Abstract

Mediated Empire: Colonial Taiwan in Japan's Imperial Expansion into South China and Southeast Asia, 1895-1945

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Between 1895 and 1945 the Japanese transformed the colony of Taiwan into a regional center for southern expansion under the auspices of the Government-General of Taiwan (GGT). This dissertation explores how this process unfolded by focusing on the Government-General's interactions with other imperial institutions, the populations under its nebulous jurisdiction, and the peoples it sought to control through the production of ethnographic knowledge. By viewing empire through the lens of one strategic colony, this project demonstrates the existence of multiple imperial centers that possessed unique geographical and institutional imperatives.

The GGT initiated imperial strategies that took advantage of its proximity to neighboring territories on the empire's edges. Due to Taiwan's geographical and cultural affinities with South China and Southeast Asia, it extended Japanese economic, cultural, and geopolitical interests across the East and South China Seas. Japanese colonial leaders mobilized Taiwan's institutions and personnel to economically exploit and later administer what would collectively become the "Southern Region." Imperial ambitions in Taiwan, however, did not always align with those of the Tokyo central government. Rather, the GGT at times actively competed with the Foreign Ministry, Army, and Navy to shape Japan's southern advance. Japanese imperial ideas and practices thus did not solely emanate from the metropole but also from its colonies out toward extra-imperial regions.

In addition to advancing Japan's trans-regional circuits of mobility and exchange farther south, the GGT pioneered Japanese area studies of the Southern Region through research institutions such as Taiwan's Encyclopedia Bureau and Taihoku Imperial University. Japanese colonial officials and scholars compiled ethnographic surveys to promote Japanese trade and investment in Southeast Asia's natural resources. They simultaneously formulated historical and ethnological narratives of commonality and connections among Japan, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia as cultural legitimacy for Japan's southern advance. Drawing on Japanese- and Chinese-language sources from Taiwan, Japan, and China, this dissertation illustrates how Japanese colonialists and Taiwanese subjects shaped Japan's relations with South China and Southeast Asia well before the Imperial Navy and Army's southern military advance in the late-1930s. Taiwan-based initiatives that advanced Japan's economic and cultural ties with, and knowledge production of, the Southern Region helped lay the institutional and conceptual groundwork for subsequent military occupation during the Sino-Japanese and Pacific Wars.
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INTRODUCTION

With its victory over the Qing in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–95), Japan acquired the subtropical island of Taiwan¹ as its first overseas colony. Roughly the size of Maryland and Delaware combined and located about 100 miles off the coast of South China, 500 miles north of the Philippines, and 450 miles from Okinawa (southwest Japan), Taiwan had been a commercial entrepôt for Western, Chinese, and Japanese trade since the seventeenth century.² Originally inhabited by Malay-Polynesian aborigines, the island was subsequently settled by ethnic Han Chinese migrants from Fujian and Guangdong provinces (southeast China) under the rule of the Dutch (1624–62), the Zheng Chenggong family (1662–83), and the Qing (1683–1895).³ Although Japan sent a punitive military expedition to Taiwan in 1874 against aborigines who had killed fifty-four shipwrecked Okinawans, the annexation of the island in 1895 was not the result of long-

¹ Throughout this dissertation, I use the term "Taiwan" generally to refer to the physical island but also the Japanese colonial institutions, officials, and Japanese and Taiwanese subjects who resided on the island. When not otherwise qualified, "Taiwan" should be read to mean the physical island. Taiwan was alternatively known by Westerners as "Formosa" ever since the Portuguese named the island "Ilha Formosa" (literally, "Beautiful Island") in the late-sixteenth century. Included in the cession of Taiwan were the Penghu islands (Pescadores) located between Fujian and Taiwan. For a general introduction to Taiwan's history, see Shih-shan Henry Tsai, Maritime Taiwan: Historical Encounters With the East and the West (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2009).

² The island is about 1,400 miles southwest of the Japanese capital, Tokyo.

term planning. In contrast to Korea and Manchuria (northeast China), which the Tokyo central government—especially the Army and Foreign Ministry—viewed as the crux for strategic interests in continental Asia, the Japanese had obtained Taiwan more as a symbol of national prestige and to placate the Navy with a southern foothold in the South China Sea.

To quell anti-Japanese resistance and harness Taiwan's agricultural resources, in May 1895 the Tokyo central government established the Government-General of Taiwan (Taiwan sōtokufu, 1895–1945) to oversee the island's military and civilian affairs. At the same time that Japanese colonial leaders worked to restore public order and develop Taiwan's economy, they also promoted the island as a regional center for southern expansion. Taking advantage of Taiwan's geographical proximity to, and cultural affinities with, South China (Minami Shina) and Southeast Asia (Nanyō) the Government-General of Taiwan initiated imperial strategies to extend Japanese

5. Between 1895 and 1918, the Tokyo government appointed high-ranking officers from the Imperial Army and Navy as Taiwan governors-general. It was only in 1919, with the appointment of Den Kenjirō, that Taiwan had a "civilian" governor-general. From 1936 to 1945, the governors-general were once again military leaders. On a comparative history of the Government-General of Taiwan and Government-General of Korea, see Okamoto Makiko, Shokuminchi kanryō no seijishi: Chōsen, Taiwan sōtokufu to teikoku Nihon (Tokyo: Sangensha), 2008.
6. Although the Japanese officially declared the island pacified in October 1895, anti-Japanese resistance by Chinese and aborigines lasted until 1902 and was not completely suppressed until 1915. Aborigine attacks on Japanese colonialists continued up until the 1930 Musha Incident. See Paul R. Katz, When Valleys Turned Blood Red: The Ta-pa-ni Incident in Colonial Taiwan (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2005).
7. The Japanese terms for South China included Minami Shinkoku (South Qing), Minami Shina (South China), Nanshi (South China), and Taigan (Across the Straits). At its most expanded form, "South China" in Government-General of Taiwan publications referred to Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Guizhou, Yunnan, Hong Kong, Macau, and Hainan.
8. The Japanese used the terms "Nanyō," "Nankoku," and "Nankai" more or less interchangeably to refer to present-day Southeast Asia (Philippines, Vietnam, Malaya, Indonesia, and Thailand). In my dissertation, for the sake of intelligibility, I use the term "Southeast Asia" as the English translation for "Nanyō." Previous English-language studies often translate Nanyō as "the South Seas" to specifically refer to Japan's Micronesia Mandate (1918–45). For more on the genealogy of the Japanese term Nanyō see Shimizu Hajime, "Southeast Asia as a Regional Concept in Modern Japan," in Locating Southeast Asia: Geographies of Knowledge and Politics of
economic, cultural, and geopolitical interests across the East and South China Seas. Japanese imperial ambitions in Taiwan, however, did not always align with those within the Tokyo central government. Rather, the Government-General of Taiwan at times actively competed with the Foreign Ministry, Army, and Navy to shape Japan's southern advance. Japanese imperial ideas and practices thus did not solely emanate from Japan's metropole (home islands) but also from its colonies toward neighboring extra-imperial regions. I argue that Japan's empire consisted of multiple imperial centers with Taiwan as the vital geographical and institutional nexus for Japanese relations with what came to be collectively called by the 1930s in Japanese the "Southern Region" (Nanpō). 9

In the study of Japanese empire, scholars have focused overwhelmingly on Japanese imperialism in Northeast Asia. Historians have created narratives that center on Japan's northern expansion: after annexing Taiwan (1895), Japan colonized Korea (1910) and Manchuria (1931) before taking over strategic regions in North China (1937), Central China (1938), and South China (1938–9) during the Sino-Japanese War (1937–45). The story of Japan's southern empire generally enters the picture only after 1936, when the Imperial Army and Navy agreed on a unified policy of simultaneous northern and southern advance that culminated with the Pacific War (1941–45) and Japan's occupation of Southeast Asia. 10 By orienting the geographic focus to the understudied southern half of Japan's empire centered on Taiwan, this dissertation illustrates how Japanese

9. Although the Japanese geographical definition of "Nanpō" continuously shifted and expanded throughout the 1930s and 1940s, it generally referred to the combined areas of South China, Southeast Asia, and the South Pacific islands. See Chou Wan-yao, "Cong 'Nanzhi Nanyang' diaocha dao Nanfang gongrongquan: yi Taiwan tuozhi zhushi huise zai Fashu-zhongnanbandao de kaifa wei li," in Taiwan tuozhi zhushi huise dang'an lunwenji, ed. Fu Guangsen et al. (Nantou: Taiwan wenxianguan, 2008), 103-74.

colonialists and Taiwanese subjects\textsuperscript{11} shaped Japan's trans-regional circuits of exchange with South China and Southeast Asia well before the 1940s. Taiwan-based initiatives that advanced Japan's economic and cultural ties with, and knowledge production of, the Southern Region helped lay the institutional and conceptual groundwork for later military occupation during the Sino-Japanese and Pacific wars.

Incorporating the case of Taiwan as an imperial gateway into South China opens up new avenues for research in Sino-Japanese relations. I explore the Government-General of Taiwan's geopolitical and discursive strategies to compete with the Anglo-American powers for hegemony in South China. One of the Government-General of Taiwan's key imperial innovations in extending its sphere of interest across the straits was increasing the "overseas Taiwanese" (J. *Taiwan sekimin*, C. *Taiwan jimin*)\textsuperscript{12} population in the treaty port cities of Xiamen, Fuzhou, and Shantou. With ethnic, linguistic, and familial ties with local Chinese, Taiwanese served as ideal economic and political intermediaries. In addition, Japanese officials used the rationale of ostensibly "defending" their overseas Taiwanese subjects from Chinese "violence" to legitimate military and police intervention. Such techniques, which I call "frontier imperialism by colonial proxy," were later applied by the Japanese in the borderlands of Korea and Manchuria in the 1920s.

\textsuperscript{11} I use "Taiwanese" (J. *Hontōjin*, Taiwanjin; C. *Bendaoren*, Taiwanren) as a political term to refer to ethnic Han Chinese with colonial Taiwan subjecthood. In April 1895, the Japanese offered residents in Taiwan a two-year grace period during which they could relocate to mainland China and continue as Qing subjects. The 2.8 million Han Chinese who remained in Taiwan past the May 1897 deadline automatically became Taiwanese subjects. (An estimated 6,400 people, or 0.2 percent of the island's population, departed for China.) Taiwan's aborigines did not count as Qing subjects before 1895 and were not initially legally Taiwanese subjects during Japanese colonial rule. See Harry J. Lamley, "Taiwan Under Japanese Rule, 1895–1945: The Vicissitudes of Colonialism," in *Taiwan: A New History*, ed. Murray A. Rubinstein (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2007), 208.

\textsuperscript{12} I use "overseas Taiwanese" as the translation for the Japanese term "Taiwan sekimin" and Chinese term "Taiwan jimin," which both literally meant "those registered in Taiwan as imperial subjects." As Japanese subjects, the overseas Taiwanese enjoyed Japanese extraterritorial rights—tax exemption and consular protection—in South China's treaty ports. For more, see Chapter One of dissertation.
and 1930s. At the same time, Chinese and Taiwanese alike often exploited Japanese colonial subjecthood in South China for their own benefits without regard to national interests. In contrast to previous mainland Chinese scholarship that depicts the Chinese as "victims" and the overseas Taiwanese as "collaborators" of Japan, my project attempts to illuminate the multiple, often conflicting layers of imperial relations that Japanese imperialism engendered in South China.13

My methodological approach to empire has been inspired by scholarship on the British empire that traces imperial networks across colonies beyond the metropole.14 Thomas Metcalf and Sugata Bose, in particular, have pioneered the study of colonial India as the imperial center for the "Indian Ocean Arena." Colonial models of administration—in law, policing, and the military—were exported from India to colonial Malaya and East Africa, and Indian personnel were deployed as imperial colonizers.15 While such studies focus on inter-colonial connections within individual Western empires, however, my project explores the ways in which Japanese imperial networks emanating from Taiwan were also a means of competition between rival powers (Western, Chinese, and Japanese) in South China. I follow Louise Young and Jun Uchida's multifacted approach to studying empire as "simultaneously an economic, political, cultural, and discursive phenomenon."16

13. For example, see the six-volume series on historical Xiamen-Taiwan relations edited by Kong Yongsong, especially Wu Erfen, Jiaorong gongjin, ed. Kong Yongsong (Fuzhou: Haifeng chubanshe, 2004), Xiamen yu Taiwan congshu 5. See also publications by the Xiamen Municipal Archival Bureau such as Xiamen-shi dang’anju et al., Jindai Xiamen shehui lueying (Xiamen: Xiamen daxue chubanshe, 2000). My work is thus in dialogue with Timothy Brook, Jun Uchida, Miriam Kingsberg, and others who challenge the analytical dichotomies of "imperial collaborators vs. colonized victims."
16. Louise Young, Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); Jun Uchida, Brokers of Empire: Japanese Settler
From the 1960s up through the 1980s, historians of Japanese empire focused primarily on the "centrifugal forces" of imperialism, that is the flow of power, ideas, and institutions from the Japanese metropole out toward the colonial peripheries (Taiwan, Korea, Manchuria, Micronesia). Their research addressed the political and ideological origins of Japanese imperialism and the socioeconomic policies adopted for colonial administration. Since the 1990s, scholars led by Louise Young, Stefan Tanaka, and others have demonstrated how Japanese nation-building and empire-formation were not only simultaneous but also reciprocal enterprises. By placing Japan's domestic and imperial history under a single analytical framework, they have given equal weight to empire's "centripetal forces": the political, socioeconomic, and cultural impact of the colonies on the metropole.

Inspired by the rising tide of postcolonial studies and the "cultural turn" of the 1980s–1990s, historians increasingly turned to the examination of Japanese discourse and visual representations of colonial "Others" (Chinese, Koreans, Taiwanese, native aborigines, et al.) as depicted in newspapers, travel writing, fiction, woodblock prints, postcards, museums, and exhibitions. In contrast to previous studies on the geopolitical and economic dimensions of


empire, historians and literary scholars illustrated how Japan's imperial subjugation of "backward" Asian Others was critical to Japanese self-conceptions as "civilized modernizers" equal to Westerners. 21 Although many of these studies focused on Japanese perspectives—due to their reliance on Japanese-language sources—over the past decade English-language scholarship on Japanese empire has also become increasingly multi-lingual. 22 Drawing on sources and perspectives both from the Japanese and their colonial subjects, scholars of colonial Korea and Taiwan have adopted the concept of "colonial modernity" to go beyond previous binary frameworks of "Japanese oppression and anti-colonial resistance." 23 Such studies have revealed the multi-faceted, contradictory nature of Japanese rule and its simultaneous impact on colonial identity, language, cultural autonomy, and historical memory.

For the most part, however, the historiographical focus has remained on two-way relations between Japan and its colonies. Conventional studies of empire have continued to treat each


colony as a discrete unit and highlight the vertical relationships between the Japanese metropole and its respective colonies. In the case of Japanese migration within the empire, for example, the focus has been on Japanese settlers who traveled from the metropole to work overseas in colonial Taiwan, Korea, Micronesia, or China.  

Literary scholars have also analyzed colonial subjects who traveled from their respective colonies to the metropole for higher education. Yet by highlighting channels of mobility between the metropole and each of its colonies, scholars have generally neglected multi-directional ties not only between Japan's colonies but also between colonies and neighboring regions that lay outside Japan's formal empire.

By examining Taiwan as an imperial hub that mediated Japanese interests in South China and Southeast Asia, we can discover imperial connections that have been neglected due to conventional divides among the study of Sino-Japanese relations, Japan-Southeast Asian relations, and Japan-Taiwan relations. Indeed, until recently historical narratives of Japan's "informal empire" in China—the leasehold in southern Manchuria (1906–31) and coastal "semi-colonial"


26. While there have been several comparative studies of Japanese colonies—for example, the comparison of economic, education, and cultural assimilation policies in colonial Taiwan and Korea—yet inter-colonial exchanges between the colonies has been understudied. Yamamuro Shin'ichi has appealed for more studies on the mobility of Japanese and colonial personnel (Taiwanese, Koreans, Chinese) among Taiwan, Korea, and Manchukuo. Yamamuro Shin'ichi, "Shokumin Teikoku, Nihon no kōsei to Manshūkoku: Tōchi yōshiki no seni to tōchi jinzai no shūryū," in *Teikoku to iu gensō: "Daitōa kyōeiken" no shisō to genjitsu*, ed. Kobayashi Hideo and Peter Duus (Tokyo: Aoki shoten, 1998), 155-202. Matsuura Masataka has recently written an exemplary tome tracing the political and economic connections of "Pan-Asianism" throughout the empire. “*Dai tōa sensō*” wa naze okita no ka: *han Ajia shugi no seiji keizaishi* (Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai, 2010), 334.
treaty ports—have been separated from those of Japan's "formal empire" (overseas colonies). For example, Peter Duus, Mark Peattie, and Ramon Myers divided their seminal series on Japanese empire into volumes on formal and informal empire as *The Japanese Colonial Empire* (1984) and *The Japanese Informal Empire in China* (1989), respectively.

As this dissertation illustrates, however, the boundaries between Japan's colonial and informal empires were not so neatly divided. Colonial rule in Taiwan was inextricably linked to geopolitical developments in South China; in turn, Taiwan served as a conduit for Sino-Japanese economic and cultural relations in the Chinese treaty port cities of Xiamen, Fuzhou, Shantou, and later wartime Guangzhou and Hainan. In this way, I am in dialogue with a growing body of literature that has begun to analyze the trans-regional flows of people and commodities (oftentimes illicit) between Taiwan and China that paralleled similar developments between Korea and Manchuria. By analyzing the role of Taiwanese subjects in China and Southeast Asia not just as colonial subjects but also as imperial intermediaries, I highlight the multi-layered nature of Japanese imperialism that occurred beyond the borders of Taiwan.


The historical study of Taiwan's colonial past has witnessed several paradigm shifts over the last half-century. After the fall of Japan's empire in 1945, Taiwan was transferred to Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government and occupied in 1949. In an effort to "re-Sinicize" post-war Taiwan, Nationalist authorities propagated their own historical narratives of Taiwan as an integral part of China's resistance against Japan. In line with Chiang's goal of eventual unification between Taiwan (named the Republic of China) and mainland China (Mao Zedong's People's Republic of China), after 1949 Chinese historians who relocated to Taiwan studied the island primarily as a case study in "local Chinese history." Under Chiang's rule of martial law, the historical study of the Japanese period remained politically taboo as competing interpretations of Japanese rule (e.g., positive Japanese contributions to Taiwan's development) were censored.29

Meanwhile, from the 1950s through the 1970s historians in the United States and Japan focused on the political and socioeconomic impact of Japanese rule on Taiwan. Although English- and Japanese-language scholarship also explored questions of economic exploitation, political discrimination, and anti-colonial resistance, the focus centered on Taiwan as a colonial laboratory for Japanese modernization.30 In contrast to early post-war studies of colonial Korea that


denounced Japanese rule as wholly oppressive and exploitative, U.S. scholars positively assessed Japan's development of colonial Taiwan as a case in "successful modernization."\(^{31}\) Ramon Myers, E. Patricia Tsurumi, and others credited Japanese rule not only for establishing Taiwan's modern infrastructure—irrigation systems, deep-water ports, railways, schools, and medical facilities—but also for its more benign rule compared to that of Korea. For example, in his 1973 article titled "Japan: Oppressor or Modernizer? A Comparison of the Effects of Colonial Control in Korea and Taiwan," Edward I-te Chen concluded: "For Koreans the Japanese were oppressors and exploiters, but for many Formosans [Taiwanese] they were developers and modernizers."\(^{32}\)

With the end of martial law in 1987 and the ensuing political and academic liberalization of Taiwan, the writing of Taiwanese history experienced a renaissance. With Taiwan's Republic of China no longer internationally recognized as the "real China" after the normalizing of American and Japanese diplomatic relations with the mainland People's Republic of China in the 1970s, a new generation of Taiwanese scholars began rewriting the history of Taiwan not as peripheral cases within Chinese and Japanese national historiographies, but from the perspective of Taiwanese identity and nationalism. In an attempt to differentiate Taiwan both historically and


31. For example, the demographer George Barclay wrote in 1954: "In short, they [the Japanese] transformed Taiwan from a 'backward' and neglected land into a thriving region that could regularly export a large share of its agricultural produce. This was a success that would satisfy most of the countries striving for modernization today." George W. Barclay, *Colonial Development and Population in Taiwan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954), 9; Ronald G. Knapp, *China's Island Frontier: Studies in the Historical Geography of Taiwan* (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1980).

politically from the People's Republic of China, these scholars re-examined Taiwan’s colonial past as an integral part of Taiwan’s modernization, studying, among other issues, the formation of Taiwanese "consciousness" and "subjectivity." With the founding of the Institute of Taiwanese History at Academia Sinica in 1993 and the opening of the Government-General of Taiwan archives in the 1990s, Taiwanese historians went beyond prior paradigms of "modernization" and "anti-colonial resistance" to examine the diversity of indigenous experiences in terms of ethnicity, culture, and historical memory. Taiwanese who received their doctoral degrees in the United States, such as Chou Wan-yao, drew on Taiwanese oral histories to study the impact of Japanese assimilationist and wartime mobilization policies on Taiwanese identity. The U.S.-based Taiwanese sociologist Lo Ming-cheng studied the "hybridization" of colonial identity among Taiwanese doctors.

In dialogue with this new wave of revisionist histories of Taiwan, English-language scholarship drew on postcolonial studies of the 1980s–1990s to re-conceptualize colonial encounters between the Japanese and Taiwanese from cultural perspectives. Historians like Robert Eskildsen analyzed how Japanese encounters with Taiwan aborigines were critical to the Japanese self-conception as "civilized modernizers." Literary scholars Leo Ching, Faye Kleeman, and Robert Tierney looked at Japanese representations of aborigines in travel writing and fiction at times as violent headhunters in need of "civilizing" yet at other times as "noble savages" with pre-modern virtues no longer existing in modern Japan.

35. Eskildsen illustrated how the Japanese media used the Imperial Navy's punitive expedition to Taiwan in 1874 as a chance to showcase the enlightened role of Japanese as "civilizers" of "barbaric" aborigines. Eskildsen 2002.
As part of the postcolonial re-evaluation of colonial Taiwan, scholars in the U.S. and East Asia adopted the framework of "colonial modernity" from Korean and Chinese studies to go beyond previous frameworks of "Japanese oppression and anti-colonial resistance." The edited volumes *Taiwan Under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1895–1945: History, Culture, Memory* (eds., Liao Ping-hui and David Der-wei Wang, 2006) and *Refracted Modernity: Visual Culture and Identity in Colonial Taiwan* (ed., Yūko Kikuchi, 2007), for example, analyzed the multi-faceted, oftentimes contradictory, nature of Japanese rule in relation to colonial law, medicine, education, and the arts, as well as its impact on Taiwanese cultural identity and national consciousness.\(^{37}\) As Kikuchi argued in the introduction to her volume, Japanese colonial rule resulted in the consciousness of an "imagined community" in Taiwan not as a "peripheral part of China" but as "an independent cultural entity with distinctive characteristics.... The prototypes for Taiwanese ethnic and cultural identity were formed during this period."\(^{38}\) In this way, cultural studies on Taiwan have contributed to the ongoing processes of Taiwanese nation-building and "Taiwanese identity" formation.\(^{39}\)


particularly, have illustrated the importance of colonial Taiwan's agricultural models and personnel
in Japan's wartime occupation of Hainan (the southernmost island of China). My dissertation
builds on such studies to further explore the range of opportunities—as well as limitations—that
Japanese officials faced in mobilizing the Taiwanese to compete with the Anglo-American powers
for economic and cultural hegemony in South China. Although overseas Taiwanese were at times
perfect intermediaries to strengthen the Government-General of Taiwan's regional relations with
Fujian officials and economic elites, at other times they were a source of Japanese anxiety as they
formed anti-Japanese alliances with Chinese and Korean activists.

In recent years, a growing number of historians have begun to trace the important role of
colonial Korea in the making of Japanese Manchukuo. Hundreds of thousands of Koreans
migrated as farmers and illicit drug dealers to Manchuria before and after Japan's formal
occupation of the region in 1931. Although the number of Taiwanese subjects who settled in
South China and Southeast Asia was only a fraction of that of Koreans in Manchuria, there were
significant parallels in the ways that Taiwanese and Koreans both wittingly and unwittingly served
as "imperial intermediaries" of Japan. Yet because of ethnic, linguistic, and cultural affinities
between the Taiwanese and Chinese in South China, as well as the different political and economic
environments of South China and Manchuria, the ways in which Taiwanese and Koreans

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43. Schneider has argued that the Government-General of Taiwan promoted "sub-imperial"
    economic activities in Hainan and Indochina from 1936 to 1945, while Chung has characterized
    occupied Hainan as the "exporting of Taiwan's model to create a 'second Taiwan.'" Justin Adam
    Schneider, "The Business of Empire: The Taiwan Development Corporation and Japanese
    Imperialism in Taiwan, 1936–1946" (Ph.D. Diss., Harvard University, 1998); Chung Shu-ming,
    "Shokumin to saishokumin: Nihon tōchi jidai Taiwan to Kainantō no kankei ni tsuite," in Shōwa
    Ajia-shugi no jitsuzō: teikoku Nihon to Taiwan, 'Nanyō,' 'Minami Shina,' ed. Matsuura Masataka
45. Korean migration to Manchuria began in the 1880s when the Manchus relaxed migration to
    the region. By 1904 there were 78,000 Koreans, over 238,403 in 1912, and nearly one million in
participated as imperial actors also varied, a subject that I will address in more detail in Chapter One and the Conclusion.

Taiwan was not only an imperial node for Japanese and Taiwanese migration farther south but also an important center for Japanese knowledge production on South China and Southeast Asia. Previous cultural and intellectual studies of empire have highlighted the role of Japanese Sinologists—especially historians and social scientists who worked for the South Manchurian Railway Company's (SMRC) Research Bureau (1906–45)—in shaping Japanese discourse on, and economic interests in, Korea and Manchuria.\(^{46}\) Stefan Tanaka has traced the Japanese historical discourse of China as part of Japan's "backward" past in the academic discipline of Tōyō-shi (East Asian history), pioneered by the Tokyo Imperial University historian Shiratori Kurakichi (1863–1942) who also worked in the SMRC Research Bureau. Yet Tanaka conflates Japanese orientalist discourse of Manchuria with that of China as a whole. Rather than viewing China as a monolithic entity, Japanese colonialists in Taiwan in fact formulated geocultural conceptions and historical narratives of South China as a region separate from North and Central China. Upon taking over Taiwan in 1895, the Government-General of Taiwan propagated the rhetoric of "South China–Taiwan unity" that envisioned South China as a geocultural extension of the island ripe for further economic, cultural, and even military expansion. While Taiwan had been a political and economic appendage of Fujian under the Qing government from 1683 to 1895, Japanese colonial leaders wished to reverse the cross-straits relationship: Fujian, and by extension South China, would become an imperial arm of colonial Taiwan. In contrast to the Japanese Army, Foreign Ministry,

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and South Manchurian Railway Company, which focused their research activities on North and Central China, the Government-General of Taiwan compiled economic and ethnographic surveys of South China as a means to extend Japanese interests in the region. In this way, the scope and aims of Japanese Sinology differed throughout the empire depending on the location and perspective of each imperial node.

