The Effect of Immigration Enforcement on Crime Reporting: Evidence from the Priority Enforcement Program*

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Abstract

Weak trust between immigrants and law enforcement may undermine law enforcement agencies' ability to keep communities safe. This paper documents that an immigrant's willingness to report crime is affected by immigration enforcement policies. I analyze the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP), which was launched by the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency in 2015. Under PEP, ICE focused enforcement efforts on immigrants convicted of serious crimes and shifted resources away from immigration-related offenses, thereby lowering the cost to immigrants of reporting crime to the police. I use incident-level data from the Dallas Police Department that include the name and ethnicity of all complainants to show that the number of incidents reported by Hispanic individuals increased by 10 percent after the launch of PEP. The results of this study suggest that reducing immigration enforcement of individuals who do not pose a threat to public safety can potentially be one way to enhance trust between immigrant communities and the police.

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1 Introduction

The ability of law enforcement officials to detect and sanction criminal behavior depends on an individual's willingness to report crime. However, many Hispanic individuals in the United States have a specific reason for not reporting crime to the police: unauthorized immigrants, or individuals living with or residing near unauthorized immigrants, might fear that contact with law enforcement could result in a police officer learning about their or someone else's immigration status (see for example, Theodore 2013). Under-reporting of crime can make it more difficult for police departments to prevent and solve crimes, leading to a misallocation of resources and a lack of investigation or prosecution of offenders (Langton et al. 2012). Yet, a majority of crimes—even serious violent crimes—often go unreported. The National Crime Victimization Survey found that in 2016, only 42 percent of 5.7 million violent crimes and 36 percent of 15.9 million property crimes were reported to the police (Morgan and Kena 2017).

Immigrants' hesitancy to contact the police was likely heightened after the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)'s Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency launched a number of programs (namely, 287(g) in 2006 and Secure Communities in 2008) that increased cooperation between local law enforcement and federal immigration authorities.¹ Indeed, as the number of detainer requests and deportations rose between 2008 and 2014, a number of police departments expressed that worsening relations with the Hispanic community was making them less effective.²

As one illustration of this concern, former Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department William J. Bratton remarked:

Keeping America's neighborhoods safe requires our police forces to have the trust and help of everyone in our communities. My nearly 40 years in law enforcement and my experience as Police Commissioner in Boston and New York City and as Chief in Los

¹ For more background and details on the 287(g) and Secure Communities programs, I refer the reader to Alsan and Yang (2018), Miles and Cox (2014), Wang and Kaushal (2018), and Watson (2013).

² A detainer request is a written notice from ICE requesting local jails or law enforcement to detain an individual while ICE decides whether he or she will be taken into federal custody for removal purposes.

Angeles has taught me this. Yet every day our effectiveness is diminished because immigrants living and working in our communities are afraid to have any contact with the police. [...] My officers can't prevent or solve crimes if victims or witnesses are unwilling to talk to us because of the fear of being deported. [...] We can't solve crimes that aren't reported because the victims are afraid to come forward to the police.

Certain local jurisdictions went as far as limiting their cooperation with ICE, citing eroding trust between police and immigrant communities as one of the reasons. This decreased cooperation eventually convinced DHS to suspend the Secure Communities program in November of 2014.

This paper studies whether the program that was introduced to replace Secure Communities, the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP), changed the degree to which Hispanic individuals reported crime to the police. Under PEP, the agency no longer sought to detain individuals with immigration offenses alone, and instead only focused on detaining individuals convicted of significant criminal offenses.³ In reducing the number of circumstances under which it could detain individuals, ICE attempted to re-establish cooperation with state and local jurisdictions.

By redefining ICE's priorities to only focus on individuals who posed a threat to public safety, PEP did not significantly lower the probability that an immigrant who was convicted of a serious crime would be detained. However, PEP did reduce the likelihood that an unauthorized immigrant who had not committed a crime would be detained or deported, thereby reducing the cost of reporting a crime. For these reasons, PEP—unlike most other immigration policies—directly changed the incentives for Hispanic victims to report crime, while leaving the punishment for criminal behavior unchanged.

To explore the impact of this program on a Hispanic individual's willingness to report crime, I use administrative data from the Dallas Police Department (DPD). This incident-level dataset from the DPD is relatively unique in that it includes information about a complainant's race and Hispanic ethnicity as well as his or her full name.⁴ Using this information, I employ a

³ For lack of a better term, I will refer to PEP and its narrower enforcement priorities as a “softer” or “less harsh” immigration policy.

⁴ Most other police departments are either unwilling to release this level of information or have inaccurate data on

difference-in-differences strategy, in which I estimate how Hispanic complainants' reporting behavior changes relative to reporting by non-Hispanic complainants in the same neighborhood (i.e., Census tract). In addition to the richness of its policing data, Dallas is a useful setting for evaluating this policy since slightly more than 40 percent of the population is Hispanic and the vast majority of neighborhoods are at least 20 percent Hispanic.⁵ It is also worth noting that roughly 20–25 percent of Dallas County's Hispanic population is unauthorized immigrants (U.S. Census Bureau n.d.; Migration Policy Institute 2018).

Using this identification strategy, I find that after PEP was launched, the number of incidents reported to the police by Hispanics increases by around 10 percent (relative to the mean of 37 incidents in a Census tract per quarter). A rough estimate suggests that during the year and a half that PEP was in effect, the DPD was notified of around 7,500 more incidents than it would have been otherwise. Since increased reporting or the potentially improved allocation of police resources might have dissuaded some criminal offenders from committing crime, this number is likely an underestimate. These results are robust to the definition of neighborhood used as well as to the identification of Hispanic complainants using names (as opposed to using the race/ethnicity written down by the DPD).

I consider two alternative explanations for the increase in reported crime by Hispanic individuals following the implementation of PEP: a rise in the underlying crime rates of Hispanic offenders (who typically commit crimes against other Hispanic individuals) and growth of the Hispanic population. I use arrest data from the DPD as well as a dataset on suspects to show that the share of arrestees and the share of suspects who were Hispanic stayed relatively constant over this time period. These results suggest that the increase in reported crime was likely not driven by Hispanic individuals committing more crimes, which is consistent with the program's goal of prioritizing the detainment of serious criminal offenders. I then use the Current Population Survey as well as data on school enrollment to show that there was not a sudden influx of Hispanic individuals into Dallas that could explain the increase in complaints.

complainants' race and ethnicity.

⁵ The median Census tract in 2010 was 30 percent Hispanic (TIGER/Line Shapefiles 2017).

Finally, the implementation of PEP by federal authorities was supported and enforced in Dallas at the local level. Shortly after PEP was launched, Dallas County Sheriff Lupe Valdez announced that the Sheriff's office would carefully review detainer requests from ICE, with the vetting process being similar to PEP's guidelines. To better understand the role of local support for this federal program, I use similar incident-level data from the Austin Police Department. (Travis County, where Austin is located, agreed to participate in PEP but without any additional enforcement of its softer policies at the local level.) I find that reporting in the two cities was trending similarly before PEP, but that the increase in reporting in Dallas was significantly larger than the increase in Austin. The difference between the two cities suggests that the local enforcement of the new program in Dallas likely played a role in increasing Hispanic individuals' willingness to report crime. This last result thus indicates that communicating and enforcing immigration policies at the local level seems to be important for altering levels of trust between communities and law enforcement officials.

