RE-CONCEPTUALIZING THE ENCLAVE IN AN ERA OF TRANSNATIONALISM:
ETHNIC SOLIDARITY AND UPWARD MOBILITY IN THE KOREAN ENCLAVE
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Abstract

This project uses ethnographic research conducted between 2010 and 2011, as well as original survey data (n=800), to examine how the transnational enclave impacts opportunities for upward mobility among Koreans in Beijing. Specifically, I set out to challenge how the key principles of the enclave hypothesis differed within the transnational context by examining four empirical field sites: 1) the space of everyday life in the enclave (chapter 5), 2) the ethnic church (chapter 6), 3) the individual experiences of first-generation South Koreans and third- and fourth-generation Korean Chinese ethnic entrepreneurs, and 4) the South Korean chaebol (conglomerate) firm in Beijing (chapter 8). My project demonstrates that the mechanisms of ethnic solidarity touted in the enclave hypothesis are largely absent in the Korean transnational enclave in Beijing. Frequent transnational movement and disparities in class and cultural identity have led to bifurcated social networks, residential segregation, and institutional fragmentation within the community. While the enclave still provides minorities with opportunities by facilitating the growth of transnational activities, buffering the costs of immigration, and stimulating the accumulation of foreign capital, migrants face formidable obstacles in mobilizing ethnic resources due to damaged bonds of ethnic solidarity. Rather than rely solely the enclave for sustenance, migrants must move flexibly across a broad range of contexts both inside and outside the enclave to gain access to resources to sustain their entrepreneurial activities. To this end, third- and fourth-generation Korean Chinese migrants who are able to act as cultural intermediaries are best able to utilize the opportunities available in the transnational enclave, whereas their first-generation South Korean counterparts, despite their high levels of human capital, largely fail to due to their inability to form ties with local Chinese bureaucrats. The ability to form social networks with locals plays a critical role in Korean entrepreneurs’ ability to manage the institutionally uncertain environment of the PRC. The enclave, by geographically and socially sequestering the South Koreans within their own community, largely perpetuates their isolation from Chinese society and as a result, their perpetual dependence on Korean Chinese intermediaries to conduct business.
Acknowledgements

I first realized that I wanted to conduct ethnographic research on the Korean diaspora well before I entered graduate school, as a third-year college student at Dartmouth College. I am grateful to my advisors at Dartmouth, Steve Ericson, Dennis Washburn and James Dorsey, who first encouraged me to pursue my intellectual curiosity on the Koreans in Japan. More than anything, they profoundly shaped my ambitions to become a sociologist and a scholar, more broadly.

Even before I was accepted into the Princeton doctoral program, I relied on my advisor, Gilbert Rozman, for encouragement and support. From the time I was an undergraduate at Dartmouth, Professor Rozman read my senior thesis and drafts of conference papers, wrote me a recommendation letter for graduate programs, and met with me on several different occasions to speak to me about my research interests and my future plans. From these experiences, I knew that he would be a wonderful advisor supporting me through ups and downs throughout my time at graduate school. He has fulfilled these expectations and much more over the years. Professor Rozman has inspired me to conduct honest research and has always supported my decisions even when it departed from his own research interests. I could not have asked for more from an advisor. He has been a role model to me in so many ways, not only as a scholar, but also as a person.

I am also deeply grateful for King-to Yeung, who spent many, many hours reading different drafts of papers with a fine-tooth comb and helping me sort through different theoretical ideas related to my dissertation. I know that the time investment he made in deeply engaging in the various stages of my dissertation came at a high cost as a
junior faculty member, burdened by a series of perhaps more pressing obligations. I always felt that he made me a priority and I am sincerely grateful for all the sacrifices he must have made for me. King always challenged to think more rigorously and encouraged me to familiarize myself with new, sometimes intimidating, theoretical ideas. He has played an indelible role in my training to become an independent thinker.

My time at Princeton also was greatly enriched by the support and guidance of Alejandro Portes. As an undergraduate at Dartmouth, I first learned about sociological research on immigration by reading his work on the ethnic enclave and second-generation youth. I feel so honored and blessed to have been able to work closely with someone who has single-handedly shaped the course of research in our field. He has inspired me to conduct research on the ethnic enclave and transnationalism, and despite his busy schedule, he has taken the time provide thorough feedback on my ideas and dissertation more broadly. I appreciate how, despite my relative lack of experience and knowledge of the field, he has patiently supported me in finding my own voice in writing about the ethnic enclave.

The process of collecting field research in a foreign country is always full of complications and hurdles. I would not have been able to complete field research in Beijing and Seoul without financial support from Princeton's Global Network for Inequality in 2010 and the National Science Foundation Dissertation Improvement Grant. In addition, were it not for my research assistant, Young-me Pyou, who was a college student at Minzu University at the time, I would have never been able to conduct a survey of the Korean Chinese population or establish the rapport necessary to carry-out in-depth interviews with many of the Korean Chinese minorities I met in the field. She was my
right-hand woman throughout the two years I was in Beijing, accompanying me wherever I went. Young-me started out as my research assistant, but later became the little sister I never had.

While I was in China, my small group bible study at the Korean underground church I became involved treated me like I was a member of their family. I am so thankful for having met each and every one of them. I will not disclose their identities here to protect their privacy, but their warm presence provided me with the emotional strength to finish my field research in Beijing.

I am also indebted to the South Korean church I became involved in. Again, I regret not being able to disclose the names of the people who helped me in particular, but you know who you are. Thank you so much for allowing me to gain entry into your social circles, even as a temporary guest, and for taking it upon yourselves to distribute surveys, recruit interviewees, and introduce me to your friends so that I could complete my data collection. Your generosity has touched my heart.

I am thankful also for the South Korean missionary, who will remain anonymous, for taking the time to introduce me to several different South Korean and Korean Chinese pastors in and around the enclave. He treated this project as if it were his own and did his very best to make sure that I would be able to gain the contacts to conduct a mass survey of the Koreans in Wangjing.

I came back to Princeton after completing my field research in China to write the dissertation. I am grateful to my professors, friends and family who provided support to me during this time. In particular, I would like to thank Mitch Duneier, for his words of encouragement during difficult times and intellectual guidance, as well as Edward Telles,
for listening to various presentations and serving as a reader for my dissertation. I am also thankful for my colleagues in sociology, Denia Garcia, Naomi Sugie, Carol Ann MacGregor, Rachel Ferguson, Alex Murphy, Rene Flores, Alex Tham, Kyla Thomas, Lori Smith and Tina Lee.

Akito Kusaka, although not a sociologist himself, spent countless evenings reading drafts of chapters and brainstorming how to organize the theoretical ideas I present in the dissertation. I gained strength from the lovely bento lunches, home-cooked dinners and words of encouragement he provided me during the stressful time I wrote my dissertation.

And last, but not least, I would never have thought to become a sociologist in the first place, had it not been for my family—my brother and his wife, Joseph and Christine Yoon, and my parents, Evelyn and Barnabas Yoon. When I felt discouraged, I thought about all the hardships that we went through as a family and felt motivated to persevere. Thank you for your undying support.

Parts of this dissertation have been previously published in Gilbert Rozman’s edited volume (No. 23) in *Joint US-Korea Academic Studies*. I have also presented findings from this project in various forums at the University of Pennsylvania’s Korea Studies Symposium series, the annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies in 2012, Princeton University’s "Culture and Inequality" and "Center for Migration" forums, the Social Science Research Council’s "Labor Migration and Integration Conference" in Beijing, Harvard University’s "China Sociology Workshop" and the Korean Chinese Research Institute’s annual meeting in Kyoto in 2012.
Preface

This dissertation was deeply shaped by my personal experiences growing up as the pastor’s daughter of a small Korean immigrant church. For Korean immigrants in America, the church forms the hub of the ethnic community. And as the pastor, my father acted not only as the spiritual leader of the Korean community, but also as a marriage counselor, business advisor, translator, and confidant to many Korean immigrants who had no where else to turn. The doors of our home were always open to Korean immigrants who were in need.

When I was growing up, my father served as the senior pastor at several churches scattered all over the country. When I was five years old, we lived in Buffalo, New York, where my father’s ministry targeted mostly South Korean international students earning graduate degrees at SUNY Buffalo. Two years later, we moved to Tacoma, Washington. Our church in Tacoma was located near Fort Lewis, a major army base, and our congregation was almost entirely made up of middle-aged Korean women. The majority of these women had married American GIs despite the social stigmas attached to international marriages in Korean society in order to climb out of their situation of poverty and start a new life in the U.S. My mother told me that many of these women had been orphans or prostitutes in their past lives in the homeland.

Two years later, we moved yet again, this time to Detroit, where the majority of our congregation worked in the downtown area as entrepreneurs who catered to the African American population. They were, to use Edna Bonacich’s (1973) label, “middleman minorities” whose businesses served the urban poor. I was nine years old at the time and I frequently accompanied my parents when they made their weekly rounds
visiting the stores where the members of our congregation worked. I remember wandering around these stores looking at the big posters of African American women with elaborate hair-dos and aimlessly browsing through the racks of oversized graphic T-shirts as my parents counseled and prayed for the immigrant entrepreneurs who faithfully served our church.

When we moved to the suburbs of New Jersey four years later, our lives became somewhat more settled. I was in junior high school, by then. My father ended up serving this church until I graduated college. Our congregation consisted of a diverse mix of people—from Korean graduate students who came to the U.S. to earn doctoral degrees at Rutgers University, to South Korean entrepreneurs who owned nail salons and dry cleaners in white neighborhoods, to elite South Korean businessmen who were dispatched by South Korean chaebol (conglomerate) companies to supervise operations based in the New York metropolitan area. But just as I was about to graduate college, the church that my parents had poured so much of their lives into, disbanded, and my father found himself suddenly unemployed. By then, there was a surplus of Korean immigrant pastors in New Jersey and a shortage of churches. Moreover, no church in the area was willing to hire a man of his age.

My parents invested their retirement savings into a small shop they started in an upper-middle class neighborhood just outside of Princeton. But after two years or so, they decided to close the store because the cost of rent and supplies exceeded the profit they were able to bring in each month. During my first couple of years at graduate school, they started working at a local dry cleaner’s. But the stresses of labor in their old age, the
meager income they were able to earn, and the bleak future that lay ahead led them into a downward spiral of depression.

All the while, a bright future lay ahead of me as I graduated from Dartmouth College and entered the doctoral program in sociology at Princeton University. Through my many years at graduate school, there have been many times when I questioned whether I had made the right decision to enter graduate school rather than find a job or invest in a more “practical” professional degree. I never questioned my passion for sociology, but I did from time to time struggle with a lurking sense of guilt that I had not made the most of my Ivy League education. My parents were living paycheck by paycheck not knowing when they would be replaced by younger, more energetic workers who cost less than they did. Meanwhile, I was reading about inequality and downward mobility in textbooks in the comforts of my graduate student apartment.

I kept myself afloat through graduate school by turning a blind eye to the dire circumstances that my parents were in. I tried to ignore the lingering feeling in my heart that I could have been able to protect my parents from the painful life they were leading and the depression that overwhelmed their day-to-day existence had I chosen a different career path. But instead of trying to console my parents, I continued to rationalize to myself that I had given up my childhood years for them living under the microscope of the Korean immigrant community even as a young girl, and that I owed it to myself to finally pursue what I wanted. My parents meanwhile continued to support my ambitions to become a sociologist, never once questioning the practicality of my career choice.

For me, being in the field was a deeply emotional experience. Writing this dissertation, for that matter, carried so much weight—psychologically and
symbolically—not because I felt that the dissertation represented the culmination of my training in graduate school, but more so because everywhere I went I was reminded of my parents. I saw the faces of my parents when I interviewed struggling South Korean immigrant entrepreneurs in Beijing who explained to me how they had invested their entire savings in their businesses and that they were facing bankruptcy. I was reminded of my father when I went to church and listened to Korean immigrant pastors preach each week. When I interviewed elderly Korean Chinese couples who faced unemployment and lived with their children who financially supported them, I felt pangs of guilt and would go home and call my parents to see if they were doing ok.

In a sense, by writing this dissertation, I wanted to prove to myself that all of the hardship that my parents endured throughout their lives was for a purpose. That it all was meant to produce something that was good, something that would help scholars more intimately understand the struggles of immigrant communities like the ones my parents had sacrificed so much of their lives for.

Looking back, I can see how much I have gained growing up in the environment that I did. As you will see in the pages to come, the church has functioned as a core field site for this ethnographic project. And my familiarity with the inner-workings of the immigrant church came to my aid on numerous occasions. I felt confident and at ease serving at church, reaching out to the elders and deacons and volunteering for various roles even as a newcomer. I was able to offer many skills acting as presider over worship service, playing the piano and singing for the praise band, making church bulletins, and so on, because I grew up playing these roles as a child. Looking back, I can now see how
my unique set of experiences prepared and trained me to act as an effective ethnographer of immigrant communities today.

I was not able to provide my parents with financial or even psychological support when they needed it most due to my various weaknesses and shortcomings. This dissertation is a product of our experiences as a family. My parents have inspired this work from its very core and have nurtured it to fruition, always patiently believing that my research on the Korean community in Beijing would make a positive contribution to society even when I was full of doubt.

I feel both deeply grateful as well as remorseful towards my parents as this project approaches completion. I know that no work that I could produce can ever make their painful past worthwhile, but I hope that despite its flaws, I will be able to impart some sense of meaning and gratification to my parents through this dissertation. Mom, Dad, I dedicate this work to you. It is as fully a part of you as it is a part of me.
Chapter 1. Introduction

I first met Mrs. Kim at a prayer meeting at a local South Korean church I had been attending for several months. She was dressed unusually for a South Korean woman her age. The evening I met her she had on worn-down jeans cuffed at the ankles, an oversized black jacket, black sneakers and her silver, shoulder-length hair was kept in place by a headband. From the lines on her face and hands, it was clear that she was well into her fifties if not her sixties.

When I first approached Mrs. Kim after our prayer meeting had ended, rather than introduce herself to me, she laughed awkwardly and diverted her eyes from mine. It was only after we started walking together outside in a small group towards the bus station that she started talking to me.

I later learned that Mrs. Kim had been attending our church for several months, but had avoided attending main group functions. She liked going to prayer meetings because so few people came each week and she could come and go as she pleased. “I don’t like telling people that I’ve been in China for so long because I don’t have much to show for it,” she explained as she looked down, kicking a stone across the street. As we waited for our bus to come, Mrs. Kim told us how she and her husband had moved to China 14 years ago to start an entrepreneurial firm. They had had to downsize their company several times since then and were currently struggling to make a living. “Didn’t you know?” she asked me matter-of-factly, “It’s hard for South Korean entrepreneurs to make it here.”

Since Sino-South Korean diplomatic relations were established in 1992, thousands of South Korean immigrants have flooded China in search of opportunities for
upward mobility. On the surface, the stage is set for success. South Korean entrepreneurs come armed with relatively significant amounts of material capital. The vast majority have college degrees, previous entrepreneurial experience, and sufficient seed money to start their own businesses. South Korean entrepreneurs also have access to a valuable, yet cheap labor force: fourth-generation Korean Chinese migrant workers from the Chinese countryside who are fluent in both Korean and Mandarin. In addition, the Korean enclave is teeming with wealthy South Korean consumers who actively seek out Korean-language services and Korean cultural products in China. Beijing, in particular, has become the target of numerous South Korean tourists and elite South Korean businessmen dispatched by major chaebol (South Korean conglomerate) firms.

But despite these seemingly auspicious conditions, the South Korean media has lamented the high incidence of failure and bankruptcy among South Korean entrepreneurs in China (Park 2009). The Chinese Academy for Social Sciences estimates that of a population of about 70,000, from 20,000 to 30,000 South Koreans, or about every 1 in 3 South Koreans, had left Beijing in 2009 due to economic hardship (Park 2009). Many have packed their bags and returned back to South Korea, whereas others have fled to less developed areas within China where the costs of living are much lower. Others, still, remain in Beijing, leading increasingly isolated existences from the rest of the Korean community. Such, I suspect, was the case for Mrs. Kim. In a society that places so much significance on “face” and social status, entrepreneurs who have experienced bankruptcy have a hard time maintaining ties with other South Korean immigrants in the enclave. Many avoid extended interactions with other South Koreans altogether, making it even more difficult to break out of their downfall into poverty.
This bleak story of stunted mobility contrasts sharply with the more uplifting experiences of the fourth-generation Korean Chinese ethnic minorities who are hired in large numbers to work for South Korean enclave firms in Beijing. And indeed, the impressive trends of upward mobility among the Korean Chinese rural migrants have attracted widespread attention among Korean scholars (Kim 2010, Rui 2010, Park 2008). Surprisingly, unlike their South Korean counterparts, the Korean Chinese ethnic minorities have been able to attain access to ladders of mobility despite low levels of material capital. Korean Chinese migrant workers largely originate from the remote northeastern corners of the mainland, where they lived in ethnic villages, cultivating rice paddies under the Mao regime. And by virtue of their primarily rural background, they have by no means comparable rates of college attendance, job experience and financial capital as the South Korean entrepreneurs.

Why are South Koreans unable to achieve entrepreneurial success in the PRC? And why are the Korean Chinese ethnic minorities, despite their comparable lack of material wealth and human capital, able to attain access to upward mobility at such high rates? This set of perplexing findings motivates my dissertation project. In particular, this project examines how the structure of the enclave and co-ethnic relations within the enclave shape the ways in which Korean ethnic entrepreneurs in Beijing are able to gain access to resources to sustain their businesses.

The Setting

Wangjing, the name of the residential neighborhood where the Korean enclave in Beijing is located, is interesting in that it is home to two waves of Korean migrants.
According to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, in 2009, 70,000 South Koreans and about 80,000 Korean Chinese minorities were reported to reside in Wangjing (Park 2009).\textsuperscript{1} Since Sino-South Korean normalization of ties in 1992, South Koreans started migrating to Beijing in search of employment opportunities. The first group of South Koreans who crossed the border were high-level business executives from major chaebol companies such as LG, Samsung, SK, Hyundai and the like. When restrictions of foreign trade and travel were further liberalized after China joined the WTO in 2001, South Korean businessmen of more diverse backgrounds, including grass-roots entrepreneurs, started to enter China hoping to penetrate the booming Chinese consumer market.

According to national statistics, more South Koreans travel to China than any other country in recent years. In 2010, for instance, 32.8 percent of all South Korean sojourners (or 4.1 million South Koreans) had traveled to China. Japan ranked a distant second in most popular destination, with about 2.4 million visitors. In addition, roughly a third to half of the South Koreans in China reported that they had resided in the country for over a year (Korea Tourism Organization).\textsuperscript{2}

The growing number of South Korean tourists and businessmen in Beijing, in turn, led to a surge of lucrative employment opportunities for bilingual Korean Chinese ethnic minorities. These ethnic minorities are primarily third- and fourth-generation descendants of Korean migrants who first settled in the southern Manchurian region in the early 1900s.

Prior to their entry into Beijing, however, the Korean Chinese were largely secluded in tightly knit ethnic villages scattered throughout the rural northeast (see Figure

\textsuperscript{1} Scholars have noted that this is likely a conservative estimate, however, due to the high volume of transnational mobility that characterizes this population (Spencer et al 2012).

\textsuperscript{2} The proportion of South Korean immigrants who have settled in China varies by each year.
1). The Chinese National Census Bureau reports that 97 percent of the Korean Chinese population lived in one of the three northeastern provinces, including Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang during the Mao Era. Up until 1978, Korean Chinese minorities were prohibited from domestic migration due to the strict regulations on economic activity and travel put in place by the Mao Regime. Past studies on the minority population state that the majority of the Korean Chinese population had lived in agricultural communes cultivating rice paddies (Kim 2010).

Economic reforms put in place by Deng Xiao Ping in 1978 lifted restrictions on domestic travel and economic activity, unleashing a massive exodus of Chinese migrants from the countryside to the cities. China scholars have referred to these rural migrants as the “floating population” (liudong renkou). According to statistics from the national census, in 1982, 6.5 million people had left their place of origin for more than a year and were living in other places temporarily. This wave of migration has continued to increase to this day, reaching 221 million in 2010 (National Population and Family Planning Commission, PRC).

Past research demonstrates that much like immigrants in the US and other parts of the world, rural migrants in the PRC tend to cluster together in migrant communities due to a “familiar home environment, identical home dialect, similar experiences and a sense of common fate” (Ma and Xiang 1998). Migrants make use of hometown and kinship networks to find employment and access to resources in the cities. According to Cai (1997), 75 percent of rural migrants in Jinan, a city in Shandong, found their first job through contacts provided by their relatives in their home villages and 77 percent moved to the city in groups of two to five people.
A 1994 survey of migrants in Beijing similarly found that companies often recruited new workers through village and kinship ties of their current employees (Zou 1994).

Much of the sociological research on the floating population, however, portrays these migrant enclaves as problematic inner-city ghettos responsible for the perpetuation of crime and diseases in China’s metropolises (Wong et al. 2007). Policy specialists have
considered the lack of social and spatial integration of this new underclass into the fabric of the mainstream as a major problem.\(^3\)

The Korean ethnic enclave is markedly distinct from these migrant enclaves in Beijing in that it benefits from its transnational ties to South Korea. South Korean migrants who face formidable linguistic and cultural barriers in the mainstream rely on the enclave to go about their daily lives. And to this end, they continue to inject large flows of capital and resources from South Korea into the enclave in Beijing.

Thus, while other rural migrants rely on strong, internal networks based on hometown ties, their access to resources is limited to their small community. The Korean Chinese, by contrast, are linked to other Korean ethnics in the enclave by weaker ties that are not necessarily characterized by strong emotional attachments or bonds of solidarity, but rather by cultural and linguistic affinities. They are subsequently able to make use of their ethnic networks to gain access to a broader pool of resources that are not limited to the confines of their small community within China, but expand to South Korea.

Since the turn of the 21\(^{st}\) century, China has emerged as South Korea’s largest export market and has even surpassed the United States as the most popular destination for South Korean foreign direct investment (Kim 2004). The Korean enclave in Beijing is thus, an important site that allows us to understand the impact increasing economic interdependence between South Korea and China has had on trajectories of mobility at the grass-roots level.

\(^3\) A few scholars, however, have been able to demonstrate that village networks fostered within these migrant enclaves can actually provide alternative avenues for upward mobility for rural migrants (Ma and Xiang 1998). The works in this limited line of scholarship largely consist of anthropological accounts on migrant entrepreneurs from Zhejiang Province (Solinger 1999; Zhang 2001). But while Zhejiang migrants have been able to utilize native-place networks to spawn flourishing entrepreneurial businesses in major Chinese cities, their potential for growth and expansion is somewhat limited by the domestic scope of their operations. This limitation becomes even more apparent when we compare the trajectories of mobility of the Zhejiang migrants to those of the Korean Chinese.
Theoretical Contributions

Proponents of the enclave hypothesis have argued that in enclaves that are characterized by sufficient socioeconomic diversity, co-ethnics are able to pool together their resources to attain access to alternative ladders of upward mobility within the enclave. According to the logic of this framework, ethnic entrepreneurs are able to rely on cheap co-ethnic labor in exchange for training and preparing their workers to eventually start their own entrepreneurial firms. Enclave theorists reason that the self-sufficient community of the enclave procures mechanisms of “bounded solidarity” and “enforceable trust” among co-ethnics, allowing for such mutually beneficial workplace relations to proliferate within enclave firms (Portes 1997, 2010).

But there is an inherent tension within the logic of this framework. Namely, those enclaves that have sufficient socioeconomic diversity will also tend to have more problems in cultivating solidarity and trust among its inhabitants. As the gap between the entrepreneurial class and low-wage working class becomes greater, for instance, there will also tend to be a weaker sense of “common fate” among co-ethnics (Portes and Bach 1985). In addition, with the rapid pace of labor migration in recent years, the notion that ethnic entrepreneurs need only rely on resources within the enclave to sustain their businesses has become increasingly obsolete. Particularly in the case of recruiting cheap labor, more entrepreneurs must reach outside of their ethnic communities to hire non-co-ethnic workers to keep prices low and commensurate with those of their competitors.

If working class co-ethnics are less attractive to ethnic entrepreneurs, and if low levels of solidarity and trust characterize co-ethnics, does the enclave offer any benefits
to ethnic minorities? How does mobility work in the enclave? In the chapters and pages that follow, I examine the interactions between the South Koreans and Korean Chinese in Beijing to provide an alternative perspective on the significance of the enclave on trajectories of mobility and immigrant adaptation.

This dissertation also engages a second body of literature, namely scholarship on transnational communities. This line of research has only started to receive attention in mainstream sociology in the past decade.\(^4\) Alejandro Portes (2010) defines transnationalism as a process of “‘globalization from below’ in which individuals and communities mobilize their grassroots networks to adapt and respond to the globalizing activities of corporation and governments.” It is noteworthy, however, that the majority of works in this emerging field has been limited to the study of Latin American or Asian transnational migrants in the United States.

This lack of diversity in case studies has severely stunted theoretical understandings of transnational communities. Studies of Asian transnational entrepreneurs in the US fail to highlight the impact that transnationalism can make on upward mobility as travel to the other side of the world is as of yet, too burdensome both in terms of time and cost to support frequent transnational activity. Hence, while some Korean entrepreneurs in the US might indeed rely on connections to their home country to run their businesses, it is likely that their transnational links are not as dense or pervasive as those of Korean entrepreneurs within East Asia. Moreover, although Latin American countries may be more proximate to the US, these migrants face significant structural barriers in conducting business in America. Those who are granted visas to

\(^4\) See Portes, Haller and Guarnizo (2002) for a more detailed discussion on transnationalism as a field in sociology.
enter the US, face a series of barriers in securing the capital necessary for transnational entrepreneurship. As a result, transnational activities among Latin American migrants primarily consist of sending remittances back home (Portes et al. 2002).

Due to the limited scope of studies in the past, scholarly understandings of this phenomenon remain relatively undeveloped. In contrast to previous case studies, the Korean enclave in Beijing provides ideal conditions for transnational entrepreneurship. The proximity of South Korea to China has made transnational activities widespread within the Korean enclave, rather than concentrated to exclusively elite members, who can afford extensive travel. Since Sino-South Korean normalization, travel between the PRC and the ROK has only become cheaper and institutionally less restrictive over the years. In addition, increasing economic interdependence on the macro-sociological level between South Korea and China has created the financial and institutional infrastructure to support the expansion of transnational activities at the grass-roots level, as well.

Overview of the Dissertation

In the first half of the dissertation, I orient the reader with the nature of the field site and the major theoretical literature that frames this work. Accordingly, the next series of chapters include a review of past theories on the enclave and immigrant

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5 Portes (2010) argues that enclaves that are not populated with a large enough “entrepreneurial class”—individuals who have enough schooling and job experience to start their own businesses—will not have enough resources to provide enclave workers with opportunities for upward mobility. Furthermore, in the same volume, Portes argues that transnational entrepreneurs tend to have even higher levels of human capital than domestic entrepreneurs. By this logic, it is not surprising that the “transnational activities” of Mexican circular migrants in the US have been limited to sending of remittances. Very few, if any Mexicans engage in transnational entrepreneurship.

6 According to Zhan (2005), between 1993 and 2000, more than 85 percent of South Korean firms concentrated their investments on areas such as Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning, Beijing, Hebei and Shandong that are known to have strong concentrations of Korean Chinese minorities.
entrepreneurship, a description of the methodological approaches used to collect data, a historical background on the formation of Wangjing and descriptive information that situates the context of the Korean enclave in Beijing.

The second part of the dissertation consists of four empirical chapters analyzing different aspects of how Koreans in the enclave mobilize and gain access to resources. First, I look at the space of the enclave and how divisions among South Koreans, Korean Chinese and the Han Chinese have led to damaged bonds of ethnic solidarity among Korean ethnics of different waves of migration. Second, I look at the church as an example of a transnational organization and examine how South Koreans and Korean Chinese minorities in major churches in the enclave are able to cultivate solidarity within their respective groups and how this affects their ability to collectively mobilize resources. Third, I look at the individual skill-sets of South Korean and Korean Chinese entrepreneurs and analyze how these different types of capital affect their ability to access resources in the enclave. Finally, I examine the nature of inter-group relations within a South Korean conglomerate firm in Beijing. By looking at the space of the enclave, the nature of minority organizations, the individual-skills of Korean entrepreneurs, and inter-group relations within the workplace, I will demonstrate why the Korean Chinese are in a structurally advantageous position for upward mobility, particularly when compared to their South Korean counterparts in the Korean enclave in Beijing.
Chapter 2. Immigrant Adaptation, Ethnic Entrepreneurship and the Enclave: Theoretical Foundations

Scholars of immigrant adaptation have grappled with understanding how access to culture and social networks relate to spatial patterns of settlement and socioeconomic mobility for many years. According to Milton Gordon’s (1964) canonical work, *Assimilation in American Life* (1964), acculturation, or the process of adopting the culture of the dominant group, was regarded as the first step in gaining access to the internal networks of the mainstream, a phenomenon he called “structural” assimilation. Gordon further argued that “entrance of the minority group into the social cliques, clubs and institutions of the core society at the primary group level” would act as a catalyst for eventual full integration and the dissolution of all remaining markers of difference between immigrant minorities and members of the mainstream (Gordon 1964).  

In the 1970s and 1980s, the “assimilationist” perspective was criticized for its static and unidirectional view of immigrant adaptation. In particular, the “multiculturalist” school challenged the assumption that American society consisted of a unified core into which immigrants were supposed to assimilate. Rather, multiculturalists argued that the mainstream was composed of individuals from diverse cultural backgrounds and that the “core” of host society was constantly evolving (Greeley 1971; Glazer and Moynihan 1970; Alba and Nee 1997).

Furthermore, whereas the assimilationist school framed “distinctive ethnic traits, such as old cultural ways, native languages, or ethnic enclaves as sources of disadvantage,” critics pointed to the post-1965 waves of Asian and Latin American

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7 For a more in-depth literature review of the assimilationist perspective, refer to the following works by Haller et al (2011), Alba and Nee (1997) and Zhou (1997).
immigrants in the United States for exhibiting trajectories that contradicted such claims (Zhou 1997). Unlike their European counterparts who had gradually acculturated and attained socioeconomic mobility, many Asian and Latin American immigrants retained connections to their ethnic heritage and utilized ethnic networks to gain access to alternative ladders of upward mobility.\(^8\)

One major field of research that emerged out of the criticisms targeting the assimilationist perspective included studies on how entrepreneurship and employment in ethnic firms provided immigrant minorities with resources that were unavailable to them in the primary labor market (Light 1984; Waldinger 1984; Portes and Bach 1985). Specialists of immigrant entrepreneurship argued that immigrant minorities relied on ethnic resources to build competitive entrepreneurial firms. Within this framework, to use Light and Bonacich’s (1988) own words, ethnic resources consisted of “social features of a group which co-ethnic business owners utilize in business or from which their business passively benefits,” including “values, knowledge, information, attitudes, leadership, solidarity, an orientation to sojourning and institutions.” This dissertation engages many of the theoretical ideas put forth by this line of research. I will discuss the major arguments and criticisms of this field in greater detail later on in this chapter.

But to go back to the perspectives that were discussed in the beginning of this chapter, as I sought to make sense of my empirical findings through the course of writing about this project, I found that many of the theories that were most relevant to my findings lay in the canonical works of the assimilationist school. Today, the

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\(^8\) The earlier waves of European immigrants and later waves of Asian and Latin American immigrants were characterized by contrastive trajectories of adaptation due to various structural factors that shaped their experiences of incorporation into the host society (for a more detailed explanation, refer to Portes and Rumbaut 2001).
assimilationist perspective has become out-of-vogue in academic circles and scholars have increasingly focused on how various structural factors impact trajectories of immigrant adaptation. But with the gradual attenuation of the assimilationist approach, systematic discussions on the role of culture have also receded to the background.

The neglect of culture in theoretical frameworks on immigrant adaptation is particularly conspicuous in theories of immigrant and ethnic entrepreneurship. Light and Bonacich (1988), for instance, by creating the all-encompassing concept of “ethnic resources,” fail to differentiate how the mechanisms of culture and social capital might interact to provide opportunities for mobility within ethnic communities. And as I will discuss later in this chapter, Alejandro Portes and his associates, in conceptualizing the enclave hypothesis, have focused primarily on the role of social capital as a mechanism of mobility within enclave communities, leaving the concept of culture largely untouched.

Much of the trends to focus on the structural forces at the expense of culture as an explanatory variable stems from sharp criticisms targeted towards the “culture of poverty” argument. Oscar Lewis (1966) largely garnered notoriety in the American academy for arguing that sustained poverty generated a set of cultural attitudes, values and behaviors that would tend to perpetuate itself over time. The black underclass was perceived as “caught in a tangle of pathologies that resulted from the cumulative effects of slavery and the subsequent structural poverty” (Small et al 2010).

While I agree with past criticisms of the assimilationist perspective and the culture-of-poverty model, I also argue that due to the decreasing popularity of cultural models of immigrant adaptation, the field has come to lack a holistic and systematic
framework explaining how cultural, spatial, socioeconomic and institutional integration play different, interactive roles in shaping the experiences of immigrant minorities. As Mario Small and his colleagues point out (Small et al 2010), sociologists have since developed more nuanced ways of studying the role of culture in sociological phenomena. In his words:

> Contemporary researchers rarely claim that culture will perpetuate itself for multiple generations regardless of structural changes, and they practically never use the term ‘pathology.’ But the new generation of scholars also conceives of culture in substantially different ways. It typically rejects the idea that whether people are poor can be explained by their values. It is often reluctant to divide explanations into ‘structural’ and ‘cultural,’ because of the increasingly questionable utility of this old distinction. It generally does not define culture as comprehensively as Lewis did, instead, being careful to distinguish values from perceptions and attitudes from behavior. It almost always sets aside the ideas that members of a group or nation share a ‘culture’ or that a group’s culture is more or less coherent or internally consistent (Small et al 2010).

And yet, despite the series of advances made by the field of cultural sociology, theories of immigrant adaptation have by and large remained disconnected from such developments.

In this dissertation, I work to bring culture back into the forefront on discussions of immigrant adaptation. Like past scholars in the assimilationist school, I argue that culture plays a critical and unique role in providing immigrant minorities with access to social networks and that these networks are in turn, integral to the ability to mobilize resources. Throughout this chapter, I will build my case for this theoretical perspective.

This chapter provides the theoretical background that frames the sociological significance of this study. The next section will describe the theoretical debates surrounding immigrant entrepreneurship and the ethnic enclave. I will then discuss in detail how enclave theorists have conceptualized the nature of mobility within the enclave and then explain the shortcomings of this perspective. For the remaining portion of the chapter, I refer to research on cultural capital and social networks to provide the
theoretical foundations for an alternative explanation of how ethnic entrepreneurs in the enclave attain access to ladders of mobility.

The Ethnic Enclave Hypothesis

Theories on immigrant entrepreneurship have captivated the interest of sociologists since the 1980s. The scholarly contributions that this field has made on sociological thought on disadvantaged minorities are significant. Past empirical studies have demonstrated that immigrant entrepreneurship stimulates employment for minorities who would otherwise be at risk for unemployment in the primary labor market (Light et al. 1994), helps relieve sources of competition with the native-born (Portes and Zhou 1999; Light and Roach 1996), and propels a growing population of new immigrant entrepreneurs through the presence of successful role models (Waldinger 1984). But while scholars have been able to prove that entrepreneurship led to gains for individual entrepreneurs, debates on whether the success of ethnic entrepreneurs also led to heightened life chances for co-ethnics employed in low-wage positions in these ethnic firms continue to circulate the field (Zhou 2004).

In the early 1980s, Alejandro Portes and his associates introduced the argument that the ethnic enclave, which he defines as “assemblages of enterprises owned and operated by members of the same cultural/linguistic group that concentrate in an identifiable geographic area” (Portes 2010), provides rich opportunities for mobility for not only immigrant entrepreneurs but also workers who were employed in enclave firms. The underlying assumptions of such an argument, that the benefits of social capital were commensurate or even potentially more powerful than human capital in achieving
upward mobility, were indeed provocative. This argument burgeoned a new body of literature on how the ethnic enclave effectively spurs the mobilization of ethnic resources. The primary argument of the enclave hypothesis stems from the notion that relationships between co-ethnic employers and workers in the enclave extend beyond contractual bonds found in ordinary economic contexts.

The first line of scholarly works on the enclave argued that enclave firms have higher levels of vertical integration and that employer-employee relations are much more reciprocal and less exploitative when compared to non-enclave firms (Wilson and Portes 1980; Wilson and Martin 1982; Portes and Bach 1985; Portes and Manning 1986). Enclave theorists argued that whereas ladders of mobility are few and far between in the secondary labor market where workers are often stuck in dead-end jobs, enclave workers who start off as low-wage laborers have more opportunities to gradually move up the ranks to managerial positions in their firms, and that once appointed as managers, they are able to accumulate the financial capital and job experience necessary to initiate their own entrepreneurial projects. As Portes and Bach (1985) argue:

> If employers can profit from the willing self-exploitation of fellow immigrants, they are also obliged to reserve for them those supervisory positions that open in their firms, to train them in trade skills, and to support their eventual move into self-employment. It is the fact that enclave firms are compelled to rely on ethnic solidarity and that the latter “cuts both ways,” which creates opportunities for mobility unavailable in the outside (p. 343).

This model of mobility via informal apprenticeship has since come under much criticism. Of the many critiques, perhaps the most well known is Jimy Sanders and Victor Nee’s (1987) work in the *American Sociological Review*. Sanders and Nee (1987) argue that while entrepreneurs benefit from enclave participation, co-ethnic workers do not. In their study of Chinese and Cuban enclaves in the United States, they find that factionalism and competition among ethnic firms are often impediments to group
mobility within the enclave (Sanders and Nee 1987). In addition, they argue that Portes and his associates emphasize the positive effects of ethnic solidarity while largely ignoring its more negative consequences. According to the authors, “the ‘embeddedness’ of economic activity in networks of ethnic relations can trap immigrant workers in patron-client relationships that bind them, in exchange for assistance at an early stage, to low-wage jobs” (Sanders and Nee 1987). They further note that a “detailed analysis of the actual pattern of exchange between bosses and workers within immigrant enclaves is needed before generalizations can be made about ethnic solidarity’s effect on the socioeconomic mobility of immigrant workers” (Sanders and Nee 1987).

Sanders and Nee’s (1987) article spawned a series of heated debates between Portes and Jensen (1987, 1989, 1992) and the authors, Sanders and Nee (1987, 1992), in the American Sociological Review, as well as numerous articles by other scholars of immigrant entrepreneurship challenging the claims of the enclave hypothesis. The major point of contention in these heated debates lay in empirically defining the enclave from the ethnic economy. Critics argued that the enclave was difficult to effectively operationalize leading to the likelihood for measurement error. Ethnic neighborhoods usually included clusters of multiple ethnic groups. Flushing Queens, for instance, was home to not only Korean immigrants, but also to Hispanics, the Chinese, and other South Asian groups. Scholars, thus, suggested the ethnic economy as a more appropriate theoretical concept. Unlike the enclave economy, the ethnic economy does not require a spatial clustering of co-ethnic firms (Light et al. 1994). Rather, it broadly includes “any immigrant or ethnic group’s self-employed, employers, and co-ethnic employees” (Zhou 2004). Moreover, scholars questioned whether or not the spatial clustering of ethnic firms
definitively changed the nature in which ethnic solidarity was utilized within ethnic firms.

To use Roger Waldinger’s (1993) words:

Methodological problems aside, there is good reason to think that the debate has pushed the discussion towards a dead end. If we think of the ethnic economy as a particular form of social organization, in which immigrant entrepreneurs employ co-ethnic workers, there is no reason to assume that the particular factors that distinguish the informal training system among immigrant workers and entrepreneurs are uniquely a product of their placement in space… the informal training systems operating in concentrating ethnic economies are likely to function in similar ways in ethnic economies which are dispersed across space. For example, Korean entrepreneurs who principally sell to non-Korean clients in non-Korean neighborhoods are characterized by a high level of organizational density, multiple and criss-crossing social networks, and a continual flow of new workers and potential entrepreneurs (p. 450).

Others even went so far as to challenge the role of ethnic solidarity as an effective mechanism for upward mobility. Ivan Light and his associates argue that the ethnic economy is a more effective means of understanding mobility of immigrant entrepreneurs precisely because it makes no claims about “an ethnic cultural ambience within the firm or among sellers and buyers” (Light and Karageorgis 1994).

*Structural Conditions for Mobility in the Enclave*

In response to criticisms on the enclave hypothesis, Portes highlighted several structural conditions that enclaves must satisfy in order to offer enclave participants with the resources for mobility. I will reiterate them here, briefly. First, he argued that enclaves must have a sizeable entrepreneurial class (Zhou 2004; Portes 1987). The entrepreneurial class provides an important source of capital to the enclave community; without it the enclave would lack the resources to grow economically. For instance, according to Portes and Bach (1985), enclaves that are inhabited by exclusively peasants or low-skilled workers, such as the Mexican enclaves in the United States, tend to have lower rate of economic growth and development. By contrast, immigrants with entrepreneurial experience in the country of origin generate social and economic capital
into the community through their social networks in various ethnic organizations, the formation of rotating credit unions, patterns of consumption and the like. In addition, immigrant entrepreneurs create employment opportunities for co-ethnics that are more conducive to promotions into supervisory positions and the initiation of entrepreneurial activities themselves (Zhou 2004).

Second, the enclave must also have a working class of co-ethnics. Enclaves that have sufficient socioeconomic diversity are able to provide otherwise vulnerable minority entrepreneurs with privileged access to an inexpensive, co-ethnic labor force. This low-wage labor force is less prone to unionize and more apt to provide high-quality services despite long hours and harsh working conditions due to the bonds of reciprocity and trust that characterize employers and employees in enclave firms.

Third, the enclave must have a “captive market” for ethnic goods and services (Portes 1987; Wilson and Portes 1980; Bach 1986). A high demand for such goods and services that is difficult to access outside of the boundaries of the enclave protects vulnerable entrepreneurs from external competition. Portes (1987) argues that in the absence of a working class, immigrant entrepreneurs “must fend for themselves in the open market and must cater to the tastes of the native majority from the start.”

And finally, fourth, enclaves must be characterized by a diversity of both businesses as well as minority organizations. As Zhou (2004) argues, the range of businesses available in the enclave must include not only niche markets shunned by natives, but also a wide variety of enterprises common to the general economy, such as professional services and production. In addition, economic organizations—such as chambers of commerce, credit associations and the like—provide direct assistance to
novice entrepreneurs who might otherwise lack the sufficient resources in the mainstream economy to start their own businesses (Light 1980; Bonacich, Light and Wong 1977; Dinnerstein 1977). Civic organizations, such as ethnic churches, play an important role in solidifying the collective consciousness of the community and provide access to social networks (Zhou 2004; Portes 1987).

The Mechanisms of Mobility

In addition, Portes countered criticisms on the potency of ethnic solidarity by offering the conceptual frameworks of “bounded solidarity” and “enforceable trust.” In Portes’ own words, the presence of bounded solidarity and enforceable trust in a community does not suggest that “immigrants go about spouting love messages about the solidarity they feel to one another and how trustworthy their fellow ethnics are” (Portes 1997). Rather, Portes (1997) argues that “bounded solidarity emerges as an aggregate ‘elective affinity’ on the choice of business partners, employees, and customers, and in patterns of associational participation.” In other words, while immigrants in the enclave might not actually personally like the co-ethnics they conduct business with, for whatever reason—be it for the convenience for shared cultural norms of behavior, linguistic limitations, or lack of opportunities outside the enclave—they will continue to rely on ethnic resources to keep their business afloat. Similarly, he favors a more instrumental interpretation of trust over a romantic one, in which “enforceable trust is reflected in the routine behavior of participants in business transactions, relative to how similar operations are conducted on the outside.”
Under Portes’ model, the enclave is unique in that it procures a favorable environment for co-ethnics to utilize these mechanisms for mobility. Moreover, he argues that without the spatial clustering of ethnic firms and residences within the enclave, bounded solidarity and enforceable trust would fail to take shape in ways necessary for the mobilization of ethnic resources.

To explain the nature of these mechanisms in greater detail, bounded solidarity and enforceable trust represent two types of social capital that are driven by “consummatory” versus “instrumental” motivations, respectively. The first mechanism, bounded solidarity, refers to a sense of “common fate,” a sentiment that stems from Marx’s concept of the class-consciousness of the industrial proletariat, that argues that “by being thrown together in a common situation, workers learn to identify with each other and support each other’s initiatives” (Portes 2010). This notion is based on the idea that enclave workers and entrepreneurs come to recognize that they are in the same boat as immigrants who are similarly marginalized from the mainstream society despite their different class positions. To use Portes and Bach’s (1985) words, “ethnic ties suffuse otherwise ‘bare’ class relationships with a sense of purpose.” The ethnic minorities share a nostalgic past of life in the homeland and a difficult future in overcoming obstacles in making a living in a foreign environment. By living and working in shared spaces, or to use Bourdieu’s term, by sharing a “habitus,” ethnic solidarity will invariably become more strengthened than if the ethnic minorities were to live and work within dispersed spaces.

The second mechanism, “enforceable trust,” finds its roots in Durkheim’s theory of social integration and the sanctioning capacity of group rituals (Portes 2010). Enclave
Theorists reason that co-ethnics who depend on the enclave economy for their livelihood and are integrated within the social structure of the enclave have strong incentives to abide by internal norms that guide behavior within the community. To violate such behavioral norms comes at the risk of ostracization from the ethnic community. Subsequently, co-ethnic employers and their workers are able to conduct economic activities with a certain level of confidence that their transactions are protected from deception or exploitation (Portes and Zhou 1992, Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993, Portes 2010). Min Zhou (2004) stresses that the efficacy of enforceable trust and bounded solidarity lies not in ephemeral emotional bonds, but in the ethnic organizations and networks that are embedded in the social structures of a territorially bounded community. These institutions have the power to sanction deviant behavior.

Looking Beyond Solidarity and Trust

The problem with this type of framework on trust and solidarity, however, lies in the fact that many enclaves are actually characterized by significant levels of distrust and factionalization that are not only reflected in mere feelings of detachment and animosity, but also in the institutional organization of the enclave community. Take, for instance, Little Havana, an enclave that has enjoyed the spotlight of many of Portes’ works (Wilson and Portes 1980, Portes and Bach 1985, Portes 1987, Portes and Jensen 1989). The earlier waves of Cuban refugees, dubbed the “Golden Exiles” by scholars, were of a much higher socioeconomic background than later waves of Cubans to the United States (Bach 1980, Alberts 2005, Portes 1987). The Golden Exiles represented the class of landowners and entrepreneurs displaced by Fidel Castro’s despotic regime. This group
brought with them to the United States, a high level of educational attainment, entrepreneurial experiences and business connections. The businesses that the Golden Exiles first established in the early 1960s laid the foundations for the Cuban success story in Miami (Boswell and Curtis 1984).

In stark contrast to the Golden Exiles, the Cubans who immigrated during the Mariel Boatlift in 1980 included members of the lowest rungs of Cuban society, notably ex-offenders and mental health patients, who were dispatched as a part of Castro’s notorious attempt to “purify” his country of “undesirable elements” (Alberts 2005). These “undesirable elements,” however, contributed to the formation of an inexpensive co-ethnic labor force for prospective entrepreneurs in the Cuban enclave (Bach 1980).