Similarly, Taiwan was integral to Japanese economic and ethnographic research on Southeast Asia before and during the Pacific War. English-language scholars have generally focused on the economic, strategic, and ideological aspects of Japan's military advance in Southeast Asia in the lead-up to the Pacific War. Those who have analyzed Japanese "southern advance" ideologies (nanshin-ron) and representations of the tropical south have concentrated on writings by Japanese Navy officials, journalists, and entrepreneurs who traveled from the metropole to Southeast Asia and Pacific Islands from the 1880s up to World War II. Although a handful of Japanese writers in the metropole had published travelogues and novels about Southeast Asia, up until the 1910s there remained a dearth of economic intelligence on the region. It was

47. Yano Tōru, Nakamura Takeshi, and Gotō Ken'ichi, Japanese historians of Southeast Asia, were the first scholars to examine colonial Taiwan as a major Japanese site for intelligence work on Southeast Asia. Yano Tōru's 'Nanshin' no keifu (Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha, 1975) and Nihon no Nanyō shikan (Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha, 1979) have been reprinted as one volume, 'Nanshin' no keifu (Tokyo: Chikura shobō, 2009). See also Nakamura Takeshi, "Taishō Nanshinkī to Taiwan, Nanpō bunka 8 (1981): 209-57; Gotō Ken'ichi, Haraguchi Takejirō no shōgai: Nanpō chōsa no senku (Tokyo: Waseda daigaku shuppanbu, 1987); Gotō Ken'ichi, "Japan's Southward Advance and Colonial Taiwan," European Journal of East Asian Studies 3 (2004): 15-44.


during the interwar period (1918–37) that the Government-General of Taiwan pioneered Japanese area studies on Southeast Asia through such research institutes as the Encyclopedia Bureau (est. 1919) and Taihoku Imperial University (est. 1928).\(^{50}\) As boosters of southern expansion, Japanese colonial researchers compiled economic and ethnographic surveys to promote Japanese trade and investment in Southeast Asia's natural resources. At the same time, they also formulated historical and ethnological narratives of commonality and connections among Japan, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia as cultural legitimacy for economic exploitation, and later military occupation, of the region.

I argue that it was through such research that the Japanese re-conceptualized not only Japan's but also Taiwan's geocultural relationship to Southeast Asia. While previous scholars have mostly focused on Japanese Pan-Asianist discourse in northeast Asia centered on the puppet-state of Manchukuo (1932–45),\(^{51}\) Japanese colonial officials and scholars in Taiwan simultaneously promoted their own Pan-Asianist conceptions of a "Southern Regional Sphere" (Nanpō-ken) that traced geocultural and ethnic ties among Taiwan, South China, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific Islands. The case of Taiwan as an imperial center of southern studies thus illustrates the multi-vectored nature of Pan-Asian discourse throughout the process of Japanese empire-building.


This dissertation uses Japanese- and Chinese-language archives and published sources from Japan (Tokyo), Taiwan (Taipei), and China (Xiamen, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Shanghai). In contrast to previous English-language studies on Japan's "informal empire" in China's treaty ports, which often rely on Japanese Foreign Ministry materials (especially consular police reports), I draw heavily on Government-General of Taiwan archives in Taipei that were made public in the 1990s. The Government-General of Taiwan archives allow me to examine Japanese colonial strategies and policies regarding Taiwan's relations with South China and Southeast Asia. By using Taiwan-based sources in tandem with the Tokyo-based Foreign Ministry, Ministry of Defense, and Japanese National archives, moreover, I aim to understand how the Government-General of Taiwan cooperated with, but also at times contested, the Foreign Ministry, Navy, and Army on Taiwan's cross-straits policy.

Also invaluable for capturing the perspectives of Japanese colonial officials, journalists, and scholars were publications and periodicals by the Government-General of Taiwan and Taiwan-based companies and research institutes available in Taipei's National Taiwan University (formerly Taihoku Imperial University) and National Taiwan Library (formerly the Government-General of Taiwan Library). I also consult metropole-based publications and periodicals from Tokyo's National Diet Library related to Taiwan, South China, and Southeast Asia. Because of the censored nature of pre-1945 publications (both in Taiwan and in the metropole), I also draw on post–World War II articles, memoirs, and transcribed oral histories by former Japanese who worked in the Government-General of Taiwan or Taihoku Imperial University.  

52. The Government-General of Taiwan archival materials have recently been digitized by Academia Sinica's Institute of Taiwanese History and can be viewed in their archival room.  
53. I am aware, however, of the limitations of post-war testimonies by Japanese that intentionally—or even unwittingly—whitewash their participation or intent in Japan's imperial
In order to incorporate perspectives of Taiwanese subjects in my dissertation, when appropriate I also use Chinese- and Japanese-language articles written by Taiwanese subjects especially during the periods between the 1920s and 1940s (I supplement these with post-war Taiwanese memoirs and oral histories). Most of the Taiwanese writings, however, were by educated and/or prominent Taiwanese elites, while the majority of Taiwanese protagonists who appear in my story (especially the "overseas Taiwanese" in South China) left few records of their own. For the period from 1895 through the 1910s, my source-base is thus limited to how the Japanese colonial and consular sources and mainland (KMT) Chinese newspapers in Fujian depicted the overseas Taiwanese community.\(^{54}\) I have only been able to access published (and thus censored) Chinese archival materials and periodicals from Xiamen and Fuzhou, which portray the overseas Taiwanese in starkly negative terms.\(^{55}\) For additional views on Japanese and Taiwanese activity in South China between 1895 and 1910, I use British and American consular reports\(^{56}\); for the years between the 1910s and 1930s, I also refer to British newspapers such as *The North China Herald*. For the wartime period, I draw on post-war oral histories by Taiwanese political elites, entrepreneurs, military auxiliaries, doctors, as well as aboriginal conscripts that were transcribed by Academia Sinica's Institute of Taiwanese History in the 1990s and 2000s.\(^{57}\)

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54. Generally speaking, in contrast with Chinese newspapers that portrayed the overseas Taiwanese as Japanese imperial pawns at the expense of "Chinese victims," Japanese officials propagated a parallel discourse of the Taiwanese as "victims of Chinese violence."

55. Despite introduction letters from several Chinese history professors, I was not given access because of my foreigner status. The most commonly used published archival records from Fujian in mainland Chinese and Taiwanese scholarship is Fujian sheng dang'an, Xiamen shi dang'an'guan, Min-Tai guanxi dang'an ziliao (Xiamen: Lijiang chubanshe, 1993), which I have also consulted.

56. These reports are available as microfilm from the British Foreign Office and United States National Archives and Records Administration.

57. Due to space and time, however, I have not been able to fully incorporate them into Chapters Four and Five. I also have not included Taiwanese subjects who joined KMT and CCP forces to fight against Japan during the Sino-Japanese War.
Chapter One, "Colonial Taiwan as Japan's Imperial Gateway into South China (1895–1918)" traces the geopolitical and discursive strategies adopted by the Government-General of Taiwan to compete with the Western powers for hegemony in South China. Upon annexing Taiwan, Japanese colonial leaders envisioned Fujian as a geocultural extension of the island that lent itself to further expansion. The Japanese actively encouraged the growth of "overseas Taiwanese" communities in South China to legitimate military intervention and to mobilize Taiwanese as imperial intermediaries for economic interests. Although the Taiwanese were relegated to second-class status compared to ethnic Japanese due to discriminatory policies within Taiwan, in South China they found opportunities for financial profit and social mobility unavailable to them in the colony or metropole. As Japanese subjects overseas, the Taiwanese had the dual advantage of enjoying extraterritorial rights—tax exemption and consular protection—while having the linguistic ability and kinship ties to conduct business with local Chinese.

Colonial Taiwan served as an imperial center not only for Japanese economic ventures in South China but also for extending cultural hegemony across the straits. Chapter Two, "Overseas Taiwanese Students and Transnational Networks of Empire and Resistance in China (1908–1936)" analyzes how Government-General of Taiwan officials exported its Taiwan-based educational institutions (including Japanese and Taiwanese teachers) to South China. Their aim was to compete with Anglo-American schools over the education of Chinese and overseas Taiwanese youth. Yet at the same time, it was also in the borderlands of South China that the Government-General of Taiwan faced its greatest challenge in monitoring Taiwanese subjects. South China provided Taiwanese youth and activists with opportunities not only to imbibe Chinese nationalist—including anti-Japanese—education but also to come into contact with the cross-fertilization of anti-imperial movements and ideas. Overseas Taiwanese rubbed shoulders with Chinese communists and Korean independence activists who jointly formed youth groups.
promoting a Pan-Asian alliance of "weak and small peoples" against Japan.

Chapter Three, "Taiwan as Japan's Brain Trust for Southern Studies (1895–1936)"
examines how Japanese colonial officials promoted interests farther south by pioneering Japan's area studies of South China and Southeast Asia in economics, history, and anthropology. With a dearth of intelligence in the Japanese metropole on the southern regions, Japanese colonialists established research institutions in Taiwan—the Encyclopedia Bureau, Taipei Commercial College, and Taipei Imperial University—that collectively became the empire's brain trust for knowledge production on the south during the inter-war period (1918–36). Based on discursive analyses of official and scholarly publications, I argue that Japanese colonialists marshaled historical and racial narratives of commonality between Japan and Southeast Asia to culturally legitimate economic expansion in the south.

Chapter Four, "Taiwan in Japan's Wartime Occupation of South China (1938–1945)" looks at how the Government-General of Taiwan exported "Taiwan's colonial experience" to occupied South China. With the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, colonial Taiwan's institutions and personnel—including Taiwanese subjects—were instrumental in the Japanese military occupation and economic reconstruction of wartime Fujian, Guangdong, and the southernmost tropical island of Hainan.

Chapter Five, "Taiwan in the Making of Japan's Southern Co-Prosperity Sphere (1936–1945)" explores how colonial Taiwan served as an imperial center for Japanese cultural activities and knowledge production on South China and Southeast Asia in the years before and during the Pacific War. In the late 1930s, the Government-General of Taiwan initially sought greater administrative powers by proposing to head a "Southern Region Government-General" that would unify Hainan and Micronesia under its rule. Although the Government-General of Taiwan ultimately failed to achieve these political ambitions, it still actively participated in cultural and
military activities aimed to improve ethnic relations within Japan's expanding southern empire.

Japanese colonial scholars in Taiwan advanced studies of the "Southern Region peoples," which included not only aborigines but also the overseas Chinese. With the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941 and Japan's occupation of Southeast Asia (1942–45), the Government-General of Taiwan deployed colonial officials and scholars, as well as Taiwanese merchants and military personnel, to help aid the wartime administration of Southeast Asia.
CHAPTER ONE

Colonial Taiwan as Japan's Imperial Gateway into South China (1895–1918)

Introduction

The year 1895 marked a major turning point in the history of modern East Asia. With its victory in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–95) over the Qing, Japan acquired Taiwan as its first overseas colony and joined the ranks of the Western imperial powers. For the Qing empire, the devastating loss resulted in a large indemnity and the cession of its southeastern island, which had been under Manchu rule since 1683. Unlike Korea, which Japanese leaders had coveted since the 1870s and finally obtained in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5), Taiwan was annexed by Japan not as a result of long-term planning. Only with the Imperial Navy's insistence regarding Taiwan potential as a strategic military station in the south did the Japanese demand the island as one of the terms of the April 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki. In May 1895, the Japanese central government in Tokyo established the Government-General of Taiwan (Taiwan sōtokufu), headed by leaders from the Imperial Navy and Army, to oversee the island's military and civil affairs.

Over the next half-century, Taiwan became an agricultural base that provided raw materials for Japan's industrializing economy. At the same time, the Government-General of Taiwan leaders promoted the island as Japan's "southern gate" (nanmon) for further imperial expansion across the straits into South China, centered on Fujian province. Citing Fujian as Taiwan's lifeline on account of its raw materials and long-distance trading port of Xiamen (Amoy), Japanese colonial leaders

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58. On Qing rule in Taiwan, see Shepherd 1993, Teng 2004.
used Taiwan as a stepping stone to compete with the Western powers for geopolitical and
economic supremacy in the "semi-colonial" treaty ports of South China.59

Conventional narratives of the Japanese empire typically highlight Japan's "northern
expansion" (hokushin) into Korea and Manchuria from 1870s onward, which culminated in the
Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5.60 A closer look at Japanese relations between colonial Taiwan and
South China between 1895 and 1904, however, reveals how Japan's northern advance at the turn of
the twentieth century was not a foregone conclusion. As this chapter illustrates, the Government-
General of Taiwan took advantage of the unexpected growth in the "overseas Taiwanese" (J.
Taiwan sekimin, C. Taiwan jimin)61 population in South China to legitimate military incursions and
economic development in the region. Unlike treaty ports in Central and North China (such as
Shanghai and Tianjin), where Japanese from the metropole had settled in droves, in the Fujian
treaty ports of Xiamen and Fuzhou the overseas Taiwanese outnumbered the ethnic Japanese seven
to one by 1900.62 Despite the fact that the majority of "overseas Taiwanese" were actually local
Chinese who had naturalized as Taiwanese subjects through loopholes in the colonial passport
system, Japanese officials opportunistically used them as proxies of national interests in South
China. As exemplified by the 1900 Xiamen Incident,63 when the Japanese temporarily occupied
Xiamen during the Boxer Rebellion, Japanese colonial leaders promoted the discourse of

59. By "semi-colonial," I mean regions where foreign nationals—Japanese, European,
60. With Japan's victory of Russia in 1905, the Japanese acquired a leasehold in southern
Manchuria (northeast China) and Korea as a "protectorate" (which later became an official colony
61. The Japanese term "Taiwan sekimin" literally meant "those registered as Taiwanese
subjects."
Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937, ed. Ramon H. Myers, Peter Duus, and Mark R. Peattie
East Asia, see Par Kristoffer Cassel, Grounds of Judgment: Extraterritoriality and Imperial Power
63. English-language literature has conventionally called the "Xiamen jiken" (J.), "Xiamen
shijian" (C.) the "Amoy Incident."
"protecting overseas Taiwanese from Chinese violence" as a pretext for military intervention in South China.

In contrast with previous studies that focus on vertical relations between the Japanese metropole and Taiwan, this chapter conceptualizes Taiwan not as a passive colony at the periphery of empire but as an imperial center in its own right. Drawing on Japanese colonial and consular intelligence reports, as well as Japanese- and Chinese-language newspapers, I argue that Japan's imperial competition with the Anglo-American powers in South China was spearheaded by Japanese colonial leaders in Taiwan. This chapter first explores how the Government-General of Taiwan envisioned South China as a geocultural extension of Taiwan that lent itself to further expansion. The second and fourth governors-general, Katsura Tarō (1848–1913, in office 1896) and Kodama Gentarō (1852–1906, in office 1898–1906), legitimated military intervention and economic development across the straits by claiming South China as Taiwan's lifeline and security threat. Even after Japan's aborted invasion of Xiamen in 1900, the Government-General of Taiwan continued to vie for economic resources in South China at the expense of its Anglo-American rivals. The second half of the chapter examines how Japanese colonialists collaborated with overseas Taiwanese intermediaries to extend Japanese shipping, banking, camphor, and railway industries from Taiwan into South China.

Although historians of China have begun questioning the simplified dichotomy of Chinese as either "resisters" or "collaborators" of Japan, they have largely ignored the role of Japan's colonial subjects as imperial actors in China. While the Taiwanese were relegated to second-class status in Taiwan due to discriminatory colonial policies, in Fujian and Guangdong they often found greater opportunities for economic profit and social mobility than within the colony or metropole.


Yet, the overseas Taiwanese were not a monolithic community of imperial agents on behalf of Japan. They often took advantage of their status as imperial subjects to pursue individual interests that did not necessarily align with either the Japanese or Chinese state. Japanese policies toward the overseas Taiwanese were thus haphazard and internally contradictory: they were as much about reacting to, rather than simply directing, the liminal status and unpredictable behavior of the Chinese and Taiwanese in South China's borderlands.

*Katsura Tarō and Kodama Gentarō's Visions of Southern Expansion*

After the Qing cession of Taiwan to Japan in April 1895, Japanese occupation troops faced fierce resistance from the island's residents, which consisted of Han Chinese (Qing subjects) and native aborigines. Led by Qing officials Governor Tang Jingsong (1841–1903) and General Liu Yongfu (1837–1917), Taiwan's residents engaged in armed resistance against Japan. In May 1895, Tang and Liu declared an independent "Taiwan Republic" (May–October 1895) in an attempt to persuade the Western Powers to come to their defense. In response, the Tokyo central government appointed Admiral Kabayama Sukenori as Taiwan's first governor-general (in office May 1895–June 1896) with complete military and civilian authority over the island. Kabayama's forces quickly crushed the so-called "republic" and declared Taiwan "pacified" by November 1895. During its first two decades of colonial rule, the Government-General of Taiwan worked to

66. In 1895 there were approximately 2.8 million Han Chinese residents and 100,000 Taiwan aborigines.
68. In March 1896 the Imperial Diet enacted "Law 63," which authorized the Taiwan governor-general to issue ordinances (ritsurei) with the same effect as Japanese laws, in effect giving him complete legislative and executive powers over the island. For more on colonial Taiwan's legal system, see Wang Tay-sheng, *Legal Reform in Taiwan Under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1895-1945: The Reception of Western Law* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000).
69. Local Chinese and aborigine resistance, however, continued with sporadic guerrilla attacks
restore Taiwan's domestic order through military and civil police units stationed throughout the island. At the same time, Japanese colonialists established modern infrastructure—railways, deep-water ports, roads, irrigation projects, etc.—to develop Taiwanese agriculture. Under the guidance of Taiwan Civil Governor Gotō Shinpei (1857–1929, in office 1898–1906), the production of rice, sugar, and camphor—the main exports to Japan—rose dramatically so that by 1905 Taiwan no longer required budgetary support from the Tokyo government.\(^{70}\)

The Government-General of Taiwan did not only focus on political and economic developments within the islands, however. Led by the governors-general Katsura Tarō and Kodama Gentarō, Japanese colonial officials promoted Taiwan as a stepping stone for further southern expansion. Between 1896 and 1900, Katsura and Kodama promoted the Japanese strategic principle, "Defend in the north, advance in the south" (hokushu nanshin).\(^{71}\) In the aftermath of the Triple Intervention of 1895, when France, Germany, and Russia prevented Japan from obtaining Manchuria in northeast China, Katsura became wary about the feasibility of Japan's northern expansion. He believed that even if Japan could control Manchuria, the region would have to be co-annexed with at least two or three other Western powers.\(^{72}\) Prime ministers Itō against Japanese colonialists up through 1915. On the series of anti-Japanese clashes in Taiwan from 1895 up through 1915, see Katz 2005.

70. The Government-General of Taiwan also increased colonial tax revenues through government monopolies on opium, salt, camphor, and tobacco. For more on Japanese economic policies during the colonial period, see Ka Chih-ming, Japanese Colonialism in Taiwan: Land Tenure, Development, and Dependency, 1895-1945 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995).

71. This phrase was first advocated in 1895 by Foreign Minister Matsukata Masayoshi, who advocated a "southern strategy" (Nanpō kei'ei) centered on Taiwan. Matsukata had opposed the Japanese acquisition of Manchuria that was coveted by the Japanese Army, Diet, and the press. After the acquisition of Taiwan, the main supporters of a "southern strategy" were in the navy and the Taiwan colonial government. Duus 1995, 169-70.

72. Tsurumi Yūsuke, Gotō Shinpei den: Taiwan tōchi hen (Tokyo: Taiheiyō kyōkai shuppanbu, 2005 [1943]), 494. This is somewhat ironic as Katsura would later become the Prime Minister (1901-6), with Kodama as Army Minister, who oversaw the Russo-Japanese War and annexation of Korea and southern Manchuria in 1905. Katsura had been a key army general staff officer in the Sino-Japanese War, and served as Minister of War (1898-1900) and three terms as Prime Minister (1901-6, 1908-11, 1912-3). On Katsura's biography, see Kobayashi Michihiko, Katsura Tarō: yo ga seimei wa seiji de aru (Kyoto: Mineruva shobō, 2006).
Hirobumi (1841–1909) and Yamagata Aritomo (1838–1922), both of whom had previously supported northern expansion in the 1880s-90s, agreed in the post-1895 period with the strategy of developing Taiwan into a stepping stone for South China.

Katsura was the first Taiwan governor-general to actively promote the island as a gateway into South China and Southeast Asia. Upon his appointment in June 1896, Katsura took a one-month observation tour of Taiwan and Xiamen with Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi and Navy Minister Saigō Tsugumichi (1843–1902). In his summary report to Itō titled, "Principles of Taiwan Rule," Katsura outlined the island's strategic importance to southern expansion:

On the opposite side of Taiwan and the Pescadores is the South China coast with connections to the key port of Xiamen; to the south of Taiwan are the Southeast Asian islands. Taiwan is thus the perfect site from which to control the South China Sea.  

Katsura compared Taiwan's position to that of Tsushima, the island off the coast of southwest Japan that had historically been the intermediary trading zone between Japan and Korea during the Tokugawa period (1600–1867). Just as Tsushima had been Japan's economic gateway into Korea, Taiwan would become Japan's "strategic base" (rikkyakuchi) in the South China Sea.

For Katsura, "cross-straits strategic policy" (taigan kei'ei) in South China was part and parcel of colonial administration in Taiwan. Japan could not be content solely with exploiting Taiwan's natural resources: "Colonial rule in Taiwan cannot be merely limited to the island's

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73. "Katsura sōtoku no nanshinron" (1896), reprinted in Tsurumi 2005 [1943], 494.
75. Katsura and subsequent colonial leaders interchangeably used "gateway to the south" (nanmon no sayaku), "base" (rikkyakuchi), "stepping stone" (tobi'ishi), and "station colony" (chūkei shokuminchi), to describe Taiwan's role in the south. See Katsu Tarō, "Taiwan shokan," Taiwan kyōkai kaihō, 1898, 21-7. Reprinted in 1987-8 by Yumani Shobō, Kaminuma Hachirō (ed.), 39-45.
borders, but must also involve overseas expansion.” Although leaders in the Tokyo central government and military had sought to occupy Korea since the 1870s, Katsura believed that Japan's northern advance into the peninsula was unfeasible for the time being:

If we reflect on our position in Korea ... there are several Great Powers that have managed to extend their interests in that country. Even if the peninsula were to fall, two or three Great Powers would co-annex it. The reality of the current situation is that it would not be easy for us to increase our power in Korea.  

Katsura instead focused on the treaty port city of Xiamen in Fujian as the key to carving out Japan's sphere of influence in South China.

Located directly across the straits from Taiwan, Xiamen had been a major trading entrepot since it first opened to Western commerce in 1842 following China's defeat by the British in the first Opium War (1839–42). With no deep-water ports of its own, Taiwan was economically dependent on Xiamen for long-distance trade of its main exports (tea, camphor, sugar) for re-shipment to Europe and the United States. In addition, Taiwan historically held close political and cultural ties to Fujian province. Since the island's colonization by the Qing government in 1683, Taiwan was formally under the jurisdiction of Fujian and did not become an independent province until 1885. The majority of the island's Han Chinese settler population, moreover, had immigrated from the Fujian ports of Xiamen, Fuzhou, Quanzhou, and Zhangzhou. Katsura thus sought to maintain Taiwan's maritime connection with Xiamen as a Japanese portal into South

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China: "Xiamen has now become a critical area for us politically and economically, as it is a new entrance for our goods and customs." With the establishment of a Japanese consulate in Xiamen in 1896—as well as in Shanghai, Tianjin, and Hankou—as part of China's concessions to Japan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895), Japanese colonial authorities were in prime position to advance Taiwan's ties with Xiamen.

In late-nineteenth century China, Fujian was one of the few remaining coastal provinces yet to be absorbed under Western imperial control. By 1898, the Western powers were in the midst of carving up China into their respective "spheres of influence". Britain in the Yangzi Delta region, Weihaiwei (Shandong), and Kowloon (Hong Kong); Germany in Jiaozhou Bay (Shandong); France in Yunnan, Guangdong, and Guangxi; and Russia in Lüshun and Dalian (Manchuria). Not to be outpaced in the imperial scramble for China, the Japanese Foreign Ministry negotiated with the Qing government for exclusive rights to Fujian. In April 1898, the two countries signed a "Fujian Non-Cession Agreement," effectively confirming Japan's primacy in the province: Qing officials agreed not to cede Fujian to other foreign powers and to consult Japan in the event that they wished to accept foreign capital or personnel.

With the 1898 Fujian Non-Cession Agreement and the establishment of Japanese concession settlements in Xiamen (October 1898) and Fuzhou (April 1899), the fourth Taiwan governor-general Kodama Gentarō set out to fulfill Katsura's vision of Taiwan as a gateway into South China. Kodama highlighted the commercial interdependence of Taiwan and Fujian and advocated extending colonial government-sponsored banking, shipping, railway, and camphor trade.

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82. According to Prasenjit Duara, in contrast to outright colonial rule, "spheres of influence" relied on informal mechanisms "where dominance rested on leaseholds, treaty rights, and economic investments." Duara 2003.
84. Ajia-kyoku, "(2) Fukken fukatsujō ni kansuru kōkan kō bun," 1898, JACAR B02130062500.
industries across the Taiwan Straits as a way to "peacefully occupy" Fujian without resorting to war.\textsuperscript{85} While Taiwan had been a political and economic appendage of Fujian under the Qing, Kodama wished to reverse the cross-straits relationship: Fujian, and by extension South China, would become an imperial arm of colonial Taiwan.\textsuperscript{86} Drawing on Taiwan's historical ties to Fujian, Kodama propagated the rhetoric of "South China-Taiwan unity" that envisioned South China as a geocultural extension of colonial Taiwan.

Central to Kodama's cross-straits policy was the encouragement of naturalizing local Chinese in South China as "overseas Taiwanese subjects." In his fourteen-point "Memorandum on the Past and Future of Taiwan Rule" (June 1899), Kodama stated:

The numbers of Xiamen residents who wish to naturalize [as Taiwanese subjects] are not only growing daily, but they also seek financial backing from Taiwan for their various enterprises. The Government-General of Taiwan cannot forgo this opportunity and should strive to win over the hearts of the Xiamen people.\textsuperscript{87}

Kodama in particular encouraged the naturalization of wealthy and well-connected Chinese who could serve as local intermediaries for Japanese interests in the region.\textsuperscript{88} Before we examine how the Government-General of Taiwan attempted to mobilize such intermediaries as imperial proxies, however, let us first introduce the origins of the "overseas Taiwanese."

\textsuperscript{85} Kodama Gentarō, "Taiwan tōchi no kiō oyobi shōrai ni kansuru kakusho" (June 1899), reprinted in Tsurumi 2005 [1943], 505. 
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., 506-7.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., 504.
\textsuperscript{88} For example, prominent overseas Taiwanese in Fujian include Lin Erjia, Lin Xiongxiang, and Lin Weiyuan of the Lin family from Banqiao; and Lin Chaodong and Lin Jishang of Lin family from Wufeng. Lin 2011, 314-5.
The phenomenon of the "overseas Taiwanese" (Taiwan sekimin) grew out of Japanese passport and naturalization policies established at the start of the colonial period. Upon annexing Taiwan in April 1895, the Japanese offered residents in Taiwan a two-year grace period during which they could relocate to mainland China and continue as Qing subjects, or stay and convert into Japanese nationals. The 2.8 million Han Chinese residents who remained in Taiwan through the May 1897 deadline automatically became Taiwanese subjects with Japanese nationality (only an estimated 6,400 people, or 0.2 percent of the island's population, departed for China). Inspired by the British colonial model in Singapore, India, and Hong Kong, the Government-General of Taiwan adopted a passport and visa system to monitor cross-straits travel. With the May 1897 enactment of the "Regulations on Passports for Foreign Travel," Taiwanese subjects were required to apply for a Taiwanese passport in order to travel to China.