This paper contributes to a number of literatures. First, I add to a growing literature in economics about how immigration laws and policies can influence the choices and behavior of immigrants. A number of studies show that immigration policies that instill fear can affect the physical health, mental health, and economic outcomes of immigrants, and can have a "chilling" effect on their willingness to participate in federal safety-net programs (Alsan and Yang 2018; Amuedo-Dorantes et al. 2018; Wang and Kaushal 2018; Watson 2014). Previous studies have also shown that immigration policies affect immigrants' educational attainment (Kuka et al. 2018; Liscow and Woolston 2018). To my knowledge, this study is the first to consider the effect of immigration policies on an individual's willingness to report crime to the police.

Second, this paper is related to a number of studies, mainly in criminology and sociology, that use surveys to study the relationship between immigrant communities and law enforcement (see for example, Kirk et al. 2010 and Tyler et al. 2010). This paper is the first in this literature to use administrative data to estimate the causal effect of immigration enforcement on the number of interactions between immigrants and the police. Moreover, by showing how crime reporting increases when the enforcement environment changes, this study also contributes to a relatively small literature on the underreporting of crime (Carr and Doleac 2016). Indeed, despite the millions

of crimes that go unreported, little is known about the effectiveness of policies to increase an individual's willingness to report a crime.

Finally, this paper complements a large body of literature that estimates the effect of immigration enforcement on crime (Bohn et al. 2015; Chalfin and Deza 2018; Freedman et al. 2018; Miles and Cox 2014). Within this body of literature, a big obstacle in interpreting results is differentiating whether any changes in crime are driven by changes in underlying criminal behavior or changes in crime reporting. By studying the Priority Enforcement Program—a program that reduced the cost of reporting crime for immigrant victims, while holding the punishment for serious offenses relatively constant—this study is the first in this literature to be able to directly estimate changes in crime reporting.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly provides background on the implementation of PEP nationwide and in Dallas. Section 3 outlines the data utilized, presents summary statistics, and introduces the methodological framework. Section 4 presents the results, conducts robustness checks, and considers the effect of PEP on service requests. Section 5 discusses and rules out alternative explanations. Section 6 considers the role of the Dallas County Sheriff in the implementation of PEP in Dallas. Section 7 concludes.

2 Federal Immigration Policies and Related Literature

2.1 Priority Enforcement Program

The Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency was established in 2003 to enforce the country's immigration laws within the United States. One of ICE's most well-known programs is Secure Communities, which was rolled out on a county-by-county basis starting in 2008. The goal of this program was to increase coordination between local law enforcement and federal immigration authorities in order to detain and deport non-citizen immigrants who commit crimes. Under this program, ICE could seek the transfer of individuals in state or local custody (i.e., issue a detainer request) for a broad number of reasons, including immigration-related offenses. After the start of Secure Communities, the number of individuals detained and deported increased dramatically nationwide: between fiscal years 2008 and 2013, more than 2.3 million individuals

were deported (TRAC 2014).

A few years after its introduction, a number of states, cities, and other local jurisdictions became wary of the program and began limiting their cooperation with ICE. For example, in 2012 the Los Angeles Police Department announced that it would no longer honor ICE detainer requests for unauthorized immigrants arrested for nonviolent offenses (e.g., driving without a license) unless they were part of a gang or had a criminal record. Police Chief Charlie Beck said that Secure Communities had hampered efforts to keep the city safe by eroding trust between communities and the police. He announced, “Community trust is extremely important to effective policing. So it’s my intent, by issuing this change in procedures, that we gain this trust back.”⁶ In similar fashion, in 2014 the mayor of Philadelphia signed an executive order to limit the city’s cooperation with ICE, also referencing the need to rebuild trust between police and immigrant communities as one of the main reasons.⁷ In addition to reduced trust, some local jurisdictions were hesitant to cooperate with ICE after federal courts found that parts of the Secure Communities program were unconstitutional. By 2014, more than 100 localities (not including Dallas) had limited or ended their cooperation with ICE.⁸

In November of that year, the Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson issued a memo suspending Secure Communities, citing the reduced cooperation at the local level as well as the federal court decisions as the main reasons (DHS 2014). He then announced the program that would take its place, the Priority Enforcement Program, and set forth new enforcement guidelines for the agency. The program was officially launched in July of 2015, soon after ICE released a brochure on PEP and the new forms for law enforcement officials and ICE officers.⁹

The main goal of the program was to target resources toward detaining and deporting individuals

⁶ “Los Angeles to Cease Transferring Some Immigrants.” *The New York Times*. October 4, 2012.

⁷ “Philadelphia Ends Local Cooperation With ICE Detainers.” *CBS Local*. April 16, 2014.

⁸ “Why cities are rebelling against the Obama administration’s deportation policies.” *Vox*. June 6, 2014.

⁹ The six-month period between the suspension of Secure Communities and the official launch of PEP seems like a six-month period of relative uncertainty. In January of 2015, the U.S. House of Representatives tried to pass a bill to reinstate Secure Communities, but it was blocked by the Senate. ICE slowly began implementing the new program after its announcement, but it was not until June 12, 2015 that an official brochure on PEP as well as the new detainer forms were released.

convicted of significant criminal offenses. PEP's guidelines directed ICE to focus on detaining individuals who posed a threat to public safety (e.g., participating in gang or terrorist activity, being convicted of a felony), and to no longer seek the transfer of individuals with solely civil immigration offenses or those who had not been convicted of a criminal offense.¹⁰

By de-prioritizing immigration-related offenses, this program reduced the likelihood that non-citizen immigrants who had *not* committed a serious crime would be detained or deported, thereby lowering their (as well as their friends' and family's) cost of reporting a crime to the police. Unlike most other immigration policies that affect both victims and offenders, PEP is unique in that by design, it changes the incentives for individuals to report crime, but does not alter the punishment for serious criminal behavior. Indeed, in his original memo announcing PEP, Secretary Johnson motivated the changes by highlighting the need to support community policing and to maintain the trust of individuals in working with local law enforcement. He also emphasized the need to engage with state and local governments as well as law enforcement officials about these enforcement changes. Throughout 2015, ICE (and DHS more broadly) "conducted a nationwide effort to implement PEP and promote collaboration, reaching out to thousands of local law enforcement agencies and government officials" (DHS 2015). The Department of Homeland Security announced in their FY2015 report that most law enforcement agencies were back to cooperating with ICE via PEP.¹¹ This program remained in effect until January 25, 2017 with the start of the new administration.

2.2 Implementation of PEP in Dallas

As mentioned above, after announcing PEP, ICE tried to engage with state and local governments as well as law enforcement in order to re-establish cooperation. However, not all jurisdictions readily accepted PEP, with some sheriffs deciding to participate after some months of indecision

¹⁰ More precisely, the prioritized enforcement included: participating in an organized criminal gang or terrorism; constituting a threat to national security; or being convicted of a felony or aggravated felony, three or more misdemeanor offenses, or one "significant" misdemeanor (e.g., burglary, domestic violence, DUI). The de-prioritized enforcement included individuals with civil immigration offenses alone or individuals who had been charged, but not convicted of criminal offenses.

