Zimbabwe and the Crisis of *Chimurenga* Nationalism

A country that has become a pariah state needs to be talked about so that its situation is understood objectively and dispassionately.

Yash Tandon (2008: 47)

It is hard to think of a figure more reviled in the West than Robert Mugabe. Liberal and conservative commentators portray him as a brutal dictator, and blame him for Zimbabwe’s descent into hyperinflation and poverty. The seizure of white-owned farms by his black supporters has been depicted as a form of thuggery, and as a cause of the country’s declining production, as if these lands were doomed by black ownership. Sanctions have been imposed, and opposition funded with the explicit aim to unseating him.

Mahmood Mamdani (2008: 17)

**Introduction**

The term *Chimurenga* occupies a central place in the nationalist-oriented constructions of the Zimbabwe nation-state that came into being in 1980. It began to be widely used in the 1970s by the nationalists mainly in the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and its fighting wing known as the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) as a vernacular name for the armed liberation struggle against the settler colonial state. It is also used today by ZANU as an ideological thread capturing the undying spirit of African resistance to colonialism, running from primary resistance of the 1890s to the present attempts by the Harare nationalists to take the liberation and decolonization
project to its logical conclusion of achieving economic empowerment of the black people through land redistribution and other initiatives aimed at indigenizing the economy. Of course, what has been hailed by ZANU-PF as the ‘Third Chimurenga’ has raised many debates, with some seeing it as controversy-ridden and African elite-dominated primitive accumulation drive under the cover of black economic empowerment, and others celebrating it as a genuine economic redistributive process that has seen land ownership imbalances and unequal access originating from settler colonialism being resolved (David Moore 2004; Raftopoulos and Phimister 2004; Moyo and Yeros 2007a, 2007b).

The current debates over the character of the Zimbabwe state, its ideological orientation and intentions makes the case study of Zimbabwe ideal to be interrogated in this book. Thus before one provides a detailed interrogation of the idea of Zimbabwe and the concomitant politics that has developed around it, including issues of identity, nation-building, violence and party politics, there is need to analyse the main contours of the intellectual debates that have been sparked off by the land reform programme and the crisis that has befallen the state since 2000. At one level, Zimbabwe provides a window into the operations of a schizophrenic neocolonial state whose politics exhibited a complex mixture of redemptive, grotesque and virulent nationalism mediated by a consistent anti-imperial and anti-colonialist rhetoric (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Muzondidya 2011). At another level, it reveals the machinations of colonial matrix of power, the costs to be incurred by a small peripheral state if it tried to chart an autonomous path of development and defy commandments from the West, as well as the controversies that arise as an African state tries to resolve its intractable national question.

**Is Zimbabwe a victim of new imperialism?**

The case study of Zimbabwe manifests all the problems identified in the previous chapters related to the predicament of postcolonial states as they try to resolve the national question within a world governed by the invisible colonial matrix of power sustaining the racialized, hegemonic, patriarchal, capitalist and violent global order. While the Zimbabwean leadership has committed many blunders as it tried to survive in a world that does not accommodate African states that try to defy the neoliberal commandments, the experiences of Zimbabwe since 2000 indicates beyond doubt the ability of the Western nations’ commitment to discipline and work towards dethroning those leaders that are considered to be deviating from the post-Cold War global normative framework of maintaining the status quo of neoliberalism and the Washington Consensus. As noted by Sam Moyo and Yeros (2007, 2009) hell was let loose
on Zimbabwe the very time the government conceded to popular pressure from below and engaged in radical resolution of the national and agrarian questions that had been spoiled by settler colonialism.

Two broad, dominant and discernible schools of thought on the Zimbabwe question reveal two points of enunciation of the Zimbabwe problem. The first one is the liberal reformist perspective informed by ideas of democracy, human rights and notions of civil society and concerned about the rising tempo of authoritarianism, militarism and violence that engulfed Zimbabwe at the beginning of 2000. This camp encompassed what is termed internationalist leftists and liberals. Within this camp the Zimbabwe question was framed as constituted by exhausted patriarchal, authoritarian and populist nationalism that had failed to undergo internal democratization in line with the post-Cold War global normative trends (Campbell 2003, Bond and Manyanya 2003, Ranger 2003, Raftopoulos 2006). The crisis deepened as the nationalist leadership found itself besieged by an array of ‘unfinished business’ (Hammar and Raftopoulos 2003). To this camp the land reform programme was nothing but a political gimmick that was seized by a desperate and bankrupt regime as a survival populist strategy that eventually destroyed a once vibrant agricultural sector which was a strong pillar of the national economy.

What is persuasive about the arguments of this camp is its moral outrage about a former liberation movement that has turned into a violent leviathan and is feasting on the citizens. Secondly, this camp is very alert to issues of cronyism and corruption that have accompanied the fast-track land reform programme. The camp squarely blames ZANU-PF and its leader Robert Mugabe for the Zimbabwean crisis as they mismanaged the economy and lacked good governance skills to keep the economy alive. But the camp is generally not very clear on the role of external factors, including sanctions, in contributing to the economic and political collapse of Zimbabwe into crisis. They say very little about ZANU-PF’s efforts at restructuring a colonial state to serve African interests and even its commitment to redemptive nationalism informed by redistributive justice.

Facing this camp is another broad grouping of scholars comprising of nationalist left, regime intellectuals, outright nativists and populists, and even militarists with securocratic mentalities. The main contribution of the amorphous camps is that they have not missed any opportunity to point out the havoc being wrecked by the colonial matrix of power on Zimbabwe. The most sophisticated and scholarly articulation of the Zimbabwe question from a critical African and Global South perspective in represented by the classic
work of Moyo and Paris Yeros (2005, 2007, 2009) and Moyo (2011). What is refreshing about their arguments is that they take the issue of new imperialism very seriously and they also investigate two historical questions systematically (national and agrarian) as the core state businesses that needed to be resolved under whatever circumstances.

What Moyo and Yeros privilege in their analysis is not the state and ZANU-PF; instead, they investigate what they term a crisis of semi-proletarianism which enabled them to approach the national question ‘from below’ where the ‘land occupation movement’ originated (Moyo 2001, Yeros 2002). They also highlight that the state had to respond to agitation for land ‘from below’ and the ruling party risked losing rural and urban support simultaneously if it did not act positively on the land issue. Even more relevant for this book on the coloniality of power and the question of myths of decolonization and illusions of freedom is the continued engagement of Moyo and Yeros with the question of imperialism as the broader discursive terrain within which the Zimbabwe question can be understood. There is no doubt that since the time of the liberation struggle, the future political trajectory of Zimbabwe mattered to imperial powers; hence their active participation at the Lancaster House Conference to soften the radical nationalists to accept a neocolonial arrangement in lieu of decolonization. Today the popularity of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) across Europe and America indicates the continuing interests of imperial centres on Zimbabwe. The funding of ideologically-compliant political formations is a long-standing part of the global colonial matrix of power.

In a way, by 1997, Zimbabwe under ZANU-PF, broke ranks with the common African political habit of allying with external forces against the mounting demands of the local people. With the support of war veterans, the state began the difficult task of shedding off its neocolonial character which culminated in the radical land reform programme that provoked the anger of the West, leading to in sanctions being imposed on Zimbabwe. This alternative narrative of the Zimbabwean question, however, must not be taken to mean endorsement of ZANU-PF’s authoritarianism, militarization of state institutions and politics, and violence. The message is that the Zimbabwean question is complex and cannot be explained from a one-dimensional approach. The complexity is compounded by the fact that there are numerous horizontal, vertical and lateral struggles emanating from the semi-proletarianized sector, the urban sector, ZANU-PF, the state, opposition and civil society about different as well as common issues. There is no clear
monolithic ideological thrust open for a singular reading of the Zimbabwe question. Added to this is the question of complex identities which transcend race but spill over to generational questions as well.

At the same time, the recent work of Sam Moyo (2011) and Ian Scoones (2010), based on empirical research inside Zimbabwe has confirmed Mamdani’s 2008 thesis that the fast-track land reform programme did not only result in crony capitalist primitive accumulation by the elite, but achieved a radical distribution of land to the landless people of Zimbabwe. This emerging body of research is an indictment of the earlier literature that emphasized chaos, violence and corruption as the hallmarks of the fast-track land reform programme. Such research also calls for re-evaluation of the intentions of ZANU-PF and its commitment to furthering the agenda of redistributive justice.

This chapter, therefore, provides a historical view of the development of the Zimbabwe question starting from the 1960s when the idea of a Zimbabwe nation-state liberated from colonial rule developed. The chapter begins with engagement with the ideology of Chimurenga as the political thread that runs through from the 1960s to the present, albeit being contested from inside and outside particularly about its emancipatory and liberatory potentials and commitments in a world where issues of democracy, human rights, human security and social peace have assumed a normative form. From here I delve into questions of both the nation and the state which are equally complex and open to intractable intellectual and academic interpretations.

**The ideology of Chimurenga**

Chimurenga’s linguistic coinage is from the Shona language spoken by the majority of present-day Zimbabweans. Its historical roots are traceable to the 1896-1897 Ndebele-Shona uprisings, deriving from Murenga, a name of a spirit medium who was actively involved in the 1896-1897 war of resistance, providing the desperately needed ideological support to the African fighting forces. Murenga is said to have administered some traditional war medicine on the African fighting forces that would make them invulnerable and immune to white forces’ bullets (Ranger 1967: 217-220).

In current nationalist discourse of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), Zimbabwe is a product of Chimurenga. It was born as a result of two violent Zvimurenga (Shona plural for Chimurenga) of 1890s and 1970s. But Zimbabwe had to experience a Third Chimurenga at the beginning of 2000 that was dubbed *Impi YamaSimu* in Ndebele...
language and Hondo *Yeminda* in Shona language (meaning the war for land reclamation) (Mugabe 2001). In the dominant nationalist discourses of the nation, Zimbabwean history is nothing other than a catalogue of *Chimurengas* spearheaded by patriotic forces in search of independence and in defence of national sovereignty. This rendition of national history in terms of a series of ‘nationalist revolutions’, has been termed ‘patriotic history’ by some scholars (Ranger 2004; Tendi 2010).

By the 1970s, the concept of *Chimurenga* had found a dignified niche within African nationalist revolutionary politics as an anti-imperial and anti-colonial ideology. But worrisome are some of its recent uses within Zimbabwe to justify any form of nationalist violence even against citizens of the postcolonial state. In line with Chimurenga-oriented ideas of the nation, Zimbabwe is celebrated as a product of violent nationalist revolutions that has to be defended through the spilling of more of the blood of those considered to be opposed to ZANU-PF, which is taken as a symbol of Zimbabwe. The perpetrators of this crime use the Chimurenga language to justify the killing and torture of opposition political members and groups as well as other citizens who do not belong to ZANU-PF.

The ideologies of *Chimurenga* also incorporate a violent conception of political practice in which the periodic elections are taken as a war situation in which they must defeat their enemies. Thus, every time ZANU-PF has been cornered politically by the opposition forces, it has tendentiously reminded people that ‘Zimbabwe ndeyeropa’ (Zimbabwe came after a violent war of liberation) and that it would go back to the bush to fight another Chimurenga if defeated in an election.

The threats of fighting another *Chimurenga* were often issued to scare the people who still have fresh memories of the 15 year liberation war where they were caught in between violent Rhodesian forces and equally violent ZANLA and ZIPRA forces. In celebrating *Chimurenga* as a precursor of the nation of Zimbabwe, even the head of state, President Robert Mugabe, often brags about having degrees in violence and he punches the air at political rallies to emphasize the agenda of violence as a solution to the political question in Zimbabwe (Blair 2002; Chan 2003; Meredith 2002; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009).

The ideologies of *Chimurenga* were also being mobilized to fragment the people of Zimbabwe into patriots, war veterans, puppets, traitors, sellouts, born-frees and enemies of the nation. These political identities have resulted in a deep polarization of the nation. The space of patriots and veterans is reserved for those who participated in the liberation struggle (*the Second
Chimurenga) in general and all members of ZANU-PF specifically. Members of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) are categorized as traitors, sell outs and puppets that deserve to die if the Zimbabwean nation is to live. Instructively, White commercial farmers constitute the enemies of the nation (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011). Such bifurcation of the nation forms a fertile ground for conflictual politics and violence that has sapped the strength of the nation and plunged it into a pariah stat.

At another level, the ideas of Chimurenga are also associated with onprogressive economic policies and partisan politics. For instance, the controversial fast-track land reform programme and the equally controversial economic indigenization legislation being pushed through by the Ministry of Youth and Empowerment were justified as part of the Third Chimurenga (Mugabe 2001). This once respected revolutionary ideology of liberation is now associated with political gimmicks and regime survival techniques of ZANU-PF. While some scholars like Mamdani (2008), Yeros (2002), Moyo and Paris (2007a; 2007b; 2009), and others, believe that the fast-track land reform was a revolution interrupted by forces of neocolonialism, there is an equally strong body of thought that views it as chaotic, partisan, ill-thought-out, ill-timed and, above all, part of selfish party-crony primitive accumulation that left the economy in tatters (Phimister and Raftopoulos 2004; Raftopoulos 2006).

Zimbabwe also projects complex politics of trying to sort out the intractable issues of incomplete decolonization and unresolved questions of social and economic justice within a constrained environment of a postcolonial neo-colonized world ensnared by global colonial matrices of power. It also demonstrates how liberatory rhetoric is used to justify the elite/native bourgeoisie’s primitive capitalist accumulation as well as how the Western powers are able to discipline those African leaders considered to be deviating from the neoliberal template of economic and political policies.

**Framing the debates and discourses on the nation**

Zimbabwe is haunted by a repertoire of violence that has dominated pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial epochs. This violence encompasses pre-colonial raids and conquests and imperial/colonial wars of domination of 1893-1894 and 1896-1897. The spectre of violence has continued into postcolonial Zimbabwe where it has been carried out under different code-names such as Gukurahundi (rains that wash away chaff) of the 1980s right into Operation Murambatsvina (clean-up of urban filth), post-29 March 2008 Operation Mavhoterapapi (who did you vote for), Operation Chimumu (silent...
night kidnappings) and the most recent *Operation Budirani Pachena* (Let’s tell each other the truth). David Coltart, a Zimbabwean lawyer and politician had this to say about violence in general:

Zimbabwe is afflicted with a disease akin to alcoholism, namely endemic violence. For over 150 years, leaders of this beautiful country, bounded by the Zambezi and Limpopo Rivers, have used violence to achieve their political objectives. Violence was used by Lobengula to suppress the Shona. Violence was used to colonise and the threat of violence was used to maintain white minority rule. Violence was used to overthrow the white minority. And since independence, violence has been used to crush legitimate political opposition. The use of violence has been compounded by another phenomenon—namely a culture of impunity. Those responsible for use of violence have never been brought to book. Not only is there a long history of violence used successfully to achieve political objectives but also those who have committed horrendous crimes have prospered through their actions. As a result, the use of violence is now deeply embedded in our national psyche. Political violence is accepted as the norm. [But] political violence is not the norm in democratic societies. It may be the norm in tyrannical states. It may have been used in the formative stages of democracies. But it is now anathema in democracies. There is also no doubt that the use of violence inhibits economic development and creates a whole barrage of social problems, including domestic violence. The sustained and long-term use of violence in Zimbabwe lies at the very core of many of the problems our nation faces today. We are indeed afflicted by a very serious disease and need help (Coltart 2007: 48-54).