In the sociological literature on the enclave, the Cuban case has exemplified how multiple waves of co-ethnic immigration can influence the socioeconomic make up of an enclave. And for Portes (1987), this case embodies ideal conditions for upward mobility precisely because the ethnic community is so socioeconomically diverse. The presence of a lower socioeconomic class provides prospective entrepreneurs with privileged access to a presumably loyal and hard-working, low-wage labor force, while co-ethnic entrepreneurial firms provide immigrants of low human capital access to valuable business know-how, social networks, and opportunities for eventual promotion into managerial positions.

But at the same time, in his other works, Portes notes that disparities in class between immigrants from different waves has also led to deep fissures formed within the enclave community.

More important still, the old middle-class Cuban population of Miami largely severed their ties with the new arrivals. They were not part of old Cuba, having been raised during the revolutionary period and lacked strong kinship and friendship ties with the established Miami Cuban
community. Perceiving marielitos and post-Mariel entrants as responsible for the rapid decline of Cubans’ public image in the United States and having few social links with them, pre-1980 exiles came to regard the newcomers as a group different from themselves. The separation was physical, as well as social—the old middle-class Cuban population settled in the comfortable suburbs of Coral Gables and Kendall; Mariel and post-Mariel refugees crowded in the poor city of Hialeah and the deteriorating ‘Little Havana’ quarter of Miami (Portes and Shafer 2006).

Nonetheless, to Portes, internal conflicts are not necessarily incompatible with solidarity and trust among co-ethnics. Criticizing his opponents for taking people’s perceptions of conflicts in the enclave at face value, he explicitly differentiates solidarity and trust from everyday emotional attachments to fellow co-ethnics (Portes 1997).

It seems unrealistic, however, to take this explanation to imply that serious conflicts and factionalization do not have a strong and direct impact on the mobilization of solidarity and trust in the enclave. The framework that he provides leaves no room for the possibility of institutional fragmentation of the community. And indeed in Portes and Shafer’s (2006) work on Little Havana, they find that a “rupture in modes of incorporation” precluded post-Mariel refugees from benefiting from the “internal ties of solidarity and mutual business support” that had been available to the Golden Exiles. The authors find that the Golden Exiles and their offspring are characterized by trajectories of upward mobility while the post-Mariel entrants are not. They state:

No ‘character loans’ were available to prospective new entrepreneurs for they were not known to Cuban bank officials. No tips about new business opportunities were available to them. While many eventually went to work for Cuban-owned firms in Miami, and some eventually learned the ropes of self-employment, their links to business owners and to the established Cuban community at large were much weaker (Portes and Shafer 2006).

The strained solidarity between the Golden Exiles and post-Mariel refugees, and the stunted mobility of the latter wave of Cuban immigrants, has been at the forefront of Heike Alberts’ (2005, 2006, 2009) works, as well.

Portes (2010) also finds in his research on transnational entrepreneurs that while on the one hand, the entrepreneurs rely on migrant networks to overcome legal and
material barriers in conducting their businesses, on the other hand, communal sanctions
that discourage deviance and malfeasance that are at work in the enclave are absent or
weak when entrepreneurial activities operate at a transnational scale.

Precisely because they “float” over space and national borders, transnational communities are
seldom able to bring sanctions to bear against those who shirk their obligations or violate the
terms of the original agreements. Sending towns cannot penalize migrants who fail to send
remittances or join civic hometown associations abroad, except by withdrawing social approval.
Migrants are essentially at liberty to cut off ties and seek full integration into the host society,
which is precisely what assimilation theory predicts. Similarly, migrant associations can seldom
seek redress against their home country counterparts if the latter abscond with philanthropic
contributions or rechannel them to their own ends…

Trust sustained by value introjection and bounded solidarity is particularly subject to malfeasance.
Thus, it is not surprising that a number of such incidents have been reported in the
transnationalism literature, leading to the break up of cooperative relations. In the absence of
formal contracts or strong overarching social structures guaranteeing reciprocal expectations,
participants in the transnational field are commonly at the mercy of the goodwill and the good
character of their long-distance transactors.

In this sense, Portes (2010) acknowledges the importance of enclosed networks and
social embeddedness in facilitating trust in cooperative relations. Transnational
communities are too open to effectively enforce normative behavior. And likewise, from
this perspective, it is possible that those enclaves that are divided by social class or waves
of immigration are similarly characterized by open networks that cut across various
demographic traits.

In Search of Alternative Explanations for Mobility

Rather than use the concepts of bounded solidarity and enforceable trust to
theorize how networks are mobilized in the enclave, I offer an alternative perspective that
frames culture as the key mechanism for mobility. As I argued in the previous section, by
fixating on the concepts of solidarity and trust, we assume that enclaves that are
characterized by high degrees of conflict and institutional fragmentation offer few
advantages to ethnic minorities. And as I have pointed out earlier, this is problematic
because due to the increasing diversity of immigrants who settle in enclaves, it is quite likely that enclaves that are rich in resources are also low in solidarity and trust.

In addition, this perspective also neglects to consider the positionality of individuals who are a part of both the enclave and mainstream societies. Instead, it takes on an either-or approach to framing enclave participants—upwardly mobile immigrants are either endowed with the cultural and linguistic skills to compete in the primary labor market, or they rely on the ethnic resources found in the enclave. As a case in point, according to Portes and Rumbaut’s (2001) theory on segmented assimilation, upwardly mobile second-generation minorities are able to utilize the gains that their first-generation parents made via immigrant entrepreneurship by obtaining white-collar jobs in the mainstream economy. The enclave is merely used as a platform for eventual entrance into primary labor market. This pattern is largely demonstrated by second-generation Asian immigrant children who are characterized by astounding levels of educational attainment and high degrees of employment in the professional sector (Portes and Rumbaut 2001).

But enclave participants also potentially involve individuals from a wide range of backgrounds. Specifically, this perspective fails to consider the structural position of individuals who are integrated in both the ethnic community and the host society. Sociologists have argued that individuals who have affiliations with multiple networks will have more opportunities for mobility than individuals who are confined to only one of these spheres (Granovetter 1973).

By using the concept of culture, we are not only able to avoid this binary view of immigrant adaptation, but we are also able to better represent the elements of the enclave hypothesis that may be worth salvaging. In a sense, the “elective affinities,” which,
according to Portes, characterizes the concept of bounded solidarity, might actually be more effectively conceptualized by the concept of culture. Unlike solidarity, culture does not presume strong bonds of loyalty, trust, and identity. Presumably, Portes would agree that co-ethnics are drawn to each other not necessarily because they feel a strong emotional attachments towards each other, but rather because they are able to work effectively together due to a common system of cultural codes and norms that infuse their interactions.

In my dissertation, I distinguish culture as a set of skills, a form of capital (Bourdieu 1986; DiMaggio 1982). Cultural capital consists of knowledge, skills, tastes, art forms and mannerisms that can be converted to other forms of material gain. The theoretical notion of cultural capital is important to this study primarily because it illuminates why and how culture relates to social networks and trajectories of mobility.

Cultural Capital and Social Networks

Scholars of cultural sociology have argued that cultural capital is a key mechanism that reproduces and maintains boundaries of social networks. As Paul DiMaggio (1987) put it, culture “provides the stuff of everyday sociability.” In the following excerpt, DiMaggio (1987) explains how culture maintains group boundaries by acting as “fodder” for conversations:

Conversation is a negotiated ritual in the course of which participants must find topics that reflect their level of intimacy and to which each partner can legitimately contribute. Persons entering into conversation seek to ‘establish co-membership’ by identifying groups to which they both belong, even when the goal of the interaction is instrumental. If conversing strangers use linguistic variants ‘to probe for shared background knowledge,’ the same is true, a fortiori, of the deployment of various conversational contents. Shared cultural interests are common contents of sociable talk. Consumption of art gives strangers something to talk about and facilitates the sociable intercourse necessary for acquaintanceships to ripen into friendships (DiMaggio 1987).
The earliest works on cultural capital primarily emphasized how the particular “tastes,” codes of behavior and art forms of the elite have acted as mechanisms of social closure. Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, who examined how the processes of the socialization in schools and the family reproduced systems of stratification through the manipulation and redistribution of cultural tastes and practices, first introduced the concept of cultural capital into the sociological literature. Cultural capital, here, was defined as “informal academic standards”—“informal knowledge about school, traditionist humanist culture, linguistic competence, and specific attitudes or personal style”—set by the dominant elite (Lareau and Lamont 1988). Bourdieu and Passeron argued that schools were not socially neutral institutions, but rather, were deeply embedded in the cultural values of the elite. Hence, according to the authors, children from upper-class families enter school with a subtle, taken-for-granted understanding of proper etiquette and social cues due to their upbringing, whereas those from lower-class families must acquire this skill-set on their own. In addition, while these disadvantaged children may be able to acquire the “social, linguistic, and cultural competencies which characterized the upper-middle and middle-class, they can never achieve the natural familiarity of those born to these classes and are academically penalized on this basis” (Lareau and Lamont 1988).

Since Bourdieu and Passeron’s canonical work, scholars have studied how cultural capital is manifested in political attitudes, systems of stratification, the reproduction of educational inequality and marital selection. These earlier works focused on how cultural capital among the elite perpetuated inequality by excluding outsiders from the inner social circles of the privileged. In a sense, the ideas undergirding this line

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9 See Lareau and Lamont (1988) for a more comprehensive literature review on cultural capital.
of works resembles the underlying logic of Gordon’s theory of assimilation, in which he argues that adopting the culture of the dominant society would lead to access to elite social networks and that these networks would act as the gateway to greater opportunities and resources for socioeconomic mobility.

Recent works on cultural capital have diverged from this line of thought, however, arguing that individuals with access to a broader range of networks are better positioned for upward mobility. In particular, the notion of “cultural omnivoruousness” has attracted much attention. First conceived by Richard Peterson (Peterson and Simkus 1992; Peterson 1992), this theoretical framework argues that high-status individuals do not limit their cultural consumption to highbrow art forms, such as opera or classical music, but also actively consume popular culture, such as pop or folk art. According to Peterson’s paradigm, the cultural domain is not distinguished by highbrow or lowbrow culture, but rather between high-status omnivores and “univores” (Van Eijk and Lievens 2008). That is to stay, that while the elite are able to enjoy and understand a wide range of cultural forms such as the opera and bluegrass, low-status individuals are confined in the types of culture they are able to engage in due to their limited cultural knowledge. Peterson, in a later article, asserts that omnivoruousness in and of itself has become a “standard for good taste” (Peterson 2005).

Omar Lizardo (2006) has also made some attempts at developing a more explicit framework for understanding of how cultural capital might relate to social networks and patterns of mobility. In his influential paper on cultural omnivores, Lizardo (2006) explains in great detail how cultural capital can be viewed as a mechanism for connecting
and integrating individuals within social structure. In particular, he relates the concept of cultural capital to Mark Granovetter’s (1973) concept of weak versus strong ties.

To briefly summarize, Granovetter (1973) argues that individuals who are loosely connected to a broad range of non-overlapping networks have access to diverse channels of information, leading to greater opportunities for mobility. However, individuals who have “few weak ties will be deprived of information from distant parts of the social system and will be confined to the provincial news and views of their close friends (Granovetter 1973).” In other words, Granovetter argues that the individuals with whom we have strong ties are more likely to overlap in contact with those we already know, and as a result, provide redundant types of information (Granovetter 1973). Our acquaintances, on the other hand, are less likely to know each other and thus, will have access to different types of opportunities and resources.

Applying this concept to theories on cultural capital, Lizardo (2006) distinguishes two types of cultural consumption: consumption of widely available popular cultural forms and that of more niche tastes, which require “extensive training and experience to be consumed.” Individuals who have a broad repertoire of popular culture are more likely to have access to a broader range of weak ties. Or in his own words, “popular culture (i.e. sports, movies, music, etc.) becomes the type of ‘safe’ form of cultural knowledge that can be used to sustain connections with contacts that are far away in social space, thus providing the individual with the benefits that accompany this type of social capital” (Lizardo 2006). And consumption of cultural forms that have “more restricted audiences” is more likely to be associated with strong ties. Within this framework, cultural omnivores are in the most structurally advantageous position because by consuming both
broadly accessible as well as niche cultural art forms, “they are able to convert their complementary cultural resources into a network rich in both types of social capital” (Lizardo 2006).

Hypotheses

To briefly summarize the key ideas undergirding the field, cultural sociologists have by and large argued that cultural capital acts as a key mechanism allowing individuals to gain access to social networks. Social networks are in turn, important in that they provide access to resources for upward mobility. Individuals who are best positioned for mobility, then, are those who consume both popular and niche cultural forms, because the cultural capital they have access to will provide fodder for conversations with people who are both close and more distant from them within the social structure.

If we apply these ideas to theories of ethnic entrepreneurship and the enclave, we can hypothesize that ethnic entrepreneurs who have a broad cultural repertoire are able to establish rapport with diverse individuals from non-overlapping networks. These individuals are better positioned for upward mobility because they will have access to diverse channels of information and resources compared to their peers who are confined to strong networks with co-ethnics, as well as those who have fully assimilated to the mainstream and have for some reason or another cut off their ties to the ethnic community. In other words, ethnic entrepreneurs from culturally hybrid backgrounds are expected to perform more successfully due to their ability to flexible connect with members of the mainstream, their ethnic community, as well as other types of networks.
Moreover, we can also hypothesize that residential patterns and organizational affiliations that promote the formation of diverse weak ties will also put ethnic entrepreneurs at a distinct advantage.

The Context

The Korean enclave in Beijing represents an opportune setting to examine the trajectories of mobility among ethnic entrepreneurs for several reasons. First, by studying a non-American context, my study holds greater potential for arriving at a more generalizable framework for entrepreneurship in the enclave. By examining how certain findings based in the United States hold true in the Chinese case, we can get a better idea of which traits are specific to certain national contexts and which traits are more broadly applicable.

Second, entrepreneurship has been long touted by China scholars as perhaps the most powerful avenue for upward mobility in post-reform PRC. Scholars have argued that entrepreneurs in China experience faster rates of financial growth compared to their wage-earning counterparts. According to the Household Income Project, between 1995 and 1999, the average entrepreneur earned over 35 percent more than the average person in yearly income (Yueh 2008). But despite the singular importance of entrepreneurship in understanding the changing systems of inequality and stratification in China, scholars have yet to provide a clear answer as to whether entrepreneurship provides a feasible route to upward mobility for the non-elite, or in other words, for those rural residents who had faced a series of disadvantages under the planned economy of the Mao Regime.
Third, China scholars have argued that due to the institutionally uncertain environment of the post-reform economy that softer forms of capital, such as social networks, act as critical mechanisms for mobility (Krug and Mehta 2001; Yang 2007; Yueh 2009). Chinese government policies are notoriously volatile. Property rights are insecure and laws are constantly changing. As a result, businesses remain subject to unpublished regulations and the whim of the court. Entrepreneurs must deal with the local, provincial and central governments, which often have different and sometimes conflicting agendas and demands. The inability to understand how to navigate this unpredictable and often somewhat arbitrary legal environment places entrepreneurs at a high risk for failure. In addition, compared to the United States and other post-industrial societies, access to resources such as credit, loans, skilled labor and so on remains scarce. Most entrepreneurs must rely on their personal savings or loans from family (Liao and Sohmen 2001). According to an estimate made by a Chinese chief economist of the World Bank, less than 1 percent of the 40 million small and medium-sized enterprises in China received loans from banks in 2006 (Lin 2007).

What types of strategies, then, have entrepreneurs mobilized in order to overcome barriers and gain access to resources in such a challenging environment? China scholars have largely focused on the theoretical significance of “guanxi,” loosely translated as “social relationships or connections,” as holding the key to deciphering this research puzzle (Gold et al 2002; Krug and Mehta 2004; Yang 1994; Yang 2002). Many have gone even so far as to assert that in institutionally uncertain environments, guanxi is more valuable to securing entrepreneurial success than human capital. As Barbara Krug and Judith Mehta (2004) argue, upwardly mobile entrepreneurs are characterized by “the
ability to form an alliance with those economic agents who possess or control the financial assets, physical assets, or specific human capital needed for brokering market entry” (Krug and Mehta 2004). Moreover, the authors find that the vast majority of successful entrepreneurs were “endowed with wide-ranging personal attributes or endowments, such as charm, charisma, persuasiveness, as well as intelligence, adaptability and imagination,” or in other words, personal attributes that were “valuable in securing cooperation with others” rather than high human capital or strong organizational skills (Krug and Mehta 2004).

But how “Chinese” is this particular strategy for mobilizing resources? Here, it is imperative to clarify that guanxi is not simply interchangeable with the Western concept of “social capital.” Experts on the topic emphasize that guanxi is a relationship that is based on implicit, rather than explicit mutual gain (Gold, Guthrie and Wank 2002; Yang 1994). While Western notions of social capital, to the extent that it is defined in relation to social relationships and interactions, also certainly contains an affective component, China scholars tend to view emotions as playing a more prominent role in guanxi. It is, for instance, considered crude to give off the impression of prioritizing some type of instrumental agenda when engaging in guanxi-building interactions. Thomas Gold and his associates point out that guanxi is “more than simply an issue of social embeddedness and social connections; it is a system of gifts and favors in which obligation and indebtedness are manufactured, and there is no time limit on repayment” (Gold et al 2002). It consists of a “gift economy” based on a subtle system of social rituals and rules. And furthermore, in order to be fully effective, these instrumental practices must be convincingly imbued with “ganqing” or emotion, projecting an air of warm sincerity and
thoughtfulness as opposed to rational calculation. One must be sensitive to the unspoken rules of Chinese social rituals that must be delicately observed in order to successfully build rapport.

And yet, despite the awkward fit, social capital is still most widely used by China scholars as the major theoretical framework to explain the significance of guanxi to the Western academic audience. Insofar as social rituals and emotions play a central role in guanxi, I argue that rather than using the theoretical framework of social capital to understand this mechanism, the field is in need of a new framework that more accurately represents the intersection of social and cultural capital that encompasses the concept of guanxi. A framework of guanxi that does not include the influence of cultural capital, also fails to capture what types of skills—the very mechanisms—that are needed to make successful connections with people. In this sense, the range of cultural capital an individual has access to, directly shapes his breadth of social capital, as well. Cultural capital dictates an individual’s knowledge of proper social rituals that are appropriate for specific situations, and in addition, his ability to smoothly weave in and out of different social contexts.
Chapter 3. Methods: The Ethnographer as Co-Ethnic Participant

Ethnographic works often are the target of criticism as subjective and unscientific accounts. Compared to processes of data collection that involve experimental designs or nationally representative surveys, the types of data that are collected through the ethnographic method seem to be more easily influenced by the particular personality of the individual researcher. How can we trust that the ethnographer’s eye acts as an objective lens through which we should view the enclave, for instance? And how do we know that the data that was collected is reliable and can be used to build generalizable theories? In this part of the dissertation, I outline the strategies that I have utilized to, at least in part, account for the biases incurred by my personal background.

Preparing for Entry into the Field

The summer of 2006, I spent three months as an English Conversation instructor at the Yanji University of Science and Technology (YUST). YUST is located in the capital of Yanbian, the Korean Autonomous Prefecture, in northeastern China. The university was founded in 1992, by a South Korean missionary, who had a vision of using education and public service as a means of indirectly evangelizing to Korean Chinese students. Since proselytization is forbidden under the Communist government, the South Korean professors who comprise the vast majority of the faculty at YUST attempt to touch the lives of their students by showing them acts of selflessness, compassion and kindness through their own lived experiences rather than by directly imparting religious doctrine. Particularly over the summer months, many Korean Americans are recruited through South Korean church networks to work as English-
language teachers. As part of this summer program, I taught two hours of English language classes at YUST of over sixty students each morning. In my entire class, only three students were not Korean Chinese.

While at YUST, I lived in the student dormitories to get to know my students at a more intimate level. Our tiny room was jam packed with four bunk beds, two on each side of the room, and eight lockers, where we stored our clothes, books and personal items. We shared bathroom facilities with more than fifty other girls on our floor. Living conditions resembled those of any ordinary Chinese university dormitory in the countryside. Electricity in our building was shut off promptly at eleven and turned back on at six in the morning everyday. Hot water for showers was available three times a week for two-hour windows at a time. These challenging living conditions, however, were compensated by the opportunities I had to bond with my Korean Chinese students and the other Korean Chinese women on the floor. And perhaps more importantly, I was able to observe how the Korean Chinese students at YUST interacted with each other in their natural habitat.

Outside of the classroom and dormitories, I also formed relationships with the South Korean professors who taught at YUST, and spent considerable time conducting archival research at Yanbian University, which is known for producing the majority of existing research on the Korean Chinese minority population.

My experiences in Yanbian played a formative role in my dissertation project for three reasons. First, it allowed me to experience life as a Korean Chinese minority in Yanbian, which, prior to the economic reforms, was home to well over 50 percent of the minority population. In this sense, when my Korean Chinese friends in Beijing would
speak of the ethnic villages in the remote northeast that they migrated from, I could relate their depictions to my own experiences living in Yanbian. By the time I had arrived in Beijing, I knew what the city center in Yanji looked like. I had shopped before in the commercial districts and had walked by the KTV rooms they spoke of. I was familiar with the particular taste of Yanbian cold noodles and could speak a bit of the Yanbian regional accent. My knowledge of the landscape of Yanbian and the culture of the Korean ethnic minorities in the region played an important role in allowing me to establish rapport with the Korean Chinese in Beijing with more ease.

Second, YUST in particular was known as an important feeder institution for major South Korean firms. More than any other Chinese university, YUST had strong networks with South Korean conglomerates in all of the major cities in China. And as a result, I found that many of the students in my classes hoped to obtain jobs at major South Korean companies upon graduation and in addition, those South Korean firms in Beijing and Shanghai were the most sought after destinations. It was in this context that I first learned that there was a teeming Korean ethnic community in Beijing and that the Korean Chinese thrived socioeconomically in Beijing due to the employment opportunities provided by the South Koreans.

Third, I was able to form relationships with Korean Chinese minorities at YUST who had never experienced life outside their hometown as well as those who did not plan to go to Beijing after graduating. This gave me an appreciation of how the Korean enclave in Beijing might differ from the Korean minorities in other parts of China, as well as a sense of their similarities.
Barriers

As a second-generation Korean American, I personally felt an affinity to both the South Korean population who reminded me of my first-generation immigrant parents, as well as to the third- and fourth-generation Korean Chinese ethnic minorities, whose experiences of alienation from both the South Korean and Han Chinese communities were reminiscent of my own personal experiences growing up in a predominantly white suburban neighborhood in New Jersey. But despite the fact that I felt that I could relate to both groups of Koreans, I was for the most part perceived as a South Korean in Wangjing. Granted, I had more flexibility in fitting in with both the South Koreans and the Korean Chinese than a South Korean national would, for instance. But I found myself struggling to establish rapport with the Korean Chinese minorities I met because they felt that Korean Americans received preferential treatment and were embraced by the South Koreans as co-ethnic brothers whereas they were by and large rejected.

In retrospect, the fact that I initially struggled to gain entrée into the Korean Chinese community in Beijing seems warranted. The 1999 Law on the Entry/Exit and Status of Overseas Koreans, for instance, granted overseas ethnic Koreans the right to visit and conduct business in South Korea freely. This law was initially established to attract investments from ethnic Koreans residing abroad to rejuvenate the faltering economy after the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997. “Overseas Koreans” (제외 동포), however, were defined as ethnic Koreans who had left the Korean peninsula after 1948, the year when South Korea was established, effectively excluding Korean Chinese and Soviet Koreans from benefiting from the rights that were afforded to Korean Americans.
such as myself. After much protest from Korean Chinese activists and NGOs in South Korea, this law was modified in 2003 to include all Korean ethnics residing abroad.

But resentment among the Korean Chinese towards Korean Americans, like myself, still persists to this day. These perceptions deeply impacted my interactions with the Korean Chinese population in the field. I experienced significant difficulty in establishing close and intimate relationships with the Korean Chinese minorities compared to my experiences with the South Koreans in Beijing. As a result, I invested significantly more time and energy participating in various bible studies and social activities with the Korean Chinese minorities than the South Koreans in the enclave. I also relied heavily on my Korean Chinese research assistant, who accompanied me to many of my sites of participant observation, to understand the positionality of the Korean Chinese—why they reacted to different things in the ways they did and so forth.

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Data Collection on the Korean Chinese

*Constructing the Questionnaire and Explanation of Sampling Procedures*

When I first landed in Beijing in May 2010, I arrived without access to any contacts other than a Han Chinese professor who acted as my official sponsor at the Chinese Academy for Social Sciences [CASS], the institution I was affiliated with at the time. Through a somewhat convoluted series of contacts stemming from my advisor at CASS and her graduate students, I was eventually able to form close relationships with
two important individuals: a South Korean missionary and a Korean Chinese college student who attended Minzu University\(^{10}\) (中华民族大学) in Beijing.

When the South Korean missionary, who I will call Mr. Park from here on, heard that my father was also a pastor of an immigrant church, he felt sympathetic towards my cause and was eager to help me. After our second meeting or so, Mr. Park suggested that I conduct a broad survey of the Korean Chinese population in Beijing and offered to tap into the networks he had with various Korean Chinese pastors to help dispatch the surveys. At that stage in my project, I was far from prepared to conduct my own survey. I knew little more about the Korean Chinese than what I had read in books. But in spite of my initial apprehension, I eventually took him up on his offer due to my fear of losing an important opportunity to gain contacts in the field.

I started off with a four-paged questionnaire, which I first wrote in English and then worked with my father to translate into Korean. I was broadly interested in ascertaining the types of environments the Korean Chinese minorities worked in, their attitudes towards the Han Chinese and the South Koreans, and the types of connections they had to South Korea and the enclave in general. I then, hired a Korean Chinese student named Young-me to help revise how my questions were phrased such that they resembled a more colloquial Korean Chinese style of speech. Young-me also helped create a Mandarin version of the questionnaire.

Young-me led me to the public parks, shopping centers, and residential neighborhoods that the Korean Chinese minorities often frequented in order to recruit

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\(^{10}\) Minzu University is a prestigious, government-sponsored university in Beijing that was originally established to train cadres who were preparing to enter ethnic minority areas and to provide a high-quality education for promising minority youth. The university boasts the largest enrollment of Korean Chinese students in Beijing.
participants for the pilot surveys. We targeted public venues in two regions in Beijing in particular: Wangjing (望京) and Wudaokou (五道口). I knew that people would react more sympathetically to a fellow Korean Chinese minority, and so while Young-me and I approached people together, she spoke on my behalf for the majority of the time. She was able to put the Korean Chinese we met at ease with her strong Korean Chinese accent and I was often assumed to be her older sister or friend if I remained silent.

I paid Young-me a base wage of 200 RMB (31 USD) a day plus a commission of 20 RMB (3.1 USD) for every survey participant she was able to recruit. I worked closely with Young-me for a week to revise the pilots. She helped flag questions and answer choices that were irrelevant to the minority population. By the time we drew up the final version of our questionnaire, we had sampled about fifty Korean Chinese minorities from the streets. At the end of the questionnaire, I also included a blurb that informed participants that I offered a 50 RMB honorarium for an hour-long interview for my project. I have included one version of the pilot and final interview questionnaires in the appendix.

The following three months, I went to six different Korean Chinese ethnic churches with Mr. Park. We met with a different pastor each week to obtain permission to dispatch the surveys. Sometimes it took several visits before the pastor would grant us permission to conduct the survey, but in the end, all but one church we visited agreed to participate in the study.

Of the six churches, three of the pastors were more proactive in helping secure a high response rate. The participants at these churches altogether accounted for 62 percent of the total sampling population. At the end of worship service, the pastors at these
particular churches made an announcement introducing my research project to the rest of the congregation. Only in one of the two instances did the pastor specify that I was Korean American, the other two times the pastors left my particular identity ambiguous. Before dismissing the congregation, the pastors asked the deacons and elders to help pass out the survey questionnaires and pens to each of the individuals present. A little over half of the people there actually stayed to fill out the questionnaires.

We also encountered two additional problems. First, perhaps because the respondents were not provided with an incentive to participate, many did not fill out the questionnaires entirely, some leaving entire pages empty. And second, we found that individuals with low levels of education did not know how to read or fill out the questionnaires themselves. Young-me, Mr. Park and I helped read the questions out loud, filling out the answers for these individuals one by one, but many would get frustrated with waiting for our assistance and left before we had a chance to get to them.

The two other churches distributed the survey questionnaires during separate meetings such as bible study or fellowship hour. I suspect that the pastors at these churches saw these surveys as potentially disrupting the sanctity of Sunday worship service. Because these meetings were often organized by age, the sampling distributions obtained from these two churches are also highly likely to be clustered by age or other demographic traits.

About 18 percent, or 74 of 417 respondents were recruited outside of the church. Young-me and I targeted restaurants and clothing stores in the enclave that employed or were owned by Korean Chinese minorities. Young-me and I approached Korean Chinese minorities working at these establishments each individually, and consequently, the
majority of the survey questionnaires we handed out were filled out almost entirely. In addition, by talking to many of the Korean Chinese minorities who worked at or owned these establishments, I was able to gain a better understanding of the range of work environments in enclave businesses.

Selection of Field Site and Interviewees

The survey that I conducted on the Korean Chinese minority population was useful not only in that it allowed me to get a sense of broader demographic and attitudinal trends within the Korean Chinese community, but also in the sense that it allowed me to more effectively choose appropriate sites for participant observation and locate Korean Chinese minorities from diverse socioeconomic and cultural backgrounds to interview.

After spending several months in the field and analyzing the survey questionnaires that I collected, I found that there were no clear differences in the types of attitudes and demographic traits that characterized Korean Chinese minorities who I had recruited from churches from those who I had recruited from public venues. The Korean Chinese who filled out the surveys at the churches we visited had just as negative views of the South Koreans as those we met on the streets. Also, while two of the churches I had sampled from were skewed in age and socioeconomic status, three consisted of members from relatively diverse demographic and occupational backgrounds.

Since the church represented a relatively confined community that would allow me to interact with a diverse group of Korean Chinese within an intimate context, I decided to choose one of these three churches as my primary site of participant observation. From my experiences, I knew that the church would provide opportunities
for me to hear about the problems that individuals faced in their everyday lives in a more natural setting than the context of an interview. I also chose the church as my primary field site for personal reasons. My father had served as the pastor of a Korean immigrant church in America for over twenty years and my entire childhood and adolescence was spent inside the church. I was intimately attuned to the inner-workings of the church, how it was organized, what types of activities would allow me to establish intimate ties with people, how I could get involved, and so on. I also knew that my background as the pastor’s daughter of an immigrant church in the United States would hold currency among the members of the congregation, as well.

So every Sunday afternoon at three, I would hop in a cab outside of the South Korean church I attended in the mornings, and rushed over to attend worship service at a large Korean Chinese underground church. The Korean Chinese church I chose had a little less than a hundred members and held service on the fifth floor of a dark, nondescript building located in the periphery of the enclave.

I became actively involved at this church for about five months. Each Friday night, I worked with the elders, deacons and the assistant pastor to make the Sunday bulletins for each week. And for four weeks, I taught English conversational lessons to a small group of people after Sunday worship service. I also participated in weekly bible study meetings and attended early morning prayer meetings every weekday at six in the morning. After morning prayer meetings ended, I often spent time helping my Korean Chinese friend who owned a small clothing boutique in a popular commercial district in the enclave. I met this friend through the bible study I attended and since we both
regularly went to morning prayer meetings together as well, it was convenient for me to spend time with her at her store after prayer meetings every day.

Throughout my time in the enclave, I regularly recorded my experiences in a field notebook. Many of the conversations and scenarios that I present in this dissertation are taken from these notes. The ethnographic observations that I was able to make through my involvement at the Korean Chinese church were immensely helpful in three ways. First, I was able to observe interactions between people directly rather than rely solely on potentially biased descriptions of interactions from the interviews that I conducted. Second, by establishing relatively intimate relationships with people at the church, I was able to gain access to richer, potentially more controversial insights on their attitudes towards the South Koreans. People confided in me in ways that they would not have had I met them for just an interview. Third, my observations and experiences in the field acted as an interpretive filter in analyzing and understanding the data that I collected through my surveys and interviews.

In addition to intensive participant observation, I also conducted many semi-formal interviews with Korean Chinese minorities. These interviews were scattered throughout my time in Beijing, spanning over a period of nearly two years. During the first phase of data collection, I used the interviews to help form a basic understanding of the nature of the Korean Chinese community in Beijing. The surveys that I conducted were immensely helpful on this front. In the survey questionnaire, I included a page that informed the respondent that I would offer an honorarium for at least an hour of interview time. Those who were interested checked a box displaying their willingness to participate and wrote down their contact information. To protect the privacy of the
interviewees, I had to detach any forms of personal identification, including contact information, from the survey questionnaires before storing them. But before I did so, I was able to locate individuals of diverse demographic and occupational backgrounds who were willing to be interviewed. I was also able to locate individuals who had extreme views on South Koreans—both exceptionally positive and negative—for interviews to see what might account for these biases. In the later stages of my field research, I mainly relied on interviews to first, fill in gaps of information—to expose myself to types of people who I felt that I had fewer opportunities to come into contact with in my sites of participant observation—and second, to confirm what I found from my experiences in the field and from my survey analyses. In total, I conducted over fifty interviews with Korean Chinese individuals in Wangjing and transcribed a selection of these interviews into manuscripts for closer analysis.

Data Collection on the South Koreans

*Constructing the Questionnaire and Explanation of Sampling Procedures*

I conducted an additional survey targeting the South Korean population in Beijing in October 2012. Although I used similar sampling techniques to recruit participants, the quality of the survey data I was able to obtain on the South Koreans was much higher than that of the Korean Chinese population.

First, I was able to purchase 330 USB ports for 30 RMB (4.7 USD) each using funding from the National Science Foundation Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Grant (NSF DDRI #1131006). I handed out the USB ports to my survey
participants after they completed filling out their questionnaires. Having a material incentive not only made it easier to recruit participants, but also, since we checked whether they had filled out the entire questionnaire before giving them the USB ports, we had fewer issues with missing data.

Second, since I was able to use the NSF funding to cover many of my research-related expenses in Beijing, I had enough personal funds to hire four research assistants, who were all South Korean college students I met at the South Korean church I attended. I paid my RAs 10 RMB (1.57 USD) per completed questionnaire. In order to ensure a high completion rate, I told my RAs to not hand out USB ports until after questionnaires were completed and also alerted them that I would not compensate them for any questionnaires that had several questions left blank.

I also anticipated that South Koreans of lower socioeconomic statuses would be more resistant to filling out the surveys, and so I offered to pay double the normal rate for each questionnaire that was filled out by South Koreans over 30 years old, who were not employed (or whose husbands were not employed) by a large South Korean conglomerate. Since there were multiple services and meetings in multiple locations around the site throughout the day on the weekends, we were each in charge of different areas around the church to distribute the questionnaires. By the end of the weekend, we were able to obtain 322 questionnaires.

Third, since I composed the second questionnaire after having conducted field research in the enclave for over a year, I had a better sense of how to create appropriate categories for the questions I wanted to ask, and in addition, I had a better grasp of the types of questions that would be more relevant to my overall dissertation. I was able to
anticipate which types of questions the participants would feel averse to answering and what type of information I needed to complete my dissertation. Thus, while I have tried to maintain the same types of topics I covered in the first questionnaire I passed out to the Korean Chinese population in order to provide some basis for comparison, there was still a marked difference in the content of the first versus the second questionnaire.

Fourth, none of the South Koreans that I approached had the types of difficulties that some of the Korean Chinese with low levels of schooling had in filling out the questionnaire itself. First, it seemed that the South Koreans were much more used to the social practice of filling out surveys in general whereas many of the Korean Chinese minorities I surveyed did not understand what a survey was to begin with. And second, it was very rare to encounter a South Korean who had not attended high school, whereas this was not as uncommon among the Korean Chinese population. This, I believe, is due largely to better access to compulsory education in South Korea compared to the Chinese countryside.

For all the reasons I have laid out above, I was able to make more use of the survey data that I collected on the South Korean population for my dissertation. In addition, because I changed the wording and answer choices of some questions in the second questionnaire to ensure a higher response rate, it was difficult to make direct comparisons of some of the key issues—such as the nature of social networks or work environments—between the South Koreans and Korean Chinese using my two datasets.

15 percent or 57 of the 379 South Koreans who participated in my survey were recruited at public venues or through personal networks. The remaining 322 individuals were recruited at the South Korean church I attended. This church is one of the two
largest churches in the enclave with over two thousand members. While the members of
the congregation come from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds, the reader must be
mindful that downwardly mobile South Koreans will tend to avoid large organizations
such as this church, and that those who do attend are more likely to avoid filling out
survey questionnaires. I have attempted to overcome these biases by providing my RAs
with incentives to seek out this population and by personally visiting mom-and-pop shops
owned by struggling South Korean entrepreneurs to more directly target this population.
Nonetheless, my RAs and I encountered much resistance in recruiting participants from
this segment of the population in general.

Selection of Field Sites and Interviewees

Since I conducted the surveys on the South Korean population at the final stages
of my data collection in the enclave, I was not able to use my survey data to choose my
field sites and interviewees as I had for the Korean Chinese population. But because it
was easier for me to establish social networks with the South Korean community in the
enclave, I was able to use my personal contacts to recruit interviewees and choose an
appropriate field site instead.

The South Korean community in Beijing is distinct from the Korean Chinese
community in that first, while the church is considered a prominent civic organization
within the Korean Chinese community, it plays an even more central role among the
South Koreans in Beijing. Most South Korean immigrants in Beijing are connected to the
church. And in addition, the extent of their involvement at church in their personal lives
is significantly deeper, as well. It is not uncommon for instance, for a South Korean
immigrant to spend twenty hours in church activities each week. On weekends alone, leaders of the church community spend over ten hours serving in various functions. Most of these members are also involved in Wednesday bible studies, Friday night prayer meetings, daily morning prayer meetings, and other more specific functions such as the women’s group, the young adults group, various outreach programs, the choir, the praise band and so on. Consequently, for the South Koreans, the church clearly dominates their social life. They have no time to spend outside of the church and place of work.

Because I wanted to have access to a broad network of South Koreans in the enclave, I chose to attend one of the two biggest South Korean churches in the enclave. The particular church I attended had over two thousand members. Near the entrance of the church, a few of the elders stood by checking to see if we had our foreign passports with us. Chinese citizens are barred from participating in our church activities. The church was actually a branch of a major church located in Seoul. We received weekly newsletters about the major events that took place at our “headquarters” in Seoul. About once a month, the church in Seoul would send a speaker to Beijing to lead a workshop or seminar series. Our daily devotionals and other bible study materials were also sent from Seoul each month. Many of the assistant pastors and leaders at the church were also sent over from the Seoul headquarters.

I was an active member of this church for about five months. I chose to become involved in a smaller organization within the church I attended in order to foster closer relationships with the people there. After surveying the various organizations that were available to someone of my background, I ultimately became deeply involved in the Japanese ministry. I chose the Japanese ministry for several important reasons. First, the
ministry was desperately in need of individuals such as myself who could speak Japanese and so I knew that I could immediately become one of the core members of their organization. Second, the key members of this ministry represented individuals of various age groups and occupational categories, including South Korean college students, entrepreneurs, and high-level executives employed in major chaebol firms. Third, many of these key members were also deeply involved in other niche activities within the church and could easily introduce me to a broad range of South Koreans according to their age group, gender and particular interests. Fourth, while on the surface, the ministry was supposed to cater to the Japanese population in Beijing, in reality, only three Japanese individuals actually attended our services. The rest of the members were South Koreans who could not speak Japanese but were interested in outreach, in general. As a result, the group did not pose any of the clear biases that other groups that were organized by particular interests or demographic categories would.

This group became my core connection to the South Korean community while I was in Beijing. I spent the better part of my weekend attending bible studies, overnight trips, praise band practices, and so on with this group. The friends that I made at this organization also snowballed into relationships with people outside of this group, as well.

During the weekdays, for nearly two months, I also worked as an intern at the China headquarters of a major South Korean chaebol firm. I asked to be placed in the Human Resources Department because it was the most diverse, consisting of an equal mix of Korean Chinese, Han Chinese and South Korean workers. The particular team that I worked with was part of a task force that focused on problems relating to cross-cultural communications among employees. In my team, I worked under a Han Chinese
supervisor, alongside one South Korean worker, one Korean Chinese intern, and two Han Chinese workers. I collaborated with my co-workers on team projects, attended team meetings, and after work, often went out to drink with the other individuals who worked on my floor.

Throughout my time in the field, I conducted interviews with the South Koreans in a similar fashion that I did with the Korean Chinese. I wanted to use my interviews to expose myself to individuals I had less exposure to in my field sites. I mobilized the social networks that I established at the major chaebol firm I worked at and at church to recruit interviewees. Since I had plenty of exposure to life at the chaebol, I invested considerable effort in using my contacts to connect to the South Korean entrepreneurial community and to those South Koreans who were of a lower socioeconomic status. Many of the interviews I conducted were with this demographic group. I also used my interviews to clarify and confirm my understanding of the nature of the South Korean community and their ties to the Korean Chinese during the course of my field research.

Getting In

When I first attempted to become involved in the Korean Chinese underground church I had been attending in the spring of 2010, I initially confronted a series of barriers. After having attended three consecutive Sunday services, I felt I had waited the appropriate amount of time to look for ways to become more actively involved in the community.
So, when the assistant pastor made an announcement at the end of worship service my fourth Sunday that the choir director was in dire need of more members and encouraged anyone with an interest in singing to join—no prior experience or vocal training necessary! I jumped at the chance to join. The choir would be a great way to form deeper relationships with a diverse group of Korean Chinese minorities. When I asked the pastor how I could sign up, he led me to the choir director.

The choir director was a sturdy-looking Korean Chinese woman in her forties, dressed in a brightly patterned one-piece and black pumps. She had an unbuttoned white and green choir robe hanging over her shoulders, and when I first met her gaze, I noticed the thick black eyeliner that accented her already wide-set eyes. When I was first led to her, she was laughing loudly with two other Korean Chinese women, who also had choir robes slung over their shoulders. They were noisily bantering in a thick Yanbian accent, choir books in one hand and a plate of Korean rice cakes in the other. I was introduced to them as they were rushing down the hall, I presumed for choir practice after service.

“This young lady would like to join the choir. Can you make arrangements for her?” The assistant pastor shouted over the laughing women.

The assistant pastor left me with the choir director in the middle of the crowded hallway. He seemed to have other urgent matters to attend to. I bowed deeply to show deference, feeling shy and a bit intimidated by her bold presence. And in a voice that betrayed the uncertainty I felt inside, I stammered something about how I wanted to sing and that I had been in the choir at my church back at home and that it was my fourth week here. By then, the other two women had left, and I was left with the choir director standing awkwardly in the middle of an emptying hallway. She looked me up and down.
I remember that I had made an effort of wearing neutral colors and simple clothes on days I knew that I would be interacting with Korean Chinese minorities. I wanted to blend in as much as possible, but despite my efforts, I was painfully aware of how I still stuck out. That particular day, the somber hues of my black capris and grey, cotton V-neck were painfully incongruous against the colorful patterned dresses that the other women around me had been wearing.

“So you want to join the choir, huh?” The woman’s manner of speech changed instantaneously when she addressed me. Her jovial Yanbian dialect quickly morphed into an almost overly polite honorific Seoul-style Korean. And it was also during that split second that I knew that something about my appearance and demeanor gave her the impression that I was a South Korean. I vowed to go out and buy a colorful dress to wear next Sunday.

“Well, you know, we don’t just allow anyone to join. Are you a baptized Christian?”

“Yes, I am. My father was the pastor of a small Korean immigrant church in America for over twenty years. I sang in the church choir back home practically ever since I could walk.” I forced out an awkward laugh in my attempts to lighten the mood. I had emphasized ‘immigrant,’ hoping that she would see me as a fellow, oppressed minority, but my peppy answer was met with tense silence. She pursed her lips and her eyes narrowed down to focus intensely on her plate of rice cakes. Apparently, she did not see me as a fellow, oppressed minority.

“Well, we don’t just let anyone join,” she repeated. “You have to go through an intensive interview process. We only allow people who are strong, devout Christians with
a calling for our ministry to join. So why don’t you write your phone number down here,” she pointed to her choir book, “and I will give you a call to set up an interview with you.”

Three weeks went by before she called me over after service one day. By, then, I had given up. I had already joined a bible study at the church and it seemed as if no one else had gone through an “intensive interview” process to sing in the choir. The choir director led me into a small room so that we could have our “interview.” The atmosphere inside that small room was tense. Her fingers kept on fidgeting with her pen, then a piece of a paper and I could sense a sharp coldness in her eyes and tone of voice.

“I’m sorry I didn’t get back to you sooner. But, I decided that since you are a baptized Christian that you should be allowed to sing with us.” I had been right. The “interview” had been a ploy to discourage me. She “passed” me before asking me any questions or even consulting anyone else. I looked down. I felt uncomfortable. She went on, “You can’t ever be too careful these days. Even in Wangjing, there are so many people who belong to an occult but pose as Christians.”

When I left church that day, I was on the verge of tears. I called one of my Korean Chinese friends, as I walked outside to hail a cab. She could tell from the tone of my voice that something was amiss. I told her that I felt a bit rejected and filled her in on the details of my conversation with the choir director.

“Maybe she doesn’t like me because she sees me as a South Korean.” I said out loud, half hoping that she would contradict me. Interestingly, she didn’t take the bait. Instead, she said, “Older people don’t differentiate between South Koreans and Korean Americans,” followed by some obligatory words of comfort, “She didn’t mean it. We’re
not all like that. Younger Korean Chinese like me know that Korean Americans are not the same as South Koreans. At the very least, I know you’re different.”

A few weeks later, I was sitting outside the choir practice room chatting casually with a different middle-aged Korean Chinese woman, when the woman asked where I was from. I told her that I was born and raised in America.

“So, you’re not South Korean, then?” she asked.

“That’s right, I’m not.” I replied.

“But your parents are still South Korean, right?” She persisted. They technically were. But, I knew that once she marked my parents with that label, that she would also categorize me as South Korean, as well. I didn’t know how to answer. I grew silent for what felt like a full minute.

“Well, they lived in the US for over thirty years. They have American passports now. I feel like they’re more American than South Korean.”

“But they had South Korean passports before then, right?”

“Well, yes.”

“And all of their family members are South Korean, right? Like your uncles and aunts and grandparents… they’re all South Korean, right?”

“Yes…”

“So in a sense, your parents would consider themselves South Korean, too. Am I wrong?” Her question was met with another long pause on my end.

“Yes, I suppose you’re right.” I finally replied. She gave me a smug smile, and then stood up and left the room.
For the first three months, I encountered countless episodes similar to the ones I have portrayed above that forced me to come to terms with the fact that first, as a Korean American, I was perceived as a part of the South Korean community, and second, that because of this perception, the walls that I had break down to connect with the Korean Chinese population as an ethnographer were indeed quite formidable.

