Swaziland and South Africa Since 1994: Reflections on Aspects of Post-Liberation Swazi Historiography

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Introduction: African historiographies

This consideration of the post-1994 historiography of Swaziland seeks to do two things: to provide a general survey of the historical work done since 1994, and to highlight some of the scholarly efforts that have attempted to project Swaziland’s position vis-à-vis the liberation struggle in Southern Africa. The chapter assumes the status of a kind of interim reportage. An essential first step is to take stock of what has been done and what is currently available. Subsequent research will involve a more intense analysis of the contents of the work, with a view to assessing the extent to which it all contributes to a set of new directions in the scholarly discussion of Swazi history since 1994.

The production of historical knowledge about Swaziland was closely patterned on the way in which Southern African and African historiographies in general evolved. Given the geo-political and historical position of the country, this is scarcely surprising. These historiographies began with the imperialist/colonial school that saw publications written by the colonial administrators within the colonies. Their concern was to provide a basic description of what they called the natives’ social and political way of life as well as their economic organisation. Closely following this and intimately allied with it was the school of historians that concentrated on the ‘invaders’ and their imperial activities. They often sought to justify the colonial state’s position through their study of the various administrative policies applied in the colonies. These included programmes such as ‘Direct’ and ‘Indirect Rule’, ‘Assimilation’, ‘Native Administration’, and so forth. Their history of the
Africans was largely intended to assist the colonial state entrench its rule. As a reaction to this approach, the Nationalist/Africanist school emerged in the late 1950s and early 1960s, as the anti-colonial political campaign gained momentum in nearly all African colonies, to challenge alien control and the colonial presence as a whole. This was the kind of history that sought to place the African at the centre-stage, to trace the origins and development of nationalism in particular African countries, and to focus on the task of recovering the ‘African initiative’. Later on, this school was severely criticised by scholars who could be described as representing the post-Nationalist historiography of the 1980s. They pointed out what they perceived as an undue pre-occupation with nationalism even where there were still no ‘nation-states’. Among its limitations was the stark reality that, attractive as it was at the time, it could not explain the poverty and instability that confronted Africans everywhere during the post-independence years. Such revisionist scholars were sometimes referred to as the post-colonial pessimists because of their disillusionment with the ‘emptiness’ of the political independence already acquired by African states at this stage. They suggested a different kind of historiography that would trace and depict the social and economic transformation of Africa more satisfactorily. They generally preferred to frame their questions within a different set of theoretical perspectives. For Slater, post-nationalist historiography is ‘that historiography which sought to move beyond the bourgeois limitations of the Africanist historiography of the 1960s, and towards the production of a form of historical knowledge whose objective [was] to understand and present ... Africa’s history from the standpoint of the workers and peasants, the oppressed classes of Africa...’ (Slater 1986:250). If the early African historical scholarship was mainly concerned to ‘demonstrate that African history existed’ and was doable, and if the nationalist writers were pre-occupied with producing ‘corrective history’, certainly by the early 1980s African history had ‘come of age’.

**South Africa and the BOLESWA countries**

Relations between the modern republic of South Africa and its smaller neighbours of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, have attracted serious academic as well as journalistic discussion for almost as long as the enclave countries have existed as separate entities. From the period of the Mfecane social upheavals of the early nineteenth century, when the evolution of the modern Nguni and Sotho states began, till contemporary times, the question of their very survival as independent sovereignties has been a major concern for all three. That they have been and are for all practical purposes socially and economically an integral part of their larger and more powerful neighbour...
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One of the aspects of South Africa’s relations with the enclave states during the 1970s and 1980s that interested many scholars was the question of their role in the anti-apartheid struggle. In the eyes of several observers, these countries had the opportunity of playing the part of a Trojan horse for the liberation movements. Indeed, both Botswana and Lesotho were used as hideouts and/or the first stopping points for liberation fighters fleeing from or infiltrating into South Africa. As is well documented, this often led to retaliatory and punitive responses towards these countries by the South African apartheid regime with very costly consequences for them. Any effort at taking a census of ‘apartheid deaths’, as some of the ongoing discussion amongst historians of Southern Africa is currently seeking, will have to take into account such casualties inside the affected countries. The general consensus seems to be that, apart from the obvious examples of the more ‘traditional’ front-line states of the late 1970s and early 1980s, such as Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique or Tanzania, both Lesotho and Botswana played a positive role in all this.