This violence is lodged deeply in the national psyche and it is the chief instrument of statecraft. The people who make up the citizenry of Zimbabwe have been invited into the nation on an invitation card written in blood. And instead of the leaders to seek the means of exorcizing this ‘blood stained national invitation card’ they celebrate blood-spilling in songs and speeches.

A number of academics have tried to explain both the spectre of violence and the other crises that bedevil Zimbabwe from different angles (see, for instance, (Raftopoulos and Mlambo 2009). Also Political scientists and activists from the civil society have focused their research on the murky present with a view to predicting the mysterious future (Masunungure 2009). In his comment on the present situation in Zimbabwe, Brian Raftopoulos said:

Unfortunately, I think there are many activists in civil society whose sense of the past is compressed into the developments that have taken place in the last decade, namely the period that has been characterised as the ‘Zimbabwean Crisis.’ At one level this is understandable for activists who are faced with the enormous immediate challenges of an authoritarian state, and the debilitating effects of an economy that has been de-
constructed on a daily basis. The result however is that the activists often get trapped in
the present, so to speak, where the need and opportunities to understand the past, do
not seem immediately relevant. Moreover, when the discourse in which the problems
of the crisis is constructed is limited to the areas of human rights and governance,
important as these are, the longer term complexities of different historical legacies get
occluded from the questions that are asked and the types of politics that are engaged
in. [...] Additionally, this takes place in the face of a state whose political messaging is
embedded in a broader, even if distorted, sense of the past (Kwabato 2009).

The tendency to use the present to explain the present even degenerated further
into explaining processes and events through blaming certain political actors.
This was most visible in international media where President Mugabe was
framed as that individual who single-handedly brought about the liberation of
Zimbabwe from colonialism only to preside over its destruction in the 2000s.

Even phenomena like race and ethnicity that need to be explained in their
own right were deployed wrongly as causes of conflict and crisis. How can
that which needs to be explained and which is part of the crisis serve as the
language of intellectual analysis? Race and ethnicity are, indeed, imbricated
and inextricably intertwined with politics, and what is needed is to explain
why the situation is like that and what it is that is expressed through race and
ethnicity. How did race and ethnicity emerge as markers of difference, and
under what conditions, through whom, and to what end? A focus on race
and ethnicity as the thing itself that causes crises and conflict tends to hide
rather than reveal the underlying drivers of politics, causes of human action,
and shapers of human relations.

Zimbabwe, like most postcolonial and post-apartheid societies suffers
seriously from consequences of incomplete decolonization, incomplete nation-
building and contested state-making. This politics is inextricably intertwined
with the complex discourses of belonging, citizenship, resource ownership,
meaning of freedom and sovereignty. Since 2000, these issues have become even
more complex as they became imbricated in equally complex regime security and
regime change politics, pitting ZANU-PF against MDC political formations.

Consequently, the politics of transition that the signing of the Global
Political Agreement (GPA) inaugurated in September 2008 and the installation
of the inclusive government in February 2009 has remained locked within the
complex contestations over political power, strategic resources, state control,
belonging and citizenship as well as mode of governance. Power politics were
further articulated in the languages and idioms of partisanship, regionalism,
race, ethnicity, class and nativity.
The Zimbabwean crisis is profoundly historical as well as political. It is linked to the legacies of colonialism as well as with the question of the making of Zimbabwe as a nationalist construction of the 1960s. What has come to be termed the ‘Zimbabwean crisis’ together with issues of ethnicity and race, are actually manifestations of the deep-seated challenges of nation-building within a state suffering from incomplete decolonization. This incompleteness of the nation, state and decolonization was described by Amanda Hammar, Brian Raftopoulos and Stig Jensen (2003) as ‘Zimbabwe’s unfinished business’. Raftopoulos further raised some of the key issues that are often ignored in scholarly interrogations of Zimbabwe’s problems:

The point is that [creating national identity] is a process of continuing contestation and struggles, with the dynamics of such struggles often led by, but not confined to, the dominant sections of particular societies. It is important that visions of national belonging continue to be open to debate and discussion, and that no party or group of people claim the sole right to set the parameters of such an ongoing process. For countries like Zimbabwe the experiences of colonial rule and imperial domination have been key vectors in determining the terms of debate around national identity. Moreover, the effectiveness with which Mugabe has deployed the anti-imperialist message demonstrates the continuing resonance of this trope in the historical imaginations and lived experiences of Africans. The continued inequalities in the relations between the West and Africa are a stubborn reminder of the conditions which generate such oppositions. What is important in this context is to fight the tendency of nationalist parties to monopolize the constructions of this past and to wield it to maintain an authoritarian hold on power (Kwabato 2009).

It is within this broader context that this chapter seeks to revisit the history of the imaginations and the making of the Zimbabwe nation-state project as the terrain within which one can find the roots of the present politics of race and ethnicity that continue to haunt the country in the twenty-first century. These questions of belonging, citizenship, modes of governance, power and ownership of resources have become sharpened in a country experiencing economic and political crisis and where politicians have resorted to the politics of denial, witch-hunting and formalizing crises as a culture. This is a point raised by Alois Mlambo, Maurice Vambe and Abebe Zegye:

The disquieting aspect is that there is now in Zimbabwe a culture of crisis; leaders taking crisis as normal, thriving from it, and holding the lives of the people to ransom. When the crisis has been formalized as a culture within state institutions, it distorts attempts at resolving tensions and conflicts that lead to crisis in the culture (Mlambo et al 2010: 89-91).
Zimbabwe is ‘fractured along historical, spatial, political, racial, ethnic and personal lines’ (Mlambo et al 2010: 89). It has continuously been haunted by the complex question of how to transform its various ethnicities into one nation and the former ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’ into a common citizenship mediated by equality and loyalty to the postcolonial state on the one hand, and how to mobilize different ethnicities into stable common nationhood on the other. The official policy of reconciliation of races and the rhetoric of unity of ethnicities of the 1980s have proven to be minimalist, inadequate and even problematic within societies characterized by unresolved colonially-induced economic inequalities and resilient ethnic tensions informed by a combination of precolonial, colonial and postcolonial experiences.

Zimbabwe has no strong primordial roots except that of naming derived from the prehistoric site of Great Zimbabwe located in Masvingo province. Some of those who read too much into this ritual of naming of postcolonial states and search for a foundation myth for Zimbabwe have tried to interpret Zimbabwe as a successor state—to the precolonial Munhumutapa state (Mudenge 1988). This raises the question of how some foundation myths do become sources of conflict, exclusion and alienation rather than facilitate national cohesion and guarantee less problematic flow from the pre-colonial past into the present (Barthes 1972).

In a situation where the precolonial terrain was dotted with diverse socio-political formations ranging from independent chieftaincies, separate clans, kingdoms, states, and unstable confederacies, it becomes very difficult to find an acceptable myth of foundation for the postcolonial nation. For instance, picking the precolonial Munhumutapa state as the foundation of postcolonial Zimbabwe becomes problematic because this state was associated with only one ethnic group—the Karanga. Zimbabwe is a multi-ethnic society encompassing Karanga, Zezuru, Manyika, Shangani, Sotho, Tswana, Hlengwe, Tonga, Nambya, Venda, Nguni, Kololo, and other smaller groups. If Zimbabwe can be interpreted as a successor state, then it succeeded numerous and disparate precolonial social and political formations rather than one, including the colonially crafted Rhodesian state.

Further questions arise as to how adequate the liberation struggle is as the foundation myth of Zimbabwe if precolonial history cannot provide a credible and acceptable one. Does Zimbabwe need a single foundation myth? What about using various myths informed by various histories? Worse still, can the empty signifiers such as ‘democracy’ and ‘human rights’ offer Zimbabwe new myths of foundation not associated with race and ethnicity? There are no
quick and ready answers to these historical and political questions, although this chapter tries to provide some of the useful pointers.

The other erroneous tendency has been to conflate diverse identities into Ndebele and Shona groups and, in the process, undermine the country’s social pluralism. On top of this layer are racial groups of Coloureds, Indians, and Whites. The key political challenge is how to build a stable nation and forge common citizenship out of these diverse identities. The nationalism that emerged in the 1960s, together with the armed struggle of the 1970s, did not culminate in the emergence of a stable nation and state founded on an overall social, political, economic, psychological and ideological metamorphosis, whereby ex-colonizers and the former colonized were re-born as equal members of a single political community called Zimbabwe mediated by mutual consent. This is the bane of the Zimbabwe national project.

Social and political conflicts in Zimbabwe are partly rooted in and generated by a problematic formulation and articulation of national history and reluctance by professional historians to refute outright some ‘erroneous’ and ‘false’ views of history that have percolated into popular imagination. There are a number of popular but sometimes inaccurate accurate and incorrect accounts of national history that have been allowed to percolate into the minds of the people and in the process spoil human relations. These range from the popular view of Zimbabwe as characterized by a bimodal ethnicity of the Ndebele and Shona people who are naturally antagonistic because of ancient hatreds and historical grievances. To me, the correct characterization of Zimbabwe would be that of complex and plural society inhabited by various people, including racial minorities, all of whom speak over eighteen different languages. Contemporary ethnic tensions are often fuelled by recent histories rather than remote pasts.

The second fallacious and dangerous but popular view is that of conflating the Fifth Brigade (Gukurahundi) that committed atrocities in Matabeleland and the Midlands region in the 1980s, with the Shona people as a collectivity. The Fifth Brigade was a ‘political army’ fighting a ‘political’ if not purely partisan cause that was justified in ethnic terms (Nkomo 1984). A related erroneous view that is equally dangerous but popular is that Matabeleland and the Midlands region harboured politically motivated, structured and organized ‘dissidents’ fighting on behalf of the Ndebele people as a collectivity opposed to the Zimbabwe state in the 1980s.

If there were any ‘dissidents,’ they existed as a bizarre mixture and assortment of ordinary armed criminals, isolated bandits, terrified ex-ZIPRA
escaping witch-hunts within the Zimbabwe National Army, a few ideologically
persuaded elements not happy about the Lancaster House Agreement,
mentally-deranged elements who missed the news of the ceasefire, pseudo and
manufactured elements used by ZANU-PF to justify liquidation of PF-ZAPU,
and Apartheid-sponsored Super-ZAPU elements (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009).

All these political issues were mainly logical residues of an armed liberation
war rather than representatives of the aspirations of the people of Matabeleland
and the Midlands region. It has recently come to light that what was considered
as ‘arms caches’ discovered in PF-ZAPU properties around the cities of
Bulawayo and Gweru, that contributed to the breakdown of the Government
of National Unity concocted in 1980 were a farce and a mere political pretext
to crush PF-ZAPU as an opposition movement. Frederick Charles Mutanda
(war-name Chillis), a former senior ZIPRA officer in a foreword to the recent
edition of Joshua Nkomo’s autobiography *Nkomo: The Story of My Life*, wrote
that ‘Allegations that Dr Nkomo and PF ZAPU after losing elections were
conspiring to overthrow the government in 1982, were false and mischievous
statements.’ Mutanda elaborated further on the issue:

Elections results were announced on the 4th of March 1980 and the setting up of
the Joint High Command started on the 6th of March under the command of Lieu-
tenant-General Walls who had been appointed by Prime Minister Robert Mugabe.
The Joint High Command appointed liaison officers to prepare for the integration
of the three armed forces. Amongst the issues which were thrashed out at the be-
ingning was the question of bringing all ZANLA and ZIPRA arms and equipment
from Zambia and Mozambique. I was one of those who remained in Zambia and
involved in preparing part of the ZIPRA list and movement of these ordnances.
Before 18th April 1980 ZIPRA had presented its schedules of ordnances and as
agreed, the Rhodesians gave our commanders their list. The ZIPRA list included
battle tanks, Armoured Personnel Carriers, artillery and other fighting equipment.
ZANLA did not present a single thing. The ZIPRA ordnance and armament mat-
ching the schedule eventually came into the country via Victoria Falls. No decision
or instruction was made as to how and where the ZIPRA ordnance was to be sto-
red. The administration of integrating the three armies, weapons and ordnances,
including Assembly Points was the responsibility of the Joint High Command, thus
removing political parties over military affairs. Arms which were then discovered at
Ascot and Hampton Farms were not caches at all but had been procedurally decla-
red and submitted to the Joint High Command (Mutanda 2010).

These revelations by those who actively participated in the struggle and in
the transitional politics of 1980s were signs that, as historians, we need to
rethink some of the issues taken as truth in Zimbabwe. What has escaped
scholarly analysis is that these historically false views circulate as truth in popular imagination and are open to manipulation by politicians as well as deployment by ordinary people for favours and discrimination. Ranger (2004) described these deeply partisan histories as ‘patriotic history’.

The real danger for nation-building is that false views have power to incite violence, confirming Membe’s (2002: 239-273) notion of ‘the power of the false’. Zimbabweans must be careful of ‘the power of the false’. Powerful but false narratives of the historical development of Zimbabwe, from a colony to a sovereign state, from transitional state to crisis, permeate not only issues of power but also perceptions and conceptions of the social identity of the country. Those who raise these issues of identity have done so from a very emotional angle raising fears that open discussion of identity-related conflict is too risky for the nation. Even celebrated books like Becoming Zimbabwe that tracked the idea of national belonging and citizenship had no specific chapters on identity, as though this issue was not at the centre of creating a coherent nation (Raftopoulos and Mlambo 2009).

Tash Tandon correctly identified the general challenges that were confronted by postcolonial African states soon after attaining political independence:

After independence, however, matters became complicated. People who fought and won independence, involving huge sacrifices...began to ask their political leaders and intellectuals some critical questions: Where do we go from here? What now? What do we do with this hard won independence? There also came to the surface even more difficult questions about self-identity that had been subdued during the struggle for independence: Who are we as a ‘nation’? How do we forge nationhood out of disparate ethnic, racial, religious, linguistic, regional and sub-regional groupings? (Tandon 2005: 67)

For Zimbabwe, the veteran nationalist Joshua Nkomo lamented how immediately after attaining independence, Zimbabweans found themselves hostage to a violent African regime. This is how he put it:

Today Zimbabwe is defenseless because the people live in fear, not of our enemies, but of their own government. What has happened to the brave and determined, confident and fearless people of Zimbabwe and their soldiers of liberation, who showed the world that no power on earth could prevent us from achieving our freedom? [...] Today our enemies laugh at us. What they see are a divided, confused, and frightened people, led by a divided, confused and frightened government. Government which has the love, respect and confidence of the people does not have to use the laws and weapons of colonial regimes to protect itself. The people themselves will protect their government if they have full trust
Zimbabwean nationalism was born with a very bad birthmark. The split of 1963 that gave birth to ZANU as a splinter movement from ZAPU was a concretization of the poor social basis of Zimbabwean nationalism that unfolded throughout the age of liberation as a site of ethnic and regional-inspired struggles that cost the lives of cadres like Herbert Chitepo and others. Poor nationalism gave birth to a predatory nationalist revolution that ate its own children and eventually led to a violent and intolerant postcolonial state that has consistently devoured its own citizens with utmost disdain (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009).

Some radical Zimbabwean scholars, particularly those informed by political economy such as Ibbo Mandaza (1986), noted that the liberation struggle enabled a problematic transition whose content and direction remained undefined beyond the rhetoric of socialism and reconciliation. Being independent was increasingly reduced to the assumption of state power by a black bourgeoisie that had spearheaded the liberation war. Until the late 1990s, the postcolonial state maintained a delicate balance of preserving and protecting white settler interests and serving the demands of the majority of African people, typical of all neocolonial entities.

