 LANDSCAPES OF CONQUEST: SPACE, PLACE, AND ENVIRONMENT IN LIVY’S
AB URBE CONDITA

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Abstract

This dissertation deals with the topics of space, place, environment and geography in Livy’s work. It examines the ways in which Livy uses images of the landscape and the environment to explore the themes of power, knowledge and authority in his narrative of Rome’s conquests. Recent research on space and place in Livy has tended to concentrate on the first decade and on the monuments and topography of the city of Rome. My project, on the other hand, aims to bring more attention to the later decades, in particular the fourth and fifth, in which the history turns more towards Rome’s expansion throughout the Mediterranean world.

I argue that Livy’s representations of landscapes and geography outside Rome can be read as a metaphor for his approach to history in general. By creating fluid, subjective spaces in his narrative, he draws attention to the importance of those qualities in historical narratives, and implies that it is not possible to represent either history or geography in an objective, singular way. By presenting multiple perspectives on the spaces and places of the history, and multiple possible readings of them, Livy emphasizes the idea, presented in his preface, that events can be interpreted in a number of different ways.

Alongside that, I argue that his use of space and geography is fundamental to understanding his narratives of conquest and empire abroad. Livy’s portrayals of individual places and larger conceptions of space become a means of exploring anxieties and tensions among the Romans themselves about their rapid military expansion. The characters’ reactions to new places and the broadening of their geographic horizons are a
particularly significant way of conveying both the virtues and the dangers of their successive conquests in Greece and Asia.
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Space and place are essential and inevitable components of any narrative, in that they are where events happen. Historical narratives, since they claim to tell the truth about the past, also implicitly claim to tell the truth about the spaces and places in which their events take place. It has long been recognized, however, that this claim to tell the truth is more complicated than it appears. No historical narrative is capable of straightforwardly and objectively representing the past; the nature of narrative forces the author to select and shape the events being told, and in the same way the settings of that narrative, the spaces and places in which events take place, are also selected and shaped for the purposes of the text.¹ No narrative space, then, can be a true representation of reality, even in a historical text which purports to talk about real events and real places. It is easy to ways in which space and place are functioning as more than reflections of reality when they appear in a text which announces itself as fiction, a novel or a poem.

Nineteenth century novels, with their detailed descriptions of setting, have attracted a great deal of this kind of attention. The symbolic qualities of wild landscapes in the work of Thomas Hardy and Emily Bronte, for example, has been much discussed, alongside the domestic spaces which are more prominent in Jane Austen and Henry James.² Idealized pastoral settings in poetry have been analysed as a commentary on the problems of an urban society from Theocritus to


Wordsworth. The artificiality of space is even more pronounced in drama, which so severely constrains the scope of its action. The idea that history might deliberately do more than attempt to represent space and place in an objective way, however, has received much more resistance, and few attempts to analyse its treatment of these concepts in the way that has become commonplace for other types of text. Among the ancient historians, Livy is especially appropriate for this kind of analysis because he is not under the illusion that his history is a straightforward narrative of the past. In his preface, he uses the image of the *monumentum* as a metaphor for his history, upon which viewers can see the lessons of the past and choose which they wish to imitate and which to avoid. In the opening statement of his work he prioritizes interpretation and the multiplicity of readings. In this dissertation, I will argue that his treatment of space and place is very much in accordance with that original perspective – they are interesting because of the variety of readings and interpretations they provoke.

My main interest, then, is in the way that Livy uses space and place in a literary, formal way, to characterize his actors, to highlight themes running through the history, and to suggest possibilities for interpreting it. The aspects of space and place I discuss are varied, sometimes appearing as descriptions of places or landscapes or the geography of a larger area in the voice of the author, at other times focalized through a particular character or group of characters. Livy does not tend to give lengthy descriptive excursuses on geography or terrain, nor does he seem to envisage geography as an area of interest that should run alongside history (as do Herodotus and Polybius, for example). He has frequently been criticized for his lack of accuracy and apparent disinterest in topography for this reason. Various explanations have been given for this, ranging from carelessness, to the more sympathetic idea that the Romans generally accepted invention.

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and “illusion” in their descriptions of topography, to David Levene’s recently proposed theory that Livy was consciously placing himself outside of a historical tradition (embodied by Polybius) which prioritized accuracy and autopsy. The latter approach, in reinforcing the point that Livy was not inflexibly committed to the representation of a prosaic reality, and that he recognized that historiography could go beyond that, most characterizes my own approach to the way that space and place function in the AUC.

At this point, it will be useful to look more specifically at some of these functions, and consider some different ways in which space and place in the history do more than just (attempt to) describe an objective reality. As I have said, there are relatively few extended descriptions of landscape or geography, and when they do appear, they usually signal a critical moment in the narrative. There are several in books 21–22 which accompany significant events: Hannibal’s first sight of the Alps is described in some detail, and the account of his crossing features regular notes on the terrain. Major battles often prompt a description of the landscape: Trasimene in book 22 and the capture of New Carthage in 26 prompt some of the most lengthy and detailed topographies in the third decade, while Cynoscephalae, Thermopylae and Pydna, in books 33, 36, and 44 respectively are also very much situated in their particular terrain. One of the aspects of these kinds of description which I focus on is the sense of activity in the landscape; these places are not merely backdrops but rather have some part to play in events. John Ruskin’s notion of the ‘pathetic fallacy’ is a useful idea to have in the background here, although it must be stressed that the sentimental, emotional expressions of nature that he had in mind are a long

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way from what Livy is doing. Nonetheless, Livy’s landscapes do take on qualities which elevate them above the level of a setting. The terrain of Trasimene appears to encourage the ambush that Hannibal sets up for the Romans there, while the mysteriously ebbing lagoon of New Carthage lends itself to Scipio’s divine pretensions. Often there is a moral element to these landscapes, even a kind of immanent divinity which works through or against Livy’s characters. Hannibal falls afoul of a violent storm on a mountainside soon after a particularly violent and treacherous attack on an Italian town; Aemilius Paullus’ mastery of his Macedonian environment in 44 takes on some supernatural elements which put his enemy Perseus at a disadvantage.

Another major topic I focus on is Livy’s sense of spatiality, or the conceptions of space that appear in the narrative, sometimes in the authorial voice but usually focalized through one character or another. We see how they think about their position in a certain space, which can be anything from the entire orbis terrarum to a small part of the Italian countryside. The most basic thing that characters do in space is move through it, and their conceptions of space are often governed by a journey. The way that they are shown thinking about their position and trajectory can reflect both on their character and on larger themes in the history. At either end of the third decade, for example, Hannibal and Scipio are characterized in a significant way by their very similar drive to move forward and their tendency to view the space of their journeys into Rome and into Spain in a simplified, clear-cut way. Both are also associated with crossing boundaries, and at a basic level this highlights how extraordinary each man is. But the opposing directions that each prioritizes (Hannibal is obsessed with getting to Rome and comes to see Italy as a foreign homeland, while Scipio prefers to move away from Italy altogether) raise questions about the problems of viewing Rome as the centre of the world, and the difficulties of Italy becoming a homeland for the Romans, as it was coming to be in Livy’s own time. Another example is a

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speech given by the commander at Thermopylae, as the Romans are about to engage in battle with Antiochus, sets up a construction of the space seen from the mountain pass in which Syria (and the wealth of the Seleucids) is just within reach, the next logical step in Roman expansion. The distortion of the geography and perceived immediacy of Syria reflects the rapid outward progression of the Roman army and the speed of conquest, and also provides a context for the reader to question Roman motivations for expansion. By looking at the way these spaces are thought about within the narrative, we can understand how Livy was reflecting on the changing position of Rome in the world over the past centuries, and the Augustan world-view pervaded the Romans’ sense of their past.

The last major aspect of my approach is the recurrence of particular types of landscape or place in the history, and the way that Livy makes these places touchstones for a certain kind of theme or discussion. Certain features of the natural world appear again and again, and fulfill the same functions at different points in the narrative. The sea, for instance, and characters who draw attention to the significance of crossing it, are a recurrent feature of the fourth decade, and highlights the fateful nature of the Romans’ first major wars outside Italy. Mountains, and the views that they afford, also recur, and provide visions both of space and time. Characters see both the area ahead of them and prospects for future conquest, which may or may not be misleading. Even more powerful is the recurrence of places with which the Romans have had some interaction, and the way that they come to stand for some problem or ambivalence in the history. In the third decade, the brutality of Roman interactions with the sanctuaries of southern Italy and Greece – places which have the traits of a locus amoenus – also comes up repeatedly. As centres of divine activity which the Romans choose to trample on, those sanctuaries also become centres for the troubled relationship between Rome and its allies. From this we can see
that places are not just there in the history because they need to be; rather Livy is making them focal points for interpretation of Rome’s history.

The overarching theme which Livy’s treatment of space and place brings up is Rome’s place in the world and the Romans’ relationship to the other peoples in it. The link between conceptions of space and Roman empire is one that was being widely used and thought about in the Augustan period, and the AUC often echoes that discourse. Stock phrases about the borders of empire, about Roman power extending over the *orbis terrarum*, or from the rising to the setting of the sun, frequently find their way into the narrative. We will discuss in more detail later the way that Livy responds to various aspects of spatial thought that were prevalent in his own time, but for now it is enough to note that the association between space and politics was one that he had thoroughly absorbed. Livy, however, does not incorporate this kind of thinking into his history in a straightforward way. One of his main concerns is of course in the complexities and ambiguities of how empire comes into being.

I have already touched on the way that Livy uses both individual conceptions of space and the recurrence of certain types of place to raise questions about the status of Italy with regards to Rome. Another such ambiguity appears in the Romans’ interactions with Greece and its high culture. The delicate relationship between Rome and Greece, which has yet to devolve into open war by the end of the extant parts of the history, is often figured through references to Romans seeing and hearing about famous Greek places. In its nature, the narrative is fundamentally Romanocentric, and this reveals itself even in the events that take place away from the city. When we find Roman commanders and armies abroad, their interactions with spaces and places become a way for Livy to highlight the Romanocentrism of their relationships
with other cultures. The best example of this is the tour of Aemilius Paullus in Greece, who goes on a tour of famous places in Greece, and his perceptions of those places relate them, in one way or another, back to Rome. The glories of the Greek past are essentially overwritten by being seen through Roman eyes, and they become important because they are now placed in a Roman context. This is a way for Livy to figure the tension between wonder and conquest which characterizes the Roman attitude to Greece in his history. Similar, but more subtle effects are created when the Romans are shown in places which recall some famous past event, such as the Persian invasion at Thermopylae or the Trojan War. In these cases, the famous place takes on new resonances because the Romans are there, but we also see the Romans in a particular light because they are in the context of that place. When Livy puts the Romans at Thermopylae, or at Troy, it is especially interesting because of the associations of these places with attackers and invaders; Livy is creating a problematic context here for the pervasive Roman rhetoric about liberation and defence of allies, rhetoric which accompanies their military progress into Asia.

Space and place in Livy, then, fulfill a variety of functions which go beyond their real existence, and in this Livy is taking quite a different approach from many of his predecessors in historiography. We can take Polybius as an example. Livy uses Polybius as a source for his narrative from at least the third decade onwards, and many passages in Livy can be compared with “originals” in Polybius. Yet their approach to space and geography is worlds apart. For Polybius, geography and topography are things that a serious person should know about. If you are interested in history, you should be interested in geography; both are things you can extract knowledge from that will be useful in the real world. Polybius’ approach to space and

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geography is that it should be a representation of the real world, because that makes it useful for his readers, and his history is fundamentally didactic and concerned with usefulness. Livy is less concerned with representing reality, and uses place and space both for the effects described above, and also as a reflection on his own historiographic vision. Spaces in the Ab Urbe Condita are to an extent part of reality, but they are also part of history and of the tradition of historical writing. In that sense, they are like events themselves, in that they have a reality, but also a history which is subject to interpretation. They have general knowledge and memory associated with them, alongside the written tradition. Certain places engender certain expectations and associations, and Livy actively engages with these. As I mentioned above, famous places like Thermopylae take on new meanings as Roman history is laid onto them, but they could not take on those meanings without an understanding of their past and the tradition that exists about them. Livy’s Thermopylae is not simply an objective space, neither is it just Herodotean, or Catonian; rather it encompasses all of those things and creates a new version of itself at the same time.7 This is true both in the thematic sense, that the Romans make the places they encounter more Roman, but it is also a comment on the nature of the historiographic tradition and its fluidity. This aspect of Livy’s treatment of place is particularly important because all historical texts purport to have the same relationship with space, that is, they should represent reality. Written descriptions and perceptions of places actually encourage interactions with other texts because the places have both a reality (their objective existence), as well as repeated interpretations of that reality in literature. Historiography cannot explicitly do with place what poetry can – embellish it, invent it, mythologize it – nor is there the same expectation of allusion and engagement with predecessors. Yet, just as Livy expresses an inclination towards a poetic

opening at the end of his preface (si, ut poetis, nobis quoque mos esset, libentius inciperemus), his use of place and landscape reflects a poetic sensibility.

With this approach to interpreting the meaning of spaces in the AUC, we have to take for granted that Livy’s relationship with his sources is much more than copying. Polybius is a source for Livy’s Roman history, but his text is also something that Livy was actively engaged with and which he reshaped, modified and criticized in the construction of a new narrative. David Levene argues that Livy frequently reworked and adapted his Polybian material (and he holds this to be especially true for the third decade), in a deliberate and self-conscious way, sometimes even “correcting” points where he disagrees with Polybius. Livy at least is aware of the fact that some of his readers might be looking at his work with Polybius in mind or at hand, and adapts accordingly.\(^8\) Alongside this multifaceted use of sources, Livy was interacting with the ancient literary tradition at large, both historical texts and others. Echoes of Sallust have been widely recognized, in the preface, for instance, and in Livy’s description of Hannibal at the beginning of book 21, and Thucydidean allusions can also be identified.\(^9\) One example I will discuss in my first chapter can be found in the account of the massacre at Henna during the Hannibalic war in book 24, where Livy seems to have Cicero’s Verrines in mind, in which an extended description of Henna can be found.\(^10\) So space and place become a node of connection between Livy and the literary context he is working in. The AUC shows us that knowledge and memory are stored in these places, whether that is through general knowledge or written history, and Livy engages with that kind of memory in his narrative. Descriptions of places are not meant to be a

\(^8\) Levene, Hannibalic War, 126–63.


\(^10\) See also Mary Jaeger, “Once more to Syracuse: Livy’s perspective on the Verrines.” in Livy and Intertextuality.
straightforward reflection of reality, but they prove that space itself is subject to competing interpretations, that various meanings can be attached to spaces at different times. In this respect spaces function as an analogy for historical events in Livy, they can teach us lessons about the present and future, and we can prioritize which lessons we take from them.

*Space and place: some theoretical background*

The analysis that I am doing of space and place in Livy owes much to the general theoretical work that has been done on these concepts in recent years. There has been a huge increase in the amount of attention paid to spatial topics in scholarship on the ancient world since the 1980s, following on from the ‘spatial turn’ in the humanities and social sciences which picked up pace in the 1970s. The kind of work that is being done on Classical texts owes a great deal to the many and varied theories of space and places which have developed since then. In this section we will look at the ideas which are most relevant for thinking about Augustan and specifically Livian constructions of space and place. Firstly, the idea that space is socially constructed: spaces are both physically created and mentally imagined by human beings, rather than just existing in an objective way. Central to this theory is the notion that the control of space is a means for people to exercise power over other people. This has clear ramifications for thinking about the way space was organized in Augustan Rome, where the space of the city was reconstructed to reflect the power and virtue of the new regime, and where the geography of the empire was constantly on display. When we come to Livy, we will see that perceptions of space

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11 As Denis Cosgrove describes it, “A widely acknowledged ‘spatial turn’ across arts and sciences corresponds to post–structuralist agnosticism about both naturalistic and universal explanations and about single–voiced historical narratives, and to the concomitant recognition that position and context are centrally and inescapably implicated in all constructions of knowledge.” *Mappings*, (London: Reaktion Books, 1999), 7.
in the history often feed into our notions about the nature of Roman power and control over others. While space and mapping have been one major concern of human geographers, the even more subjective concept of place has come to be equally important. The interpretation of places and what they represent (the past, the future), is a recurrent theme in Livy, and in this section we will touch on some influential theories of place, which show how human experience and memory are crucial to our understanding of what place is. The way that scholars have shown the endless imaginative possibilities of place, and conversely, the way that certain associations tend to cling to places, will be an essential basis for thinking about this concept in Livy.

The kinds of definitions of space and place currently used in the humanities and social studies developed out of the field of human, or cultural geography (as opposed to physical geography). This field is concerned with the relationship of human beings with their environments, of whatever type and scale that environment may be. How does human activity respond to the environment and how does it shape it? Human geographers began to devote a lot of attention to the concepts of space and place only relatively recently, from the 1960s and 70s onwards, forming ideas about space that were rooted in the way that human beings perceive it. This development was a reaction to the definition of space that had been most prevalent at the time, a definition which has its basis in physical geography and cartography: space is an absolute, something external to human perception, and something which can be measured objectively. According to this kind of definition, space is something neutral, analogous to a container, and humans simply do things in or on it.

The alternative to this line of thought is that space can actually be active. In itself, and in the ways it is organized by human beings, it has the capacity to shape human behavior. Henri

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Lefebvre’s 1991 book *The Production of Space* is the most comprehensive articulation of this idea, although it had been in existence since the 1970s in the work of David Harvey and many others. Marxist thought was the primary impetus for the work of both Harvey and Lefebvre, and their concern is broadly the way that society and social groups create, imagine and respond to space, and how it underpins power relations between those groups. Harvey argued for the idea that the way space was constructed (particularly in cities) actually reinforced social structures, namely capitalism and the injustice that it brought with it. As a way of reconciling this large-scale social analysis with the way that people really experience space on a day to day basis, Lefebvre proposed three categories of space, or three types of human relationship with space: conceived space, perceived space and lived space. Conceived space is the most absolute and theoretical, and it is the one common to cartographers and to people who build cities. Perceived space is more to do with social interaction and daily life, it is the view of space which allows people to function and interact with one another, which in turn influences how space is produced within that culture. Finally, lived space is the imaginary space of human beings, the way space looks in the mind, with all the images and symbol that humans might associate with it. All three of these categories are related, they help to formulate and propagate each other. This exploration of the role of space in society and different levels of imagining it is a useful background for thinking about space in the Augustan period and how Livy was responding to that context. Augustan Rome was a space built to reflect and strengthen power structures, and building projects in the provinces took on that role as well; the Sebasteion at Aphrodisias is a particularly

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striking example.\textsuperscript{15} The broader idea that there are different ways to see space which operate at different times is also helpful when we think out the ways that various characters within Livy’s narrative perceive space and what that means. ‘Conceived space’ is an especially applicable idea when it comes to certain commanders in the history, and we will discuss what effect it has when characters display this absolute view of space.

Alongside these Marxist-influenced discussions of space, the work that has been done on the nature of maps and their relationship with social structures and power also provides a useful perspective on Augustan attitudes to space. J.B. Harley, the author of the most influential work on cartography in the 1980s and 90s, also moved away from an objective reading of space when he wrote about ‘deconstructing the map’.\textsuperscript{16} Harley adopted an approach to the map which was heavily influenced by Foucault and Derrida. By examining the map as a text and exposing its ideology (hidden beneath the scientific objectivity usually claimed by cartographers), Harley shows how all maps are in fact ‘rhetorical’. They all serve some kind of purpose in relation to those who are having the maps made, the people in power. Harley looks especially at the kinds of maps made by colonial powers from the 18\textsuperscript{th} to the 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries, suggesting that they are in essence an imperialist tool; by engaging in mapping, the agents of colonialism are bringing territories under their control. Maps also have the power to prioritize particular kinds of information, as Harley discusses in detail in his essay ‘Maps, knowledge and power’. Military maps and maps which mark out individual property serve obvious purposes for the social orders which require them, and maps are also subject to omission and distortion, as in the famous


\textsuperscript{16} J.B. Harley. ‘Deconstructing the Map.’ \textit{Cartographica}, 26, no. 2 (Spring 1989), 1-20.
example of Mercator’s Euro-centric world map. They can present the world as their makers think it should be.17

As a cognate to Harley’s specifically map-based work, we might think about a more general way in which views of space and geography reflect power relations. A key concept behind much of Edward Said’s work on cultural imperialism is ‘imaginative geography’, the way in which one part of the world conceptualizes another. In Orientalism, Said discusses the reductiveness of viewing ‘the Orient’ as a geographical entity in itself. As an example, he uses two Athenian tragedies which feature the East, Aeschylus’ Persians and Euripides’ Bacchae, arguing that in them we can see the roots of modern ‘imaginative geography’ about the Orient. We see in these plays how Europeans are giving voices to the Orient, speaking for them and thus dominating them, and also how the Orient is conceived of as a seductively dangerous force with the capacity to undermine European rationality. Said goes on to show that the subdivision of the Orient into smaller spheres in the ancient world was mediated by European exploration: there are regions explored and conquered by Herodotus and Alexander, and then there are unknown regions not visited by them.18 Said’s discussion of ‘imaginative geography’ helped the subjects of space and place assume a great deal of importance in post-colonialist studies.19 The analysis of the conceptions of space and geography that are produced by conquerors and self-appointed

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17 See also Denis Wood and John Fels. The Power of Maps, (New York: Guilford Press, 1992); Mark S. Monmonier, How to Lie with Maps, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Cosgrove, Mappings.
superior powers is a vital tool in interpreting texts about empire, and one which has been influential in Classical studies.\textsuperscript{20}

The kind of cultural geography so far discussed focuses on the relationship between space and overarching superstructures, and is helpful for thinking about the social context Livy was working in. We will talk more about the Augustan preoccupation with geography, mapping and borders later on, and also about how Livy responds to these discussions. When we move into an analysis of the individual places in Livy, and the way that they store memory and tradition, and provoke a range of perceptions, we can find some useful background in more experience-based theories of smaller scale spaces.\textsuperscript{21} Yi-Fu Tuan has done the seminal work on place as a space of “lived experience”, created by memory and emotion. Tuan adopts a humanistic philosophy to examine how space is experienced, filtering everything through lens of an individual. Yet he also illustrates the multiplicity of human experience and perspectives on space and place. The same kind of landscape and the same kind of space can evoke totally different reactions from different people at different times. Tuan’s work has echoes of the earlier phenomenological work of Gaston Bachelard in \textit{The Poetics of Space}, which also asks how the individual consciousness experiences spaces. Bachelard is especially drawn to domestic spaces, the spaces in which poets and writers work, and he analyzes the human experience of these


\textsuperscript{21} The distinction I am drawing here between social constructivist notions of space and phenomenological notions of place is a highly simplified way of defining the two, but it is helpful to think about these two broad traditions as a way into the discussion of space and place in literature. Stephen Cheeke in the introduction to his book \textit{Byron and Place: History, Tradition, Nostalgia} (Houndmills; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), esp. 7-8, sees these two categories (‘Marxist cultural analysis’ and the more place-oriented ‘poetics of space’ tradition which emerges out of the phenomenology of Heidegger) as the most significant for literary studies of space. For a much more comprehensive and detailed discussion of the scholarship on place and its complex relation to scholarship on space, see Charles J. Withers, ‘Place and the “Spatial Turn” in Geography and History’, in \textit{Journal of the History of Ideas} 70.4 (October, 2009): 637–658. For a more philosophical background to the concept of place, see Edward Casey, “How to Get from Space to Place in a Fairly Short Stretch of Time: Phenomenological Prolegomena,” In \textit{Senses of Place}, edited by Steven Feld and Keith S. Basso, (Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press, 1996).
places through readings of poetry. The spaces of houses and homes are the ones with which we are most intimate, and in which our personal experience of space is most fully developed.

The work done by Tuan and Bachelard places a great deal of emphasis on the individual’s conception of place, but the analysis of a historical narrative tends to raise more questions about collective conceptions. These, of course, are rarely unified and straightforward, so that one of the recurring themes of this dissertation is the way in which certain places have different resonances and contain different memories at various points in the history. Much work has been done on this idea with relation to landscape, which Denis Cosgrove defines as ‘the external world mediated through subjective human experience.’ Simon Schama has taken up this approach to landscape in his wide-ranging and digressive study, *Landscape and Memory*. As he remarks in his introductory pages, ‘Before it can ever be the repose of the senses, landscape is the work of the mind. Its scenery is built up as much from strata of memory as from layers of rock.’ Even the places which appear be most natural, untouched or primeval are still the products of our own culture, and look different from one culture to another. One of his lengthier discussions centers on the forests of Germany and their role in German self-fashioning from the Roman period up until the twentieth century. In discussing the AUC, we will look at the ways in which certain landscapes create certain expectations, and think about how Livy challenges those expectations, in his treatment of the Alps, for example, or of the *locus amoenus* motif in Latin literature.

Equally important to this study of Livy is the kind of work that has been done on memory and built spaces. If the natural world is constructed through memory and culture, the city, which is literally constructed through human agency, is even more so. Said provides an example of how

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this works in his article ‘Invention, Memory and Place.’ In pointing out how fluid memory is, and how it can be ‘used, misused, and exploited’, particularly when it comes to national history, Said lights on the example of Jerusalem. As he puts it, Jerusalem is ‘a city, an idea, an entire history, and of course a specifiable geographical locale, often typified by a photograph of the Dome of the Rock, the city walls, and the surrounding houses seen from the Mount of Olives.’ Said points out how the histories and traditions associated with Jerusalem are often in conflict with one another, and how the mythological Jerusalem seems to ‘overlay’ the real landscape with ‘symbolic associations totally obscuring what as a city and real place Jerusalem is.’ This notion that myth and history are, in certain places, the primary things that people see when they look at those places, that they detract from the possibility of viewing the ‘real’ place beneath, is vital for interpreting the role of place in Livy’s work, especially when we see the interactions between conquerors and the many places in the ancient Mediterranean that had strong myth-historical traditions. Said’s work, both in this article and in Orientalism, also speaks to the role that historical narratives have in reinforcing and maintaining certain associations of places. Livy’s awareness of the way that earlier historiography and other forms of literature canonized particular places (or types of places) is crucial to understanding his own approach to it.

The questions that these studies of space and place have tried to answer have been to do with the way the world is; they are social and historical questions. To a large extent, studies of the representation of space and place in literature have been focused on similar questions. In the introduction to his book The Role of Place in Literature, Leonard Lutwack remarks on two major ways of looking at his titular subject: place can have a role in literature as either ‘idea’ or ‘form’.

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25 ibid. p180
26 ibid. Rome itself is often thought of in similar terms, as when George Eliot describes its impact on Dorothea in Middlemarch: “[Dorothea] was beholding Rome, the city of visible history, where the past of a whole hemisphere seems moving in funeral procession with strange ancestral images and trophies gathered from afar.”
The first of these he explains as ‘attitudes about places and classes of places that the writer picks up from his social and intellectual milieu and from his personal experiences’. When this kind of place is studied in literature, what is usually being examined is the way in which the author reflects his own culture and society in his writings. In terms of this dissertation, we might think about how Livy’s conception of space and geography compares to and differs from other Roman and Augustan representations of space. In Lutwack’s other category, when place is used in a more formal way, it is as ‘material for the forms he uses to render events, characters and themes.’ The justification for using this literary approach derives from the work of Hayden White on the essential narrative quality of historiography, and subsequent efforts to build on that work in relation to ancient histories. A. J. Woodman’s *Rhetoric in Classical Historiography* has been the most decisive force in drawing attention to the literary qualities of ancient historical writing and has had a massive influence on the way that these texts are now read.

The division of approaches to space and place into Lutwack’s two categories is to some extent a helpful one (and one I have made in this introduction when talking about ways to approach space in Livy), but nonetheless they frequently overlap. An approach which takes into account the social context of literature and asks how the author is responding to it, but also emphasizes the role of space and place as ‘formal’ elements and the way in which they bring out certain themes and concerns, is the method I have chosen to follow in this dissertation. The questions asked by human geographers about our experience of space and place, which have filtered down into studies of literature, are the questions I am asking of Livy. How is Livy

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27 See the introduction to Irene de Jong, ed. *Space in ancient Greek literature: Studies in ancient Greek narrative*. (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2012) for a list of types of narratological space which goes into more detail on these more formal uses of space.

responding to and subverting contemporary cultural notions of space and the rhetoric around it? What bearing does the rhetoric about empire in particular have on those constructions of space and place? Separate, but not indistinguishable are the questions about the role that space and place have in highlighting themes and aspects of characterization in the narrative – how are they working as formal elements? And what function does the thematization of place and landscape have? How does it contribute to a distinctive historiographic project, a notion of the way history should be viewed? Before turning to a summary of the way I answer these questions in my chapters, it will be helpful to have some background on the discussion of space and place in Classical scholarship, and consider how classicists have used these theoretical approaches in the study of the ancient world.

*Space and place in ancient thought and literature.*

Recent scholarship has seen a variety of ways to approach the question of how the ancients conceived of space, some focusing on particular authors and others drawing on a range of sources in order to give a comprehensive view of one aspect of spatial thought. Examples of the latter approach, which explore the role of a certain type of landscape or space in ancient thought and literature, have covered an array of topics. Some influential examples include James Romm’s treatment of the juncture between myth and geography in *The Edges of the Earth in Ancient Thought*, and C. R. Whittaker’s more down to earth discussion of the frontiers of the Roman empire. Other studies have been devoted to particular features of the landscape, such as the monographs by Harry Brewster and Prudence Jones on rivers in Greek and Roman culture.

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respectively, discussions by Merle Langdon and Richard Buxton of the role of mountains in Greek religious thought, as well as a book on Greek meadows. A recent volume by Diana Spencer provides a survey of Roman attitudes to landscape which is of particular interest here, although she is most concerned with cultivated landscapes and aesthetic appreciation of them, and in her detailed discussions of Roman literature she mostly focuses on ‘natural’ landscapes actually created by human beings: the country estate and the garden.

A frequent theme in my dissertation is the role of a kind of immanent, implicit divinity in Livy’s landscapes. The gods do not explicitly have a role in the action, of course, but nonetheless there are hints throughout of divine or supernatural activity. There have been several studies looking at how the ancients conceived of the connection between deities and the countryside. Traditions about deities inhabiting landscapes abounded in Greek and Roman religion, and certain places or types of landscape had mythical associations or vaguer numinous qualities which might either attract people to them or cause them to stay away. The relationship between Greek religion and the landscape has been the focus of several of the studies mentioned above, including Richard Buxton’s *Imaginary Greece* and André Motte’s treatment of meadows and gardens in Greek religious and philosophical thought. Taking a somewhat different tack, Susan Cole’s study of the Greek landscape and religion focuses more on spatial divisions: the ways in which the Greeks claimed religious space, maintained it, and gendered it. Her work draws heavily on the theory of social space in the ancient Greek polis articulated by François de

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Polignac, wherein cult sites on the edges of polis territory functioned to distinguish civilized space from wild space. There have been fewer comprehensive studies of Roman religion’s connection to the natural world, with most discussion about Roman religion centering on the city of Rome and major extra-urban sanctuaries, although the Italian countryside certainly did have an abundance of smaller sacred sites. 33

The Italian rural landscape and its magical or divine qualities does, however, feature prominently in Latin literature, and there are several treatments of the way it functions there, particularly in poetic texts. One purely literary study is Charles Segal’s monograph on landscape as symbol in the Metamorphoses. 34 Working on the assumption that the locus amoenus has been used by earlier authors as a symbol of peace and harmony, Segal shows how Ovid subverts the trope and makes the landscape a more ambiguous entity, suggesting deception, menace, and violence. In a study of Virgil’s Eclogues that is more grounded in Roman cultural conceptions of the countryside, Eleanor Leach questions the premise that the locus amoenus was unproblematically a symbol of peace for the Romans. 35 The negative connotations of numinous landscapes are also brought out in Matthew Leigh’s article on the sacred grove and Caesar’s destruction of it in Lucan’s Bellum Civile. 36 Clearly, the poets who are the subject of these studies had much more license with the way they describe landscape and the qualities they ascribe to it, but I would argue that this sense of the supernatural acting in the environment is something that Livy internalized and that it is there in his history. Even though Livy sometimes

explicitly rejects the possibility of divine forces at work (for example in his account of Scipio’s miraculous–seeming turning of the tides at New Carthage), he does nevertheless leave the reader with a lingering suggestion that something out of the ordinary has happened. There are landscapes with strange qualities, such as the battlefield at Trasimene, in which the Roman army is stripped of its powers of perception throughout the battle, or the Alps, which are as treacherous and deceptive as Hannibal himself. Commanders who appear to have extraordinary power over the landscape also become a theme; Hannibal and Scipio and their superhuman feats of control over nature bookend the third decade, and Aemilius Paullus demonstrates similar power in Macedonia in the fifth.

When it comes to senses of place and space in urban and built settings, the bibliography is vast. Most relevant for my dissertation is the work that has been done on cities and memory, and the way that urban spaces configure the past, very much in the vein of Said’s remarks about Jerusalem. A chapter by John Ma in *The Oxford Handbook of Hellenic Studies* gives a helpful introduction to the topic, discussing how Greek cities created and maintained collective identity through monuments which ‘make memory.’ Rome is and has been the primary object of this kind of reading, and Augustan Rome in particular. I have already mentioned how we can see the Augustan program of rebuilding, and its deliberate effort at creating memory, as an important context for thinking about place in Livy. Even though I will not be focusing much on the city of Rome in my dissertation, the major studies that have been done on its topography give us some useful background. Catherine Edwards’ *Writing Rome* explores this topic through the lens of ancient literature written about the city, asking what part texts played in generating meaning and

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memory. Diane Favro’s work on Rome’s ‘urban image’ takes a different approach, looking both at collective cultural notions of the ancient city and the physical impact of the surroundings on the city’s inhabitants and visitors, and tracing the changes in both of these areas undertaken by Augustus. Both of these studies share the notion that the city can be read like a text, with Edwards contending that monuments and topography functioned as a historical narrative in ancient Rome, in fact as ‘a substitute for a literary narrative.’ This line of thought has been an influential one for studies of ancient literature, as we shall see, giving rise to analyses of the way that spaces can be read within literary narratives, and also the way that texts, in turn, function as spaces. The ‘city as memory’ idea has been taken up in treatments of individual texts, such as Tara Welch’s monograph on Propertius’ fourth book, which looks at the depiction of monuments in the elegies and how they can be read as subverting the Augustan project of creating memory through urban regeneration. The multiplicity of meaning in literary monuments is also the subject of Mary Jaeger’s Livy’s Written Rome, which is (in part) concerned with the way that Roman monuments represent the past and the way that characters in the text respond to that. Ann Vasaly’s Representations also has much to say about the way that Roman audiences reacted to monuments and the memories wrapped up in them, and the ways in which Cicero used this to persuasive effect in his speeches.

Jaeger’s book is also interested in a narratological perspective on space in Livy, in the way that the text creates and becomes its own space, structuring the reader’s perception of the real spaces it portrays. As she puts it in the first chapter, “The Ab Urbe Condita presents the

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reader with a written Rome, one that refers to the world outside yet, through its own organization, controls the reader’s perception of that objective world. This is particularly evident in Livy’s portrayal of the city proper. The hills, river, and plains of the city impose their own shape on the narrative of events, even as the record of those events fills the landscape with significance. The narrative produces a schematized urban topography, one that is all the more meaningful for its abstraction.  

41 Jaeger and Christina Kraus have also discussed Livy’s conception of his text as a particular kind of space, arguing that metaphors of paths (and movement down them) provide an way of understanding how the author saw his text developing and how he structured it.  

42 A somewhat different narratological approach is taken by Alex Purves in her study of ancient Greek narrative, which seeks to demonstrate how the author’s conception of space affects the shape of the narrative. focusing on two different conceptions of space, cartographic and hodological.  

43 The contrast she draws between space in the Iliad and in the Odyssey demonstrates the difference: the Iliad presents space in a (proto)cartographic manner, from a god’s eye view, and the plot reflects this, ranging over a variety of characters and actions in a compressed length of time. The Odyssey, on the other hand, conforms to a hodological view of space, seeing events from the traveller’s perspective, and so the narrative has no fixed boundaries, just as the Odysseus’ wanderings have none. Of the approaches we have seen so far to space and place, this is the one which receives the least attention in my dissertation. In particular, I want to move away from the topographic, Rome–based study that has been particularly fruitful from a narratological standpoint, and think more about the spaces.

41 Jaeger, Livy’s Written Rome, 19.
43 Alex C. Purves, Space and time in ancient Greek narrative. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
and places associated with war and conquest – the outward movement of Rome. We can still identify in the later decades moments where the relationship between textual space and narrative space is pronounced. A good example is the beginning of book 31, where Livy contemplates the volume of work left still to do and compares it to wandering into the shallows of the sea and suddenly finding himself out of his depth, with the expanse of ocean before him. Thermopylae, too, with its viewpoint over the future sites of Roman conquest, can be read in this light, and we will touch on these significant examples.

More relevant to the discussion of spatial thought and its relationship to Roman power is the recent interest in ancient mapping, which can be attributed to efforts on the part of David Harley and his colleagues, is an excellent example of how classical scholars are trying to understand the realities of ancient conceptions of space, in a way that is less reliant on the idiosyncrasies of individual authors. The apparent scarcity of two-dimensional maps from the ancient world has sparked a great deal of debate about how the ancients thought about space, distance, and how to get from A to B. These questions have been particularly urgent when it comes to the Romans, since it is a baffling thought that they were able to maintain a vast empire


45 Numerous overviews of the ancient evidence for thinking about space and geography have been produced. The mostly traditional survey which sparked the recent interest in ancient maps is Oswald Dilke, Greek and Roman maps, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1985). The volumes cited above, edited by David Harley and Richard Talbert, also offer overviews (Dilke was largely responsible for the sections on ancient cartography in Harley and Woodward, History of Cartography). Francesco Prontera, “Karte (Kartographie),” In Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum, ed. Georg Schöllgen, (Stuttgart: Hiersemann, 2001) is a shorter and useful survey. Daniela Dueck, Geography in Classical Antiquity. Key themes in ancient history, (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012) is the most recent overview, with a chapter by Kai Brodersen on cartography which sums up the major points to emerge from his own classic study, Terra Cognita: Studien zur römischen Raumfassung, (Olms, Hildesheim 1995, 2nd ed. 2003). Claude Nicolet, Space, geography, and politics in the early Roman empire, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991) also provides an overview in two chapters and lays out the evidence for drawn and painted maps in the Greek and Roman world.
without wide-scale use of maps. The scholarly fascination with the map of Agrippa, for which our only evidence is in literary sources, is one such manifestation of the problem.\footnote{See J. J. Tierney ‘The Map of Agrippa’, in \textit{Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy. Section C: Archaeology, Celtic Studies, History, Linguistics, Literature} 63, (1962 - 1964):151-166; Nicolet, \textit{Space}, 95–122; discussions of the map can also be found in every overview listed above.} One early answer to this problem, proposed by Pietro Janni in 1984, is that the ancients conceived of space more in terms of one-dimensional lines than two-dimensional maps.\footnote{Pietro Janni, \textit{La mappa e il periplo: Cartografia antica e spazio odologico}, (Roma: Bretschneider, 1984).} As evidence for this he discusses the Peutinger map, the medieval depiction of the \textit{cursus publicus}, the road network of the later Roman Empire, thought to derive from ancient maps, possibly even the map of Agrippa itself. The Roman itineraries, principally the Antonine itinerary, a written list of stations along the roads of the Roman empire and the distances between them, also lend support to this idea. The maps that did exist, such as the map of Agrippa, may well have reflected this line/itinerary-based world view.

One of the major points to emerge about Roman conceptions of space is how closely linked they were to their empire. There was clearly an explosion of interest in geography in the late first century BC and under Augustus, which was linked to the rapid expansion of Roman hegemony into new and distant territories. In many recent studies on Roman mapping we find this link made explicit, echoing David Harley’s work on mapping as an exercise of power. C. R. Whittaker, in his book \textit{Frontiers of the Roman Empire}, argues for a Roman conception of space which divided it into territories that were under control and territories that were not, with the borderland or frontier as the space of transition. Whittaker attributes this to two main factors, on the one hand the cosmological thought that the Romans inherited from the Greeks, which was defined by the notions of centre and periphery, with a good deal of distortion and uncertainty about the places in between; on the other hand the ‘science and techniques of divination and
mensuration’, which were ‘deeply embedded in Roman society’.\(^{48}\) Whittaker goes on to discuss the work of the agrimensores and the inevitable association of such land-surveying and boundary-drawing with the exercise of power and control. The same point is also made in Brian Campbell’s article on the agrimensores, that ‘in time of conquest the creation of limites and the division of land provided a public and highly visible demonstration of Roman power and the humiliation of the enemy; they announced complete Roman control of the disposal of the land, permanent occupation, and a probable intention to distribute the fruits of victory to her own citizens and soldiers.’\(^{49}\) We can see from this kind of scholarship how fundamental conquest and power were to the way the Romans thought of the spaces outside of Rome.

This link between conception of space, organization of space and the expression of power is clearly demonstrated in the scholarship on Caesar’s commentarii, in which we have access to the way a Roman general really did conceive of space. Michel Rambaud’s article on the tripartite division of space in Caesar’s Gallic wars (into geographical space, strategic space and tactical space) was the first of a number of treatments of Caesarian space. In his monograph on the Gallic Wars, Andrew Riggsby argues that Caesar conceives of space in the commentaries, particularly tactical space, in a way that corresponds to a more official Roman way of measuring land, that of the agrimensores or land surveyors. As both ways of dealing with space imply conquest and appropriation, and Caesar’s approach to space is closely tied to his imminent takeover of the land.\(^{50}\) Christopher Krebs also draws on Rambaud’s categories draws a contrast between Caesar’s perception of space in Gaul and in Germany, suggesting that while the general

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\(^{48}\) Whittaker, Frontiers, 18.  
predominantly saw Gaul in terms of strategic space, (i.e. lines he could easily travel along), he sees Germany more in terms of geographic space, and this reflects how overwhelming its landscape is.51

This brief run through the scholarship on space and place in Classical studies has demonstrated the main areas of interest within the field, and these are interests for the most part taken up in my dissertation. We will see how some distinctively Roman attitudes to space and place are reflected in Livy’s history, and how memory and the interpretability of places function to create a more complex picture of Roman expansion and the Roman relationship with foreign peoples. Building on this survey, we can now think about Livy’s approach to space and place in some more immediate contexts, that of the Augustan period itself and the ancient historiographical tradition.

*Space and place in Augustan Rome*

With the background of these approaches to space in ancient literature and culture in mind, we can now turn to Livy’s more immediate context. Livy was writing a history of Rome at a time when, under Augustus, the Romans were celebrating their empire reaching its widest yet extent. So what were the main features of contemporary thinking about space, place, and geography which might have had an impact on Livy’s history? Firstly, geography and images of the world were closely bound up with politics and the ruling class. As Claude Nicolet points out in the introduction to his book, *Space, Geography, and Politics in the Roman Empire*, the most prominent representations of the world available to Romans at this time were linked with

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Augustus himself. Agrippa was responsible for the first map of the world to be put on public display in Rome, though the form it took has been a subject for debate. Sculptural representations of conquered nations were another highly visible way to display the extent and variety of Rome’s empire: the lost “Porticus ad nationes” supposedly featured depictions of all the nations under Roman control. The Res Gestae, inscribed on pillars in front of Augustus’ mausoleum, also put on display the contemporary obsession with the space covered by Roman influence and also the borders and boundaries of the pax Romana. The text is shot through with geographical rhetoric which conveys the enormous, world-encompassing, almost cosmic scale of empire: there are frequent references to the orbis terrarum and to the great boundary of Oceanus, alongside other impressive natural boundaries such as the Alps, the Rhine, and the Danube. The lists of foreign names of tribes and kings also reinforce this sense of distance and exoticism.

Naturally, this rhetoric bled into the literature that was being produced at the same time. The prophecy of Anchises in Aeneid 6 develops the image of cosmic empire (and its association with Augustus) even more explicitly, moving on from Augustus’ delight in the borders of empire to the idea of imperium sine fine, and describing Augustus extending the empire to a land that lies extra sidera…extra anni solisque uias, ubi caelifer Atlas axem umero torquet stellis ardentibus aptum. Ovid gives his own rejection of prosaic boundaries in the Fasti: gentibus est

52 Nicolet, Space, 7–9.
53 Tierney, ‘Map of Agrippa,’ 151; see also Brodersen, Terra Cognita, 268–285 for the conjecture that the map was not a map at all, but rather a text, listing places and the distances between them, as well as geographical features and the names of tribes and peoples.
55 E.g. RG 26: omnium provinciarum populi Romani quibus finitimae fuerunt gentes quae non parerent imperio nostro fines auxi. Gallias et Hispanias provincias, item Germaniam, qua includit Oceanus a Gadibus ad ostium Albis fluminis pacavi. Alpes a regione ea quae proxima est Hadriano mari ad Tuscum pacificavi nulli genti bello per inuiiam inlato. classis mea per Oceanum ab ostio Rheni ad solis orientis regionem usque ad fines Cimbrorum navigavit, quo neque terra neque mari quisquam Romanus ante id tempus adit.
Horace makes the same claim in Juno’s speech in Odes 3.3 (*quicumque mundo terminus obstitit, hunc tanget armis*). Livy deploys this kind of rhetoric regularly in his history, but often in unexpected and subversive ways. Hannibal, for example, in the course of his journey into Italy in book 21, uses the same cosmic imagery to describe his own exploits, and imagines that the Rome he is going to war with is already the *caput orbis terrarum*. He seems to envision making war on Augustan Rome, with himself as a conqueror of equal standing. Later on, in book 37 after the defeat of Antiochus, the king’s servile ambassadors also use similar rhetoric as flattery, comparing Roman power with that of the gods.

Augustan poetry also shows a fascination with the people who are said to live around the borders of the *orbis terrarum*, with Horace volunteering to brave Syria, Britain and Scythia in the company of the Muses, and Propertius claiming to wish for a similar journey with his friend Tullus. While poems such as these demonstrate the power of fantasies about the borders of empire and travel to far-flung places, they also contain stereotypes about the kinds of people who lived in them. The perception of foreign peoples in Greek and Roman literature was generally governed by such stereotypes, most of them negative. However, the rapid gains of Roman power in the second and first centuries BC forced a level of interaction with foreigners that to some extent complicated these perceptions. Horace gives the most famous expression of this complication with his phrase *Graecia capta ferum uictorem cepit*, which so neatly encapsulates Roman elite ambiguity towards the Greeks. Cicero makes the problem even clearer in the first letter to his brother Quintus, governor in Asia, when he warns him to beware of most of the

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57 *Fasti* 2.683–4  
58 Odes 3.4; Elegies 1.6.  
60 *Epistles* 2.1.156
Greeks in his province, except *qui sunt vetere Graecia digni*. The tension between admiration and contempt which characterizes these passages is also very much present in Livy’s narrative of earlier Roman interactions with the Greeks, which is also tinged with the awareness of the destruction and violence that would be carried out against Greece in later parts of the history. That same awareness can be seen in the letter of Servius Sulpicius to Cicero, consoling him after the death of his daughter, wherein the sight of Corinth, as well as Aegina, Megara, and Piraeus, prompts him to reflect on the insignificance of human existence.

The celebration of Rome’s power spreading over the entire world was matched by the consolidation of Rome’s power closer to home. The Social War had been fought only sixty years prior to Actium, and the problems it brought to the surface were not immediately or completely solved. As Ronald Syme points out in *The Roman Revolution*, Italy was by no means a unified country by the time of the civil wars, and Augustus did a lot of work to enlist the support of the Italians for his regime. The integration of Rome and Italy is similarly celebrated in the literature of the period, in the *Aeneid*, of course, where Italy is the primary objective in Aeneas’ journey, with Rome only to be founded by later generations. Italy is also thought of as a homeland in the *Georgics*, the second of which digresses from a discussion of climate and soil to address a panegyric to the *Saturnia tellus*. Italy is frequently mentioned in Horace’s *Odes* as the base of Roman military power and a partner or extension of Rome itself. In the last of the *Odes*, 4.15, he praises Augustus for reinvoking the ‘ancient arts’, *per quas Latinum nomen et Italae creuere*

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61 ad Quintum fratrem 1.1.16  
62 ad Familiares 4.5  
64 *Georgics* 2.136–176.
uires famaque et imperi porrecta maiestas ad ortus solis ab Hesperio cubili. The cultural unification of Rome and Italy which Augustus promoted and which we see reflected in these poems was not something that Livy fully bought into, as I shall argue in my first chapter. Rather, he was concerned with the fundamental disunity there and the complex history of Rome’s relationship with the Italians.

If the new co-extension of Roman power with Italy and with the orbis terrarum was a frequent topic of discussion in Latin literature of the Augustan period, the city of Rome was still the focus of attention. The program of rebuilding which Augustus undertook, combined with his encouragement of interest in Rome’s foundation and early history, produced an awareness of how the past was present in the everyday environment of the city. Propertius’ fourth book of Elegies contains a number of origin stories for Roman monuments, and the first poem harks back to the mythic past of Romulus and Remus and the idealized rustic origins of Rome, when the senators wore animal skins and a shepherd’s horn called the Romans to assembly. Virgil uses the same theme in Aeneid 8 when Aeneas visits Evander and the future site of Rome, and sees cattle lowing in the place where the Forum would be. Livy’s first decade, particularly the first book, is also very much concerned with the power that places and monuments have to remind people of the past. This interest in the stories, the myths behind places is, as we have seen, the context for the way that Livy uses place in the later decades of his history. The creation of tradition we can see in Augustan building work, and the written accompaniments to it, filter in to Livy’s narrative, where it becomes normal to be engaged both with the sites of interest themselves and with their written history.