90. Lamley 2007, 208. Incidentally, Taiwan's aborigines did not count as Qing subjects before 1895, and they were not initially included in colonial Taiwan's new household registry.
Many Chinese in South China, however, found loopholes in the Japanese passport system to naturalize as Taiwanese subjects through both legal and illegal channels. Chinese in Fujian and Guangdong coveted Taiwanese subjecthood for the following reason: under the 1895 Sino-Japanese "unequal treaties," all Japanese nationals—including colonial subjects—enjoyed extraterritorial privileges in China's treaty ports such as tax exemption and consular protection. By means of family connections, forgery, or bribery, hundreds of Chinese obtained passports and

93. A digital copy of the 1896 Qing travel permit is located in Academia Sinica's Institute for Taiwanese History Archival Office. The 1917 Taiwanese passport has been reproduced from Lin 2011, 321.
94. According to the historian Nakamura Takeshi, it was rumored in 1908 that Taiwan passports could be purchased for five to ten yen around 1902-3, and later for over 100 yen in 1908. Nakamura Takeshi, "Taiwan sekimin o meguru shomondai," Tōnan Ajia kenkyū 18:3 (1980), 71.
95. The 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki granted Japan extraterritorial privileges in the Chinese treaty ports of Xiamen, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Ningbo. On the unequal treaty and extraterritorial legal system in East Asia, see Cassel 2012; Turan Kayaoglu, Legal Imperialism: Sovereignty and Extraterritoriality in Japan, the Ottoman Empire, and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
naturalized as Taiwanese subjects to pursue illicit enterprises in opium, gambling, and prostitution at the expense of both China and Japan. Chinese thus found ways to manipulate the passport system for their own self-interests. As the Japanese consul in Fuzhou stated:

There are Qing subjects who forge the name and date of birth of a Taiwanese person, or they apply for a passport with the help of a relative or friend who resides in Taiwan. There are also [colonial] officials who, despite knowing the reality of the situation, accept bribes in exchange for approving passport applications.97

According to the Fuzhou consul, "roughly two-thirds of the people who register at our consulate as Taiwanese subjects have done so in an illegal manner."98

A large percentage of the Taiwanese population in Fujian thus came to include "fake overseas Taiwanese" (J. kabō sekimin, C. jiamao jimin), as they were referred to by Japanese and Chinese officials.99 Many of these "fake overseas Taiwanese" had no kinship ties to Taiwan, much less had ever set foot on the island. As noted in 1896 by Sawamura Gentarō, a Government-General of Taiwan official stationed in the Xiamen consulate, the main incentive for local Chinese in Fujian was to acquire Taiwanese subjecthood for economic gain and legal protection:

If they become Japanese nationals, then their businesses in China do not have to abide by Qing government laws or tax customs. Not only can they avoid paying customs and taxes, but as foreign nationals they can obtain consular protection.

96. In Xiamen, there were 391 overseas Taiwanese in 1896, 1,046 in 1905, 3,516 in 1919, 6,115 in 1924, and 10,317 in 1936. See the chart in Kondō 1996, 67. As for the total figures of overseas Taiwanese in China, there were 1,202 in 1899, 5,160 in 1900, 10,000 in 1906, and approximately 50,000 in the 1930s-40s. According to Lin Man-houng, by 1945 there were 22,935 Taiwanese in South China, 7,045 in Central China, 1,442 in North China, 1,000 in Manchukuo, and 3,000 in Southeast Asia. Lin 2011, 306-7, 312.
97. "Nanbu Shina zairyū Taiwan sekimin meibo chōsei ikken dai ichi," Gaimushō kiroku 3-8-7-18, 1907.
98. Ibid.
99. A Japanese consul in Xiamen estimated that roughly two-thirds of the people who registered at his consulate had obtained their status in an illegal manner. A 1908 Fuzhou consular report stated that approximately 10-20% of overseas Taiwanese residents there had authentic Taiwan passports. Nakamura 1980, 71.
against meddlesome Chinese officials or attacks by bandits. For example, if they are a British national then their business is protected by the British consul. At present there are many Xiamen merchants who have become nationals of British Singapore for this very reason. Similarly, those who naturalize and become Taiwanese can take advantage of their status as Japanese merchants to avoid paying store-sign fees and run their business without worry.  

The overseas Taiwanese community soon became notorious in Fujian for abusing consular protection and profiting from lawsuits against their Chinese peers. In 1898, Sawamura again reported: "Many [Taiwanese] come to the Japanese consulate having concocted fake legal cases relating to money-lending, real-estate, or theft. Their aim is to use their power as Japanese merchants to extort other Chinese." Sawamura complained that such malicious behavior not only taxed the resources of the Japanese consulate but also damaged Japan's reputation among local Chinese.

Cases of manipulating nationality in China's treaty ports were not limited to the overseas Taiwanese population, however. Since the mid-nineteenth century, Chinese had obtained British, French, German, American, and Dutch nationalities as local compradores of foreign companies or as members of churches, schools, and hospitals. Reports in 1900 by British and American consuls in Xiamen expressed frustrations similar to those of Japanese consuls for legal cases involving Anglo-Chinese and Filipino-Chinese. These parallel cases illustrate how Chinese quickly mastered the legalities and loopholes of semi-colonial institutions under Western and Japanese imperialism. By the turn of the twentieth century, the Chinese in Xiamen preferred Japanese

100. "Shinajin Nihon ni kika wo kibōsuri no gen'in," Taiwan sōtokufu kōbun ruisan 4514-5, August 1, 1896.
101. For example, see Despatches from U.S. Consuls in Amoy, 1844-1906 (7.11.1900), "Status of Filipino born citizens residing abroad." A. Burlingame Johnson (Amoy Consul); FO 228/1357 (7.14.1900). Intelligence Report for June 1900 (R. S. Mansfield, Amoy consul).
nationality over other nationalities. Few Chinese were registered as German or Dutch subjects because nationality from these countries required military conscription and inheritance taxes, which did not apply to Taiwanese subjects. In 1910, in contrast to more than 2,000 registered overseas Taiwanese (not including an additional 5,000–6,000 unregistered overseas Taiwanese), there were only 23 households with British nationality, 16 households with French nationality, and 47 with Spanish nationality. 103

British consuls observed that Japan's naturalization policies appeared to be more lax than those for British Hong Kong. In 1899, the British consul in Xiamen reported that Ueno Sen'ichi, the Japanese consul, was "issuing rather freely certificates of Japanese nationality to Formosan [Taiwan] Chinese" and that "this action is viewed with great suspicion by Chinese authorities and may be a fruitful source of trouble in the future." 104 According to another British consular report in 1900, "qualifications required of applicants for [Taiwanese] registration go little beyond the payment of a fee." 105 And whereas "persons of Chinese blood should show two generations of residence in a British Colony to entitle them to British protection in China, the mere fact of having been resident in Formosa [Taiwan], and in many cases even a slighter qualification is sufficient for a Chinese to secure Japanese protection in Amoy [Xiamen]." 106

The ease with which Chinese were able to naturalize as Taiwan subjects resulted in increasing Sino-Japanese conflicts in South China. Qing officials complained to the Government-General of Taiwan about how Chinese criminals had been taking advantage of Taiwanese naturalization to evade Chinese law. In April 1900, when Taiwan Civil Governor Gotō Shimpei

103. Nakamura 1980, 67. With its assimilation laws in 1907, the Dutch colonial administration required foreign applicants to speak Dutch and to provide military service. Lin 2011, 321.

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conducted an observation tour of Fujian, he met with Fujian-Zhejiang Governor-General Xu Yingkui and the Xiamen Magistrate Yan Nian. Yan Nian bought up the problem of Fujian Chinese registering as Taiwanese subjects:

Taiwan and Fujian are separated by only a narrow strait, and there is a heavy traffic of merchants and people going back and forth. For example, there are those here [in Xiamen] who flee to Taiwan after committing a crime, and then deftly obtain Japanese nationality. Such cases present severe obstacles for our government since we no longer have recourse to investigate their cases since these criminals are now under your jurisdiction.107

Gotō brushed off Yan's criticism by replying: "Our Government-General of Taiwan has enacted regulations for naturalizing foreign nationals as Japanese subjects. There are no real problems in the enforcement of these regulations."108

Despite Gotō's dismissal of the "overseas Taiwanese problem," it was not only Chinese who entered Taiwan to avoid Qing law but also anti-Japanese Taiwanese insurgents who fled from Taiwan to South China to avoid Japanese jurisdiction. The Government-General of Taiwan in response coordinated with Japanese consular officials and local Chinese authorities to try to extradite to Taiwan anti-colonial Taiwanese who took refuge in Fujian. One of the most prominent Taiwanese insurgents was Jian Dashi (1870–1900), who fought against the Japanese from 1895 until 1898, when he realized that further armed struggle was futile and fled to Xiamen. In February 1900, Qing authorities complied with Japanese demands to arrest and extradite Jian to Taiwan, where he was sentenced to death by the Taipei colonial court.109 Yet as Japanese colonial documents illustrate, anti-colonial Taiwanese leaders continued to travel back and forth across the

108. Ibid.
Taiwan Strait up through World War I (1914–8).  

The 1900 Xiamen Incident

Despite the inability of Japanese authorities to fully restrict the mobility of anti-colonial insurgents to and from Taiwan, they opportunistically used anti-Japanese threats against the overseas Taiwanese to justify military intervention in South China. In the 1900 Xiamen Incident during the Boxer Rebellion in north China, which we examine below, the Government-General of Taiwan staged a so-called "anti-Japanese attack" on a Japanese Buddhist temple in Xiamen as a pretext for landing Japanese troops in the city. Although the Japanese ultimately aborted the invasion, the Xiamen Incident exemplifies the rhetoric of "protecting overseas Taiwanese" that the Japanese used to legitimate further southern expansion. While previous historians like Erik Esselstrom and Yaqin Li have studied the Japanese subjugation of anti-colonial "bandits" and "recalcitrants" in post-1919 Korea and post-1931 Manchuria, the Japanese rhetorical use of "bandits" as a security problem to justify military intervention in fact originated with the 1900 Xiamen Incident.  

In June 1900, anti-foreign Chinese peasants known as the "Boxers" attacked the foreign legations in Beijing. During the Boxer Rebellion, the Japanese took an active role in the eight-
nation Allied Expedition by dispatching 22,000 troops—the largest of the forces—to pacify the Boxers and occupy Beijing. With the attention of the Western powers focused on north China, and Russia having taken advantage of the situation to occupy Manchuria, the Tokyo central government, military, and Government-General of Taiwan agreed that the time was ripe for occupying Fujian.\textsuperscript{113} Despite repeated assurances by Fujian authorities that foreigners in the province would be protected from Boxers, the Japanese used the spread of Boxer attacks in central and southern China as a pretext for military action. In June, the Japanese Navy dispatched two battleships to Xiamen ostensibly to "defend" its 800 Japanese residents, including 700 overseas Taiwanese.\textsuperscript{114} On August 14, Navy Minister Yamamoto Gonbei (1852–1933) told the captain of the Izumi battleship to land troops immediately if any chaos broke out in Xiamen; on August 18, a third Japanese battleship arrived in Xiamen.\textsuperscript{115}

Even Prime Minister Yamagata Aritomo (1838–1922), who had previously advocated a northern advance with Japan's "line of interest" in Korea and Manchuria, wrote on August 20 that Japan should extend its sphere of influence in Fujian and Zhejiang.\textsuperscript{116} Since occupying Korea or Manchuria would most likely instigate a war with Russia, Germany, or France, it was better for Japan to give up on the northeast continent for the present by cooperating with Russia.\textsuperscript{117} In an August 23 telegram to Kodama, Yamagata and Katsura Tarō (now Army Minister) wrote to Kodama:

\begin{itemize}
\item[114.] Kodama Gentarō, Amoi jiken no tenmatsu oyobi taigan shôrai no seisaku, reprinted in Tsurumi 2005 [1943], 537-8.
\item[115.] "Meiji 33-nen 7-gatsu 30-nichi kara Meiji 33-nen 8-gatsu 3-nichi," 1900, JACAR B02031925800, 425.
\end{itemize}
We have decided that if there is an opportunity in the near future, it is necessary for Japan to occupy Xiamen. If the captain of the Izumi battleship requests aid, you should immediately dispatch an army battalion from Taiwan to Xiamen in order to help the navy accomplish this mission.  

The very same day, Taiwan Civil Governor Gotō Shimpei travelled to Xiamen with Navy Captain Hirose to prepare for a potential occupation. Around midnight on August 24, the pretext for invasion was set when a Japanese Honganji temple in Xiamen burned to the ground. According to later U.S. and British consular reports, the fire had been started by the temple's own Japanese priests. Yet it was reported at the time by the Japanese consul in Xiamen, Ueno Sen'ichi, that the perpetrators were most likely anti-Japanese Taiwanese insurgents who had taken refuge in Fujian and were plotting to "liberate" Taiwan from Japanese rule. Thereafter, the three Japanese battleships immediately landed their troops in Xiamen.

On August 26, the Taiwan Daily published an article entitled "The Xiamen Uprising and Cross-Straits Safety," which advocated for further military aid from colonial Taiwan:

With the inadequacy of the Qing police, we have had to act on behalf of the Great Powers to protect lives and property in Fujian. Especially considering our interests in the cross-strait with regard to our Taiwanese, the responsibility to protect those under our flag lies not just with our consuls in the cross-straits but also with our

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119. According to Gotō Shimpei's biographer, Tsurumi Yūsuke, during the Boxer Rebellion the Honganji priests in Xiamen had been invited by Kodama to discuss the situation in Fujian. When the priests returned to Xiamen, their Honganji temple was burned down by "ruffians" (bulai no to), but managed to escape unharmed. Tsurumi 2005, 567. Kobayashi has written that through Gotō's connection, Kodama had secretly paid the Honganji priest, Takamatsu Sei, 600 yen in military funds to do so. Kobayashi Michihiko, Kodama Gentarō: soko kara ryōjunkō wa mieruka (Kyoto: Minerva shobō, 2012), 183.

120. Taiwan sōtokufu Kodama Gentarō/Takachiho kanchō sōtoku Katsura ikugun daijin/ Takachiho kanchō Hirose chūsa, "Gunkan takachiho (2)," 1900, JACAR (Japan Center for Asian Historical Records) Ref.C08040942400, 316.
The following day, Katsura ordered Kodama to dispatch the Taiwan army battalion to Xiamen, and to prepare two more battalions for transport on August 29. With rumors floating around Xiamen that the Japanese had not only planted the fire in their own Honganji temple but also had sent a few thousand troops from Taiwan, the British, American, and German consuls in Xiamen issued protests to Consul Ueno to withdraw Japanese troops.\(^{122}\)

Japanese authorities legitimated the military occupation of Xiamen by citing the need to protect "good Taiwanese subjects" (*Taiwan ryōmin*) from attacks by Taiwanese rebels. On August 28, Foreign Minister Aoki Shūzō (1844–1914) telegraphed the British, French, German, and American envoys in Japan with the justification that "Xiamen and its neighboring regions have served as bases for rebellious plots against Taiwan, which continue to be a source of Japanese anxiety."\(^{123}\) The next day, Ueno requested Aoki to send for more Japanese troops to protect the 700 "good Taiwanese subjects" from "Taiwanese bandits" who had fled to Xiamen: "Among the several Taiwan bandits who have fled to Xiamen and caused this incident, there are those who have aims to attack good Taiwanese subjects.... It is not enough only to station troops in the consulate; we must also dispatch more troops."\(^{124}\)

Meanwhile, the British, American, French, and Russians had landed their own battleships in Xiamen to prevent a Japanese takeover. Despite Japan's claim to Fujian as its "sphere of influence," Xiamen remained a major site of imperial competition among the Western powers. As early as June 1900, the British consul in Xiamen had suspected that the Japanese were preparing to


\(^{123}\) Kashiwagi 1998, 199.

\(^{124}\) Ibid., 200.
occupy Xiamen due to the landing of the Izumi battleship. He warned London of two negative outcomes in the event of a Japanese annexation of Xiamen:

The first is the certainty of raucous and widespread disturbances throughout the whole province which would be very prejudicial to British trade. And the second is that British trade would suffer from the usual policy of protection and exclusion pursued by the Japanese. A heavy blow has already been struck at the moribund tea trade of Amoy which bids fair to kill it off together.  

While British and French consular officials eyed mineral resources and railways that could be developed in Fujian, the United States consul in Xiamen highlighted the city's importance as a shipping center and source for Chinese migrant labor for the newly colonized Philippines.  

With mounting pressure from the Western powers, on August 28 the Tokyo central government ultimately called off the occupation of Xiamen, much to the dismay of Japanese officials in Fujian and Taiwan. The strongest opposition to the occupation came from Itō Hirobumi (1841–1909), the Meiji oligarch and former prime minister. While Itō was no longer a member of the Tokyo cabinet, he retained influence as the head of the Privy Council. Worried that the occupation of Xiamen would ignite a backlash by the Western powers, and perhaps result in a second Triple Intervention, he convinced Prime Minister Yamagata, Foreign Minister Aoki, and Army Minister Katsura to abort the invasion of Xiamen.  

Japanese officials stationed in Xiamen, including Ueno, Gotō, and Navy Captain Hirose Takeo (1868–1904) objected and did not easily agree to the decision. On August 29, Gotō sent a telegram to Katsura and Aoki pleading that the

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"people in Taiwan would be upset by a Japanese retreat." The Tokyo central government persisted, however, and on August 30 Japan withdrew its battleships and troops from Xiamen. A dejected Kodama was so furious that he immediately threatened to resign his post as governor-general. In the end, Japanese leaders appeased Kodama by appointing him to the dual post of army minister and governor-general, while Yamagata resigned as prime minister to symbolically accept the blame.\textsuperscript{128}

In the aftermath of the Xiamen Incident, Murota Yoshiaya (1847–1938), a representative from Taiwan, travelled to Xiamen in late September 1900 to reconcile with Fujian officials. Murota defended the dispatching of Japanese military forces to Xiamen by contending that they were protecting over 700 Japanese subjects from attacks by anti-Japanese "rebels" who had fled from Taiwan. Over ten bands of such "rebels" were hiding in Xiamen, Murota claimed, including soldiers who had been defeated by Japanese troops in 1895 and continued to spread rumors about "expelling Japan" and "recovering Taiwan." The purported aim of the Xiamen occupation had been to arrest "rebels" suspected of setting fire to the Japanese Buddhist temple, and to put an end to the "root of bandit behavior" aimed at disrupting Taiwan.\textsuperscript{129}

\textit{Taiwan's Economic Advance in the Imperial Scramble for Fujian}

Although Kodama and Gotō had been unable to realize their goal of occupying Xiamen by force, after 1900 the two aggressively continued to extend Taiwan's economic reach into Fujian and Guangdong. While conventional narratives emphasize the cooperative nature of Anglo-Japanese relations in the late Meiji period (1895–1912), highlighted by the 1902 Anglo-Japanese

\textsuperscript{128} Kashiwagi 1998, 205.
\textsuperscript{129} "Taiwan tōbō bōmin no shuryō ni shite gen ni Amoi fukin ni senpukushi tsuneni Taiwan no tōchijō ni bōgai wo kokoromi tsutsuarumono jūyohai arī," in Gotō Shimpei bunshō: Taiwan minsei chōkan jidai. Microfilm R-29, Tokyo: Yūshōdō shoten, 1989.
Alliance against Russia, in South China the Japanese in fact remained in fierce competition with Britain, France, and the United States over the region's natural and human resources. In 1900, Gotō called for Taiwan's new mission "to drive out Western—especially British—capital through economic occupation." Goto believed that "in order to bring Fujian province or Xiamen island under our imperial control, we need to first invest capital in the region's commerce and transportation."

Despite Japan's nominal claim to Fujian as its "sphere of influence" since 1898, Fujian officials not only refused to grant exclusive railway rights to Japan but also virtually ignored their promise to first consult the Japanese before accepting Western capital or advisers (for example, they hired French and British engineers in 1906 and 1908, respectively). Meanwhile, local Chinese entrepreneurs played the imperial powers off each other to obtain lucrative contracts for rights to local railway and mining enterprises. In order to extend Japanese shipping, banking, railway, and mining interests from Taiwan into South China, Gotō thus turned to overseas Taiwanese elites to serve as economic intermediaries for Japan. With over 80 overseas Taiwanese managing shops in Xiamen with a total capital of over three-quarters of a million yen by 1900, the growing overseas Taiwanese community held the key to consolidating Japan's sphere of interest in South China.

First, Kodama and Gotō sought to extend Japanese shipping routes between Taiwan and South China, which had been monopolized by Britain's Douglas Steamship Company since the 1880s. Between 1895 and 1898, the Government-General of Taiwan initially poured its energy

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134. Douglas Shipping first established its shipping base in Hong Kong in 1863. Starting in 1871, it established routes between Hong Kong, Xiamen, Fuzhou, and the Taiwanese ports of
into redirecting Taiwan's trade away from China toward Japan so that Taiwan's agricultural exports of rice and sugar could aid industrialization efforts in the metropole. The colonial government subsidized shipping routes between the Japanese ports of Kobe and Osaka to Jilong for the private firms Osaka Shipping Company (Ōsaka shōsen kaisha) and Japan Shipping Company (Nihon yūsen kaisha).136

Beginning in 1898, the Government-General of Taiwan sought to drive Douglas Shipping out of Taiwan for two main reasons: (1) to help sever the smuggling of Chinese arms to anti-Japanese insurgents in Taiwan; and (2) to control Taiwan's trade routes with South China.137 Kodama and Gotô subsidized Osaka Shipping to establish sea routes connecting Taiwan (Anping and Danshui ports) with the South China ports of Xiamen, Fuzhou, and Hong Kong. Osaka Shipping invited the wealthiest overseas Taiwanese in Guangzhou, Lin Lisheng, to serve as the compradore for the company's Xiamen branch due to his previous experience with Douglas Shipping.139 Osaka Shipping successfully managed to undercut Douglas Shipping Company's Danshui and Anping. Although Liu Mingzhuang established regular Chinese shipping routes from the Chinese mainland to Taiwan following the Sino-French War (1884-5), the Chinese withdrew from shipping competition with Douglas Shipping by 1891. Kokaze Hidemasa, Tekikokushugika no Nihon kaiun: kokusai kyōsō to taigai jiritsu (Tokyo: Yamakawa shuppansha, 1995), 262-3.

By the early 1930s, 80 percent of Taiwan's imports and 90 percent of exports went to Japan. Justin Adam Schneider, "The Taiwan Government-General and Prewar Japanese Economic Expansion in South China and Southeast Asia, 1900-1936," in The Japanese Empire in East Asia and Its Postwar Legacy, ed. Harald Fuess (Munich: Iudicium, 1998), 162, 165.


passenger rates by 1900, and in 1902 the British firm withdrew its shipping routes between South China and Taiwan.¹⁴⁰ In 1901, the Government-General of Taiwan also established a "Budget to Expand South China Trade" (Nanshin böeki kakuchōhi), which stimulated an increase in Taiwan exports to South China.¹⁴¹

Figure 1.3: Map of Taiwan's shipping routes to Fuzhou (top red), Xiamen (central red), and Shantou (bottom red).¹⁴²

assisting Katō Hiromi to establish a Japanese Buddhist temple (Ōtani branch of Honganji) in Xiamen, Lin Lisheng would later go on to help the Government-General of Taiwan acquire railway rights in Fujian and Guangdong in 1904.

¹⁴⁰ As Adam Schneider has pointed out, one reason why the Government-General of Taiwan chose Osaka Shipping for its Taiwan-South China routes, rather than Japan Shipping Co., was that the latter was more closely tied to the Tokyo central government and was likely to be less responsive than Osaka Shipping to Taiwan government demands. Schneider 1998b, 170.

¹⁴¹ The budget increased from 10,000 to 90,000 yen by 1906 and remained the focus of Taiwan trade until the budget was renamed the "Budget to Expand South China Southeast Asia Trade" (Nanshi Nanyō böeki kakuchōhi) in 1912 to include Southeast Asia. Kondō 1996, 70.

¹⁴² In Miyakawa Jirō, Amoi (Taihoku: Seibunsha, 1923).
Second, Gotō sought to strengthen Taiwan's financial presence in South China through the Bank of Taiwan, which was founded in 1899. Gotō oversaw the establishment of overseas Bank of Taiwan branches in Xiamen (1900), Hong Kong (1903), and Fuzhou (1905), which became critical for circulating Japanese currency, financing Sino-Japanese joint ventures, and providing loans to Chinese officials and companies.\(^{143}\) Gotō believed that the Bank of Taiwan could not rely solely on Japanese investments, but needed to recruit Chinese and Taiwanese capital from Xiamen.\(^{144}\) Gotō contended that Xiamen not only was central to Taiwan's economy but also held the key to attracting the capital of wealthy overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia with family and business ties to Fujian.\(^{145}\) Throughout the 1900s and 1910s, local and overseas Taiwanese elites—including Lin Lisheng in Xiamen, Lin Xiongzheng (1888–1946) in Taiwan, and Guo Chunyang (1859–1935) in the Dutch Indies—invested in Bank of Taiwan ventures in South China and Southeast Asia.\(^{146}\)

A proponent of Japan's southern advance in China, the second Bank of Taiwan president, Yagyū Kazuyoshi (1865–1920, r. 1901–16), initiated economic surveys for coastal South China from 1907 onward.\(^{147}\) Yagyū had previous survey experience as a former military officer in the

\(^{143}\) The Bank of Taiwan would later establish branches in Shantou (1907), Guangzhou (1910), and Shanghai (1911), as well as over thirty locations in Southeast Asia beginning with Singapore (1912). In 1900, the bank had provided 19,000 yuan in loans overseas; by 1911, its overseas loans totaled 2,320,000 yuan. Nagura Kisaku, Taiwan ginkō yonjūnen-shi (Tokyo, 1939), 20-2; Kodama Gentarō, "Taiwan tōchi no kiō oyobi shōrai ni kansuru kakusho" (June 1899), reprinted in Tsurumi 1943 [2005], 505-6.

\(^{144}\) Ibid., 509-10. Kitaoka Shin’ichi, Gotō Shinpei: gaikō to bijon (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 2000), 64.

\(^{145}\) Ibid., 510, 513.

\(^{146}\) Lin 2005, 234. As Adam Schneider has pointed out, however, the eleven loans to Chinese businesses between 1900 and 1911 ended disastrously when Chinese borrowers defaulted in the 1920s. Schneider 1998b, 171-2.

