Section II

Theoretical Reflections
Introduction: Value, Culture and Development

The relationship between values, culture and development is seldom investigated, sometimes argued or assumed, often wholly ignored in development literature (Sen 2004a:35). This is an obvious concern in a context where a hidden popular assumption is that culture and values are the real difference between African development paths and development paths in other parts of the world. From a research perspective it is a concern and an opportunity at the same time. The opportunity lies in dealing with a very complex matter in an adequate manner and opening up a field of research in that way. Our aims are presently more limited and specific in that the objective is to elicit the important concepts that are dealt with in existing literature and to describe the state of empirical research on these concepts in our context.

Obviously the field of development draws from almost everything in science that has a bearing on the social and natural features of human existence – which is both commendable and problematic. A most sceptic perspective asks what a field of study aims to achieve if it becomes a site where every concept in social sciences can be deposited and no coherent project can be defined but the nature of the discourses in the field is often such that it is no more than an accumulation of social science sects (Gareau as cited in Hettne 1990:232). Referring back to the Methodenstreit, Hettne responds by organising the development of the field in an interesting and fruitful manner when he distinguishes two axes of difference,
namely the positive-normative axis and the formal-substantive axis (even though one may not agree with Hettne's placement of some theoretical perspectives on these axes) (Hettne 1990).

The first axis deals with the position of the theory regarding the desirability of development theory being normative or positive. With Hettne, one has to conclude that all theories depend on certain values, but some theorists do not want to acknowledge that and think of their theories as being objective (Hettne 1990:235-236; Bernstein 1980). The second axis categorises theories in terms of how they define the goals and indicators of development and a formal approach would then work with abstract and finite indicators and goals while a substantive approach would tend to define development in more holistic and inclusive terms. The difference is not particularism versus universalism but, really an economistic definition versus a more comprehensive social and culturally inclusive approach. Obviously, an attempt to discuss and understand the cultural and social dimension of development will tend to find itself in the substantive half of the four quadrants that Hettne uses to categorise theoretical approaches to development as we also subscribe to Adelman's denouncement of the fallacy that 'underdevelopment (or development for that matter) has but a single cause', whether that be 'physical capital', 'entrepreneurship', 'incorrect prices', 'international trade', 'hyperactive government', 'human capital', or 'ineffective government' (Adelman 2001:104-117).

**Figure 3.1** (adapted from Hettne 1990:240)
A full survey of research on attempts to relate values and culture to development is a major task. We limited ourselves to broad theoretical themes, to empirical research in the social sciences, to material directly relevant to African conditions and, mostly, to studies on a larger scale than anthropological and specific studies of particular communities or small groups.

The theoretical themes are discussed, firstly, in terms of classic utilitarianism and its most recent and influential critique in capability thought. This provides a useful backdrop for the discussion of alternative views of development that go beyond an economistic approach. Our discussion of utilitarianism and the capability critique will rely significantly on Clark’s interpretation of Rawls, Sen and Nussbaum’s critique of utilitarianism. Our discussion of alternative development theory will range more widely. Where the debate about utilitarianism is a debate about the nature of a universalist view of development, the debate about alternative development theory is a debate about a type of universalism versus particularism in principle.

The theoretical discussions are followed by an overview of more specific attempts at relating values and cultural aspects to development in empirical research – often a direct attempt at reflecting on theory from empirical research. In an overview of the cultural-social complex of explanations for development, we take a look at Fedderke and Klitgard’s discussion of the interrelatedness of social aspects that impact on development, Odiambo’s critique of cultural explanations for underdevelopment, and Oyeshile’s discussion of the role of ‘moral probity’ in development. We go back to follow Ruttan’s (1988) overview of twentieth century economists who tried to integrate social factors in their economic analyses before relating the results of analyses by Granato and others, Marini and Inglehart when actually combining social and economic data in modelling development. These studies are bound to modernisation theory. We then consider some of the results in Noland and Tyndale’s work respectively of the even more specific arguments that attempt to correlate religion and development. We then briefly discuss Lian and Oneal’s review of analyses of the role of cultural diversity, as well as a number of other studies on the importance of local culture, trust, group membership and gender in order to give some indication of how these themes are dealt with in empirical research.

A survey of relevant empirical research in political science and sociology makes clear at least one important deficiency in our knowledge about the relationship between values, culture and development in Sub-Saharan Africa. No extensive research has been undertaken that was initiated in terms of African development as a point of departure and that would provide an adequate basis for comparative understanding of the role of values and culture in African societies. However, much that is relevant to such an undertaking has been done, and this will be discussed in more detail below.
Reviewing Relevant Development Theory

Choosing Universals: Classical Utilitarianism and the Capability Critique

Utilitarianism

Central to dialogues about human development is the question of what constitutes a good life, what the exact meaning of development is and what the goals thereof are. ‘Modern conceptions of development concerned themselves with growth, capital accumulation, technological change, structural transformation of the economy, and the modernisation of the social, cultural and political institutions necessary to facilitate economic development’ (Clark 2002a:1). Thus, traditional development theory has, in many respects, a utilitarian backbone. Within the utilitarian ethical framework, ‘actions are right or just in proportion to the extent to which they tend to promote happiness, pleasure or the absence of pain’ (Perman et al. 1996:28). More specifically, the framework has three key components: firstly, decisions can only be judged in terms of the extent to which they contribute to the social good; secondly, a criterion for the constitution of the social good is developed; and finally, social good can be measured and compared across persons, time and geographical space (Perman et al. 1996:28). Individual good (utility) is seen to be a function of a person's happiness, where happiness is determined by the attainment of goods and services, and social good is seen to be a function of individual utilities added together (Perman et al. 1996:28). The measurability and comparability of this classical framework allows one to address issues of the distribution of income, wealth and welfare across generations, countries and population groups within countries. This characteristic of utility theory explains why the approach remains enduringly popular.

Utilitarianism has, however, suffered from strong criticism. Criticisms of the classical utilitarian ethic have centred on the view that ‘utility, in the usual sense in which the term is used, is defined too narrowly to be an adequate description of human economic behaviour’ (Perman et al. 1996:33). In short, critics claim that individuals are motivated by far more than mere personal happiness as determined by the attainment of goods and services.

The Capability Critique

Capability theories are concerned with ‘the development of people rather than the development of things’. Furthermore, unlike approaches based on narrow concepts of utility (or basic needs), the capability framework readily accommodates the entire range of “beings” and “doings” that contribute to a good life’ (Clark 2002a:162). In other words, the capability approach is concerned with what people are actually able to do rather than with utility or welfare type happiness and
income. In terms of the categories of Hettne as discussed above, this means that
the capability critique is a substantive theory of development rather than a theory
that leads to the definition of formal criteria of development as would utilitarianism. A key component of the capability approach is the distinction
between means and ends, where means are considered to be of only instrumental
importance in achieving ends and thus only ends have intrinsic value. It is further
important to clarify the distinction between capabilities and “functionings”: capabilities constitute everything that is possible, whereas functionings constitute
everything that has actually been realized (Robeyns 2005:95). Bearing these
distinctions in mind, ‘what is ultimately important is that people have the freedoms
or valuable opportunities (capabilities) to lead the kind of lives they want to lead,
to do what they want to do and be the person they want to be’ (Robeyns 2005:95).
Within this context, policies are to be evaluated in terms of the extent to which
they impact upon human capabilities. Importantly, the inputs into capabilities include
the social context, within which an individual is situated, the institutions within
which an individual has to function, as well as the personal characteristics of the
individual. Thus, the capability approach is clearly a multi-dimensional approach
accounting for the impact on capabilities of the individual, institutions and groups
(via the social context).

Stewart (2005), however, argues that insufficient attention is being given to
groups within initial versions of the capability approach. Groups, whether the
group is the family, neighbourhood, school, club, institution, association or even
country, can serve to constrain the possibilities (capabilities) of individuals: ‘the
quality of groups with which individuals identify forms an important direct
contribution on their well-being is instrumental to other capabilities, and influences
people’s choices and values’ (Stewart 2005:185). Group membership can also
increase the well-being of an individual given possible functional gains of group
membership or simply by belonging, where belonging increases self-respect and
can even bestow identity upon the member (Stewart 2005:187). Individual well-
being and capability will increase or decrease depending on how well the group
is functioning and on the extent to which the group is influencing individual values,
preferences, behaviour and choices (Stewart 2005:188-189). Thus, the concept
of an autonomous individual is clearly misleading.

A further important point is that conflict within or among groups can also
decrease individual capabilities and increase inequalities (Stewart 2005:190). In the
context of the poor, group membership is of particular importance: the poor
have little economic or political power, and therefore, they are able to increase
their capabilities by joining groups (Stewart 2005:195). Group membership thus
facilitates collective action and empowerment – the formation of Stokvels in
South Africa is a good example of empowerment via group membership.
One capability type criticism of classical utilitarianism relates to the possibility of unjust consequences: the context within which a classical utilitarian ethic calls for the judgement of actions based on their outcomes creates space for unbridled self-interest where the sacrifices of a few may be justified on the basis of the good of society as a whole.

One advocate for a critique of this ethic is John Rawls, whose critique contends that the self-interest inherent in utilitarianism may infringe upon fundamental freedoms and basic rights, and thus capabilities, of individuals which have an inherent worth that should be protected (Perman et al. 1996:34). Rawls subsequently makes the argument that if all people were entirely impartial and asked to determine the fundamental principles of social justice, all people would unanimously, firstly, identify equal rights and basic civil liberties as being of key importance to social justice, and would, secondly, decide to arrange society in a manner in which economic inequalities would be permitted only to the extent that such inequalities are to the advantage of all and attached to positions open to all (Perman et al. 1996:35). From another angle, this could be interpreted as stating that inequalities and actions are just, only if they benefit even the worst off person in society. Hence, the capabilities of all individuals need to be advanced in order for a policy to be acceptable in development terms. The capability approach, therefore, places the person back into the spotlight of development (Perman et al. 1996).

Rawls, however, is credited with having developed a “thin” theory of the good rather than a “thick” theory of the good, where the “thin” theory of the good leaves the final ends of human existence unspecified and the “thick” theory of the good sets out to identify important ends of human life (Clark 2002a:65). Rawls’ theory is also considered to be a “thin” theory of the good because he uses primary goods in his analysis, and primary goods are considered to be means to an end and not intrinsic ends in themselves and are thus unable to account for the entire spectrum on human diversity (Robeyns 2005:97).

One of the most influential critics of utilitarianism, and the true pioneer of the capability approach, is Armatya Sen, who believes in the existence of a sharp distinction between the classical notion of utility and true personal well-being. The framework of Sen, whose conceptualisation draws on the work done by Rawls, conceptualises development as ‘the expansion of human capabilities……[in which] Sen argues for the necessity of viewing people as ends in themselves and never as only means to other ends’ (Clark 2002a:5). More specifically, ‘Sen regards well-being as a multi-dimensional quantity, depending not only on what individuals have achieved or attained in the way of goods and services, but also on various attributes they enjoy as citizens’ (Perman et al. 1996:34). A person’s fundamental freedom and subsequent ability “to do something” is regarded by Sen to be of particular importance and of intrinsic value rather than of instrumental importance.
According to the utilitarian ethic, all goods, services and fundamental freedoms are only valuable in the sense of their instrumental worth in promoting individual utility. Furthermore, Sen argues that well-being is not the only aspect of human existence which is of importance; individuals are not motivated exclusively by personal well-being, rather individuals may pursue goals that do not improve their narrowly defined well-being (Perman et al. 1996:34).