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66 Prop. 4.1.12–13; Aen. 8.360–1.
Having defined the parameters of my interest in space relative to other examples of Augustan literature, we can now explore Livy’s approach to space and place in the context of ancient historiography as a whole. To what extent can we see the thematization of these concepts in earlier examples of historical writing, and how is Livy defining himself against this tradition?

It is possible to argue that Livy’s major predecessors in the classical canon (particularly Thucydides and Polybius) were mainly interested in the reality of space and how knowledge of that might be useful to their readers: what did the spaces they describe actually look like, how did they affect the course of events? Certainly Thucydides and Polybius had different opinions about the usefulness of spatial description; Thucydides mainly limits himself to description of specific places (usually battlefields) and Polybius is concerned both with these and with the geography of the oikoumene at large. In the introduction to his book on Josephus and geography in ancient historiography, Yuval Shahar draws a distinction in particular between the approach of Polybius (alongside Strabo and Caesar, whom he views as following Polybius’ spatial approach) and that of Livy and Tacitus. For the former, this concern with spatial reality and the didactic aspect of including geography in history is their guiding principle, while for the latter, “space… is merely a literary element which is intended to provide surprise, dramatic intensity, and so forth.” This distinction is essentially right; space and place in Livy are used thematically to an extent that they are not in earlier historiography, and we can easily see this

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67 Yuval Shahar, *Josephus Geographicus: The classical context of geography in Josephus*, (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 165–69 views this as a “synthesis” between the approaches of Herodotus and Thucydides, or between a preoccupation with the geography of the known world and one with individual landscapes.

distinction when we compare descriptions of famous battlefields in Livy and Polybius (as Shahar does with their accounts of New Carthage). I would go further than Shahar, and argue that Livy’s use of space and place is a way for him to situate his own historiographical project in contrast to the pragmatic approach exemplified by Polybius. When we explore how types of places and landscapes and types of Roman interactions with them recur, we will see in more detail how essential it is to Livy’s conception of history that places and spaces are not simply reflections of reality.

Nonetheless, to draw this distinction so sharply elides some of the helpful commonalities between Livy and the historical tradition he was joining. At the most basic level, the centrality of Rome to the narrative, which must have been a feature of previous Latin annalistic historiography, is also something that Livy shares with the historians labeled as ‘universal.’ The most obvious feature of Livy’s approach to space is the way that he uses the Roman political year as a structuring tool, beginning each year with affairs at Rome, moving onto affairs abroad, and (usually) springing back to Rome to end the year, and to some extent this focus on the calendar year must have been picked up from earlier Roman methods of measuring time and recording events. But by the time Livy came to write, space and geography had become especially politicized concepts, as we have seen. Not only Romans but Greeks were writing histories in which Rome was the centre of the world and other regions were interesting in large part because of their relationship to Rome. Nicolet implies that the Augustan preoccupation with

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69 Although this level of structure is subordinated to the divisions between books, and the two do not correspond well. See Levene, Hannibalic War, 34–63; also J.W. Rich, ‘Structuring Roman History: The Consular Year and the Roman Historical Tradition’, Histos 1, http://www.dur.ac.uk/Classics/histos/1997/rich1.html. Levene also shows how Livy does not always conform to his own annalistic structure, but sometimes subverts it in order to highlight political problems. For example, the un-formulaic narrative of the close of the year 216, the year of Cannae, in book 23, which seems to end on a normal administrative note but actually goes on to give an account of various disruptions (including the death of the consul–elect) and the Roman campaign in Spain. Levene shows how this alteration to the regular formula emphasizes the sense of crisis and disruption that Hannibal’s invasion had brought to political life.
geography was behind the flourishing of geographic work and universal history that took place during that period, and this idea is made more explicit in an article by Katherine Clarke on universal history.\textsuperscript{70} In the introduction to her monograph *Between Geography and History*, Katherine Clarke points out that conquest can often be a catalyst for a reassessment of space and geography; this was the case for Herodotus, who influenced the Hellenistic historians under discussion in her book.\textsuperscript{71} Strabo receives the most attention, and Clarke demonstrates how Romano-centric Strabo’s view of the cosmos was, but also how this aspect of his project is somewhat undermined by his preoccupation with Greek affairs and the structural centrality afforded to Greece in his text. She also compares the Romano-centrism of Polybius and Strabo, suggesting that Polybius’ conception of world space (which comes out in the way he moves from place to place in his narrative) reflects the fact that Rome was still growing and its position as centre of the known world was not yet fixed, while Strabo’s world-view has at its core the notion that Rome, its empire, and the relationship to them were more or less fixed and stable.\textsuperscript{72}

Livy was working in the context of this re-evaluation of space and geography; for him, both history and world space have Rome at its centre. As such, space and place become viewed through the lens of how they relate to Rome. Famous sites in Greece and Asia, even those as famous and indelibly linked with one historical or mythical event, like Thermopylae, and Troy, become touchstones for discussions of Roman attitudes to conquest and expansion. The way that characters move through and refer to geographical space, distance, and the physical boundaries of the Mediterranean world – sea, mountains, and rivers – can also be read as comments on the

\textsuperscript{70} Nicolet, *Space*, 8–9; Katherine Clarke ‘Universal perspectives in historiography’ in Kraus, ed. *Limits of Historiography*, 277.

\textsuperscript{71} Clarke, *Between Geography and History*, 69–72.

role of Rome in the world at large and its moral position. Livy is, then, engaging with the historiographical tradition in several ways, both setting out a new way of using space and place that is in line with his own priorities for writing history, and subverting the conventions of Roman annalistic history, as well as of the universal historians who chose to put Rome at the centre of their history.

Chapter summaries

The first chapter takes as its subject the third decade, and focuses on conceptions of Italy, and how various ideas about Italy as a space reflect on its role in Roman history. The first part of the chapter looks at Hannibal’s journey into Italy in book 21, up to and including his first battle with the Romans at the Ticinus, and examines his distorted, heroic view of space as he attempts to reach Rome. In particular, I look at the tendency of Livy’s Hannibal both to collapse and exaggerate the extent of space he travels through, and discuss how this reflects on his character and on the nature of the war itself. One of the themes of this chapter is the way that Livy raises questions about the relationship between Rome and Italy, and about Rome’s place on the world stage in his own time, and we will see how Hannibal’s idea of Rome’s standing in Italy reads as though he is making war on the Rome of the Augustan period, rather than that of the third century. The second part of the chapter moves on to the continuation of Hannibal’s journey, and focuses more on the individual landscapes of Italy, including those of the major battles at the Trebia, Trasimene, and Cannae. Hannibal’s approach to space and to Rome is still important here, but we start to get increased attention to the atmosphere of important places. I argue that Italy is portrayed as a treacherous and hostile space through the description of individual
landscapes, and that Livy hints at the presence of the supernatural and divine in the countryside. The Carthaginians are affected by this, but the Romans are affected much more, and seem unable to function properly in their own territory. This section finishes with the end of book 22, where we see how Italy falls away from Rome after Cannae, at the same time as the possibility of capturing Rome falls away from Hannibal. Hannibal’s optimistic and warped conception of the ease of travelling through Italy is stripped from him, and Italy seems to become bigger, more real and more difficult to navigate for both sides.

In the next chapter we come to the Roman relationship with their allies and former allies in Italy and Sicily. I look at this relationship through the lens of a certain kind of place, cities which are associated with major sanctuaries. These places come up repeatedly during the third decade, and serve as a locus for Livy to explore the brutality and violence in the way that the Romans interact with their allies. A motif of trampling on the divine is set up, as Livy shows these beautiful, mythically rich places being violated (unnecessarily) by the Roman army. In the last section of the chapter, the themes that have been running through since the beginning come together in a discussion of Scipio and his approach to space and place. Scipio’s conception of space is very similar to that of Hannibal: optimistic and clear-cut. But Scipio is intent on moving away from Rome, not towards it, and we will see how this reinforces the sense that has been building throughout the third decade, that Italy is a fundamentally difficult place for the Romans to operate in, and its status as a homeland and as an entity that will be unified with Rome by Livy’s day is very much in question. The issue of divinity also arises again here, as Scipio is strongly associated with the divine and has a supernatural-seeming knowledge of the landscape. His type of divinity, which is self-fashioned and totally within his own control, stands in sharp
contrast to the gods of Italy and Sicily who have been clashing with the Romans in their sanctuaries. Ultimately I argue that Scipio represents the need within Livy’s history for the Romans to move forward and outward from Italy, as they do at the beginning of the fourth decade.

The third chapter is about this move away from Italy, and the Romans’ commitment to war in Greece. Here I focus on books 31-33 and the war against Philip of Macedon, and I argue that the clarity and positivity of Scipio’s drive to fight abroad dissolves into tension and ambiguity. The war in Greece is begun with a defensive motive at the forefront, but ends up with aggression as Antiochus looms on the horizon. Greece is a space in which attempts to define things such as territory, identity and moral character are bound to fail, as Flamininus finds out over the course of the war. Roman interactions with Greeks, Macedonians, and the peoples on the edges of Greek identity, such as the Aetolians, call into question some of the values of Roman identity. At the same time, we start to see how differing perspectives on the same places demonstrate the shifting nature of place and space in Livy’s narrative. Capua, Athens and Aetolia are all invoked at different times by different characters in the text, and the interpretation of these places, their history and future shows how pliable these real places can be. They are not the backdrop to the events that happen there, they do not just exist in historical time, but they are also historiographical entities which show us how history can never be only one thing. This chapter also looks at the set-up of the war with Antiochus, and discusses the growing tendency of the Romans to try and define huge units of geographical space according to fixed borders, and to claim their own sphere of influence.
The fourth chapter moves on to the later books of the fourth decade, 36-40, in which the Romans take the war with Antiochus into Asia. These books also cover the campaign of Manlius Vulso against the Galatians. It is at this point that Livy marks the transmission of corruption and *luxuria* to Rome via Manlius’ army and the spoils they brought back. Here, I discuss Asia and the various roles it plays in the history. The Romans’ crossing into Asia is marked as a significant moment before it actually happens, when M. Acilius Glabrio gives a speech before the battle against Antiochus at Thermopylae in book 36. The mountain situation offers the Romans a view both over their surroundings and into their future. Already Glabrio conceives of Asia as a place where the Romans can acquire massive wealth, and the Romans’ motivation to continue the war with Antiochus becomes less to do with liberation and more with spoils. Asia is not only a place of corruption, however, it is also a huger and more unwieldy space than the Romans have dealt with before. The natural boundaries created by mountains, the Taurus mountains in particular, start to assume much more importance here. The Romans find themselves in a situation where they must create boundaries for the reach of their influence, and this situation attracts some foreshadowing of Augustan rhetoric in the narrative around that decision. Asia is therefore a way for Livy to predict the state they find themselves in during the Augustan period. Massive empire is theirs, but along with that comes moral failure. Asia is also a place littered with the memory of previous wars. Echoes of the Persian wars and the Trojan war come through in the narrative as the Romans come to places strongly associated with the past. Further questions about Roman expansion are raised as they seem to be cast simultaneously as Greeks and Trojans or Persians depending on the places where they are and their role there.
The fifth and final chapter looks at the last extant books of Livy, focusing on 44-45 and his account of the war with Perseus in Macedonia. The main part of this chapter looks at the figure of Aemilius Paullus and his mastery over the landscape in the events surrounding his victory at Pydna. Paullus displays a command over the terrain of Macedonia which is almost supernatural and recalls that of Scipio in Spain at the end of the third decade. Here, I examine the contrast between Livy and Polybius’ idea of a model general with relation to their knowledge of space and landscape, and look at the element of the supernatural which Livy favours. The heart of the chapter is an examination of Paullus’ tour around the famous sites of Greece, and I demonstrate how his tour symbolizes an important aspect of Livy’s depiction of Roman imperialism. The tour captures a tension between admiration of the cultural legacy of a conquered (or about to be conquered) people, and appropriation of that culture in the service of a Romanocentric world view. Paullus is both the benevolent philhellene, appreciating the mythical and historical sites of Greece, and the conqueror and agent of Roman hegemony, whose perception of these sites relates them back to Rome and the kinds of things a Roman would find interesting. We will also look at the way in which Livy adapts Polybius in this passage, and see how he overwrites the Polybian perception with that of a foreign power.
In the introduction to this dissertation, I set out two broadly defined functions of space and place in Livy’s history. On the one hand, they are a means for Livy to bring out certain themes, to characterize individuals and to comment in various ways on the course of Roman history. Additionally, and perhaps more crucially, they work as a distinctive and in some ways programmatic aspect of his historiographical project. Viewed as a recurring theme within the history, they reinforce the idea that history can (and should) be approached as a narrative, subject to interpretation and debate. In this chapter we will see how both of these functions play out in the first books of Livy’s third decade. The space I want to focus on in this chapter is that of Italy. Livy’s third decade offers multiple conceptions and imaginings of Italy from various perspectives. In books 21-22 these mostly come from Hannibal and from the Romans themselves, and of course also from the narrator himself. All suggest different ways of viewing Italy as a geographical, political and cultural space. These multiple Italies are, I argue, a way in to some central issues in Roman history, particularly the question of Italy’s status in relation to Rome. As a Paduan writing a history of Rome, Livy must have been keenly aware of the difficulties in viewing Rome and Italy as a unified entity, as it was increasingly becoming during the Augustan period.¹ Not only is space used as a medium for raising these historical issues, but the various possible interpretations of Italy in these books also remind us to be skeptical about what seems easy and straightforward in written history. If Italy as a space was being consolidated in the Augustan period just as the narrative of Roman history was also being streamlined, then

the complication of Italy in Livy’s history brings up the notion that the historical narrative is also complicated and open to interpretation.

Much of this chapter will revolve around Hannibal, in part because his conception of space and of Italy is the dominant one in books 21 and 22, and in part because he is, as a character, ideally positioned to bring out the complexities and ambiguities of Italy’s relationship with Rome. In Livy’s history he embodies the complex, the paradoxical, the multi-layered. In Roman history at large he is an ambiguous figure, to be both admired and hated, notable for both his astonishing successes and his ultimate fall from grace. Livy adds further layers, making him a great leader who claims exceptional knowledge and authority in various episodes of books 21 and 22, but who is also associated with misunderstanding, exaggeration, deception, and illusion. Both his failures to understand space and his ability to manipulate it to his own advantage raise the issue of the interpretability and subjectivity of space and place. Hannibal’s affinity with Italy – his drive to possess it, his power over the landscape, as well as his perception that it is a unified country – also points towards the problematic status of Italy in Roman history; Livy suggests that it is not as strongly bound to Rome as his Augustan readers might believe.

The first section of this chapter will deal with Hannibal’s journey to Italy and his conception of space as he makes progress. In particular, it will look at the way that Hannibal distorts and misunderstands both his onward journey and the ground he has already covered, and the ways in which his perspective conflicts with other perspectives presented in the narrative. The second section will briefly cover Hannibal’s time in Italy up until the battle at Trasimene, examining how Hannibal’s interactions with the landscape illuminate his character and suggest a transition from the difficulties of the Alps crossing to the successes of the early battles. The third section will look at the rest of book 22, from Trasimene to Cannae, showing how Hannibal
manipulates the landscape in order to create illusions, and what it is about the landscape that lends itself to deception. Running throughout these books of Livy is the theme of contested spaces, and contested perspectives on space.

_Hannibal’s Italy: conceptions of space on the journey from Spain._

This first section looks at Hannibal’s vision of the space he is travelling through on his way to Italy (or rather, as he sees it, to Rome), and the disconnect between his vision, that of other characters within the history, the reality of the journey as Livy presents it, and the perspectives of other historiographers. The journey he is making is focalized for the most part through Hannibal himself or the Carthaginians generally, and so it is his notion of space and movement which dominates book 21, but others are present and they play off one another in productive ways. Hannibal’s own understanding of space is characterized in a number of ways, which I argue raise some large historical questions, and also function, at this critical moment in Livy’s history, to initiate a discussion about the limits and possibilities of historical narratives themselves. Firstly, there is the centrality of Rome to Hannibal’s world view. It is his most important objective and destination, and beyond that, it is his destiny. The strength of his connection to Rome is such that at times he seems to be Roman himself, as we shall see from the first part of book 21. Closely linked to this is his assurance that he can move forward quickly and easily, and that Rome is just around the corner, just within his reach. He repeatedly simplifies the space ahead of him and imagines it to be more straightforward than it actually is, even when it is filled with enormous obstacles. This assertion of authority when it comes to space is frequently
shown to be questionable and misleading, though ultimately Hannibal is successful in navigating the obstacles in his way.

Secondly, we also see a related tendency to aggrandize and “epicize” space. Rome is the centre of the world for Hannibal; at times there is evidence that he views it as more of a centre than it actually was at the end of the third century. His vision of Rome bears more resemblance to Rome as it would become in Livy’s time. The way that Livy depicts Hannibal’s view of his campaign suggests an attack on Augustan Rome, with Hannibal describing his own journey and his mission in distinctly Augustan rhetoric. All this has the effect of encouraging the reader to think of alternative possibilities for Rome’s future: a future in which Rome is sacked again, in which Hannibal attacks it as a world empire, rather than as a mainly Italian power. All this has the effect of questioning the status of Italy in relation to Rome that was becoming normal in the Augustan period. The unity that was being consolidated, the sense that Rome and Italy were one entity and belonged together – all this is problematized by Hannibal, partly because as a foreigner he has such strong ties to Italy; partly because his invasion of Italy is deeply destabilizing and threatening; partly because his failures of authority as a guide who purports to know the way into Italy and to Rome suggest the potential lack of authority of the historical narratives which end up with Italy and Rome in unity.

Book 21 begins with an introduction to Hannibal and his ambitions to avenge his father’s defeat at the hands of the Romans. As we meet Hannibal, we see how big a part Rome plays in his character. The centrality of Rome is already made clear (if not in spatial terms) by the story of his childhood oath to be the “enemy of the Roman people” at the very beginning of the book (21.1.4). Then, the description of his personal qualities which strongly recalls Sallust’s description of Catiline at the beginning of the Bellum Catilinum reinforces the point, hinting that
Hannibal is like Catiline, and so perhaps not very foreign at all. He is the kind of enemy that Rome might produce for herself. In an article entitled “Domestici hostes”, James Clauss explores the portrayal of two foreign enemies or ‘others’ in ancient literature, Apollonius’ Medea and Livy’s Hannibal, and shows how they echo figures who were more familiar and more to be identified with the ‘self’ of the audience, Homer’s Nausicca and Sallust’s Catiline. Clauss shows how Livy’s allusive portrait of Hannibal allows for some blurring of the boundaries between self and other. This resemblance to the Roman domesticus hostis (as Cicero labels Catiline and his fellow conspirators in the third Catilinarian (Cat. 3.8), is strengthened by the fact that Rome has been the motivating force in his life, with him since childhood. As Livy frames it in the very beginning of the book, his life has been shaped by Rome’s “arrogance and greed”. Livy also suggests this latent Roman-ness as Hannibal embarks on his command, saying that he acted “as though Italy had been assigned to him as a province” (uelut Italia ei provincia decreta bellumque Romanum mandatum esset). Hannibal is thinking and behaving as though he were a Roman commander, even as the vocabulary makes clear that Italy and Rome are still separate and outside his own boundaries.

The framework of Hannibal’s single-minded, simplified view of space can be found in the language of the treaty between Rome and Hasdrubal which Livy has already summarized. The treaty sets the Ebro river as the point of transition between the two imperia (finis utriusque imperii esset amnis Hiberus Saguntinisque mediis inter imperia duorum populorum libertas

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2 James J. Clauss, “‘Domestici Hostes’: The Nausicca in Medea, the Catilina in Hannibal,” Materiali e discussioni per l'analisi dei testi classici, No. 39, Memoria, arte allusiva, intertestualità (Memory, Allusion, Intertextuality) (1997): 165-185. Clauss also points out that Hannibal, as a domesticus hostis, is also an enemy to his own home city, to Carthage, and this is emphasized again in Hanno’s speech predicting the sack of Carthage at 21.10.10. David Levene, in Livy on the Hannibalic War (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 99-102, points out further resemblances between Hannibal and Sallust’s Jugurtha. R. H. Martin and A. J. Woodman also discuss the relationship between Catiline, Hannibal and Tacitus’ Sejanus in their commentary on Tacitus’ Annales IV (Cambridge University Press, 1989), 84–7.
3 21.1.3.
4 21.5.1.
After Hannibal has subdued the Spanish tribes who lived between New Carthage and the Ebro (21.5), Livy points out that “everything beyond the Ebro, apart from the Saguntines, belonged to the Carthaginians” (*et iam omnia trans Hiberum praeter Saguntinos Carthaginiensem erant*). This comment comes in the context of Hannibal’s rapid victories over the Spaniards, and it reflects his tendency to see both space and his achievements in clear cut, definite terms. Carthage and Rome appear to be the only two major powers in the world. As the war picks up pace, the city of Rome moves to the forefront of Hannibal’s world-view. It becomes so central to Hannibal that, by the middle of book 21, he will imagine it as the centre and capital of the known world, something it was far from being in 218 BC.

When Hannibal comes to Saguntum, Livy introduces it as the richest city on that side of the Ebro, with its inhabitants mainly descended from Greeks from the island of Zacynthus, but also including some of the Rutulians from Ardea. The presence of a Latin strain in the population, and the fact that Ardea was a Roman colony subtly hint at Saguntum’s resemblance to Rome. Livy’s explanation of the causes of its prosperity also suggests a Roman quality to the city. Its commerce on land and sea, the rapid increase of its population, and the integrity of its discipline (*disciplinae sanctitate*), are named as the reasons for success. This last quality brought with it loyalty to their allies (*fidem socialem*), and this was the cause of their destruction. These are

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5 21.2.7
6 21.5.17
7 Or might it suggest that Hannibal is standing in for Aeneas, since Turnus was king of the Rutuli and had his seat at Ardea (Aen. 7.409); Giovanni Cipriani, *L’epifania di Annibale* (Bari, 1984), 105-6, draws the parallel between Hannibal’s dream and that of Aeneas by the Tiber (Aen.3.26-33).
8 21.7.2-3. For *disciplina* as an essential quality of the Roman state, see Liv. 8.7.16, where Titus Manlius Torquatus hands his son over for execution on the grounds that he broke the military discipline, *qua stetit ad hanc diem Romana res.*
qualities which recall Rome’s own success, and we might think of Saguntum as a staging in advance of the sack of Rome which Hannibal expects.9

This image of Saguntum as Rome is reinforced by Livy’s description of the reaction of Rome, which quickly follows on from the fall of the city (21.14-15). The senators, upon hearing the news, are thrown into confusion and feel as though the enemy were already at the gates (uelut si iam ad portas hostis esset).10 The attack on Saguntum is experienced as an attack on Rome itself.11 Both the Romans and the Carthaginians are frequently shown imagining that the war has already come to the city of Rome, as Livy comments in the context of the reaction to Saguntum:

\[\textit{cum orbe terrarum bellum gerendum in Italia ac pro moenibus Romanis esse} (21.16.6)\]

This is an anxiety that recurs over and over again in books 21-22, until it becomes clear after Cannae that the war will be primarily fought out in the Italian countryside. Each progression in the war is met by either Hannibal or the Romans, or both, imagining that Rome is in immediate danger. The way in which the setting immediately reverts to Rome after most of the major battles in 21 and 22 also reflects the city’s centrality in the overall conception of space in these books. The recurrence of the “enemy at the gates” motif, in Hannibal’s hopes and the Romans’ fears, opens up the idea of an alternate future for Rome, one in which the Carthaginians might have pressed their early advantage against the Romans and taken the city.12 For Dennis Pausch, this

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9 As R. J. Edgeworth points out in ‘Saguntum: A Livian Overture,’ \textit{Eranos} 87 (1989): 140, the Saguntum narrative “sketches an “alternative version” of the Sixth Pentad. What did happen to Saguntum is what \textit{would} have happened to Rome had the paradigm run its course.”

10 21.16.2


12 21.16.2. As Levene points out (\textit{Hannibalic War}, 18) there are repeated foreshadowings in book 21 of the only moment when Hannibal will approach the walls of Rome, at 26.10.3. Manfred Fuhrmann discusses the “\textit{Hannibal}
kind of reference to alternate possibilities for the future (“‘virtueller’ Geschichtsschreibung”), is a way of changing the reader’s conception of historical time overall; it calls to our attention the idea that history is not singular, but always open-ended. There were always other possibilities for how events might turn out. Livy’s spaces and places, with all their fluidity, reinforce this point. One place can have a multiplicity of associations, standing in for another place and another moment in time, and playing out those other possibilities.

Ultimately, the war will not come to the walls of Rome, but rather those of Carthage, and Saguntum also functions as a stand-in for that city. When Hannibal hears during the siege that Roman ambassadors are on the way, he sends letters to Carthage in order to prepare them. In the Senate debate which follows, the senator Hanno alone speaks out against Hannibal’s actions, predicting that the war will come back to Carthage.

_Carthagini nunc Hannibal uineas turresque admouet, Carthaginis moenia quatit ariete:_

_Sagunti ruinae—falsus utinam uates sim—nostris capitibus incident, susceptumque cum Saguntinis bellum habendum cum Romanis est._ (21.10.10)

Hanno sees more clearly than anyone else that, although war with Saguntum means war with Rome, it is not the _moenia_ of Rome which will suffer. Hannibal’s preoccupation with Rome’s

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13 Pausch, Livius und der Leser, 254.
walls will eventually bring about the fall of Carthage’s. Both futures are therefore present in the sack of Saguntum; the one Hannibal hopes for, which is a constant presence in books 21 and 22, and the one which eventually happens.

Hannibal, however, still has his eyes firmly on Rome, and after the sack of Saguntum, and the formal declaration of war from Rome (21.17), the narrative continues with the crossing of the Ebro and the beginning of the journey to Italy (21.22-23). The Ebro has already been flagged by the treaty mentioned at 21.2 and by various other mentions of Hannibal’s imminent crossing of it as a significant boundary. The momentousness of this crossing is signalled by the dream Hannibal has when he comes to it, in which he sees a beautiful youth sent by Jupiter as his guide, who instructs him to follow and never turn his eyes away from him.15 The vision, immediately preceding the crossing, recalls, as Pelling points out, Caesar crossing the Rubicon, when (at least according to Suetonius), a similar youth appeared to the whole army.16 We are thus reminded that this boundary forms the point of no return for Hannibal; though both the Ebro and the Rubicon were relatively minor geographical boundaries, their political significance becomes immense when they are crossed. This dream is not only a promise of divine support, but also an insight into the future. At this early stage in the campaign, natural boundaries such as the Ebro and later the Alps seem to provoke visions of the future and moments of insight, which is appropriate for the massive act of transgression Hannibal is committing, although his interpretation of such visions may be misguided. In this dream, the guide instructs him not to

15 Cf. Cicero, de Div. 1.24.49 for the same vision. Cicero cites the story as coming from Silenus via Coelius. In this version, there is no emphasis on the idea that Hannibal should not look into the future, as there is in Livy, rather he is only warned not to worry about what is happening behind him. See Levene, Hannibalic War, 14, 132-3 for more discussion of Livy’s adaptation of this passage.
16 Christopher Pelling, “Tragical Dreamer: Some Dreams in the Roman Historians,” Greece & Rome 44 (1997): 202. He also points out that the specific time of the vision, right before the Ebro crossing, is not in Coelius’ version, where we just get “after the capture of Saguntum”. Cf. Joseph Vogt, Das Hannibal-Porträt im Geschichtswerk des Titus Livius und seine Ursprünge, Diss. Phil. Freiburg 1953, 83-89, on the tradition of the dream, and 98, on Hannibal’s religiosity;) and Cipriani, Epifania, 103-128, for similar literary dreams and the contribution of this passage to the mythical resonances of Hannibal’s character in 21-22.
look around him, only ahead, but Hannibal’s curiosity gets the better of him, and when he does look back, he sees a vast serpent wreaking destruction on the landscape:

*tum uidisse post sese serpentem mira magnitudine cum ingenti arborum ac uirgultorum strage ferri ac post insequi cum fragore caeli nimbum. tum quae moles ea quidue prodigii esset quaerentem, audisse uastitatem Italiae esse; pergeret porro ire nec ultra inquireret sineretque fata in occulto esse.* (21.22.8-9)

This dream, with its emphasis on not looking around and not asking about the future, only moving forward, highlights the deceptive simplicity of Hannibal’s conception of both space and time, and the close link between them. He imagines that, like the snake, he will simply make progress, flattening everything in his path, and that his conquest will be immediate, taking no account of the enormity of the obstacles in his way. His acceptance of the instruction not to ask about the future flags his single-mindedness and his failure to look seriously into what his crossing into Italy will entail. This lack of preparation and the assumption of knowledge of what is ahead is characteristic of Hannibal, in keeping with the boldness and rashness of his invasion, until he undergoes a swift shift towards conscientiousness in book 22.

The Pyrenees are the next major boundary faced by the Carthaginians, but they are dealt with in a perfunctory manner (21.23-24), only enlivened by the departure of the Spanish Carpetani, who fear the crossing of the Alps. The very brief description of the crossing (*inde, ne mora atque otium animos sollicitaret, cum reliquis copiis Pyrenaenum transgreditur et ad oppidum Iliberrim castra locat*), strengthens the sense that certain geographical features are less interesting than others. Coming between the Ebro and the Alps, the Pyrenees crossing seems to
have gained no historiographical significance in the tradition about Hannibal; all attention has been focused on the greater mountains ahead.

The various characteristics of Hannibal’s conception of space can all be found in the speech that he gives to his army upon their approach to the Alps at 21.30. The aim of the speech is to encourage the soldiers whom he sees becoming demoralized at the prospect of crossing them, and in it he reviews their past achievements and then goes on to downplay the difficulty presented by the mountains. The substance of the speech is that the army has done so much already – they have subdued Spain, captured Saguntum, crossed the Pyrenees and the Rhone, waged war on Gauls – and thus they have nothing to fear in this next (and by implication, last) boundary. Hannibal portrays the progress of his army in impressive geographical terms. They have conquered all of Spain, bringing under Carthaginian rule *omnes gentesque et terrae quas duo diversa maria amplectantur*. They have crossed the Ebro for the purpose of destroying Rome and liberating the known world (*ad delendum nomen Romanorum liberandumque orbem terrarum*). Their march from Spain to Italy is characterized as a march *ab occasu solis ad exortus*. The vision of space and of achievement in this speech is peculiar, and reflects a perspective quite distinct from normal reality as Livy narrates it. For Feldherr, discussing the ways in which Hannibal appears as an internal historian or Epicurean teacher in the Alps narrative, this speech is an attempt to rewrite history from a different perspective, which belongs only to Hannibal and is meant to contrast with the kind of narrative considered normal in the Roman annalistic tradition. In this alternative narrative, Hannibal elides the serious defeats of the First Punic War, concentrating only on recent success. His distortion of the landscape he has

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17 21.30.2-4.
travelled through into this kind of epic geographical space is part of this ‘alternative construction of the past’.  

The scope of the journey and the Carthaginian successes in Spain are exaggerated in such a way as to remind the reader of more familiar achievements; the vocabulary used in the speech strongly recalls Augustan rhetoric about world conquest. As he looks back on the space he has covered, Hannibal recreates the earliest part of his journey as a heroic progression from one end of the world to the other. In addition to distorting space, he also distorts history, when he claims as his mission the “liberation of the inhabited world”. With the use of this phrase, Livy creates the sense that Hannibal is talking about Rome at the height of its power, in fact, the Rome of the Augustan period. *Orbis terrarum* is not a meaningful way to describe the sphere of Rome’s influence at the end of the third century. At the end of the speech (21.30.10), Hannibal calls Rome the *caput orbis terrarum*, a title which could only really apply from the later years of the Republic onwards, and which must have been familiar from phrases used about the extent of Roman power under Augustus. It is as if Hannibal imagines himself both conquering Rome at that future point, at the height of its power, and also taking over the achievements that would become so essential to Roman identity, liberating the world and setting the limits of their influence at the far horizons. He even wants to claim for himself the type of victory over the Romans that the Romans will ultimately claim over Carthage – *ad delendum nomen Romanorum* recalls Cato’s stock warning, *Carthago delenda est*. He does not see that history is tending in precisely the opposite direction to the one he predicts. Rome is not yet the *caput orbis terrarum*,

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but it will be, and it will take on the job of liberating oppressed peoples, and its power will take on the cosmic limits that Hannibal saw himself traversing.

With their magnified achievements in mind, Hannibal then asks, do his troops intend to stop in *ipsis portis hostium*? For Hannibal, here and in a later speech looking down on Italy from the Alps, the mountains appear to be the only thing between him and Rome, and they are not much of an obstacle at that. Again, the prospect of crossing a boundary prompts an imagining of the future, which is misleading. Hannibal encourages his troops to believe that Rome is central and easily reachable, and that the campaign is already in its final stages. This tendency to collapse great distances into nothing is matched by his approach to the Alps. In his effort to prove the insignificance of the mountains, Hannibal changes the tone of the speech, and moves into a rationalizing mode. The Alps are nothing but *montium altitudines*, and, contrary to the beliefs of his men, there is nothing out of the ordinary about them. They do not touch the skies, they are not impassable. Quite the opposite, in fact, they are cultivated and frequently crossed. The Carthaginian army had even seen Boian ambassadors who had just made the crossing. Hannibal emphasizes towards the end of the speech that the Alps are merely the last of the many major obstacles the army has faced up to this point. In this of course, he will be proved wrong by the geographical boundaries he has to face in Italy.

All this rationalizing, however, is soon disproved when the army finally arrives at the Alps, and even the terrified imaginings of the soldiers are shown to be inadequate to the full reality of the mountains. The frozen flocks, the wild men, the heights of the mountains which really do (almost) touch the sky, all of this is *visu quam dictu foediora*. For Levene, this is part of the complex relationship of Livy to his main source for this part of his narrative, Polybius. Polybius

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20 21.30.5
21 21.30.6
22 21.32.7
himself had crossed the Alps, and when he comes to Hannibal’s crossing he writes a digression criticizing those authors who exaggerate its difficulties and make it sound like an impossible task. Hannibal just planned it very carefully, in Polybius’ view, and made sure that it was possible. Polybius uses many of the same arguments that Livy’s Hannibal uses to exhort his troops. Levene shows how Livy is implicitly criticizing Polybius’ rationalizing approach by putting it in Hannibal’s mouth and then showing it to be false. Polybius’ overall historical approach, based on the superiority of autopsy and empirical knowledge, appears to be unreliable. 

_Fama,_ on the other hand, which is such a prominent concept in Livy, and is how the Carthaginian soldiers first hear about the terrors of the Alps in Livy (at 21.29.7), is actually much more accurate.  

As we have seen, Feldherr in his analysis also shows that Livy is using Hannibal as an embodiment of the problems of any historical narrative. There is always an alternative perspective. Hannibal is in many ways like a historian when he attempts to exhort his troops through rationalization, and his attempt to create a realistic narrative turns out to be mistaken. Both Levene and Feldherr, then, show that Hannibal suffers a serious failure of authority with regard to the Alps, which raises questions about the reliability of historical narratives at large, whether we are thinking of Polybius’ rationalizing account of events or the cumulative wisdom of Roman annalistic history.  

But Hannibal, as Feldherr points out, is a fundamentally paradoxical character in Livy, and does in fact succeed in the impressive feat of crossing the Alps, despite his failure of authority and despite the fact that the mountains are shown to be at

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24 See also Timothy Moore, ‘Livy’s Hannibal and the Roman tradition,’ in _Livy and intertextuality: papers of a conference held at the University of Texas at Austin, October 3, 2009_, ed. Wolfgang Polleichtner (Trier, Germany: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Trier, 2010), 135-167, for the idea that Livy undermines the authority of his own stories about Hannibal in order to suggest that the character is the product of a long and problematic historiographical tradition—again, the validity of historiography as a whole comes into question. 135–167.
least as terrible as any of the sensationalizing historians criticized by Polybius could have made them. And Livy’s Hannibal is not explicitly described as divine or in any way superhuman, as those other historians suggested he was. In Livy’s narrative, it is Hannibal’s human ability that allows him to cross, even though the crossing appears to be beyond human capacity. As Feldherr suggests, Livy is thus offering us multiple interpretations of Hannibal – he is both a distoriter of space, exaggerating the journey made by his army, and yet he is actually successful at interpreting the nature of the Alps. He says it will be possible to cross them, and he does cross them. By creating these multiple ways to read Hannibal, Livy makes him continue to fulfil the paradoxical description with which he is introduced at the beginning of book 21.

These facets of Hannibal’s character form an important backdrop to our understanding of space in Livy’s history. Just as Livy uses Hannibal to call attention to the contradictions and subjectivity of historiography, he also uses him to refract various perspectives on space and place. The Alps in Livy’s narrative are the way in to one function of space in this history, because with them we see the intersection between a historical character’s (Hannibal’s) conception of the mountains, the popular image of them (via fama) the image of them given in the authorial voice, and the interpretations of them offered by other historical writers (Polybius, for example). All these versions of the Alps are present in this narrative, and so we are reminded of the interpretability of space, and by extension, of history. If Hannibal is to be read as a

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26 This kind of “immanence” of divine action, which Feldherr argues is the product of the tension between “a conception of history as a non-miraculous account of what men do and the necessity of allowing for the amplification of Roman history as a story in which divine action is immanent and effective” (“Delusions”, 318) marks an important similarity between Hannibal and Scipio Africanus, whose divinity is in question when he comes to prominence in books 29-30. Scipio also performs actions worthy of a divinity, though Livy explicitly rejects the notion that he might have any supernatural power.

27 21.4.3: nunquam ingenium idem ad res diversissimas, pandem atque imperandum, habilius fuit.
historian-like figure, then his assertion of authority and its failure add depth to the comparison between space and history. The Alps’ resistance to authority and easy interpretation is reflected in the treachery and instability of its landscape, and in the problems Hannibal faces in guiding and being guided on the passage.

The first sign of this instability in the landscape comes with the crossing of the Druentia, a river which lies across their path through Gaul to the mountains. Livy describes it as an *Alpinus amnis*, and by its nature it certainly foreshadows the kinds of difficulties presented by the mountains themselves.

is et ipse Alpinus amnis longe omnium Galliae fluminum difficillimus transitu est; nam cum aquae uim uheat ingentem, non tamen nauium patiens est, quia nullis coercitus ripis, pluribus simul neque isdem aluets fluens, noua semper <per> uada nouosque gurgites—et ob eadem pediti quoque incerta uia est—ad hoc saxa glareosa uoluens, nihil stabile nec tutum ingredienti praebet. et tum forte imbribus auctus ingentem transgredientibus tumultum fecit, cum super cetera trepidattonie ipsi sua atque incertis clamoribus turbarentur. (21.31.10-12)

The problems of crossing the Druentia will be repeated in the major natural boundaries that the Carthaginians face from this point on. The river will not support boats, and it is impossible for the soldiers to gain any kind of foothold in it. This lack of stability, and the inability of the army to gain any kind of control over their surroundings is a crucial component of Livy’s descriptions of the Alps, the Apennines, and the flooded marshes that they cross in order to get to Arretium at the beginning of book 22. The noise and tumult created by the attempt

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28 For the actual geography of this part of the route, see Dexter Hoyos, “Crossing the Durance with Hannibal and Livy: the Route to the Pass,” *Klio* 88, no.2 (2006): 408–465.
to get over is also a recurrent property of the Carthaginians’ crossings. Order reliably collapses, matching the chaos of the landscape. This river is peculiarly chaotic, it cannot be contained within its banks and it also keeps recreating itself, constantly flowing into new channels. This, too, reflects the nature of boundaries in books 21-22; they keep renewing themselves and refuse to be contained in the easy way Hannibal expects them to be.

When the army begins its passage over the mountains themselves, the chaos and unknowability of the landscape continues, now revealing itself in pathless ground, numerous hiding places for barbarian ambushes, and slippery slopes. Their first encampment is in a landscape described as *confragosa omnia praeruptaque*, and its inhabitants take full advantage of these characteristics. As soon as the Carthaginians get close enough for a real encounter with them, we are introduced to their methods of fighting – they spring out from concealed places and attack (*apparuerunt imminentes tumulos insidentes montani, qui si valles occultiores insedisset, coorti ad pugnam repente gentem fugam stragemque dedissent*). The deceptiveness of the *barbari* and their tendency to attack from ambushes is made clear again at 21.34.6, when a tribal chief has made friendly overtures to Hannibal but then proceeds to attack *ex insidiis*. Despite the fact that treachery and deception were such prominent characteristics of the Carthaginians themselves in Roman history (one of Hannibal’s characteristics in the introductory character sketch of him at 21.4 is *perfidia plus quam Punica*), the state produced in their army by these similar tactics on the part of the Gauls is one of near constant chaos. Much of the narrative of

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30 21.32.8-9

the Alps crossing is shot through with their emotional and physical reactions to the difficulties.\textsuperscript{32}

This treacherousness in both the countryside and the people is matched by difficulty in finding their way. At 21.35.4, Hannibal reaches the summit of the mountain range after much wandering around (\textit{errores}), owing sometimes to the \textit{ducentium fraus}, or else to a refusal to trust the guides. This lack of trustworthiness on the part of the guides also hints at the inherent difficulty of the landscape and the problems with defining it, understanding it, and finding a clear path through it. The act of guiding, in particular of guiding that fails, is a repeated motif in books 21-22.

The local guides might be untrustworthy, but the ultimate \textit{dux} on this campaign is Hannibal himself, and his vision of the path ahead is also untrustworthy and distorted, as he continues to misunderstand and mislead in his conception of space. In the middle of the crossing, the army reaches a promontory from which they look out upon Italy, and he uses this as an opportunity to encourage his troops.\textsuperscript{33} But again, the insight into the space and the time ahead is a false one, and the apparent clarity of the view and the easy authority which Hannibal claims are at odds with the long struggle they will actually face.

\begin{quote}
\textit{per omnia niue oppleta cum signis prima luce motis segniter agmen incederet pigritiaque et desperatio in omnium uultu emineret, praegressus signa Hannibal in promunturio quodam, unde longe ac late prospectus erat, consistere iussis militibus Italiam ostentat subiectosque Alpinis montibus Circumpadanos campos, moeniaque eos tum transcenderere non Italiae modo sed etiam}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{32} See Pausch, \textit{Livius}, 150–57 on the focalization of the Alps narrative through the Carthaginians. See also Chrysanthe Tsitsiou-Chelidon, ‘History beyond Literature: Interpreting the ‘Internally Focalized’ Narrative in Livy’s \textit{Ab Urbe Condita},’ in Jonas Grethlein and Antonios Rengakos (eds), \textit{Narratology and Interpretation. The Content of Narrative Form in Ancient Literature} (Berlin 2009); Feldherr, ‘Delusions,’ 317n9.

\textsuperscript{33} See M. R. Girod, ‘La géographie de Tite-Live,’ \textit{ANRW} II.30.2 (Berlin; New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1982), 1208-1210 on ‘hautes visages’ in Livy, and the tendency to see abstract visions from high places.
Even more clearly than before, Hannibal collapses the distances and obstacles in the way, believing that the Alps are the only boundary between themselves and Rome. His army is scaling the walls of Rome right in that moment. The image, as Levene points out, goes back to Cato, and Livy may be consciously using Cato’s words here, as well as later on in the book, when Scipio urges his troops to fight as if they were ante Romana moenia. Rome and Italy are thus equated, in terms which recall a truly Roman perspective, one which privileged Roman unity with Italy and also saw Carthage as the major threat to Roman strength. We imagine a unified territory, with Rome as the centre. Hannibal also claims that the rest of the campaign will be easy, both in that the path will actually be level and downhill, and that only one or two battles before Rome is theirs. The contrast between this imagined future and what really lies ahead is immediate, as the narrative of the downward route into Italy follows on from the above, and is dramatically difficult for the Carthaginians. Every path downwards presents problems, and the paths are described as praeceps angusta lubrica (steep, narrow and slippery/treacherous). Later the army comes to a slope, already difficult but made worse by a landslide. Hannibal attempts to lead the army around it, but the men in front pack down the fresh snow by treading on it, creating a layer of ice which proves hazardous for those behind. The struggle is described in some detail:

34 21.41.15 Levene, Hannibalic War, 107-8.
36 Pausch, Livius 237–42, esp 241
taetra ibi luctatio erat via lubrica [glacie] non recipiente vestigium et in prono citius
pedes fallente, ut, seu manibus in adsurgendo seu genu se adiuvissernt, ipsis adminiculis
prolapsis iterum corrurerunt... ita in levi tantum glacie tabidaque nive volutabantur. (21.36.7)

The vocabulary used of the slope here is interesting. Both *lubrica* and *fallente* have
connotations of deceptiveness, of treachery.\(^{37}\) *Levis*, too, can have associations with instability
and fickleness. The landscape is deceptive and difficult to get a grip on, both literally and
figuratively.

Eventually the Carthaginians succeed in navigating the descent, and arrive in the fields of
the Po Valley (21.37). Yet the impossibility of grasping and interpreting the Alps continues even
after the Carthaginians have left them behind. As the first engagement with the Roman army
draws near, Livy gives us a set of paired speeches from the Roman general, Scipio, and from
Hannibal, in which each commander encourages the troops and stresses the significance of this
battle.\(^{38}\) These speeches present opposed conceptions of space and of Hannibal’s journey up to
this point. These differing visions of what has happened serve both to illuminate the character of
each general, but they are also a neat way of showing how events, and the space in which they
happen, can be subject to opposite, ideologically motivated interpretations.\(^{39}\) Scipio’s speech
comes first, and offers a vision of the state of affairs which will be contradicted in most of its

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\(^{37}\)Elizabeth Sutherland, in her article on Horace *Odes* 1.19, ‘How (Not) to Look at a Woman,’ *AJP* 124.1 (2003): 67-8, sums up the meanings of *lubricus* in Latin literature: it tends to describe or be associated with materials, states, and situations that are unstable, unpleasant or even dangerous.

\(^{38}\) These speeches are much longer and more elaborate than their counterparts in Polybius’ narrative (3.63-64). Ragnar Ullmann suggests intermediate sources in the form of Claudius Quadrigarius and Coelius Antipater in ‘Quelques remarques sur Polybe, III, 64, et Tite Live, XXI, 40-41,” *Symbolae Osloenses* 10 (1932).

\(^{39}\) Feldherr, *Spectacle and Society*, 53–54ff for the notion that Livy presents contrasting views of the world in pre-battle speeches as being at stake in the battle ahead; victory will confirm one side’s story over the other. In this case Hannibal’s world view would win out, but the obvious knowledge that Hannibal will eventually lose, and his grand imaginings will not come to pass, complicates the situation somewhat. For further discussion of these speeches, see Eric Adler, *Valorizing the Barbarians*, (Austin, 2011), 88–98, and Ursula Händl-Sagawe, *Der Beginn des 2. Punischen Krieges : ein historisch-kritischer Kommentar zu Livius Buch 21*, (Munich, 1995), 256–7.
details by Hannibal. From his perspective, the Carthaginian army is transformed beyond hope by their journey across the Alps, that they now resemble the mountain-dwelling Gauls more than a functional army.

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\textit{effigies immo, umbrae hominum, fame frigore inluui}\textit{e squalore enecti, contusi ac debilitati inter saxa rupesque; ad hoc praeusti artus, niue rigentes nerui, membra torrida gelu, quassata fractaque arma, claudi ac debiles equi. (21.40.9)}
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In short, Scipio expects that “the Alps have conquered Hannibal”. In his own speech, Hannibal makes the opposite claim, referring to himself as \textit{uictorem eundem non Alpinarum modo gentium, sed ipsarum, quod multo maius est, Alpium}.\(^{40}\) It is unclear whose interpretation is to be preferred, since the description of the army when they did come down from the Alps corresponds quite well with Scipio’s vision – Livy notes their \textit{squalida et prope efferata corpora}.\(^{41}\) The Alps once again defy easy interpretation; they are the location of opposing interpretations of a historical event. Their status as slippery boundary seems to leak out into the way that their history is understood, so that they come to stand for the difficulty of seeing events in a singular way.

The speeches also offer contrasting views of space more generally, which reflect each general’s approach to reality and narrative. Both have something to say about their journeys up to this point. Scipio’s is a comparatively dry and down to earth account of his movements since the declaration of war, prosaic and grounded in detail (\textit{licuit in Hispaniam, prouinciam meam, quo iam profectus eram, cum exercitu ire meo…. cum praeterveherer nauibus Galliae}

\(^{40}\) 21.43.15  
\(^{41}\) 21.39.2
This recitation of his route up until this point is appropriate for the character of the rational, capable general, it recalls the clear, A to B approach taken by Caesar in his *Bellum Gallicum*. Specifically, it recalls Michel Rambaud’s category of ‘espace stratégique’, the dominant view of space in the *Bellum Gallicum*. Beyond characterizing Scipio, its main function is to bring home to the reader how extreme and divorced from reality Hannibal’s approach to space is. Hannibal’s normal viewpoint is more like Rambaud’s ‘espace géographique’, in which everything is seen in large terms, as if from above. Scipio’s pragmatism is also apparent in his interpretation of the past: he takes into account the defeats of the First Punic War (which Hannibal glossed over in his speech before the Alps), and extrapolates from the past into the present:

> experiri iuuat utrum alios repente Carthaginienses per uiginti annos terra ediderit an idem sint qui ad Aegatis pugnauerunt insulas et quos ab Eryce duodeuicenis denariis aestimatos emisistis, et utrum Hannibal hic sit aemulus itinerum Herculis, ut ipse fert, an uectigalis stipendiariusque et seruus populi Romani a patre relictus... (21.41.6-7)

Scipio’s pragmatism is not entirely endorsed by the narrative, since we have already seen that a supernatural element to Hannibal’s character is not ruled out by his crossing of the Alps, and there will be much more in the way of quasi-supernatural behaviour as events unfold.