\(^{147}\) For biographies of Yagyū sponsored by the Bank of Taiwan, see Ōno Kyōhei, Yagyū Kazuyoshi (Tokyo: Yamazaki Genjirō, 1922); Ōno Kyōhei, Yagyū Tōdori no hen'e (Tokyo: Yamazaki Genjirō, 1922).
Imperial Army under Kodama and Gotō's watch from 1893 to 1895.\textsuperscript{148} Between 1907 and 1910, the Bank of Taiwan published 101 survey reports on South China in collaboration with Japanese consuls and employees of Mitsui Company and Osaka Shipping. The economic surveys conducted by the Bank of Taiwan were in many ways the precursor to later surveys conducted by Gotō's South Manchurian Railway Company (est. 1906).\textsuperscript{149}

In a further attempt to eliminate Chinese and Western economic competition, Gotō established the colonial "Sango Company" (\textit{Sango kōshi}, 1902) in Xiamen. The aim of the company was to advance Japanese interests in Fujian railways and camphor (a waxy solid obtained from laurel trees for use in plastics and medicines).\textsuperscript{150} Nominally a Sino-Japanese joint enterprise, with half of its capital supplied by the Government-General of Taiwan and half by local Chinese, Sango was administered by Gotō's protege, Akuzawa Naoya, who understood the importance of cooperating with local Chinese elites to expand Taiwan's economic foothold in Fujian.\textsuperscript{151} With camphor as one of Taiwan's main monopoly industries, along with rice and sugar, Sango sought to extend Taiwan's camphor monopoly into Fujian to eliminate foreign competition.\textsuperscript{152} The Japanese paid particularly close attention to Lin Chaodong (1851–1904), a prominent Qing gentry-official and member of the wealthy Wufeng Lin family of Taizhong in central Taiwan.\textsuperscript{153} Lin had fled from

\textsuperscript{148} Naikaku sōridaijin Hara Kei/Ōkura daimyu danshuku Takahashi Korekiyo, "\textit{Yagyū Kazuyoshi jokun no ken}," 1920, JACAR A10112887000.
\textsuperscript{149} Yokoi Kaori, "\textit{Yagyū Kazuyoshi to Taiwan ginkō no ‘Nanshi Nanyō’ chōsa}," \textit{Tōyō shihō} 11 (2005): 39-41. Between 1899 and 1918, the Bank of Taiwan published 358 survey reports on South China and Southeast Asia's economic and geopolitical conditions. Nagura 1939, 271.
\textsuperscript{150} The company was named after the year they were founded (Meiji 35, 1902). The Government-General of Taiwan provided funds for Sangō Company from 1906-1916 (much more than to any other companies). Other South China industries that the Sango participated in were the Tōa shoin, Yuansheng Bank, Shantou irrigation, and Longyan and Fujian railways. Chung Shuming, "\textit{Shokuminchi kara tairiku e:} Taiwan kaikyō wo wattata Nihonjin," in \textit{Mosaku suru kindai Nitchū kankei: taiwa to kyōzon no jidai}, ed. Kishi Toshihiko et al. (Tokyo: Tōdai shuppankai), 36.
\textsuperscript{151} Chung 2009, 30-5.
\textsuperscript{152} On Taiwan's camphor industry during the Qing and Japanese period, see Tavares 2004.
\textsuperscript{153} On Lin's biography, see Zheng Xifu, \textit{Lin Chaodong zhuan} (Taizhong: Taiwan sheng wenxian weiyuanhui, 1979).
Taiwan for Fujian in May 1895 after initially opposing Japanese rule. While two of Lin's sons stayed behind in Taiwan to protect their family property, Lin himself spent the remainder of his life managing his business affairs from Fujian. When the Taiwan representative stationed in Xiamen, Sawamura Gentarō, reported in 1901 that Lin had obtained exclusive rights to Fujian camphor from the Fujian-Zhejiang provincial governor, Gotō dispatched Akuzawa to negotiate with Lin about acquiring his camphor privileges.

Lacking the necessary capital and camphor personnel to run his newly founded camphor business (Yuben gongsi), Lin was more than happy to sell his camphor rights to Sango Company. Shortly thereafter, Akuzawa launched Sango's manufacturing and distribution centers in Fujian and Shanghai. The British and German consuls in Xiamen, however, fiercely protested to the Japanese consul about the Government-General of Taiwan's attempt to monopolize camphor production in Fujian. The British, in particular, had already established cooperative ties with Lin Chaodong's camphor business and were purchasing Fujian camphor for shipment to Hong Kong.

Taking a broader view of commercial rights in China as a whole, Japan's Foreign Ministry concluded that it was not in Japan's best interest to alienate the Western powers over camphor rights in Fujian. In the end, the Government-General of Taiwan criticized Consul Ueno, who represented the Foreign Ministry in Xiamen, for his weak stance in negotiating with Western and Chinese authorities over the camphor issue. The case of Fujian camphor once again reflected disagreements over Japanese policy in South China between the Tokyo central government and Taiwan authorities. While the Foreign Ministry ultimately yielded to Western demands for equal

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156. Schneider 1998b, 168.

camphor rights in Fujian, Gotō and Akuzawa had sought a more aggressive monopoly at the exclusion of the Western powers. Even so, Sango went on to extend Taiwan camphor production from Fujian into northern Jiangxi and southern Zhejiang province in central China. Increasing production costs, falling camphor prices, and growing Chinese demands for "rights recovery" against foreigners, however, ultimately resulted in Sango's withdrawal from camphor production in China by 1910.

In addition to its camphor enterprise, Sango acquired exclusive rights from Chinese authorities to construct a Chaozhou-Shantou railway in Guangdong province. In order to conceal Japanese involvement, Akuzawa went through Lin Lisheng, the overseas Taiwanese compradore of Osaka Shipping, and three wealthy overseas Chinese intermediaries—Wu Lixiang (Hong Kong), Zhang Yunan (Sumatra), and Xie Rongguang (Penang)—to obtain railway rights from the Qing government. As early as 1903, Sango had dispatched the colonial railway engineers, Ogawa Shigen and Hasegawa Kinsuke, from Taiwan to survey the lands between Chaozhou and Shantou to prepare for construction. Once Wu, Lin, Zhang, and Xie acquired railway rights from the Qing authorities in 1904, the four partnered with Akuzawa to form the Chao-Shan Railway Company, with half of the capital supplied by Zhang and Xie, and the other half by Wu and Sango (with the company's funds placed under Lin's name). In this way, the Chao-Shan Railway Company was nominally a Sino-Japanese joint venture, though in reality the company was administered by Wu and Akuzawa.

162. Tsurumi 1943 [2005], 617-20, 635-43. See also Nakamura 1988, 76-7.
In May 1904, Akuzawa commenced railway construction by hiring the Taiwan Railway Bureau chief, Satō Kenjirō, along with 20 other Japanese and Taiwanese railway staff members. In addition, Akuzawa brought in Japanese graduates from the Japanese school in Shanghai, the East Asia Academy. With the additional hiring of 79 staff members and 111 construction workers, Satō completed the Chao-Shan railway by 1906. During the construction process, however, local Chinese killed several Japanese workers in retaliation for the forced sale of land for the railway, and in the 1909 "Shantou Railway Incident" 50 Chinese and six Taiwanese employees organized a strike against the Japanese. Thereafter, Akuzawa gradually replaced Japanese personnel with Chinese and Taiwanese workers in an effort to mollify anti-Japanese sentiment. By 1914, there were 47 Taiwanese and over 130 Chinese employees, compared to only nine Japanese employees.\textsuperscript{163} Sango Company continued to profit from the railway up to the 1920s, but relinquished control in 1922.\textsuperscript{164}

Unlike the Manchurian borderlands adjoining Korea, where Japanese officials tried to prevent overseas Koreans from naturalizing as Chinese nationals, Japanese colonial officials did not mind that overseas Taiwanese in South China retained their Chinese nationality.\textsuperscript{165} Japanese, in fact, actively sought out Chinese nationals and overseas Taiwanese with dual Sino-Japanese nationality since many positions in the Chinese government and commercial sector—fisheries, automobile exports, etc.—required Chinese nationality.\textsuperscript{166} Shi Fanqi, for example, an overseas Taiwanese comprador for the Sino-Taiwan Company in charge of Chinese migrant laborers in Taiwan, concurrently served as a Fujian official by retaining his Chinese nationality.\textsuperscript{167} Similarly, Chen Xuehai worked as an overseas Taiwanese comprador for the Osaka Shipping branch in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{163} Ibid., 13.
\item \textsuperscript{164} Schneider 1998, 167-8.
\item \textsuperscript{165} See Brooks 1998; Esselstrom 2009.
\item \textsuperscript{166} Chung 2004a, 404-5.
\item \textsuperscript{167} The Sino-Taiwan Company was renamed South Country Company (\textit{Nankoku kōshi}) in 1915.
\end{itemize}
Xiamen at the same time that he managed Xiamen companies as a Chinese national.168

In sum, the Japanese competed with the Western powers over naturalizing Chinese in Fujian, particularly those who could aid Japanese economic and cultural interests in not only South China but also Southeast Asia. A few overseas Taiwanese thus simultaneously held Chinese, Japanese, and British nationalities, using the former to obtain Chinese government posts, while employing the latter two to manage foreign businesses.169 The most prominent example was Guo Chunyang, an overseas Chinese merchant in the Dutch Indies, who concurrently held Dutch, British, and Taiwanese (Japanese) nationality.170

Cross-Straits Police Networks and Illicit Activities by Overseas Taiwanese

In this way, the Government-General of Taiwan actively recruited overseas Taiwanese as economic intermediaries in South China, particularly those with "individual character, skills, or capital that benefit Japan's national interests."171 Colonial officials rewarded overseas Taiwanese who donated generously to Japanese schools, newspapers, and hospitals in South China with imperial "gentry awards" (shinshō) and leadership positions in the Taiwan Association (Taiwan kōkai). At the same time, Japanese colonial and consular authorities continued to monitor so-called "bad overseas Taiwanese" (furyō sekimin)—those who committed crimes, instigated Sino-Japanese legal disputes, or harbored anti-colonial schemes.172 Yet Japanese policies and perceptions toward the overseas Taiwanese were not monolithic. Japanese officials often disagreed with each other on

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168. Chung 2004a, 404-5.
169. Ibid.
171. "Nanbu Shina zairyū Taiwan sekimin meibo chōsei ikken dai ni, fu zai Shina sekimin torishimari ni kansuru ken dai ni kan," Gaimushō kiroku 3-8-7-18, September 1907-August 1913.
172. Ibid.
how to handle the so-called Taiwanese "gangsters" (*bulaikan*), and in 1915 and 1916 the Government-General of Taiwan hosted a conference in Taipei to discuss with Xiamen and Fuzhou consuls how best to deal with Taiwanese troublemakers.173

In July 1916, Japanese consular police in Xiamen cooperated with Chinese officials to arrest tens of armed Taiwanese "gangsters" who had come into conflict with local Chinese. When the Japanese consul, Kikuchi Yoshifusa, deported several of the criminals to Taiwan, the Government-General of Taiwan strongly opposed the decision. The *Taiwan Daily*, the colonial organ, defended the deported Taiwanese as "the vanguard of our southern advance policy" and criticized Consul Kikuchi for having upset "the environment in which 2,000 overseas Taiwanese happily live and work."174 While Kikuchi had hoped to revoke the deported Taiwanese of their Japanese nationality, colonial officials instead argued that these "armed Taiwanese" (*buryokuha*) could protect the Japanese and Taiwanese community in Xiamen since they were feared by Chinese officials and regional warlords.175

Indeed, for the most part Japanese colonial and consular officials agreed on the need to ally with powerful, armed Taiwanese. For example, the Government-General of Taiwan naturalized Xiamen's Wu Yunfu as a Taiwanese subject in 1913 and granted him an imperial gentry award in 1920 for his financial and political contributions to the overseas Taiwanese community.176 Despite his notoriety for smuggling opium into Fujian, Japanese officials turned a blind eye to Wu's illicit

173. Subsequent conferences would be held in Taiwan for South China consuls to meet with Government-General of Taiwan officials in 1921, 1922, 1923, 1924, and 1934. Chung Shu-ming, "Taiwan zōngdufu 'Nanzhi Nanyang' zhengce zhi yanjiu: yi qingbao tixi wei zhongxin," in Taiwan wenxian shiliao zhengli yanjiu xueshu yantaohui luowenji, ed. Lin Jintian (Nantou: Taiwan sheng wenxian weiyuanhui, 1999), 722-3; Esselstrom 2009, 44.


175. "Nanbu Shina zairyū Taiwan sekimin meibo chōsei ikken dai ni, fū zai Shina sekimin torishimari ni kansuru ken dai ni kan," *Gaimushō kiroku* 3-8-7-18, September 1907-August 1913.

176. In 1914, Wu became a representative of the Taiwan Association and donated a 1,000 yen to help establish new classrooms and dorms for the Xiamen Kyokuei Academy. "Wu Yunfu hoka jūichi-mei shinshō kōfu no ken," *Taiwan sōtokufu kōbun ruisan* 3057-13, November 1920.
trade. While Foreign Ministry and colonial Taiwan archives contain numerous cases from the 1910s up through the 1930s where Japanese consular police cooperated with Chinese authorities to shut down Taiwanese opium and gambling parlors, contemporary Chinese and Western newspapers corroborate the unchecked nature of most illicit Taiwanese businesses in Fujian.  

It is important to note, however, that the boundaries between "Taiwanese" and "Chinese" participation in opium enterprises was much fuzzier than it has been portrayed by mainland Chinese historiography, where local Chinese have been depicted as "victims." Despite Chinese prohibitions on opium throughout the Republican period (1912–49), Fujian warlords, navy officials, and civilians actively collaborated with overseas Taiwanese in collecting opium taxes. *North China Herald*, a British newspaper in Shanghai, attested to the complexity of Fujian's opium situation in an article titled "Fukien [Fujian] Drug Rackets not Japanese Run: Chinese Peddlers Pose as Formosans [Taiwanese]." Whereas Chinese newspapers had reported that prostitution, blackmail, kidnapping, and smuggling in Fujian were "exclusively Formosan," they were in fact "quite similar to the opium trade—a handful of Formosans lending protection to hundreds of Chinese. All in all, the underworld of Fukien is not so foreign as we have been led to believe."

In contrast to Chinese newspapers that portrayed the overseas Taiwanese as the "running dogs" (C. *daigou*) of Japan, Japanese colonial authorities propagated a competing discourse of the Taiwanese as victims of Fujian's "lawlessness and banditry." In 1916, the Government-General of

177. Chung Shu-ming has argued that Japanese colonial officials were passive observers and supporters of the rise of the "bad overseas Taiwanese." Chung believes that by not actively regulating the opium crimes of the Taiwanese, colonial Taiwan used them as "the teeth and claws" of Japan's "southern advance" policy in China. Chung Shu-ming, "Taiwan zongdufu de dui'an zhengce yu yapian wenti," in *Taiwan wenxian shiliao zhengli yanjiu xueshu yantaohui lunwenji*, ed. Lin Jintian (Nantou: Taiwan sheng wenxian weiyuanhui, 2000), 252.
178. For example, the British newspaper in Shanghai, *North China Herald*, stated on December 21, 1929 that there were 109 opium dens in Fuzhou and 198 in Xiamen, mostly owned by Taiwanese. By June 3, 1936, *North China Herald* reported 319 opium dens in Fuzhou and 323 in Xiamen.
Taiwan cited the Chinese government's inability to regulate Fujian's "state of anarchy" (museifu jōtai) as justification for increasing the number of Japanese police officials in South China to protect Japanese subjects. A colonial report, "Relations Between Taiwan and South China" (undated, most likely circa 1916), estimated 3,000 overseas Taiwanese residing in Fujian and Guangdong, 93 of whom had been designated by the consulates as "suspected men" (yōshisatsuujin)\(^\text{181}\), for threatening the security of Taiwan.\(^\text{182}\) The report concluded that because the Chinese police were powerless, it was critical for "us [Japanese] to dispatch colonial police officials to the region or have our police advisers hired by the Chinese government."\(^\text{183}\)

Since Japanese consulates in South China lacked the necessary funds to hire additional police, in November 1917 the Government-General of Taiwan dispatched four police captains and 15 officers to be stationed in the Xiamen, Fuzhou, Shantou, and Guangzhou consulates. The Xiamen consulate, in particular, received colonial police officials and spies from Taiwan who were fluent in the local Xiamen (Taiwanese) dialect. In addition to gathering intelligence on the overseas Taiwanese, these officials were responsible for surveying Chinese reactions to Japan-related news and Japanese institutions like schools and hospitals.\(^\text{184}\) Despite Chinese protests in Xiamen that the staffing of the colonial police was a violation of China's sovereignty, Japanese authorities continued to mobilize the discourse of "protecting overseas Taiwanese from Chinese bandits" to legitimate their interventionist policies.\(^\text{185}\) From the 1900 Xiamen Incident to the violent disputes that followed between overseas Taiwanese and local Chinese—most notably in 1913, 1923, and 1932—Japanese naval troops landed several times in Xiamen to ostensibly

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181. The Japanese term literally translates in English as "men in need of surveillance."
182. Taiwan sōtokufu minseibu keisatsu honcho. *Taiwan to Minami Shina to no kankei* (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu minseibu keisatsu honcho), date unavailable, 2-3, Appendix 2.
183. Ibid., 12.
184. The Xiamen and Taiwanese dialects were practically the same. Taiwan sōtokufu keimukyoku, *Taiwan sotokufu keisatsu enkakushi* 1 (Taihoku, 1933), 167-9; cited in Chung 1999, 707-8.
185. Esselstrom 2009, 44-5.
"protect its Taiwanese subjects" from "bandits" and anti-Japanese attacks. Whether or not the armed conflicts were initiated by the Taiwanese themselves, Japanese officials were able to point to the growing Taiwanese communities in Fujian as a justification for increased Japanese military and police activity in along the South China coast.

**Conclusion**

Japanese colonial officials envisioned Taiwan as an imperial gateway for southern expansion with overseas Taiwanese serving as proxies of Japanese interests. The overseas Taiwanese population quickly outnumbered British and American nationals in Fujian, reinforcing Japanese claims to the province as their own "sphere of influence." By identifying the Taiwanese as an integral part of the Japanese community in Fujian, the Government-General of Taiwan used the pretext of protecting their subjects to dispatch military and police officials to South China.

On the one hand, the Government-General of Taiwan welcomed the inclusion of wealthy Chinese elites as Taiwanese subjects. The Japanese relied on overseas Taiwanese leaders not only for their financial contributions to Japanese institutions but also to mediate Sino-Japanese tensions, particularly during the anti-Japanese boycotts of the 1910s and 1920s. In contrast to later assimilation policies under the "imperialization" (*kominka*) policies in 1937–45, which sought to eliminate the "Chinese-ness" of Taiwanese subjects, Japanese authorities encouraged the overseas Taiwanese elite to maintain their Chinese linguistic, familial, and political ties with Fujian to serve as intermediaries for Japan.186

Yet the overseas Taiwanese were not a monolithic community of "imperial agents" or "running dogs" of Japan. Despite successful partnerships with some Taiwanese in South China,

Japanese consuls continued to voice reservations about the utility of the Taiwanese. In his March 1910 report, the Japanese consul in Xiamen, Moriyasu Saburō, complained that even so-called "useful" Taiwanese such as Lin Lisheng, the vice-manager of the Chao-Shan Railway established by Sango, lacked any sense of Japanese loyalty: "Because overseas Taiwanese like him love wealth, they do not give much thought to morals ... nor do they have a fixed ideology, sense of honor, or loyalty toward a nation."187

Indeed, despite the various uses that Japanese officials had for the overseas Taiwanese, Chinese and Taiwanese alike exploited the liminal status of colonial subjecthood for their own self-interests. With their abuse of extraterritorial rights, the Taiwanese became a mixed blessing for Japanese officials. While they served as economic and political intermediaries, they often also incited further anti-Japanese sentiment in South China. The accounts in this chapter thus challenge a simplified narrative of "Japanese-Taiwanese collaboration versus Chinese resistance." Responses by Japanese and Chinese officials toward the Taiwanese were contingent and improvisatory as both sides oscillated between denouncing the Taiwanese as "ruffians," on the one hand, and "compatriot allies" (J. dōhō, C. tongbao) on the other.

187. "Nanbu Shina zairyū Taiwan sekimin meibo chōsei ikken dai ichi," Gaimushō kiroku 3-8-7-18, 1907.
CHAPTER TWO

Overseas Taiwanese Students and Transnational Networks of Empire and Resistance in South China (1908–1936)

Introduction

The Government-General of Taiwan promoted Taiwan as an imperial base from which to compete with the Anglo-American powers for geopolitical and economic hegemony in South China. Japanese colonial officials welcomed the naturalization of Chinese as "overseas Taiwanese" subjects in Fujian and Guangdong as one strategy to extend its colonial authority across the straits. Japanese colonial and consular officials, however, remained vigilant of the growing overseas Taiwanese population. Despite their legal status as Japanese subjects, many Taiwanese continued to culturally and politically identify with their respective local Chinese communities in South China. Japanese officials worried that rising Chinese nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiment potentially compromised the "usefulness" of overseas Taiwanese as imperial intermediaries. With few Japanese cultural institutions in South China at the turn of the twentieth-century, for example, Japanese consuls noted distressingly that the spoken language, daily customs, and political views of Taiwanese hardly differed from those of their local Chinese peers. In response, Japanese consular and colonial officials sought ways to mold the overseas Taiwanese into "loyal Japanese subjects." Starting in 1908, the Government-General of Taiwan began exporting Taiwanese "common school" models (J. kōgakkō, C. gongxuexiao)188 and teachers (both Japanese and Taiwanese) to Fuzhou, Xiamen and Shantou. Overseas Taiwanese schools (Taiwan sekimin gakkō)

188. The Government-General of Taiwan had founded Taiwanese "common schools" in 1898 exclusively for Taiwanese students. Ethnic Japanese subjects in Taiwan separately attended "regular elementary schools" (jinjō shōgakkō).
initially aimed to acculturate Taiwanese youth through Japanese-language pedagogy in place of classical Chinese education of the nineteenth-century. Yet what began as the Japanese transfer of colonial Taiwan's education experience to China quickly turned into a hybridization of educational practices modeled on, and in competition with, local Anglo-American and Chinese schools.

Western historians of colonial studies, led by Frederick Cooper and Ann Stoler, have long drawn attention to the transnational production of colonial knowledge and institutions.\textsuperscript{189} Stoler has pointed out that the process of Western empire-building entailed "cross-imperial knowledge acquisition and application including a poaching of practices, a searching for new technologies" between imperial powers.\textsuperscript{190} Japan was no exception to this phenomenon: Japanese colonial rulers and intellectuals studied and adopted British, French, German, Dutch and American models of colonial law, economy, medicine, and education.\textsuperscript{191} The Government-General of Taiwan archives contain a multitude of reports from the early twentieth century by Japanese colonial officials who surveyed British law in Hong Kong, U.S. education in the Philippines, and sugar cultivation in the Dutch Indies, among other colonial practices. Within Japan's own empire, colonial practices and personnel circulated among Taiwan, Korea, Manchuria, and Micronesia from the early 1900s up through World War II.\textsuperscript{192} Yet previous historiography has rarely looked at the semi-colonial treaty ports of South China as dynamic sites of inter-imperial competition and resistance among Japan, China, the Western powers, and Japan's colonial subjects.\textsuperscript{193}

Although conventional narratives of colonial Taiwan under Japanese rule depict the

\textsuperscript{189}. Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, \textit{Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 13.
\textsuperscript{191}. Peter Duus has called this Japanese phenomenon "mimetic imperialism." Duus 1995.
\textsuperscript{192}. For example, see Yamamuro 1998.
severing of Chinese contact with Taiwan, the Government-General of Taiwan in fact welcomed cross-strait exchanges that promoted Japanese cultural interests in South China. The first half of this chapter explores how Japanese colonial educators from Taiwan competed with Anglo-American schools in South China over the education of Taiwanese and Chinese youth. Initially, Chinese parents in Xiamen and Fuzhou preferred to send their children to Anglo-American schools for English-language and vocational education. In response, Japanese colonial educators adopted and integrated Anglo-American practices for their overseas Taiwanese schools to better cater to the local needs of their Chinese and Taiwanese clientele. Schools in this way became competitive sites for cultural hegemony between Japan and the Western powers in treaty-port South China.

At the same time, in the "fringes of empire" of South China the Government-General of Taiwan faced its greatest challenge in monitoring its Taiwanese subjects. With limited opportunities for secondary education in Taiwan and the high costs of studying abroad in Japan, hundreds of Taiwanese decided to study in Anglo-American and Chinese secondary schools and universities throughout the 1920s and 1930s. Xiamen, Shanghai, and Guangzhou provided Taiwanese youth and activists with opportunities not only to imbibe Chinese nationalist—including anti-Japanese—education but also to come into contact with the cross-fertilization of anti-imperial movements and ideas. Overseas Taiwanese students rubbed shoulders with Chinese communists and Korean independence activists who jointly formed youth groups promoting a Pan-Asian alliance of "weak and small peoples" (J. *jyakushō minzoku*, C. *ruoxiao minzu*) against Japan. Just as Japanese colonial institutions circulated across the straits in South China, Taiwanese students and activists found refuge in the very same Chinese treaty ports, what I call "anti-colonial activist havens" for Taiwanese, Chinese, and Korean youth.

195. I have drawn inspiration from Karen Thornber, who looks at "literary contact nebulae"
Previous scholarship on Chinese and Taiwanese students overseas has focused on anti-colonial and literary exchanges in Japan's metropole and its colonies.\textsuperscript{196} As part of "self-strengthening" movements, colonial subjects (Taiwanese and Korean) and "semi-colonial" Chinese sought in Tokyo what they believed to be cutting-edge Westernized ideas and institutions.\textsuperscript{197} Similarly, studies of Western empires have highlighted the education of anti-colonial activists in the capital of the imperial metropole, whether they were Indian subjects (e.g., Mahatma Gandhi) in London or Vietnamese students (e.g., Ho Chi Minh) in Paris.\textsuperscript{198} In contrast, the second half of this chapter examines South China's treaty ports—outside both the metropole and colony—as an equally fertile anti-imperial site for Taiwanese youth. Taiwanese students in China actively participated in what the international historian Erez Manela has called the "transnational networks of nationalist activists who imagined themselves as part of a global wave."\textsuperscript{199} I argue that cross-strait education channels thus presented Japanese authorities with the dual challenge of acculturating overseas Taiwanese youth as "good Japanese subjects" while concurrently restricting Taiwanese youth as agents of anti-imperial dissent.

\textsuperscript{196} In addition to Thornber, see Ching 2001 and Kleeman 2003. \\
\textsuperscript{197} Thornber 2009, 11-12. \\
To consolidate the leadership of the overseas Taiwanese, in 1900 the Japanese consul in Fuzhou, Toshima Sutematsu, advised several wealthy overseas Taiwanese to establish the Taiwan Association (Taiwan kōkai). Likewise in Xiamen, in 1907 several overseas Taiwanese led by Shi Fanqi formed the Xiamen Taiwan Association. Half of the twenty or so representatives of the Taiwan associations were elected by fellow association members, and half were appointed by the Japanese consul. The majority of representatives, as in the case of Shi, Yuan Shunyong, and Zeng Houkun, were prominent entrepreneurs with economic and political ties to Chinese and Japanese authorities.\footnote{200} The Taiwan associations coordinated with Japanese consular and colonial officials to promote the socioeconomic welfare of the overseas Taiwanese community in areas such as education and health. In addition, association leaders mediated local conflicts between the Taiwanese and Chinese during the 1910s and 1920s.\footnote{201}

Despite the formation of such associations, however, Japanese consular officials noted that the overseas Taiwanese remained culturally indistinguishable from their Chinese peers. In March 1907, the Japanese consul in Fuzhou, Takahashi Kitsujirō, wrote to the Government-General of Taiwan requesting financial aid to establish a school for the overseas Taiwanese. According to Takahashi, the 270 Taiwanese subjects in Fuzhou were "Japanese subjects in name only, for in reality nothing differentiates them from other Qing subjects in terms of their language, thought, or economic activity."\footnote{202} The only education offered by the Fuzhou Taiwan Association was a Chinese-style curriculum established in 1905 to teach classical Chinese (J. kanbun, C. hanwen).

