Mexican-origin people and Spanish is widely spoken – and, of course, it used to be part of Mexico. Popular shopping and vacation destinations in south Texas like McAllen or San Antonio figure on the mental map of middle-class regios as closer than Mexico City or Guadalajara. Against this background, it is easy to understand why northern Mexicans experienced the international border as a somewhat arbitrary check on their movement. Many people felt that they were entitled to cross this border freely – and dual nationality guaranteed this freedom of movement.

Since around 2010, the critical importance of this kind of mobility was highlighted for residents of northern Mexico when the region was struck by a wave of drug-related violence. In every town where the violence reached, law and order quickly broke down. Drug-smuggling gangs would wage gun battles on central streets in broad daylight, sometimes even skirmishing with the police or the military; decapitated bodies would be left to hang from bridges, often with menacing handwritten notes pinned to their dead torsos; and residents often became the target of indiscriminate killing, kidnapping and robbery. This “insecurity” (inseguridad), as it is usually referred to, temporarily pushed many residents away from the area. Youth from other parts of Mexico who planned to study in Monterrey headed to Guadalajara or Mexico City instead; international visitors and tourists disappeared almost entirely. Affluent regios began looking for a way out. Many richer families temporarily moved to San Antonio, Texas; if they did not have dual nationality, they stayed there by obtaining an investor’s visa or buying real estate.

Statistics from the American Community Survey (ACS) provide clear evidence of these movements. While the number of Mexican immigrants in the United States as a whole has remained stable since 2007, different regions saw very different trends. Figure 6 below shows how the number of Mexicans changed in the U.S. as a whole and in six selected counties.
Figure 6: Changes in the number of Mexican-born in 2010 and 2014 relative to 2007

While the overall number of Mexican immigrants in the United States as a whole remained constant between 2007 and 2014 (at 11.7 million), trends starkly diverged in different parts of the country. Traditional immigrant destinations like Los Angeles and Dallas saw the number of Mexicans declining by between 6% and 9% relative to their number in 2007. In contrast, the counties near the U.S.-Mexico border saw the number of Mexicans increasing dramatically. In general, the timing of the increase in each county follows the onset and decline of mass violence in the Mexican state across the border (Baja California for San Diego, Chihuahua for El Paso, Tamaulipas and Nuevo Leon for San Antonio and McAllen).

Insecurity reached Baja California first but passed quickly: violence shot up in 2008 and declined by 2011. This is reflected in fluctuations in the number of Mexicans in San Diego – a surge of 12% (40,000 people) between 2007 and 2010, followed by an
equally rapid decline back to 2007 levels. During the peak of violence, tens of thousands of Tijuana residents apparently crossed into San Diego; by 2014, many of them have returned to Mexico.

Violence in Chihuahua, Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas rose dramatically in 2010. In the city of Monterrey, order was restored within 2-3 years, and many regios who left for San Antonio and elsewhere have returned (although some decided to settle down permanently in the U.S.). The rest of the northeastern Mexico, and especially border towns like Ciudad Juarez, Nuevo Laredo and Reynosa, remains dangerous and unstable. Accordingly, we see dramatic increases in the number of Mexicans in San Antonio, El Paso and McAllen (80,000 in those three counties alone). Since south Texas counties receive little immigration from other parts of Mexico, we can assume that this increase is the result of immigration from nearby areas in northern Mexico (Reyes and Estrada 2013). Once calm is restored in northern Mexico, some of these immigrants will presumably return to Mexico, like residents of Tijuana and Monterrey did.

In this context of semi-coerced, temporary movement across the U.S. border, dual nationals found themselves in a much better position relative to their mono-national neighbors. Not only could they cross the border at will and set themselves up in the U.S. (for residents of the border, “immigrating” to the United States might entail moving no more than an hour’s drive away), but they could also sponsor residency for their parents, siblings and partners. This practice was particularly common in the border towns of the state of Tamaulipas, which were hit hard by drug-related insecurity. Carmen’s mother (from Vignette 2), from a little town near the U.S. border, said that “when the shootings and kidnappings started here, many people left for the U.S. [...] Those who had children [in the U.S.] benefited from the possibility to become residents. The others had to emigrate illegally”.

Compensatory dual citizenship is often a form of “insurance policy” against some undefined future catastrophe. In northern Mexico, the catastrophe against which U.S. dual nationality was meant to insure has actually taken place, and compensatory citizenship has proven its value. The statistics that were presented above indicate that this lesson was not lost on middle-class young parents from Monterrey. As the insurance
value of U.S. nationality became more concrete, interest in obtaining it through birth tourism has increased.

Up to this point, I have discussed mobility in the sense of having the right to work and settle in the United States. I will now discuss another aspect of mobility, which is the right to use a United States passport and present oneself as American when crossing borders. All of the dual national respondents held an American passport and most of them have used it to visit the U.S. Dual nationals reported that they crossed with much greater ease than Mexican mono-citizens. However, this was rarely discussed as a major advantage of U.S. citizenship, only mentioned in passing as a kind of side benefit. This stood in stark contrast to Israelis and Serbs with European Union citizenship, who were very enthusiastic about owning a “European passport” and were eager to use it at airports and border crossings. Why do we find relatively little enthusiasm about the U.S. passport in Mexico?

The power of the passport as a marker of nationality usually becomes most visible at border crossings, which are traditionally constructed as a site where differences between co-nationals and foreigners are performed, even exaggerated. In most border crossings around the world, foreigners must use a separate line which is slower-moving and more unpredictable than the line for nationals. This explains the excitement of Israeli dual citizens when they are allowed to use the line for EU-nationals (Harpaz 2013). The same national-foreigner distinction is experienced by travelers landing in U.S. airports.

However, when entering the U.S. by land – and this is the most common mode of entry for northern Mexicans – nationality plays a more minor role. In border crossings such as San Diego or McAllen, Americans and foreigners stand (or, more commonly, sit in their cars) in the same line. To be sure, Americans are far less likely to be stopped for further questioning. At the United States’ land borders, however, access to the privileged, faster-moving lane is not reserved to U.S. citizens but to persons of whatever nationality who signed up for programs like Global Entry and SENTRI. These programs offer a fast and easy crossing, in exchange for providing a great deal of personal information and paying a hefty fee. Through these programs, well-to-do Mexican mono-nationals can cross the border faster and with greater ease than less affluent U.S. citizens, reflecting a prioritization of class over nationality. Having an American passport, then, does not make
a big difference in terms of entering the United States. This explains why the passport did not figure high on the list of motives for birth tourism.

Another potential use of the United States passport was for travel outside North America. Dual national respondents who visited Europe or Asia were more likely to report that they used their American passport, although many also used their Mexican passport on some occasions (note that Mexicans, like Americans, enjoy visa-free access to most European and Latin American countries).

Overall, respondents had a conflicted relation to using the American passport when traveling to third countries (in contrast, nobody felt uncomfortable about entering the United States with their American passport). Some respondents expressed shame about having used their American passport to visit Europe, calling it “pure malinchismo” (admiration of foreign things). In contrast, they often told stories about their travels whose moral was that people around the world liked Mexicans more than Americans. For example, Bernardo, a 27-year-old dual national from Nuevo Laredo, said, “when traveling abroad, I use a U.S. passport but I always present myself as Mexican”. He went on to tell about a visit to Honduras, when “the customs guy was very hostile at first when he thought I was a gringo, but then I spoke to him in Spanish and he started liking me”. This was typical: other respondents told that they preferred to use their Mexican passports when entering countries like Brazil, France and Spain, and explained that Americans were disliked in those countries. In contrast, respondents said, “nobody has any problem with Mexicans” (one of them added: “except in the U.S.”). On the other hand, respondents said that if they needed consular protection abroad, they would turn to the American rather than the Mexican embassy, because they saw the U.S. as much more committed to protecting its citizens than Mexico.

Dual nationals who obtained their U.S. nationality as a result of birth tourism typically showed little interest in the political aspects of U.S. nationality. Studies of “classic” expatriates who grew up in the U.S. and moved abroad for love, to work or to retire have shown that they maintain a strong national identity that is associated with political engagement and voting (Croucher 2009; Klekowski von Koppenfels 2014). In contrast, strategic dual nationals who benefitted from birth tourism did not identify as American or as Mexican-American (in fact, norteño elites usually held quite negative
views on Mexican-Americans – see below); instead, they saw themselves as Mexicans who also had a U.S. nationality. This was very similar to the self-understanding of Israelis who obtained ancestry-based dual citizenship from Germany or Poland but saw themselves as “Israelis with a European passport” (see Chapter 5).

Strategic dual citizens in Mexico were not particularly interested in American politics and viewed it from an outsider’s perspective as Mexicans. None of the respondents I interviewed had voted in U.S. elections from abroad. Some of them voted when they happened to be in the U.S. in a presidential election year. This lack of interest in U.S. identity and politics marks a huge difference between these dual nationals and the mostly mono-national American expatriates who were mentioned above. Strategic dual citizens did not typically register at the U.S. consulate in Monterrey.

Family

Viewed historically, the institution of citizenship has had an individualizing effect vis-à-vis the family. The extension of citizenship was tied up with the modern state’s attempt to replace the family as the main source of identity and rights, and to face citizens as atomized individuals. It is therefore no surprise that much of the literature on citizenship analyzed it as a relation between the state and aggregates of individuals. In recent years, however, new bottom-up empirical approaches began to examine strategies for acquiring citizenship and the ways that it is used on the ground. Authors who adopted this perspective quickly found out that in most cases, the social actor that obtains citizenship and uses it is the family rather than the individual. We thus see transnational families that diversify citizenships as one would do with an investment portfolio (Ong 1999); parents who consider dual citizenship as the perfect gift for their children (Harpaz 2013; Balta and Altan-Olcay 2016); and couples who meticulously plan the location and timing of marriage and childbirth so as to benefit from citizenship laws (Curiel 2004; Mateos 2013). In the study of citizenship, this potentially represents a similar move to the “new economics of migration” that shifted the emphasis from individual immigrants to families where one or more members has migrated (Massey et al. 1993).

This family logic is clearly visible in the Mexican case of compensatory dual citizenship. Parents who engage in birth tourism are making a major investment in time
and money to obtain a good that in high likelihood will never benefit them personally. Indeed, all birth tourist respondents explained their decision in terms of the future utility to the child – above all, the general formulation “she will have more opportunities”. None of them said that they planned to profit from their children’s citizenship themselves (to use their children as “anchors”, as anti-immigration critics would say). We can thus view birth tourism as a form of intergenerational transfer of wealth, like investing in children’s education. By offering a “free gift” to their children, birth tourist parents are strengthening the cohesion of the family unit: the act of giving citizenship performs parents’ commitment to their children, instills a reciprocal obligation on the part of the children and creates a new family asset. As we saw above, when northern Mexico was hit with insecurity, dual nationality often provided security and mobility for entire families.

U.S. citizenship, however, is an asset that does not come free from liabilities. Chief among them is being subjected to universal taxation: American citizens who live abroad are required to report their income and their assets, and higher-income individuals might have to pay additional taxes. In the wake of the economic crisis, the United States’ Department of Treasury tightened its taxation regime, requiring foreign banks to report on the accounts of American citizens. As a result, record numbers of expatriates have renounced their U.S. citizenship, and many more began to seriously consider doing so (University of Kent 2015). Surprisingly, dual nationals in Mexico – especially those from working-class and middle-class background – were mostly unaware or indifferent to their potential tax obligations as Americans living abroad. When asked about the potential tax implications of U.S. citizenship, most respondents reacted with surprise. Most adult dual nationals I interviewed have never filed a U.S. tax report.

Some respondents, however, formed an exception to this rule: those from the most affluent and business-savvy families in the sample. These individuals were keenly aware of all the liabilities that came with dual nationality, and frequently consulted their auditors about the implications of holding on to U.S. citizenship. Several wealthy individuals even decided to renounce their U.S. citizenship in order to protect their assets. Some elite Monterrey families apparently employed a strategy of differentiated citizenship by gender: girls would be born in the U.S. and boys in Mexico, and all taxable assets would be registered under the name of the men. This careful division of ownership
allowed the family to enjoy the security provided by U.S. citizenship, without exposing their property to the U.S. tax collector (it also had the added effect of reinforcing male domination in the family).

There is an additional and quite unexpected family-related aspect of dual nationality that came up in the interviews, and also appears in the quotation from Ricardo (vignette 1): several respondents practiced birth tourism in order to ensure that all their children had the same citizenship status. These were usually parents whose first child was born while they were studying or working in the U.S., and then decided to have all their other children in the U.S. as well. It seemed that having one birth in the United States increased the likelihood of having subsequent births in the U.S. Apparently, parents who have given birth in the U.S. do not usually regret the decision and want to repeat it with their other children (this might have to do with the present insecurity in northern Mexico). Another possibility has to do with strategies of social distinction: equal treatment of older and younger siblings and of boys and girls might serve as a performance of parents’ enlightened, egalitarian values and their elite identity. This sets them apart from lower-class families, where between-sibling favoritism (based on gender, birth order, certainty of paternity or just looks) is common. It also marks them as different from migrant families, where mixed citizenship statuses are the norm. Thus, birth tourism can also be used as a medium for performing elite values and transmitting them across generations.

Status

Mexico is an extremely unequal country in terms of wealth as well as social status. Moreover, status inequality in Mexico is closely tied up with a cultural characteristic commonly called malinchismo – the blind admiration of anything foreign. Numerous analysts of Mexican society – above all, the famous writer Octavio Paz (1961) – identified malinchismo as a key feature of the Mexican national psyche. Respondents frequently made references to this trait during interviews. Above, I discussed the way malinchismo is expressed in the high value that regios attached to shopping and consuming in the U.S., to American education and to the English language. Given those characteristics, one would expect U.S. citizenship to become a prominent status symbol
among middle-class Mexicans. However, the interviews I conducted gave no indications that this was the case. In everyday life, dual nationals rarely discussed being American citizens; and during the interviews, they spoke about their second citizenship with little excitement and usually downplayed its personal importance to them. Obviously, it was not a source of pride. How can we explain this unexpected finding?

The indifference to American citizenship cannot be explained by the historical rivalry between the two nations. As we saw, this rivalry does little to lower the attractiveness of U.S. culture to many Mexicans, especially in the north. For example, many regios follow American baseball, and young people celebrate Halloween with greater excitement than the traditional Mexican Day of the Dead. Moreover, given that German passports have become a status symbol among grandchildren of Holocaust survivors in Israel (Harpaz 2013), it seems that history does not usually stand in the way of individuals’ quest for status through high-value citizenship.

To understand why U.S. citizenship is not perceived a sign of higher status in Mexico, we should refer to a quotation that came up in several interviews: “anybody can get it”. The notion that U.S. citizenship is not exclusive enough sounds strange, given the high economic costs entailed by birth tourism. What this statement means, though, is that U.S. dual nationality is not exclusive enough in the context of another, non-economic system of social stratification: the hierarchical ordering of society by the degree of European ancestry and phenotype. Like most other Latin American nations, Mexico can been described as a “pigmentocracy” (Telles 2014) – a society in which status is deeply and powerfully connected with whiteness. European colonialism, which officially ended two centuries ago, retains its grip on Latin American societies in the form of deeply-internalized racial hierarchies that posit “white” as prestigious and beautiful and “indigenous” or “black” as inferior.

In the wake of the Mexican Revolution, elites attempted to create an alternative national ethos that depicted Mexico as a mestizo (mixed-race) nation and Mexicans as members of a unique “cosmic race” (Telles 2014; Hoyo 2015b). On the ground, however, a Eurocentric racial hierarchy continues to have a huge impact, expressed, for example, in the daily discrimination suffered by dark-skinned and indigenous-looking individuals (Telles 2014) and in the consistent tendency of Mexican media to cast white actors or
models for any role that conveys prestige and high status (De la Miyar 2013). The preoccupation with whiteness is particularly strong in northern Mexico, where many families claim descent from Spanish or other European settlers. Given this social context in which European ancestry equals high status, we should not be surprised to find that dual citizenship from any European country is a formidable status symbol: a Spanish, French or German passport is an undisputed, concrete demonstration that one has recent European ancestry. Preliminary findings from a recent study on Euro-Mexican dual nationals (Mateos 2016) suggest that Euro-Mexican dual nationals were almost all upper-class and perceived their European citizenship as a mark of high status.

U.S. citizenship, in contrast to European citizenship, states nothing about the origin of its bearer. Indeed, “anybody” can get it. Such citizenship could even have a negative impact on its owner’s status because it is associated with Mexican immigrants to the United States (migrantes) and their children. Monterrey elites subscribed to a stereotypical view of the migrante as an impoverished rural person whom they treated with a degree of condescending pity. Regios, moreover, did not usually view the U.S.-born children of Mexican immigrants as American. Instead, they saw them as lower-class Mexicans who were “pretending” to be American, and referred to them by the pejorative term chicano. Some respondents accused chicanos – especially those employed in border protection and police – of treating Mexicans in a hostile and discriminatory manner, which was explained by the resentment that they inherited from their lower-class Mexican parents. This is why U.S. citizenship never became a status symbol for middle-class Mexicans: from their perspective, to put it crudely, a Mexican with a European passport is a member of the elite; a Mexican with a U.S. passport is a chicano.

This suggests that birth tourism is an ambivalent practice in terms of status and prestige. On the one hand, it is a form of prestigious consumption which proves that one has substantial economic means. Recounting the experience of having given birth in McAllen can be compared to talking about one’s last vacation in South Padre Island or shopping trip to San Antonio. On the other hand, engaging in opportunistic strategies to obtain U.S. citizenship comes disturbingly close to the practices of lower-class migrantes. Moreover, birth tourism in itself might be a demonstration that one has more money than
class: for example, in 2011 it was reported that the wife of drug lord Joaquin Guzman ("El Chapo") came to Los Angeles to deliver her twin daughters (Wilkinson and Ellingwood 2011).