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42 21.41.2-3
44 On the opposing Carthaginian and Roman perspectives on the loss of Sicily and Sardinia in the First Punic War, and their implications for understanding the role of focalization in Livy’s narrative technique, see Pausch, *Livius und der Leser*, 145–8.
Nonetheless, Hannibal will be defeated just as his father was; ultimately the Carthaginians will not prove to be that different from their predecessors.

If Scipio tries to deny any Herculean qualities to Hannibal, that general’s speech reclaims them, by applying an epic veneer to all of his achievements so far, just as he did in the speech prior to the Alps at 21.30. Italy’s absolute centrality to Hannibal’s world view now becomes particularly prominent. At the beginning of the book, Spain was his base and everything radiated outwards from there. Now Spain is peripheral (he refers to his army’s past in the uastis Lusitaniae Celtiberiaeque montibus)\textsuperscript{45}, and he imagines that he has come to the centre of the world and the end of his journey. Much of the success he praises in himself and his army has to do with crossing great natural boundaries – he describes the Carthaginian position in Italy as being hemmed in by such boundaries:

\begin{quote}
\textit{dextra laeuaque duo maria claudunt nullam ne ad effugium guidem nauem habentes; circa Padus amnis, maior ac uiole\textit{t}ior Rhodano, ab tergo Alpes urgent, uix integris uobis ac uugentibus transitae. Hic uincendum aut moriendum, milites, est, ubi primum hosti occurr\textit{is}.}
\end{quote}

(21.43.4-5)

The overwhelming nature of these boundaries, which they have crossed or will have to cross, becomes the measure of their achievement; it becomes even more exaggerated as the speech goes on, and again we see rhetoric which recalls Augustan ways of expressing Roman success in conquest:\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{45} 21.43.8
\textsuperscript{46} Horace, Odes 3.4.33-36: uisam Britannos hospitibus feros/ et laetum equino sanguine Concanum/ uisam pharetratos Gelonos/ et Scythicum inuiolatus annum; Catullus 11.5-12: sive in Hyrcanos Arabesve molles, seu Sagas sagittiferosve Parthos/,sive quae septemgeminus colorant/ aequora Nilus,/sive trans altas gradietur Alpes,
Everything about Hannibal’s perception of his journey and his destination contradicts the picture offered by Scipio. Space is not something that a general simply moves through, going from A to B. Instead, each step along the way becomes another signifier of Hannibal’s great destiny. Space is for Hannibal a rather stylized setting for his achievements, and this view of space, that it is composed of borders and obstacles to be crossed, is at the heart of his self-definition. It is also how he defines himself in opposition to the Romans. As he sees it, they are concerned with using the geography of the world to set limits for others, to define space in a prohibitive way. Hannibal crosses those limits and collapses those definitions.

At this stage, however, the Ebro is the only real boundary the Romans have set for the Carthaginians, and that was agreed in a treaty. Again, Hannibal seems to be projecting his ideas about who he is fighting with into the future. His preoccupation with Roman boundaries brings

to mind future events, such as their dealings with the Seleucids: the setting of the Taurus mountains as the limit to Antiochus III’s power, or Popilius Laenas drawing a circle around Antiochus IV to prevent the invasion of Egypt.47

But in Hannibal’s view if the Romans are arrogant in their setting of boundaries, they are even more so in their own crossing of them. He points to the assignment of the consuls to Africa and Spain at 21.17.1. Although the consul Sempronius, to whom Africa was assigned, did not make it beyond Sicily, Hannibal implies that that Africa and Spain, the homelands and former bases of his army, are already lost to the them (*nihil usquam nobis relictum est, nisi quod armis uindicarimus*).48 At the very least, they are fighting beyond their own territory and do not have the *tuta ac pacata itinera* that the Romans can fall back on.49 No possibility of flight or retreat remains to them. This brief passage again raises the idea of Italy as the Romans’ homeland; they are safe there, while the Carthaginians have no home.

However, Hannibal’s idea that the Romans have the friendly countryside on their side is a questionable idea about how Rome and Italy relate to one another at this point in time. The treachery of the Italian countryside and its communities will prove to be a huge problem for the Romans, and Hannibal will end up having to use it to his advantage. This misconception of Hannibal’s, however, is in line with the sense we have been getting all along in book 21, that Livy is somehow presenting us with an attack on Augustan Rome. The status of Rome and Italy (and the level of their interconnectedness) which Hannibal envisages is anachronistic. The same notion of Italian unity is put forward in Scipio’s speech, when he tells the Roman troops that they must fight “for Italy” at the Ticinus (*pro Italia uobis est pugnandum*).50 Urso, in his article on the

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47 Livy 45.12, Polybius 29.27.
48 21.44.7
49 21.44.8
speeches and battle at the Ticinus, points out this oddity and suggests that it should be read in the context of a burgeoning Italian identity in these years, an identity which would form in the aftermath of Hannibal’s invasion in response to a foreign threat within the Italian peninsula, and this seems right. But it also makes sense as a retrojection of Augustan values regarding Italy that would be familiar to contemporary readers. This sense is further borne out as the narrative approaches the battle at the Trebia. At this point, Livy narrates for us the anxieties of the consul Sempronius in the run-up to the battle. Not only does he fall prey to the same exaggerations of Hannibal’s progress that Scipio and Hannibal himself have expressed, complaining that the Carthaginian camp is in Italia ac prope in conspectu urbis, but he also thinks about the forebears of the Romans and how their land, their territory is about to become destabilized.

Non Siciliam ac Sardiniam uictis ademptas nec cis Hiberum Hispaniam peti sed solo patrio terraque, in qua geniti forent pelli Romanos. "quantum ingemiscant" inquit "patres nostri, circa moenia Carthaginis bellare soliti, si uideant nos, progeniem suam, duos consules consularesque exercitus, in media Italia pauentes intra castra, Poenum quod inter Alpes Appennis inque agri sit suae dicionis fecisse? ” (21.53.4-5)

On the surface this seems anachronistic. To a reader of Livy’s day, the generations that fought the Punic wars were remembered as superior men, so to read about a man of the third century worrying about inferiority to his own forebears must have seemed rather strange. It is

also strange that Sempronius implies that this part of Italy is uncomplicatedly part of the Roman patria, part of the lands in which their fathers lived. As Levene points out, the area around the Trebia was at that time inhabited by Gauls, whose allegiance was uncertain. But it makes sense that Livy would have Sempronius put it this way. To readers of his own time, it is more shocking to think of the lands they knew as part of Italia falling away out of Roman control.

Space and history are equally fluid, then, in this part of the third decade. Hannibal and his view of space, and the views of those around him, present us with various possibilities for understanding Italy, and the significance of his invasion. By repeatedly collating Rome and Italy, and referring to a level of unity which was only being consolidated in Augustus’ own time, the Roman reader is encouraged to remember the fractured history of the relationship between the two. The Carthaginian invasion appears to be taking place at a time more similar to their own. The suggestions that Hannibal looks on third century Rome as more like its future Augustan self perform the same function. The status of Rome, Italy, and Carthage with respect to one another and to the rest of the world is not yet set, and the various perspectives through which we see space and geography in book 21 remind the reader of this.

Hannibal in the Italian landscape:

From the concern with large spaces and conceptions of geography which are prominent during Hannibal’s journey into Spain, we move to a more landscape-focused narrative as the war proper gets underway. The landscapes which form the backdrop to individual battles and moments of crisis will be our main subject as we look at the end of book 21 and book 22. Livy’s

descriptions of landscapes serve several purposes: they can help to reflect on the character of the individuals in the history, particularly on Hannibal and the Roman generals who oppose him; hints of the supernatural or of a certain agency on the part of the landscape add a genre-bending momentousness to the narrative; they can also continue to raise questions about the relationship between the Romans and Italy. There are strong suggestions in book 22 that the Italian countryside has the capacity to work against the Romans, and this naturally recalls the disunity and fragmentation of Italy over the course of the Hannibalic War. The unity Hannibal imagined he would find is shown to be deeply questionable.

The end of 21 and the beginning of 22 do not quite fit in to this pattern. Instead the difficulties faced by both the Romans and the Carthaginians in acclimatizing to war in Italy and its terrain emerge gradually from the narrative. The battle at the Ticinus (21.46) proves to the Romans that they are no match for the Carthaginian cavalry, and therefore that the open plains of the Po Valley are not the place to make a stand (campos patentes, quales sunt inter Padum Alpesque, bello gerendo Romanis aptos non esse). The battle at the Trebia follows after an interlude on Sicily, and we see Hannibal’s predilection for concealment and illusion in the landscape:

_Erat in medio riuus praevalitis utrimque clausus ripis et circa obsitus palustribus herbis et quibus inculta ferme uestiuntur, uirgultis uepribusque. Quem ubi equites quoque tegendo satis latebrosum locum circumuectus ipse oculis perlustravit, "hic erit locus" Magoni fratri ait "quem teneas ....”_ (21.54.1)

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53 21.47.1
Hannibal points out to the men who will hold this position that they have an “enemy blind to these arts.” This creation of illusion in the landscape, and the Romans’ failure to perceive it, will be a recurring feature of their interactions throughout book 22. The natural environment plays a large part in the battle, with the extreme cold causing both sides to suffer; the Romans as they are driven back, some crossing the river to reach their camp, and the Carthaginians in pursuit.

\[\textit{imber niue mixtus et intoleranda uis frigoris et homines multos et iumenta et elephanto prope omnes absumpsit. finis insequendi hostis Poenis flumen Trebia fuit, et ita torpentes gelu in castra rediere ut uix laetitiam uictoriae sentirent. (21.56.6-7)}\]

Both the deception practised by Hannibal (and facilitated by features of the landscape) and the role of the natural world in the defeat are elements that will recur frequently in 22; they are especially prominent in the Trasimene narrative (22.3-7), where they play a much larger part in the Romans’ defeat, but they are also present at Cannae as well. The assistance lent by the environment to Hannibal’s victory (even though the Carthaginians also suffer from the cold) is strikingly repeated at each major battle, as well as in smaller engagements. As Catin puts it, “Avant tout, Hannibal est un stratège, c’est-à-dire un diplomate qui fait alliance avec les fleuves, les montagnes, le ciel. A la Trébie, il conspire avec le neige, à Trasimène avec la brume, à Cannes avec le soleil et le vent.”

Following these early battles, Book 21 ends with Hannibal crossing the Apennines, where his alliance with the weather does not hold up. The passage that deals with this is strangely isolated in Livy’s narrative; it follows Hannibal’s capture of Victumulae, which is treated briefly,

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with a passing mention of the outrages visited upon the inhabitants by the Carthaginian army, and precedes some skirmishes with the consul Sempronius. Much of what has happened between the crossing of the Alps and this point has served to emphasize the success of Hannibal and his army in their first engagements in Italy. For the most part, the Carthaginians grow in confidence during this period and the Romans seem to lose it, with one consul, Scipio, wounded at the Ticinus and the other, Sempronius, depicted as dangerously reckless. The crossing of the Apennines tempers this trajectory; it serves to remind us that Italy in these books is still a threatening, unpredictable landscape and a suitable backdrop for the trauma and chaos of this period. The immediately preceding episode, the capture of Victumulae, showcases both the confidence of the Carthaginian army and the horrors of the war; this confidence is temporarily shattered, and other horrors then visited upon the Carthaginians by the mountains and their violent weather.

The seizure of Victumulae brings home to the reader the brutality of war and its effects on the smaller communities of Italy. After an unevenly matched battle in front of the town, Hannibal’s army easily routs the locals, and the town surrenders and receives a garrison. Livy contrasts the confidence and orderliness of Hannibal’s men with the disarray of the Italians.

\[\text{magis agmina quam acies in via concurrerunt, et cum ex altera parte nihil praeter inconditam turbam esset, in altera dux militi et miles duci fidens, ad tringinta quinque milia hominum a paucis fusa.} \ (21.57.12)\]

The Carthaginian army is portrayed as harmonious and disciplined, with the balance between general and his men reflected in the chiastic middle of the sentence. This emphasis on
their orderliness makes the confusion that follows in the Apennines all the more striking.

Following the surrender (deditio), Livy tells us that this act was followed up by a sack of the city, tamquam vi captam urbem, accompanied by omne libidinis crudelitatisque et inhumanae superbiae exemplum. This episode reminds us not only of the horror of war but of the deceptiveness and treachery so often mentioned as being characteristic of the Carthaginians. The Italians perform deditio, a Roman ceremony, in a Roman spirit, expecting it to be met with restraint; instead Hannibal allows the kind of violence normally associated with a forcible capture.  

This incident is actually followed by a period of rest in winter quarters for Hannibal’s men, but this is quickly passed over, and with the first signs of spring, the crossing of the Apennines takes place. The Alps might have been particularly imposing as an obstacle and boundary in the Roman imagination, but the Apennines were also a prominent obstacle to travel within Italy itself. The roughness of the mountains, however, is conveyed not by any description of the landscape, but by the weather. We are told that Hannibal was heading for Etruria, in order to subdue the Etruscans as he had done with the Gauls and the Ligurians. On the way over the mountains, however, the Carthaginians experience an atrox tempestas.  

The effect of the storm on the army is to throw them into the confused, semi-incapacitated state that they last experienced in the Alps. At first they struggle against the wind and rain (contra enitentes vertice intorti adfligebantur), then they are forced to stop and try merely to stay in one place, because

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55 Elizabeth Keitel mentions this passage as a formulaic example of the ‘disaster narrative’ in Roman historiography – Livy is merely summing up the usual horrors: ‘The Art of Losing: Tacitus and the Disaster Narrative,’ in Ancient Historiography and its Contexts: Studies in Honor of A. J. Woodman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 338-9. For Walsh this is also an example of Livy’s ‘restraint in contrast to the sensationalism of others’: Livy: His Historical Aims and Methods (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), 195.


57 21.58.3
they find they cannot breathe (*cum iam spiritum includeret nec reciprocare animam sinister, aversi a vento parumper consedere*). Now that they are still, the noise and the flashes of lightning actually stun them:

> tum vero ingenti sono caelum strepere et inter horrendos fragores micare ignes; capti auribus et oculis metu omnes torpere. (21.58.5)

From the Carthaginians visiting every horror of war upon the inhabitants of Victumulae in the previous paragraph, treating the city *tamquam vi captam*, we now see that they themselves have become *capti*, numbed by the violence of the storm. In some respects this passage conveys the idea that the army is being attacked by the weather and the cold and harshness of the mountains. Livy mentions the *vis venti* and the *vis frigoris*, recalling the behaviour of the Carthaginians at Victumulae; after the men have pitched camp, sleet comes down so heavily that the men fall forward, overwhelmed, as Livy says, by their tents instead of protected by them (*tegminibus suis magis obruti quam tecti*). At this point, the men and animals are left in a *miserabili strage*, most literally a “pitiful heap”, but *strages* can also mean something like “carnage”, and perhaps here the image of the camp after the sleet might recall the aftermath of a battle; the description of this heap as *miserabilis* also recalls the reference to the inhabitants of Victumulae as *miseros*, wretched men upon whom the *libido, crudelitas* and *inhumana superbia* of the Carthaginians were acted out. Following the sleet, the men really are incapacitated, actually unable to move their limbs because of the cold, and so they are forced to stay where they are for two days, as if they were besieged (*biduum eo loco velut obsessi mansere*). This image of the siege reinforces the idea that the encounter with the storm was a kind of warfare, with the
Carthaginians as their own little city, under assault by the weather. This image gains further strength by its juxtaposition with the violence that took place at Victumulae. Finally, the storm episode is implicitly compared to a real battle, to the Trebia, as Livy tells us that many men and animals died, and even seven elephants which had survived the battle at the Trebia (elephanti quoque ex iis qui proelio ad Trebiam facto superfuerant septem absumpti).

Livy does not make explicit the idea that the Italian landscape might be functioning in a divine, morally aware capacity here, nor does he explicitly say that Hannibal is being punished for his earlier behaviour. However, the fact that the Carthaginians are plunged into confusion and stunned by the natural world immediately after an episode in which both their strength and their deceptiveness are on display, underscores the difficulty of gaining control in the war and in the Italian landscape, and also hints at the supernatural character of the landscape, and at the idea that it can reflect and thereby punish immoral behaviour. Levene, in his discussion of causation in Livy’s third decade, argues for this kind of slightly vague, underlying sense of moral causation throughout these books. Italy therefore is not simply a space to be defined by either Romans or Carthaginians; it has its own existence, and from time to time the landscape itself seems to suggest a kind of consciousness and activity.

Hannibal’s attempt to cross the Apennines failed because of the storm, and we see him at the end of this passage retreating back towards Placentia to return to winter quarters. He leaves again later in the spring, at the beginning of Book 22. His delay, we are told, occasioned a number of plots against him from the Gauls in whose territory he was camped. But this time, the treachery of Hannibal’s enemies actually benefits him, since they keep betraying each other’s

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58 Levene Hannibalic War, for example at 347, discussing the Apennines episode: ‘It is true that exceptional weather might be felt to be intrinsically the sort of thing that has divine connotations, and so it is not a great stretch to see the divine at work here… But that interpretation, even though a natural one in Roman terms, is not foregrounded here. In its absence we are left with a vaguer sense that morality and immorality may – at least some of the time – be causally connected with success and failure. But the nature of that connection is opaque.’
plots to him, and Hannibal himself, with the help of disguises, manages to keep them from attacking him.\textsuperscript{59} The notorious Carthaginian duplicity is reflected by this strategy, and simultaneously mirrored by the behaviour of the Gauls. Krafft argues that this passage is intended by Livy to counteract the image we get elsewhere of Hannibal as a dynamic, capable leader. In his reading, Livy’s emphasis on the ad hoc, makeshift nature of Hannibal’s use of disguise as he attempts to avoid assassination by the Gallic chiefs serves to balance his account against the stream of victories and successes won by the Carthaginians throughout 21 and 22.\textsuperscript{60} However, I would rather suggest that this is perfectly in line with the descriptions of Hannibal’s character and his behavior that we have seen all along. He is a paradoxical and duplicitous character, difficult to get a handle on. In particular, this passing mention of disguises sets the stage for a major part of Hannibal’s strategy in book 22, which revolves around creating misleading appearances and tricking the Romans into rash action.\textsuperscript{61} His ability to make things seem other than what they are, which he does extremely successfully with the landscape at various points, will be a repeated theme. Over the course of this book, Hannibal will move away from being undermined by his own false accounts of events (as he was in the Alps), to creating false and undermining visual narratives which will take in his enemies.

Having failed to cross the Apennines, Hannibal decides to take the long route into Etruria, but runs into marshland flooded by the river Arno. This latest struggle with the landscape also contains echoes of the Alps, in terms of the destabilizing effect of the terrain on

\textsuperscript{59} 22.1.3
the army and the motif of failed guidance which runs all the way through Livy’s narrative of
Hannibal’s invasion. The episode begins with Hannibal’s risky decision to take this route:

\[\textit{dum consul placandis Romae dis habendoque dilectu dat operam, Hannibal profectus ex}
hibernis, quia iam Flaminium consulem Arretium peruenisse \textit{fama} erat, cum aliud longius,
ceterum commodius \textit{ostenderetur} iter, propiorem uiam per paludes petit, qua \textit{fluuuius Arnus} per
eos dies solito \textit{magis} inundauerat. \textit{(22.2.1-2)}\]

Livy’s account of the crossing of the marshes has its basis in Polybius (3.78-9), and for
the most part resembles it quite closely, but there are some significant differences in the ways
each describes this decision. Polybius attributes a good deal of care and responsibility to
Hannibal prior to entering the marshes, telling us that he made careful enquiries as to the route he
should take to Etruria, and that his choice of this road was due to the fact that he could take
Flaminius by surprise. There is a lot of emphasis on Hannibal’s calculations about the route; we
get the sense that, even though it turned out to be difficult and had unfortunate consequences,
there was a certain rationale to going this way. Polybius’ Hannibal here conforms to his image of
an ideal commander; he is a careful, conscientious planner and learns by making inquiries.\(^{62}\) In
Livy’s account, barely any agency is attributed to Hannibal in this matter. He does not actively
make enquiries, but hears via \textit{fama} that the consul Flaminius has made his way to Arretium, and
the route through the marshes is pointed out to him by some unknown person \textit{(ostenderetur}
\textit{iter)}.\(^{63}\) Hannibal makes the same preparations in Livy as he does in Polybius, but where Polybius

\(^{62}\) For a full account of the importance Polybius places on the rationality of his commanders, see Stephan Podes,
\(^{63}\) Although \textit{fama} has its moments as a reliable source of information in Livy (see Levene, \textit{Hannibalic War}, 154-15;
‘History, Metahistory, and Audience Response in Livy 45,’ \textit{CA} 25 (2006), 77-87), here Hannibal’s reliance on it
devotes a few sentences to explaining his calculations, based on his knowledge of the unusual flooding of the marshes, Livy simply tells us what he does, incorporating a mention of the flooding as something he (Livy) knows, rather than something Hannibal is thinking about (propiorem uiam per paludes petit, qua fluuius Arnus per eos dies solito magis inundauerat).

Just as we saw in the Alps, where Livy orders his narrative in such a way as to suggest Hannibal’s loss of authority, as the mountains turn out to be so much more horrifying than the men imagined, the marshes present us with a Hannibal who is not prepared, and not grounded in reality. His inability to foresee difficulties in the landscape here is a smaller scale version of his encounter with the Alps. As we saw, Livy seemed to be responding to the narrative of Polybius, who imparted much more authority, much more knowledge to Hannibal. Where Polybius’ Hannibal knew what he was getting into, and that rational perspective was justified, Livy gives us a character who refuses to make the proper inquiries and base his notion of space in the real world. Once again, Livy rejects the version presented by his predecessor and source.

Once the journey through the marshes begins, it becomes clear how big a miscalculation this is, as the troops suffer dreadfully in the flooded ground. Water is again (as it was with the Druentia) a source of instability and difficulty in moving forwards. 64 There are guides to lead them through, but, as in the Alps, they are associated more with difficulty than with clarity.

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64 We might think of Livy’s own image of himself floundering in the ocean as he begins on the fourth decade at 31.1.4–5. Water is so frequently in the AUC a symbol of the lack of a clear way forwards. Hasdrubal also finds water misleading at 27.47.10, as he tries to use the River Metaurus as a guide when he is lost, but the twists and turns of the river only lead him further astray: Hasdrubal dum lux uiam ostenderet ripa fluminis signa ferri iubet, et per tortuosi amniss flexusque cum errorem uoluens haud multum processisset, ubi prima lux transitum opportunum ostendisset transiturus erat. sed cum, quantum a mari abscedebat, tanto altioribus coercentibus amnem ripis non inueniret uada, diem terendo spatium dedit ad insequendum sese hosti.
Livy goes on to narrate the difficulties faced by the Gauls in particular, who struggle to stay upright, with some dropping dead amidst the baggage animals. In the marshes, the impossibility of gaining a foothold recalls the Druentia and the Alps, where the lack of footholds, the constant slipping and falling reflected the destabilization of both notions of space and historical narrative. Hannibal’s status as a leader and guide is also in question; despite raising himself above the water on an elephant, the damp and the lack of sleep cause him to be ill (the site of the illness is his caput), and he loses the sight in one of his eyes. This lack of vision seems to compound the loss of authority and capacity for guidance that we have seen from Hannibal over the course of his journey into Italy. However, as the army reaches the other side of the marshes, this picture is complicated by a newfound carefulness and conscientiousness as he considers his next move:

\[
\text{certumque per praemissos exploratores habuit exercitum Romanum [in] circa Arreti moenia esse. consulis deinde consilia atque animum et situm regionum itineraque et copias ad commeatus expediendos et cetera, quae cognosse in rem erat, summa omnia cum cura inquirendo exsequebatur. (22.3.1-2)}
\]

It looks like Polybius’ ideal general has been delayed until after the crossing of the marshes in Livy’s account, and this allows for a major turning point in the narrative. The Italian landscape has been shown to be treacherous and difficult to navigate, with no clear paths or
opportunities for easy progress available. Hannibal’s predictions of immediate access to Rome (which have previously been prompted by the surmounting of other significant natural obstacles such as the Ebro and the Alps) have been proven false, and his status as a guide and leader frequently thrown into question. But things largely shift gear at this point, after the last major boundary is crossed. Even as he loses an eye and his power of literal sight diminishes, Hannibal becomes much more authoritative, and gains a more practical and realistic approach to space and his movements through it. His use of scouts who can find out what the landscape looks like through autopsy, now that relying on *fama* has become problematic, is a major part of this. The change is reflected in his use of the Italian landscape, which he is now much more able to manipulate to his own advantage.

*Illusion and misperception: Trasimene and the deceptive countryside.*

The reassertion of Hannibal’s control over his surroundings after the misery of the marshes heralds a new phase of success, and contrasts sharply with the behavior of the Roman consul, Flaminius. Beginning with his appearance at the end of Book 21 as a consul designate, Flaminius is portrayed by Livy as reckless and headstrong, initially in his attitude towards the gods and the auspices required by his office. Since Hannibal has taken on the persona of the good, careful, Polybian general, the recklessness of Flaminius is all the more striking, and the ground is prepared for the Romans’ (especially Flaminius’) spectacular loss of control at Trasimene, where the Italian landscape is portrayed as deceptive and hostile to the Romans themselves.

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65 21.63 ff. for Flaminius’ unpopularity and cavalier approach to the auspices.
Immediately after emerging from the marshes, Hannibal begins to use the Italian countryside against the Romans. In keeping with his awareness of the power of sight and vision, he now makes a strategy out of showing things to the Romans in order to bait them; sometimes real views of destruction, at other times misleading visions of calm and emptiness. Here, it is the ravaging of the Etrurian countryside which he shows (ostendit) to Flaminius as a way of drawing him out. This sets the stage for a series of episodes in which the Romans are susceptible to the spectacles and shows put on by Hannibal. As an audience they repeatedly fall for the provocative and often deceptive images and narratives he creates in the landscape. When Flaminius follows him to Trasimene, Hannibal devises another show, this time a false one, leaving a small section of his army out in the open while hiding the rest of them behind the hills. The way that Livy describes the landscape of Trasimene lends it a kind of agency in this deception:

\begin{quote}
\textit{et iam pervenerat ad loca nata insidiis, ubi maxime montes Cortonenses Trasumennus subit. uia tantum interest perangusta, uelut ad <id> ipsum de industria relictio spatio; deinde paulo latior patescit campus; inde colles insurgunt.} (22.4.2)
\end{quote}

The idea that a place in Italy is \textit{nata insidiis}, created for treachery, for the kind of tactics we know Hannibal to favour adds to the foreboding and to the sense of inevitability. This is Hannibal’s landscape, it allows him to behave in a particularly Carthaginian way; despite its Italian location, it exists to work against the Romans and for their enemies. Throughout the account of the battle itself, the natural features of the place become a second enemy for the Romans, simply by being there. The landscape is a significant presence in this battle, and the way that it seems to aid the Carthaginians, and functions in accordance with the treachery of

\footnote{22.3.6}
their plans, lends a supernatural aspect to the narrative. Supernatural elements to the major battle episodes in Book 22 have been mentioned before, notably when it comes to the long and vivid prodigy lists, and the bad omens provoked by Flamininus that precede the battle at Trasimene.⁶⁷ Extra-human occurrences are mainly associated with the possibility of Roman moral failure; prodigies and bad omens must be expiated for success to occur. In book 22 it seems that the landscape adds another, less straightforward dimension to this idea. The suggestion that Italy and its countryside are somehow acting against the Romans at this stage in the war, in tandem with the divine anger which already is implied to be present, makes this section of the narrative much more frightening and unsettling. It also adds an element to the narrative which is not strictly historiographical, but more poetic in nature. Hannibal is a major part of this; his peculiarity as a character in a Roman historical narrative is partly suggested by his affinity with the supernatural, or rather his ability to create supernatural-seeming effects.

From the beginning of the battle onwards, the power of sight is correlated with success and, to a certain extent, moral superiority. Flamininus, through his consistent rashness and refusal to take notice of omens, is emblematic of Roman moral failure at the beginning of the Hannibalic war, and some of his soldiers are complicit in these problems. Just before the Trasimene narrative begins, we are told that the ordinary soldiers “took pleasure in the rashness of their commander”, and failed to look at (intueretur) the causes for their enthusiasm. Flamininus leads them in this failure to see – he arrives at the lake at sunset and sets out through the defile where Hannibal’s cavalry are waiting before the sun is properly up. He operates, then, in only semi-light conditions, and will not wait for the daylight which might help him. As a result, he sees only what Hannibal wants him to see, and fails to detect the super caput insidiae. The environment aids the Carthaginians at this point; the Romans’ vision is obscured by mist from

⁶⁷ E.g. Levene, *Religion in Livy*, 22; Walsh, *Livy*, 63, 68
the lake, which is thicker at their level than at the level of the Carthaginians in the hills. Hannibal’s troops are therefore able to coordinate their attack. The Roman army is trapped, equally cut off by the landscape and by Hannibal’s army, two forces working in tandem (clausum lacu et montibus et circumfusum suis copiis habuit hostem).\textsuperscript{68}

The fog, for Livy, is almost as active in creating horror as the Carthaginians themselves. If we compare Polybius’ account, there is no such suggestion of agency on the part of the weather. He notes that the day was ὀμιχλώδους διισφερόντως, and also that the thickness of the mist prevented the Romans from seeing the unified attack from above, but crucially gives the responsibility for the slaughter to the ἀκρισία of Flaminius, who is unceremoniously killed off in the next sentence.\textsuperscript{69} Meanwhile in Livy’s battle, Flaminius is praised for keeping a cool head in the midst of disaster and rallying the troops as best he could. Polybius’ ideas about what happened in this battle are quite straightforward: Flaminius was foolish, therefore he got himself and his army slaughtered. In Livy’s account, Flaminius’ recklessness is also prominent, but there are other factors at work that complicate this story, and I would argue that the landscape is one of them.\textsuperscript{70} Not only does this episode reinforce the idea brought up by the Apennines, that there is some kind of extra-human moral force which resides in the countryside, which punishes Flaminius for his religious wrongdoing, but it hints at a problematic view of the relationship between Italy and the Romans. Italy is not a safe, friendly space for the Romans (the \textit{tuta ac pacata itinera} that Hannibal imagined would welcome the Romans at 21.44.?); its turning against Rome, apparently in sympathy with the Carthaginians’ deceptive tactics, foreshadows the way that the communities of Italy will turn away from Rome and defect to Hannibal.

\textsuperscript{68} 22.4.5
\textsuperscript{69} Plb. 3.84.4.
\textsuperscript{70}See Levene, \textit{Hannibalic War}, 267–70 on the lack of obvious circumstantial causation at Trasimene (which is typical of Livy’s battle scenes), and the importance of wider moral issues on the sequence of events.
Hannibal’s skill in creating appearances is highlighted once again in his interactions with Fabius Maximus and his headstrong master of the horse, Minucius. Hannibal’s strategy of provocation relies on characters like Flamininus and Minucius, and the latter is vocal in his opposition to Fabius’ refusal to engage with the enemy. When Hannibal sets fire to the Falernian district in Campania (which Livy calls *amoenissimus Italiae ager*) Minucius delivers a harangue to his fellow officers:

‘spectatum [est] hoc’ inquit Minucius, ‘ad rem fruendam oculis, sociorum caedes et incendia, uenimus?’

Minucius is protesting the passivity of Fabius’ strategy, but he hits on an essential part of the Carthaginian aim; Hannibal is trying to create spectacles, things to be seen by the Romans, which play on their own conceptions and imaginings of Italy. This part of Italy has particular emotional resonance, which Minucius picks up on in his speech: it contains a Roman colony, Sinuessa, and Roman citizens once sent out by the *patres*. It is in a sense an extension of Rome itself and raises the spectre of the city being invaded. With such close ties to Rome, it is particularly disturbing to see foreigners attacking it, who have come here *ab extremis orbis terrarum terminis* (and Minucius echoes Hannibal’s own interpretation of his journey to Italy). This notion of an Italian heartland closely bound to Rome, almost an extension of Rome, in fact, prompts further comparison with the ancestors:

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72 22.14.1

73 22.14.4
Minucius’ invocation of memory and exempla against Fabius’ strategy continues throughout the speech, moving to other traumatic moments in Roman history: the Gallic invasions (which more explicitly bring to mind an attack on Rome itself) and the Samnite Wars, as well as the more recent expulsion of Carthage from the Aegatian islands off Sicily. So Hannibal’s attack on Sinuessa and the Falernian countryside provokes a wider vision of Italy, of Roman territory and the shame of invasion by foreigners. The memory and emotion which resides in the Italian countryside for the Romans is thus harnessed by Hannibal even as he uses the landscape against them, setting the scene for Minucius’ shame-focused narrative of Roman decline.

As Fabius persists in his tactics, eventually blocking the Carthaginians’ route out of the Falernian district, Hannibal adopts an escape plan which manipulates ideas about the landscape in a different way – this time by invoking the possibility of supernatural forces. Again, Livy stresses the importance of visual appearance for Hannibal’s plan:

\[ ludibrium oculorum specie terribile ad frustrandum hostem commentus principio noctis furtim succedere ad montes statuit. \]

(22.16.6)

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74 See Jane Chaplin, *Livy’s Exemplary History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000), 43-44 for Minucius’ use of exempla, specifically the exemplum provided by Caudium, in this speech.
By rounding up cattle and setting fire to their horns in the darkness, Hannibal creates the illusion that the entire landscape is ablaze (*haud secus quam siluis montibusque accensis omnia circa uirgulta ardere uisa*). And when the cattle come near enough to the Roman soldiers holding the pass through the mountains, the soldiers at first think they are breathing fire, and stand still, *miraculo attoniti*, until it becomes clear that the whole thing is down to *humana fraus.* Even though the episode ends with this realization, it still suggests a supernatural quality to Hannibal in that he can create the illusion of such a ‘miracle’. His introduction of the potentially supernatural into the day to day conduct of the war is surprising and unexpected, just as Livy’s hints at the supernatural are generically surprising. This ability to manipulate the landscape and all its potential resonances in the Roman imagination, even when the Romans claim that landscape as their own, is certainly powerful and beyond the norm.

Still alter, when the conflict between Minucius and Fabius comes to a head and Minucius gets his opportunity to command, the battle goes against him and the defeat is blamed on his rashness. Just as with Flaminius, the landscape works against him, and in a very similar way. Livy sets the scene for the battle by describing the terrain between the camps of Minucius and Hannibal. As on many other occasions, Hannibal plans to use this terrain for an ambush. He lures the Romans into battle by conspicuously occupying a strategically well-placed hill, but meanwhile he posts men to ambush them in the land between. This is described as follows:

*Ager omnis medius erat prima specie inutilis insidiatori, quia non modo silvestre quicquam, sed ne vepribus quidem vestitum habebat, re ipsa natus [de]tegendis insidiis eo*

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75 For further discussion of this episode see Paul François, “Hannibal pyromane?: Tite-Live XXII, 17.” *RPh* 2001, 2: 257-271.
77 As words put into the mouth of Fabius demonstrate: *ita est, inquit, non celerius quam timui deprehendit fortuna temeritatem* (22.29.1).
This landscape is *natus tegendis insidiis* just as the terrain around Trasimene was, and by nature it reflects Hannibal’s own character as an *insidiator*, seeming to do something other than is really the case. The accumulation of language to do with deception and hiding builds the sense of unease that also accompanied Flaminius’ arrival at the lake, and also strengthens the association between the terrain and Hannibal himself. The triple repetition of cognates of *insidia*, a word often used to describe Carthaginian methods, is striking in such a short space.\(^7\) The fact that Hannibal is so in tune with the landscape in Book 22 seems to be connected with his growing success. While Livy’s narrative hints that the Romans are being punished for their faults in this war, namely their inability to see how to deal effectively with the Carthaginians, it also hints that Hannibal’s success is being encouraged. Italy is not on the side of the Romans, however strong the imagined links between the two are.

The climax of book 22 comes of course with the battle at Cannae, which follows the pattern of the rash Roman general established with Flaminius and Trasimene. The landscape plays little part in this battle, although Hannibal is able to take advantage of one environmental factor, the wind called the Volturnus and the clouds of dust it brings. By positioning his army with its back to the wind, he forces the Romans to face into it, and as the battle line is drawn up, the dust deprives them of their sight.\(^8\) The Romans are now physically in the same state as they

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\(^7\) Levene, *Hannibalic War*: 231 n.189 citing Wheeler (1988): 84-7 on the word *insidia*.

\(^8\) 22.46.9 – a repetition of what is said earlier at 22.43.11.
were at Trasimene, unable to see, and in the same state as they have figuratively been all the way through book 22, lacking perception and understanding of what Hannibal is doing.

The aftermath of Cannae, however, marks the very end of the conception of space which dominated book 21. The Italian countryside has already become the scene of the action, and we have seen how it seems to stand in for Rome, from the Roman perspective. For them, the invasion of Italy has been almost as horrifying as an invasion of the city itself. But Rome as the centre of Hannibal’s world view has to drop away after Cannae, when his delay of the march on Rome is marked as the moment when the city was saved (*mora eius diei satis creditur saluti fuisse urbi atque imperio*). The very end of the book, where Livy lists the allies who then went on to defect during the war, as a consequence of losing hope in Rome after Cannae, compounds this sense of a shift in notions of space. All the people who left Rome and went over to the Carthaginians are noted in a long list, and through this it is obvious that Rome is no longer the centre of things. The war will now be fought out in the Italian countryside and among its communities.

We have seen a number of functions of space, geography and landscape in this chapter, from its role in questioning the straightforwardness of historical narrative, to its illumination of character and major themes, in particular Rome’s relationship with Italy, played out in the countryside. In the next chapter I will mainly expand on this last function, looking at the memories contained in certain evocative places in Italy and how the Romans interact with both place and memory. The next chapter will also bring my analysis of Hannibal full circle by looking at the character of Scipio and his conception of space at the end of the third decade. This shows some significant similarities with that of Hannibal, and casts more light on the functions

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80 22.51.4
of Italy within the narrative, yet the specific resonances of Scipio’s vision of space are quite different.
In the last chapter we explored the various resonances that Italy as a space contains in books 21 and 22, as well as the capacity of individual landscapes to bring out certain historical themes. The thread running through the chapter was the problematic status of Italy in relation to Rome, and the ways in which that could be threatening to Augustan notions of a unified Italy. In this chapter we will continue to explore these themes in the spaces and places of the rest of the third decade. As we saw at the end of the previous chapter, Book 22 ended with a list of the allies and regions who defected to Hannibal over the course of the war (22.61.10–15). This fragmentation, and the subsequent Roman attempts to regain their hegemony, are of course a major theme of the third decade, and the question of Italian identity and what that means comes up repeatedly. Defections and resistance on the part of communities with historically close ties to Rome provide Livy with opportunities to explore the fluid nature of Roman and Italian identity.

Some important work has been done in recent scholarship on some of the more significant places in the third decade, particularly on the cities which make up Rome’s major Italian and Sicilian antagonists, Capua, Tarentum and Syracuse. This work has tended to focus on the ways in which the fates of these places in the Hannibalic war reflect on Rome’s own historical (and historiographical) trajectory. As David Levene has shown, the defection of Capua is an important episode for thinking about Roman-Italian relationships in Livy, since it is a place that is strongly connected to Rome through intermarriage and alliance (e.g. at 23.4.7. id modo erat in mora ne extemplo deficerent, quod conubium vetustum multas familias claras ac potentis Romanis miscuerat), but is also portrayed as being un-Roman in its values and way of life (23.2.1. inde Capuam flectit iter luxuriantem longa felicitate atque indulgentia fortunae, maxime
As the Capuans prepare to admit Hannibal, appeals to prevent it are made by the Roman consul Varro and by the pro-Roman element in Capua (represented by Decius Magius) on the grounds of that closeness. Varro even refers to Rome as their \textit{communem patriam} (23.5.10). These appeals, however, fail, and Capua’s defection becomes the most devastating betrayal of the war, since it proves the fragility of even the closest ties.\footnote{See 26.1.3–4 on the importance of recovering Capua: \textit{ea tum cura maxime intentos habebat Romanos, non ab ira tantum, quae in nullam unquam ciuitatem iustior fuit, quam quod urbis tam nobilis ac potens, sicut defectione sua traxerat aliquot populos, ita recepta inclinatura rursus animos uidebatur ad ueteris imperii respectum.}}

James Chlup’s 2009 article on Tarentum is another good example of this kind of discussion, in which he reads the Tarentine episodes as presenting an \textit{altera historia} for Rome, a temporary opening up of a future in which Hannibal can be seen as the liberator of Italy from an oppressive Rome.\footnote{James T. Chlup, \textit{“Maior et clarior victoria: Hannibal and Tarentum in Livy,” Classical World} 103.1 (2009): 17-38.} Chlup’s reading of the wall built by the Carthaginians and Tarentines to keep the beleagured Romans in the citadel is especially original: it briefly makes Tarentum into a place dominated by a monument to Roman defeat, which, no less, recalls the Gallic sack of Rome in 390 BC. Of course, the Romans claw their way back from the “precipice” of this \textit{altera historia}, but the significance of Tarentum within the third decade is in part to allow the reader to comprehend the nearness of other possibilities. Syracuse and its conquest by Marcellus has also attracted a good deal of this kind of analysis. Mary Jaeger’s 2003 article compares Syracuse in the period of its revolt from Rome with Rome itself, arguing that the great Sicilian city ultimately fails in its attempt at independence because it lacks the wisdom to use its past and to learn from exempla, the kind of wisdom that has been central to Rome’s continued liberty.\footnote{Mary Jaeger, \textit{“Livy and the fall of Syracuse,”} \textit{in Formen römischer Geschichtsschreibung von den Anfängen bis Livius: Gattungen—Autoren—Kontexte}, ed. Ulrich Eigler, Ulrich Gotter, Nino Luraghi, and Uwe Walter (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2003), 213–234.}

Meanwhile Andreola Rossi focuses more on Marcellus than on Syracuse itself, reading the “tears

\textit{tamen inter corrupta omnia licentia plebis sine modo libertatem exercentis).}^{1}$
of Marcellus” as a signal of the beginning of Rome’s decline.⁵ Syracuse’s conquest “signals the final collapse of that Greek culture and civilization in Italian territory, which had seen its acme in the prestigious and glorious past of the city of Syracuse itself”. By absorbing that culture and civilization, Rome paves the way for its own moral decline, which starts with Marcellus himself. These studies all use moments of crisis in other places to illuminate some aspect of Rome’s larger historical narrative, either something did become integrated into that narrative, or something which was just envisaged for a moment. In this chapter I will build on this work, using specific places as prisms through which to view the larger picture of Rome’s relationship with her nearest allies.

I am taking as a starting point for this discussion a speech which comes from beyond the confines of the third decade, but which looks back on it in some useful ways. At the beginning of Book 31, the consul to whom the province of Macedonia has been assigned, Publius Sulpicius, gives a speech attempting to persuade the assembly to vote on war with Philip. He starts from the premise that if an army is not taken to Macedonia to fight with him there, then Philip will soon invade Italy and they will have to fight with him on home soil. He uses the example of the Hannibalic War, concluded only months before, to convince his audience that delaying the beginning of war, as they did when Hannibal besieged Saguntum in 219, will inevitably mean that war will be brought to them. The shattered resources of the Romans, the defections of the allies are mentioned as reasons to avoid having another enemy in Italy, and of course there is the sheer physical devastation, as Sulpicius describes it here at the end of the speech:

Macedonia potius quam Italia bellum habeat: hostium urbes agrique ferro atque igni uastentur. experti iam sumus foris nobis quam domi feliciora potentioraque arma esse. (31.7.13)

There is a strong sense in this speech of the trauma now associated with fighting in Italy, of a certain insecurity about their homeland, which is driving them to eliminate threats further afield. In this chapter I want to explore that insecurity and how it manifests itself in Livy’s treatment of Rome’s engagement with various Italian communities, particularly those in southern Italy and Sicily. Just before the passage quoted above, Sulpicius asks his audience if he thinks the peoples of Magna Graecia and central Italy would stay quiet if Philip were to invade Italy. He gives a definitive reply to his own question: *nunquam isti populi, nisi cum deerit ad quem desciscant, ab nobis non deficient.* In this chapter, we will see how this sentiment is built throughout the books of the third decade. Having mentioned how Capua and Tarentum have been read as fitting into this picture of fragmentation and disunity, I will focus on some less-studied places which nonetheless feature prominently in the war – the Greek cities of southern Italy and Sicily, looking at how the problems of their relationship with Rome come out in Livy’s portrayals of them. We will then go on to look at the character of Scipio and his attitude to Italy as he brings about the greatest successes of the war on foreign turf.

The first half of the chapter, then, will look at a recurring theme, the violence perpetrated by Roman armies against places associated with divinities in southern Italy and Sicily. The three places I will discuss – Croton, Henna, Locri – were all Greek cities and all had rich cultural and mythic histories, as well as, to varying extents, a presence in ancient literature; Croton and Henna certainly incorporate features of the literary *locus amoenus,* and I will focus on the ways

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6 31.7.12. That this kind of sentiment still existed towards the end of the first century can be seen in Horace, *Epodes* 16, 1–10, in which the Marsi, Etruscans and Capua join the great foreign enemies of Rome, Hannibal, the Germans and the Gauls, as examples of destructive forces comparable to civil war.
that Roman violence overwrites and erases these characteristics. Livy thematizes these divine places and poses them as one particular kind of landscape; the historiographical function of this kind of landscape is to serve as a symbol of Roman violation of southern Italian and Sicilian (Greek) culture and religion. By repeating this trope, we end up with a sense that the Roman relationship with its former and future allies in Italy is fundamentally troubled and unstable.

The second half of the chapter looks at Scipio in Spain, and only serves to reinforce this impression. Scipio is characterized in an important way by his approach to space, which is strikingly similar to the conception of space that we saw in Hannibal in books 21–22. Scipio is preoccupied with forward movement and with the crossing of boundaries, and has little time for the complexities of the Italian past. He looks forward to Spain and Africa as the sites of Roman victory, and his movements away from Italy are met with resounding success. As a contrast to the brutal Roman interactions with the gods of Magna Graecia and Sicily, Scipio creates his own sense of divinity, as we see in the narrative of the capture of New Carthage. The correspondences between Hannibal and Scipio become especially significant at the very end of the third decade, when both commanders leave Italy for Africa. Hannibal, for whom Italy was a kind of second homeland (as we saw in the first chapter) is tormented by his enforced departure, while Scipio’s crossing to Africa is serene and met with favourable omens; from this we see how Livy problematizes and complicates the Augustan notion of the unification of Italy.7

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Croton, Henna, Locri: clashing with the gods.

Croton, a Greek city in the toe of Italy, provides a good example of a place which recurs throughout Livy’s narrative and illustrates some of the problems between Rome and the communities of this region at various points in its history. In ancient literature the reputation of the city revolved around the healthiness of its position and the beauty and athletic prowess of its citizens. When we first encounter Croton, at the beginning of Book 24, Livy calls attention to the devastation wrought by Pyrrhus:

Urbs Croto murum in circuitu patentem duodecim milia passuum habuit ante Pyrrhi in Italiam adventum; post uastitatem eo bello factam uix pars dimidia habitabatur; flumen, quod medio oppido fluxerat, extra frequentia tectis loca praeterfluebat, <erat> et arx procul eis quae habitabantur. (24.3.1)

It is unclear who was to blame for the uastitas inflicted on Croton during the war with Pyrrhus, but the spatial layout of the city has been completely changed and disrupted so as to diminish its functioning in a normal way. The things which should be the heart of the city, the river and the citadel have been removed and placed outside its bounds. One of the most striking aspects of the way in which Italian places are described in the third decade has to do with the presence of Pyrrhus, who is frequently called to mind in the speeches of various characters and in the author’s own voice. Locri, to which we shall return later, when it is subject to depredation by the Roman general Pleminius, appeals to Rome to recall what happened when Pyrrhus also

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8 On which see Michael Fronda, Between Rome and Carthage: Southern Italy during the Second Punic War. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2010), 148–187.
9 Strabo VI.12, Cicero, de Inventione 2.1.
robbed their temple of Proserpina – the goddess wrecked his fleet in a storm.\textsuperscript{10} The memory of Pyrrhus also serves as a negative exemplum for the defecting Capuans at the beginning of Book 23. As the city is on the verge of handing itself over to the Carthaginians, the lone voice of dissent we hear is from a leading citizen, Decius Magus, who recalls the similar situation of the Tarentines when they brought Pyrrhus over and its disastrous outcome (\textit{Pyrrhi superbam dominationem miserabilemque Tarentinorum seruitutem exempla referens})\textsuperscript{11}. This is not the first time in living memory that these cities have suffered in a war between Rome and an outside power, even if to a large extent they invite that trouble. The Samnites also bring up the failed hopes presented by Pyrrhus when they go over to the Carthaginians in Book 23; when he ended his alliance with the Samnites they were forced to make peace with Rome, and they are wary of repeating the past.\textsuperscript{12} But the Romans in this case, as at Locri, are the main problem, since Marcellus was at that time conducting constant raids on Samnite territory from his base at Nola. These references to Pyrrhus obviously call for a comparison between Hannibal and Pyrrhus as invaders, but they also add up to a picture of central and southern Italy as a place that keeps suffering from the effects of Rome’s expanding power, a place that both suffers in the present and is still scarred from past wars.\textsuperscript{13} The war with Pyrrhus offers a backdrop against which the current behavior of both the Carthaginians and the Romans can be judged. Nonetheless, these places are clearly not passive victims in Rome’s wars; the Samnites and many communities of southern Italy and Sicily voluntarily allied with Pyrrhus against Rome, and will do the same in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{10} 29.8; 29.18.
\item \textsuperscript{11} 23.7.5
\item \textsuperscript{12} 23.42.2: Postquam his parum fidebamus, Pyrrho regi nos adiunximus; a quo reliqui pacem necessariam accepiimus fuimusque in ea per annos prope quinquaginta ad id tempus quo tu in Italiam uenisti.
\item \textsuperscript{13} A famous (but probably spurious) anecdote in Livy has Hannibal meeting with Scipio in 193, and telling the Roman general how much he had admired Pyrrhus’ campaigns (Liv.35.14.5–12).
\end{itemize}
the Hannibalic War. The memory of Pyrrhus reminds Livy’s readers of the fragility of Roman
hegemony in Italy.