\footnote{200} Ide Kiwata, "Minzoku no dōsei yori mita Taiwan to Minami Shina," \textit{Tōyō: Shisei yonjūshūnen Taiwan tokushūgō} (1935): 97-110. \footnote{201} Miyakawa 1923. \footnote{202} "Shinkoku Fukushū Taiwanjin shitei kyōiku no tame Mitsuya kyōyū haken ni kanshin shōfuku no ken (zai Fukushū ryōji)," \textit{Taiwan sōtokufu kōbun ruisan} 5100-15, April 1908, 86.
and official spoken Chinese (J. *kanwa*, C. *guanhua*). Takahashi feared that without Japanese-language instruction, the second generation of overseas Taiwanese would remain culturally Chinese with little loyalty toward Japan. He therefore requested the Government-General of Taiwan to dispatch a Japanese teacher from Taiwan to establish a new Japanese-language school for overseas Taiwanese in Fuzhou.

But why did Consul Takahashi turn to the Government-General of Taiwan instead of his Foreign Ministry superiors in Tokyo to acquire educational funds for Fuzhou? Since the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–5, the Foreign Ministry had in fact been deeply involved in Sino-Japanese educational exchange in Fujian province. The East Asian Common Culture Association (*Tōa dōbunkai*), funded by the Foreign Ministry, had established two Japanese schools in Fujian—Fuzhou East Culture School (J. *Fukushū Tōbun gakudō*, C. *Fuzhou Dongwen xuetang*, 1898) and Xiamen East Asia School (J. *Amoi Tōa shoin*, C. *Xiamen Dongya shuyuan*, 1899)—to prepare Chinese children for study abroad in Japan. Several Chinese graduates of the two schools studied in Tokyo in the early 1900s, joined Sun Yat-sen's Revolutionary Alliance (*Tongmenghui*), and returned to Fujian as officials of the 1911 Chinese Nationalist government.

Yet after Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5, which resulted in Japan's acquisition of concession rights in southern Manchuria, the Foreign Ministry transferred its institutional priorities to Manchuria and Shanghai and withdrew support for its two Japanese schools.

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**203.** The Chinese teacher, Lin Jianggao, was hired to teach nine Taiwanese students. "Taiwan Sekimin kankei jikō chōsakata ni kansuru ken 2," 1930, JACAR B02031445200, 129.

**204.** "Shinkoku Fukushū Taiwanjin shitei kyōiku no tame Mitsuya kyōyu haken ni kanshi shōfuku no ken (zai Fukushū ryōji)," *Taiwan sōtokufu kō bun ruisan* 5100-15, April 1908, 87.


**206.** For example, Lin Huaichen (1883–1912), Li Baoqu (1887–1912), and Song Yuanyuan (1882–1961)—graduates of Fuzhou East Culture School—and Lin Wanli and Liu Chongyou—graduates of Xiamen East Asia School—who went on to secondary schools in Japan before participating in the Nationalist Government after 1911. See Fujian sheng difang zhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, *Xinhai geming Fujian yingjie tuzhi* (Fuzhou: Haixia shuju, 2011), 149, 181, 258-9; Okamoto Yōhachirō, "Amoi Tsūshin," *Taiwan kyōiku* 144 (1914), 36.
schools in Fujian.\textsuperscript{207} As Takahashi stated with respect to Fujian in a February 1907 interview in the *Taiwan Daily*, "at present the central Japanese government is busy with plans in Manchuria and does not have the luxury to invest in the region."\textsuperscript{208} With the decline in student enrollment exacerbated by growing Chinese anti-Japanese sentiment, the Foreign Ministry handed over Fuzhou Common Culture School to Qing officials in 1906 and closed the Xiamen East Asia School in 1909.\textsuperscript{209}

The Foreign Ministry and Government-General of Taiwan thus demonstrated different priorities for Japanese cultural activities in China. While the Foreign Ministry had redirected its interest from South China to North and Central China, the Government-General of Taiwan remained enthusiastic about developing Japanese cultural institutions in South China. Without funding support from the headquarters of the Foreign Ministry, Consul Takahashi in Fuzhou thus had few options but to turn to the Government-General of Taiwan for educational funds and personnel. Takahashi requested that Taiwan Civil Governor Iwai Tatsumi (1865–1908, in office 1906–8) dispatch a Japanese teacher to Fuzhou who could teach Japanese language three hours a day to Taiwanese children and night classes to Taiwanese adults. Eager to take responsibility for the education of overseas Taiwanese, Iwai wrote back to Consul Takahashi in June 1907:

\begin{quote}
From the beginning the Government-General of Taiwan has held a special relationship with the Taiwanese who reside in South China: we have never been satisfied with simply viewing them as regular overseas Japanese supervised by the Foreign Ministry.... It is indeed our responsibility to educate the overseas Taiwanese so that they can become good Japanese subjects in the future.\textsuperscript{210}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{207} Reynolds 1989, 237.
\textsuperscript{208} "Nanshin ni okeru Nihonjin no hatten (Takahashi Fukushū ryōjidan)," *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō* (February 5, 1907); Cai 2012, 138.
\textsuperscript{209} Nakamura 1980a, 12; Kannō 2002, 127-8.
\textsuperscript{210} "Shinkoku Fukushū Taiwanjin shitei kyōiku no tame Mitsuya kyōyu haken ni kanshi shōfuku no ken (zai Fukushū ryōji)," *Taiwan sōtokufu kōbun ruisan* 5100-15, April 1908, 93.
Yet, Iwai disagreed with what he viewed as Consul Takahashi's "make-shift curriculum, which would merely teach the Japanese-language in a cursory manner without the effects of a comprehensive education." Instead, Iwai suggested that the overseas Taiwanese school import the curriculum of Taiwan's "common schools" (kōgakkō), established in 1898 exclusively for Taiwanese students (ethnic Japanese in Taiwan separately attended "regular elementary schools," or jinjō shōgakkō). Iwai also suggesting hiring Japanese teachers from Taiwan with the relevant common school teaching experience, including knowledge of the Taiwanese (Fujianese) dialect. Rather than focusing solely on Japanese-language education, as Takahashi had proposed based on the model of previous Foreign Ministry schools in Fujian, Iwai hoped to provide the same six-year Taiwanese curriculum—consisting of Japanese language, ethics, classical Chinese, arithmetic, music, and gymnastics—that would cultivate "loyal and productive" Taiwanese subjects both inside and outside of Taiwan. In this way, the Government-General of Taiwan sought to export the Taiwan common school model and its teachers to South China.

It is important to note, however, that the establishment of the Taiwanese schools was not simply a top-down process imposed by Japanese authorities. Only with the help of generous donations by the overseas Taiwan associations was the Government-General of Taiwan able to establish the Fuzhou Tōei School (J. Fukushū Tōei gakudō, C. Fuzhou Dongying xuetang) in 1908 and Xiamen Kyokuei School (J. Amoi Kyokuei shoin, C. Xiamen Xuying shuyuan) in 1910. Due to budgetary limitations, the Government-General of Taiwan initially agreed to subsidize the

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211. Ibid.
212. Out of a total population of 588,786 school-age Taiwanese children in 1905, 5.5 percent (31,823) were enrolled in common schools and 3.4 percent (19,915) in Chinese private schools (C. shufang). In contrast, 86 percent of Japanese children in Taiwan were in regular elementary schools, and 7 percent in private schools (shobō). Julean H. Arnold, *Education in Formosa* (1908), 31, republished in Abe Yō, *Nihon shokuminchi kyōiku seisaku shiryō shūsei Taiwan hen dai 5 shū Taiwan kyōiku kankei chosho* (Tokyo: Ryūkei shosha, 2008).
213. Tōei/Dongying 東瀛 was a classical Chinese term used to refer to Japan.
214. Kyokuei/Xuying 旭瀛 was similarly a Chinese term used to refer to Japan.
salaries and travel fares of Japanese school teachers in Fujian. In turn, the Taiwan associations would fund the monthly costs of the schools.\textsuperscript{215}

Throughout the 1910s and 1920s, the Government-General of Taiwan rewarded overseas Taiwanese who contributed generously to the two schools with leadership positions in the Taiwan associations and imperial "gentry awards" (\textit{shinshō}). Zhou Ziwen, for example, a Taiwanese entrepreneur who prospered in part due to the extraterritorial protection provided by Japan, was appointed the head of the Xiamen Taiwan Association from 1910 to 1914. Zhou had contributed funds to help found the Xiamen Kyokuei School and later donated part of his own private estate for the school's expansion in 1913, for which he received a gentry award.\textsuperscript{216} Similarly, the Japanese granted gentry awards to Taiwan Association representatives who contributed large donations for the construction of two additional Xiamen campuses in 1915.\textsuperscript{217}

\textsuperscript{215} "Shinkoku Fukushū Taiwanjin shitei kyōiku no tame Mitsuya kyōyu haken ni kanshi shōfuku no ken (zai Fukushū ryōji)," \textit{Taiwan sōtokufu kōbun ruisan} 5100-15, April 1908, 95.

\textsuperscript{216} "Amoi Zhou Ziwen shinshō haiju no go reijō," \textit{Taiwan sōtokufu kōbun ruisan} 2325-6, May 1914.

\textsuperscript{217} "Wu Yunfu gai jūichimei shinshō kōfu no ken," \textit{Taiwan sōtokufu kōbun ruisan} 3057-13, November 1920; Amoi kyokuei shoin, \textit{Amoi kyokuei shoin yōran} (Xiamen, 1918), 53-6. For details on donations made by Xiamen Taiwan Association members to the school, see Kyokuei shoin, \textit{Dairei kinen jigyō} (Taihoku: Kyokuei shoin, 1925).
The Government-General of Taiwan appointed two experienced Japanese teachers of Taiwan common schools, Mitsuya Daigorō (1857–1945) and Kotake Tokuyoshi (1876–1913), as the respective principals of Fuzhou Tōei School and Xiamen Kyokuei School. But while the two overseas Taiwanese schools imported the common school curriculum and teachers, from their inception they differed from their counterparts in Taiwan by also welcoming the enrollment of Chinese students. When Fuzhou Tōei School opened its doors in May 1908 to 33 students, only four were Taiwanese subjects while 29 were Chinese. Several reasons lay behind the Japanese

219. Mitsuya was a Fukui native who had taught in Japanese and Taiwanese schools in Taiwan from 1896 to 1907. A Gifu native and graduate of a Government-General of Taiwan Japanese school in 1898, Kobayashi taught in common schools for seven years before moving to Xiamen in 1910. Cai 2012, 25-7.
decision to include Chinese students. First, the school admitted children and relatives of overseas Taiwanese who were still legally registered as Chinese nationals.\textsuperscript{220} Second, the Government-General of Taiwan viewed the Taiwanese schools as intermediary bases of "Sino-Japanese goodwill" (\textit{Nisshi shinzen}). By cultivating Chinese students with skills and interests tied to Japan, officials hoped to mollify growing anti-Japanese sentiment in Fujian.\textsuperscript{221} Just as Anglo-American missionary schools educated Chinese to become compradors for Western companies, the Japanese sought to train Chinese graduates who could work in Japanese economic and cultural institutions in South China.

Fuzhou Tōei School and Xiamen Kyokuei School, however, initially faced huge obstacles in attracting large numbers of Taiwanese, let alone Chinese, students. By the 1910s, Fujian was already home to a large number of established Anglo-American missionary schools, such as the British-run Anglo-Chinese School (\textit{Heling Yinghua shuyuan}, est. 1898) and American-run Tongwen School (\textit{Tongwen shuyuan}, est. 1898) in Xiamen.\textsuperscript{222} Even with the Government-General of Taiwan's founding of Shantou Tōei School (J. Swatou Tōei gakudō, C. Shantou Dongying xuetang, est. 1915), European and American cultural institutions (tens of largely outnumbered those of Japan in South China (three schools, three Buddhist temples, and one hospital)).\textsuperscript{223} Anglo-

\textsuperscript{220} In 1916, 50 percent of the students and their parents had Taiwanese status; 37 percent of students and their parents did not have Taiwanese status; 10 percent of students did not Taiwanese status but had parents who did; 1 percent had Taiwanese status but parents who did not. Okamoto 1914, 35.
\textsuperscript{221} Chinese anti-Japanese sentiment had increased due to Japanese attempts to occupy Xiamen in 1900 (see Chapter One on the Xiamen Incident) and the cession of southern Manchuria to Japan following the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5.
\textsuperscript{223} According to one 1917 colonial police report, in South China there were 112 Western schools, 29 hospitals, 99 churches, and five orphanages compared to colonial Taiwan's three schools, three Buddhist temples, and one hospital. Nakamura 1988, 58. For comparative statistics of Japanese, Chinese, and Western cultural institutions in South China in the 1930s, see Taiwan sōtokufu bunkyūkyoku, \textit{Nanshi Nanyō no kyōiku shisetsu}, (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu bunkyūkyoku, 1935).
American churches invested much more capital per school in China that allowed schools like the Anglo-Chinese School and Tongwen School to build spacious classroom buildings and dorms on a much larger scale that could enroll hundreds of Chinese students.\textsuperscript{224}

In addition, Anglo-American schools better appealed to Chinese students with an English- and Chinese-language curriculum that included vocational training in industry and commerce. English and Chinese were viewed by the local Chinese as particularly useful for commerce with overseas Chinese from Hong Kong and Southeast Asia, as well as for work in Fujian customs, consulates, churches, schools, and trading companies.\textsuperscript{225} As a result, even some prominent overseas Taiwanese merchants insisted that "the Japanese language is not essential" and preferred sending their own children to Anglo-American or local Chinese schools.\textsuperscript{226}

In order to compete with Anglo-American and Chinese schools for Fujian students, Japanese colonial educators instituted several reforms for the overseas Taiwanese schools. First, they abolished tuition fees in 1917 to allow more children of impoverished Chinese families to attend.\textsuperscript{227} As Li Deming, a graduate of Xiamen Kyokuei School, attested in a post–World War II oral interview, many poor Chinese families were drawn to Xiamen Kyokuei School because of its free tuition: "My father had very little income, and while it must have been distressing to send his own son to a Japanese school, he did so because the school charged no tuition, not even for textbooks."\textsuperscript{228} As Li's case attests, in spite of intermittent boycotts and demonstrations against the

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\textsuperscript{225} Nakamura 1988, 50.

\textsuperscript{226} "Amoi ichinenkan no shokan to hiken (Kyokuei shoin Okamoto Yōhachirō)," \textit{Taiwan sōtokufu kōbun ruisan} 2414-2, February 1915, 13.


\textsuperscript{228} Endō Orie and Huang Qingfà, \textit{Chūgokujin gakusei no tojitta senji-chū Nihongo nikki} (Tokyo: Hitsuji shobō, 2007), 328.
\end{flushright}
Japanese, Chinese parents often remained pragmatic about opportunities and costs for their children's education.

Second, the Japanese principals of Fuzhou Tōei School and Xiamen Kyokuei School used additional subsidies from the Government-General of Taiwan and Taiwan associations to expand their campuses to accommodate several hundred students. Based on the model of the Xiamen U.S. Tongwen School, which drew boarding students from as far away as Shanghai and Hong Kong, Okamoto Yōhachirō (1876–1960), the second principal of Xiamen Kyokuei School, built school dorms in order to recruit Chinese students from throughout Fujian province. By 1917, Xiamen Kyokuei School dorms housed Chinese students from Quanzhou, Zhangzhou, and Shima, among other parts of Fujian. As for Fuzhou Tōei School, 15 of the Chinese graduates in 1930 were natives of the Fujian cities of Minhou, Fuqing, Changle, Longxi, as well as the Yangzi Delta region.

A third major reform was the language component of the overseas Taiwanese curriculum. As Okamoto stated in 1915, Xiamen Kyokuei School needed "to teach Taiwanese education and Chinese education simultaneously" by increasing the instruction time of classical Chinese (J. kanbun, C. hanwen), official spoken Chinese (J. kanwa, C. guanhua), and English. With its initial emphasis on Japanese-language education, overseas Taiwanese schools were teaching 10 to 12 hours of Japanese and only four hours of literary Chinese a week. In contrast, local Chinese elementary schools offered 20 hours of literary Chinese a week. By 1919, Xiamen Kyokuei School and Fuzhou Tōei School had increased their literary Chinese courses to eight hours a week and

229. Amoi kyokuei shoin 1918, 53-6. For specific details on donations made by Xiamen Taiwan Association members to the school, see Kyokuei shoin 1925.
adopted the literary Chinese textbooks used in Chinese private schools.\footnote{In 1920, for example, they were \textit{Guomin xue\textasciitilde{xiaoyong xinshi guowen jiaokeshu} and \textit{Gaodeng xiaoxue xiaoyong guowen jiaokeshu}. Endō 2007, 316.} In addition, the two schools added three hours a week of official spoken Chinese and English for boys from grades four through six.\footnote{Liang Hua-huang, \textit{Taiwan zongdufu de "dui\textasciitilde{\text{"}}ban" zhengce yanjiu} (Taipei: Daoxiang, 2001), 123-4.}

The supplementing of classical Chinese in overseas Taiwanese schools differed widely from the development of common schools in Taiwan that had reduced classical Chinese from four to two hours a week in 1918, and then made the course an optional elective in 1922.\footnote{Tsurumi 1977, 59, 99.} In this way, while Japanese educators in Taiwan shifted the common school curriculum ever closer to that of Japanese elementary schools, in Fujian they instead tailored the overseas Taiwanese curriculum to cater to local Taiwanese and Chinese needs. In Taiwan, Japanese authorities aimed to gradually replace Chinese with Japanese as the mother tongue for Taiwanese subjects. In South China, however, Japanese educators recognized the importance of classical and spoken Chinese for graduates of overseas Taiwanese schools who wished to go on to Chinese secondary schools or to work in Chinese companies. Due to a lack of Japanese educators trained in English and Chinese, Xiamen Kyokuei School and Fuzhou Tōei School hired Chinese and Taiwanese teachers, many of whom had graduated from, or had taught at, rival Chinese and Anglo-American schools.\footnote{For example, Huang Tianzong, a Chinese graduate of Tongwen School taught classical Chinese, official spoken Chinese, and English in Xiamen Kyokuei School. Amoi Kyokuei shoin 1918, 13.}
Connecting Overseas Taiwanese with Taiwan's Secondary Schools

In Principal Okamoto's view, what most disadvantaged overseas Taiwanese education vis–à-vis its Anglo-American competition was its lack of secondary schools. With Xiamen Kyokuei School and Fuzhou Tōei School both limited to six years of elementary school, many Chinese students in Fujian opted to attend American schools like the Tongwen School that continued from elementary to secondary grades and offered commercial education. By the 1910s, graduates of Anglo-American schools had joined the growing professional Fujian elite as educators, doctors, government officials, entrepreneurs, and church staff. Anglo-American schools also served as

239. Nakamura 1988, 150.
240. Dunch 2001, 42.
feeder institutions for further higher education in the United States, Britain, and their respective colonies in the Philippines and Hong Kong. The Tongwen School, for example, was founded in 1898 as a Chinese branch school of Columbia University and sent its top Chinese graduates to the university.

The popularity of American schools in Fujian was a pressing concern for Japanese officials, who viewed the schools as hotbeds of anti-Japanese education during the 1910s. In 1915, Principal Okamoto reported to the Government-General of Taiwan that the Tongwen School actively propagated anti-Japanese sentiment among its Chinese students. After the Japanese government submitted its Twenty-One Demands to China in 1915, which included handing over Shandong and Fujian to Japan, Okamoto observed Tongwen School students spreading phrases such as: "the Japanese try to seize whatever foreigners have established in China, whether it is Lushun or Qingdao," and "Japan will seize Fujian province." In contrast, Chinese students praised "Americans as nice" and "Germans and Italians as strong." Japanese consular officials similarly noted that Tongwen School teachers "fanned the flames of anti-Japanese ideas and movements among their students."

Okamoto cited the success of Christian missionaries, who had a fifty-year history in Fujian, as a central reason for the pro-U.S. stance of local Chinese. Okamoto contrasted the flourishing of Christian churches, schools, and hospitals with the ineffectiveness of Japanese Buddhist missions in South China. Although the Japanese had established Buddhist temples (Honganji and Tenrikyō 241. "Amoi ichinenkan no shokan to hiken (Kyokuei shoin Okamoto Yōhachirō)," Taiwan sōtokufu kōbin ruisan 2414-2, February 1915, 12.
242. Following the Chinese education rights recovery movement. Tongwen Institute was renamed Tongwen Middle School (Tongwen zhongxue) and handed over to Chinese administrators. Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi Xiamen-shi weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui, Xiamen de zujie (Xiamen: Lujiang chubanshe, 1990), 41-2, 46.
243. "Amoi ichinenkan no shokan to hiken (Kyokuei shoin Okamoto Yōhachirō)," Taiwan sōtokufu kōbin ruisan 2414-2, February 1915, 11.
244. Yūchi Kōhei, "Shina narabi Shinajin ni kansuru hōkoku (dai-33 hō)," 1917, JACAR B03041651000, 124.

sects) in Fujian as early as 1898, several of which had been subsidized by the Government-General of Taiwan, they were not nearly as successful in converting local Chinese. "Compared to missionary work by Westerners, which has a strong base here, there is little hope of Chinese conversion to Japanese Buddhism or Shinto," observed Okamoto in 1915. "It is difficult for us to compete with the missionary work of other foreigners, and it is of little benefit to our Chinese policy."\(^{245}\) In the aftermath of the 1900 Xiamen Incident, when the Japanese were accused of setting their own Buddhist temple on fire as a pretext for military invasion, Qing officials limited proselytization by Japanese Buddhists, which they saw as an infringement of China's sovereignty. Following a series of Chinese attacks on Japanese temples in 1904–5, few Chinese in Fujian thereafter converted to Japanese Buddhism.\(^ {246}\)

Instead of religious proselytization, Okamoto argued that education and medicine were the two most promising paths for increasing Japan's sphere of influence in Fujian. In particular, he proposed that Xiamen Kyokuei School add an introductory middle school curriculum for commerce and medicine so that graduates could go on to study in Taiwan's secondary schools. Such courses would attract more Chinese students from Xiamen's middle and upper classes: "Taiwan would become a convenient base for educating and molding Chinese people's feelings and customs: moreover it is economically more feasible for Chinese to study abroad in Taiwan than in Japan."\(^ {247}\) In August 1915, Xiamen Kyokuei School inaugurated a special program of study to prepare Chinese students for medical education in Taiwan.\(^ {248}\) The following year, Okamoto added a supplementary middle school course for Taiwanese and Chinese who wanted to enroll in

\(^{245}\) "Amoi ichinenkan no shokan to hiken (Kyokuei shoin Okamoto Yōhachirō)," *Taiwan sōtokufu kōbun ruisan* 2414-2, February 1915, 14.


\(^{247}\) "Amoi ichinenkan no shokan to hiken (Kyokuei shoin Okamoto Yōhachirō)," *Taiwan sōtokufu kōbun ruisan* 2414-2, February 1915, 14-6.

\(^{248}\) Okamoto Yōhachirō, "Amoi tsūshin," *Taiwan kyōiku* 184 (1917): 64.
teaching and vocational secondary schools in Taiwan.²⁴⁹

Starting in May 1915, Okamoto sent two Taiwanese graduates, Zhou Youli and Chen Zhaozong, and one Chinese graduate, Zeng Tianchi, to study abroad in the Taiwan Medical School in Taipei. Founded in 1899, Taiwan Medical School offered one of the main areas of secondary education—besides "normal schools" for teacher training—open to Taiwanese students as a means for upward social mobility.²⁵⁰ The following year, five more graduates enrolled in the medical school, and thereafter a steady trickle of Taiwanese and Chinese graduates went to study medicine in Taiwan.²⁵¹ Japanese colonial authorities supported vocational or "practical" education yet discouraged liberal arts higher education for Taiwanese. Having studied the experience of colonial India, where Indians educated in law and politics at British universities had led to further anti-colonial discontent, Japanese officials attempted to restrict Taiwanese learning to the "safe" channels of medicine and teaching.²⁵² As a case in point, when Taihoku Imperial University (est. 1928) was opened in Taipei as colonial Taiwan's first university with a humanities department—including history, literature, politics, and philosophy—the majority of admitted students were limited to ethnic Japanese.²⁵³

Meanwhile in Fujian, Japanese colonial educators and overseas Taiwan associations coordinated to facilitate study abroad opportunities. In 1916, the Xiamen Taiwan Association implemented a policy exempting Xiamen graduates from travel visas and administrative fees for study in Taiwan.²⁵⁴ Xiamen Kyokuei School also offered to pay for student travel to Taiwan for

²⁴⁹ Amoi Kyokuei shoin 1918, 6-8.
²⁵⁰ In 1906, 35 out of 300 Taiwanese in the island were accepted to the four-year Taiwan Medical School, and 90 out of 350 to the four-year Japanese Normal School. The 80 Taiwanese admitted to the two-year Agricultural School were limited to males 17 years and older whose family owned at least two-and-a-half acres of land in Taiwan. Arnold 1908, 41, 46.
²⁵¹ Amoi Kyokuei shoin 1918, 6-7.
²⁵² Tsurumi 1977, 22.
²⁵³ I will examine the role of Taihoku Imperial University in Taiwan's "southern advance" policies in Chapter Three.
²⁵⁴ Xiamen-shi Taiwan kyōryūminkaichō Liu Shou. "Zai chūshi no bu 12 Xiamen kyokuei
secondary school entrance exams, while Osaka Shipping Company granted student discounts for boat fares to Taiwan.\textsuperscript{255} Lin Xiongzheng (1881–1946), a wealthy Taiwanese entrepreneur with investments in South China, established an annual scholarship to fund two Xiamen graduates—starting in 1917 with Chen Bingdong (Chinese) and Chen Minsong (Taiwanese)—to study in Taiwan's industrial schools.\textsuperscript{256} In 1921, the Chinese Nationalist government also agreed to finance nine Chinese graduates from Xiamen Kyokuei School to attend Taipei's medical, agricultural, and industrial schools.\textsuperscript{257}

Between 1916 and 1936, 130 Chinese and Taiwanese graduates from Xiamen Kyokuei School studied abroad in Taiwan. In contrast only 19 graduates of the school went on to Japan for further secondary education.\textsuperscript{258} The previous flow of Fujian students to Tokyo in the 1900s was thus redirected toward Taipei between the 1910s and 1930s through what I call Taiwan's "cross-strait education channel." Japanese colonial educators sought to link overseas Taiwanese elementary schools to Taiwan's secondary education at a time when the latter was still discouraged for most colonial subjects in Taiwan.\textsuperscript{259} The marketplace of secondary education in Fujian offered by Anglo-American and Chinese schools, however, which accepted graduates of the Xiamen Kyokuei School, compelled Japanese officials to advocate for further instruction of overseas Taiwanese and Chinese in Taiwan. Imperial competition over the acculturation of overseas

\textsuperscript{255} Okamoto 1917, 65; Xiamen-shi Taiwan kyoryūminkaichō Liu Shou, "Zai chūshi no bu 12 Xiamen kyokuei shoin," 1940, JACAR B0401205840, 141.
\textsuperscript{256} Amoi Kyokuei shoin sōritsu nijūshūnen kinenshi (Amoi, 1930), 12.
\textsuperscript{257} Ibid., 14.
\textsuperscript{258} Out of the 130 students who studied in Taiwan, 96 were boys and 34 were girls. Amoi Taiwan kyoryūminkai, Amoi Taiwan kyoryūminkaihō sanjū shūnenkinen tokkan (Amoi, 1936), 21.
\textsuperscript{259} Only in 1915 did the Government-General of Taiwan finally approve the founding of a Taiwanese middle school, "Taizhong Middle School," which was initiated by the anti-colonial activists Lin Xiantang et al.
Taiwanese and Chinese thus led to more opportunities for Japanese colonial officials to improvise and innovate in education policy.