These considerations help explain why elite respondents took pains to distance themselves from undocumented immigrants and the practices associated with them. One such distancing strategy included passionate statements about their commitment and love toward Mexico, and avowals of their lack of interest in the United States (comparable patriotic rhetoric was recorded among Israelis and Turks who sought dual citizenship (Harpaz 2013; Balta and Altan-Olcay 2016)). Another self-distancing strategy came up when discussing the future uses of citizenship: birth tourist parents emphasized that they only wanted to help their children study in the U.S., while usually dismissing the possibility that they would work or settle there. Respondents also made it clear that they had paid for the births themselves and that they regularly spent money on shopping and vacations in the U.S. This rhetoric stemmed from the fact that consuming in the U.S. (through shopping, tourism or education) elevated one’s status whereas receiving money or benefits lowered it. Elite Monterrey birth tourists took care to frame their bid for U.S. citizenship as an act of consumption that will facilitate further acts of consumption, and not simply a move to gain benefits from the U.S. government. This distinction was less crucial for people from small towns near the border, as seen in the quotation from Carmen’s mother (vignette 2): one of the aims of birth tourism, she openly says, is that her children “will never stay without work”.

VI. Conclusion

In this chapter, I explored a growing and understudied pattern of interaction between Mexico and the U.S.: birth tourism practiced by members of the middle and upper class in northern Mexico. Paradoxically, those individuals and families who have the resources and the motivation to practice birth tourism often have the least motivation to emigrate to the U.S. Upper-class elites, in particular, are strategically positioned in heavily-skewed social and economic system that enables them to accumulate much greater benefits than would be available in the U.S. They perceive the U.S. nationality as
an insurance policy and an opportunity enhancer (especially as pertains to educational opportunities) which is detached from traditional contents of citizenship such as residing in a country or feeling identification with it. This case has implications in three empirical and theoretical contexts.

Within the context of Mexico-U.S. ties, the growth of birth tourism represents an important component in the rise of new patterns of transnational interaction between the two countries. It is clear that we are moving away from the situation that prevailed since the 1990’s in which millions of Mexican immigrants settled in the U.S. The post-mass-immigration age, which arguably began with the crisis in 2007, will be marked by a greater overlap in the countries’ citizenries and by more short-term and short-distance mobility. These changes will be driven by U.S. dual nationals in Mexico – both the elite beneficiaries of birth tourism and the U.S.-born children of returnees, who are usually of more humble background. This study should also highlight the importance of going beyond the traditional focus on undocumented Mexican immigrants and examining the transnational dynamics of consumption and mobility of norteño elites (cf. Reyes and Estrada 2013; Sarabia 2015).

Second, this study of strategic U.S. dual citizens aims to point out a phenomenon of growing importance: U.S. citizenship held by people who live outside the U.S. The number of American citizens living abroad has more than doubled over 15 years: from 3.8 million in 1999 to about 8 million in 2015 (Shachter 2006; AARO 2016). Studies of Americans abroad have focused on “classic” expatriates (Croucher 2009; Klekowski von Koppelfels 2014) who grew up in the U.S. before emigrating and have a strong national identity as Americans. However, there is strong grounds to assume that many non-resident American citizens are dual citizens who have much stronger ties to their countries of residence. This involves not only beneficiaries of strategic birth tourism but also U.S.-born children whose families were deported and people who were born in the U.S. while their parents were there temporarily. While some preliminary studies have begun to examine these accidental or strategic Americans (e.g. Grant 2015; Balta and Altan-Olcay 2016; Mateos 2016), there is still much to be learned about the novel ways in which these individuals create meanings and find uses for their U.S. citizenship.
Finally, the case of U.S. dual nationality in Mexico illuminates the global phenomenon of compensatory which stands at the focus of this dissertation. The United States’ permissive policy about birth tourism combined with the Mexican acceptance of dual nationality created an opportunity for norteño elites to convert their economic advantage (and their geographic location) into additional rights from another country. How does this phenomenon compare with the case of Hungarian co-ethnic citizenship in Serbia? From a policymaker’s perspective, we find an interesting instance of equifinality, meaning that very different starting positions lead to similar outcomes.

Whereas Hungary actively encouraged non-resident dual citizenship for ethnic Hungarians and is willing to accept some strategic applicants as “collateral damage,” the United States does nothing to encourage this kind of citizenship and its laws bear no trace of the shift to “post-territorial nationalism” (Ragazzi and Balalovka 2011) that has been identified in Central and Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, members of the middle and upper classes in some middle-tier countries – including Mexico, Turkey and Taiwan, as well as China – have identified loopholes in the American citizenship regime which allow them to secure non-resident dual citizenship for their children. A network of citizenship entrepreneurs has emerged which profits from providing services that help them in this quest. Far from producing so-called “anchor babies” (a pejorative for children of undocumented immigrants), birth tourist parents return to their countries soon after the birth. They do not necessarily wish to immigrate to the United States or encourage their children to do so. Instead, they perceive value in being U.S. citizens – from abroad. This motivation to become citizens in a country without intending to live there represents a new understanding of the meaning of citizenship and the relations between an individual and a state.

At the same time, different citizenship criteria not only define what resource may be converted into a second citizenship (ethnicity and education in Serbia, economic capital and location in Mexico, ancestry in Israel) but also entail different effects on the identity of individuals who strategize their way into dual citizenship. In the previous chapter, we saw the complex consequences of the language criterion used by Hungary. On the one hand, it was not successful in entirely eliminating acquisitions by people who did not identify as ethnic Hungarians. On the other hand, most of the non-Hungarians
who became strategic dual citizens have developed some connection to Hungary and its culture following the time and effort that they had spent learning the language. This shows that the language criterion is successful in producing some identity effect, even when it is instrumentally strategized. In contrast, the birthplace criterion, when strategized through birth tourism, has no effect on identity. Technical fulfillment of the birth criterion for citizenship allows individuals to become citizens in a country to which they have no ties besides having spent the first week after their birth there. Combined with the high economic cost of birth tourism, this suggests that from the point of view of citizenship seekers, birth tourism is quite close to “investor citizenship” programs that award citizenship or residency in exchange for cash (practiced, for example, by Malta or Portugal). Whereas dual citizenship obtained on the basis of ancestry or ethnicity is always tied up with some assumptions on identity, birth tourism is an almost-naked exchange of cash for citizenship.
Notes

1 Mexican law makes a clear distinction between nationality, or state membership, and citizenship, which entails full political rights. Mexico does not permit dual citizenship, only dual nationality, and severely curtails the political rights dual nationals (FitzGerald 2005; Hoyo 2015).

2 This stands in contrast to Western Europe, where struggles over citizenship continue in the second (sometimes even third) generation of immigrants. These contestations stem from the dominance of jus sanguinis citizenship laws and the absence of automatic jus soli in most European countries and the origin countries (e.g. Turkey or Morocco). Under these conditions, the citizenship of the second generation becomes the object of dispute between the origin country, the destination country and the individuals themselves (Bauböck 2010). This creates a “triadic nexus” in Western Europe which is not dissimilar to that identified by Brubaker (1996) in Eastern Europe.

3 This represents a break with the pattern of settlement-oriented immigration which dominated since the 1980’s (Alarcon 2011) and intensified in the 1990’s (Massey, Durand and Pren 2014).

4 Note that birth tourism is distinct from the well-known and pejorative term “anchor babies”, which is applied to births by undocumented immigrants. This term is seen by some as dehumanizing because it implies that undocumented immigrants use children as “anchors” to protect themselves against being deported; in fact, having a U.S.-born child does not protect one against deportation.

5 Some European countries – for example, Germany or France – apply qualified forms of jus soli. Children of foreigners who were born in those countries and grew up there may obtain citizenship relatively easily. Birth tourism, however, may only be practiced in countries with automatic jus soli, where any child born in the country receives citizenship automatically and unconditionally. Most Latin American countries – including Mexico and Brazil – also have similar clauses but attract much less birth tourism because their citizenship is not as attractive.

6 For various reasons, however, the naturalization rate of immigrants in the U.S. is somewhat lower than in Canada and several Western European countries (Bloemraad 2006; Spiro 2015).

7 “Natural-born citizen” includes two kinds of American citizens by birth: those born in U.S. territory (“native-born”) and those who inherited U.S. citizenship from their parents. Both categories are eligible to become President (this became an issue when Panama-born John McCain was presidential candidate in 2008, and again in 2016 around the candidacy of Ted Cruz).

8 This estimate is based on an extrapolation of State Department estimates on the number of U.S. citizens in different countries, which were combined with statistics on the number of births to U.S. citizens. These latter data were kindly provided to me by Amanda Klekowski von Koppenfels, and they consist of statistics on the number of births to American citizens abroad that the State Department made available to Andy Sundberg in 2011. In 1999, there were 1.04 million Americans in Mexico in 1999 out of a total of 4.1 million Americans abroad (Shachter 2006). In 2000, these 1.04 million Americans in Mexico had registered 2,750 births. By 2010, the number of births increased 69% to 4,655. If we assume that the ratio of births to citizens remained constant, we can estimate that the number of U.S. citizens in Mexico reached 1.75 million in 2009. By 2016, this number is expected to have reached at least 2 million. See also Klekowski von Koppenfels and Costanzo 2013.

9 This is justified for three reasons. First, the figures come from different sources. While the number of U.S. mono-nationals comes from the administrative records of the Instituto Nacional de Migracion, the number of U.S.-born comes from the census. It is very likely that the census surveyors ignored many foreigners because they could not speak Spanish or because they were not in Mexico when the census was conducted. Second, even if we assume that all 60,000 U.S. mono-citizens in Mexico were included in the census, this represents only about 8% of the U.S.-born in Mexico. And third, this percentage is even lower in the northern border states which are our region of interest. There were only 16,000 U.S. mono-citizens in Mexico’s northern border states (author’s calculation based on Chavez and Cobo 2012). This represents less than 5% of the 330,000 U.S.-born individuals in those states.

10 Immigrants from other countries, which are not shown in the figure, numbered only 220,000 in 2010 and experienced a far more modest growth of 130% relative to 1970.

11 There is also a relatively high percentage of foreigners over 65, who are American, Canadian or European retirees (Chavez and Cobo 2012:29; see Croucher 2009).
A census of primary and secondary school students carried out by INEGI supports these findings, as it shows that Baja California and Chihuahua received only about 4% of return migrants from the U.S. but hosted 20% of the foreign-born school students (Jacobo and Espinosa 2015). One could counterargue that border states have a high number of U.S.-born because deportees settle in those states after being forced across the border from the U.S. However, a survey among deportees in Tijuana shows the almost all of them return to their original community in Mexico or their home in the U.S., and only 12% wish to stay in the border region (Velasco y Coubès 2013).

For example, staff at the American consulate in Tijuana informally estimated that there were 250,000 U.S. citizens in Baja California (personal communication in December 2014) – double the number of U.S.-born reported in INEGI data for that state. In 1999, the State Department estimated the number of American in Mexico at 1 million (Shachter 2006), while INEGI recorded only 344,000 U.S.-born.

Several authors reproduced the figure of non-resident births reported by the National Centers for Health Statistics (NCHS) which I also use below (Gonzalez 2011; Camarota 2015; Feere 2015). Those studies, however, did not track the trend over multiple years and did not juxtapose it with official data on citizenship acquisition. Another attempt at estimating the scope of birth tourism used data on out-of-state births in Arizona (Gonzalez 2011), which are flawed because they also include mothers visiting from other U.S. states. The highest estimate in circulation (Camarota 2015) was produced by comparing NCHS and American Community Survey (ACS) records and identifying a “gap” of up to 30,000 births a year. This estimate is much higher than the figure of 7,000-9,000 a year that NCHS data leads to. While the figure of 30,000 in itself does not appear unreasonably high (there is no doubt that NCHS data represent an undercount because it is relatively easy to provide a fake U.S. address when registering a birth), the methodology is flawed because ACS data is based on a sample and therefore has a substantial margin of error. Using unofficial estimates from foreign countries (as in Feere 2015) is also not a reliable method. My analysis does not attempt to determine the full number of tourist births, which I suspect is an impossible task because of the reporting issue mentioned above; instead, I focus on showing how the phenomenon grows over time and how it is correlated with acquisition of Mexican dual nationality.

Agustin Escobar (2015) reported a total of 87,140 declarations of Mexican nationality between 2000 and 2013, whereas David FitzGerald (2005) cites a figure of 67,000 applications to regain Mexican nationality between 1998 and 2003. It is difficult to determine at this point whether these gaps represent rising demand or differences in measurement and reporting.

It is interesting to note that the annual number of registrations for Mexican dual citizenship in the U.S. is roughly a third of the number of Mexican immigrants who naturalized in the U.S. over the same period (MPI 2013).


Consular jurisdictions did not always correspond to U.S. towns or counties of the same name (see map at http://www.ime.gob.mx/matriculas2014/consulados2014.html). For this reason, it was impossible to precisely calculate the Mexican population in each consulate’s jurisdiction. Furthermore, the eligible population for citizenship registrations is not Mexican immigrants but rather their U.S.-born children. Therefore, the percentage of Mexican population (calculated on the basis of Migration Policy Institute Data Hub (www.migrationpolicy.org)) should be seen only as a heuristic for the size of the eligible population.

I identified Mexicans based on statistics on ethnic origin for 1994-1999 and 2003-2014; for 2000-2002, I used statistics on place of birth. It is justified to use these statistics interchangeably in this case because we are dealing with foreign residents, meaning that Mexican-Americans are excluded.

Foreign-resident birth statistics included almost no Asians, suggesting that many Asian birth tourists provided fake addresses (Camarota 2015; Yan 2015). Furthermore, many Mexican non-immigrants can provide addresses of U.S. residences owned or rented by themselves or their relatives.

Figures are for 2013. Statistics for other years were very similar.

This is not to rule out the effect of other factors, such as changes in demand for citizenship among Mexican-Americans or fresh Mexican immigration.

Drug-related violence has erupted in 2007 and has been moving across Mexico’s north since. Once it reached the north, homicide statistics allow us to trace its movement from west to east: homicides peaked in Baja California in 2009, in Chihuahua and Sinaloa in 2010, in Nuevo Leon in 2011 and in Tamaulipas in 2012. I used 2011 on the graph because on that year Mexico’s national homicide rate peaked (at a rate five times higher than the U.S. rate).
I use absolute homicide figures rather than the homicide rate in order to illustrate the number of people killed as part of the crime wave. A graph representing the rate would look very similar, since Chihuahua’s population did not grow dramatically over that period (from 2.7 million in 1994 to 3.6 million in 2014).

Respondents’ names were changed to protect their privacy.


For Mexicans from border towns the costs are lower and it is a little easier to obtain a visa.

Source: [http://www.simon.com/Mall/LeasingSheet/2546_LaPlaza.pdf](http://www.simon.com/Mall/LeasingSheet/2546_LaPlaza.pdf)

There were some attempts at suppressing Chinese birth tourism in California but they did not seem to seriously impact this practice (Yan 2015). I did not find evidence for any systematic policy against Mexican birth tourism.

This does not matter to undocumented immigrants since they are “stuck” in the United States anyway (Massey, Durand and Pren 2015).

In an earlier study of dual EU citizenship in Israel, I similarly analyzed the uses of EU citizenship along the axes of market, family and class (but not mobility) (Harpaz 2013).

Homicide data is taken from INEGI online database (see also [http://mexicomexico.org/Voto/Homicidios100MEstados.htm](http://mexicomexico.org/Voto/Homicidios100MEstados.htm)).

U.S. citizens over the age of 21 may sponsor their immediate family members to come to the U.S. After obtaining residency in the U.S., the parents would either stay there or return to their original towns in Mexico, secure in the knowledge that they can always come back.

In contrast, dual nationals who grew up in the U.S. and “returned” to Mexico as adults remained strongly identified with the U.S., followed U.S. news and were politically engaged.

Malinche (or Malintzin) was an Aztec princess who married the conquistador Hernan Cortes and was crucial in the Spanish takeover thanks to her translation and advice. She is at the same time a traitor to Mexico and the mother of the nation: the mixed-race child of Malinche and Cortes is often referred to as “the first Mexican.”

Note that the tone of these references among middle-class regio interviewees was humoristic, even conciliatory: they seemed to view malinchismo as a mildly-embarrassing feature common to all Mexicans, not as some abominable sin.

In the PERLA survey, 22% of people in northern Mexico self-identified as white, compared with only 13% in Mexico overall. Sources: Telles 2014; Rene Flores, personal communication. Interestingly, Mexicans become whiter when they cross the border: 65% of Mexican immigrants in the U.S. self-identified as white. Among Mexicans in Texas, the percentage of self-identified whites reached 80% (ACS 2014).

Another term, pocho (literally: rotten), describes Mexican emigrants who superficially adopt American symbols and mannerisms and flaunt them when visiting Mexico (for example, by speaking English or displaying a U.S. flag). The sociologist David FitzGerald (2009) offers a vivid description of the envy and resentment that residents of emigrant-sending communities in Jalisco feel toward these pochos. My respondents, however, were less interested in this phenomenon because emigration was far less common in their social environment.
Chapter 5: European Union Dual Citizenship in Israel

I. Introduction

The expansion of the European Union, we have seen above, has created massive demand for dual citizenship in the Eastern European countries that border the new members of the Union. The pull of the EU, however, does not stop at its physical borders. In middle-tier countries that have historically received immigration from Europe – above all, in Latin America and Israel – the children and grandchildren of European immigrants are acquiring dual citizenship on the basis of their ancestry. As part of this phenomenon, hundreds of thousands of Argentineans and Brazilians obtained Italian citizenship, many Cubans and Venezuelans obtained Spanish citizenship and many Israelis obtained citizenship from Germany, Poland and other European countries (Chapter 2).

There have been a number of studies that examined European Union citizenship in Latin America (Tintori 2011; Cook-Martin 2013; Izquierdo and Chao 2015; Mateos 2016). In contrast, less attention has been accorded to the Israeli case (see Harpaz 2009, 2013). In this chapter, I will examine the case of EU-Israeli dual citizenship while focusing on the reacquisition of ancestry-based dual citizenship by Israelis whose parents and grandparents immigrated from Central and Eastern European countries between 1920 and 1970. This case has unique features that can help shed light on the global phenomenon of compensatory citizenship. It is a valuable case within the present comparative study because of the key dimensions in which it varies from the two other cases and the sociological puzzle that it presents.