Swaziland, on the other hand, by and large enjoyed a far less flattering image and came under severe criticism from various writers for its alleged indifference and even opposition to the liberation movements operating from inside it. One scholar even went as far as suggesting that in its dealings with the Republic, it was ‘a willing bedfellow of apartheid South Africa’ in contrast to the position of the other two enclave states of Botswana and Lesotho, which had found themselves reluctantly obliged to co-operate with the enemy (Daniel 1984). Indeed, Swaziland has often been accused of having been overtly hostile to the African National Congress (ANC) and other Southern African liberation movements prior to 1994. The animosity appears to have reached its apex in the so-called four-year Liqoqo (inner council of Swazi expert advisers) period following the death of King Sobhuza II in 1982, when the government was under the effective control of this group (Shongwe 1995; Africa Report 1984; Simelane 1999). During this period, by all accounts, the factional in-fighting within the ruling circle saw a group of ruthless Swazi senior politicians not only assume dictatorial powers, but literally declare the ANC unwelcome in the country. These evidently sour relations to which critics such as Daniel drew attention were, however, largely a reflection of the Swazi state’s hostility to the organization rather than that of the ordinary Swazi. Available evidence shows that many ANC activists were able to undergo educational and other social training programmes, to work in

goes without saying. That their history was for a long time—and continues to be—treated as a part of the history of South Africa by some scholars is also self-evident.3

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paid employment in both government and private institutions, and even undertake clandestine political projects within Swaziland in the 1970s and 1980s. A related and important aspect of the relations between the liberation movements and Swaziland was the real possibility that some government officers may have acted without official sanction. Rather, some evidence is now emerging that suggests they may have been acting independently by taking the liberty to harass the ANC men and women living in Swaziland at that point. It was during the same time that the abortive Ingwavuma/Kangwane land deal, made public barely two months before Sobhuza’s death, seemed to assume a considerable degree of urgency (Griffitties and Funell 1983).

This chapter does not seek to endorse or promote the official position of Swaziland or any of the ‘front-line’ states in the region. After all, it would be easy enough for nearly all of them to claim, at the political level at any rate, that they all contributed to the struggle to a lesser or greater degree. Rather, we wish to examine critically the claim that Swaziland consistently maintained warm relations with apartheid South Africa and was conversely always less than welcoming to the liberation movements. In doing so, the discussion will briefly revisit the question first posed by Bischoff in the mid-1980s. His argument was that Swaziland’s policy towards South Africa had been ‘non-conflictual and accommodationist’ largely as a consequence of sheer necessity. Not only had the Swazi monarchy historically played a key role in the ‘national liberation’ (that is, the struggle for the Swaziland’s own independence) during the 1960s, but Swaziland had gone ahead and adopted a strategy of accommodating foreign capital in the post-independence years and accepted a policy of multi-racialism (Henri-Bischoff 1988, 1986). The intimate relationship between the Swazi ruling group and South Africa, the dominant power in the region, was seen as an insurance for the survival of the Swazi state in the face of the impending radical change in the region. This, in Bischoff’s view, made the country different. It can be argued further that this was one explanation of why Swaziland appeared to have taken a somewhat low-key posture on the liberation issue. The question becomes even more significant in view of the long acknowledged fact that at the beginning of the twentieth century Swazi rulers were intimately involved in the launching of the original South African Native National Congress (SANNC). Queen Regent Gwamile Labotsibeni provided financial support to the party’s newspaper and her son, Prince Malunge, who was an important political actor in the Swazi ruling circle, attended the early meetings of the ANC. Scholars from the region have continued to be mostly silent on this question and related themes since 1994. Has there been a recognition that Swaziland is indeed a component part of a wider world, and that it should see itself as part of this
rather than an isolated country insisting on being different? What are the principal attributes of recent historical studies from Swaziland itself? To what extent have they been shaped by the changing regional relations since 1994?