Of course, Sen's critique and quest for broadening the concept of personal well-being heightens the already complex task of measuring utility for the sake of comparison. However, this is the case for all approaches that wish to go beyond an economistic or utilitarian definition of development.

The importance of individual freedoms and basic rights as propagated by both Sen and Rawls relates to a libertarian moral philosophy. Libertarianism 'asserts the primacy of processes, procedures and mechanisms for ensuring that fundamental liberties and rights of individual human beings are respected and sustained' (Perman et al. 1996:36).

Osmani (2005) also highlights the critical importance of human rights in enhancing capabilities hence alleviating poverty. He argues that the denial of human rights is an important aspect of poverty given that rights are of undeniable instrumental importance to the poor and that true development goes beyond economic progress (2005:206). He emphasizes the importance of individual freedoms and attempts to create a direct link between human rights and the capability approach, stating that ‘any human rights can be seen as “capability rights”’ (2005:207). Osmani then proceeds to identify two types of human rights – constraint rights and goal rights. Constraint rights involve constraining the behaviour of others such that individuals are granted the ability to engage in the just acquisition of assets as well as the ability to transfer and own assets unhindered (2005:209). Such entitlement to assets and the accompanying command of resources it allows is of critical importance for the poor to be able to develop. Goal rights, on the other hand, requires that human rights be incorporated into the goals of society and this implies that these rights have to be both promoted and protected (2005:211). An example of this would be a society’s realisation that people have a right to freedom and consequently incorporating this right to freedom into the society’s goals. Within this libertarian framework of an individual’s right to capabilities, the maintenance of institutions is also critical for development, as institutions maintain individual freedoms and allow for the just acquisition of resources via contracts and thus develop individual capabilities. Hence, the scope for interventionist government policies such as redistribution is severely limited.

The capability critique has been developed further by Martha Nussbaum, whose work differs from that of Sen mainly in terms of the goals they wish to achieve via their work. Sen’s goal is to develop a loosely defined evaluative paradigm, and
hence does not attempt to aggregate his results for the purposes of universal applicability; Nussbaum, on the other hand, aims to develop an aggregate theory of social justice ‘by arguing for the political principles that should underlie each constitution… To perform this task, Nussbaum develops and argues for a well-defined but general list of “central human capabilities” that should be incorporated in all constitutions’ (Robeyns 2005:103). In other words, Nussbaum attempts to determine what is common across cultures. ‘In the end Nussbaum effectively concludes that we should design a system that permits “each and every” manual labourer, farm worker and poor person to “live well”’ (Clark 2002a:140). Her strategy thus considers local traditions and circumstances and the elements of the strategy ‘chosen in consultation with those most deeply immersed in those traditions’ (Clark 2002a:68). However, her reference to local cultures remains problematic at least in the sense that she does not reflect on the impact of modern Western society on local cultures.

Nonetheless, it remains useful to mention the basic human capabilities identified by Nussbaum as being applicable to all human life. The list includes a concern for issues related to mortality, a concern for the welfare of the human body, a desire for pleasure and avoidance of pain, an ability for cognition (both sensually and in terms of thinking), infant dependency, the ability to reason, an affiliation to other humans, a relation to other species and nature, the desire for humour and play, the need for individual separateness and finally the need for a strong sense of separateness related to personal liberties (Clark 2002a:68-69). According to Nussbaum, this list refers only to the bare minimum requirements of a decent human life. Therefore, one would want to move beyond this list for true development. Nussbaum then proceeds to further expound the list to include virtues such as such as self-respect, human flourishing, ecology, compassion and friendship and community (Clark 2002a:71-73). Significantly, Nussbaum fails to incorporate the importance of security and access to economic resources. Furthermore, one can certainly argue that essential goods such as food, water and shelter have intrinsic value in their own right and are not merely of value as a means to an end (Clark 2002a:82-83). Moreover, Nussbaum’s list is severely criticized given that she provides no direct evidence for the inclusion of the components of her list, and, in addition, the true universality of her list certainly remains questionable. For example, given the inclusion of sensual and thinking cognition as a requirement for decent human living, the blind, deaf and mentally disabled could be considered as living indecent human lives and this is most certainly not the case (Clark 2002a:74). The problematic nature of developing a universal list has given rise to criticisms as regards whether such a list should be developed at all. Despite problems and criticisms, it is undeniable that ‘Nussbaum and Sen’s capability approach helps to facilitate our understanding of human development by directing attention towards the ultimate ends of life’ (Clark 2002a:144).
We now have some perspectives on how we would know if development is taking place, but only implicit perspective on how culture and values play a role in successful development. The capabilities approach actually makes it more difficult to define effective processes of development as the goals of development are more complex and diverse. A utilitarian approach to development has an almost pre-defined method of achieving successful development incorporated in the definition of development itself. If the aim is the “attainment of goods and services” then development is simply the optimal use of resources and technology to encourage growth in the economy. Every aspect of society, especially government, is defined in terms of its supporting role in the quest for growth. If development is, however, defined in the capabilities mode, it is clear that much more needs to be done to facilitate development and the role of various aspects of society towards the multi-dimensional goal of enhancing capabilities will, of necessity, also be multi-dimensional and complex. However, the role of social and cultural values clearly now become more relevant and multi-dimensional as well as much more coming into play than the simple question of how growth is to be attained and supported by all aspects of society.

Universalism in Practice Versus Particularism in Principle: Mainstream Development versus Alternative Development

Having illustrated the importance of human development above and beyond income and material well-being, it is important to examine to what extent such principles are to be found in mainstream development practice. It is useful to begin the discussion of mainstream poverty assessment with an examination of the World Bank's assessment of poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa. For this purpose, one can refer to the study conducted by Hanmer, Pyatt and White which engages in an analysis of twenty-five World Bank poverty assessments of twenty-two Sub-Saharan countries (Hanmer et al. 1999:795). When assessing poverty, three central questions need to be addressed: Who are the poor? Where are the poor? And, what can be done about poverty? The World Bank's definition of poverty stated that 'people are considered poor if their standard of living falls below the poverty line, that is, the amount of income (or consumption) associated with a minimum acceptable level of nutrition and other necessities of everyday life' (Hanmer et al. 1999:795). According to this definition either income or consumption is the measure used to decide who the poor are, where a critical poverty line is drawn at a critical income level (Hanmer et al. 1999:797). Such an income-based assessment of poverty constitutes the key element of mainstream development analysis and has dominated research in the field for decades.

It is important, then, to determine to what extent and in what way such an assessment is subjective or objective; in other words, 'are the dimensions of poverty to be analysed chosen with reference to those things held to be most important in
this regard by either the society under study or the poor themselves, or is some external, objective standard to be applied?’ (Hanmer et al. 1999:797-798). In the case of World Bank assessments, despite recognizing and briefly mentioning other indicators and their importance, twenty-two of the twenty-five assessments distinguish the poor from the non-poor based on the setting of an “objective” income-based poverty line (Hanmer et al. 1999:798). The use of income as an indicator raises concerns as regards the nature of indicators adopted: for as our discussion of the capability critique has revealed, income is simply ‘one of several dimensions of poverty, which range from basic needs to political rights’ (Hanmer et al. 1999:798). Furthermore, the relative importance of indicators may also vary depending on the social context or groups, which may vary by gender or ethnicity, for example (Hanmer et al., 1999:798). Income-based poverty analysis can therefore not facilitate true social analysis and the only relation to social reality that income-based poverty has is that poverty is also broadly correlated with the characteristics of households, such as size and location; and heads of households, such as gender and education (Hanmer et al. 1999:805). A further important point to note when examining poverty assessments is whether an absolute or a relative poverty line was employed; ‘an absolute poverty line can be set with respect to minimum consumption needs…. whereas relative poverty takes into account societal norms so that the definition of the socially acceptable level of consumption tends to rise with a country’s overall standard of living’ (Hanmer et al. 1999:799).

According to Hanmer et al., there are nonetheless a number of useful results to be drawn from the World Bank poverty assessments. The two most important results are that income poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa is continuing to increase with little indication of an imminent turn-around of this trend, and that Sub-Saharan Africa is recording insufficient growth with a deteriorating distribution of the benefits of the little growth attained (Hanmer et al. 1999:818). Yet, though useful, this information does not truly add to either our understanding of poverty or insights as to what can be done about poverty (Hanmer et al. 1999:819). There is a multitude of important considerations as regards the nature of economic growth and poverty that is not addressed by the World Bank assessments. In terms of growth itself, it is also important to examine not only whether there is growth, but what the pattern thereof is; in other words, it is important to ask whether growth is pro-poor such that the incomes of the poor grow faster than the incomes of the rich, and whether growth is labour-intensive or capital-intensive (Hanmer et al. 1999:814). In terms of poverty, it is also important to examine the key linkages between poverty and the society and the economy more closely, to examine the nature of gender relations and their impact on household welfare and to accordingly examine the nature of intra-household dynamics (Hanmer et
Moreover, macroeconomic issues, such as low growth and the debt crisis, and political instability should also be considered in terms of their effect on poverty. Finally, the cultural and ethnic context of the society being analyzed also warrants attention.

When considering all the crucial factors not considered by the World Bank assessments, it is not surprising that its simplistic three-pronged strategy of investment in human capital formation, represented by investment in education and health, broad-based growth and the creation of social safety nets has experienced limited success (Hanmer et al. 1999:814). Poor quality of public facilities, especially health and education, and poor access to both public facilities and government transfers reveals that the problem in Sub-Saharan Africa is not merely one of resource provision, but one of access, exclusion and inefficiency, while ‘traditional support systems are being worn away by rising population, political violence, AIDS and the increasing scarcity of environmental and other resources’ (Hanmer et al. 1999:819). Furthermore, at the micro (household and community) level, gender relations and labour market discrimination hinder resource and asset accumulation and limit the ability of women to generate income, which results in a misallocation of resources and decreased household investment – all of which, in turn, lowers economic growth (Hanmer et al. 1999:812).