In the words of Mandaza, the state assumed a ‘schizophrenic’ character whereby its pursuit of socio-economic transformation, developmental objectives and fulfillment of popular aspirations was happening concurrently with violent suppression of popular demands and longings (Mandaza 1986). Thus, once political independence was achieved; there was no systematic commitment to nation-building. Political elites spent energy on state consolidation that was itself a form of personal power consolidation by the triumphant leadership of ZANU-PF. Violence became the main method of hailing the people into the nation, beginning with the military conquest of Matabeleland and the Midlands regions that were considered to be wavering and not fully behind the Zimbabwe that was created in 1980 (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003: 17-38).

The policy of reconciliation aimed at hailing the white minority and the rhetoric of unity aimed at beckoning ethnicities into the nation did not succeed in creating a stable nation-state. Any nation-state project refers to that protean process of making the state-as-people (state-making) and the making of nation-as-people (nation-building). Ideally, therefore, a stable and durable political community is one whose citizens are actively engaged in deciding...
their common future together. Bound together by ties of national solidarity, they discover and implement principles of justice that all can share, and in doing so they respect the separate identities of minority groups within the community (Miller 2000). This has proved to be hard to achieve in a country that emerged from settler colonialism and that is inhabited by both former disfranchised ‘natives’ and ex-privileged settlers, separated not only by race but also by glaring material endowments.

Billig (1995) argued that the creation of the ‘nation-as-people’ has never been a harmonious process in which, for example, a traditional ‘ethnie’ grows from ‘small shoot into the full flower of nationality, as if following a process of “natural” maturation.’ The process typically is attended by conflict and violence. ‘A particular form of identity has to be imposed. One way of thinking of the self, of community and, indeed of the world, has to replace other conceptions, other forms of life’ (Billig 1995: 27). This process is even more complicated in ex-colonies where imperialism and colonialism added the politics of race on top of the equally complex layers of the ‘tribe’, ethnicity, religion and regionalism and other power struggles emanating from pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial histories.

Raftopoulos and Mlambo (2009: xvii-xxvi) argue that the making of a national identity known as ‘Zimbabwean’ is still in a state of construction—a state of ‘becoming national’. This is so because the nationalist struggle did not manage to create a nation in 1980. Pre-colonial leaders ranging from those of Great Zimbabwe, Munhumutapa, Rozvi and Ndebele political formations did not create one. The Rhodesian state created ‘subjects’ (black natives) and ‘citizens’ (white settlers) defined by race and concretized by spatial segregation.

Colonialism brought the issue of race into the centre of African national project as race had been the main criterion for inclusion and exclusion into colonial forms of citizenship. An imagined Zimbabwe nation was to emerge from the centre of settler colonialism within which race and ethnic identities were highly politicized divide and rule pillars. Inevitably, nationalist actors had to grapple with race and ethnic issues as they imagined a postcolonial nation and state founded on the principles of common citizenship and singular national identity.

Highlighting the centrality and imbrications of race and class within the African national project in general, Ekeh (1975: 102) argued that the African struggle for independence was nothing other than ‘a struggle for power between the two bourgeois classes involved in the colonization of Africa’, namely the
entrenched white colonial bourgeoisie and the emerging black bourgeoisie. The African liberation struggle could not avoid assuming the form of a civil war between the black ‘natives’ and the white ‘settlers’, making the liberation war in Zimbabwe take the form of an identity-based-conflict in which the black ‘natives’ fought to defeat white ‘settlers’.

Zimbabwean nationalists only succeeded in creating the ‘nation-as-state’ but failed dismally to create the ‘nation-as-people’ (Billig 1995; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009). The ‘crisis’ that engulfed the country at the beginning of 2000 has its deep roots in the legacies of settler colonialism and the miscarriage of African nationalism that enabled the emergence of a state without a stable nation. This reality had far-reaching implications for the evolving nation-state project.

Enfranchisement of the black majority was not accompanied by access to strategic national resources like land, mines and factories. No wonder then that control over and access to land continued to shape and influence postcolonial political contestations and imaginations of freedom (Rutherford 2007: 106). Rutherford noted that land in Zimbabwe became associated with the nation; the national liberation struggle was interpreted as a peasant struggle for land, and the political rhetoric of ZANU-PF as well as its policy prescriptions were subsequently formulated around agrarian issues (Rutherford 2001). The land and race questions formed the centrepiece of ZANU-PF’s definition of belonging, citizenship, exclusion, and the whole history of the nation. President Robert Mugabe once articulated this very clearly in the following words:

> We knew and still know that land was the prime goal of King Lobengula as he fought British encroachment in 1893; we knew and still know that land was the principal grievance for our heroes of the First Chimurenga led by Nehanda and Kaguvi. We knew and still know it to be the fundamental premise of the Second Chimurenga and thus a principal definer of succeeding new Nation and State of Zimbabwe. Indeed we know it to be the core issue of the Third Chimurenga which you and me are fighting, and for which we continue to make such enormous sacrifices (Mugabe 2001: 92-3).

Even political contestation between ZANU-PF and the MDC did not escape imbrications of race. For example, Mugabe forcefully tried to delegitimize the MDC as nothing rather than a front for white colonial interests. This is how he framed the MDC:

> The MDC should never be judged or characterised by its black trade union face; by its youthful student face; by its salaried black suburban junior professionals; never by its rough and violent high-density lumpen elements. It is much deeper
than these human superficies; for it is immovably and implacably moored in the colonial yesteryear and embraces wittingly or unwittingly the repulsive ideology of return to white settler rule. MDC is as old and as strong as the forces that control it; that drives and direct; indeed that support, sponsor and spot it. It is a counter revolutionary Trojan horse contrived and nurtured by the very inimical forces that enslaved and oppressed our people yesterday (Mugabe 2001: 88).

This situation led Raftopoulos (2007: 181) to argue that one of the key features of the Zimbabwean crisis as it unfolded across the early 2000s was the emergence of a revived nationalism that was delivered in a particularly virulent form mediated by race as its main trope. To gain a full picture of the Zimbabwe problems, it is important to understand its social complexion.

**Social identities**

One of the most erroneous views on Zimbabwe is to frame its social composition in terms of Shona-Ndebele ethnic divisions that were said to be antagonistic due to historical reasons. This popular but false view ignored the ethnic and racial complexity of Zimbabwe. It also ignored the fact that ethnic polarities were informed mainly by recent rather than remote histories including elite manipulation of identity. Nation-building is adversely affected by emotional, subjective and powerful notions of identity, some of which were historically and philosophically ‘false’.

For one to gain a clear understanding of the ethnic and racial complexion of Zimbabwe, there is need to reflect on the history of the ‘peopling’ of the lands bounded by the River Zambezi in the north and the River Limpopo in the south. Beach (1994: 78) argued that the vast region lying between the Zambezi and Limpopo rivers from as early as the tenth to the mid-nineteenth centuries was a theatre of immigration of different peoples that included the ancestors of the Shona, the Nguni, and other groups that have left an indelible ethnic complexion on modern Zimbabwe. As a result of precolonial historical processes of migration and settlement, Zimbabwe developed socially into a multi-ethnic society inhabited by the Shangani/Tsonga/Hlengwe in the south-eastern parts of the Zimbabwean plateau; the Venda in the south and borderland with South Africa; the Kololo, Tonga, Leya and Nambya in the north and borderland with Zambia; and the Kalanga, Sotho-Tswana, and Nguni in the south-west (McGregor 2009).

The numerically dominant groups collectively termed Shona were also dispersed spatially and linguistically into Karanga, inhabiting the southern parts of the plateau, including Masvingo province. The Zezuru and Korekore inhabit the northern and central parts of the plateau (Mashonaland West,
East and Central provinces), and the Manyika and Ndau in the east, covering the areas known as Manicaland and Chipinge, stretching to the border with Mozambique (Beach 1984; Ranger 1989). On the language ecology of the country Ndhlovu (2006: 305) says ‘Zimbabwe is a multilingual country with eighteen African languages that include Shona, Ndebele, Kalanga, Nambya, Tonga, Sotho, Domba, Xhosa, Tonga of Mudzi, Venda, Shangani, Tshwavo, Tswana, Barwe, Sena, Doma, Chikunda and Chewa’ (Hachipola 1998). However, Shona and Ndebele have come to be the dominant national languages alongside English which serves as the official one.

What is known about identities prior to colonialism is that they were very fluid, permeated by complex processes of assimilation, incorporation, conquest of weaker groups by powerful ones, inter- and intra-marriages, alliances, fragmentation, and constant movements. Identities that crystallized from this complex milieu were social and moral in character rather than solid and political.

Identities founded on moral imperatives had more to do with culture and communal security, and social membership, as opposed to political identities that were mediated by competitive confrontation over material resources and over political power (Lonsdale 1992; 2004: 73-95). On the fluidity and flexibility of precolonial identities, Ranger argued: ‘Before colonialism Africa was characterised by pluralism, flexibility, multiple identities; after it African identities of “tribe” gender and generation were all bounded by the rigidities on invented tradition’ (Ranger 1993: 63).

It was colonialism that had the negative effect not of inventing identities from scratch, but re-inventing existing ones, rigidifying and politicizing them in a number of ways. This is a subject that attracted the attention of Mamdani (2006) who has demonstrated empirically and conceptually how colonialism constructed ‘ethnic citizenship’ in Africa. Mamdani noted that the advent of settler colonialism entailed differentiation of people within the boundaries of colonies according to race. This culminated in the development of the colonial state as a bifurcated phenomenon governing citizens and subjects differently. Citizens (white settlers) were governed through urban civil power, and this enabled them to enjoy all the fruits of civil and political freedoms and liberties. The subjects (natives/black Africans) were governed through ‘decentralized despotism’ permeated by tradition and customary order, overseen by a rural chiefly authority as the lowest ranking and salaried colonial official. Under this decentralized structure, Africans were fragmented into rigidified ethnic groups (Mamdani 1996: 18).
Under Rhodesian colonialism the population was categorized into Europeans, Asians, coloured, and native peoples. The natives were further categorized into: ‘aboriginal natives’ and ‘colonial natives’, the ‘Mashona natives’, and the ‘Matabele natives’ (Southern Rhodesia 1963). This was part of creating ‘ethnic citizenship’ that was regulated through a ‘regime of ethnic rights’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2006: 1-18). Ethnic citizenship was enforced through the national identity card system that coded and classified Africans according to an assigned village and district of origin.

Every ‘native district’ in Rhodesia was represented by a specific numerical code and every adult ‘native’ was issued a national identity card known as *isithupha* in Ndebele and *chitupa* in Shona. This identity document provided details of one’s chief, village of origin, and district of ancestral origin. Added to this, the colonial state went further to formulate an ethnicized wage differential systems within which ‘native’ workers were ethnically differentiated for specific jobs. This practice was rampant in the mines where Shangani were stereotyped as the ‘best workers above and below ground’, the Ndebele were said to be the best ‘foremen’ and the Manyika were said to be ‘best house servants’ (Ranger 1989).

Both historians and language specialists have revealed how missionaries and the colonial drive to standardize ‘native’ languages contributed heavily to the invention of ethnicity (Ranger 1985; 1989; Chimundu 1992: 103-129). Vernacular languages had to be codified and orthography established for missionary, educational, and administrative purposes. The Rhodesian government commissioned Clement M. Doke in 1929 to research the language varieties spoken by ‘natives’ for purposes of standardization into monolithic and homogenous linguistic categories. As put by Doke, his purpose was ‘a settlement of the language problems involving the unification of the dialects into a literary form for educational purposes, and the standardization of a uniform orthography for the whole area’. He went further to brag that ‘natives were placed at my disposal for investigations, and information was most readily supplied’ (Doke 1931: iii).

Doke’s work in the ‘invention’ of standard Shona culminated in the *Report on the Unification of Shona Dialects* of 1931 that created what is today called the Shona language, and indirectly contributed to the manufacturing of greater regional Shona identity that is today standing in polar opposition to the equally manufactured greater Ndebele regional identity (Doke 1931). Solomon Mombeshora well captured the overall contribution of colonialism to the identity problems in Zimbabwe by stating that ‘the seeds of ethnic
factor were derived from the precolonial past, [but] the colonial era provided fertile soil in which the ideology of tribalism germinated, blossomed and was further propagated’ (Mombeshora 1990: 431).

The imagined common national identity could not be easily manufactured within a colonial environment in which ethnic identities were deliberately politicized. Colonialism never intended to create homogenous African nations based on common national identity because this was going to fuel African nationalism that would threaten colonialism as a system. Colonialism wanted to create colonial states as ‘neo-Europes’ that served metropolitan material needs while maintaining Africans fragmented into numerous tribes and unable to unite against colonial oppression and domination. Memories and histories of multiple layers of malignant and contested histories stretching from precolonial times right through to the present, did not make it easy to forge a monolithic Zimbabwean identity as required by nationalists.

On the precolonial situation, Gerald Mazarire argued that, ‘the precolonial history of Zimbabwe is best appreciated from “breaking points” or those contexts of build up and fragmentation already written in the larger narratives of the “rise and fall” of states where new identities emerge and old ones are transformed, negotiated or accommodated’ (Mazarire 2009: 2). This prescient analysis is very relevant for a new understanding of the issue of identities in postcolonial Zimbabwe. Where previous historians emphasized the existence of homogenizing precolonial ‘empires’ of Mutapa, Torwa, Rozvi and Ndebele, Mazarire points to the neglected heterogeneity (Mazarire 2009: 1-38).

In is clear from Mazarire’s (2009: 1-8) analysis that Shona identity was a conflation of linguistic, cultural and political attributes of a people who did not even know themselves by that name until the 1930s. What is today homogenized as Shona is a conflation of people who were variously described as ‘vaNyai’, ‘abeTshabi’, ‘Karanga’, or ‘Hole’. Jocelyn Alexander described the idea of a homogenized ‘Shona’ identity as ‘an anachronistic label applied to a diverse range of groups with no single cultural or political identity’ (Alexander 2006: 19).

One can add that in the south-west of the Zimbabwe plateau emerged another hegemonic identity known as Ndebele that conflated and homogenized such identities as Kalanga, Nyubi, Venda, Tonga, Tswana, Sotho, Birwa and Lozwi into a broad Ndebele identity (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009). Without this historical deconstruction of the processes of enlargement and homogenization of identities, a false view of a Zimbabwe divided into ‘Shona’ and ‘Ndebele’ identities will persist. Zimbabwe has already paid dearly for freezing people
into this conflict and suspicion-ridden bimodal ethnicity as indicated by the 
low-intensity ‘civil war’ that engulfed Matabeleland and the Midlands regions 
in the 1980s (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace and Legal Resources 

Recent studies by Joann McGregor on Zambezi border areas inhabited 
by such groups as the Tonga, Nambya and other minority peoples, reveal 
complex ethnic politics revolving round politics of recognition and claim to 
local resources. McGregor wrote:

These ethnic mobilizations in the Zambezi border were important for the emer-
ging politics of landscape. As modernist cultural nationalist movements, they in-
volved essentialised notions of culture that were territorialized and politicized. 
Their focus on specific evocative ‘sites’ within lost lands in which culture and the 
past were instilled made implicit or explicit claim to ownership and access, and 
demanded compensation and development (McGregor 2009).

Ethnic mobilizations have culminated in demands by Tonga and Nambya 
people for preferential employment at Hwange Coal Mines and recognition of 
their primal fishing rights on the Kariba Dam (McGregor 2009). Reko Patswe 
Mathe has unearthed similar ethnic nationalism developing among the Venda 
of Beitbridge border region informed by issues of recognition, belonging and 
language preservation (Mathe 2005).