Pre-1994 analyses of Swaziland’s relations with South Africa

As already pointed out, the historiography of Swaziland’s relations with South Africa can be traced to the turn of the nineteenth century when, at the end of the negotiations following the Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902, the Union of South Africa was created. Then, as Hyam and other writers wrote some time ago, the possibility of the eventual incorporation of Swaziland and the other two High Commission territories of Basutoland and the Bechuanaland Protectorate was left open. The question continued to hang over the little states throughout the twentieth century and was a major consideration in determining their political attitude towards South Africa (Hyam 1972). In the discussion of both Lesotho and Swaziland’s resistance to South Africa’s ambitions to take them over, for instance, several scholars pointed out that the opposition to incorporation in both countries was based upon the African people’s fear of South Africa’s racial policies. Moreover, Britain, the colonial power in question, was highly critical of the South African authorities’ overall outlook towards its African population (Nyeko 1979-81; Mekenye 1996). In recent times, therefore, more attention has been given to the need for a greater appreciation of the African resistance within these territories to South Africa’s intentions. Although the decision to retain the status of the former High Commission territories was one that was clearly made in Whitehall rather than Maseru, Mbabane or Gaborone, the attitude of the colonised people contributed significantly to the conclusion made by the British authorities on the question.

If South Africa failed to absorb the neighbouring states politically throughout the twentieth century, the position was quite the opposite in terms of her economic relations with them. Here the available evidence confirms what is generally well known: that through a variety of processes, the economies of these countries were integrated into that of South Africa over the years. The coverage of this theme has been quite extensive in the historiography of the region and continues to grow. The emergence of a dominance-dependence relationship looms large in studies of the modern history of the individual countries as well as in their collective experience. As the political scientist Joshua Mugyenyi (1990) showed, this affected the small countries’ foreign policies. Contributing to the discussion of the question why Swaziland seemed to pursue a different kind of policy than the other two states, he identified four factors that shaped the country’s attitude to South Africa. These in-
cluded the role of international capital (which was largely South African), South Africa’s own policy of destabilising its neighbours, the white settler interests within Swaziland, and the Swazi ruling group’s interests. This particular line of argument was in keeping with the position articulated by Henri-Bischoff (1988). Other related issues that indicate a greater level of economic integration and received scholarly attention include the question of land and the struggle for it, the development of migrant labour and its impact on the ordinary citizens of these countries, the rise of settler economic power, mining, agriculture, capital penetration, worker consciousness, etc.9

Swazi historical studies since the 1990s: Contributions from the University of Swaziland (UNISWA)

In a recent review of the Canadian scholar, Gillis’s, study of the political history of Swaziland, Jonathan Crush has lamented the author’s failure to recognize the new historiography of Swaziland that has emerged in the period c.1971–2001. Gillis is faulted for persisting with the royalty-centred approach previously criticised by other scholars. Rather than produce a history covering the majority of the population, he provided, instead, a ‘narrative [that] describes the actions of the great, not the lowly. Swazi kings and queen-regents, colonial governors and officials, and white settlers feature prominently in the narrative’ (Crush 2001).10 Crush goes on to classify the existing historical work on Swaziland as falling under the categories of ‘colonial and imperial history’, the ‘African nationalist’ school, and those who are concerned with the ‘social and economic’ transformation of the country. Whether the more recent work emanating from the University of Swaziland can be fitted into any or all of these categories would seem immaterial. The overall picture, however, is that it has taken due cognisance of Swaziland’s historical and contemporary interaction with the rest of society. A brief survey should highlight some of the features of these writings.

If many of the previous efforts at studying Swazi history and culture had been hampered by an undue concentration on the ‘Swazi way’, a tendency to see it as different and isolated, and a marked reluctance to perceive the country as a part of the wider world, certainly the Department of History at the University of Swaziland has steered its work in a totally distinctive direction over the last decade or so. The overall picture shows a clear move away from a concern with the rulers and pays less attention to political history.

From the early 1990s, undergraduate students undertook staff-supervised research projects that increasingly showed awareness of Swaziland’s social and economic ties not only with South(ern) Africa, but also with the rest of the world. Thus, students were encouraged to examine the growth and impact
of certain industries such as cotton production, sugar cultivation with special reference to how it has affected Swaziland’s economy since independence in 1968, and the maize industry. Other themes that have been covered include the role of co-operatives in the marketing of agricultural produce, and farmers’ use of them as a mechanism for developing the rural areas of the country, as well as the introduction of bodies such as the National Agricultural Marketing Board (NAMBOARD) by the government. Worker consciousness and labour issues have also been of central interest in a number of works by the students. Throughout this latter category of research projects, there seems to be an emphasis on the way in which the Swazi ordinary citizen, for a long time marginalised in previous studies, has now been placed at the centre-stage.