Mexico and Serbia are both high-emigration, upper-middle income countries and both are strongly tied to a major Western bloc that they border physically. Compensatory dual citizenship makes automatic sense in that context, because as it provides full access
to territories and polities on which applicants are dependent whether they want it or not. Furthermore, seekers of citizenship typically have some historical, functional or emotional tie to the granting country. Israel, in contrast, is a high-income country (GDP per capita is at EU average) that does not border any Western bloc. It exports relatively few emigrants, of whom less than 20% head to EU countries (Cohen 2011). Moreover, European-origin Israelis typically feel no nostalgia to the European countries where their families were persecuted and murdered. Numerous commentators in Israel published op-eds that strongly condemned the acquisition of dual citizenship (Rivlin 2008; Weiman 2008). It seems, then, that Israelis should have neither a practical nor a sentimental incentive to seek dual citizenship from EU countries. Yet they do so nonetheless, and in large numbers. This is the sociological puzzle that this chapter will address: why do Israelis seek EU dual citizenship?

Drawing on statistics and material from interviews, I will show that the motives that drive Israelis to acquire dual citizenship are thoroughly embedded in culturally-specific, non-economic logics of action. Many applicants acquire dual citizenship because they wish to secure an “insurance policy” in case Israel is destroyed. This reflects an attitude towards citizenship that is conditioned by a diasporic family *habitus*, as well as the direct experiences of respondents’ parents or grandparents in the Holocaust. Another major motivation to obtain European Union – particularly among younger applicants – is that it is perceived as a “cool” thing to have, to talk about and to show at border crossings. For many younger Israelis, the EU passport is a status symbol or, in other words, a strategy of distinction.

The particularity of the Israeli case is also reflected in the preferred term that Israelis use to describe the phenomenon: the words “dual citizenship” and the name of the granting country are almost never used. Instead, Israeli dual citizens describe themselves as having a “European passport”. This phrasing avoids the problematic concept “dual citizen” while also minimizing the connection origin countries like Germany and Poland, whose name usually evoke negative associations in Israel. In the typology of intended vs. strategic dual citizens, the EU-Israeli dual citizens I study here are all strategic.¹

This chapter will proceed as follows. First, I will present legal and historical background on citizenship in Central and Eastern European countries and in Israel. Then,
I will offer a demographic analysis of EU-Israeli dual citizenship, using statistics on citizenship acquisition to analyze trends in demand for citizenship and learn about potential motivations. I will then draw on material from interviews to discuss the dynamics of citizenship acquisition and analyze the motivations and uses that drive Israelis to obtain ancestry-based citizenship from EU countries.

II. Legal and historical background

Israel has explicitly permitted dual citizenship since its establishment, and there have always been dual citizens in its population. Thus, dual citizenship is not an entirely new phenomenon there. Most Central and Eastern European countries, in contrast, only permitted dual citizenship after the transition to democracy in the 1990s. Moreover, citizenship in most of these countries only became attractive to Israelis after 2000, as their accession to the European Union was nearing. Below, I will first sketch the demographic and political history that created eligibility for dual citizenship from European countries in Israel, and then survey the citizenship laws of Israel and the relevant European countries.

Today, less than 5 percent of the world’s Jews live in Central and Eastern Europe. From the early modern period up until the Holocaust, however, this region served as the demographic core of world Jewry. In 1880, the number of Jews in Central and Eastern Europe (including Russia) was 5.7 million, or 75 percent of the world’s Jews. By 1939, their numbers increased to 8.1 million but their relative share declined and to a half of the world’s Jewish population (DellaPergola 2001). This is explained by the massive exodus that began in the 1880s. Over two million Jews left Eastern Europe in four decades of mass emigration, almost all of them settling in the United States. In the 1920s, the U.S. closed its gates to Eastern European immigrants. It was at this point that Palestine became a major destination for Jewish immigration. At the time, the territory was under a British Mandate charged with enacting the resolutions of the 1920 San Remo conference, which designated it as the future Jewish national home. From 1920 to 1970, approximately one million Jewish immigrants (or Olim, which means “those who ascend
from Central and Eastern Europe arrived in the Palestine Mandate and (after 1948) the State of Israel (Cohen 2002).

The most prominent European origin countries in that period were Germany, Poland and Romania. About 70,000 Jews arrived from Germany; most of them came between 1933 and 1939, escaping the Nazi regime. About 300,000 Jews came from Romania, most of them after World War Two. The largest origin country was Poland, with about 340,000 immigrants, of whom half arrived before 1948 and half after Israel’s independence (Cohen 2002). Smaller numbers of Olim arrived from Bulgaria, Hungary, Greece, Czechoslovakia and other European countries. These individuals and their descendants – who today number an estimated 2.4 million persons – make up the population that is potentially eligible for EU citizenship in Israel.

I will make three quick notes about the sociological characteristics of this population. First, European-origin individuals from all these different origins merged in Israel to form one unified social group which is referred to as Ashkenazim. Ashkenazi Jews are the most advantaged group in Israel in terms of socio-economic status and symbolic prestige (Cohen 2002; Shenhav 2006; Cohen, Haberfeld and Kristal 2007). Today, there are no meaningful social distinctions between Ashkenazim of different origin countries or times of arrival in Israel.

Second, a word is needed on the generational structure of the Ashkenazi family in Israel. There is a widely-held folk conception about this structure which respondents took for granted. The “first generation” includes individuals who were born in Europe around the years 1910-1930 and immigrated between the 1920’s and 1960’s. The “second generation”, or the parent generation, were born in 1940-1960, most of them in Israel. The Ashkenazi “third generation” were born in Israel between 1970-1990. At first sight, these terms appear similar to those used in other immigration countries (as in “second-generation immigrants”). In fact, the event that they refer to is not immigration to Israel but the Holocaust. It appears that this entire generational structure is extrapolated from the expression “second generation to the Holocaust” (Dor Shen LaShoah) which originated in the psychotherapeutic discourse about the transmission of trauma.

Third, as I noted above, Ashkenazi Jews in Israel are descended from refugees who emigrated right before or right after the Holocaust. There is no Ashkenazi family in
Israel that has not lost some of its members in the Holocaust. Ashkenazi families have also lost whatever property they had in Europe, and often their citizenship was taken away. Moreover, in some Central and Eastern European countries Jews have been persecuted since the 1920s – long before the Nazi occupation – and into the postwar years (Lendvai 1971; Rothschild 1993; Gross 2001). This context defines a key difference between EU-Israeli dual citizens and other cases in which the descendants of emigrants reacquire citizenship. When Italian descendants in Argentina apply for citizenship, they are to some extent reconnecting with their ethnic roots (Tintori 2011; Cook-Martin 2013). Israelis, in contrast, have no identification with their origin country; when they seek dual citizenship, it is experienced as a form of restitution.

Considering legal conditions in Israel, the country never prohibited dual citizenship. In fact, its citizenship law, which was first formulated in 1952, explicitly permits it (Herzog 2010a). The main logic driving this tolerant attitude is ethno-national. As Patrick Weil (2001) notes, Israeli citizenship and immigration law are premised on the legal fiction that Israel is receiving returning emigrants rather than accepting new immigrants. Thus, the 1950 Law of Return automatically grants citizenship to diaspora Jews who wish to settle in the country, without imposing any of the requirements that are associated with immigrant naturalization. The toleration of dual citizenship should be understood within this context: it is aimed to encourage *Olim* to become Israeli by allowing them to keep their former nationality (Kalekin-Fishman 2007; Herzog 2010b). In contrast, non-Jewish immigrants who wish to naturalize in Israel must fulfill residence and language requirements and renounce their original citizenship. Dual citizenship never became a politically contentious issue in Israel, and there were no serious proposals in the parliament to restrict it.6

In the early 1950s, when Israel’s citizenship regime was taking shape, the right to dual citizenship was entirely irrelevant for the vast majority of Israelis, who came from Middle Eastern or Eastern European countries that stripped them of their citizenship. Its toleration was mainly intended to attract Jews from rich Western countries. However, very few immigrants came from those countries until after the 1967 Six-Day War (Cohen 2002). Thus, the recent proliferation of dual citizenship among hundreds of thousands of native-born Israelis whose parents and grandparents have come as refugees from Eastern
Europe represents a historic irony: what was originally designed as an exception for elite diaspora Jews has become a common status among native-born Israelis.

Let us now examine citizenship regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. As in Israel, citizenship in those countries is highly ethnicized (Brubaker 1992, 1996; Liebich 2009). In Chapter 3, I analyzed Hungary’s 2011 citizenship law as an example of a co-ethnic citizenship regime aimed at a country’s former territories. The legal constellation in European countries that gave rise to EU dual citizenship in Israel, while also connected with ethnic preferentialism, has a different basis. It is mainly driven by *jus sanguinis* transmission and citizenship restitution, rather than cross-border co-ethnicity. If the clauses offering co-ethnic citizenship aim to undo 20th-century border changes, those providing citizenship restitution are primarily concerned with bringing back emigrants who left before and during communism.

The nation-states of Central and Eastern Europe were established on the basis of ideologies calling for the liberation and unification of a particular ethnic nation. They came into being in the period between 1871 and 1920 on the ruins of multi-national empires. In all of them, however, independence was not the end point of the nationalizing project. Those new countries suffered from discrepancies between the scope of the ethnic nation they claimed to represent and the territory they actually controlled. Those territories were at the same time “too small” (some co-ethnics were left outside the borders) and “too large” (some citizens were of the wrong ethnicity). The response was to adopt “nationalizing” policies (Brubaker 1996) that entailed encouraging irredentist co-ethnics abroad while simultaneously excluding minorities at home through discrimination, boycotts and outright persecution (Rothschild 1993; Liebich 2009).

While in the early years after World War One, the ethno-national principle was moderated by a commitment to minority rights imposed by the postwar peace treaties, the following period saw the rise of fascist regimes that applied this principle without restraint. By the end of World War Two, the drive for homogenous nation-states and the imperial projects of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union have solved the region’s “minorities question” through population exchanges and expulsions that impacted millions of Germans, Poles, Ukrainians and other nationalities. The cruelest fate was reserved for the Jews: Nazi Germany embraced genocide as the Final Solution to
Europe’s “Jewish problem”. Four million of the Jews killed in the Holocaust were citizens of Poland, Hungary, Romania or Germany (Dawidowicz 1975).

After the war, the governments of most Central and Eastern European countries repealed the anti-Semitic laws that stripped Jews of citizenship and gave back citizenship to some survivors (Iordachi 2010). Germany has an explicit policy of restitution and invites its Jewish former citizens and their descendants to regain citizenship. When Israel and Germany established diplomatic relations in 1965, some Israelis discreetly asked to regain their German citizenship. In those years, Germany prohibited dual citizenship but made an exception for German Jews and their descendants: since the Nazi law that stripped them of citizenship was deemed illegal, it was decided that they had an unconditional right to regain it (Hailbronner 2010).

The situation was very different in Eastern Europe, where communist regimes came to power after the war. There was no question of regaining citizenship by non-residents because dual citizenship was not allowed (Iordachi 2004). Furthermore, some communist regimes enacted anti-Semitic policies of their own. Jews in those countries were often denounced as “rootless cosmopolitans” or “Zionists” and subjected to occasional persecution, such as the 1968 expulsion of 15,000 Jews from Poland and the striping of their citizenship (Lendvai 1971; Braham 1994; Genest 2009). During the communist era, millions of non-Jewish Eastern Europeans also emigrated to the West, many of them for political reasons. They too were stripped of their citizenship.

The departure of this latter group of emigrants belonging to countries’ majority ethnicities was seen as a major loss to the nation. Furthermore, Eastern European emigrants in the West played a role in those countries’ transition to democracy, providing financial and political support. As a consequence, in many countries one of the first steps after the transition from communism was offering dual citizenship to those emigrants, with the hope of demonstrating the tie with the diaspora and potentially encouraging return migration (Brubaker 1998; Verdery 1998). Within this context, most of the region’s countries moved to permit dual citizenship shortly after the post-communist transition (Iordachi 2004, 2010; Poganyi, Kovács and Körtvélyesi 2010; Gorny and Pudzianowka 2010; Kovács and Toth 2013). As Constantin Iordachi (2004:116) wrote, “in Central and Eastern Europe, […] dual citizenship has not served as a way of
integrating alien residents, but mostly as a way of reconstructing the national ‘imagined communities’”. The offer of dual citizenship was not limited to the actual persons who emigrated. Most countries in Central and Eastern Europe permit unlimited *jus sanguinis* transmission, therefore eligibility extends to emigrants’ children and grandchildren as well (Dumbrava 2014).

There is an inconsistent relationship between laws that offer citizenship restitution to the diaspora and those targeting cross-border co-ethnics. In Romania, the same law handles emigrants in the West and co-ethnics in Moldova, whereas in Hungary these are two separate laws (restitution is available since 1993 and co-ethnic citizenship became available in 2011). Poland, meanwhile, only offers restitution to the diaspora because its potential cross-border co-ethnics live in countries that do not allow dual citizenship. In any case, citizenship policy in Central and Eastern Europe typically focused on enfranchising co-ethnic populations, whether they lived in the West or the East. Except in Germany, there was no attempt to offer wholesale citizenship restitution to the Jews who had left those countries.

During the 1990’s, European-Israelis and their descendants, who felt no identification with the Polish or Romanian nation, had little interest in regaining citizenship. The few who did so were hoping it would help them gain restitution for their family’s property (usually it didn’t). All this changed around the year 2000, when most post-communist countries were preparing to enter the European Union (there were other reasons as well and they will be discussed below). At that point, demand for dual citizenship went up dramatically. The growth of EU-Israeli dual citizenship, then, is an unintended consequence of citizenship policies that are aimed to achieve very different goals.

We see, then, that the rise of aggressive ethnic nationalism in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s has led to the destruction of European Jewry and made Israel into a haven for Jewish refugees. In the 1990’s, however, the children and grandchildren of those refugees suddenly became eligible for dual citizenship from the countries that their families had escaped decades before. And after 2000, as EU expansion was nearing, such citizenship also became desirable. This development is ironic in a double sense. First, there is something perverse about the fact that the descendants of Jews who narrowly escaped
destruction in Europe are now looking back to their origin countries for protection. Second, Israelis are now acquiring citizenship on the basis of a law that was not intended for them. Except in Germany (and, to some degree, Poland), governments in granting countries did not typically intend to offer citizenship restitution to Jews. Instead, they aimed to attract emigrants from the country’s ethnic majority population and reinforce the link between ethnicity and citizenship (cf. Verdery 1998; Ragazzi and Balalovska 2011). These countries’ citizenship policies aim to continue rather than undo the nationalist policies from the interwar period. Ashkenazim in Israel, then, are now being awarded with European citizenship as an unintended consequence of the same ethno-national principle that played a crucial role in forcing their parents and grandparents out of the continent.

III. Data and methods

In this chapter, I combine two data sources in order to construct a multi-dimensional sociological profile of EU dual citizenship in Israel. The first type of data includes previously-unanalyzed administrative statistics on citizenship acquisition from EU countries. I assembled these original statistics from various sources: European embassies in Israel, administrative reports, scholarly publications and the records of a citizenship lawyer. These data make it possible to determine the scope of demand for dual citizenship and analyze the motives behind it.

The second type of data consists of material from 50 in-depth interviews with EU-Israeli dual citizens and applicants. The sample is non-random, since random sampling would be technically impossible, and respondents were recruited using a snowball technique. I conducted the interviews two waves: 22 interviews in 2008-2009 and another 28 in 2015. Most of the interviewees held citizenship from Germany (15 respondents), Romania (10), France (9), Poland (5) or Hungary (4). There were one to two respondents who sought citizenship from each of the following countries: Britain, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Greece and Italy. Forty interviewees were between 20 and 35 years old (“third generation”) and ten were between 50 and 70 years old (“second generation”).

The duration of each interview was between 75 and 150 minutes. Interviews were conducted in Hebrew and included questions about three topics: how respondents
obtained (or tried to obtain) dual citizenship, what motivated them to apply and how they viewed the phenomenon more generally. I also recorded their life histories in brief. I coded and analyzed the interviews based on pre-defined themes (for example, actual and projected uses of the second citizenship) as well as themes that emerged inductively from the material (for example, feelings of shame and pride). In addition to interviews with dual citizens, I also conducted interviews with officials at the German, Romanian, Polish and French embassies in Tel-Aviv. I also carried out several sessions of ethnographic observation at those embassies. In addition, I interviewed five lawyers who specialize in citizenship applications.

One factor that presumably had an effect on the interviews was the fact that I am myself part of the studied population. I am a third-generation Israeli of Romanian origin and, since 2007, a dual citizen of Romania. Having the same background as my respondents and partaking in the same phenomenon facilitated data collection: it was easy to build rapport with respondents and they were quick to open up. My close familiarity with Israeli society and culture also allowed me to identify various nuances in their discourse. The main potential problem of this proximity to the objects of the study is the risk of insufficient defamiliarization: a researcher who shares the cultural assumptions of his or her respondents might view their behavior and discourse as commonsensical and self-evident, thereby becoming less sensitive to sociological puzzles and contradictions. The multiple-site comparative framework used in this study is intended precisely to counter that risk.

IV. EU dual citizenship in Israel: a demographic profile

In this section, I will first present a demographic profile of EU dual citizenship in Israel including stocks of dual citizens and figures on citizenship acquisition from different countries. I will then offer a detailed analysis of original statistics on German citizenship that I obtained in order to learn about the motives driving applications for citizenship.

Israel’s census does not include questions about additional nationalities held by respondents. Therefore, I use original statistics from European granting countries in order to learn about the number of dual citizens in Israel. I obtained most of these statistics
directly from embassies in Israel through email inquiries and face to face interviews. Figure 1 below lists the stock of dual citizens from eleven European countries in Israel.

**Figure 1: Stock of dual citizens from selected European countries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Dual Citizens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>125,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>72,415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary (est.)</td>
<td>17,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>16,565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>15,318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria (est.)</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania (est.)</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>7,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep.</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other EU</td>
<td>7,310</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: For most countries, the numbers represent the number of dual citizens of each country living in Israel. For France, Italy and Austria, the numbers pertain to the total number of citizens in Israel. Data for all countries except the UK pertain to 2014-2015. “Other EU” countries include Spain, Portugal, Greece and Finland. Source: Appendix 2.