¹¹ Of the twenty-five jurisdictions with the largest number of declined detainer requests, sixteen agreed to participate in PEP (TRAC 2016).

and a few choosing to not participate at all.¹² In the case of Dallas, the director of ICE visited the city in May of 2015 to introduce the agency’s new priorities.¹³ She remarked at one meeting that “People think of us as deporting women and children and adult males willy nilly. It is my job to ensure that each of our 26 field officers are actually enforcing the priorities which focuses on criminals.” ICE representatives then met with Dallas County officials in late July and late August of 2015 to further discuss PEP, and Dallas County Sheriff Lupe Valdez agreed to accept the new notification and detainer forms.

In late August, Sheriff Valdez also instituted a policy in which Dallas County officials would review all detainer requests prior to honoring them.¹⁴ Dallas County’s vetting process was very similar to the PEP priorities, so that the Sheriff’s office did not decline any of ICE’s detainer requests following the launch of PEP. In fact, in a spreadsheet tracking PEP’s reception by local jurisdictions, ICE officials write about Dallas County (DALCO): “DALCO detainer vetting is similar to our PEP priorities. DALCO provided [ICE] with the points-of-contact for detainer vetting and all detainees have been approved since the inception of the process.”¹⁵

2.3 ICE Detainers Before and After PEP

Following the announcement and implementation of these redefined enforcement priorities, the number of detainer requests issued—and thus the number of individuals held in county jails with detainer requests—began to fall. Figure 1 plots the stock of inmates in Dallas County with an immigration detainer. The figure shows a fall in the number of inmates following the announcement of PEP (dashed green line), followed by a sharp decline after its launch (solid green line).¹⁶

¹² See, for example: “San Francisco Votes to Keep Shielding Immigrants From Deportation Officials” *The New York Times*. October 20, 2015. Or, “Immigration agents allowed back in L.A. County jails, with limits.” *Los Angeles Times*. September 23, 2015.

¹³ “ICE chief says immigration removals focus on convicted criminals.” *The Dallas Morning News*. May 20, 2015.

¹⁴ The reason behind the sheriff’s new policy was not clear, but it was perhaps the result of growing controversy and legal challenges to immigration holds in Dallas that year.

¹⁵ I am grateful to the Immigrant Legal Resource Center for obtaining and sharing information about whether particular jurisdictions complied with PEP as well as about meetings between ICE officers and local officials.

¹⁶ It is not clear from these monthly counts why the number of inmates rises in 2016, but it is worth reiterating that these data measure the stock, not the flow, of inmates. So, if any incident occurred that resulted in a large number of immigration detainer requests in Dallas County (e.g., targeted raid, spike in gang activity), the number of inmates

As a result of the changing enforcement priorities, the composition of individuals with immigration detainers also changed with PEP. Using data on ICE detainer requests from the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), Figure 2 shows the number of immigration detainers issued for Dallas County between 2012 and 2015, by individuals' most serious criminal convictions. This figure highlights that PEP seems to have achieved its enforcement goals in Dallas County: it hardly changed the number of immigration detainers issued for individuals convicted of a felony or aggravated felony, but it lowered the number of detainers issued for individuals convicted of misdemeanors and for those with no conviction. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that if the number of detainers for these latter two groups stayed at their November 2014 levels, ICE would have detained nearly 1,000 more individuals in Dallas County by the end of 2015.

3 Data and Methodology

3.1 Data on Police Incidents

In order to estimate whether PEP had an effect on a Hispanic individual's willingness to report crime to the police, I utilize data on police incidents in Dallas, which come from the Crime Analysis Unit of the Dallas Police Department. These data not only include information about the incident (e.g., the location and offense code), but they also include details about the complainant (e.g., his or her full name as well as race/ethnicity). I restrict the sample to include all reported incidents in which the complainant was categorized as white, black, or Hispanic, and restrict the sample period to the years 2013 through 2016.¹⁷

Table 1 shows the share of police incidents reported by Hispanics and non-Hispanics in Dallas.¹⁸

would remain at those higher levels for the subsequent months.

¹⁷ Figures 1 and 2 show a spike in ICE detainers in 2012, which suggests that 2012 is not a suitable year for the pre-period since the incentives for crime reporting were likely changing in that year. As noted above, PEP was suspended in January of 2017, so I focus on the time period during which the program was active. Doing a similar analysis to the one below with 2017 data shows that the reporting behavior of non-Hispanic individuals seems to change in 2017 (perhaps also because of the new administration), so that non-Hispanic individuals no longer seem like a suitable comparison group in that year.

¹⁸ For the remainder of this paper, "non-Hispanic" refers to complainants categorized as white or black by the DPD. Individuals categorized as belonging to any other group (roughly 3 percent of the sample) are dropped since it is not

This table highlights that only 30 percent of incidents are reported by Hispanics, even though roughly 40 percent of Dallas is Hispanic (U.S. Census n.d.). In contrast, 38 percent of incidents are reported by black complainants, even though only 23 percent of Dallas is black. These differences could arise from differences in crime rates, reporting rates, or a combination of both. Table 1 also shows the breakdown of reported incidents into violent crimes (e.g., assault and robbery), property crimes (e.g., burglary and theft), part II crimes (e.g., criminal mischief, disorderly conduct), and accidents. Almost 40 percent of the incidents in these data are classified as property crimes, and the distribution of crimes is generally similar for both Hispanic and non-Hispanic complainants.

To get a better sense of the spatial distribution of incidents, panel (a) in figure 3 shows the Census tracts in Dallas; the color of each tract indicates which quintile the total number of incidents in that tract falls into. This figure highlights that crime reporting is mostly concentrated in the southern half of the city. Panel (b) in this figure shows the share of incidents that have a Hispanic complainant for each tract. This map suggests that Hispanic communities are concentrated in the southwest and southeast parts of Dallas.¹⁹

Finally, I plot the raw data to see how the number of incidents reported by Hispanic and non-Hispanic complainants trended over time. Figure 4 shows that reporting by Hispanics and non-Hispanics mirror each other from 2013 through the second quarter of 2015. In the third quarter of 2015 however (at the time PEP is launched), reporting by Hispanics begins to increase and diverges from the reporting patterns of non-Hispanics.

3.2 Methodology

In order to formally estimate the effect of PEP on the degree to which Hispanic individuals in Dallas reported crime, I employ a difference-in-differences strategy. The spirit of the analysis is that the immigration policy change only affected Hispanic individuals' incentives to report crime,

immediately clear how, or whether, they were affected by the new enforcement priorities.

¹⁹ To confirm this geography, appendix figure A1 uses data from the 2010 Census to display the share of each Census tract's population that is Hispanic. The fact that this map and panel (b) of figure 3 are so similar in representing where Hispanic communities reside suggests that the DPD data are relatively accurate in identifying whether a complainant is Hispanic.

while leaving the incentives unchanged for white and black individuals. I therefore compare the change in the number of police incidents reported by Hispanic individuals (treatment group) with the same change for non-Hispanic individuals (control group). The main assumption underlying this approach is that the reporting behavior of Hispanic and non-Hispanic individuals would have continued to trend similarly in the absence of PEP. This analysis also assumes that Hispanic individuals are more likely to be unauthorized immigrants (or to live with or near unauthorized immigrants).