Nationalist discourses of nation-building favoured unitary histories upon 
which to base the imagined postcolonial nation. In the process they ceaselessly 
constructed national nodal points on which to hinge and construct national 
identity. Some historians deliberately sought to construct a national rather 
than tribal history of Zimbabwe in which the Ndebele and the Shona united 
against colonialism in 1896 and 1897 (Ranger 1967). Roberts (2005) criticized 
the work of Terence Ranger for sustaining a linear unitary nationalist history 
running from ‘Mukwati to Nkomo/Mugabe.’ To him, Ranger produced a 
political history of Zimbabwe that fell into the old-fashioned Whiggish mould 
of Panglossian unilinear development (Roberts 2005).

But Roberts’ criticism of Ranger does not take into account Ranger’s 
latest intellectual interventions on Zimbabwean studies where he explored 
complexities and ambiguities of nationalism, including explaining how Joshua 
Nkomo (a leading Zimbabwean nationalist) became fascinated with identities 
to the extent of becoming a leading member of Kalanga Cultural Promotion 
Society and of the Matabeleland Home Society (MHS) as well as of Bantu 
Congress. His identity at home was Kalanga; in Bulawayo it was Ndebele; 
in Rhodesia as a whole it was nationalist’ (Ranger 1999: 210-211). Ranger
celebrated Nkomo’s belief in possibilities and desirability of one person having multiple identities and ‘possessing such a hierarchy of identities, each deep and valid and each enriching the other’, concluding that: ‘Nkomo was a great synthesizer’ (Ranger 1999: 211).

Zimbabwean nationalism failed to continue the progressive process of ‘synthesizing’ different identities as a logical way to arrive at common identity. Added to this, some scholars like Masipula Sithole (1999) bought themselves into the bimodal ethnic categorization of Zimbabwe to the extent that Sithole even conflated ‘Shangani’ identity into ‘Shona’ identity. This is revealed in his analysis of ethnic grouping within nationalist movements and his listing of the Sitholes as ‘Shona’. Progression of Zimbabwean nationalism has fossilized along these false Ndebele-Shona ethnic fault-lines with devastating implications for the postcolonial nation-building project.

A very xenophobic document entitled ‘For Restricted Circulation: Progress Review on the 1979 Grand Plan’ that defined the nationalist struggle as nothing but a Shona affair to establish Shona hegemony in Zimbabwe, circulated within the country in the 1990s. It partly read:

The Ndebeles had no legal claim whatsoever upon Zimbabwean sovereignty just like their earlier cousins (followers of Soshangane) later led by Ndabaningi Sithole, that hobgoblin who tried to hijack the struggle. Sithole was foiled and summarily ejected from the party – an act he regretted till his grave … ZANU’s correction of Sithole’s errors left the Shangaans a thoroughly confused group despite the modification of their identity to drift closer to Shona under the guise of a language called Ndau, generally accepted among the ignorant as a dialect of Shona. The truth remains – they are foreigners, unwilling to advance our cause as they huddle around and cling childishly to the ‘Ndonga’ (Progress Review on the 1979 Plan).

The authors of this document were never identified. Its origins were roughly linked to some Shona-speaking intellectuals based in the United Kingdom in the late 1970s who were deeply tribalist and xenophobic. It was aimed at the Ndebele whose presence in Zimbabwe was considered an irritation. ZANU-PF dismissed the document as a product of imperialist plans to divide the country, and it deeply infuriated those Ndebele-speaking people that had access to it. The document even celebrated the Gukurahundi conflict that left over 20,000 Ndebele civilians dead between 1980 and 1987. It created an impression of Gukurahundi as part of a ZANU-PF Grand Plan to eliminate the Ndebele.

Besides Sithole’s (1999) *Struggles within the Struggle* that documented pulsations of ethnic identities within the rank and file of liberation movements, Zim-
babwean historians have been reluctant to engage directly with issues of identities, leading James Muzondidya and Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni to argue that:

Until recently, Zimbabweans have been conspicuously silent about questions of ethnicity. As in the colonial period, especially during the days of the nationalist liberation struggle, all attempts to discuss ethnic identities, especially their manifestation in the political and economic spheres, were brushed aside. Yet, ethnicity has continued to shape and influence the economic, social and political life of Zimbabwe since the achievement of independence in 1980 (Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2007: 276).

But in recent years, Enocent Msindo boldly engaged with the deconstruction and decoupling of Ndebele and Kalanga identities in the south-western part of the country, inaugurating a deconstruction of regional ‘Ndebele’ identity. Msindo argued that:

The history of Matabeleland is one of a restless frontier where identities (ethnicity, regional and/or national) shifted and got different meanings in different historical contexts. It is not simply a Ndebele history, but a complicated history of many ethnic groups that have never attracted the scholarly attention of researchers who simply work under the illusion that Matabeleland is Ndebele land (Msindo 2004: 1).

While nationalism was meant to forge a common national identity as part of the imagination of the postcolonial nation, it quickly ran up against resilient local and regional identities that needed careful negotiation or marshalling into a common national identity. It became very hard for nationalism to ignore some identities with a precolonial origin. In the heydays of unitary mass nationalism (1957–62) the chairman of a cultural club that organized the Zimbabwe Festival of African Culture held in May 1963 stated that:

We are descended from the great civilization of the Monomotapa Empire which even today enriches the archives of this land and literature of the Portuguese and Arab peoples. Let that be known by those who wish us ill or well. Let those who pour scorn and derision on this our modest beginning, know that we shall work untiringly to make Zimbabwe the heart of African culture (Turino 2000:181).

To some historians, postcolonial Zimbabwe is a successor state to precolonial Munhumutapa. This interpretation of the nation conflates being ‘Karanga’ with being ‘Shona’, and being ‘Shona’ with being an ‘authentic’ Zimbabwean. Stan Mudenge (1988) wrote that postcolonial Zimbabwe was ‘not merely a geographical expression created by imperialism during the nineteenth century’. To him, it was ‘a reality that has existed for centuries, with a language, a culture and a ‘world view’ of its own, representing the inner core of the Shona
historical experience’ (Mudenge 1988: 362-364). The danger of popularizing such a primordial origin of Zimbabwe tended to obliterate or suppress other histories.

On top of the sensitive issue of ethnicity is the issue of race that is equally important in the debate on forging national identity in the context of a neo-colonial environment. Mamdani explored the entanglement of race in struggles for national identity in postcolonial Africa in terms of the complex ‘native–settler’ question, arguing that:

The settler–native question is a political question. It is also a historical question. Settlers and natives belong together. You cannot have one without the other, for it is the relationship between them that make one a settler and the other a native. To do away with one, you have to do away with the other (Mamdani 2001: 63-76).

The settler presence in Rhodesia made the crystallization of nationalism and the concomitant issue of identity to be permeated by race. The daunting tasks to African nationalists as nation-builders in ex-settler colonies like South Africa and Zimbabwe is how to create a stable, common and single citizenship for settlers and natives. This task involves more than the de-racializing of institutions and removal of racial pieces of legislation from the statute books.

To build a nation out of settlers and natives requires ‘an overall metamorphosis’ within which ‘erstwhile colonizers and colonized are politically reborn as equal members of a single political community’ (Mamdani 2001: 65). For both Zimbabwe as in South Africa, the African nationalists have attempted to use the policy of reconciliation as a methodology of bringing the former ‘native’ and the former ‘settler’ into common citizenship. This has proven to be an inadequate formula. What is lacking is the building of a new political order that is not tainted by colonial and apartheid legacies that is based on consent rather than conquest, capable of creating equal and consenting citizens.

**Nation formation**

In the 1960s, African nationalism sought to create and mobilize what Manuel Castells termed ‘resistance identity’ to create a postcolonial Zimbabwean nation. Castells used the term ‘resistance identity’ to refer to ‘those actors that are in positions/conditions devalued and/or stigmatized by the logic of domination’ (Castells 1997: 8-9). With specific focus on Zimbabwe, Msindo argued that the founding fathers of nationalist parties used nationalism loosely, without clearly defining the nation, adding that:
They were not clear who the future national citizens were to be, and to them, it does seem nationalism was a desire for freedom, justice and self-governance. The project required an imagined collective Zimbabwean community of *abantwana benhlaba* (children of the soil/land), transcending ethnicities. Interestingly, this definition was flouted by the very people who coined it, making it difficult to assert that there was any founded collective ideology of ‘the nation’ as we know it intellectually (Msindo 2004: 21).

Msindo posed crucial questions about nationalism’s mission in Zimbabwe prior to independence:

> Was nationalism just about anti-colonialism or simply the desire for Independence? In which case did it become a struggle for power? Was it mere xenophobia, justifying an anti-white stance? … Alternatively, was it about defining a nation in which questions such as ‘Who are we?’ And ‘Who should be part of the nation?’ became issues in those years? (Msindo 2004: 21).

To respond to these questions one needs to track how the nationalist parties and the nationalist actors defined and articulated the pertinent issues of nation, national identity, and citizenship. The first mass modern nationalist movement was the liberal-oriented Southern Rhodesia African National Congress (SRANC) formed in 1957. Its ideological position was framed within very moderate and conservative liberal imagination of liberation and definition of citizenship. The issue of national belonging was not given a careful thought beyond the rhetoric of a multiracial society of equal citizens. SRANC’s statement of principles had this to say on national identities:

> Its aim is the NATIONAL UNITY of all inhabitants of the country in true partnership regardless of race, colour and creed. It stands for a completely integrated society, equality of opportunity in every sphere and the social, economic and political advancement of all. It regards these objectives as the essential foundation of that partnership between people of all races without which there can be no peaceful progress in this country (SRANC 1957).

The Congress affirmed complete loyalty to the British Crown as the symbol of national unity and maintained that it was not a racial movement. Its pronouncements opposed both tribalism and racialism to the extent of welcoming as members persons of any race who were sympathetic with its aims and objectives of the SRANC. It also recognized the rights of all who were citizens of the country, whether African, European, Coloured or Asian, to retain and enjoy permanently the fullest citizenship. It believed that the imagined democratic society could only advance through non-racial thinking and acting, and that an integrated society provided the only alternative to tribalism and racialism (SRANC 1957).
The SRANC emphasized that it was opposed to tribalism alongside racism in its imagination of an integrated nation founded on ‘true partnership regardless of race, colour and creed’. There was fear by early nationalists that to cause panic on the white settler community was going to make them dig in and resist African nationalism as an anti-white phenomenon. Opposition to racism informed SRANC’s policy on citizenship as it stated:

Congress believes that full citizenship must be extended to all those of any race or colour who are lawful and permanent inhabitants of the country, and have demonstrated this through their satisfactory residence and integration in the life of the community over the course of five years’ residence in the country (SARANC 1957: 10).

But despite its moderate agenda, the SRANC met with increased colonial repression that culminated in the declaration of a state of emergency, the banning of the party, and detention and restriction of its leadership in 1959. The SRANC was succeeded by the NDP that was formed on 1 January 1960 and launched in the suburb of Highfields in Salisbury (Harare). The NDP defined itself as ‘a political party initiated and led by Africans’. Among its aims was pursuing ‘the struggle for, and attainment of freedom for African people of Southern Rhodesia’, and ‘establishing and granting one man one vote for all inhabitants of Southern Rhodesia’ (Samkange 1960: 21).

The NDP committed itself to ‘working in conjunction with other freedom organizations in Africa for the establishment and maintenance of democracy in Africa and the achievement of Pan-Africanism’ (Samkange 1960: 21). While the SRANC was preoccupied with anti-racism, the NDP emphasized ‘one man one vote’ as the solution to what became known as the ‘Rhodesian Problem’ (Weinrich 1975). Unlike the SRANC, that was mainly an urban political formation, the NDP made deep inroads into rural areas and its rallies were massive.

The ethnic composition of the NDP leadership was dominated by nationalists of Kalanga ethnic extraction. These were Joshua Nkomo (President), George Silundika (Financial Secretary), and Jason Ziyaphapha Moyo (Secretary General). Msindo noted that these were powerful posts in the seven-man Executive Committee of the NDP. The Kalanga ethnic group is said to have celebrated the dominance of people from their tribe in the leadership of NDP (Msindo 2004: 233).

Ethnic divisions emerged strongly within the NDP that touched on the suitability of the name Zimbabwe for the imagined postcolonial nation. Some people from Matebeleland, whose imagination of political independence
was influenced by memories of the powerful precolonial Ndebele state, were opposed to the naming of the imagined nation as ‘Zimbabwe’. To them the name ‘Zimbabwe’ conjured up the promotion of Shona history and memory. Both Ndebele and Kalanga nationalist activists pushed for the name ‘Matopos’. Mbobo, the Secretary General of the Matebele Home Society (MHS), pushed the idea of ‘Matopos’ as the name for the country in these words:

[...] both historically and traditionally (Matopos) was of greater significance and spiritual importance [that] attempts to belittle it would be resisted by all in Matabeleland. Those leaders … were best advised to stop thinking in tribal terms and we in Matabeleland are going to resist any imposed leadership (Bantu Mirror, 23 September 1960).

Msindo correctly noted that such regional concerns and tensions indicated the fragility of the emerging territorial nationalism. A split within the NDP occurred that had partly to do with issues of regional identities. The split saw a group of Karanga nationalists breaking from the NDP to form the Zimbabwe National Party (ZNP), the first political party to use the name ‘Zimbabwe’ for the country. Michael Mawema, a Karanga from Fort Victoria (Masvingo) where the Zimbabwe Ruins are located, is credited with coming up with the name ‘Zimbabwe’ for the imagined postcolonial nation. Msindo (2004) argued that Nkomo managed to contain a severe split in the NDP by outmanoeuvring the Karanga clique that had formed the ZNP by quickly bringing more Shona leaders into the upper echelons of the NDP.

But NDP was banned on 9 December 1961 and it was succeeded by Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) within six days. ZAPU had a more tumultuous political existence before it was banned on 20 September 1962. It was the first mass nationalist party to use the name ‘Zimbabwe’ to signify its acceptance of the imagination of the postcolonial nation as ‘Zimbabwe’. ZAPU was a more radical political formation that inaugurated a period of sabotage to cause panic on the white settler population as part pressure to grant independence to Africans. ZAPU intensified the agitation one man one vote as the foundation of democratic governance in the country, and relentlessly demanded majority rule.

Nyangoni (1977: 50) argued that the major significance of ZAPU was that it was the first African political organization to apply the concepts of imperialism and pan-Africanism to Zimbabwe liberation. ZAPU was also the first African political formation to entertain the idea of a bloody nationalist revolution as a way of achieving independence. But this radical political discourse invited the wrath of the colonial forces that increased its arrest of the nationalist leaders.
In the midst of laying the foundation for confrontational politics ZAPU suffered a devastating internal split in 1963 that badly affected efforts to create a national identity called ‘Zimbabwean’. The split led to the formation of a Shona-dominated Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). With the split, the fossilization of nationalism took a bimodal form of ZAPU and ZANU mediated by the spectre of Shona and Ndebele antagonistic ethnicities. Nationalism as a unifying force had miscarried and ‘black-on-black violence’ was let loose.

ZANU soon branded itself as a new political formation that favoured ‘confrontational politics’ compared to ZAPU. ZANU’s approach to the issue of belonging was not radical though and did not differ from that of ZAPU. It defined itself just like ZAPU as ‘a non-racial union of all the peoples of Zimbabwe who share a common destiny and a common fate believing in the African character of Zimbabwe and democratic rule by the majority regardless of race, colour, creed or tribe’ (ZANU 1963).