Pieterse (1998) takes this discussion further and discusses both what mainstream and alternative approaches can teach us. Given the limitations of traditional income-based poverty measures, there has been scope for alternative development paradigms to take shape. But, it is critical to examine what format such alternative development theories should take (Pieterse 1998:344). Alternative development theories have attempted to redefine the goals of development in order to bring the individual and the community back into development practice. Alternative approaches are also critical of mainstream development theories, being constantly in search of alternatives (Pieterse 1998:350). The two key distinctive aspects of alternative development approaches is their emphasis on the local and their support for de-modernisation given that modernisation is perceived to be incompatible with human development (Pieterse 1998:347). Such approaches can at times even demonstrate anti-capitalist tendencies and a ‘valorization of indigenous knowledge’ (Pieterse 1998:357). Alternative approaches are, however, criticized on the grounds that they merely represent a loose set of ideas given that all the elements of the approach are not linked by a unifying theory. Indeed, the various elements of the approach can often even be contradictory (Pieterse 1998:348, 357). This point is highlighted when considering the statement that ‘if the people are the principle actors in the alternative development paradigm, the relevant reality must be the people’s own, constructed by them only’ (Rahman in Pieterse 1998:357), which implies that there cannot be a single paradigm of alternative development, but
only a collection of a multitude of local development perspectives (Pieterse 1998:357). Such a theory of development is termed to be an endogenous theory in terms of Hettne's classification above and is categorised as both substantive and normative in that it rejects universal definitions of development that reduce development to a limited number of criteria and does not believe that development is simply the unfolding of objective historical processes.

Mainstream development, on the other hand, places greater emphasis on international institutions, international cooperation and institutional change, and when analysing poverty employs variables such as GDP per capita, economic growth, health, literacy, education, housing and some degree of local participation (Pieterse 1998:358). Thus, the mainstream approach can be considered to be to some degree people-centred. Many aspects of alternative theories are consequently beginning to enter mainstream development practice, especially as regards the increased recognition of the importance of community participation in development, and thus the boundaries between mainstream and alternative development approaches are becoming increasingly vague (Pieterse 1998:344). In short then, a definitive shift in development thinking is beginning to take shape: ‘development is now more anchored in people’s subjectivity, rather than in overarching structures and institutions’ (Pieterse 1998:369). However, an important distinction between alternative and mainstream development approaches must be made: mainstream development is people-centred from the top-down, whereas alternative development is people-centred from the bottom-up. Thus, even though mainstream development does support the local participatory principles of alternative development, it ‘remains on the whole state-centred, top-down social engineering, in which the state is viewed as the main agent for implementing human development policies’ (Pieterse 1998:370). Hence, Pieterse continues to advocate that there should be an enduring distinction between alternative development, newly termed popular development by Pieterse, and more human or mainstream development, but emphasizes also that these two approaches are no longer entirely opposed to each other as the boundaries separating them become gradually more vague (Pieterse 1998:370).

Pieterse also mentions two further development perspectives, namely post-development and reflexive development. Post-development is situated at a far extreme opposite mainstream development, opting for the complete rejection of the concept of development as such, and is consequently anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist and anti-productivist (Pieterse 1998:362). Accordingly, this approach rather advocates the supremacy of indigenous knowledge, cultural diversity and self-reliance: ‘post-development parallels dependency theory in seeking to disengage the local from external dependency, taking it further to development as a power/knowledge regime. While dependency theory privileges the nation state, post-development privileges the local, the grassroots’ (Pieterse 1998:362). Reflexive
development, on the other hand, advocates a constantly reflexive approach to development given past failures and continuing development crises. In the context of this approach, new development policies should be ‘increasingly concerned with managing the hazards, risks, unintended consequences and side-effects brought about by development itself’ (Pieterse 1998:367-368).

Robins (2003) argues against the complete rejection of mainstream development and its conception as an expansion of Western imperialism, arguing that ‘development packages are resisted, embraced and reshaped or accommodated depending on the specific content and context’ (Robins 2003:265). Robins, thus, argues that modernity is often indigenised and, therefore, the sharp dichotomy between tradition and modernity is steadily dissipating: ‘responses to development are usually neither wholesale endorsements nor radical rejections of modernity. Even when resisting and subverting development ideas and practices, people do not generally do so on the basis of either radical populist politics or in defence of pristine and authentic local cultural traditions’ (Robins 2003:265). In order to demonstrate this point, Robins discusses three case studies of post-Apartheid land claims which reveal the incorporation of tradition, cultural rights and the modern legal system in land claim strategies. Robins also draws attention to the fact that benefits of Western modernity and development can be extremely attractive for resource-poor communities, while ‘there may be very little that is romantic about their experiences of the local’ (Robins 2003:283).

Participatory approaches, both from mainstream and alternative perspectives, to analysing poverty are becoming increasingly widespread in order to obtain the poor’s perspective of poverty. Such a study was, for instance, conducted by Lwanga-Ntale and McClean (2004) in order to gain a clearer understanding of how chronic poverty is perceived by the poor in Uganda. Despite having decreased the number of people living below the poverty line from 56 per cent in 1992 to 35 per cent in 2000, chronic poverty remains severe in Uganda (Lwanga-Ntale and McClean 2004:177). Ugandan chronic poverty is mainly a rural phenomenon, and is particularly severe in the Northern Region and among women, children, the elderly and large households (Lwanga-Ntale and McClean 2004:178). Lwanga-Ntale and Melean used this information as well as qualitative data from Ugandan Participatory Poverty Assessments to shed light on the perspectives of the chronically poor on poverty (Lwanga-Ntale and McClean 2004:178-179).

What the study reveals is that the three key aspects of poverty, as defined by the poor, are: a persistent lack of basic necessities such as food, water, shelter, clothes and means of production; a lack of social support or networks, which increases both vulnerability and social exclusion; and feelings of negativity such as hopelessness, resignation, defencelessness and worthlessness (Lwanga-Ntale and McClean 2004:180). The poor also identified five factors which they perceived to
cause and increase the duration of poverty. Firstly, the intergenerational nature of poverty transmission was perceived to breed resignation and feelings of inevitability, which often leads to a ‘production of poverty’ (Lwanga-Ntale and McClean 2004:181). Secondly, insecurity and conflict results in the loss of already limited resources and property as well as in both physical and mental distress and restricted labour mobility (Lwanga-Ntale and McClean 2004:182). Thirdly, drought also results in the loss of resources, and as men are forced to migrate in search of alternative income, women, children and the elderly are plunged into even greater poverty (Lwanga-Ntale and McClean 2004:184). Fifthly, poverty is also often linked to the seasons, where weather and agricultural patterns result in some of the poor being rendered even poorer at specific times of the year. Finally, HIV/AIDS is resulting in the loss of both the lives and productivity of young men. In conclusion, ’three inter-linked factors causing and maintaining poverty that were often cited by poor men, women, male youth, the elderly and the disabled alike were lack of education, illiteracy, and disempowerment’ (Lwanga-Ntale and McClean 2004:185). Importantly, these results reveal that poverty as such, and consequently the task of development, is far more complex than merely economic growth, increasing income and resource and service provision.

A study was also conducted by Allison Goebel (1998) based on a participatory study of a Zimbabwean Resettlement Area. The aim of the first part of the study was to reveal that participatory research both reveal and conceal power relations in communities, whereas the second part of the study attempted to demonstrate that local knowledge and social reality itself can oftentimes be highly challenged and disputed and at times can even be contradictory (Goebel 1998:280). Goebel warns that participation is continually in danger of coming ‘to mean “a way to get people to do what we want”, rather than a means fundamentally to change the project idea or construction, or a way to involve and respect local knowledge on an equal footing with foreign, particularly scientific, expertise’ (Goebel 1998:279). A second danger relates to the adoption of the principles of Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) ‘without adequately acknowledging the complexity of social realities, or properly practicing the intended notions of “participation”’ (Goebel 1998:279).

PRA studies aim to encourage local information sharing and collection and often involve visualizations and the employment of local materials given that local people are often illiterate and, therefore, ‘the use of survey questionnaires and other formal methods involving paper and pens that are controlled by researchers, are thought to be alienating, and afford little opportunity for people to express ideas in their own terms’ (Goebel 1998:281). Despite PRA group discussions and information sharing activities being able to afford researchers the ‘opportunity to observe some power relations in action, as people interact during
the exercises’ (Goebel 1998:284), the Zimbabwean assessments also reveal that
the emphasis on group work and consensus when presenting responses can serve
to silence ‘marginal or dissident views’ (Goebel 1998:284). The marginalisation
of women in such discussions becomes especially evident. This highlights the
importance of investigating the perspectives of different groups rather than
viewing the community as a unified whole. Many researchers, thus, divide
communities into different observable groups based on characteristics such as
gender and clan. In the case of Zimbabwe, important clusters of power were
observable based on gender, ‘totem or clan, wealth, relationship to the ruling
party, and witchcraft’ (Goebel 1998:285).

Goebel further notes that ‘there is no one “indigenous” or “local” knowledge,
but competing perspectives. Some dominate while others are marginalized’
(Goebel 1998:284). Therefore, it is dangerous to apply Western paradigms on
societies when “local” knowledge is treated as a unified whole. Local “knowledges”
always have to be investigated 'within their changing historical contexts, contested
belief systems, local power dynamics and struggles over the control of resources’
(Goebel 1998:294). According to Goebel, what the Zimbabwean participatory
assessment also reveals is that Zimbabwean traditional practices have been
continually altered under pressures of Western-indigenous interactions and
Christianity, ‘hence there is very little called “indigenous” that does not have
something “Western” implicated in it’ (Goebel 1998:294). Therefore, it is essential
that indigenous people be allowed to provide their own categorization of what
constitutes the traditional and what aspects of this tradition they perceive as being
or having been influenced by either the West or Christianity (Goebel 1998:294).

Taylor (2002), in studying the rural livelihoods of the hunter-gatherer Basarwa
peoples of Botswana, similarly warns that livelihood components such as money,
livestock and wildlife which, in the Western perspective, can be viewed as merely
sources of income or food, in actual fact ‘exist in a socio-political environment in
which each of them signifies a different way of living and a different set of
values’ (Taylor 2002:470). Money, livestock and wildlife are interconnected in
Basarwa communities and represent the essential components in the construction
of Basarwa livelihood strategies (Taylor 2002:486). Thus, mainstream development
practices cannot successfully introduce development programmes that aim to
replace one of these elements of Basarwa livelihood with another. Given their
remoteness, the Basarwa people are already facing enormous challenges to
obtaining entitlement to resources. For example, they are far from education and
employment opportunities, they feel stigmatised given their ethnic identity and
are, therefore, reluctant to attempt to gain employment. They are situated in wildlife
areas and, therefore, their crops and livestock are prone to be destroyed by wildlife,
while hunting legislation denies them their traditional practice of hunting for food
(Taylor 2002:487). This is significant when considering ‘Sen’s influential work Poverty and Famine (1981), which brought to the fore the importance of “entitlements”, or the ability to control commodities, in understanding the relationship between people and resources in maintaining their livelihoods’ (Taylor 2002:470).