In the end, I did not join the choir, but I finally found a home in the Korean Chinese church I attended, which I will heretofore call "First Presbyterian," through my involvement in bible study and early-morning prayer meetings. After several months of persevering through experiences of tacit exclusion and suspicion, I took a cab to church at five in the morning one Wednesday. I couldn’t fall asleep because of the stress and anxiety I felt and I figured I would just go to the prayer meeting held at First Presbyterian that morning.

I got there half an hour early. With nothing to do, I sat idly at the front steps of the building waiting for others to arrive. Our church was located on the periphery of the enclave. It was an underground church, and so, the building that housed all of our meetings gave off no appearances of your ordinary “church.” We rented out almost the entire third floor of a nondescript building that was connected to a karaoke lounge. At six in the morning, the dark building was accented only by the flashing rainbow neon light sign of the KTV room next door. Fifty feet away, two skinny girls who looked about my age were smoking cigarettes, clad in identical red, body-skimming dresses.

The assistant pastor was the first to arrive that morning. He seemed surprised to see me sitting on the cement stairs of the building’s entrance. He ushered me inside. I must have looked distraught, because he asked me if everything was ok. That morning,
nine other people had come including two married couples, one elderly woman in her seventies, one woman in her late thirties with her autistic son who was about seven, one single mother in her thirties, one single woman in her forties, a man in his forties, and two single women in their late twenties. Of the nine individuals who came that day, four were from my bible study. They all seemed a bit surprised to see me.

After the pastor finished his sermon, he turned off the lights and turned on a recording of some hymns. There was something about feeling emotionally exhausted and sitting in the dark with the hymns playing loudly in the background that melted my heart. There was something comforting and familiar about the setting. I had gone to morning prayer meetings with my parents all throughout my childhood. As a child, I had laid down on the pews next to my mother under a small blanket sleeping to the sounds of hymns and people wailing out their troubles in the background. I had felt stressed and anxious, but until that moment, I was unaware of how strong my emotions had actually become. All of the disappointment and loneliness that I had felt over the course of my first three months in the field suddenly rose to the surface and I felt hot tears stream uncontrollably down my face.

I am quite certain that everyone in that dark room knew that it was me, the strange Korean American girl, who was crying her heart out. After awhile, the leader of my bible study came to sit next to me and she silently held my hand. As people finished praying, one by one they started to exit the room.

I was one of the last to leave. When I walked out, I heard laughter and chatter in the room next door. I peered in to find everyone sitting around a long table eating rice porridge and Korean-Chinese style pickled vegetables. The somber mood of the room
next door was a sharp contrast to the happy, lively ambience of everyone eating breakfast family-style. One of the men from my bible study pulled out a chair, motioning for me to join them. My eyes were bloated and I was still too emotional from what had happened only a few moments ago to immediately transition into the jovial banter that enveloped that small room. But as they continued to laugh and talk, I somehow felt for the first time their sympathy.

I continued to go to prayer meetings every weekday for the next three months after that day.

I will never be certain what it was exactly about that initial experience that led to my entry into the community, but when I look back, I can pinpoint that experience as the moment when the Korean Chinese individuals at First Presbyterian started to open their hearts to me and let me inside. I formed an emotional bond with the core members of my bible study since we met every morning in such a vulnerable context. Many of the stories and conversations that were shared around the breakfast table after the prayer meetings gave me valuable insight into the nature of the everyday struggles of the Korean Chinese minorities in the enclave. And perhaps more importantly, the individuals who saw me at these prayer meetings started to protect and vouch for my presence in my interactions with the other Korean Chinese minorities at church.

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My foray into the South Korean community was by no means as emotionally marked, or as difficult, for that matter, as my attempts at gaining access to the Korean
Chinese community. For one, I was immediately welcomed, at a superficial level anyway, into the congregation that I joined.

The church that I chose to attend had over two thousand members and was known as one of the two biggest South Korean churches in the enclave. Even though this church was established under the sanction of the PRC state, the building was hidden away behind a gigantic clothing warehouse*. It was almost impossible to find since the building was not visible from the street, which in itself was not a major street but more or less a dirt path off of a major street. Fortunately, it seemed that all the cab drivers in Wangjing were familiar with where the church was. All I had to tell them was that I wanted to go to “that big South Korean church” and they asked, “Which one, the one behind the clothing warehouse or the one down by the big seafood market*?”

The government forbade any Chinese nationals from attending the South Korean church, so there were of course, no Korean Chinese members. At the entrance of the building, two men in black suits stood behind a table that had a big sign taped to the front that read, “Passport Check,” in Korean letters. I didn’t have my passport with me on the first visit, and so I showed them my New Jersey state ID. One of the men asked in perfect English, “You’re from New Jersey? Whereabouts?” Apparently the man had gone to Rutgers University to get his Ph.D. in engineering. I started to answer, but I was pushed from behind by a horde of women and their children who were rushing to get inside. The shuttle buses that made rounds to the various apartment complexes around the enclave had started to arrive and were unloading large groups of people at a time. The colorfully patterned dresses that had adorned the women in my Korean Chinese church were replaced by neutral monochromatic pencil skirts, blouses, and one-pieces. Next to the line
of shuttle buses, men clad in expensive-looking suits, drove up in dark sedans with their wives and children.

I decided to join one of the smaller worship services held in the morning. The main Korean-language worship service had over five hundred attendees for each service and so I knew that it would be difficult to get to know people by attending the meetings held in the main chapel. I saw a sign by the lobby for a Japanese-language service, however. My initial motivation for checking out the Japanese-language service was purely personal, rather than research-oriented: I simply was interested in finding a way to maintain my Japanese language skills while I was in China.

When I sneaked inside the room where the service was held, only about thirty people were sitting in the fold-up chairs that were lined in neat rows of ten along the room. And although the service was held entirely in Japanese, almost all of the individuals sitting in the chairs had on earphones. I later found out that there were only two individuals in the congregation who were actually ethnically Japanese, and that other than the pastor, who was ethnically Korean but had spent over ten years as a missionary in Japan, no one else seemed to speak Japanese fluently. The ministry sought to evangelize to the foreign Japanese population in Beijing, but few Japanese were interested in Christianity to begin with, and even fewer Japanese were interested in attending services held in a massive South Korean church. The South Koreans who attended the service were mainly deacons and elders who were actively involved in the church, as well as college students who were interested in learning Japanese. Many spent well over ten hours at church on Sunday alone. They came out to early morning prayer meetings every weekday, Friday night bible study, and Saturday staff meetings for the
various programs they were apart of. The Japanese-language ministry was only one in a long list of groups they were apart of.

On my first Sunday at Redeemer, the pastor made an announcement at the end of service that they desperately needed volunteers. In particular, they needed a keyboardist for their praise band as the current keyboardist was going home to Seoul for the summer. I approached the pastor after church, in similar fashion as I had at the Korean Chinese church, and asked how I could help.

“Praise the Lord! Hallelujah! God has sent us an angel,” was her reply when I told her that I had experience playing the keyboard at my father’s church as a teenager.

“I haven’t played in more than ten years…” I started, “but if there really is no one else who can play, I am willing to try my hand at it…”

“When can you start? We have weekly bible study meetings and praise band rehearsals on Saturday mornings from nine to two. Can you come this Saturday?”

So starting my second week there, I became fully involved in this ministry, spending over six hours on Saturdays taking part in staff meetings, bible studies, lunch and fellowship hour and praise band rehearsal.

The problems started creeping up, however, when I told them that I was a researcher the first Saturday I rehearsed with them. They asked me why I was in Beijing. The moment I told them that I was conducting field research to write a dissertation on the Korean enclave in Beijing, their smiles faded.

“A doctoral dissertation…? How fancy.” The pastor’s remark seemed a bit sarcastic, but I think that she was mainly just relieved that she had found a pianist. She could care less of what “really” brought me there.
“So basically you’re writing about us.” An elderly man with John Lennon style glasses seemed a bit more concerned.

“Well, yes. Well, I am writing about how the South Koreans are struggling to make a life here.” I tried to put a positive spin on my topic.

“So you’re basically here to observe us... you’re going to want to conduct interviews and surveys and then, when you’re done, you’re going to go back to America to write about us.” Mr. Lennon folded his arms around his chest. I didn’t know how to respond.

After lunch, Mr. Lennon and I hitched a ride with Mr. Kim back to a popular South Korean residential neighborhood in the enclave, where we all lived. Mr. Kim was a wealthy man in his early forties who had come to the PRC about ten years ago with his wife and children. He was a high-ranking supervisor at Samsung. Mr. Lennon was in his sixties. He had come to Beijing more than fifteen years ago to start an entrepreneurial business. But when his business became bankrupt, he was barely eking out a living by running a small Korean restaurant in the center of the enclave.

During the ride home, Mr. Lennon asked me more detailed questions about my dissertation. When I told him that I was particularly interested with the relationship between the South Koreans and the Korean Chinese in the enclave, he went off on a tirade about how deceptive and untrustworthy the Korean Chinese were. Nearly six months later, I would learn that Mr. Lennon had paid his Korean Chinese landlord nearly have his savings for a down payment of a new property only to be later evicted shortly after having moved in. The landlord, it turned out, had drawn up a fake contract.
The difficulty with the nature of field research for my project lay in the unavoidable fact that I needed to simultaneously establish rapport with members of two communities that were characterized by hostility and distrust towards each other. How could I act as an ethical researcher and not conceal the fact that I was deeply involved in the South Korean community while managing to maintain the trust of my Korean Chinese friends? How would the same people who were deceived by Korean Chinese middlemen react when I told them that I also attended worship services at a Korean Chinese church on Sunday afternoons?

When I interacted with the South Koreans, I did not actively vouch for the Korean Chinese when they came up in our conversations. But at the same time, when the South Koreans at First Presbyterian asked me where I rushed off to after lunch every Sunday afternoon, I also did not conceal the fact that I was also involved in a Korean Chinese underground church. They never asked me details about my experiences at the other side of the enclave. But, I know that the fact that I had a foot in both worlds aroused suspicion.

My breakthrough at cannot be traced back to one particular moment as was the case at First Presbyterian. I was able to gain trust and acceptance gradually, through a series of what felt like tests, in retrospect. I was fortunate that due to the nature of my upbringing and profession, I had many skills that they were in need of. Every time a staff member left the community to go back to Seoul, whether permanently or temporarily, I was able to fill a different role. Throughout the five months I spent as a volunteer for their ministry, I acted as the keyboardist, vocalist, presider, and translator. As I volunteered any and all of the skills that I had to help out this struggling organization, the
other members started to view me as an essential part of their group and expressed their appreciation to me. And when it came time for me to conduct surveys and interviews towards the end of my visit, they jumped to my aid. This core group of deacons and elders introduced me to the other leaders of the church, who recruited their own staff and members to help me distribute surveys and find potential interviewees.

My last week in Beijing, the staff at Redeemer threw me a farewell party at Mr. Lennon’s small Korean restaurant. Mr. Lennon sat next to me on the day of my farewell dinner and proceeded to tell me about his experiences with bankruptcy and entrepreneurial failure in the enclave.

“I feel sad that I couldn’t tell you about my experiences until now, right when you are about to leave,” he said, “but I thought that it was better late than never.”
Chapter 4. Crossing the Border

Early Waves of Korean Migration to the PRC (1860-1940)

While historians note that migration from the Korean peninsula dates back several hundred years, most historiographical accounts of the Korean Chinese start from the latter years of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912). During the majority of the Qing Dynasty, movement across the present-day Sino-North Korean border was tightly restricted. Both the Qing and Chosun Dynasties set up military patrols around the Jangbaek Mountain Range to control possible border crossings (Piao 1990). In addition, there is no existing record of Korean communities prior to this era, as early Korean settlers who managed to sneak across the border by and large assimilated to Chinese society to escape discrimination from the Manchus.

Following the Boxer Rebellion (1850-1864), as the grip of the Manchus grew increasingly weak, border patrols barring Korean migrants from entry into Manchuria also became more relaxed. Thus, when a series of natural disasters in the 1860s spurred poverty and famine in the Korean peninsula, Korean farmers started to flee to Manchuria in large numbers (Piao 1990). In 1870, historical records indicate that there were 470 households, or over 20,000 Koreans scattered across 30 villages north of the Yalu River. By 1894, this population expanded to 8,700 households, or 37,000 Koreans (Piao 1990).

The Koreans who were a part of this wave of migration settled together in ethnic villages based on hometown and kinship ties (Yoon 1993). These villages were primarily

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12 This mountain is referred to as Changbai in Chinese. In general, I use Romanized versions of Korean place names for this chapter as this part of the dissertation is written from the perspective of the ethnic Koreans crossing the Sino-Korean border.
concentrated in southern Manchurian region known as Kando, comprising of Yanji, Helong and Wangqing counties (Lee 1932). In Kando district, over 75 percent of the population consisted of ethnic Koreans throughout the early 1900s. As a Korean geographer who conducted intensive fieldwork on the area in the early 1930s noted, “The cities in Kando are Korean in their outward appearance and in their content. A stranger here will feel that he is no longer in Chinese territory but in Korea” (Lee 1932, 201).

Most of the migrants were farmers who relied on collective labor to build irrigation systems and cultivate rice paddies (Yoon 1993; Lee 1986; Lee 1932). The villages set up their own local self-governing structures (hyangyak) and enjoyed protection from a private military force that was set up by a high-ranking official dispatched by the Chosun state (Lee 1986).

Migration across the Sino-Korean border continued into the early 1900s, accelerating particularly after Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910 (see Figure 2). A large number of farmers who lost their rights to their land as a result of a large-scale land survey conducted by the Japanese colonial regime conducted from 1910 to 1918 crossed the border (Yoon 2012). According to a survey conducted in the 1920s, 93.6 percent of Korean migrants had fled to Kando due to economic hardship (Lee 1986). Others who ventured across the border during this period consisted of intellectuals who sought to join the rising anti-Japanese independence movements that were gaining momentum in Kando (Han and Kwon 1993).

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13 This place is referred to as Jiandao in Chinese. Kando later became designated as the Korean Autonomous Prefecture by the Chinese state after the end of the civil war between the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) and KMT (Kuomintang, otherwise known as the Nationalist Party) (1926-1950) in the PRC.
In 1931, Japan invaded Manchuria and established “Manchukuo,” a puppet regime that would provide subsidies and help prepare the colonial government for full-scale war with China. In the years following the invasion, the Japanese put into motion a 15-year plan to transfer 300,000 Korean rural households, or 1.5 million Koreans, across the Sino-Korean border to help secure Korean manpower in the region (Lee 1986). The 15-year plan was never fully implemented, but the Korean population rose from 460,000 in 1920 to 607,000 in 1930, and 1.45 million in 1940 (Kwon 2001). The Koreans who migrated as a part of this wave were distinct from their earlier counterparts in that they originated from the southern parts of the Korean peninsula and relocated to regions north of Kando (Lee 1986). Records indicate that the majority of Korean settlers prior to this collective wave of migration had come from regions surrounding the Sino-North Korean border and settled primarily in Kando (Lee 1986). Because entire villages in the Korean
peninsula were uprooted and replanted in Manchukuo, the ethnic Koreans migrants were able to maintain their regional dialects and culture (Lee 1986). Following the end of World War II in 1945, many Koreans repatriated to the homeland. Some estimate that there were from 700,000 to 800,000 Koreans who remained in the Manchurian region after the war (Piao 1990).

The Early Korean Enclaves in the PRC (1945-1970s)

Although the Korean Chinese have lived in China for nearly a century, they have been able to preserve their ethnic identity due to their isolation from the Han mainstream (Choi 2001; Kwon 1997). The Korean Chinese population is largely concentrated in three provinces located in northeastern China, including Jilin, Heilongjiang and Liaoning. In 1953, there were about 1.1 million Koreans living in these three regions, amounting to 99.2 percent of the total Korean population in China (Kim 2003). Moreover, 42.7 of the total population is further concentrated within the Kando region, which is known today as the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture in Jilin Province (Kim 2003). Much of this concentration is a result of the collective nature of migration that characterized settlements in the PRC in the early years leading up to the establishment of the PRC (see Figure 3 and Table 4).

Scholars note that the Korean Chinese lived in “cultural islands” within Chinese society (Kim 2003; Kwon 1997). The early Korean enclaves were institutionally incubated from Han influence due to Beijing’s preferential policies towards ethnic minorities. Since 1952, the Chinese state has designated Yanbian in Jilin Province, the Korean Autonomous Prefecture. The government has also recognized one Korean
autonomous county in Jilin and 43 Korean autonomous townships throughout the three northeastern provinces.

In 1990, about 53% of the total minority population lived in regions that were Korean autonomous districts (Kim 2003). These regions are granted privileges in self-
government and special rights to preserve the use of their ethnic language, education and culture. In these ethnic zones, Korean minorities represent a sizeable proportion of incumbent government officials, and both Korean and Mandarin are used in public documents, government announcements and business transactions (Jin 1990). Korean ethnic schools have also flourished as a result of protective state policies. In 1986, about 79 percent of eligible children attended one of 960 Korean kindergartens in Yanbian. 98.5 percent attended one of 1,151 Korean primary schools and 92.6 percent attended one of 219 Korean middle schools (Jin 1990). Korean language media has also thrived. Five Korean-language newspapers are published in China, and Korean-language publishing and broadcasting have also proliferated throughout the years (Lee 1986; Jin 1990).

Both scholars and CCP officials frequently cite the Korean minorities in China as the nation’s “model minority.” Although most Korean Chinese descended from poor, landless peasants, in contrast to the vast majority of ethnic minorities who have significantly low levels of educational attainment, Koreans have higher levels of education than even mean levels of education among mainstream Han. In 1982, the illiteracy rate of ethnic Koreans 12 years old and above was above 10.5 percent, the lowest among all 56 Chinese nationalities and three times lower than the national average of 32 percent (Kim, 2004). According to Yun (1993), 19.6 out of 1,000 Koreans are college educated, surpassing the national average of 6 out of 1,000 individuals. The share of white-collar workers is also two times the national average.

During the Mao era, Koreans in China by and large, enjoyed a high standard of living. They were successful in transforming the formerly barren lands of the 3 northeastern provinces into fertile and arable soil, by using an innovative irrigation
technique (Choi 2001). As most Koreans cultivated rice paddies, a highly valued agricultural product at the time, Koreans fared considerably well in spite of the plethora of disadvantages that were attached to rural residence during the era.

Market Reforms and the First Wave of Korean Chinese Urban Migration

Geographic concentration of the Korean ethnic communities in China slowly started to disperse in the 1980s, however, when more and more Korean Chinese minorities started to head to nearby cities in search of better employment opportunities. But, the Korean Chinese were not the only ones who were migrating during this period. Rather, they acted as part of a massive nation-wide trend of urban migration that was triggered by the economic reforms under Deng Xiaoping regime in the late 1970s and 1980s.

The “hukou” or household registration policy was an important state apparatus that perpetuated the “dual-class” system of the Mao regime (Wang 2004).14 Up until the late 1970s, the state controlled rural-urban migration by granting access to grain rations, employment, housing, education, and healthcare in those areas where one’s hukou was registered. Because access to food, housing, and employment was monopolized by the state, it was extremely difficult to circumvent the system and flee the impoverished

14 Under Mao, Chinese class structure was largely bifurcated between the urban elite and poor farmers, and poverty was primarily concentrated in rural areas (Davis 1995; Whyte 1996). Average city incomes were triple those of the countryside (Davis 2000; Parish 1984; Walder 1986). The dramatic income gap between urban and rural residents was largely a result of asymmetrical state policies that prioritized the welfare of cities over the country. Under the Mao regime, the state aimed to utilize agricultural villages for the sole purpose of providing an abundant supply of inexpensive food for urban workers. Thus, rural farmers were only permitted to sell produce at low prices fixed by the state and were prohibited from engaging in private trade or seeking employment opportunities in the industrial sector. In addition, individuals in the Chinese countryside did not have access to high quality social welfare facilities. Urban residents, on the other hand, who were by and large employed by the state, enjoyed higher wages and access to better housing, education and healthcare.
conditions of the countryside (Chan and Zhang 1999). China scholars have regarded the hukou system as a particularly formidable mechanism of stratification as one’s hukou status was not only virtually immutable during one’s lifetime, but also passed down inter-generationally (Davis-Friedmann 1985, Korzec and Whyte 1981, Parish 1984).

With the economic reforms under the Deng Xiao Ping regime, however, socioeconomic mobility was no longer controlled by the tight grip of the state (Bian 2002). By the close of the 1980s, prices of food and goods were largely set by the market and the ration-coupon system that had regulated access to food and goods had vanished (Alexander and Chan 2004). In addition, jobs were no longer exclusively allocated by the state and the collective communes that tied rural residents to the land had been abolished. While holders of rural hukous still did not have access to changing their rural hukous to urban hukous and were thus, blocked from access to a series of welfare benefits including employment protection, healthcare, and education, they were nonetheless, free to settle down in urban areas for longer terms (Alexander and Chan 2004).

The breaking down of strict hukou regulations in the planned economy combined by the push and pulls of a surplus of unemployed farmers in the countryside and a demand for unskilled, cheap labor in urban areas by domestic and foreign capitalists unleashed a mass exodus of rural migrants to urban areas in search of jobs in the market economy. Dubbed the “floating population” (liudong renkou), according to statistics from

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15 According to Wang (2004), there were four major revisions of hukou legislation in the past decade. First, restrictions on internal migration of select groups of people, such as the elderly, children and highly skilled workers, have been relaxed. In addition, the state has streamlined local policies on registration for temporary or permanent migration. Second, the government has started to abolish the rural-to-urban migration quota in all small cities and towns since 2001. Third, individuals with at least a college degree hired by local employers can now easily obtain a local hukou in most Chinese cities and it has become possible to purchase an urban hukou for a high price or by ownership of local property. And finally, from 2001 to 2002, some provinces began a national wave to “erase” the rural/urban distinctions in the hukou system. This wave, however, was temporarily discontinued by the national government within a year of its inception.
the Chinese Census Bureau, in 1982, 6.5 million people left their place of origin for more than a year and were living in other places temporarily. By 1990, the population had reached 20 million. This figure nearly quadrupled to 79 million a decade later (Liang and Ma 2004) and has shown no signs of decrease, jumping to an estimated total of 221 million in 2010 according to the National Population and Family Planning Commission (www.npfpc.gov.cn).

In the early 1980s, the Korean Chinese mostly migrated from remote areas to nearby cities within the three northeastern provinces, such as Yanji, Shenyang, and Changchun (Kim 2010; Yoon 2012). Some Korean Chinese started to head to more distant cities such as Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Shenyang, Qingdao, and Shanghai in the late 1980s as the state continued to liberalize its restrictions on migration (see Tables 5 and 6). Statistics from the Chinese Census demonstrate, however, that this cross-country movement did not reach significant heights at this point as northeast China still accounted for 98 percent of the Korean Chinese population in 1990 (Kim 2003).

Table 5. Ethnic Korean Population in Major Chinese Cities, 1982 and 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>1982</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Qinhuangdao</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>869</td>
<td>704.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qingdao</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>327.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dalian</td>
<td>2,042</td>
<td>4,816</td>
<td>135.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tianjin</td>
<td>816</td>
<td>1,788</td>
<td>119.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yanji</td>
<td>100,337</td>
<td>177,547</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beijing</td>
<td>3,905</td>
<td>7,689</td>
<td>69.9</td>
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<td>Shenyang</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Yanbian</th>
<th>Jilin (w/Yanbian)</th>
<th>Heilongjiang</th>
<th>Liaoning</th>
<th>Inner Mongolia</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
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<td>1953</td>
<td>1,110</td>
<td>551</td>
<td>756</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1,349</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>867</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1,765</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>1,104</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1,921</td>
<td>821</td>
<td>1,182</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>33</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Koreans in Beijing During the Early Stages of Reforms (1980s-1990s)

Prior to the implementation of economic reforms and nation-wide urban migration, the Korean Chinese population in Beijing had consisted of a small group of highly educated elites who held urban hukous and were employed by the state. In 1982, 3,734 Korean Chinese were residing in Beijing (Chinese Census, 1982). Interviews with Korean Chinese leaders indicate that most lived among the Han Chinese, in government allocated housing in the Weigongcun region, where most of the state-sanctioned minority organizations, such as Minzu University, minority publication companies, minority broadcasting stations and so on, were located.

During the preliminary phases of Korean Chinese rural to urban migration, the Korean Chinese population grew to reach 7,375 people in Beijing (Chinese Census,

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16 Minzu University (中华民族大学) is a prestigious, government-sponsored university in Beijing that was originally established to train cadres who were preparing to enter ethnic minority areas and to provide a high-quality education for promising minority youth. The university boasts the largest enrollment of Korean Chinese students in Beijing.
The early Korean Chinese migrants who populated Beijing were not so unlike their Han Chinese counterparts. In the 1980s and early 1990s, Korean migrants typically made a living by selling *kimchee*, traditional Korean pickled cabbage, in the markets or on the streets because they did not have access to large sums of money sufficient for starting a larger-scale entrepreneurial business (Cho and Park 1997). Those who were able to save enough money as street vendors were able to open small Korean restaurants, and the few who were able to run successful Korean restaurants started nightclubs and KTV bars. Descriptive accounts of the early Korean Chinese migrants in Beijing note, however, that very few were able to expand their businesses into significant, large-scale enterprises (Kwon 2005; Kim 2003; Cho and Park 1997). And while they lived in clustered regions around Beijing, they were still too insignificant in number to form a substantial enclave community during this period (Interview in Beijing with Korean Chinese pastor, 2010).

**South Koreans Enter China (1990s-current)**

Sino-South Korean normalization of diplomatic relations in 1992 lifted restrictions on travel and economic activity between the two countries. This watershed event ended a long period of isolation between the PRC and South Korea. In the years leading up to and immediately after normalization, China opened up regular shipping and ferry routes between Chinese and South Korean ports, as well as direct flights between Seoul and major cities in China (Lee 1996). According to the civil aviation agreement between South Korea and the PRC, each side was granted permission to operate nine flights a week between Beijing and Seoul. In addition, direct routes between Seoul and
major Chinese cities such as Shenyang, Qingdao, Dalian, Tianjin and Shanghai were also
opened up. The first regularly scheduled flights between South Korea and the PRC
commenced on December 22, 1994 (Figure 7).

Diplomatic rapprochement, as well as the opening up of air and sea routes, paved
the way for the increase of economic cooperation between the two countries. Two months
after normalization of ties was formalized, Kim Sang Ha, the president of the Korean
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, led the organization of the Korea-China Economic
Council to promote economic exchange between the two countries. The council included
important South Korean business leaders such as the CEOs of all the major chaebol firms
and representatives from the Federation of Korean Industries, the Korean Foreign Trade
Association, the Korea Federation of Small Business and the Korea Employers’
Federation (Lee 1996). In addition, the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency
(KOTRA) and the China Chamber of International Commerce (CCOIC) set up offices in
Beijing and Seoul, respectively.

By 1994, China became South Korea’s primary destination for foreign investment
and remained so, until the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 brought on economic recession
in South Korea. Studies show that during the early stages of South Korean penetration of
Chinese markets from the early to mid-1990s, South Korean foreign direct investment
was driven mainly by small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which occupied 40
percent of investment outflows to China (Snyder 2009).

South Korean SMEs in the PRC share three important characteristics. First, they
are by and large dominated by their Korean headquarters, which handle most decision-
making (Sun et al. 2010). Second, most of the SMEs in China act as subsidiary firms to the chaebol, who “began to actively encourage subcontracting SMEs into entering China to maintain the vendor-buyer relationship in the Chinese setting” (Lee et al. 2012). And third, during the early stages of economic activity in the PRC, South Korean SMEs by and large sought to take advantage of the low costs of Chinese labor.\(^\text{17}\) Statistics from the Export-Import Bank of Korea indicate that between 1993 and 2000, 87.2 percent of all South Korean FDI in China was concentrated in the manufacturing sector (Snyder 2009).

Studies indicate that South Korean firms, and in particular SMEs, relied heavily on the assistance of bilingual Korean Chinese ethnic minorities to help settle in the PRC.

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\(^\text{17}\) In 1992, the average monthly wage of Chinese managers employed by South Korean firms was 455.5 RMB (or 80 USD). This sum was only 10.2 percent of the average salary for South Korean managers. In addition, monthly wages for skilled and unskilled workers in the PRC also amounted to only 9.8 and 9.2 percent of those of their South Korean counterparts, respectively (Lee 1996). Given that most of the hired workers in the early 1990s consisted of Korean Chinese migrants, it is likely that wages for Han Chinese rural migrants during the early 1990s were even lower.
(Lee 1996; Kim 2003; Kim 2010). As one South Korean high-ranking manager who worked with Korean Chinese intermediaries to set up a factory for his firm in Tianjin during the mid 1990s put it, the Korean Chinese acted as “your hands and feet.” They acted as your translator when you needed to negotiate with Han Chinese bureaucrats. They introduced you to the appropriate vendors in the area. They led you around the vicinity, showing you the lay of the land, teaching you where you could go to buy certain things, where the nice hotels were, where you could go to eat Korean food, and so on. Even in the early years immediately following normalization of ties, this South Korean manager noted that there were several Korean Chinese companies that were set up in Beijing for the primary purpose of providing services as middlemen for South Korean investors.

While more than 70 percent of foreign firms invested in the southern and central regions in the PRC, over 86 percent of South Korean firms focused their investments in the Bohai Sea area and the Northeast (see Table 8). Three factors account for this trend. First, these regions were more proximate to South Korea, and in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the two governments set up accessible transportation routes connecting these regions to South Korea. Second, Chinese state policies in Shandong, Liaoning, and Jilin, explicitly encouraged South Korean FDI and set up the institutional and legal infrastructure to support their business activity (Snyder 2009; Lee 1996)18. And third,

18 According to Lee (1996) for instance, Shandong was granted permission to issue entry visas to South Korean businessmen and tourists even prior to diplomatic normalization. In September 1990, Shandong’s two ports, Weihai and Qingdao, opened direct shipping routes with Incheon. Two years following normalization, direct flights between Seoul and Qingdao started operating. According to a Chinese reporter, in 1993, there were 131 South Korean firms in Qingdao that amounted to a total of $210 million USD. An estimated 1,000 South Korean businessmen had settled in the area, attracting about 800 Korean Chinese workers from the northeast.
South Korean investors actively sought out and relied on the assistance of Korean Chinese middlemen, who were concentrated in the northeast.

As more and more South Koreans entered the PRC to set up businesses in major cities around the PRC, Korean Chinese urban migration also reached new heights. While only 30 percent of the Korean Chinese population was urban in the late 1970s, the share of urban Korean Chinese migrants exceeded 50 percent in the early 1990s (Tabulation on China’s Nationalities 1994). Other estimates demonstrate an even sharper increase, from 34 percent in the early stages of the economic reforms to 70 percent of the employed population in the late 1990s (Park 2009).19

South Korean economic interdependence with the PRC continued to solidify as the Chinese increasingly liberalized their policies toward foreign investors. And in particular, China’s induction into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 marked another important milestone in this regard. Following its accession into the WTO, China lowered its tariffs of foreign firms, eased conditions on foreign investors, and opened up the Chinese domestic market to foreign goods (Snyder 2009).

The South Koreans were hit with “China Fever” for the second time since normalization and headed to the PRC in record-breaking numbers. In 2002, China surpassed Japan as the most favored destination among Korean travelers and in recent years, data from the Korea National Tourism Organization demonstrates that over 5 million South Koreans visit the PRC each year (see Figure 9). South Korean trade also surged in the years proceeding China’s induction into the WTO. According to the Export-

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19 It is difficult to obtain precise statistics on this change as the Korean Chinese rural migrants consist of a constantly mobile population that do not have access to urban household registration.
Import Bank of Korea, South Korean FDI increased from $1 billion USD in 2002, accounting for 5.2 percent of all foreign investment in China that year, to over $5 billion.

Table 8. Geographic Distribution of Korean Investment in China, 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th># of Cases**</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Total Amount*</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bohai Area</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>374,331</td>
<td>38.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shandong</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>131,053</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tianjin</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>62,362</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beijing</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>23,533</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebei</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>591,299</td>
<td>60.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>399</strong></td>
<td><strong>38.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>248,241</strong></td>
<td><strong>25.4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast Region</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaoning</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>125,155</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jilin</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>46,186</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heilongjiang</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>76,900</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>399</strong></td>
<td><strong>38.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>248,241</strong></td>
<td><strong>25.4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central China</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiangsu</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>45,897</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>18,612</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhejiang</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>6,676</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>74</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>71,186</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.3</strong></td>
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<td>Guangdong</td>
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<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hainan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>52</strong></td>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
<td><strong>59,604</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.1</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other regions</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>6,594</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,043</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>976,923</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Amount is in thousands of USD. **Represents number of cases approved for entry into the PRC. Source: Chinese Almanac, 1994, p. 635.
USD in recent years (see Figure 4.9).\textsuperscript{20} In particular, in an effort to take advantage of the expansive Chinese consumer market, chaebol firms such as Samsung, SK, LG, Hyundai, and so on have started large-scale investment projects in major cities, focusing increasingly on technology-intensive sectors in electronics, communications automobiles and household products, as opposed to labor-intensive, exporting-processing operations that had dominated projects of the 1990s (Snyder 2009; Zhan 2005).\textsuperscript{21} As a result, South Korean firms have expanded their operations progressively away from the northeastern provinces to major Han-dominated urban areas such as Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai, where labor and real estate costs are highest in the country. The chaebol have focused on localizing their operations, hiring more Han Chinese employees and partnering with Chinese companies to target the booming Han Chinese consumer market (Synder 2009; Zhan 2005).

\textsuperscript{20} It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to discuss Sino-South Korean economic relations in further detail. For supplementary reading on this topic, refer to Snyder (2009).

\textsuperscript{21} Samsung, for instance, first established a joint-venture subsidiary in Tianjin in April 1992. In 2002, Samsung owned one investment company, 24 production-oriented legal-person enterprises, four sales-oriented legal-person enterprises, one R & D center and one sales service company, all of which amounted to an aggregate value of $2.3 US billion. Samsung, in 2002, employed a total of 38,000 workers, the bulk of whom consisted of local hires. Their sales volume in China that year reached $6 billion USD. LG and Hyundai have enjoyed similar levels of success. According to the Beijing Daily News in 2003, Hyundai Motors in Beijing accounted for 12 percent of Beijing’s overall industrial output. In 2003, LG boasted a sales volume of $7 billion USD and had a total of 11,000 employees, 98 percent of whom were Chinese nationals. Many of the chaebol are partnered with major Chinese companies in joint-venture projects in these areas (Zhan 2005).
Figure 9. The Number of South Korean Visitors to the PRC (in millions), 1997-2007

Source: Korea National Tourism Organization, www.knto.or.kr.

Figure 10. South Korean Direct Investment in the PRC (in millions of USD), 1990-2008

Korean Chinese Migration to South Korea (1990s-now)

After over five decades of no contact during the Mao Era, media images of the Seoul Olympics in 1988 made a deep impression among the Korean Chinese. When they saw for the first time, their long forsaken homeland and South Korean brethren living in economic prosperity, many felt an immense source of pride and yearning (Im 2003; Lee 1986; Song 2009).

Thus, while South Korean investors rushed to the PRC to set up factories and other entrepreneurial firms, numerous Korean Chinese crossed the Yellow Sea in search of employment opportunities in South Korea. Meanwhile, South Korea in the early 1990s had a strong demand for cheap labor due to the rapid economic development combined with a series of labor demonstrations and strikes in the 1980s and 1990s that led to rising labor costs among the indigenous population (Song 2009). Many South Korean entrepreneurs responded by taking advantage of the low-cost of labor in China and other developing countries, whereas others sought to import unskilled labor from the neighboring countries.

The South Korean government attempted to address the problem of labor shortages by establishing the Industrial Technical Training Program (ITTP) that recruited foreign workers for 3-D (dirty, difficult, dangerous) jobs. Policy-makers encouraged the recruitment of Korean Chinese workers over other foreigners by providing employers with a separate quota for the Korean Chinese and in addition, offering the co-ethnics with higher wages (Seoul and Skrentny 2009). As a result, according to national statistics the
Korean Chinese have represented the largest group of foreign workers in South Korea since the induction of the program in 1991 (Seol and Skrentny 2009) (see Figure 11).

Social activists and NGOs in South Korea have sharply criticized the ITTP for perpetuating civil rights violations of foreign workers, however. Most trainees hired under the program overstayed their visas or ran away from their sponsored firms, becoming undocumented workers (see Figure 11).

After a series of protests against the harsh working conditions and ambiguous legal status of the Korean Chinese in South Korea, however, the South Korean government liberalized a series of restrictions on the Korean Chinese, making it less difficult to settle in their former homeland. For one, the government encouraged naturalization among Korean Chinese co-ethnics. Korean co-ethnics who had a relative who was a former Korean national could restore their Korean

Figure 11. Korean Chinese Population in South Korea, 1991-2006

nationality, acquire permanent residence, or reside in the country with a special visa status granted to Korean ethnics (F4, F1-1, or F1-2). Ethnic Koreans holding this visa status could easily renew their visas, or alternatively, they could apply for permanent resident status or naturalization after having lived in South Korea for two to three years. According to the Korean Ministry of Justice, ethnic Koreans accounted for 63.8 percent of all naturalized immigrants in 2007.

For those ethnic Koreans who do not meet the requirements for the special visa status mentioned above, they were given the option to apply for other visas that allowed them enter South Korea. In 2007, the government issued the H-2 visa, which allowed ethnic Koreans to enter the country multiple times within five years to seek employment in a wide range of sectors (Kong et al. 2010). The liberalization of South Korean laws towards Korean ethnics led to a significant influx of Korean Chinese migration to South Korea in the past decade. Data from the Korean Ministry Justice demonstrates that 365,747 ethnic Korean immigrants resided in South Korea in 2007, accounting for 34.3 percent of the total foreign-born population. About 90 percent of these ethnic Korean immigrants are of Chinese origin (Kong et al. 2010).

Upon arrival to South Korea, Korean Chinese migrants often go through agencies that specifically cater to their population in order to find short-term or long-term employment. Past survey research on the population shows evidence that most Korean Chinese migrants in South Korea are over 40 years-old, previously married with children, and have low levels of schooling. The data also exhibits a slight bias in women over men (A. Kim 2010). This data is along the lines of field research conducted by the author that
indicates that the Korean Chinese who migrate to Beijing have by and large higher levels of human capital than their counterparts in Seoul. Those who migrate to Seoul expect to work in the secondary labor market, whereas their counterparts in Beijing often are hired as mid-ranking managers for South Korean firms or are able to start their own entrepreneurial firms.

Korean Chinese women have more employment opportunities than men in South Korea. By and large, middle-aged to elderly women are hired in large numbers to work in the service sector—and in particular as the wait staff in restaurants—or as domestic workers or nannies. Younger women are often recruited by international marriage agencies. These agencies introduce them to South Korean men in the countryside who face a shortage of potential mates willing to live with the poorer living conditions of the rural areas. The majority of Korean Chinese men in South Korea work in construction.

Demographic Changes in the Korean Chinese Population in the PRC

The mass exodus of Korean Chinese from northeastern China, however, has also had some negative consequences on the Korean Chinese community in the PRC. First, with the acceleration of urban migration, Korean ethnic villages scattered across the three northeastern provinces have started emptying out. Many of these villages have been since taken over by the Han Chinese (Kim 2003; Kim 2010; Paik and Ham 2011).

Some estimate that approximately 64 percent of the entire Korean Chinese population who had formerly resided in Korean autonomous zones had left (Paik and Han 2011). Between 1982 and 2002, 109 Korean ethnic villages were abandoned and overtaken by the Han Chinese. Similarly, in Yansu County, 14 Korean villages were
merged into six villages. And while scholars estimate that there were 389 ethnic villages that were entirely populated by ethnic Koreans in prior to the mass exodus, today only 150 of these villages remain (Ryu and Kim 2007; Du 2007). Yanbian, the Korean Autonomous Prefecture is also no longer dominated by ethnic Koreans. Whereas in 1949, 63 percent of its population consisted of ethnic Koreans, this figure dropped to 33 percent in 2007 (see Figure 12). Paik and Ham’s (2011) interview with a Korean Chinese pastor helps illustrate the sheer extent of this phenomenon:

My hometown consisted of four Korean and eight Han brigades. Each brigade had four or five villages with thirty to sixty households. We had Korean elementary and middle schools and did a great job in collective rice farming until the early 1990s. However, the migration to Korea and to the cities began and our village lost 53 out of 60 [ethnic Korean] households, and to a similar extent, so did the other three Korean villages. Then, the city and township governments merged the four Korean brigades into one, which is managed by only one Korean cadre. When I visited in 2007, our brigade and villages had been reduced to complete ruin (Interview by Paik and Ham in Changchun, 2008).

The widespread abandonment of Korean autonomous districts has also caught the attention of the media as well. According to a popular South Korean newspaper, more than half of the 600 residents in a Korean Chinese village in Heilongjiang Province had reportedly left in search of employment in South Korea (Wolgan Joongang, Feb. 2002).

And with the marked disappearance of Korean ethnic villages, Korean schools, which had formed the institutional hub of the Korean ethnic community during the pre-reform years, are also closing down at alarming rates (Kim 2010; Kim 2003). In Yanbian, Korean elementary schools dropped from 419 in 1985 to 177 in 1995, and Korean secondary schools similarly decreased in number from 118 in 1985 to 49 in 1995 (Huang 2002). Similarly, in Heilongjiang Province, there were only 51 Korean elementary schools in 1997, compared to 382 in 1990, and only 15 secondary schools, compared to 77 in 1990 (Huang 2002). According to Asia Times, between 1990 and 2000, 53 percent,
or 4,200 Korean teachers, lost their jobs due to school closures (Asia Times, August 16, 2007).

**Figure 12. Korean Chinese and Han Chinese Population in Yanbian, 1949-2007**

Because the Korean Chinese do not have the resources nor the proper institutional support from the Chinese government to set up Korean ethnic schools in the cities that they migrate to, the Korean Chinese youth today attend Han Chinese schools and have quickly assimilate to the dominant Han society. Korean Chinese leaders of the community have lamented the loss of the Korean ethnic schools because the schools have in the past, played a critical role in allowing the Korean Chinese to maintain fluency in the Korean language and an understanding of their Korean ancestral heritage.

Korean Chinese youth have also increasingly turned to juvenile delinquency in recent years (Kim 2010; Kim 2003; Kwon 2006). Many scholars have linked this trend to the growing incidence of broken families within the Korean Chinese community. Almost
all of the Korean Chinese young adults that I came across during my course of field research in Beijing had been raised in a household where one or both parents were absent. In most of these cases, their parents were living and working under strained conditions in South Korea and sending back remittances to fund their children’s education. Most grew up with very scant memories of their parents. And the few memories related to their parents that they had were of expensive gifts that they would receive from South Korea on their birthday each year. When I asked some of my closer Korean Chinese acquaintances how widespread the phenomenon was, many replied that the vast majority of their classmates at the Korean Chinese schools they attended also lived with an aunt or relative because their parents were in South Korea. Hyejin Kim’s (2010) interview with a Korean Chinese student demonstrates the nature of the lives of these Korean Chinese youth quite well:

Father went to South Korea first and he begged my mom to go to Korea because it was hard for him to make money on his own. She was worried that he could be exposed to bad temptations in Korea and would not come back home. Those kinds of tragic stories are all what we Korean Chinese hear. She left for Korea right away. So I live in the school dormitory and sometimes go back to my grandparents' house. But it doesn’t matter for me. Being here with friends who are in the same position is not bad (Hyejin Kim Interview with a Korean Chinese student, Winter 2001).

Media reports also support findings from the field of the ubiquity of single-parent households within the Korean Chinese community in recent years. According to one study conducted in Yanbian, 54 percent of Korean Chinese students live with only one of their parents (Heungyongang Shinmun, May 19, 2004). And similarly, in one elementary school in Yanji, 71.4 percent of Korean Chinese students were living in single-parent households (Chosun Ilbo, Dec. 7, 2001).

The Rise of Beijing’s Koreatown, Wangjing
While Wangjing contains the largest concentration of South Koreans in the PRC today (Spencer et al. 2012), only ten years ago, it was a virtually undeveloped expanse of land. The metropolitan area of Beijing did not extend beyond the Third-Ring Road in the 1990s. During the first-wave of South Korean migration in the years immediately proceeding Sino-South Korean diplomatic relations, South Koreans were concentrated primarily around Wudaokou (五道口), where the Beijing Language and Culture University (北京语言大学) is located, and in regions with “waixiaofang” or literally, housing approved for foreigners.

Beijing Language and Culture University sponsored the vast majority of South Korean college students who came to China to study Mandarin, as the university was the only institution that specialized in teaching foreign students in the 1990s. Korean ethnic entrepreneurs opened up Korean ethnic restaurants, grocery stores, and stationary stores that sold K-Pop memorabilia around the university dormitories where many of the South Korean international students lived. Because the South Koreans could not lease out commercial property due to the tight restrictions placed on foreigners at the time, many South Koreans partnered up with Korean Chinese minorities in opening up small shops in these areas. The South Koreans provided the amount of financial capital to pay for the rent of the property and in return, borrowed the names and identities of the Korean Chinese minorities, who did not face such restrictions due to their Chinese citizenship-status, when filing for documentation to open their stores. Many of these South Koreans, however, ended up losing their businesses to their Korean Chinese middlemen, who refused to give the South Koreans access to their legal rights once the properties were purchased.
Up until 2002, foreigners were required to live in designated housing complexes or hotels (Wu and Webber 2004). Housing, during the pre-reform era, was strictly controlled by the state under the socialist housing system, and the Chinese by and large lived in units provided by state-collectives. In the 1990s, housing approved for foreigners was clustered in four districts within Beijing: the East Changan Area, Asian Games Village, CBD area, and the Third Embassy Area. According to my interviews and field research, the first wave of South Korean expatriate workers lived primarily in the Asian Games Village and the Third Embassy Area, the areas surrounding Wangjing. Rent in these state-sponsored regions was very high. At an estimated $5,000 USD per month for a small living space in the early 1990s, only the most wealthy South Korean dignitaries and businessmen could afford to live in Beijing for extended periods of time. When economic recession hit South Korea during the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, both Koreatowns were adversely affected and many South Korean businessmen returned back home.

After China’s induction into the WTO, Beijing liberalized its policies towards foreigners, making it easier for them to conduct business and live in the PRC. In particular, as noted previously, it soon became legal for foreigners to live outside of these government-controlled districts. Beijing’s liberalization of policies towards foreign entrepreneurs, and in particular, the affordability of housing for foreigners, attracted a new stream of lower and middle-class South Korean entrepreneurs to Beijing.

In the first five years following China’s accession into the WTO, Wangjing experienced dramatic growth as South Koreans, and in turn, the Korean Chinese, started to flock to this newly developing area. According to an interview with a South Korean
scholar who lived in the region during this period, two factors are largely responsible for the rapid expansion of Wangjing. First, Wangjing is a district planned by the government to stimulate economic growth via foreign investments. Starting in the mid-1990s, the Chinese state started to carry out its plans to build an upwardly mobile residential district in the suburbs of Beijing. In 1999, the first major apartment complex, Wangjing New City (新城), the third private real estate project in Beijing, sold for an average unit price of 3,500 RMB per square meter (Seo 2007). These apartment units were relatively expensive for local standards, but they were much more affordable compared to the cost of rent in former state-approved housing for foreigners. Large numbers of South Korean immigrants started to rent out, as well as purchase, these units from wealthy Han Chinese tenants. Whereas only about 500 South Korean households lived in Wangjing in 2001, by 2005, there were several thousands. The vast majority lived in Wangjing New City, also known as the 4th District (4区), which today, has become the hub of the Korean enclave in Beijing.