ZANU’s policy on citizenship simply stated that: ‘All people born in Zimbabwe or who have been citizens of Zimbabwe shall be citizens of the republic. Foreigners may qualify for citizenship under conditions prescribed in accordance with the Law of the Republic’ (ZANU 1963). At the ZANU Inaugural Congress held in Gwelo (Gweru) from 12 to 13 May 1964, its founder president, Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, asserted that: ‘ZANU which was formed on the 8th of August 1963, stands for democracy, socialism, nationalism, one man one vote, freedom, Pan-Africanism, non-racism and republicanism’ (Sithole 1964).

Both ZAPU and ZANU premised their politics on the language of majority rule and one man one vote as the key nationalist trope. Joshua Nkomo, the leader of ZAPU argued that: ‘Being, as I am, an ardent exponent of majority rule, as the only and natural solution to the political, social and economic problems that beset the country, let me give a picture of the majority rule that we are struggling for’ (Nkomo 1964). He did in the following words:

There is talk by some people that ‘majority rule’ means rule by Africans only; that Africanisation will deprive Europeans of their jobs and that there will be a general lowering of standards. To us majority rule means the extension of political rights to all people so that they are able to elect a Government of their own choice, irrespective of race, colour or creed of the individual forming such a government. All that matters is that a Government must consist of the majority party elected by the majority of the country’s voters. ‘Africanisation’ means the opening of all those jobs and extension of the ceiling which had been closed to Africans, without necessarily
eliminating those who at present hold such jobs, unless they chose to do so on their own accord, or are proved to be disloyal to the administration (Nkomo 1964).

Nationality and citizenship have always and constantly been defined in terms of Africans versus whites, as though Africans were already a collectivity pursuing a single and common political goal. The unity of Africans was taken as given even in the face of the split of 1963 that was followed by a clear ‘black-on-black’ violence. But in the 1970s when political parties continued to fragment along many fault lines of Ndebele vs. Kalanga, Kalanga vs. Shona, Karanga vs. Manyika, and Karanga vs. Zezuru, the rhetoric of unity came into political discourses of the nationalist parties, particularly from such newcomers to the political scene as Bishop Abel Muzorewa, and new political formations like the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI).

At the formation of FROLIZI, one of its leaders Nathan Shamuyarira emphasized its commitment ‘to the unity of all Africans within and across borders’, adding that unity was the overriding concern that led to the formation of FROLIZI (Shamuyarira 1971).

However, those closer to politics of the the struggle saw FROLIZI as nothing but a tribal political formation and blamed Shamuyarira for championing tribal Zezuru clique politics (Bhebe 2004). FROLIZI was derided as the ‘Front for the Liaison of Zezuru Intellectuals’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009). On the other hand, ZAPU and ZANU fought over ‘authenticity’ and which party was more committed to the liberation of the country than the other while suffering under proscription.

Another new political formation called the African National Council (ANC), which was launched on 10 March 1972, also emphasized the centrality of unity. The ANC was founded within a conjectural context of resisting the Peace Commission at a time when ZAPU and ZANU were proscribed. So to ZAPU and ZANU leaders, the majority of whom were in detention, the ANC was a stop-gap measure to continue nationalist politics and close the political vacuum created by Ian Smith’s post-UDI politics of intensified repression. The ANC was also formed within a context in which the disunity between ZAPU and ZANU had caused terrible violence in Salisbury (Harare) and Bulawayo (Muzorewa 1972). Indeed, efforts to forge unity among major nationalist political formations remained elusive throughout the time of the liberation struggle and even beyond, up until 22 December 1987 when Patriotic Front-Zimbabwe African People’s Union (PF-ZAPU) was finally swallowed by Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF).
Zimbabwean nationalism was, therefore, highly contested from within and from without. Tribalism and regionalism affected ZAPU and ZANU as well as other smaller political formations. The interlocutors of nationalism, while agreeing on the need for a decolonized nation as the central moral and normative frame of reference, still held on to a variety of beliefs and divergent methods of realizing this dream of forging nationhood and were active in tribal, ethnic and regional squabbles.

Leading nationalist leaders fought to blur the nationalist visions of some of their ranks and project others as sell outs, counter-revolutionaries and puppets as the struggles for power intensified within the liberation movements of different ideological persuasions. Suffice it to say the Zimbabwean nationalists were affected by ethnic divisions, ideological difference, as well as by tactics and strategies for achieving political independence. Some preferred a negotiated settlement even in the face of settler colonial intransigence, others preferred a combination of coercion and diplomacy, yet others thought violence was the only solution to the colonial problem. Zimbabwe was eventually born out of a combination of violence and diplomacy.

Birth of neocolonial Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe joined the community of African nations as the fiftieth independent African state on 18 April 1980. At birth, the young state was forced to dream in both socialist and liberal terms. Its political ideology was captive to these antagonistic worldviews. In addition, the transfer of political power from the white settler political elite to the black elite took the form of negotiated settlement at Lancaster House in Britain under direction of Britain and America. One of the objectives of these Western patrons was to ensure that the radical Marxist ideology the liberation forces had imbibed and by which they advocated the smashing up of the colonially constructed state and building of a new socialist republic did not materialize. At the end of decolonization, Zimbabwe was born as a successor to the Rhodesia colonial state rather than as a new alternative to it.

The Lancaster House Conference of 1979 was a neocolonial trap. The settlement was directly responsible for compromising a ‘revolutionary’ transition, under which racially biased inequalities in land and asset distribution could have been resolved. A ‘revolutionary’ transition was also made remote by the dominance of the African bourgeois elite like Joshua Nkomo, Robert Mugabe and many others who had not completely ‘committed class suicide’ to fully embrace the radical demands of the peasants, workers and the fighting
forces of ZIPRA and ZANLA who needed radical changes. The bourgeois elite throughout Africa were mainly concerned with taking over as new leaders where the white colonial bourgeoisie had left; radical transformation was not built into their plan.

The failure of the Zimbabwean transition to assumed ‘revolutionary’ character has been described as a ‘revolution that lost its way’ (Astrow 1983). The Zimbabwean transition to independence took a form of ‘half-way house’ between ‘revolutionary’ and ‘settlement’ patterns. Despite the limitations imposed by the Lancaster House Agreement and the Lancaster House Constitution, ZANU-PF that had emerged triumphant in the elections of 1980 committed itself to fulfil some of the key tasks of the liberation project. The national liberation project remained vaguely defined and ambiguously articulated across both ZAPU and ZANU nationalist political formations compared, for instance, to the South African’s African National Congress (ANC) which had the 1955 Freedom Charter as its ideological guide that spelt out what type of nation they imagined and wanted.

The ZANU-PF government set for itself an ambitious postcolonial agenda of ending poverty and underdevelopment among Africans; bridging the disparities between the formerly colonized and the former colonizers in terms of wealth, income and opportunities and de-racializing the patterns of ownership of productive property; ensuring economic growth that benefitted every Zimbabwean; entrenching democracy by ensuring the greater involvement of the masses of the people in the system of governance that was denied under settler colonialism; and securing Zimbabwe’s rightful place in Southern Africa, Africa and the rest of the world (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009; Mbeki 2001).

But from the 1980s, ethnicity reared its ugly head and plunged Matabeleland and the Midlands regions dominated by Ndebele-speaking people into violence -- this time orchestrated by the ZANU-PF dominated state. This violence led to the collapse of the coalition government in 1982 as PF-ZAPU became framed as a dissident party that deserved to be destroyed. Zimbabwe soon assumed the character of an ethnocracy with the Shona-speaking people becoming the authentic subjects of the nation, while the Ndebele were subjected to state-sanctioned ethnic-cleansing (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009).

The violence that engulfed the south-western part of the country in the 1980s dented ZANU-PF and Mugabe’s positive contribution in reversing some colonial policies in the areas of health and education particularly. But ZANU-PF demonstrated reluctance in entrenching democratic and human rights culture from the beginning. Democracy and human rights remained part of
their rhetoric and propaganda. ZANU-PF’s political practice did not emphasize democracy and human rights as its cardinal policy. What the ZANU-PF government concentrated on was consolidation of regime security at the expense of a clear nation-building agenda beyond the policy of reconciliation.

The celebrated redistributive project of the 1980s that saw Zimbabwe opening educational opportunities for black people, raising the standard of living of rural people, while making health care accessible to the majority of people was predicated on sharing what was available without clear plans of reproducing what was being consumed and distributed (Davies 2004; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2006). Zimbabwe was also benefitting from the goodwill of the international community that was generous with financial support in spite of ZANU-PF’s deplorable human rights record that left 20,000 Ndebele-speaking people dead and its reluctance to embrace liberal forms of governance and strict corporate management that worked against corruption. Throughout the 1980s, ZANU-PF and Mugabe consistently talked left and walked right while consolidating their internal authoritarian system of governance that tolerated violence. Every election since 1980 was dominated by violence that exposed ZANU-PF as an authoritarian political formation not committed to fair political competition.

Early economic policies were geared towards large expenditure on education, health and welfare; significant expenditures on rural development; and subsidization of essential commodities such as food and fuel. This was followed by subsidization of the state corporations to keep the prices of the goods and services they supplied down. The third pillar was training and deployment of black Zimbabweans in senior positions in all areas of the public sector. The fourth was an upward adjustment of wages and salaries in the public sector to bridge the gap between black and white earnings; and a limited programme to encourage the emergence of a black rural and urban petit bourgeoisie (Libby 1984).

Among the key economic flaws was the failure to harmonize the private and public sectors’ efforts to address poverty and underdevelopment. The private sector remained a sacred cow and a domain of the few economically powerful, white bourgeoisie, playing a minimal role in the government’s effort to bridge the material disparities between the black and white communities (Mbeki 2001). This was partly due to ZANU-PF’s surprising religious adherence to the Lancaster House Agreement’s ‘sunset clauses’ on the economic arena, while violating its human rights and democratic clauses willy-nilly (Mandaza 1986).

What was immediately poignant was that the ‘economy and the national budget could not carry the costs imposed on it by the requirement to respond to two of the tasks [ending poverty and underdevelopment] of the Second
Phase of the National Democratic Revolution, of meeting the needs of the people’ (Mbeki 2001). The only way out was to increase borrowing and to turn to international financial organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for assistance, resulting in the accumulation of debt by the young postcolonial state of Zimbabwe. While all this was happening, the ZANU-PF government ‘maintained a complex system of government controls over the economy, which increased the cost of doing business in Zimbabwe and acted as a disincentive for investors who had the choice to invest in less regulated markets’ (Mbeki 2001).

In the economic arena, the postcolonial state failed from the beginning as ZANU-PF adopted a subjective and populist approach to the accomplishment of the tasks of the liberatory project in the field of the economy. In pursuing these tasks, it did not take into account the objective reality of fiscal and economic constraints. By as early 1984, the state was already running out of resources and began to appeal to the IMF for financial help. Thus a subjective approach to the economy, which was solely driven by the populist desire to serve the interests of ZANU-PF supporters, imposed new and heavy burdens on the national economy.

This situation was compounded by the failure of ZANU-PF to prevent the rise of cronyism, clientelism, neo-patrimonialism and corruption, which saw those close to the ruling party dividing up the national cake among themselves at the expense of the masses. George B. N. Ayittey (2005) argued that ‘Africa’s postcolonial development effort may be described as one giant false start’, where African leaders (with few exceptions) adopted the wrong political systems such as sultanism or one-party states; the wrong economic system (statism); the wrong ideology (socialism); and took the wrong path (industrialization via import substitution). He added that most leaders were functionally illiterate and given to schizophrenic posturing and sloganeering. The leadership lacked basic understanding of the development process (Ayittey 2005: 92-95).

By the end of the 1980s, the distributive agenda of the 1980s collapsed as the resources had been drained beyond repair. Adoption of Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) was a desperate measure and did not manage to rehabilitate the economy that was now experiencing destructive patronage, corruption and clientelism (Mlambo 1997, Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2006). When ESAP was eventually officially abandoned in 1997, Zimbabwe was governed through crisis management and some destructive economic decisions were being taken, including giving lump sums of unbudgeted money to war veterans and intervening militarily in the DRC (Ndlovu 2006; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009).
By the beginning of 2000, Zimbabwe had lost social peace within and political peace without. The nationalist project entered its most populist, militaristic and reckless trajectory mediated by what Horace Campbell (2003) termed executive lawlessness. A number of indicators demonstrated this degeneration. First was the consolidation of an ‘imperial presidency’ together with the concomitant spreading of the personality cult of President Mugabe as the embodiment of the nation-state. Second was the increasing deployment of violence and coercion as a governance strategy through military operations that began with Operation Gukurahundi in the 1980s, Operation Murambatsvina in 2005 and many others that followed. Third was the increasing and profound closure of the democratic space through tightening screws of repression and oppression.

Fourth was the appearance of the war veterans and the nationalist leaders as the ‘first citizens’ of the nation to which all other people were expected to pay homage as liberators, the alpha and omega of Zimbabwe. This happened alongside the militarization of state institutions and further increase in executive lawlessness. All this combined to make democracy an orphan in Zimbabwe. In attempting to make sense of all these negative political developments, Ranger (2003) mounted one of the most robust critiques of the character of Zimbabwean nationalism, revealing that the nationalist liberation wars had proven to be a dangerous terrain of authoritarianism, personality cults, ‘commandism’ and violence where ‘disagreement could mean death’.

But how and why did the ZANU-PF government fall into this mess? A number of explanations can be given. The first is that ZANU-PF emerged within a terrain marked by violence from both the intransigent colonial settler state and from the ZAPU it had split from in 1963. The intransigence and bellicosity of the Rhodesian settler state also forced both ZAPU and ZANU into militancy and to embrace violence as a legitimate tool of liberation.

On this development, John Makumbe argued that ‘supposedly democratic political parties, formed for the twin purposes of putting an end to colonialism and creating a democratic dispensation in Zimbabwe, were forced to become militant and militaristic liberation movements’ (Makumbe 2003:24). Both ZAPU and ZANU received military support and training from the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Cuba, and China, on top of the support from fellows Africans on the continent. Thus the Socialist bloc had a lasting impact on the liberation movements to the extent that: ‘The political organization of ZANU […] assumed the eastern bloc format, complete with a central committee and politburo’ (Makumbe 2003: 24).
The conduct of the armed struggle against a belligerent settler colonial state implied a number of developments that left a lasting impression on ZANU-PF and the state it created in 1980. The first was militarization of the liberation movement, together with the development of commandist and regimental attributes. The second was the prominence of the party leader within the movement that gradually developed into the postcolonial cult of personality. The third was that the militarist approach tended to brook no dissent. The fourth was the building of a nationalist-military alliance that has remained up to today, in which top commanders of the army are loyal ZANU-PF members (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2006).

Makumbe (2003: 34) argued that these developments implied that ZANU ‘would become vulnerable to tendencies of authoritarianism and personalized rule’. Under the influence of Eastern bloc countries that had one-party political systems, ZANU’s pronouncements and propaganda throughout the liberation period into the 1980s and beginning of 1990s, emphasized their need to create a one-party socialist state in Zimbabwe (Mandaza and Sachikonye 1991; Reed 1993). Even today, the way ZANU-PF conducts itself politically is as though Zimbabwe is under a one party-state political system. Makumbe further argued that ZANU-PF’s adherence to socialist party organizational structures and systems of operational management had resulted in its failure to transform itself into a democratic political party, concluding that:

The genesis of a political party seems to have a bearing on that party’s future development. The Zimbabwe case seems to illustrate that liberation movements struggle to transform themselves into democratic political parties when their countries become liberated or independent. Indeed, whenever they are threatened with loss of political power, former liberation movements tend to resuscitate their original achievements as liberators as a license to continued tenure of office. They also harness their wartime tactics of instilling fear in the electorate to win elections (Makumbe 2003: 35).