The Pyrrhic dislocation of Croton itself is in stark contrast with the description that
follows, of the precinct of Juno Lacinia near to the city, which remained untouched.

sex milia aberat inde urbe nobili templum, ipsa urbe nobilius, Laciniae Iunonis, sanctum
omnibus circa populis; lucus ibi frequenti silua et proceris abietis arboribus saeptus laeta in
medio pascua habuit, ubi omnis generis sacrum deae pecus pascebatur sine ullo pastore,
separatimque greges sui ciusque generis nocte remeabant ad stabula, nunquam insidiis
ferarum, non fraude uiolati hominum. magni igitur fructus ex eo pecore capti columnaque inde
aurea solida facta et sacrata est; inclitumque templum diuitiis etiam, non tantum sanctitate fuit.
ac miracula aliqua adfinuntur ut plerumque tam insignibus locis: fama est aram esse in
uestibulo templi cius cinerem nullo unquam moueri uento. (24.3.3–7)

The precinct, far from the extreme change wrought in Croton, is perceived to be
untouchable, not subject even to the normal degradations of weather and human crime. It is a
kind of pastoral locus amoenus, though lacking any sign of human intervention. A hint of
cynicism on the author’s part invades this peaceful description though, in the solid gold column
which makes the sanctuary famous for its riches as well as it’s holiness, and the miracula that are
“invented” to go with it.

The attention given to the sanctuary, as well as the juxtaposition of the total disruption
of the city of Croton, currently suffering again from internal division and foreign attack, and the

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14 On the typical features of the locus amoenus see E.R. Curtius, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages,
inviolability of the sanctuary, must be designed to draw attention to Croton as a place of some significance within the narrative. Mary Jaeger, in an article on the mentions of this temple in Livy, uses it to explore the role that an individual place can have within Livy’s history, and its relation to his historiographical project.\textsuperscript{15} The temple at Croton comes up in several contexts; we have seen it at the beginning of Book 24, where it comes up in the context of the Bruttian seizure of the city in 215 BC. The second is in Book 28 when Hannibal erects a monument on the promontory where the temple was located, recording his achievements, as Livy tells us, in Punic and Greek.\textsuperscript{16} Then in Book 30, prior to Hannibal’s departure from Italy, he slaughters those of his Italian allies who did not want to follow him to Africa in the temple.\textsuperscript{17} The last is in Book 42, where some brief notices record the theft of roof tiles from the temple of Juno by the censor Fulvius Flaccus in 174 BC; Flaccus removed them so that he might use them for his own temple in Rome, but was later forced to return them.\textsuperscript{18} Jaeger reads into these passages “a strand of narrative complementing the main thread of Livy’s account of Rome’s expansion”.\textsuperscript{19}

Jaeger’s argument is that Croton becomes more and more a place that is integrated into Italy as the narrative moves forward. When we read about Croton and the temple described in detail in Book 24, the city is described as scarred by war, and the temple is a famous, numinous place, but one which no longer exists in the time of Livy’s readers, as he hints throughout the description. Jaeger also suggests that the way it is described recalls a local tradition of travel-writing and local history in Magna Graecia, which might emphasize Croton’s status as part of a southern Italian unit. But later, the place moves from being a part of its locality to become the

\textsuperscript{16} 28.46.16.
\textsuperscript{17} 30.20.6. This is an interesting contrast with the anecdote recorded by Cicero (via Coelius) that Hannibal refrained from plundering the temple after being visited by Juno in a dream: \textit{de Divinatione} 1.24.
\textsuperscript{18} 42.3.1-11.
\textsuperscript{19} Jaeger, “Hannibal’s Monument,” 389.
manifestation of a new, unified Italy. The slaughter of the Italian allies is a step in this process, as Jaeger puts it: “from the Roman point of view, the Italians, by dying in the Italy they refused to leave, have been sacrificed in the temple as part of the founding of a unified peninsula.” By the time we reach Book 42, the behavior of Flaccus in mistreating the Crotonians and stealing the tiles from the temple is seen as unacceptable, and he is punished for it (he is reprimanded by the Senate and then later hangs himself, resulting in gossip that Juno had taken his mind as punishment for his sacrilege against the temple). The region is now part of a unified Italy; the Italian *socii* have in some sense been annexed to Rome, and Flaccus cannot get away with treating them like this. Jaeger concludes with the following statement:

“By returning repeatedly to the temple of Juno and its environs, by reiterating the idea of violation and by making use of the place’s location at the end of Italy, Livy spins a strand of narrative that complements his main thread. The result is to show how a place that for centuries was important to the Greeks of southern Italy became of historical and even religious significance to Rome.”

One might add to this, however, that although Italy begins to become a unified place in the aftermath of the Hannibalic War, and the temple of Lacinian Juno is certainly an expression of that process, central and southern Italy remain deeply problematic regions within Livy’s narrative, as they did in history itself. Croton and its temple are not just emblematic of

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20 Jaeger, ibid. 412. We see a similar argument from a purely historical perspective in J. Wells, “Impiety in the Middle Republic: The Roman Response to Temple Plundering in Southern Italy”, *CJ* 105.3 (2010) 229-243, which deals with Flaccus’ theft of the roof tiles along with other instances of plundering, such as Plaenius’ treatment of the temple of Proserpina at Locri. He argues that the fact that the Romans ordered expiation and/or reparation in these cases indicates a shift in thinking about southern Italy – their temples become central to Roman identity as opposed to ‘other’ and therefore acceptable to ransack. This seems right, but it doesn’t eliminate the fact that the violations happened.
unification, they are emblematic of a very troubled and uncomfortable process of unification, marked, as Jaeger suggests, by repeated instances of violation, and by a lasting sense of insecurity. Flaccus’ theft of the roof tiles is typical of the Roman attitude towards southern Italy and Sicily throughout the books of the third decade. A temple which is famous for the immunity of its precinct to the normal violence of the human and animal world, which has a history and a significance totally apart from that of Rome, becomes subject to the depredations of a Roman magistrate. This type of historical-cultural violation of places in the Greek cities of southern Italy and Sicily happens several times over the course of the third decade, and gives us a picture of what kind of people the Romans are when they come into contact with these kinds of places – places with a rich history and even mythological significance. In places like these, the Romans seem to be characterized by violence, insensitivity and moral failure.

We see the same pattern when it comes to the perpetration of another violation, a massacre carried out by L. Pinarius (a lieutenant of Marcellus), at Henna, the reputed site of Proserpina’s abduction in Sicily. Henna was a famous place in antiquity and was described by Ovid both in his *Metamorphoses* and in the *Fasti*21, and Diodorus Siculus, as well as Cicero in *In Verrem* II.4. Each source calls attention to its beauty, its groves and its legendary flowers. Livy’s brevity on matters of place and landscape in the latter books of the third decade can be usefully illustrated by reference in this case to Cicero, who of course devoted (or would have devoted) generous stretches of time to describing various places in Sicily in his *Verrines*. Whereas Cicero’s concern is to emphasize (at length) the beauty of these places and their cultural and religious significance, in order to stress the magnitude of Verres’ crimes, Livy avoids long description of places for the sake of it, and here that tendency is particularly marked because Henna is a place so often described in ancient texts.

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21 Met.5.341ff; Fasti 4.419ff; Diodorus 5.2.3 – 5.5.1.
The comparison with Cicero is especially useful here because Cicero’s description of Verres’ desecration of the Henna temple seems to be a model for Livy’s account of Pinarius’ massacre, as Stephen Hinds and David Levene have illustrated. 22 As we shall see, there are certainly verbal echoes of Cicero’s description of Henna in Livy. Relatively briefly, Cicero sums up the beauty of the landscape in order to emphasize the sacredness of the place and the enormity of Verres’ crime as he will subsequently relate it (circa lacus lucique sunt plurimi atque laetissimi flores omni tempore anni, locus ut ipse raptum illum virginis, quem iam a pueris accepimus, declarare videatur). 23

Livy, however, almost totally omits any reference to the landscape itself or its famous beauty. Henna comes up in the context of growing unrest in Sicily: the war with Syracuse has just begun (24.33), and other cities are starting to revolt and drive out their Roman garrisons with assistance from the Carthaginian general Himilco. The massacre at Henna was a pivotal moment in this process, since the Roman forces pre-empted a revolt by penning the populace in the theatre during an assembly and slaughtering them en masse. Instead of frightening the rest of the Sicilians into submission, this ended up causing more cities to abandon their allegiance to Rome and go over to Carthage. When Livy describes Henna as a place, it is purely in terms of its strategic position:

This description not only ignores the material which seems to be standard in mentions of Henna elsewhere, but also has the effect of making the city itself seem isolated from its surroundings, whereas in Cicero, it is clear that the famous plain of Proserpina is there alongside the city in its loco perexcelso atque edito. The only references to the myth and the religious significance of Henna are in contexts which speak strongly of pollution. Pinarius gives a speech to his troops laying out his plan for the massacre and justifying it, in which he talks of Henna being drenched in blood (itaque crastino die aut uestro aut Hennensium sanguine Henna inundabitur). At the end of this speech, just after urging the troops to see that no potential rebel survives from the assembly, comes a startingly perverse prayer to the goddesses of the place, Ceres and Proserpina, in which he asks them to understand the motivation for their actions and look favourably on them.

uos, Ceres mater ac Proserpina, precor, ceteri superi infernique di, qui hanc urbem, hos sacratos lacus lucosque colitis, ut ita nobis uolentes propitii adsitis, si uitandae, non inferendae fraudis causa hoc consilii capimus. (24.38.8)

This is the only place where the normal elements of the landscape (the lake and groves) are mentioned, yet they come up in this quite shocking manner. As Hinds and Levene point out, the lacus lucosque echoes Cicero’s lacus lucique in the passage quoted above, but instead of

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appearing in the context of the description of a beautiful place, they appear in this chillingly impious prayer. Livy is alluding to Cicero’s pleasant *locus amoenus* and also drawing attention to the fact that he has elided it almost totally. Where Cicero sees the description of Henna’s beauty as an essential set-up for the shock of Verres’ thefts, Livy never sets it up in the first place. Henna’s lovely numinosity only shows up at the moment it is being violated. Pinarius acknowledges the sacredness of the landscape and the presence of the goddesses, yet thinks he can appropriate them for Roman purposes, which in a sense reminds us of Flaccus’ actions in stealing the roof tiles from Croton, and also, more immediately, of Marcellus, who steals the treasures of Syracuse for Rome, despite the fact that he weeps at the magnificence of the city he has just captured. Marcellus in Syracuse is really the apex of this tension between respect and ruthless appropriation, a tension which will see again in the fifth decade with Aemilius Paullus in Greece.

We see the magnitude of the Roman transgression after the massacre is accomplished, when Livy makes the following comment about the reaction to it:

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\text{atque ea clades, ut urbis in media Sicilia sitae claraeque uel ob insignem munimento naturali locum uel ob sacra omnia uestigiis raptae quondam Proserpinae, prope uno die omnem Siciliam perua sit et, quia caede infanda rebantur non hominum tantum sed etiam deorum sedem uiolatam esse, tum uero qui etiam ante dubii fuerant defecere ad Poenos. (24.39.8–9)\]^{25}

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\(^{25}\) For this act as the ultimate in violation, see also the Athenian complaints about Philip V at Liv. 31.30. Dennis Pausch, on the other hand, argues that the reader is left to make up his own mind about whether the massacre was justified or not, since Livy informs us that Marcellus approved it after the fact (24.39.7), as well as giving us the Sicilian reaction: *Livius und der Leser*, (München: C. H. Beck, 2013), 137–8.
The clades is perceived by the Sicilians as an offence not only against men but against gods. The shock of this disaster, as Livy says, comes both from the famous impregnability of the site, but also from the fact that the place exists and is sacred because of the footsteps, the traces of Proserpina. This association seems to have more import in the sense of catastrophe which spreads across the island, since the possibility of punishment by the gods is also implied here. We must presume that part of the reason that the Sicilians defect to the Carthaginians is that they expect that the Romans will be punished for their violation. Sicily, with its prominent place in myth-history, is a place where the Romans find themselves in conflict with superior powers which already exist there; they themselves are not the biggest power in the region. I argue that this is a major part of the characterization of southern Italy and Sicily in Livy’s narrative, and a large part of why this is such a problematic set of places. Inevitably the Romans clash with what is already established there; whether it is myth and gods or culture and wealth they are presented as a destructive force.

We see very much the same thing going on at Locri later, in Book 29, when the inhabitants of the city complain at Rome about the violence against their people and the plundering of the temple there by Roman troops under Scipio’s lieutenant, Quintus Pleminius. The Romans, under Scipio, regained Locri in 205 BC from the Carthaginians, to whom the city had revolted in 215. Pleminius was left in charge of the city after its recapture and proceeded to rob the temples, including the temple of Proserpina, and perpetrate various unspeakable outrages on the inhabitants. The situation eventually devolved into a miniature civil war between Pleminius and the military tribunes also stationed there, whom Pleminius eventually tortured.

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26 As Levene, Hannibalic War, 342-3 states in his discussion of this passage: “…the religious violation in and of itself is something which is expected to cause problems for the Romans over and beyond its psychological effect on other people…. Pinarius’ religious violation at the very heart of Sicily (24.39.8 in media Sicilia) has effectively polluted the whole island.”
27 29.8.6-11.
killed, and left unburied. After complaints by the Locrians at Rome, Pleminius was arrested and brought back to Rome, where he died in prison.\textsuperscript{28} As Levene points out, this is the only time in the third decade when Livy explicitly draws the connection between immoral behaviour and divine punishment in his own voice; he draws attention to the fact that Pyrrhus had also robbed the temple of Proserpina, and that his ships were subsequently wrecked, with the only recovered property being that of the goddess. Locri is a place where the patron goddess is particularly present and active, consistently intervening and doling out punishment to the enemies of Locri.

The Romans are also being punished for their plundering, in this case with vicious fighting between the officers of the army \textit{(tum quoque alio genere cladis eadem illa pecunia omnibus contactis ea uiolatione templi furorem obiecit atque inter se ducem in ducem, militem in militem rabie hostili uertit)}.\textsuperscript{29}

The speech of the Locrians, when they come to complain to the Senate about their treatment at the hands of Pleminius, emphasizes that Pleminius is the very worst in a succession of traumas. Certainly he and his men and worse than the Carthaginians, and the ambassadors do not shrink from saying that if Pleminius is representative of Roman behaviour, they would rather the Carthaginians won the war.\textsuperscript{30} But this is not enough, and they have to look back into mythology for a suitable comparison to what they are currently suffering, reaching back to the legendary monsters Scylla and Charybdis, which were supposed to occupy the strait between Italy and Sicily near to Locri.

\begin{flushright}
\textit{nec hominis quicquam est, patres conscripti, praeter figuram et speciem neque Romani ciuis praeter habitum uestitumque et sonum Latinae linguae; pestis ac belua immanis, quales}
\end{flushright}

\textsuperscript{28} 29.22.7-9.  
\textsuperscript{29} 29.8..11.  
\textsuperscript{30} 29.17.7.  

103
It is interesting that Pleminius supersedes, by becoming the contemporary manifestation, of the archetypal destructive monsters of mythology. In the same way that Pinarius’ massacre of the Hennans looms over Sicily and supersedes the more famous clades, the rape of Proserpina, which once happened there, Pleminius has become a more immediate evil to the Locrians. Thinking about more recent history, Pleminius also supersedes Pyrrhus in the extent of his crimes. Pyrrhus also made them suffer when he attacked Locri, and inter alia foeda, he also robbed the temple of Proserpina, but realized his impiety when his fleet was wrecked as he attempted to carry off the treasure, the only ship surviving being the one which actually had it on board. Naturally he took the treasure back, having learned that the gods do exist, and this even though he was superbissimus rex, as the Locrians describe him. Pleminius has learned no such lesson, despite the retribution which has apparently been carried out on himself and his troops.

When relating Pleminius’ robbery of the temple, the embassy is careful to distinguish that man from the rest of his people, whose piety the Locrians acknowledge (uidimus enim cum quanta caerimonia non uestros solum colatis deos sed etiam externos accipiatis). Nonetheless, Pleminius is a representative of the Roman people, and the Romans, however much devotion

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31 Given how prominent styles of dress (mostly the toga) and the Latin language are to Roman identity in the Augustan period (e.g. Virgil’s gens togata prophesied by Jupiter at 1.282), we can see some irony in this statement – maybe this is all there is to being a Roman. Vergil also emphasizes the importance of the Latin tongue to the new identity of his people in another speech of Jupiter’s in Book 12 (834-7): sermonem Ausonii patrium moresque tenebunt, utque est nomen erit; commixti corpore tantum subsident Teucri. morem ritusque sacrorum adiciam faciamque omnis uno ore Latinos.
32 29.18.3-6.
34 29.18.2. The Locrians may only be referring to the Roman decision to import the cult of the Magna Mater from Phrygia, a decision only recently taken in Rome (29.11), or perhaps to the tendency to import deities more generally, and not necessarily to the Romans’ respect for the temples of other Italian communities.
they might show to the gods of their own homeland, demonstrate a pattern of sacrilege in southern Italy and Sicily. The ambassadors refer to Pleminius as *legatus uester*, and to the anger of the goddess afflicting *militibus uestrís*. Their division of Rome from its representatives is false, merely a consequence of their tactfulness. The idea of punishment from the gods is much more active in the Locri episode than it was at Henna. The Locrians claim that Pleminius and his men are already being punished, since the commander and his military tribunes have been fighting, with Pleminius left disfigured and torturing the tribunes to death in return. Human responsibility and divine agency seem to be equally at work during this episode, but it is clear that the Romans are perceived to be at the mercy of a higher power in Locri.

*Leaving Italy behind: Scipio Africanus in Spain and Africa.*

The emergence of the young Scipio as proconsul in command of the Spanish campaign (in Book 26) marks a turning point in the war. As Rossi shows in her comparison of the parallels between Hannibal and Scipio in Livy’s history, Scipio is portrayed as a foil for Hannibal, and the similarities in their lives encourage comparison between the two; the similarities also have the effect of collapsing the distinction between Rome and its enemies. Scipio is a new and charismatic leader, elected on the back of the deaths of his father and uncle in Spain in 211 BC and the destruction of much of their army at the hands of Hannibal Barca. Scipio’s is a totally different kind of leadership to that which we see espoused by Pleminius,

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35 All of the sources for Scipio’s life, and discussions of the conflicts and disagreements between them, can be found in H. H. Scullard, *Scipio Africanus: soldier and politician* (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1970).
36 Andreola Rossi, “Parallel Lives: Hannibal and Scipio in Livy’s Third Decade.” *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 134, no. 2 (2004): 359–81. This collapsing of the distinction between Rome and Carthage can be seen most clearly in the conversation between Scipio and Hannibal prior to the battle at Zama: *quod ego fui ad Trasumennum, ad Cannas, id tu hodie es* (30.30.11). See also Levene, *Hannibalic War*, 231-235.
Pinarius and even Marcellus. It has its basis in clarity, confidence and respect for the natural world, as well as a moderate tendency to self-mythologizing. From the start we see that Spain is to be the arena in which Scipio proves himself, and this is borne out by his clear-cut attitude to the space and boundaries of his province. In his first speech to his army he expresses his intentions for the campaign thus:

\[\textit{sed cum iam benignitate deum id paremus atque agamus, non ut ipsi maneamus in Hispania, sed ne Poeni maneant, nec ut pro ripa Hiberi stantes arceamus transitu hostes, sed ut ultro transeamus transferamusque bellum...}(26.41.6)\]

This paragraph sums up a few essential things about Scipio’s mindset and value as a commander: his constant reference to the gods (\textit{benignitate deum}), his proactive-ness, and the association Livy frequently makes between him and the idea of forward motion.\(^3\) Boundaries, for Scipio, are there to be crossed (\textit{ultro transeamus transferamusque bellum}), and this crossing, significant in its own right as it will reverse the one which started the war in 218 BC, also prefigures the much larger crossing to Africa which Scipio and his army will undertake in 204. In this preoccupation with crossing boundaries, he very much resembles Hannibal in book 21, and brings to mind Hannibal’s resentment of the Romans for imposing limits on others.\(^4\)

As he continues in his speech we see that his attitude towards the disastrous past of the war, and the places associated with its greatest catastrophes, is equally clear and confident.

\(^3\) Scipio here seems to be oversimplifying space, making the crossing of the Ebro the catalyst for the war, instead of the earlier attack on Saguntum.

\(^4\) See Andrew Feldherr, \textit{Spectacle and Society in Livy’s History} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 64–72 for a discussion of Scipio’s invocation of the gods in the context of Roman generals claiming religious authority in Livy.

\(^5\) At 21.44.5-6.
Scipio argues that it is the lot of the Romans to conquer only after they have been defeated, citing wars against the Etruscans, Gauls and Samnites (26.41.9-10). But the disasters and betrayals that are linked with various places, while heartbreaking, seem only a backdrop to the centrality of Roman *uirtus*.

_Trebia Trasumennus Cannaes quid aliud sunt quam monumenta occisorum exercituum consuluumque Romanorum? adde defectionem Italiae maioris partis, Siciliae, Sardiniae; adde ultimum terrorem ac pauorem, castra Punica inter Anienem ac moenia Romana posita et uisum prope in portis uictorem Hannibalem. in hac ruina rerum stetit una integra atque immobilis uirtus populi Romani; haec omnia strata humi erexit ac sustulit._ (26.41.12)

Here, we see how Scipio turns Hannibal’s own vision of victory against him: where Hannibal saw closeness to Rome as one and the same thing as a victory over Rome, Scipio’s faith in Rome’s *uirtus* trumps mere spatial proximity. In this image, almost the whole of Italy beyond the walls of Rome appears to be a kind of wasteland, its places marked by reminders of defeat, the _monumenta_ of the three great Roman defeats in Italy at the beginning of the war, the Carthaginian camp and the vision of Hannibal himself at the gates. The only thing standing in all this _ruina_, the only thing which can raise everything up again, is the _uirtus populi Romani_, which, as Scipio goes on to say, has now been able to overrun Italy once more:

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40 Pausch (*Livius* 100, 171) uses this speech as an example of ‘Rekapitualation,’ a narrative technique used frequently by Livy, in which part of Roman history is summarized later on, or indeed competing versions of the past are given by more than one character. As he points out, book 26, as the middle of the third decade and the beginning of a new pentad, is particularly full of recapitulations.
nunc benignitate deum omnia secunda prospera in dies laetiora ac meliora in Italia

Siciliaque geruntur. in Sicilia Syracusae Agrigentum captum, pulsi tota insula hostes,
receptaeque prouincia in dicionem populi Romani est. in Italia Arpi recepti, Capua capta; iter
omne ab urbe Roma trepida fuga emensus Hannibal, in extremum angulum agri Bruttii
compulsus nihil iam maius precatur deos quam ut incolumi cedere atque abire ex hostium terra
liceat. (26.41.14-16)

Again, the formulaic acknowledgement of the gods’ help, and again we see this
straightforward conception of space: the enemy has been driven out of all of Sicily (tota insula).
Hannibal has “measured out in terrified flight” the entire distance from Rome to the most remote
corner of Bruttium, and can only think of leaving. Everything is whole and tidy for Scipio, and
this is reinforced by the clipped consonances of his phrases (Agrigentum captum; Arpi recepti,
Capua capta). Aside from this, it is significant that Scipio here refers to Italy from Hannibal’s
perspective, as hostium terra. This is actually not Hannibal’s attitude – as we shall see, he curses
having to leave Italy and regards the Carthaginians who ordered him to leave as more damaging
to him than the Romans. In contrast, Scipio thinks of future success as being outside of Italy.
Again, Scipio’s vision of moving through space is a kind of mirror image of Hannibal’s; where
the latter myopically focuses on Rome and Italy, Scipio looks outward and away from Rome. As
we have seen in the earlier sections, and as the speech of Sulpicius with which this chapter began
makes clear, Italy is increasingly becoming, from various Roman perspectives, a place of
betrayal and failure. The successes of the Romans in Italy have been hard won, and Scipio fixes
on Spain as the great hope now for winning the war.
As the Spanish campaign gets underway, Livy devotes an unusual amount of space to the
description of New Carthage, a mark of the significance of the victory won there and a necessary
preliminary to the unusual way in which it was won. There are various problems with Livy’s
description of the city and his (and Polybius’) explanation of Scipio’s successful strategy, which
I will not go into here as they have no bearing on the portrayal of Scipio here and have been
clarity in relation to space which is becoming integral to Livy’s portrayal of him. As far as he is
concerned, New Carthage is the centre of the world at this point in time. This also recalls
Hannibal’s focus on Rome, and the importance he placed, for example, on the battle at the
Ticinus (\textit{hic uincendum aut moriendum, milites, ubi primum hosti occurristis}).\footnote{21.43.5.} Again, Scipio
looks outward instead of inward, seeing New Carthage as the key to the Carthaginians’ power
elsewhere in Spain and Africa.

\begin{quote}
\textit{oppugnabitis enim uere moenia unius urbis, sed in una urbe uniuersiam ceperitis}
\end{quote}

\textit{Hispaniam… haec illis arx, hoc horreum aerarium armamentarium, hoc omnium rerum
receptaculum est. huc rectus ex Africa cursus est, haec una inter Pyrenaeum et Gades statio,
hinc omni Hispaniae imminet Africa.} (26.43.3, 8)

Again, in an echo of Hannibal, Scipio’s certainty and clarity is somewhat misguided, or
at least exaggerated for rhetorical effect; his victory over New Carthage will not deliver all of
Spain into Roman hands, although it is nonetheless a significant victory and brought with it major strategic gains. The victory is of course aided by his own careful inquiry into the city’s position, and his ascertaining that he could make a surprise attack on the side of the city which would be unguarded because of the regular ebbing of the lagoon there. As both Livy and Polybius emphasize, however, Scipio attributes his success to the gods:

hoc cura ac ratione compertum in prodigium ac deos uertens Scipio, qui ad transitum Romanis mare uerterent et stagna auferrent uiiasque ante nunquam initas humano uestigio aperirent, Neptunum iubebat ducem itineris sequi ac medio stagno euadere ad moenia.

(26.45.9)

In doing so Scipio is of course playing into an image, which Livy implies may well be self-constructed, of his special relationship with the gods. This image, we are told at the time of Scipio’s election to the proconsulate, played a large part in getting so young a man into so high a position. In that first speech to the troops which was discussed above, we certainly see Scipio reinforcing this connection with the gods as he prophesies victory in Spain (animus quoque meus, maximus mihi ad hoc tempus uates, praesagit nostram Hispaniam esse... quod mens sua

43 See H. H. Scullard, Scipio Africanus in the Second Punic War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), 98–99. Levene (Hannibalic War, 119–122) sees this as part of a pattern of allusion to Alexander in Livy’s portrayal of Scipio, comparing this passage to Alexander’s speech before the siege of Tyre in Arrian (2.17.3), in which he claims that the capture of Tyre would give them all of Phoenicia.

44 See also 26.48.3: “First he offered up a thanksgiving to the immortal gods because they had not only made him master in a single day of the wealthiest city in all Spain, but had also brought together beforehand into the place all the resources of Africa and Spain, so that whilst nothing was left to the enemy he and his men had a superabundance of everything.”

45 26.19.3-9. Livy does not deny that Scipio’s communing with the gods may have been a result of genuine superstitio, but he does emphasize that it was a carefully developed ars on the young commander’s part which made his divinity a prominent part of his public image. Livy even hints in this passage (via a Tacitus-worthy shrug directed at the rumour) that Scipio may have come up with his Alexander the Great-esque divine origin story himself.
sponte diuinat, idem subicit ratio haud fallax). Like Hannibal, Scipio has a fondness for claiming authority and prophesying, but the latter’s prophesying is accompanied by constant references to the gods, and thus he claims a higher authority for his claims. While Hannibal (in his speech prior to the Alps crossing (21.30) for example), rationalizes in order to back up his claims and is proved wrong, Scipio, with his religious rhetoric, turns out to be more trustworthy and more authoritative. Livy is certainly cynical about Scipio’s supposed divine connections, though his cynicism is less forcibly expressed than that of Polybius, who is quite clear that it was no more than a clever device for gaining support among ordinary men. Nonetheless, the constant intrusion of the divine into the narrative of the conquest of New Carthage and its clear centrality to Scipio’s character as Livy portrays it, does suggest that the commander’s respect for the divine and his acknowledgement of it are crucial to his success. His unstoppable forward progress is guided by the gods (as he commands his men to follow Neptune across the lagoon) and completed by his thanksgiving to them. As Feldherr points out in his discussion of representations of the past by Roman imperatores, Livy appears to be making a wider point about the nature of authority here, which specifically contrasts with Polybius’ ideas.

Even if Livy cannot openly endorse religious authority and the role of the supernatural in events, he gives it a function in his history, suggesting an attitude to historiography quite different from the uncompromising rationality of Polybius.

Scipio’s attitude towards Italy, which begins to emerge in his initial address to his troops in Book 26, becomes more evident later on in the decade, after his serious illness and brush with death prompts a mutiny in his camp at Sucro. In rebuking the troops for their rebellion (28.27–

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47 Plb. 10.2
48 Feldherr, Spectacle, 66–72.
29), Scipio compares them to their Spanish enemies in that there is no difference in what they want to accomplish. What makes the Romans even more contemptible in Scipio’s view is that they have chosen men of low rank, who furthermore are not even Roman, rather than *regiae nobilitatis uiros*, as the Spaniards did. Part of Scipio’s argument, and his chief disappointment, is that these mutineers have failed to show any loyalty or love for their country (*patria*) or for the distinguished men at its forefront; it is clear throughout that country is Rome and its leaders are men from its prominent families. By contrast, he repeatedly abuses the ringleaders of the mutiny for their low, non-Roman origin:

*uos auspicium et imperium ad Umbrum Atrium et Calenum Albium detulistis.*(28.27.5)

Salmon, in his discussion of the sources for the mutiny, claims that these non-Roman leaders were an invention on the part of the ‘unknown annalist’ who was the original source for this speech, and that it is unlikely that a Latin from Cales and an Italian from Umbria could have led a mutiny of Roman troops. Whether or not this is the case, the concentration on the mutineers’ Italian origins, and the distinction drawn in the speech between the body of troops who are Roman citizens, and their non-citizen leaders, portrays Scipio as hostile to Italians. Nowhere in the speech is there a sense of a close relationship between Romans and Latins or Italians. Italy as a communal homeland, or Rome as a communal *patria* for the Italians, is clearly not an foregone conclusion from this perspective.

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50 28.27.5: quid enim uos, nisi quod Ilergetes et Lacetani, aut optastis aliud aut sperastis.

51 Polybius’ speech (11.28) has no such emphasis on the origins of the mutiny’s leaders, but focuses more on the idea that they were conspiring with Spanish chieftains.
Further illustration of Scipio’s outward-focused view comes in Book 29, as Scipio is preparing to cross from Sicily to Africa. Progress and the crossing of boundaries remain at the heart of his character, as we see from this comment by Livy on the significance of the campaign:

*simul et mens ipsa traiciendi, nulli ante eo bello duci temptata, quod ad Hannibalem detrahendum ex Italia transferendumque et finiendum in Africa bellum se transire uolgauerat. concurrerat ad spectaculum in portum omnis turba non habitantium modo Lilybaei sed legationum omnium ex Sicilia quae et ad prosequendum Scipionem officii causa conuenerant et praetorem prouinciae M. Pomponium secutae fuerant; ad hoc legiones quae in Sicilia relinquebantur ad prosequendos commilitones processerant; nec classis modo prospectantibus e terra, sed terra etiam omnis circa referta turba spectaculo nauigantibus erat.* (29.26.6-8)

Both Scipio and a future Hannibal are imagined crossing in this passage, and the crowds who come to see them off seem to be pushing them on their way with their own forward motion. Scipio is the initiator of all this, he is presented as a manifestation of progress and change. It is important to note that his progress takes him continually away from Italy, that this is where success is now envisaged. In this context, we can look more closely at Scipio’s departure from Italian shores and compare it with the succeeding departure of Hannibal in Book 30.

In between these two campaigns, Scipio has of course been implicated in the scandal caused by Pleminius in Locri, since he was the ultimate commander of those forces. Along with the accusations linked to Pleminius’ behaviour, charges have also arisen (apparently brought up

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by Scipio’s Roman opponents) about his decadent and hellenized lifestyle while in Syracuse. Livy does not come down firmly on one side or another with respect to these charges, but he redeems himself with a show of discipline among his forces in Italy and sets out for Africa in the Senate’s good graces. As Levene notes, however, he has become implicated in impiety and in the Hellenization that will be central to Rome’s decline, and it happens in Syracuse, the place where Marcellus becomes infected with a similar decadence. And it is at the moment of his departure from Sicily that Scipio regains his religious standing and simultaneously his clear sense of progress. At the moment of the fleet’s setting off from Lilybæum, Scipio makes a prayer to the gods for a successful campaign, the first half of which is as follows:

‘diui diuaeque’ inquit ‘qui maria terrasque colitis, uos precor quaesoque uti quae in meo imperio gesta sunt geruntur postque gerentur, ea mihi populo plebique Romanae sociis nominique Latino qui populi Romani quique meam sectam imperium auspiciumque terra mari amnibusque sequuntur bene uerruncent, eaque uos omnia bene iuuetis, bonis auctibus auxitis...’
(29.27.1-3)

Firstly, as an example of a Roman commander, this prayer sets Scipio up in contrast to Lucius Pinarius at Henna, who also prayed to the gods who dwell (colitis) in a particular place on the even of conquest, but whose prayer was fundamentally impious in attempting to gain favour for an impious act. Scipio’s successful prayer is of a different order entirely. For a start, it is not turned inward on a (potentially) disloyal ally, it is instead outward looking. He addresses the gods in a general way, the gods of vast geographical space (qui maria terrasque colitis) and

53 29.19.11
envisions the Romans also progressing over undefined landscapes (*quique meam sectam imperium auspiciumque terra mari amnibusque sequuntur*). Under Scipio’s auspices, Roman conquest is no longer being turned in on itself and its allies, it is moving outward to less familiar territory. The commander’s piety, his ability to exercise his special relationship with the divine and the movement into foreign countries are all bound up together.

Of course, what this prayer recalls more than Pinarius is another inversion of it, Hannibal’s acts of impiety as he also leaves Italy for Africa in Book 30.55 He first slaughters those of his Italian allies who refused to leave for Africa with him in the temple of Juno Lacinia, which had been inviolate up to that point (*multis Italici generis, quia in Africam secuturos abnuentes concesserant in Iunonis Laciniae delubrum inuiolatum ad eam diem in templo ipso foede interfectis*)56. He then sails away, angry and bitter, and Livy comments on his departure thus:

> raro quemquam alium patriam exsilii causa relinquentem tam maestum abisse ferunt quam Hannibalem hostium terra excedentem; respexisse saepe Italiae litora, et deos hominesque accusantem in se quoque ac suum ipsius caput exsecratum quod non cruentum ab Cannensi uictoria militem Romam duxisset; Scipionem ire ad Carthaginem ausum qui consul hostem Poenum in Italia non uidisset: se, centum milibus armatorum ad Trasumennum ad Cannas caesis, circa Casilinum Cumasque et Nolam consensuisse. haec accusans querensque ex diutina possessione Italiae est detractus. (30.20.7-9).

55 As Levene points out in *Religion in Livy*, 74, Hannibal’s impiety and Scipio’s piety are reinforced by the balancing omens they receive on their journeys to Africa. Hannibal comes across a derelict tomb while Scipio fortuitously lands at the “Fair Promontory” after losing his bearings.

56 30.20.6.
His curses against gods, men, and *suum caput* as he leaves Italy obviously recall the beginning of Scipio’s campaign. Scipio is looking outward, Hannibal is looking back, and in their respective characters they sum up the futures of their own homelands, as well as each other’s. As Jaeger points out, this departure also forms a bookend to the war itself, as well as Livy’s third decade, by looking back on the moment in Book 21 when Hannibal, crossing the Alps, came to his first *prospectus* over Italy and predicted victory for the Carthaginians (21.35.8). For Jaeger, the slaughter of the Italians becomes the inauguration of a new era of Italian unity under Roman hegemony. It is the foundational sacrifice necessary for that new, positive future. I would argue, however, that it can be read in a different, perhaps more pessimistic light. The passages which deal with Hannibal’s departure are shot through with questions about what it is to have a homeland, about what the *patria*, really means. Rather than endorsing the integration of Rome and Italy as a stronger whole, I think that these passages ultimately question whether Italy can ever be a homeland in any meaningful sense.

We saw in the first chapter how there are hints that Hannibal seems to belong to Rome in certain senses. His character sketch at 21.4 recalls Catiline, he will ultimately prove to be the reason for Carthage’s destruction (as Hanno makes clear in his speech at 21.10.10), and he has lost his own home in Africa (21.44.7). In the passage quoted above, Hannibal is leaving the *hostium terra*, but more sorrowfully than many an exile from his *patria*. For Hannibal, Italy has become a *patria*: it is the place he has bled and grown old in, it has belonged to him (*ex diutina possessione*). It is much more home for him than Carthage now is. In a slightly earlier passage, when the delegation from home reaches him and orders him to come back, Hannibal’s reaction is that Carthage has harmed him more than Italy ever did:
uicit ergo Hannibalem non populus Romanus totiens caesus fugatusque, sed senatus Carthaginiensis obtructatione atque invidia; neque hac deformitate reditus mei tam P. Scipio exultabit atque efferet sese quam Hanno, qui domum nostram quando alia re non potuit ruina Carthaginis oppressit. (30.20.3-4)

Italy is in fact more of a patria to Hannibal than it is to Scipio. When Scipio gives that first speech to his troops in Spain, as I noted then, Italy seems to be a place of desolation for him. Rome may stand firm, but the rest of Italy is marked by loss. That almost angry comment about the Trebia, Trasimene and Cannae (quid aliud sunt quam monumenta occisorum exercituum consulumque Romanorum?), reveals that for Scipio, those places and battles have little meaning beyond the memory of dead Romans. For Hannibal though, those places are loaded with meaning, he was there, he led the slaughter of those armies and wore himself out around other places of Italy, Casilinum and Cumae and Nola. Scipio’s strength, conversely, does not lie in Italy, but, as Livy says for Hannibal, he will face the Carthaginians abroad as the qui consul hostem Poenum in Italia non uidisset.

If the idea of Italy as the homeland of the Romans and the site of future unification is destabilized in this way, then Livy’s history offers us more than one way of reading this moment in time. As James Chlup has argued for the narrative of the Carthaginian capture and subsequent loss of Tarentum, we see a kind of altera historia opening up for Italy at this moment. There, it seemed that Hannibal was briefly the liberator of Italy from oppression by the Romans, and a different story of Italian history opened up, where different perspectives on its success become available. Here, the image of Hannibal being dragged from a place which has become his patria

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57 26.41.12.
58 30.20.8.
similarly opens up the prospect of Carthaginian victory, and raises questions about who is really the rightful victor in Italy.

There are also interesting connections here with Feldherr’s discussion of Hannibal’s speech in the Carthaginian senate upon his return. Hannibal claims in the passage quoted above (30.20.3-4) that it is not Rome who has conquered him, but Carthage and Hanno. This looks forward to his speech at 30.44.7-8, back in Carthage, and his prediction that “no great state can be at rest for long; if it does not have an enemy abroad it finds one at home, just as mighty bodies seem protected from external afflictions, but are burdened by their own strength.” Feldherr argues that Livy is here appropriating a Sallustian mode of historiography, using an external perspective, an alien voice, as a way of commenting, for his Roman audience, on Roman decline. Though they are reading about their own victory, and an enemy’s defeat, Hannibal’s words apply equally to their own future (past) troubles in the second century: “the Roman audience experiences their victory as defeat by blurring the difference between themselves and their Carthaginian rivals.” Certainly as Hannibal leaves Italy the difference between himself and his Roman counterpart is collapsed, as the very phrase consul hostem Poenum in Italia uidisset implies by the proximity of all its constituent parts to one another. As Rossi and Feldherr also point out, the cognomen taken by Scipio after his conquest has the same effect: it commemorates both Roman triumph and Carthaginian defeat, it reminds the reader that the end of the Hannibalic War “becomes the beginning of a much more depressing story”, as Livy ends Book 30 with the

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comment on the cognomen and explicitly links it to the decline of the Republic under Sulla and Pompey.

*Africani cognomen militaris prius favor an popularis aura celebrauerit, an, sicuti Felicis Sullae Magnique Pompei patrum memoria, coeptum ab adsentiatione familiari sit, parum compertum habeo. primus certe hic imperator nomine uictae ab se gentis est nobilitatus.*

(30.45.6-7)

The loss of distinction between Carthage’s defeat and Rome’s eventual decline is where Livy ends up as he closes the third decade, and the instability of Italy as a homeland is a part of that conclusion. As Sulpicius says in Book 31, the future looks brighter when Roman arms go abroad and this is where they have their greatest successes. Scipio is the leader who really expresses this, forming a contrast with the follies of Pinarius and Pleminius in Sicily and Italy. Yet, as the ending of Book 30 reminds us, being pushed outwards and towards new territories will ultimately lead to decline in itself, and this becomes abundantly clear as the fourth decade progresses and the Romans come to Asia. Scipio’s success in moving beyond the trauma of the war in his *patria* is in fact only pointing the way to the fast-moving decline of the second century.

This chapter and the previous one have shown how central Italy is as a space to Livy’s historical narrative, and also that he uses it to question the Augustan image of a unified relationship between the two. By exploring various perspectives on the space of Italy and the places and landscapes which stand out in the war, Livy demonstrates that space and place are

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fluid entities, shot through with competing memories and ideas. Rome’s centrality to Italy, and the inevitability of reconciliation between them, which was so much a fact of the Augustan period despite a century dominated by civil war, are shown to rest on a complicated, troubled platform. The seeming linearity of a history which leads up to that point is also complicated by the presence of alternative possibilities for the playing out of events. This chapter has ended with the significance of Scipio’s outward perspective, and indeed from this point on the focus of the history moves to foreign wars. We shall see in the next chapter how perspectives on space shift towards Greece and the East, and start to reflect on the ambiguities of Rome’s overseas expansion.
Fighting over Greece: ruined places and strategic space in the war with Macedonia

In Books 31–35, the narrative of Roman history moves mainly into Greece, dealing with the Second Macedonian War and the preliminaries to war with Antiochus.¹ The focus in this chapter will therefore be on the landscapes and places of Greece, and on conceptions of Greece as a geographical space. This is a moment of transition in Roman history and in Livy’s historiography; the scope of Roman action is expanding rapidly, and Livy reflects on this at the beginning of Book 31. He imagines himself as a man tempted into the sea by the shallows, only to find as he goes forward that he is floundering in the deep:

iam prouideo animo, uelut qui proximis litori uadis inducti mare pedibus ingrediuntur, quidquid progredior, in uastiorem me altitudinem ac uelut profundum inuehi, et crescere paene opus, quod prima quaeque perficiendo minui uidebatur. (31.1.5)²

The significance of Roman involvement in Greece prompts a number of issues to surface in the history, which may be debated in speeches, touched on by the narrator, or hinted at by the narrative of events itself. The nature of Roman imperialism is one such issue – how should the motivations for growing Roman military involvement in the East and its consequences be understood?³ The question of how Greece and Rome relate to one another also comes up – what

² See Pausch, Livius, 74, for this passage in the context of Livy’s conception of his own work, and the expected reaction from his readers. See also Valerie Warrior, The Initiation of the Second Macedonian War, (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1996), 25–26.
³ On the modern reaction to this issue in Livy’s narrative (and that of Polybius), see Warrior, Macedonian War, 13–22. For further bibliography on the defensive/aggressive debate as a whole, see below n.28. For general accounts of Rome’s growing involvement in the Greek East, with concomitant discussion of the Livy and Polybius’ histories, see Maurice Holleaux, Études d’épigraphie et d’histoire grecque, vol. 5 (Paris, E. de Boccard, 1955); F. W.
kind of perspectives do the Romans have on Greece, and vice versa? Livy also considers how the Macedonian War itself is to be understood in the greater scheme of Rome’s wars, and the reasons for its significance. Of course, there are many different perspectives presented on these questions, and as we have seen in previous chapters, the subjectivity of interpretations of space and place in Livy’s history provides a way in to understanding the multiplicity of possible readings of these events. Having concentrated on how the idea of multiple Italies in the third decade illustrates the complexity of the Rome-Italy relationship, we can now go on to do the same for Greece and Macedonia. We will look at the resonances of individual places and the way that the Greek world is imagined as being historical and belonging to the past, with little real relevance in the present. But alongside that, we will see how conceptions of space and geography reveal how Greece relates to Rome as a strategic space, a theatre of war, and how Livy’s Romanocentric narrative has to expand to consider definitions of Greekness and barbarism in relation to Rome. Finally, we will examine the ways the landscape is used as a means to define the contrast between Macedonians and Romans, and illuminate the characteristics of Rome which bring about its success.

To go into a little more detail about the structure of the chapter, the first section will deal with questions of place and history, looking at how, in the first place, events in Greece and Macedonia can be understood as echoes of other events in Rome’s own past. Place is one medium by which Livy brings this kind of repetition to life. In the second place, Greece’s own historical tradition is also present in the events of the second century. Livy makes clear that Athens, which is the main representative of Greekness at the beginning of the fourth decade, has declined from its past greatness, but that past lives on in the fabric of the city. Philip’s attacks on

the city and his destruction of that fabric allows us to see how history has played out in the past and also how it will go in the future, as Athens becomes more closely tied to Rome. A comparison between Philip’s treatment of Athens and Rome’s treatment of Capua in the Hannibalic War also provides an opportunity to think about how places preserve memory and the different ways in which memory can be removed from the landscape. 

The second section will focus on how Greece is defined as a geographical space in these books, looking at what kind of people inhabit it, how it defines itself against non-Greeks, where its borders are, and how various players in the history view it as a strategically significant territory. Beginning with a debate between the Macedonians, Athenians, and Romans, we will look at how the issue of Greek identity vs. barbarianism is played out with reference to the Roman arrival in Greece. We will then look at the ambiguity of Greek self-definition and how that contrasts with the clear-cut perspective of the Romans on Greece, who can easily define space and peoples in strategic and legal terms. From there, the theme of Greece as a vulnerable space emerges, and we will look at the way it functions first as a kind of in-between territory, threatened from every side, and then as the frontier of Europe against Asia, as the war with Antiochus begins. By the time we reach Books 34 and 35, Rome’s sphere of influence and the scope of geographical space that is open to them has dramatically expanded.

The third section, picking up on the Roman tendency to define and map space, will look at how interactions with the landscape characterize the Romans in the war narrative of Books 31–33. Technology, skill, and discipline are the main aspects of the Roman approach to the Greek landscape, and we will see how Livy contrasts this with the undisciplined violence against

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civilized spaces, and the reliance on the natural environment which are characteristic of Philip and the Macedonians. The depiction of the Romans as increasingly in control of their surroundings hints at the larger historical trajectory of expanding Roman hegemony in the world at large.

Finally, we are moving into a section of the narrative that certainly used Polybius heavily as a source. Much of the scholarship on Livy’s fourth decade has concentrated on source-criticism, and the reliability of the Polybian narrative vs. the problems introduced by Livy’s proposed annalistic source. As has been in the case in the previous chapters, I take Livy’s narrative on its own terms, comparing it with Polybius’ history where that is extant and noting any points of interest, but I will not engage extensively in issues of source-criticism.

Recurring places: memory and destruction in Macedonia, Athens and Capua.

The representation of Macedonia and Greece, places which in the Roman world view are especially significant because of their past greatness, demonstrate how crucial an understanding of the past is to the interpretation of events, and how it can be invoked for different purposes, while at the same time giving the reader the sense that the past can be quite separate from the new realities of the present. In Livy’s narrative we see quite clearly how large the gulf is between the past glory of the Greeks and their present (second century) state of decline, where the presence of the Romans and other formidable powers is increasingly dominant. At the same time, however, the Greek past (and its future) is intertwined with second century events. The city of Athens with its landscape and monuments, and its own famous historical tradition, is an

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especially significant place in this narrative, since, through its interactions with Philip, it is possible to see the past, the present, and the future of Greece unfolding simultaneously.