According to the sources cited in Figure 1, the total number of Israelis who held EU (including British) and Swiss citizenship in 2015 was 380,000, or almost 5 percent of Israel’s population. This is a minimum estimate that does not include several countries that presumably have thousands of dual citizens each (including Belgium, Netherlands, Slovakia and Lithuania) and since the figures for some countries might be higher than
reported here. Based on the estimate of 2.4 million Israelis of European descent, we can calculate that about 16 percent of the potentially eligible population have acquired EU citizenship.

Out of this total of 380,000 EU-Israeli dual citizens, approximately 200,000 Israelis held dual citizenship from a Central and Eastern European country. About 125,000 held German citizenship, and 75,000 more held citizenship form Poland, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Austria. While there have always been some Israelis with dual citizenship from Western countries like the U.S. or the UK and such citizenship enjoys broad legitimacy, citizenship from Central and Eastern European countries became popular only recently. While statistics on acquisition are from most countries are incomplete, the available data – corroborated through interviews with consular officials – show that before the year 2000, there was practically no demand for citizenship from Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary. The statistics I collected show that from 2000 to 2013, a minimum of 62,406 Israelis have acquired EU citizenship from Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Romania, Hungary and Italy. This includes 30,000 acquisitions of German citizenship, 15,373 Polish citizenship acquisitions, and at least 4,000 acquisitions from Bulgaria and 3,000 from Romania (source: Appendix 2).^9^

Citizenship in Eastern European countries, then, only became attractive to Israelis when it was clear that they were about to join the European Union. This is consistent with the compensatory citizenship approach, and illustrates the manner in which individuals around the world are engaged in an unconscious calculation of the value of their own citizenship relative to all other citizenships that they stand to gain. It is not clear, however, why demand for German citizenship increased so dramatically around the same time. The practical value of German citizenship certainly increased with the consolidation of the EU, but this change did not take place in 2000 (for example, Germans may work in the UK since 1973).

I suggest that German citizenship became more attractive after 2000 for three reasons. First, citizenship lawyers began to advertise their services, raising public awareness about eligibility. Second, around those years the European Union became a concrete reality in the minds of Israelis, which was expressed most clearly in the
institution of its common currency in 2002. And third, Israelis with roots in Eastern European countries began to apply for dual citizenship. As a result of these trends, the term “European passport” became popular. This meant that German dual citizens applicants now had a new way to understand and explain their second citizenship: instead of contaminating themselves with the “abomination” of German citizenship (cf. Porat 2011), they were now simply seeking a “European passport” like their fellow Israelis who had Polish, Hungarian or Czech roots. Thus, ironically, EU integration helped legitimize German dual citizenship in Israel by minimizing its association with Germany. Whereas scholars and policy makers who emphasize the sentimental aspects of citizenship assume that people take citizenship because it is associated with a particular nation, the case of EU citizenship in Israel shows that people sometimes take citizenship precisely because it has been dissociated from a specific identity.

The next step in the quantitative analysis is to try to learn about the motivations behind the acquisition of EU citizenship. First, I will examine the relationship between dual citizenship and emigration. In the Hungarian-Serbian case, I found that the proliferation of dual citizenship was associated with an increase in emigration from Serbia to Western Europe. In the U.S.-Mexican case too there was a link between dual citizenship and emigration: although the norteño elites that practice birth tourism rarely emigrate in search of jobs, many dual nationals moved from Mexico to the U.S. when their communities were struck by gang violence. Is there evidence of a similar spike in emigration from Israel following the mass acquisition of EU passports?

Figure 2 presents data on Israeli acquisition of German citizenship alongside statistics on emigration from Israel. These are original, previously-unanalyzed administrative statistics that I received from the German Statistical Office. I use statistics on German citizenship because it is the only country for which I have a data series going back more than 20 years. Moreover, Germany is the leading country in Central and Eastern Europe in terms of the citizenships it granted. The emigration statistics used in Figure 2 were published by Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics. The graph shows net emigration of Israeli citizens, i.e. the number of Israelis who left the country for over a year minus the number of Israelis who returned after a stay of more than a year abroad.
(new Olim to Israel are not represented in this graph). The higher the figure in the graph, the higher the number of Israelis that Israel “lost” to emigration.

**Figure 2: Acquisition of German citizenship and emigration from Israel, 1990-2013**

![Graph showing acquisition of German citizenship and emigration from Israel, 1990-2013](image)

Note: The dashed grey line represents acquisition of German citizenship by Israelis and refers to the axis on the left. The solid black line represents net emigration from Israel and refers to the axis on the right.

Sources: Data received from German Statistical Office; data from Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics.

Figure 2 allows us to explore the complex relationship between dual citizenship and emigration. The acquisition of German citizenship began to increase in 2000 and peaked in 2004-2006. After 2007, it settled on levels that are still much higher than in the 1990s.\(^{10}\) The graph that represents emigration initially follows a similar pattern: it is more
or less stable in the 1990s and then surges after the year 2000. Net emigration reached peak levels in 2001-2002. After that period, however, it declined rapidly. In 2004-2006, when demand for German passports was at its highest, emigration was winding down, and it reached historically low levels in the years after the 2008 crisis. The graph presents absolute numbers of emigrants; the decline in emigration rate has been even more dramatic, as Israel’s population grew by 75% since 1990.

Two processes that affected Israel around the year 2000 might have contributed to both emigration and demand for citizenship. From 2000 to 2002, there was a coordinated wave of Palestinian suicide bombings that killed hundreds of Israelis. Around the same years, Israel was also suffering from an economic crisis that began after the bursting of the so-called “Dot-Com bubble” in 2000. In those years, Israeli citizenship lost value in terms of opportunities and security. It is therefore no surprise that a growing number of Israelis decided to seek opportunities and security from other countries – either by emigrating (mostly to the U.S., Canada or Australia) or by obtaining another citizenship. And while it is outside the scope of this paper to make a contribution to the study of the determinants of migration (e.g. Cohen 1988; Massey et al. 1993; Skeldon 2013), we can hypothesize that some conditions can lead to increases in both emigration and acquisition of non-resident dual citizenship (see Harpaz 2015).

For our purposes, however, the important point to take away from Figure 2 is the following: the mass acquisition of German and other EU citizenships – over 60,000 new citizens since 2000 – did not lead to an increase in emigration. Only few dual citizens used their new citizenship to move to Europe (this is corroborated by statistics from OECD and EU databases, which show very modest increases in the numbers of Israelis in EU countries). This finding is consistent with the compensatory citizenship hypothesis: in today’s world, dual citizenship is useful in other ways besides facilitating migration, and it is often acquired by individuals who have no incentive to emigrate. It also suggests an interesting possibility: in some cases, dual citizenship might actually depress emigration because, operating as an “insurance policy”, it provides some of the benefits of emigration at a much lower personal cost. On the other hand, if Israel is struck in the future by a grave security or economic crisis, many of these dual citizens could find it easy and attractive to emigrate.
At this point in time, then, dual citizenship does not lead to emigration. This suggests that unlike in Serbia, the prospect of getting a job abroad does not play a major role in the Israeli demand for EU citizenship. What other factors might be driving this demand? To answer this question, I will offer a more careful analysis of fluctuations in the demand for citizenship. To that end, I use another source of data which provides a more accurate measure of demand than the German citizenship statistics that were used in Figure 2. These statistics are ill-suited for measuring how demand changes in response to various events and conditions because there is a delay (from six months to two years) between the filing of the application and the actual acquisition of citizenship.

In order to offer a more precise analysis of demand for citizenship, I obtained original, previously-unanalyzed statistics from an additional source. These statistics were provided by one of the leading law offices that specialize in German citizenship applications; they list the number of telephone or email inquiries that the office has received from potential applicants from 2008 to 2014. They provide a direct, raw measure of demand for German citizenship because they capture the very first stage in the process. The figure below focuses on the relationship between dual citizenship and security. As an indicator of security, I used the annual number of Israeli casualties (civilian and military) from Palestinian terrorism and militancy in the relevant period. Figure 3 below presents citizenship inquiries alongside casualties.
A quick look at the figure is sufficient in order to recognize that the two indicators are strongly correlated. Regression analysis confirms a statistically significant (p=.028) and positive correlation between the number of casualties of terrorism and inquiries about German citizenship. For example, in 2009, 2012 and 2013, years with fewer than 10 Israeli casualties, demand for citizenship was substantially lower than in years of peak violence like 2008 and 2014 (in those latter two years, there were conflicts with Hamas during which the terrorist organization fired hundreds of rockets at Israeli cities). Officials at the German and Polish consulates confirmed that demand for citizenship increased whenever there was a security-related event. In contrast, interest in dual citizenship was not significantly correlated with economic factors like growth rate or unemployment rates, or with the level of emigration.
This analysis demonstrated that EU dual citizenship becomes more attractive to Israelis when they experience insecurity due to wars and terrorism. This is consistent with the citizenship acquisition statistics presented above in Figure 2. It suggests that the spike in citizenship acquisitions between 2000 and 2006 was driven in part by the wave of Palestinian terrorism in 2000-2002 (keep in mind the delay between applications and acquisitions). On the basis of material from interviews, we can assume that demand for citizenship is associated not only with direct threats like rockets and suicide bombings but also with longer-term security concerns like Iran’s nuclear program.

This finding can be compared to the situation in Mexico, where interest in U.S. citizenship increases in response to crime-related insecurity, and to Serbia where demand spiked in response to threats to Serbians’ visa-free access to Europe. These differences reveal variations in the kinds of citizenship deficits that individuals in those middle-tier countries experienced – geopolitical security in Israel, safety from crime in Mexico and freedom of movement in Serbia.

In the next section, I will use material from interviews to discuss in greater detail the ways Israelis acquire, use and understand EU dual citizenship.
V. Strategies and uses of dual citizenship

Vignette 1: Shiri, 37, German-Israeli dual citizen, lives in Tel-Aviv

Shiri was born in Tel-Aviv and so were her parents. Three of her grandparents were born in Poland and one grandfather was born in Berlin. In 1992, her grandfather applied for German citizenship. “Back then, it was mainly about the property and less about the citizenship – we had several buildings and a factory in East Berlin,” she said. Soon afterwards, Shiri’s mother took her to get her first German passport. “I realized that there was some conflict around it because my mother’s sister said to my mother: ‘How can you let such a thing happen? Why would you take a Nazi passport?’”.

At 21, after her military service, she moved to Europe for eight years. She studied cooking in Paris and completed a Master’s degree in European Studies at Maastricht. When living in Europe, she discovered that her German citizenship gave her extensive rights, including reduced tuition fees, a work permit and health insurance. She became friends with many Germans there (“I feel closest to them in the mentality because my grandfather was very German”). At the same time, she said she was often treated like a token Jew. “Once, on a class trip, we visited [the Nazi concentration camp] Theresienstadt. There I really felt like a monkey in the safari. All the Germans wanted to have their picture taken with me”.

Shiri returned to Israel in 2007 and now works at organizing collaborative projects between the EU and Israeli municipalities. “Living in Europe has not made me more European or more German but it has made me less Israeli. [...] My biggest insight from this sojourn abroad is that we are not the best or the most beautiful or the most just [...] I want to be cosmopolitan, to stay away from any kind of nationalism”. When traveling abroad, Shiri uses her German passport exclusively. She is married and has a young son, whom she registered as a German citizen when he was two months old. “As an Ashkenazi Jew, you always feel persecuted and you want to know that you have other options”.

About her right to German citizenship, she said “my grandfather was German so if there had been no Holocaust, I would have been German. But if anyone asked me to justify [my citizenship], I wouldn’t justify. It just happened. Karma. [...] It’s like winning the Green Card lottery. I won a Green Card to Europe and I am very grateful. It’s tragic that it’s involved in the complex history of Ashkenazi Jewry, but that’s how things turned out”.
Vignette 2: Nadav, 31, seeking Hungarian and Spanish citizenship, lives in Tel-Aviv

Nadav was born in 1984 in a village near Tel-Aviv. His father’s parents were born in Austro-Hungarian territories that now belong to Poland and Slovakia, and his mother’s parents were Sephardic Jews from Turkey and Greece. He studied government in Israel and the U.S. and now works at a research institute in Tel-Aviv. “I started [my quest for EU citizenship] at the Polish embassy. But I discovered that my grandfather was briefly drafted to the IDF in 1948 so I got rejected […] Then, I tried the Czechoslovak side but [my grandfather’s town in Silesia] changed hands several times and now it’s not part of the Czech Republic. So that didn’t work either. I also contacted the Turks and the Greeks but nothing came out of that”.

Nadav temporarily gave up on his dream of a second citizenship, until two years ago when new opportunities surfaced: “In 2013, my sister discovered that we might be eligible for Hungarian citizenship. It would cost us 10,000 shekels ($2,500) and I would need to study Hungarian – but only to a basic level […] So I bought some books from Berlitz and at some point I will sit down and learn Hungarian”. Several months before the interview, he discovered he could get another, more attractive citizenship: “My mom read in the newspaper that Spain was giving out citizenship and her parents’ last names are on the list of Sepharadic names. […] She was initially against the citizenship thing but now that it’s Spain she got excited”.

The main reason he wants another citizenship is “freedom of movement […] [With another passport] I can go to Jordan and from there, theoretically, anywhere I want. [I will be able to] go to Indonesia, Malaysia, Dubai… United States without visa. Freedom”. He added, “there is this global elite that is very mobile. And you can’t get into it unless you’re in that small group of Israelis who have two passports. […] Having another passport, together with my connections from the time I spent in the U.S. – that would open up many opportunities for me”.

Dual citizenship, he said, is also a form of insurance: “for my [future] kids, so they have more options. If [Israel] stops being prosperous or becomes insecure for any reason, they can leave”. A final motivation was that “with another passport, you can tell a story that’s more complex and unique […] it’s like some cool gadget that you put in your car and you can tell people about”.

181
Nadav defines himself as exclusively Israeli. He does not feel a connection to any of the countries whose citizenship he tried to obtain (“except maybe Greece, because of the food my grandmother used to make”). Furthermore, he says, “the passport I would really like to have is American. Europe is not attractive for me. But I’ll take what I can get”.

When ancestry turns into a resource

Israelis must fulfill two criteria in order to become citizens of their European countries of origin. First, they must have a parent or grandparent who was a citizen of that country. Second, the original citizen must not have lost his or her citizenship – or, if they had lost it – the origin country must be willing to give it back. In this chapter, I will set aside the second criterion because it is of no sociological interest. I will focus on the first and more meaningful criterion: descent from European immigrants.

The criterion automatically excludes anyone who does not have European ancestry – including most Israeli Jews of Middle-Eastern or Russian-speaking origin and all Israeli Arabs. The population that is eligible for citizenship roughly correlates to the social group of Ashkenazim, or European Jews. Since this is the leading sector in Israel in socio-economic terms, we find that in the Israeli case – as in Mexico and Serbia – compensatory dual citizenship is an elite phenomenon. Whereas Mexican norteño elites convert their economic capital into dual citizenship and Serbians use their ethnicity or cultural capital, Ashkenazi Israelis draw on their ancestry (or, we could say, genealogical capital) to gain compensatory citizenship. Israeli citizenship applicants do not typically have to demonstrate any linguistic skills or ethnic affinity. They only have to establish the citizenship of the original immigrant, and then eligibility flows down to their children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren thanks to the generous jus sanguinis laws of the origin countries, who typically define no generational stopping point for the transmission of citizenship (Dumbrava 2014).

In the context of this ancestry-centered evidentiary regime, the key to citizenship is a document that provides proof of the citizenship of the original immigrant. In Chapter 3 above, we saw the great ease with which Vojvodinian applicants established their ancestors’ Hungarian nationality. Furnishing such proof required nothing more than a trip
to the nearby town where they could easily locate the relevant birth records with the help of officials who speak the same language as they do and at a cost of about five Euros. Israeli applicants find themselves in a radically different situation. Most of them have never been in the country from which they seek citizenship and cannot speak its language. Furthermore, in most of these locations Jewish life ceased to exist after the Holocaust. In many, the bureaucratic records of Jews were destroyed as well. Therefore, obtaining this critical document that proves the immigrant grandparent’s original citizenship is often a major challenge.

The easiest way for applicants to establish the immigrant grandparent’s original citizenship is to provide their own proof, which might include a variety of old documents such as decades-old passports, travel permits, identity cards, birth certificates and even high-school diplomas. The first step in the quest for citizenship is therefore an attempt to dig up decades-old documents hiding in the original citizen’s home. In many cases, this search does not produce anything – which is unsurprising, given the long time that passed since the immigration to Israel and the fact that many came as refugees without any documents, families or connections to their original community. When applicants are not in possession of a document that testifies to the immigrant’s original citizenship, the family must somehow reconstruct the grandparent’s “paper trail” in his or her origin country and locate some documentary evidence of their past lives there. Often, they have only vague family anecdotes to guide them in this process.

This task is usually easier for descendants of German Jews than those with roots in other countries. In Germany, local officials often go out of their way to assist Israeli citizenship applicants. Sometimes they even waive the required processing fees for retrieving documents, motivated by the principle of reparation (Wiedergutmachung). In other countries – especially Romania and Hungary – officials typically exhibit an unhelpful, even hostile attitude towards Israeli applicants; sometimes, citizenship specialists must pay extra to provide incentive for them to provide the needed documents or move the application forward. These differences mirror the divergence in those countries’ legal attitudes – i.e. whether citizenship restitution to Jews is a deliberate policy goal, as in Germany, or an unintended consequence of policies that aim to attract another population, as in Romania and Hungary.\(^\text{17}\)
Some applicants try to locate the required documents themselves (this often requires one or more trips to the origin country). Most of them, however, prefer to turn to citizenship specialists who facilitate applications. While the availability of U.S.-Mexican dual citizenship produced an industry of cross-border births and Hungarian-Serbian dual citizenship created an industry of foreign language instruction, in Israel the availability of EU ancestry-based citizenship gave rise to an industry of experts who specialize in navigating through the bureaucracies of Central and Eastern European countries. This industry has grown very rapidly over the past 15 years, to the point that there are today dozens of lawyers, translators and machers (Yiddish for “fixers” who cut through red tape).

The expertise that these citizenship specialists “sell” is knowledge of the relevant country’s language, familiarity with its citizenship law and bureaucratic contacts and know-how. Each lawyer or macher specializes in one or two countries, usually according to their origin. Thus, Romanian citizenship services are usually provided by lawyers of Romanian origin, Polish citizenship services by Polish-origin lawyers, and so on. This is not always the case, however. For example, one of the first lawyers to handle applications for German citizenship is actually Romanian-born (and German-educated) and one of the specialists in Czech and Slovak citizenship is an Israeli Arab who studied law in Prague.