In addition to the expensive apartment complexes targeted to the Chinese urban middle class and wealthy foreigners, in 1999, the Beijing Municipal Government sponsored the construction of Wangjing Science and Technology Park. This impressive district, which spans across an expansive 70,000 square meters, actively recruits the establishment of foreign technological enterprises. In 2005, the park had hosted 228 foreign enterprises, accounting for a total registered capital of $256 million USD. Today, many foreign multinational corporations have set up major offices in Wangjing. These companies include Siemens, Panasonic, Ericsson, Motorola, Sony Ericsson, Nortel Networks, Alcatel, Lucent, Microsoft, Mercedes-Benz, Daimler, Samsung, Agilent
Technologies, LG and Pohang Iron Steel. The large number of reputable foreign companies in Wangjing has in turn attracted a steady influx of Westerners to Wangjing and its neighboring areas, contributing to the rising real estate value of the region. Eventually, the Beijing Municipal Government aims to make Wangjing into a second Central Business District (CBD).

Second, the entry of various South Korean chaebol into the Beijing market also played an important role in attracting a growing number of Koreans to Wangjing. Particularly, in 2002, Hyundai opened a large factory in Shunyi, a suburb located just thirty minutes north of Wangjing, near the Beijing International Airport. Along with Hyundai, 68 manufacturing companies under the Hyundai conglomerate also settled in the surrounding region. Many of the factory workers who were hired were Korean Chinese minorities. The new apartments in Wangjing New City were too expensive for the locals to rent out, and so Hyundai bought out large sections of property in the Nanhu (南湖) neighborhood to provide housing for many of its Korean Chinese workers. Conditions were not comfortable to say the least as more than 15 workers were crammed into small two-bedroom units. Nonetheless, today, the Nanhu area has developed into the residential area populated with the highest concentration of Korean Chinese minorities in Wangjing.
Chapter 5. Divisions within the Enclave

Wangjing From a Comparative Perspective

Korean Enclaves in China, Japan and the US

According to the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, in 2009, of an estimated population of 6.8 million overseas Koreans, nearly four-fifths lived in China, Japan or the United States. In recent years, China has surpassed the US in attracting the largest population of Koreans abroad. The demographic composition of the Korean communities in China, Japan and the US reflect particular historical trajectories of emigration. To better understand how Korean enclaves around the world differ from each other, it is important to examine the specific contexts of migration that have characterized the settlement patterns of overseas Koreans.

The first significant wave of mass emigration from the Korean peninsula took place during Japanese colonial rule, between 1910 and 1945. Under the colonial regime, the Japanese state forcibly uprooted millions of Korean migrants to Manchuria, as farmers under the Manchurian Project starting 1931, as well as to Japan, as workers who provided cheap labor for Japanese factories and coal mines.

But what is interesting and significant about the diasporic communities in China and Japan lies in the fact that Korean migration to its East Asian neighbors came to an abrupt halt for several decades following the close of World War II in 1945. As I have relayed earlier in this dissertation, border crossings between China and the Korean peninsula was barred during the 31 years of Mao Zedong’s reign in the PRC. Similarly, the Japanese government’s strict restrictions on immigration and its discriminatory policies towards foreigners made it an inhospitable environment for South Korean
settlers, as well as for other people who were not of Japanese ancestry, during the post-war years.

After a long period of isolated contact, the 1990s heralded a new era of economic integration within Northeast Asia, setting the stage for the second major wave of migration within the region. Japan, in the aftermath of the economic recession in the late 1980s, slowly liberalized its strict immigration policies to account for the shortage of low-wage labor. The New Immigration Control Law of 1990 in particular allowed a wider range of immigrants from South Korea, China, and Brazil to enter the country. In addition, the Alien Registration Act of 1992 paved the way for foreigners to consider the possibility of long-term residence in Japan.

In the PRC, the rise of the Deng Xiao Ping regime led to China’s integration into the global economy. Deng’s implementation of market reforms liberalized Chinese foreign policy, which was once tightly controlled by the Communist government. And since its induction into the WTO in 2002, Beijing has only continued along this trajectory of increasing liberalization of its policies since then.

Meanwhile, in South Korea, President Kim Young Sam’s enacted the *segyehwa* [globalization] campaign in the early 1990s, arguing that the most effective way for South Korea to become a world-class, advanced country was to become more integrated into the global economy. In addition to opening its door to foreign labor, it also became a major sender of immigration during this era (Yoon 2012).

Since the 1990s, South Korean immigrants have come from more diverse socioeconomic backgrounds and have headed to a more diverse set of countries, with China and Japan emerging as the most favored destinations among South Korean
travelers according to the Korea National Tourism Office. Many are transnational migrants who seek to escape the economic recession that have plagued South Korea in 1997 and the late 2000s. These transnational migrants have sought to achieve upward mobility by starting small-scaled entrepreneurial firms in these countries. Many have initially settled in Korean enclaves established by their third- and fourth-generation co-ethnics to help ease their adjustment into the host society. Within the Korean communities in Japan and China, this post-1990s wave of South Korean immigrants are widely referred to as the “newcomers” whereas their third- and fourth-generation counterparts are known as the “oldcomers.”

Prior to this wave of migration, most South Koreans who left the Korean peninsula between the 1960s and the 1980s consisted of a small group of highly educated elite primarily destined for the US (Yoon 1997). In 1962, the South Korean government encouraged contract and group migration to relieve population pressure and secure foreign currency through remittances (Kim 1981). Meanwhile in the US, the Immigration Act of 1965 opened the doors of the US to more diversified flows of immigrants from outside of Europe. As In Jin Yoon (2012) notes, the first wave of post-1965 South Korean immigrants included mostly of professionals and other highly skilled elite. The immigrant population gradually diversified socioeconomically as more Koreans sponsored the settlement of their family members through family reunification policies in the 1970s and 1980s. Immigration to the US trickled down after the Seoul Olympics in 1988 and the L.A. Riots in 1992, however (Yoon 2012). According to the 2010 US Census, about 1.4 million Koreans reside in the US today, a figure which includes a significant number of second-generation Korean Americans.
The contexts of emigration that I have just described help us better understand the nature and composition of Korean ethnic communities in China, Japan and the US from a comparative perspective. In American sociological works, Korean immigrants in the US have heralded much attention for their ability to successfully mobilize ethnic resources to attain access to alternative ladders of mobility (Light and Bonacich 1988). Like many immigrants in the US, Koreans faced structural barriers in finding mainstream jobs due to language barriers and the low market value of their foreign-earned human capital. As a result, many found themselves turning to self-employment, particularly in small business (Min 1996). As Yoon (2012) notes, a quarter of South Koreans were self-employed, making them the “highest of all national-origin groups in self-employment rates.” Korean small businesses are particularly concentrated in large cities, such as New York, Los Angeles and Chicago, where between 30 and 60 percent of the employed population are entrepreneurs (Yoon 2012).

The Korean communities in America are markedly distinct from those in Japan and China in the sense that the population is by and large made up of immigrants who have arrived in continuous waves since the late 1960s. In contrast, the Korean communities in Japan and China are characterized by two distinct types of Korean co-ethnics: the newcomers, who have arrived since the 1990s and the oldcomers, who are descendants of Koreans uprooted by the Japanese colonial regime in the early 1900s. Thus, while there are certainly generational divisions between the second-generation Korean Americans and more recent first-generation South Korean immigrants in the US, the rifts in cultural and ethnic identity that conspicuously divide the newcomer and oldcomer populations in China and Japan do not exist in the American context. This
distinction has implications for the mobilization of ethnic resources and the formation of ethnic solidarity within these communities. A topic I will delve into more deeply later on in this chapter.

Korean Enclaves in the PRC

About 2.3 million Koreans live in China today. In addition to the numerous Korean ethnic villages and autonomous districts scattered throughout the three northeastern provinces, new enclaves have formed in major cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Qingdao. Today, Korean enclaves in China are for the most part, inhabited by both first-generation South Korean migrants as well as third- and fourth-generation Korean Chinese ethnic minorities.

The Korean enclaves in the PRC differ across two dimensions: their extent of urbanization and their geographic location, or namely, whether the enclave is located within the three northeastern provinces. First, Korean enclaves that are located in major metropolitan areas such as Shanghai and Beijing attract the most upwardly mobile group of Korean ethnics from both groups. Shanghai and Beijing attract the most talented Korean Chinese youth who have matriculated into the nation’s most prestigious universities concentrated within these cities. In addition, many of the most powerful and well-established South Korean and Chinese firms have headquarters in Shanghai and Beijing. These firms recruit many of these highly skilled Korean Chinese youth once they graduate. Companies located in Shanghai and Beijing are able to benefit from the large supply of high human capital labor in the region. In contrast, firms located in the Korean enclaves in Qingdao or Shenyang, for instance, seek to hire Korean Chinese youth with
lower levels of education as they cannot afford the high pay-grades that college-educated youth are often accustomed to.

South Korean chaebol firms also dispatch high-level business executives from their Seoul headquarters to major cities such as Shanghai and Beijing, contributing to the continuous influx of high-spending South Korean consumers in enclaves located in these cities. While chaebol employees provide an important source of capital into the enclaves, they are also responsible for the rising rates of housing and costs of living within the Koreatowns. As a result, Korean entrepreneurs who open businesses in Shanghai and Beijing tend to have the highest levels of human and financial capital. At the very least, Korean entrepreneurs must be able to afford the high standards of living in these cities, and those who experience difficulty in their businesses, often move on to Korean enclaves in less economically developed regions where the financial burden of making a living is not as demanding.

Second, on a related note, most Korean entrepreneurs in Shanghai and Beijing are concentrated in the service industry, as opposed to the manufacturing sector, due to the high costs of real estate. Manufacturing firms require a large mass of land to operate their factories and consequently, expensive real estate in Shanghai and Beijing are not conducive to providing ideal environments for such firms. In addition, costs of labor in these cities are much higher than those in less developed areas. As a result, firms in Shanghai and Beijing tend to focus on industries that can make use of the plentiful supply of highly skilled labor.

Another important dimension of distinction among Korean enclaves in China consists of whether the enclave is located in Jilin, Heilongjiang or Liaoning, the three
northeastern provinces that occupied 95 percent of the Korean Chinese population prior to the massive exodus since market reforms. As expected, in these regions, the Korean Chinese population remains dominant, both in terms of numbers and their structural position. Prior to the influx of South Koreans since the 1990s, the Korean Chinese in these regions benefited from the institutional support of the Chinese state. As I have discussed in detail earlier in this dissertation, they were able to set up their own school system, minority organizations, and dominate positions in the government. While the South Koreans might have better access to financial capital, they are still in a subordinate position when compared to the Korean Chinese. Their access to power and privileges will admittedly fluctuate according to the level of influence the South Korean government has on the particular region, providing institutional support to their experiences of adaptation in these regions.

The Proliferation of Migrant Enclaves in Beijing

When Deng’s market reforms unleashed a surge of peasant migrants into the cities, these rural migrants huddled together in migrant enclaves located in the peripheries of these urban areas (see Figure 1). Chinese media reports by and large have portrayed these migrant enclaves as inner-city ghettos that have contributed to the proliferation of crime, disease, and chaos in the cities (Danvin 1996). A small line of works, however, have provided an alternative depiction of these migrant enclaves as stemming from highly organized flows of chain-migration, whereby rural migrants mobilize kinship and hometown networks to find employment and places to live in the cities (Ma and Xiang 1998; Zhang 2002).
Migrant enclaves are distinct from ethnic enclaves in the sense that they are for the most part, formed by Han Chinese. Enclaves formed by non-Han minority groups, such as the two Xinjiang villages and Koreatowns in Beijing, stand as exceptions to this general trend, however. Much like ethnic enclaves, migrant communities are organized by place of origin or “hometown” (laoxiang). Rural migrants tend to cluster together due to their “familiar home environment, identical home dialect, similar experiences and a sense of common fate” (Ma and Xiang 1998).

Different migrant enclaves specialize in particular sectors of the economy and have developed occupational niches in the city. Of the nearly 3 million rural migrants in Beijing, in 1994, individuals from Hebei (21.1%), Zhejiang (20.9%), Anhui (11.2%), Sichuan (5.6%), Jiangsu (4.8%) and Shandong (4.8%) account for over 80 percent of the total floating population in the area (Zou 1994). In Beijing, nearly 40 percent of construction workers consist of peasants from Hebei, 43 percent of entrepreneurs in small businesses are from Zhejiang, 33% of domestic workers are from Anhui and 67% of collectors of recyclable trash come from Henan (Zou 1994). This occupational specialization is largely due to the highly structured nature of chain migration among these migrants. According to Cai (1997), 75 percent of rural migrants in Jinan, a city in Shandong, found their first job through contacts provided by their relatives in their home villages, and 77 percent moved to the city in groups of two to five people. A 1994 survey on migrants in Beijing, similarly found that companies often recruited new workers through village and kinship-ties of their current employees (Zou 1994).

Among the migrant enclaves in the cities, perhaps the most frequently cited enclave is the Zhejiang enclave (Solinger 1995; Zhang 2002). Peasants from Wenzhou in
Zhejiang Prefecture have virtually monopolized the leather jacket market in Beijing, occupying a major position in the garment industry. The Zhejiang enclave in Beijing is located in the city’s outskirts, due to the lack of affordable housing in the center of the city. Migrants in the enclave exceed the number of Beijing locals by a large margin. In 1994, some 14,000 Beijing local residents lived in the area compared to the more than 96,000 migrants from Wenzhou. More than 50,000 migrants were employed in the garment industry and 75 percent of migrants originated from Yueqing City within the greater Wenzhou area.

Workers from Wenzhou are known to maintain close relationships with their bosses. Entrepreneurs tend to hire migrants from their hometown and show more personal concern for the plight of their workers. As a result of their strong social networks, access to a high demand product, and the accumulation of business know-how within this community, the Zhejiang migrants in Beijing are regarded as an extraordinarily upwardly mobile group among China scholars (Ma and Xiang 1998; Zhang 2002).

Works such as these provide important information on the nature of upward mobility among disadvantaged minorities in post reform China. Studies of migrant enclaves that have high rates of upward mobility have the potential to explain how individuals, who were formerly part of the lowest rung of society, have been able to take advantage of the opportunities afforded by the market reforms. Such works show that more human capital, one’s place of origin and access to resources cultivated by the enclave play critical roles in shaping life chances.
Figure 13. Migrant Enclaves in Beijing

![Map of Migrant Enclaves in Beijing](image)


The present study contributes to this emerging, but still underrepresented line of works by examining the Korean ethnic enclave in Beijing. The Korean enclave is distinct from other migrant enclaves in Beijing in that it is organized around shared ethnicity rather than regional hometown. The “ethnic” nature of identity leads to a distinct set of advantages and disadvantages. Undoubtedly, its greatest source of advantage lies in the fact the Korean Chinese rural migrants are connected to an existing nation-state that has become a key played in the economic development of post reform China. Unlike other migrant enclaves, the Korean enclave in Beijing benefits from a rich source of external capital that sustains the growth of the enclave economy. Rural migrants who have the
cultural and linguistic skills are able to tap into these resources even despite their low levels of education and job experience.

In addition, they are also able to benefit from the tight transnational connections to the Korean enclave has to South Korea. Korean Chinese migrants often are the recipients of remittances from family members working in South Korea, and many go overseas to gain job skills and advanced schooling. They, in turn, use these skills gain access to better jobs and become successful entrepreneurs when they return to the PRC.

But mobilizing resources is substantially different in the Korean enclave, as well. Unlike other migrant enclaves that are organized by close kinship ties and thereby, relatively homogeneous, Korean enclaves are much more heterogeneous. The strong bonds of solidarity that characterize the workplace relations in the Zhejiang enclave are noticeably absent in the Korean enclave. Korean ethnics are brought together by linguistic and cultural affinities, and subsequently, South Koreans and Korean Chinese ethnics are better characterized by weak, rather than strong, ties, to use Mark Granovetter’s (1973) terminology.

Introducing Wangjing

*Wangjing as a Neighborhood of Koreans*

The Korean enclave in Beijing is located in a neighborhood known as Wangjing, an upper-middle class residential neighborhood in the Chaoyang District of Beijing. Four major highways—the Fifth Ring Road, the Fourth Ring Road, the Airport Expressway and Daguang Expressway—border this expansive region (see Figure 14). But the
Koreatown is concentrated within the 15-mile radius surrounding Wangjing New City, where the first group of South Korean immigrants rented out apartment units in the late 1990s.

In 2009, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences estimated that about 70,000 South Koreans and about 80,000 Korean Chinese reside in Wangjing (Chosun Monthly Magazine, April 2009). Well over thirty percent of the population in this region is ethnically Korean (Spencer et al 2012). But in certain apartment complexes, such as New City, more than half of the residents are ethnically Korean. While Korean firms, shops, residential districts also extend outside this relatively small neighborhood, they become gradually less dense as one moves further away from the hub.
From the major road that New City sits on, it is hard to tell whether one has indeed entered the heart of China’s largest Koreatown. Aside from the occasional group of Korean-speaking individuals that walked by and the sprinkling of Korean-language signs that adorned a storefront here and there, I found myself hard-pressed in locating the telltale signs of the “typical” Koreatown. Where, for instance, were the densely packed streets of Korean restaurants, hair salons and grocery stores that characterized the Koreatowns in New York, Osaka and Tokyo? In Manhattan, when one asked for directions to Koreatown, they would be pointed to “Korea Way,” located on 32nd Street between Fifth Avenue and Broadway. In Tokyo, one would be led to Okubo-Doori near the Shin-Okubo Subway Station. And in Osaka, one would be directed to Myuki-Doori shopping street located in a neighborhood known as Tsuruhashi.

When I asked a South Korean shop owner near New City, how I could get to Koreatown when I first arrived in Wangjing, she looked at me momentarily with a puzzled expression on her face, and then quickly turned back to organizing her boxes. “This is Koreatown… I don’t understand where you are trying to go. Try asking someone else,” she snapped. I only understood why my question had been so strange after having lived in the enclave for several months.

Whereas Myuki-Doori, Okubo-Doori and Korea Way primarily serve as commercial districts catering to an ethnic market, Wangjing’s Koreatown is more of a residential neighborhood that boasts a high concentration of Korean inhabitants. The Koreatown is organized around these residential neighborhoods—particular high-rise apartments, such as New City—rather than a street lined with Korean shops. From my field research, it became clear that these Korean stores had initially sprouted up to cater
to the increasing number of South Koreans who lived in New City. On the outside, all one saw were a cluster of gray, cement high-rise buildings. But upon walking inside the compounds, one could find Korean-language signs seamless integrated inside the high-rise buildings that also served as places of residence.

*Residential Segregation*

In the past ten years, Wangjing has developed at impressively rapid rates. Since the construction of New City in the late 1990s, new apartment complexes have been built each year and more South Korean immigrants have moved into these new units as the became available. More stores selling imported goods from South Korea have followed the pattern set by New City, moving into the ground floors of the high-rises to cater to the Koreans living there.

According to a map published by a major Korean real estate agency, there were 44 different apartment complexes in Wangjing in 2010 (Baeyoung Real Estate, [www.mylandnet.com](http://www.mylandnet.com)). Of these apartment complexes, the ethnic Korean population is largely concentrated within eleven apartment parks that are located in the vicinity of New City. 22

The Koreans who reside in these particular apartment complexes are by and large clustered according to their demographic and cultural background. That is to say, the Korean Chinese for the most part live in the Nanhu apartments located northwest of New

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22 Through the course of my fieldwork, I have confirmed which apartments are known to have high concentrations of Korean residents by consulting with Han Chinese cab drivers, Korean Chinese minorities, South Korean immigrants, middle class Han Chinese residents, as well as Korean and Han Chinese real estate agents in the area. In addition, large South Korean churches provide a free shuttle service to the church grounds from these major neighborhoods. The shuttle stops largely correspond to the zones that I have listed here.
City. Many of the South Korean entrepreneurs who owned businesses in the enclave congregated in the two large compounds that made up New City—the 3rd and 4th Districts. The more successful South Korean entrepreneurs lived in the apartment compounds northeast of New City. And the South Korean elite who were employed by major chaebol firms lived with their families in the luxurious apartments bordering New City in the southeast known as Huading. And finally, the Han Chinese and Korean Chinese workers who took up the low-wage jobs of the Korean ethnic businesses in the enclave by and large lived in the dank basements of the 3rd and 4th Districts (see Figure 15).

**Figure 15. Map of High-Rise Apartments in Wangjing**
After having lived in Wangjing for a month or so, I quickly realized how personal it was to ask someone where in the enclave they lived. By finding out which apartment compound someone lived in, one could also, by default, gather their ethnic cultural background, social class, marital status, and also, at times, even their occupational background.

Moreover, due to the concentration of Koreans of particular backgrounds in distinct neighborhoods, the Korean enclave as a whole has become spatially differentiated according to demographic background. The Nanhu residential district, for instance, largely coincides with the Korean Chinese commercial district, and as a result, is tacitly recognized as the Korean Chinese side of the enclave. The South Korean immigrants, on the other hand, both live and socialize on the southwest corner opposite the Korean Chinese neighborhood.

Although there is some level of convergence between the two Korean communities, one expects to find South Korean-style goods and services on the South Korean side of the enclave and vice versa. In addition, while a significant number of Korean Chinese socialize, live and work in the more expensive South Korean region, very few South Koreans cross over to the Korean Chinese neighborhood within the enclave. Despite the fact that there are easily over twenty bus routes that cut through the enclave, only two travel between the Nanhu area and New City. The buses on these two routes also run rather infrequently, at an average of one every hour, in contrast to the vast majority of buses in the enclave, which come every ten to fifteen minutes.
Survey Data on Inter-Group Tensions

Friendship Networks

Given that the South Koreans and Korean Chinese live and socialize, for the most part, in distinct parts within the enclave, it is not surprising that according to my survey, 76.8 percent of South Koreans surveyed responded that they did not socialize with Korean Chinese minorities outside of the workplace. In addition, very few reported that they had Korean Chinese friends. When I asked, “How many Korean Chinese friends can you rely on during a time of need?” 49.6 percent of South Koreans responded that they did not have any Korean Chinese friends and 19.1 percent only knew of one Korean Chinese friend whom they felt they could rely on. These trends were also replicated among the Korean Chinese minorities I surveyed. When I asked, “Do you have many close South Korean friends?” 68.8 percent responded that they did not. This number is striking when compared to their friendship networks with the Han Chinese. Only 33.7 percent responded “no” when I asked the same question for Han Chinese friends.

Attitudinal Measures

Findings from the attitudinal measures of my survey further confirm the heightened tensions that characterize South Korean-Korean Chinese relations within the enclave. I presented my survey respondents with a series of statements on inter-group relations. Respondents were presented with a five-point Likert scale that ranged from strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree and strongly disagree.

From my results, it is apparent that on the one hand, the South Koreans and Korean Chinese felt that they shared a common ancestral heritage. When I asked South
Koreans to respond to the statement, “The Korean Chinese have more in common with the South Koreans than they do with the Han Chinese,” 54.9 percent agreed or strongly agreed. An additional 31.3 percent were neutral, but only a small minority disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement. When I presented the Korean Chinese with the statement, a striking 78.4 percent of respondents either agreed or strongly agreed to the statement.

On the other hand, I found that both South Koreans and Korean Chinese felt ambivalent about whether they belonged to the same ethnic group. To the statement, “The Korean Chinese are members of our country” [조선족은 우리 나라 사람 이다], the South Koreans surveyed were more or less evenly distributed across the five-point scale. Similarly, the Korean Chinese were also evenly distributed in their response to the statement, “I feel more close and intimate to the South Koreans than the Han Chinese.”

In addition, my survey results demonstrate that the South Koreans and Korean Chinese also felt uneasy about interacting with each other. For instance, only a little less than 20 percent of South Koreans felt that it was easy to become close friends with Korean Chinese minorities, and only 13 percent of the Korean Chinese surveyed did not feel uncomfortable when interacting with the South Koreans.

My survey results also confirmed my anticipation that South Koreans by and large experienced difficulty trusting their Korean Chinese co-ethnics, particularly in the workplace. On the one hand, an overwhelming majority, or more specifically, 72.1 percent, of South Koreans responded that they believed that they needed the help of Korean Chinese minorities in order to survive in the PRC. But on the other hand, 59 percent of South Koreans also agreed or strongly agreed to the statement, “South Koreans
are victims to opportunistic behavior of the Korean Chinese.” In addition, only 12.3 percent of South Koreans trusted the Korean Chinese more than they trusted the Han Chinese. South Koreans also by and large felt cynical about whether their Korean Chinese co-ethnics trusted them in return. To the statement, “The Korean Chinese do not trust their South Korean co-ethnics,” 54 percent agree or strongly agreed, 27.1 percent were neutral, and 18.8 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed.

The Transnational Enclave and the Transference of Stereotypes

On August 1996, Korean Chinese minorities onboard the Peskama, a South Korean fishing boat in the South Pacific, were charged with the murder of seven South Koreans and three Indonesians (Chosun Daily, August 26, 1996). The Korean Chinese had left their posts as teachers in the Chinese countryside to find employment opportunities in South Korea. They had arranged to work on the fishing vessel in exchange for a means to get to their former homeland. The South Korean fishermen, however, physically and verbally abused the Korean Chinese workers when they became frustrated with the unsatisfactory levels of productivity of their Korean Chinese workers. The Korean Chinese, in response, felt trapped, without a means to escape their situation on sea as well as the piles of debt they had incurred by signing the contracts they had made with the brokers who had promised them a life in South Korea.

This high profile media story brought to light the severity of tensions forming between the South Koreans and Korean Chinese. The Korean Chinese community expressed outrage towards the remorseless South Koreans who perpetuate slave-like
conditions for Korean Chinese workers in their former ethnic homeland. One Korean
Chinese novelist captured the frustration of the minority community poignantly.

Among those who have worked in South Korean deep-sea fishing vessels, there are few who say
they like South Koreans. They were not treated as human beings, being beaten and scolded…
Resentment does reside in the heart of the Korean Chinese. We are just poorer than the South
Koreans. Why do they treat us like slaves? Have they ever thought about the fact that the ancestors
of the Korean Chinese fought for Korean Independence [during Japanese annexation of the
Korean peninsula]? How could South Korean companies in China prosper without the Korean
Chinese? It was a fratricidal tragedy and a tremendous shock. Two million Korean Chinese are
waiting, suppressing their resentment. Until when can we put up with this? (Choi 2001)

The South Koreans, by contrast, expressed their shock and anger in numerous op-ed
articles of major South Korean newspapers during the time of the murder (Song 2009).

This highly publicized criminal case was only one of many media reports
demonstrating South Korean hostility towards the Korean Chinese minorities. Between
1998 and 2011, Chosun Daily, a major South Korean newspaper with a circulation of 2
million people published 1,034 articles that mentioned Korean Chinese in conjunction
with the word “problem.” Other words commonly used in articles about the Korean
Chinese included “police” (718 articles), “illegal” (549 articles), “crime” (232) articles,
“murder” (155 articles) and “assault” (116 articles). Descriptive accounts of the Korean
Chinese in South Korea also attest to the rampant negative media images of the Korean
Chinese ethnic minorities (Park 1996; Moon 2000; Song 2009).

Heh-Rhan Park’s (1996) dissertation research demonstrates that while the Seoul
News referred the Korean Chinese as the “hyoruk” (“blood-shared family”) in the 1980s
when the South Korean government welcomed the Korean Chinese who first visited the
homeland to reunite with their long-lost relatives, by the 1990s, the South Korean media
depicted the Korean Chinese as illegal migrant workers and criminals. Korean Chinese
women who had married South Korean bachelors in the countryside were portrayed as
“women obsessed with material wealth who are willing to transgress all moral principles and threaten the very basis of Korean identity” (Park 1996).

The power dynamics and labor relations of the Korean Chinese and the South Koreans in South Korea, of course, play out differently in China. In the PRC, Han Chinese rural migrants mainly occupy low-wage labor positions whereas the Korean Chinese, in contrast, have more opportunities in semi-skilled and managerial positions due to the high demand for their bilingual skills. But while the Korean Chinese in Beijing do not endure the exploitation and explicit discrimination their counterparts encounter in South Korea, they are still deeply affected by the abuses that occur abroad.

As I have mentioned earlier in this dissertation, the Korean enclave in Beijing is a transnational community in the sense that it remains tightly integrated with and profoundly affected by the people and activities of the homeland. In particular, the negative stereotypes and media images of the Korean Chinese minorities that are formed in South Korea continue to impact co-ethnic relations with the Korean enclave in Beijing. Here, I want to highlight four structural factors intrinsic to transnational enclaves that account for this trend.

First, many of the civic organizations within the South Korean community, and to a lesser extent, the Korean Chinese community, are funded and institutionally sponsored by powerful organizations in South Korea. In particular the church. South Korean missionaries try to reach the Chinese population by funding Korean Chinese churches around the enclave. Most South Korean churches in Wangjing are also funded by South Korean host churches. Interactions with South Korean tourists, short-term missionaries, and speakers is common.
Second, on a related note, a large proportion of the South Korean population consists of short-term sojourners who have arrived in Beijing relatively recently. These South Korean sojourners import with them stereotypes of the Korean Chinese as second-class citizens to the enclave. In addition, this section of the population is by and large no dependent on the Korean Chinese for any type of help, and so they have even less of an incentive to tone down their negative impressions of the Korean Chinese in Beijing.

Third, most of the Korean Chinese in South Korea are circular migrants who visit and send remittances to China regularly. Subsequently, many Korean Chinese minorities in the PRC are exposed to South Korean discrimination either through their own personal experiences, or indirectly through the experiences of a family member or close friend. According to my survey data of the Korean Chinese population, 87 percent of my Korean Chinese sampling had family members working in South Korea. One Korean Chinese woman in her early 20s depicted this transference of negative media perceptions during an interview.

A lot of Korean Chinese mothers go to South Korea to work as manual laborers. Whether it be working as a domestic worker or as a janitor or at a hospital. There are a lot of people like that and it was hard for me to deal with this fact when I was young. [I thought to myself], why do Korean Chinese individuals have to live like this even though we are of the same ethnicity [as South Koreans]. My mother and my friends’ parents would tell me how South Koreans would mistreat the Korean Chinese and how they would discriminate against us. So I became worried that South Koreans would discriminate against me too if they could hear from my accent that I was Korean Chinese. So when I was young, I didn’t want to feel inferior to them. I wanted to have better possessions than they did… because I didn’t really understand my identity back then. I wondered why I had to be poorer than they did. Why did I have to live amidst numerous Korean Chinese mothers who were looked down upon [by the South Koreans]? I desperately wanted to show them that among Korean Chinese individuals, there were people who were kind and smart, too.

In addition, it is highly likely that South Korean immigrants in China have already been tainted by prejudiced images of Korean Chinese minorities as poor, second-class citizens even prior to their actual encounters with the Korean Chinese in China.
Reification of Stereotypes in Everyday Life

South Koreans in Beijing grapple with understanding how to define the Korean Chinese minorities in the enclave. Prior to coming to the PRC, they are largely ignorant of the existence of the Korean Chinese minorities despite the fact that these ethnic minorities have in the past decade become a significant minority population in South Korea, as well. As one South Korean man I worked with closely in the enclave put it:

I was really curious about what kind of people the Korean Chinese minorities were [prior to coming to Beijing]. Why do they know how to speak Korean? How are these people able to carry on a conversation with me even though they are Chinese [중국 사람]? How come they are in China? I was curious about things like that but, honestly, because I didn’t really have many opportunities to come across them [in Korea], I was more or less indifferent about their existence.

Due to this type of widespread indifference towards the Korean Chinese population, South Koreans are particularly susceptible to mainstream media depictions of the Chinese and the Korean Chinese in forming their impressions of these groups.

Interestingly, the South Korean immigrants that I encountered in the field exhibited a tendency to conflate their impressions of the Korean Chinese with those of the PRC, in general. By and large, they saw the PRC as an uncivilized, Third World country that was over run with cheap goods and deceptive people. For instance, Hee-Won, a thirty-something South Korean woman who worked for a large South Korean conglomerate in the outskirts of the enclave explained that she had chose to come to Beijing to learn Chinese in order to further her prospects for the job market.

All of the major South Korean conglomerates are offering better wages and benefits to individuals who can speak Chinese because they are really eager to tap into the Chinese consumer market… So I came here for my career. Before I came, I saw China as an underdeveloped country… like a country that is still uncivilized, you know? So to be honest, I had a really negative image of China before I came. But I thought that it would still help me out in the long run, so even though I didn’t really have a good impression of China, I still came because I like feeling challenged and adapting to new environments.
When I asked Hee-Won what type of image she had of the PRC in particular, she answered:

Like from the Internet and other forms of mass media. For instance, you know how we use a lot of products… and foods from China, right? So if something was made in China, we expect it to break really fast. Or, if we buy food imported from China… from the media, we are exposed to a lot of weird stuff… to give you an example, like chicken feet… they were showing Chinese women eating chicken feet… but how can I explain it… they were ripping off the skin of the chicken and the way they were filmed, the really looked uncivilized. It was kind of disgusting. There were a lot of pictures of those women on the Internet. Or, there was this news story about a sandwich that was imported from China, and from the outside, it looked like there were eggs and ham like any other ordinary sandwich, but once you opened up the sandwich, there was nothing inside. There were only the trimmings of eggs and ham… So most of the pictures and news stories on China I came across on the Internet and TV were along these lines. It’s really common for Koreans to associate their impressions of the Chinese with something that is uncivilized, low-quality, underdeveloped, inferior, boisterous and so on.

Thus, while the South Korean immigrants often see China as the land of opportunity, at the same time, they look down on the PRC and differentiate themselves as people from a more civilized and wealthy society. To the South Koreans, comparing the economic statuses of their homeland to China was a way of bolstering their pride and identity as South Korean nationals.

Perhaps because the South Koreans I interacted with in the enclave were all aware of the fact that I was simultaneously also deeply involved in the Korean Chinese community, very few explicitly articulated their disdain for the Korean Chinese ethnic minorities. In front of me, they regarded the Korean Chinese as our “dongpo” or “co-ethnic brothers.” But when I went out with my Korean Chinese friends to South Korean-owned restaurants and shops, I often stumbled upon subtly derogatory comments and behavior cloaked in polite speech towards the Korean Chinese. For instance, when I told a South Korean shop owner that the woman I was with was actually a Korean Chinese ethnic minority, she exclaimed, “But she looks so neat and fashionable. I thought for sure you were both South Korean!” Or when I walked into a tea store I frequented to have tea with the Korean Chinese store manager and his South Korean customers, the South
Koreans would often make a remark along the lines of how the Korean Chinese manager was so unlike other Korean Chinese minorities they knew in that he was so gentle, soft-spoken, polite and cultured. Similarly, when a South Korean minister introduced me to a young Korean Chinese couple, he made it a point to mention to me on several occasions how the couple was highly educated and intellectual. I wondered if the same couple had been South Korean, if he would have thought it necessary to emphasize these traits to me to the extent that he had.

Moreover, the Korean Chinese minorities I encountered in the field had no shortage of stories and experiences that illustrated how they felt simultaneously excluded and perceived as inferior by the South Koreans due to their Chinese upbringing. Joo-Mi, a Korean Chinese entrepreneur who had lived and worked in Seoul prior to settling down in Beijing explained to me how she had perpetually felt like an outsider in South Korea. She felt that South Koreans pitied her for having been raised in the impoverished Chinese countryside. Joo-Mi was thoroughly offended by such perceptions, however.

When I went out to the markets to buy food, once people found out that I was from China, they would ask me if I had ever eaten meat before or if I had eat fruit back home. They clearly saw China as a poor country where people barely had enough food to survive.

From the comments made to her, it was painfully clear to Joo-Mi that the South Koreans were ignorant of the actual living conditions in China. They had exaggerated views of poverty that the rural Chinese endured, and moreover, associated her first and foremost with these images of abject poverty. And for Joo-Mi who worked long hours for low wages as a waitress of a small restaurant in Seoul and whose mother also worked as a manual laborer at a South Korean factory at the time, these comments were all the more painful because she was aware that she and her family occupied the bottom rungs of South Korean society.
Joo-Mi and I became close friends after attending the same bible study for several months and she often invited me out to drink with her Korean Chinese friends in the evenings. But though we became close, because Joo-Mi and her friends had a difficult time disassociating me with my South Korean accent and mannerisms, they seemed constantly preoccupied with the anxiety that I would view them as pitiful, impoverished Korean Chinese minorities. The following excerpt from my field notes illustrates this dynamic.

The following day, I went out to drink with two women from my bible study. They were both slightly older than me. One woman, Joo-Mi, was a single mother and the other was married to a Korean Chinese man who worked in Tianjin. Both of them were relatively well off socioeconomically. Joo-Mi had been going through an especially difficult time emotionally. She was upset by some issues at home, which she would not talk about in detail, and by the fact that her landlord wanted to raise the rent by 500 RMB. We drank and had chicken wings at a run-down joint by my house. They seemed concerned that I would feel uncomfortable there since the restaurant looked so decrepit. They kept on asking me if I was ok and were concerned with how I would feel about using the bathroom, which apparently was quite dirty. I tried my best to put them at ease, telling them I ate at local Chinese restaurants that were more run-down than this one all the time. After we had drunk about five bottles of beer and were ready to leave, I tried to get the check but they wouldn’t let me. What was interesting though, was that they kept on telling me, ‘We’re not poor. We can afford to eat out like this, too. You don’t have to worry about it. Do you think we’re poor?’ I responded, in turn, ‘It’s not that I am worried that you can’t foot the bill. I just know that Joo-Mi is going through a hard time and so I wanted to treat her because I wanted to show her that I cared about her.’

The experience I had at the local bar with Joo-Mi and the other Korean Chinese woman from my bible study was by no means an isolated event. Money was perpetually a central issue in my relationships with many Korean Chinese minorities, particularly because I was perceived as a South Korean. Spending large amounts of money in front of my Korean Chinese friends could easily be seen as offensive and arrogant. And though we were friends, showing my discomfort of the run-down conditions of local restaurants, stores, bathrooms and so on, could also be perceived as offensive. By expressing disdain for the poor conditions of Chinese shops, I was in effect, affirming that I viewed China
was an underdeveloped country and also, by default, that I also looked down on the Korean Chinese as people associated with this disheveled and impoverished environment.

It is easy to see, however, how such a dynamic can make it extremely difficult for a South Korean not to say anything that could be perceived as offensive to their Korean Chinese counterparts. One negative comment or reaction made about anything related to China could potentially be interpreted as a negative comment about the Korean Chinese, themselves. The following statement made by a Korean Chinese minority demonstrates this tendency.

I know it’s not fair of me, but I react more sensitively to things that South Koreans say to me. I think it’s because I have a bias that they look down on us Korean Chinese. Once, I was leading a group of South Korean tourists around major sites in Beijing, and one of the men in my group said something like, ‘Wow I never knew that there were so many nice European cars in Beijing, too.’ I was really offended by what he said because he seemed to imply that China was still backwards and underdeveloped. But then later on, he said that he had visited Beijing ten years ago, and back then, there were a lot of bicycles and not as many cars. I thought about it and what he said made sense. I know that I was being a little over-sensitive with him because he was South Korean, but I can’t help it. When a South Korean starts to make a comment about China, it kind of makes me put my guard up instinctively. That’s just the way things are for us Korean Chinese.

My interviewee admitted that her initial interpretation of the South Korean man’s observation of the surprising number of luxury vehicles in Beijing was negative. Upon hearing his comment, she immediately jumped to the conclusion that the South Korean was implying that China is a poor, underdeveloped country. Moreover, she instinctively interpreted the notion that the PRC was underdeveloped with South Korean views on Chinese people, and also, by default, Korean Chinese minorities in general. Later on, by speaking to him at more length, however, the woman realized that he had been making a simple observation rather than making a derogatory comment on China and the Korean Chinese.

Assumptions that the South Koreans looked down on the Korean Chinese as Chinese nationals and as outsiders who could not be trusted, often complicated social
interactions between the South Koreans and the Korean Chinese in the enclave. On the one hand, it caused the Korean Chinese to react more sensitively to comments that in other settings could be passed off without a second thought. This tendency also fueled at times, hypersensitivity on the part of South Koreans to act cautiously when interacting with the Korean Chinese. As one South Korean man noted:

> When I see a Korean Chinese person, sometimes, I want to go over and start a conversation with him. But then, I think to myself, what if he thinks that I am suspicious or strange for wanting to talk to him for no apparent reason. What if he realizes that I am South Korean and feels intimidated by me… I want to go over and talk to him and become friends with him not because I want help with something, but because he knows how to speak Korean [and can communicate with me], but I often feel silly for feeling these things. I feel like I would cause more problems if I did [go over and start a conversation].

What is interesting about my conversation with this South Korean man was the fact that he assumed that it was strange and out of ordinary for a South Korean man to want to talk and act friendly towards a Korean Chinese minority without any ulterior motives. In a sense, my South Korean friend’s reaction reflected the fears of most well intentioned South Koreans in the enclave. Throughout my interactions with both Korean Chinese and South Korean individuals in Beijing, I found that the bulk of relationships between South Koreans and Korean Chinese were born out of necessity. South Koreans sought out the help of the Korean Chinese in order to navigate the Chinese foreign environment, and the Korean Chinese interacted with the South Koreans in the context of providing them linguistic and cultural assistance despite the fact that they disliked their South Korean co-ethnics in exchange for some type of material gain.

Divisions Within the Workplace

> While they are not as vulnerable to exploitation as their counterparts in South Korea, because many Korean Chinese heavily depend on the South Koreans for
employment and economic sustenance, South Korean discrimination of Korean Chinese minorities continues to be reinforced by interactions that are structured along class-based lines. The Korean Chinese, who have migrated to urban areas within China, overwhelmingly rely on their connections to South Korean immigrants to make a living. Middle-aged Korean Chinese women work as domestic workers for South Korean families. Upwardly mobile Korean Chinese entrepreneurs depend heavily on South Korean clientele to sustain their small-scaled businesses. Young, college-educated Korean Chinese minorities work for large or medium-sized South Korean corporations in various cities in China. Korean Chinese men with lower educational attainment are heavily recruited to work as managers for restaurants, grocery stores, real estate agencies, and other small-scaled retail stores owned by South Korean immigrants.

Only rarely can one find Korean Chinese individuals who are in more authoritative or powerful positions than the South Koreans they are interacting with. Few South Koreans are willing to work under Korean Chinese entrepreneurs who have become successful, and those South Koreans who have become bankrupt or failed at their businesses leave the enclave. As a result, those South Koreans who remain active participants of the business activities in the enclave are overwhelmingly in positions of power, either as employers, managers or customers.

The imbalanced power dynamics between South Koreans and the Korean Chinese in the work place have become so taken-for-granted among individuals that being South Korean has become a symbol of a certain social class, and individuals who are Korean Chinese are automatically assumed to be of a lower class regardless of other status.
markers that might indicate otherwise. A South Korean woman interviewed by the author lucidly articulates how this dynamic plays out at a Korean ethnic church in Beijing.

In the eyes of South Koreans, the Korean Chinese only appear subordinate to them because of this context. They [South Koreans] do not feel that they are on equal terms with the Korean Chinese no matter how poorly educated a South Korean is… At our church, there is a Korean Chinese young woman who is married to a South Korean man. She graduated from a very elite university in Beijing. When she goes back to her hometown, they had banners with her name and university on it because they were so proud of her accomplishments… even people as elite as her are looked down upon by South Koreans by virtue of being Korean Chinese… when they speak, the South Korean’s have these types of facial expressions [she crinkles her forehead and squints]… You can tell from their facial expressions [that they are prejudiced]. Also, you can tell by the way they treat them [Korean Chinese]. To other people they’re so warm and friendly, and brusque towards the Korean Chinese and walk past them… I think this type of behavior comes from a subconscious prejudice that South Koreans have that the Korean Chinese are of a lower class.

Furthermore, because Korean Chinese minorities are hired by South Koreans primarily for their familiarity with Korean culture and bilingual skills, South Koreans often see Korean Chinese workers as an expendable labor force and undermine the role of Korean Chinese intermediaries in contributing to the success of their businesses regardless of their different levels of human capital.23 One exasperated Korean Chinese minority made a poignant analogy between instant ramen and the manner by which South Korean employers treat Korean Chinese workers in China. During an interview, this individual complained that the South Koreans use the Korean Chinese when they need help, but discard their co-ethnic brethren when they find other ways of better satisfying their needs.

Still, despite the fact class conflicts impede cohesion and solidarity of the Korean ethnic community in China, South Koreans and the Korean Chinese continue to live within the contours of the same ethnic enclave. They live in the same neighborhoods, go

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23 According to fieldwork conducted by the author at a major South Korean conglomerate in Beijing, even Korean Chinese minorities who had prestigious degrees from Beijing University or Qinghua University were hired primarily to translate documents from Korean to Mandarin and to work as intermediaries between the more senior South Korean and other lower-level Han Chinese employees. The more “highly skilled” technical labor was outsourced to the Han Chinese. No Korean Chinese workers at this firm held positions higher than section manager. Of course, there were exceptions to this case and the author encountered a few Korean Chinese workers who held more senior-level positions at other South Korean corporations in China. However, these individuals were clearly in the minority particularly in the more established firms.
to the same grocery stores, eat at the same restaurants and work at the same firms. And without a doubt, the fact that the Korean Chinese and South Koreans eat, work and play in overlapping social spaces is not due to coincidence, but rather shared ethnicity. Despite tensions that have arisen out of disparities in power and class, South Koreans and Korean Chinese still feel a lingering emotional bond due to a shared ancestral heritage. An excerpt from a Korean Chinese novelist, Ryun-Soon Ha’s (1992) “Seoul Wind” [서울바람] depicts these tensions between class conflict and ethnic solidarity particularly well. The author poignantly articulates how the tensions between the South Koreans and the Korean Chinese go beyond simple class conflicts. The betrayal that she argues the Korean Chinese minorities feel is complicated, precisely because the co-ethnics are bound by strong emotions due to their shared ancestral heritage.

Why must the Korean compatriots in China, who were born connected by the umbilical of one ancestral lineage, come to the homeland where the bones of our ancestors were buried to endure irreversible suffering and grief? Does the suffering come from economic disparities? If it merely came down to that, then ours would be an extravagant suffering. Ancestral lineage is a tenacious and frightening thing. In spite of the bitter hardships we endured in our tedious everyday lives, we yearned for our homeland and we yearned for our parents and brethren. And because we yearned so fervently, we started to shuttle back and forth in our shabby appearances to our homeland, sneaking in medicinal herbs [to sell on the streets]. We lost our voices as we shed tears when we were reunited with our parents and brethren. Entangled in sorrow and happiness, our tears were untainted, pure and sincere. However, they did not cry. Their apathetic and unemotional eyes only watched us coldly. Their cold eyes were something I had never seen before. The bitter chills of mid-autumn [enveloped my body].