Specifically, I estimate the following equations:

$$\ln(Incidents)_{nht} = \alpha + \beta_1 Hispanic_h + \beta_2(Hispanic_h \times Post_t) + \lambda_t + \omega_n + \varepsilon_{nht} \quad (1)$$

$$\ln(Incidents)_{nht} = \alpha + \beta_1 Hispanic_h + \sum_{t=-9}^6 \theta_t(Hispanic_h \times Quarter_t) + \lambda_t + \omega_n + \varepsilon_{nht} \quad (2)$$

where n , h , and t index neighborhoods, Hispanic ethnicity, and time, respectively. In both equations, the dependent variable is the logged number of incidents in neighborhood n , in time period t reported by ethnicity h .²⁰ β_2 in equation (1) is a difference-in-differences estimate, capturing the extent to which changes in reporting before and after PEP differ for Hispanics relative to non-Hispanics. Equation (2) estimates a coefficient θ_t for each quarter in the sample, so that I can plot changes in reporting over the entire time period (with the difference in reporting centered at zero in the second quarter of 2015 before PEP is launched).

Both models include time (i.e., quarter $\times$ year) fixed effects to account for time-variant factors, such as the seasonality of crime, that influence the number of police incidents. The specification also includes neighborhood fixed effects to absorb level differences in crime across neighborhoods (which are quite evident from Figure 3).²¹ Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level.

²⁰ Some neighborhoods have zero incidents reported by either Hispanics or non-Hispanics in a quarter. In order to incorporate these observations in the analysis, I add one to all of the counts and then apply the log transformation. I choose to use the log transformation in order to reduce the influence of large outliers and estimate the average percent change in crime reporting (since there is wide heterogeneity in crime reporting across Dallas tracts).

²¹ One might think that the desired specification would include neighborhood $\times$ time fixed effects in order to flexibly control for idiosyncratic shocks within a neighborhood and quarter. However, each neighborhood $\times$ time pair in the data has exactly one treatment and one control observation. So by construction, the empirical approach already compares the treatment and control units within a neighborhood and quarter. Including neighborhood $\times$

In all of the main results, a neighborhood is synonymous to a Census tract (of which there are approximately 340 in Dallas, with an average population of 4,000 individuals), but I check the robustness of results to the definition of neighborhood in Section 4.

4 Results

4.1 Increase in Number of Reported Police Incidents

Figure 5 plots the θ_t coefficients from equation (2), showing the difference in reporting between Hispanic and non-Hispanic complainants over time, after taking into account neighborhood and time fixed effects. The figure shows that the reporting behavior of Hispanic individuals was trending slightly upward until the quarter before PEP was introduced. However, after the launch of PEP, the Dallas Police Department saw a sharp increase in the number of police reports with a Hispanic complainant. The corresponding result in table 2 suggests that reporting of crime by Hispanic complainants increased by around 10 percent (on a baseline of 37 incidents per tract per quarter) following the introduction of PEP. To more easily visualize the reporting behavior of Hispanics and non-Hispanics separately over time, appendix figure A2 plots the reporting behavior of the two groups; this figure confirms that their reporting behavior trended relatively similarly (providing support for the parallel trends assumption), and then deviated with the launch of PEP.

The 10 percent increase implies that on average, the police was notified of three to four more incidents in each neighborhood per quarter following the introduction of PEP. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that in the six quarters that PEP was in effect, the police was notified of around 7,500 more incidents than they would have been if the enforcement priorities had not changed.²² Another way to gauge the magnitude of this estimate is to consider the average number of incidents reported by Hispanic individuals before PEP: 22.7 incidents per neighborhood per quarter. If we assume that PEP only affects the behavior of unauthorized immigrants (and not of individuals in

time fixed effects does not change the treatment-control differences, and therefore mechanically does not affect the difference-in-differences coefficient.

²² There were roughly 150,000 total incidents in Dallas while PEP was in effect, and roughly 45,000 of those were reported by Hispanic individuals.

their networks) and that roughly 20 percent of the Hispanic population is unauthorized, then the 10 percent result implies that the police saw roughly 2.27 more incidents on a base of 4.54 (0.2×22.7), suggesting an implied effect of the policy of roughly 50 percent.

A standard model of crime predicts that offenders alter their criminal behavior in response to a change in the probability of getting caught. Along these lines, if the probability that an individual reports crime increased or if the police potentially improved their allocation of resources following PEP, then we would predict that criminals in Dallas subsequently committed fewer crimes. I thus conclude that the 7,500 calculation is likely an underestimate; the police would have been notified of even more crimes had offenders not changed their criminal behavior in response to PEP.

Finally, the incident-level data include all types of police incidents including assault, robbery, drug offenses, animal bites, and accidents. Ex-ante, it is not clear whether one would expect the effect of this policy to be larger for more or less serious crimes. On the one hand, it is possible that many immigrants were not reporting any crimes to the police prior to PEP, so I would expect to see a larger effect for more serious crimes (since individuals likely see greater value in reporting violent or property crimes). On the other hand, if individuals were already reporting serious crimes to the police before PEP but were on the margin of reporting less serious crimes, then I would expect to see a larger effect for this latter group. To test this question empirically, I restrict the sample to incidents that are classified as either violent or property crimes using the Uniform Crime Report offense code.²³ I find an increase of about 4 percent in the reporting of these more serious incidents. Alternatively, when I restrict the sample to all incidents that are neither violent nor property crimes, I find an increase of about 8 percent in the reporting of these less serious crimes. Columns 3 and 4 of table 2 show these results. These findings suggest that PEP incentivized Hispanic individuals, who might have previously been hesitant to interact with law enforcement over relatively less serious matters, to report these crimes to the police.

²³ The Dallas Police Department changed its crime classification methods in June of 2014; for the next two specifications only, I begin the sample period with the third quarter of 2014. If I restrict the sample period in this way for all incidents, the difference-in-differences coefficient in column 2 of table 2 suggests an 8 percent increase in the reporting of incidents.

4.2 Alternate Definitions of Neighborhoods and Hispanic Ethnicity

There are alternative ways to divide Dallas into neighborhoods besides using Census tracts. To check the robustness of the main results, I run the same specification but use bigger and smaller neighborhoods: namely, police beats (of which there are roughly 234) as well as reporting areas (of which there are roughly 1,152).²⁴ Figure 6 and the corresponding results in table 3 confirm the robustness of the main result, and suggest that the number of incidents reported by Hispanics increased by approximately 8–12 percent after PEP.

Up to this point, I have been identifying Hispanic complainants using the race/ethnicity written down by the police. If Hispanic people were more willing to identify themselves as Hispanic to police officers or if officers were more willing to write down that a complainant was Hispanic after PEP, then I would see an increase in the number of Hispanic complainants that was unrelated to an increased willingness to report crime. To rule out these explanations, I use the same sample and run the same specification, but using the last name of the complainant. Following Arnold et al. (2017), I match the surnames in the DPD data to the 2010 Census genealogical records of surnames. If the probability that a given surname is Hispanic is greater than 80 percent, I identify this complainant as Hispanic.²⁵ The Hispanic identification written down by the DPD is highly correlated to the Hispanic identification using surnames for all years in the sample period (overall correlation of 0.88), implying that the DPD data are relatively accurate in identifying Hispanic complainants. Appendix figure A3 shows that the results are hardly changed when using surnames, which leads me to conclude that the results are indeed driven by a greater number of Hispanic complainants and not by different patterns in identifying Hispanic ethnicity over time.