Similarly, the researchers show an awareness that the common Swazi always found themselves in a disadvantaged relationship with their employers or competitors in almost any commercial economic activity they undertook, whether jointly or separately. Thus, Mangaliso Nkambule, in his examination of the initiative taken by the Swazi monarchy to help indigenous entrepreneurs, especially commercial transport operators, pointed out, for example, that as far back as 1947, Sobhuza II had founded the organisation known as the ‘Swazi Commercial Amadoda’ following his ‘realization that the Swazis were being ignored in commerce by the white settlers ...’ (Nkambule 1992). Swazi business men and women set up small shops and groceries in the rural areas of the country. Yet, it soon became clear that laudable as the organization’s intentions had been, it was seriously handicapped by internal wranglings, indiscipline, and corruption. Thus, it achieved only limited success and was, by and large a failure. Much of the argument in this work and the others in the same category was couched or formulated in largely nationalistic terms. The general tone is one in which the explanation of historical themes places blame on some extraneous factors—usually the colonial system or its legacy—as being responsible for Swaziland’s woes. Then, again, the unit of study, in a number of cases, was frequently a tiny locality in a corner of the country. However, while the focus of these studies seemed understandably local, they all showed awareness of the comparative work from other parts of Africa. For example, the projects undertaken by Manyatsi and Dladla respectively illustrate the point that an understanding of the way in which Swaziland’s co-operatives functioned could be enhanced by an appreciation of similar studies carried out in similarly European-dominated areas such as Kenya.

So while the topics themselves may appear narrowly focused or somewhat parochial, there is a distinct recognition that Swazi history has long moved away from being presented as just the exploits of the ruling group and the story of their confrontations with the Boers, British or other African peoples.
It is particularly striking that even the projects that addressed specifically political themes were themselves not restricted to the older type of court history but rather dealt with questions that concerned the wider society. The undergraduate students’ research projects appear to have been suspended by the University authorities around the mid-1990s. Consequently, there is a break in the record from 1995 until 2002 when the Department of History resumed its offering of the course. It attracted as many as twenty-six students and the range of the subjects of study once again illustrated the continued preference for social and economic history over the purely political issues. The emphasis seems to have been on what might be described as ‘applied history,’ seeking to illustrate the relevance of the topics chosen to contemporary society. Many of the studies covered the last two or three decades of the twenty-first century and some carried their discussion up to 2002. Thus, the contribution of the trade unions to Swaziland’s recent history, the impact of HIV-AIDS on society, gender relationships, women’s changing attitudes to various mechanisms of social control over them in modern Swaziland, the role of Non-Governmental Organizations, (NGOs), the effects of the mass media control regulations, and the impact of co-operation between Swaziland and international organizations such as the European Union on the country’s development programmes, the plight of elderly people in Swaziland today, and the significance of national heritage and tourism—all appealed to students who opted for this course during the 2002/2003 academic year. This partiality for the more recent themes of Swazi history as a subject of historical investigation seemed to continue during the 2003/2004 academic year, as the students opted for the course.

The mid-1990s also saw the department embark on a two-part MA degree programme even though it temporarily shelved the BA projects. The main interests of the research portion of the post-graduate course, however, remained largely similar to those pursued in the undergraduate one. During the first year of the degree programme, the students attended taught classes on such optional areas as ‘Gender and Society in Africa,’ ‘Comparative Peasantry,’ and ‘Comparative Slavery in the World’. They also took the compulsory ‘Themes in the History of Swaziland’ and ‘Historiography of Southern Africa’. They spent the next year researching a topic of their choice dealing with some aspects of Swazi history. While numbers have been small due to obvious financial constraints, the completed dissertations have demonstrated, once again, the shifts in the historiography of Swaziland since the 1980s. Thus, although certain old themes such as the history of missionary endeavours in the country may appear to have been over-studied in the past, they have certainly been worth re-visiting. By focusing on the life histories of some
educated women, it is possible to show how the mission-provided training they received, for example, helped change their status and image in Swazi society. One striking feature of a recently completed work under this programme concentrated specifically on the way in which women were affected by the activities of such missionary institutions (Ndwandwe 2000). Yet another MA student, Nhlanhla Dlamini, examined the nature of race relations at a particular mine complex in Swaziland during the colonial period, considering specifically relations between Europeans and Africans at the country’s Havelock Asbestos Mine between 1939 and 1964. The author believed that the relevance of his study lay not only in the fact that the mine was a major employer of both European and African workers, but that race relations also occupied an important place in the historiography of Swaziland’s economic development. (Dlamini’s 2001) work has helped underline the point that, as was the case during the colonial period, race relations are likely to influence the overall attitude of the Swazis and Swaziland towards South Africa even in the post-1994 years. His continuing work on this theme will surely explore this argument further and advance our knowledge on the subject.15