While every ethnic enclave deals with class tensions, how class affects the Korean ethnic enclave in Beijing is unique in that class becomes conflated with ethnicity such that Korean Chinese becomes equated with a “different” type of ethnicity to South Koreans. This sense of betrayal among the Korean Chinese undoubtedly influences social interactions with South Koreans and the nature of work relations between Korean Chinese minorities and South Koreans in South Korean firms in China.
South Korean-Han Chinese Tensions in Wangjing

The Han Chinese who live in Wangjing by and large have negative impressions of the South Koreans, as well. The South Koreans are viewed as aloof and arrogant and their presence is tolerated because of the wealth and capital they bring to Wangjing.

While a small minority of Han Chinese individuals in Wangjing have taken the effort to learn Korean and understand Korean culture to facilitate their interactions with their South Korean employers or clients, these instances are too rare to merit considerable attention. From my interviews and interactions with the Han Chinese living and working in the enclave, I have found that the Han Chinese by and large have little more than superficial interactions with the South Koreans. For the most part, the Chinese locals are uninterested in forming relationships with the South Koreans that extend beyond their immediate needs. For instance, the following excerpt from an interview with a native Beijing man below demonstrates these trends. This particular Han Chinese man had settled in the Korean enclave to work as a “black car driver” [黑车司机], the term used for illegal taxis in Beijing, for mostly South Korean clients since 1998.

Interviewer: What percentage of your clients would you say are South Korean?
Driver: Probably half and half.

Interviewer: Wow, 50 percent of your clients are South Korean? …For most of your South Korean clients, do they usually call you personally to ask you to come and pick them up or are your clients mostly random people who just hail you from the streets?

Driver: Mostly, they call.

Interviewer: What do you usually talk about while you drive them to their destination?

Driver: What can we talk about? I have a low-status job. If someone asks me something, then I’ll give him a response. We can talk about whatever they [my clients] want to talk about.

Interviewer: What do they usually ask about?
Driver: What do you mean, what do they ask? It’s just small talk.

Interviewer: Then, are there things about China that they are curious about?

Driver: If there’s something they’re interested in it’s that the living costs are so high. The living costs in China are high [compared to before].

Interviewer: Do you ever initiate a conversation with them?

Driver: Me? In general, I don’t. If someone asks me something, I’ll answer. If they ask me something that I can’t give a clear answer to, then I’ll avoid going into that topic. That’s the way it goes, wouldn’t you agree?

Interviewer: What kind of impressions do you have of the South Koreans?

Driver: Some are nice; others are just so-so.

Interviewer: What do you mean some are nice and others are so-so? How are they nice?

Driver: I can tell just by chatting with them. Some look down on us [for being Chinese], some have tempers, some are really laid back, and so on. Some are not good people; they’re condescending. Even though they are [inaudible], they have no right to look down on me. If they want to look down on China, then why did they come to China in the first place?

It is noteworthy that despite the fact that the man my Han Chinese assistant had interviewed had been working for South Korean clients in the Korean enclave for nearly twenty-five years, his relationships with the South Koreans did not go beyond his call of a duty as their driver. In all his years working in Wangjing, he mentioned later on in the interview that he only had one South Korean friend to speak of. In general, it is fair to say that he was not interested in developing a relationship with the South Koreans and actually avoided speaking to them even though it is evident that this native Beijinger mostly relied on long-term contacts for business as most of his assignments were arranged not randomly, but by personal contact. Moreover, it is likely that the driver’s lack of desire in getting to know his South Korean clients was driven by suspicion that the South Koreans looked down on China, rather than solely due to a language barrier. This Chinese driver’s experience is hardly exceptional. Nor is his impression of the
arrogance of the South Koreans merely reflective of the status gap between him and his South Korean clients.

The following interaction my Han Chinese research assistant and I had with a Han Chinese resident of New City, also demonstrates similar attitudes of apathy and disinterest towards the South Korean immigrants. When my research assistant heard that a lot of South Korean immigrant children attended the local Chinese elementary school that the elderly man’s grandson went to, she asked:

**Interviewer:** Does your grandson have South Korean friends?

**Resident:** No. He’s too young.

**Interviewer:** None? Then, do you socialize with any of your South Korean neighbors?

**Resident:** I [pause] don’t really [pause] don’t [pause]… I guess, I talk to some who are nice. There’s a foot massage parlor in front of where I live and an old [Korean] couple comes over sometimes to hang out.

**Interviewer:** Wow. So would you say that get along with them?

**Resident:** Yeah.

**Interviewer:** So what do you think about them?

**Resident:** I [pause] it’s just [pause] small talk. Our relationship isn’t all that deep.

**Interviewer:** Ah, I see. Your contact with them isn’t all that deep. But how do you feel about them?

**Resident:** There are a few who seem nice. But for the most part, they’re not all that good. For instance, in the evenings, over there in the West gate [of New City], and then there’s also a small shop, it gets really lively. They drink a lot. [inaudible] There’s a lot of loud yelling.

**Interviewer:** I see…

**Resident:** It’s usually really busy and crowded around here. It’s all because of those South Koreans. But the people who are doing business are all Chinese… It’s so loud that it’s hard to fall asleep at night.

In this case, the man that we interviewed was an elderly Han Chinese man who had migrated to Beijing from Hebei in 1965, and then, moved to Wangjing in 2000. Earlier in the interview, the elderly man remarked that when he had bought his current apartment
unit in New City in 2000, there had not been many South Koreans in his neighborhood at the time, but that in the past ten years, more and more South Koreans have moved in. He told us in dismay that most of his neighbors today were South Korean.

Like the Han Chinese driver introduced earlier, this Han Chinese resident had little interest in forming relationships with his South Korean neighbors even though he had lived in the area for more than ten years. In addition, his reasons for not wanting to establish a deeper relationship with his South Korean neighbors resembled the sentiments of the Han Chinese driver, as well. Both held negative impressions of the South Koreans and these negative stereotypes discouraged them from pursuing more involved interactions with the immigrants. It was thus, not merely that these Han Chinese faced a linguistic barrier in communicating with the South Koreans that perpetuated their disconnect from the immigrant community, but rather, their avoidance of the South Koreans was driven mostly by their preconceived notions of the South Koreans as arrogant and disruptive of their community. Moreover, these descriptive accounts are further buttressed by secondary research demonstrating negative views of South Koreans in the PRC (Rozman 2012, Gryes 2012).
Chapter 6. Are We in This Together? Solidarity in the Church

Sociological research has long demonstrated that the church plays a central role in the lives of immigrant minorities. The church is not only a place of worship, but it is also an important civic organization through which minorities network, mobilize resources, share information, and cultivate solidarity. As I have explained at length earlier in this dissertation, prior sociological research on the enclave demonstrates that civic organizations play important roles in cultivating mechanisms of mobility—bounded solidarity and enforceable trust—among co-ethnics in the enclave (Portes and Zhou 1993). This chapter examines how increasing transnationalism might affect the formation of these important mechanisms of mobility within the enclave through an in-depth comparison of a South Korean church and a Korean Chinese church.

The church plays a significant role in providing social services and resources to marginalized populations, particularly in the PRC, where the Communist state has gradually weakened over the years. Churches in China have grown rapidly to fill an important social and emotional need in the lives of its citizens. In the words of one Korean pastor:

Since 1972, when [Chinese politician] Lin Biao was overthrown and killed, the Communist government also collapsed. Regardless of what they might say, they [Communist government officials] don’t study Communist ideology when they meet anymore. The state might use Communist doctrine to unite the people, but its used more as a means to an end. In reality, there is a void in the hearts of the [Chinese] people. There’s a strong thirst for religion [in China]. And in addition, with the market reforms, while the government was responsible for everything before, now, individuals might find their own means for survival. Some are able to find their own means, but another group of people are increasingly alienated…

According to this pastor, the church fills both an emotional and material void for those living in China—a void that has emerged with the weakening of Communist ideology and state. During Mao’s reign, Communist ideology provided individuals with a source
of emotional motivations for their lives. In addition, the government provided for the material well being of its people by rationing out housing, food and other social welfare resources through its redistributive system. With market reforms, however, individuals have had to fend for themselves. And while the urban elite have experienced few problems in supplying their own housing, food, healthcare, education and so on, for the disadvantaged, conditions of everyday life have worsened since the economic reforms (Davis and Feng 2009). In addition, whereas NGOs and other non-profit organizations have worked to provide social welfare services to the disadvantaged in countries, in China, these types of social services remain as of yet, under developed. Within such an environment, the church plays an important role in the lives of Korean Chinese minorities and South Korean immigrants in filling both emotional and material needs.

By no means do all South Koreans and Korean Chinese minorities attend church, but for a significant proportion of the population, the church embodies, by far, the most central organization in the community. For both South Korean and Korean Chinese churches in the enclave, church involvement does not end with Sunday worship once a week, but often includes a wide range of activities such as Friday night prayer meetings, small group bible study meetings, Wednesday night “women’s group” (여성교회) meetings, choir rehearsals, leadership training, outreach programs and so forth. Most churches also hold daily prayer meetings every morning starting from five or six am to encourage individuals to start their day with prayer before going off to their respective jobs.

When I asked one South Korean woman why she saw the church as such a powerful force in the everyday lives of people who were involved, she replied:
You can’t look at how a person’s involvement in one group [at church] affects his life. I believe that it’s our involvement in a variety of groups that brings about real change—whether it be through Wednesday women’s group meetings, or daily early morning prayer meetings, or eating breakfast together after Saturday morning family prayer meetings.

In describing more concretely, the extent to which individuals are engaged in the church, she said:

People who are actively serving the church spend more than ten hours at church each week. For instance, on Sundays, activities start at 8 am. We come at around 7:50 or 8:00 am to pray, read the bible and prepare for Sunday worship service. Worship begins at 10:20 am. Most people who come to the morning worship service are involved in other activities in the afternoon, during afternoon worship service. So, in the afternoon, they serve in their particular groups, and those who are in the choir or praise team practice for next week starting 3:00 pm. So in total, for people like me, on Sundays alone, we spend about 7 hours at church. And on Wednesdays, I am one of the small group leaders for the women’s meetings so on Wednesday, I come to church by 9:00 am. The activities begin at 10:00 am, but I come by 9:00 am to prepare and when our meeting ends it is around 12:00 in the afternoon. And then on Saturdays, I am involved in Family Prayer Meetings and breakfast at church in the morning and then in the afternoon, we have choir practice… on Mondays, the church is open for individuals to come and pray on their own. On Tuesdays, we have intercessory prayer meetings. On Wednesdays, there is the women’s group and on Thursdays, we have our outreach program, and on Fridays, there is small group bible study meetings…

As my survey statistics from Table 16 demonstrate, while it is not uncommon for South Koreans in the enclave to be involved in civic organizations outside of the church, their time commitments to activities at church clearly outweigh their commitments to activities in other civic organizations combined. Nearly 40 percent of the South Koreans who participated in my survey spent more than six hours at church each week. In contrast, only about 10 percent of the same population spent the same amount of time in other organizations outside of the church.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 16. Number of Hours Spent Each Week in Civic Organizations (S. Koreans in Beijing)</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1 to 2 hrs.</th>
<th>3 to 6 hrs.</th>
<th>6 to 10 hrs.</th>
<th>10 hrs. or more</th>
<th>Total N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Church</td>
<td>36 (9.5%)</td>
<td>70 (18.5%)</td>
<td>125 (33%)</td>
<td>70 (18.5%)</td>
<td>78 (20.6%)</td>
<td>379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Church Org.</td>
<td>131 (34.9%)</td>
<td>121 (32.3%)</td>
<td>84 (22.4%)</td>
<td>26 (6.9%)</td>
<td>13 (3.5 %)</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A South Korean woman I interviewed went on to point out that this extent of involvement at church was specific to their situation in the enclave in Beijing:

So, actually, you could come to church everyday of the week if you wanted to. In Korea, it’s not easy to become so involved. You have to go to work and there are a lot of things to take care of. But here, we’re only here temporarily, so I feel like we feel like there are less distractions and we can commit ourselves more fully to church.

In South Korea, many of the women, in particular, had commitments outside the church. They had their own social circles and personal responsibilities to run errands and take care of their children. In Beijing, these South Korean women are able to outsource their domestic work to Korean Chinese and Han Chinese low-wage workers. In addition, both South Koreans and Korean Chinese seek to integrate themselves in the new environment where they otherwise feel lost. There are few civic organizations that rival the institutional complexity and size of the church in the enclave. And as a result, for many Koreans, the church serves as the primary social institution.

From my field research on the Korean Chinese churches, I found that for many of the same reasons, the church played just as critical a role in their community as well. Prior to economic reforms, Chinese Census Data shows that the vast majority of Korean Chinese minorities lived in tightly knit ethnic villages that were isolated from the Han Chinese society in the countryside. Back in their hometown, the Korean Chinese were involved in a variety of communal activities, just by virtue of their living arrangements. In the cities, however, the Korean Chinese do not have access to this extensive set of organizations. Most compensate by meeting together in underground churches. Moreover, although many Korean Chinese who attend church in Beijing also had attended underground churches back in their hometown, a significant fraction are drawn to these churches not necessarily because they are Christian, but because they seek the
type of ethnic community that they had grown up in prior to the reforms. I will delve more deeply into the types of consequences that these distinctions have had later in this chapter.

This chapter is based on extensive ethnographic and interview data conducted primarily from two types of churches in the enclave—a South Korean state-sanctioned church and a Korean Chinese underground church. More specifically, this chapter is organized around three inter-related research objectives that allow us to better understand the nature of collective mobilization of resources in the enclave. First, I analyze how the church as a transnational organization might provide its members with access to resources from the homeland. Second, I also look at how the church, because it is a transnational organization, might also pose problems for members who rely on the church for social welfare benefits and other sources of assistance. Third, I examine the church to gain a sense of the degrees of internal group solidarity within the South Korean and Korean Chinese churches, respectively. By carrying out these three objectives, this chapter sheds insight on how Koreans utilize civic organizations and internal networks to mobilize resources within the enclave community more broadly.

For both the South Korean and Korean Chinese churches, the transnational nature of its membership and organizational infrastructure plays an important role in shaping the types of opportunities and obstacles that their members are exposed to. As I will elaborate later in this chapter, I find that, on the one hand, both churches struggle with sustaining institutional stability due to its highly mobile population, which lend to a constantly fluctuating membership. But on the other hand, both churches also benefit from a rich pool of financial and cultural resources from South Korean sponsors. This set
of advantages and disadvantages that individuals face in the church also poses as an important corollary for how civic organizations at large might affect the mobilization of resources in a transnational enclave.

South Korean Missionaries and the PRC

According to the South Korean Census, in 2007, 29.2 percent of South Koreans were Christian, accounting for nearly 14 million Christians in South Korea. Since its rapid growth in the 1980s and 1990s, South Korea has attracted international recognition for becoming an important bastion of the religion today. Seoul is home to ten of the eleven largest congregations in the world and South Korea has recently become the largest sender of missionaries after the United States. An estimated 16,000 South Koreans are working in more than 150 countries around the world as missionaries, the majority of whom head to China.

In the 1990s, South Korean missionaries followed the footsteps of South Korean businessmen, settling primarily in the three northeastern provinces where there was a strong concentration of Korean Chinese minorities. They set up churches and orphanages in Korean Chinese ethnic villages. Many sought to convert their co-ethnic brothers to Christianity, while others reached out to the Han Chinese community through Korean Chinese middlemen. The majority are disguised as students, researchers or businessmen to deflect the suspicion of the Chinese government as proselytization remains strictly prohibited in the PRC. In 1997, according to Na YuKyung’s (2000) survey research, 36 percent of South Korean missionaries were connected to the Korean Chinese community.
The Church and the Communist State: Contextualizing the Field Site

While the Chinese state provides the right to exercise the freedom of religion under the constitution, the government requires all religious organizations and organized places of worship to be officially registered and sanctioned by the state. Government-sanctioned churches must abide by a long list of regulations including laws that forbid members from meeting outside church grounds, proselytizing to Chinese citizens, sponsoring non-religious activity, and so on. In addition, the state dispatches undercover agents to attend weekly services and report back potentially suspicious activities. In the eyes of the state, the church is largely viewed as a political organization that must be carefully watched and followed closely. As a result, the majority of Korean churches in the enclave are not registered by the state and are colloquially referred to as “family churches” (가정교회), or in English, “underground churches.”

Because the Chinese government prohibits South Korean churches from allowing Chinese citizens to participate in church activities, the Christian community in the enclave is by law, divided between the South Koreans and Korean Chinese minorities. The South Koreans, as foreigners, must hold services that only admit holders of foreign passports, and the Korean Chinese, as Chinese citizens, are permitted to attend only state-sponsored churches that serve the native population.

However, it is more likely that the divisions within the Korean churches in the enclave are primarily driven by preference than by law. Underground churches do not abide by government regulations and among the five underground churches I visited the members of the congregation were just as decisively divided between the South Koreans and Korean Chinese.
On the surface, both South Koreans and Korean Chinese alike profess that they are all children under the same God, or as one South Korean I interviewed put it, “we believe that under God, we are all brothers and sisters… we are not divided by socioeconomic status, by discrimination according to our ethnic or cultural background…” But under the veneer of this message of equality, in reality, the same tensions and stereotypes that divide the South Koreans from the Korean Chinese in the workplace can also be found in Korean churches in the enclave. One Korean Chinese minority who was actively involved in a Korean Chinese underground church expressed her dismay in the following way:

If you go to a South Korean church that has mostly South Korean members, they don’t think of us as members of their in-group. Do you know what I mean? If you go to a South Korean church, they see South Koreans as members of the same family, but they don’t see people like us [Korean Chinese minorities], who are born and raised in China, in the same light.

Such sentiments are further buttressed by conspicuous patterns of membership within underground churches according to nationality. Only one South Korean family attended the Korean Chinese underground church where I conducted my participant observation, for instance. And the South Korean pastors who served in the underground churches that catered to the South Koreans in Wangjing expressed that they were unaware of any Korean Chinese minorities who regularly attended their services. For the majority of South Koreans, becoming involved in church is largely a means for them to stay socially integrated within their own, insular communities in the PRC. The church does not form an umbrella organization for the Korean ethnic community, but rather allows Koreans of particular demographic backgrounds to consolidate their internal networks.

My field research took place in a South Korean state-sanctioned church, which I have given the pseudonym “Redeemer,” and a Korean Chinese underground church,
which I refer to as “First Presbyterian.” Although many underground churches meet in private apartment units located in ordinary residential neighborhoods, First Presbyterian has grown to boast a membership of several hundred individuals over just a few years and consequently, needed a larger space to accommodate its expanding membership.

First Presbyterian was first established in 2007, with a membership of about 20 Korean Chinese minorities. But in just a few years, the church grew rapidly to reach several hundred members. Two worship services are held. One for the Han Chinese in the morning, and a second service is held in Korean for the Korean Chinese community. The Han Chinese members consist largely of young, well-educated elite. The Korean Chinese, by sharp contrast, represent diverse age and socioeconomic groups.

We rented the entire fifth floor of a large building in the outskirts of the enclave. For those who were unfamiliar with First Presbyterian, on the outside, there were no telling markers that we held meetings in the building. There were no signs, no crosses, no greeters in the front on Sundays, and so on. The first floor was always dark on Sundays and all one could see were groups of well-dressed people heading to the elevator at around two in the afternoon.

When I asked the pastor and deacons why they didn’t seek state sanction, they replied that they would not be able to go about many of their normal activities if they were constantly under government surveillance. During an interview, the pastor at First Presbyterian expressed:

Like other Communist countries, the Chinese government set up an organization regulating religious activities. And the church can only exist within the confines of this institution. So there are a lot of limitations and restrictions. People in other countries would probably have a hard time understanding [the types of limitations that we face]. The government sees the church as a political organization and so, as to be expected, we come across a lot of conflicts [with the government]. As a pastor, even though I might come up with some of kind of vision for our church, often times, I cannot attempt to mobilize my congregation according to the types of plans that I believe God has for our church because of these conflicts. As a young man, I was passionate about my faith and
my ministry. And I was also quite stubborn. If I hadn’t been stubborn, I wouldn’t have chosen to become a pastor in China. And so I started to think, I cannot live like this [always minding Chinese legal regulations]. I have to pursue God’s plan first and foremost. So I left the church I had been serving and went abroad to further my education in theology. When I came back [to Beijing after my studies], I started a church that the government would not be able to control.

Pastor Cho first came to Beijing in the late 1980s to attend college. Upon graduating, he decided to pursue the ministry and enrolled in a government-sanctioned theological seminary in Beijing. As a young man in his twenties, he served as an assistant pastor at a state-sanctioned Korean Chinese church for several years. But as he stated in the interview, it was then that he realized the many limitations that state-sanctioned churches faced. When he came back, he started First Presbyterian, an underground church.

What is interesting about First Presbyterian lies in the fact that the Chinese government tacitly allows it to continue holding worship services, despite its unregistered status. In Pastor Cho’s words:

Underground churches are in general, churches that try to hide [from the government] by holding services inside private homes. It’s like that in Beijing, too. But for me, there is nowhere to hide. Even if I wanted to hide, they all know who I am… I am a pretty well known person because I worked at a government-sanctioned church for over ten years in Beijing. I also studied for several years at the theological seminary in Beijing. Even if I tried to hide, my efforts would be useless. And I don’t want to hide. I feel that God has called me to work for His will out in the open.

In addition to First Presbyterian, I made several trips to attend services at five well known Korean Chinese churches in Beijing, two of which were government-sanctioned, in order to conduct interviews and collect survey data. The underground churches I visited were similar in that like First Presbyterian, they were well-known in the Korean Chinese community, had a sizeable population of both Han Chinese and Korean Chinese members, and were located in discreet locations. Most rented out private spaces within large office buildings. These places of worship were difficult to locate due to the lack of signs in and around the building indicating that services were held there. Like Pastor Cho, the pastors of these underground churches consisted of highly elite Korean Chinese minorities who
had graduated from top rank universities in Beijing. Some had attended seminary in South Korea, as well.

In these underground churches, there is perpetually an air of instability due to their illegal status. I found this to be true not only of First Presbyterian, but of the other underground churches I visited. During sermons, the pastors would often speak of how the government had threatened to send officials to the premises to prevent them from holding worship services on Sunday. Pastor Cho once spoke of how he had been summoned to meet with government officials regarding his ministry on a few occasions. He joked that they had put him up in a luxurious hotel and that he had been treated so well. But the congregation seemed to understand the lurking possibility hidden in Pastor Cho’s jovial remarks that their beloved pastor always faced possible imprisonment for his leadership in an underground ministry.

Pastor Cho knew however, that if he maintained his ministry within certain bounds and did not cause too much disruption with the government, that he could continue to run his ministry as he pleased. Pastor Cho’s background as a graduate of a prestigious university in Beijing and his ability to communicate effectively with the Han Chinese elite is a non-trivial matter in this regard. As evidence of his skills in managing this delicate balancing act with the government, he was able to not only sustain his ministry over a period of five years, but also, cultivate a flourishing ministry that grew larger each week.

The South Korean churches in the enclave, by contrast, were notorious for running into trouble with the government. Many of the South Korean pastors I interviewed spoke of the detrimental effect that government restrictions have had on
South Korean underground churches. In the case of one particular underground church that had been established when the enclave first formed in the late 1990s, the pastor I interviewed spoke of how the church suffered from a dwindling membership in recent years.

Pastor: Now only about 160 people come to services, including children. Before, with children, there were about 800 members…

Me: How did that happen?

Pastor: These past few years, we’ve been running away from the government, moving the location of our church every few years. And as our church entered a period of hardship, our members started leaving to join larger churches in the area. Four years ago, our senior pastor fasted for forty days… Ever since then, more people have left our church. Our pastor went back to Korea because he fell seriously ill due to the fast and now he is trying to recover. I came in from Korea just six months ago to take over for him.

Like many South Korean entrepreneurial firms, this particular South Korean church attempted to deflect government investigations by making their location hard to find. But in doing so, they also made it difficult for new members to find where their church was located and added to their growing reputation as an unstable spiritual community within the enclave.

In Wangjing, even South Korean churches that are well established and government-sanctioned often run into problems with the Chinese state. They, for instance, are prohibited from accepting members who are Chinese citizens, including Korean Chinese ethnic minorities. In order to enter the premises of the church, the deacons and elders stand near the entrance checking passports and IDs. In addition, they also must appease the government in running any large-scale activities and making any type of executive decision. By offending important government officials, South Korean churches face the threat of having to close their doors to the Korean community.
For instance, one large South Korean church that had been established in the early 1990s had met in the auditorium of a hotel in Beijing for several years. After many years of fund-raising, they were able to amass the resources and money to build a large sanctuary, gymnasium and cafeteria in the outskirts of the enclave. But because the South Korean leaders of the church sought to obtain permission from the government after construction had been completed, government officials were angered by their presumptuous behavior and denied them the rights to congregate in their newly built property. Today, the church buildings have remained unused for several years. As one South Korean man who had attended this church explained:

The church was built in the late 1990s… Our church was pretty large and all the government officials were familiar with it. As a South Korean government-sanctioned church, our church was quite well-known. It’s so big. Several thousand South Koreans attend each week. At first, they held services inside a hotel and so whenever there was some kind of event [at the hotel] they had to cancel worship service. So they would have to use the building of a nearby church in order to hold services and we did moved back and forth like that for many years. Eventually, the leaders felt that they had to build their own church where they could hold services regularly without any interference and so they bought a plot of land to build the church. But customarily, you have to obtain permission before you start construction, but they just built the church and then after it was completed, they filed for government approval. They just assumed that everything would be ok. But it turned out that they had angered the government officials and so they were unable to obtain permission and the buildings just lie there empty and unused. They continue to hold services at the hotel.

The church faced possible closure if they went against government stipulations and held services in their new building. So, rather than shut down their operations completely, they have left their new buildings unused and have instead rented out the space to third parties who occasionally need facilities to host barbeques, weekend retreats and sports events.

Redeemer, the South Korean church where much of my ethnographic fieldwork took place, was also a large, government-sanctioned church. The leaders learned from the mistakes of their predecessors by making significant efforts to maintain harmonious ties with the government. They strictly enforced state regulations in the ways that they held
services and church activities. My interviews with the members at Redeemer demonstrated such efforts:

When there is a major church event, the deacons contact the government officials to let them know what type of event they are going to hold, the date and time of the event, and how many people they expect to show up. Then, on that day, government officials will come to the church grounds to observe that we are holding the activities in line with regulations... We never know what’s going to happen. That’s why we have to bring our passports to church every Sunday. Just because China has become more liberalized in recent years doesn’t mean that we can just do as we please. You know how many churches in Wangjing have closed in recent years because they aroused government suspicion? Some got caught because they were proselytizing to the native Chinese population and they had to shut down. China isn’t a country where you can just hold worship services the way you please.

Due to its efforts to maintain peace with the government, Redeemer has grown to secure a membership of over two thousand members, making it perhaps one of the largest Korean churches in the enclave. In addition, members are shuttled to weekend activities and Sunday worship services by a series of church buses and events are held in one of three large sanctuaries in the church grounds.

Organizational Consequences of the “Floating” Population

Portes (2010) notes that in transnational communities social capital works in distinctive ways. Within ethnic enclaves that are primarily bound within a single territorial space, minority organizations function to cultivate in-group solidarity and trust among co-ethnics by conferring sanctions on potentially deviant behavior, he points out that it is difficult to sanction malfeasance across long distances:

Trust sustained by value introjection and bounded solidarity is particularly subject to malfeasance. Thus, it is not surprising that a number of such incidents have been reported in the transnationalism literature, leading to the breakup of cooperative relations. In the absence of formal contracts or strong overarching social structures guaranteeing reciprocal expectations, participants in the transnational field are commonly at the mercy of the goodwill and the good character of their long-distance transactors (Portes 2010).

In the case of the Korean enclave in Beijing, although it is indeed difficult for South Koreans and Korean Chinese minorities to maintain trusting relationships with Korean
ethnics back in the homeland, frequent transnational movement among inhabitants in the enclave bear a series of consequences extending beyond this issue, as well.

From an organizational perspective, a highly mobile population makes it difficult to collectively mobilize resources. Both First Presbyterian and Redeemer struggled with a regularly fluctuating membership throughout the many months I worked in these churches as an active member. In particular, I found that the size and scale of the organization played a central role in its ability to offset the detrimental effects of the highly mobile nature of its members. In general, churches that were relatively new and/or small in membership were heavily impacted by the constant outflow of trained and experienced members.

As I have noted earlier in this dissertation, I joined a small ministry within Redeemer that consisted of a core group of around twenty South Korean members. Our ministry sought to spread the gospel to the Japanese expatriate community in Beijing, but in reality, because we were based in a well-known South Korean church, only a few Japanese individuals actually attended our meetings regularly.

South Korean Churches and the Sojourner Orientation

Our staff consisted of a small group of about six South Koreans who lived and worked in the enclave. The day I joined, the most veteran member of the staff was a South Korean college student who moved back to Seoul after having completed his studies in Beijing. During the three months I worked as a member of their praise team, their pianist also left to go to Japan, two additional South Korean college students temporarily left to go to South Korea to spend their summer vacation with their family in
Seoul, and the pastor, a South Korean missionary, also went back to South Korean permanently to join another mission group. By the end of the three months I was there, I had become one of the most experienced members of the staff and only two individuals had remained in leadership positions for the entire period I had served at Redeemer. Due to the shortage of experienced staff, I often took on multiple tasks each Sunday constantly filling in for the individuals who were going back to Seoul for various business and personal reasons. When I left, the ministry lost yet another core member.

The problems that Redeemer had in maintaining trained and seasoned staff was a struggle that all organizations face in the enclave given the highly mobile nature of the population. South Korean college students leave to go back to South Korea once they have obtained their degrees, South Korean executives who work for chaebol firms are only dispatched on short-term assignments that span from two to five years, and many of the South Korean entrepreneurs who are unable to sustain their businesses in the PRC leave the enclave after a few years because they have more resources and access to welfare benefits back home.

At another South Korean underground church I visited, the pastor remarked that during the six months he had served the church, about ten percent of the population had left to go back to Korea. He commented that there was always an ambience of instability hanging over their heads due to the “sojourner” mentality, to use Bonacich’s (1979) term, of his congregation:

Pastor:  No one comes to China thinking that this is the place they want to settle in for the rest of their lives…

Me:  Even people who have lived here for a long time? They always feel that some day, they will return…

Pastor:  Certainly. For some people that could be “someday,” for others that could be tomorrow. Some people say that they are only here for two or three years, but now it’s already been
six or seven years since they’ve come… People come here thinking that they’re only visiting temporarily, so there’s no sense of emotional stability. They are always a bit anxious, wondering about how they will go back to Korea, how the move will affect their children’s education, their retirement plans, and so on.

When I asked how this overarching sentiment of temporality and uncertainty affected his ability to mobilize church activities, he replied:

It’s seems as if once someone is ready to become a leader or an active member of the church, they have to leave. People who undergo training have to stay around to serve more actively and take on more responsibilities at church, but they end up leaving just as they’ve finished training. So when new members join our church, we train them from the very beginning again. But these people end up leaving, too, after a few years. People are constantly dropping out of the congregation. It is a vicious cycle of training people and then watching them leave once they’re ready to serve. And we can’t ask people who have just joined our church to take on a lot of responsibilities. There is no one who is able to serve.

A South Korean social activist who had been trying to set up an NGO in the enclave for the past several years similarly remarked that the shortage of long-term staff was the biggest obstacle he faced.

There is some interest from LG or KIA Motors in providing funding… But the problem is, even if we end up setting up an office with the money they give us, is finding a proper consultant [to run the office]. Even if we provide that consultant with a nice salary so that he will stay for a long time, if that person decides to go back to Korea, then that’s it for our NGO. The South Korean immigrants here plan to leave after their children finish school. Right now, the consultant who works for us, one of his children is a junior in high school and the other is in his third year in middle school. He’s in Korea right now for summer vacation and will return to China in September or October. That’s why we had to close the office during the summer. Ideally, we need someone to fill in for this person, but we don’t have enough funds to hire someone new. Right now, our entire operations revolve around this one consultant and once his children finish school, he is planning on going back to Korea. And currently, we don't have someone to take his place. It's hard for us to consistently run our NGO for a long period of time. We need to have staff who are willing to commit to living here in the long-term and pass on the training that they have gone through to new staff members…

Small organizations and churches lack the funds and the resources to constantly hire and train new staff to continue managing their activities. The staff that they do invest time and money in, end up leaving after a few years and organizations are unable to reap the benefits of the capital they invested in the people they trained.

Larger organizations, however, are better able to handle the volatile nature of the enclave population. For instance, the Women’s Ministry is one of the most established
and well-attended among the various organizations within Redeemer. About 250 women meet every week. The group is further divided into 30 smaller groups of about 8 members, according to the age of their children. Single women meet together to talk and pray about meeting a spiritually grounded and compatible husband. Women with infants meet separately to discuss the problems they have with accessing high quality healthcare in the PRC. Those with toddlers talk about which kindergartens provide the best services and so on.

Like the other groups within Redeemer, the Women’s Ministry also struggled with a highly fluctuating membership. The following conversation I had with the leader of this ministry reflects this issue:

Me: About how long would you say most of your members stay in China?

Woman: About an average of three years, probably. Three years for the most part, for those who stay longer, maybe five years.

Me: What about the entrepreneurs?

Woman: I would say a lot of the entrepreneurs end up leaving just as quickly as they arrive. There are others who end up living here for a really long time, for over ten years or so.

Me: What proportion do you think make up this group of people, who stay in China for more than ten years?

Woman: Not many.

Me: Can you give me an estimate?

Woman: Of the people that have lived here for over ten years, some are South Korean expat workers who are employed by the chaebol firms and some are entrepreneurs, but to give you a percentage… it’s very small. Even if you include everyone, I know maybe ten people. Maybe not even as many as that.

This particular woman, herself, was the wife of a upper-level supervisor for a chaebol firm who had planned on living in Beijing for a short-term. She however, has served Redeemer since 2006 and is easily the most veteran member of her organization, allowing her to take on a high-profile leadership position within the Women’s Ministry.
During our conversation, I asked this South Korean woman what type of impact the large fluctuations in membership had on the organization. She said:

Most people leave after three years. After three years or so, they start to feel attached to the organization and they start to work more effectively and actively as leaders within the group. I feel that they leave just as they become sufficiently trained to take on leadership positions… But I am also grateful for the fact that we constantly have new members joining our group to replace the people who leave. As the people who have been in our organizations leave to go to back to Korea, our new members fill the empty positions that are left. And those people who take on these new positions become leaders and we have a new set of new members. Our roles are constantly changing and being filled like this. Our church is constantly expanding in size and so we continually have a larger pool of leaders to fill the roles that are necessary to continue running our group. I think that is why we can handle so much change and volatility. So when we first started, we had 20 small groups within the Women’s Ministry, but now we have more members to expand and create new groups and we have a new pool of members to take on leadership roles for those groups. We have been able to create 10 more groups since then. I think if we were a smaller group, it would be very difficult to sustain our ministry in the ways that we have been able to.

Similar trends can be found in larger, more established South Korean organizations and churches within the enclave. The problem is that such large-scale operations can be sustained at Redeemer due to the large funds and sophisticated programs that families of elite South Korean chaebol employees supply. South Korean underground churches whose congregation included fewer numbers of these elite South Koreans and thereby lacked the resources that Redeemer had access to gradually have become smaller and weaker as their members flocked in large numbers to mega-churches like Redeemer. As a result, the South Korean population has become increasingly concentrated in a few churches where the elite play dominant roles.

Selective Migration at First Presbyterian

In my experiences working with Pastor Cho and thedeacons at First Presbyterian, I found that the Korean Chinese also encountered similar problems in maintaining trained staff. However, unlike the South Korean population, among the Korean Chinese, high degrees of mobility were primarily concentrated within the young adult population. One
critical distinction between the South Korean and Korean Chinese population lies in the fact that whereas the South Koreans—both the elite businessmen and the entrepreneurs alike—see themselves as short-term sojourners, the Korean Chinese by and large see Beijing as their home. This difference in their orientation towards the host society palpably shapes patterns of movement and the ways in which they approach relationships within the church.

Deacon Lee, whom I became close to during my time at First Presbyterian, once told me:

I stayed in Beijing after I graduated from college. People [the Korean Chinese] tend to do the same. It’s like how people go to the US from South Korea or China. They end up going abroad to study, but once their studies are over, most do not come back and just settle in the US. Most of the Korean Chinese who come from the countryside to Beijing do not go back. More than half of the people I know who came to Beijing to attend college have not gone back.

Deacon Lee first came to Beijing in 1990 to obtain his college degree from a highly selective university. He was 19 years old when he first arrived and has lived in Beijing ever since then, for over twenty years. Deacon Lee’s mother went to Seoul in 1994 to work as a domestic worker for a wealthy South Korean family after his father passed away in 1991. She was able to obtain a visa through one of her relatives in South Korea. Deacon Lee explained to me that since his mother has naturalized to take on South Korean citizenship, he could easily obtain South Korean citizenship as well and live comfortably in South Korea. During our conversation, I probed him further on why he did not take up the opportunity to live in South Korea with his mother:

Me: But don’t a lot of [Korean Chinese] people go to South Korea? Why don’t you want to go to South Korea to…?

Deacon Lee: Who’s gone to South Korea [out of the people we know at our church]?

Me: Aren’t there a lot? There are a lot of Korean Chinese people who…
Deacon Lee: Those people are from the countryside. They're country bumpkins. Out of college-educated Korean Chinese, who do you know who has gone to South Korea?

Me: There's no one?

Deacon Lee: Very few people who have graduated from college go to South Korea.

Me: Aren't there people who start entrepreneurial businesses in South Korea? I heard that some Korean Chinese co-ethnics go to…

Deacon Lee: Well, there are probably some who do, but not a lot. People who are capable stay in China, why would they go to South Korea to work [in the 3-D labor market]? Maybe there are a few who go to South Korea to open some kind of entrepreneurial firm, but most of the people who go are usually middle-aged men and women from the countryside who have nothing better to do, or maybe young Korean Chinese kids who haven't been able to gain acceptance into college in China.

Me: But what about that guy from our church who we threw a farewell party for the other day. Didn't he go to South Korea to matriculate into Seoul National University?

Deacon Lee: Ah, I guess there are a few young Korean Chinese who go to South Korea to study abroad. These days, most go to further their education in South Korea, those who go to work are people who haven't been able to graduate from college here. People who graduate from universities in China don't go to Seoul. Why would they want to go to Korea to work in such harsh conditions? For what? To make a few thousand dollars? I wouldn't go even if they offered to give me five thousand dollars.

Deacon Lee is an extremely successful entrepreneur in Beijing. He drives to church in a brand new Audi every Sunday. He owns several real estate properties in and around Beijing. And he is extremely proud of his prestigious degree from a top university in Beijing. When I asked him whether he had ever considered going to South Korea to live, he was rather offended by my question. He was indignant that I had grouped him with other middle-aged Korean Chinese individuals from the countryside who went to South Korea due to the lack of opportunities they faced in China. And as he stated during our conversation, those who did go to South Korea to work were hired as 3-D laborers, often abused and perceived as second-class citizens by their South Korean employers.
It was not only Deacon Lee or the situation specific to First Presbyterian, but also I found that in my interviews with many different Korean Chinese pastors, the Korean Chinese largely saw Beijing and China, in general, as the place they wished to settle in. Most of the mobile population consisted of low-educated, middle-aged minorities or young Korean Chinese college students who sought to obtain professional degrees in South Korea. To cite the words of one pastor:

Most people who come here [to Beijing] to find jobs or attend school end up living here for the rest of their lives. People who go back to the countryside, where their hometowns are, have a hard time adjusting back to their old lifestyles… From what I have seen, most people who migrate to the cities are looking for better opportunities. It’s hard to support your kids as a farmer. So most of the people from the countryside go to South Korea to look for jobs in order to support their children’s education. People who live in the cities don’t really have that need, if you have a good job here [in Beijing] and you earn a good salary. So Korean Chinese parents who already have good jobs in the cities do not go to South Korea [to support their children]. Also, Korean Chinese young adults often go to South Korea on short-term study abroad programs. In our church, there are quite a few people who finish college here in Beijing and go to South Korea for graduate school… But they after they finish their schooling, they come back to Beijing and find good jobs here.

This pastor echoes Deacon Lee’s claims that the Korean Chinese who are involved in significant degrees of transnational migration are concentrated into two groups—middle-aged farmers who have low levels of education and as a result, limited employment prospects in the cities and college-educated Korean Chinese youth who seek to further their human capital by tapping into resources in the homeland. The Korean Chinese in Beijing, thus, are by and large represent elite members with high levels of human capital who seek to lead settled lives in the PRC rather than endure the discrimination and harsh working conditions in South Korea.

This distinction has important implications. First, while on the surface, it may seem as if the Korean Chinese churches are characterized by the same volatility in membership as their South Korean counterparts, the fact that they are able to retain a core group of leaders is important. During the six months I served at First Presbyterian, we
held numerous farewell parties for members of our congregation. The majority of these farewell parties were for Korean Chinese young adults who had matriculated into South Korean universities for graduate school. When these youth left our church one after the other, Pastor Cho and the leaders at First Presbyterian struggled to find people to take their place. The Korean Chinese congregation only numbered 150 people, including the children, and so we were always in need of people to serve. When I joined, I took the place of a Korean Chinese young woman in making the church bulletins each weekend. This woman had left Beijing to go back to her hometown in Yanbian, where the condition of her ailing father had worsened. A month into my stay, the young man who played the drums for our praise team left to matriculate into a Ph.D. program at Seoul National University. A few weeks later, a Korean Chinese woman who had just obtained her college degree in Beijing left to attend a two-year program training as a kindergarten teacher in Seoul. But because she had been in charge of teaching the toddlers at our church, Pastor Cho scrambled to find someone to take her place when she left. In addition, during the span of the several months I spent at First Presbyterian, the lead vocalist and guitarist of our praise team were also preparing to leave Beijing in the near future to pursue further studies abroad, as well.

Yet, at the same time, the five deacons who held major leadership positions within the church regularly attended Morning Prayer meetings every day. By also attending these meetings each morning, I became well acquainted with the leadership staff at First Presbyterian. These men looked after the church’s finances, they organized the major retreats and outreach events, they helped Pastor Cho make executive decisions that influenced the future of our church, they led and hosted small group meetings inside
their homes, and they made sure that the church ran smoothly each week. Arguably, while the roles that the Korean Chinese youth at our church held were also very essential, these men held positions that exposed them to the inner-workings of our church. Pastor Cho met with these leaders each week to discuss with them confidential information about the church and to make important decisions that would affect the future of First Presbyterian. When First Presbyterian faced problems with government officials, Pastor Cho relied heavily on these men to help resolve these problems. When we faced eviction from our landlord due to threats in raising the cost of rent each month, the deacons exercised their personal networks to find an alternative space. That these men built reputations as loyal and trustworthy individuals over many years was important to Pastor Cho.

And certainly, such reputations cannot be built over night. While some of the deacons at First Presbyterian occasionally went to South Korea on business, these men and their families had lived in Beijing since the 1990s and early 2000s. One deacon was a lawyer at a top Chinese law firm, another was a retired officer from the Communist army, another owned a factory in the outskirts of Beijing, and the remaining two owned small to medium-scaled entrepreneurial firms in Beijing. These upwardly mobile men led stable lives in Beijing and had no plans of leaving the enclave in the future. And by forming a core leadership at First Presbyterian, these men allowed Pastor Cho to continue to carry out his plans for the church and weather the significant fluctuations our church experienced within the young adult population despite the limited resources and small size of our church.
Transnational Resources and Internal Solidarity

The Korean Chinese Church and Transnational Resources

Historically, Korean Chinese underground churches have received large amounts of financial and institutional support from churches in South Korea seeking to engage in missions work in China (Kim 2010). The majority of these South Korean churches sponsor Korean Chinese churches in remote villages in northeastern China (Kim 2010). For instance, one South Korean church sponsored several Korean Chinese minorities who had started attending their church while working as low-wage laborers in Seoul. When the Korean Chinese workers decided to go back to China, the church provided them with significant amounts of financial capital to build churches where they lived. According to an interview with an elder at this church:

When new [Korean Chinese] people come to our church, we teach them about the bible. Whether it be over a period of a week or a few months, we spend time teaching these people about the gospel and see if they really, truly believe that Jesus is their Lord and Savior, that Jesus saved them from their sins. And so while these people are in South Korea, they join our community as fellow brothers and sisters in Christ. And then after a period of time, they go back to China. The Korean Chinese tend to go back to their country of origin after working for a period of time [in Korea]. And so, naturally, they start churches in the places where they live. We don’t try and build new churches in random places [where we have no ties to]. These churches are built spontaneously, naturally. And the leaders at these churches were people who were members of our community in Seoul. And then, these Korean Chinese start spreading the gospel to people in their area [in China]. A long time, we sent South Korean missionaries to China and then sent money to build new churches where they were, but now, we send Korean Chinese minorities who had attended our church to go back and start churches under our sponsorship.

This particular church supported 20 different Korean Chinese underground churches in various Korean ethnic villages scattered throughout the three northeastern provinces. Each month, the church sends about 3,000 USD to each of these underground churches in the PRC in addition to a significant lump sum during the early phases to fund the construction of church buildings.
Past research has shown however, that financial support from South Korean mega churches have led to significant conflicts between South Koreans and the Korean Chinese (Kim S. 2000, Kim C. 2003). In Kim (2010), the author states:

South Korean churches especially focused on building churches in Korean Chinese villages. In a small agricultural Korean Chinese village, new church buildings towered like castles over farmers’ huts. Some Korean Chinese attended service to obtain economic advantages and South Koreans have come to have the prejudice that Korean Chinese are interested only in money. Moreover, South Korean churches promised to rebuild a new church in a Korean Chinese village. Local people destroyed the church and waiting for the support form the Korea churches, but they did not send the money (Kim 2010).

As a result of these tensions, Korean Chinese pastors have tended to stress the importance of remaining financially independent from support from the homeland in recent years.

And perhaps due to this historical context, Pastor Cho and his colleagues in Beijing stressed their financial independence from South Korean churches during our interviews. By remaining financially independent, the Korean Chinese pastors in Beijing felt that they could run their church as they saw fit, rather than have to heed the advice of South Korean pastors whom they perceived as oblivious to the specific needs of their community and the cultural environment of the PRC.

At the same time, however, First Presbyterian often invited short-term missions groups and well-known speakers from South Korea. During the six months I was there, we hosted two groups—one missions group of Korean Americans from a church in Los Angeles and another from Seoul. These mission groups met with the young adults from our church to sing, pray and share with one another the difficulties of the underground Christian movement in the PRC. In addition, our deacons helped organize outreach programs for these groups.

But even though our church frequently sponsored the stay of these groups, outside of Pastor Cho, the deacons and other members of First Presbyterian largely ignored their
presence when they attended our worship services on Sundays. During a small group bible study meeting one Wednesday, the deacon who led my group described these Korean missionaries in a particularly negative light. I recorded this instance in my field notes:

The other day, when I went to small group, the small group leader told me about how he really disliked the Korean Americans and South Koreans who came to our church as short-term missionaries. Apparently, South Koreans and Korean Americans come quite frequently. He said how they went and passed out little Christian brochures about how to be saved. When he sees them making photocopies at church, he gets really upset. “Who do they think they are? Do they really think that what they are doing is going to be effective? They think they’re so much better than people in China just because they’re from richer countries. But you know what? Their economies are going down. The South Korean and American economies are in recession. But China is on the rise China’s economy is booming. What use is a little pamphlet going to do when they don’t even understand who they are talking to, who they are interacting with?”