The immediate point of contact for Rome in the Greek world is with Philip and Macedonia. Livy makes clear in the introduction to Book 31 that this war is quite different from the war with Hannibal which immediately preceded it. The greatness of Hannibal and the scale of a war fought on Roman soil secured the Second Punic War’s claim to a place in history; Macedonia’s claim is admittedly lesser, and based on a different set of standards. Livy primarily expresses the importance of the war in terms of reputation:

\[\text{pacem Punicam bellum Macedonicum exceptit, periculo haudquaquam comparandum aut uirtute ducis aut militum robore, claritate regum antiquorum uetustaque fama gentis et magnitudine imperii, quo multa quondam Europae maiorem partem Asiae obtinuerant armis, prope nobilius. (31.1.6–7)}\]

It is the reputation of Macedonia which makes the war significant, and of course this significance is itself based on how well-known the war was. It only approaches comparison with the Hannibalic war when it comes to nobilitas. We can see a certain self-consciousness about what makes this war worth writing about – it is to a large extent because Macedonia and its kings have already been so extensively celebrated in existing tradition that they are now noteworthy.⁶ Rome’s attitude towards Macedonia is filtered through what they have heard (and read) about it,

⁶See Livy’s discussion of Alexander in comparison to famous Romans at 9.18, which concludes immo etiam eo plus periculi subisset quod Macedones unum Alexandrum habuisissent, multis casibus non solum obnoxium sed etiam offerentem se, Romani multi fuissent Alexandro uel gloria uel rerum magnitudine pares, quorum suo quisque fato sine publico discrimine uiuaret meroreturque. Cf. Diana Spencer, The Roman Alexander, (Exeter, 2002), 41–53. In the historiography of the Augustan period, Macedonia is often represented as one of the series of great empires which preceded Rome and therefore necessarily of a bygone era (see Strabo, 15.1 16.2; Dionysius 1.3.1).
and we will see how this repeats itself in other imaginings of the Greek world in the fourth and fifth decades. Macedonia’s impressiveness is therefore rooted in the past, there is no longer anything particularly important about it, as *quondam* makes clear.

The same point is made even more strongly towards the end of the war, before the decisive victory at Cynoscephalae. Flamininus encourages his troops with reference to previous victories, but also emphasizes that *fama* is all there is to Macedonia:

*fama stetisse, non uiribus Macedonieae regnum; eam quoque famam tandem euanuisse.*

(33.8.5)

Here we see the transience of *fama*, and the malleability of the image of Macedonia in the history. Although Livy claimed it as something real and a solid reason for the war’s significance in Book 31, Macedonia’s reputation has already disappeared, lost over the course of a brief war with Rome. Interpretation of Macedonia has moved from its past glories (via Sulpicius’ fears about the present) to an image of nothingness. The Romans, by defeating Philip as they are about to do, seem to have obliterated Macedonia’s *fama*. It is Rome’s reputation that is of central importance to this history.

The Romanocentric point of view on Macedonia extends to the notion that this war is a repetition of earlier events in Roman history, and we can see this as context for the way that places repeat and stand in for other places in these books. Livy hints at this when he says at 31.1.6 (above), *pacem Punicam bellum Macedonicum exceptit*. He immediately clarifies the difference between them, but an equivalence on some level is implied.\(^7\) In terms of his

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\(^7\) This acknowledgement of the way one war gives way to another can also be seen at the beginning of the war with Antiochus. See 33.13.5, and especially 33.19.6.
historiography, the new war does indeed take over the narrative. When the consul Sulpicius gives his speech urging war to the people at the beginning of Book 31, he also encourages the comparison, with the idea that Athens, currently under threat from Philip, will be the next Saguntum.

\[patiamur expugnandis Athenis, sicut Sagunto expugnando Hannibalem passi sumus, segnitiam nostram experiri regem.\] (31.7.6)

Sulpicius does not push the comparison too far, since Philip is clearly no Hannibal, but he might be more convincingly compared to another semi-Greek invader, Pyrrhus (\textit{ne aequaueritis Hannibali Philippum nec Carthaginiensibus Macedonas; Pyrrho certe aequabitis}), in comparison to whom he is certainly a greater threat, since Pyrrhus’ kingdom of Epirus is only a \textit{minima accessio} to Macedonia.\textsuperscript{8} As we have seen in the previous chapter, Sulpicius’ main fear is that another invasion of Italy will cause another set of defections and betrayals on the part of peoples who will take any opportunity for treachery. As he says at 31.7.12, \textit{numquam isti populi, nisi cum deexit ad quem desciscant, ab nobis non deficient}. An invasion by Macedonia would cause a repetition of a story which has already taken place twice, under Pyrrhus and Hannibal, and Philip is seen as the potential successor to these bogeymen. Sulpicius plays on the existence of this motif in Roman history in his efforts to convince the Roman people that Philip is a threat. This interpretation of the war, of Macedonia and of Philip in terms of past events, and the attempts to fit them in to the overall historical narrative, set the stage for the role of place in the opening of the fourth decade.

\textsuperscript{8} 31.7.8–9.
The idea that the war with Philip is a lesser version of the war with Hannibal also comes out in the way that individual places repeat the events of the earlier conflict. Although Sulpicius raised the possibility of Athens becoming another Saguntum, it is another place which actually fulfils that potential. Alongside his siege of Athens, Philip was also attacking the city of Abydus on the Hellespont (31.16.6–18.9). Their response to his demand of unconditional surrender comes in the form of mass suicide. Livy refers to a kind of imitation of the Saguntines’ behaviour (ut ad Saguntinam rabiem uersi) as the people of Abydus make their plans. Livy makes the comparison again at the end of the siege, this time juxtaposing Saguntum and Abydus as provocations which drew Rome into war (uelut Sagunti excidium Hannibali, sic Philippo Abydenorum clades ad Romanum bellum animos fecisset). For this portion of Livy the corresponding narrative in Polybius can be compared, and the precedent for the behaviour of the Abydenes is quite different. For Livy, the most obvious point of comparison is one immediate to Rome’s own history, that of Saguntum, while for Polybius, Abydus more obviously echoes other episodes from Greek history, ones he himself had also described:

ἐξ ὧν εἶποι τις ἀν καὶ τὴν λεγομένην Φωκικὴν ἀπόνοιαν καὶ τὴν Ἀκαρνάνων εὔψυχίαν ὑπερηφάνει τὴν τῶν Ἀβυδηνῶν τόλμαν... ὑπὲρ ὧν τὰ κατὰ μέρος ἡμεῖς ἐν τοῖς πρὸ τούτων ἱστορίκαμεν. (16.32.1-3)

Livy’s different emphasis reveals both the strictly Roman focus of his history, in which the extreme behaviour of a Greek city is naturally related to something close to home, but also

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9 31.17.5
10 31.18.9.
12 The Acarnanians faced with invasion by the Aetolians in 211 BC (Plb. 9.40), and the Phokians resisting the Thessalians (Pausanias 10.6.1).
his desire to describe the Macedonian war in such a way that it seems to be a repetition. The capture of Abydus was much less immediately relevant to the Romans’ going to war with Philip than Saguntum had been in the war with Hannibal, and Livy seems to distort his assessment of the episode to make it fit.

So far, we have seen the ways in which the beginning of the Macedonian war is made to echo the war with Hannibal; for Rome, history seems to be repeating itself. But this war takes place in Greece, and its history is also present in the landscape and places which stand out from the narrative. Athens is particularly prominent in this respect, both because it is a major player in the war, and because it has such a great weight of cultural heritage behind it. Livy is explicitly dismissive of the Greeks (specifically of the Athenians) in the present, while he acknowledges their past greatness. In Livy’s history, Athens’ past is constantly present in the narrative. As Livy introduces the events that led to Athens entering the war, he makes the following bald statement:\(^\text{13}\)

contraxerant autem sibi cum Philippo bellum Athenienses haudquaquam digna causa, dum ex uetere fortuna nihil praeter animos servant. (31.14.6)

Again, as we saw in the portrayal of Macedonia at the very beginning of the book, the importance of Athens lies almost entirely in the past. Livy does not dwell on the past glories of Athens or Greece at large, but the past nevertheless bleeds through in his descriptions of the city in the war. Perhaps the most visible aspect of Livy’s image of Athens, however, is the presence of the sacred in its landscape, in which respect it recalls the Greek cities of Italy and Sicily which

\(^{13}\) Briscoe, 1973, 95, claims that the ‘anti-Athenian tone of this sentence is certainly due to Polybius who took a poor view of Athens at this time.’
were discussed in Chapter 2. In contrast to the violations of the Greek sanctuaries we looked at in that chapter, here in Athens the Romans emerge as protectors of the sacred against Philip, who repeatedly disregards divine law in his acts of destruction. The Athenian entry into the war is prompted by the mistaken sacrilege of two Acarnanians who wandered into the celebration of the mysteries at Eleusis, a transgression which was punished by death. When Attalus arrived in Athens after Philip’s first assault on Attica to confirm his alliance with Athens, the active presence of the divine in the city is revealed by the description of his reception:

\[
\text{ciuitas omnis obuiam effusa cum coniugibus ac liberis, sacerdotes cum insignibus suis intrantem urbem ac di prope ipsi exciti sedibus suis acceperunt. (31.14.12)}
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Polybius describes this scene in very similar terms (at 16.25.5–7), and mentions the priests and priestesses inviting Attalus to perform sacrifices, but the vivid picture of the gods rising from their seats is not present.\(^{14}\) This emphasis on the gods’ presence in Athens serves to highlight the violence against the gods which Philip goes on to perpetrate. In his assault on Athens at 31.24–26, it is this violence which receive the most attention. Philip is described as being motivated by great hostility towards Athens (\textit{quod ubi Philippus uidit, habere se hostes in potestate ratus et diu optata caede – neque enim ulli Graecarum ciuitation infestior erat – <iram> expleturum...})\(^{15}\), which reveals itself in destruction of their landscape and the monuments it contains.

\(^{14}\) Polybius’ version: οὐ γὰρ μόνον οί τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐχοντες μετὰ τῶν ἵππων, ἄλλα καὶ πάντες οἱ πολίται μετὰ τῶν τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν ἀπήντων αὐτοῖς. ὡς δὲ συνέμειζαν, τοιαύτη παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἐγένετο κατὰ τὴν ἀπάντησιν φιλανθρωπία πρὸς τε Ῥωμαίους καὶ ἕτε μάλλον πρὸς τὸν Ἀτταλόν ὅσθ’ ὑπερβολὴν μὴ καταλιπεῖν. ἐπεὶ δ’ εἰσῆκε κατὰ τὸ Δίσυλον, ἦς ἐκατέρου τὸν μέρους παρέστησαν τὰς ἱερείας καὶ τοὺς ἱερεῖς, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάντας μὲν τοὺς ναοὺς ἀνέφειαν, ἐπὶ δὲ πάσι θύματα τοῖς βομβίοις παραστῆσαντες ἥξισαν αὐτὸν θύσαι.

\(^{15}\) 31.24.11 – here following the conjecture of Weiss (1860).
...castra ad Cynosarges – templum Herculis gymnasiu numque et lucus erat circumiectus – posuit. sed et Cynosarges et Lycium et quidquid sancti amoeniue circa urbem erat incensum est, dirutaque non tecta solum sed etiam sepulcra, nec diuini humaniae iuris quicquam prae impotenti ira est seruatum. (31.24.17-18)

The destruction of sacred elements of the landscape is the most prominent aspect of this description: the temple, the lucus with its religious associations, the reference to quidquid sancti amoeniue, and the implication that only ‘uncontrollable anger’ (impotenti ira) could permit the violation of both human and divine law. The insistence on this violation is one that the Athenians themselves stress as a reason for war, as we shall see when we look at the speeches made by Philip, the Athenians and the Romans to the Aetolian assembly later on in the book. Of course if is not only religious sites that are destroyed here – the Lyceum has obvious associations with the past as being the site of Aristotle’s philosophical school, and Cynosarges also hosted a gymnasium associated with Cynic philosophers; consequently the cultural treasures of Athens seem to be under attack here, as well as, to some extent, the famous sites of its past. The destruction of tombs also alludes to the removal of memory form the landscape. The history of Athens itself, as it manifests itself in these suburban spaces, is being destroyed.

Philip’s next attack on Athens has a slightly different emphasis, this time on the fabric of the city itself (or rather its outlying demes), and the beauty of its artworks. Here too we find allusion to the past, and we can see how Philip’s actions ripple through Athens’ entire history, including events that were yet to come in Livy’s narrative. After ravaging the suburb of Athens where the Lyceum lay, Philip begins a fresh attack on Athens at 31.26.8. Frustrated in his
attempts to take first Eleusis, then Piraeus, he is repulsed by a cavalry sally from the midst of the broken down Long Walls (*semiruti muri*). Finally, he turns his attention to the countryside and the temples of the gods:

> cum priorem populationem sepulcris circa urbem diruendis exercisset, ne quid inuiolatum relinqueret, templum deum quae pagatim sacrata habebant dirui atque incendi iussit.

> et ornata eo genere operum eximie terra Attica et copia domestici marmoris et ingenii artificum praebuit huic furori materiam; neque enim diruere modo ipsa templum ac simulacra euertere satis habuit, sed lapides quoque, ne integri cumularent ruinas, frangi iussit. et postquam non tam ira satiata quam irae exercendae materia deerat, agro hostium in Boeotiam excessit, nec aliud quicquam dignum memoria in Graecia egit. (31.26.9-13)

Again we find the focus on the sacred, and this time Philip has gone further, destroying not only the tombs but the temples themselves, and the works of art within them. Athens now appears as a place of cultural artifacts, something that might be familiar to Romans of the Augustan period who had visited Greece or received an education in Greek. In the fifth chapter, we will see how Livy’s description of Aemilius Paullus’ reactions to Greece also focuses on the physical, on the statues and adornments of the city. For Cicero, the impressiveness of Athens can be summed up in a similar way, when he has Scipio in the *Republic* describe it in terms of its art and architecture:
From these passages we get the impression that much of Athens’ importance as a religious and cultural centre in Roman eyes was contained in its physical fabric, which they might be able to go and look at. This wealth of art, for which Athens remained famous, is in this part of Livy broken down into stones by Philip. The above passage detailing this destruction follows immediately from a mention of the ruins of the walls connecting Piraeus and Athens (where the Athenian cavalry see Philip off), and recalls in certain ways Thucydides’ account of their construction in the 450s. Thucydides talks about the haste with which the foundations of the walls were laid:

καὶ δὴλη ἡ οἰκοδομία ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐστὶν ὅτι κατὰ σπουδὴν ἐγένετο: οἱ γὰρ θεμέλιοι παντῶν λίθων ὑπόκεινται καὶ οὐ ξυνεργασμένων ἐστιν ἢ, ἀλλ᾽ ως ἕκαστὸν ποτε προσέφερον, πολλαὶ τε στῆλαι ἀπὸ σημάτων καὶ λίθοι εἰργασμένοι ἐγκατελέγησαν.

(Thuc.1.93.2)

“To this day the building shows signs of the haste of its execution; the foundations are laid of stones of all kinds, and in some places not wrought or fitted, but placed just in the order in which they were brought by the different hands; and many columns, too, from tombs and sculptured stones were put in with the rest.”

16 See also Att. 5.10.5, where he writes that Athens is only pleasing to him in the urbis ornamento and in the love its inhabitants show towards Atticus.
The juxtaposition of the *semiruti muri* with the description of the damage inflicted on the same kinds of stones tells us something about both Philip and Athens. Philip himself has now been cast as an agent of irrational violence, a violator of tombs and sacred spaces. For the Athens of the 5th century, this kind of damage and destruction was self-willed and used for a constructive purpose, and the Athenians might tear up their own tombs and sculptures in a show of strength and independence, but now the emphasis is on ruin; the walls are falling down and Philip’s destructiveness will not lead to anything better. The sculptures and temples of Attica are now *materia* for nothing more than Philip’s anger. Of course this highlights the decline of Greece at this point in time, and its falling walls (barely) stand for the fall of Athens by the time that Philip and the Romans get to it. If the construction of the walls marked the beginning of Athens’ glory days, then here they are well in the past. It also highlights the frightening capacity of individual men to change the culturally charged landscape of Greece.

If this account of Philip’s rage against Athens brings the past city to mind and encourages comparison between past and present, we can also read hints of further change in the fabric of the city as its future becomes increasingly tied up with Rome. Philip’s foreshadows another radical change to the physical and cultural space of Athens, Sulla’s sack of the city in 86 BC, and it shares some features with the later sources for that attack. The places attacked by Philip also suffer in the siege and capture of Athens – the Lyceum, for example, is ravaged again during Sulla’s preparations for the siege, along with the site of another famous gymnasium, the Academy. The neighbouring *lucus* Livy refers to at 31.24.17 is echoed in Plutarch’s ἱεροῖς ἄλσεσι, also destroyed by Sulla. He also ends up demolishing part of Athens’ walls, the section between the Piraeus Gate (which led to the road between the Long Walls) and the Sacred Gate.

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18 Plutarch, *Sulla*, 12.3
Plutarch’s Sulla is seized by a similarly uncontrollable passion when it comes to Athens (δεινὸς γὰρ τις ἄρα καὶ ἀπαραίτητος εἶχεν αὐτῶν ἔρως ἐλεῖν τὰς Ἀθήνας). For both commanders it is a special place, although the motivations for their single-minded fury at the city are different. In Plutarch’s account it is explicitly given as a possibility that Sulla is obsessed by “some envy towards the shadowed reputation of the city.”

Appian and Pausanias also reflect the tradition of Sulla’s fury. Pausanias (1.20.7) gives no particular reason for this anger, while Appian in the *Mithridatic Wars* says that he was moved ὑπ’ ὀργῆς on account of the Athenians having gone over to Mithridates so quickly, and also because they had shown ‘unreasoning animosity’ towards him.

For Philip the anger is more a matter of politics, yet the ancient glory of Athens is just as present in the narrative. The Dipylon gate features prominently in both accounts (it is where Philip first attacks Athens at 31.24.9, and the description of the streets inside this gate in Livy forms an eerie set-up for the slaughter we get when Sulla infiltrates the city in Plutarch. Livy talks about the wideness of the streets, and how there was enough room for the citizens to line up from the market place to the gates, and plenty of room for infantry and cavalry in the road outside the gate which led to the Academy. In Plutarch, this entire area is covered in blood after Sulla enters the city; it covers the entire Cerameicus and even flows out of the gate and drenches the suburb outside.

Also, here, it is the narrowness of the streets that is commented upon in the context of the horror of slaughter. What is the scene of a fairly ineffectual battle between Philip and the Athenians in Livy becomes a bloodbath in Plutarch. The recurrence of these places in the accounts of Philip’s and Sulla’s attacks on Athens illustrates how the city exists through time and

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19 *ibid.* 13.1: δεινὸς γὰρ τις ἄρα καὶ ἀπαραίτητος εἶχεν αὐτῶν ἔρως ἐλεῖν τὰς Ἀθήνας, εἶτε ξῆλθε τινὶ πρὸς τὴν πάλαι σκιασμαχοῦσα τῆς πόλεως δόξαν, εἶτε θυμῶχα κούματα φέροντα καὶ τὰς βιομολογίας, αἷς αὐτῶν τὲ καὶ τὴν Μετέλλαν ἀπὸ τὸν τειχὸν ἕκαστος γεωργίζον καὶ κατορχούμενος ἐξηρέθιζεν ὁ τύραννος Αριστίων.

20 Appian, *Mithridatic Wars* 38.

21 Pausanias also mentions the Cerameicus as a place of slaughter in Sulla’s capture of Athens, claiming that the general imprisoned there all the Athenians who had opposed him, and that he ordered one in every ten to be executed (1.20.6).
history, stretching from the Thucydidean past into the Roman future. Its history is contained and can be read in the fabric of these places, which keep appearing in different contexts as time goes on.

The implications of Philip’s violence against the Attic landscape, with its sacred spaces and cultural treasures, are teased out in a series of speeches made by the Macedonians, the Athenians, and the Romans at the Panaetolian Conference later in Book 31, as the Romans and Athenians try to convince the Aetolians to take their side against Philip (31.29–31). The first speech (31.29) comes from the Macedonians, the gist of which is that the Romans are only using the pretext of defending their allies when they enter into new wars, and in fact they end up brutally governing the territories they came to protect. The second part of the argument concerns the notion that Romans are barbarians and foreigners and as such they are the natural enemies of the Greeks. This second part I will look at in the next section, but here I am concerned with one accusation in particular that the Macedonians level against Rome, to do with the treatment of Capua after its defection in the Hannibalic war. Here we see the example of another city which has suffered destruction, but this time it has nothing to do with the physical fabric of the city, but rather its living components and institutions. However, given that we have just seen how Philip has dealt with Attica, the language used of Rome’s treatment of Capua is striking:

\[
\text{nec id mirari debent aut possunt, cum Italiae urbes, Regium Tarentum Capuam—ne finitimass quarum ruinis creuit urbs Roma nominem—, eidem subiectas uideant imperio. Capua quidem sepulcrum ac monumentum Campani populi, elato et extorri eicto ipso populo,}
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superest, urbs trunca sine senatu, sine plebe, sine magistratibus, prodigium, relicta crudelius
habitanda quam si deiecta foret. (31.29.10–11)

For the Macedonians, Rome is a city built on the ruins of other cities, yet when Philip attacked the demes of Attica, he had the stones of the temples broken down further, so that they should not remain as integri ruinas (31.26.12). Both Athens and Capua inspired anger in their enemies – we have seen references to Philip’s rage against Athens, and Book 26 is full of similar references to the resentment and anger stirred up at Rome by Capua’s defection (although these references come generally from the Capuan point of view (e.g. the speech of the rebellious Vibius Virrius at 26.13.11–13), and Livy plays down the role of anger in the Roman decisions about Capua at e.g. 26.1 and 26.16). Both respond to these cities by attempting to remake the landscape, and to change the memory it contains. Philip destroys the temples, the art, and the sepulcra of Athens, erasing its cultural and religious memory, while Rome tries to change Capua from a living city to a tomb and a monumentum, in effect, only a memory of their betrayal and Rome’s punishment. It is interesting that at 26.16, when the Senate decides on the fate of Capua, Livy is quite enthusiastic in his praise for its sense and reasonableness. He phrases the decision thus:

ceterum habitari tantum tamquam urbem Capuam frequentarique placuit, corpus nullum
ciuitatis nec senatum nec plebis concilium nec magistratus esse... non saeuitum incendiis
ruinisque in tecta innoxia murosque (26.16.9, 12)
This is mild language, and Livy is explicit in his rejection of the kind of behavior we saw from Philip at Athens, where he was described as venting his rage on buildings and creating ruins out of them. The Romans themselves in their own speech to the Aetolians (31.31), which is largely a justification of Rome’s dealings with their defeated enemies, echo Livy’s assessment, though in defence of themselves they also use terms which imply an erasure of memory and history. Anyone who looks at the city today, they say, would not see a trace of its siege and capture (urbem innoxiam stare incolu mem pateremur, ut qui hodie uideat eam nullum oppugnatae captaeue ibi uestigium inueniat). The Macedonian accusation, then, paves the way for an alternative interpretation of the Romans’ treatment of Capua, quite different from the one the Romans present within the narrative and which the authorial voice endorses. The framing of the Macedonian’s speech suggests that they very things the Romans found fair (leaving Capua as merely tamquam urbem), without the vital institutions that make up a community, is itself a horrible and unnatural thing (prodigium) because it remakes the place as only a memory, depriving it of any existence in the present. This is a different form of erasure than Philip carried out at Athens; this passage implies that the Romans’ symbolic destruction of Capua is as much if not more of a violation than Philip’s physical assault on the relics of Athens’ past. It also reminds us that place can be constituted out of different things: Athens, a city of the past in Livy’s narrative, exists in its relics, while Capua’s institutions and people are what makes it a city.

The Athenian speech (31.30) is in the middle of the three, and argues for Roman intervention on the basis of the unusual savagery of Philip’s campaigns. Sandwiched between Rome and Macedonia, two powers associated in this immediate context with ruins and

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23 31.31.15
24 See Pausch, Livius, 184–186 for a discussion of the Macedonian speech in the context of external perspectives on Roman history, and also of the unusual triplet of speeches, a departure from the normal historiographical convention of two opposing speeches. Pausch posits that the Athenian speech might be there to endorse the Roman perspective, outweighing the Macedonian accusations.
destruction, the Athenians champion the importance of built memorials and sanctuaries. This speech returns to a focus on the sacred elements of the city that were destroyed by Philip, and the violation of divine law. For them, it is hypocritical of the Macedonians to call the Romans barbarians, when Philip has “polluted all human and divine law alike” (31.30.4). The beginning of the speech makes the distinction between normal devastation of territory, expected in war, and what they call *cum superis bellum nefarium* (31.30.4). It continues with a vivid description of their ruined sacred landscape – tombs and monuments destroyed (*omnia sepulcra monumentaque diruta esse in finibus suis*), the dead left unburied, the images of the gods desecrated (*semusta truncata simulacra deum inter prostratos iacere postes templorum*).²⁵ The vocabulary is strikingly similar to that which the Macedonians used with reference to the Roman treatment of Capua, the *urbs trunca*. Philip is uprooting and laying bare their temples and tombs, in which can be found the sacred and cultural heritage of the city; the vocabulary makes it clear that this is should recall the behaviour of the Romans in making a tomb out of a living city. There is also a contrast drawn between the fortified, protected major sanctuaries, from which the Athenians were able to repulse Philip (the temple of Athena on the Acropolis, the temple of Demeter at Eleusis and that of Athena and Zeus at Piraeus), and the smaller shrines and temples which lay on the outskirts of the city and which are protected ‘by reverence alone’ (*sola religione*), and therefore suffered in the attacks (31.30.9–10). In the past, the Athenians say, their ancestors consecrated these shrines when they lived in separate villages, and they did not abandon them when they united into one city (31.30.6). Athens’ remote past and its foundation myth are also threatened by Philip’s violence. The wider geographic implications of Philip’s attitude to landscape then come through in the next statement by the Athenians to the Aetolians:

²⁵ 31.30.5–7
Philip’s destructive habits, which are mentioned frequently as the war proceeds, are transformative and threaten to change the Greek *terra* drastically. The nature of the complaints against Philip make it clear that it is not only the physical aspects of the landscape that will be in danger, but Greece’s gods and its past are also potentially under threat. The speech ends with a bold statement about Roman power: the Athenians urge the Aetolians to join the war, *ducibus dis immortalibus, deinde Romanis, qui secundum deos plurimum possent* (31.30.11). The conventional respect for the gods belies the implication of the passage as a whole. The Athenians have just made clear that the fact of the gods alone has not protected their temples. Philip was repulsed from the main temples of Athens and Attica *ui atque armis* (31.30.10), and this is the basis of real power, which the Romans now represent.

One aspect of the Athenian response to Philip’s violence comes later in the book, when they, feeling safer in the knowledge of aid from Pergamum and Rome, order a *damnatio memoriae* (31.44). A bill was passed in the assembly to the effect that all representations of Philip and his ancestors should be destroyed, any religious memory of him (feast-days, priesthoods, etc.) should be abolished, and the places where any memorials or inscriptions in his honour had stood should be considered polluted. In addition, measures were passed against praising or honouring him, and in favour of anything that would bring shame on him. The final measure allows for all the decrees once passed against the Pisistratidae should apply to Philip as well. The physical manifestations of Philip in Athens are erased just as he had erased markers of Athens’ past from the Attic landscape, while simultaneously history is repeating itself, since
former tyrants are still present in the political life of the city. Livy appends another critical comment on the subject of the Athenians’ decline at the end of this passage: *Athenienses quidem litteris uerbisque, quibus solis ualent, bellum aduersus Philippum gerebant* (31.44.9).²⁶

From these passages we can see how places take on different meanings at different times in history and in different parts of Livy’s historical narrative. Athens in particular represents a strong contrast between past and present (and future), all three of which are visible in the text, but Capua too highlights the way that the meaning of place can change in people’s minds, and be invoked for different purposes in written history. In Athens, it is the very stones and buildings which contain its history, and these appear in different configurations at multiple points in the ancient historiographic tradition – coming together in Thucydides, falling apart in Livy and further disintegrating in the sources for Sulla. Capua undergoes a different change – its bricks remain in place, and no visible changes are made, but it is deprived of the living institutions that make it a city, and becomes a memorial instead.

*Mapping Greece: conceptions of peoples, space and borders in the succession of wars*

Although the past is a major part of Greece’s significance in Livy’s history, its meaning as a place also has to do with its status as a theatre of war. Both in the war with Philip and in the upcoming war with Antiochus, Greece is a place to be fought over, and in the fourth decade we can see a broad discussion emerging about the borders of Europe, the sphere of Roman influence, and the problems of contact with foreign peoples. In this section we are moving from looking at the way that Greece and Macedonia can be viewed in terms of their past, and as part

²⁶ As with the earlier disparaging comment about the Athenians at 31.14.6, Briscoe (1973), 152 assumes that Livy is reproducing Polybius here, who in turn was consciously following Demosthenes in *Philippics* 1.30, urging the Athenians to make war against Philip I with deeds, not just with letters.
of a historiographical tradition, to the way they are viewed in terms of their peoples, borders, and fortifications. Books 31–33 represent the first major Roman military foray into the Greek world, and as such we can see attempts to define it, map it, and pin it down running through the narrative. There is the sense, which mainly comes from Greek perspectives in the history, that it is a territory that is difficult to define, particularly when it comes to its borders, which appear to be vaguely defined and permeable, and the nature and Greekness of its inhabitants. On the other hand, the Romans view Greece through a military lens, and conceptions of its space are dominated by discussions of gateways, vulnerable spots, and strategically important places. Eventually, as Antiochus becomes a more immediate danger, Greece takes on the status of a European frontier against Asia, where the Romans draw the line against his encroachment. The fact that Rome’s military commitments are now expanding rapidly also means that there is a discourse about the nature of Roman imperialism running through these books, from the initial speech by Sulpicius at 31.7 urging war on defensive grounds, to accusations of aggression leveled at Rome by the Macedonians and by Antiochus. I will not engage with the details of these arguments, but I will discuss the ways in which geography and conceptions of space are invoked to support them.

The speeches of the Panaetolian conference deal in part with the reasons for Rome’s entry into Greece, and the significance of that crossing. In the Macedonian speech (31.29), the Romans are depicted as serially crossing into new territories under the pretext of helping their allies, after which they establish hegemony. The example used is Sicily:

Messanae ut auxilio essent primo in Siciliam transcenderunt, iterum, ut Syracusas oppressas ab Carthaginiensibus in libertatem eximerent; et Messanam et Syracusas et totam Siciliam ipsi habent uectigalemque prouinciam securibus et fascibus subiecerunt. (31.29.6–7)

Here the motif of crossing over, which had such a positive connotation, is made to seem a deliberate act of aggression. The flipside of the argument is given at the beginning of Book 31, in the speech of the consul Sulpicius in favour of war (31.7). We have already looked at this speech in the previous chapter and at the beginning of this one, focusing on Sulpicius’ remarks about the fragility of Italian unity and the fear of imminent invasion by Macedonia. But the speech is also notable in that it articulates the idea of ‘defensive imperialism,’ the thesis that Rome’s expansion into other territories was motivated primarily by fears about the infringement of other powers. The potential repetition of previous invasions by Hannibal and Pyrrhus is brought up as motivation for taking on war with Macedonia. For Sulpicius the fear that Philip might come to Italy, and that the speed of sea crossing could bring him there faster than Hannibal’s land journey, is very real:

non quinto inde mense, quemadmodum ab Sagunto Hannibal, sed quinto die quam ab Corintho soluerit naues, in Italian perueniet. (31.7.7)

In both speeches, crossing the sea seems to be a transgression; in Sulpicius’ view, because it illustrates the vulnerability of Italy and its permeability from the outside, but for the Macedonians, it is just one symptom of their foreignness. The second half of the Macedonian speech concentrates on the fundamental differences between Romans and Greeks, in which category they include themselves, the Aetolians, and the Acarnanians.²⁹

furor est, si alienigenae homines, plus lingua et moribus et legibus quam maris terrarumque spatio discreti, haec tenuerint, sperare quicquam eodem statu mansurum…. adsuefacite his terris legiones externas et iugum accipite; sero ac nequiquam, cum dominum Romanum habebitis, socium Philippum quaeretis. Aetolos Acarnanas Macedonas, eiusdem linguae homines, leues ad tempus ortae causae diiungunt coniunguntque: cum alienigenis cum barbaris aeternum omnibus Graecis bellum est et eritque; natura enim, quae perpetua est, non mutabilibus in diem causis hostes sunt. (31.29.12, 14–15).

The opposition between ‘Greeks’ and Romans is in this speech much more than a matter of spatial separation, but rather something natural and therefore permanent.³⁰ The Athenian


³⁰ Although it has been argued that these sentiments derive from Polybius, who elsewhere in his history has characters label the Romans as barbarians (e.g. at 5.104.1; 9.37.6), there is no reason to believe Livy could not have expressed these ideas. Briscoe (1973), 133 relates some of the history of the idea that the Romans were barbarians. See Craige Champion, “Romans as BAPBAPOI: Three Polybian Speeches and the Politics of Cultural Indeterminacy,” *CP* 95.4 (Oct. 2000), 425–444 on Polybian characters expressing this sentiment. He claims this speech in Livy is derived from Polybius: “It is safe to assume that Livy here reproduces an image of the Romans he found in Polybian speeches; he is unlikely to have invented the anti-Roman sentiments himself.” Champion follows Nissen, *Kritische Untersuchungen*, 126–27. See contra Eric Adler, *Valorizing the Barbarians: Enemy Speeches in Roman Historiography*. (Austin, University of Texas Press, 2011), discussing critiques of Rome in Roman historians generally, and Livy specifically in part 2; also Erick Burck, “Die römischen Expansion im Urteil des Livius.”
speech argues for the opposite point, that Philip’s violence proves him a barbarian, while the Romans, as we have seen, are ranked second only to the gods in power and leadership of the war. Further opposing viewpoints emerge throughout the book. Philip himself, upon seeing a Roman camp from a high point, and admiring its orderly arrangement, says that no one who saw it would believe that it belonged to barbarians \( \textit{negasse barbarorum ea castra ulli uideri posse} \), even he has just been horrified by the brutal effects of the short \textit{gladius Hispaniensis} on his troops (31.34.4, 8). This initial debate about whether the Romans are barbarian or not hints at the wider question about what and who constitute Greece. The Macedonian argument that they, along with the Aetolians and Acarnanians, are unproblematically Greek, and \textit{eiusdem linguae homines}, is obviously provocative, and the question surfaces again as the Romans become more deeply involved in Greek affairs.

The Aetolians are the focus of much doubt about their Greekness. As we shall see in the next section, they are generally characterized as indiscriminate plunderers and more or less savage, in which assessment Livy generally agrees with Polybius.\(^3\) At the peace conference at Nicaea (32.32–36), Philip, angered by the allies’ territorial demands, especially those of the Aetolian ambassador, Alexander, rejects the Roman-endorsed call for him to evacuate Greece:

\[
\text{\textit{indignari inde coepit Aetolos tamquam Romanos decedi Graecia iubere, qui quibus finibus Graecia sit dicere non possent; ipsius enim Aetolie Agraeos Apodotosque et Amphilochos, quae permagna eorum pars sit, Graeciam non esse. (32.34.4)}}
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Philip’s speech (and the narrative of the Nicaea conference generally), follows Polybius quite closely, and we find the same point about Aetolia at Plb. 18.5.6–9. Even if, however, Livy is reflecting Polybius’ well established antagonism towards the Aetolians, there is still a wider point to be found in Livy’s narrative about the difficulty of defining Greece, the flexibility of self-definition from the Greeks themselves, and the Roman response to that flexibility.

This ambiguity about Aetolia and identity on the borders of Greece is more forcefully expressed again in Book 34, at a discussion between the allies about whether to try and restore Argos, currently under Spartan control, to the Achaean League. The Achaean strategos Aristaenus is provoked by the Aetolians’ insistence that the Romans evacuate Greece completely, and responds thus:

“mare interiectum ab istis praedonibus non tuetur nos, T. Quincti: quid si in media Peloponneso arcem sibi fecerint futurum nobis est? linguam tantum Graecorum habent sicut speciem hominum: moribus ritibusque efferatioribus quam ulli barbari, immo quam immanes beluae uiuunt. itaque uos rogamus, Romani, <ut> et ab Nabide Argos recuperetis, et ita res Graeciae constituatis ut ab latrocinio quoque Aetolorum satis pacata haec relinquatis.”
(34.24.3–4)

Aristaenus draws the distinction between the superficial characteristics of Greekness, in this case the language, and the behaviour of the Aetolians which makes them “more savage than wild beasts.”32 We are missing Polybius’ narrative for these events and it is not unlikely that

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32 The notion of Aetolian barbarism can also be found in Thucydides, who at 3.94.5 refers to one Aetolian tribe, the Eurytanes (apparently the largest Aetolian tribe), as speaking an especially unintelligible dialect and also possibly
similar criticisms would have been found there; nonetheless, this passage is again part of a pattern of questioning Greekness with which Livy engages throughout his history of the wars in Greece. The most interesting example comes at the beginning of the war with Antiochus in Book 35, and it is here we see the tension between Greco-Macedonian ambiguity about Greekness, which stems from their long, complicated history of expansion and colonization, and Roman realpolitik, which prefers concrete definitions. The preliminaries to the war with Antiochus include a meeting between Antiochus’ advisor Minnio and the Roman envoys Sulpicius and Villius, the first two commanders in the war with Philip and two of the ten commissioners for the settlement of Greece. Minnio is characterized as ignorant of affairs outside of Syria and Asia, with no idea of Roman strength, but his argument is nevertheless forceful. It is reminiscent of the Macedonian speech at the Panaetolian conference (31.29) in which the Romans’ own aggressive tendencies are pointed out, but this time we see a more clear-cut comparison between Roman behaviour in Italy and Antiochus’ claim over the Greek cities of Asia Minor:

“specioso titulo” inquit “uti uos, Romani, Graecarum ciuitatum liberandarum uideo; sed facta uestra orationi non conueniunt, et aliud Antiocho iuris statuitis, alio ipsi utimini. qui enim magis Zmyrnaei Lampsacenique Graeci sunt quam Neapolitani et Regini et Tarentini, a quibus stipendium, a quibus naues ex foedere exigitis?” (35.16.2–3)

Minnio’s exploitation of the wide geographical range of Greekness, and the difficulty of defining the identities of diaspora Greeks, is met with dismissiveness by the Roman envoys eating raw flesh: Εὐρυτάνιον, ὥπερ μέγιστον μέρος ἐστὶ τῶν Ἀἰτωλῶν, ἀγνωστότατοι δὲ γλῶσσαν καὶ ομοφάγοι εἰσίν, ὡς λέγονται…

33 See John D. Grainger, The Roman War of Antiochos the Great, (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 158–161 for the similarity in content between the meeting with Minnio here and the conference with Antiochus that took place at Lysimacheia at 33.39–40, three years earlier in the narrative.
(35.16.7–13), who in their response choose to ignore the fact that any of these cities are Greek, and concentrate only on the issue of laws and treaties. It is also a distinctively Romanocentric response, which focuses on the relationship of the Greek peoples to them, tuning out any vague rhetoric about Greekness (ab Reginis et Neapolitanis et Tarentinis, ex quo in nostram uenerunt potestam, uno et perpetuo tenore iuris, semper usurpato nunquam intermisso, quae ex foedere debent exigimus). Their claims on the Greek cities of Italy rest on treaties which have been in continuous existence since the time they came under Roman power. The cities of Ionia, they claim, have not been continuously in the power of the Seleucids – some have been in the hands of Philip, some of Ptolemy, and some have been free. This contrast seems simplistic at best; Tarentum for one had certainly not been in possession of an unbroken treaty with Rome even since the end of the war with Pyrrhus. This glossing over of the complications of Rome’s relationship with Magna Graecia and Sicily, however, reveals the gulf between the Romans’ attitude to territory and that of the Greeks and Macedonians.

We can see a Greek perspective on Roman power back in Book 32, when the Achaean Confederacy meets to decide whether to leave Philip and join the Romans. Their strategos Aristaenus makes a long speech in favour of going over to Rome, which concentrates on the concrete reality of Roman power in Greece. The speech urges a realistic viewpoint, reminding the Achaecans that Philip has proved an unhelpful ally to them, remaining absent while they are threatened by their old enemy Sparta. He also makes clear that the Romans have the greater power, and if they remain on Philip’s side, there is no reason to believe he would protect them

34 35.16.8.
against Rome. Aristaenus praises the Roman presence in Greece, and their energetic campaign against Macedonia, and where Philip accused them of aggression in crossing the sea, Aristaenus, in the conclusion of his speech, frames it as an act of goodwill:

*sine uestro labore et periculo qui uos in libertatem uindicarent cum magnis classibus exercitibusque mare traiecerunt. hos si socios aspernamini, uix mentis sanae estis; sed aut socios aut hostes habeatis oportet.* (32.21.36–7)

This is a different reading again of Rome’s motivations; it is neither Sulpicius’ defensive imperialism nor the Macedonians’ disguised aggression, but it makes the best of Rome’s actions, buying into their altruistic motives while also acknowledging how things stand: Rome has power, therefore the Greeks will have to deal with them one way or another. Crossing the sea becomes a kind of motif in the discussion of Roman imperialism. Earlier in the speech Aristaenus expresses Roman power in simple geographical terms (32.21.32) – they control the sea and bring under their control every land they visit (*mare in potestate habent; terras quascumque adeunt extemplo dicionis suae faciunt*).

The Roman attitude to Greece as a space, exemplified in their response to Minnio in Book 35, involves a firm grasp of the essentials, and this can be seen in the way that certain places come to dominate the conversation about the end of the war. The conference at Nicaea sets out the specific territorial demands of the Romans, Aetolians, Rhodians, Achaeans, and Pergamum (32.33.1–9), but the issue of Philip’s withdrawal crystallizes around the three citadels known as the “fetters of Greece” (*compedes Graeciae*). When the allied ambassadors go to
Rome to plead for the continuance of war, the importance of these three cities becomes clear to the senate:

*cetera eorum oratio conuiciis regis consumpta est: mouerunt cum maxime senatum demonstrando maris terrarumque regionis eius situm ut omnibus appareret si Demetriadem in Thessalia Chalcidem in Euboea Corinthum in Achaia rex teneret, non posse liberam Graeciam esse et ipsum Philippum non contumeliosius quam uerius compedes eas Graeciae appellare.*

(32.37.1–4)37

This realistic, clear-cut view of territory pervades the narrative of the settlement of Greece and the Isthmian proclamation, and it feeds into the portrayal of Flamininus as a rational, capable commander. The Aetolians’ growing anger after Cynoscephalae is met with pragmatism about the need for balance in Greece. Soon after the battle, the Aetolians start to feel themselves cut out from the consul’s plans, and Livy comments that he was deliberately trying to diminish their status, since he saw that with Philip gone, the Aetolians would assume power in Greece (*Philippo sublato, fractis opibus Macedonici regni Aetolos habendos Graeciae dominos cernebat*).38 In expanding upon the Roman habit of clemency towards the defeated, Flamininus makes another observation to the Aetolians, that with Macedonia gone, a much greater problem would threaten Greece – the barbarians on its northern borders (*si regnum gensque tollatur, Thracas Illyrias Gallos deinde, gentes feras et indomitas, in Macedoniam se et in Graeciam*).

37 Polybius’ corresponding passage (18.11.4) is very similar, though with a slightly different emphasis on the intentions of the envoys: τότο δ’ ἐπιμελῶς ἐντύκτειν ἐπειρώσατο τῇ συγκλήτῳ πάντες, διότι τῆς Χαλκίδος καὶ τοῦ Κορίνθου καὶ τῆς Δημητριάδος ὑπὸ τῶν Μακεδόνων ταττομένων ὑπὸ δέν τῆς Ἑλληνικής ἔννοιαν λαβεῖν ἔλευθερίας.

38 33.11.9
This vision of Greece as a exposed space, trapped between various different powers and in imminent danger of becoming unbalanced, is echoed in the images we see in these books of the old heartland of Greek power, the Peloponnese. The threats to Greek stability are not only from external powers, but from other Greeks themselves. If we return to Aristaenus’ speech in Book 32, we find there an image of the Peloponnese and Achaea as intensely vulnerable: the theatres of war are closing in on the Achaeans, and if Philip is nowhere to be seen, the Romans are in plain sight (consulem legionesque eius, exiguo maris spatio diiunctas, Phocidem et Locridem peruagantem uidemus). The Achaeans themselves are stuck between potential attack from Rome’s allies from the sea, and if they retreat inland, from Nabis in Sparta:

paeneinsula est Peloponnesus, angustis Isthmi faucibus continenti adhaerens, nulli apertior neque opportunior quam nauali bello. si centum tectae naues et quinquaginta leuiiores apertae et triginta Issaei lembi maritimam oram uastare et expositas prope in ipsis litoribus urbes coeperint oppugnare, in mediterraneas scilicet nos urbes recipiemus, tamquam non intestino et haerente in ipsis uisceribus uramur bello? (32.21.26–27)

After the war with Philip is over, and war with Antiochus is on the horizon, the ten commissioners who had drawn up the settlement with Greece warn the senate about the trouble in the Peloponnese, referring to Nabis as aliud in uisceribus Graeciae ingens malum (33.44.8), repeating the vivid image of the Peloponnese as the ‘guts of Greece.’ Aristaenus’ second, brief speech in Book 34, which attacks the Aetolians for their reluctance to join in the campaign to free Argos from Sparta, and labels them ‘more savage than barbarians, or rather than wild

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39 33.12.10.
40 32.21.7
beasts,’ also demonstrates the vulnerability of the Peloponnese to Aetolia, from which they are separated only by the sea, and expresses the fear that they might gain control of Argos themselves (mare interiectum ab istis praedonibus non tuetur nos, T. Quincti; quid si in media Peloponneso arcem sibi fecerint futurum nobis est?).

The disappearance of old, Classical structures of power in Greece is also alluded to by Flamininus in this debate about the fate of Argos. Responding to Nabis, who claims to be acting according to the terms of alliance with Rome, and also in accordance with the ancient customs of Sparta, Flamininus reclaims history and tradition for his own side:

\[
\text{nobilis uero, etiamsi Argos nec cepisses per fraudem nec teneres, liberantibus omnem}
\]

\[
\text{Graeciam Lacedaemon quoque uindicanda in antiquam libertatem erat atque in leges suas,}
\]

\[
\text{quarum modo tamquam aemulus Lycurgi mentionem fecisti. an ut ab Iaso et Bargyiis praesidia}
\]

\[
\text{Philippi deducantur curae erit nobis, Argos et Lacedaemonem, duas clarissimas urbes, lumina}
\]

\[
\text{quondam Graeciae, sub pedibus tuis relinquemus quae titulum nobis liberatae Graeciae}
\]

\[
\text{seruientes deorment?} \ (34.32.4–5)
\]

Flamininus dismisses Nabis’ (unstated) claims to be fulfilling the legacy of Lycurgus, and instead asserts Rome’s claim to be the liberator of Greece, and the restorer of ‘ancient freedom and laws.’ Nabis is seen as separate from Sparta itself, since Sparta’s significance to the Romans is based on the notion of an older, pre-tyranny city. It is clear that this is a new order, however, as we can see from the way he refers to Argos and Sparta, as clarissimas, and lumina quondam Graeciae. Like Macedonia and Athens earlier on in the narrative, Livy shows that the

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41 34.24.3

42 Briscoe (1981), 98–99: Nabis is referring to the peace of Phoenice in 206, in which Sparta was included.
relevance of these cities is in the past, and in their reputation. It is now Rome’s task to preserve them, and Rome seems to hold the keys to Greece’s past. They determine how the past can be invoked and what relation it bears to the present.

Another conception of Greece can be found in Antiochus’ plans for invasion, which also reflect the significance of newer powers in Greece, particularly the Aetolians and Nabis. After the meeting of the Roman envoys with Minnio, Antiochus holds a council to discuss war with Rome, one participant at which is the Aetolian Alexander. His vision of Greece, with which he encourages Antiochus to invade, emphasizes the prominence of the enemies of Rome:

\[ \text{iam primum Aetolos, qui umbilicum Graeciae incolerent, in armis eum inuenturum,} \]
\[ \text{antesignanos ad asperrima quaeque belli paratos; in duobus uelut cornibus Graeciae Nabim a} \]
\[ \text{Peloponneseo concitaturum omnia, repetentem Argiuorum urbem, repetentem maritimas ciuitates} \]
\[ \text{quibus eum depulsum Romani Lacedaemonis muris inclusissent, a Macedonia Philippum, ubi} \]
\[ \text{primum bell<ic>um cani audisset, arma capturum; nosse se spiritus eius, nosse animum; scire} \]
\[ \text{ferarum modo quae claustris aut uinculis teneantur ingentes iam diu iras eum in pectore} \]
\[ \text{uoluere. (35.18.4–6)} \]

The idea of the Aetolians being at the \textit{umbilicum Graeciae} replaces the image of the Peloponnese as the ‘guts of Greece’ that we saw earlier; Alexander imagines his own people as replacing the traditional power structures of Greece. It must also allude to the fact that the Aetolians had been in control of Delphi (the \textit{ὁμφαλός} of Greece\textsuperscript{43}) since repulsing the Gallic invasion under Brennus in 279 BC. Meanwhile Macedonia and Nabis’ Sparta are on the ‘wings,’

\textsuperscript{43} As it is referred to frequently in Greek literature: see Pindar, \textit{Pythians} 4.74; Bacchylides 4.4; Aeschylus \textit{Eumenides} 40, 166; cf. Plato \textit{Republic} 427c; Strabo 9.3.6; Pausanias 10.16.3
a vital part of Antiochus’ forces. The changing configuration of Greece is emphasized by the inclusion of these different points of view. The places which were once relevant and powerful have now become merely famous, enshrined in their reputation, while new powers take their place.