Overseas Taiwanese Doctors and Teachers in South China

By the 1920s, graduates of Xiamen Kyokuei School had the opportunity not only to attend schools in Taiwan but also to study and practice Western medicine in Xiamen. In collaboration with local Chinese and overseas Taiwanese elites, the Government-General of Taiwan established "philanthropic hospitals" (hakuai byōin) in Xiamen in 1918, Fuzhou and Guangzhou in 1919, and Shantou in 1924. Taiwan Civil Governor Shimomura Hiroshi (1875–1957, in office 1915–21) sought to export Japan's colonial medical experience and personnel from Taiwan to South China to further promote "Sino-Japanese harmony" (Nisshi shinzen). Shimomura dispatched Japanese and Taiwanese doctors (graduates of Taiwan Medical School) to South China's philanthropic hospitals to treat Japanese and Taiwanese residents, as well as local Chinese who made up 90 percent of the hospital's patients. In contrast to the Foreign Ministry–funded Dōjinkai hospitals in North and Central China, which catered to middle- and upper-class Chinese, the four South China philanthropic hospitals administered by the Government-General of Taiwan were aimed at lower-class Chinese. Between 1918 and 1929, the four hospitals treated over seven million Chinese patients, demonstrating the effectiveness of such cultural policies.

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260. Shimomura Hiroshi, "Shokumin-ron (1-6)," Ōsaka mainichi shinbun (February 13-20, 1918).
261. One of the most prominent Taiwanese novelists, Lai He, worked as a doctor in Xiamen Philanthropic Hospital from 1918-9, during which time he was exposed to the May 4th Culture Movement. Huang Xinxian, Min-Tai jiaooyu de jiaorong yu fazhan (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2003), 141. For more on Taiwanese doctors in South China, see Chen Lihang, "Rizhi shiqi zai Zhongguo de Taiwan yishi (1895-1945)" (M.A. Thesis, Guoli zhengzhi daxue Taiwanshi yanjiusuo, 2012).
262. Andō Shigeru, Dōjinkai to Nanshi keiei (Taihoku: Takushoku tsūshinsha, 1926), 12, 14; Shimojō Kumaichi, "Nanshi no iji eisei no genjō to waga taigan no iryō shisetsu," Taiwan jihō
In 1921, the Xiamen Philanthropic Hospital established a four-year tuition-free medical institute for Chinese and Taiwanese students, the majority of whom came from Xiamen Kyokuei School. By 1928, when the medical institute shut down due to financial difficulties, 67 graduates of the institute had become licensed doctors in Xiamen, Quanzhou, Zhangzhou, and Southeast Asia. While Japanese doctors remained the department heads of Xiamen Philanthropic Hospital, the rest of the hospital's medical positions were filled by Taiwanese and Chinese graduates of Taipei Medical School and Xiamen Philanthropic Medical School. At Xiamen Kyokuei School, Cai Shixing, a Taiwanese graduate of the Taipei Medical School, served as the school doctor from 1910 to 1924; his successor, Liu Shouqi, was also a Taiwanese graduate of Taipei Medical School. Other overseas Taiwanese doctors opened their own medical practices in Fujian. In 1929, Cai Qiren bought the Huichunlu Hospital from the Chinese Medical Association and turned it into a charity clinic for the poor with the help of two Chinese doctors. Several overseas Taiwanese without formal medical licenses also practiced medicine for their livelihood. In 1930, the Japanese consul in Xiamen observed that 25 hospitals and 18 dental practices had been opened by unlicensed Taiwanese: "While they are not as good as licensed doctors, they are more experienced and skilled than Chinese doctors and are thus trusted by Chinese patients." In this...

(1931), 54.


264. Exceptions included Zheng Dehe, a Taiwanese native of Tainan who served as vice-head of internal medicine. Zheng had graduated from Tokyo Medical School, which was more prestigious than Taiwan Medical School. Hirota gaimu daijin/Tsukamoto ryōji, "Zai Xiamen ryōjikan," 1934, JACAR B04013220800, 213-4.

way, Taiwanese doctors—not only those licensed by the Government-General of Taiwan but also those with informal medical experience and knowledge of Chinese medicine (kanpō)—found employment opportunities in South China's medical marketplace.\footnote{Terajima Takafumi, "Taiwan sekimin kankei jikō chōsagata ni kansuru ken 6," 1930 JACAR B02031445600, 212.}

Like the overseas Taiwanese "medical missionaries," Taiwanese teachers in South China were simultaneously colonial subjects and imperial agents of Japan.\footnote{Lo Ming-cheng has called the overseas Taiwanese doctors "medical missionaries." Lo 2002, 96-7. By the 1910s, an increasing number of Taiwanese graduates of Japanese-language school teacher-training programs taught in common schools not only in Taiwan but also in Fujian and Guangdong. Taiwanese assigned to Xiamen Kyokuei School and Fuzhou Tōei School had a teacher rank (kundō) one level below that of Japanese teachers (kyōyu). Teaching in South China not only offered better salaries but also opportunities for social advancement perhaps less available in Taiwan. Taiwanese teachers in Xiamen like Yang Beichen and Huang Liu were appointed as Xiamen Taiwan Association representatives and received imperial awards for their teaching, including pay raises.\footnote{The same can be said for the Irish and Indians under the British empire.}\footnote{In 1917, Yang and Huang earned thirty-three yen and twenty-eight yen a month, respectively. Huang received a 4th-degree salary in 1931, and then was promoted to 8th-degree in 1935. Taiwan sōtokufu, Minami Shina oyobi Nanyō chōsa dai-10 (Taihoku: Taiwan Sōtokufu, 1917), 87; Amoi Taiwan kyoryūminkai sōritsu sanjūgoshūnen kinenshi (Amoi: Amoi kyoryūkai, 1942), 151.}

Graduates of Xiamen Kyokuei School who completed secondary school teacher training in Taiwan often returned to Xiamen to teach at their alma mater. Two graduates, Lin Xiang'e (Taiwanese) and Yang Qilai (Chinese), for example, both returned to teach at the school in 1926 after studying in Taipei's Number Three Girls School and Taipei Normal School, respectively.\footnote{"Amoi Nihon kokumin gakkō 2. Kyōshokuin ninmei kankei (1) Yippan bunkatsu 2," 1922, JACAR B0401211080, 144-5.}

One unique case was Wang Jian'an (Taiwanese), who graduated from Xiamen Kyokuei School in 1913 and studied abroad at an arts school in Kyoto. Upon returning to Xiamen, he taught art
courses at his alma mater and was later concurrently hired in 1922 by the U.S. Tongwen School to teach painting.\textsuperscript{272} As Principal Okamoto complained, Anglo-American schools were shameless in poaching qualified teachers from Xiamen Kyokuei School.\textsuperscript{273} In turn, Okamoto readily hired Taiwanese and Chinese teachers from neighboring foreign schools, particularly to teach English and classical Chinese courses. A case in point is Xu Shengtong, a Taipei native who attended Xiamen's Anglo-Chinese College, where he remained as a teacher before transferring to Xiamen Kyokuei School to teach English in 1926.\textsuperscript{274}

\textit{Advertising Taiwan's Economic Development through School Exhibitions and Cross-Straits Tourism}

In addition to dispatching students and teachers back and forth across the Taiwan Straits, Japanese officials in South China used Xiamen Kyokuei School itself as an exhibitionary space to showcase colonial Taiwan's modern economic and social development to the Chinese public in Xiamen. In 1915, Principal Okamoto proposed:

\begin{quote}
We should use school graduation as an opportunity to open a school exhibition to display its achievements, as well as to introduce Taiwan to the general public, particularly to Chinese officials and educators. This would be a way to develop closer ties with other Chinese schools and to promote our Japanese civilization.\textsuperscript{275}
\end{quote}

Okamoto hoped that such an exhibition would not only increase Chinese interest in Japanese

\begin{footnotes}
\item[272] Ibid., 153-4.
\item[273] "Amoi ichinenkan no shokan to hiken (Kyokuei shoin Okamoto Yōhachirō)," \textit{Taiwan sōtokufu köben ruisan} 2414-2, February 1915, 13.
\item[275] "Amoi ichinenkan no shokan to hiken (Kyokuei shoin Okamoto Yōhachirō)," \textit{Taiwan sōtokufu köben ruisan} 2414-2, February 1915, 20.
\end{footnotes}
colonial education but also improve Chinese impressions of colonial rule as a whole. In December 1917, Okamoto and Yuan Shunyong, the Xiamen Taiwan Association president, curated an "Education Exhibition" inside the school that was open to the Chinese public. The exhibition introduced Taiwan's elementary and secondary education (including philanthropic schools for aborigines and the deaf and blind) by displaying colonial textbooks, travel diaries from class trips to Taiwan, and student work in Japanese by Xiamen graduates who had gone on to Taiwan's secondary schools. The exhibition also displayed photographs and publications illustrating advances made in Taiwan's industries, railways, and ports, as well as surveys and samples of the island's fauna, flora, minerals, and commercial goods.

The Xiamen Education Exhibition, later held again in 1920, 1928, and 1935, was part of a larger effort by the Government-General of Taiwan to forge cooperative relationships with Chinese officials and educators in the treaty ports of South China. In the 1920s the Taiwanese schools initiated teacher visits with Chinese schools throughout Fujian and Guangdong. Chinese educators were invited to observe Xiamen Kyokuei School, Fuzhou Tōei School, and Shantou Tōei School. In turn, Xiamen Kyokuei School dispatched teachers to neighboring cities, such as Zhangzhou, to establish Japanese-language courses in Chinese elementary schools. Xiamen Kyokuei School had a particularly close relationship with Xiamen University president Lin Boom-keng (1869–1957), a British-educated overseas Chinese doctor from Singapore who welcomed visits by Japanese and Taiwanese teachers to the university and the Jimei School, which were both founded by fellow overseas Chinese entrepreneur, Tan Kah-kee (1874–1961).

277. Amoi kyokuei shoin, Shina jihen to kyokuei shoin (Taihoku: Amoi kyokuei shoin, 1940), 2.
278. On Lin Boom-keng and other British-educated overseas Chinese leaders who contributed to medical and education activities in China, see Wayne Soon, "Coming from Afar: The Overseas Chinese and the Institutionalization of Western Medicine and Science in China, 1910-1970" (Ph.D. Diss., Princeton University, 2014).
279. "Taigan chihō shisatsu jōkyō," Taiwan kyōiku 295 (1926), 79; Huang 1942, 148. On Lin
Okamoto Kensō, a Xiamen Kyokuei School teacher, to concurrently teach Japanese-language courses. Lin was one of several Chinese dignitaries who attended Xiamen Kyokuei School's twentieth anniversary commemoration in 1930. In attendance to raise Chinese and Japanese national flags at the school's "Sino-Japanese harmony" festivities were Japanese representatives from the Government-General of Taiwan, Xiamen consulate, Japanese Resident Association, Benevolent Hospital, Taiwan's secondary schools, as well as Fujian navy and police officials from Xiamen and Zhangzhou.

The Government-General of Taiwan also sought to improve cross-straits understanding by inviting Fujian and Guangdong educators and officials—representing industry, military, transportation, and agriculture—to conduct observation tours of Taiwan as potential models of socioeconomic development. Chinese teachers and students from Guangzhou Agricultural School and Fujian Mining School, for example, went abroad to survey Taipei's secondary vocational schools in the 1910s. As one Chinese educator, Hou Hongjian, wrote in China's Education Magazine (Jiaoju zazhi, September 1917), he was impressed with how developed Taiwan's educational institutions were compared to those in Zhangzhou, Quanzhou, and Xiamen. Hou advocated that Fujian learn from Taiwan's education model by establishing teachers' schools in Zhangzhou and Quanzhou, increasing Fujian's industrial and commercial schools, and sending more Chinese graduates for higher education in Japan.

and Tan, see Soon Keong Ong, "Coming Home to a Foreign Country: Xiamen, Overseas Chinese, and the Politics of Identities, 1843-1938" (Ph.D. Diss., Cornell University, 2008); Amoi kyokuei shoin sōritsu nijūshūnen kinenshi (1930), 14. ibid., 55.
283. Taiwan sōtokufu jimu seiseki teiyō 26 (1920), 158; Taiwan sōtokufu jimu seiseki teiyō 27 (1921), 133, reprinted in Zhongguo fangzhi congshu, Taiwan diqu 192: 40, 42, 44 (Taibei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1985).
Navigation School and Jimei Middle School also dispatched Chinese teachers and students from Xiamen to observe industries in Taiwan's port cities for two weeks. The marine and navigation students stayed in Taiwan for additional two-week internships before returning to Xiamen.285

Chinese educators accompanied Xiamen Kyokuei School class trips (shūgaku ryokō) to Taiwan, which were aimed to impress upon the Chinese and overseas Taiwanese the modern infrastructure and economic growth of Taiwan in contrast with Fujian. After the first class trip in April 1916, where 37 Xiamen Kyokuei School students attended the Taiwan Industrial Fair (Taiwan kangyō kyōshinkai), in January 1919 five Chinese educators were invited to join the school's second class trip to Taiwan.286 In October 1935, 75 students from Xiamen Kyokuei School, along with 12 Chinese students and two teachers from Quanzhou Middle School, took a 50-day class trip to attend the Taiwan Industrial Exposition to commemorate 40 years of colonial rule.287 More significantly, Vice Governor-General Hiratsuka Hiroyoshi invited Chen Yi (1883–1950), the Fujian provincial governor under Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Government, and 32 other Fujian officials as honorary guests of the exposition.288 Chen viewed Taiwan as an important model for Fujian's reforms in agriculture and infrastructure.289 Taiwan thus became a gateway for Chinese students and officials to gain exposure to Japanese colonial models of development.

289. Liu Shiyong, "Chen Yi de jingji sixiang jiqi zhengce," Taiwan fengwu 40:2 (1990): 56, 75. Chen's observation group later published its survey of Taiwan's economic conditions as Reports from Our Investigation of Taiwan (1935).
Taiwanese Study Abroad and Anti-Colonial Movements in China

Despite Taiwan's "cross-strait education channels," the majority of overseas Taiwanese graduates of Xiamen Kyokuei School and Fuzhou Tōei School who continued on to secondary schools during the 1910s and 1920s did not do so in Taiwan, much to the dismay of Japanese educators. Through various school reforms, Principal Okamoto encouraged Xiamen Kyokuei

School graduates to study abroad in Taiwan and Japan as a means of keeping them within the sphere of Japanese acculturation. Yet by 1931, two-thirds of graduates who went on to secondary education did so in Chinese and Western schools; only one-third went on to study abroad in Taiwan or Japan. 291 Japanese consular officials in Fujian complained that loyalty toward Japan cultivated in the overseas Taiwanese schools was later undone by Chinese and Anglo-American secondary schools, which in the 1910s and 1920s had became hotbeds of anti-Japanese thought and student activism. 292

While overseas Taiwanese schools aimed to "make good Japanese subjects" through language acculturation and Japanese ethics courses, Anglo-American schools threatened Japan's cultural and political hegemony in South China. Western competition for Chinese and Taiwanese students not only undermined Japanese goals of acculturation but also fostered anti-imperial movements among the overseas Taiwanese and Korean diaspora in China. Faced with limited opportunities for higher education within Taiwan, Taiwanese elites on the island began sending their children in the 1910s to secondary schools and universities in Japan and China. 293 The Japanese restriction of Taiwanese higher education thus led to the unintended consequence of an exodus of Taiwanese youth abroad. Some chose to study in China because it was more affordable than Japan; others did so out of sympathy for the rising tide of Chinese nationalism in their former "motherland" (C. zuguo). Taiwanese youth faced an array of choices in overseas education that

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291. While 15 graduates went on to further education in Taiwan, 10 to Japan, one to Manchuria, and three to Shanghai, 65 enrolled in Chinese and Anglo-American secondary schools. Amoi kyokuei shoin sōritsu nijūshshine kinenshi (1930), 39.
293. As Karen Thornber has illustrated, the Japanese capital of Tokyo in the 1920s-30s became a "literary contact nebula," where Taiwanese students and writers interacted not only with Japanese leftist thinkers but also fellow Chinese and Korean students. Approximately three-quarters of Korea's and Taiwan's major early-twentieth century writers studied in Japan. Thornber 2009, 8.
remained outside the purview of the Government-General of Taiwan. In the 1920s, a growing number of Taiwanese enrolled in Chinese and Anglo-American schools in Xiamen, Guangzhou, and Shanghai—cities that I designate here as "anti-imperial activist havens" for Taiwanese, Korean, and Chinese students to ally with each other against Japan.

In response, Japanese colonial and consular officials made great efforts to monitor cross-strait education channels between Taiwan and South China. In particular, they were wary of overseas Taiwanese students who could be "re-Sinicized" (J. sai-Shinaka), or inculcated with Chinese nationalism and mobilized by anti-imperial youth groups. Japanese authorities displayed great anxiety about policing the movement and activity of overseas Taiwanese students in China lest they be influenced by anti-Japanese and communist tracts. Starting in 1917, the Government-General of Taiwan stationed colonial police officials and intelligence spies (mittei) in the Japanese consulates of Xiamen, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Shantou, and Shanghai to monitor "suspicious Taiwanese" (yōshisatsu Taiwanjin, literally "Taiwanese in need of surveillance"), particularly those who had graduated from Chinese and Anglo-American schools.294

Japanese colonial officials in Taiwan attempted to limit the number of Taiwanese studying abroad in China through the Taiwanese passport system.295 Taiwanese subjects who wished to travel to China were required to apply for a passport, and those with "suspicious backgrounds" (i.e., anti-colonial inclinations) or intentions to study in China were often rejected. In the 1920s, Taiwanese activists who petitioned for greater political representation looked to abolish the passport system.296 Articles by activists like Huang Chengcong (1886–1963) and Wang Zhonglin

294. In addition to gathering intelligence on overseas Taiwanese, Taiwan officials were charged with surveying local Chinese reactions to Japanese-related media, Japanese institutions, etc. Chung 1999, 707. By June 1932, consular police listed a total of 313 "suspected Taiwanese" residing in South China and Shanghai (part of Central China). Ogino Fujio, Tokkō keisatsu (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2012).
295. On the Japanese implementation of the Taiwanese passport system, refer to Chapter One.
296. On the Taiwan political movement to establish a Taiwan parliament in the 1910s-20s, see Chen 1972, Wakabayashi 2001 [1983].
(1884–1966) in the sole Taiwanese-run newspaper, *Taiwan People's Newspaper* (J. *Taiwan minpō*, C. *Taiwan minbao*), criticized the passport system for hindering Taiwanese opportunities to travel to China for business and education. As Xie Nanguang (1902–69) stated in his petition to Governor-General Ishizuka on September 19, 1929:

> Although the supposed aim of the passport system is to protect Taiwanese travelers in the Republic of China ... in reality the passports are intended to restrict Taiwanese travel to China.... Applicants undergo complicated procedures that result in the delay, or flat-out rejection, of passports. This hampers Taiwanese efforts in commerce and also inconveniences students who enroll in Chinese schools.

While Japanese officials waived passport requirements for overseas Taiwanese and Chinese in Fujian to study abroad in Taiwan's secondary schools, they maintained legal barriers as a deterrent for Taiwanese who wished to study abroad in China.

Yet, Taiwanese students found ways to circumvent colonial passport restrictions. Xie Dongmin (1907–2001), a native of Taizhong who studied in Shanghai and Guangzhou in the 1920s and later became a professor of Japanese at Sun Yat-sen University, recalled in his post-war memoir: "My friend Cao Guanshi and I knew that the odds of acquiring a Taiwanese passport for China were low." However, since passports were not required for Taiwanese to go to Japan or for those traveling from Japan to China, "we decided first to travel to Nagasaki [western Japan], then to Shanghai, where we told customs officials that we were Chinese students returning from study abroad in Japan." Other Taiwanese smuggled themselves directly from Taiwan to Fujian ports by

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297. The leading advocates of abolishing the passport system were Huang Chengcong, Wang Zhonglin, and Xie Nanguang. See Huang Chengcong, "Shina tokō ryoken seido no haishi wo nozomu," *Taiwan* 9 (December 1922); Huang Chengcong, "Xiwang chefei duxang Zhongguo lujuan zhidu," *Taiwan minbao* 21 (October 1924); Wang Zhonglin, "Ryoken teppai undō ni tsuite," *Taiwan minbao* 261 (May 1929); *Taiwan minbao* (1923-30) was first known as *Taiwan qingnian* (1920-1), *Taiwan* (1922-3), and later *Taiwan xinminbao* (1930-7).

298. Xie Chunmu, *Taiwanjin wa kaku miru*, (Taihoku: Taiwan minpōsha, 1930), 12.

bribing the crew to hide them in Taiwan passenger ships and fishing boats.

While there were only an estimated 19 Taiwanese studying abroad in China in 1920, the number of students grew to over 200 by 1923. Throughout the 1920s, the number of Taiwanese students in China was about one-tenth of the number studying in Japan, yet Japanese consular officials remained particularly watchful of those studying in China. In his 1926 Xiamen consular report, Inoue Kōjirō listed 214 Taiwanese students in secondary schools and universities throughout China, with the majority enrolled in Chinese schools—Jimei School (67 students) and Zhonghua Middle School (39 students)—followed by the British Anglo-Chinese School (26 students) and the U.S. Tongwen School (15 students). A small fraction of these students were overseas Taiwanese who had grown up in Xiamen, with the majority having come over from Taiwan, Inoue believed, either because they had been unable to enter Taiwan middle schools due to poor grades or misbehavior, or because they were attracted to the cheaper tuition and living costs of China compared to those of Taiwan and Japan. Inoue summed up the overseas Taiwanese student body as "delinquents who bear antipathy toward Taiwan." What worried Consul Inoue the most was the potential impact of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) on overseas Taiwanese students:

> Because these regions are under the rule of the Guangzhou-based KMT, these students come into contact with teachers, friends, and periodicals that disseminate KMT propaganda. They consciously and unconsciously are drawn to Sun Yatsen's ideologies and revolutionary ideas, and consequently their hostile feelings toward the Taiwan government become that much more accentuated.

The radicalization of overseas Taiwanese youth was evidenced by the formation of anti-imperial

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300. According to Wakabayashi, there were 273 Taiwanese students in China in 1923, and 344 in 1928. Wakabayashi 2001 [1983], 257.
301. "Zai Shina Taiwan sekimin mondai zakken," Gaimushō kiroku 3-8-2-330, 1926.
302. Ibid.
student groups in Xiamen such as the Southern Fujian Taiwanese Student Union in 1924. The
union consisted of Taiwanese students from Xiamen University (Li Sizhen, Wang Qingxun),
Zhonghua Middle School (Guo Binxin and the teacher Jiang Wanxing), Jimei Middle School
(Weng Zesheng, Hong Chaozong), the U.S. Tongwen School (Xu Zhiting), and the British Anglo-
Chinese School (Su Wen'an).303 To commemorate the tenth anniversary of Japan's 21 Demands on
China (May 9, 1915), which had instigated China's first nation-wide anti-Japanese protest
movement, the Taiwanese student union distributed printed materials critical of colonial rule in
Taiwan to fellow Chinese students.304 The student union similarly protested the anniversary of
Taiwan colonial rule (June 17, 1895) as a "national day of humiliation" (C. guochi jinianri) by
assembling lectures under a KMT flag and distributing anti-Japanese pamphlets.305

Yet the Chinese did not unconditionally welcome Taiwanese students with open arms. As
Du Congming (1893–1986), a Taiwanese doctor and professor at Taiwan Medical School, wrote in
the Taiwan People's Newspaper in 1923 upon visiting Xiamen, the reputation of the overseas
Taiwanese in Fujian among local Chinese had been maligned by "lower-class Taiwanese who have
become infamous here as the 'running dogs' of Japan."306 In particular, mainland Chinese civilians
and officials feared the "armed overseas Taiwanese" (J. buryokuha sekimin, C. wulipai jimin)
whom Japanese consular officials had enlisted to quell anti-Japanese boycotts by local Chinese in
1919. Furthermore, the overseas Taiwanese were infamous for abusing their extraterritorial
privileges: they regularly extorted their Chinese neighbors or administered illegal opium and

303. Lan 2006, 270. On 1925 anti-Japanese demonstrations by Jimei Middle School (founded
by the overseas Chinese Tan Kah-kee), see "Kang-Ri yundong," Jimei zhoukan 51 (1925), in
Xiamen shi jimeizhongxue, Xiamen shi jimeizhongxue (Beijing: Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe, 1998),
10-1. On the history of Xiamen University (est. 1921), founded also by Tan Kah-kee, see Zhu
Shuiyong, Xiada wangshi: Zhongguo zui mei de daxue, Xiamen daxue (Xiamen: Xiamen daxue
chubanshe, 2011).
304. "Zai Shina Taiwan Sekimin Mondai Zakken," Gaimushō kiroku 3-8-2-330, 1926.
gambling enterprises. Even representatives of the Xiamen Taiwan Association were notoriously called the "opium representatives" (C. yapian yiyuan) by overseas Taiwanese students.\(^{307}\)

Overseas Taiwanese students and activists consequently faced the challenge of Chinese discrimination. In order to avoid Chinese accusations that they were "imperial agents" of the Japanese, many overseas Taiwanese adopted pseudonyms or pretended to their Chinese peers to be either Fujianese or Cantonese Chinese.\(^{308}\) Particularly by the 1930s, when Sino-Japanese tensions were further exacerbated by Japan's occupation of Manchuria in 1931, Taiwanese visitors to China—including novelists such as Wu Zhuoliu (1900–76) and activist-journalists like Xie Nanguang—hid their Taiwanese status in order to blend into the Chinese community.\(^{309}\) Taiwanese activists like Yang Wanxing made efforts to disabuse Chinese preconceptions of Taiwanese as Japanese "pawns." He petitioned several anti-Japanese Chinese associations in Shantou in 1932 "not to discriminate against all Taiwanese by at least differentiating the good ones from the bad."\(^{310}\) At the same time, overseas Taiwanese students encountered large swaths of the mainland Chinese population who remained completely ignorant about Taiwan. Xie Dongmin recalled that when he first arrived in Shanghai to study at a Chinese middle school in 1925, his Chinese classmates "had no knowledge of Taiwan's geography nor of its history; in fact they thought that the Taiwanese were a separate race from the Chinese."\(^{311}\)

\(^{307}\) "Zai Shina Taiwan sekimin mondai zakken," Gaimushō kiroku 3-8-2-330, 1926.