This citizenship industry is not just a consequence of the demand for EU citizenship; it also played a key role in boosting that demand in two ways. First, citizenship lawyers contributed to the dramatic increase in the public awareness about the possibility of applying. In 2001, Israeli bar regulations changed to allow lawyers to advertise their services. Citizenship services proved ideal for advertisement, and soon there were many advertisements in the newspapers inviting eligible Israelis to reclaim German, Austrian or Polish citizenship. Before 2001, most eligible Israelis had no idea that they could become citizens of Central and Eastern European countries. The appearance of advertisements led to an increase in awareness that led to an increase in demand, and that in turn led to a further increase in public awareness, as the media caught on to the subject (Harpaz 2009). Today, the vast majority of European-origin Israelis are aware that they might be eligible for citizenship. It is interesting to compare this to the situation in Serbia, where the main organization
diffusing information about the eligibility for citizenship was the Hungarian government. The comparison highlights the far greater commoditization of dual citizenship in Israel. Whereas in Serbia, demand for citizenship is pushed through top-down campaigns from a vote-seeking government, in Israel it is a bottom-up marketing effort by individual entrepreneurs who seek personal gain.

Another way in which specialists make dual citizenship more accessible is by helping Israelis overcome their fear and distrust of Central and Eastern European bureaucracies. Applicants for Polish, Romanian and Hungarian citizenship – but not German citizenship – often felt highly uncomfortable when interacting with officials representing “their” European countries, whom they experienced as hostile and uncooperative. This feeling that was intensified by the insistence of many officials to use only the origin country’s language, which second-generation applicants typically spoke poorly and which evoked painful memories in first-generation immigrants. It was also enhanced by consular officials’ curt attitude and by the disorderly and rushed atmosphere that prevailed in many embassies.

Many applicants instinctively linked this unwelcoming treatment to the experiences of persecution that they or their parents underwent in Europe, and to ingrained views about the anti-Semitic nature of these countries and their bureaucracies. As illustration, consider an episode that took place outside the Polish embassy during my observation there:

*Ruth, a Polish-born Israeli woman in her seventies, was waiting outside the embassy, which was scheduled to open in ten minutes. She told me that she had come to apply for the sake of her grandchildren. It started raining, and she asked the security guards to allow her to enter the embassy for shelter before the official opening time. After the security guards refused to let her in, she came back out looking shocked and said: “they told me ‘Out!’ They dared to tell me ‘Out!’’. They did not change one bit. They just want to humiliate us”. She then walked away from the embassy in anger.*

The exaggerated sensitivity expressed in this anecdote reveals the deep trauma that many Israeli Holocaust survivors carry with them. This trauma also affects many second-generation and even third-generation applicants, who likewise described their visits to the
embassy as extremely unpleasant. Such sentiments and expectations make it difficult for many Israelis to apply for citizenship on their own. Even when they have all the necessary documents, the procedure is simply too emotionally painful or humiliating. Thus, citizenship specialists play a key role in facilitating applications not just by locating ancestry documents but also by insulating applicants from some of the emotional costs of application, namely shame, humiliation and anxiety.

The expenditure involved in citizenship acquisition typically ranges from around $500 to $2500 per person, with the typical expenditure being around $1,000 (the procedure usually takes between one and four years). The costs are lower for those who file the application themselves. A thousand US dollars are less than two weeks’ average wage (the average monthly salary in Israel is about $2,500), making EU-Israeli citizenship much more affordable than in the other cases, relative to average wages. It was 25 times more affordable than strategic U.S. citizenship for Mexicans (the lowest expenditure on birth tourism equaled a full year’s average salary) and twice more affordable than in Serbia, where strategic citizenship acquisition cost about a month’s salary and also involved the extremely onerous task of studying Hungarian (on the other hand, citizenship was free for ethnic Hungarians). These differences contributed to making strategic dual citizenship into a mass phenomenon in Israel.

The large potential market for EU citizenship in Israel – over two million people might be eligible and the vast majority among them can afford it – has created tremendous opportunities that attract entrepreneurs. The EU citizenship industry in Israel operates as a much more competitive capitalistic market relative to those in Serbia and Mexico. Whereas in the latter cases, applicants locate specialists through informal networks, Israeli lawyers and machers create attractive websites and invest in internet advertising. Furthermore, whereas the profits of Mexican birth tourism are all accrued on the U.S. side of the border and the sums involved in Hungarian citizenship in Serbia are too small to make any economic impact, EU citizenship in Israel involves substantial sums (over $60 million since 2000, assuming $1,000 per application), most of which stay in Israel. As the demand for citizenship shows no sign of abetting, ever more entrepreneurs enter the market, seeking new ways to profit from their fellows Israelis’ fascination with dual citizenship.
The uses of compensatory citizenship

The conversion of European ancestry into European Union citizenship is not an inexpensive or painless procedure. It involves an average expenditure of about $1,000, a long waiting period and a readiness to deal with shame and traumatic memories. At the same time, the statistical analysis given in the previous section has shown that very few Israelis actually use the passport to move to a European Union country. This leaves us with the question: what are the motivations and expected uses that drive Israelis to obtain dual citizenship from EU countries? Below, I will draw on material from interviews and fieldwork to analyze these motives and uses. I will discuss the value of citizenship in four social fields: market, mobility, family and status.

Market

When asked why they were applying for ancestry-based dual citizenship, the first answers given by respondents usually pointed to practical motives: they said that they wished to gain access to economic opportunities in the European Union. This practical-economic discourse on the European passport is dominant not only among dual citizens themselves but also in the media, and several news outlets published “consumer guides” that instruct Israelis on how to obtain citizenship and advise them on its possible uses (Goldstein and Barzilay 2004; Walla 2005; Halperin 2011). Indeed, European Union citizenship potentially carries substantial economic benefits, including the following:

1) Eligibility for residence and work in European countries on the basis of EU freedom of movement for workers.
2) Facilitated access to university education in EU countries, thanks to the unrestricted right to residence and employment, and potential eligibility for reduced tuition in some countries (Center for Economic Studies 2007).
3) Facilitated access to the United States through the Visa Waiver Program, which is available to citizens of some EU countries.
4) Dual citizens may visit 18 Arab and Muslim-majority countries that do not accept Israeli passports, including Saudi Arabia, UAE, Malaysia and Iran. Some Israelis use
their EU passports to do business in Arab Gulf countries. Other than that, this right is used by few Israelis (except perhaps spies who work for Mossad).

5) The right to purchase real-estate in countries where this right is or was reserved for citizens (e.g. Romania and the Czech Republic).

6) Facilitation of claims for restitution of property. Generally, suits for individual restitution from countries beside Germany are rarely successful, and there is no clear indication that citizenship improves these chances (Weinbaum 1999).

Most applicants were interested in the former three uses, which had to do with the country’s membership in the European Union. The latter three uses, which were much more country-specific, generated far lower interest. This is consistent with the results of the analysis of trends in demand above, which showed that citizenship in post-communist countries only became attractive when they were set to join the European Union. This attitude can be illustrated through a quotation from Shoshana, a 58 year old travel agent from Tel-Aviv who obtained Hungarian passports for herself and her three sons:

*Around 2000, that’s when [my sister and I] started handling the application [for Hungarian citizenship]. It was then that people started talking about the European Union. And we thought it’s a good idea: if we have a European passport, then the kids can study, work, whatever they want. We’ll open up new horizons for them.*

This quotation is typical: dual citizens explained that a passport was “practical” because it could create opportunities for employment and education in European Union countries. Around 2000, “people started talking about the European Union”, in Shoshana’s words, because of the imminent introduction of the unified Euro currency (in 2002) and the accession of ten new members to the EU (including Hungary) in 2004. Note the broad and non-specific view of the perceived usefulness of the passport (which is “European” not Hungarian). It is useful for the younger generation to do “whatever they want” and will open “new horizons” for them. This non-specific attitude towards EU citizenship – epitomized in the typical expression *tov she’yesh* (“it’s good to have”) – can be contrasted with the highly-specific plans that Serbian applicants had for their Hungarian citizenship (e.g. study for a Master’s degree in the Netherlands, join a cousin who lives in Sweden). The Israeli attitude was much closer to that of Mexican elite parents, who had a
general conception that U.S. citizenship would expand the scope of opportunities for their children in ways that they could not anticipate fully.

There was, however, a key difference that sets Israeli and Mexican seekers of dual citizenship apart. Elite *norteños* are often intimately connected to the U.S.: they speak its language, know the culture and often have relatives there. Shopping, vacationing and studying in the U.S. are indispensable practices that define the identity of the elite in northern Mexico. In contrast, Israelis do not see visiting Europe as an exclusive status strategy (anybody can do it), neither does studying in Europe elevate one’s status. Moreover, few young Israelis speak any European languages beside English. And as I noted above, labor migration to Europe is practically nonexistent. In this context, that there is unsurprisingly no folk knowledge about the practical uses of the EU passport. This explains the vague expressions cited above – “new horizons”, “opening doors” and so on. It was encapsulated in respondents’ lack of knowledge about tuition rates, wage levels or potential job opportunities in Europe.

The statistical analysis above suggested that Israelis began to obtain citizenship from countries like Romania or Hungary after it became EU citizenship which supposedly provides access to the advanced economies of Britain or Germany. However, the low rate of emigration to Europe, indicates that at present, Israeli dual citizens do not massively head to those Western European destinations either. That said, the past years have seen the emergence of a new and unexpected destination for Israeli immigration: Berlin.

The number of Israelis in Berlin has grown significantly in recent years and is now estimated at around 11,000, of whom about 2,200 are German-Israeli dual citizens (Kranz 2015). This immigration, while modest in demographic terms, is interesting because of its provocative symbolism (the grandchildren of Holocaust survivors returning to the capital of the Third Reich) and because it represents new modalities of migration and transnationalism that EU dual citizenship has made possible.

Israelis who move to Berlin are not looking for high-paying jobs, which are not that city’s strong point anyway. Instead, the German capital has become a Mecca for young Israeli artists, musicians and students, who enjoy the city’s vibrant and cosmopolitan atmosphere and its low cost of living. This migration is partly a response to
the meteoric rise in real estate prices and rents in Israel since 2008, which was driven in part by a new phenomenon whereby Jews from the diaspora buy real estate in Israel as insurance. Some young Israelis – especially those working in the creative professions where salaries are low and insecure – began to feel that Tel-Aviv has become too expensive for them. Berlin’s rise as a European center of culture and the proliferation of EU dual citizenship in Israel have provided a solution for some of them. While all EU-Israeli dual citizens may live and work in Berlin with any bureaucratic difficulties, those whose grandparents came from Germany are particularly fortunate. As German citizens who “return” to Germany, they are eligible for a special package of benefits, including free language instruction and welfare benefits worth about 1,000 Euros a month during their first year in Germany – a sum that allows them to live in inexpensive Berlin almost without working.

For example, Nir, a 31 year old German-Israeli dual citizen from Tel-Aviv, moved to Berlin so he can focus on creating electronic music: “With the 1,000 Euros they give me here, I can live well. I rent an apartment and a studio. In Israel, I would need 2,500 Euros to live like that… So here I can live from music”. Nir also makes extensive use of welfare fraud: in order to become eligible for various benefits, he hides the fact that he moved in with his girlfriend, that he brings in money from Israel and that he occasionally works in Germany. Thus, some Israelis view EU and especially German citizenship as a kind of artist’s scholarship, which allows them to live without working. Many of those artists, students and seekers split their time between Berlin and Israel, thereby benefitting from dual citizenship to construct new transnational forms of migration that were impossible in the age of exclusive citizenship and expensive flights.

These uses, however, pertain to a small minority among dual citizens. The vast majority of European-Israelis continue to live in Israel. For them, the principal practical use of their passport is to make international travel easier. For the large majority of dual citizens, the only concrete economic benefit they derive from their European Union passport is the visa waiver to the United States. Typically, respondents did not expect to derive short-term economic benefits from their citizenship. Instead, they saw it as an asset that might prove useful in some unspecified way in the future. This was remarkably
similar to the way Mexican birth tourist parents conceived of the usefulness of U.S. citizenship for their children.

Furthermore, in Israel, even more than among elite Mexicans, there was a widespread discourse on citizenship as investment – and, more generally, a strong tendency to think of citizenship using economic metaphors. Many Israeli respondents spoke of their EU citizenship as an investment or a product, something that they received as restitution (from the origin country) and gave onwards as a gift (from parents to children). For example, Ya’akov, 58 year old, who applied for Romanian citizenship for himself and his daughter, explained:

[The European passport] is like a luxury article that you buy, a fine watch or a laptop computer. You don’t use all of its features. Possibly, you will never use more than five or ten percent of its capacities. But you are willing to pay extra for the potential.

In this quotation, national membership is translated into the language of market consumption. Romanian citizenship is a “luxury article” because of the promise of EU membership; it is “bought” rather than acquired on the basis of origin and identity. This citizenship-reimagined-as-product does not confer rights (let alone impose duties); instead, it has “features” and “capacities” (compare this to Vignette 2, where Nadav’s compares EU citizenship to a gadget). In a similar vein, many respondents argued that their parents’ or grandparents’ citizenship was a piece of family property that was illegally taken away, and that they had a natural right to demand its return. In the words of a second-generation Hungarian-Israeli respondent, “we are not asking for any favors – we just want what is ours”. The irony is that until recently, when lawyers and the media began informing Israelis that they could acquire citizenship, most applicants had no idea that they possessed such an inviolable right.

While the use of economic metaphors was common, it must be stressed that most applicants did not view citizenship acquisition as a purely economic transaction. Many of them felt that citizenship restitution was also an act of justice, and almost all second-generation applicants also saw citizenship as a gift that they wished to bestow upon their children (see the next subsection). Therefore, citizenship acquisition was not a straightforward purchase of the kind offered by citizenship-by-investment programs.
Instead, it was a complex act of appropriation that does not conform to any one category of exchange. An application might be initiated for an economic purpose, but it proceeds as a legal claim for restitution and is justified on the basis of family history. Therefore, the European passport needs to be examined at the site where the social and biological reproduction of citizenship takes place: the family.

**Family**

Israelis become eligible for a European passport on the basis of ties of kinship and blood. Accordingly, the decision to apply for citizenship always involves a whole circle of relatives: not just the immigrant parent or grandparent (if they are alive), but also the children of citizenship applicants, their siblings, and often their spouses. The opportunities provided by European Union citizenship are mainly relevant to the younger generation. And indeed, it is often young people in their twenties and thirties who typically initiate applications after learning about that possibility from their friends or from the media. In other cases, second-generation parents initiate the application in order to improve the life prospects of their children. Citizenship lawyers report that an average application “produces” three to five citizens from two or three generations. Applying for a European passport is a family project governed by family logic.

Applications usually followed a typical generational division of labor: first-generation immigrant grandparents supply the basis for eligibility, but (being dead or very old) take no part in the application; and third-generation grandchildren often initiate the procedure, but do not actively contribute to it. The parent generation, in their fifties and sixties, are the ones who carry out the application and provide the necessary labor and expenses. This bureaucratic journey is often undertaken in collaboration with siblings, who also split the costs between them. In spite of the work they put into obtaining citizenship, second-generation dual citizens typically do not derive any personal benefit from it. Most of them never even use their European passports for international travel, and take only their Israeli passports abroad. Thus, the primary motive of second-generation parents to apply for citizenship is the feeling that it is “good for the family”. For example, 58-year old Shoshana said:
“I only [obtained Hungarian citizenship] so that my children will have a passport. I have no intention of using it. Actually, I am ashamed of having a Hungarian passport. [I am ashamed] because my mother would turn in her grave if she knew... She hated the Hungarians, they were anti-Semitic and bad. She left Hungary at 18 and never wanted to talk or visit or hear from them”

While not all second-generation dual citizens held such negative views of their countries of citizenship, the sentiment of shame expressed by Shoshana is highly typical of that generation. The phenomenon whereby people take the citizenship of countries that they dislike often leads to ironic, even comical results. Take Haim, a 55 year old engineer whose German-born father left Germany in 1939 as a boy and was the sole survivor from his large family. Haim boycotted Germany his entire life and has never set foot there. However, when his daughters asked him to obtain citizenship for them, he complied. Now he is a German citizen with a German passport who continues to boycott Germany and everything German, including his own passport.

It is interesting to compare the Israeli family dynamic to the Serbian and Mexican cases. Like Israelis, ethnic Hungarians in Serbia often apply for dual citizenship as a family and members of the older grandparent generation also become citizens. The sentiments involved in this reacquisition, however, are diametrically opposite: older ethnic Hungarians in Serbia are extremely moved at the opportunity to become Hungarian once again (“it’s a wonderful feeling to become again what I once was”, as one respondent said). In contrast, Israeli Holocaust survivors are often horrified by the idea of becoming Hungarian or Romanian again (the relation to Germany is more ambivalent). Some of them veto the visa application and the process only begins after they die. In other cases, they grudgingly agree to go along with the application but only “for the sake of the grandchildren” (as in the anecdote from the Polish embassy above).

It is also interesting to compare the Israeli family dynamic to the Mexican case of birth tourism. As in Israel, we see in Mexican parents who acquire citizenship for their children without expecting to benefit from it themselves. The difference between those cases, however, is revealing: in northern Mexico, parents belonging to the economic elite use dual citizenship to consolidate their socio-economic advantage. Giving birth in the
U.S. can be compared to sending one’s kids to a prestigious bilingual private school or a good university – it directly boosts the family’s prestige and economic opportunities. These are practices that can be seen as part of the family *habitus* of Latin American elites, who are conditioned by a history of colonialism, underdevelopment and internal insecurity to view ties with the U.S. or Europe as a source of economic power and symbolic authority and an “escape route” for troubled times.22

In Israel, we find evidence of a different family habitus that is shaping the relation to dual citizenship. After discussing the hypothetical economic opportunities of EU citizenship, many respondents – especially second-generation parents – also brought up Israel’s uncertain future, the lessons of Jewish history and their families’ experiences in the Holocaust. Many respondents brought up the term “insurance policy” (yet another economic metaphor) to explain how they saw their citizenship. This leads us to suspect that Israeli parents who acquire EU citizenship for their children are partly inspired by dispositions that form part of the habitus of the diasporic Jewish family.