In response to Antiochus, the Romans are forced to expand their own conceptions of the world as it relates to them. From the liberators of Greece they become the protectors of Europe against Asia. The rapidity of the expansion is reflected by Livy’s approach to his narrative. As he says in Book 33, when the scope of affairs related to the oncoming war with Antiochus moves towards Rhodes and the Ptolemaic possessions of southern Asia Minor, *non operae est persequi ut quaeque acta in his locis sint, cum ad ea quae propria Romani belli sunt uix sufficiam* (33.20.13). With Antiochus, the Romans come up against a justification for annexing territory that is unfamiliar – he claims his right to certain lands based on the example of his predecessors. We have seen this viewpoint in Minnio’s speech above as it relates to the Greek cities of Asia. In Book 33, Livy introduces Antiochus’ ambitions in the following terms:

*eodem anno Antiochus rex, cum hibernasset Ephesi, omnes Asia ciuitates in antiquam imperii formulam redigere est conatus.* (33.38.1)

The king’s attachment to history brings him over the Hellespont to the Chersonnese, where, after various cities surrender to him, he takes on the project of rebuilding and repopulating Lysimachia, *nobilem urbem et loco sitam opportuno* (33.38.11). The Romans,

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44 See Pausch, *Livius*, 132, for discussion of this passage as an example of the Romanocentrism of the narrative.
45 Lysimachia was founded by Lysimachus in 209 and passed into Seleucus’ hands after the battle at Corupedium in 281. It changed hands many times between then and 196, when Antiochus rebuilds it, and was damaged both in the Galatian invasion in 279 and by the Thracians towards the end of the third century.
drawn in to mediate between Antiochus and Ptolemy, send ambassadors to Lysimachia, and in their (reported) response we can see how Antiochus’ claims to historical jurisdiction are ignored as irrelevant, (and there is some similarity here to Flamininus’ criticism to Nabis’ pretensions to be acting in accordance with the customs of his ancestors at 34.32.4). Instead, everything is boiled down to the implications for Rome:

\[
\text{sed ut in Asiam aduentus eius dissimulari ab Romanis tamquam nihil ad eos pertinentem potuerit, quod iam etiam in Europam omnibus naualibus terestribusque copiis transierit, quantum a bello aperte Romanis indicto abesse? illum quidem, etiam si in Italiam traiciat, negaturum; Romanos autem non expectaturos ut id posset facere. (33.39.7)}
\]

This response also shows how dramatically the Roman sphere of influence is opening up. At this point it is still possible to imagine that Asia is not relevant to the Romans (as Livy’s limitations on his own narrative make clear), but the space for which they are responsible has shifted from Greece to Europa, and crossing into Europe is seen as almost tantamount to invading Italy. Antiochus responds that it is none of the Romans’ business what he does in Asia, just as it is none of his business what the Romans do in Italy, and his current activities in Thrace rest on his ancestor Seleucus’ claims, since the territory passed into his hands on the death of Lysimachus. These arguments are repeated at the end of Book 34 (57–58) when ambassadors from the king appear before the Senate. At that point, the Romans explicitly take on responsibility for Asia as well. As Flamininus puts it:

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46 Nabis actually foreshadows this point by telling Flamininus: “Do not measure what happens in Sparta against your own laws and institutions.” (\textit{nolite ad uestras leges ac instituta exigere ad ea quae Lacedaemone fiunt} – 34.31.17)
The Roman response to Antiochus and the much grander scale on which they now envision their influence recalls the speech made by Hannibal in Book 21, when he has just entered Italy and is facing his first battle with Rome at the Ticinus. In the speech he expresses resentment against Rome for presuming to set boundaries for others (circumscribit includitque nos terminis montium fluminumque, quos non excedamus, neque eos, quos statuit, terminos obseruat).\textsuperscript{47} Hannibal’s appearances in the court of Antiochus as an advisor remind us that history is again repeating itself;\textsuperscript{48} when the Romans hear about his involvement they worry that a Punicum bellum is also on the way (34.60.1). His prediction of the Roman obsession with borders, which at that time was confined to a relatively small scope, has now taken on the universal proportions which he imagined.

\textit{Use and abuse of the landscape: characterizations of Rome, Macedonia and Aetolia.}

As we saw in the third decade with Hannibal’s invasion of Italy, the landscape is also an important tool in the characterization of individuals and peoples. In the narrative of the Macedonian war, the treatment of landscape and terrain is a significant way of characterizing

\textsuperscript{47} 21.44.5
\textsuperscript{48} Hannibal leaves Carthage for Antiochus’ court at Tyre at the end of Book 33 (45–49), and appears again in Book 35 as an advisor to the king. Livy reports the story that he met with Scipio Africanus at 35.14; he declares his undying hatred of the Romans at 35.19, and at 35.42–43 Antiochus’ plan to make Hannibal his general in Africa is put aside out of fear that he might overshadow the king.
Philip in particular, but also the Romans and the Aetolians (and later, to some extent, the Achaeans). It is perhaps not quite as clear cut as the divide we saw in Book 22 between the exploitation of the landscape by Hannibal, and the aura of the supernatural which that control lent his character, and the blindness and lack of perception of the Romans, but there is nonetheless a contrast to be found. In the first place, there is a Philip’s destructiveness, which comes out in his approach to built landscapes in particular – he cannot act moderately when it comes to the territory of the Athenians, for example. The Romans, on the other hand, bring order and civilization to the terrain, in their camps, for example, and thereby make it their own.⁴⁹

Related to this, the Romans’ reliance on order, discipline, and technology in their interactions with the natural landscape, contrasts with the Macedonians’ reliance on the landscape itself. They often trust in the difficulty of the terrain to protect them, which it only sporadically does.

The violence against the sacred landscapes of Attica at the beginning of Book 31 did much for Philip’s initial characterization in Livy’s history.⁵⁰ There, his _ira_ against Athens was the primary cause of his destruction of the temples and tombs. Later, in Book 32, on a march towards Thessaly, he carries out a similar kind of irrational violence. This time he collects the men from the regions he marches through, then burns their towns and hands over any of the possessions the men can’t carry with them to the army as booty:

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⁴⁹ Livy’s description of Philip viewing the Roman camp at 31.34.8 provides a classic example of the Romans bringing order to the terrain: _ac subiecta cernens Romana castra, admiratus esse dicitur et uniuersam speciem castrorum et discripta suis quaque partibus cum tendentium ordine tum itinerum interuallis, et negasse barbarorum ea castra ulli uideri posse_. I look at the Roman camp in this context in more detail in chapter 5.

⁵⁰ On the characterization of Philip in Livy’s history as a whole, and in particular on the ‘tragic’ aspects of his portrayal, see Catin, _Tite-Live_, 66–71.
nec quod ab hoste crudelius pati possent reliquiquam fuit, quam quae ab sociis patiebantur. haec etiam facienti Philippo acerba erant, sed e terra mox futura hostium corpora saltem eripere sociorum uolebat. (32.13.7-8)

Once again, Philip’s violence is transgressive; at Athens it took the form of, as the Athenians put it, waging war against the gods, and here it breaks all the rules of alliance and friendship. To some extent the vocabulary even reminds us of Philip’s attack on the tombs of Attica, since the phrase e terra... corpora saltem eripere sociorum could equally be applied to the desecration of a grave. Philip realizes how serious his actions are, but justifies them as preventing his allies from falling into Roman hands. This episode is later brought to the attention of the Romans at the peace conference at Nicaea (32.33.8–36.10), when the Aetolian ambassador Alexander sums up Philip’s qualities as a leader, emphasizing his faithlessness in negotiations and his tendency to destroy the places his enemies were trying to conquer. Alexander points out the foolishness of this habit, since it deprives everyone, including Philip, of the prizes of fighting and alienates allies:

at non antiquos Macedonum reges <...>, sed acie bellare solitos, urbibus parcere quantum possent, quo opulentius haberent imperium. nam de quorum possessione dimicetur tollentem nihil sibi praeter bellum relinquere, quod consilium esse? plures priore anno sociorum urbes in Thessalia euastasse Philippum quam omnes qui unquam hostes Thessalitae fuerint. (32.33.12–14)
This characterization also rests on the idea of decline from the past; and again we see that Macedonia’s significance lies mainly in its former glories. The measure of the decline of the Antigonids is perhaps more to do with Philip’s lack of *consilium* than his brutality. Nonetheless, elsewhere in Books 31–34 Philip is depicted as reasonably conscientious; at 31.38, after a disastrous cavalry battle with the Romans, noting that ‘there have been those who have accused the king of rashness, and the consul of sluggishness on that day’, Livy includes a balanced defence of both Philip and Sulpicius. The characterization of ineptitude does not slip into caricature, and Philip is portrayed as conscientious when it comes to his assessment of terrain in the battles which follow (e.g. 32.5.10, prior to the battle at the Aous, *cum situm omnem regionis adspexisset, maxime idoneum ad muniendum locum creditit esse praeter amnem Aoum*).

The engagement which immediately follows that cavalry battle, however, does highlight another aspect of the Macedonian/Roman contrast. The difficulty of the Greek terrain is often a factor in the battles of this war, and it is instructive to look at how each side copes with it. When Philip, followed by the Roman army, fortifies a mountain pass leading to the region of Eordaea, the opposite characteristics of the two sides are put on display. In order to block the road he uses whatever supplies the terrain allows, stones, timber and so on (*ut aut locus postulabat aut materia suppeditabat*). He thinks he has control over this space, but Livy hints that he is wrong:

> ...*ut ipse rebatur; uiam suapte natura difficilem obiectis per omnes transitus operibus inexpugnabilem fecit.* (31.39.9)

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51 This ascription of caution to Philip accords with the way Livy initially introduces him into the history at 23.33, where he decides to wait and see how the war between Rome and Carthage plays out before picking sides.

52 31.39.8.
Philip has attempted to use nature to his own advantage, but it is in fact standing in his way. The forest around him makes it difficult for the Macedonian phalanx to operate (errant pleraque siluestria circa, incommode phalangi maxime Macedonum) because they don’t have the open space necessary to thrust their spears forward, and the Thracian contingent are similarly hindered by their weapons. Even the Cretan archers are of little use given the large Roman shields. As the Romans advance, the Macedonians again try to use their environment to help the situation, picking up stones and hurling them at the enemy, but the Romans, iis quoque spretis, simply form a testudo and keep moving forward, eventually winning the pass. The Romans do not attempt to blend in to their environment or trust in it to help them. Rather, they are self-reliant and force their way through by means of their own discipline. The same pattern plays out again when the Romans make an attack on the city of Celetrum. This city was located on a peninsula on a lake, only accessible, as Livy says, by angustis faucibus from the mainland. The inhabitants of the city trust to their natural situation to protect them from the Romans (situ ipso freti), but the testudo comes into its own again, filling up the narrow isthmus with troops and terrifying the inhabitants into surrender. The machine-like order of Roman discipline overcomes, twice in a row, the advantages that nature can provide and which others rely on.

The same kind of distinction between Roman discipline and Macedonian reliance on the landscape appears at the beginning of Book 32, when Flamininus arrives in Greece and, after a brief conference with Philip near his camp on the River Aous, decides to attack. The initial battle starts on flat ground and then moves into the hills as the Macedonians retreat, prompting Livy to comment on their different tactics:

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53 31.39.10
54 For the importance of Roman disciplina in explanations of their success, and the opposing view of ‘barbarian’ fighting methods, see Susan P. Mattern, Rome and the Enemy: Imperial Strategy in the Principate (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 202ff.
The battle is evenly matched in this instance, and Roman order does not automatically win out. In the larger battle which follows, after the Romans follow an Epirote guide through the hills to Philip’s camp, the terrain seems to actively help the Macedonians. As Livy says, the Romans were at an advantage in terms of *uirtute et scientia et genere armorum*, but the Macedonians retreated to *loca aut munimento aut natura tuta* (32.12.2–3). Attempting to follow, the Romans are hindered by the unfavourable ground, and ultimately the terrain prevents them from following the enemy as they are route. The king then ends up in a rather idyllic location in the Lyncus mountains in Epirus (*uestiti frequentibus siluis sunt; iuga summa campos patentes aquasque perennes habent*). In what we have seen so far, then, the terrain does not seem to be portrayed as a force favouring one side or another, but the way that each side approaches the natural landscape is an important means of characterization. For the Romans, it is something to be mastered and overcome, while for the Macedonians, it is something to be used and relied on. As a further illustration of the Roman affinity for technology and skill, at the beginning of Book 33, just prior to the battle of Cynoscephalae, Livy includes an explanation of the difference in the Roman and the Macedonian/Greek method of constructing a *uallum*, a temporary stockade for a camp. The Macedonians and Greeks cut their trees which are too big, difficult for the soldiers to carry, and easy to pull out from the fence because of the gaps between them. The Romans, on the other hand, cut thinner trees and interweave them to create a tighter structure (33.5.5–12). This

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55 32.13.3
passage is very similar to Polybius’ explanation of the same phenomenon at 18.18, in which he remarks that the Roman method of forming a stockade is worthy of imitation by the Greeks.

The last major episode in which we see both sides interacting with the landscape and the natural environment comes with the battle of Cynoscephalae (33.6–10). In this battle, neither side is portrayed as particularly more competent than the other. The weather (thick fog and rain) and the rough, hilly landscape are common obstacles to each side, and as the battle gets underway, both Flamininus and Philip experience panic and hesitation because of the difficulty in seeing what is going on. In the run-up to the battle, neither side can get any decisive advantage in some preliminary confrontations because of the gardens and trees which crowd the terrain (magnum utris<que> impedimentum ad rem gerendam fuit ager consitus crebris arboribus hortique, ut in suburbanis locis, et coartata itinera maceriis et quibusdam locis interclusa). Once both commanders decide to retreat from this region, they can no longer figure out exactly where the other side is, because of a ridge of hills running between them (colles perpetuo iugo intererant). The landscape, though it separates the two sides and makes battle impossible, lends a sense of constraint to the account, and a kind of eeriness, as if the terrain is conspiring against them and leading them, unawares, to the same location. The weather also helps to create a sinister atmosphere, making it difficult for anyone to find their way around or understand what is going on in their environment:

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56 Eckstein, Moral Vision, 183–193, gives a thorough discussion of the role of each commander in this battle, focusing on the differences between Polybius and Livy. Where Polybius draws a sharp contrast between the sober conscientiousness of Flamininus and the reckless panic of Philip, Livy makes both of his commanders suffer uncertainty and confusion. Eckstein concludes that Livy was not interested, as Polybius was, in using battle scenes like to this to teach lessons about the art of generalship, but was simply focused on writing a dramatic and exciting narrative. Cf. Robert J. Sklenář, “Sources and Individuality in Two Passages of Livy,” Historia 53.3 (2004), 302–310.

57 33.6.7

58 33.6.9
tertio die primo nimbus effusus dein caligo nocti simillima Romanos metu insidiarum
tenuit. Philippus maturandi itineris causa post imbre nubibus in terram demissis nihii
deterritus, signa ferri iussit; sed tam densa caligo occaeauerat diem ut neque signiferi uiam nec
signa milites cernerent, agmen ad incertos clamores uagum uelut errore nocturne turbaretur.
(33.6.12-7.2)

Tränkle notes the emphasis which Livy places on the weather, in contrast to Polybius’
treatment of it, calling attention to the enargeia of his description. Whereas Polybius simply
reports the fog caused some difficulties (18.20.9), Livy extends the description and focuses in on
the way the scene would have felt and sounded. As Tränkle puts it, “Polybius reports facts; Livy
portrays them.”59 This whole scene recalls some of the characteristics of the major battles with
Hannibal in Books 21-22, Trasimene and Cannae in particular, as the environment itself
engenders fear and the potential for treachery. The Macedonians’ blindness in the fog is
reminiscent of the dust-induced blindness of the Romans as they meet the Carthaginians at
Cannae, and the Roman soldiers, fleeing into the lake at Trasimene uelut caeci.60 Both sides
suffer from it, however, as Flamininus too is holed up in his camp, fearing an ambush. When the
two sides do initially meet, after Flamininus and Philip both send troops to the hills, they are
both briefly still, and unsure what to do (pauore mutuo injecto uelut torpentes quieuerunt). The
whole scene is somehow unnatural, taking place in darkness and producing stillness where action
is expected. This confusion and paralysis continues to be a feature of the battle. The beleaguered
Romans request help from their camp repeatedly (Romani alios super alios nuntios ad ducem
mitterent), until it finally comes. Philip, blindsided by the battle, which itself is a surprise, cannot

60 22.6.4.

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decide what to do in response to his own messengers who come begging for help (*aliquamdiu ops consilii trepidauit*).\(^6^1\) He is only coerced into action when the messengers tell him that the fog is lifting. There seems to be in this case a direct correspondence between the state of the environment and Philip’s own state of mind. Both sides are now forced to put their entire forces into the field, though Livy emphasizes how unwilling Philip was to do this.

The role of the landscape in Greece and the significance of Roman interactions with it are highlighted by the speech Flamininus gives to his troops just as the battle proper begins. Livy reports the speech, which sums up the Romans’ achievements in the war with Macedonia so far, in particular their ability to overcome the difficult terrain of northern Greece:

...*simul admonens cum iisdem Macedonibus pugnaturos quos ad Epiri fauces, montibus fluminibusque saeptos, uicta naturali dificultate locorum expulissent acieque expugnassent, cum iis quos P. Sulpicii prius ductu obsidentes in Eordaeam aditum uicissent; fama stetisse non uiribus Macedoniae regnum; eam quoque famam tandem euanuisse.* (33.8.4-5)

At this point the landscape seems to become the real enemy for the Romans, while the Macedonians themselves are imagined as insubstantial, practically only the image of an enemy, fading away both physically and in reputation (as we saw at the beginning of the chapter) while the true obstacles of the northern Greek landscape remain as real as ever. Overcoming the difficulties of the natural world, mountain passes and rivers, has been the major achievement of the Roman army in this war.

Flamininus eventually gets the better of the Macedonians, after a rather changeable battle, by encircling them and attacking them from behind with his elephants. Having had the advantage

\(^{6^1}\) 33.7.5–8.
for most of the battle by fighting on the tops of the ridges of Cynoscephalae, the left flank of the Macedonian army is now on the lower ground after chasing some Roman soldiers down the hills. The ridges pass into the hands of the Romans, coming up from behind, and the unwieldy phalanx finds itself trapped in the middle, unable to manoeuvre quickly enough to escape. When Philip sees that the Romans are in possession of the hills, he flees from the battle himself (deinde postquam fugam effusam animaduertit et omnia circa iuga signis et armis fulgere, tum et ipse acie excessit). The panicked flight of his own men is juxtaposed with the solid presence of the Romans in the surrounding landscape. The symbols of Roman power become the most visible things in the countryside, and this image forms an apex for the discourse around Roman technology and armour that has been going on throughout these books. The Romans have succeeded in overcoming the difficulties of their environment, while the Macedonians disappear from it.

In this chapter we have seen the various ways in which Greece and Macedonia can be viewed from a Roman perspective, and incorporated into a Roman historical narrative. Images of a Greece which is primarily located in its past, and viewed in terms of its historical tradition, sit alongside conceptions of Greek space and geography in the present, which revolve around their relationship to Rome. The space that is relevant to Livy’s history starts to expand rapidly in these books, and a new preoccupation with determining borders and boundaries starts to appear in response to the ambiguous definitions of Greece and Greekness, and in response to Antiochus’ grand historical claims to territory. Meanwhile the landscape helps to define the aspects of the Roman character – discipline and technology – which allow for their success. In the next chapter, the further expansion of Roman arms into Asia continues some of these themes. Asia is also

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62 33.10.2.
imagined in terms of its past, and that past opens up the entire history of East-West conflict between Greece and Asia, in which the Romans are now participating. Asia is also conceived of as a place which brings about decline, and Rome’s involvement with this new continent ushers in a new period in its own history.
This chapter is concerned with a major point of transition in the Roman conquest of the Mediterranean: the point at which Roman armies cross to Asia. This, for Livy, is the crossing of a moral boundary, as well as a geographical one, since he pinpoints the beginning of Rome’s decline as the campaign of Cn. Manlius Vulso against the Galatians in 187. I want to explore the ways in which the first wars in Asia are described with a deep sense of ambivalence towards Roman success and expanding conquest. Books 36-39 put on display some of the anxieties about conquest and the influence of foreignness that would have been very familiar to the Augustan reader. These books are to a large degree a narrative about the unintended consequences of success, about the realization that taking Roman armies further out into the world is both a glorious enterprise and a dangerous one that will pose a threat to Rome’s distinctive values.

In the first section I will focus on the Roman battle with Antiochus at Thermopylae, and the ways in which Livy interacts with the history of that site and the previous battles which took place there. Thermopylae is the gateway to the ambivalence which surrounds the wars in Asia, and already we start to see conquest in this double light. By calling our attention to the differences and similarities with the famous battle of 480 BC, Livy juxtaposes the Romans with both the Greeks and Persians of history, imagining them both as defenders and as invaders. This happens again when the Romans take the war with Antiochus into Asia and come to Troy. I will also be exploring the historiographical strategy of overwriting famous historical places with new, Roman, associations, looking at how historiography itself can be a form of imperialism.

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1 39.6.7, in the context of Manlius’ triumph over the Gallograeci.
In the next section, I shall move from a focus on individual places to looking at the way Livy and his characters conceptualize geographical space as they move beyond the boundaries of Greece. Speeches in particular, on the part of both Romans and the inhabitants of Asia, start to portray Rome’s hegemony in terms of large geographical units, in terms of continents and massive natural boundaries such as the Taurus mountains. In itself, this appears to be a positive thing, reflecting the strength and confidence of Rome, and the discourse of space in these books reminds the reader of Augustan rhetoric about universal hegemony and the pacification of the orbis terrarum. Yet this rhetoric is frequently subverted, as the motives for Roman conquest and the character of Roman rule are suggested to be less than entirely virtuous.

In the last section, I shall come to Manlius’ campaign against the Galatians. At this point, ambivalence turns to a more straightforwardly negative attitude. The foreignness of Asia is repeatedly flagged in terms of its potential to affect, to corrupt those who move through and inhabit its landscape. The threat of the Romans themselves being changed by Asia is realized with the return of Manlius’ army at the end of Book 38 and the beginning of 39, as Livy explicitly condemns the general for introducing the semina luxuriae into Rome. But the portrayal of Manlius himself is somewhat problematic, and I will argue that the need to pin down someone as responsible for the beginning of Rome’s problems, which has become a historiographical necessity over the course of the first century, leads to Manlius being made the scapegoat of this narrative.
Roman encounters with Antiochus: the role of historical places.

The battle of Thermopylae in 191, in which the Romans drove Antiochus out of Greece, is obviously an important turning point in the history of Roman hegemony in Greece. Within Livy’s narrative, it also takes on historiographical significance as the point from which the Romans are able to look out and predict their future success, conceptualizing it as an inevitable progression from their defeat of Antiochus. It is the starting point of their conquest of Asia, and in this section we shall see how this future conquest starts to be positioned by Livy as both good and bad. In the narrative, it is both what the Romans (of the Augustan period and very likely of the second century) liked to say it was, that is, defence of their allies and a way of accruing glory for Rome, and it is also what many people by the Augustan period (both Romans and presumably their enemies), were worried it was, rapacious conquest motivated by greed.

It also becomes important in the narrative because it has obvious associations with other battles which took place on the same ground, most notably the famous last stand of the Spartans there against Xerxes in 480.\(^2\) Livy explicitly refers to this battle several times, making the comparison unmistakeable. In his introduction to the site of Thermopylae, he explains its name as follows:

\[
\text{ideo Pylae et ab aliis, quia calidae aquae in ipsis faucibus sunt, Thermopylae locus appellatur, nobilis Lacedaemoniorum adversus Persas morte magis memorabili quam pugna.}\(^3\)
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\(^2\) Other encounters took place on the same ground in between the battles with Xerxes and with Antiochus, namely during the Third Sacred War in 353 BC, when the Athenians successfully blocked the pass against Philip II, and the unsuccessful attempt to defend it against the Galatian invaders in 279 BC.

\(^3\) 36.15.12.
This looks like it is there simply by way of introduction, highlighting the inevitable association between the famous battles. However, the point of the subsequent references to the earlier battle is more to mark the difference between the two occasions, and more specifically they serve to compare Antiochus unfavourably with the Spartans who occupied the same position. As Jane Chaplin points out in her study of Livy’s Thermopylae narrative, this sentence is immediately followed by one which points out Antiochus’ inferiority (*haudquaquam pari tum animo Antiochus…*). This is emphasized as Livy describes Antiochus’ anxiety about his position, and has Antiochus recall that the Spartans were surrounded by the Persians (*nam et Lacedaemonios quondam ita a Persis circuitos fama erat*). Chaplin focuses on the peculiar nature of the intertextual references in this part of Livy, whether these are allusions to specific historiographical accounts, or simply calling on the reader’s general knowledge of the battles which took place at Thermopylae. Ultimately she argues that, while allusion to the 480 battle is very much present and active in Livy’s narrative, he does not incorporate it as fully or as openly as we might expect, and what is there is aimed at showing us that what is going on in 190 is only familiar in terms of territory, while the characters are very unfamiliar. The Roman commander M’. Acilius Glabrio re-emphasizes in his speech how unfamiliar Antiochus is as a defender of this geographical position:

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rex ipse confessus nusquam aequo campo non modo congredi se ad pugnam audere, sed ne castra quidem in aperto ponere, relicta omni ante se regione ea quam se nobis ac Philippo ademisse gloriabantur, condidit se intra rupes, ne ante fauces quidem saltus, ut quondam Lacedaemonios fama est, sed intra penitus retractis castris; quod quantum interest ad timorem
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5 36.16.7.
ostendendum, an muris urbis alicuius obsidendum sese incluserit? sed neque Antiochum
tuebuntur angustiae, nec Aetolos uertices illi quos ceperunt.\(^6\)

Glabrio dwells on Antiochus’ unwillingness to defend an open position; his instinct is to
hide, to close himself in, and this provides a natural contrast with the Spartans, who were happy
to stand ante fauces. The 480 battle is certainly prominent in this account, but mostly as a point
of contrast. Chaplin argues that, while Plutarch and Pausanias use the 480 battle much more
centrally in their accounts of the battle (Plutarch’s Cato is thinking about the Persian strategy as
he creeps across the heights to attack the Aetolians, and Pausanias structures his narrative very
similarly to Herodotus’ account, even mentioning Herodotus by name), Livy instead activates an
intratextual allusion alongside the intertextual one, comparing the Roman Thermopylae with the
Romans’ own battle against Philip in 197 at the River Aous.\(^7\) He puts this comparison in the
mouth of Glabrio.

_Macedonico bello inexsuperabilior saltus ad amnem Aoum fuit quam hic; quippe portae
sunt hae, et unus inter duo maria clausis omnibus velut naturalis transitus est._\(^8\)

Ultimately Chaplin makes the point that, because the Roman victory at the Aous was
achieved by very similar means to the Persian victory at Thermopylae in 480 (a local was found

\(^6\) 36.17.10-12.
\(^7\) Plutarch, Cato, 13.1; Pausanias 10.19.5 – 23.14. The battle at the River Aous is narrated by Livy at 32.11-12. Livy
has already subtly recalled the Aous battle earlier on, at 36.16.7, when he is describing Antiochus’ worry about
being surrounded at Thermopylae: _nam et Lacedaemonios quondam ita a Persis circuitos fama erat, et nuper
Philippum ab iisdem Romanis._
\(^8\) 36.17.3-4. The comparison also comes up more obliquely earlier in the narrative, when Livy mentions Antiochus’
concern about the similarities between the Roman position at Thermopylae, the Persian position at Thermopylae and
the Roman position at the Aous: _nam et Lacedaemonios quondam ita a Persis circuitos fama erat, et nuper
Philippum ab iisdem Romanis_ (36.16.7).
who was willing to show the Romans the path to get around and behind Philip), the allusion to the 480 battle is really travelling via this other allusion to the Roman battle in 197:

“[Livy] may or may not have regarded, and written, the Aous as a version of the battle at the more famous site, but upon reaching his Thermopylae he activates the intratextual and intertextual vibrancy of the Aous, thereby making it into an allusion to the 480 Thermopylae. In doing this he performs a kind of mimesis. Acting as a guide, he leads the audience to the reason for the Romans’ victory not by the path immediately at its feet, but by a circuitous route back through his text.”

Chaplin concludes that this mimesis is the point of the double allusion. Because the nature of the allusion reflects the nature of the battles at Thermopylae, it was worth making in this way. Certainly Chaplin’s approach is helpful for showing the value of an intertextual, and intratextual reading of Livy, and for revealing the subtleties of Livy’s approach to historiographical allusion. I would argue a further point, however, that this is part of a pattern in Livy, a pattern of rewriting, or at least realigning historical and historiographical narratives in order to make the Romans central to them. A big part of what Livy is doing when he sandwiches the allusion to the Aous in between the 191 and the 480 battles, is making a Roman battle a prominent reference point, and making it compete with the earlier Greek victory. Historiography itself is shown to be an active participant in imperialism, since a distinctly Greek place, and a set of references to Greek battles, to the defence of Greece by its own inhabitants, is taken over by a Roman allusion, to a battle won by the Romans in the name of defending Greece.

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Another way of looking at this allusion brings us to the ambivalence of this moment within Livy’s narrative, and the ways it draws subversive parallels between the Romans and the occupants of the same space earlier in time, setting them up as both defenders and invaders of Greece. If the reader is to see them simply as defenders, then there almost has to be another reference point for the Romans here, particularly in Glabrio’s speech, because if the 480 Thermopylae is the only allusion, then the Romans would have quite a problematic *exemplum* on their hands. They are, of course, more or less in the geographical position once occupied by the Persians, and the Persian victory in 480 was facilitated by treachery.\(^\text{10}\) Even without that treachery, the Persians are not an attractive point of comparison for a Roman army. The use of the Aous helpfully inserts a more palatable comparison and places our focus solidly back on Rome. Why think about Persians, or Greeks, for that matter, when you can think about Romans? This appropriation of a historical narrative, however, is not without its problems, and always contains some level of ambiguity. As readers, we always have in the back of our minds the more obvious allusion; here, no matter how prominent the Aous battle is in Glabrio’s speech, we cannot help but be bound to thinking about the earlier battles at Thermopylae itself, and to some extent to thinking about the Romans as successors of the Persians.

This idea is reinforced by another part of Glabrio’s speech, in which he talks about the motivation for winning this battle with Antiochus. He encourages his troops partly on the basis of the wealth they will gain if they pursue Antiochus back into Asia, mentioning the supplies of the king at Ephesus and the treasures of Asia, Syria, and beyond (*neque ea tantum in praemium uestrum cessura, quae nunc in regi\(<i>\)s castris sunt, sed illum quoque omnem apparatum qui in dies ab Epheso exspectatur, praedae futurum, Asiam deinde Syriamque et omnia usque ad ortum*

\(^{10}\) Although Plutarch does not have a problem with using the Persians as a reference point for the Roman victory in 191, since his Cato bears the Persian strategy in mind as he is on his way to attack the Aetolians (*Cato* 13.1).
This passage and its implications will be dealt with more fully in the following section, but for now it is enough to point out that, for this to be a prominent part of the Romans’ motivations for conquest at this moment is quite striking, and takes us a step closer to identifying the Romans with the Persians. In this way, Livy’s whole engagement with the 480 version of Thermopylae is deeply ambivalent. On the one hand, history is rewritten to some degree, with a Roman victory intruding on the obvious associations of the battle site with its previous battles, and reminders that this version of Thermopylae is very different from the more famous one. Antiochus is not worthy of the Greeks whose geographical position he occupies, and the Romans ostensibly are not like the Persians. On the other hand, the Romans in some ways are like the Persians; certainly they are not uncomplicatedly heroic or virtuous, and obviously they are not the heirs of the Greek defenders. They too are portrayed as invaders, even if at the moment they are heading east rather than west.

We can see a very similar thing going on with allusions to the Trojan War and the Homeric past, which come up briefly during the later campaign of Lucius Scipio against Antiochus in Asia itself, a campaign which culminated in the battle of Magnesia in 190, and the Treaty of Apamea in 188. There are only a few of brief mentions of anything associated with the Trojan War in the narrative of the war with Antiochus, but what we do have hints at the same kind of ambivalent relationship with a heroic moment of the past. Upon the crossing of the Roman and army into Asia, Livy narrates a sequence of events designed to show the Romans in a positive light. Scipio Africanus, although he is not actually in charge of the army, but only there in an advisory capacity to his brother, emerges as the main character on the Roman side. We see him detached from the army for the purposes of fulfilling his duties as a Salian priest, indicating

solis ditissima regna Romano imperio aperturos).\[11\] For background on the idea of booty as motivation for war in the Roman Republic, see Michaela Kostial, *Kriegerisches Rom?* (Stuttgart, 1995), 92–101, who points to the later first century and Pompey’s campaigns in the East as the time when booty became a primary motivation for making war.
how seriously he took his religious duties, and then he is approached by Antiochus’ envoy, Heraclides of Byzantium, in preference to his brother.\textsuperscript{12} When Heraclides tries to bribe him in the name of avoiding war, Scipio refuses with a speech that places him squarely as a model of Roman incorruptibility (\textit{quod Romanos omnes, quod me, ad quem missus es ignoras, minus miror, cum te fortunam eius a quo venis ignorare cernam}).\textsuperscript{13}

Immediately following this speech, Livy mentions the Roman arrival at Ilium, which is not flagged as a particularly important moment; in fact is just one item in a paragraph which more or less lists the movements of the Roman army and of the Pergamene king Eumenes.\textsuperscript{14} The first half of the paragraph builds on the favourable picture of the Roman army established above by telling us about the reception given to them by the inhabitants of the cities they encountered:

\begin{quote}
\textit{Consul omnibus praeparatis ad proposita exsequenda, cum ex statuis mouisset, Dardanum primum, deinde Rhoeteum, utramque ciuitate, obuiam effusam uenit. inde Ilium processit, castrisque in campo, qui est subiectus moenibus positis, in urbem arcemque cum escendisset, sacrificauit Mineruae praesidi arcis, et Iliensibus in omni rerum uerborumque honore ab se oriundos Romanos praeferentibus, et Romanis laetis origine sua.}\textsuperscript{15}
\end{quote}

The Romans’ invasion of Asia is thus portrayed very favourably, even as a happy occasion for the Greek cities, but the mention of Ilium and Lucius Scipio’s stop there sends us in another direction. The focus is ostensibly on the Roman descent from the Trojans, and so we see

\textsuperscript{12} 37.33.7 ff.
\textsuperscript{13} 37.36.3.
\textsuperscript{14} 37.37.
\textsuperscript{15} 37.37.1-3.
a friendly relationship between the two cities and a mutual recognition of the kinship.\textsuperscript{16} But in
topographical terms, there is a subtle indicator that we might want to read this differently. We are
told that the Romans made their camp \textit{in campo, qui est subjectus moenibus}, which surely puts
them in the same position as Homer’s Greek army, besieging Troy. The sacrifice to Minerva
reminds us of the (non-Homeric) tradition that the Greeks stole the Trojan image of Athena, the
Palladium, at the end of the Trojan War. The Romans kept their own Palladium in the city;
Augustus housed it in his shrine to Vesta on the Palatine, but there were varying traditions about
how it got there. One possibility was that it was brought by Aeneas, but another tradition
recorded that it had come with Diomedes.\textsuperscript{17} It certainly was not unusual for the Roman
commanders to sacrifice like this at an important centre in the territory in which they were
campaigning; Antiochus himself had observed the same procedure earlier on.\textsuperscript{18} However, this
reminder of a Greek act of appropriation, when coupled with the campsite of the Roman army in
the plain beneath the walls of Ilium, pushes us to think of the Romans not just as Trojans, but as
Greeks, as aggressors. Almost the same thing has actually happened even earlier in the narrative,
in an even briefer mention of Ilium. The commander of the Roman fleet, Gaius Livius, makes a
stop there while making preparations for the crossing of the army:

\textsuperscript{16} On this passage see Andrew Erskine, \textit{Troy Between Greece and Rome}, (Oxford, 2001), 234–237, who places
Scipio’s visit in the context of other visits to Ilium made by other ‘relatives of the Trojans’ such as Alexander and
the Attalid kings. The importance of Ilium under Caesar and Augustus is also discussed at 245–253.
\textsuperscript{17} The \textit{Ilias parva} (A. Bernabé, ed., \textit{Poetae Epici Graeci} I (Leipzig 1987) fr. 25) recounts the theft of the Palladium;
for the tradition that Diomedes brought it to Lavinium see Cassius Hemina fr. 7 Peter; Serv. Aen. 2.66; Sil. 13.51-
78. References to the Palladium in the Roman shrine of Vesta: Serv. Aen. 7.188; the pontifex maximus Metellus
rescues it in 241 BC at Ovid, Fasti 6.437.
\textsuperscript{18} 35.43.3: priusquam solveret naves, Ilium a mari escendit ut Minervae sacrificaret.
This reference to the port of the Achaeans, where the Greek army was supposed to have anchored its fleet, is a much more explicit example, albeit at a less significant moment in the narrative. To have a Roman fleet in the same place once occupied by the Greeks in the Trojan War forces us to think of the Romans as invaders, rather than (or as well as) kin to the current inhabitants of Troy. Their myth-historical relationship with the Trojans, as well as the motives for their current war in Asia, are thus complicated simply by how Livy chooses to refer to the topography of Ilium.

Roman interactions with these mythically or historically famous places, then, highlight the ambivalence inherent in Livy’s account of their conquest. Through allusion to the previous events that happened at Thermopylae and at Troy, Livy allows the Romans to take on different roles, to be associated with different sides of the story. In each instance they are portrayed as both good and bad, both as defenders and as aggressors. The rest of this chapter will move up in scale, and look at larger geographic conceptions, and how then can illuminate this same ambivalence.

Roman geographical rhetoric and the Asian campaigns.

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19 37.9.7.
At this point I would like to return to Thermopylae, which, as we have seen, is painted as a turning point in Roman history and a fresh instance of the long tradition of conflict between Europe and Asia. This is highlighted in part by the significance of individual places and allusions to past history and legend, which raises questions about the Romans’ role in this war. But Thermopylae also introduces a new kind of rhetoric into Livy’s narrative. Although all of the major battles at Thermopylae, including the one with Antiochus, were about defending Greece from outside invaders, Livy includes in his narrative of the 190 battle another element, the possibility of moving outside of Greece, the possibility of going on the offensive into Asia, and far beyond. As the likelihood of defeating Antiochus becomes a real one for the Roman army, the whole geography of Asia and the prospect of conquering it also opens up. The way geography is perceived becomes closely connected with the intention to conquer. Distant places become the future frontier of Roman hegemony.

We see this first in the speech made by Glabrio at Thermopylae, which we looked at briefly above. Here I will quote the end of his speech more fully, so that we can look more generally at the terms in which he predicts Roman success:

*illud proponere animo uestro debetis, non uos pro Graeciae libertate dimicare tantum,*
*quamquam is quoque egregius titulus esset, libera<ta>m a Philippo ante nunc ab Aetolis et ab Antiocho liberare, neque ea tantum in praemium uestrum cessura quae nunc in regi<i>s castris sunt, sed illum quoque omnem apparatum qui in dies ab Epheso exspectatur praedae futurum, Asiam deinde Syriamque et omnia usque ad ortum solis ditissima regna Romano imperio aperturos. quid deinde aberit quin ab Gadibus ad mare rubrum Oceano fines terminemus, qui orbem terrarum amplexu finit, et omne humanum genus secundum deos nomen Romanum*
This section of the speech reflects Roman movements in its structure, progressing rapidly across the expanse of territory east of Greece. It begins with the idea of freeing the Greeks, with the scope of Roman action being confined to Greece itself. First they free them from Philip, then the Aetolians, then Antiochus; the next reward comes from further afield, in the shape of Antiochus’ supplies from Ephesus. Then it moves even more quickly from Asia down to Syria and onwards towards the rising sun, with the boundaries being set as the limits of *Oceanus*, from the Pillars of Hercules to the Red Sea. The sense of universal Roman power is driven home, with the reference to the horizons of the rising sun in the east and *Oceanus* in the west, the repetition of *omnia* and *omne humanum genus*, and the use of *orbis terrarum* to denote the entire area of human occupation. This “opening up” of geographical space is strongly linked with the acquisition of wealth, since Glabrio started by encouraging his troops with the thought of Antiochus’ booty. Evenly spaced throughout this passage we have *praemium, praedae, praemia* and the mention of the *ad ortum solis ditissima regna*. At this point, the temptation of riches is ostensibly a positive thing, an incitement to success in battle, but it is only within four years that Livy pinpoints the *semina luxuriae* in Rome with Manlius Vulso’s return from his Galatian campaign. The speed with which Glabrio sees the wealthy East opening up before him is matched by the speed of Rome’s decline. Even without this later point in mind, the focus on wealth, even if it is just an extension of a normal soldier’s enthusiasm for booty, seems quite

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20 36.17.13-16.
21 Livy himself uses the phrase *orbis terrarum* in reporting the reassuring prophecy of Rome’s destiny made by Proculeius Julius after Romulus’ mysterious disappearance from the Campus Martius.
22 39.6.7.
distasteful within the Roman moral framework. And yet, Glabrio portrays this as the real reason for wanting victory; the motives behind this campaign seem to change before our eyes. The liberation of Greece is only a reward for the time being, and in fact, the only reward it really brings is an *egregius titulus*, as he says at the beginning of the passage above.

The crossing of the Romans into Asia actually takes place in Book 37, and is preceded by lengthy preparations on each side. Antiochus tries to secure an alliance with Prusias of Bithynia, and we see in the letter that Livy appears to be paraphrasing, that Antiochus has caught on to the new world view of the Romans. The conquest of the whole world seems almost as inevitable to him as it did to Glabrio:

> ad Prusiam Bithyniae regem legatos miserat litterasque, quibus transitum in Asiam

> Romanorum increpabat: uenire eos ad omnia regna tollenda, ut nullum usquam orbis terrarum

> nisi Romanum imperium esset; Philippum Nabim expugnatos; se tertium peti; ut quisque

> proximus ab oppresso sit, per omnes uelut continens incendium peruasurum; ab se gradum in

> Bithyniam fore, quando Eumenes in voluntarium seruitutem concessisset. 24

Although the tone is obviously different, the basic ideas and the vocabulary are very similar. The focus on universality is again conveyed by the repetition of *omnis*, and the idea of a series of kingdoms, *omnia regna*, falling one after the other to Roman dominion, is also present. The metaphor of the fire, however, makes it obvious that this is a destructive progression, as opposed to the apparently glorious vision presented by Glabrio. What are we meant to think of Antiochus’ version of Roman conquest? Other examples of this set-up in Roman historiography,

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23 The land army’s crossing of the Hellespont takes place at 37.33.
24 37.25.4-8. Cf. Chaplin (2000): 74ff for discussion of this passage in terms of *exempla* and the persuasive use of the past by Scipio.
in which we get the damning perspective of an enemy king or commander, tend to have the
effect of subverting Roman rhetoric about their own preconceptions (about other people and
about themselves). There are several striking examples, not least the speech given to the Gaul
Critognatus before the battle at Alesia in Caesar’s *Bellum Gallicum* (7.77), in which the portrayal
of Critognatus as not only noble and eloquent but also quite Roman in his modes of thought,
collapses any easy opposition between Romans and barbarians.25 There is no reason to think that
something similar is not going on here. This is the overtly negative version of the glorious vision
put forward by Glabrio earlier. Here, though Prusias is initially upset (*motum*) by the letter, he is
entirely reassured by Scipio Africanus, brother of the consul, who informs him about the
comfortable relationships which the Romans maintained with their other client-kings. However,
when we think back to Glabrio’s speech and the motives laid out there for Roman conquest, and
when we think about what had actually happened to the kings mentioned by Scipio by the time
Livy was writing, we might think that Prusias’ peace of mind is unwarranted, and Antiochus’
point of view is justified.26

After the war with Antiochus is finished, the casually confident approach to large spaces
that he feared from the Romans is very much in evidence. The ambassadors from the king who
approach the Roman commanders for terms submissively set the stage for this approach,
comparing Roman power to that of the gods:

25 See Andrew Riggsby, *Caesar Between Gaul and Rome*, (Austin, 2010), 107–118. Other examples include Sallust,
*Histories* 4.69, the Letter of Mithridates, and Tacitus *Agricola* 30, the speech of Calgacus. For Sallust’s letter of
Mithridates, see Eric Adler, *Valorizing the Barbarians*, (Austin, 2011), who also discusses other major examples,
including Hannibal’s speeches in Polybius and Livy.
26 Philip, Nabis, Masinissa (Rome’s failure to deal with the heirs of Masinissa), not to mention what we know of
later client kings like Eumenes.
The speech conveys quite clearly that the Romans have reached something of a crossroads; the ambassadors seem to be calling on them to adjust their thinking, to step up to the new position of power in which they find themselves. Of course, they express this in unattractively flattering language, and this overblown rhetoric is no doubt meant to reflect poorly on the ambassadors. They are in the service of a king of Asia, and they conform to the groveling stereotype. To a certain extent, however, it also reflects poorly on the Romans themselves. We have seen how familiar this kind of vocabulary is to readers of the Augustan period, and to have it be just as easily associated with the slavish deference of royal ambassadors is surely a reminder of its essential arrogance. Scipio wisely does not buy into the premise of their speech. He acknowledges the Romans’ debt to the gods and claims moderation as a virtue of the Roman spirit. He is not proposing terms as gods might to mortals, but rather as victors to the conquered (victores victis). But these terms begin on a huge geographical scale, and reflect the new, continent-sized level on which the Romans are working:

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27 37.45.8-9.
28 P.G. Walsh, in his commentary Livy Book XXXVII, (Warminster, 1992), 171, details how Livy differs from Polybius in his portrayal of the ambassadors as particularly sycophantic, and Scipio as particularly scrupulous. David Levene argues that the rhetoric of the ambassadors here (particularly the religious rhetoric) is there in order to demonstrate their excessive obsequiousness, which does not reflect badly on the Romans: “God and Man in the Classical Latin Panegyric,” PCPhS (1997), 66–103, esp. 84–5.
29 37.45.13.
Europa abstinete; Asia omni, quae cis Taurum montem est, decedite.\textsuperscript{30}

Once we are back in Rome and it is left to the Senate to decide how to divide the territories from which they had ejected him, namely, everything north of the Taurus mountains, we get the same kind of rhetoric from other parties. The speech of the Rhodians to the Senate is particularly loaded with references to the new extent of Roman power, and it looks very much like the kind of geographical rhetoric we see in the Augustan period. For example:

\textit{terminus est nunc imperii uestri mons Taurus; quidquid intra eum cardinem est, nihil longinquum uobis debet uideri; quo arma uestra peruenerunt, eodem ius hinc profectum perueniat. barbari, quibus pro legibus semper dominorum imperia fuerunt, quo gaudent reges habeant…}\textsuperscript{31}

This anticipates some of the phrasing found in Augustus’ \textit{Res Gestae}, as well as in Horace’s \textit{Odes} and \textit{the Aeneid}.\textsuperscript{32} Part of the \textit{Res Gestae} talks about how Augustus extended the borders of the provinces which bordered onto peoples not subject to Roman rule (\textit{omnium provinciarum populi Romani quibus finitimae fuerunt gentes quae non parerent imperio nostro fines auxi}).\textsuperscript{33} Later on the text mentions that kings were appointed by Augustus for the Parthians and the Medes (\textit{a me gentes Parthorum et Medorum per legatos principes earum gentium reges petitos acceperunt}).\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{30} 37.45.14.  
\textsuperscript{31} 37.54.23-4.  
\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Res Gestae} 26.  
\textsuperscript{34} ibid. 33.
The same processes are also referenced by Cn. Manlius Vulso on his return from his campaign against the Galatians in Asia. Unlike the (relatively) straightforward success story we get in the conclusion of the war with Antiochus, and the extension of Roman hegemony that accompanies it, the reaction to Vulso’s campaign reflects a growing anxiety about the extent of conquest, and about whether the Romans really have a place in these new territories. Vulso is accused by the commissioners who had been with him in Asia (since his job there was the oversight of the settlement with Antiochus) of provoking a war with the Galatians where none was needed, and of only barely being restrained from crossing the important boundary of the Taurus mountains:

*Cupientem transire Taurum aegre omnium legatorum precibus, ne carminibus Sibyllae praedictam superantibus terminos fatalis cladem experiri uellet, retentum admosse tamen exercitum et prope <in> ipsis iugis ad diuortia aquarum castra posuisse.*

I shall discuss some of the other charges against him in the next section, but this one belongs here, because it portrays Vulso as a reckless crosser of a geographical boundary; it is the opposite vision of Roman power to the one brought up by Antiochus’ ambassadors in Book 37. The voices of the commissioners reflect a discomfort with the idea of the Roman as *domini orbis terrarum*, and an anxiety about what is on the other side of the *terminos fatalis*, both geographically and temporally. As Pagnon puts it, in his discussion of these passages, “il semble que le Taurus marque pour Tite-Live une limite aussi bien géographique qu’historique.” Vulso is forced to defend his campaign, advocating that the Senate should take an interest at least in

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35 38.45.3.