\(^{308}\) Chen Yisong, Wu Junying, and Lin Zhongsheng, Chen Yisong huiyilu: taiyang qixia fengmantai (Taipei: Qianwei chubanshe, 1994), 201. For example, when Xie Dongmin was a student at Sun Yat-sen University in Guangzhou in the 1920s, his classmate and friend Zhang Zhenqian recalled that Xie referred to himself as "Fujianese." Only when Zhang pushed him further on his geographical origins did Xie add that he was "Fujian Taiwanese." Huang 2003, 144.


\(^{310}\) Taiwan xinminbao, January 9, 1932, 9.

\(^{311}\) Xie 1988, 60.
The overseas Taiwanese student groups established in Xiamen, Shanghai, and Guangzhou in the mid-1920s thus aimed to educate the Chinese public about Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan, and to mobilize support for what they called "Taiwan's liberation." After Japanese colonial police arrested members of the Taiwan Culture Association in Taipei who had petitioned for a Taiwan Parliament in 1924, the Southern Fujian Taiwanese Student Union held protest movements in Xiamen. That same year, the student union published articles in the Xiamen newspaper, Siming Daily (Siming ribao), as well as their own organ, Sympathize (Gongming), on the economic exploitation of Taiwan by Japanese colonialists and Taiwanese landed elite such as Gu Xianrong (1866–1937) and Lin Xiongzheng.

Overseas Taiwanese Youth and the Rise of Anti-Imperial Pan-Asianism

In Xiamen, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, overseas Taiwanese youth groups distributed newspapers and pamphlets that depicted the Taiwanese as "fellow anti-imperial compatriots" (C. Fandi tongbao) allied not only with the Chinese but also with Koreans, Indians, Filipinos, and Vietnamese against the imperial powers of Japan and the West. These Chinese treaty port cities thus emerged as synergetic sites of what I call "transnational anti-imperialist networks" for Chinese, Taiwanese, and Korean youth in the 1920s and 1930s. Particularly in Shanghai, Taiwanese students collaborated not only with Chinese communists but also with Korean independence activists who had taken refuge in Shanghai’s French Concession following the Korean Independence Movement of March 1, 1919. The French Concession provided Taiwanese

312. Lan 2006, 270.
313. Ibid., 271-2.
and Korean activists with a haven that was largely beyond the reach of the Japanese consular police.\footnote{Esselstrom 2009, 65.}

Between 1923 and 1927, overseas Taiwanese leftist students at Shanghai University (1922–27, jointly administered by the KMT and Chinese Communist Party [CCP]), led by Cai Xiaojian (1908–82), Xu Naichang (1906–75), and Weng Zesheng (1903–39), formed youth and student groups in collaboration with Chinese and Korean communists.\footnote{Having graduated from Taiwan common school, Weng Zesheng studied abroad in Xiamen's Jimei Middle School (1921-4). In 1925 transferred from Xiamen University to Shanghai University, where he studied under the Chinese communist, Qu Qiubai. In 1925 he entered the CCP. He Chizhuo, Weng Zesheng zhuan (Taipei: Haixia xueshu, 2005).} In March 1924 the Chinese communist, Luo Gu, gathered Taiwanese and Korean youth in his French Concession residence to establish the "Peace Society" (Pingshe) to study and propagate communist thought.\footnote{Taiwan sōtokufu keimukyoku, Taiwan sōtokufu keisatsu enetakushi (Taihoku, 1933), reprinted as Taiwan shakai undō shi (Tokyo: Ryūkei shosha, 1973), 77. Taiwanese members included Peng Huaying (a member of a Japanese socialist group) and the communist student Xu Naichang.} Xu Naichang wrote an article for the inaugural issue of the Peace Society's organ Peace Peace (Pingping) advocating for a Taiwanese revolution based on an international anti-imperial alliance between Taiwan and the working classes of the Soviet Union, Japan, China, and Korea. Pingping's inaugural edition also included articles written by Korean communist, Yin Suye, and the Japanese communist, Sano Manabu (1892-1953).\footnote{Ibid., 78-80.} A year later in 1925, Cai Xiaojian and He Jingliao gathered overseas Taiwanese students from Jinan University, Daxia University, and Nanyang Medical University to form a Shanghai Taiwanese Student League. For the league's opening meeting, over 100 overseas Taiwanese students from throughout China convened with Koreans and Chinese in the French Concession. Taiwanese students called upon their Korean and Chinese
"compatriots" for an alliance with other colonized peoples in Asia—Indians, Filipinos, Vietnamese—"to seek their independence from capitalist-imperialists."\textsuperscript{319}

In addition to gathering in Shanghai and Xiamen, a growing number of Taiwanese students went to Guangzhou to study at the Whampoa Military Academy (\textit{Huangpu junxiao}) and Sun Yat-sen University (\textit{Zhongshan daxue}), both founded in 1924.\textsuperscript{320} After the KMT reorganized its central headquarters in Guangzhou during the 1926–28 Northern Expedition, when the KMT launched a military campaign against the Beiyang government in the north to unify China, several Taiwanese students went down from Shanghai to Guangzhou in support of the KMT-CCP "united front."

Among them was Zhang Shenqie (1904–65), who later became a prominent Taiwanese novelist. Zhang enrolled in Sun Yat-sen University's Law Faculty and joined the Guangzhou Taiwanese Student Union in 1926, which included more than 20 overseas Taiwanese students.\textsuperscript{321} Student union conferences were supported and attended by the president of Sun Yat-sen University, Dai Jitao (1891–1949), as well as other Chinese professors and students of Sun Yat-sen University and the Whampoa Military Academy. As depicted in Zhang's post-war memoir, pre-1928 Guangzhou provided Taiwanese students with even more political freedom than Shanghai: "Although we were quite free within the Shanghai concessions, we were limited to secret and passive political

\textsuperscript{319} Lan 2006 158-9; Tsurumi 1977, 201.

\textsuperscript{321} In 1927 the group was renamed the Guangzhou Taiwanese Revolutionary Youth Alliance.
activities, while public and active activities were not allowed. Once I arrived in Guangzhou, however, I immediately felt that the shackles on my whole body had been untied."322

Zhang and other Taiwanese students in Guangzhou participated in public demonstrations to commemorate "national humiliation days" such as May 9 (Japan's 21 Demands) and June 17 (anniversary of Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan). They also published critical articles of the Government-General of Taiwan in Guangzhou newspapers and distributed propaganda pamphlets to mobilize Chinese support for Taiwan's anti-colonial movement.323 One particularly active writer was Zhang Yuedeng (Xiuzhe, 1905–82), a student at Lingnan College who later transferred to Sun Yat-sen University's Law Faculty.324 In June 1926, Zhang published an article in the Guangzhou newspaper Republican Daily (Minguo ribao) titled "The Painful History of Taiwan: One Taiwanese Person's Letter to His Chinese Compatriots."325 After introducing the 31-year history of Taiwan's anti-colonial struggle against Japan, which consisted of 14 "revolutionary uprisings" by martyrs such as Luo Fuxing (1886–1914) and Yu Qingfang (1879–1915), Zhang emphasized the interlinked fates of the Taiwanese and Chinese:

Beloved [Chinese] compatriots, four million Taiwanese compatriots are oppressed by Japan. That four million Taiwanese compatriots are oppressed is the same as Chinese people being oppressed.... If our [Taiwan liberation] movement advances by one day, then the liberation of the Chinese people will also be one day closer.326

Zhang appealed to the Chinese public to aid the four million Taiwanese in their struggle to obtain

323. Taiwan sōtokufu keimukyoku 1933 [1973], 123.
324. For Zhang's post-war memoir (he was also known as Zhang Xiuzhe), see Zhang Xiuzhe, “Wuwang Taiwan” luohuameng (Taipei: Weicheng chuban, 2013).
326. Taiwan sōtokufu keimukyoku 1933 [1973], 118-9. Zhang ended his article with the Taiwanese Student Union's slogans: "Realize the Three Principles! Overthrow Japanese imperialism! Implement a Taiwan Parliament! Strive for the success of the Chinese People's Revolution! Strive for the liberation of world's weak and small peoples!"
political rights and equal treatment from Japan.

From 1926 through mid-1927, Taiwanese students in Guangzhou received support from KMT leaders. Zhang and his colleagues from Sun Yat-sen University and the Whampoa Military Academy published the Guangzhou Taiwanese Youth Alliance organ, *Taiwan Vanguard (Taiwan xianfeng)*: its first issue included a preface by Li Jishen (1885–1959), the KMT military chief of staff, as well as a transcribed lecture given by Sun Yat-sen University president Dai Jitao. In his lecture, Dai stated that the "Taiwanese people are Chinese people" and that he supported an alliance of the "weak and small peoples" (*ruoxiao minzu*) to overthrow Japanese imperialism.327 *Taiwan Vanguard* also published articles by the Korean, Li Yingjun ("One Korean Youth Sends a Letter of Respect to Taiwan Revolutionary Comrades") and Chinese, Li Runxiang ("One Chinese Compatriot Sends a Letter of Respect to Taiwan Compatriots"). The Youth Alliance distributed 2,000 copies of *Taiwan Vanguard* to Taiwanese in Xiamen, Fuzhou, Shanghai, Tokyo, and Taiwan.328

The Taiwanese student publications and pamphlets in Guangzhou had a marked impact on fellow Chinese students and professors. Guo Moruo (1892–1978), a Chinese novelist and head of Sun Yat-sen University's Humanities Department, for example, wrote a preface to Zhang Yuedeng's 1926 propaganda pamphlet, *Do Not Forget About Taiwan (Wuwang Taiwan).*329 Guo wrote that although he had often heard about the Korean independence and Indian non-cooperation movement, he hardly knew anything about anti-colonial resistance in Taiwan. Instead, Guo had "often heard about Taiwanese in Xiamen who took advantage of Japan's power to commit acts of

329. In *Don't Forget Taiwan*, Zhang wrote that the oppression of the Taiwanese was part and parcel of the oppression of the Chinese since they were the same race. He supported Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles, Chinese revolutionary success, and the liberation of the world's "weak and small peoples." Taiwan sōtokufu keimukyoku 1933 [1973], 118-9.
violence against their [Chinese] compatriots.” Consequently, he wondered if the Taiwanese no longer opposed Japanese rule and instead had forgotten about their "motherland" China. After Zhang showed Guo his "The Painful History of Taiwan: One Taiwanese Person's Letter to His Chinese Compatriots," however, Guo concluded that the problem had been a lack of publicizing "the oppressive nature of Taiwan rule" in China.

Chiang Kai-shek's Leftist Crackdown and the Taiwanese Communist Youth

By the spring of 1927, however, Chinese treaty port cities had become less favorable to overseas Taiwanese and Korean activist movements. On April 15, the KMT leader Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975) ended the first KMT-CCP united front and cracked down on "leftist elements" in Guangzhou, including Korean communist youth groups. In June, Chiang branded the Guangzhou Taiwanese Revolutionary Youth Alliance as "leftist" and ordered for its disbandment. With Japanese consular and colonial police hot on their trails, Taiwanese students and youth activists left Guangzhou for other port cities in China, Taiwan, and Japan. Japanese police arrested Taiwanese who had fled from Guangzhou to Shanghai (Zhang Yuedeng), Taiwan (Zhang Shenqie), and the port city of Monshi in western Japan. With 64 Taiwanese in Guangzhou targeted for arrest by the Japanese police, 23 were captured and 41 escaped by August.

Following the KMT crackdown on Chinese communists and Taiwanese youth groups in 1927, the remaining Taiwanese student activists in Guangzhou regrouped in Shanghai under Weng Zesheng (a Taiwanese member of the CCP) to form the Taiwan Communist Party.
gongchandang, TCP). In 1928, the Comintern (Third International) ordered Xie Xuehong (1901–70) and Lin Mushun (1904–32), Taiwanese members of the CCP who returned to Shanghai after studying in Moscow's "revolutionary universities" in 1926-7, to establish a formal Taiwanese communist organization. With an initial total of seven Taiwanese members, one CCP Chinese representative, and one Korean communist representative, Xie and Lin founded the TCP in the French Concession on April 18, 1928. Unfortunately for TCP members, the Japanese consular police in Shanghai had been closely monitoring their activities even before the official formation of the party. A month earlier, Japanese officials had observed TCP leaders attending the Korean Provisional Government's commemoration of the March 1 (1919) independence movement, where they read aloud a celebratory note: "The Chinese, Taiwanese, and Koreans strive together for the liberation of oppressed peoples and the attainment of Taiwan and Korea's independence." Upon confiscating "subversive" documents by the TCP from the French Concession, the Japanese police arrested five TCP members in Shanghai on April 25, while the remaining members hid in Shanghai or fled to other parts of China and Japan. Despite the initial setback, the TCP continued its political activities in Taiwan and Shanghai until the fall of 1931, when an outbreak of Taiwanese labor strikes in Taipei resulted in the Japanese arrest of 107 TCP members and the dissolution of the party.

334. Lin Mushun studied at Moscow's Sun Yat-sen University while Xie Xuehong attended Moscow's East Asia Communist Workers' University. Ibid., 588.
335. The Comintern placed the TCP officially under the auspices of the Japan Communist Party (JCP) because a party needed to have a membership of more than 100 to be recognized as an independent party, for which the TCP did not qualify. Frank S. T. Hsiao and Lawrence R. Sullivan, "A Political History of the Taiwanese Communist Party, 1928-1931," *Journal of Asian Studies* (1983), 271.
337. Ibid., 662-4, 670, 674. Pan Qinxin fled to Xiamen while Weng Zesheng hid in Shanghai; Cai Xiaoqian and Hong Chaozong fled from Taiwan to China; Lin Mushun and Chen Laiwang escaped to Tokyo, where they formed the Tokyo branch of the TCP. The four who were arrested, including Xie Xuehong, were released without trial. Xie Xuehong, Lin Rigao, and Zhuang Chunhuo regrouped in Taiwan as the central committee of the TCP by November 1928.
338. Ibid., 737-9. With the disbandment of the TCP, Taiwanese communists who fled to China
Like Shanghai, Fujian continued to be a hotbed of Taiwanese communist and student activity up through the early 1930s. The Japanese arrests of TCP members in the fall of 1928 led many Taiwanese communists—Hong Chaozong, Pan Qinxin, Xie Yuye, Li Shanhuo, and Cai Xiaqian—to take refuge in Xiamen and its neighboring port city, Zhangzhou, where they joined the CCP's Fujian committee and began recruiting overseas Taiwanese students.\(^{339}\) Japanese consular reports observed that by 1929, Xiamen had become a communist base attracting overseas Taiwanese students from Jimei School, Zhonghua Middle School, and Tongwen Institute.\(^ {340}\) Kang Xu, a Taiwanese student in Zhonghua Middle School and co-founder of the Xiamen Overseas Taiwanese Student Union in 1930, accepted his Chinese classmate Chen Bingzhi's invitation to join the CCP. On June 17, 1931, Kang distributed throughout Zhonghua Middle School student and teacher dorms a few hundred copies of a propaganda pamphlet entitled "The 6.17 Xiamen Committee's Proclamation to Commemorate Taiwan's Subjugation." The pamphlet cited Japan's oppression of the peoples of Taiwan, Korea, and Ryukyus, including the recent massacre of Taiwan aborigines in the 1930 Musha Uprising.\(^ {341}\) It called upon Chinese and overseas Taiwanese "compatriots" to ally with the proletariat classes and "weak and small peoples of the world" to overthrow Japanese imperialism.\(^ {342}\)

Interestingly, it was KMT officials who initially arrested Kang and handed him over to the Japanese consulate in Xiamen. After the breakup of the KMT-CCP united front in 1927, KMT officials actively cooperated with Japanese authorities to arrest "subversive" overseas Taiwanese, were absorbed into the CCP. Hsiao and Sullivan 1983, 276.

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\(^{339}\) Lan 2006, 276-7.


\(^{341}\) On the 1930 Musha Uprising, see Chapter Four in Ching 2001, 133-73.

\(^{342}\) Sōryōji Tamura Teijirō, gaimushō/Zai Fūshū Sōryōjikan. Shōwa 6-nen 2-gatsu 10-nichi kara Shōwa 6-nen 11-gatsu 12-nichi, 1931, JACAR B02031443400, 191-8. In Zhangzhou on the same day, Cai Xiaqian and other Taiwanese communists gathered forty Taiwanese students and twenty Chinese students together for a meeting to discuss the anniversary of colonial rule.
particularly those affiliated with the CCP.\textsuperscript{343} As Miyakawa Jirō, a Japanese journalist in Xiamen wrote in 1928: "There are many Taiwanese along the South China coast, especially in Xiamen, who are involved with the CCP whom even the KMT government officials are on guard against."\textsuperscript{344} For Taiwanese leftist activists and students, in the late 1920s the KMT was as dangerous a political enemy as the Japanese consular police. Suspected CCP members whom the KMT arrested, once they were discovered to be Taiwanese subjects—such as Jiang Wenlai in Zhanghou in May 1929—were handed over to Japanese consulates before being deported to Taiwan.\textsuperscript{345} KMT-affiliated Jimei Middle School and Zhonghua Middle School expelled Taiwanese students suspected of communist ties, and the Fujian Provincial Education Bureau ordered Chinese schools to disband leftist students groups like the Southern Fujian Overseas Taiwanese Student Union.\textsuperscript{346}

Despite the anti-CCP alliance between KMT and Japanese officials, however, Sino-Japanese tensions arose over Korean activists in China who cooperated with the KMT. According to Japanese consular reports, the KMT had recruited Koreans in Shenyang and Jilin (northeast China), Nanjing, and Xiamen to join Chiang Kai-shek's armies, particularly those who had graduated from Chinese military schools.\textsuperscript{347} By 1928, several Korean revolutionary and communist

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{343} Miyakawa Jirō, \textit{Nanshi kyōsantō to Kanton seikyoku} (Tokyo: Takushoku tsūshinsha, 1928), 11.
\item \textsuperscript{344} Ibid., 23-4.
\item \textsuperscript{345} "Shōwa 4-nen 7-gatsu 3-nichi kara Shōwa 4-nen 7-gatsu 31-nichi," 1929, JACAR B02031442900. Similarly in 1933, Zhuang Haihan, a CCP-affiliated Taiwanese was arrested by the KMT. Although KMT authorities had initially wanted to shoot him for his anti-Chiang Kai-shek activities, the Japanese consul in Xiamen negotiated with the KMT to hand Zhuang over to the consulate. "Shōwa 8-nen 9-gatsu 8-nichi kara Shōwa 9-nen 6-gatsu 29-nichi," 1933, JACAR B02031443900, 345.
\item \textsuperscript{346} Gaimu kikan Arita Hachirō/Zai Amoi ryōji Miura Yoshiaki, "Shōwa 6-nen, 7-nen, 8-nen, bunkatsu 2," 1932, JACAR B04013163600, 414.
\item \textsuperscript{347} "Zai Shi Chōsenjin oyobi Taiwan sekimin to kokumin seifu to no kankei chōsa ikken," 1928, JACAR B02031465000, 474-6, 483-5. Japanese consular reports from Xiamen also kept track of overseas Taiwanese who had joined KMT armies, such as Zhang Zhongling, Jiang Shusheng, Ke Quan, and Wu Haiqing. Ibid., 477-80, 487-92.
\end{itemize}
activists had moved from Manchuria, Shanghai, and Guangzhou to Xiamen, where they formed a secret society with Chinese and Taiwanese anti-imperialists called the "China-Korea-Taiwan Association." Among its members were Korean graduates of Guangzhou's Whampoa Military Academy who had become military instructors for the KMT in Xiamen. On March 2, 1928, six Japanese consular police officials arrested four of the Korean military instructors.

KMT officials criticized the Japanese arrests as an infringement of Chinese sovereignty and requested immediate release of the four Koreans. Chinese periodicals defended the Koreans as KMT members who had renounced their Japanese nationality and naturalized as Chinese, and thus were outside Japanese legal jurisdiction. In protest, local Chinese staged boycotts of Japanese goods, went on strike in Japanese companies, and refused to allow ships from Osaka Shipping Company to dock in Xiamen. Even Taiwanese residents became the target of anti-Japanese agitation, as illustrated by a North China Herald article on March 17:

> Chinese pickets are displaying great activity and are preventing not only Chinese but also Formosans [Taiwanese] from boarding Japanese steamers. About 100 Formosans who attempted to embark in the O.S.K. [Osaka Shipping Company] steamer Hozan maru, which entered port yesterday, for Formosa, were threatened with pistols by the pickets.

Although the Japanese consul ultimately refused to release the Koreans, instead deporting them to Korea, the case illustrates the sympathy that Chinese showed for Koreans as fellow "weak and small peoples" victimized by Japanese imperialism.

348. Miyakawa 1928a, 21-2.
349. Ibid.
350. "Zai Shi Chōsenjin oyobi Taiwan sekimin to kokumin seifu to no kankei chōsa ikken," 1928, JACAR B02031465000, 480.
As with Korean members of the KMT, overseas Taiwanese with ties to the KMT continued to remain active in China up through the 1930s. Xie Dongmin, a Taiwanese native of Taizhong who later became vice-president of Taiwan's Republic of China from 1978 to 1984, studied at Sun Yat-sen University (SYU) in Guangzhou from 1927. As a Taiwanese student of Taizhong Middle School in the early 1920s, Xie had faced colonial discrimination and was also angered by his Japanese teacher's condemnation of China as a divided nation in his "Foreign History" class. Consequently, Xie decided to drop out of his Taiwan middle school in 1925 and instead study abroad in Shanghai.\(^{354}\) In 1927, Xie transferred from Shanghai's Dongwu University to SYU because of the latter's low tuition and favorable admission policies for overseas Taiwanese and Korean students.\(^{355}\) At SYU's Law Faculty, Xie became a valued commodity for his Japanese-language skills as countless Chinese classmates still wished to study abroad in Japan.\(^{356}\) During his senior year in 1930, the year he joined the KMT, Xie was asked by his SYU law classmates to teach night classes to 30–40 students, and the department hired him as a Japanese lecturer after graduation.

In the fall of 1932, however, Xie encountered the unexpected. Instead of being promoted to assistant professor, as the head of the SYU Law Faculty had promised Xie, the university failed to renew his contract. When he approached the SYU president, Xie was told it was "because Xie had been suspected of being a Japanese spy." With the support of his department head, Xie was finally offered a Japanese lectureship in the agricultural studies department, but only at one-third of his former salary. Instead, Xie decided to open a Japanese cram school in his own living room for 30 students, which paid him much more generously. Later, Xie found out that in addition to the SYU

\(^{354}\) Xie 1988, 47-9.
\(^{355}\) Ibid., 69-72.
\(^{356}\) Ibid., 82. Most Chinese chose to study abroad in Japan because it was cheaper than going to a Western country. Moreover, at the time China's social sciences were heavily influenced by Japan.
administration, the Guangzhou Public Security Bureau had also suspected him of being a Japanese
spy due to his Taiwan origins.357

Meanwhile, the Japanese consulate in Guangzhou had also been collecting intelligence on
Xie as a "suspicious anti-Japanese Taiwanese." Xie found out from his friend, Li Tianzhi, a
Taiwanese doctor in the Japanese-run Guangzhou Philanthropic Hospital, that the Japanese
consulate periodically sent undercover agents to ask Li about Xie's activities. With the outbreak of
the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, KMT authorities became increasingly suspicious of Xie and other
overseas Taiwanese as "potential Japanese spies." Lin Jiaqi, Xie's Taiwanese friend who taught
Japanese in SYU's Agricultural Studies Faculty, was arrested on the charge of conspiracy with
Japan. Shortly thereafter, Xie fled to Hong Kong with his wife and child.358 As Xie's case
illustrates, overseas Taiwanese held conflicting identities themselves and faced "double
discrimination" from both Chinese and Japanese authorities.359

Conclusion

Japanese colonial authorities established cross-straits education channels aimed to
acculturate Taiwanese and Chinese in South China. At the same time, Japanese authorities
attempted to restrict Taiwanese study abroad in Anglo-American and Chinese schools in South
China and closely monitored anti-colonial youth groups that congregated in Xiamen, Shanghai,

357. Ibid., 103-5.
358. Ibid., 105-10. In Hong Kong, he worked as a freelance writer, submitting articles to
Dagongbao and Shenbao. In July 1942 he went from Hong Kong to Guilin, where he worked for
the Guangxi Daily (Guangxi ribao) listening to Japanese radio news from Tokyo. In 1943, the
KMT established a Taiwan Subordinate Party (Taiwan zhishu dangbu) headed by Weng Junming,
who appointed Xie to be a member and propaganda chief. In 1945, Xie participated in the KMT
Chongqing meeting. Xie Dongmin xiansheng quanji bianji weiyuanhui, Xie Dongmin xiansheng
quanji 1 (Taipei: Guoshiguan, 2004), 210-1.
359. Misawa Mamie, “Teikoku” to “sokoku” no hazama: shokuminchiki Taiwan eigajin no
kōshō to ekkyō (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2010).
and Guangzhou. The 1910s marked a critical turning point in Japanese education policy in South China. At the turn of the twentieth century, Japanese teachers had initially been dispatched from the Japanese metropole by the Foreign Ministry to prepare Chinese for study abroad in Japan. With the sudden rise of the overseas Taiwanese population, however, the center of Sino-Japanese educational exchange in Fujian shifted from Tokyo to Taipei. The Government-General of Taiwan took the lead over the Foreign Ministry in implementing Japanese-language education in Fuzhou and Xiamen by exporting its colonial education model to fit local needs.

Despite anti-Japanese movements during the 1910s and 1920s, Chinese enrollment in the overseas Taiwanese schools of Xiamen and Fuzhou continued to increase due to the school reforms implemented by colonial educators. The schools for overseas Taiwanese provided educational opportunities for poorer Chinese children who could not afford the private tuition of Chinese or Anglo-American schools. Moreover, a handful of Chinese and overseas Taiwanese graduates each year went on from Xiamen Kyokuei School to secondary education in Taiwan. By 1930, Japanese education surveys in Xiamen reported on the effectiveness of Xiamen Kyokuei School to recruit children of local Chinese elites who sought to strengthen connections with Taiwan or Japan.360 There are few existing Chinese-language testimonies that can reliably verify to what extent Japanese educators won over the hearts and minds of Taiwanese and Chinese youth in South China. However, Government-General of Taiwan sources indicate that many graduates of the overseas Taiwanese schools went on to work in Japanese companies (including schools and hospitals) in Fujian and Guangdong. Moreover, a 1943 report by Wang Lianyuan, a Chinese education advisor for occupied Xiamen, confirmed that Taiwanese graduates of Xiamen Kyokuei School were employed by the Japanese military administration in Fujian during the Sino-Japanese War.361 In this way, overseas Taiwanese schools appear to have contributed to Japanese cross-

361. It is unclear however, if they "volunteered" or were coerced by the Japanese authorities.
straits interests in both pre- and wartime South China.

The Government-General of Taiwan also welcomed cross-strait exchanges that included Chinese school trips and study abroad in Taiwan. In addition, Japanese colonial officials invited Fujian representatives in education, agriculture, transportation, and other bureaus to observe colonial Taiwan's modern institutions and infrastructure. Through Taiwan industrial exhibitions in Taipei and school exhibitions in Xiamen Kyokuei School, Japanese colonial officials sought to improve Chinese impressions of Taiwan's colonial development and to establish closer working relations with Chinese officials and educators in South China.