²⁴ To patrol the city, DPD divides the city into seven divisions. Each division is then divided into five sectors. Each sector has several police beats, each of which is patrolled by a beat officer. Each beat then contains even smaller neighborhoods, called reporting areas.

²⁵ For individuals with more than one surname, I match each surname individually and jointly. If any of the probabilities are greater than 80 percent, then I label this individual as Hispanic. If any individual's last name cannot be matched to the Census surnames, I assume the individual is not Hispanic; as such, any estimates using this methodology are likely conservative.

4.3 No Effect on Service Requests

As noted earlier, previous studies, such as Alsan and Yang (2018) and Watson (2014), find that immigrant individuals reduce their participation in safety net programs when the enforcement environment becomes more hostile toward unauthorized immigrants. Based on this evidence, it is plausible that PEP could have a symmetric opposite effect, encouraging individuals to interact with government authorities and to participate in civilian activity. To consider this possibility, I use data on service requests sent in to the city government. These requests are typically submitted via telephone, the web, or mobile apps for issues such as street repairs, dead animals, missed recycling, and missing garbage roll carts.

It is not clear ex-ante whether we should expect an increase in the number of service requests. On the one hand, PEP's narrower enforcement priorities do not alter the costs or benefits of submitting service requests for Hispanic immigrants; unlike law enforcement, city officials do not have a partnership with ICE, and thus cannot detain individuals. We thus should expect to see no increase in calls if individuals understand the distinction between contacting law enforcement and making service requests. However, if this difference is not clear or if PEP increases overall trust in government institutions, then we might expect to see an increase in the number of requests.

To formally test whether the number of service requests changes with PEP, I use data on service requests submitted to the City of Dallas between 2013 and 2016. Of the service requests in this data, approximately 40 percent of them include a participant name that I can identify as either Hispanic or non-Hispanic using the Census records of surnames.²⁶ Like the police incident data, these data also include a precise location so that I can identify the Census tract for each request.

Panel (a) of figure 7 shows an analogous graph to figure 4, but for these service requests. Graphing the raw data in this way highlights that the number of service requests submitted by Hispanic and non-Hispanics mirrored each other closely both before and after PEP. Indeed, the share of Hispanic complainants in this data remains constant between 20–25 percent during this

²⁶ Of the 60 percent without an identifiable last name, the vast majority are simply missing a participant name. Even though I can only use 40 percent of the service requests, the sample size is still over 300,000 service requests over the span of four years.

entire time period. I then perform the corresponding difference-in-differences analysis; panel (b) of figure 7 shows that unlike the number of police incidents, the number of service requests submitted by Hispanic complainants did not change significantly with PEP.

The reason behind this lack of an increase is ambiguous. It certainly is possible that Hispanic individuals in Dallas understand the difference between contacting law enforcement to report a crime and contacting city officials for a service request.²⁷ If this distinction is clear, then PEP's narrower enforcement priorities would not change a Hispanic individual's incentives to submit a service request and this lack of an increase serves as a type of placebo test for the policy. However, it is also possible that immigrant communities make essentially no requests for government services (or prefer to do so anonymously), so we might not expect the number of requests to respond to the immigration enforcement environment.²⁸ Nevertheless, regardless of why there is not a change in the number of service requests, the lack of an increase—in contrast to the increase in reported crime—supports the idea that PEP primarily enhanced trust in law enforcement.

5 Ruling out alternative explanations

So far, I have found that the number of incidents reported by Hispanic individuals increased by about 10 percent after the introduction of PEP. However, if something besides individuals' willingness to report crime changed at the same time that PEP was introduced, then I could be incorrectly attributing this rise in the number of complaints to increased willingness to report crime. In this section, I consider two other possible explanations—increased criminal behavior and population growth—that could result in more Hispanic individuals reporting crime to the police.

²⁷ The City of Dallas has tried to increase awareness of city services in the past few years. In the fall of 2015, they instituted a program called “City Hall on the Go!”, in which a vehicle drives around neighborhoods five days a week with the purpose of taking City Hall to the community and of increasing awareness of city services. The vehicle specifically targets locations that are in primarily Hispanic neighborhoods.

²⁸ Feigenbaum and Hall (2015) use similar administrative data from Boston to show that higher-income areas devote more effort to requesting government services. If immigrants typically live in lower-income areas, then we might not expect them to use these services all that often.

5.1 Increasing Criminal Behavior

The reason that PEP is a particularly useful policy for studying an individual's willingness to report crime is that it changes the incentive to report crime, but does not alter the punishment for serious criminal offenses. Moreover, the empirical strategy allows me to see how reporting by Hispanic complainants changes relative to reporting by non-Hispanic complainants in the *same* neighborhood, thereby holding overall crime levels constant in the comparison. Nevertheless, if Hispanic offenders decided to commit more crimes at the time of PEP's introduction (whether coincidentally or intentionally), then part of the increase in the number of Hispanic complaints could be driven by this increase in criminal behavior; this scenario would occur since Hispanic offenders typically commit crimes against other Hispanic individuals.²⁹ One possible explanation for an increase in Hispanic crime rates is PEP's focus on convictions (as opposed to criminal charges); if Hispanic offenders believe that PEP has now decreased their overall likelihood of being detained *and* they believe that this decreased cost outweighs the higher probability of getting caught (from increased reporting or potentially improved allocation of police resources), then they might decide to commit more crimes.

To test this possibility, I use arrest data from the Dallas Police Department to see whether Hispanic individuals seem to be committing more crime after PEP. I first consider the share of arrests that can be linked to the incident-level data, and focus only on the incidents reported by non-Hispanic individuals.³⁰ By focusing on individuals whose reporting incentives did not change with PEP, I can isolate changes in the criminal behavior of Hispanic individuals. If the share of arrested individuals who are Hispanic increases after PEP, then this increase would suggest that Hispanic individuals were indeed committing more crime.

Figure 8(a) shows that the share of arrestees who are Hispanic seems to stay relatively constant after PEP. I can do this same exercise but with data on suspects. Figure 9(a) shows that the share

²⁹ As an example, between 2012 and 2015, 40 percent of violent victimizations against Hispanic individuals were committed by Hispanic offenders (Morgan 2017).

³⁰ I only count each individual once for an arrest regardless of the number of charges against him or her. Because most incidents are not immediately resolved with an arrest, only a small share of the incidents in the data can be linked to specific arrests.

of suspects who are Hispanic (for incidents reported by non-Hispanic complainants) also seems to stay relatively unchanged over this time period.³¹

Finally, I can look at this same time series, but using all arrests and all suspects (i.e., not just those that can be linked to incidents); results are shown in panel (b) of figures 8 and 9. Like with the previous graphs, the lack of an increase in the share of arrestees and suspects who are Hispanic implies that Hispanic individuals in Dallas did not suddenly commit more crimes following the introduction of PEP relative to non-Hispanic offenders. These results provide support for PEP not altering Hispanic offenders' propensity to commit crime, and thus allow me to conclude that the increase in reported crime that I find is likely not driven by changes in underlying criminal behavior.³² Overall, these findings suggest that at least in Dallas, PEP achieved its intended goal of increasing trust in law enforcement without adversely impacting crime rates.