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what is on their side of the mountains. His is a confident, interventionist idea of Roman hegemony:

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equidem aliquid interesse rebar inter id tempus, quo nondum in iure ac dicione uestra
Graecia atque Asia erat, ad curandum animaduertendumque, quid in iis terris fieret, et hoc, quo
finem imperii Romani Taurum montem statuistis, quo libertatem, immunitatem ciuitatibus datis,
quo aliis fines adicitis, alias agro multatis, aliis uectigal imponitis, regna augetis minuitis
donatis adimitis, curae uestrae censetis esse, ut pacem terra marique habeant.37
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This also recalls closely the words of the Res Gestae, particularly chapter 13, in which Augustus writes of closing the doors of the temple of Janus Quirinus, *cum per totum imperium populi Romani terra marique esset parta victoriis pax*. The idea common to both Livian passages, to the Res Gestae and the other examples of Augustan writing, is that Rome has the capacity to make Roman whatever lies within the boundaries of their territory. Their particular brand of *ius* will make its way as far afield as the army does, and it has the capacity to civilize even the most alien of peoples. Manlius almost rebukes the Senate for not seeing that his desire to campaign against the Galatians was part of a broader project, to impose Roman order on the areas within their control. On the surface, of course this mission should be read as a positive one. The spread of Roman order was a prominent part of Augustan ideology; the strength of the idea is borne out by its tenacity among the Romans of the imperial period. In Livy, however, the flipside of this ideal is continually being brought to our attention, since what actually happens in the latter half of the fourth decade is the opposite. Instead of promulgating Roman values, we see

37 38.48.3-4.
the process of decline take hold among the Romans as their involvement in Asia deepens, while foreign habits and values become increasingly normal among their elite. In the next section I will discuss some of the ways in which the rhetoric of glorious Roman expansion is subverted by the negative effects of Rome’s involvement in Asia. I will also examine what part climate, environment and geography play in Livy’s ideas about the spread of moral corruption and the decline of the Roman Republic.

*Manlius Vulso and the Gallograeci: environment and the spread of corruption.*

One of the ways in which Asia becomes a problematic space in Livy’s narrative is through the essential noxiousness of its environment and inhabitants, and this is very much tied up with Cn. Manlius Vulso’s Galatian campaign in 187, which Livy marks as a turning point in the moral decline of Rome. What is, in the scheme of things, a fairly insignificant expedition, takes up a major part of Book 38 and is described in a great deal of detail.38 I will argue that this is part of the emphasis on Asia which we have been looking at throughout the preceding books, and that Asia now starts explicitly to stand for the negative aspects of Roman conquest, in particular the perceived degenerative effects of contact with the East and the subsequent influx of wealth and *luxuria* into Rome.39 The Roman anxiety about foreign *luxuria* has been present in Livy’s history since the very beginning, when he expresses his worries about Roman decline in his preface.

Ceterum aut me amor negotii suscepti fallit, aut nulla unquam res publica nec maior nec sanctior nec bonis exemplis ditiior fuit, nec in quam [civitatem] tam serae avaritia luxuriaque immigraverint, nec ubi tantus ac tam diu paupertati ac parsimoniae honos fuerit. Adeo quanto rerum minus, tanto minus cupiditatis erat: nuper diuitiae auaritiam et abundantes voluptates desiderium per luxum atque libidinem perundique omnia invexere.40

Livy does not make explicit here the association between luxuria and the East, but it is clear at least from immigraverint and invexere that it is a phenomenon which comes in from abroad.41 The speech of Cato in Book 34, defending the lex Oppia’s restraints on women’s adornment, makes it clearer:

Saepe me querentem de feminarum, saepe de uirorum nec de priuatorum modo sed etiam magistratum sumptibus audistis, diuersisque duobus uitiiis, auaritia et luxuria, ciuitatem laborare, quae pestes omnia magna imperia euerterunt. haec ego, quo melior laetiorque in dies fortuna rei publicae est, quo magis imperium crescit—et iam in Graeciam Asiamque transcendimus omnibus libidinum inlecebris repletas et regias etiam adtrectamus gazas—, eo plus horreo, ne illae magis nos ceperint quam nos illas.42

Anachronistic as this might seem, this is the background for what we find when we read the narrative of Manlius’ campaign against the Galatians.43 We find here a particularly deep

40 Praef. 11-12.
41 As Luce, Livy: 273 points out: “The basic cause is social and cultural: the contamination of sound native traditions by ideas and practices from outside”.
42 34.2
43 Luce, Livy: 252-3 mentions and explains the anachronism thus: “What Cato says in the aside about royal treasures and Asia, of course, is not true: the Romans have so far done neither. Livy is here casting him in the role of a
concern about the potential for change in the Romans themselves, a change for the worse which wealth and pleasure can hurry on; there is a further sense, however, that Asia is harmful in more than just the superficial wealth it can provide. Asia as a place, as an environment, seems to have a deep impact on the Roman character, and Manlius is in some respects painted as the agent of that change.

The speech of the Rhodians in Book 37, at the same time as it buys into the rhetoric of Roman expansion, also introduces the concept, familiar from Greek and Roman thought, that climate and environment might play a large part in determining the nature of a place’s inhabitants. This idea is most famously expressed in the Hippocratic treatise *Airs Waters Places*, where the cowardice and general torpor of Asian peoples is discussed, but it can also be found in some examples of Roman thought about the character of foreign peoples. Although it does not address the undesirable aspects of the Asian character explicitly, it does hint at their existence.

As it happens, the Rhodians are here denying to the Senate that the environment of Asia Minor has had any effect on the Greek cities there, with a view to persuading the Romans not to hand over those cities to Eumenes:

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prophet…. Note that Livy has given Valerius nothing to say in rebuttal to this argument of Cato. The reason is that Livy believed it to be true, for it is repeated later and in his own person (39.6.3-9”).

44 Discussion of this idea takes up much of the second half of the treatise; it is summed up in chapter 12, and the author goes into detail about Asia specifically in chapter 16: περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀθυμίας τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῆς ἀνανδρείας, ὅτι ἀπολεμώτεροι ἦσαν τῶν Εὐρωπαίων οἱ Ασινοὶ καὶ ἐμεξότεροι τὰ ἱδέα αἱ ὄρας αἰτοῖα μᾶλλον, οὐ μεγάλας τὰς μεταβολὰς ποιοῦμενα υἱὸτε ἐπὶ τὸ θεμέλιον υἱὸτε ἐπὶ τὸ ψυχρόν, ἀλλὰ παραπλησίως. οὐ γὰρ γίνονται ἐκπλήξεις τῆς γνώμης υἱὸτε μετάστασις ἱσχυρῆ τοῦ σώματος, αἱ δὲ τῶν όργην ἀγριοῦσαι τε καὶ τὸν ἀγνώσιον καὶ θυμοειδής μετέχειν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ ἄνθρωποι αἰτοῖα ἐνότα. οἱ γὰρ μεταβολαὶ ἐσαὶ τῶν πάντων ἐπεγείρουσαν τὴν γνώμην τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ οὐκ ἔσωσα αἴτησαν γίνεται. διὰ ταύτας ἔμθα δοκεῖ τὰς προφάσις ἀναλύει τοῦ γένους τοῦ Ασινοῦ καὶ προσέτη διὰ τοὺς νόμους. The author goes on, however, to make the important distinction between inhabitants of Asia who are ruled by kings (who tend, thanks to that instigation, to be unwarlike and lazy) and those who are not (who are much bolder and apt to take risks). Political institutions and climate, then, seem to have at least an equal role in determining character, but this distinction is nowhere to be found in Livy. Livy has further comments on the link between nature and character at 9.13.7 (on the hardy, mountain-dwelling Samnites) and 45.30.7 (on the warlike Macedonians). Cicero also comments on the role of environment in forming mores at *Agr. II. 95*. For a (controversial) discussion of these ideas, see Benjamin Isaac, *The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity*, (Princeton, 2004). Luce, *Livy*, 276-81 discusses the effect of environment on character in Livy more broadly.
The implication is that their Asian surroundings have not de-civilized or had any detrimental effect on the Greek colonies. This is made clear with the Rhodians’ later reference to the Greek colony at Massilia on the southern coast of Gaul. If Massilia had managed to avoid becoming barbarized (*efferassent*), though it was surrounded by *tot indomita gentes*, then why should the Romans think any differently of the colonies in Asia?\(^4^6\)

Later on, in Book 38, as Cn. Manlius Vulso is about to lead his troops into battle against the Gauls of Galatia, he makes precisely the opposite point, that the Asian environment in particular has a powerful capacity to change its inhabitants.\(^4^7\) This signals a big change in the way Roman conquest is talked about in Livy. For the first time, the Romans are moving into places which pose a threat to their character. The discourse about Roman conquest in Livy now becomes more prominently concerned with questions of virtue and moral integrity, and with the link between virtue and military competence. Manlius is an excellent example of this, since he fails to protect his army from the corrupting influence of these new places, and almost immediately faces difficulties because of that.

In his speech to his troops at the beginning of the campaign, Manlius argues that the Gauls, who are not the most formidable enemies at the best of times (*mollia corpora, molles, ubi ira consedit, animos sol puluis sitis, ut ferrum non admoueas, prosternunt*)\(^4^8\), have degenerated in these new surroundings, tamed by the pleasant climate and fertile land. This change in character

\(^{45}\) 37.54.18.  
\(^{46}\) 37.54.19.  
\(^{47}\) Luce, *Livy*: 279-84 makes the case for reading the Rhodian speech and that of Manlius together, since both present different ways of viewing Roman exposure to foreign peoples.  
\(^{48}\) 38.17.7.
is inevitable for any people, it seems, with a move to a new environment, and Manlius references the Massilians in particular:

\[
\text{sicut in frugibus pecudibusque non tantum semina ad seruandam indolem ualent}
\]
\[
\text{quantum terrae proprietas caelique sub quo aluntur mutat. Macedones, qui Alexandream in}
\]
\[
\text{Aegypto, qui Seleuciam ac Babyloniam, quique alias sparsas per orbem terrarum colonias}
\]
\[
\text{habent, in Syros Parthos Aegyptios degenerarunt; Massilia, inter Gallos sita, traxit aliquantum}
\]
\[
\text{ab accolis animorum; Tarentinis quid ex Spartana dura illa et horrida disciplina mansit?}
\]
\[
\text{generosius in sua quidquid sede gignitur; insitum alienae terrae in id quo alitur, natura uertente}
\]
\[
\text{se, degenerat.}^{49}
\]

Not only has this unfortunate decline happened to the Galatians and the rest of the peoples mentioned by Manlius, but it also becomes clear that he fears and anticipates it happening to his own army, despite the fact that their campaign in Asia will only be brief:

\[
\text{uobis mehercule, Martiis uiris, cauenda ac fugienda quam primum amoenitas est Asiae:}
\]
\[
\text{tantum hae peregrinae uoluptates ad extinguedumb uigorem animorum possunt; tantum contagio}
\]
\[
\text{disciplinae morisque accolarum ualet.}^{50}
\]

The effect of Asia, then, is seen to be like a disease (contagio), and it could very easily pass to the Romans. The pleasures of the environment could take their grip on the Roman army quickly, and this is in fact what we see happening. This is one of the last passages in Livy where

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49 38.17.10-13.
50 38.17.18.
the contrast between the Martiis viris and the peregrinae voluptates will work; the change promoted by their stay in Asia happens even before they get back to Rome.\textsuperscript{51}

At the very beginning of Book 39, Livy explicitly condemns the leadership of Manlius in the campaigns that were related in the previous book. In the context of talking about the concurrent campaigns against the Ligurians, Livy returns to the idea that the environment in which an army fights can have a significant impact on their discipline and courage. While Liguria (is hostis) is uelut natus ad continendam inter magnorum interualla bellorum Romanis militarem disciplinam, Asia can only make its armies richer (ditiores quam fortiores exercitus faciebat).\textsuperscript{52} Livy makes the comment at this point that the state of the army was particularly bad under the command of Manlius (praecipue sub imperio Cn. Manlii solute ac neglegenter habiti sunt).\textsuperscript{53} Slightly later, Livy chooses the moment of Manlius’ triumph to make his comment about the semina luxuriae and the beginnings of Roman decadence. Manlius, eager to avoid prosecution for having ruined military discipline in the army left to him in Asia by Lucius Scipio (quod disciplinam militarem seure ab eo conseruatam successor ipsu omni genere licentiae corrupisse fama attulerat), triumphs later than usual.\textsuperscript{54} Livy comments that the problems of the army were not confined to reports from abroad, but rather they were playing out every day among the soldiers in Rome:

\textsuperscript{51} As put by Walsh, Livy XXXVIII: 146 on 38.18: “The view was pervasive at Rome that the civil conflicts of the 1stC BC were caused by moral decline which set in with luxurious life first encountered by troops in the east and imported into Rome by a sort of Asian “flu.” As he points out, this view “had already been propounded by the 2ndC annalist Calpurnius Piso (fr. 34P).” The fragment comes from Pliny, \textit{NH} 34.14: \textit{triclinia aerata abacosque et monopodia Cn. Manlius Asia deuicta primum inuexisse triumph suo, quem duxit anno urbis DLXVII, L. Piso auctor est.”
\textsuperscript{52} 39.1.2-4.
\textsuperscript{53} 39.1.4.
\textsuperscript{54} 39.6.5.
luxuriae enim peregrinae origo ab exercitu Asiatico inuecta in urbem est. ii primum lectos aeratos, uestem stragulam pretiosam, plagulas et alia textilia, et quae tum magnificae supellectis habebantur, monopodia et abacos Romam aduexerunt. tunc psaltriae sambucistriaeque et conuiualia alia ludorum oblectamenta addita epulis; epulae quoque ipsae et cura et sumptu maiore apparari coeptae. tum coquus, uilissimum antiquis mancipium et aestimatione et usu, in pretio esse, et quod ministerium fuerat, ars haberi coepta. uix tamen illa quae tum conspiciebantur semina erant futurae luxuriae.\textsuperscript{55}

From his description of the triumph itself, despite the qualification at the end that Manlius’ army has brought with it only barely the seeds of future luxuria, it seems that Asia has had an immediate effect both in material and moral terms. The Gallic spoils themselves, the crowns, silver, gold, and coins form the focus of the triumph, but Livy also marks his disapproval of Manlius with the following comment:

\textit{Carminaque a militibus ea in imperatorem dicta ut facile appareret in ducem indulgentem ambitiosumque ea dici, triumphum esse militari magis fauore quam populari celebrem.}\textsuperscript{56}

How are Livy’s criticisms of Manlius borne out by the actual narrative of the war against the Galatians? The Asian landscape seems to have an immediate negative effect on the Roman army as they travel through Asia. The narrative of Manlius’ journey from his landing point at Ephesus to the frontiers of the tribe of the Tolostobogii (38.12.8-15.14) is full of what looks like

\textsuperscript{55}39.6.7-9.
\textsuperscript{56}39.7.3.
extortion on his part. The dense list of Greek place names is shot through with anecdotal information about the history of the places, emphasizing the foreignness of the landscape. For example, Livy annotates a mention of Antiocheia on the Maeander with the following:

Huius amnis fontes Celaenis oriuntur. Celaenae urbs caput quondam Phrygiae fuit; migratum inde haud procul ueteribus Celaenis, nouaeque urbi Apameae nomen inditum ab Apama sorore Seleuci regis. Et Marsyas amnis, haud procul a Maeandri fontibus oriens, in Maeandrum cadit, famaque ita tenet, Celaenis Marsyan cum Apolline tibiarium cantu certasse.57

Meanwhile, in the midst of this pointedly exotic countryside, Manlius is busy acquiring so much money that the army can barely move by the end (quorum praeda iam graue agmen trahens uix quinque milium die toto itinere perfecto ad Beudos, quod uetus appellant, peruenit).58 Livy is not openly critical of Manlius through all this, and the people he encounters, such as the rather unattractive tyrant of Cibyra, Moagetes, certainly are not beyond reproach, but I would argue that it is difficult to extract a very positive picture of Manlius from this passage. The same goes, albeit even less explicitly, for the episode in which a centurion rapes the wife of one of the Gallic chiefs, Orgiago.59 The centurion is characterized as a man of libidinis et avaritiae militaris, and although his failings are not directly attributed to Manlius’ lack of discipline, the vices of his soldiers ultimately reflect on the general to some extent. It is also interesting that Livy blames a rather general “military” disposition for the centurion’s actions, implying that this

57 38.14.4-5. Xenophon, in relating Cyrus’ journey east in the Anabasis, describes the very same places (1.2.7–9), also with a reference to Marsyas when Cyrus arrives at Celaenae and the Maeander. We might think of the Romans being compared to the Persians here, as they are compared to the Greeks at Troy?
58 38.15.13.
59 38.24. The anecdote is also related more briefly by Plutarch in his Γυναικῶν ἄρεται (22), who cites Polybius (21.38) who apparently spoke to the woman herself at Sardis. This version places more explicit blame on the individual centurion for his vices, but also mentions that he behaved στρατιωτικῶς.
was the condition of the army overall (although he may mean that as a comment on the army at all times, not just under Manlius).

Livy’s authorial criticisms of Manlius are reflected in the narrative of his campaign, but not to such an extent that it seems to justify the force of those criticisms. It should be pointed out that Manlius is also criticized within the history by the senatorial commissioners who accompanied him on his campaign (as mentioned above in the context of the crossing of boundaries). He is accused by two of them in particular, Lucius Furius Purpurio and Lucius Aemilius Paullus, who oppose his request for a triumph on the grounds that he was reckless and unnecessarily aggressive in making war. They make the case that Manlius had been looking for a fight in Asia, conducting what they call a *latrocinium privatum*. Further, he had been irresponsible in allowing battles to be fought on unfavorable ground. The only saving grace of the campaign, the speaker states, was that the enemy were degenerate Gallograeci (*mixti et vitiati*) rather than real Gauls; the Thracian attack served as a reminder of what might have happened had Manlius been facing a real enemy all along. Manlius goes on to defend himself, citing the complaints of Eumenes and of “all the cities of Asia” about the Gauls, and comparing them as an enemy to Antiochus himself. He also cites comparable episodes of commanders forced to fight on difficult terrain, such Manius Acilius at Thermopylae and Flamininus at the River Aous.

It is unclear at this point who is right; the narrative of Manlius’ campaign gives no hint that he was a particularly irresponsible general. Furius and Aemilius do accuse him of collecting

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61 38.45.7.
63 38.49.2-3.
money from the people of Phrygia, but the rest of the charges seem unwarranted by the preceding narrative.\textsuperscript{64} In many ways he is actually depicted as being a good general; he is conscientious and careful, particularly in the narrative of the battle at Mount Olympus, where his foresight, discipline and careful reconnaissance are described at some length.\textsuperscript{65} Livy is ambiguous about whether he had a real reason to start the war, he simply says, when Manlius arrives in Asia in at the end of Book 37, that consuli non deerat cum Gallis belli materia.\textsuperscript{66} When the campaign itself starts, he justifies it to the soldiers on the grounds that the Gauls had been part of Antiochus’ army, and that to truly keep Antiochus on the other side of the Taurus mountains would be impossible without defeating them.\textsuperscript{67}

We have several different versions of Manlius then. We have the reckless, aggressive commander of the commissioners’ complaints, who is not much in evidence in Livy’s narrative. We have Manlius’ own idea of himself, in Walsh’s words a ‘hawk, eager to impose a settlement through military prowess and martial glory.’\textsuperscript{68} And we have the authorial criticisms made in Book 39 of Manlius as the first real importer of foreign luxuria into Rome. It is possible, as Luce discusses, that Livy used different sources for different parts of this narrative, but that is to blame Livy for carelessness in stitching them together.\textsuperscript{69} The senatorial debate reflects the different approaches that might be taken to victory in Asia; should the Romans impose their own will

\textsuperscript{64} See Briscoe, \textit{Commentary on Livy Books 38–40}, 158, who stresses that the charges against Manlius are ‘not borne out by Livy’s earlier narrative.’

\textsuperscript{65} Especially at 38.20: \ldots tertio die cum omnibus ad loca exploranda profectus, quia nemo hostium extra munimenta processit, tuto circumuectus montem, animaduertit meridiana regione terrenos et placide adcluiues ad quendam finem colles esse, a septentrione arduas et rectas prope rupes, atque omnibus ferme aliis inuis itinera tria esse, unum medio monte, qua terrena erant, duo difficilia, ab hiberno solis ortu et ab aestiuo occasu. haec contemplates, eo die sub ipsis radicibus posuit castra...\textsuperscript{67}

\textsuperscript{66} 37.60.2. Pagnon, \textit{Vulso}: 123 points out that the war with the Gauls was already predicted at 37.51.10: “les sénateurs ‘nihil tamen aut de consule mittendo in Asiam mutandum aut minuendas eius copias censuerunt metu ne cum Gallis foret bellandum.’”

\textsuperscript{67} 38.12.3.4.

\textsuperscript{68} Walsh, \textit{Livy XXXVIII}: 177, introducing chs. 45-50.3.

\textsuperscript{69}Luce, \textit{Livy}: 256-8. On his account, Polybius is the source for the Galatian campaign and the return via Thrace, while ‘Roman sources’ are responsible for the accusations of the senatorial commissioners, and Livy’s authorial criticisms of Manlius in Book 39 derive from Calpurnius Piso (only on the basis of the fragment cited above n51).
through war, or conciliate and proceed cautiously? There seem to be two equally valid Roman values at work in each speech. Furius and Aemilius focus heavily on the idea of public and divine consensus for war, of responsibility in command; Manlius, as we have seen, propounds the Augustan values of spreading Roman peace and justice to barbarian peoples. Asia is the catalyst within Livy’s narrative for this discussion of what Roman imperialism should look like.

As for the authorial criticisms of Livy, which are only to some extent backed up by his own narrative of the campaign, I would suggest that the pinning down of this war as the beginning of Rome’s moral decline is more of a received rhetorical trope than a real criticism of Manlius himself. Livy’s idea of the decline of Rome has a great deal to do with the influx of foreign (really, Eastern) customs and goods, which come under the umbrella of luxuria, and Manlius’ campaign is the first to bring with it a significant wave of such things. Livy’s criticisms of Manlius personally, at the beginning of Book 39, may simply be a conflation of the man himself with the vices Livy associates with his return from Asia, and quite possibly owes a lot to later perceptions of 1st century generals like Lucullus and Sulla, who also conducted campaigns in the East. It is almost as though the character of Manlius within Livy’s history has been contaminated by his association with Asia, in the very way that Livy has him warn against in addressing his troops.

The description of Manlius as indulgentem ambitiosumque at 39.7.3 might call to mind criticisms of the generals of the later Republic. Although we have none of Livy’s own views of men like Lucullus, Sulla and Pompey, the vices he flags in Manlius, that he was indulgent

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70 Although, as Luce, *Livy*, 255-6 points out, Livy does not put any blame for the influx of luxuria on the brothers Scipio and their campaign in Asia against Antiochus, although their corruption trial might provide an opening to do so. In fact, in the process of reporting public opinion of Manlius at 39.6.5, one of the criticisms leveled at him is that he ruined the military discipline that was maintained (conservatam) by Lucius Scipio. Pliny the Elder, on the other hand, does name Lucius Scipio alongside Manlius (in a succession that includes Pompey) as an importer of foreign goods: victoria tamen illa Pompei primum ad margaritas gemmasque mores inclinavit, sicut L. Scipionis et Cn. Manli ad caelatum argentum et vestes Attalicas et triclinia aerata. (37.12)
towards his soldiers and personally ambitious, and that his success rested on his soldiers’
goodwill, were the kinds of problems that we hear a lot about with regard to commanders in the
first century BC. It is likely that, because Livy attaches so much importance to the phenomenon
of *luxuria* and corruption from the East, that he associates the person of Manlius with wealth he
brought back and with *luxuria* in general. From there, Manlius becomes associated with the vices
that were popularly attached to other commanders who were let loose in their eastern *provinciae*
and gained a bad reputation for their acquisition of wealth and for currying favour with their
soldiers. Athenaeus records a tradition about Lucullus, who, although he was acknowledged to
be an excellent commander and was a good example of restraint in his dealings with the cities of
Asia, abandoned himself to a luxurious lifestyle after his return. Athenaeus tells us that Lucullus
was ‘the first to introduce luxury into Rome, after he had harvested for himself the wealth of the
two kings [Mithridates and Tigranes]…’71 Lucullus’ lifestyle was notorious to the point that the
Stoic philosopher Tubero is supposed to have called him “Xerxes in a toga”, with reference to
his monumental fishponds.72 The Roman general, corrupted by exposure to Asian luxury, is
certainly a trope in Roman historiography. In particular, Livy’s description of Manlius recalls
Sallust’s mention of Sulla, and the criticisms he raises in his introductory sketch of Roman
history in the *Bellum Catilinae*.

*Huc accedebat, quod L. Sulla exercitum, quem in Asia ductauerat, quo sibi fidum faceret,
contra morem maiorum luxurose nimisque liberaliter habuerat. Loca amoena, uoluptaria facile
in otio ferocis militum animos molliuerant. Ibi primum insueuit exercitus populi Romani amare,
potare, signa, tabulas pictas, uasa caelata mirari, ea priuatim et publice rapere, delubra*

71 Athenaeus, *Deipnosophistae* VI. 274F (?)
spoliare, sacra profanaque omnia polluere. Igitur ii milites, postquam victoriam adepti sunt, nihil reliqui uictis fecere. Quippe secundae res sapientium animos fatigant: ne illi corruptis moribus uictoriae temperarent.\textsuperscript{73}

For Sallust also, Asia is a significant marker on the downward trajectory of the Roman character, except that its major effect is on Sulla, not Manlius. The negative associations are very much the same, as we can see from the emphasis on material goods, although Sallust’s description goes further, as it is also talking about the seizures of property carried out by Sulla during the period of proscriptions. But the exposure of Sulla’s army to Asia is likewise the point where greed really takes hold and starts to corrupt the Romans. The similarities extend to the point that Sulla is criticized for being too lax with his soldiers and treating them too generously in order to secure their loyalty; Livy implies that Manlius has done the same when he mentions the soldiers’ songs about him in the triumphal procession. Asia’s place in Roman historiography of the late Republic, whether it comes up in a second or first century context, is firmly that of a destructive influence. Livy may have been influenced by this to the extent that he retrojects characteristics onto Manlius for which there is no evidence given in the detailed narrative of the campaign.

Manlius, then, is closely linked with the idea of Asia as a place of corruption and decadence. Livy insists that he become a figurehead for the decline of morals in the Republic, despite not giving us any evidence for this, almost as though luxuria were some kind of disease he had caught while on campaign. The impression that this campaign has inaugurated the decline of Rome is reinforced by the fact that the narrative of the Bacchanalia almost immediately

\textsuperscript{73} Sallust, \textit{BC} 11.
succeeds that of Manlius’ triumph. The theme of eastern corruption continues with the introduction of the cult by a *Graecus ignobilis… sacrificulus et vates.* In the initial description of the rites, the emphasis is on the *voluptates* indulged in by the initiates, and the spread of the cult is described as a *contagio morbi.* These last two provide verbal echoes of Manlius’ speech to his troops, in which he warned of the contaminating effects of the pleasant Asian environment.

These passages have illuminated something of the ambivalence in Livy’s narrative of Roman military engagement with Asia. A tension clearly exists between the promise of glorious conquest and the perceived corruption of foreign influence. Asia is a problematic area in the expanding geography of the Roman world, and we can see in the last half of the fourth decade an increasing sense of anxiety and insecurity about the effects of prolonged contact with it. This anxiety continues to play a large role in the narrative of the Bacchanalia affair, spreading the fear of corruption to involve what is seen as a Greek phenomenon. In the next chapter, I will explore how worries about foreignness play out in the last extant parts of Livy’s history, books 44-45. By that point, a much stronger sense of confidence and control characterizes the Roman attitude to their conquests, yet the debate about the right way to approach foreign places is still being played out through individual commanders’ interactions with landscape and topography.

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74 39.8.3. Livy makes clear, however, that this man should not be considered representative of Greeks in general: *Graecus ignobilis in Etruriam primum uenit nulla cum arte earum quas multas ad animorum corporumque cultum nobis eruditissima omnium gens inuexit, sacrificulus et uates.*

75 39.8.5-6, 39.9.1.
This chapter is concerned with the establishment of Roman control in Greece during Livy’s fifth decade, and how that is reflected in geography and landscape. I will focus on Books 44-45, since it is here that we can see a real sense of Roman confidence taking hold in their dealings with Greece. This is the culmination of a trajectory that has been developing since the third decade, as we have seen in the previous chapters, and Book 45, at the mid-point of a decade and containing the narrative of the Third Macedonian War, is an appropriate place to reach this culmination. ¹ The development of Roman confidence can be charted in different ways: firstly, in the way that the known world is talked about and conceptualized by characters in Livy’s history. How do Romans, in particular, see themselves in relation to the wider world and its geography? Secondly, as in previous chapters, we can see the this development taking place in the successes of the Roman commanders and the corresponding failures of their enemies.

The main part of the chapter will look at the progress of individual commanders, focusing first on Q. Marcius Philippus, the first general in the war against Perseus, and finally on L. Aemilius Paullus, whose campaign in Macedonia marks a high point in Roman understanding of the landscape and environment. Much of this discussion will look at the natural landscape of the Macedonian countryside; in both Philippus’ and Paullus’ campaign, there is a sense of increasing confidence and comprehension of this environment, which becomes almost supernatural in

¹ Luce, Livy, 120 suggests that the (largely missing) Book 43 was mostly concerned with Roman failures, particularly against Perseus, and that Book 44, beginning strongly with the campaigns of Philippus in Macedonia in 169, introduces a “renewed sense of purpose and confidence”. The summary in the Periochae for 43 certainly suggests that this was a low point in the fifth decade: Praetores aliquot eo quod auare et crudeliter provincias administrauerant, damnati sunt. P. Licinius Crassus procos. complures in Graecia urbes expugnavit et crudeliter corripit. Ob id captui qui ab eo sub corona uenierant ex S. C. postea restituti sunt. Item a praefectis classium Romanarum multa impotenter in socios facta. Res a Perse rege in Thracia prospere gestas continet uictis Dardanis et Illyrico, cuius rex erat Gentius. Motus, qui in Hispania ab Olonico factus erat, ipso interempto consedit. M. Aemilius Lepidus a censoribus princeps senatus lectus.
Paullus’ case. Alongside this trajectory, Perseus becomes less and less in control of the landscape around him, which is in fact his own native terrain; his failures in this regard are portrayed as humiliating and seem almost inexplicably stupid. The sheer ridiculousness of Perseus is in sharp contrast to the competence of Philippus and Paullus; this is much more of a sharp contrast than existed between Macedonians and Romans in the fourth decade.

One theme which starts to emerge here is the idea of making foreign places familiar, even making them Roman, which is the ultimate expression of control. Mary Jaeger brings up this theme in the introduction to her study of space and monuments in Livy, using Paullus as an example. She mentions the idea of space being conceived as a series of concentric circles radiating out from a centre, which in this case is Rome. The further one moves from the centre, the more alien the surroundings become. I want to develop the idea that, although Paullus is far from the centre in Books 44-45, Rome is still very much a presence, whether in the Roman camp or in his perceptions of Greek places. Much of Paullus’ function in Livy, it can be argued, is the redefinition of Macedonian and Greek space as Roman.

The last part of the chapter, instead of looking at these characters moving through the natural world, will focus on Paullus and his relationship with particular sites in Greece, when we come to the tour he takes following his victory at Pydna. The spotlight here is very much on sacred places and sites of cultural interest, which comprise a sort of myth-historical and religious landscape. Looking at Paullus’ reactions to these places will throw light on some aspects of the Roman attitude to Greece in this period, at least as Livy portrays it. On the one hand, Paullus’ relationship with the famous sites of Greece (as with the terrain of Macedonia) is characterized by acts of appropriation; on the other hand, the primary focus of scholarship on Paullus has often been his reputation as a benevolent philhellene. I want to examine Paullus’ philhellenism through

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the lens of his relationship with Greek places. What can we say about Livy’s portrayal of Roman philhellenism with this relationship in mind? What does it consist of and how does it manifest itself in the narrative?

Before getting down to this discussion of Philippus and Paullus, I want to look more generally at how the Roman attitude to geographical space has been developing over the course of the fourth and fifth decades. This first part of the chapter will deal with bigger, more abstract geographical concepts than we have seen before, looking at how the overall progress of Roman success in the fourth and fifth decades begin to be reflected in some much broader imaginings of geographical space, as Livy’s Romans start to see themselves expanding their hegemony ever farther across the Mediterranean world. This discussion will allow us some insight into how Livy portrays the Roman mindset during an intense period of expansion, paving the way for a look at these attitudes on a smaller scale when we come to examine the individual commander later on in the chapter.

_Conquest and the broadening of geographical perspectives:_

One of the first times that the extent of Roman domination of the Mediterranean world is explicitly predicted in Livy is during his account of the battle of Thermopylae in 191. Livy’s introduction to the battle gives us a particularly spectacular view over the country, and this prompts a vision of success for the Romans. Here the author’s voice describes the view, which takes a rather conceptual form. It is a not a vista from any particular point, or from anyone’s perspective; rather it takes the location of the pass as its starting point and extends beyond the visible landscape to encompass a description of all of Greece, as it relates to the Romans’

\[3\] 36.15-17.
position at Thermopylae. He talks about Greece being divided in two by a mountain range he compares to the Apennines, describing it as though it runs east-west from Thermopylae to Leucas on the west coast. The comparison with the Apennines is somewhat misleading; the mountains between Thermopylae and Leucas do not stand out among the other mountains of Greece as a definitive barrier between north and south, and Livy is surely emphasizing the importance of the location by giving it this dividing quality. The location also carries the echoes of previous encounters with foreign forces, as Livy makes explicit at the end of his description of the view (Thermopylae locus appellatur, nobilis Lacedaemoniorum adversus Persas morte magis memorabili quam pugna). Just as the view from the pass, according to Livy, runs to the north and the south, the encounter at Thermopylae reflects both the past and the future.

Shortly after this description, Livy has the Roman commander at Thermopylae, Manius Acilius Glabrio, encourage his troops with a prediction that Roman imperium will spread from this point onwards to Asia, Syria and beyond.

illud proponere animo uestro debetis, non uos pro Graeciae libertate tantum dimicare, quamquam is quoque egregius titulus esset, liberatam a Philippo ante nunc ab Aetolis et ab Antiocho liberare, neque ea tantum in praemium uestrum cessura, quae nunc in regis castris sunt, sed illum quoque omnem apparatum, qui in dies ab Epheso expectatur, praedae futurum, Asiam deinde Syriamque et omnia usque ad ortum solis ditissima regna Romano imperio aperturos. quid deinde aberit, quin ab Gadibus ad mare rubrum Oceano finis terminemus, qui orbem terrarum amplexu finit, et omne humanum genus secundum deos nomen Romanum
This engagement with Antiochus marks Rome’s first defeat of a major Asian power, and thus the beginnings of their hegemony on the far side of the Aegean. The surprisingly comprehensive view described by Livy from Thermopylae therefore provides an opportunity for the Romans to envision the growing geographical extent of their power. This is perhaps less a straightforward imagining of what Glabrio might have said than a retrospective prophecy from the point of view of Livy’s own time. The kind of rhetoric used in Glabrio’s speech must have been familiar to Livy’s readers in the Augustan period and beyond, for it had been used increasingly from the late Republic on to describe the spread of Roman hegemony. Augustus’ own Res Gestae make use of such terminology, with the first line laying out the fact that the entire world is now subject to Rome. Sallust, in the letter of Mithridates in Book 4 of his Histories, describes the Romans from the perspective of the soon to be conquered king:

an ignoras Romanos, postquam ad occidentem pergentibus finem Oceanus fecit, arma huc convortisse?

Livy himself uses the phrase orbis terrarum in reporting the reassuring prophecy of Rome’s destiny made by Proculus Julius after Romulus’ mysterious disappearance from the

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4 35.17.
5 Nicolet, Space, 29ff sums up the sources for the idea of universal Roman dominion.
6 Res Gestae 1: rerum gestarum divi Augusti, quibus orbem terrarum imperio populi Romani subiecit... exemplar subiectum.
7 Sallust Histories 4.67.17.
Campus Martius. This concept that the Romans would go as far as the great natural boundaries of the earth allowed, seen here both from the positive perspective of the Romans themselves, and from the imagined negative perspective of an enemy, was an extremely common way of talking about Rome’s empire, and in Livy’s narrative this seems to be reflected in the ability of the Romans to predict the future by looking out over a huge expanse of territory.

Towards the end of Livy’s extant narrative, the beginning of book 44, the Romans experience another similar, though smaller-scale view, emerging on to a kind of hilltop balcony in the middle of a difficult crossing into Macedonia. The consul Q. Marcius Philippus has arrived from Rome with his forces in 169 BC, and is making his way through Thessaly towards Perseus’ camp near Dium, at the foot of Mount Olympus. After a difficult journey across rough ground, he comes out onto a ridge from which he has a view of another Macedonian camp very nearby, as well as the surrounding region as far as Dium and the sea. The situation provides an almost exact parallel to Hannibal’s view from the Alps in Book 21, in which the Carthaginians find themselves on a kind of balcony overlooking Italy itself:

*praegressus signa Hannibal in promunturio quodam, unde longe ac late prospectus erat, consistere iussis militibus Italiam ostentat subiectosque Alpinis montibus circumpadanos campos, moeniaque eos tum transcendere non Italiae modo sed etiam urbis Romanae; cetera plana, proclivia fore; uno aut summum altero proelio arcem et caput Italiae in manu ac potestae habituros.*

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8 1.16.7: *Abi, nuntia, inquit, Romanis, caelestes ita velle ut mea Roma caput orbis terrarum sit...*
9 44.3.
10 21.35.8.
The view not only allows the Carthaginians to see Italy for the first time, but it also provides a window into the future, through which they see their eventual conquest of Rome.\textsuperscript{11} It is as if the act of seeing the country, after reaching the summit of the mountain barrier, has delivered it into their power. The view provided by the mountain also serves as a turning point in the narrative, it marks the beginning of Hannibal’s descent into Italy, and shows us one possible path for the unfolding narrative, a possibility, of course, that will not be fulfilled. The promise of success is treacherous, both in the long run, as they will eventually be forced to leave Italy, prompting Hannibal to look back over Italy with a similar all-encompassing viewpoint, and in the immediate future, as the descent from the Alps into the Po Valley proves to be the most difficult and treacherous part of the crossing. The possibilities that opened up along with the view seem to last only as long as the view itself, a momentary vision into the future that is dampened by the danger and loss the Carthaginians experience as soon as they begin to descend. In Book 44, however, it is clear that the optimism felt by the Romans as they look out beyond the Macedonian camp is entirely justified, since we know the outcome of this war too.

\textit{Non hostium modo castra, quae paulo plus mille passuum aberant, sed omnis regio ad Dium et Philam oraque maris late patente ex tam alto iugo prospectu oculis subicitur. Quae res accendit militi animos, postquam summam belli ac regias omnis copias terramque hostilem tam e propinquo conspexerunt.}\textsuperscript{12}

The wide, open nature of the view is emphasized here with \textit{omnis regio} and \textit{late patente... prospectu}, as though it had suddenly appeared before the army’s eyes. The view is not

\textsuperscript{11} See Jaeger, \textit{Hannibal’s Monument}, on Hannibal’s views of Italy, here and at 30.20.7-9, where he looks back upon his departure.

\textsuperscript{12} 44.3.6-8.
just convenient, however, or strategically helpful, but rather it fires the soldiers up; they have seen *summam belli*, the substance of the war, before them. The phrase, in most translations, denotes Perseus’ preparations, but surely it also has the implication that the soldiers might be imagining the war, the substance of the war and its final outcome, being played out in this view; they see what they are up against in terms of the king’s army, but also in terms of how the war will proceed.\(^\text{13}\) So fired up are the soldiers at this point that they demand to be led to the Macedonian camp straightaway, with the implied expectation of success. Philippus, however, gives them a day’s rest to recover from the march. Two minor battles follow, their seriousness constrained by the limited space in the pass, and then the consul makes the decision to descend.

While Thermopylae and the view towards Dium predict Roman success, and we know that the predictions will come true, a similar moment in Book 40 offers us the other side of that coin, the frustration of Macedonian ambitions for conquest. In 181 BC, Philip planned an expedition to Mount Haemus in Maedica, in the belief that from the peak could be seen the Pontic and Adriatic Seas, the Danube and the Alps, all from the same viewpoint. This extensive view, he thought, would come in useful for planning a war against Rome.\(^\text{14}\) The whole journey, however, turns out to be fraught with trouble and frustration.\(^\text{15}\) Once Philip starts the ascent of the mountain, the climb becomes more and more difficult, and the expectation of the amazing panorama grows. Their journey upwards is shrouded in darkness, first from the thickness of the foliage interlacing over their heads, and then, when they approach the summit, an unusual fog makes them feel as though they are travelling at night (*quod rarum in altis locis est, adeo omnia*

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\(^\text{13}\) The phrase *summam belli* is used to denote the outcome of a war at Liv. 32.17.9, when Flamininus is besieging the Thessalian fortress Atrax in 198 BC.

\(^\text{14}\) 40.21.1-3.

contecta nebula erant, ut haud secus quam nocturno itinere impedirentur). As Jaeger points out in her discussion of this passage, the darkness and the fog reflect Philip’s misguidedness, his inability to comprehend what is going on. What really happened at the summit is unclear; the author, with the insertion of the word credo, suggests that Philip saw nothing, and that he pretended on the way down to have seen the rumoured view, in order not to have his march become an object of fun (nihil volgatae opinioni degressi inde detraxerunt, magis credo, ne vanitas itineris ludibrio esset, quam quod diversa inter se maria montesque et amnes ex uno loco conspici potuerint). Livy, then, admits he doesn’t know what Philip saw at the top of Mount Haemus. His suggestion that Philip saw nothing, and was trying to conceal that fact, contributes to a characterization of Philip as misguided and frustrated in his attempts to carry on a war with the Romans. Just as the view over Italy for Hannibal allowed him to look forward to a possible conquest of Rome, the denial of this (even grander) view to Philip denies the king any opportunity to predict that his war will be successful, and therefore removes any suggestion to the reader of the possibility of it being successful. At this stage in the history, when the Romans have already been victorious against Antiochus and successfully prosecuted a war in Asia Minor, Livy chooses to characterize Philip’s vain hopes as somewhat pathetic.16

From these passages we can see how perceptions of geography and terrain on a large, almost conceptual scale reflect ideas about conquest and success, particularly in the fourth and fifth decades. The characters’ ability to see and correctly interpret views over the country in question is correlated with their hopes of victory. In the case of Roman predictions of their own

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16 Jaeger, Fog on the Mountain, calls attention to the nature of the narrative arc concerning Philip in the fourth and fifth decades: “the Mount Haemus story is an act in what has been called the “tragedy” of Philip, which opens early in Book 40 with his atrocities against his own people, culminates in Demetrius’ murder, Philip’s own death, and Perseus’ ascent to the throne, and leads in the fullness of time (and five more books of Livy) to Rome’s conquest of the Greek east. The very war that Philip promotes by this journey destroys his kingdom. Livy’s readers already know that Philip has been cursed and that the angry gods have driven him mad. The ascent of Mt. Haemus intertwines the mad king’s literal attempt to achieve a clear view with his inability to perceive clearly the developing conspiracy, a failure that contributes to the episode’s tragic sensibilities”.

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success, we can see that the world is opening up in their imagination, that the possibility of an immense empire is starting to become more realistic. Correspondingly, Philip’s apparent failure to see the strategically important view of Europe reflects the fact that power is passing out of his hands. In the next section of this chapter, I will move to a smaller scale, and examine the ways in which this scheme emerges from the interactions between the Roman commander Paullus and Philip’s son Perseus. The steady confidence of Q. Marcius Philippus in the early part of Book 44, and the minor miracles performed by L. Aemilius Paullus in the Macedonian landscape later on, as well as the consistent failure of Perseus to use the landscape effectively, imply a similar passing of power from Macedonian to Roman hands.

_Philippus and the establishment of Roman confidence in Macedonia:_

The campaign of Philippus in Greece, which takes up less than half of Book 44, is a good place to examine the growing confidence of the Romans in their conflict with the Macedonians. In some ways this campaign can be seen as an intermediate phase between Book 43’s apparent focus on Roman failures and acts of cruelty, and the consulship of the exceptionally capable Paullus. Philippus’ role in Livy’s narrative is to establish the opposition between Roman confidence and ability, and Macedonian foolishness as embodied in the semi-demented figure of Perseus. The sense of competence which characterizes the new Roman campaign at the beginning of Book 44 is unmistakeable. After a brief description of Philippus’ arrival in Thessaly and the handover of power by his predecessor Aulus Hostilius, Livy paraphrases the consul’s speech to his soldiers. He describes the wrongs committed by Perseus in coming to the throne as _diis invisa_, and compares the military forces of the Macedonians with those of the Romans,

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17 For Book 43 see n.1 in this chapter.
which are described as *iam terrarum orbem complectentis*, again reflecting the universal scale of Rome’s wars. What follows is an account of Philippus’ and Perseus’ respective movements at this point, as the consul tries to work out his route into Macedonia. We get a clear sense of the carefulness and conscientiousness of Philippus and his advisors, as the different routes are presented to them and they repeatedly confer about which one to take. Perseus, on the other hand, is explicitly described as *adeo inops consilii, ut obtorpuisse videretur*, as he rushes to defend various places with no explanation of his rationale.

As Philippus progresses, he comes upon the viewpoint mentioned above, and the eventual success that will in fact attend the Roman campaign seems within reach. What follows, however, is an account of the immense difficulties they suffer in the rough, hilly terrain between Thessaly and Dium. After getting stuck on the ridge from which they have seen the Macedonian camp, and facing continual attack from the Macedonians, Philippus decides to press on *per invia*, clear the pass ahead and descend from the mountains. Livy glosses this decision as a bold follow-up to an already bold undertaking, while making it clear that another possible interpretation would be to characterize it as rash and foolish.

*nec aliud restabat quam audacter commissum pertinaci audacia, quae prudens interdum in exitu est, corrigere. ventum quidem erat eo ut, si hostem similem antiquis Macedonum regibus habuisset consul, magna clades accipi poterat.*

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18 44.1.10-12.  
19 44.4-5.  
20 44.4.11.  
21 44.4.8-9.
It is clear here, as it is in numerous other places, that Livy sees Perseus as doomed to fail, as a weak imitation of the *antiquis Macedonum regibus*; Philippus is successful at being bold partly because he is facing a pathetic enemy. Nevertheless, Livy persists in his praise of Philippus, who fights alongside his men as they engage the Macedonians and overcomes the bodily obstacles posed by his age and excessive weight to “magnificently pursue his bold undertaking to the end” (*egregie ad ultimum in audaciter commisso perseveravit*).

The account of his descent from the mountains recalls the difficulties faced by Hannibal in the Alps. Both experiences are described as being somehow beyond words: when the Carthaginians first see the Alps Livy describes the sights as *visu quam dictu foediora*, while here Livy refers to the trouble of passing through the mountains as *inenarrabilis labor descendentibus.*

In Book 21 the Alps are consistently seen as an enemy, and Hannibal makes this explicit when he calls himself *victorem eundem non Alpinarum gentium sed ipsarum, quod multo maius est, Alpium*. Towards the end of Philippus’ journey, the hemmed-in valley he finds himself in at the bottom of the slope is called *infestus is locus*, and the absence of the Macedonian enemy is made up for by the landscape itself (*cum ab nulla parte hostis teruisset, locorum asperitas hostiliter vexavit*). The similarities are most explicit when it comes to the contribution of the animals to the difficulties. As in Hannibal’s case, it is predominantly the animals who translate the natural confusion of the “pathless places” (*invia*) into full-blown panic for the men. For Hannibal, in one of the early engagements with the Alpine Gauls, it was the

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22 21.32.7; 44.5.1.
23 Hannibal as victor over the Alps: 21.43.15; Philippus’ hostile valley: 44.44.9-10.
horses who caused trouble, here it is the elephants, but in both cases the uproar is described as equivalent to an enemy attack.24

hostilem prope tumultum agmini elephanti praebebant, qui, ubi ad invia venerant, deiectis rectoribus cum horrendo stridore pavorem ingentem, equis maxime, incutiebant, donec traducendi eos ratio inita est.25

At this point, the Romans are forced to come up with an ingenious strategy to get the elephants down the slope; they make a large-scale series of wooden steps down the slope and the elephants slide from one to the next until they reach the valley floor.26 Again Hannibal comes to mind, supposedly engineering a path for his baggage-animals down a similarly difficult slope by blowing up the rocks with vinegar.27

The similarities with Hannibal’s journey end as the Romans approach the plains near to the sea and Perseus’ camp at Dium. Although the last day of the mountain crossing takes them through territory just as difficult, they have gained experience and confidence and find it easier (adsuetudine peritius et meliore cum spe).28 But where Hannibal’s army emerged, wasted by the mountain crossing, to a more or less confident Roman army under Scipio, the arrival of Philippus’ force prompts sheer panic on the part of Perseus. If allusion to Hannibal in the Alps served to elevate the Roman army and their struggles in Macedonia to a grander scale, the contrast with Perseus’ terrified reaction, as he leaps from his bath, declaring himself already

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24 21.33: equi maxime infestum agmen faciebant, qui et clamoribus dissonis, quos nemora etiam repercussaeque valles augebant, territii trepidabant et icti forte aut vulnerati adeo consternabantur ut stragem ingentem simul hominum ac sarcinarum omnis generis facerent.
25 44.5.2.
26 44.5.3-7.
27 21.37.2.
28 44.5.12.
beaten, and runs off with the gold statues, makes a mockery of the Macedonian king. This encounter (or lack thereof) with Perseus even suggests a contrast between the struggles the Romans have faced with the landscape, and the bathetic failure of Perseus’ opposition to them.

Perseus’ failure as a commander is all the more apparent from his total loss of control over the terrain of his own country. It emerges that Philippus has actually got himself into a very difficult situation; he is now trapped in the narrow coastal plain near Dium, with his only routes out (either past Dium into Macedonia, or back to Thessaly via the pass at Tempe) both of them hitherto blocked by Macedonian troops. But Perseus’ rashness leads him to remove all his garrisons and take them back to Pydna (caecata mens subito terreore, nudatis omnibus praesidiis patefactisque bello cunctis aditibus Pydnam refugit). Livy spends considerably more time than he usually does in a straightforward description of the landscape, in an effort to explain how difficult it would have been for Philippus to get away by either of these routes if Perseus had kept his defences there. He describes the pass at Tempe in particular detail, and diverges significantly from the stereotypical image of the place as a locus amoenus.