Taylor also proceeds to briefly discuss the value and importance attached by the Basarwa to money, livestock and wildlife. Taylor finds that even in the remote Basarwa communities, money as a source of life is of critical importance. Therefore, employment is important for the Basarwa, but given their location and ethnicity, employment is unpredictable. Livestock has a very distinct cultural relevance for the Basarwa. Cattle are strongly desired by the Basarwa because they represent symbols of wealth, power and proper humanity (Taylor 2002:477). Cattle have also come to have a wider meaning as a source of food, income and ceremony (Taylor 2002:477). Importantly, these values of cattle were previously applied to wildlife, but given the new legislation the Basarwa culture has gradually transformed into a cattle culture (Taylor 2002:477). However, the substitution of a wildlife culture for a cattle culture cannot be complete. Given drought, the tsetse fly, attack by wild predators and the fact that cattle can be divested given the subordinate ethnic status of the Basarwa and the reduction of their hunting rights, this source of food for the communities has been drastically reduced (Taylor 2002:474, 478). Moreover, even though they do receive food handouts as compensation, the handouts contain limited proteins and therefore, proteins are still highly sought after by the Basarwa (Taylor 2002:478). In addition to the nutritional need for meat, it is also important to note that the Basarwa ‘consider game meat to be an essential part of their diet’ (Taylor 2002:479), and therefore, of their identity. The combination of cultural and nutritional needs, the “meat culture” of the Basarwa cannot simply be entirely replaced by a “cattle culture” with the imposition of development programmes and legislation and therefore, the Basarwa continue to lay claim to game meat, even if this implies illegally hunting more game than is allowed by their community quota (Taylor 2002:479). Indeed, the question of wildlife rights has become symbolic of the conflict between the Basarwa and the law (Taylor 2002:479). In conclusion, the study highlights that development programmes cannot simply replace traditional livelihoods without affecting community welfare or giving rise to some measure of conflict.

It is clear that a universalist perspective tends to lose sight of particular combinations and a particularist perspective will not be able to provide direction on anything but a local and limited level. The key seems to be in finding studies that look for combinations of a range of universals in particular combinations. Empirical research that has an interpretative sensitivity for different meanings and different relationships between universal categories tends to do that implicitly and sometimes explicitly. These are the basic principles of good comparative methodology and they are explored further in the next sections.
Empirical Analyses of Relationships Between Culture and Development

Modernisation Theory

The first line of analysis of the impact of specific cultures on economic development would always be modernisation theory as the approach has had such a dominant influence on development studies and practice as a whole. This theory attempts to link broad cultural characteristics to both the process of modernisation and economic development. A comprehensive series of studies were done in this regard by Ronald Inglehart and other colleagues (for an overview of the critique against Inglehart that is relevant to African issues see: Müller 2004). Seeing that Inglehart has been publishing on these matters for decades we will only discuss some of the arguments.

The first study conducted in this line of thought relevant to us was conducted in 1995. According to Inglehart, two dominant schools of modernisation theory can be identified: the first school is represented by a Marxist mode of thinking ‘which claims that economics, politics and culture are closely linked because economic development determines the political and cultural characteristics of a society’ (Inglehart 1995:379); and the second school of thought is represented by a Weberian mode of thinking ‘which claims that culture shapes economic and political life’ (Inglehart 1995:379). Even though Marxists claim that the mode of economic development determines a society’s cultural characteristics whereas Weberians claim that a society’s cultural characteristics determine its mode of economic development, the two schools do agree on the important point that there is a close and significant relationship between cultural characteristics and development. Given this purported close link, it is suggested that ‘from knowledge of one such trait, one can predict the presence of other key traits with far better than random success’ (Inglehart 1995:379). Inglehart, then, attempts to examine the validity of modernisation theory using the World Values Survey of 43 nations, conducted in the period 1990 to 1991 (Inglehart 1995:380). More specifically, the aim of the study is to determine whether coherent cultural patterns exist and whether such patterns are related to economic development. The existence of coherent cultural patterns and their accompanying link to economic development represent the two central assumptions of both the concept of modernisation and the concept of post-modernisation (Inglehart 1995:380-381).

The process of modernisation is accompanied by a shift from religious authority to state authority involving a process of secularisation in which a scientific worldview gradually replaces the worldview based on the mystical components of religion (Inglehart 1995:384). A second component of the process of modernisation is the rise of bureaucratic organisation as accompanied by rules, efficiency, explicit
goals and achievement values (Inglehart 1995:384). The shift to postmodernism, on the other hand, involves a movement ‘away from both religion and the state to the individual, with an increasing focus on individual concerns such as friends and leisure’ (Inglehart 1995:384). Five key components of this shift can be identified: firstly, there is a shift from scarcity values to security values; secondly, the acceptability of modern bureaucratic authority diminishes; thirdly, the western model is rejected while socialism is rejected as a workable alternative at the same time; fourthly, authority is rejected in favour of individual freedom as conducive to democracy; and finally, despite continued secularisation in terms of the lessening need for the security of religion, the importance of science and rationality gradually diminishes as concern for a greater purpose in life increases (Inglehart 1995:385-387).

The first question the study attempts to answer is whether the various religious, social, economic and political components of given cultures are more or less randomly related; or whether they go together, with a few coherent combinations being far more probable than others’ (Inglehart 1995:388). The study identifies the dimensions of modernisation and post-modernisation. Forty-seven variables were classified according to four dimensions, namely the polarisation between traditional authority and rational-legal authority, and the polarisation between scarcity values and postmodern values. The forty-seven variables were selected from the World Values survey to reflect and encompass a multitude of questions and related entries that demonstrate similar patterns (Inglehart 1995:388). In other words, in order to unearth and convey what Inglehart considers the fundamental cultural patterns, the most sensitive variables of each cluster were selected for the purposes of the study. The selected variables were then classified according to the two dimensions, and consequently the study found that ‘there is a great deal of constraint among cultural systems. The pattern found here is anything but random” (Inglehart 1995:388). There is a particular predictable cluster of values that accompanies the transition from traditional society to modernisation and the transition from modernisation to post-modernisation. Hence, as traditional societies move towards modernisation, the shift is accompanied by increased mass mobilisation as well as a move from traditional authority to rational legal authority (Inglehart 1995:402). Secondly, a society’s movement from modernisation to post-modernisation is predictably accompanied by ‘the emergence of advanced industrial society, with an increasing share of the public having higher education, being employed in the service sector, and feeling assured that their survival needs will be met, gives rise to a process in which high levels of subjective well-being and postmodern values emerge, and in which a variety of attributes, from equal rights for women to democratic political institutions, become increasingly likely’ (Inglehart 1995:402).

The study does, indeed, find constrained coherent cultural patterns (given that one has to accept the construction of the categories for the sake of the argument),
but these patterns hold over regions rather than over individual countries. Furthermore, the study shows that these cultural patterns are related to a society’s level of development. Thus, given these two results, significant support is lent to a general modernisation theory which argues not only that ‘coherent cultural patterns exist, but that these patterns are linked with a given society’s level of economic development’ (Inglehart 1995:397). However, Inglehart concludes that further studies are necessary in order to determine the direction of causality of the revealed linkages. In other words, simply because a linkage exists between postmodern values and development, one does not know whether development will result in spreading these values or whether the spreading of these values results in development. Yet, what is clear is that the cultural changes linked with the shift to postmodern values are conducive to the development of democracy (Inglehart 1995:400). Hence, one of the most important findings of the study is that ‘the linkage between culture and democracy found here is even stronger than the linkage between economic development and democracy…’ This finding suggests that economic development by itself does not automatically produce democracy; it may do so in so far as it gives rise to a specific syndrome of cultural changes’ (Inglehart 1995. For how this line of reasoning has been taken further, see Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). Finally, Inglehart speculates on why it is that cultural change follows predictable patterns, and then claims that change is predictable given that it follows a process of rational choice in the long-run: in the gradual shift to modernisation, focus is shifted in order to gain a ‘better’ economic outcome and thus focus is firmly placed on maximising economic growth; the shift to postmodernism, on the other hand, takes place in more advanced industrialised nations where economic gains begin to demonstrate diminishing returns and, in response, a rational choice is made to shift focus to improving subjective well-being and quality of life (Inglehart 1995:401).

In 2000, Inglehart and Baker examined modernisation in terms of two recent schools of thought: the first school of thought argues that in the face of modernisation all values converge, where traditional values are gradually replaced by “modern” values; and, the second school of thought argues that, regardless of modernisation, traditional values persist, and therefore, this approach regards values to be ‘relatively independent of economic condition’ (Inglehart and Baker 2000:20). As the twentieth century continued, and the West continued to develop while the rest of the world was lagging far behind, modernisation theorists argued that for lagging countries to “catch up” with the West, they would have to relinquish their traditional practices and values in favour of the Western model proliferated. However, towards the end of the century, and in the wake of the East Asian development miracle that occurred within the context of non-western cultures, values and development models, few observers would attribute moral superiority...
to the West, and Western economies are no longer assumed to be the model for the world’ (Inglehart and Baker 2000:20-21). As a consequence, it becomes important to empirically investigate whether modernisation is leading to a convergence of values as propagated by earlier theorists, or whether traditional values continue to have a significant effect. Inglehart and Baker again highlight the change in values expected to accompany a move from a traditional society characterised by traditional values to an industrial society characterised by modern values, and again from an industrial society to a post-industrial society characterised by postmodern values (Inglehart and Baker 2000:21).

Inglehart and Baker begin their investigation by using World Values Survey data for sixty-five societies for the period 1995 to 1998 and Huntington’s (Huntington 1993; Huntington 1996) eight cultural zones to plot the sixty-five societies on a two dimensional global map of cross-cultural variation. The ‘two dimensions reflect cross-national polarization between traditional versus secular-rational orientations toward authority; and survival versus self-expression values’ (Inglehart and Baker 2000:23). The zones identified by Huntington are ‘Western Christianity, the Orthodox world, the Islamic world, and the Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, African, and Latin American zones’ (Inglehart and Baker 2000:22). Using these dimensions, the first significant finding is that economic development has a definite impact on cultural values. The traditional versus secular-rational dimension is related to a movement from a traditional society to an industrial society, whereas the survival versus self-expression values is related to the movement from an industrial society to a post-industrial society (Inglehart and Baker 2000:30-31). Furthermore, the countries in each cultural zone also demonstrate similar cultural and value patterns (Inglehart and Baker 2000:31). This relation between countries in cultural clusters persists even when controlling for per capita income and labour force structure, and, accordingly, all Protestant European countries, for instance, do not merely have similar values because they are wealthy (Inglehart and Baker 2000:34). A further important finding is that ‘interpersonal trust is significantly correlated with a society’s level of GDP per capita’ (Inglehart and Baker 2000:35), a finding which reiterates the importance of the creation of trust for economic development given its role in creating the social structures inherent in democracy and facilitating the establishment of the complex social organisation required for large-scale economic activity (Inglehart and Baker 2000:34). Interestingly, both an orthodox religious heritage and a communist historical legacy has a damaging impact on the formation of not only interpersonal trust, but also on tolerance, well-being and postmaterialism, all of which form part of self-expression values (Inglehart and Baker 2000:35, 39-40). In contrast, Protestantism was found to have a positive impact on the formation of self-expression values (Inglehart and Baker 2000:39). Finally, the study finds that secular-rational values do become more pervasive as a country industrialises (Inglehart and Baker 2000:41-42).
Similar to the earlier Inglehart (1995) study, it was found that as countries industrialise, the emphasis on survival lessens as feelings of security increase, and increased security is accompanied by a move towards postmodern values. As a result of this decreased concern for survival and security, modernisation theory predicts that the pervasiveness of religious faith should decline. However, this is not the case as evidence suggests that religious cleavages remain strong given that, even though institutional religious attendance has declined, spirituality has increased (Inglehart and Baker 2000:46). This trend effectively reveals that ‘the need for security is not the only attraction of religion’ (Inglehart and Baker 2000:47). As countries move beyond industrialisation into the realm of post-industrialism, people ‘are less attached to traditional forms of religion … but they are more likely to spend time thinking about the meaning and purpose of life’ (Inglehart and Baker 2000:47).