ZANU-PF became concerned with regime security above all other considerations. It took a number of strategies to safeguard its regime security. The first was intolerance of opposition that manifested itself in the violent elimination of PF-ZAPU as the first postcolonial credible opposition in Zimbabwe. The second was the increasing call for a one-party state, and the justification for these calls on a number of grounds.

The justifications included the question of economic development that was said to need monolithic unity; African tradition that was said to have no space for opposition parties; and the idea that a multi-party system was not just a luxury in Africa but that it promoted instability, regionalism and tribalism that
stood opposed to the nation-building agenda. This was indicated in Mugabe's speeches that included envisioning 'one state with one society, one nation, one party, one leader' (Moto Magazine, 1 August 1982). Mugabe emphasized that as an indication of the unity of the people in Zimbabwe, 'They should be one party, with one government and one Prime Minister' (The Chronicle, 25 January 1982). This rhetoric of unity was used to destroy any site of pluralism within society (Sylvester 1986: 246).

As the national cake continued to shrink in the 1990s, the ZANU-PF government responded with increasing closure of democratic space coupled with use of violence against those considered opponents. There were also noticeable changes to ZANU-PF's conception of nationalism, democracy, and economic development. Dorman (2001: 50) claimed that 'the joint nation and party-building [...] was defined in terms of three interlocking concepts: reconciliation and unity; development; and nationalist rhetoric and symbolism'. She added that 'the regime's new legislative and security powers based upon the oppressive laws of the Rhodesian state, allowed it to regulate widely providing a political-military framework through which to dominate and demobilize society' (Dorman 2001: 51).

Norbert Tengende (1994) reinforced Dorman's analysis, arguing that the ZANU-PF nation-building project was nothing but an instrument of domination and control marked by the marginalization of popular participation (Tengende 1994: 153; Sachikonye 1996: 142). The tree of democracy was easily uprooted and substituted by the tree of presidentialism in the late 1980s. This was symbolically represented by what Dorman termed 'the omni-present “official portrait” of the president' that even substituted nationalism (Dorman 2001: 57). With the establishment of the ‘imperial executive presidency’ in 1987 there followed the inauguration of the Robert Mugabe ‘father of the nation motif’, backed by liberation war credentials and nationalist iconography that is proving very hard to transcend democratically.

Disillusionment with ZANU-PF authoritarianism resulted in the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in September 1999. The MDC soon gained national support across racial, ethnic, gender, class, and religious divides through its promised commitment to restore democracy, human rights, constitutionalism, rule of law, and economic growth. These were issues that ZANU-PF had downplayed in their political agenda (Sithole 1997: 127-141; Sithole 2001). In the place of democracy and human rights ZANU-PF emphasized social and economic justice issues that were soon undermined by ZANU-PF elite accumulation of land ahead of peasants and workers, together with state-sanctioned violence against peasants and workers.
Over the years, membership of ZANU-PF and support for Mugabe personally had become conditions for access to positions of employment, resources, and authority. This happened alongside the loss of support among sections of the population who did not benefit from its political patronage. Worse still, as this process evolved, the structures of the party showed signs of atrophy, and the organization began to deviate from its role as representatives of the popular will. The party was now being perceived as the state, abusing public resources and dispensing public resources to clients and cronies in a brazenly partisan and very destructive primitive accumulation manner (Mbeki 2001).

By 2000 popular democracy had found its way into intensive care; and other agents as the war veterans, youth militias, and the military came to be the basis of ZANU-PF and Mugabe’s power. While ZANU-PF thought it would continue to have strong control the war veterans, another development occurred, with a negative impact on the structures of the party: According to Mbeki (2001):

[T]he ‘war veteran’ structures are not subject to the processes of control and accountability binding the normal structures of the party of revolution. Accordingly, the ‘war veterans’ have achieved a level of autonomy that further weakens the capacity of the party of revolution to influence and lead the masses of the people. Because they are not bound by the practices of normal party of revolution, the ‘war veterans’ resort to ways and means predicated on the use of force against the people, rather than the education and persuasion of these masses to support the revolutionary cause. For these reasons, they also attract into their ranks the lumpen proletariat in particular. … Inevitably, therefore, to the extent that it sustains these parallel structures, the party of the revolution becomes an opponent of the democratic institutions of governance and democratic processes that it has itself established and encouraged and for whose establishment it fought most heroically, with many of its militants laying down their lives [my emphasis].

Having burst into Zimbabwe’s body politic as storm-troopers of ZANU-PF, the war veterans in collusion with youth militias and ‘militarized’ members of the national army, constituted themselves into an extra-party and built parallel political structures that were inimical to democracy, constitutionalism, and the rule of law. They were seen to constitute a huge stumbling block to democracy and transitional justice in Zimbabwe. In short, those who fought for democracy had turned around to become serious obstacles to the democratic project in Zimbabwe.

On the foreign policy arena, Zimbabwe degenerated into pursuit of abrasive foreign policy towards the West at a wrong time when the country had no capacity to contain the disciplinary responses of the West and its impact on the
domestic sphere. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and implosion of the socialist republics of eastern and central Europe, the developed capitalist world assumed a hegemonic position in global economic and political affairs.

What Zimbabwe considered to be its allies in the war against the West such as China and others in the East were themselves opening up to significant inflow of private capital from the developed capitalist world, while Zimbabwe went in the opposite direction by ‘Looking East[ward]’. ZANU-PF and Mugabe miscalculated strategically and tactically as ‘it is clear that, at this historical moment, it is impossible to mobilize the disciplined socialist and anti-imperialist forces that it might have been possible to mobilize two decades ago, to act as a counterweight to the developed capitalist countries’ (Mbeki 2001: 24).

The fact that the country would end up in isolation, confronted by an array of international forces that could not be defeated outright eluded the ZANU-PF leadership. Zimbabwe also needed to work harder to avoid sinking into an ever-deepening social and economic malaise that would result in the reversal of many of the gains of the 1980s. As ZANU-PF’s popularity was sinking lower and lower, Mugabe developed an Afro-radical discourse that assumed a deeply racialized character.

**Fighting racial domination in a neocolonial state**

In December 1997, President Robert Mugabe declared that:

> We are now talking of conquest of conquest, the prevailing sovereignty of the people of Zimbabwe over settler minority rule and all it stood for including the possession of our land [...] Power to the people must now be followed by land to the people (The Herald, 6 December 1997).

In December 2000, President Mugabe told the ZANU-PF Congress that:

> This country is our country and this land is our land...They think because they are white they have a divine right to our resources. Not here. The white man is not indigenous to Africa. Africa is for Africans. Zimbabwe is for Zimbabweans (cited in Norman 2008: 110).

These two statements and others marked official repudiation of the previous national policy of reconciliation that formed Mugabe’s approach towards race relations in the 1980s. What has not been adequately explained is why racism became official policy of ZANU-PF in the late 1990s. Or rather, what factors made race attractive to politicians? How did ordinary people respond to the race discourse of the 1990s and 2000s? Don Robotham provided part of the answer to these questions:
When these hundreds of years of common history include merciless cruelties, denigrations, and exploitation by the same oppressor, a particularly fierce nationalism is often the result. This collective sentiment simmers over centuries and then may burst forth with fanatical ferocity. While at the abstract level one can extract the universal human from the particular experience of local groups, all people make history in the concrete. It is this actually concrete common historical experience that generates distinctive identities and necessarily finds expression in national movements dedicated to that specific cause (Robotham 2005: 567).

What is not clearly unexplained is why and when does African nationalism degenerate into racism and under what conditions beyond Frantz Fanon’s explanations? To respond to this question, it is necessary to focus on the material and historical conditions that fuel this behaviour. In Zimbabwe, race became a major concern even for moderate politicians like Joshua Nkomo because of its historical linkages with colonial dispossession politics. The Lancaster House Conference and the subsequent decolonization formula postponed the race issue. It also ignored the ethnic issue. No wonder then that ethnicity plunged the country into violent crisis barely two years into independence and race plunged the country into violence in the 1990s. What are the rational reasons for all this type of politics?

It was almost inevitable that the issue of race would continue to haunt Zimbabwe beyond the policy of reconciliation. This was partly because the policy of reconciliation failed to percolate into changing actual race relations on the ground and partly because unequal material realities still remained largely shaped by race. James Muzondidya argues it this way:

Far from being exhausted, the political rhetoric on race, black economic empowerment and radical, exclusive black nationalism, despite all the ambiguities and contradictions, continued to resonate with many Zimbabweans in both rural and urban areas who recognized the unfair balance of ownership of land and other important economic resources between blacks and whites (Muzondidya 2010: 13).

What is clear is that the Lancaster House Agreement was just an armistice for ten years rather than a resolution of the race problem. The manifestations of this race problem in a postcolonial Zimbabwe took various forms. The first indicator was the continued dominance of white minorities in the ownership of strategic resources like land, mines and industries. In the 1980s, an estimated three per cent of the population consisting mainly of white farmers and a very small black bourgeoisie owned the bulk of strategic national resources and controlled two-thirds of gross national income.
A 1989 report on black advancement in the private sector revealed the following racial distribution at management level: senior management: 62.5 per cent white, 37.5 per cent black; middle management: 35.5 per cent white, 64.5 per cent black; junior management: 22 per cent white, 78 per cent black (Raftopoulos 1996:6). The Financial Gazette of 8 January 1998 indicated that by 1993, there was only 2 per cent of black participation in all sectors of the economy.

The second indicator of the continuation of the race problem was the disengagement of whites from national politics once the Conservative Alliance collapsed and the white reserved seats were scrapped from the voters’ roll in 1987. Politically speaking whites withdrew into their farms, secluded suburbs and business premises only to re-surface in 2000 when their privileged economic life was threatened by the fast-track land reform programme. This is a point emphasized by Muzondidya:

Until the removal of the 20 reserved seats in 1987, politically active whites continued to see themselves as existing outside the new nation state and overwhelmingly continued to support the conservative Rhodesia Front...After the demise of the Rhodesia Front and the enactment of the constitutional amendment which abolished the separate voter’s roll, most whites withdrew from national electoral politics while others continued to hold on to their political imagination of Rhodesia (Muzondidya 2010: 24, see also Godwin and Hancock 1993).

The white community seemed to adhere to what Peter Godwin and Ian Hancock described as the spirit of ‘Rhodians Never Die’ which prevented them from embracing the policy of reconciliation fully, socially, politically, psychologically and economically (Godwin and Hancock 1993; Kinloch 1997: 820-838).

The third indicator of the continuation of the race problem was the white maintenance of a colonial settler culture revealed through coercive control over black labour and their manipulative approach to the maintenance of their economic interests as well as social seclusion from the black population. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s the white community tied to maintain what Dan Kennedy termed ‘islands of white’ within Zimbabwe (Kennedy 1987).

Lack of racial social integration also continued to conjure up a society of two separate races, one white and the other black. The social apartheid was manifest in attempts by the white community to ring-fence itself round away from blacks through withdrawal to expensive and ‘gated communities’ guarded by dogs and black guards; and building of independent schools whose
fees structures excluded the majority of black children from middle and low-income families (Muzondidya 2010: 25; Kilgore 2009). The isolation and lack of racial contact extended to the sporting field where such sport as rugby and cricket were dominated by whites (Muzondidya 2009: 167-200).

The net effect of all this was catastrophic for the white community. As Selby (2006: 242) noted, the visible white community’s affluence and continued isolation provoked anti-white sentiment among blacks and exposed whites as targets. Many whites failed to cross over from racism to new coexistence with blacks. This continued existence of racism made it very easy for political gladiators in ZANU-PF to mobilize people on a racial basis when their political fortunes were diminishing in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

Racial politics of redress resonated among the emerging black middle classes who were thirsty for fast incorporation among the bourgeoisie. As Maphosa (1998) said, many aspiring black businessmen and women were desperate to enter into those sectors of economy the like land ownership, mining and manufacturing that were monopolized by whites. Such groupings as Indigenous Business Development Centre (IBDC) and Affirmative Action Group (AAG) began to blame race for their failure to make a bold entry into the private sector and thus embraced ZANU-PF politics of racial redress as a vehicle to advance their business interests.

Similarly, the former freedom fighters who had languished in poverty since demobilization enthusiastically embraced ZANU-PF politics of redress as advancement of the liberation project (Ndlovu Gatsheni 2006: 23). On this reality of resonance of race within society, Muzondidya argued that:

[... ] the continued existence of deep racial inequalities and racial prejudice in Zimbabwe, two decades after the end of colonial rule, enabled the incumbent ZANU-PF to mobilize the political idiom of race to defend its control of the state by blaming all its weaknesses and failure to deliver on social and political demands on white control over the land and economy (Muzondidya 2010: 26).

The latest manifestations of racial politics since the coming to power of inclusive government in February 2009 include the continued invasion of remaining white farms and the refusal by President Mugabe to swear-in Roy Bennett as Deputy Minister of Agriculture as he was appointed by MDC-T to that portfolio. Bennett, a former Rhodesian soldier and commercial farmer is the Treasurer-General of MDC-T.

But since Bennett’s return from self-imposed exile in South Africa, he has been undergoing prosecution for an alleged terrorist plot. Even after the courts have found him innocent Mugabe has not sworn him in as Deputy Minister.
One of the explanations for the refusal is that Bennett was a member of the Rhodesian security forces that murdered a lot of innocent black people in defence of the white settler colony of Rhodesia in the 1970s. His commercial farm was taken away from him by the ZANU-PF government under its fast-track land reform programme. It is these realities on the ground that led Muzondidya to conclude that:

Opportunistically mobilizing on the rhetoric of race and land, ZANU-PF was able to articulate the Zimbabwe crisis as a racial issue whose solution could only be found in addressing issues of racial domination and inequalities. While oppression and coercion were important aspects of ZANU-PF rule in the late 1990s onward, the rhetoric on race and land was its political draw-card. [...] mobilizing on the basis of race, an increasingly repressive and waning ZANU-PF was not only able to rally a significant proportion of the masses in Zimbabwe behind it but also to build its political legitimacy inside the country and abroad. [...] the insensitivity to, and inability to deal with, issues of race and racial domination within both domestic and international opposition movements helped not only to internationalize the Zimbabwe crisis but also to prolong its resolution as it came to polarize regional and international opinion. [...] The mobilization on the basis of race indeed concealed the multiplicity of causes of the crisis and ZANU-PF leaders’ individual responsibility for the crisis. However, the visibility of racial differences in poverty and wealth among blacks and whites enabled race to assume a broad appeal as a political mobilizing idiom. The above observations regrettably are some of the disconcerting but greatest lessons of the Zimbabwe crisis which have been shunned or silenced by most intellectual and academic debates on the crisis (Muzondidya 2010: 27).

Muzondidya’s analysis of the importance of race dovetails into the arguments of Mamdani (2008), and Yeros and Moyo (2007) who also strove to indicate that something needed to be done to resolve material inequalities rooted in settler colonialism. For instance, Mamdani noted that: ‘The inadequacy of the Lancaster House provisions for the decolonization of land ensured that it remained the focus of politics in Zimbabwe’ (Mamdani 2008: 2). Also Yeros and Moyo (2009: 1-10) argue that the question of resolution of material inequalities is as important as the question of democracy and human rights and that there can be no deeper democracy and comprehensive human rights without economic and social justice. It is within this context that race, has continued to haunt Zimbabwe. But besides race, is the problem of ethnicity that continues to complicate politics in the country and compromise efforts towards forging common citizenship and heal the nation.
Ethnocracy and the nation

Norma Kriger (2003: 75) argued that ZANU-PF sought to create a ‘party-state’ and a ‘party nation.’ By this she meant that the processes of state-making and nation-building were deliberately channelled to crystallize around ZANU-PF and ZANLA liberation histories, symbols and regalia. The history of ZANU-PF was turned into national history. Party symbols became national symbols and national symbols like Great Zimbabwe became party symbols as well.