It is clear here that the tensions that have risen from the asymmetrical power dynamics that characterize the workplace between South Korean employers and their Korean Chinese workers also bleed into dynamics within the Christian community. At First Presbyterian, the Korean Chinese intentionally avoid receiving any type of assistance from South Koreans not only because they wish to make executive decisions without interference, but also because they lack trust and solidarity with their South Korean co-ethnics. They did not trust that the South Koreans would treat them with respect due to asymmetries in access to wealth and resources. They also did not feel any type of ethnic solidarity with the South Koreans or the Korean Americans, for that matter, due to experiences of discrimination that have colored everyday life in the enclave and in South Korea.

Thus, despite the frequency of contact and the establishment of social networks with South Korean churches in the homeland and abroad, the Korean Chinese largely did not mobilize these networks to exchange information or obtain access to transnational resources. Rather, increased contact with the South Koreans only acted to strengthen their
feelings of marginalization and conversely, the internal solidarity they felt with other Korean Chinese minorities.

*Internal Solidarity at First Presbyterian*

While First Presbyterian and many other Korean Chinese underground churches in the enclave do not receive financial support or resources from South Korea, their experiences of marginalization and alienation from their South Korean co-ethnics largely acts to facilitate stronger bonds of solidarity within the Korean Chinese community. As Portes and Bach (1985) find, perceptions of discrimination are “inevitably linked with the reinforcement of ethnic boundaries and ethnic solidarity.” In the case of the Korean Chinese, discriminatory attitudes among the South Koreans cause them to re-draw ethnic boundaries to include members within the Korean Chinese community and exclude South Koreans and Korean Americans.

In addition, the Korean Chinese at First Presbyterian are able to draw from their common experiences growing up in remote ethnic villages in northeastern China to strengthen their bonds of solidarity and to distinguish their identities from the South Koreans. While large socioeconomic gaps between chaebol employees and the entrepreneurs divide the South Korean community in Beijing into two, these gaps are largely absent within the Korean Chinese community. This is not to say that the Korean Chinese population is socioeconomically homogeneous. But rather, that first, the disparities are not as clear and sharp as in the South Korean community, and second, that socioeconomic gaps are organized according to demographic characteristics, such as age
and gender, rather than according to levels of human capital. This allows ethnic solidarity to trump class barriers.

According to Pastor Cho, the members of First Presbyterian are by and large from Korean ethnic villages from the Chinese countryside. The village that Young-Jae, a Korean Chinese college student at First Presbyterian, grew up in illustrates the typical setting in which these tightly knit communities were situated in. Young-Jae grew up in a small village in rural Liaoning that consisted of about one hundred Korean ethnic households. Like his neighbors, he lived in a small roof-tiled house with his family. A river runs behind the village, and in front, there is a dirt road, and in front of the dirt road, there are rice fields. The Korean village took up the western part of the large landmass where Young-Jae lived, and the Han Chinese farmers and their families lived in the eastern part. The two villages were distinctively separated from each other.

Each year, the Korean families in his village would work the fields every day and in the fall, everyone would help gather the crops and sell them at the marketplace. “We had a stable life. I mean it wasn’t as if we were wealthy or anything, but we weren’t poor either. We didn’t worry about our economic condition,” Young-Jae explained. When I asked what everyday life in the community was like, he said:

All of the people who lived on the eastern side of the region were Korean Chinese… In the evenings the adults would eat dinner and then everyone would come out and congregate together. We would talk during the evening and then, around eight or nine, when our favorite television programs came on, everyone went to their respective homes to watch TV.

During Korean cultural holidays, all the Korean Chinese in the village would gather together to celebrate and eat traditional Korean food with each other. Young-Jae went on to explain:

When someone in our village turned 60 years old, the whole village would have a huge celebration for that person. Or when someone got married, we would also have a feast in honor of the newly weds. Only the Korean Chinese would celebrate together though. We didn’t include the Han
Chinese in our gatherings. We would just eat and drink and celebrate together in our own community.

As I explained earlier in the dissertation, since the 1990s, large numbers of Koreans left these villages to migrate to major cities in China, such as Beijing, as well as to South Korea for better employment opportunities. But after having lived among other Korean Chinese in such a communal setting for so many years, the Korean Chinese feel a void when coming to the cities. Korean Chinese college students join clubs at their respective universities to maintain this sense of community, but for the employed population, the church functions as the major organization that allows the minorities to maintain closely-knit ties to other Korean Chinese minorities.

The church also provides the Korean Chinese with an identity that stems from their structural position as middlemen between South Korean and Han Chinese society. At First Presbyterian, Pastor Cho teaches his congregation that they must use their intermediary position to spread the gospel in China. He stresses that they are able to most effectively carry out this mission because unlike the South Koreans, they are able to connect to the Han population as fellow Chinese:

I tell the members of our congregation that we need to have a God-centered view of our ethnic identity. I believe that God had a plan for our ethnic group [the Korean Chinese]. It was in His plan for us to leave the motherland and come to China [many decades ago] to live like this. Of the fifty or so ethnic minorities in China, the Korean Chinese first received the gospel. Christianity is not the religion of our ancestral heritage, but later, we received the gospel and today, large numbers of Korean Chinese minorities are Christian. Other ethnic minority groups tell us, “You Korean Chinese have traditionally believed in Christ. It’s part of your cultural heritage.” [He chuckles] So, I believe that God sent us here [to China] to spread the gospel. That is why I believe that we need to maintain good relations with the Han Chinese. By having good relations with the Han Chinese, we can more fully realize the purpose that God has for us.

This sense of purpose that Pastor Cho instilled in the hearts of his congregation helped the Korean Chinese at First Presbyterian to alleviate their distress from being marginalized by both the South Koreans and the Korean Chinese. It also allowed the Korean Chinese to share a common sense of purpose and identity.
A conversation I had with a woman at First Presbyterian illustrates this dynamic particularly well. While Mi-ryong first became a Christian through the efforts of a South Korean missionary while she was in college in Yanbian, she found it difficult to establish an intimate relationship with this missionary due to the discriminatory views he held towards China:

At church once, the South Korean missionary started speaking about his experiences in India. He told our group how the bathrooms were so dirty. Right in front of us, he kept going on and on about how dirty they were. But for us, when someone says something like that, we start thinking about how the situation in China is not so different [from India]. These days, in big cities, our circumstances are much better, but seven years ago [during the time when the South Korean missionary spoke to us], our bathrooms, how people behaved in the streets, the environment in general was quite run down. [When people say things like that], we feel disheartened. We feel that that person does not love this country [China]. It doesn’t seem as if this person who is standing in front of us is truly opening his heart and reaching out to us. I feel that true mission work requires someone to stand in the same position as we are and to hold our hands while doing His work. It hurts when we feel that someone pities us…

Mi-ryong tried to understand that the condescending attitudes that her mentor held were only natural, given the disparities in wealth in South Korea and China. But despite her attempts, the socioeconomic gaps in the environments that she and her mentor had grown up continued to act as a barrier in their relationship. When she came to First Presbyterian, she told me that she realized that she felt grateful for being Korean Chinese and for having been born in China. Unlike South Korean missionaries, she believed that the Korean Chinese were able to share the gospel with Han Chinese individuals with sincere compassion and as equals.

At the same time, she felt grateful for her Korean ancestry because she realized that without their connections with South Korea, the Korean Chinese might not have been able to receive the gospel so early and in such large numbers:

When the door to South Korea opened, we were able to read a lot of books about our faith in our mother tongue and numerous South Korean missionaries came to China to share the gospel with us. Because we shared a common language, the South Koreans were able to connect with us so quickly… There are few Korean Chinese who have not had heard of the gospel. Wouldn’t you think so? So we have had more opportunities, we have been able to come across these
opportunities more quickly. Because we shared a common ethnicity, we were able to understand and react more quickly to these opportunities. And what is so important about us is that [unlike the South Korean missionaries] we do not look down on the Han Chinese. We are able to pray for our land [China] and embrace this country as we share the gospel with the [Han Chinese] people here… We are able to do this because we were born here.

Like Mi-ryong, the members of First Presbyterian rely on this framework of ethnic identity to overcome their feelings of alienation from both Chinese and South Korean societies. As Christians, they are able to see how their intermediary position has allowed them to more effectively further God’s will.

In addition, the members of First Presbyterian are able to overcome differences in socioeconomic status within their group largely because these differences are primarily organized by age and gender. Like most churches in the enclave, First Presbyterian follows the institutional model of South Korean churches and breaks down their congregation into a series of “small groups” [소그룹]. These groups are organized by age and gender. At First Presbyterian, there are six to ten small groups, depending on the fluctuating size of the congregation. One group consists of college students and recent graduates, three to five groups consist of young couples and singles in their thirties and forties, one to three groups consist of couples in their forties and fifties, and the final group consists of individuals over sixty. Each group is comprised of four to ten people. Formally, these groups meet at the homes of the small group leader during the weekday for a few hours to study the bible and pray together about the struggles they faced in their individual lives. But informally, members of each small group met throughout the week to socialize and help each other during times of hardship. For several months, I was an active member of a small group for individuals in the thirties and forties age bracket.

At First Presbyterian, solidarity and a sense of “common fate” (Portes and Bach 1985) is further strengthened by the fact that the Korean Chinese share common
experiences according to their age groups. Members of the youngest small group by and large consist of Korean Chinese youth who attend colleges in Beijing, as well as college graduates who fill entry-level positions at large South Korean chaebol firms. The oldest cohort consists of Korean Chinese who have returned to Beijing after having worked in 3-D labor market in South Korea, as well as those who have retired and moved in with their children in Beijing. In between these two cohorts, the middle-aged population largely works in South Korean firms in the enclave. A significant number also work as entrepreneurs of small to medium-sized firms concentrated in the service sector. While there is some degree of socioeconomic diversity among the middle-age population, the disparities appear insignificant when compared to those of the South Korean population.

According to the survey data I collected, the median income for South Korean entrepreneurs ranges from 10,000 RMB to 20,000 RMB. For South Korean chaebol employees, this figure ranges from 30,000 RMB to 40,000 RMB, not including stipends that cover housing, children’s tuition, and living expenses. Tables 17 and 18 provide a more precise and detailed comparison of the income levels of both populations.

By sharing their struggles with the members of their small group on a regular basis, the Korean Chinese who attend First Presbyterian feel that they are not alone, but rather part of a family. As one member described:

Whenever I encounter some kind of difficulty, for instance, if I feel sick and tell them [the members of my small group] of my condition, they take such good care of me. They are proactive in suggesting different clinics I should go to, different medications I should take... And when I experience such thoughtfulness, I feel so grateful. They don’t just tell me what I should do, but they actually make calls to different places for me [so that I can recover quickly] and they drive me to the clinics [that specialize in my illness]. I experience help like this so often. We just moved here [to the enclave] this year and so we had been feeling lonely, but they visited our home and made us feel welcome. I think because our church is small and because we see each other so often, it’s easier to become close to each other.
Similarly, throughout the time I spent attending small group meetings at First Presbyterian, I witnessed members jumping to each other’s aide on countless occasions. Personal problems were seen as collective problems. We became intimately aware of the different circumstances our fellow small group members were in as we shared our troubles every Wednesday at six. Each week our meetings started after eating the warm, home-cooked meal that our small group leader graciously prepared for us each week. Dinner was followed by bible study and then intercessory prayer time, when we went around the table sharing the problems we were going through.

Trends of mutual reliance that characterize small group meetings is significant in understanding how the Korean Chinese are able to collectively mobilize resources to gain access to upward mobility. This is particularly true for entrepreneurs. Of the five members who regularly attended my small group meetings, three were self-employed owners of small firms in and around the enclave. As fellow entrepreneurs, the members
of my small group exchanged practical information that would help improve their
businesses. The following passage from my field notes demonstrates how such sharing of
information helped one Korean Chinese woman initiate a new entrepreneurial business:

As we were sharing our prayer requests, Hee-won spoke of how she wanted to start her own
company soon and that she would like us to pray for her about this situation. Ji-soo, who had been
sitting quietly next to me, started to say how Hee-won should open up a glamour shot photo booth
just like the ones they had in Korea. She spoke excitedly about how there were none of those in
China, yet, and all of the places in China were so old-fashioned that taking photos with your
significant other was such a hassle. In Korea, she explained, you could just go into a little booth
where they had a nice cloth backdrop and take a glamour shot with your boyfriend in just ten
minutes or less to get wallet-size photos. Hee-won seemed to think that Ji-soo was on to
something and she replied that she had been planning on visiting Korea sometime next month and
would have to go look at some of these shops to get a better idea of how such a shop was run. Ji-
soo then spoke in great detail about the prices of plane tickets to Korea these days with striking
accuracy. She quoted prices of different airlines for different times with such precision that I
initially mistook her for a travel agent. When I asked her if she worked for a travel agency, she
just smiled and said that she knew because traveled back and forth often. I found out later that she
traveled frequently to Korea for her business selling imported clothes from Korea in the enclave.

Ji-soo is a seasoned entrepreneur who owns two clothing stores in Beijing. Her clothes
are all imported from the garment industry in Seoul. She attributes her success to the
rising popularity of South Korean fashion in China as well as to six years of experience
working in the garment industry in Seoul when she was in her twenties. Ji-soo travels
once every ten days to Seoul to select a new shipment of clothing for her stores and
remains connected to vendors in the garment industry where she once worked. During
small group meetings, she shares her extensive knowledge of transnational
entrepreneurship to help others in our group start and sustain their own businesses in the
enclave.

Exchanging information and supporting each other’s businesses is not particular
to our group. At First Presbyterian, there is great diversity in the extent of experience
individuals have had in South Korea and in China. And like the members of my small
group, the Korean Chinese at First Presbyterian were able to collectively overcome major
structural barriers that many entrepreneurs faced in the PRC. Not only were they able to
help each other in situations when they needed someone who understood how to solve issues that dealt with South Koreans or the South Korean business environment, but also, when someone had trouble dealing with Chinese officials or needed help recruiting new workers, a person with the appropriate expertise and background was able to come to their aid.

For instance, while our bible study leader, Min, did not know about different laws that entrepreneurs had to be vigilant of, he had several friends who did. As I mentioned before, Min was a retired officer of the PRC army, and so, he had many friends who were low ranking state officials. For the farewell barbeque that Min organized for me, he invited some of his Han Chinese friends to join us. And as we sat around the picnic table munching on pork chops and lamb skewers, one of the women in our group shared that she was contemplating opening up a second clothing store near the garment district. Min’s friends were particularly knowledgeable about how to go about applying for certain licenses, what new regulations one had to be cautious of, and so on. One of Min’s friends spoke up that one of his friends also worked in that area and could probably help her with questions she had about setting up her store. The two swapped cell phone numbers.

The Class Divide at Redeemer

Some believe that Redeemer was able to rise so quickly in fame and in size due to its affiliations as a sister-church of a well-known church in Seoul. As one South Korean pastor of a different church somewhat spitefully commented during an interview:

Redeemer represents a type of “brand.” It’s part of a very famous church in South Korea. Subconsciously it taps into an image as a church that is modern and sophisticated. If you go to Redeemer, you feel this atmosphere of a First World country. I think that the people who go to Redeemer are attracted to this type of image.
The headquarters in Seoul was first established in 1985 with the main focus of training missionaries. In 2011, the church grew to become one of South Korea’s largest churches with 25 branches, a congregation of 75,000 members, and 1,220 missionaries dispatched to countries around the world.

Redeemer in Beijing remains tightly connected to its home base in South Korea. In the church lounge, you can find a pile of monthly newspapers published by the headquarters, informing members of the congregation of the major events taking place in Seoul. All of the pastors and many individuals in top leadership positions are trained and dispatched by their Seoul headquarters. During bible studies, members of the staff speak of vision that the senior pastor in Seoul had for our growing congregation in Beijing. When he passed away after undergoing surgery in 2011, the entire congregation in Beijing went into mourning for several weeks. The pastors, deacons and elders dressed in black and the ambience of what was once a lively and bright church turned palpably somber as people wept and spoke of his passing hushed voices. We held our own memorial services in Beijing and watched the funeral take place in Seoul from the Internet. Many of our pastors flew to Korea to pay their respects in person at his funeral.

While Redeemer does not receive significant financial support from the home church, Redeemer in Beijing receives all of its spiritual texts and other curriculum from Seoul. The headquarters in Seoul owns a publishing house that supplies their branches overseas with a diverse array of spiritual texts. Redeemer also imports a variety of extracurricular programs from South Korea, as well. These resources, in addition to the extensive supply of human capital that comes with the size and scale of a mega church like Redeemer, have contributed to its rapid expansion. One South Korean family, who
had coincidentally attended both churches, commented that Redeemer provided her children with a stronger curriculum and foundational knowledge of the gospel than First Presbyterian:

When we first arrived in Beijing, we went to Redeemer. Their Sunday School curriculum is much more organized and they are able to teach the children more effectively. Whether it be for instilling the children with a strong foundational understanding of the bible or something else, Redeemer’s Sunday School program is very well organized. Even my children notice the difference [between Redeemer and First Presbyterian]. When they go to Redeemer, there is a separate pianist for the Sunday School and the program is clearly more sophisticated. At First Presbyterian, there is no pianist for the children and the type of learning environment that they are able to provide is clearly weaker. For these reasons, when my children started going to First Presbyterian, they were bored at Sunday School and they thought that Redeemer was so much better and fun.

Certainly, the fact that Redeemer is a branch of a mega church based in Seoul has lent to a series of benefits that sets it apart from Korean Chinese underground churches like First Presbyterian. In this case, we can see how its institutional sophistication and access to program materials attracts a growing population of South Koreans in the enclave.

The entire congregation at Redeemer also purchases monthly issues of daily devotionals. The leaders of different groups within the church would start their staff meetings by asking members of their staff to share what they had reflected on while reading their daily devotionals each week. We went around in a circle, integrating stories of the struggles and hardships we faced in our daily lives with the spiritual messages that were printed in our devotionals.

These daily devotionals became an important reference point for our community. Each day, we knew that there were some two thousand other Koreans who were reading the same passage and reflecting on how that particular spiritual message applied to our lives. We also knew that members of Redeemer in Seoul and in other parts of the world were also reading the same devotionals each day. When I met with members from Redeemer outside the church, passages from our daily devotionals often came up as my
friends explained how they were doing. By providing their members with a common medium through which they felt free to express their daily struggles, the devotionals played a significant role in creating a sense of community and solidarity among the South Koreans at Redeemer.

Redeemer in Beijing also imports materials for different programs that cater to specific demographics within the community. Two in particular that I will mention here, consisted of programs that targeted women and men, respectively. The programs sought to train their members become good role models for their children and loving spouses to each other. While these programs were not intended for the overseas population specifically as the same texts and curriculum were used also in Korea and other parts of the world, they played an important role in helping families adjust to the many challenges they faced in the foreign environment of the PRC. According to one of the leaders of the men’s program:

The fundamental goal of our program seeks to provide an answer to the question: what type of person is your father? Most of the men who come to our program realize that they became fathers even though they were not ready to take on that role. If you want to drive, you have to first pass an exam in order to obtain a license, but despite the fact that being a father is such an important role, we never undergo rigorous training to help us prepare to become good fathers. So our program first tries to help our members realize what type of fathers they were raised under and what type of fathers they are to their children now. And afterwards, they understand how important their role in the family is… We teach them that in order to be a good spiritual role model to their children, they need to become the type of father that our Heavenly Father is to us. They need to become a good father not through their words, but through their actions, by remaining actively connected to the lives of their children…

During our interview, I learned that this particular leader was able to reconnect with his wife and children through his involvement in the program. While he was not able to make his entrepreneurial business successful in Beijing, he remarked that he was grateful to God for having been given the opportunity to strengthen his relationships in the home and become a better father by coming to Beijing and discovering the program.
Similarly, the women’s program also helped South Korean women at Redeemer use curriculum imported from their headquarters in Seoul to train their members to become better mothers for their children. While the curriculum itself was not originally intended for the population in Beijing, the program had the unintended consequence of giving South Korean women a resource to help them cope with the many changes their children were encountering in Chinese schools. According to the chair of the Women’s Ministry:

Generally, we talk about our children’s education and problems we have with our husbands. But mostly we talk about our children’s education. For women who have children, they are most concerned about how their children are doing at school… Our children are not a part of a Korean curriculum here in China. Many of our children go to international schools, which are completely run in English. For children who have only attended school in South Korea, suddenly, they find themselves having to learn English in addition to Chinese. As a result, they are overwhelmed with their studies. Even though they don’t have to worry about taking the Korean college entrance exams, and I suppose for children who are particularly gifted in languages, this is not a big deal, but imagine how hard it must be for those children who aren’t gifted in that area? To have to learn another country’s language all of a sudden… we talk about how to deal with these types of stress that our children encounter here. Because that is what our children struggle with the most, the mothers in our ministry come together and listen to each other’s experiences and try to help each other out.

At first glance, the level of solidarity and mutual reliance that characterizes the Women’s Ministry seemed comparable to the types of support that I found at First Presbyterian. Like the Korean Chinese at First Presbyterian, the South Korean women at Redeemer met with one another on a regular basis, sharing a common set of problems and exchanging information and resources in order to collectively overcome the struggles they faced in raising their children in China.

Indeed, for the South Koreans, the church fulfilled a series of social needs that were external to explicit spiritual or religious goals. And through the church, South Koreans in the enclave came to strengthen their identities and networks of solidarity as South Koreans in their everyday lives. As one woman put it:
A higher percentage of South Koreans attend church in Beijing than in Korea. And because we are immigrants, people who don’t believe in God come to church because they feel lonely in this foreign country. I can’t tell you exactly what percent of the population attends church, but when I go about my daily activities here in Wangjing, I often run into people I know from my church. My church is quite large with over 2000 members and I spend a lot of time at church for various activities. I run into people I know from small group, choir, women’s group, and so on. We’re all connected to each other through a number of these activities at church. I know this person from this particular group and another person from another group and so the breadth of people I know through church is quite large. If I go to a restaurant [in the enclave], I always run into people I know.

But while on the surface, the programs at Redeemer seem to foster solidarity among South Koreans, the socioeconomic gaps between South Korean entrepreneurs and South Korean chaebol employees has led to the formation of class tensions within the South Korean community. Or as one South Korean man at Redeemer put it:

You can’t see [the tensions] with your eyes. It’s in a sense invisible, but keenly felt. I think that women who are married and have children feel this tension the most. It’s hard for South Korean chaebol employees and their wives to become close to ordinary South Koreans in the enclave. It’s not easy.

Like First Presbyterian, the small groups at Redeemer are also organized by age cohorts. In the Women’s Ministry, women are divided into separate groups according to the age of their children. But while the members of each small group at First Presbyterian shared a common set of worries, at Redeemer, members face a distinctive set of issues depending on the status of their husbands. Wives of entrepreneurs for instance, by and large are unable to send their children to the prestigious international schools that the wives of South Korean chaebol employees send their children to. These so-called “A Level” international schools are located in Shunyi (顺义), a district just north of Wangjing. These schools charge 180,000 RMB (28,500 USD) per year for grades 1 through 6, and 200,000 RMB (31,600 USD) per for all upper level grades. South Korean chaebol employees receive separate stipends for their children’s education to afford the exorbitant tuition at these schools. The students who attend these A Level schools are taught by Western faculty and have a high success rate of entering top universities in
America. In stark contrast, the vast majority of South Korean entrepreneurs cannot afford to send their children to these schools and so they send their children to Korean private schools, where the tuition is ten times less than the tuition of these elite Western schools at about 20,000 RMB (3,000 USD) per year, or Chinese public schools in Wangjing, which charge Korean students 5,000 RMB (800 USD) per year.

As the leader of the Women’s Ministry noted:

The enclave is actually quite small. If we were in Korea, we go about our daily lives largely oblivious of each other because we are geographically scattered. It’s hard to know what goes on in the personal lives of others. Comparatively, it’s so small here. Also, the types of schools that Korean children can attend are also quite limited—Korean private schools, Western international schools, Chinese public schools in the enclave and so on. Our children can only attend one of these few schools and so we are intimately aware of each other’s lives.

Because South Korean children attend different schools according to their socioeconomic status, and perhaps more specifically, according to whether or not their father’s are employed in prestigious chaebol firms, the types of problems that South Korean women face in raising their children and the types of goals they have for their children’s futures also differ. These differences make it difficult for South Korean women of similar age cohorts to feel a sense of solidarity with one another. Rather, the wives of South Korean entrepreneurs became acutely aware of their relatively disadvantageous situation.

Because the students who attend Korean private schools or Chinese public schools can apply to universities in either South Korea or China, they are on a different track from the students who attend who attend A Level international schools. The wives of South Korean entrepreneurs and South Korean chaebol employees find it difficult to find common ground not only because they have such disparate lifestyles due to gaps in income levels, but also because the educational trajectories of their children are so different. Mothers of children who attend A Level schools converse about which
afterschool SAT or TOEFL program in Wangjing is known to get the highest scores for their children who are aiming to apply to highly selective universities in America. These afterschool programs charge an additional 2000 RMB (300 USD) per month, which amounts to 24,000 RMB (4,000 USD) each year per subject matter. Most students enroll in three subjects (for instance, SAT Math, Reading and Writing). Some even send their children to Seoul over the summer to study at the best SAT summer programs in order to prepare for the American college admissions process. When these figures are placed in juxtaposition to the average salaries of South Korean entrepreneurs, the sheer gaps in class and lifestyle become strikingly clear. The total tuition fee for a month of afterschool programs at 24,000 RMB, amounts to more than the median monthly income level for South Korean entrepreneurs, which ranges from 10,000 RMB to 20,000 RMB.

The gaps in socioeconomic status and lifestyle between the South Korean chaebol employees and South Korean entrepreneurs are staggering. Whereas the South Korean entrepreneurs’ incomes are by and large unstable, their counterparts who work for chaebol firms are paid nearly twice the salary they received in South Korea in addition to separate stipends for their children’s private school tuition, housing, domestic help, transportation and so on. According to my interviews with real estate agents in Wangjing, the families of South Korean chaebol employees and entrepreneurs largely live in distinct residential zones. The families of chaebol employees rent out more than thirty percent of the housing units in two residential areas—Huading (华鼎) and Daxiyang (大西洋). Less than five percent of the residents in these apartment complexes consist of South Korean entrepreneurs. One Chinese real estate agent noted that this was due to the fact that the rent at these apartments was nearly seven times as high as those of surrounding areas:
Those South Koreans are really rich. They all get housing stipends from the companies they work at. It’s a fixed amount and sometimes, the housing units are actually a little cheaper than their stipends. So we will tack on things like a Korean Chinese housekeeper, a full set of luxury furniture, a personal driver and so on to compensate for the gap in price.

These wealthy South Koreans have been seen as responsible for the rising real estate prices of property in Wangjing, further lending to the escalation of tensions between themselves and South Korean entrepreneurs who struggle to accommodate the inflated costs of rent in the enclave.

In addition, due to disparities in lifestyle, the families of South Korean chaebol employees often socialized amongst themselves outside of church. The wives of chaebol employees would go out to eat lunch after worship service and the men would often go out to play golf on the weekends. When I asked Deacon Kim who was a part of the ministry I had joined at Redeemer, why the two groups socialized in such separate circles, he seemed a bit baffled by my question.

Deacon Kim: What do you mean? We might go to the same church but we have nothing in common with them [South Korean entrepreneurs].

Me: Why do you have nothing in common? Mr. Park and you for instance both volunteer in the praise team with me. Don’t other people attend bible study and other church activities together?

Deacon Kim: I suppose we do serve on the praise team together. But the entrepreneurs never really open up and share what is actually going on in their lives in front of us [South Korean managers]. And outside of those activities, it’s hard to go out to eat or hang out with them. We just have such different lifestyles. I feel bad going to an expensive restaurant because I know that they [the entrepreneurs] probably can’t afford it. At church, we’re nice to each other because we share a common faith, but honestly, our relationship is not very intimate. Outside of church, I only socialize with other men who work for other major South Korean companies. We go play golf on the weekends and go drinking at nice bars. We just live in two different worlds.

The wives of these elite South Korean men also socialize exclusively amongst themselves.

A pastor of a small South Korean church seemed to capture the dynamic particular poignantly:
The wives of South Korean entrepreneurs don’t have time to socialize. They are busy working around the clock with their husbands. On the other hand, life for the wives of men who work for chaebol firms is so easy in Wangjing. They don’t have a care in the world. In Korea, they used to run errands, clean the house and take care of the children. In Wangjing, they can afford to hire outside help for nearly everything. Most women have nannies to look after their children, a housekeeper to clean their house and take care of errands, and a driver who will take them places. These women have time to go to expensive restaurants for lunch and get their hair done everyday. They have time to go to bible studies and other church functions during the week. All the while, I only see the wives of South Korean entrepreneurs on Sunday for worship service. They don’t have time to come out during the weekdays. I feel bad for them.

Thus, while Redeemer may offer a variety of services and programs for the South Koreans in the enclave, the entrepreneurial population, who are perhaps the most vulnerable and in need of assistance, are unable to benefit from these resources. Instead, they feel largely alienated by South Korean community, due to gaps in income and lifestyle.
Chapter 7. The Entrepreneurs

This chapter looks at how Korean ethnic entrepreneurs in the enclave gain access to resources in order to sustain their businesses. In particular, I compare the experiences of South Korean and Korean Chinese entrepreneurs I interviewed and observed in the field. I will describe in the pages to come that despite the fact that the South Koreans come with relatively higher levels of educational attainment and job experience, they are unable to sustain their businesses for an extended period of time when compared to their Korean Chinese counterparts. The Korean Chinese entrepreneurs, while they lack the sort of business expertise and financial capital that the South Koreans have access to, are more successful in slowly growing their businesses over longer periods of time.

While past sociological works have highlighted levels of human capital as important predictors for mobility among entrepreneurs, human capital is not the driving mechanism in the Korean enclave in Beijing. In this chapter, I will argue that the key mechanism for mobility for entrepreneurs in the enclave consists of none other than cultural skills. Understanding how to communicate and establish rapport with key actors such as South Korean consumers, Korean Chinese managers, Han Chinese bureaucrats and Han Chinese workers is of primary importance in running businesses in China.

I have divided this chapter into two parts. The first part uses survey data that I have collected as well as complementary data from the Chinese Census Bureau and the Chinese Statistical Yearbook to compare the types of capital and skill-sets that the South Korean and Korean Chinese populations are armed with when they arrive in Beijing. My field research is largely focused on Korean entrepreneurs who own small-scaled businesses concentrated within the service sector in the enclave. The second part of this
chapter examines how the Korean entrepreneurs are able to mobilize resources by looking at their relationships with four key actors in the enclave—South Korean consumers, Korean Chinese managers, Han Chinese low wage workers, and Han Chinese bureaucrats. I will argue that the Korean Chinese are able to utilize their bicultural skills to flexibly build rapport with all of these key actors.

Part 1: Levels of Capital and Skill-sets of the Entrepreneurs

*Human Capital*

The majority of South Koreans who immigrate to China come with high levels of educational attainment and work experience. Of the 381 South Korean immigrants I surveyed, 64.3 percent had college degrees and 18.6 percent had advanced graduate degrees. And among South Koreans who had been employed in South Korea, 55 percent worked at either a South Korean chaebol, a small or medium-sized corporate firm, or had owned their own entrepreneurial companies. Only a small fraction of South Koreans in Beijing had occupied blue-collar jobs prior to immigration. Within this population, South Korean entrepreneurs in particular are a high human capital group, as well. 72 percent had college degrees and 13 percent graduate degrees. And in addition, 49 percent reported that they had also been entrepreneurs in South Korea.

Although it is difficult to make any detailed comparisons due to different sampling procedures, data on the Korean Chinese population from the Chinese Census Bureau demonstrates that a significant proportion of the Korean Chinese population had held low-wage, low-skilled positions prior to the massive wave of urban migration in the 1990s. According to this data source, of the 918,673 Korean Chinese individuals who
were employed in 1982, 59.7 percent had been employed in the agricultural sector and 17.3 percent in manufacturing. In addition, in stark contrast to their South Korean counterparts, only a small fraction had held white-collar jobs. Of those who had, 2.5 percent were employed in the public sector, 4.7 percent in education and the arts, 0.4 percent in finance and 0.4 percent in scientific research (Choi et al 2005).

1990 Chinese Census Data of Korean Chinese minorities in the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture demonstrates similar findings. As noted earlier, Yanbian accounted for 53 percent of the Korean Chinese population prior to the mass exodus of the minorities to urban areas in the 1990s. Of the nearly 5,000 Korean Chinese minorities who were surveyed, 72 percent were farmers and only 3 percent of this population responded that they were entrepreneurs.

These national statistics correspond with existing descriptive accounts from secondary sources as well as field research I conducted on the Korean Chinese ethnic minorities. Past studies note that before the mass exodus of Korean Chinese rural migrants to urban areas, according to Chinese Census Data, 97 percent of the ethnic minorities, resided in one of three bordering provinces in northeastern China (Kim 2003). The ethnic villages that were scattered about this larger region were primarily agricultural communes where the vast majority of the Korean Chinese tilled rice paddies for a living (Kwon 1997).

But despite the fact that most of the early Korean ethnic communities were located in the countryside, which is notorious for the poor quality of public facilities, the Korean Chinese have long been recognized for their high-levels of educational attainment by the Chinese state. Indeed, studies show that the Korean ethnic minorities have not only
out-performed other ethnic minority groups in educational attainment, but that they have also done better than even the Han majority. The Chinese government’s “ethnic statistical yearbook” demonstrates that in 2005, 8.38 percent of Korean Chinese minorities had completed college, compared to 3.73 percent of the national population and 0.009 percent of the minority population. Rates of illiteracy among the Korean Chinese are also the lowest at 2.86 percent, compared to 9.08 percent of the national population and 14.54 percent of the total minority population.

Furthermore, data from my own survey demonstrates that levels of educational attainment among Korean Chinese in Beijing are rather impressive. Of 383 Korean Chinese respondents, 61.9 percent had attended either a two-year or four-year college and 20.6 percent had finished high school. These trends are in line with expectations that Korean Chinese minorities who choose to start a life in Beijing represent the elite within their group. Major South Korean companies in Beijing, for instance, have a strong demand for college-educated, bilingual Korean Chinese. Conversely, those who have little schooling have more employment opportunities in smaller cities such as Qingdao, Yanji or Harbin, where less established South Korean companies seek to hire bilingual Korean Chinese minorities for lower wages.

Still, although the Korean Chinese in Beijing exhibit impressive levels of educational attainment compared to their Han Chinese counterparts, the Korean Chinese still lag behind the South Koreans both in terms of their actual overall levels of educational attainment, as well as the quality of education they were able to receive. For one, the schools in South Korea have better access to high quality resources and facilities than those in rural China. While there is certainly a broad range in the quality of schools
Korean Chinese minorities attend according to geographic location of the schools, many of these schools struggled with lack of funding and resources. One Korean Chinese woman described her elementary school as the following:

About thirty children went to the elementary school in my village and there were about four classrooms in the school. It wasn’t set up so that the school had six grades. If there weren’t enough kids in one grade to make a class, they just eliminated that grade. So to give you an example, when I was in sixth grade, our school didn’t have a fifth grade… Come to think of it we only had five levels [when I was a student]—third grade, fourth grade, first grade, kindergarten [and our grade]. We didn’t have a second grade or a fifth grade… All of the Korean Chinese children who lived in our village went to that school… The Han Chinese kids went to a different school… Since the school was so small, the quality of the teachers at our school was also a bit low… Our school was just like any typical school in the Chinese countryside where poor people live. If the glass in the window broke, we would just tape it over with paper. We also didn’t have a heater so in the winter we just gathered wood and built a fire in the furnace… All of the students sat in desks that were scattered around the furnace, which was in the center of the classroom. All of the students would take turns putting wood in the furnace to keep the fire going and making sure the room stayed warm. There were about eight students in my class, but our class had the most students in the school. Some classes only had three or four students… Our desks were also so old that parts were worn out.

Certainly the school that is depicted in this excerpt is likely to be at the poor end of the spectrum of schools that Korean Chinese children typically attended. At later points in the interview, the woman spoke of how she and the children from her village attended a larger Korean ethnic school in a larger town nearby that had access to electricity and bigger classrooms for junior high and high school. Yet, from my interviews with other Korean Chinese minorities, this woman’s elementary school experience was also by no means exceptional either. The lack of facilities and resources at many of the Korean ethnic schools that is depicted in this interview excerpt clearly demonstrates the sheer gap in the quality of education of the South Korean immigrants versus Korean Chinese minorities. Moreover, only a small fraction of the college-educated Korean Chinese had attended university in Beijing. Most had attended either a local junior college or university in their province.
There is currently no known quantitative data on the background of the Korean Chinese entrepreneurs in Beijing, in particular. However, participant observation and in-depth interviews with entrepreneurs indicate that they represent the elite of the minority population. For the most part, three types of Korean Chinese minorities make up the entrepreneurial class. The first group consists of individuals who were relatively high-ranking teachers of Korean ethnic schools. The second group consists of those who had worked at a prestigious South Korean conglomerate upon graduating from a highly selective university in Beijing. And the third group consists of those who had been employed by the state collective (“danwei”) or had worked as a bureaucrat in their local village prior to the wave of urban migration in the 1990s. Thus, qualitative data suggests that although the Korean Chinese, on the whole, have lower levels of human capital compared to the South Koreans, the Korean Chinese entrepreneurial class is by no means lacking in educational attainment or work experience.

Social Capital

Both Korean Chinese and South Korean entrepreneurs can gain access to social networks in order to recruit workers and obtain information relevant to operating their businesses via two methods: word of mouth and ethnic media.

In the 1990s, when the enclave consisted of a smaller ethnic community, entrepreneurs relied heavily on word of mouth to recruit potential workers and share relevant business information. More often than not, the Korean entrepreneurs obtained contacts at church, a core organization among both the Korean Chinese and South Koreans. South Koreans would trade information with other South Korean businessmen
they knew to obtain referrals on potential Han Chinese and Korean Chinese workers. By relying on internal networks with other South Koreans who they could trust and who were embedded in the same set of minority organizations as they were, the South Koreans felt that they could be connected to hard-working and reliable workers.24

As the enclave grew and as the Internet and cell phones became increasingly ubiquitous in the PRC, entrepreneurs have come to rely on other, less personal means to recruit workers and manage their social networks. Today, there are numerous websites, blogs, and magazines that cater to specific niche communities within the Korean enclave. The following excerpt taken from an interview with a South Korean entrepreneur in Beijing demonstrates this shift in trends:

Back in the 1990s when Korean ethnic media sources were not as developed as they are today… the Korean expatriate community was not as big so we could get most things done by word of mouth. We would get referrals. They would say, ‘we worked with so and so for a period of time and they were good at this, but not so good at that. But considering your needs, we think that they will be a good match.’ That method was probably the most reliable way of hiring people. Back then, not a lot of people were used to using the Internet. Nowadays, people use twitter, personal blogs, websites specifically for hiring, and so on. You can obtain information very easily and quickly… Now, if we post an ad that we are hiring, we will get dozens of calls right away.

The increasing dependence on more impersonal means of networking has allowed both South Koreans and Korean Chinese entrepreneurs to gain access to a broad and diverse group of individuals. Gaining access to networks was not as dependent on the level of their integration into the social structure of the enclave, but rather, on their ability to effectively manipulate social media. But as a result of this shift in methods of recruitment and dissemination of information, the entrepreneurs were less able to filter out potential deviants and had to rely more on their personal skills to recruit trustworthy

24 The same was true for the Korean Chinese population. It is important to note, however, that in the 1990s, most of the Korean Chinese minorities worked as managers of South Korean firms and only a small proportion of the population consisted of entrepreneurs. In the 2000s, the proportion of entrepreneurs increased to reach about ten percent of the Korean Chinese minority population today according to my survey results.
and hardworking individuals. As I will argue later on in the next section of this chapter, this shift has made the cultural knowledge and linguistic capabilities of the entrepreneurs all the more important in maintaining the success of their businesses.

*Cultural and Linguistic Skills*

South Korean immigrants arrive in Beijing facing formidable language barriers. Prior to immigration, 65.7 of South Korean survey respondents could not speak a word of Mandarin and an additional 20.3 percent had only a rudimentary command over the language. But even more surprising is the fact that almost a third, or 32.1 percent, of the population reported that they still knew little or no Mandarin even after having resided in the PRC for over a year. Of the South Korean entrepreneurial population, over 40 percent knew little or no Mandarin even though 62.5 percent of these entrepreneurs had lived in the PRC for over 5 years.

It is likely that the decision to live and work in the enclave accounts for the lack of linguistic and cultural assimilation of the South Korean population. Because the South Koreans in the enclave do not have speak or understand Chinese to go about their daily lives in the enclave, they have little opportunity to extend outside their comfort zone and come into contact with the Han Chinese population. In support of this conjecture, my survey results demonstrate a weak correlation between years of residence in Beijing and Mandarin proficiency. And this is particularly, apparent among the South Korean entrepreneurial population who tend to rely heavily on the help of their Korean Chinese managers to communicate with their Han Chinese workers and other Han Chinese
business partners. In my case study, the enclave works to perpetually isolate the South Koreans from contact with the Han Chinese population.

In stark contrast, results from my survey indicate that the vast majority of the Korean Chinese participants were bilingual—81.4 percent were fluent in Korean and 12.3 percent felt comfortable speaking, reading, and writing in Korean. In terms of Mandarin proficiency, 72.8 percent were fluent, and 20.1 percent were comfortable speaking, reading, and writing in the language.

Undoubtedly the impressive bilingual capabilities of the Korean Chinese ethnic minorities are a testament to the bilingual curriculum of the Korean ethnic schools, as well as to the high degrees of institutionalized autonomy they have been able to enjoy under the affirmative action policies of the government.\textsuperscript{25}

But while fluency in multiple languages is an important source of cultural capital, in order to access and mobilize resources, it is also critical to understand the unspoken rules of conduct that allow social bonds to form and be sustained. Or, to put it in other words, the ability to internalize the social norms and expectations necessary for establishing rapport with a broad range of people is just as, if not more important than being able to physically communicate with others. Just as Bourdieu argues that the cultural tastes and sensibilities of the elite require a length of time to properly acquire, an

\textsuperscript{25} Since 1952, the Chinese state has designated Yanbian, the Korean Autonomous Prefecture. In addition, the government has also recognized one Korean autonomous county, as well as 43 ethnic Korean autonomous townships throughout the three northeastern provinces, which include Jilin, Liaoning, and Heilongjiang. In 1990, 53 percent of the Korean Chinese population lived in regions that were institutionalized Korean autonomous districts (Kim 2003). By state regulation, these regions are granted privileges in the preservation and use of their ethnic language, education, and culture. Korean ethnic minorities represent a sizeable proportion of government officials in these zones, for instance, and both Korean and Mandarin are used in public documents, government announcements, and business transactions (Jin 1990). Also, an overwhelming majority of Korean students attend Korean ethnic schools, where classes are held in both Korean and Mandarin. In my sampling, 88.8 percent had attended a Korean ethnic school for more than five years.
extensive understanding of the social norms and expectations that are embedded in particular cultural contexts also cannot be acquired overnight, nor can it be simply procured through years of language training within a classroom. Such “skills” are, for the most part, subconsciously internalized through processes of socialization via important social institutions such as the family, schools, religious organizations and so forth (see Berger and Luckman 1966). They are acquired not through intentional processes of learning, but rather accumulate as corollary products of mundane life experiences.

This is perhaps why the bicultural Korean Chinese ethnic minorities are not so easily replaced by Han Chinese individuals who have attained a high-level of proficiency in Korean, or by South Korean immigrants who have persevered through long years of linguistic training in Mandarin. The Korean Chinese offer much more than just their bilingual skills. They offer precious insight into the inner-worlds of both the Han Chinese and the South Korean communities. By virtue of having spent their childhood and much of their adult lives in a bicultural and bilingual environment, for the Korean Chinese, navigating social interactions with individuals of different cultural backgrounds has become like second nature.

Furthermore, the Korean Chinese not only understand Korean ethnic culture, but they have also become adept at picking up on the particular tastes and needs of the South Koreans. Since normalization of diplomatic relations between South Korea and the PRC in 1992, the Korean Chinese community has become increasingly structurally integrated with the South Korean community, both in the PRC and in the homeland. In Beijing, 52.5 percent of Korean Chinese minorities surveyed worked under a South Korean employer and 66 percent worked alongside South Korean employees in their place of work. In
addition, 87.1 percent reported that they had family members living in South Korea and 68 percent had plans to visit South Korea in the near future. The consumption of South Korean popular culture, such as trends, fashion, and soap operas, has also become a part of the daily lives of even those Korean Chinese living in the Chinese countryside. Survey results show that 65.3 percent of Korean Chinese participants watched at least three hours of South Korean soap operas each week.

For the Korean Chinese, the increasing prominence of South Korea and South Koreans in their everyday lives has allowed them to gain a better grasp of the needs and wants of their South Korean clients and employers. I was often surprised during the course of interacting with the Korean Chinese minorities at how precisely the understood the subtle particularities of South Korean mannerisms. Some had “repaired” their speech such that all traces of a Korean Chinese accent were erased, their facial expressions and gestures resembled those of South Koreans, and their style of dress was in line with what was currently in trend in Seoul. These individuals could easily “pass” as a South Korean in their daily lives, but when they were around other Korean Chinese, I noticed that they switched the way they spoke to make their rustic background more obvious. When I asked why they invested so much effort into conforming to South Korean styles of speech and dress, many responded that they were motivated by strategic reasons. South Koreans felt more comfortable interacting with them and respected them more for being able to assimilate into their community. Of those who participated in my survey, 63 percent responded that they adopted South Korean manners of speech when interacting with South Koreans.
Unfortunately, while the merging of the South Korean and Korean Chinese communities has led to an increased understanding of South Korean culture on the part of the Korean Chinese, the reverse has not been the case. In South Korea, the Korean Chinese are perceived as second-class citizens due to their Chinese nationality and rustic background. Those Korean Chinese who travel to their former homeland in search of employment are primarily employed in the secondary labor market and due to their inferior social status they encounter harsh discrimination and difficulty entering into the inner-circles of the South Koreans. South Korean immigrants carry these negative stereotypes of the Korean Chinese as unsophisticated, country bumpkins with them when they enter the PRC. And as a result, even though they are to large degree dependent on the Korean Chinese to navigate their new environment, from my interviews, I found that many expect the Korean Chinese minorities to adapt to their ways of doing things rather than attempting to adjust to the new social norms and expectations of Chinese society. This is most likely because the South Koreans arrive in China with much more material capital than the average Korean Chinese minority has access to, and subsequently, the South Koreans often pay for the assistance that they receive. Offering monetary compensation for the aid of bilingual Korean Chinese creates an uneven power dynamic between the two co-ethnics such that the South Koreans feel entitled to ask the Korean Chinese to accommodate to their particular needs even outside their home turf.