Sunt enim Tempe saltus, etiamsi non bello fiat infestus, transitu difficilis. Nam praeter angustias per quinque milia, qua exiguum iumento onusto iter est, rupes utrimque ita abscisae

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29 44.6.1-4: lavanti regi dicitur nuntiatum hostis adesse. quo nuntio cum pavidus exiliuisset e solio, victum se sine proelio clamitans proripuit; et subinde per alia atque alia pavida consilia et imperia trepidans duos ex amicis, Pellam alterum, ut, quae ad Phacum pecunia deposta erat, in mare proicieret, Thessalonicum alterum, ut navalia incenderet, misit; Asclepiodotum et Hippiam, quique cum iis erant, ex praesidiis revocat omnisque aditus aperit bello. ipse ab Dio auratus statuis omnibus raptis, ne praeda hosti essent, incolas eius loci demigrare Pydni cogit.

30 44.6.17.


Again, a contrast is set up between the genuinely terrifying and hostile landscape, which brings on physical weakness in those who have to pass through it, and the inadequacy of Perseus as an enemy. He also removes his garrisons from the other route, the narrow strip of land between the foothills of Mount Olympus and the sea, an exit which Livy describes as being ‘of the utmost difficulty’ (ingentis difficultatis). He is unable to exploit the terrain of his own country to his own ends, blinded as to the possibilities - even when, as Livy makes clear, it would be perfect as a defence against the Romans - but he removes his garrisons and flees instead. This panicked retreat allows the Romans to make their way north to Dium and eventually Thessalonica.

This degradation of Perseus does not detract from the image of Philippus as a good commander, since Livy has praised him for pulling off the bold move of crossing the mountains, but it does reinforce the idea, which has built up over the fourth decade, that the Macedonians are no match for the Romans. What comes next is Paullus’ smooth, almost effortless comprehension of the landscape. When this is set next to Perseus’ inaptitude, the reader gets the impression that Roman hegemony in Macedonia is a kind of natural progression, that it is explained or even justified by the Romans’ ability to control the natural world.

Paullus in Greece: symbolic appropriation of the landscape.

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32 44.6.7-9.
33 44.6.14.
The account of Philippus’ campaigns in Macedonia is characterized by a kind of stolid confidence; it provides an appropriate lead-in for the arrival of Paullus, Philippus’ successor in the Third Macedonian War, who is in many ways a model general in Livy’s history. Modern scholarship on Paullus has always been divided between subscription to the basically favourable picture painted by Polybius, Livy and Plutarch, and scepticism about this picture, particularly in the light of the sack of Epirus conducted by Paullus in 167. Was he a benevolent philhellene, as the primary sources make out, or was he a ruthless agent of Roman Machtpolitik, as the events of the war narrative might suggest? Here, of course, I will focus on Livy’s account, and I want to explore the ways in which Paullus’ dealings with landscape and with the legendary places of Greece inform our ideas about him as a conqueror and about the Roman conquest of Macedonia and Greece in general. Ultimately I will argue that this polarized debate about Paullus, and the question of how to see him, is irrelevant to Livy’s portrayal; both can be true, and Paullus’ relationship with the landscape and with sacred places is a good way of demonstrating this.

This discussion can be divided into two parts, the first of which will deal with the narrative surrounding the battle of Pydna, and the second with the sightseeing trip around Greece that Paullus decides to take a little later on, in Book 45. Paullus’ ability to control his environment is an important aspect of his characterization as a great general, and the ease of his physical control of the Macedonian landscape reinforces this. However, once we come to his dealings with the religious and historical sites of Greece itself, the picture of the exemplary commander is complicated. Livy’s depiction of what on the surface looks like sympathetic philhellenism on Paullus’ part raises questions about what philhellenism means in the context of

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conquest, as all of the manifestations of Paullus’ interest in Greece can be seen as forms of appropriation.35

In Livy’s account of the build-up to the battle of Pydna, Paullus seems to become increasingly familiar with the landscape and naturally in command of it. In the mould of other masterful commanders in Livy’s narrative, he is not only conscientious and skilled in dealing with the terrain, but there are strong suggestions that he has an almost supernatural connection with it. These ideas are first expressed in the speech Paullus gives to a contio after his appointment to the command in Macedonia. The last third of his speech lays out some of the principles of good general-ship, stressing the importance of finding out about the enemy and the terrain. His emphasis on skill and experience sets him up as a model general and the ideal counterpoint to the rashness and ineptitude of the Macedonians. Earlier in his speech, Paullus’ ability is expressed in slightly different terms. He acknowledges that the Roman people think him capable of bringing the war to an end, and expresses the hope that the gods will be on his side. Haec partim ominari, partim sperare possum, he says of these possibilities, and we know he will turn out to be right; his prophecies will come true, the gods will favour him and he will end the war. In his ability to interpret and predict correctly he reflects the virtues of the successful commanders who have come before him. This is also the first of several strong prophecies and interpretations that will form a theme in his conquest of Perseus.

Having arrived in Macedonia, after a gap in the narrative where he would have arrived at the Roman camp, Paullus leads the soldiers on an expedition to fetch water. His impressive instincts concerning the terrain are demonstrated when he decides that digging some wells on the

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35 Paullus’ interest in Greece, since he comes as a powerful Roman magistrate and the conqueror of Macedonia, is difficult to interpret as innocent, and this idea, that a conqueror’s interest or “wonder” at a foreign civilization can be read as an act of appropriation, is most influentially expressed in Stephen Greenblatt’s Marvelous Possessions, (Chicago, 1991). Obviously the difference in power, and the strangeness of the two peoples to one another was much greater in the interactions Greenblatt discusses, but the basic idea remains the same.
beach at the foot of the mountains will allow him to tap into some occultos latices. In fact the process is much easier than he expects, as water gushes out when they have barely begun to dig:

_uix diducta summa harena erat, cum scaturrig<in>es turbidae primo et tenues emicare, dein liquidam multamque fundere aquam velut deum dono coeperunt._ 36

The description of this phenomenon as velut deum dono is striking, given how rarely Livy suggests a direct ascription of any event to the gods. 37 It hints at the idea of Paullus and his army being favoured by the gods of this landscape, in a way that foreshadows Paullus’ appropriation of Greek sacred landscapes during his sightseeing tour. We are told that this success with the water added to the _fama_ and _auctoritas_ of Paullus among the soldiers, and the narrative continues with his various improvements to the discipline and functioning of the army. This includes another short speech on being a good general, and being a good soldier, which we are told had an immediate positive effect. By the time Livy returns to Perseus, Paullus is firmly established as authoritative and in control.

Later on, immediately before the battle of Pydna, another encounter with the natural world, this time a lunar eclipse, illustrates the confidence and competence of the Roman army under Paullus’ command, and also provides a contrast with the Macedonians. 38 A military tribune, Gaius Sulpicius Gallus, predicts the eclipse to the soldiers and tells them not to regard it as a bad omen. He explains that eclipses are as predictable as the risings and settings of the sun and moon. The soldiers duly see the eclipse and are impressed by Gallus’ wisdom, it seems to them _prope divina._ Again Livy suggests a supernatural element to the Romans’ ability to deal

36 Liv. 44.33.3.
37 Levene, Religion in Livy, 26-30.
38 Liv. 44.37.7-9.
with their environment and to interpret correctly.\textsuperscript{39} Despite Gallus’ emphasis on science and his urgings not to take the eclipse as a \textit{prodigium}, the description of his wisdom as \textit{prope divina} casts him in the mould of a soothsayer.\textsuperscript{40} The Macedonians react very differently, taking the eclipse precisely as a \textit{triste prodigium}, a sign of the “fall of the kingdom and the ruin of their race”. Their emotional reaction (\textit{clamor ululatusque in castris Macedonum fuit, donec luna in suam lucem emersit}) is a sharp contrast with the calm confidence of Gallus. The real soothsayers in their camp do not dissuade them from this reaction (\textit{movit nec aliter vates}), and they happen to be right, but the Macedonian acceptance of the natural phenomenon as an omen signals their lack of knowledge of nature, despite their being on home ground, and this confusion in the face of their own landscape is emphasized again after the battle is over.

All of this suggests that the Romans are being portrayed as more at home in Macedonian territory than the Macedonians themselves are. This is reinforced in a further contrast between Romans and Macedonians. Paullus, in his speech to Nasica before the battle, in which he justifies his decision not to fight immediately, stresses the need for a fortified camp in enemy territory, in a speech which has the general theme of control and restraint. The camp, he says, is a \textit{patria altera militaris}. The rampart stands in for the walls and each tent represents the soldier’s \textit{domus}

\textsuperscript{39} Polybius 9.14.1-4 argues, using the example of Nicias at Syracuse, that commanders in the field need to understand that such events as eclipses are not ominous; they need to grasp seemingly supernatural phenomena for what they really were and take advantage of them. But it was certainly not unusual for the soldiers to consider this kind of knowledge as potentially supernatural in itself: See Feldherr, \textit{Spectacle and Society}, 64–78, for Livy’s use of the divine to undercut Polybian rational historiography.

\textsuperscript{40} For a discussion of Livy’s accuracy in reporting this eclipse and Gallus’ role in it, see Alan Bowen, “The Art of the Commander and the Emergence of Predictive Astronomy,” in \textit{Science and Mathematics in Ancient Greek Culture}, edited by C. J. Tuplin, T. E. Rihll, and Lewis Wolpert (Oxford, 2002). Gallus only appears in the Latin accounts of this episode (here and at Cicero, \textit{De Re Publica} 1.23-4; Pliny \textit{Historia naturalis} 2.53-55). Polybius’ account is only recorded in a fragment (39.16), while Plutarch’s account of this episode (\textit{Life of Aemilius} 17.7-12) ignores Gallus and instead casts Paullus as the main figure. He admits that Paullus knew something about eclipses and what really happened during one, but goes onto say that he was devout and most interested in sacrifices and divination. Paullus deals with the eclipse with an extravagant sacrifice to the sun and a practically interminable series of sacrifices to Hercules which he continues until he gets favourable omens. Where did this Paullus come from?
This is a particularly strong example of Roman appropriation, and it illustrates an important point, the constructive nature of that appropriation. We have seen in Chapter 4 how the Macedonians frequently in Livy’s narrative are seen destroying land, even the land of their allies, and this is something that characters in the history have called attention to. When they are not misinterpreting and failing in their attempts to use the landscape, they are often destroying it. By contrast Roman control is mostly expressed through understanding the landscape and through constructive acts, such as the finding of water above. The way Paullus talks about the camp makes it clear that through the act of setting up camp, the Romans are actually making part of the landscape Roman, making it their own, and this is expressed in terms of peculiarly Roman ideas like patria and the marking of home by the presence of the penates.

While the Romans are busy making Macedonia their own, the aftermath of the battle at Pydna represents the most striking instance of the Macedonian loss of control of their native land. The battle is full of the vocabulary of confusion, with Perseus’ troops consistently described as scattered and thrown into uproar by the Romans. At the end of the battle, while the king and the cavalry managed to escape unharmed, the Roman soldiers were busy cutting down the Macedonian phalanx. Some Macedonians escaped to the shore, where they advanced into the sea in the hope of being picked up and made prisoner rather than killed, but they were cut down anyway. Their helplessness in the water is signalled when they raise their hands and supplicate

41 Liv. 44.39.5
42 E.g. 44.41.6-8: in medio secunda legio inmissa dissipauit phalangem. neque ulla evidentior causa victoriae fuit, quam quod multa passim proelia erant, quae fluctuantium turbarunt primo, deinde disiecerunt phalangem, cuus confertae et intentis horrentis hastis intolerabiles uires sunt; si carptim adgrediendo circumagere immobilem longitudine et grauitate hastam cogas, confusa strue inplicantur; si uero aut ab latere aut ab iergo aliquid tumultus increpuit, ruinae modo turbantur, sicut tum adversus ceteruatim incurrentes Romanos et interrupta multifarim acie obuiam ire cogebantur.
43 In doing so they join the grand tradition of Livian armies wading into water and realizing it wasn’t a good idea: e.g. the Romans after the battles at the Trebia (21.56.4) and Trasimene (22.7.7), the Carthaginians in the Druentia (21.31.9-12) and the Arno marshes (22.2), the Romans again tricked by the Istrians at 41.2.4. Contrast the control demonstrated by Scipio over the lagoon at New Carthage (26.42-44), and the Romans and Istrians at 41.11.3-4.
the Romans coming towards them (suppliciter vitam orabant). Even the Macedonian elephants end up in the sea, crushing the men who are trying to get out of the water.\footnote{ibid. 44.42.4-6.} We have seen in earlier chapters Livy’s pervasive association of water with confusion and loss of stability, and this scene especially recalls the Roman soldiers wading into Lake Trasimene at the end of a battle in which they too, were characterized by confusion and helplessness. Now, as they approach the apex of their power in Greece, the roles are reversed. The loss of control over their own landscape that was such a horrifying feature of the early battles with Hannibal is now inflicted on another people.

As the battle ends, the focus switches to Perseus, who in many ways exemplifies his army’s helplessness. Escaping with his cavalry, he attempts to make his way back to Pella, but manages to get lost in the forests on the way:

\begin{quote}
Rex ad mediam ferme noctem errore et variis difficultatibus viae est vexatus.\footnote{44.43.4. Forests are also frequently places of deception and confusion in Livy. Cf 23.24.7-13, where the Roman consul-elect Postumius and his entire army are destroyed by a treacherous Gallic tree-lopping trick; 25.39.1, where Romans hide in a forest to ambush Carthaginian fugitives, and Livy disparagingly refers to it as \textit{ars Punic}. Hanging around in forests seems to be seen by the Romans as something their enemies do which is inappropriate for Romans, as Minucius makes clear at 22.14.8.}
\end{quote}

By contrast, we have been told just above this that the Romans, aware of the fact that going after the Macedonian fugitives by night might be problematic, called off their pursuit\footnote{44. 42. 9}. The Romans, then, show restraint and know when the terrain might get the better of them, while the Macedonians and even their king are shown as being in the wrong place at the wrong time, in a constant state of confusion. Their own native environment seems like a strange place to them, while Roman control of the territory, overseen by the commanding figure of Paullus, is shown to
be real and solid; they have the ability to extract what they need from the land, to understand its workings. This is symbolized by the image of the camp as an altera Roma, a physical manifestation of Rome’s imposition of itself on to the enemy landscape. The Macedonians, conversely, are shown to be confused, fearful and lost in what is technically their homeland, though the presence of the altera Roma makes that less certain.

The interactions between Paullus and the landscape so far imply a kind of inevitability to Rome’s conquest of Macedonia. If the Roman commander is so much more capable and in control of a foreign country, and Perseus is so lost, it seems almost justified that the Romans should take it over. This impression is reinforced when we look at the aftermath of Pydna, and Paullus’ experiences at Pella and at Amphipolis.\textsuperscript{47} A great deal of emphasis is placed on the impregnability of Pella, and particularly of the citadel Phacus. Paullus camps near to the city and inspects its position; Livy notes the surrounding swamps (cingunt paludes inexsuperabilis altitudinis aestate et hieme), and the isolation of Phacus, projecting from the swamp but separated from the city itself by a river, ut nec oppugnante externo aditum ab nulla parte habeat, nec, si quem ibi rex includat, ullam nisi per facillimae custodiae pontem effugium. But despite the apparent inaccessibility of the city, we see that Paullus’s men are already inside the treasury (sed tum nihil praeter trecenta talenta…inventum est), and that he himself is being met by an outpouring of embassies who have come to congratulate him. The difficulties presented by the city have no effect on Paullus whatsoever, in fact, he seems to be welcome there. The same thing happens when he reaches Amphipolis, at the very end of the extant part of Book 44.\textsuperscript{48} Although Livy mentions that Perseus, during his flight from Pella, had tried to cross the nearby Axius River as early as possible, because he thought that it would be too difficult for the Romans to

\textsuperscript{47} 44.46.4-11.
\textsuperscript{48} 44.46.10-11.
cross.\textsuperscript{49} When Paullus comes to leave Pella, however, the river goes unmentioned, and Livy simply says that he departed from Pella and arrived at Amphipolis on the fourth day. The last sentence of the extant text describes the reaction to his arrival:

\textit{effusa omnis obviam turba cuivis indicio erat non bono ac iusto rege orbavisse se Paulum.}\textsuperscript{50}

The reaction of the inhabitants of Amphipolis makes explicit what the natural world has been implying all along in Livy’s narrative, that Paullus is more suited to being in command in Macedonia than Perseus was; his lack of judgement and helplessness have caught up with him.

The theme of Perseus’ helplessness becomes more and more explicit following Pydna. In Polybius he is the ultimate example of the power of τύχη, and Livy takes up this idea. Perhaps the best image comes from the beginning of each historian’s account of Paullus’ sightseeing trip. Both mention the visit to Delphi and Paullus’ erection of his own image on top of the columns built by Perseus to accommodate his image before his defeat at Pydna. Livy tells us this without comment, but Polybius calls attention to it as an illustration of the uncertainty of τύχη:

\begin{quote}
\textquote{Ἐξ ὅν μάλιστα κατίδοι τις ἄν ἡμα τῆν ὀξύτητα καὶ τῆν ἄβεβαιότητα τῆς τύχης, ὅταν ἡ μάλιστ᾿ ἂν τις αὐτοῦ χάριν οἴηται διαπονεῖν, ταῦτα παρὰ πόδας εὐρίσκεται τοῖς}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{49} 44.43.8: \textit{properans ante lucem Axiun annem traecere, eum finem sequendi propter difficillatem transitus fore ratus Romanis.}

\textsuperscript{50} 44.46.11.
Livy and Polybius also call attention to the same kind of reversal earlier, when Paullus has finally captured Perseus and has an audience with him in the Roman camp. This time the sentiment is expressed in Paullus’ own voice. Here is Livy’s version:

‘exemplum insigne cernitis’ inquit ‘mutationis rerum humanarum. uobis hoc praecipue dico, iuuenes. ideo in secundis rebus nihil in quemquam superbe ac uiolenter consulere dect nec praesenti credere fortunae, cum, quid uesper ferat, incertum sit. is demum uir erit, cuius animum neque prosperae <res> flatu suo efferent nec aduersae infringent.’

Paullus is made to acknowledge the possibility of being brought low by some unexpected blow, but at least at this moment in Livy’s account, he himself seems very far from being subject to the whims of fortune. Here he speaks in much the same persona he has occupied since his entrance into the narrative, as a teacher. His pre-Pydna speeches focused on what it meant to be a good general and the importance of experience and conscientiousness, cementing his image as a figure of authority. His expansion into broader life lessons here lends a certain grandeur to the occasion, signalling Perseus’ defeat as an important moment in Rome’s history.

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51 Plb.30.10.1
52 Liv. 45.8.
53 At the end of Book 45 (45.40.6-42.1), as well as in Plutarch’s Paullus (36), the general does become a victim of fortune when his two sons both die at the time of his triumph; even then, however, in the very similar speeches given him by Livy and Plutarch, he is still able to reflect on fortune with the same kind of objectivity. He says in that speech that he was waiting for the inevitable reversal of his own fortunes after the success of his war against Perseus, and seems almost relieved that it has come, and has only affected him personally, rather than the city as whole.
54 In part also by looking forward to Scipio mourning the destruction of Carthage in 146, which Polybius narrates at 38.21, though this is fragmentary and we get more of the story from Appian (Punic 132) and Diodorus (32.24).
Paullus’ tour: Greece becomes Roman.

So far the discussion has focused on how Roman control of the landscape and the corresponding Macedonian loss of control have informed our ideas about the conquest of Macedonia. While Paullus is the consummate commander, in control of a foreign environment and possibly even favoured by its divinities, the Macedonians are in a state of chaos, unable to deal successfully with their native landscape. What I have been talking about is a very physical kind of appropriation on the Romans’ part; military conquest is matched by real appropriation of physical spaces. What I want to talk about next is Paullus’ approach to Greece, where military conquest was not yet necessary and where Romans still trod much more delicately. The kind of appropriation we see here still has to do with place, but we are moving into the territory of cultural, imaginative control, looking at how Livy’s Paullus makes Greek places and landscapes Roman in a symbolic sense.

The nature of Livy’s engagement with Greek peoples and with Hellenism throughout the Ab Urbe Condita is difficult to pin down. He certainly reflects much of the prejudice against indiscriminate Hellenism that we find throughout the mid-late Republic and the Augustan period, alongside the Roman disdain for the Asian Greeks. He blames Cn. Manlius Vulso and his army, whom he sees as having been corrupted by their campaign in Asia in 189, for introducing the semina luxuriae into Rome, and he strongly implies that this will develop into one of the major

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55 E.g. in the speech he gives to Cato (34.2-4), and his description of the Bacchanalian conspiracy, which he says came to Italy via a ‘Graecus ignobilis’ (38.9); for the characterization of the Asian Greeks see the speech of Glabrio at Thermopylae, condemning the armies of Antiochus III (37.17.5-6), and that of Cn. Manlius Vulso, addressing his troops before the 189 campaign against the Galatians (38.17).
moral failings of the Republic.\textsuperscript{56} He also implies a condemnation of the Roman enthusiasm for Greek art (in a passing comment on Marcellus’ plunder of Syracuse) with a remark that it leads to the despoliation of *sacra profanaque omnia*.\textsuperscript{57} This gives us at least a vague idea of how we might think about Roman interactions with the Greeks of the mainland in the fifth decade. The primacy of Rome and the rejection of free indulgence in foreign culture are important components of Livy’s history, and we need to bear this in mind as we look at Book 45.

Paullus himself has been the subject of much discussion in scholarship on Roman history, and the later parts of Book 45, in which he takes a sightseeing tour of Greece and manages the post-war settlement, have come in for a good deal of that attention.\textsuperscript{58} Usually the questions that are being asked about these passages have to do with Paullus’ attitude towards the Greeks, or with the attitudes of Republican Romans more generally. Some of these discussions have focused on the historical figures of Paullus and other Roman leaders, for example, Jean-Louis Ferrary in his influential study of philhellenism, and some have focused on the literary sources’ portrayal of them.\textsuperscript{59} The figure of Paullus, whether historical or literary, seems to defy interpretation for many scholars, and it does not help that scholarship on philhellenism is also complicated and the concept itself remains difficult to define. Before embarking on a discussion of Livy’s Paullus at the end of Book 45, I would like to sum up some of the more important and interesting views of him as a historical figure and as a character of Livy’s, in order to make it clearer what I want to do with this passage and how it fits in with what has been written before.

\textsuperscript{56} 39.6.7
\textsuperscript{57} 25.40.2: ceterum inde primum initium mirandi Graecarum artium opera licentiaeque hinc sacra profanaque omnia volgo spoliandi factum est, quae postremo in Romanos deos, templum id ipsum primum quod a Marcello eximie ornatum est, uertit.
\textsuperscript{58} 45.27-28.
For Erich Gruen, who has done much of the foundational work about the relationship between Roman attitudes to Greece and Roman policy in Greece, philhellenism is primarily a cultural phenomenon, and there is a real divide between how Romans thought about Greeks and Greek culture in private, and how they acted in public:

“The divorce between cultural leanings and matters of state was sharp. The very idea of philhellenism as national policy would be unintelligible to a Roman… Nor is there any discernible connection between Roman zeal for learning Greek and the subordination of the East to the western power.”

When Paullus goes on his sightseeing tour of Greece, it is a sign of his cultivation and interest in things Greek, but it seems that the ‘public’ side of his mentality comes into play, for example, when he orders his own image to be placed on top of Perseus’ pillar-dedication at Delphi. Essentially, his philhellenism is irrelevant to his actions as a Roman magistrate; they are two distinctly separate ways of thinking. The problem with this, of course, is that Paullus is actually a Roman magistrate and acting in that capacity when he goes on his tour of Greece and does other things that demonstrate his philhellenism, and this is the problem that I wish to address in Livy’s narrative, by means of examining Paullus’ relationship with these culturally

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60 Gruen, Hellenistic World, 271.
61 The assumption here is that Paullus’ tour is something he does aside from his official duties as a proconsul, although this assumption is not universal. Egon Flaig, in his article “Lucius Aemilius Paullus – militärischer Ruhm und familiäre Glücklosigkeit,” in Von Romulus zu Augustus. Große Gestalten der römischen Republik, eds. Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp and Elke Stein-Hölkeskamp, (Beck, München 2000): 138 calls it an “Inspektionsreise”, and argues that its purpose was to calm down the political life of the Greek cities by placating them with polite gestures. We do get this impression from Plutarch’s account (Aemilius Paullus 28.1), in which it is mentioned that he restored popular governments and gave gifts to the various cities.
62 See Gruen, Hellenistic World, 268, and at 269: “Compartmentalization was complete. The most cultivated Romans, however well-versed in Hellenic literature, philosophy, and art, insulated those interests from performance as servants of the Republic. They might evince appreciation for the cultural traditions of the Hellenes – but that appreciation did not dictate their treatment of the Hellenes themselves.”
loaded places. In his later work, Gruen begins to address this, using Paullus as an example of how an interest in Hellenic tradition and practices could be used as a way of expressing domination over the Greeks. For instance, the games Paullus throws at Amphipolis are a symbolic way of expressing the sentiment “anything you can do, I can do better”.63 This comes closer to dealing with the problem, but which other models of philhellenism might also be useful?

For Ferrary, philhellenism is not merely an interest in Greek culture, but a more complicated, more active process, in which Romans actually learned how to make themselves and their power more acceptable to Greek people. By becoming interested and sympathetic to Greek culture and traditions, they were able to make symbolic gestures of generosity and understanding that went a long way towards integrating them into the Greek world. Paullus’ sightseeing tour and, more importantly, the games he subsequently put on at Amphipolis, are examples of these important gestures. Ferrary makes quite clear that when Paullus goes on his sightseeing tour, although he may have changed the language of his actions (both literally, as Ferrary presumes he would have spoken Greek to those he met, and figuratively, as he is not longer carrying out official business), he is still very much a Roman magistrate and his behaviour should be interpreted as such. What he is doing when he goes on this tour, and when he throws Greek-style games at Amphipolis, is advertising to the Greek cities how cultivated a Roman can be; he is showing them that a representative of Rome can fit into their world. Further, he is specifically behaving as a Hellenistic king might behave on the occasion of a victory.64

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Ferrary is talking about the historical Paullus, and uses all three major sources (Polybius, Livy and Plutarch) to reach his conclusions, but nevertheless, the framework of his discussion is helpful for my own argument about Livy. He gives us a way in which philhellenism as a cultural phenomenon can co-exist with the facts of Roman magistrates’ behaviour in Greece. Any philhellenic tendencies of Paullus’ which allowed him to throw such unambiguously Greek games at Amphipolis, or to hire a Greek tutor for his sons, or to take a tour of Greece in his leisure time, are absolutely compatible with the brutal acts of war which Paullus carried out, most notably the sack of the cities of Epirus; there is no need to try and identify two separate frames of mind to allow for that, as Gruen does.\footnote{ibid. 547-553.} Philhellenism is a means of making his presence and actions as a Roman magistrate acceptable to the Greek world.

The same attempt to reconcile ruthless Roman policy with a positive, philhellenic Paullus is behind a more recent study of Livy’s portrayal of the aftermath of the Third Macedonian War. Ulrich Eigler, in his 2003 article on Paullus, asks the question: how do we deal with the fact that the sources (Polybius, Plutarch and especially Livy) characterize Roman policy at this time quite negatively, but characterize Paullus, the agent of this policy, very positively? Should we distrust the sources and see Paullus as a negative figure, or should we continue to see him as an exemplary figure despite this problem?\footnote{Ulrich Eigler, “Aemilius Paullus: ein Feldherr auf Bildungsreise,” in \textit{Formen römischer Geschichtsschreibung von den Anfängen bis Livius}, eds. Ulrich Eigler, Ulrich Gotter, Nino Luraghi and Uwe Walter, (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2003): 252.} Eigler uses the ‘Bildungsaspekt’, the educational, cultural framework of the sightseeing tour in Book 45 to try and answer this question, ultimately coming to a conclusion similar to my own: the way Livy portrays the details of the tour gives the impression that his philhellenism really has a lot to do with domination. His interest in the tourist sites of Greece is focalized through Rome; the tour isn’t really about Greece in some ways, since
Paullus’ perceptions of what he sees often remind us of Rome and Roman history. Broadly, the way Eigler interprets Livy is quite similar to the way Ferrary interprets Paullus himself. Both see him functioning as a Roman magistrate, even while he is on this trip, and both manage to see philhellenism and the more callous examples of Roman policy as two sides of the same coin.

What I would like to do in my discussion of this passage is develop Eigler’s idea, as I have sketched it, with a more detailed look at the tour. The passage dealing with this sightseeing trip gives a very subtle picture of philhellenism as a form of appropriation. It builds on the image of Paullus we have seen in his interactions with the Macedonian landscape, but with a more complicated portrayal of the conqueror’s relationship with place. Before I get into Livy’s account, however, it will be helpful to compare Livy’s narrative of Paullus’ trip to Greece with that of Polybius, who seems to have quite different concerns at this stage in his account. Polybius is so often cited as Livy’s source for the fourth and fifth decades that it is illuminating to see how much Livy does with this part of the narrative that is apparently independent of him.

Polybius’ narrative at 30.10 is fragmentary and therefore poses some obvious problems if we are hoping to analyse its aims and compare it with what we find in Livy. The fragments come from various different headings of the Suda and so we cannot be sure even that what is quoted there is the entirety of what Polybius had to say on Paullus’ visit to each city mentioned there. We also cannot know how long his account of Paullus’ tour was, how much detail he used or how much authorial comment he inserted. What we can see from the fragments, however, accords with what we know about Polybius’ interests when it comes to good commanders. His Paullus spends his tour looking at things – concrete, physical objects that, for the most part,

relate to the real world around him. Starting in Corinth, he admires the θέσιν καὶ εὐκαρίαν of the city and its acropolis. Here we can see the competent general, looking at a city and assessing its position, with the implication, perhaps, that he is considering how one would go about attacking it. Polybius and his readers, of course, know that Corinth will eventually be attacked and destroyed by another Roman commander only 22 years later. Again at Sicyon Paullus is made to notice την ὀχυρότητα, the strong fortifications, and at Argos it is τὸ βάρος τῆς τῶν Ἀργείων πόλεως that is picked out. Although this is not much to go on, a picture is starting to emerge of Paullus, the victorious general, seeing the great cities of Greece and admiring their strength and strategic value. This is, of course, the kind of picture we would expect Polybius to create; his interest in military and tactical matters is unavoidable, and the Greece of his imagination is still strong, still a force to be reckoned with.

In the final fragment, where Paullus visits Olympia, there is of course no sign of military interest. Instead Paullus gives his attention to Pheidias’ statue of Zeus:

τὸ ἄγαλμα θεσάμενος ἐξεπλάγη καὶ τοσοῦτον εἶπεν ὅτι μόνος αὐτῶ δοκεῖ Φειδίας τὸν παρ᾽ Ὀμήρῳ Δία μεμιμήσθαι, διότι μεγάλην ἔχων προσδοκίαν τῆς Ὀλυμπίας μείζω τῆς προσδοκίας εὐρηκώς εἶ ἡ τὴν ἀλήθειαν.68

The statue of Zeus is special because of Pheidias’ craftsmanship: it truly represents the Zeus that Paullus has read about in Homer. Polybius Paullus’ is still concerned with reality, with the skill of this famous artist. He respects Greek culture as represented by Pheidias and also by Homer, while his own Roman-ness takes a back seat to his admiration of Greek accomplishment. As we shall see, Livy offers quite a different perspective on this scene, where the general’s

68 Plb. 30.10.5
Roman-ness is very much in the forefront of the picture, and Rome is Paullus’ central point of reference.

By way of introduction to Livy’s interpretation of the tour, it will also be helpful to look at the context of it, at the actions taken by Paullus which precede and follow it. The tour is sandwiched between two passages describing acts of ruthless brutality on the part of the Romans, the first of which is instigated by Paullus himself. Immediately before setting out on his tour, he sends his son Maximus to sack two cities, Aeginium and Agassae, and he sends Postumius to sack another city, Aenia, for various acts of resistance. Upon his return, he hears of atrocities perpetrated in Aetolia which were facilitated by the Roman garrison there; hundreds of the leading men of Aetolia who had supported Perseus had been put to death by the pro-Roman leaders Lyciscus and Tisippus, with the help of the Roman soldiers. Paullus later acquits the killers, only condemning the commander of the garrison for his actions.69

Beyond what immediately precedes and succeeds the tour, Paullus’ later actions keep drawing our attention to the same, complicated relationship between knowledge and landscape. What follows the tour is Paullus’ announcement to the assembled Macedonians of the terms of his settlement. The king’s territory was to be split up into four separate regions, with little movement allowed between them.70 This announcement is accompanied by two striking images. The first, as the consul and the ten Roman commissioners take their seats before the Macedonian assembly, presents Paullus and his retinue as a more terrifying display than the kings:

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69 45.27.1-4 for Paullus ordering the sacks of these cities; 45.28.6-8 for the Aetolians; Paullus acquits them at 45.31.1-3.
70 45.29-30.
This casts a new light on the tour that has just taken place among people who were in fact allies, rather than conquered enemies. Even they, Livy implies, might have had reason to be frightened of the Romans. The second image is of the carved up Macedonian kingdom, which Livy presents, from the perspective of the Macedonians, as a mutilated animal, its limbs torn apart from one another (*tamquam animali in artus alterum alterius indigentis distracto*). From the knowledgeable Roman perspective, which Livy compares with the ignorance of the Macedonians about their own country, Macedonia was entirely suitable for being split up in this manner. Knowledge about the nature of the terrain is associated very strongly here with a rather brutal and active control over it, and this sheds a somewhat negative light on the interest in, and knowledge of Greek sites that Paullus displays on his tour. Finally, Livy records the sack of Epirus, a notoriously ruthless undertaking, but one which Paullus carries out without any apparent qualms.

These reminders of the stark reality of Roman power, in Macedonia but also in Greece, obviously call into question the image of Paullus as an uncomplicated philhellene. The details of the tour, as we shall see, continue to problematise this impression, but rather than precluding our

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71 45.29.2. 
72 45.30.2. 
73 Ferrary, *Philhellenisme*, 548-550 points out the contrast between Livy and Plutarch’s accounts. Plutarch notes how horrible the sack of Epirus was, and even tells us that it was contrary to the ‘mild and generous nature’ of Paullus (Plut. *Aem.* 29.4-30.1), while Livy has Paullus writing a letter to the nearby Roman general Anicius, telling him not to bother about what was going on, since the senate had granted the plunder of Epirus to his army: *Haud procul inde Anici castra aberant. ad quem litteris missis, ne quid ad ea, quae fierent, moveretur; senatum praedam Epiri ciuitatum, quae ad Persea defecissent, exercitu dedisse suo* (Liv. 45.34.1).
reading Paullus as a philhellene, I suggest that they raise questions about the nature of philhellenism as a whole, since Paullus’ cultural interest in the sites he sees seems to be represented as a series of acts of appropriation.

One of the most striking ways in which this tour represents the Roman appropriation of the Greek landscape is through the takeover of sacred places, and particularly through sacrifice. At the very beginning of the tour, Livy tells us that Paullus sacrifices at Delphi, to Apollo, and then again at Lebadia, where he visits the precinct of Jupiter Trophonius and Hercynna.\footnote{45.27.7-8.} Again when he reaches Athens, he sacrifices to Minerva, called by Livy praesidi arcis, translating her title Πολιοῦχος.\footnote{45.28.1.} Finally he sacrifices to Jupiter at Olympia\footnote{45.28.5.}. Sacrifice for the Romans was a way of propitiating the gods, of obtaining their favour, and Livy’s repeated mentions of Paullus’ sacrifices suggests that this is an important aspect of the tour. The Roman general is trying to assure divine favour. Some of the primary occasions for Roman generals sacrificing would be at the beginnings of wars, prior to battles and before crossing frontiers.\footnote{See C. R. Whittaker, \textit{Rome and its Frontiers}, (London, 2004), 128.} Prayers both for the protection of the Roman people and for the extension of Roman greatness might be included.\footnote{See C. R. Whittaker, \textit{Frontiers of the Roman Empire: A social and economic study}, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 21.} When a Roman commander sacrifices in a foreign place, surely he is recalling the sacrifices performed as rituals of conquest? The idea of sacrifice as a form of appropriation is also conveyed by the way in which Livy describes the Greek gods encountered by Paullus. When we come to the final stop on the tour, Olympia, Pheidias’ lifelike statue of Zeus is once again the focus. Paullus is said to be \textit{motus animo}, confronted with \textit{Iovem velut}...
praesentem. But instead of talking about the craftsmanship and the ability of Pheidias, as Polybius did, Paullus immediately orders a sacrifice to be prepared, and here Livy makes the following comment.

... quam si in Capitolio immolaturus esset, sacrificium amplius solito apparari iussit.79

The temple of Zeus at Olympia here seems to be transfigured into the temple of Jupiter on the Capitol. Mary Jaeger points out how this, along with the contrast with the privilege of Greek culture in Polybius’ account, makes the Greek world seem like an extension of Rome itself:

“…the pantheon conceived by the Greek poet has given way to the one that occupies the site of Rome. Paullus’ other actions after Pydna convey clearly a sense of Roman ascendency, and Livy’s description of his trip asserts that Rome is now the cultural center of the world.”80

The consistent use of Roman names for major deities in Livy’s account, though not remarkable in itself, underlines this point. The reference to Minerva, as praesidium arcis, even as it translates the goddess’ Athenian epithet, also recalls the position of Minerva on the Capitol, Rome’s own arx. By subsuming the Greek gods into Roman roles, by making them, essentially, into Roman gods in local guises, Paullus is taking over the Greek sacred landscape on they symbolic level.81 Despite the fact that he is on a sightseeing tour in a foreign country, it seems

79 45.28.5.
80 Jaeger, Livy’s Written Rome, 3.
81 This may even be a subtle hint at the ritual of evocatio, which could be used to aid conquest and promote military success – c.f. Alain Blomart, “Die evocatio und der Transfer fremder Götter von der Peripherie nach Rom,” in
that there is nothing really novel or unfamiliar about what he sees and does, no suggestion that he is anything but at home and in control in the religious places he visits, to the point where they actually seem to become Roman. On top of this, the allusion to sacrifice on the Capitol, performed by a general soon after a major victory, recalls the culmination of the Roman triumph.\textsuperscript{82} Paullus’ triumph was one of the more memorable of the Roman Republic; it became notorious for the sheer volume of treasure plundered from Macedonia.\textsuperscript{83} The implication that Paullus is in the guise of a triumphator only strengthens the idea that Livy is portraying his interest in Greek places as a manifestation of his power.

This theme is continued in different ways in the rest of Livy’s account of the tour. One prominent feature of Livy’s account of the tour is the frequency of references to the mythology and cults of the places visited. Aulis, in particular, is referred to in these terms, as \textit{portum inclutum statione quondam mille navium Agamemnoniae classis}, with the temple of Diana, explained as \textit{ubi navibus cursum ad Troiam filia victima aris admota rex ille regum petiiit}. Livy’s language becomes poetic as he gets into the spirit of the Trojan wars; Agamemnon is referred to as \textit{rex ille regum}. Next, in Oropus, the scene changes from epic to something resembling pastoral, as he describes the sanctuary of Amphiaraus, and its \textit{templumque vetustum est fontibus rivisque circa amoenum}. Athens is described as \textit{plenas… vetustae famae}, full of the statues of gods and men, while Sparta by contrast is \textit{non operum magnificentia sed disciplina institutisque}.
memorabilem. All these places are described not as they actually are, nor in any particular detail, but as how they should be remembered. David Levene’s article on Livy 45 makes this into a comment on Livy’s own historiographical method: the importance of the places does not come from seeing them – except for Olympia, there is no sense of Paullus’ reaction to actually seeing these places – but from what we hear about them, what we learn about their past. Thus Livy’s “recorded history” is privileged over autopsy.\footnote{Levene, “Metahistory”, 84} This, too, is a form of appropriation. By reducing these places to the features that educated Romans would have read about, Livy suggests that that is all they need to know. Merely reading about these places is enough to know them. Further, these are places that are chiefly remarkable for things that happened in the past, their relevance to the present is downplayed. These are places that are easy to keep under control, since memory is essentially all there is to them.

We can see how marked this tendency is with a comparison to other literary sources which make ‘tours’ of Greece. We have already seen how Livy has modified Polybius’ emphasis on military concerns and how, at least in the scene at Olympia, has changed the focus from the cultural accomplishments of the Greeks to the centrality of Rome. Other, fuller examples of periegetic literature illustrate how narrowly Livy characterized Greek culture in his account of the tour. The long fragments of a work attributed to Herakleides Kritikos (On the Cities of Greece) in the 3rd century BC make clear just how much other information might have gone into even a brief description of the places visited by Paullus.\footnote{Jeremy McInerney, “Herakleides Kritikos (369A).” Brill’s New Jacoby. Editor in Chief: Ian Worthington (University of Missouri). Brill Online, 2012. Reference. Princeton University Library. 30 June 2012 <http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/brill-s-new-jacoby/herakleides-kritikos-369a-a369a>}

From the first fragment (369A F1), here is Herakleides on Athens:

84 Levene, “Metahistory”, 84
1. “From here [one proceeds] to the city of Athens. It is a fine road, passing through land all under cultivation, quite pleasant to behold. The city, however, is entirely dry. It suffers from a poor water-supply, and, because of its antiquity, the lay-out of the streets is chaotic. Most of the houses are shabby, few are better quality. At first sight, a foreigner would find it hard to believe that this was the famous city of Athens. At second glance, however, he would believe it. It is truly the loveliest place in the inhabited world. It possesses a noteworthy theatre, large and astonishing, as well as an expensive temple of Athena, which is conspicuous and worth seeing, the so-called Parthenon, perched above the theatre. It makes quite an impression on those who see it. Also impressive is the Olympieion. It is only half-finished but the plan of the building is clear. It would be the finest building of its type, were it ever finished. There are three gymnasia: the Academy, the Lykeion and Kynosarges. All three are well wooded, and have grassy grounds. Festivals of every kind, ... an endless succession of spectacles, rest and recreation for the spirit thanks to every kind of philosophical school, a thousand diversions, an endless succession of spectacles."

Clearly, Livy is not a periegetic writer; he is not writing an account of Athens for the sake of it, and he has no need of all this detail. It is likely that the brevity of his comments on the various stops on Paullus’ tour is a cue taken from Polybius’ narrative. Nonetheless, when we look at the kinds of things Herakleides writes about Athens, it becomes clear how much there was to notice at first sight, and conversely, what a narrow focus on the past Livy attributes to Paullus. The difference between a 3rd century BC perception of Athens and a 1st century AD (masquerading as 2nd century BC) perception of Athens is striking. To the sensibilities of Livy’s Paullus, Athens is no longer a living, breathing place, but rather a repository of artefacts about the past, whether historical or legendary. The same is true for the other places on the trip, several of which Herakleides also mentions, incorporating comments about the layout of the cities, the buildings, the temples and the inhabitants. In Livy’s account, however, there is no real information, no
interest in any details about the present day in any of these places, about the current inhabitants or the sights and sounds that a traveller might experience. Even what we can tell about Polybius’ interest in the contemporary military arrangements has been left behind. The experience which Paullus actually has while travelling around Greece, as narrated by Livy, very much bears out the idea that there is nothing particularly interesting about the famous sites, apart from what you might hear from other people, and this is a kind of fossilization of Greek culture.

Despite Livy’s narrow focus on the past and the former glories of Greek culture, there is a sense in which Paullus’ experience impresses broader considerations on the reader. We have to take into consideration the fact that Roman readers did know much more about these places than just their legends and history. There was also everything they knew was going to happen subsequent to Paullus’ tour. Recent history included Sulla’s sack of Athens, and Athens was only just being rebuilt when Livy was writing his history.\(^{86}\) The *simulacra deorum hominumque* which Paullus saw in Athens may well have been looted by the time the Roman tourists of Livy’s lifetime came to visit.\(^{87}\) Something very similar is going on when we get to Corinth. He refers to the city as a *spectaculum*, and talks about the two seas on either side of Corinth as facing the rising and setting of the sun, *ab occasu et ortu solis*. much more grandiose language than Polybius uses. It is, in fact, the kind of vocabulary used by the Augustan period to describe the impressive geographical extent of Roman power. Livy himself uses similar language in the speech of Glabrio before their battle with Antiochus at Thermopylae in 191, predicting that Roman dominion will extend into Asia and onwards *usque ad ortum solis*.\(^{88}\) This kind of language, calling to mind the spread of Roman empire, as well as the mere fact of a Roman

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\(^{87}\) Livy 45. 27.11.

\(^{88}\) cf. Dionysius 1.3.3
commander looking at Corinth, calls to mind the fact that Corinth would shortly, in a mere twenty years, be razed to the ground by a Roman army, and its treasures ransacked. For Livy’s readers, the primary connection of Corinth with Rome must have resided in an image of it sacked and destroyed, as Servius Sulpicius thinks of it when he writes to Cicero to console him on the death of his daughter. For him, Corinth, now in ruins, is an example of the mortality of all things. Livy’s reference to Corinth as a *spectaculum* takes on a different resonance in the light of this image. Corinth is a sight that is temporary, about to be lost to the ruthlessness of Roman power, and in the poignancy of its loss it also reminds the reader of the transience of all things, including, perhaps, Rome’s own empire.

The landscape and places of Greece in Livy can be seen as one of the means Livy uses as a guide to the interpretation of his narrative of Roman conquest. In this case, the way Romans interact with Macedonian and Greek territory gives us a starting-point from which to assess the character of Roman involvement with Greece. The terrain of Macedonia and the sites of Greece are approached very differently by Paullus in Livy’s narrative, suggesting to us the difference in how Romans dealt with them as political entities at this time. At the same time the ease with which the Romans control and appropriate landscape and place and the corresponding failure of the Macedonians to do any such thing give us the impression that Roman conquest is somehow inevitable, even justified by divine favour. The striking transformation of the temple at Olympia into the Capitoline temple marks a high point in this process, and also signals that what might be understood as a benevolent interest in and familiarity with the culture and history of Greece, i.e.

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89 Πολύβιος δὲ τὰ συμβάντα περὶ τὴν ἀλωσιν ἐν οίκτου μέρει λέγων προστίθησι καὶ τὴν στρατιωτικὴν ὀλιγωρίαν τὴν περὶ τὰ τῶν τεχνῶν ἔργα καὶ τὰ ἀναθήματα. (Strabo 8.6.23, Plb. 39.2).

90 Cicero, *Fam.* 4.5.4: *Ex Asia rediens cum ab Aegina Megaram versus navigarem, coepi regiones circumcirca prospeciere: post me erat Aegina, ante me Megara, dextra Piraeus, sinistra Corinthus, quae oppida quodam tempore florentissima fuerunt, nine prostrata et diruta ante oculos iacent. Coepi egomet mecum sic cogitare: "hem! nos homunculi indignamur, si quis nostrum interiit aut occisus est, quorum vita brevior esse debet, cum uno loco tot oppidum cadavera proiecta iacent? Visne tu te, Servi, cohibere et meminisse hominem te esse natum?"*
philhellenism, can in fact be read as a new manifestation of Rome’s power and control in this region.
Conclusion

This dissertation has shown that place, space, and landscape are an integral part of Livy’s historiographical project. From the preface of the *Ab Urbe Condita* it is clear that Livy does not fully subscribe to the notion that a history should be as objective a representation of events as possible; instead his narrative is compared to a *monumentum* at which readers can look and take away their own interpretation of the past. The representation of space and place in the history brings this concept to life. We have seen how they are endlessly interpretable, and how Livy actively draws attention to their subjective existence by presenting his readers with multiple perspectives on cities, landscapes, and the wider spaces of the known world as they are conceived by his characters. The portrayal of individual cities is perhaps the most exciting aspect of this discussion: we have seen how Athens and Capua, for example, are seen from various perspectives, Roman, Greek, and Macedonian, and that these perspectives all allow for radically different interpretations of the events which take place there and the damage they suffer in the war with Philip and the war with Hannibal.

In addition to this overarching idea, we have seen that Livy also uses geography to reflect on themes in Roman history. Livy was looking back from a point of crisis; he had experienced the apparent decline of the late Republic and the civil wars, and the emergence of Augustus as a ruler with a global vision of empire. Space and place become ways in to the ambiguity of Roman ideas about their own expansion, and the anxieties that accompanied the spread of military power across the Mediterranean world. Part of the endless fluidity of places and spaces in the history stems from the fact that Livy is always taking into account their entire history up until his own time, not only their existence at the moment he is narrating. So the issue of defection and
betrayal in the Hannibalic War also reflects on contemporaray tensions in Augustan Rome about the incorporation of Italy as an extension of Rome. The Athens of the second century becomes a particularly powerful place for thinking about the consequences of panhellenism and the Roman preoccupation with Greek artifacts, because it is later ransacked by Sulla.

The research presented in this dissertation opens up several avenues for further exploration. I have not treated the first decade here, but it also deserves a thorough and focused treatment of its use of place and space which could be integrated with discussion of the later decades. There is a massive amount of material in the first decade on the city of Rome, of course, but also on Rome’s early dealings with its neighbours and with the Samnites. The beginnings of many of the themes that have been traced through this dissertation, including the tensions and difficulties of expansion, can be found here, and it would be useful to treat them in a comprehensive way. This project could also be expanded to consider historians and writers on historical subjects beyond Livy. The late Republic and the early Imperial period saw a flourishing of complex approaches to history, and it would be interesting to explore the relationship between attitudes to history and attitudes to space and place in these other texts.


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