5.2 Population Growth

The main result of the analysis shows that Hispanic individuals reported more incidents to the police following the introduction of PEP. However, if there was a large influx of Hispanic people into Dallas at this same time, then part of the increase in the number of complaints could be driven by growth in the Hispanic population. As Bohn et al. (2014) and Watson (2013) show, migration choices are responsive to immigration policy. For example, Arizona's immigrant population declined quickly and significantly after the passage of the 2007 Legal Arizona Workers Act. In the case of Dallas in 2015, sudden growth in the Hispanic population would have had to be the result of the Dallas County Sheriff's local enforcement of the policy (since PEP was a federal policy).

To test whether there was an influx of Hispanic people into the Dallas area around the time of

³¹ In this dataset, I allow the same individual to be a suspect for multiple incidents. Unlike with the arrest-level data, many more incidents have suspects, so the sample size used for this figure is much larger. Data are missing for the latter half of 2014 due to a change in the DPD's Records Management System.

³² I can do a similar analysis using the 2014 and 2015 National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS). Since the NCVS is a retrospective survey, I need the 2017 data in order to accurately look at the number of victimizations in 2016, and this last survey has not yet been published. Even though the sample size of Hispanic individuals reporting an incident is relatively small, the trends in the data do show that victimizations of Hispanic people did not suddenly outpace those of non-Hispanics in the months following PEP's introduction. These results thus indicate that the increase in reported crime we see in Dallas was likely not driven by Hispanic offenders committing more crime after the launch of PEP.

PEP's introduction, I take a similar approach to Bohn et al. (2014) and use the monthly Current Population Survey (CPS) for 2011–2016 (Flood et al. 2017). Panel (a) of appendix figure A4 shows the share of the population that is Hispanic in the Dallas-Forth Worth-Arlington (DFW) metropolitan area and in its central cities. Panel (b) shows the same time series, but for the share of the population that is Hispanic and not a citizen. The graphs illustrate that the share of Hispanic individuals, and of Hispanic non-citizens in particular, seems to stay relatively unchanged between 2011 and 2016. Importantly, it does not appear that there was a significant influx of Hispanic individuals into the DFW metropolitan area or its central cities around the time of PEP's launch, which suggests that the increase in Hispanic complainants was likely not driven by population growth.³³

Finally, I use student enrollment reports from the Texas Education Agency's Public Education Information Management System (PEIMS) to see whether the share of students who are Hispanic rose during this time period. The share of students who are Hispanic in Dallas County and in the Dallas Independent School District stayed relatively constant at around 55 percent and 70 percent, respectively, between 2012 and 2017. These results further indicate that population growth did not drive the increase in reporting.

6 Local Enforcement of PEP

As noted earlier, even though PEP was a federal program, it was enforced locally by the Dallas County Sheriff's office. Shortly after the introduction of PEP, Sheriff Lupe Valdez implemented a policy for reviewing detainer requests from ICE, with the vetting process being very similar to PEP's softer enforcement priorities.³⁴ Sheriff Valdez received significant media attention after

³³ The previous result showing a lack of an increase in service requests provides some additional support for the argument that it was not population growth driving the increase in complaints. If there had been a large influx of Hispanic individuals into Dallas during this time period who were comfortable reporting incidents to the police, then we might also expect to see some increase in the number of service requests submitted by Hispanic individuals. The fact that the number of requests does not change provides some evidence against population growth driving the increase in reporting. However, as I note above, interpreting the null result for service requests is not straightforward since it is possible that Hispanic individuals, and immigrants in particular, tend to not make requests for government services.

³⁴ The Dallas Morning News reported that the Sheriff introduced this policy after meeting with ICE officials as well as activists from the Texas Organizing Project, and that the policy was well-received by the activist group.

introducing these new guidelines. Texas Governor Greg Abbott publicly criticized the Sheriff's policy and wrote a letter to Sheriff Valdez demanding that Dallas County fully honor all ICE requests.³⁵ He also put forth potential repercussions for Dallas County if Sheriff Valdez did not change the policy (e.g., making it illegal for the sheriff to not honor a federal detainer request, making the county financially responsible for the actions of any immigrants who were released because the Sheriff did not honor a detainer request).³⁶ Sheriff Valdez responded to Governor Abbott's criticism by reiterating that ICE was familiar with Dallas County's policy and that she had not denied any detainer requests in the first two months of the policy.

Given the amount of media attention given to the clash between the Sheriff and the Governor, it is possible that Hispanic individuals were more willing to report crime because of the Sheriff's new policy, rather than because of ICE's program (even though on paper the two policies were very similar). To try to estimate how much of this increased willingness to report crime was Dallas-specific, I consider the case of nearby Austin.³⁷ The Sheriff in Travis County (where Austin is located) also met with ICE during the summer of 2015 and agreed to accept the new forms under PEP, but he did not institute any additional policies for enforcing the softer guidelines at the local level. Appendix figure A5 confirms that like Dallas County, Travis County also experienced a significant change in the immigration enforcement environment; the number of inmates with immigration detainers was relatively high between 2012 and 2014, and then fell following the announcement and introduction of PEP.³⁸

See: "Activist group commends Dallas County Sheriff's Department for new policy." *The Dallas Morning News*. September 18, 2015.

³⁵ Following the Governor's letter, support for Sheriff Valdez grew with the hashtag #StandWithLupe. Both the Texas Democratic Party and its collegiate arm, the Texas College Democrats, released statements of support for the Sheriff. The latter group claimed that they "support [Sheriff Valdez] in her efforts to build a strong relationship between the Sheriff's department and the residents of Dallas County."

³⁶ "Dallas sheriff responds to Texas governor: All ICE detainees honored this year." *The Dallas Morning News*. October 26, 2015.

³⁷ I submitted similar data requests to a number of police departments around the country, and besides Dallas, Austin was the only other police department willing to share the necessary information to do this analysis (namely, the race/ethnicity or surname of the complainant).

³⁸ The difference in the number of detainees between Dallas County and Travis County is not surprising given that Dallas County is twice the size of Travis County. Data between the announcement and introduction of PEP are missing for a few months for Travis County, and might at times have reporting errors (especially given the large differences in the number of inmates in a short period of time).

In order to test the effect of PEP on crime reporting in Austin, I use incident-level data from the Austin Police Department. These data are less optimal than Dallas' for this analysis since the variable that indicates whether a complainant is Hispanic is missing for many individuals, and in some years more so than in others. However, I can use surnames again to identify who is likely Hispanic and run the same specifications as above. Figure 10 shows the difference in crime reporting in Austin relative to Dallas. Importantly, this figure highlights that crime reporting in the two cities is trending similarly prior to the introduction of PEP. However, the degree to which Hispanic people report more crimes to the police after PEP is quite limited in Austin, and the difference-in-differences estimate is one-third of the magnitude of the corresponding estimate in Dallas.