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Part 2: Culture as a Mechanism of Mobility

In this section, I compare how South Korean and Korean Chinese entrepreneurs manage their relationships with four different types of actors—South Korean consumers,
Korean Chinese managers, Han Chinese low-wage workers, and Han Chinese bureaucrats. I am especially interested in examining how the different cultural skill-sets that the entrepreneurs have access to influences their ability to form harmonious relationships with these key actors. I define culture, here, following Swidler (1986), as a “‘toolkit’ of symbols, stories, rituals and world-views, which people may use in varying configurations to solve different kinds of problems.”

**South Korean Consumers**

For Korean ethnic entrepreneurs who have built mom-and-pop shops within the enclave, their ability to appeal to South Korean consumers is quintessential to the success of their businesses. I will argue in this section, that contrary to what we might expect, the Korean Chinese are better positioned to offer a more attractive set of products and services than their South Korean counterparts due to their structural position as cultural intermediaries within the enclave.

Wangjing is primarily a residential neighborhood of high-rise apartment buildings. Integrated within these apartment complexes where an estimated 60 to 70 percent of the population is ethnically Korean, we can find a diverse range of Korean stores, restaurants, and organizations are integrated. The way in which the enclave is spatially organized evokes an air of familiarity among the South Koreans. Time and time again, the South Koreans I encountered in the field remarked of how Wangjing felt like an ordinary neighborhood one would find back home in South Korea, where high-rise apartment complexes dominant residential districts.
This feeling of comfort is precisely what draws wealthy South Koreans who are in Beijing on a short-term basis to the enclave. During my interviews with the managers at the chaebol firm where I was an intern, my supervisors remarked that they had chosen to live in Wangjing, despite the longer commute to work, for their families. One of the supervisors I interviewed stated:

I felt bad for having my family relocate to China because of my job. So at the very least, I wanted to make the transition as easy as possible for them. Besides, I don’t plan on living in China forever anyway. I am here on a five-year contract and then they will relocate my family back to Seoul. It’s not worth the hassle to learn Chinese and live amongst the Chinese here. Wangjing is just like Korea. My wife doesn't know how to speak Chinese but she doesn’t need to in Wangjing. She can get everything she wants using only Korean. All my friends here, their wives and kids all live in Wangjing, too. So she [my wife] has people to socialize with. Actually, my wife has come to like life in Wangjing even more than Seoul now because it’s so convenient and everything is cheaper in China (Interview with upper level executive at X firm, Beijing, June 2011).

For these elite South Korean businessman who are employed by major chaebol firms such as LG, Samsung or Hyundai, the enclave serves as the perfect respite from the chaos of everyday life in a foreign environment. 13 percent of South Koreans I surveyed were employed in a major chaebol firm. Because the majority comes to Beijing with their wives and children, collectively, this group accounts for over thirty percent of the South Koreans in the enclave. According to my survey, a little over 50 percent of this population had lived in Beijing for two years or less. Due to their plans of living in Beijing for such a short period of time, these businessmen and their families often feel little motivation to try and learn Mandarin or adopt the lifestyles of the mainstream Chinese. The enclave helps buffer the costs of immigrant adaptation for this group.

The South Korean chaebol employees, along with their wives and children, are a significant consumer class within the enclave. As I relayed earlier in this dissertation, they represent the highest earning demographic group in the enclave with 41.67 percent earning more than 40,000 RMB (or 6,400 USD) each month in addition to separate
stipends for housing, their children’s tuition, transportation and other living expenses. An additional 25 percent responded that they earned between 30,000 RMB and 40,000 RMB. These income levels are significantly higher than average income levels of middle-class Han Chinese residents in Beijing. According to a report published by the Social Science Academic Press and the Beijing University of Technology on July 17, 2010, the average income of a member of the middle class in Beijing is about 5,923 yuan per month. In addition, statistics from the Beijing Statistic Information Bureau show that the average wage in Beijing across all classes in 2009 was 4,037 yuan per month.

On the surface, it might at first seem as if the South Korean entrepreneurs are better able to cater to the particular needs and preferences of these consumers. After all, as recent migrants from South Korea, they grew up in the same cultural context, are exposed to the same set of social norms, and can relate to each other with more ease and familiarity than they might with the Korean Chinese minorities. In addition, if we consider the tensions between the South Koreans and Korean Chinese populations, at first glance, it might seem all the more likely that the South Korean entrepreneurs are at an advantage on this point.

But through my interviews and field research, I found that this was not the case. First, from the perspective of South Korean consumers, their priority was not so much on their feelings of camaraderie or emotional attachment towards the cultural background of their employer, but rather, the quality of products and/or services and the price of these goods.

On the one hand, the South Koreans had a slight advantage in their ability to cater to the specific tastes of the South Korean consumers. This seemed to make a difference in
the restaurant business where the South Korean consumers were willing to pay a premium for a subtle type of South Korean cuisine that the Korean Chinese found difficult to imitate. The excerpt below is taken from an interview took place at a local Korean restaurant in the center of the enclave. The South Koreans I interviewed noted right away that they could tell the owner of the restaurant was Korean Chinese and not South Korean due to the flavor of the kimchee that was presented with our entrees.

SK female: If you taste the kimchee, you can tell right away. You can, right? [She looks over at the South Korean male and me for our reaction.]

Me: Why? What kind of taste is it? How is it different?

SK female: How is it different? Hmmm… [South Korean kimchee] It doesn't taste as sour or old. See if you look at this kimchee, there’s a lot of dried pepper flakes and its bright red, but you can’t really taste the ingredients [even though you can see that it's there].

SK male: South Korean kimchee tastes fresh even when it’s old.

SK female: Yeah. There’s a lot of flavor in the sauce and it’s crunchy.

SK male: The way people here [Korean Chinese minorities] make kimchee, they use cheap ingredients so it tastes old and rotten even if they just made it.

SK female: I wonder if it’s because they don’t use expensive [high-quality] ingredients. I think the way that they [the Korean Chinese] make it is just different.

When I socialized with my South Korean friends in the enclave, it was customary for them to differentiate South Korean restaurants and bars from Korean Chinese ones. From the subtle flavors of the food that was presented, to the nuanced differences in décor, to the quality of the services that were provided, South Korean establishments were seen as more authentically Korean and higher quality than Korean Chinese establishments. Admittedly, this tendency can be traced to South Korean discriminatory views of the Korean Chinese as representing poor imitations of their cultural heritage.

But, on the other hand, Korean Chinese businesses were seen as more attractive in two important ways. First, Korean Chinese firms were able to offer similar products and
services for much cheaper—often amounting to half the cost—of their South Korean counterparts. Thus, for large-scale functions when price was taken into consideration, Korean Chinese services were favored. For most church-functions, for instance, we opted to make large orders from Korean Chinese restaurants instead of South Korean restaurants.

Second, and perhaps more importantly, while certain service industries such as the restaurant business or clothing boutiques were more influenced by subtle cultural distinctions between the South Koreans and Korean Chinese, the Korean Chinese were able to make use of their culturally intermediary position to dominate other sectors of the enclave economy. For instance, South Korean consumers flock to real estate agencies, language schools, clinics, law offices, travel agencies, and advertisement agencies that are owned by the Korean Chinese. Due to the short-term orientation of many South Korean consumers, the South Koreans exhibit a strong demand for services that help them understand how to adapt and live within the Chinese environment. This is along the lines of Edna Bonacich’s (1973) theory of “middleman minorities,” in which she argues:

In contrast to most ethnic minorities, they occupy an intermediate rather than low-status position. They tend to concentrate in certain occupations, notably trade and commerce, but also other ‘middleman’ lines such as agent, labor contractor, rent collector, money lender, and broker. They play the role of middleman between producer and consumer, employer and employee, owner and renter, elite and masses (Bonacich 1973).

Although the Korean Chinese might not have a perfect grasp of the nuanced preferences and tastes of the South Korean consumers, as third- and fourth-generation Korean minorities, South Korean consumers by and large view them as more competent at providing these type of niche services as intermediaries between the enclave community and the surrounding Han Chinese society.
For instance, Hee-won’s case demonstrates in more detail how South Korean migrants are dependent on Korean Chinese brokers when they first arrive in Wangjing.

One of my co-workers introduced me to her brother-in-law’s friend who is an entrepreneur here. He told me that he had used this particular [Korean Chinese real estate] intermediary when he had first arrived [in Wangjing]. But you know what happened? Because at that time, I had no way of comparing prices, I was just grateful that they were warm and provided me with good service. And they were. They helped me move all of my belongings [to my new place], they helped me contact the local Police Office [to apply for alien registration], if I think about it now, I feel like they helped me in ways that was beyond their call of duty. For instance, even when I went to the supermarket, I had no idea how to find the things that I was looking for. And since I’m unfamiliar [with the transportation system], I would take the wrong buses and even if I took a taxi, I didn’t know how to describe where I wanted to go. So, they would solve all of my problems for me. They would tell me that the standard rate for black cars [illegal taxis in Wangjing] was 10 RMB if my location was within Wangjing so I wouldn’t get ripped off by the cab drivers, and so on. They would help me get acquainted with this type of common knowledge—information that everyone knows. And so I was really grateful for how kind they [the Korean Chinese real estate agents] were to me.

Like Hee-won, most South Koreans rely on their internal networks within the South Korean immigrant community to get in touch with Korean Chinese real estate agents when they first arrive in Wangjing. Moreover, as in the case of Hee-Won, Korean Chinese real estate agents in the enclave specialize not only in facilitating deals in real estate, but also in helping South Korean immigrants ease into their new life by providing them with basic survival skills and know-how for everyday life in China.

The Korean Chinese dominate middleman industries that cater to a wealthy South Korean clientele in the enclave because they have access to information and resources in both South Korean and Chinese societies. The services they provide by and large aim to fulfill the needs of South Koreans in two ways: 1) some offer services that are customary in South Korea but not found in the PRC and 2) others offer services that introduce South Koreans to information necessary to sustaining daily life in the PRC that is otherwise hard to access due to linguistic and cultural barriers.
For instance, in addition to real estate agencies, the Korean Chinese dominate the minbak market as well. Minbak refer to bed-and-breakfast hotels that are generally located within regular apartment units of urban areas. Korean Chinese entrepreneurs create blogs advertising their minbak in major South Korean websites such as naver.com and daum.net. The Han Chinese residents who live in apartment complexes that host a concentrated population of South Koreans often complain of the noise, lack of security and disturbance caused by the continuous traffic of South Korean customers who stay at these minbak. As one elderly Chinese man complained to me, “They’re using our private property for commercial purposes. It’s hard to sleep at night with all the racket they create.”

Owners of minbak provide meals and useful information to South Korean travelers who are unfamiliar with the surroundings of the enclave. They help South Koreans navigate the Chinese metro system, provide maps of the region that are labeled in Korean, and they also escort their customers and help them open bank accounts, set up cell phones and so on by communicating with Han Chinese vendors on their behalf. Many South Koreans first live in minbak for a few weeks temporarily before they are able to select a place to live in more permanently. And during the time they stay in the minbak, they obtain important pieces of information on their surroundings from the minbak owner. As one South Korean woman explained:

My husband first came here [to the enclave] for six month to figure out where to live. He stayed at a minbak for about two months during this time… The company where he worked was located in the enclave, so we knew that we wanted to live in the vicinity. As he lived in the minbak he was able to obtain information on the surroundings. For instance, he was able to find out where we would send our children to school if we lived here. We found out that our children would not be able to attend other Chinese public schools because of their nationality as South Koreans. Fortunately, the public schools in the enclave accept South Korean children if we pay a certain fee. So in the end, that’s why we decided to live here in Wangjing because it was near my husband’s work and the schools our children would attend… My husband also was introduced to the church we attend now through the minbak owner. He went a few times before the whole family came to
Beijing and he told me of how good the services were. He also visited a few other churches in the enclave. After we moved to Wangjing, we visited these churches together as a family.

For many South Korean sojourners, minbak act as an important access point into China. Like the woman I interviewed, many South Koreans choose to stay at a minbak not necessarily due to the comforts of the minbak, but due to the wealth of insider information the host of the minbak is able to provide their guests.

The Korean Chinese also dominate Korean media outlets in the enclave. The most popular ethnic media consist of monthly magazines that contain advertisements and expansive telephone directories of the major Korean businesses in the enclave. In Wangjing, three media companies—Kyung Han Advertising, Han Wool Tari, and Korean—command by far, the widest circulation of readers. All three of these companies are owned by Korean Chinese entrepreneurs who cater to a predominantly South Korean customer base. According to the managing director at one of these firms:

We have more South Korean clients [than Korean Chinese or Han Chinese]. The main reason this is the case is because South Koreans come here [to Wangjing] from a foreign country. In South Korea, they are used to being exposed to advertisements like these. They have this mentality that if you want to operate a business, you have to advertise first and foremost. That type of mind-set is already well established. But when we first started, there was no outlet or any magazine where they could produce these advertisements.

In the case of this firm, the Korean Chinese entrepreneur was able to initiate a successful business because he understood that there was a strong demand for advertising among the South Koreans that had been left unsatisfied in Beijing. He was able to capitalize on this demand because he understood the needs of his South Korean customers—not only potential clients who would want to have their businesses featured in the magazine, but also potential readers who would want to regularly consume their issues:

In terms of the content of the magazine, we pay attention to showcasing information that might be simple to read but very useful to their lives in Beijing… We tried to provide information that will be helpful in their daily lives. For instance, which restaurants to take a friend who has come to visit you for a short while, or you know, things that have to do with where to sleep, what to eat, what to buy… So we showcase how to find the best restaurants, where you can order lunch, which
hotels are best to stay at during which season… Also, for Koreans who live in Beijing, we give them information on different schools in the area. A lot of people worry about which schools to send their children… Or, we show people how to take the subway, or for instance, if you want to go to the airport, if you should take Terminal 1 or Terminal 2.

Within the South Korean community in Beijing, these magazines have become an important source of information necessary to daily life. They are regularly used as telephone directories as the vast majority of small-scaled ethnic businesses in the enclave do not have websites. In addition, they are widely available due to mass circulation in major South Korean churches and corporations around the enclave.

In addition to the wealthy South Korean businessmen, the enclave attracts a significant number of South Korean tourists each year. Wangjing’s location in Beijing, the nation’s capital, and its geographic proximity to Seoul, has led it to become the most popular destination among South Korean tourists. According to recent statistics, about five million South Koreans traveled to the PRC in 2010 (Korean National Tourism Office). These tourists play an important role in helping stimulate the enclave economy.

A whole industry of services has sprouted that cater specifically to this clientele. In Wangjing, over 15 percent of the ethnic firms listed in the Korean Yellow pages consist of bed-and-breakfasts, travel agencies, tour guide companies, and other related ethnic businesses that seek to introduce South Koreans to Beijing. Due to the linguistic and cultural expertise required by these jobs, these businesses are also dominated by the Korean Chinese. The Korean Chinese, due to their familiarity and extent of interactions with the South Koreans, instinctively understand the types of attractions South Korean tourists wish to visit, the types of historical explanations of sites they find interesting, and the types of Chinese cuisine that they will enjoy or dislike.
As I demonstrated through my examples of Korean Chinese real estate agencies and minbak, oftentimes, the appeal of these businesses is not merely in their advertised services, but rather, in the additional tidbits of information and contacts that are useful to individuals who are relatively unfamiliar with China that the Korean Chinese provide. I argue that it is precisely these added bonuses that set the Korean Chinese entrepreneurs apart from their South Korean competitors in this line of service industries.

*The Korean Chinese Managers*

Korean entrepreneurs operating firms within the enclave rely heavily on Korean Chinese manager, regardless of whether they are South Korean or Korean Chinese. This is because the manager must be able to flexibly and smoothly interact with segments of the Han Chinese as well as South Korean population simultaneously. Enclave firms must be able to handle both South Korean as well as Han Chinese clients. And on top of this, entrepreneurs are looking for managers who can also effectively communicate with Han Chinese rural migrants who occupy most of the low-wage jobs in enclave firms.

When I asked Mr. Kim, a South Korean entrepreneur, why he chose to hire a Korean Chinese manager over a South Korean local, who had spent enough time in China to acquire a high-level of Mandarin proficiency, he explained:

> In terms of getting the job done, of course it is easier to work with someone who has lived in the same cultural environment and has similar goals as you do. So, in terms of getting things done, I feel like I didn’t run into any major problems [in my experiences working with South Korean locals]. But the problem with hiring South Korean workers is the fact that as an employee, you have to pay a South Korean a much higher wage than you would a Korean Chinese employee. For instance, for the salary you give one South Korean worker, you could hire six or seven Chinese workers.

The other South Korean entrepreneurs I interviewed echoed these concerns, as well.

South Korean locals have often graduated from prestigious universities in Beijing and
though they spent much of their early adult life in the PRC, they are also used to a relatively high standard of living. While most highly educated Korean Chinese with similar credentials work for an average salary that ranges from 3,000 RMB (471 USD) to 5,000 RMB (786 USD) a month, few South Koreans would be satisfied with such a wage. Most South Korean college graduates receive more than this amount from their parents in South Korea to help defray their living expenses alone.

Ethnic firms that hire South Korean locals to act as managers are also unable to compete with other local firms due to the high costs of South Korean labor. As Mr. Park, another entrepreneur I interviewed, pointed out:

There’s a lot of competition in the industry that I am in. There are a lot of advertising agencies that are run by local entrepreneurs in the enclave, as well. The agencies that are owned by South Koreans are known for their expertise in design and creative aspect of the production. So the clients will hire the South Koreans to do the parts that are not very cost-heavy, but labor-intensive and time-consuming. And then, once they get the finished design are ready to go into production, the clients will start negotiating with several different agencies and have us bid against each other. And of course, South Korean companies do not have the competitive edge [in pricing] that the Chinese companies do. South Korean employees are used to working for a much higher wage than the Chinese are… They say that if you pay a Chinese worker 2,000 RMB (314 USD) [as a monthly wage], you have to pay a South Korean worker 20,000 RMB (3,140 USD). That’s ten times more. Our company struggled a lot because of this huge gap in wages and pricing. I knew that we just couldn’t continue on like this and so I started thinking about other things that I could do.

Hence, to keep costs down and remain competitive with local Chinese companies, South Korean entrepreneurs by and large cannot afford to hire South Korean locals. While South Korean chaebol have the financial resources to hire South Korean locals in large numbers, South Korean SMEs cannot. In a sense, due to the significant gaps in wages, South Korean employees represent a huge financial burden to South Korean entrepreneurial firms. Thus, unless the workers are able to provide a rare form of professional expertise that the company is need of, South Korean entrepreneurs by and large avoid hiring South Korean locals.
In addition, South Korean youth are also concerned with their social status. Most college educated South Koreans aspire to work as business partners at South Korean SMEs or as upper level supervisors at reputable South Korean firms, such as the chaebol. Moreover, if they are hired in entrepreneurial firms, they often feel disdain for working under local Chinese employees. Most are only willing to work in positions of authority regardless of their age or prior job experience.

Finally, even aside from wage differentials and potential tensions among workers within ethnic firms, South Koreans also favor the Korean Chinese minorities over the South Korean locals because they provide a distinctive perspective on trouble-shooting problems. As Mr. Kim put it:

But even aside from the huge gaps in salary, the South Korean workers I hired thought and approached things the same way I did since, you know, at the end of the day, we are all South Korean. And even though there are a lot of advantages to having these similarities, I found that the types of obstacles that my South Korean employees faced trying to make things happen in the foreign environment of the PRC, were the same types of barriers that I faced as a boss and as an entrepreneur. We ended up facing the same types of obstacles. So, I thought to myself, ‘I’m paying this guy so much to work for me… wouldn’t it just make more sense to just let him go and hire even just three or four more Chinese employees in his place?’

The Korean Chinese are more effective managers because they provide more than just their linguistic skills. They are able to share a different way to approach problems and interpret events. In this particular case, Mr. Kim notes that he views the Korean Chinese as invaluable to the welfare of his company because they provide a cultural perspective that South Korean locals lack. For South Korean entrepreneurial firms, Korean Chinese workers’ ability to more effectively resolve potential issues in the institutionally uncertain environments of the PRC represents a highly valuable commodity that cannot be provided by the South Korean locals, no matter how fluent their Chinese.

The problem, however, lies in the fact that the South Korean entrepreneurs have difficulty establishing a harmonious relationship with their Korean Chinese managers. I
have gone into the reasons behind the tensions between the South Korean and Korean Chinese community in great detail earlier in this dissertation so I will not repeat the argument here. As I will explain later on in this chapter, the inability of South Korean entrepreneurs to establish rapport and maintain healthy relationships with their Korean Chinese managers puts them in a vulnerable position. The Korean Chinese manager often works as the right-hand man of his South Korean employer, controlling the communication channels between his boss and the Han Chinese population. Consequently, when sufficiently frustrated, the Korean Chinese manager can easily use his discretionary power to cause the downfall of his South Korean boss.

Hence, the Korean Chinese entrepreneur is at an advantage when compared to his South Korean counterpart in two respects. First, as I have argued earlier in this dissertation, strong bonds of solidarity characterize the Korean Chinese community in Beijing. Whereas the South Korean entrepreneurs are adversely affected by the tensions between the South Korean and Korean Chinese population in the enclave, the Korean Chinese entrepreneurs share a sense of common fate with their managers. They are, after all, both marginalized by the Han Chinese and South Korean populations, and as a result, bonds of in-group loyalty and solidarity run strong.

Second, Korean Chinese entrepreneurs, because they are also bilingual and bicultural, are better able to protect themselves from potential opportunistic behavior. Their managers are unable to monopolize the channels of communication between their employers and the Han Chinese as they themselves are bilingual and subsequently are able to monitor the behavior of their workers. I will explain this dynamic in further detail in the pages that follow.
South Korean Communication Barriers with the Han Chinese

While South Korean entrepreneurs might be able to somewhat cater to the needs of wealthy South Korean consumers, they struggle with managing their relationships with the Han Chinese segments of the population. The enclave attracts a substantial flow of wealthy consumers precisely because it creates an environment where one doesn’t have to learn Mandarin or adapt to Chinese customs in order to survive. But ironically, it is precisely this feature of the enclave that causes the downfall of the South Korean entrepreneur. The South Korean entrepreneur who relies on the enclave to buffer the cultural and linguistic barriers of Chinese society fails to learn the skills that are necessary for him to successfully manage his Han Chinese workers and build rapport with local Han Chinese officials.

No entrepreneur in China can successfully run a business without the help of Han Chinese migrant workers. This is because in order to keep prices low and competitive with other firms, they must hire these rural migrants who are willing to work for a fraction of the price than the Korean Chinese are. Unlike their Korean Chinese counterparts, however, South Korean entrepreneurs struggle to effectively motivate and manage their Han Chinese workers due to cultural and linguistic barriers. Even South Korean entrepreneurs who had lived in the enclave for several years experienced difficulty in this respect. As one South Korean put it:

The hardest part of my job was trying to communicate with my Han Chinese personnel because of my limited Chinese. Even though in my heart, I wanted to treat them well and encourage them to work hard, but it was hard for me to express all of my feelings in Chinese. Once a month, I would have meetings for all of my workers and I wish I could have been able to speak eloquently in Chinese, but I always found myself relying on a translator… So when I gave a presentation, I would first speak in Korean and all of the South Korean workers would understand what I was saying and then, my manager would translate what I said into Chinese so all of Chinese staff could understand… Once my Chinese got a little better, I started to understand everything that he was
saying. And so sometimes, after we gave the presentation, I would ask him, ‘why did you leave this or that part out of my speech?’ He was a pretty smart guy, though. He knew how to discern what parts to translate and what parts to leave out. He would explain to me that certain parts of what I wanted to say would actually have more of a negative effect on my staff and so he intentionally had left that part out. So for instance if I spoke about three different things, but of the three, one of my points wasn’t going to have a positive impact on my staff, he would just leave that part out. He would only talk about the other two points. And when I asked him, ‘why didn’t you talk about this third part?’ Afterwards, he would explain to me why that part was not really appropriate. And I trusted him because I believed that he understood more about their culture than I did.

This particular South Korean entrepreneur had taken Chinese lessons with a private tutor for about three months after arriving in Beijing and in addition, he had lived in Beijing for over seven years. Yet, he continued to rely on his Korean Chinese manager to act as his translator when he wanted to communicate with his Chinese staff because he felt insecure about relaying his emotions in an effective way. I want to point out here, that the problem lies in his lack of understanding of the cultural context that his workers are situated in. It was not that he was unable to recruit hard-working individuals as his workers—or to put it in other words, it was not his lack of access to social networks with the Han Chinese rural migrants, but rather, his inability in effectively mobilizing them once they were recruited.

In addition, South Korean entrepreneurs who first arrive in the enclave have little knowledge of how to keep up with the rapidly changing regulations on how to properly run their businesses in the PRC. According to the literature on “guanxi” (social-networks) in China, local bureaucrats have long played key roles in granting access to resources in the PRC. Although the increasing institutionalization of legal practices in China in recent years has arguably lessened the central role of local bureaucrats, even recent work on entrepreneurship in China demonstrates that these state officials continue to hold a lot of discretionary power in managing local businesses (Gold and Guthrie 2002).
During the course of my fieldwork, I found that it was not so much that one had to bribe local officials in order to protect one’s business, but more that one had to maintain open channels of communication with local bureaucrats in order to keep up with the many changing laws regarding entrepreneurial activities in the area. If a law regarding a certain practice had changed recently and it became known that one’s business was not abiding by that regulation, it was possible that a local official would pay that business a visit and threaten to close down that shop within a few days.

However, few South Koreans understand what licenses to apply for and how to keep up with the changing regulations. In actuality, the only way to maintain a business that properly abides by the local laws is to maintain close ties with local bureaucrats who can alert the entrepreneur of major requirements. Since the majority of South Koreans are unable to build this type of rapport or communicate with local officials, numerous have had to shut down their shops because they were not able to pass inspection tests.

In contrast, Korean Chinese entrepreneurs are better skilled at maintaining a good reputation in the surrounding Chinese community as well as in understanding how to abide by local regulations. During an interview with a Korean Chinese manager who worked at an advertising agency that published magazines featuring major ethnic Korean businesses in the enclave, the manager noted how many of her South Korean competitors disappear after a few years. In fact, the CEO of her company had first worked under a South Korean entrepreneur in 1993. After gaining a few years of experience, her boss took over the company in the late 1990s and has been running it successfully ever since then. When I asked her why her company had been able to maintain a stable business for over ten years, she answered:
So there are inspections [twice a year]. We don’t run into major problems when we go under inspection because we follow all of the laws and regulations carefully. We’ve been running this business for over 13 years now… Our South Korean clients come to us and say that they used to work with South Korean advertising agencies because they felt a bond of loyalty with the South Koreans. But do you know what happened? They would lose all their money because after paying for a contract for a year, the [South Korean] company would disappear. So they decided to invest in our company because they can trust that we will be around for a long time.

Among South Korean advertising agencies, all but a few don’t publicize their address and contact information. They hide their information. Do you know why? They move around a lot. One day they are located here, and the next, it’s somewhere else. It’s because they are trying to run away from the government. They don’t want to get inspected. But we put all of our information right up front, in the front of our magazine for all to see. We have nothing to hide. That’s why our magazine is a bit bland. There’s a lot of stuff that we would like to put in to make it more appealing and fun. But the government imposes a lot of restrictions. That’s why we include some useful information. How to use the subway in China, for instance… That kind of stuff is allowed. Or, if you want to go to the airport, should you go to terminal 1 or 2 or 3... But for instance, if we include interesting a series of short stories for each issue, our magazine might be more appealing, but the government doesn’t allow it, so we don’t. We follow all of the rules. We pay all of our taxes on time and so forth. So we’re not really afraid of the government… Sometimes there are people in the adult entertainment industry who come with a bucket load of money—one year’s worth of advertisement fees—and ask us to print their ads. Sometimes it’s tempting, but we don’t.

According to this Korean Chinese manager, the reason why their company had been so successfully was presumably because they had abided by the law whereas the South Korean companies have not. Later on in our interview, she noted how South Korean magazines would include advertisements from adult entertainment industries or would publish interesting articles on topics that might be appealing to South Korean consumers, but were against governmental regulations. She noted how there were always a dozen South Korean magazines that popped up now and then, but that they would just as soon disappear after not passing governmental inspections.

But while it is certainly true that many of these South Korean companies go against Chinese regulations in order to pull in more customers or because they were tempted by bribes, from my interviews with the South Korean entrepreneurs, I found that more often, these entrepreneurs were unaware of what laws to follow. As I stated before, local regulations are quite volatile, difficult to decipher, and oftentimes, not clearly publicized. Many of the South Korean advertising agencies do not list their contact
information, not because they have something to hide, but because they are aware that most South Korean companies fail governmental inspections and that they should avoid it at all costs.

In order to overcome these linguistic and cultural barriers, many South Koreans opt to hire a Korean Chinese manager who can help them manage their relationships with their Han Chinese workers and local bureaucrats. The problem, however, lies in the fact that the Korean Chinese already have such negative views of the South Koreans that it is very easy to incite resentment among their Korean Chinese managers. At the same time, a lot of South Korean entrepreneurs mistreat their Korean Chinese workers for a variety of reasons, whether because they are in a position of power as employers or because they were exposed to a lot of derogatory images of the Korean Chinese while they were in South Korea.

Many of the South Korean entrepreneurs I interviewed claimed that their businesses failed because they were blackmailed by their Korean Chinese managers. As of yet, the Chinese state has not institutionalized any program granting long-term residence for foreigners. Consequently, foreigners live as short-term visitors, extending their visas every year or so regardless of whether they have resided in China for just one year or over ten years. And as short-term residents, South Korean immigrants receive no protection or access to public facilities from the Chinese state. Thus, those South Koreans who experience bankruptcy due to business failure become extremely vulnerable to falling into a dismal situation. They have no rights to social welfare or public health care granted to Chinese citizens. They are unable to send their children to public schools. And many have become ineligible for welfare back home, as they have stopped paying taxes.
to the South Korean government while in China. They also have limited funds. As one
South Korean entrepreneur I interviewed noted:

In China, there’s no way you can get loans from the bank, so you have to mobilize your personal
networks. So for us Koreans, we don’t have any other way to get money other than to get it from
Korea. But after living abroad for several years, you lose touch with people in Korea. Even people
you had gone to school with, for instance. Once you don’t talk to them for a few years, it’s hard
just get back in touch with them all of a sudden to ask them for money. So its hard to go to anyone
other than your relatives.

Thus, when stripped of their wealthy guise, South Korean immigrants are actually quite
vulnerable to any sufficiently ill intentioned Korean Chinese worker. They have much to
lose should their businesses go down under, which is unfortunate since they are at high
risk for failure.

The power dynamics between the South Korean entrepreneur and his Korean
Chinese manager is largely dependent on their differential access to cultural capital. In
other words, the power dynamics depend on the interaction between how skilled the
Korean Chinese manager is as a cultural broker and how alienated or integrated the South
Korean entrepreneur is vis-à-vis the Han Chinese population.

The Korean Chinese manager’s power increases according to the degree the South
Korean entrepreneur is disconnected from the Han Chinese third party. Recent South
Korean immigrants who rarely leave the enclave and thus, have limited exposure to
interactions with the Han Chinese are most at risk to Korean Chinese opportunism. In
such cases, the Korean Chinese manager is able to exercise total control over the
communication that goes on between the South Korean entrepreneur and the Han Chinese
individuals involved in the brokerage relation.

When we compare the structural position of the Korean Chinese worker in the
small-scaled entrepreneurial firm to his position in a chaebol firm, we can better
appreciate the extent discretionary power he has access to in the entrepreneurial firm. The
checks and balances that are in place at the South Korean chaebol do not exist in this case. In the South Korean chaebol, several translators of different backgrounds who have potentially conflicting interests at hand are often present during business meetings. As a result, the Korean Chinese intermediary is able to have less power in molding the message that gets relayed across to benefit his position. In the case of the South Korean entrepreneurial firm, oftentimes, the Korean Chinese manager is the only party present who is able to communicate with both the South Korean entrepreneur and the Han Chinese third party. Consequently, a sufficiently aggravated Korean Chinese worker can wield their knowledge of internal information, their ties to the migrant workers at their firm or their ties to local Chinese bureaucrats to blackmail their South Korean employers into giving them a large sum of money.

For instance, the Korean Chinese manager can potentially subvert the relationship his employer has with the low-wage Han Chinese workers in his firm. The following excerpt is taken from an interview with a South Korean restaurant owner:

I don’t know if it is because the Korean Chinese have been influenced by Chinese society, but at any rate, once they get some kind of title or authoritative position, they often even override their superiors… Just because they are managers, they start overstepping boundaries and start taking control of the business. So for instance, if there is a manager in the middle, even though I told the manager to carry out a specific task, I find out later on that what he actually did and what I asked him to do was totally different. In a restaurant kitchen, people are divided into various groups. Some people are in charge of fried foods, others are in charge of sautéed foods, others are in charge of baked foods, and so on. So if there is one chef who is in charge of the kitchen overall, you have to make sure you communicate well with the chef in order to produce good food. So the manager needs to be an effective intermediary between the chef and the owner, but often, the relationship between the chef and owner turns sour. People find out later that the manager told the chef things that were totally different from the original message that the owner had intended to relay to the chef. Turns out that the manager just told the chef whatever he thought was best, as if it was his business to run. Later on, people working in the kitchen get so angry that they leave the restaurant. A lot of times, when the owner tries to figure out why they are so offended, and meets up with his employees individually, and uses a different translator to speak to them, he finds out that the manager told them things that were not in line with his own intentions. All of the problems that are associated with miscommunication arose because of the Korean Chinese person he employed to act as an intermediary… There are thousands of restaurants that went out of business because of this.
In this case, we find that the South Korean restaurant owner was unable to directly communicate with his Han Chinese workers and as a result, depended completely on his Korean Chinese manager to manage his workers. This South Korean entrepreneur’s inability to directly manage his workers ultimately led to the demise of his company.

Likewise, South Korean entrepreneurs often are completely dependent on their Korean Chinese managers to communicate with the local Han Chinese bureaucrats. And as we saw in the situation above, this places the Korean Chinese manager in a position of power where he can control the type of relationship his boss has with the Han Chinese third party.

South Korean entrepreneurs often place Korean Chinese workers in charge of administrative and managerial positions in their firms, and as a result, Korean Chinese managers have open access to confidential information. Because Korean Chinese managers have a better understanding of how business contracts and financial licenses work in the PRC, they are able to use their direct networks to Han Chinese bureaucrats to potentially blackmail their South Korean employers. For instance, as one South Korean I interviewed relayed:

There are people I know whose businesses have failed because of Korean Chinese minorities… When [my friend] just arrived from Korea, he obviously couldn’t speak or understand Chinese… he needed someone who could communicate in Chinese, so he hires a Korean Chinese ethnic minority who can help him. But because my friend can’t speak Chinese very well, it is easy for his Korean Chinese employee to relay incorrect information to him. And because the Korean Chinese worker also handles all of the accounting documents for his firm, it’s easy for him to slip in some money for himself between the cracks… They [the Korean Chinese] are able to manipulate regulations to their advantage because they can speak Korean and Chinese fluently. Whether tax regulations, accounting regulations, business license requirements… they start prodding here and there [to see where their boss’ weak spot is]. If it turns out that his boss is renting from a space that doesn’t have a proper business permit, it’s easy for a Korean Chinese minority to use that against his boss… So, even if the South Korean entrepreneur initially had been able to open up a store… once a report is filed [that he was illegally renting commercial property] it’s all over. He [the entrepreneur] has to leave the space. So, the South Korean has to either leave or pay a fine of tens of thousands of Chinese yuan. When you are hit with unfortunate events like this and lose tens of thousands of yuan a few times, it’s not long before you are left with nothing. How can you run a business under these circumstances?
No matter how skillfully one might be able to decipher the local regulations, due to the complicated nature of local laws and the prevalence of institutional uncertainty in the PRC, most of the entrepreneurs I met, at one point or another, has come across a situation where they were in danger of failing an inspection. In such situations, whether or not the entrepreneur has a personal relationship with the local bureaucrat can make the difference of failing or passing the inspection. As one South Korean entrepreneur explained:

To give you an example, in a space like this, let’s say that you need to have five fire extinguishers according to the stipulations of the Fire Department. But we only have four. That’s breaking the law, right? But let’s say that the inspector who comes to visit our office is someone I know. He’ll just let it slide. He’ll probably say, ‘Hey, you’re missing one. Ah well. No big deal.’ And then he’ll just leave… But let’s say I don’t have a relationship with that person. He’ll say, ‘you don’t pass the requirements. Pay this failed inspection fine.

This South Korean entrepreneur had conducted business in China since the late 1990s. He initially came to China as a student in his early twenties to study Chinese. Eventually, after mastering the language and living among the Han Chinese for several years, he decided to take advantage of his contacts in South Korea to open a trading firm in the enclave. When I asked him how he had managed to keep his business open for so long, he responded that it was his ability to form personal relationship with the governmental official in his local district. He noted how his South Korean colleagues, no matter how long they lived in Beijing, experienced difficulty in establishing rapport with the Chinese bureaucrats because they did not understand how to approach them. By contrast, he felt that he had been able to break down cultural barriers and form close ties with the Han Chinese due to his experiences when he was young.

In this chapter, I argued that the major mechanism of mobility amongst Korean entrepreneurs in the Korean enclave in Beijing consisted of cultural skills. Although
South Korean entrepreneurs come to the enclave with higher levels of human capital and have easy access to networks with the Han Chinese and other Koreans in the enclave, they are unable to make use of their skills and resources due to their social and cultural isolation from Chinese society.

They are unable to successfully tap into the lucrative opportunities to cater to the wealthy consumer class of South Koreans in the enclave for four reasons. First, they must compete with Korean Chinese firms that are better able to provide relevant services as cultural intermediaries for short-term South Korean migrants who need help acclimating to the Chinese environment. Second, the South Korean entrepreneurs struggle to establish harmonious relationships with their Korean Chinese managers, whereas the Korean Chinese entrepreneurs are tied to their managers by a sense of common fate. Third, the South Koreans, due to their lack of cultural and linguistic assimilation, have difficulty managing their relationships with Han Chinese workers and Han Chinese bureaucrats, and as a result, perpetually rely on their Korean Chinese managers to act on their behalf. Fourth, this puts the South Korean entrepreneurs in a precarious position, as they become vulnerable to the opportunistic behavior of their Korean Chinese workers.

In the Korean enclave, cultural skills provide Korean Chinese entrepreneurs with access to resources. Due to their culturally hybrid background, the Korean Chinese are adept at both understanding the needs of their South Korean clients as well as understanding how to manage relations with important Chinese actors. But this is not to say that the Korean Chinese rely solely on their cultural skills to run their businesses successfully. They are able to acquire the necessary job-training and professional skills to start firms that successfully compete with their South Korean counterparts, in large part,
due to the proliferation of South Korean chaebol firms that hire Korean Chinese workers in large numbers. While the Korean Chinese are unable to gain access to mobility by climbing the corporate ladder in these firms, they use their experiences in these South Koreans firms to acquire job skills to eventually start their own entrepreneurial firms. The following chapter discusses this dynamic in further detail.
Chapter 8. Inside the Chaebol

In the previous chapter, I argued that the South Korean entrepreneurs, despite their higher levels of human capital, were not as successful as the Korean Chinese entrepreneurs in sustaining their businesses in the enclave due to their cultural and social isolation from Chinese society. The high rates of entrepreneurship among the Korean Chinese population are astounding particularly in light of the fact that an overwhelming number of Korean Chinese grew up in small ethnic villages in the Chinese countryside, where access to high quality education and job experience is scarce.

This chapter stems from extensive ethnographic research conducted at a major South Korean chaebol in Beijing. Throughout the chapter, I supplement the observations I made from ethnographic fieldwork with interviews of South Koreans and Korean Chinese minorities who have worked at major South Korean chaebol firms in Beijing.

In this chapter, I examine workplace relations to analyze how the chaebol might affect trajectories of upward mobility among the Korean Chinese employees. I demonstrate that the chaebol both stunts and assists college-educated Korean Chinese youth in gaining access to upward mobility. But in sharp contrast to classical theories of mobility in the enclave, I will argue that the Korean Chinese are able to take advantage of their experiences working in the South Korean firm not because they share ethnic solidarity with their superiors, but because they are able to manipulate the system to their advantage.
Hierarchical Organization of the Firm

585 employees worked at the major chaebol firm I interned at in the summer of 2011. Of this population, 26.3 percent, or 154 employees, were South Korean expats (주재원). These expats consist of high-level supervisors who were brought in from the company headquarters in Seoul to oversee operations in Beijing on a short-term basis. In addition, 32 percent (193 employees) of the employees were South Korean locals, 21.9 percent (128 employees) were Han Chinese, 16.9 percent (99 employees) were Korean Chinese, and 1.9 percent (11 employees) were American.

For the most part, the hierarchical organization of the labor force strongly corresponds to the particular demographic categories that the workers belong to. South Korean chaebol firms are known to take after the structural organization of the Japanese zaibatsu in their rigid hierarchical division of labor (see Rohlen 1979). The company that I worked at is roughly divided into four major levels: the executive directors (상무), the department leaders (부장), the section leaders (과장), and the staff. The members of the staff are also further broken down into different levels of power according to their length of employment at the company and expertise.

The South Korean expats stand at the top of the hierarchy. Many of the expats are executive directors or work directly beneath these executive directors as department leaders in the firm. According to internal statistics gathered by the Human Resources Department at this firm, 17 percent of the expats occupied executive positions, 61 percent were department leaders, and 22 percent were section leaders. The South Korean expats by and large live in Beijing on a temporary basis, however. Internal statistics show that

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26 Elsewhere in this dissertation, I have referred to these “expats” as South Korean chaebol employees.
the 25th percentile of South Korean expats had lived in Beijing for 1.8 years, the 50th percentile 4.17 years, and the 75th percentile 6.7 years. The length of period that the expats had lived in Beijing largely corresponds to their rank, such that the executive directors have lived in Beijing for a longer period of time than the section leaders.

The South Korean expats not only have the most authority within the company, but they are paid significantly more than any other category of employee, including South Korean locals. The expats are paid nearly twice the salary they received in South Korea to compensate for the inconvenience of having to relocate to Beijing temporarily. In addition, they receive separate stipends for their children’s private school tuition, housing, domestic help, personal drivers, and so on.

Directly beneath the expats in the hierarchy are the South Korean locals. Many South Korean locals start off at the bottom of the hierarchy and gradually work their way up the corporate ladder. These employees follow a similar trajectory of gradual promotion embodied by the lifetime employment system of conservative Japanese firms (Rohlen 1979). These South Koreans not only make up the largest proportion of the employee population, but they also form the core members of the China headquarters. Their rank largely corresponds to their age and seniority in the firm. The older South Korean locals are largely department leaders and while many of the younger South Korean locals work alongside their Korean Chinese and Han Chinese co-workers in the entry-level positions. But unlike the Han Chinese and Korean Chinese who are rarely able to occupy positions as department leaders due to their cultural backgrounds, the South Korean locals do not experience such barriers in promotions. Most executive directors are brought in from the Seoul headquarters as expats, however.
There are many distinctions that set the South Korean locals apart from the South Korean expats that are worth mentioning. The vast majority of the South Korean locals have attended universities in China and in large part, due to the lack of employment opportunities in South Korea, have decided to stay in China to work at various South Korean firms after graduating. As a result, most of the South Korean locals are fluent or highly proficient in Mandarin. They are also generally younger in age than the South Korean expats. While the South Korean expats are paid more than 40,000 RMB (or about 6,300 USD) each month in addition to separate stipends for living expenses, the South Korean locals are only paid between 10,000 RMB (1,574 USD) to 30,000 RMB (4,725 USD) according to their rank and do not receive extra benefits. In addition, while the South Korean expats leave after a term of about two to five years, the South Korean locals are hired to work at the Beijing office on a more or less permanent basis. The large wage differential between the South Korean locals and expats continues to act as a significant source of tension between the two groups, however.

Beneath the South Korean expats and South Korean locals are the Han Chinese workers. The Han Chinese are paid on a similar wage scale as the South Korean locals. In addition, they are mostly hired for their technical expertise or for their connections to important government bureaucrats. They have by and large graduated from prestigious universities in China. In addition, while many occupy the lower-level positions in the firm, there is also a strong representation of Han Chinese workers in the mid-tier managerial positions as section leaders. This is in large part due to the trend among many South Korean chaebol firms towards “glocalization.” By recruiting more highly skilled Han Chinese to work in lower-tier managerial positions within the company, the South
Korean chaebol firms hope to better cater to the Chinese consumer market. The upper-tier managerial and executive positions, however, remain dominated by the South Koreans.

Most Korean Chinese employees remain at the lower-level positions as staff. A few exceptional Korean Chinese workers have been able to move up in the ranks to act as section leaders, as well, but for the most part, they are fewer in number than the Han Chinese. Most are young workers in their twenties and thirties, who have recently graduated from prestigious universities in China, like their Han Chinese counterparts. But while the Han Chinese are hired for some type of technical expertise, the Korean Chinese are hired primarily for their cultural and linguistic skills. Each section within the company has one or two Korean Chinese workers who take care of both clerical work and act as the main translators for their South Korean and/or Han Chinese managers.

The Spatial Organization of the Chaebol

The chaebol I worked for was located in a high-rise office building in the outskirts of the enclave. Our corporate offices occupied most of the floors in the high-rise, with one or two departments located on each floor. A series of six elevators were located in the middle of the floor, with three on each side facing each other. Next to the elevators, also in the middle of the floor, were the bathrooms and a sleek lounge area with tables, chairs, a water dispenser and an espresso machine. On the particular floor that I worked at, this lounge area separated the Finance Department from the Human Resources Department. I was told that the lounge area was a new addition that was constructed to facilitate small talk and light socializing among the different employees on the floor. The café was built as part of a new effort to ease the tensions that were forming among the
South Korean, Korean Chinese and Han Chinese workers at our firm. The company also started organizing parties and events to promote intra-group bonding, but these efforts seemed to have been largely ineffective in resolving tensions.

Each side of the floor was divided into separate clusters of cubicles that were arranged according to the different teams that made up the department we were associated with. At the corner of each cluster, there was a larger desk that was slightly separated from the other cubicles. These larger desks were occupied by the section leaders. The department leaders and the executive directors, of course, had corner offices that were distinctly separated from the rest of the cubicles on our floor. In general, the desks and office spaces were organized such that those in higher positions of authority sat in desks towards the walls of the floor plan. This spatial layout is in line with that of conservative Japanese firms in the postwar era, as well, whereby the hierarchical organization of the firm mirrored the positions of desks and offices on the floor (Rohlen 1979). I was told that the section managers were in effect more integrated within the space where their team worked, while the department leader and executive directors were more removed from the grounds of the daily operations.

In my team, I worked alongside two Han Chinese workers, a South Korean translator, a Korean Chinese translator and an American. Our section leader was a Han Chinese man in his forties who had studied at Korea University for two years to receive in his masters in economics. Our section leader reported to a South Korean department leader, who was an expat who could not speak any Mandarin. Whenever our section leader had meetings with the other section leaders on our floor, he would walk in with either the South Korean translator or Korean Chinese translator. The translators acted as
more or less his assistants, following him around throughout the day to various meetings. This was true for the other leaders on our floor, as well.

Workplace Relations

The team that I was hired to work for had only recently formed in the past two years or so as part of a company-wide effort to reduce the tensions forming between the South Korean expats and the Han Chinese employees. While I was there, I worked on a presentation that explained the nature of South Korean corporate culture to incoming Han Chinese employees in our firm. My co-workers collaborated on an attitudinal survey that tried to gauge the source of conflict between the South Korean expats and the rest of the company.