The study thus finds that there is a two-fold dynamic occurring which encompasses both a convergence to modern values and a persistence of traditional values. Thus, ‘modernization theorists are partly right. The rise of industrial society is linked with coherent cultural shifts away from traditional values. … But values seem to be path dependent: a history of Protestant or Orthodox or Islamic or Confucian traditions gives rise to cultural zones with distinctive value systems that persist after controlling for the effects of economic development’ (Inglehart and Baker 2000:49). This seems to be an important finding and leads Inglehart and Baker to re-conceptualise modernisation theory to account for the fact that the process of modernisation is not linear in nature, that it is deceptive to equate cultural change with Americanisation and that even though ‘economic development tends to transform a given society in a predictable direction … the process and path are not inevitable’ (Inglehart and Baker 2000:49).

Generic Social Structures and Goods that Influence Development

Culture and Development in Africa

Modern theorists attempting to explain why the growth and development of lagging regions such as Africa and Latin America has been so low have been unable to uncover any comprehensively convincing explanation. The issues are complex and we discuss a few findings in order to point to some of the important dynamics.

For instance, Barro (1991), and Easterly and Levine (1994) ‘find that even after controlling for a wide range of variables, the weak growth performance of Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa remains unexplained’ (Fedderke and Klitgaard 1998:456). Fedderke and Klitgaard argue that the reason why no clear causal linkages can be found lies in the possibility of webs of association existing between growth, political and civil rights, political stability and the efficiency of
public institutions; in other words, there may be ‘distinct groupings of social indicators with differentiated impacts on economic growth’ (1998:455, echoing Adelman’s insistence on the complexity of development processes, 2001:117). There may thus be interactions between political and social institutions, and consequently it is not either political or social institutions impacting on growth, but rather a joint impact on economic growth (Fedderke and Klitgaard 1998:456). The Fedderke and Klitgaard study then attempts to test this claim by considering the interactions among a number of variables that include ‘instability, violence, political and civil rights, corruption, inequality, political and ethnic fractionalization, separatist and discriminatory pressures, family stability, and an array of cultural characteristics’ (Fedderke and Klitgaard 1998:458).

The results of the study reveal that there are, indeed, correlations between rights, instability and institutional efficiency, between regime-threatening instability measures, between non-regime-threatening instability measures and between institutional efficiency and fractionalisation and separatist pressure (Fedderke and Klitgaard 1998:464-471). However, Fedderke and Klitgaard also highlight the possibility that the common use of proxies for social indicators may also distort results as it is often not entirely clear what precisely is being measured (1998:458). It is, therefore, important that interactions among variables be examined when attempting to explain growth performance rather than investigating variables in isolation. This is precisely what the literature on culture and economic growth and development attempts to achieve, where culture as a variable consists of a variety of social indicators, all of which interact with each other and with economic growth.

Given the inexplicable poor growth performance in Africa, there has been a resurgence of theories propagating that African culture inhibits growth (Odhiambo 2002:1). A study conducted by Odhiambo criticizes this theory and rather calls for further investigations into the realities of African cultures today such that development practices would be able to build ‘on the indigenous roots of African culture as a way forward’ (Odhiambo 2002:1). Some of the ostensible features of African culture believed to inhibit growth include apathy, fatalism, a lack of individualism, a poor conception of time, irrationality, a lack of encouragement of individual merit and traditional religious orientations (Odhiambo 2002:2). Odhiambo does not deny the existence of these cultural aspects in Africa, but argues that such aspects should not be viewed as an inhibitor to growth but should rather ‘be considered as the point of departure for dynamic development’ (Odhiambo 2002:7). This implies a conception of African cultures as dynamic rather than static phenomena, ‘and therefore can be and ought to be evaluated internally by their practitioners, the Africans themselves’ (Odhiambo 2002:7). Thus, by refocusing attention on what Africans have to say about both their culture and
development, the study again highlights the importance of conceptualising development from the bottom-up rather than from the top-down.

Oyeshile (2003), on the other hand, criticises the popular literature that often seeks to explain Africa’s poor growth performance by referring to the inhibiting roles of colonialism and ethnicity. Oyeshile argues that colonialism and ethnicity alone cannot be blamed for Africa’s troubles, and that one should rather examine the impact on economic performance of the ‘lack of moral probity’ (Oyeshile 2003:83). Therefore, the link between morality and governance is reemphasised. One of the dominant features of Africa is the continuing prevalence of instability in the context of democratisation, and political, social and economic theories have failed to account for this (Oyeshile 2003:81). Oyeshile thus considers whether a re-examination of traditional social-ethical values may enhance stability and, accordingly, economic development (Oyeshile 2003:81). In this regard, Oyeshile specifically examines the values of the traditional Yoruba society, which include values such as selflessness, truthfulness, covenant keeping, condemnation of stealing, character, tolerance, sharing, solidarity, support, cooperation, independence, religious tolerance, reciprocal obligation, rectitude and an opposition to hypocrisy (Oyeshile 2003:83). Furthermore, a person is considered to have a good character if his or her actions are good for the community; in other words, the individual and community are integrally linked, where communal well-being is of utmost importance (Oyeshile 2003:84-85). Individuals are not allowed to exist in isolation and therefore have to be able to sacrifice self-interest for the good of the community, and, in return, the community is required to recognise the rights of individuals (Oyeshile 2003:86). Importantly, this principle is also applied in the case of leadership: ‘in cases where any leader becomes deaf and blind to public opinion, such a leader soon loses his position’ (Oyeshile 2003:86). In Oyeshile’s view, the mentioned values and communal cultural legacies are almost entirely lacking in modern African governance, and therefore, he argues that these values should be reapplied to contemporary African governance, institutions and economics (Oyeshile 2003:86). Of critical importance in this regard is a renewal on the part of government and institutions of a sense of responsibility to the community (Oyeshile 2003:85).

The study conducted by Oyeshile in 2004 revisits the issue of Africa’s development crisis and the possible role of communal values and cultural identity in alleviating the crisis. Again, Oyeshile asserts ‘that the traditional African emphasis on communal values needs to be reinvigorated while remembering that African leaders need to be more ready to adopt new values and ideas such as will promote future development’ (Oyeshile 2004:291). In this study, Oyeshile highlights the importance of HIV/AIDS, corruption, multi-ethnicity, religious conflict and the alienation of government from its people as important stumbling blocks to
economic progress (Oyeshile 2004:292). However, in addition to the reiteration of the need to return to communal values in order to improve governance and institutions, the 2004 study also recognizes that ‘instead of trying to defend African identity at all cost, we should preoccupy ourselves with the benefits that can accrue to us from indigenous and foreign cultures in order to improve the current situation’ (Oyeshile 2004:301).

In conclusion, despite specifics, what these studies on African development and culture reveal is the increasing importance of recognizing the impact of culture on economic and social development as well as recognizing the incredible complexity involved in capturing this cultural effect. Development cannot simply be imposed from “above” by an alien culture, but must rather be rooted in a society’s culture so as to embrace both the local and the universal. Thus, it is important to examine more broadly the relationship between culture and economic growth in order to gain new insights into the relationship between culture and development in the African context.

Culture and Economic Development

An early study conducted by Vernon W. Ruttan (1988) represents an attempt to more broadly examine the relationship between culture and development. The study introduces a general conceptual model which identifies resource endowments, cultural endowments, technology and institutions as important factors that may influence economic growth. The study also attempts to investigate the relationship among these variables, where the relationship of cultural endowments in promoting or preventing institutional innovation is of particular interest: ‘cultural endowments make some forms of institutional change less costly to establish and impose severe costs on others’ (Ruttan 1988:250). Within the context of considering these variables, the study proceeds to provide a useful overview of post-war development theorists acknowledging some role for culture in economic development. Importantly, all of these theorists purport that institutional change away from the traditional and towards the modern is required for economic progress and the dawn of modern society.

The first of these theorists is Bert F. Hoselitz (1952), who argues that ‘value systems offer special resistance to change (…) their change is facilitated if the market economic environment in which they can flourish is destroyed or weakened’ (Hoselitz in Ruttan 1988:252). Hoselitz argues such change in the economic environment is spearheaded by the emergence of minorities, which encourages increased social mobility and aids in the generation of an economic environment conducive to the emergence of a modern society and weakens commitment to traditional production and organisational systems (Ruttan 1988:251).
A second theorist, Everett E. Hagen (1962), attempts to combine the fields of anthropology, sociology, psychology and economics, arguing ‘that the interrelations between personality formation and social structure are such that social change could not occur without prior or concurrent personality change’ (Ruttan 1988:252). For instance, Hagen argues that traditional societies can be said to be characterised by an “authoritarian personality” and thus requires a personality change before development and democratisation is possible (Ruttan 1988:252).

Irma Adelman and Cynthia T. Morris (1965, 1967, 1973), on the other hand, ‘use factor analysis to compress a large set of indicators into groups of closely associated socio-cultural, political, and economic indicators of the development process’ (Ruttan 1988:253). Two sets of studies were conducted: the first study was performed on seventy-four countries, and the second study was performed on three sub-sets of countries as determined by the countries’ level of development (Ruttan 1988:253). The results of their studies are said to reveal that in the earliest phases of development, both cultural and social constraints inhibit development, suggesting that the enhancement of economic activity requires a transformation of the socio-cultural aspects of a society (Ruttan 1988:253). Therefore, the study reflects ‘the interaction of an organic system of institutional and behavioural change which underlies the process of economic development’ (Adelman & Morris in Ruttan 1988:252).

Myrdal (1968) also argued that traditional values inhibit growth, and consequently juxtaposed Western elitist modernisation ideals with traditional values, where the Western ideals include rationality, efficiency, diligence, innovation, independence, democracy, honesty and equity (Ruttan 1988:253). Thus, according to Myrdal, the South Asian people ‘have lived for a long time under conditions very different from those in the Western world. And this has left its mark upon their bodies and minds. Religion has, then, become the emotional container of this whole way of life and work and, by its sanction, has rendered it rigid and resistant to change’ (Myrdal in Ruttan 1988:254). Ironically, Myrdal thus argued that a strong state is necessary in order to enforce the social change and discipline needed for economic progress, and he was thus critical of South Asia’s “soft state”: ‘planning for development requires a readiness to place obligations on people in all social strata to a much greater extent than is done in any of the South Asian countries (…) development cannot be achieved without much more social discipline than the prevailing interpretation of democracy in the region permits’ (Myrdal in Ruttan 1988:254).