To try to understand the difference between the two cities, I look at the breakdown of detainer requests in Austin by an individual's most serious criminal conviction. Appendix figure A6 shows that the number of detainer requests issued for individuals convicted of a misdemeanor or for those without a conviction fell slightly following the announcement of PEP. Due to the overall lack of long-term data on ICE detainers after the introduction of PEP, it is hard to draw concrete conclusions about the program's enforcement; however, this figure does show that in 2015, the number of detainers issued for individuals *without* a conviction was typically higher than the number of detainers issued for those *with* a felony conviction. If the pattern in this figure is suggestive of ICE and Travis County not enforcing PEP's softer guidelines as stringently as Dallas County, then it might not be all that surprising that Hispanic individuals in Austin did not increase their crime reporting as much as their counterparts in Dallas.³⁹

Without similar data from more cities, it is difficult to come to any definitive conclusions.⁴⁰

³⁹ This result would be in line with Alsan and Yang (2018)'s finding that localities that fail to target serious offenders during Secure Communities generate a stronger behavioral response in terms of not participating in safety-net programs. In the same vein, if Travis County is not targeting serious offenders effectively, then we would expect Hispanic individuals to be less trusting of local law enforcement.

⁴⁰ In theory, one could do a similar analysis with data from the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS). Unfortunately, the variable for Hispanic ethnicity is often missing in this data (i.e., missing for more than 30 percent of victims in the 2015 extract) and many states with large Hispanic populations do not report incidents to this system. For example, in the 2015 extract, there are no reporting agencies from many states with significant Hispanic populations (namely, California, Florida, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, and New York). In Texas, none of the reporting agencies in the five biggest cities provided information to NIBRS in 2015; individuals in Fort Worth

However, these results do suggest that the increase in crime reporting in Dallas was not purely driven by a change in federal policy, but rather that the local enforcement of the new priorities likely played a role. It remains unclear what exactly drove the increase (i.e., the Sheriff's enforcement of the softer priorities, the media attention around the Sheriff's policy, the DPD's efforts in communicating the policy changes to Hispanic communities, or a combination of these factors).⁴¹ Nevertheless, the difference between the two cities does seem to imply that communicating and enforcing an immigration policy—and not just passing a new policy—is important if the goal is to illicit a specific community response (in this case, increasing trust in law enforcement and thus the amount of crime reporting).

7 Conclusion

In this paper, I study the launch of the Priority Enforcement Program and estimate the degree to which the program increased Hispanic individuals' willingness to report crime to the police. PEP was introduced to replace Secure Communities, and thus to re-establish cooperation between ICE and local law enforcement. In order to do so, PEP restricted ICE's enforcement priorities to focus only on individuals who posed a threat to public safety, and not on individuals who had only committed civil immigration offenses. These narrower priorities therefore reduced the cost of reporting crime for immigrant victims, while keeping the punishment for serious criminal offenses relatively unchanged. Unlike other immigration policies that typically affect both victims and offenders, the introduction of this program allows me to directly estimate the effect of immigration enforcement on crime reporting.

Using incident-level data from the Dallas Police Department that contains the ethnicity of

make up almost a third of the victims in the state, and of these, 30 percent have missing data for Hispanic ethnicity. Since the difference-in-differences is contingent on accurate and consistent identification of Hispanic individuals over time, administrative data from police departments (that includes a reliable Hispanic identifier as well as names and locations in order to verify the accuracy of the Hispanic identifier) is far better for this analysis. Finally, it is worth noting that the NIBRS data is collected at the agency level, which would not allow me to compare individuals residing in neighborhoods with similar crime levels.

⁴¹ The Dallas Police Department has a Latino Community Outreach program, designed to provide Hispanic communities with resources and information. Each Division Patrol holds quarterly meetings throughout the year and brings in speakers (for example, individuals from Catholic Charities or the Mexican consulate) to talk about immigration laws and other relevant topics with community leaders and other attendees.

the complainant, I employ a difference-in-differences strategy to estimate the degree to which reporting by Hispanic complainants changed relative to reporting by non-Hispanic complainants in the same neighborhood. I find that after PEP was introduced, the number of incidents reported by Hispanic individuals increased by around 10 percent. The results are robust to a number of checks (including using the surname of the complainant to identify Hispanic ethnicity and alternative definitions of neighborhood), and I also rule out alternative explanations for this increase in reporting (namely, increased criminal behavior and population growth). The estimates imply that between the launch and suspension of PEP, the Dallas Police Department was notified of around 7,500 incidents than it would have been otherwise. Moreover, since some criminal offenders might have been dissuaded from committing crime because of the increased reporting, this number is likely a conservative estimate.

Finally, I consider the role of the Dallas County Sheriff in enforcing PEP's new guidelines. I use similar incident-level data from the Austin Police Department to conclude that the increase in reporting was significantly larger in Dallas than in Austin. This last result suggests that the local promulgation of the new enforcement priorities by the Dallas County Sheriff's Office might have played an important role in driving the increase in reporting.

More generally, the findings of this paper suggest that lessening immigration enforcement of individuals who do not pose a threat to public safety (i.e., crime victims) can enhance trust between immigrant communities and the police. These results are also consistent with the idea that increased community-based policing is important for improving public safety and the effectiveness of police departments.

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9 Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Inmates in Dallas County with Immigration Detainers

NOTE: This figure plots the number of inmates in Dallas County with immigration detainers (i.e., individuals being held in jail or prison at ICE’s request prior to being transferred to federal immigration authorities). Data come from reports for the Texas Commission on Jail Standards. The dashed and solid green lines mark the announcement and launch of PEP, respectively. The red line marks the month in which PEP was suspended.

Figure 2: Number of Detainers Issued in Dallas County, by Most Serious Criminal Conviction

NOTE: This figure plots the number of detainer requests over time, using data on detainer requests from the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC). “Felony” refers to detainer requests issued for individuals convicted of a felony or aggravated felony. “No conviction” refers to detainer requests issued for individuals who were either charged but not convicted of a crime or neither charged nor convicted of a crime. The dashed and solid lines mark the announcement and launch of PEP, respectively.

Figure 3: Spatial Distribution of Incidents and of Hispanic Complainants

(a) Total Number of Incidents, by Census Tract

(b) Share of incidents with Hispanic complainant, by Census Tract

NOTE: Both maps use data on all incidents reported by white, black, and Hispanic individuals between 2013 and 2016. Each color represents a quintile in the corresponding distribution (number of incidents per tract and share of incidents with a Hispanic complainant per tract, respectively).

Figure 4: Number of Incidents, by Hispanic Ethnicity of the Complainant

NOTE: This figure plots the number of incidents reported by non-Hispanic and Hispanic complainants (left and right y-axis, respectively). The green line represents the launch of PEP in the third quarter of 2015.

Figure 5: Difference in Crime Reporting for Hispanics and non-Hispanics

NOTE: This figure plots the coefficients on $\text{Hispanic} \times \text{Quarter}$ from equation (2) using all all police incidents from the Dallas Police Department between 2013 and 2016. The coefficient and standard error reported are the difference-in-differences estimates from the corresponding equation (1). Standard errors are clustered at the Census tract level.

Figure 6: Difference in Crime Reporting Using Different Types of Neighborhoods

NOTE: This figure plots the coefficients on $\text{Hispanic} \times \text{Quarter}$ from equation (2) using all police incidents from the Dallas Police Department between 2013 and 2016. The coefficients and standard errors reported in the figures are the difference-in-differences estimates from the corresponding equation (1). Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level.

Figure 7: Service Requests Submitted by Hispanics and non-Hispanics

NOTE: This figure uses data on service requests submitted to the City of Dallas between 2013 and 2016. An individual is identified as Hispanic if the probability that his or her surname was Hispanic is greater than 80 percent. Panel (a) plots the raw data, showing the number of service requests submitted by Hispanics and by non-Hispanics over time. Panel (b) plots the coefficients on $\text{Hispanic} \times \text{Quarter}$ from equation (2). The coefficient and standard error reported panel (b) are the estimates from the corresponding equation (1). Standard errors are clustered at the Census tract level.