The company invested much effort in reducing the tensions that were forming between the South Korean expats and the Han Chinese locals because they saw the lack of mutual trust and cooperation as a major detriment to the operational efficiency of the company. It was widely known that the China headquarters was struggling in penetrating the Chinese consumer market. Sales were stagnant and the overall atmosphere of the company was full of pessimism and gloom.

As an ethnographer, I could sense that the company put forth effort in trying to inculcate the workers at our firm into the corporate culture of the chaebol. Every other morning, we watched news shows that broadcasted important highlights of how the company was progressing in the Seoul headquarters on the flat screen TVs on our floor. Occasionally there were also shows that portrayed hypothetical scenarios of cultural conflicts between Han Chinese and South Korean workers. The shows emphasized how
to solve these potential conflicts by utilizing methods of communication and cooperation laid out for us in our corporate manuals. These manuals were passed out to us upon entry into the firm and recently admitted employees spent several weeks going over the key concepts that our company espoused in intensive training sessions. We were encouraged to explicitly refer to these key concepts in our daily interactions with our co-workers and in our business meetings with members of other teams. In a sense, these key concepts were supposed to act as the glue that kept our company together. The idea was that even though we all came from different cultural backgrounds, we were bound by the same corporate culture and that by incorporating the cultural values of our company in our daily interactions with each other, we would presumably be able to overcome our individual cultural differences.

The company also tried to facilitate informal socializing among the employees, as well. Twice a year, each department would go on a company retreat where we would play games, eat, drink and generally spend time to get to know each other outside the confines of the office. In addition, the company also reimbursed expenses spent on food and drink if we socialized with co-workers of different cultural backgrounds. But despite these efforts, the rifts across cultural groups remained painfully conspicuous. The Han Chinese, Korean Chinese and South Koreans all continued to socialize within their own groups after work when inter-cultural interactions were not enforced.

In order to understand the nature of the power dynamics that characterize employee-relations within the chaebol, it is helpful to use Thomas Rohlen’s (1979) theories on the structure of hierarchical relations within conservative Japanese firms as a framework. The South Korean chaebol still contains elements of the lifetime employment
system first developed by Japanese firms during the post-war era. And as a result, as I have relayed earlier in this chapter, the organization of labor and the spatial arrangement of the office within the South Korean chaebol bears remarkable similarities to the conservative Japanese company examined in Rohlen’s ethnographic study.

I want to highlight three characteristics of the firm presented in Rohlen’s (1979) work, in particular. First, it is important to note that the South Korean chaebol by and large continues to reward loyalty and devotion to the firm over concrete, on-the-job skills or technical expertise. Second, on a related note, authority and power within the firm is organized largely by demographic traits rather than by an individual’s capabilities. In the Japanese firm, this meant that one’s sex and age largely corresponded to one’s position within the organizational hierarchy, such that older men were at the top of the hierarchy and younger women were at the bottom. In the case of the South Korean chaebol in Beijing, one’s cultural background is added to the mix of factors, such that older South Korean men sit at the top of the hierarchy, followed by South Koreans from China, the Han Chinese and finally, younger Korean Chinese women at the bottom of the corporate ladder. Korean Chinese and Han Chinese workers, no matter how capable they are as individuals, face formidable glass ceilings in attaining promotions within the chaebol similar to the obstacles that women faced in post-war Japanese firms. And finally, the third point I wish to highlight is that in the South Korean chaebol the divisions between work and personal life are blurred. In the proceeding pages, I will go into further detail on how these three factors help us understand the nature of employee relations within the South Korean chaebol.
Due to the large number of South Korean expat workers who are continuously brought in from the corporate headquarters in Seoul, the company relies on a large number of Korean Chinese workers to help ease their adjustment to the foreign Chinese environment. The Korean Chinese are by and large hired to act as translators for these South Korean expats. As one South Korean section leader described:

When they [the Korean Chinese workers] first are hired by our company, they work as translators and interpreters, and that line of work. We train them to do a particular type of work in their respective departments while they continue to act as translators. And perhaps their most important role is, when South Koreans first come [to China], South Koreans in the managerial level—whether section leaders or departmental leaders—to help them adjust to life in China. Since they [the South Koreans] can’t speak Chinese, they [the Korean Chinese] help them… From language in their everyday lives, to learning how to get around in Beijing, to figuring out where to eat, and so on… The Korean Chinese assist them in their daily needs in China.

As this interview excerpt demonstrates, the Korean Chinese are hired not only as translators but also as cultural brokers who help the South Korean expats understand and navigate the Chinese environment. The particular set of skills that the Korean Chinese have that distinguish them from South Korean locals and Han Chinese workers who are also proficient in both Korean and Chinese, stems largely from their intuitive understanding of the inner-workings of both mainstream Chinese and South Korean societies. For instance, when I asked this particular South Korean section leader why the company did not just rely on Han Chinese workers who spoke Korean to play an intermediary role, she answered that the South Korean expats felt an emotional connection with the Korean Chinese, whereas they felt that the Han Chinese workers were distant and unfamiliar.

South Korean chaebol firms hire young Korean Chinese minorities who have recently graduated from the top universities in China to fill this niche position as intermediaries for the South Korean expats. As one Korean Chinese worker noted:
There are a lot of Korean Chinese minorities like me, who have grown up in one of the three northeastern provinces in China, who have just graduated from college. We all have gone to universities in the cities like Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen and so on. When we graduate from college, we don’t go back to our hometowns. If you go back to our hometowns in the northeast, the Korean ethnic villages have nearly disappeared. Only the elderly ethnic Koreans are left. No one is there any more. All of the young people have stayed in the cities and have found jobs here and most of the jobs that we find are at South Korean companies like this one.

Because most of the South Korean expats in the upper-level managerial positions cannot speak Chinese, they rely heavily on their Korean Chinese assistants, not only throughout the workday when attending meetings with other Han Chinese section leaders and staff, but also in their personal lives as well.

It is important to note here that the South Korean chaebol firm is distinct from the nature of mainstream Chinese companies in the sense that the boundaries between their personal lives and work lives are much more blurred. This trend is much in line with Rohlen’s depiction of Uedagin, the Japanese bank at the focus of his work:

To the American observer accustomed to the homeward rush of employees at quitting time, these office meetings and parties that last long into the night seem at first profoundly exotic and inexplicable. In Uedagin offices, there is no set time when work ends, no time clock, and a reluctance to leave before the rest. Staying late is a common quality of office work. In some instances, the whole office will stay until the last person is finished (p. 100).

Likewise, in the South Korean chaebol in China, important work-related conversations take place after hours over drinks rather than at the office. More often than not, relationships among colleagues are cemented outside of the office. One Korean Chinese worker explained how this type of South Korean corporate culture was distinct from those of mainstream Chinese firms.

For American companies or Chinese companies, the boundaries between work and one’s private life is clear. Your work is your work and your private life is your private life. It’s clear. But it’s not like that in South Korea. You become close to your co-workers and you socialize with them as you work alongside them. You don’t ask them for anything other than what is written in your contract, you don’t go beyond your obligations to them as your co-worker. But for South Koreans, they don’t try to establish that kind of blurry relationship with the Han Chinese because they have trouble communicating with them. But once they find out that as a Korean Chinese worker, they can communicate with you easily, they start expecting to have that kind of relationship with you, as well.
Undoubtedly, in such a setting, the ability to understand how to mix one’s private and work life, the ability to emotionally connect with their South Korean superiors, and the ability to speak in Korean in a South Korean accent is a powerful resource for the Korean Chinese broker who works at the South Korean chaebol. Certainly, it sets them apart from their Han Chinese counterparts. The following excerpt of an interview demonstrates that the Korean Chinese employees indeed are at an advantage over their Han Chinese colleagues in their ability to establish rapport with the South Korean expats.

I feel a sense of emotional closeness and warmth towards the South Koreans I work with… For instance, I feel a deep sense of satisfaction when after a long day of hard work I can go get a cold beer with my South Korean managers. I feel like we can just open our hearts to each other and comfortably and honestly tell each other what’s on our minds. It’s really satisfying to be able to do that with the people you work with. It reminds me of what it feels like when I am at home talking to my parents. It’s kind of strange, right? I spent two months training in South Korea and when I was working with the South Korean section leader over there, I felt that emotion. It’s hard to put into words. It’s this feeling of closeness…

And in this sense, the Korean Chinese are favored over Han Chinese workers who can speak Korean to serve as cultural and linguistic intermediaries for the South Korean expats because they possess this capability of emotionally bonding with their superiors.

In the South Korean chaebol, loyalty and devotion to the welfare of the company is prized above individual capabilities in the workplace. In accordance to the trend of the lifetime employment system, South Koreans who are hired start at the bottom of the corporate hierarchy and gradually move up the ranks to upper-level positions with time and age. As a result, workers are rewarded for their devotion and loyalty to the company, and having stayed in the company for a lengthy period of time is more worthy of recognition than how capable an individual might be at his particular job. This is in stark contrast to the system of how the division of labor and authority structures are set up in Western firms, for instance, where one’s age and the time of length one spent working at the firm do not have much baring on one’s position.
This system of promotion does not apply to the Han Chinese or the Korean Chinese, however, who are seen as not completely understanding the ethos of the company due to their cultural backgrounds. The Han Chinese for the most part do not understand the merit of socializing with their co-workers after the workday ends, for instance. They would rather spend their personal time with their friends and family outside of work and feel resentful for allowing the company to dictate how to spend their personal time, as well. As a result, many of the South Koreans do not expect the Han Chinese to become “full” members of the company due to their disparate cultural perspectives on work and family life.

To a certain degree, the South Koreans expect the Korean Chinese to be more willing to work overtime and understand the importance of socializing outside of the office to solidify bonds within the company due to the common ancestral heritage they share. But many Korean Chinese resent the fact that they are at the brunt of a double standard. They complain that the South Koreans allow the Han Chinese to get off easy, but expect them to work overtime. In turn, the South Korean superiors interpret their grumbling as signs of laziness and a lack of devotion to their company. The following conversation I had with a South Korean section manager demonstrates this dynamic particularly well.

Me: What kinds of problems do you come across when you are trying to manage workers from different backgrounds, like the Korean Chinese and Han Chinese workers on your team?

Manager: Motivation. Since they [the workers on my team] lack motivation, some people on my team work really hard and others not so much. There are things like that, but you see, it’s not just that the person who works really hard is just working hard to get things done, but that other people on his team can see that he is working hard and also feel motivated by his efforts to work hard together with him… there’s not a lot of that on my team though [i.e. not a lot of people work hard on my team]… I am speaking from my personal experience, but for instance, there are Korean Chinese workers, Han Chinese workers and South Korean workers on my team [he draws on a napkin with his pen]. Then these
people [he points to the Korean Chinese workers who are drawn between the South Koreans and Han Chinese on a diagram on his napkin] need to help people over here [he points to the Han Chinese] come up to this level. But for instance, what we have is, I tell the Korean Chinese in the middle, ‘Since you guys can communicate better with me, please come up with me to this level.’ But then, they might answer, ‘No, we’re Chinese so we are only going to come up to this level.’ Or they might even work less so that they satisfy the minimum requirements…

Me: Are you talking about working overtime in this case?

Manager: Overtime? Yes, we have a lot of that here.

Me: So are you saying that the Korean Chinese and Han Chinese workers are reluctant to work overtime?

Manager: They don’t seek it. No, absolutely not. They rather dislike it.

Me: And you’re saying that that becomes problematic?

Manager: I’m trying to say that that’s why workers must be sufficiently motivated. They need to be motivated to help motivate the others on our team. It's not simply that I will order people on my team, ‘You need to work overtime today!’ But rather, I try to show the others on my team, as a leader, that I am working very hard and explain to them why it is so important for us to finish this project by a certain deadline and why its necessary to work overtime in order for us to meet that deadline. But even though I explain all of that, they really dislike working overtime. They feel like I am infringing on their personal time and space.

Me: Are you talking about working overtime in this case?

Manager: Overtime? Yes, we have a lot of that here.

Me: So are you saying that the Korean Chinese and Han Chinese workers are reluctant to work overtime?

Manager: They don’t seek it. No, absolutely not. They rather dislike it.

Me: And you’re saying that that becomes problematic?

Manager: I’m trying to say that that’s why workers must be sufficiently motivated. They need to be motivated to help motivate the others on our team. It's not simply that I will order people on my team, ‘You need to work overtime today!’ But rather, I try to show the others on my team, as a leader, that I am working very hard and explain to them why it is so important for us to finish this project by a certain deadline and why its necessary to work overtime in order for us to meet that deadline. But even though I explain all of that, they really dislike working overtime. They feel like I am infringing on their personal time and space.

The attitude of this South Korean section manager is very much in line the ethos of the Japanese bank in Rohlen’s (1979) work, as well. He notes that “the leader’s virtue, his concern for others, and the general esprit within the group are the most effective means to individual acceptance and participation.” We can better understand the frustration of this South Korean section manager when we view it within the context of Rohlen’s framework. His attempts to mobilize his workers largely were ineffective in that his team members did not share the same values and attachment to the firm that he did. And he largely attributes to this gap to the different cultural backgrounds of the local Han Chinese and Korean Chinese workers.

Overtime carries special currency in the South Korean chaebol as a symbol of the extent of one’s devotion to the firm. It is seen as a symbol of personal happiness for the
overall welfare of the company. The fact that the Korean Chinese and Han Chinese are reluctant to work overtime because they resent their work life bleeding into their personal time, thus, also is interpreted as their lack of devotion to the company. Because the chaebol rewards loyalty and devotion over “hard” skills such as technical expertise and individual capability, in a sense, the lack of motivation that the Korean Chinese and Han Chinese workers exhibit also acts as a retroactively imposed justification for why they are not promoted within the firm.

On the part of the Korean Chinese workers who feel that they are not rewarded according to their hard work or on-the-job performance, they feel entitled to take advantage of the system by putting in minimal effort. The different range of skills that the Korean Chinese workers may possess, in the grand scheme of things, does not make much of a difference in this type of South Korean firm. In the entire firm, there was not one Korean Chinese department leader and only a handful of Korean Chinese section leaders. I learned this from a conversation I had with a section manager in the Human Resources Department, which I later recorded in my field journal:

X confirmed that the general view of the employees at our firm was that the Korean Chinese were only recruited for their language abilities. They were not seen as bringing anything else to the table. And thus, they were rarely promoted even after being in the company for over ten years. The title of section manager was reserved, thus, for those Korean Chinese who stayed in the company for over seven years, because after such a long time, the company felt obligated to give them some sort of nominal promotion. X noted that there were no Korean Chinese above this level, however. He also noted that some times the more senior level employees would outright say to a Korean Chinese worker, ‘If you don’t like it here, then leave. Where else are you going to go?’ X noted how many of the Korean Chinese workers were abused in this way in front of their colleagues.

On the one hand, this system of promotion is in line with chaebol practices of rewarding Korean Chinese workers who have demonstrated their loyalty to the firm by staying with the company for many years. But on the other hand, the glass ceiling that the Korean Chinese face in promotion within the firm and the tacit bullying workers who
overstay their welcome endure can be likened to the stunted mobility of women working in conservative Japanese firms during the post-war era. As Rohlen (1979) notes:

Women must resign from the bank at the time they marry... The policy of employing no married women has the serious consequence of creating a high female turnover rate. Each year two hundred new women must be trained to replace those who leave for marriage. This represents an annual turnover of one-quarter of the female work force... As already mentioned, because they leave the bank upon marriage, women are less inclined than men to feel a close alliance of interest with the bank. They never have much chance to enjoy the increasing wages and bonuses that come with years of service, and they have no chance for promotions. If they are loyal and enthusiastic, it is because they like the people and their work, not because the system is designed to reward them for such contributions. There are no public and few private complaints about this, probably because most expect to be married soon and regard work as an interim activity between school and becoming a housewife.

In the Japanese firm that Rohlen studied, women were viewed primarily as women. In the author’s words:

In the office, women work alongside and do almost precisely the same tasks as the youngest men. Both serve as tellers and record keepers, and in cases where the women are more experienced or skillful they will be recognized for their ability. But no matter how valuable a worker she may be, a woman must play the part of a woman. This includes showing deference to men (even those younger), serving them tea, preparing food for parties, taking responsibility for brightening up the office with flowers and other decorations, and being cheerful.

Women held a separate occupational category within the field that corresponded to their perceived social roles that were appropriate to their gender, age and marital status. In the same way, for the most part, the appropriate social roles for Korean Chinese workers at the chaebol firm in Beijing was primarily as cultural and linguistic intermediaries and their access to power also corresponded to first and foremost their status as Korean Chinese minorities.

Part of the company’s strategy in limiting the power of the Korean Chinese employees is similar to how the Japanese firm in Rohlen’s work limits the power of women. First, the firm incorporates a policy to primarily hire the Korean Chinese for their soft skills rather than some sort of technical expertise, and second, offers Korean Chinese workers a competitive entry level salary but refrains from promoting them above a certain level no matter how skilled they were or how long they worked at the company.
Because of these two factors, the company is guaranteed to have a fresh supply of young Korean Chinese workers who have recently graduated at prestigious universities in China to fill the entry-level positions as translators and a very limited pool of Korean Chinese workers who are older or more experienced.

In this sense, at the South Korean chaebol in Beijing adapts the organizational model its headquarters such that the demographic traits of its workers has become largely interchangeable with their statuses within the workplace. In South Korea, this method of organization largely hinges on age and gender: those with most power and authority in the firm are male and older in age, while young women dominate low-status posts. In Beijing, the cultural and ethnic background of their workers also plays an important role in determining status as well.

As I stated earlier in this chapter, older South Korean workers dispatched from the Seoul headquarters sit at the top of the hierarchy, whereas young Korean Chinese women find themselves at the bottom. Moreover, just as women are excluded from the system of promotion within the chaebol firm, the Korean Chinese, by virtue of their cultural and ethnic background as ethnic minorities, are only hired as translators and by and large remain as translators regardless of the length of time they have spent at the firm or their technical expertise in other fields.

And in some cases, one’s demographic position acts as a stronger signifier of power than one’s actual status within the firm. As one Korean Chinese worker commented:

I once had a Korean Chinese co-worker who was about my age. He had graduated from Qinghua University [a prestigious university in Beijing]. He was a section manager, so he was actually, the same level as my boss within the firm. But my South Korean boss would treat him like he was a subordinate. He would order him to do this and that and speak down to him. I would watch my Korean Chinese co-worker just patiently endure all of that mistreatment silently, without a word of
complaint. I felt so bad for him but at the same time, I was so angry that he wouldn’t stand up for himself. Because you know there is definitely a hierarchy at our company. If you are a South Korean expat who is a section manager, you have more authority and power in the company than a Chinese who might actually be positioned higher than you. All of the South Koreans for instance, took home electronic appliances manufactured by our company to test them out, but none of the Korean Chinese workers were given that privilege.

Korean Chinese workers are often frustrated by the fact that their identity within the firm is primarily as a Korean Chinese ethnic minority. Due to the nature of the South Korean corporate structure that privileges one’s demographic characteristics over technical skills, many Korean Chinese feel unmotivated in the workplace. They correctly recognize that the South Korean corporate system does not reward their hard work or talents as individuals.

Turning Limitations into Opportunities

Within the Korean Chinese community in Beijing, however, the South Korean chaebol plays an important role in recruiting and hiring the brightest and most talented group of Korean Chinese youth. Despite the lack of opportunities for promotion and discriminatory treatment they endure within the firm, many Korean Chinese are able to use their experiences working at the chaebol to achieve upward mobility. Most realize that upward mobility cannot be achieved within the chaebol, however, and as a result, while South Koreans commit their lives to the firm, the Korean Chinese view their time in the chaebol as merely temporary. As one Korean Chinese minority who had worked at Samsung for several years put it:

I got bored after working at Samsung for about six years. I didn’t want to do it anymore. Also, I started to see, at that time, that it didn’t matter how long or how hard I worked. I started to think I’m just getting older and not really gaining anything in return. I wasn’t going to work there forever, anyway… so I decided to quit. I knew I wasn’t going to work there forever. And I had always wanted to do something on my own.
For this particular Korean Chinese worker, over the six years he had spent at Samsung, he had risen in rank to reach the top of the hierarchy among the lower-ranking staff. He knew that it would be difficult to reach a promotion after his position and gradually he lost his motivation to continue working at the firm. After quitting, he went on to start a series of successful entrepreneurial firms within the enclave.

From the part of the Korean Chinese, those who decide to work at a chaebol after graduating from college make the decision fully aware of the situation they are about to place themselves in. During my interviews with these young Korean Chinese college graduates, most told me that they chose to work at a chaebol knowing that they would probably not get promoted. As one of my interviewees stated:

Working at a South Korean firm is convenient… The work is not very hard; all you do is a lot of translation and clerical work… But once you go in [pause]… If you decide to work at a South Korean firm, the base salary is relatively high [compared to other Chinese firms]. If you work for a chaebol, in the case of my friends who work for South Korean chaebol firms, they make from 4000 RMB to 5000 RMB a month. Some places will give you more than 5000 RMB a month as soon as you start. But working there [with the South Korean expats] is really stressful and there’s really no future. Most of the people who work at a South Korean chaebol after working there for about three to four years don’t get a raise and don’t have many opportunities to get promoted. Maybe if you work there for five years, you might get a promotion or a raise, but I heard it’s really hard.

Thus, the Korean Chinese who choose to work at the chaebol do so because they want to get corporate experience and learn how to work with South Koreans, but they do not do so thinking that they will climb the corporate ladder. But as I mentioned earlier in this chapter, this dynamic leads to a vicious negative cycle in the firm. Korean Chinese workers do not feel motivated to work hard because they enter the company knowing that they will not be rewarded for their performance or efforts. And this in turn, frustrates South Korean managers who use the low job performance of the Korean Chinese workers on their team as a rationale for why they are not promoted in the firm.
The South Korean corporate structure certainly places the Korean Chinese in positions of disadvantage as they are only outsourced for their linguistic and cultural skills, and not cultivated and trained as long-term members of the firm. In addition, their soft skills are seen as easily replaceable and not valuable. Because the Korean Chinese are all concentrated in positions of limited authority, they have no means of breaking out of this bleak situation within the South Korean chaebol. Still, for the Korean Chinese elite, the value of working at a chaebol firm is not in its future prospects within the firm, but rather time spent in the chaebol is seen as time spent preparing for eventually starting their own entrepreneurial firms. Their experience at the chaebol allows them to acquire the cultural capital that helps them become successful in eventually starting their own entrepreneurial firms in the enclave.

In particular, one important skill they acquire while working at the chaebol consists of South Korean styles of communication. When Korean Chinese workers first enter the chaebol firm, they struggle to act as effective translators in business meetings because they are used to speaking in a Korean Chinese regional dialect. By using different colloquial expressions and accents that are reminiscent of North Korean regional speech, South Koreans not only have a difficult time deciphering what they are saying, but they have also come to associate this style of speech as crude and unprofessional. For instance, some Korean Chinese try extremely hard to mask their accents because they have come to associate their styles of speech with these derogatory attitudes held by the South Korean population. As one South Korean woman described:

I’m not trying to look down on Korean Chinese minorities, but those Korean Chinese! I feel that they cannot speak Korean proficiently! It’s not that they can’t speak Korean, they can carry a conversation with us, but [pause] I don’t feel that they really understand what we’re saying. And that’s why they can’t translate accurately. They’re good at everyday conversation, but for things like a formal discussion or a presentation or making a reservation or something, things that are a
bit more complicated… They don't use sophisticated language. They only know how to talk casually. They just figure out the basic message and just say it. They talk like they’re little children. You can’t speak as if you’re still in elementary school at a business meeting…

Among South Koreans, Korean Chinese minorities are perceived as more or less sophisticated, professional or trustworthy by the ways in which they speak. Those for instance, who are able to speak like a South Korean are seen as those exceptional Korean Chinese who are more educated and of a higher social status than those who speak in a strong Korean Chinese accent.

In addition, the style of Korean that South Koreans speak today has evolved to include many Westernized expressions. Because the Korean Chinese were secluded in their ethnic communities in the PRC during the Mao era, they also were isolated from Western influence for nearly five decades. Thus, they have difficulty understanding common expressions used in South Korea that have been imported from English and other Western languages over the years. These differences have also led to inaccuracies in translation on the part of the Korean Chinese brokers. As one Korean Chinese worker lamented:

When I was first hired, I had a lot of difficulty understanding basic things that my boss was saying. He would use a lot of Westernized expressions that I had never heard of and I felt too embarrassed to ask him what he meant every time he would use such a word. I was only nineteen at the time and it was the first time I had met a South Korean in my life. I got into trouble a lot though, because I didn’t quite understand what my boss was saying and wasn’t able to accurately communicate what he wanted to say [to the Han Chinese workers].

These inaccuracies in translation lead some South Koreans to believe that the style of Korean than Korean Chinese speak is not accurate or precise. Their linguistic skills are even further devalued in these cases.

However, Korean Chinese minorities who are able to work at South Korean chaebol firms are at an advantage over their peers in that they are given the opportunity to hone their Korean language skills to more effectively communicate with South Koreans.
By working at a major South Korean chaebol firm, they are not only interacting daily with South Koreans in a formal and professional context, but they are also exposed to South Korean culture both from within the firm and also by being sent on business trips in South Korea. At the chaebol firm where I worked, Korean Chinese workers were often sent on training sessions held at the company headquarters in Seoul for several months at a time. For many Korean Chinese workers, they are able to experience South Korean society for the first time through these business trips. As one Korean Chinese reminisced:

I’ve been to South Korea several times for my work. The first time I went, I was sent for about a month for training when I first entered the company. We went to the Seoul headquarters and worked, we learned a lot of things. We were shown how the headquarters was operated. Maybe more than training or learning, we were sent to the headquarters to get to know the South Koreans who worked there. We worked with them side by side for about a month. Then, we’re taken to the factories. There are a lot of factories… I also was able to visit the major tourist sites in Seoul for the first time. I had never been to South Korea at the time. I heard stories about what it would be like there from my grandfather. I had always dreamed of what it would be like. When we landed in the airport, I was so excited. I was so excited that in Korea, everyone spoke Korean and everyone was Korean. It was so thrilling to be there.

Like this particular Korean Chinese worker, for many of the Korean Chinese, by working alongside South Koreans on a day-to-day basis and by being given opportunities to travel to the homeland for different assignments, they are able to establish personal networks in South Korea, as well. The Korean Chinese worker I interviewed went on to explain:

When I go to the Seoul headquarters on business, the South Korean workers there are so kind to me. They are so kind because I came all the way from China. I made a lot of friends who I keep in touch with even now. I made friends at the different retail stores, at the factories, and at the headquarters in Seoul. We help each other on personal matters, too. Even though I don’t work there anymore, when my former co-workers from the Seoul office come to Beijing to sight-see, they call me up and I take them around for about two or three days. And when I go to South Korea, they meet up with me and we have dinner together.

Their increased exposure to South Korea and contact with South Koreans are certainly not solely positive. As I have illustrated elsewhere in this dissertation, often initial experiences with South Koreans are positive, however, with time, the Korean Chinese gradually start to feel disillusioned by their co-ethnic brothers. This was true even in the
case of the Korean Chinese worker above who spoke of his positive experiences making friends with his South Korean co-workers at the Seoul headquarters. Later on in our interview, he emphasized:

I don’t know why but lately, I have no desire to travel to South Korea. When I go to Korea, I don’t really have fun. Whenever I go to Korea, I can’t seem to stay for over a week… I have a few friends there. But after I meet up with them, there’s nothing to do. It’s no fun. I feel more comfortable in China.

As our interview progressed, I later learned that he left his job a few months after getting into a heated argument with one of his South Korean superiors. After I turned off my digital recorder, he expressed that he felt disappointed by his South Korean co-workers. He did not feel respected because of his background as a Korean Chinese minority and this disillusionment led him to feel unmotivated at work.

For the Korean Chinese, increased contact with South Koreans within a chaebol firm is significant not in that the chaebol provides a favorable environment for the cultivation of ethnic solidarity between South Koreans and Korean Chinese. Rather, the chaebol acts as an important institution that socializes the Korean Chinese into South Korean society. Over time, the Korean Chinese workers start to conform in their behaviors and mannerisms to South Korean corporate culture. For instance, one Korean Chinese minority who had worked at the chaebol firm for over five years told me of how her speech patterns changed naturally over time:

After I started working at a major South Korean chaebol, I have had to speak South Korean style speech more regularly and so naturally, over time, I just came to adopt this style of speech as my own. Now, when I go back to my hometown in the countryside, I speak to them using a Korean Chinese dialect. But they’ll respond to me strangely. They’ll comment how I speak like a South Korean now… I think it just happened naturally over time. At our company, I speak with a Korean Chinese dialect when I speak to my Korean Chinese friends. But I find myself speaking with a strong South Korean accent. I don’t know why, it just happens that way. I find myself changing. Also, because I am in contact with South Koreans often and I work with them on different projects, I find myself changing even more. Even in the way that I am thinking or approaching things. South Koreans at our firm will often tell me, “You really act and talk like a South Korean…”
The chaebol provides the Korean Chinese with the opportunity not only to learn how to speak in a way that garners respect from South Koreans, but also, in the process, they acquire the necessary South Korean cultural capital that allows them to forge close relationships with the South Koreans. Along these lines, their accents and manners of speech are important not only in that they are able to communicate more effectively and accurately, but also in that they are able to put their South Korean counterparts at ease by expressing themselves in a way that stimulates a sense of familiarity rather than alienation.

While the Korean Chinese worker in the above example found herself changing her speech and behavioral patterns naturally, over time, many Korean Chinese workers intentionally learn to speak in a way that is more familiar to South Koreans because they feel that this will provide them with more opportunities and advantages in the long run. For instance, in the following example, a Korean Chinese worker speaks of how she used her experiences working as a translator for a major South Korean media company to solidify her Korean language skills:

I worked for a major South Korean newspaper company, when I first came to Beijing. My job was to take Chinese news articles and translate them into Korean and upload them onto the company website. But for the first few assignments, my boss would point out that I had made a lot of mistakes. So, from that time on, I focused on re-learning [South Korean style] Korean. Obviously the Korean that South Koreans use and Korean Chinese use is different. So everyday, after I got off from work, I would [trails off]… I mean, my boss kept on correcting the articles I would send him and I would get so frustrated, so I would take a newspaper laying around in our office everyday after work. I would say, ‘Can I take this home with me?’ and sometimes my boss would say, ‘No, that just came in today. Take that one. That one’s from last week and that other one’s from last month,’ and he would hand me several newspapers. So on my way home, on the bus, I would read the newspapers. When there was no place to sit and I had to stand, I couldn’t read, but when a spot opened up and I could sit down, I would read the newspaper and would memorize each sentence one by one. And before long [pauses] the thing is, South Korean style Korean is not so different from the Korean I was used to. The differences are just very subtle. You just have to remember a few rules.

As a translator for a major newspaper company that was based in South Korea and that targeted a South Korean readership, knowing how to utilize South Korean style
grammatical patterns, vocabulary and expressions can be considered a concrete professional skill. This Korean Chinese woman used resources at the major South Korean firm she worked at to cultivate an important skill-set. She sought to communicate in a manner that was more familiar to the South Koreans, not only because it was perceived by her clientele as more professional, but also because she wanted to put the South Koreans she was interacting with at ease. In her words:

Some Korean Chinese people think, “that South Korean man is arrogant. He came to China, he should learn how to speak Chinese. Why should we change for him?” But I’m not like them. I think it’s important to be considerate of what other people might want and need. I know that there is a limit to how perfectly I can mimic South Korean style speech, but I feel like if I can speak Korean in a way that makes them feel more comfortable, then why shouldn’t I try to make them feel more at ease when they interact with me?”

Today, this Korean Chinese woman runs a successful translation agency in the enclave and among her long-time clients are major South Korean chaebol firms. Her Korean Chinese friends who also operate translation agencies often ask her how she is able to attract so many clients. “They complain that they do not get enough jobs and I always seem to have so many assignments that I cannot keep up with them all,” she told me. Undoubtedly, for this young woman, her ability to communicate with South Koreans effectively and professionally has allowed her to establish rapport and gain credibility from her South Korean clients. Access to South Korean cultural capital prepares these college-educated Korean Chinese elite to start successful middleman firms servicing wealthy South Korean consumers within the enclave.

In addition, through their experiences working at the South Korean chaebol, these Korean Chinese workers also gain exposure to how a well-established corporation is organized and operated. According to one Korean Chinese woman who had briefly worked at a major chaebol firm upon graduating from college:
I wanted to understand what a company consisted of. I thought that it would help me figure out what I wanted to do in the long term… [During my training], I saw what each section in the company did. At first, I spent some time in accounting and saw how they recorded their finances. Actually, I think after you see how they keep a record of the company’s finances, you can better understand how the company is run. After that, I worked with the people in the Sales Division. I went out with them when they made pitches to different stores. And then, I went to the warehouses and saw what kinds of problems people had in shipping out the products. Basically, I went around everywhere and saw how they did everything…

For many chaebol firms, exposing their workers to how the company is organized and operated is an important part of training their employees to become more efficient at their posts. But an unintentional consequence of this training is added business know-how on the part of the Korean Chinese. By understanding how the company is organized and by being exposed to how major corporations trouble-shoot these problems, the Korean Chinese are better able to establish their own firms in the enclave after retiring from their positions.

In this section, I have demonstrated how while Korean Chinese encounter stunted mobility within South Korean chaebol firms that they are able to benefit by their experiences working at the chaebol by accumulating important business know-how, and perhaps more importantly, by being socialized into South Korean corporate society. The skills that the Korean Chinese are able to acquire through their time at the chaebol allows them to gain mobilize precious resources found within the Korean enclave and as a result, obtain access to upward mobility as entrepreneurs.
Chapter 9. Conclusion

The Bigger Picture

In the beginning of this dissertation, I introduced a puzzling set of outcomes I came across while conducting field research in the Korean enclave in Beijing: why were such large numbers of highly endowed South Korean entrepreneurs leaving Beijing due to economic hardship and how did their Korean Chinese counterparts, despite their humble upbringing in the Chinese countryside, find success through entrepreneurship in the same enclave? Due to the ethnographic nature of my data collection process, my project was focused more on ascertaining the processes by which Koreans in the enclave mobilized resources as opposed to isolating specific structural determinants of mobility.

That the Korean Chinese minorities were more successful in sustaining their businesses than the South Korean immigrants contradicted existing sociological theories which have stressed human capital as a strong indicator of entrepreneurship (Min 1993; Portes and Zhou 1996; Stinchcombe 1990; Min 1997).

Moreover, these findings also did not fit within existing theories on the ethnic enclave. To briefly reiterate, the enclave hypothesis argues that enclaves that are characterized by sufficient socioeconomic diversity and organizational complexity are conducive to the cultivation of ethnic solidarity and trust among co-ethnics. Ethnic solidarity and trust are framed as key mechanisms of mobility (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993).

If social capital among co-ethnics within the enclave had sufficed in my case study, however, then we would also expect to find that not only the Korean Chinese, but also the South Koreans to be characterized by widespread patterns of upward mobility.
Similarly, if social capital within the enclave had been the key mechanism, then we would also expect the South Koreans to have been able to mobilize their solidarity with the Korean Chinese to overcome various obstacles in conducting business in the Chinese environment. But as I demonstrate in the dissertation, this is not the case. The South Koreans and Korean Chinese encounter significant emotional and institutional barriers in collectively mobilizing resources in the enclave. Thus, the enclave hypothesis as it stands today does not provide an adequate explanation for this puzzling set of outcomes.

I set out to challenge the principles of the enclave hypothesis through my case study of the Koreans in Beijing by looking at four empirical field sites: the space of everyday life within the enclave (chapter 5), the ethnic church (chapter 6), the individual experiences of ethnic entrepreneurs (chapter 7), and the South Korean chaebol firm (chapter 8). In each of these sites, I re-evaluated how and why the existing sociological framework for mobility within the enclave did or did not apply to the Korean enclave in Beijing. I also sought to answer the key question of why the Korean Chinese were better positioned for success than their South Korean co-ethnics in the enclave.

**Major Empirical Findings**

In chapter 5, I used survey and ethnographic data to show how bonds of solidarity between the South Koreans and the Korean Chinese in the enclave have become severely damaged over time. I showed that these damaged ties are manifested in segregated residential and commercial zones within the enclave and argued that much of the tensions between these two groups have emerged due to increasing transnational connections to the homeland. Discriminatory stereotypes rampant in mainstream South Korean media
and in the homeland are keenly felt in the enclave in Beijing due to these tight transnational ties. Both South Koreans and Korean Chinese watch South Korean television regularly, have personal experiences living or working in the homeland, and the vast majority have family members and close friends currently residing in South Korea. As a result, members of the enclave are regularly exposed to perceptions formed in the homeland.

In addition, I show that social interactions between the South Koreans and Korean Chinese take place primarily within the workplace where asymmetrical power dynamics only exacerbate underlying tensions. South Koreans predominantly hold positions of power in large ethnic firms in the enclave and often treat their Korean Chinese workers in a derogatory manner. Due to the segregated spaces of residence and leisure within the enclave, negative mutual perceptions between the two groups are sustained over time.

Chapter 5 is significant in that I show how co-ethnic conflicts within the enclave extend beyond everyday conflicts that may characterize any social group. These conflicts signify that the South Koreans and Korean Chinese in Wangjing must rely on other mechanisms of mobility in the absence of ethnic solidarity between the two groups. In the remaining three empirical chapters in the dissertation, I elaborate upon the larger ramifications that the lack of ethnic solidarity between the two groups of co-ethnics have had on the collective mobilization of resources within the enclave.

In the chapter that follows, I look closely at the organization of the Korean church within the enclave. I am interested in the church for two reasons. First, in the enclave hypothesis, organizations play an important role in giving ethnic minorities the tools and resources to cultivate mechanisms of mobility—bounded solidarity and
enforceable trust. Civic organizations cultivate a sense of common fate and common identity among co-ethnics in the enclave. In addition, they hold the power of sanctioning deviant behavior, thereby fostering the stability and reliability of social transactions among co-ethnics. Second, I chose the church as a case study of organizations due to its centrality within the enclave community. For both the South Koreans and Korean Chinese, the church stood out as the most dominant civic organization within the community, boasting the largest membership and commanding the greatest time investment among its members on a regular basis.

In this chapter, I compared a prominent Korean Chinese underground church and state-sanctioned South Korean church enclave on two dimensions—first, the overall impact that transnational activities had on its organizational capacity, and second, its role in the cultivation of solidarity within the church and ethnic community, more broadly. I examined how these two dimensions affected collective mobilization of resources among entrepreneurs.

Interestingly, I found that although the South Korean church seemed to benefit more from its access to transnational resources, that it was unable to help its entrepreneurial population—the segment of their population that was most vulnerable and in need of organizational support. This was because the transnational resources and church programs largely benefited the wealthy South Korean chaebol employees and perhaps unintentionally, isolated the South Korean entrepreneurs and their wives. In contrast, the Korean Chinese were better able to collectively mobilize resources within the setting of the church because they were able to foster stronger bonds of solidarity.
within the Korean Chinese community due to their shared structural position as marginalized minorities from both South Korean and Han Chinese societies.

These findings are theoretically interesting in that they show with greater clarity how trajectories of mobility among entrepreneurs are not solely shaped by they skills they possess as individuals. Rather, I find that the fates of entrepreneurs are powerfully influenced by the ways in which they are able to collectively overcome structural barriers. In this sense, we can see how it is not only Granovetter’s “weak ties” that are instrumental in gaining access to important information channels, but also that strong bonds of solidarity within a minority group can act as an important resource. The Korean Chinese are able to further capitalize on strong bonds of inner-group solidarity due to their structural characteristics as a group, situated at the margins of both South Korean and Han Chinese society. What set the Korean Chinese apart from their South Korean counterparts was the fact that even Korean Chinese entrepreneurs who did not possess the types of skills they needed to successfully run businesses in the enclave found themselves relying on their friends at church for help in overcoming various obstacles. Together, they were able to come up with ways to sustain their businesses over longer periods of time. They were able to do this due to the solidarity they felt with one another as Korean Chinese ethnic minorities.

In chapter 7, I compare how the different skill-sets of South Korean and Korean Chinese entrepreneurs shape their ability to set up and sustain successful ethnic firms in the enclave. My primary argument in this chapter consists of the claim that neither human capital nor social capital within the ethnic community act as the driving mechanisms of mobility among entrepreneurs in the enclave. Instead, I argue that a broad set of cultural
skills—understanding how to communicate effectively and establish rapport with key actors such as South Korean consumers, Korean Chinese managers and Han Chinese bureaucrats and workers—is critical to entrepreneurial success.

By focusing on cultural skill-sets, as opposed to social capital within the enclave community, I challenge the enclave hypothesis that implicitly claims that the self-sufficient economy of the enclave is able to provide ethnic entrepreneurs with privileged access to the necessary resources for entrepreneurial success: low-wage co-ethnic workers and a captive market for cultural goods and services. Considering the increasing trends of labor migration around the world, more and more ethnic entrepreneurs, even those who are protected by the enclave economy, must reach outside the bounds of their community to hire low-wage workers. In addition, in developing countries like the PRC, where local laws are vulnerable to the discretionary power of local bureaucrats, entrepreneurs must establish harmonious networks with local elite in order to sustain their firms over extended periods of time. Thus, this chapter shows that it is no longer enough to rely solely on ethnic networks to successfully sustain ethnic firms in the enclave. Broad social networks, and the necessary cultural skills to secure these networks, are increasingly critical for entrepreneurial success, even within the enclave economy.

Lastly, the final empirical chapter examines workplace relations within the South Korean chaebol firm in Beijing. The South Korean chaebol is the largest recruiter of college-educated Korean Chinese in Beijing. I analyze inter-group dynamics within the chaebol using the framework of workplace relations outlined in the enclave hypothesis whereby bounded solidarity and paternalistic ties between employers and their co-ethnic
workers are attributed to the eventual upward mobility of otherwise disadvantaged co-ethnic workers in the enclave.

In my case study, I use extensive ethnographic and interview data to argue that on the one hand, Korean Chinese workers encounter discriminatory treatment and stunted mobility due to their background as non-South Korean ethnic minorities. On the other hand, the chaebol plays an important role in the trajectories of mobility within the Korean Chinese population, as the vast majority of successful entrepreneurs have gained important work experience through the South Korean chaebol. The chaebol acts as an important vehicle of socialization for the Korean Chinese who have had minimal experience interacting with South Koreans and minimal exposure to South Korean society. By accruing South Korean cultural capital at the chaebol firm, these Korean Chinese minorities are better able to set up successful entrepreneurial companies that cater to the teeming population of wealthy South Korean consumers. The skills and resources acquired at the chaebol are not handed down to the Korean Chinese as a result of good will or ethnic solidarity between South Korean managers and Korean Chinese workers. Rather, the Korean Chinese are able to benefit by the transnational activities of the South Korean chaebol and their lived experiences working alongside South Koreans on a day-to-day basis within a major South Korean corporate environment.

Broader Implications

These series of findings allow us to re-conceptualize the role of the enclave and the nature of mobility among co-ethnics in the enclave as proposed by the enclave hypothesis. In particular, it becomes apparent that the framework of the enclave
hypothesis only applies to situations where 1) the migration of low-wage labor is not widespread, 2) the host society is not characterized by institutional uncertainty, and 3) enclave participants are not divided by significant cultural or socioeconomic gaps. While these criteria might have been easily satisfied in earlier periods, given the increasing complexity and frequency of migration in contemporary society, we are faced with a pressing need to revise and re-conceptualize how the enclave might help or hinder ethnic minorities.

In the beginning of this study, I proposed an alternative theoretical framework that stressed the cultural skills of ethnic minorities and the implications that particular skill-sets had on access to social networks. I was initially inspired by canonical theories of assimilation that argued that the acquisition of cultural know-how could pave the way for entrance into inner social circles and cliques that were important for socioeconomic mobility. But whereas the classical assimilationist model prioritized acculturation into the host society, in this era of transnationalism, I hypothesized that a broad cultural tool-kit that consisted not only of the culture of the mainstream, but also a range of different linguistic and cultural skills that spanned diverse national contexts, might act as the key mechanism to mobility.

Although my study confirms the important conceptual relationship between cultural skills and social networks that I proposed in the beginning of this dissertation, I have come to realize that this framework in itself cannot explain why the South Koreans are unable to achieve the same success that the Korean Chinese are able to in Wangjing. The model that I initially presented prioritizes the skill-sets of individuals, while overlooking the quintessential sociological principle first conceptualized by Emile
Durkheim (1892) that society consists of more than a sum of its parts. What has allowed the Korean Chinese to succeed was not merely that they were endowed with the cultural skills to tap into the resources of both South Korean and Han Chinese societies. What has allowed them to succeed in such large numbers was rather that they were, as a group, structurally positioned at the margins of several different societies.

The social marginalization and discrimination that they endured from the South Koreans and Han Chinese, on the one hand, has been the source of much psychological distress and pain. But this dual marginalization has also allowed them to forge strong bonds of solidarity within the minority group. Thus, despite the fact that they may not have “direct” access to the rich resources that the South Koreans seem to have access to, through various civic organizations such as the church, the Korean Chinese are able to collectively overcome the obstacles they face in their efforts to secure socioeconomic stability. Unlike the South Koreans who are driven apart by differences in class, in the case of the Korean Chinese, ethnic solidarity is able to trump class differences due to the harsh experiences of discrimination they experience in both South Korea and the PRC.

Because they are on the fringes of both societies, the Korean Chinese are also able to dominate the strong demand in the Korean enclave economy for services that capitalize on their roles as cultural brokers between South Koreans and the Han Chinese. They are better able to take advantage of the captive market for South Korean goods and services in the Chinese environment, because of their ability to understand both the needs of their consumers and the environment their businesses are situated in.

In addition, they are better able to cultivate the cultural skills that are necessary for the establishment of broad social networks because as ethnic minorities who have
grown up in a culturally hybrid environment, they are already endowed with a strong foundation of knowledge of both South Korean and Han Chinese cultures. When placed in the right environment with access to the right resources, they are better able to hone these skills to perfection. This is particularly helpful for college-educated Korean Chinese youth who quickly adopt South Korean cultural modes of behavior and speech while working in South Korean chaebol firms in Beijing.

My dissertation helps us understand the significance the enclave in this new era of transnationalism. Enclaves, by buffering the linguistic and cultural barriers in the host society, facilitate the proliferation of transnational activities. Increasing transnationalism poses immigrant minorities with a host of opportunities and obstacles, however.

In this era of increasing transnationalism, my dissertation shows that it is these types of ethnic minorities—minorities who have lived on the fringes of several different societies—that are better able to take advantage of the opportunities that emerge from the woodwork. The enclave, in this setting, no longer provides transnational migrants with shelter from the bleak employment prospects in the host society. But rather, by shielding transnational migrants from exposure and interaction with members of the host society, the enclave perpetuates their socially marginalized existence and stunts them from gaining the types of skills necessary for entrepreneurial success. But for bicultural ethnic minorities who are able to flexibly maintain contacts with individuals of diverse societies and cultural contexts, the transnational enclave opens up tremendous opportunities for unprecedented success.
Cited References


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