The works of P.T. Bauer (1984) focus on the impact on output of ethnic groups with different cultural endowments (Ruttan 1988:255). His views of the possibility of cultural constraints on development resemble those of Myrdal, except that Bauer favours market forces above the strong state (Ruttan 1988:255).
Bauer examined Chinese and Indian output, observing that even with the same inputs and equipment, Chinese output more than doubled Indian output. In response to this observation, Bauer made the claim that since ‘the great majority of both Indians and Chinese were uneducated coolies [sic] … the differences in their performances could not be explained in terms of differences in human capital formation (…) [and] was to encounter similar phenomena in West Africa, in the Levant, in India and elsewhere (…) [emphasizing the] differences in economic performance among different cultural groups as a feature of much of economic history’ (Bauer in Ruttan 1988:255).

A study conducted by Granato, Inglehart and Leblang in 1996 also broadly examines the impact of culture on economic development, arguing for a complementary relationship between economic and cultural factors (Granato et al. 1996:607). In their study, they use as a base the standard endogenous growth model and then include two cultural variables perceived to represent motivational factors that may encourage or discourage economic growth; the two variables are achievement motivation and post-materialist values (Granato et al. 1996:607). As regards achievement motivation, the study draws on the Weberian line of analysis which argues that the Protestant reform of Christianity played a key role in the rise of capitalism in Europe given a new found support for education and achievement (Granato et al. 1996:608). Yet, the study also attempts to shift attention beyond the limited scope of Weberian theories of the rise of capitalism, arguing that the Protestant role in the rise of capitalism is merely one case in a more general phenomenon. For example, a similar argument applies to the positive impact of “modern” Confucian values on economic growth; early Confucian values, as was the case with early Christian values, stigmatised profit and entrepreneurship, but again its eventual reform was instrumental in the rise of capitalism (Granato et al. 1996:608). Post-materialist values, on the other hand, no longer place emphasis on economic growth, but rather focus on factors such as the environment and quality of life.

The first segment of the quantitative analysis of the study used the World Values Survey to construct an achievement motivation index based on the summation of the percentage of people in each country studied that emphasised the values of thrift and determination, where these values were considered to reflect the importance of autonomy and achievement, minus the percentage of people that emphasised obedience and religious faith, where these values were considered to reflect the relative importance of conformity to traditional norms (Granato et al. 1996:611). In constructing the index, the level of emphasis of the values was not as important as the relative priority attributed to them (Granato et al. 1996:613). East Asia was revealed to occupy the highest position on the motivational index and also had the highest per capita growth, with the two
African countries in the study (Nigeria and South Africa) occupying the lowest position in the index accompanied by the lowest per capita growth (Granato et al. 1996:612). Finally, the European and New World countries were placed in the middle of the index, and the per capita growth of these countries was also placed between that of East Asia and Africa (Granato et al. 1996:612).

In the second segment of the quantitative analysis, three growth models were estimated. In the first model, mean per capita economic growth for the period 1960 to 1989 was regressed on the initial level of per capita GDP, on investment in human capital and on the rate of capital accumulation (Granato et al. 1996:616). The results of the model reveal that the initial per capita GDP coefficient is negative, indicating the presence of conditional convergence – meaning that poor countries grow faster than rich countries (Granato et al. 1996:616). Furthermore, both investment in human capital and capital accumulation were revealed to have a positive impact on economic growth (Granato et al. 1996:616). In the second model, mean per capita economic growth for selected countries for the period 1960 to 1989 was regressed on the achievement motivation and post-materialist values. The results of the model revealed that achievement motivation was positively related to economic growth, whereas post-materialism is negatively related to economic growth (Granato et al. 1996:616). In the final model, models one and two were combined and this model again revealed that achievement motivation was positively related to economic growth, but post-materialism was now revealed to be insignificant (Granato et al. 1996:620). Thus, the importance of motivational factors in encouraging economic growth can be recognised. What these three models reveal is that both economic and cultural models are important in explaining economic growth and therefore the results lend support for the argument that economic and cultural factors play complementary roles in encouraging economic growth.

Marini (2004) also considers the relationship between culture and economic growth and argues that there are two opposing drives in the theory regarding the relationship between culture and development; the first drive emphasises achievement motivation as being crucial for economic growth, and the second drive emphasises “trust syndrome” as being crucial for economic growth (Marini 2004:765). The first school of thought focuses on individual values and the need for achievement. McClelland (1967), for example, found a positive correlation between economic growth and cultures emphasising a need for achievement, but no such growth correlation was found in countries emphasising values relating to social relationships (Marini 2004:769). These results are supported by the Granato et al. (1996) study which also finds a positive relationship between achievement and economic growth, but similarly, finds a negative relationship between social relationship values, such as obedience and religious faith, and economic growth.
The second school of thought, in contrast, highlights the importance of social relationships and culture as a whole, and emphasises the importance of the creation of trust between impersonal agents (Marini 2004:769). The creation of trust is argued to be particularly abundant within the context of the limited institutional framework of traditional scenarios, stimulating arguments for the importance of traditional cultures (Marini 2004:769). This line of thought has been revived given the recent East Asian development boom. In this regard, the best-selling novels of Putman (1993) and Fukuyama (1995) set out to prove ‘that cultural factors play an important if not crucial role in explaining economic growth around the world’ (Marini 2004:767). However, empirical evidence for both schools has at best been confusing and at worst entirely contradictory, and hardly ever have studies been conducted that combine the two schools of thought. One possible reason for the persistent lack of consensus may be ‘the multidimensionality of the values system, a realm too vast to be mastered by the human mind’ (Marini 2004:770).

According to Marini, achievement and trust are complementary because achievement motivation, and thus the enhancement of competition, led to the industrial revolution, whereas trust facilitates market transactions and lowers transaction costs, and thus leads to the enlargement of market size (Marini 2004:774-775). Therefore, achievement and trust are two complementary and necessary requirements for economic growth and the attainment of basic materialist goals. Finally, when society reaches the threshold where basic needs have been met, secondary needs such as spiritual goals (...) can be pursued by the vast majority of the population (Marini 2004:775). This movement relates to the move towards post-materialist values. In short then, Marini's model argues that following limited growth in the traditional society, the encouragement of achievement motivation and trust creation will stimulate growth and propel the society into an era of industrialisation and modernisation, and as growth continues to increase and materialist goals are met, the society will move into a post-materialist phase of development. Following the conceptualisation of this model, Marini engages in a brief empirical study using the World Values Survey and finds that the variables associated with traditional society, such as obedience, religious faith and tolerance, are negatively correlated with economic growth, the values associated with achievement and trust, such as independence, thrift, determination and responsibility, are positively correlated with economic growth and post-materialist values, such as imagination and unselfishness, are uncorrelated with economic growth (Marini 2004:776). It is clear that religion has to be discussed as part of culture and it has also been investigated somewhat as an explanatory variable – even if always in terms that originated in Europe rather than in the African religious experience.
Religion and Economic Development
A widespread feature of the studies discussed thus far is that religious faith, except in its Protestant work ethic formulation, is either found or expected to be negatively related to economic growth given its association with values such as obedience and tradition. However, given the immense impact of the various religions on the cultures of the world, it is important to examine whether this negative relationship is as dominant and prevalent as it seems.

A recent study in this regard is that by Marcus Noland (2005) which empirically investigates the relationship between religion and economic performance. Noland argues for a positive relationship between religion and economic growth: ‘Abundant evidence affirms that religious beliefs affect a wide range of behavioural outcomes, and religious activity can affect economic performance at the level of the individual group, or country through at least two channels’ (Noland 2005:1215). These two channels, or two economic advantages, were argued to exist by Adam Smith in the Wealth of Nations: the first channel identified by Adam Smith is that of reputation, where membership to a so-called “good” sect could lend the individual a “good” reputation by association, and thus reduce the risk associated with that individual; the second channel is that of trust and discipline outside of the formal legal system such that uncertainty and transaction costs are reduced and transaction efficiency is increased (Noland 2005:1215). The argument of Adams is applicable to a wider conception of group associations than religion only.

Max Weber also contended that there is a strong link between religion and economic performance: according to Weber, ‘the Protestant Reformation was critical to the rise of capitalism through its impact on belief systems’ (Noland 2005:1215). In the process of the development of the so-called Protestant work-ethic, attitudes towards achievement, economic activity and wealth accumulation were revolutionised. In addition, the values of diligence, efficiency and thrift were cultivated, which were seen to be essential building blocks of capitalism (Noland 2005:1215). However, Weber’s argument focuses only on Protestantism and does not broaden its discussion to include the impact of religion, in all its manifestations, on economic growth.

The Noland Study attempts to test the Weberian line of argumentation with particular consideration of the purported negative impact of Islam on economic performance, drawing attention to the possibility that ‘intermediate institutions may be the mechanism through which religious belief affects economic performance at the aggregate level’ (Noland 2005:1216). In this quest, Noland employs three sets of evidence; firstly, a cross-country analysis was conducted, secondly, a smaller cross-country analysis was conducted covering nearly a century, and, thirdly, Noland conducted ‘analyses of subnational data for three multireligious,
multiethnic countries’ (Noland 2005:1216). Seven religious categories are identified by Noland, namely Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, Christians, Muslims, Jews, Hindus, and Buddhists (Noland 2005:1217). The results of the regressions reveal that although it is evident that religious affiliation is correlated with growth and factor productivity performance, ‘the regressions do not yield a robust pattern of coefficients with respect to particular religions’ (Noland 2005:1227). The long-run results yield a positive relationship between the Buddhist and Christian variables and growth and factor productivity performance, whereas the relationship between other religious variables and performance proved to be insignificant (Noland 2005:1219). The medium-run results, however, yielded a negative relationship between the Jewish, Protestant and Catholic variables (Noland 2005:1217-1218). This result of a negative correlation in the medium-run and a positive correlation in the long-run of especially the Christian variable certainly warrants further investigation and explanation. Noland hazards no theoretical explanation for the nature of his results. However, what is certain is that there is a statistically significant relationship between religious affiliation and performance even though no coherent pattern of this relationship emerges (Noland 2005:1227).