Figure 8: Share of Arrestees that are Hispanic

(a) For incidents reported by non-Hispanics

(b) All arrests

NOTE: These figures plot the share of arrestees that are Hispanic using arrest data from the Dallas Police Department for 2014–2016. Hispanic arrestees are identified using the race/ethnicity marked down by the DPD. Panel (a) only uses arrests that can be linked to the incident-level data, and whose complainant was non-Hispanic. Panel (b) uses all arrests. The green line indicates the launch of PEP.

Figure 9: Share of Suspects that are Hispanic

(a) For incidents reported by non-Hispanics

(b) All suspects

NOTE: These figures plot the share of suspects that are Hispanic using data from the Dallas Police Department for 2013–2016. Hispanic suspects are identified using the race/ethnicity marked down by the DPD. Panel (a) uses suspects for incidents that can be linked to the incident-level data, and whose complainant was non-Hispanic. Panel (b) uses all suspects. Data are missing for some months in 2014 and 2016. The green line indicates the launch of PEP.

Figure 10: Difference in Crime Reporting between Dallas and Austin

NOTE: This figure plots the coefficients on $\text{Hispanic} \times \text{Quarter}$ from equation (2) using all police incidents from the Dallas Police Department as well as from the Austin Police Department between 2013 and 2016. For both cities, Hispanic complainants are identified using surnames (i.e., an individual is classified as Hispanic if the probability that his or her surname was Hispanic is greater than 80 percent). The coefficient and standard error reported in the figure are the difference-in-differences estimates from the corresponding equation (1) for Austin. Standard errors are clustered at the Census tract level.

Table 1: Summary Statistics for Police Incidents in Dallas, by Ethnicity of Complainant

	All Incidents	Incidents with Hispanic Complainant	Incidents with Non-Hispanic Complainant
Hispanic	0.30	.	.
Black	0.38	.	0.55
White	0.31	.	0.45
Violent crime	0.14	0.15	0.14
Property crime	0.39	0.41	0.37
Part II crime	0.18	0.18	0.18
Accident	0.10	0.11	0.10
Observations	411649	107077	287098

NOTE: These data include all incidents for 2013–2016 in which the complainant was classified as white, black, or Hispanic. Non-Hispanic refers to individuals categorized as “white” or “black” in the data. All crimes are classified using the Uniform Crime Report offense code. Violent crime refers to assault, human trafficking, intoxicated manslaughter, murder, and robbery. Property crime refers to arson, burglary, lost property, thefts, and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle (UUMV). Part II crime refers to crimes classified as criminal mischief, disorderly conduct, DWI, embezzlement, forge and counterfeit, fraud, narcotics and drugs, offenses against child, prostitution, runaway, and sex offenses. Accidents include incidents like firearms accidents, motor vehicle accidents, and occupational injuries, among others. These four shares do not sum to one because incidents might have fallen into alternative categories (e.g., pending investigation, suicide, animal bite).

Table 2: Main Difference-in-Differences Estimates

	(1) All Crimes	(2) All Crimes	(3) Violent and Property Crimes	(4) Lesser Crimes
Hispanic x Start of PEP	0.095*** [0.014]	0.082*** [0.015]	0.040** [0.018]	0.076*** [0.017]
Mean of Outcome	2.93	2.89	2.17	2.41
Average Incidents	37.18	34.84	15.07	19.77
Full Sample Period	Yes	No	No	No
Observations	11072	6920	6920	6920

NOTE: This figure uses incident-level data from the Dallas Police Department. The first column shows the main estimate, using all incidents between 2013 and 2016, and Census tracts as neighborhoods. The rest of the columns restrict the sample period to start in the third quarter of 2014. The second column re-runs the same specification as column 1, but with this shorter sample period. The third and fourth columns split the sample using crime classifications. Violent and property crimes are defined using the Uniform Crime Report offense code for each incident. For a list of what constitutes a violent or property crime, see the footnote to table 1. “Lesser” crimes are all incidents that are neither violent nor property crimes. “Average incidents” refers to the average number of incidents per tract per quarter. Standard errors are clustered at the tract level.

Table 3: Difference-in-Differences Estimates for Alternative Variable Definitions

	(1) Main Estimate	(2) Beats	(3) Reporting Areas	(4) Names 80pct
Hispanic x Start of PEP	0.095*** [0.014]	0.120*** [0.015]	0.083*** [0.010]	0.082*** [0.014]
Mean of Outcome	2.93	3.73	1.84	2.93
Average Incidents	37.18	54.97	11.17	37.18
Observations	11072	7488	36864	11072

NOTE: This figure uses incident-level data from the Dallas Police Department using all incidents between 2013 and 2016. The first column reproduces the main estimate from column 1 of table 2. The second and third column vary the definition of neighborhood. The fourth column uses the complainant’s surname to identify whether he or she is Hispanic. “Average incidents” refers to the average number of incidents per tract per quarter. Standard errors are clustered at the beat and reporting areas level in columns 2 and 3, respectively, and at the tract level in columns 1 and 4.

A Appendix

Figure A1: Share of Census Tract that is Hispanic, 2010

NOTE: This figure uses tract-level data from the 2010 Census from TIGER/Line Shapefiles (2017).

Figure A2: Difference in Crime Reporting for Hispanics and non-Hispanics, 2013–2016

NOTE: This figure plots coefficients from equation (2) using all incident-level data from the Dallas Police Department. Standard errors are clustered at the Census tract level.

Figure A3: Difference in Crime Reporting Using Complainant Surnames

NOTE: This figure plots the coefficients on $\text{Hispanic} \times \text{Quarter}$ from equation (2) using all police incidents as well as the surname of the complainant. If the probability that the complainant's last name was Hispanic was greater than 80 percent, the individual is identified as Hispanic. The coefficient and standard error reported in the figure are the estimates from the corresponding equation (1). Standard errors are clustered at the Census tract level.

Figure A4: Share of Population that is Hispanic, 2011–2016

(a) Hispanic

(b) Hispanic non-citizen

NOTE: This figure uses the monthly Current Population Survey to plot the share of the population that is identified as Hispanic and as Hispanic non-citizen in the metropolitan area of Dallas-Forth Worth-Arlington (DFW) and in the central cities of the same metropolitan area. The annual estimates are calculated by taking the average of the monthly shares within each year.

Figure A5: Inmates in Travis County with Immigration Detainers

NOTE: This figure plots the number of inmates with immigration detainers held in Travis County in that month, using monthly reports for the Texas Commission on Jail Standards. The dashed and solid green lines mark the announcement and launch of PEP, respectively. The red line marks the month in which PEP was suspended.

Figure A6: Number of Immigration Detainers Issued in Travis County, by Most Serious Criminal Conviction of Individual

NOTE: This figure plots the number of detainer requests over time, using data on detainer requests from the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC). “Felony” refers to detainer requests issued for individuals convicted of a felony or aggravated felony. “No conviction” refers to detainer requests issued for individuals who were either charged but not convicted of a crime or neither charged nor convicted of a crime. The dashed and solid lines mark the announcement and launch of PEP, respectively.