The connection between dual citizenship and diasporic family habitus was explored by the anthropologist Aihwa Ong (1999) in her research on Chinese diaspora elites in Southeast Asian countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, who have a centuries-old history as a mobile trader “ethnic caste” (cf. Weber 1958). The Chinese diaspora flourished under the diverse and segmented arrangement of European colonial rule; under nationalist regimes, they suffered from discrimination and persecutions. More recently, thanks to the new opportunities provided by globalization, many overseas Chinese formed business connections across Asia, Europe and North America. Such families go to great lengths to obtain citizenship in Western countries, and relate to it in an instrumental approach that Ong terms “flexible citizenship”.

This strategic, non-sentimental approach to national membership is part of the practical, cognitive and normative dispositions that overseas Chinese families perfected during the course of their history as a mobile, mercantile diaspora in an uncertain environment (Ong 1999). The analogy to the European-Jewish case is obvious: like overseas Chinese, diaspora Jews were a highly mobile and often persecuted ethnic caste that specialized in trade and finance (Slezkine 2004). Such conditions can be expected to lead to the formation of long-term behavioral dispositions that consist of suspicion
toward host states, strong adherence to the family and an attempt to secure mobility and economic opportunities. The key role of cooperative family strategies in the social and economic advancement of Jewish immigrants was documented in the United States (Silverman 1988). It makes perfect sense to assume that there is a Jewish diasporic *habitus* that includes strategies of flexible citizenship.

In the hands of the European-Israeli parent generation, just as among Ong’s overseas Chinese, passports and citizenship are divested of their national content and reframed as instrumental objects that provide the family with opportunities and protection. Above, I discussed the uses of the European passport as an opportunity-enhancing instrument. Here, I will focus on the protective potential of the passport, which is also highly valued by the diasporically-disposed Jewish family. Fifty-six year old Sarah, who obtained a Romanian passport for the sake of her daughter, explained her motivation in the following words:

*With a European passport, she will be able to work and study in Europe, it opens up more options. And besides, it’s good to have another passport. We live in a very volatile country. Who knows what will happen here in ten years? Maybe [the Arabs] will throw us to the sea?*

This typical quotation illustrates the close intertwining of opportunity and protection in the perception of Israeli dual citizens, and the association of both values with membership in the EU. The need for protection is mentioned in connection with fears about the destruction of Israel. The specific existential fear is not always the same. For example, until the peace treaty with Egypt, fears focused on the Egyptian and Syrian militaries and the promises of these countries’ leaders to “throw the Jews into the sea”. In the past decade, Israeli anxiety mostly revolved around Iran’s nuclear program and the genocidal declarations of its leaders who promise to “wipe Israel off the map” (Nana10 2009). In this context, many dual citizens say that the European passport can serve as an “insurance policy” in the event that Israel is destroyed or becomes unlivable.

This is, of course, an ironic development. In classic Zionist thinking, the incessant search for “insurance policies” and “escape routes” is supposed to be a mark of the diasporic Jew living in Exile (*Galut*). Indeed, the post-2008 period, which is marked by
economic crisis, rising terrorism and growing populism, has seen many of the world’s non-Israeli Jews renew the search for insurance: ever more Jews in Western Europe and the U.S. buy real estate in Israel or seek another citizenship as backup (for example, from Germany or Spain). Israel, however, is supposed (according to Zionist ideology) to be the ultimate “insurance policy” that guarantees the survival of Jews, the one place where they do not need to secure a “route of escape”. The fact that Israelis too search additional insurance suggests that some elements of the Jewish diasporic habitus have withstood the revaluation of values implied by the Zionist revolution, which set out to create “the New Jew” (Avineri 1981; Conforti 2011; Neumann 2011).

At present, however, the protective capacity of the passport is mostly of interest to parents in the 50s and 60s and carries less meaning for younger applicants. Beside the collective diasporic habitus that was discussed above, second-generation parents typically had a direct personal reason that made them receptive to the concept of a life-saving document: their own parents’ experiences in the Holocaust as victims and refugees. For example, this is how Aviva, the 54 year old daughter of Holocaust survivors from Poland and Germany, explained why she applied for her passport:

*I applied for the German passport to secure a safe place for the children, and also for me. [...] This is part of being second generation. In my parents’ generation, if you had the right papers you were saved, and if you didn’t, you were doomed. So I, as their child, internalized this message. You must always have some place you can escape to.*

This message that Aviva, a classic “second generation to the Holocaust”, internalized through the memories and traumas of her parents, is the horror of statelessness. The global passport regime imposed after the First World War produced its own “matter out of place”: the stateless person without documents (sans papiéres) who does not fall under the protection of any sovereign (Arendt 1951; Malkki 1992; Jean 2011). In the age of biopolitics, when the state is charged with nurturing desirable and neglecting undesirable life (Foucault 1978, 2009; Agamben 1998), having the right documents equals having a right to live, and being without papers might spell a death sentence.

Nowhere was this principle so explicit as in the case of European Jews in the 1930s and 1940s. In the areas under Nazi control, Jews’ passports were marked with the
letter J to single them out and signify that they did not enjoy the protection of the state. During the Holocaust, in Germany as well as in Nazi allies like France, Bulgaria and Romania, Jews without papers were the first to be deported from each country; those who were citizens were usually stripped of their citizenship as a prelude to deportation to the death camps (Reitlinger 1968; Ancel 2003; Weil 2005; Iordachi 2010). Many of the survivors thus owed their rescue to whatever state documents that they managed to obtain, including visas, immigration certificates and foreign passports (Reitlinger 1968; Yahil 1983; Marrus 1985). These events, even if they were not a direct part of the immigrant parent’s personal biography, left a strong impression and contributed to the perception that (the right) papers can save from death. It is partly this lesson, combined with a pre-existing diasporic habitus of flexible citizenship that conditions second-generation parents to seek out the protective capacity of the European passport.

Aside from serving as an insurance policy, the European passport is valuable to second-generation parents in an additional way: obtaining it is an act of good parenthood which strengthens the family through a performance of love and unity. The cooperation between second-generation siblings, which was reported by almost all respondents, sets an example of coordinated family action to the younger generation. And the resultant passport is bestowed upon the third generation as a “free gift”. Bourdieu (1998) notes that a crucial element in the construction of the family in Western capitalist societies is the separation between the logic of the market, which is based on calculation and interests, and the logic of the family, which is supposedly based on pure love and free from overt calculation and expectation for repayment. The European passport is a perfect gift to be given within the family: it is created through cooperation inspired by fraternal love and given as an act of parental love. Furthermore, it is impossible to quantify and calculate the costs and the benefits of citizenship. This makes the passport suitable as a “gift of love” that serves as an intergenerational transfer of wealth while at the same time reinforcing the non-calculating symbolic basis on which the family rests.

The quest for the European passport reinforces the cohesion of the family in an additional manner: it leads family members to engage with old documents like marriage certificates and passports, family photos and stories about the lives of former generations. Stories and personalities from past generations are made present and relevant, and
conversations about them act out the continuity of the family and expand the world of meaning shared by the second and third generations. In some cases, the application process also necessitates visits to the origin country; such visits often become joint family trips in search of traces of the immigrant generation’s past lives, and strengthen the sense of a shared family history.

This collective act of weaving a continuous family story carries special meaning because most Israelis understand their family’s immigration to Israel (Aliyah) not just as a geographical move but as an existential revolution: from the humiliated and miserable life in Exile/Diaspora (the two terms – Galut and Gola – are almost synonymous in Hebrew) to proud and independent life in Israel. This fundamental aspect of Zionist ideology – the rejection of the Exile (Shlilat HaGalut) – played out dramatically in the lives of second-generation Israelis. Growing up in the 1950s and 1960s, they sought to embrace Israeli identity in the most complete way possible, including a refusal to understand Yiddish and origin-country languages, adopting Hebraicized first and last names and rejecting any nostalgia for or interest in their origin country. The total embrace of Israeli-Zionist identity entailed a feeling of estrangement from – and even shame of – their Galuti (diaporic) parents and their past lives. This rupture with the origin country was of course facilitated by the fact that there were typically no relatives left behind and no possibility of visiting communist dictatorships. Therefore, the application for EU citizenship provides the second generation with an opportunity to rediscover the family roots together with their third-generation children.

We see, then, that European citizenship acquires value within the family that goes far beyond the right to work or study in Europe. From the perspective of the diasporically-conditioned second generation, citizenship restitution is an attractive opportunity to improve the family’s prospects by securing economic and political privileges – an intergenerational transfer of wealth. Moreover, the application procedure itself provides second-generation applicants with the opportunity to perform a number of roles within the family: dedicated parents, cooperative siblings and dutiful children who remember and pass on their parents’ life stories.
Mobility

The most direct gain in the global mobility of dual citizens relative to other Israelis has to do with visa-free access to the United States, which is available to citizens of most European Union countries, including Germany and Hungary (but not Poland, Romania or Bulgaria). This cannot be described as a major benefit because the biggest component in the cost of travel to the U.S. is the cost the flight, and obtaining a tourist visa is a small hurdle in comparison. Moreover, the visa requirement imposed by the U.S. is not experienced as particularly humiliating or restrictive. Nevertheless, Israelis who have visa-exempt passports and use them to travel to the U.S. usually spoke about it with great satisfaction. An official at the Polish embassy reported that the most common question that new citizens asked her upon receiving their Polish passport was whether it allowed visa-free travel to the U.S. Given what we know about the place of visas and travel restrictions in the constitution of global stratification, the excitement over small improvements to one’s mobility rights cannot be surprising.

The second domain where EU-Israeli dual citizens may practice their freedom of travel is the European Union itself. Above, I showed that dual citizenship had no effect on labor migration to Europe but it contributed to the creation of a budding creative migration to Berlin. While only a small fraction of the Israeli dual citizen population actually uses these opportunities for migration, there is another – and much common – way for dual citizens to experience a boost in their mobility: presenting their EU passports when crossing borders in Europe. This use was very popular among third-generation dual citizens.

In Israel, as in Serbia, dual citizens were often excited about using their EU passports to enter European countries. The kind of emotions that Israeli respondents reported, however, was very different. Serbians with Hungarian passports felt liberated; their point of reference was their former selves who would wait in lines for hours outside embassies in Belgrade. With the Hungarian passport, they at last felt equal to other Europeans. Israelis did not feel any special liberation when using their EU passports in Europe because the Israeli passport already allows visa-free and hassle-free movement throughout the continent. Instead, the most commonly-cited sentiment was pleasure at being admitted to “VIP line,” which was how many Israelis viewed the EU-nationals line.
Obviously, this sense of exclusive privilege and superiority does not arise out of the comparison to Europeans, but vis-à-vis other Israelis who must use the non-nationals line. In the next subsection, I will return to the topic of using the EU passport and discuss how it interacts with the structure of status in Israeli society.

The third category of destinations where the EU passport boosted Israelis’ mobility can be described as “the rest of the world”. Israeli respondents mentioned non-Western travel destinations much more often than Serbians or Mexicans. Many respondents said – always half-jokingly – that they wished to visit Muslim-majority countries that did not admit Israeli citizens, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan and Iran and (to a lesser extent) Arab countries like Dubai or UAE. While very few dual citizens are likely to ever actually visit any of those countries, their recurrent mention says two things. First, it highlights the Western self-understanding of Israelis and their attraction to “exotic” destinations which reflects Western patterns of tourism (Mexican and Serbian elites were more attracted to “classic” and “beautiful” destinations in the West). Second, the facetious desire to visit Arab and Muslim-majority countries reflects a reaction by Israelis to the sense of siege and exclusion that comes from being surrounded by hostile countries that they can only dream of visiting (see Vignette 2 above).

More generally, the preoccupation with travel destinations around the world reflects Israelis’ view of their European passports as enhancing their global mobility. In the other study cases, the second citizenship was mostly relevant in providing access to the adjacent Western bloc. Serbians were primarily interested in the implications of the Hungarian passport for their freedom to travel of Europe (although a small minority used it to visit the U.S.). Mexican dual citizens used their U.S. passports to enter the U.S. but were less likely to use when traveling to Europe. Mexican dual citizens’ preference for using Mexican passports in Europe and Latin American had to do with the common belief that Americans were hated whereas “nobody has any problem with Mexicans”. Israelis had a diametrically opposed view of their nation’s global popularity: they were keenly aware that they belonged to one of the world’s most hated nations (BBC 2013). Numerous respondents said that it was good to have a European passport because “many people [around the world] don’t like Jews and Israelis”.

200
In that context, the EU passport was useful in three ways. First, Israeli dual citizens could use European passports to visit Muslim-majority countries that do not admit Israeli citizens. Second, even when traveling in countries that admit Israeli citizens, some Israelis prefer to keep a low profile and use their second passport to avoid attracting attention and criticism. And third, several respondents – all of them from the second generation – said that they felt safer when traveling with a European passport because it made them less of a target for terrorism. Israeli tourists abroad are often targeted deliberately by terrorists. In some cases, terrorists singled out Israelis or Jews for hijacking or murder and released non-Jewish hostages. Some dual citizens said that their German or Polish passports might allow them to hide their identity and save themselves if they found themselves in the midst of a terrorist attack. Hiding one’s Jewish identity to save one’s life is of course a familiar idea for the children of Holocaust survivors. Ironically, the German passport now appeared as a potential lifesaver.

There is yet another layer of irony here, which has to do with Israelis’ strong belief that the state of Israel – and only it – had a strong commitment to protect them wherever they were. The media in Israel are full of reports about Israeli embassies in South America and Asia organizing the rescue of Israeli backpackers who got lost while trekking (or even retrieving their remains). In 2011, Israel released 1,027 Palestinian prisoners in exchange for a single Israeli soldier (interestingly, a French-Israeli dual citizen) who was held captive by the terrorist group Hamas. This kind of practices instills in Israelis a strong sense that the state will do anything to protect and rescue them. They often brought it up when comparing their two citizenships. For example, Yariv, a 29 year old Hungarian-Israeli dual citizen from Tel-Aviv said: “of course, if I ever get in trouble and need to be rescued, I will only look to my Israeli citizenship. I know that Israel will send people to climb hills and jump on rocks to save me. I don’t expect this level of commitment from any normal country”. This reveals a fascinating paradox: European-Israeli dual citizens felt that their Israeli citizenship made them a target but also provided protection, while their European citizenship allowed them to keep a low profile but also left them defenseless in case of emergency. Dual citizenship allowed them to have the best of both worlds.
There was a recurrent phrase that seemed to express this sense of security in anonymity provided by dual citizenship: “with a European passport, you are a citizen of the world”. This is a surprising way of thinking about dual citizenship that would not occur to Mexican or Serbian respondents, who saw dual citizenship as a way of becoming American or European citizens. Why would Israelis with European passports describe themselves as “citizens of the world”?

On one level, the view of the passport as providing global rather than European citizenship simply reflects the fact that Israelis are more disposed to think in global rather than regional terms, because they did not clearly belong to any region. This led them to automatically think of European passports as something that could also be useful in the U.S. or Asia. On a deeper level, however, we can view the expression “citizen of the world” as revealing something about the way that Israeli dual citizens conceived of their own Israeli citizenship. The word “citizen” in “citizen of the world” is not used in the ordinary sense as “a full member who enjoys full rights” (such an interpretation would not make any sense); instead, “citizen” is understood in a much more modest sense as “someone who is accepted and tolerated”. Israeli citizens do not see themselves as “citizens of the world” qua Israelis. Not only are there many countries that they are barred from entering, but even visits to friendly countries are often fraught with anxiety about being attacked or criticized for their national identity. In this context, the second passport allows Israelis to be received abroad with benevolent indifference. As one respondent put it, “I want the Romanian passport so I can be free from the burden of being Israeli when I’m abroad”.

**Status**

Third-generation dual citizens receive their European passports as gifts from their parents. Nevertheless, they tended to see their passports as pieces of individual property to be used for their personal advancement. As I showed above, however, the large majority of third-generation dual citizens do not make use of the opportunities to work or study in Europe. Nevertheless, young respondents were usually convinced that European passports were a good thing to have, and spoke about them with an air of pride and
contentment. It was evident that many of them felt that possession of a European passport was an exclusive privilege that signaled social distinction.

One might wonder how a bureaucratic document like a passport comes to be seen as a marker of elite status. In order to understand this situation, a word is needed on the construction of ethno-class identities in Israel. Most sociologists agree that the most significant socio-economic divide within Israeli-Jewish society is based on region of origin: Ashkenazim of Central and Eastern European origin are the privileged group, while those of Middle Eastern and North African descent (Sephardim or Mizrahim) are relatively underprivileged. Ashkenazi Jews from Central and Eastern Europe led the Zionist movement since its early beginnings. Until the late 1970’s, they enjoyed complete political and cultural dominance in Israel (Kimmerling 2001). Historically, two discourses were used to justify Ashkenazi dominance: one was an ideology of republican virtue, which stratified societal groups according to their contribution to the Jewish-Zionist collective, placing the predominantly-Ashkenazi “serving elite” of settlers and fighters (epitomized in the kibbutz) on the top of the hierarchy in terms of influence and prestige (Shafir and Peled 2002); the second was a modernizing discourse that constructed Ashkenazi Jews as modern and “European” in opposition to Middle Eastern Jews (as well as Arabs), who were seen as “oriental” and primitive (Khazzoom 2003, 2008; Shenhav 2006).

Since the 1980’s, secular Ashkenazim no longer enjoy a monopolistic political hegemony, and multiple groups compete over the state’s resources and the power to determine its cultural orientation (Kimmerling 2001). This change was mostly driven by demographic factors: Middle Eastern Jews and religious Jews traditionally had higher birthrates than secular Ashkenazim, and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 brought in a huge mass of Russian-speaking Jews who did not assimilate into the Ashkenazi group, and who soon became economically successful and politically assertive. Nevertheless, Ashkenazim remain the most privileged sector in terms of income and education (Cohen, Haberfeld and Kristal 2007).