Islam is commonly associated with values and attitudes that are negatively associated with economic growth and is considered to be generally anti-market. The first problem with these theories is that it is not even clear whether Islamic countries have in fact been underperforming economically in the past number of decades (Noland 2005:1220). Indeed, ‘Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim country, has grown far more rapidly than the world average for the past four decades’ (Noland 2005:1220). The growth of Middle Eastern countries, on the other hand, has outperformed Sub-Saharan Africa, and though worse than East Asia, has been similar to that of South Asia and Latin America (Noland 2005:1220). A further complication here is to what extent the Middle Eastern growth performance merely reflects the growth impact of oil. Furthermore, ‘it could be that the negative interpretations of Islam’s historical legacy are correct, but that enough convergence in institutions has occurred that the effects have dissipated in the contemporary world, or that other positive characteristics in Islamic societies overwhelm the negative influence of Islam, or it could be that received wisdom is simply wrong’ (Noland 2005:1220; Sala-i-Martin et al. 2004 seems to have produced the same results). In all the regressions attempting to analyse the relationship between Islam and either growth performance or factor productivity performance, the coefficients revealed either a positive or an insignificant relation with performance (Noland 2005:1221-1222). The only negative coefficient found on Islam was in the sub-national regression for Malaysia, where Islam is the state religion (Noland 2005:1228). This empirical result seems to counteract popular claims that Islam inhibits economic performance. However, the contradictory results of different studies suggests that results may be dependent on the manner
in which models are estimated or the samples used, and thus further investigation into this relationship will be necessary in order to clarify results (for a sustained attempt at teasing out the detail of the argument see: Kuran 1997; Kuran 1998; Kuran 2001; Kuran 2003; Kuran 2004a; Kuran 2004c; Kuran 2004b; Kuran 2005. For an opposing argument, see: Lewis 2003).

Wendy Tyndale (2000) also conducted an interesting study with normative dimensions that investigates the importance of religion in development. Her study aims to place the individual back into the concept of development by highlighting the importance of individual faith in shaping individuals and their concept of development and the importance of religious institutions given their close contact with individuals, and thus to the grassroots of development. Tyndale draws on the argument that in the absence of spiritual advancement, there can be no true physical development, but that such spiritual considerations have been given little or no attention in mainstream development economic theories and practices (Tyndale 2000:9). In consequence, “development”, widely defined as the process by which non-industrialised countries would catch up with the more “advanced” nations, has not traditionally been understood in the context of the spirituality, values, and cultural heritage, either of the developers or of those supposedly being developed (Tyndale 2000:9). Thus, there is an ever-increasing need to clarify the “true” meaning of development and to adjust interpretations thereof to account for local conditions, cultures and religious beliefs; and, accordingly, international institutions need to acquire a ‘more intimate knowledge of the people whose poverty [they wish] to eradicate’ (Tyndale 2000:10).

In short, religion, and its accompanying priorities, should not be perceived to be stumbling blocks to either development or efficient capitalistic economic functioning, but rather as an integral part of the advancement of development and economic production (Tyndale 2000:10). Tyndale then proceeds to discuss the various manners in which the majority of religions in the world are conducive and not contrary to development. Firstly, it is in its ability to empower individuals and provide a vision that religion is most powerful in stimulating development: ‘for the faiths, “empowerment” involves the concept of personal dignity, of self-worth, of a kind of contentedness, which does not depend either on the opinion of others or on fulfilling immediate desires. This sort of empowerment brings hope and vision with it” (Tyndale 2000:11). In the end, for a people to develop, they firstly need the hope that they are able to rise above their circumstances and secondly need a vision towards which they can develop. The remaining elements of religion conducive to development are the encouragement of a sharing of wealth, the recognised importance of equity and inclusion, the relationship between people and the environment, the encouragement of personal transformation and the provision of education and leadership.
In terms of sharing wealth, the majority of faiths condemn greed and exploitation, while encouraging equity, compassion, generosity, solidarity and self-sacrifice. This suggests that the developmental models that religions may propagate may be far more in tune with a conception of the welfare state than with the current liberal models. However, ‘economists warn that a move towards self-sacrifice – the reduction of consumption – in the rich countries would slow down global growth and lead to more hardship for the poor; but, even if one accepts that growth is the prerequisite for poverty reduction, the way we consume should be scrutinized’ (Tyndale 2000:12). Within the sharing context the emphasis on equity is also highlighted, where the majority of religions contain some conception of all peoples having been created by God and consequently have an element of God within them, and are thus worthy of respect. However, despite this theological conception of equity, true equity is not necessarily exercised in practice. Inequitable practices are particularly evident in gender relations, and it is therefore important that the religions clarify ‘how much of the male domination which is practiced within many of their communities is practiced within many of their communities has to do with cultural traditions which could now be considered “out of date”’ (Tyndale 2000:14). This is an important point given that women and children are some of the poorest people in the world, and thus improved gender relations are crucial for “true” development and optimal economic growth (Tyndale 2000:14).

Religions also contain precepts on the relationship between man and the environment, where people are seen as either stewards of the environment or merely a part of creation’s whole (Tyndale 2000:14). In short, people have a duty to care for the environment and maintain a harmonious balance between man and nature. This stands in contrast to the exploitative view – which now needs to be reversed – taken of the environment in past decades. Thus, in our quest to “save” the environment, the religions may have an important role to play.

Finally, Tyndale argues that religions have an important role to play in terms of bringing about change. The first manner in which religions can bring about change is by personal transformation: ‘any strategy for change must be based on an analysis of the causes of the ills we want to change. For the faiths, these causes lie first and foremost with the individual human being. They are then to be found structurally within the societies which human beings construct’ (Tyndale 2000:15). Religions can thus alter societal structures by transforming individuals from being generally self-interested to being generally selfless (Tyndale 2000:15). This role of religion is closely related to its role as educator: ‘In some countries of the world – Tanzania is an example – the education system would be almost non-existent if it were not for schools run by religious bodies’ (Tyndale 2000:16). Religious bodies are able to teach literacy, basic health care, self-reliance, basic organisational skills
and leadership skills, all of which is important for development (Tyndale 2000:16). Thus, religious bodies have the potential to be agents of change and deliver individuals who can also be agents of change. Lastly, and in many ways in summary, religious bodies as organisations closely connected to communities are also able to aid international institutions in the setting of criteria for development. Religious criteria can highlight the importance of hope and dignity, of equity, of personal transformation and of education, all of which are critical to development.

The problem with analyses like that of Tyndale is, of course, that it mixes normative semi-theological statements with the sociological analysis of a particular facet of society in a way that a scientific analysis should not ignore but often does — exactly because it does not know how to deal with statements that seem to be theological. It is quite difficult to explain the content of religious motivation without dealing with the theological claims that structure the meaning of any variety of religion. In this case, there are a number of critical perspectives built into the analysis. Furthermore, the basic point is that the motivation to attempt to go beyond the desperate situation of poverty and exclusion comes from a sense of direction or meaning that religion could provide. This meaningful content of religious beliefs also creates institutional and social realities that should not be ignored. On the other hand, there have often been structural relationships between what was asked in the name of religion and the economic and political exploitation of a group. The nature of the Methodist attempt at converting the Barong Bo-Ratsidi in colonial and early industrial South Africa is as good an example as any (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992). Any argument about the value of religion in society has to be tempered with a very clear understanding of how religions of all types have been a camouflage for ideological and political-economic projects of the worst kind.

The problem with the standard method of inquiry about the impact of religion and especially different religious traditions on development is the neatness of the categories. African religion is always a mixture of different facets (if European religious denominations can be categorised neatly). It is only a result of significant fading of a variety of different influences that were standardised in the formation of the European nation-state system. African Islam is African, and Muslim and East African Islam is very different from West African Islam (Brenner 1993; Westerlund and Rosannder 1997). Methodism in South Africa (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991, 1997, 1992) and in Zimbabwe (Ranger 1995, 2003) had very different trajectories and occupy very different religious spaces in that the other denominations that make up the landscape and the cultural, political and social context within which Methodism found itself differs significantly. The combination of local cultural specificity, broader political-economic and social dynamics and the manner in which non-traditional religion was imported and received makes a
comparison in the standard form very difficult. This will also be an issue later on when we attempt to put forward our own Southern African analysis of the Protestant Ethic theme.

**Cultural Diversity and Economic Development**

One approach to examine the effect of culture on economic development is to suggest that the specifics of individual cultures are not as crucial as the number of cultures in any one country. In other words, the diversity of cultures is what is important in determining the level of economic development. One such study on the economic relevance of cultural diversity was conducted by Lian and Oneal in 1997, whose study aimed to determine whether cultural diversity has a negative impact on economic development given that ‘there is a long line of thought suggesting that culturally diverse states are apt to have relatively slow rates of economic development’ (Lian 1997:62). The study made use of the GDP growth per capita of a total of 98 countries for the time period 1960 to 1985, as this is the time period for which the most complete data was available (1997:62).

In their introduction, Lian and Oneal provide a brief overview of previous research in this regard. Previous research generally attributes a negative relationship between diversity and development ‘to the variety of competing demands on political and economic capital that must be met or the difficulty disparate groups have in communicating or cooperating’ (Lian 1997:62). One such study was conducted by Adelman and Cynthia Morris (1967), whose study involved ranking 74 less developed countries for the period 1957 to 1962 in terms of a 10-point ordinal scale of diversity (Lian 1997:63). Their results revealed that the more homogenous a less developed country, the less their development is hampered. Indeed, homogeneity encourages both social and political integration as well as continuous growth (Lian 1997:62). A second study was conducted by Marie Haug for 114 countries (1967). Haug identified sectionalism, race, language and religion as variables, of which language was afforded the greatest weight. Her results seemed to indicate that cultural diversity is negatively related to economic growth (Lian 1997:63). A further study was conducted by Lloyd Reynolds (1985), who investigated thirty-seven less developed countries for the period 1950 to 1980, and his results also seem to suggest that there is a negative relationship between diversity and economic growth (Lian 1997:63). However, the widespread applicability of these results remains suspect given the limited scope of these early studies.

Hence, given the limited scope of these early studies, the Lian and Oneal study attempts to reinvestigate the relationship between cultural diversity and economic development. The authors firstly compile a cultural diversity variable that contains three different cultural characteristics, namely ethnic composition, religion and language (Lian 1997:64). According to the authors, ‘these characteristics are
important because they compete with and often precede attachments, not just to a particular government but to the state itself’ (Lian 1997:64). This cultural variable is then controlled for using political and economic factors as based on Barro’s 1991 cross-national study (Barro 1991). In other words, the Lian and Oneal cultural diversity variable is added to Barro’s general model that draws on both exogenous and endogenous growth models (Lian 1997:65). The reason for their choice of model lies in the fact that Barro’s general model supports the Lian and Oneal hypothesis in that it finds that the ‘geometric mean rate of growth in GDP per capita is an inverse function of the initial level of per capita GDP and is positively associated with primary and secondary school enrollment rates and with political stability’ (Lian 1997:65).

In contrast to earlier studies, the study found no significant relationship between the cultural diversity variable and economic growth, and as a result the authors attempted to examine whether the purported cultural diversity effect may be indirect via political stability or fragmentation (Lian 1997:72). In consequence, two further intervening factors were added to the model, namely political stability and political fragmentation (a measure of the number of political parties and their share of votes) (Lian 1997:62). However, no relationship was found between political instability and cultural diversity, neither was a relationship found between political fragmentation and economic development and neither was ‘high levels of both cultural diversity and political fragmentation, which might indicate that a nation’s politics were rooted in cultural differences, associated with slower rates of development’ (Lian 1997:73). Therefore, Lian and Oneal did not prove an indirect inverse relationship between cultural diversity and economic development. It is still important to note that this result can by no means be taken as revealing that cultural diversity benefits economic growth – no evidence for such a positive association was found (Lian 1997:73). In short, what the study does reveal is that far more research needs to be conducted in this regard in order to clarify the effect of cultural diversity on economic growth.