This building of a ‘party-state’ and a ‘party nation’ happened in tandem with deepening politics of modelling the state and nation into an ethnocracy. Ethnocracy arises where the distinction between nation and ethnicity is eliminated. The result is a form of ‘cultural despotism’ exercised by the privileged ethnic groups. In an ethnocracy, the state undergoes deep ethnicization and ‘nationality itself is often defined in terms of the majority ethnicity’ (Peterse 1997: 373).

Edgar Tekere, a veteran nationalist, former ZANU-PF secretary general and former leader of the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) decried the building up of ethnocracy in Zimbabwe. To him, this took the form of asking members of ZANU-PF to stand for elections in the provinces and cities where they originated from. Tekere was deployed to stand for Mutare urban because he was Manyika and Mutare is the capital of Manicaland (Tekere 2005).

There are increasing voices emanating from minority groups about turning Zimbabwe into an ethnocracy. In a recent opinion piece entitled *Zimbabwe: The Case of Two States*, George Mkhwanazi described Matabeleland as suffering from ‘colonial subjugation’ by Zimbabwe. This how he puts it:

> Zimbabwe, as a new colonial power over Mthwakazi, has abused the numerical advantage of Shona people to effectively exclude Mthwakazi nationals from any meaningful participation in the country’s political and economic affairs. [...] There is something unmistakably colonial in Zimbabwe’s attitude to its Mthwakazi subjects. Colonialists impose their values, language, culture and filth on the colonized and Zimbabwe did just that. [...] The Shona term for ethnic and racial domination of minorities is Chimurenga (Mkwanazi 2010).

But since 22 December 1987, the government of Zimbabwe tried to use the signing of the Unity Accord between ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU to contain Ndebele feeling of marginalization and exclusion from power through elevation of a few political actors from the region to cabinet positions and reserving one of the vice-president posts to a person from former PF-ZAPU. This arrangement came after almost a decade of state-orchestrated violence that devastated Matabeleland and the Midlands regions (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace Report 1997).
Recent studies on language and ethnicity have revealed that ethnocracy does not only reveal itself in language policies, government recruitment and composition of armed forces, but also in naming of basic commodities such as meal-meal (Ngwerewere), meat (Chidzwa), chicken pieces (Machikishori) and soup (Usavi), thick meal-meal porridge (Sadza) and many others (Ndhlovu 2009). All these vernacular names are drawn from the language of the dominant ‘ethnie’. On the issue of language use in building ethnocracies, Richard Fardon and Graham Furniss posited that:

Nothing so readily places a voice on the national sound stage as its language of address. That language may already connote a particular group or else an alliance of forces may coalesce to identify it as proprietary badge. To broadcast in one language is to fail to broadcast in another and that is always taken as a message (Fardon and Furniss 2000:3).

There is indeed widespread complaint among minority language speakers about the space and airtime given to Shona and Ndebele vis-a-vis other languages like Kalanga, Nambya, Tonga, Venda and many others (McGregor 2009). The Zimbabwean political elite have focused their nation-building approach into managing rather than trying to eliminate ethnicity in society. They have realized the futility of trying to coerce people into changing their identities.

Perhaps the attempts to force the Ndebele not only to abandon PF-ZAPU and join ZANU-PF but also to speak Shona were a good lesson. The results included further deepening of resentment to ZANU-PF and consistent rejection of ZANU-PF long after PF-ZAPU was swallowed by ZANU-PF. The leading scholar on management rather than elimination of ethnicity was the renowned political scientist Masipula Sithole who argued that:

As long as politics is about power, advantage and disadvantage, ethnicity will be one of the resources political gladiators utilize to gain it. The task is to moderate and manage the use of this resource by consciously accommodating it in the structures of power. Until we accept and firmly grasp this idea, democratic stability, and thus economic development will remain elusive (Sithole 1995: 122).

But one of key weaknesses on existing literature on ethnicity in Zimbabwe is to confine the debate on ethnicity to the Ndebele-Shona binaries. This approach is premised on a false idea of Zimbabwe as a ‘bimodal country’ suffering only from ethnic polarization between the majority Shona-oriented group and the minority Ndebele-oriented ones (Masunungure 2006: 5). Ethnic issues in Zimbabwe are more complex than this.
As earlier noted, during the liberation struggle, ZAPU experienced a form of ethnicity that involved Kalanga, Ndebele and Shona identities whereas ZANU suffered from intra-Shona ethnic cleavages involving the Karanga against the Manyika, and Zezuru against the Karanga. The triumph of ZANU-PF in the 1980 elections temporarily united Shona-oriented groups through ruling group identity whereas the Gukurahundi violence of the 1980s united the Ndebele-oriented groups through fostering a victimhood identity (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008: 27-55).

The 1990s witnessed the unravelling of Shona-group consensus and the revival of intra-Shona competition for power within ZANU-PF. There was increasing realization that Zimbabwe was ruled by what Maloreng (2005: 77-88) termed a ‘Zezuru tribal clique’ with President Mugabe at the apex. Zimbabwe’s ‘Zezuru Sum Game’ played itself through deliberate allocation of government and party positions to the Zezuru ethno-linguistic group as a security measure for President Mugabe’s continued tenure of office.

The top security positions in the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), army and police are all headed by people hailing from the Zezuru branch of Shona-oriented groups (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2006: 49-80). This continued domination of the ‘Zezuru clan’ in politics provoked the emergence of regional-ethnic factions within ZANU-PF -- the most well-known being the Mnangagwa and Mujuru factions competing to succeed President Mugabe. These realities led Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni to argue that:

Ethnic polarization has not just developed between the Shona and the Ndebele, but also among various Shona groups—the Karanga, the Manyika, the Zezuru, the Korekore and the Ndau, which have accused and counter-accused each other of ethnic favouritism. Minority groups like the Shangani, Kalanga, Tonga and Venda, located in the marginal borders with little economic development and less physical and social infrastructure, have felt marginalized from both the economy and society and have complained of political and cultural domination by both Shonas and Ndebeles (Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2007: 289).

The recent history of Zimbabwe has witnessed such cases as that of Shona-Venda tensions in Beitbridge that came to a boiling point in 2002 when a group of ‘war veterans’ dismissed the head of primary school in the district, allegedly because she was employing mainly Shona teachers, and not Vendas. Mathe has noted the high levels of politicized language issues at the border town of Beitbridge reinforcing identity group boundaries between the local Venda-speaking groups and the Shona (Mathe 2005). There is the case of Shangani-speaking communities’ agitation against the employment of
vanyai—a derogatory term used locally to describe the Karanga as foreigners (Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2007: 290).

The recent fast-track land reform has also sparked ethnic tensions, and examples include the angry reactions of the Shangani of Chiredzi against resettlement of Karanga-speaking groups in what they considered their land; the Korekore being agitated against resettlement of Karangas in Muzarabani, an area they consider their ancestral lands, and the 2003 case of the refusal of Ibbo Mandaza to occupy his newly acquired farm in Bubi district of Matabeleland North province (Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2007: 290-291). These realities led to Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s argument that:

In spite of all official pretences to the contrary, Zimbabwe has increasingly become ethnically polarized. As in the 1970s, ethnic and regional tensions have been quite dominant in the power contestations within both the ruling ZANU-PF and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change. Zezuru, Manyika, Karanga and Ndebele ethno-regional identities have become the main basis through which power has been contested. The dominant factions in the ongoing struggle for succession of the leadership of ZANU-PF and the country, for instance, have all mobilized on regional and ethnic basis (Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2007: 292).

A discussion document prepared by the Zimbabwe Institute (2006) indicated complex ethnic politics at play within ZANU-PF with leading proponents of Mugabe’s continued stay in office being such people as Nathan Shamuyarira, Webster Shamu, Ignatius Chombo and Nicholas Goche hailing from Mashonaland West. Those in the Mujuru faction largely come from Chikomba and Chivhu districts.

There are many factors that explain the birth of ethnocracy in Zimbabwe. These range from colonialism’s divide and rule practices of governance to African nationalism as a terrain of re-tribalization of politics. The ZANU-PF leadership adopted authoritarian and ethnically-biased postcolonial nation-building strategies which justified violent conquest of Matabeleland and the Midlands regions in the 1980s. The violence of the 1980s and other factors such as deployment of Shona speaking people to occupy strategic positions in Matabeleland created realities and perceptions of economic marginalization.

This perception is further confirmed by asymmetrical power configurations that banish some groups to the peripheries of the corridors of power and exportation and deployment of human resources into cities and regions where they are considered aliens. The memories of violence and injury that have not been accounted for, officially recognized or settled properly to the satisfaction of victims also exacerbate ethnic consciousness in Zimbabwe. The current
contestations over state power coupled with realities of unfair distribution of national resources across regions and ethnicities is a cause for ethnic concern. Finally, the long tenure of public office and incumbency by people from one identifiable ethnic group and from one region also increases ethnic anxieties.

For Matabeleland, a group known as *uMhlahlo we Sizwe sika Mthwakazi* listed the following issues as the key drivers of ethnicity in that region: marginalization of the elected MPs from the region; institution of reign of terror in the region; perpetration of ethnic cleansing against the people of the region; translocation of economic resources of the region to Mashonaland; reserving of key jobs for the Shona in the region; depriving people of the region of opportunities; and retarding the cultural identity of the Ndebele. These grievances have coalesced to produce various political formations—some oriented towards the democratization agenda as a solution; some pushing for federalism as solution; or revival of inclusive ZAPU nationalism; and others taking a radical irredentist slant such as the recently launched Matebeleland Liberation Front (MLF).

The violence of the 1980s that left an estimated 20,000 people dead and many others missing in Matabeleland and the Midlands regions has remained a catalyst to emotional ethnicity mediated by anger, resentment and even entertainment of irredentist politics. As a motivation for his *Gukurahundi National Memorial Bill*, Jonathan Moyo (2006: 12) argued that:

> It remains indubitable that the wounds associated with the dark Gukurahundi period are still open and the scars still visible to the detriment of national cohesion and national unity. The open wounds and visible scars have diminished the prospects of enabling Zimbabweans to act with a common purpose and with shared aspirations on the basis of common heritage regardless of ethnic origin.

Moyo’s analysis is amplified by Lindgren (2005: 158) who argued that the atrocities committed by the Fifth Brigade in the 1980s heightened the victims’ awareness of being Ndebele and hatred for Shona-oriented groups. But feelings of marginalization and exclusion from power are experienced by other communities outside Matabeleland too. The Ndua of the Eastern border clung to ZANU-Ndonga until the death of its leader Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole. The Eastern border areas are dominated by a mixture of Shangani and Manyika peoples.

What is even intriguing is that ZANU-PF has become a theatre of ethnic politics as regional leaders from Masvingo, Manicaland, Matabeleland and other areas try to come into the centre of politics like the Zezuru. The apogee of this jostling for power was the Tsholotsho declaration of 18 November
2004 that sought to institutionalize ethnicity at the top level of ZANU-PF power hierarchy. As Jonathan Moyo said, the Tsholotsho Declaration was meant to creatively manage ethnicity’s free will within top power politics of Zimbabwe.

The Tsholotsho Declaration sought to re-configure politics with ZANU-PF so that they reflected and balanced ethnic considerations. The first suggestion was that the top four leadership positions in ZANU-PF (president and first secretary; two vice-presidents and second secretaries; and national chairman) that make up the presidium, should reflect the country’s four major ethnic groupings (Karanga, Manyika, Zezuru and Ndebele) in order to promote and maintain representative national cohesion, national belonging and identity. The second proposition was that the top position of president and first secretary of the party should not be monopolized by one sub-tribe (or clan) but should reasonably rotate among the four major ethnic groups.

The third proposition was that the filling of these top four positions should not be by imposition by party hierarchy but through democratic elections done by secret ballot. The final one was that the filling of the top four leadership positions and the democratic elections should be defined and guided by and done in accordance with the constitution of the party to promote the rule of law within the party as a foundation for maintaining the rule of law in the country (Moyo 2005).

Moyo revealed that the Tsholotsho Declaration was a ‘culmination of a protracted internal ZANU-PF process of debate, discussion and consultation that started soon after the June 2000 parliamentary elections in which the opposition shocked the ruling party into serious self-doubt by getting 57 out of 120 seats’ (Moyo 2005). In short, the Tsholotsho Declaration sought to mainstream ethnicity as a determinant factor in Zimbabwean politics. A particular model of ethnocracy was envisioned within ZANU-PF that had direct impact on broader structures of governance in Zimbabwe.

Ethnicity also plays itself within opposition circles. While the split within the MDC of 2005 was articulated in constitutional terms provoked by debates over the party’s participation in senatorial elections, there were also ethnic undertones as Welshman Ncube who led the split was soon framed as a Ndebele politician who was trying to challenge Morgan Tsvangirai, a Shona politician. Ncube quickly contained the spreading of ideas that his faction was a Ndebele faction by inviting Arthur Mutambara to lead it.

Ncube’s faction also retained a number of Shona members in its ranks. Tsvangirai too had to move fast to contain ethnic politics by elevating Thokozani
Khupe and Lovemore Moyo to the position of Deputy President and National Chairman of MDC respectively. Tsvangirai feared losing the Matabeleland and the Midlands constituencies to either Ncube’s faction or to ZANU-PF. In short, differences over strategy and disrespect for internal constitutional orders, complaints over rising authoritarianism of Tsvangirai as well as critiques over use of violence within the party soon assumed ethnic lines. But what was MDC’s approach towards issues of race and ethnicity in general?

**MDC imagination of a new Zimbabwe nation**

Soon after its formation, the MDC began to formulate an alternative vision of the nation founded on the imperatives of good governance, democracy, and human rights on the one hand and pan-ethnic and racial solidarity on the other. The MDC also sought to set itself apart from ZANU-PF by embracing embers of a post-nationalist politics founded on social movements rather than the tradition of nationalist liberation which has been used to install personality cults, authoritarianism, cronyism, and violence. In June 2000, Tsvangirai confidently located his party’s project within a post-nationalist terrain, openly declaring that:

> In many ways, we are moving from the nationalist paradigm to politics grounded in civic society and social movements. It’s like the role and influences that in South Africa, the labour movement and civil society organizations had over the African National Congress in the early 1990s. MDC politics are not nationalist inspired, because they focus more on empowerment and participation of the people. ZANU-PF’s nationalist thinking has always been top-down, centralized, always trapped in a time warp. Nationalism was an end in itself instead of a means to an end. One of ZANU-PF’s constant claims is that everyone in Zimbabwe owes the nationalist movement our freedom. It has therefore also become a nationalism based on patronage and cronyism (Southern Africa Report 2000).

Tsvangirai and his MDC sought to imagine and construct a new national project that was imbued with the spirit of inclusion of all races, all ethnicities, as well as driven and propelled by the overarching desire to democratize the state. This new national project was inspired by the unfolding of new struggles that advocated new politics grounded in ‘basic-needs’ and ‘people-centred’ development paradigms. It seems that the MDC was further encouraged by the global mood of possibilities that culminated in Francis Fukuyama (1993) declaring: ‘The End of History and the Last Man’.

Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000: 305) also celebrated this age of political possibilities claiming that ‘the concept of national sovereignty is
losing its effectiveness, so too is the so-called autonomy of the political’. In the region, the rise of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) in Zambia under a trade unionist, Frederick Chiluba, and its successful challenge of the nationalist-founded United National Independence Party (UNIP) under the veteran nationalist leader Kenneth Kaunda, may have given hope to the MDC in its struggle against ZANU-PF.

The era was also dominated by numerous vocal grassroots social movements that were celebrated by John S. Saul ‘as a significant signpost on the road to a post-neoliberal and post-nationalist politics … and as an impressive rallying point for those forces from below that might yet get things back on track in their country’ (Saul 2002: 13). These celebrations of politics grounded in social movements tended to ignore the continued resonance of nationalist sentiment in a post-Cold War Africa, with some social movements inspired by nationalism and advocating increased state intervention and more neo-Keynesian economic policies, rather than anti-state slogans and rhetoric.

The key intellectual challenge is whether these indications of exhaustion of nationalism really opened possibilities for post-nationalist politics? Scholars like Mkandawire (2005: 1-28) noted that nationalism defied its death and it displayed a remarkable enduring resonance. Krista Johnson (2005) added that post-nationalism emerged as an ill-defined phenomenon that was used ‘to characterize multiple and disparate political projects’. At one level, post-nationalism was used to connote a critique of post-independence state nationalism.

At another level the idea of post-nationalism was deployed as a concept to explain a burgeoning socialist and anti-imperialist movement or sentiment. To the liberal scholars, post-nationalism connoted a liberal democratic political project that placed emphasis on individual rights and multi-party politics. Radical Africanist and pan-Africanist scholars were generally wary of so-called post-nationalist political projects that were detached from the pan-African ideal and free of its moral imperatives. They viewed post-nationalism as promoting a more exclusionary and adversarial image of the nation (Johnson 2005).

The advocates of the post-nationalist alternative in Zimbabwe tended to ignore the ability of nationalism to renew its agendas and projects. Throughout the 2000s, ZANU-PF mobilized enormous energy to revive nationalism as the authentic and progressive pan-African phenomenon. Within this revival, President Mugabe tried hard to portray himself as dedicated to the continuation of the historic mission of taking decolonization to its logical end of economic decolonization.
But Mkandawire (2002) argued that nationalism had always been double-sided, with virtues and darker aspects. Among its virtues were fostering a sense of community, patriotism, and a sense of shared historical past. Its dark sides included promotion of strong communal feeling that could easily be turned into xenophobia, and emphasis on monolithic unity that could degenerate into undemocratic pressures for conformity and blind loyalty. In Zimbabwe, ZANU-PF tried hard to reclaim the virtues of nationalism to counter a possible post-nationalist takeover.

The MDC projected a leaning towards a social democratic transformation agenda crafted within the neoliberal paradigm at one level. They emphasized that a post-nationalist dispensation was claiming Zimbabwe for democracy, human rights, economic prosperity, constitutionalism, and rule of law. But at its formation it also tried to appropriate the liberation struggle as having been propelled by the working class.

Gibson Sibanda, the founder deputy president of the MDC, argued that the political struggle in Zimbabwe was historically led by the working class and was fought for dignity and sovereignty of the people. He noted that in the First Chimurenga, workers fought against exploitation in the mines, farms, and industry, and peasants against the expropriation of their land. To him, the nationalist movement that led the Second Chimurenga was born from, and built on, struggles of the working people. What then happened was that the current nationalist elite in ZANU-PF hijacked this struggle for its own ends, betraying the people's hopes and aspirations (MDC Election Manifesto 2000).

The MDC did not seek to disparage the nationalist liberation tradition as a foundation myth of the postcolonial nation of Zimbabwe. Rather it sought to liberate the tradition from being monopolized by one political party as though it was not a national heritage of all Zimbabweans. To the MDC, the liberation struggle was made possible by the people of Zimbabwe not by a few nationalist elites who continued to claim that they ‘died’ for all the people.

In a way, the post-nationalist discourse was not a negation of the liberation tradition but a rescue of the national project from abuse and betrayal of the people. In a 2003 document on the core values, goals, and policy principles, the MDC recognized ‘the struggle of the Zimbabwean people throughout our history for economic, social and political justice’ and acknowledged ‘the continuing liberation struggle for social, economic and political rights and freedoms’ (MDC 2003: 5).
Its 2008 policy documents projected the MDC as pursuing ‘social liberation policies aimed at completing the unfinished business of the national liberation struggle and shall strive for the democratic structural economic liberation, rehabilitation and transformation of Zimbabwe’ (MDC Manifesto 2008). Tsvangirai himself emphasized that the struggle in Zimbabwe had always been one for dignity and freedom, and that the workers and peasants were always in the forefront of the first and second liberation struggles that brought the country to independence and gave sovereignty to its people. What the MDC was fighting against was the evident fact that the ruling nationalist elite in ZANU-PF were exploiting this long history of struggle for its own ends (MDC 2000).

The MDC’s 2005 manifesto for the parliamentary election portrayed the party as a non-racial and a ‘truly national party that recognizes no ethnic, tribal, religious or racial boundaries. We offer the people a new Zimbabwe, a new beginning’ (MDC Manifesto 2005). As part of their agenda of delivering this ‘new Zimbabwe and a ‘new beginning’, their goal was:

A sovereign, democratic, prosperous and self-sufficient nation led by a compassionate government that respects the rule of law and the rights of all its people, pursuing their welfare and interests in an honest, transparent and equitable manner (MDC 2007).

The MDC’s relentless emphasis on issues of democracy and human rights has forced ZANU-PF to fight to claim the democratic question as well. Recent speeches by both ZANU-PF and MDC following the elections of 29 March 2008 indicate how the issue of democracy and human rights has come to be the core of party politics in Zimbabwe. This politics is intertwined with the issue of land, food, and jobs, with ZANU-PF emphasizing land, and MDC jobs and food.

Thus, following the victory of his party in the parliamentary elections of 2008, Tsvangirai issued a press statement in which he reiterated that in a ‘New Zimbabwe’ there would be restoration and not retribution; equality and not discrimination; love, not war; and tolerance, not hate. He portrayed the votes cast on Saturday 29 March 2008 as ‘a vote for jobs; it was a vote for food, for dignity, for respect, for decency and equality, for tolerance, for love, and for trust’ (Tsvangirai 2008). The March 2008 elections and the controversies surrounding them resulted in further internationalization of the Zimbabwe situation and the birth of a very problematic discourse of transition.
Conclusions

Zimbabwe is currently being governed by a shaky inclusive government that was born out of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) of September 2008. The objective of the GPA was to facilitate a transition from crisis to normalcy and from violence and authoritarianism to democracy. But one of the key problems in any transition is denial by political actors of any wrong doing. As long as the previous regime does not see anything wrong with what it was doing before signing any peace agreement then no transition can take place. President Mugabe once stated that those calling for change in Zimbabwe must repent before he can work with them in government. This was a clear sign that the incumbent regime decided to see something wrong with those calling for change and was hailing them to come back to the fold provided they have seen that they were pursuing a wrong agenda.

Up until the time of the signing of the GPA in September 2008, the radical nationalist position of ZANU-PF had not been fully delegitimized and rendered totally immoral by the opposition locally, regionally, continentally and even in the non-Western world. ZANU-PF still maintained high moral ground on such issues as redistribution of land and defence of sovereignty. The MDC position on democracy and human rights was dented from the beginning because of its close association with the local white farmers as well as Western and American hegemonic agenda that is interpreted by ZANU-PF and Mugabe as pursuing neoliberal imperialism with a re-colonizing agenda.

Thus, while ZANU-PF had to answer for violence, MDC had to cleanse itself from being considered a front for Western and American interests. The transition had to take place within this situation where no political party has clear high moral and political ground. This complicated the prospects for transition roud Zimbabwe. The current political stalemate in the negotiations is revolving not only on individuals like Gideon Gono, Johannes Tomana and Roy Bennett, but also on the issue of sanctions, which ZANU-PF is using to continue framing MDC-T as a dangerous force to national sovereignty.

A large constituency of war veterans, youth militias, sections of academia and all those who benefited from ZANU-PF patronage and its distribution of land and other resources expect MDC-T to make a transition from being a front for foreign interests into a genuinely national political formation. While others mainly operating within the civil society, in the Diaspora and urban areas expect ZANU-PF to change from being a militarized and violent political party into a modern political formation that embraces democracy and human rights. MDC-M is standing in the middle, emphasizing that both MDC-T and ZANU-PF must come and embrace core national interests.
What has been happening is that both ZANU-PF and MDC-T have been trying to fault each other, hence the intractable and unending negotiations over what has come to be termed ‘outstanding issues’. What is really outstanding is a clear direction of ‘transition from what to what’. In the absence of clear ideological direction and national vision, then issues like race, ethnicity, personalities and generational differences occupy the centrestage of politics and masquerade as outstanding issues. What is happening in Harare was well captured by Pondai Bamu in these words:

[...] ZANU-PF seeks to incorporate the MDC into government rather than a transition to democracy since ZANU-PF argues that democracy already exists. The MDC, at least the Tsvangirai faction, seeks to take the reins of power rather than be incorporated into a coalition government, since it believes it won the March 2008 election (Bamu 2009).

One of the key problems of the GPA was how to synthesize the radical nationalist position of ZANU-PF premised on uncompromising socialist-oriented redistributive project with the equally radical neoliberal position of MDC-T premised on democratization and human rights discourse. Was this not like trying to mix water and oil in one bottle called inclusive government? Throughout the negotiations and even beyond the dream of a new national project underpinned by a democratization discourse represented by the MDC locked horns with a nationalist discourse represented by ZANU-PF that emphasized continuing opposition to colonialism and espoused politics of black entitlement to strategic resources of the country based on notions of nativity and indigeneity.

The GPA, as the foundation script for the new inclusive government in Harare, could not escape a measure of vagueness on some crucial issues that have haunted the nation-state project since its conception in the 1960s because it emerged as a form of crisis management. In the first place, it remained vague on the crucial issue of transitional justice as a foundational form for national healing, national reconciliation and national unity.

While the MDC tried to push for a mechanism to make those who violated human rights accountable for their misdeeds, ZANU-PF buried its head on letting ‘bygones be bygones’ for the sake of national stability. The approach to transitional justice founded on the lie of forgetting the past has haunted the Zimbabwe nation-state project since 1980. In the second place, the GPA failed to be explicit on the issue of security sector reform despite overwhelming evidence of securitization of the state and the abuse of security organs of the state in the resolution of political power games (Rupiah 2005: 117-118).
The current stage of the unfolding of the nation-state project can therefore be best described as gridlocked within a situation where the old represented by ZANU-PF are taking time to die or exit the political stage and the new ones represented by MDC-T and MDC-M are slow to be born. In the interval (interregnum) monsters represented by the 'secrocrats/military junta' in alliance with ZANU-PF hardliners are trying to ruin everything. Past practices of undemocratic governance and brutality are currently contesting and putting all sorts of speed traps on the road towards democratization. The continuation of racialized politics is symbolically represented by some spates of new violent farm invasions and legal battles involving Roy Bennett. It is within this context that the inclusive government has been trying to unroll national healing, reconciliation and national integration.

The flag ship of the inclusive government in terms of nation-building is the Organ on National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration, a very poor political relations exercise without strong legal statutory backing. In the first place white citizens seem not to be included in this process of healing, reconciliation and integration. This is reflected in ZANU-PF’s continued discourse of framing the remaining whites as enemies of the nation. The second indicator are the trials and tribulations of Bennett which symbolizes continuity of persecution of whites including open refusal by President Mugabe to allow some of them to play a role in national politics. The third is the continued sporadic invasions of remaining white farms by sponsored ZANU-PF supporters.

Worse still, indications are that ZANU-PF and MDC political formations have remained poles apart. They continue to behave like dogs whose tails have been tied together. Reconciliation must start at the top level of government for it to percolate into the grassroots. Deng (2008: 44) argued that mediators and facilitators of conflicts in Africa in general tend to concentrate on those issues that are more amenable to negotiation such as political representation and power-sharing and ignore the equally important but intractable issues of wealth-sharing and questions of identity. He further to said that, ‘Identity issues are often left unaddressed in peace agreements because, while deeply felt, they are highly intractable. But it is ultimately what is not said that divides’ (Deng 2008: 44). According to him, identity in African countries must be understood contextually and historically with special reference to the precolonial, colonial, and independent periods. A combination of these historical interludes 'shaped the sharing of power, wealth, social services, and development opportunities' (Deng 2008: 39).
It is important to add that what is generally ignored in African Studies is that nationalism in Africa was by and large ethnicity writ large that crystallized around the histories of dominant ‘ethnie’. No wonder then that the postcolonial state in Africa, as a product of both colonialism and nationalism ‘has not become a reassuring presence but remains a formidable threat to everyone except the few who control it’ (Ake 1994: 31).

The current challenge to the inclusive government in Harare is how to reconcile fragmented identities; some ethnic and others racial, generational, class-based, regional, political and partisan. Looked at from another angle, what has come to be termed the Zimbabwe crisis can be better understood as a general crisis of the postcolony without necessarily ignoring its contextual origins and features that are equally important.

It is a crisis generated by too many ‘unfinished businesses’, postponed struggles and frustrated expectations. It reflects many things: incomplete nation-building; uncertainty of a young and captured state always worried about its completeness and security; contestations over the meaning of liberation; crisis of long presidential incumbency by one individual from a particular ethnic group; and interferences of external powers giving those in power all sorts of scapegoats to justify their undemocratic measures as part of defending national sovereignty.

It also reveals the symptoms of crumbling hegemonic histories that trammelled over and deliberately ignored balancing historical pluralities and diversities impinging on postcolonial nation-building and state-making. The nationalist lie of a monolithic nation with strong primordial roots is undergoing a very hard test. The leadership of the country is called upon to demonstrate its qualities of nation-building and state-making that take into account pluralities and diversities.

The key challenge is how to reconstruct the state and nation into an ethical community where wealth is fairly distributed, power is exercised in a responsible and caring manner, and society is united behind a common national vision. The current drive for national healing, happening concurrently with the constitutional process, reveals a society crying out for closure on past abuses but is lacking a committed, visionary and selfless leadership to guide society into new humanity. What is displayed by the inclusive government is a crisis of leadership that has allowed race and ethnicity to occupy the space of ideology and concerns about individuals to constitute national issues—the so-called outstanding issues in the language of the disputants within government.
For the Zimbabwe nation to be reborn and the state to be re-made, there is need for serious consideration of how peripheral societies can forge future-oriented politics within a postcolonial neo-colonized world where Western interference is rife. This future-oriented politics must be founded on an ethical and humanistic spirit that transcends race and ethnicity as framers of national agenda. What is also needed is a transcendence of the current crisis of political language and crisis of imagination that leads to what Frantz Fanon termed ‘repetition without change’. The hard question is: is the crisis of ‘repetition without change’ not part of cul-de-sac created by neo-colonialism?

What is needed is a new language of articulating the multitude of longings, demands, dreams and popular expectations without degenerating to race, ethnicity, victimhood or blaming particular individuals. What is lacking in Zimbabwe now is a correct reading and naming of the signs of the time. The signs of the time indicate that both nationalism and neoliberalism are failing to stand up confidently to the demands, longings and expectations of the people. The first step is to break out of the tensions between belonging and apartness at both leadership and societal level. A clear criterion of belonging and citizenship is needed. This cannot happen where there is a clear epistemological rupture in the official discourse at leadership level indicated by opposition between the presidency and the premiership.