This shift has shaped the different perspectives of the second and third generations. Second-generation Ashkenazim grew up as members of a hegemonic group that defined the Israeli mainstream. In contrast, their third-generation children, who grew
up in the 1980s and 1990s, lived through the secular change whereby their ethno-class group was transformed from hegemonic majority into elite minority. The sociologist Orna Sasson-Levy (2008), who interviewed representatives of the two generations, found that older Ashkenazim in their sixties and seventies thought of themselves as “simply Israeli”, while classifying Middle Eastern Jews as belonging to “ethnic sects”; respondents in their twenties, in contrast, defined their Ashkenazi identity as a marked ethnic category set in opposition to other marked intra-Jewish identities like Mizrachi or “Russian”. She argues that contemporary Ashkenazi ethno-class identity is associated with two interconnected characteristics: social elitism and identification with the West. The “Western” identification of Ashkenazim is not tied to the particular country of origin (Israelis do not consider Eastern European countries as Western anyway), but a broader and more vague affinity to Europe and to “Western culture”. Losing their hegemony and becoming an elite minority has changed the way Ashkenazim understood their economic and social dominance: the decline of republican discourse (and the “serving elite”) led to an increase in the importance of the Eurocentric discourse, which is premised on Western self-identification and a view of other Israelis as primitive and unenlightened.

The interviews I conducted with third-generation dual citizens produced findings that were consistent with Sasson-Levy’s (2008) arguments. Their claim to social prestige drew on privileged access to Europe and the West, and was often coupled with a desire to distance themselves from the Israeli mainstream. Many young respondents characterized themselves as individualistic, liberal and open-minded, while contrasting these values with most other Israelis who they described as nationalistic, primitive and oriental. The European passport came up during the interviews as a rhetorical prop that reinforces this self-presentation. Shlomit, a 30-year-old German dual citizen, said that she was happy to have a German passport because it made her into “an Israeli with an alternative, someone who has the option of leaving”. Yariv, another third-generation respondent, said, “my [Hungarian] passport is a provocation against this thing they keep telling us, that we have no other country”. Most respondents preferred not to address directly the gap between Ashkenazim and Mizrachim. A few of them, however, did make explicit references to this topic. Dror, a 28 year old Hungarian-Israeli, said: “in some sense [the
passport) does feel like a membership in an exclusive club. What would you prefer to belong to – the European Union or the Arab League?”

This kind of rhetoric – the European passport as a way to distance oneself from the Israeli mainstream or from Mizrachim – came up repeatedly in many interviews with young dual citizens. To understand it, we should consider two more features of the discourse around EU dual citizenship. First, Israelis were very eager to discuss their EU citizenship and enjoyed laying out their family histories and their views on the topic. This was markedly different from the situation in Serbia and Mexico, where most respondents did not find the phenomenon interesting and were not eager to talk about it. Second, many young Israeli respondents referred to EU citizenship as “magniv”. This is a slang word that roughly correlates with “cool”: something that is magniv is good because expresses its owner’s uniqueness and personality (it is also used by Nadav in Vignette 2). Some third-generation respondents even ranked European passports by their magnivut (coolness) independently of their use value. For example, one respondent said that, for example, a Greek or Italian passport was cooler (more magniv) than a German passport because “it’s more rare […] you see a lot of German passports”.

For young Israelis, then, speaking about EU passports displays high status in three ways: it demonstrates that they are Ashkenazi (at least in part), it allows them to put rhetorical distance between themselves and other Israelis (“I have an alternative”) and it also suggests some degree of uniqueness and sophistication. The European passport, then, is a performative device, part of an array of Ashkenazi strategies of distinction (cf. Bourdieu 1984). One of the main things that Israelis do with their European passports is talk about it.

Interestingly, the distance that respondents put between themselves and “mainstream Israel” does not mean that they did not identify themselves as Israeli. On the contrary, the recurring response to interview questions about their identity was that they felt “100% Israeli”. Moreover, third-generation respondents spoke of their connection to the nation in surprisingly visceral and deterministic terms. Yariv said, “I carry this genetic disease of being Israeli, my mental structure is Hebrew and I could never leave Tel Aviv completely, even if I tried to live abroad”. Sivan, a 30 year-old German-Israeli dual citizen, said: “when I visited Germany, I realized how Israeli I was. I couldn’t
identify with [the Germans]. I sit like an Israeli, gesture like an Israeli, talk like an Israeli, I think differently from them”.

In those typical narratives, being Israeli is an embodied, indelible characteristic that is inscribed in one’s mental structure, language and even bodily posture. These characteristics were described in ethnic terms that were neither religious nor racial – none of them said that Israelis had different souls or different bodies – but were nonetheless solid enough to make assimilation into any other culture impossible. This essentialist, unconditional manner of understanding their own Israeliness is an important element in the generational value shift away from a traditional Zionist view that conditions Israeli national identity on residence and exclusive allegiance. Precisely because third-generation respondents framed their belonging to Israel as unconditional and indelible, rooted in their minds and bodies, they did not believe that any action on their part, including the taking of another citizenship or leaving Israel, would make them less Israeli. This confidence in being “100% Israeli” is the basis for the gap between them and their parents: while second-generation parents were ashamed to be dual citizens, their third-generation children were proud to have a second passport.

Along everyday conversations, there was another social site where European citizenship could be converted into a feeling of superiority (or, in Bourdieu’s terms, symbolic violence). This was the passport control at European airports. For example, Omer (28) explained that the one of the main reasons he obtained his Czech passport was because “it allows me easy access to European countries – you don’t need to stamp it and all that, just show it and go through”. This was typical of third-generation respondents. Although the amount of time that EU citizens save almost never exceeds ten minutes, the experience of taking the EU-nationals line came up in many interviews, and numerous respondents rhapsodized about the “pleasures” of taking it. How does a routine passport control turn into such a special experience?

If the preoccupation with lines and stamps seems petty, it must be remembered that situations like the passport control line, where people are hierarchically arranged in space, are a prominent site for the display of status differences. For many young Ashkenazim, this is essentially what the European passport is about: not having to stand in the same line with other Israelis. This is illustrated by the story told by Yariv (29).
Using his Hungarian passport to gain access to the EU-nationals line, he said, is “one of my greatest pleasures when I visit Europe”. He went on to tell that,

*On my last flight, I arrived in Spain on a plane full of charter-flight passengers who at best could get a Moroccan passport. And of course they all tried to get into the shorter EU-nationals line, but the local gendarmes drove them back. I went right through, while the other Israelis stayed there for another ten minutes. That was fun.*

In this account, the European passport appears as a global status symbol that reaffirms Israeli class boundaries along the familiar lines of ethnicity (“Moroccan passport”, alluding to the Middle-Eastern origin of the other Israeli passengers), patterns of consumption (“charter flights” are all-included deals popular with lower-class Israelis) and “civilized” behavior (“they” are barbarically trying to push themselves into the line where they do not belong). The European law enforcer, by deciding who to let through and who to push away, provides objective, state-sanctioned validation to the distinction between those Israelis who are “European” and worthy, and those who are “non-European” and inferior. As the interviews made clear, many dual citizens think of the EU-nationals line as a VIP line: what makes it prestigious is the fact that other Israelis are not allowed to use it. Thus, the European passport serves as a portable status symbol that allows dual citizens to reproduce Israeli ethno-class hierarchy abroad and experience it in terms of an objectively justified global order.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I analyzed EU-Israeli dual citizenship as a case of compensatory citizenship. Since the year 2000, over 60,000 Israelis whose parents and grandparents came from Central and Eastern Europe have applied to regain the citizenship of their country of origin. Applicants have no interest in becoming German or Polish and see their second citizenship as having no bearing on their national identity. Their main motivation, they reported in interviews, was to gain a “European passport” that will give them access to opportunities in the EU and global freedom of movement. The analysis of trends in citizenship applications suggests another reason: Israelis seek EU citizenship in
the context of geopolitical insecurity, and demand surges in the wake of wars and terrorist attacks. Migration statistics, however, reveal that few Israeli dual citizens actually use their passports to move to Europe, whether for security or economic reasons.

This finding highlights the importance of non-economic, non-practical motivations in shaping Israeli demand for EU citizenship. These motivations vary between the two generations involved in the phenomenon. Second-generation parents appropriate the passport for the service of the family; for them, an additional passport is an “insurance policy”, a use-value conditioned by a diasporic *habitus* and reinforced by the grandparent generation’s experience as refugees. In addition, it serves as an intergenerational transfer of wealth and a gift that reinforces the phenomenological reality of the family through the simple act of giving and receiving. For the younger third generation, the passport is a useful piece of private property that enhances their opportunities and provides them with advantages in the global labor and education market. Another use of the European passport for the younger generation is as a status symbol: it is talked about and displayed in a way that performs its bearer’s high social status vis-à-vis mono-citizen Israelis.

Within the context of this comparative framework, EU-Israeli dual citizenship represents a case of compensatory citizenship that was acquired on the basis of ancestry. It has several features that set it apart from the Serbian and Mexican cases – most of them would also supposedly be found in other cases of ancestry-based dual citizenship (for example, in Brazil or Argentina). Unlike in Serbia and Mexico, in Israel the second citizenship is not acquired from a neighboring country and does not take place in the context of ongoing migration. This entails a much greater cultural distance from the granting country. Moreover, the procedure of acquiring citizenship on the basis of ancestry does little to bridge that distance. Whereas strategic applicants in Serbia and Mexico must undertake a difficult (and sometimes risky) personal journey in order to obtain citizenship – studying a new language, giving birth in a foreign country – in Israel, seekers of citizenship do not have to modify any component of their identity or lifestyle. They only seek bureaucratic recognition of their family’s pre-existing legal status and kinship ties. Most of them do not even handle the procedure themselves: their
contribution amounts to bringing whatever documents they have and paying a lawyer to do the rest.

In the experience of those applicants, then, acquiring EU citizenship is an almost-naked exchange of money for passports. This attitude is further reinforced by the highly commercialized nature of the industry around EU citizenship, which is stoked by its relative affordability that makes into a casual middle-class consumption article. These factors explain the highly economic relation of Israelis to their EU citizenship. German or Romanian citizenship is experienced not as an identity-relevant legal status that binds them to a certain collective, but rather as a piece of private property, which is obtained through a process of restitution that costs money (but no special effort) and bears the form of a concrete physical object that is only loosely national: the European passport.
Notes

1 Recent immigrants to Israel from European countries – for example, the over 70,000 French-Israeli dual citizens – are not necessarily strategic. Often, they are genuinely transnational. Here, however, I focus here on native-born Israelis with roots in Central and Eastern Europe, who are all strategic dual citizens.

2 There was also substantial immigration from non-European countries, above all from Morocco (270,000 immigrants) and Iraq (130,000) (Cohen 2002).

3 This figure was reached by combining two estimates from different sources. The first estimate is based on the number of first- and second-generation European Jews in Israel (1.04 million) to which I added one-half of the category that the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics defines as “Israeli origin” (third- or fourth-generation Israelis) which totals 2.34 million (2011 figures). It is safe to assume that at least half of the latter group are Ashkenazi in full or in part (Cohen 2002). I assumed that this population grew from 2011 to 2015 at 1.8% annually (Israel’s population growth rate), which led to an estimate of 2.37 million in 2015. The second estimate simply takes the percentage of Israeli Jews who reported some kind of European ancestry in a 2009 survey (KAS and Pardo 2009) and multiplies it by Israel’s Jewish population in 2015 (in the same survey, 4% reported that they already had EU citizenship, which is consistent with my estimate for that year). This led to an estimate of 2.48 million eligible. These figures are very close to each other so I used the average as a rough estimate.

Note that everyone who has Central and Eastern European ancestry is actually eligible for citizenship. This calculation does not take into account potential eligibility for Spanish and Portuguese citizenship which might extend to hundreds of thousands of Israeli Jews with roots in North Africa, the Eastern Mediterranean and Latin America. At this point, however, it is impossible to determine how many of them will actually be able to claim that citizenship.

4 Greek and Bulgarian Jews are actually Sepharadic rather than Ashkenazi. In general, however, Ashkenazim are from Europe and the Americas and Sepharadim from Asia and Africa.

5 None of the respondents used these generational terms to refer to their family’s duration in Israel. Moreover, Israelis who were born in Europe after 1945 are also referred to as “second generation”. Several respondents used the full expression and referred to themselves as “second/third generation to the Holocaust,” as a way of explaining various complexes and anxieties.

6 There are, however, numerous limitations on dual citizens: they cannot serve as members of parliament or serve in some sensitive security positions.

7 In Poland there is an emergent discourse of restitution towards Jews, particularly with connection to the expulsions of 1968 (Plocker 2008; Gorny and Pudzianowka 2010).

8 I also conducted informal follow-up interviews with six of the first-wave respondents.

9 Demand for German citizenship existed before 2000, but it was much lower. The yearly number of acquisitions after that year was four times higher than the average in 1970-1999 (see Figure 2 below).

Source: data received upon request from German Statistical Office.

10 Available data that are not presented here suggest that citizenship acquisition from other countries peaked later: for example, Polish citizenship peaked in 2009-2013.

11 I am grateful to Dan Assan for providing these data.

12 Only about 1 in 7 of those actually resulted in an active application. I use statistics on inquiries rather than applications because they provide a more direct measure of demand.

13 The R-Squared for the regression was 0.65. The two indicators were correlated at 0.8. Keep in mind, however, that the number of observations is very small.

14 The names of all respondents have been changed.

15 There is a random element in this second criterion. For example, many Jews who left Poland in the 1950s have never lost their citizenship and simply have to reactivate it; those who left in 1968 were stripped of their citizenship in a procedure that Poland’s current government considers flawed, and may apply for its return. However, Polish citizens who served in the Israeli military between 1948 and 1951 have automatically lost their Polish citizenship and cannot reacquire it. Most German Jews have been stripped of citizenship by the Nazis and may now regain it. In Romania, as in Poland, both situations exist.
Some Israelis actually study Hungarian for the sake of citizenship. They remain, however, a small minority among dual citizens. None of the respondents I have interviewed had studied any language or made an ethnic performance for the sake of citizenship.

These differences are not limited to the field of citizenship restitution but parallel variations in the sensitive field of property restitution. Whereas Germany has been quite forthcoming in offering property restitution to Jews, other countries have been much less cooperative (Weinbaum 1999). This has to do not only with the fact that restitution might upset millions across the region who live in properties that used to belong to Jews, but also with the fear that giving back property to Jews will reopen questions about the land and property of Germans who were expelled after World War Two.

However, several thousand Israelis who study medical professions in Italy, Hungary, the Czech Republic or Romania or pursue advanced degrees in Western European universities.

Respondents believed that a “European passport” gave them the right to free university education in any European country. In fact, citizenship has no effect on tuition in France or Germany, and EU citizens who did not live in Europe were not eligible for a reduced fee in Britain. In contrast, Mexican respondents were usually aware of the general costs of studying in the U.S. and the reduced fee for Texas-born students at Texas institutions. Serbians knew about wages in Western Europe and had some idea about what jobs were available there.

There is an interesting correlate between this kind of part-time emigration to Berlin and the phenomenon that French Jews call “Aliyah Boeing”: high-earning French-Jewish professionals who wish to move to Israel without losing their jobs in France spend Monday to Thursday each week working in France and fly to spend the weekends with their families in Israel.

Alongside this view, some respondents also justified their right to citizenship in less economistic terms. Some of them said that they deserved citizenship because their immigrant parent or grandparent was born in the granting country and spoke its language.

Habitus is a concept developed by Pierre Bourdieu (1998) which refers to a set of embedded cognitive structures and practical dispositions that are transmitted within the family. It plays a key role in the intergenerational continuity of classes and ethnic groups.

Recent examples include the 2008 attack in Mumbai and suicide bombings against Israelis in Bulgaria (2012) and Istanbul (2016).

It has been argued that the creation of two “ethnic” blocs out of diverse communities took place in Israel (Khazzoom 2003, 2008; Shenhav 2006). Mizrahim literally means “Orientals” and usually refers to Jews from Arab countries and Iran.

Khazzoom (2003) shows that the “orientalist” essentializations that were used to justify internal ethnic hierarchies in Israel replicate stereotypes that were applied to Jews by Western Europeans. Similar instances of “internal orientalism” are found among other groups that were in an intermediate position between “East” and “West”, as in the Balkans (Verdery 1995; Herzfeld, 1997; Todorova 1997). This was seen above in the chapter on Serbia, where educated urban elites saw themselves as modern and European and the rest of the population as oriental and primitive.
The aim of this dissertation has been to develop a new approach to citizenship which focuses on its role in defining an individual’s position within a stratified global society. Citizenship has traditionally been analyzed as a dyadic relation between an individual and a state. This emphasis has led scholars to study how citizenship status shaped individuals’ relation vis-à-vis the countries that they lived in or – in the case of diaspora and emigrant citizenship – had some strong political or emotional tie to. In contrast, the approach I adopted here reframes citizenship as a relation between an individual and the entire global system.

This approach builds on the theoretical foundations that were laid by multiple social scientists and legal scholars. Three key contributions include Barry Hindess’ (1998) view of citizenship as a “population management regime” that divides the world’s population into discrete, governable units; Audrey Macklin’s (2007) concept of a graded “heft of citizenship” and the series of works by Ayelet Shachar and Ran Hirschl (2007, 2013, 2014) on citizenship as inherited property, award for excellence and prize in a “birthright lottery”. These works provide a theoretical basis for thinking about citizenship as position in a global hierarchy. Until now, however, those insights have not been integrated into an empirical research program that examines how citizenship-related attitudes and behavior of individuals are shaped by consciousness of their global position.
Recent developments have made global inequality in citizenship value more salient than ever, preparing the ground for such an empirical study. Globalization entails an increased circulation of representations and information and a growing international connectedness through tourism and migration, processes that have made people around the world more aware of life standards in other countries. An even more important development is the global shift towards the toleration of dual citizenship since the 1990s. This legal change contributes to the transformation of the meaning of citizenship: from an ascriptive, rigid category that one is born into and has little prospect of changing, into a flexible status that one may pick and choose – or even strategize to maximize utility and compete with other actors.