**Global Culture Versus Local Culture**

Another important direction of research attempts to examine the importance of interactions between global and local cultures in the context of including culture as a variable in development research. In terms of Jan Nederveen Pieterse’s arguments (1995), it is important for researchers to avoid both the chauvinism of global culture and the chauvinism of local culture. In other words, research needs to ensure that a balance is maintained between the two extremes of globalism and localism (Tucker 1996:2). Lehman (1990), on the other hand, addresses the issue of modernity, and claims that all discussions on post-modernism, post-colonialism and globalisation represent expressions of cultural approaches to development, but more specifically represent a discussion on how global cultures
impact upon local cultures (Tucker 1996:1). The point is that globalisation is not
an a-cultural phenomenon and it hybridises local cultures. Such discussions raise
cautions in terms of where boundaries are drawn between local and global cultures
given the historical and ever-increasing interconnectedness of the cultures of the
world – what type of entities can be characterised as “local”? Does local refer to
villages, towns, cities, provinces, nations or regions, and, moreover, who decides
where “local” boundaries are drawn and what is the reason for the chosen boundaries (Tucker 1996:11)? In other words, the possibility exists to investigate
local and global cultures and processes not as two entirely separate entities, but
rather as two complementary perspectives and two entities that continuously impact
upon each other (Tucker 1996:14). Hence, this line of research attempts to move
away from both the ethnocentrism and westernisation of analytical approaches.

Studies conducted by Fagan et al. and Skelton (1996, 1996), similar to the
capability approaches, have aided in refocusing attention to the acknowledgement
of the “voices” of the recipients of development, thus reemphasising that it is
the perspectives of local peoples that is of critical importance and not foreign
analysis (Tucker 1996:2). This raises the issue of the concept of development
being criticised as being in essence based on Western knowledge and values which,
by its widespread propagation, is inadvertently heralded as superior to marginalised
local knowledge. However, such “Western” knowledge is often equated to “global”
knowledge in popular literature, and thus globalisation receives a large proportion
of the criticism aimed at Westernisation. Consequently there is an increasing need
for relevant literature to begin to clearly differentiate between the two concepts in
order to aid in clarifying research results. Yet, in counteraction, Collins and Tucker
cautions such studies in identifying local peoples as the location of “authentic”
development, pointing to the importance of factors such as class differentiation,
gender, external economic, political and cultural forces and the ever important
interaction between local and global actors in impacting upon local peoples to
effectively act as the source of development (Tucker 1996:2-3). It makes sense
therefore, to see what can be gained from a study that is local, but that also
investigates the classical categories of social analysis.

Group Membership, Class and Gender
Barbara Thomas-Slayter (1992) provides an interesting study of the important
interaction between resources, class and gender in Kenya. Her study is based on
data collected in July and August in 1987 in conjunction with Kenya’s National
Environment Secretariat (Thomas-Slayter 1992:810). Thomas-Slayter finds that
‘in the context of declining per capita food production, severe drought, and
famine, African resource degradation has received considerable attention [but]
analysts… have not explored the relationship between gender and resource access,
use, and management’ (Thomas-Slayter 1992:809-810). This is a conclusion which
any attempt at understanding development from a cultural and social side should be taken seriously. Thomas-Slayter found that gender interacts with class to determine internal village management structures and, therefore, access to resources. Rural women are poor and uneducated and accordingly, have little status in their village or broader social and political arenas, but bear the majority of the burden for the viability of their households. Although women have to maintain the viability of their households, they have no power to impact on resource, assets or land use practices. For example, women have no ability to intervene in poor soil usage practices even though they generally have strong soil management skills and as a result soil degradation continues to increase, plunging households and villages further into poverty (1992:825). Thus, it becomes evident how the interaction between gender relations and status has a significant impact on poverty, and though ‘the specific resource issues may vary, … the interactions of class and gender with respect to resource management at the local level are pertinent considerations across rural Africa’ (1992:826).

If the kind of insights that can be found in a closer and more local analysis of the lives of the poor can offer are so important as the above on gender, it makes sense to investigate other studies on that level. A study conducted by Warner, Al-Hassan and Kydd (1997) attempts to reveal the importance of understanding the true complexity of the lives of the poor. The general gender and household targeted development measures have had some success in reducing poverty and therefore should not be entirely dismissed, but what should be noted is the need to examine aspects of poverty such as rights, resources, obligations and the work load of women in more detail (Warner et al. 1997:163). All of these aspects accompany the distinction between married and unmarried women, given that marital status significantly impacts upon the ability of women to engage in productive activities and accumulate assets (Warner et al. 1997:146-153). Therefore, by engaging in more detailed analyses, development practitioners and theorists would be better able to reflect actual circumstances of the poor, and thus allow for the creation of more targeted policies (Warner et al. 1997:164). For example, ‘by taking account of basic and widely-recognized differences which exist between senior and junior women in all African societies…, projects could be structured in such a way that they aim at least to meet the needs of the majority of intended beneficiaries, while endeavoring not to worsen the position of other categories of women and men’ (Warner et al. 1997:164). Furthermore, ‘any approach needs to be flexible enough to take account of diversity rather than attempting to impose a single “universal truth” onto all rural peoples’ (Warner et al. 1997:160). The Warner et al. study, for instance, finds that in the Dagomba society, cooking status is of particular importance in determining the status of women, but ‘in other parts of Africa, other social constructs may be even more important in determining the social and economic position of women and men’ (Warner et al.
Thus, the study reveals the importance of accounting for the full complexity of the characteristics of the lives of the poor in Africa in order to create both culturally sensitive and effectively target development policies (Warner et al. 1997:159).

**Trust**

With the increasing interest in social capital themes and the association between social capital and trust, many studies on trust are being done. Haddad, Maluccio and May (2000, 2003) conducted typical studies which focus on the importance of social capital. Even though there is no clear definition of social capital, there is an increasing recognition in the literature that social capital is a central characteristic of social interactions (Haddad 2003:573). In their view, there are currently two broad directions of research on social capital. The first direction of research is interested in examining the sites of social interaction such as groups and networks, whereas the second direction of research is concerned with the ‘underlying mechanisms through which social capital is thought to work’ (2003:573). Examples of such underlying mechanisms include transaction costs, trust, norms and rules. The second direction of research is understood far more poorly than the first direction of research. In other words, significant evidence has been found to suggest that participation in groups and networks offers economic benefits. However the mechanism that allows for the achievement of these benefits is poorly understood (2003:573).

Haddad and Maluccio attempt to combine the two approaches by examining the precise relationship between group membership and trust (2003:574). More specifically, employing longitudinal data from KwaZulu-Natal Province in South Africa, three variables were considered: the impact trust has on deciding whether or not to join a group; the extent to which groups are able to create trust; and, the extent to which membership and trust contribute well-being as measured in terms of per capita household income (2003:574). Previous literature predicts that trust should have a positive impact on group membership, although previous literature has been unable to determine whether group membership creates trust (2003:577-578). In terms of the literature on the relationship between group membership and household welfare, research tends to reveal that group membership has a positive effect on household welfare. The Haddad and Maluccio study divides the groups under study into financial groups, which tend to be relatively more formalised, and non-financial groups.

The results of their study indicate that the two measures of trust are unrelated with general group membership and with non-financial group membership ‘but are significant determinants of participation in financial groups’ (2003:588). However, membership in both financial and non-financial groups has a positive impact on per capita income (2003:593). Given that group membership is treated
as a proxy for social capital, it is possible to begin ‘to understand how returns to social capital by way of groups are generated: it all seems to start with high levels of trust in local agents’ (2003:596).

The issue may be developed further by an even finer definition of trust where a distinction is made between “bridging” and “bonding” trust (Beugelsdijk and Smulders 2003). This distinction is intended to enable investigation of the role of different types of trust in business and other relations that are increasingly dependent on the ability and willingness to trust people that are not known personally. Beugelsdijk and Smulders anticipate the bridging trust would be important in economic success in any given society, but the application of this notion would be different in a situation where rule of law and well developed civil and public institutions bolster trust across boundaries. It is no surprise that Haddad and Maluccio find that, given that the positive impact on income of group membership is not solely the result of trust, it is not possible to conclude that trust has a positive impact on income (Haddad 2003:593, 596). The trust notion itself is vague and an explanation for the mechanism through which trust is created remains elusive in general terms and in particularly African terms.

**Conclusion**

The results are not altogether encouraging. Although significant work has been done and important initiatives have been undertaken, the issue of the role of values and culture in development is far from being an established feature or a settled body of knowledge in development research. The obvious culprit in this regard is development economics. In fact, the economistic mode of thought still fixes almost all attention on capital, technology and labour (even when this is done with broader definitions of capital and labour than the classic model allows). The lack of comparative empirical material that allows one to form an informed and rounded perspective on the role of values and culture in development in Africa, results in limited possibilities for informed policy-making and successful implementation strategies – even when the policy-makers are so inclined.

A case in point is the recent Sachs report (UN 2005), *Investing in Development, A practical plan to achieve the Millennium Development Goals*, to the UN Secretary General. Although there are many important observations and analyses in this specific document – also for African development, the fact that reference to culture and values is almost entirely absent in the report (other than in agriculture and less than in ten other references) is shocking. This can be seen as a consequence of the content of the Millennium Development Goals (Sachs is indeed critical of the MDGs and calls for attention to the investment in human and social capital, among other things (UN 2005:28-29). But it is an example of the diffuse and inadequate way in which culture and values are considered in much of development economics.
One might compare this document to the so-called Blair document (2005), *Our Common Interest, Report of the Commission for Africa*, as this was published with similar aims and in the same time-frame. This report was not bound to the MDGs and wanted to reflect more on the internal African processes of change and did so with significantly more African participation in the process of drafting the document. It exhibits a sophisticated understanding of the role of values and culture in development and makes it an integral part of its view of African development. It actively propagates this approach as the only appropriate one: ‘At the outset, our recommendation is that the international community should recognise the need for greater efforts to understand the values, norms and allegiances of the cultures of Africa, and in their policy-making display a greater flexibility, open-minded willingness to learn, and humility. Such an approach will pay respect to the Africans who must be partners in this enterprise’ (2005:132).

However, even though one cannot but support a nuanced and strong voice for the integration of a cultural perspective on development in every aspect of development, the report acknowledges that empirical research on the matter in African terms is limited: ‘It is… noticeable that the role of culture in development is relatively less studied in Africa than, for example, in much of Asia’ (2005:131). This is the crux of the matter. Even with the resources available to the Commission for Africa, they had to rely on expert submissions to the Commission and a smattering of empirical studies to be able to support the basic theoretical approach of the Commission on the matter of the relevance of values and culture in development. When one compares the supporting evidence for a particular view in the chapter on the role of values in development with the evidence supporting claims in the other chapters of health, politics, agriculture, trade and economic development in general, the results clearly show that there is a lack of useful empirical material on a scale that makes sense in development planning and development theorising respectively.