If these works focus on social history and steer clear of any discussion of political issues, our third example of the kind of MA study done at UNISWA in the post-1994 period in fact returned to political history. Thus, in seeking to make ‘a contribution to Swaziland’s post-colonial history’, Caanan Simelane initially traces the political developments in the country from the 1960s before turning to the post-independence period. He concentrates on the period from the 1973 repeal of the Independence Constitution onwards. He argues that the country-wide strikes and work stoppages that characterised the period was a manifestation of the ‘people’s frustration with the late King Sobhuza II’s move to reverse [the] democratic process in the country’. Referring to the growing pressure for democratisation in the 1990s, Simelane concludes that the ‘popular democratic opposition [had] failed to win majority support’ principally because the Swazi leadership had successfully appeased the rural majority and even the traditionalists within the country’s urban areas at the expense of those who were demanding multi-party democracy.16

Apart from making their obvious contribution through the supervision of both undergraduate and postgraduate work by students, members of the Department of History have, of course, conducted their own individual research that has often found its way into publications. Their particular interests have, not unexpectedly, been closely linked with those of their own students. Thus, agriculture, labour, social history, HIV-AIDS, and other related topics have provided the subject matter for staff research. While BAB Sikhondze
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has continued to write on the subject of rural change and trade in colonial Swaziland during the last several years, Ackson Kanduza has turned his attention to HIV-AIDS as well as to the role of intellectuals in Swaziland’s politics before independence (Sikhondze 2003; Kanduza 2003a, 2003b). The most recent and possibly the best example of these efforts is Hamilton Sipho Simelane’s 2003 study of economic relations in Swaziland during the colonial period. It is an illustration of how far the historiography of Swaziland has gone since the adoption by its students of the ‘social transformation’ and ‘political economy’ approach that Crush refers to (Crush 2001). Here we see a sustained effort to present the interests of the common Swazi man as distinct from those of the ‘traditional leadership’. Simelane points out that he is concerned with ‘moments of change [as they] affected the majority of the Swazi people’ (Simelane 2003:6). The work starts off with a review of the various theories that different scholars have used in explaining the effects of colonialism on the subject peoples. He identifies two of these in particular—modernisation theory and dependency theory, preferring the latter over the former in his discussion of the economic change that took place in Swaziland during the period 1940–1960. He then proceeds to trace that change through the period after World War II by considering specific British policies on land, agriculture, mining and capital penetration and its attendant consequences for labour and labour relations. Throughout his book, Simelane is evidently mindful of the fact that Swaziland has not been immune to extraneous influences, but he insists that his work is an example of how the country’s political economy deserves to be studied in its own right. This is quite a persuasive argument in support of our position that the book has made a most significant addition to Swazi historiography.

Conclusion

This chapter started by re-visiting the efforts of earlier scholars of Swaziland’s recent history in which they had offered explanations for the country’s different attitude towards South Africa in comparison with the outlook of the other countries in the Southern African region. It pointed out that while at the state level Swaziland may have appeared hostile to the liberation movements in the region in general and the ANC in particular, this was not necessarily the case with the bulk of the Swazi population. There seems to be growing evidence to support the view that the country was probably just as sympathetic to the liberation struggle as the other nations in the region.