**Extension of the area of struggle**

At the moment, this post-exclusive turn directly affects a relatively small minority of the world’s population – about 1.8 percent of the population in 30 countries that I sampled, and double that rate in Western countries. In the foreseeable future, at least, most people will continue to live their entire lives with the same citizenship with which they were born. Nonetheless, the presence of millions of individuals with dual nationality – which they often obtained for instrumental motives – contributes to the legitimization of a new relation to citizenship. When the condition of exclusiveness in membership is waived, numerous other aspects of citizenship also change. Dual citizenship is at the forefront of the shift from the construction of citizenship as a high-stakes, high-commitment and sanctified status to “citizenship light” (Joppke 2010a,b) – light in rights and even lighter in obligations and identity commitment. In Weber’s terms, we would say that this shift represents a change in the social action associated with citizenship from value-rational (*Wertrational*) to instrumentally-rational (*Zweckrational*). Taken to its extreme, an instrumentally-rational approach to citizenship entails that the specific country of citizenship is not an end in itself, but only an interchangeable means towards another end – in this case, global position.

Another way to think of the post-exclusive turn in citizenship is to compare it to other historical shifts in which a good that has been sanctified and kept out of the market
becomes commoditized and disenchanted. An appropriate example would be the commoditization of land in Europe. To present it in a simplified manner, during the Middle Ages, land was not for sale on the market, and could only be acquired as inheritance or as a grant from the monarch in exchange for services. Land was tied up with personhood so intimately that persons would often be named after the piece of land that they owned. In modern times, land gradually became a market good to be bought and sold as any other good. This inevitably led to the disenchantment of land ownership and its subjection an instrumental, competitive and utility-maximizing logic of action.

Another useful analogy can be found in the writings of the French novelist Michel Houellebecq. In several of his novels – above all in the novel “Whatever” whose original French title is “Extension of the area of struggle” (Extension du domaine de la lutte) – Houellebecq argues that the sexual revolution of the 1960s represented the penetration of the logic of competitive capitalism into the domain of sexuality: from a system that guarantees modest satisfaction to all to a regime of open competition which has clearly defined winners and losers. Taking a cue from Houellebecq, we can think of the rise of dual citizenship as an extension of the area of struggle to include nationality. After the abolishment of “monogamy” in the field nationality, the field of citizenship becomes an instrumental and competitive domain of acquisition. Inevitably, inequality in citizenship grows: some individuals collect two or more high-value citizenships while others have nearly-worthless citizenship or no citizenship at all.

**Rise of the sovereign individual**

This dissertation aimed to establish the existence of an increased tendency among individuals to relate to citizenship not on the basis of emotional or political ties but on the basis of its relative place within a global hierarchy of citizenship value. Such a relation entails a cognitive component – the possession of a mental map of different countries’ relative citizenship value – as well as a behavioral component – value orientations and practical dispositions that permit for strategic planning of citizenship status.

The statistical data and the interviews that I conducted in all three different middle-tier countries show the penetration of new instrumental and individualist attitudes
to citizenship. This is clearly illustrated when looking at the three study cases. In each of those cases, the citizenship dyad in question would have been unthinkable for much of the 20th century. When Yugoslavia took over Vojvodina, the residents of the region had to relinquish their Hungarian citizenship or leave (Boarov 2001); in Mexico, there was historically a very negative relation to emigrants who “betrayed” the nation by taking up U.S. citizenship (FitzGerald 2005); and for several decades following the Holocaust, the vast majority of Israelis would be horrified by the thought of taking up German citizenship. The current legitimacy of dual citizenship in those cases provides evidence of a normative shift towards greater individual autonomy.

For most of the 20th century, individuals were expected to uphold the interests and prestige of their national collective when making decisions on citizenship, and failure to do so attracted sharp criticism. This study reveals the new legitimacy for individual, utility-maximizing behavior in that domain. The strategic citizenship seekers I had interviewed were conscious of the traditional oppositions to dual citizenship – the threat of Hungarian irredentism, the affront of American dominance, the shame in accepting tainted German citizenship – but they brushed them aside without great difficulty. Respondents were aware of the relative value of citizenships around the world and were ready to take action to improve their position within that hierarchy. What do differences between the cases show about varying degrees of penetration of the new instrumental relation to citizenship in different societies?

In Israel and Mexico, seekers of strategic dual citizenship were at ease using instrumental discourses. They saw themselves as “sovereign individuals” (cf. Weil 2012) who were entitled to choose their citizenship(s) to match their interests and convenience. At the same time, respondents in those two countries had different ways of thinking about their right to a second citizenship and exhibited a different relation to their two citizenships.

In Mexico, upper-class individuals who engaged in or benefited from birth tourism saw themselves as members of a global capitalist class. They referred to that identity when justifying their instrumental bid for U.S. citizenship, arguing that their spending in the U.S. as tourists and shoppers gave them a right to secure citizenship for their children. At the same time, they also stressed that they were attached to Mexico and
did not feel American or Mexican-American. When speaking about their tie to Mexico, upper-class respondents did not emphasize ethnic or racial characteristics such as the Spanish language, the Catholic religion or their *mestizo* origin. Instead, they said that they preferred Mexico over the U.S. because of the business opportunities, comfort and luxury it offered them. They did not rule out moving in the future. Thus, they exhibited a form of capitalist cosmopolitanism that treated both citizenships in an instrumental manner (cf. to the elite diaspora Chinese studied by Aihwa Ong (1999)).

In Israel, too, respondents exhibited an instrumental-individualistic relation to their second citizenship and used economic arguments to justify their right to it. The contents of that discourse, however, were different from the one used in Mexico. First, Israelis saw their origin-country citizenship as a piece of inherited property that was illegally taken away. Whereas upper-class Mexicans claimed U.S. citizenship as consumers, Israelis claimed EU citizenship as former owners seeking restitution. In the context of this property-oriented view of the second citizenship, neither group felt that it came with any strong obligations or an identity commitment.

Second, Israelis also stressed their attachment to their primary citizenship and their distance from their secondary citizenship. However, the rhetoric they used to describe their connection to Israel was very different from the instrumental, lifestyle- and opportunity-oriented discourse used by elite Mexicans. Israeli dual citizens expressed their connection to Israel in explicitly ethnic, visceral terms. They saw the Israeli citizenship as inseparably tied to their ethnic identity and made it clear that they were unassimilable in Europe because their mentality and demeanor were intimately shaped by the Hebrew language and Israeli upbringing. Respondents had a strong sense of partaking in a Jewish fate which they could not escape – “I will never be anything except a Jew from the Land of Israel” in the words of one respondent. Therefore, European-Israeli dual citizens were not cosmopolitan (except, perhaps, “rooted cosmopolitans” (Harpaz 2013)).

In Israel, the instrumental approach has changed the understanding of citizenship (young respondents were no longer ashamed of having German citizenship) but did not penetrate into the field of ethno-national identity. Israeli dual citizens are instrumental and individualistic about their EU citizenship but sentimental and collectivistic about their Israeli citizenship.
In Serbia, the penetration of the instrumental relation to citizenship has been relatively weak – not a surprise, given the country’s recent communist past. Serbian respondents did not typically use property metaphors when referring to citizenship. While their motivation to apply for citizenship was very openly economic, they did not justify their right to it in economic terms. Furthermore, whereas middle- and upper-class Israelis and Mexicans confidently opined that they had every right to take citizenship decisions in accordance with their best interests, Serbians were much less comfortable with this individualistic, instrumental discourse. Strategic applicants often associated citizenship with ethnic identity or national allegiance and some of them felt that their bid for Hungarian citizenship was a kind of “fraud” because “I am not really Hungarian”.

Another related sentiment was a feeling of shame arising from their supposed selfishness which might put Vojvodina at a risk of being lost to Hungarian irredentism. The uneasy relation to the instrumentalization of citizenship was also expressed in the tendency of respondents to criticize Serbia in order to justify their interest in dual citizenship. This reveals their assumption that in seeking another citizenship, they were in some way breaking the contract between themselves and Serbia. That has led them to argue that Serbia broke the contract first. Finally, the application process itself often led strategic applicants to develop some affinity to Hungary. They were also open to embracing a supra-national European identity and distancing themselves from Serbian ethno-national identity. All these attitudes and behaviors were nearly absent in the other cases. These differences reflect a far slower penetration of capitalistic and individualistic practices and norms into Serbian society (cf. Lazić 2003).

**Connecting local and global inequality**

One more point that bears mentioning pertains to the impact of compensatory citizenship on local and global inequality. Traditionally, students of inequality treated nation-states as discrete containers and analyzed the internal stratification within them in isolation from the surrounding world system. The flexibilization of citizenship, however, highlights the need for a new approach that will connect within-nation and between-
nation inequality. The cases included in this dissertation illustrate the growing linkage between these two systems of stratification.

Until recently, Ashkenazi Israelis, middle- and upper-class norteños and Serbians from Vojvodina enjoyed some local advantages over their co-nationals (very modest ones in the case of Vojvodinians) but had the same status as them in relation to the outside world. The diffusion of compensatory dual citizenship has changed this state of affairs: those domestic advantages of origin, wealth, location and ethnicity can now be converted into global advantages in the form of Western or EU citizenship. Privileges that had an informal, local and non-institutionalized nature have turned into a formal status which is institutionalized in the form of a passport and recognized by all of the world’s countries.

Differential access to compensatory citizenship brings to the surface internal dimensions of heterogeneity that processes of nation-building in those countries sought to do away with: in Mexico, the gap between European-origin or globally-connected elites and less privileged indigenous and mestizo populations (cf. Mateos 2016); in Serbia, the split between a historically Austro-Hungarian, Central European north and an Ottoman-Balkan south; and in Israel, gaps between Ashkenazi and Mizrahi (Middle-Eastern) Jews. In middle-tier countries, the availability of compensatory citizenship privileges one sector of the citizenry in a way that could potentially undermine conceptions of a unified and equal nation.

In the West, dual citizenship also creates a potential disruption to national cohesion but, ironically, it mostly goes in the opposite direction. In response to the threat of terrorism, several countries (including the UK, Canada and Australia) have begun to strip dual national terrorists of their citizenship, and several other countries – including France, Germany and Switzerland – have considered such moves (Spiro 2014; Joppke 2016). It is easy to understand the motive behind this trend given the large proportion of dual citizens among the Islamic terrorists who attacked France, Belgium and other countries. However, one of the problematic aspects of this practice is the fact that it designates dual citizens – who, in the West, are mostly naturalized immigrants – as “conditional citizens”. Thus, denaturalization contributes to creating a two-tier system in which naturalized citizens are constitutionally inferior. While such a system is not unheard of in the West (it existed in the U.S. until the 1970s (Weil 2012; Spiro 2016)), it
potentially stands in contradiction to the ideal of civic equality that Western countries present as central to their politics. There is, then, a global divergence in the meaning of dual citizenship: in middle-tier countries, privileged individuals obtain dual citizenship to gain extra security and social prestige; meanwhile, in the West, dual citizenship (especially from the “wrong” country) increasingly marks its bearer as a suspect and a potential candidate for denationalization.

**Directions for future research**

There is still much that remains to be learned about the global phenomena of dual and compensatory citizenship. Two potential fields of inquiry stand out in particular.

First, a crucial avenue of investigation that I was unable to develop here concerns the effect of dual citizenship on the economic outcomes of the individuals holding it. We would expect that, all other factors being equal, compensatory dual citizenship would provide economic advantages to those holding it. This study has shown, however, that economically well-off groups – such as EU-Israelis and upper-class Monterrey U.S.-Mexicans – do not directly seek higher-paying jobs but mainly use their second citizenship to broaden the scope of consumption and lifestyle choices open to them (cf. Amit 2014). Dual citizens with fewer economic resources – Hungarian-Serbians and middle-class border-town U.S.-Mexicans – are more likely to use dual citizenship for direct economic gain through labor migration. However, there is every reason to assume that both these categories are not following traditional trajectories of mobility, employment and consumption. Therefore, there is a need to conduct more statistical, large-N studies about the actual effect of dual citizenship on earnings, education, consumption and mobility (cf. Portes, Guarnizo and Haller 2002).

Second, the field of citizenship policy is highly dynamic and involves strategic reactions and counter-reactions from all parties involved. Consider, for example, the Hungarian government’s quick response to allegations of fraud by toughening access to citizenship (Chapter 3). There is a need to study how publics and governments in granting countries respond to the proliferation of dual citizenship and to the instrumentalization of national membership. It is not implausible to assume that mono-
citizens of Western countries with lower levels of human capital would experience the growing flexibility of citizenship as a threat to their global position.

Therefore, it would be highly useful to explore the backlash against flexible and instrumental citizenship that seems to emerge in different parts of the Western world. This includes the return to denaturalization that I discussed above, as well as a host of other steps that aim to “roll back” some aspects of globalization: the introduction of strict citizenship tests in Western Europe (Orgad 2010), the scandals over “Canadians of convenience” (Patriquin 2006), the tightening of taxation on U.S. citizens abroad and even the “Brexit” vote and the Trump presidential candidacy. These dramatic developments cannot be properly understood outside the context of citizenship transformations, and the hopes and fears that they give rise to among individuals occupying different positions in the global hierarchy.

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1 See, however, Brubaker’s (1996) concept of a triadic nexus produced by politics of co-ethnic affinity.
2 Shachar and Hirschl (2007) discuss the analogy between land inheritance laws and laws of citizenship transmission.
3 This is not to argue that the proliferation of dual citizenship leads to an increase in statelessness. It is not inconceivable, however, that there is a causal link between these phenomena that has yet to be pointed out.
Appendix 1: Sources on the prevalence of dual citizenship (Chapter 2)

Germany: Göroğlu 2014.
Netherlands: Statistics Netherlands 2012
Canada: Statistics Canada 2011.
Spain: INE 2015; Shachter 2015.
Switzerland: OFS 2015. Pertains only to persons who are over 15 years of age.
UK (dual passports not dual citizenship): ONS 2014.
Portugal: Shachter 2015.
Ireland: Shachter 2015.
Finland: Shachter 2015.
Israel: author’s calculation based on Harpaz 2013, Shachter 2006, Assemblée des Français 2013, EDA 2013, Ministero dell’Interno 2013, MPC 2013 and data received from the German, Czech, British, French and Polish embassies.
Brazil: author’s calculation based on the number of dual citizens with Spanish, French, Italian, Swiss and Portuguese citizenship. I used consular statistics from those five countries, which list the number of non-resident citizens registered in their consulates and whether they are dual citizens (for France, Italy and Switzerland) or were born abroad (for Spain and Portugal). I assumed that Spanish and Portuguese citizens who were born abroad were dual citizens, since Latin American countries grant automatic citizenship at birth. This minimum estimate includes only five EU countries for which data were available, and it only includes dual citizens who registered at the consulate. Therefore, it represents a significant undercount. Sources: AIRE 2012; Assemblée des Français 2013; EDA 2013; Ministero dell’Interno 2013; PERE 2014; Observatório da Emigração 2014.
Bosnia: Štiks 2010.
Argentina: see Brazil.
Mexico: author’s calculation based on estimates of U.S. dual citizens and EU dual citizens. U.S. dual citizens were calculated on the basis of the U.S.-born population in Mexico minus the number of U.S. citizens with visas (INEGI 2011; Chavez and Cobo 2012). This is most certainly a substantial underestimate; the total number of U.S. dual citizens in Mexico might be double or even triple that. The number of EU dual citizens was calculated in the same way as in Brazil.
Serbia: data received upon request from Serbian Bureau of Statistics plus Balint 2014.
Poland: GUS 2012.
Venezuela: see Brazil.
Greece: data received upon request from Greek National Statistical Bureau; Stjepanovic 2015.
Hungary: Shachter 2015.
Croatia: Shachter 2015.
Russia: data received upon request from Russian Federal Statistics Service. These are the official census data – actual figures might be much higher but they could not be confirmed.
Czech Republic: data received upon request from Czech Statistical Office.
Lithuania: data received upon request from Statistics Lithuania.
* I used European Union Democracy Observatory on Citizenship (EUDO) country reports as a source of information about citizenship law, citizenship policy and migration trends in European countries. See www.eudo-citizenship.eu
The percentage of immigrants in the population of each country is taken from United Nations (2013).

Appendix 2: Sources on dual citizenship in Israel (Chapter 5)


**Bulgaria:** Stock: email communication with officials at the Bulgarian embassy in Israel, June 2016. Acquisition: Smilov and Jileva 2009; Zhelyazkova, Kosseva and Hajdinjak 2010; email communication with officials at the Bulgarian embassy in Israel, June 2016.

**Czech Republic.** Stock and acquisition: email communication with officials at the Czech embassy in Israel, July 2015.

**Finland:** email communication with Finnish Immigration Service, November and December 2012.

**France**: number of French citizens registered in Israel and Jerusalem in 2015 retrieved from Ministry of Foreign Affairs website (www.diplomatie.gouv.fr). According to officials at the embassy in Israel, the total number of dual citizens could be higher, even up double (personal communication, June 2015).

**Germany:** Stock: email communication with officials at the German embassy, June 2015.

Acquisition: data received from German Statistical Office.

**Greece:** email communication with officials at the Greek embassy in Israel, July 2016.

**Hungary:** Stock: author’s calculation based on MTI (2010) estimate of 15,000 Hungarian-Israeli dual citizens in 2010, to which I added a minimum figure of 2,144 Israelis who obtained Hungarian citizenship in 2011-2014 (Bálint 2014).

Acquisition: Bálint 2014.

**Italy:** Stock: number of Italian citizens registered in Israel and Jerusalem in 2014, retrieved from the Anagrafe degli Italiani Residenti All’Estero (Registry of Italians Residing Abroad) from www.esteri.it Acquisition: Tintori 2011.

**Poland:** Stock: personal communication with officials at the Polish embassy in Israel, June 2016. Acquisition: Polonia Christiana 2014 (authenticity was confirmed by embassy officials).


**Romania.** Stock: estimate based on the number of Israelis who obtained Romanian citizenship (from www.cetatenie.ro) and comparison with number of citizens from other countries. Precise statistics on the stock of dual citizens were unavailable.

Acquisition: data from www.cetatenie.org

**Spain:** Padron de Españoles Residentes en el Exterior (Registry of Spanish living abroad), 2015. Retrieved from www.ine.es
Switzerland: Stock: Auslandschweizerstatistik (Swiss abroad statistics) for 2015. Lists only dual citizens (there were an additional 3,384 mono-citizens). Retrieved from www.edua.admin.ch
Acquisition: data received from Bundesamt für Migration (Federal Office for Migration).
UK: email communication with officials at the British embassy, November 2008.

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228


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229


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