The chapter next considered the state of play in the study of history with particular attention to Swaziland-South Africa relations in the post-apartheid period. This survey has concentrated on what work has been done on the
history of Swaziland since the 1990s with special reference to studies produced locally. This particular choice of emphasis was not intended to minimise the importance of research done on the country by scholars based elsewhere. In fact, the contribution of such authors has been quite substantial, as can be attested by the work of Bonner, Booth, Crush, and others. It can be argued that they are probably not encumbered by the disadvantage of too narrow a perspective that can so easily affect local scholarship. Yet it is true, at the same time, that not much is known outside of Swaziland of what has been and is being done here. The main avenue for the publication of academic articles, for example, is the *Uniswa Research Journal*, but it does not circulate beyond the University itself. This chapter has attempted to provide a window through which to view this work.

Several glaring gaps remain to be filled. The History Department’s efforts have scarcely touched, for example, the political concerns of the region over the question of democratisation in Swaziland since 1994. On the political front, scholars and other commentators still remain unconvinced that the ‘Swazi way’—which includes the use of a no-party system of elections, for example—is the best way forward for the country. The trade unions have brought immense pressure to bear on Swaziland to introduce political change. While a start has been made to study their recent history, more detailed research needs to be done. However, by demonstrating that the various social and economic themes the students and staff have investigated since the 1990s transcend national boundaries throughout the region and Africa as a whole, they have shown that Swaziland is no longer the insulated society that earlier studies seemed to suggest it was by laying undue emphasis on the uniqueness of the ‘Swazi way’.

**Endnotes**


2. By 1965, as Ranger (1968) noted, ‘there was no longer any need to proclaim the possibility of African history’. Ten years later, the authors of a University-level text entitled *African History* and targeted mainly at American students, could state that African history had ‘come of age’ and that their own volume was itself an indication of this ‘maturity’ of their discipline. See P. Curtin et al, (1978: v).

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4. See the (September 2003) discussion of this thread on the H-Net lists on ‘African History and Culture’ and ‘South African History’, H-Africa and H-South Africa, respectively.


6. In mid-2004 both *The Times of Swaziland* and *The Swazi Observer*, the country’s two English language daily newspapers, reported on the so-called cleaning ceremonies involving ANC cadres who remembered their struggle while in Swaziland in this period. This was in commemoration of the support that the ANC had received from the Swazi populace during this period. See various issues of both papers from 20 – 25 June 2004.

7. Private conversation with some Swazi academic colleagues at the University of Swaziland, Kwaluseni, who would prefer to remain anonymous, 28 June 2004.

8. During a visit to Swaziland in April 2002, former Namibian Prime Minister, Hage Geingob, praised the country for supporting SWAPO during the liberation struggle, noting that ‘some SWAPO freedom fighters made secret visits’ to Swaziland. Such assistance extended to diplomatic support at international forums such as the UN.

9. The myriad studies covering these themes—too numerous to be listed here—clearly indicate the extent to which Swaziland, like Lesotho, has become an economic appendage to South Africa over the years.


11. Some of the BA research essays include: Muze (1992); Mabuza (1995); and Dlamini, (1994). Co-operatives and their role in post-colonial Swaziland were studied by Dladla (1993), Manyatsi (1992) and (1994).

12. For example, the Shongwe project already mentioned above focused on the post-Sohbhuza II political struggle and its wider ramifications, while both T. L. Masethula’s ‘The history of the Masebula clan’ and N. Dlamini’s ‘The Ndawandwe in the history of the Swazi nation’ placed far less emphasis on the centrality of the Dlamini clan than the older Swazi historiography spearheaded by H. Kuper had done in previous years.


15. N. Dlamini is currently (2004) working on a PhD (History) degree at the University of Witwatersrand on the legal abolition of racial discrimination in Swaziland after 1945.


17. Although this work signals a major landmark in the production of historical knowledge on Swaziland (and from Swaziland), this is not the place to provide a fully-fledged review of the book, which probably belongs elsewhere.

18. Swaziland held its last general election under the traditional *Tinkundla* system in October 2003, which coincided with the CODESRIA Southern African Regional Conference in Gaborone, Botswana. Participants were curious to know to what extent such an election reflected the majority opinion in the country.

19. Apart from Mayisela’s BA (History) research essay, Mavela Shongwe completed an MA (History) in 2002 on the role of the trade unions in Swaziland.

References

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*The Swazi Observer*, 20–25 June 2004

*The Times of Swaziland*, 20–25 June 2004