While overseas Taiwanese education served Japanese cultural imperialism in South China, we cannot simply conclude that local Chinese and overseas Taiwanese students were mere "victims" of Japanese imperialism, as portrayed by Chinese nationalist histories. In the education marketplace of China, Chinese students acted as autonomous consumers who could choose from a range of schools—Anglo-American, Chinese, and Japanese—that competed for their enrollment. To contend with their rivals, schools for overseas Taiwanese had to cater to the demands of the local population that sought language and vocational skills for employment or higher education. In many cases, Chinese and Taiwanese youth disregarded national loyalties: some graduated from overseas Taiwanese primary schools and went on to Anglo-American secondary schools, while others graduated from Anglo-American schools and then taught at overseas Taiwanese schools. In addition, the overseas Taiwanese schools offered chances of social mobility for Taiwanese teachers, many of whom were graduates of Xiamen Kyokuei School and Fuzhou Tōei School.

Despite attempts by Japanese colonial authorities to delineate the relationship of Taiwanese

Wang Lianyuan (Xiamen zhanqu jiaoyu dudaoyuan), "Diwei shishi nuhua jiaoyu qingxing" (December 8, 1943), in Xiamen-shi dang'anguan and Xiamenshi dang'anju 1997, 186-7.

362. For example, Wu 2004; Liang 2001; Wang 2009.
subjects to mainland China, however, they could not prevent hundreds of Taiwanese youth from studying in Chinese and Anglo-American schools beyond Japan's cultural sphere of influence. Taiwanese student activists in Xiamen, Shanghai, and Guangzhou established anti-imperial alliances with Chinese and Koreans that sought to delegitimize not only colonial rule in Taiwan but also Japan's entire imperial past in East Asia.\(^{363}\) Overseas Taiwanese youth groups helped bring anti-colonial Taiwanese narratives into the discourse of Chinese anti-imperialist nationalism. However limited the success of China-Taiwan-Korean alliances against Japan in the 1920s and 1930s, colonial Taiwan became an integral part of the Chinese nationalist narrative of "national humiliation" at the hands of Japan.\(^{364}\) Taiwanese youth groups also advanced the rhetoric of "Pan-Asian anti-imperialism" that was separate from the later, opportunistic Pan-Asianist ideologies advanced by Japan's "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" in the 1940s.

Yet the reality of mainland Chinese perceptions and policies toward Taiwanese remained fraught. At times the KMT welcomed Taiwanese students in their Chinese military academies and government offices, but in the post-1927 period the KMT detained Taiwanese leftists and became suspect of those like Xie Dongmin. Xie Nanguang, a Taiwanese activist who later joined the KMT in Shanghai, captured the precarious existence of overseas Taiwanese in 1930: "Our Taiwanese compatriots in China are in tragic circumstances.... Whenever a conflict of interest occurs, those Taiwanese who were treated as close friends by the Chinese yesterday are today cursed at as the 'running dogs' of Japan."\(^{365}\) Many Taiwanese thus adopted pseudonyms and hid their colonial status.

\(^{363}\) Youth group publications were read by Taiwanese intellectuals not only in China, but in Taiwan and Japan as well. Japanese colonial police censorship reports from 1929 to 1932 show that thousands of youth group pamphlets and articles were imported into Taiwan. Taiwan sōtokufu keimukyoku hoanka toshogakari, *Taiwan shuppan keisatsu sho* (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu keimukyoku hoanka toshogakari), republished by Fuji Shuppan, 2001.


\(^{365}\) Xie 1930, 132.
in order to work in China. Despite efforts by Taiwanese activists to disabuse Chinese notions of the overseas Taiwanese as imperial pawns of Japan, the onset of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 only further strained Sino-Taiwanese relations as the Japanese dispatched Taiwanese military personnel, doctors, and laborers to help occupy South China from 1938 to 1945, as we will see in Chapter Four.
CHAPTER THREE

Colonial Taiwan as Japan's Brain Trust for Southern Studies (1895-1936)

Figure 3.1: Map of South China [Nanshi] (bold line on the top-left) and Southeast Asia [Nanyō] (dotted line) in the Taiwan News (1920).

Introduction

In order to promote Japanese interest in natural resources farther south, the Government-General of Taiwan pioneered Japan's area studies of South China and Southeast Asia in economics, history, and anthropology. With a dearth of intelligence in the Japanese metropole on the southern regions, Japanese colonialists established research institutions in Taiwan—the Encyclopedia Bureau, Taihoku Commercial College, and Taihoku Imperial University—that collectively became

366 Kurata Shūichi, "Nanshi Nanyō no igi," Taiwan jihō (1920).
the empire's brain trust for knowledge production on the south during the interwar period (1918–37). Japanese and Taiwanese conducted overseas surveys, translated Western- and Asian-language documents, and published intelligence reports that constituted the foundation of Japan's pre-war and wartime archive on South China and Southeast Asia. Moreover, such materials helped form the basis of Japanese and Taiwanese historical studies of the southern regions in the post–World War II period. After briefly introducing Taiwan's role in Japanese studies of South China during the late Meiji period (1895–1912), this chapter will trace the development of colonial Taiwan's research institutions on Southeast Asia from the 1910s through 1936.

By World War I (1914–8), Japanese colonial officials prided themselves on Taiwan's pioneering role as the center for Japanese research on the "Southern Region" (Nanpō)—the neologism used to refer collectively to South China (Nanshi) and Southeast Asia (Nanyō). During their first two decades of colonial rule (1895–1914), Government-General of Taiwan officials envisioned Fujian and Guangdong province in South China as critical to the island's strategic and economic interests. While Japan's Foreign Ministry and Imperial Army focused on northern expansion into Korea and Manchuria, the Government-General of Taiwan competed with the Anglo-American powers for hegemony in South China. Japanese colonial officials, journalists, and scholars propagated South China as a natural geocultural extension of Taiwan in order to promote the island's strategic role in Japanese imperial policy on East Asia.

With the outbreak of WWI, "southern advance fever" (nanshin netsu) swept across Japan. In 1914, the Imperial Navy seized Micronesia in the South Pacific from Germany, and Japanese

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367. Several colonial researchers who launched their careers in Taiwan such as Nakamura Takeshi, Iwao Seiichi, and Miyamoto Nobuhito later became the leading Japanese historians and anthropologists of Southeast Asia in the post-WWII period.

368. The Japanese used the terms "Nanyō," "Nankoku," and "Nankai" more or less interchangeably to refer to present-day Southeast Asia. In my dissertation, for the sake of intelligibility, I use the term "Southeast Asia" as the English translation for "Nanyō." For more on the genealogy of the Japanese term "Nanyō" see Shimizu 2005; Chou 2008; Chung 2004, 150-58.
exports to Southeast Asia rose dramatically with the wartime decline of European goods in the region.\footnote{369} Japanese officials and entrepreneurs began to view Southeast Asia not only as an export market for their manufactured goods but also as a treasure-house of raw materials for Japan's heavy industry.\footnote{370} Leaders of the Government-General of Taiwan, too, anticipated the potential of Southeast Asia's natural resources for Taiwan's own future industrialization. However, although a handful of Japanese writers had published travelogues and novels about Southeast Asia since the 1880s, in the 1910s there remained little Japanese research on the region.\footnote{371} With Taiwan geographically situated in the South China Sea across the straits from the Philippines, the Government-General of Taiwan opportunistically spearheaded overseas research on Southeast Asia with the aim of furthering economic ties to the south and bolstering the island's regional importance within Japan's empire.

Recent cultural and intellectual histories of Japan's empire have focused on the impact of the South Manchurian Railway Company (1906–45) on Japanese Sinology and Korean Studies during Japan's northern advance into Korea and Manchuria.\footnote{372} Yet thus far Taiwan's critical role in Japan's area studies on South China and Southeast Asia before the Pacific War (1941–5) has been largely neglected in English-language scholarship.\footnote{373} Decades before the Imperial Navy and Army
prepared its military advance into Southeast Asia, Japanese colonial officials and scholars in
Taiwan developed economic, ethnographic, and historical studies of southern regions. As boosters
of southern economic expansion, Japanese colonial researchers compiled statistical surveys to
promote Japanese trade and investment in Southeast Asia's natural resources, such as minerals and
rubber. At the same time, they marshaled historical and racial narratives of commonality and
interdependence between Japan and Southeast Asia as cultural legitimacy for economic
exploitation of the region. I argue that it was through such historical research that the Japanese re-
conceptualized not only Japan's but also Taiwan's geocultural relationship to Southeast Asia. The
interwar period marked a turning point when Japanese colonialists began to envision Taiwan as
simultaneously located within both East Asia and Southeast Asia.

With most of Southeast Asia under Western political rule—the exception being Thailand—
overseas research by the Government-General of Taiwan did not focus on military or strategic
intelligence. Nor were Taiwan's economic surveys of Southeast Asia a teleological precursor to
Japan's military occupation of the region in the 1940s. Yet, while Japanese colonial researchers
were not necessarily interested in territorial acquisition during the inter-war period, they sought to
offer rational and historical justifications for integrating Southeast Asia within Japan's economic
and cultural sphere of interest. In contrast to late-nineteenth century Japanese writings that
classified Southeast Asia as geographically and culturally separate from East Asia—centered on
China, Korea, and Japan—in the 1920s and 1930s Government-General of Taiwan researchers
sought to re-discover Pan-Asian connections between Japan and Southeast Asia that would
undermine the rationale of Western colonialism in the region. Historical surveys by Japanese
scholars in the Taiwan's Encyclopedia Bureau and Taihoku Imperial University in particular,
advanced ethnological theories of "Japan's southern origins" and pre-modern precedents for

2008a.
Japanese activity in Southeast Asia.

From the Taiwan Association (1898–1907) to the East Asia Association (1907–15)

From 1895 up to the start of WWI, the Government-General of Taiwan established railways, camphor industries, Taiwanese schools, hospitals, newspapers, branches of the Bank of Taiwan, and cross-strait shipping routes along the South China coast. Because of South China's strategic and economic importance to Taiwan, the Government-General of Taiwan negotiated with the Foreign Ministry so that Japanese consuls in Xiamen, Fuzhou, Shantou, and Guangzhou concurrently served as contracted secretaries of the Taiwan government. Consuls were required to send all telegraphs addressed to the Foreign Minister in Tokyo also to the Governor-General in Taipei. In coordination with consulates and its affiliated representatives overseas (such as South China branches of the Bank of Taiwan), the Government-General of Taiwan amassed a wealth of economic surveys and intelligence on South China.

One of the main platforms for disseminating research on South China was the Taiwan Association (Taiwan kyōkai, 1898–1907), a semi-official, semi-private organization founded in Tokyo (with a Taipei branch in 1899) for Japanese officials, businessmen, and intellectuals involved with Taiwan. The association published a monthly Taiwan Association Journal (Taiwan Association Journal).

The geographical scope of "South China" (J. Nanshi, Nanshin; C. Nanzhi, Nanqing), differed for officials in the Tokyo central government and those in the Government-General of Taiwan. While Tokyo officials often referred to South China as the region south of the Yangzi River, centered on Zhejiang and Jiangsu provinces, Japanese officials in Taipei viewed South China as centered on Fujian and Guangdong provinces directly across the straits from Taiwan. Chung Shu-ning and Chou Wan-yao have come to similar conclusions the various regional definitions of South China. Chung 2004, 152; Chou 2008.

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374. The 1900 policy to appoint Japanese consuls in Xiamen and Fuzhou concurrently as Government-General of Taiwan representatives later came to include Guangzhou (1906), Shantou (1907), Hong Kong (1910), Shanghai (1917), and Yunnan (1921). Chung Shu-ning has called this system the Government-General of Taiwan's "intelligence network" for southern expansion. Chung 1999, 698.

375. The geographical scope of "South China" (J. Nanshi, Nanshin; C. Nanzhi, Nanqing), differed for officials in the Tokyo central government and those in the Government-General of Taiwan. While Tokyo officials often referred to South China as the region south of the Yangzi River, centered on Zhejiang and Jiangsu provinces, Japanese officials in Taipei viewed South China as centered on Fujian and Guangdong provinces directly across the straits from Taiwan. Chung Shu-ning and Chou Wan-yao have come to similar conclusions the various regional definitions of South China. Chung 2004, 152; Chou 2008.
kyōkai kaihō) to promote greater interest in the island among the Japanese public.\textsuperscript{376} In addition to introducing the economic and cultural affairs of Taiwan, the journal reported on current and historical affairs in Fujian and Guangdong province. Particularly after 1900, when the Government-General of Taiwan began subsidizing trade and enterprises in South China, reports in the journal emphasized the historical role of Taiwan as an intermediary between Japan and South China. In a 1904 article titled "Taiwan and South China's Geography," the Japanese geologist Ishii Hachimanjirō wrote that Taiwan was "a child of both Japan and China, which has been linked to the two countries geographically, geologically, and politically" since the seventeenth century. It was during this period when Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga, 1624–62), the son of a Chinese father and Japanese mother, drove out the Dutch from Taiwan and used the island as a base for the revival of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). Ishii also cited the close cultural affinities among the Japanese, Taiwan aborigines, and Chinese who had migrated from Fujian and Guangdong to Taiwan. As for Taiwan's physical environment, Ishii noted that geological researchers had discovered that its mountain ranges were a combination of those connected to both Japan and Fujian.\textsuperscript{377}

Other Japanese intellectuals who contributed to the Taiwan journal, such as anthropologist Inō Kaori (1867–1925) and journalist Takekoshi Yosaburō (1865–1950), also drew on pre-modern cases of Japanese activity in Taiwan as precedence for Japan's contemporary southern expansion.\textsuperscript{378} In his 1904 article, "The Japanese People's Past in Taiwan," Inō wrote that Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536–82), one of the legendary unifiers of Japan in the sixteenth century, had

\textsuperscript{377} Taiwan kyōkai kaihō 69 (1904), 1. Reprinted in 1987 by Yumani shobō, Kaminuma Hachirō (ed.), 22.
\textsuperscript{378} On Inō Kaori's contributions to Japanese anthropological studies on Taiwan aborigines, see Barclay 2001.
perceived early on Taiwan's strategic value as an intermediary bridge between Japan and China. Although Hideyoshi's attempt to establish tributary relations with Taiwan came to naught, by the early seventeenth century Japanese merchants had established trading networks between Japan and Southeast Asia via Taiwan. Takekoshi Yosaburō, a prominent journalist and politician, traced Japan's history of southern advance even further back to the Japanese "pirates" (J. wakō, C. wokou) of the fourteenth century. In his *Japanese Rule in Formosa* (1905, translated into English in 1907), Takekoshi recounted how Japanese pirates from southwestern Japan had joined forces with Chinese pirates to plunder Guangdong in 1368 and Fujian in 1373: "From this time the Japanese pirates made regular annual raids on the Chinese coasts, pillaging the line from Fokien [Fujian] to Chehkiang [Zhejiang] and Kwangtung [Guangdong]." Takekoshi commended these bands of "pirates," who by the 16th-century had made Taiwan their base of operations, as the Japanese pioneers of foreign trade in the South China Sea.

With Japan's acquisition of Korea and southern Manchuria in the aftermath of Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5, the Taiwan Association changed its name to "East Asia Association" (*Tōyō kyōkai*) in 1907 to reflect the expanded geographic scope of Japan's empire in continental Asia. Although the *East Asia Association Journal* (*Tōyō kyōkai kaihō*) continued to publish on affairs in Taiwan and South China, the focus of the revamped association now centered on Korea and Manchuria. The journal covered the growth of Japanese railways,
farmlands, soybean trade, and settler communities administered by the South Manchurian Railway
Company (est. 1906) and the Government-General of Korea (est. 1910).385

Uchida Kakichi and Taiwan's Turn toward Southeast Asia

While the attention of the Japanese central government in Tokyo focused on continental
northeast Asia, as evidenced by the shifting interests of the East Asian Association, Taiwan Civil
Governor Uchida Kakichi (1866–1933, in office 1910–15) initiated efforts to extend Taiwan's
economic ties with Southeast Asia. Between 1906 and 1911, the Government-General of Taiwan
had provided annual subsidies of ¥70,000 exclusively for trade between Taiwan and South China,
but in 1912 it revised the budget to include both South China and Southeast Asia.386 That same
year, Uchida established the "South China Southeast Asia Budget" (Nanshi oyobi Nanyō
shisetsuhi) to subsidize Japanese economic institutions in Southeast Asia. With the outbreak of
WWI and Japan's increase in exports to Southeast Asia, Shimomura Hiroshi (1875–1957, in office
1915–21), Uchida's successor, increased the budget tenfold by 1920 to help establish Taiwan-based
companies, banks, and warehouses in Southeast Asia.387 In addition to opening three Bank of
Taiwan branches in the Dutch Indies—Surabaya (1915), Semarang (1916), Batavia (1917)—
Shimomura founded the South China Southeast Asia Bank (Kanan ginkō, 1919) and Southeast
Asia Warehouse (Nanyō sōko, 1920), which aimed to attract investments from overseas Chinese in
chūshin ni," in Kindai Nihon no Ajia ninshiki, ed. Koya Tetsuo (Kyoto: Ryokuin shobō, 1994),
214-5.
385. On the Southern Manchuria Railway Company see Young 1998. On settler colonialism and
Japanese journals in Korea, see Uchida 2011.
386. The name of the budget was revised from "Budget to Expand South China Trade" (Nanshin
bōeki kakuchōhi) to "Budget to Expand South China Southeast Asia Trade" (Nanshi Nanyō bōeki
387. Funding increased from ¥70,000 in 1914 to ¥120,000 (1915), ¥300,000 (1917), ¥600,000
(1919), ¥750,000 (1920), and peaked between 1921 to 1924 at ¥900,000 per year; funding
Southeast Asia. He also subsidized maritime routes for Japan's Southeast Asia Mail Shipping and Osaka Shipping Company to connect Taiwan with Java, Singapore, and Haifong.

Figure 3.2: 1917 Map of Taiwan and tourist routes to South China and Southeast Asia

389. Three lines were established in 1916, 1919, and 1921 respectively. Asaka Teijirō, *Taiwan Kaiunshi* (Taihoku: Taiwan kaimu kyōkai, 1941).
Even before the start of WWI and the rise of Japan's "southern advance fever," Uchida had anticipated Taiwan's potential as an imperial gateway into Southeast Asia. In an 1912 article in *Taiwan News* titled "My Thoughts on the Colonies of Southeast Asia," Uchida argued that the Pacific Ocean was the next major arena of global competition between the Western imperial powers, with the era of Atlantic Ocean rivalry having already passed. While lamenting the lack of institutionalized Japanese studies on Southeast Asia, Uchida remained optimistic that as Japan's sole "tropical colony" (*nettai shokuminchi*), Taiwan was perfectly suited for researching tropical industries farther south. He pointed to Japanese railway officials, botanists, and doctors recently dispatched by the Government-General of Taiwan to Southeast Asia as evidence of Taiwan's value to Japan's southern expansion: "If our fellow Japanese are able to apply their experience of tropical administration in Taiwan to the Southern Region for further economic development, it will not only benefit Taiwan but also contribute to our greater empire."  

Uchida thus reconceptualized Taiwan as simultaneously located in both East Asia and Southeast Asia. Since 1905, Taiwan had been a model for colonial rule in continental Asia, as many Japanese leaders "in Manchuria and Korea first gained their administrative experience in Taiwan." Indeed, the central figures of the South Manchurian Railway Company, including Gotō Shimpei and Kodama Gentarō, had previously been leaders of colonial Taiwan (1898–1906). Uchida argued that Taiwan could serve as an even better intermediary base for Southeast Asia than it had been for northeast Asia because of the island's similar tropical climate and geographical proximity: "Those Japanese with tropical experience [*nettai keiken*] in Taiwan would no doubt have more success in Southeast Asia than those who have only worked in the metropole." As a case in point, Uchida indicated that "many of those currently engaged in rubber cultivation in

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393. Ibid.
Singapore have first worked in Taiwan. In his seminal monograph on colonial studies, *Strategies of Japanese Overseas Expansion* (1914), Uchida added that Japanese employed in Taiwan's sugar, tea, tobacco, and cotton industries were similarly well-prepared to exploit natural resources in Southeast Asia.

In the early 1910s, Uchida began to dispatch Japanese colonial officials to conduct economic surveys in Southeast Asia. One of the prominent colonial researchers was Matsuoka Masao (1894–1978), a graduate of Keio University and the University of Wisconsin, where he had studied agricultural economy. Hired by the Government-General of Taiwan in 1910 to investigate the administrative systems of colonial Southeast Asia, Matsuoka was sent overseas on a half-year observation tour of Malaya, Indochina, the Dutch Indies, and the Philippines. Like most Southeast Asia tours administered by the Government-General of Taiwan, Matsuoka's trip included stops in Hong Kong and South China. For the Government-General of Taiwan, "Southeast Asia" (Nanyō) in its broadest definition went beyond the Malay Peninsula to include neighboring territories across the South China Sea (Hong Kong, Fujian, Guangdong) with close economic ties to Taiwan and Japan.

Matsuoka published his research findings in *Travel Report on the Southeast Asian Islands* (1913), the first volume of a series of "South China and Southeast Asia Survey Reports" published

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394. Ibid.
398. In contemporary geographic terms Hong Kong, Fujian, and Guangdong would be conventionally viewed as part of South China (*Huanan*) and certainly not part of Southeast Asia (*Nanyang*).
by the Government-General of Taiwan. In a 1913 *Taiwan News* article, "Relations Between Japan and Southeast Asia," Matsuoka listed four main reasons as to why the Japanese needed to study Southeast Asia: (1) to find territories suitable for migration to solve the problem of overpopulation; (2) to help acquire Southeast Asia's raw materials for further industrialization; (3) to contribute scientific studies of Southeast Asia to the greater academic community; and (4) to advance the Japanese "civilizing mission" of uplifting the Southeast Asian natives, as they had done so with the Taiwan aborigines. Matsuoka was not shy to boast about Taiwan's pioneering role in Southeast Asian studies: "At a time when interest in Southeast Asia has yet to fully arise in the Japanese metropole, those of us in Taiwan should be proud that our colonial leaders have already invested large sums of funds and personnel to study the region." He used the metaphor of a gourd (*hyōtan*) to delineate Japan's relationship with Southeast Asia: with Japan as the stem and Southeast Asia as the base of the gourd, Taiwan was the central neck that bound the two parts together.

Matsuoka also promoted historical and racial justifications for Japan's economic advance into Southeast Asia. He pointed to late sixteenth century Japan as the height of Japanese activity in Southeast Asia. Under Toyotomi Hideyoshi's reign, the Japanese dispatched "red-seal ships" (*shuinsen*) to Southeast Asia for trade and began establishing overseas communities called "Japan-towns" (*Nihon machi*). Matsuoka blamed the Tokugawa government's policy to "close the country" (*sakoku*) in 1639 to outside trade—aside from with the Dutch and Chinese—as the reason why Japan quickly lost influence in Southeast Asia to European imperialists who occupied most of the region. Racially speaking, however, Matsuoka contended that Japanese still had ancestral ties

399. Taiwan sōtokufu, *Nanyō shisatsu fukumeisho* (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu, 1914). The series, "Minami Shina oyobi Nanyō chōsasho," published a total of 128 volumes on South China and Southeast Asia during the Taisho period (1913-26).
400. Matsuoka Masao, "Nihon to Nanyō to no kankei," *Taiwan jihō* (December 1913), 24-5.
401. Ibid., 31.
402. Ibid., 27.
to natives in Southeast Asia: in pre-modern times Malays had migrated northward from southern islands and mixed with races from Korea and China to form Japan's "immaculate Yamato race." No doubt drawing on "southern ancestral theories" (Nanpō sosen-ron) advanced by contemporary Japanese anthropologists like University of Tokyo's Tsuboi Shōgorō (1863–1913), Matsuoka claimed that "it is an inarguable fact that the Yamato race is made up of 60 percent Malay blood." "Since the Japanese have originated from Southeast Asia," he added, "to study Southeast Asia today is the equivalent of us studying our own ancestral home [sosen no funpo]."

Invoking a proto-Pan-Asian alliance, Matsuoka ominously forecasted a future clash between Japan and the Western powers over Southeast Asia, not unlike what precipitated 30 years later with the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941:

If in the future we go to war with a [Western] nation over their Southeast Asian islands, it would be a crusade [jūjigun] from Japan's perspective. Just as Europeans launched a crusade against Muslims for having occupied Christ's resting place, for us to liberate the Southeast Asian islands from foreign control would be akin to Japan recovering its ancestral home.

In light of contemporary Western discourses of the "Yellow Peril" and anti-Japanese sentiment that he most likely witnessed during his study and surveys abroad, Matsuoka believed that a racial war between Japan and the Western powers over Southeast Asia was highly probable in the future.

As evidenced by Matsuoka's reports, Uchida initiated overseas surveys that not only

403. Ibid., 26.
405. Matsuoka Masao, "Nihon to Nanyō to no kankei," Taiwan jihō (December 1913), 26. Matsuoka's "southern ancestral theory" resonated with Takekoshi Yosaburō who after writing on Taiwan published his best-seller, Travel Notes on the Southern Country (Nankoku-ki) in 1910. Takekoshi contended that the origins of the Japanese people could be traced to the "southern people" (Nanjin) in the south and that therefore Japan's "northern advance" went against the natural tide of history. Yano 1975 [2009], 48-9.
406. Ibid., 26.
advanced Japanese understanding of Southeast Asia's economy and society but also culturally legitimated Japan's future interests in the region. Even before the outbreak of WWI, Uchida dispatched other colonial researchers and journalists like Tōgō Minoru and Ōno Kōhei to survey Southeast Asia, and he published their research findings as part of the "South China and Southeast Asia Survey Reports" series that totaled 227 volumes between 1913 and 1935. While Japanese advocates of southern expansion in the 1880s and 1890s, such as Shiga Shigetaka (1863–1927), had delineated Southeast Asia as a distinct region separate from East Asia, Uchida and colonial researchers in Taiwan began to conceive of Southeast Asia not only as an extension of East Asia, but also as a fundamental basis of Japan's own historical origins.407

From the East Asia Association to the Southeast Asia Association

To further advance Japan's public interest in Southeast Asia, in 1915 Uchida teamed up with Inoue Masaji (1877–1947), a Japanese entrepreneur of Malaya's rubber plantations, to found the "Southeast Asia Association" (Nanyō kyōkai) in Tokyo.408 A former member of the East Asia Common Culture Association (Tōa dō bun kyōkai) in Shanghai and economic official in colonial Korea (from 1905 to 1910), Inoue conceived of the new association as a semi-official, semi-private platform to encourage economic enterprise in Southeast Asia.409

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407. For Japanese writings on Southeast Asia and the South Pacific during the mid-Meiji period, see Shimizu 2005, 87; Schencking 1999; Frei 1991.
408. Uchida and Inoue first met in 1912 and initially planned to establish the Southeast Asia Association in 1913. Due to a lack of funds, however, they had to wait until 1915 when greater interest arose in Tokyo due to the rise in Japanese exports to Southeast Asia. Lynn 1998, 72-3. On Inoue's economic and personnel interests in Southeast Asia, see Yokoi Kaori, "Inoue Masaji to Nanyō kyōkai no nanshin yōin ikusei jigyō," Shakai shisutemu kenkyū 16 (2008): 75-100.
409. Inoue founded his "Southern Asia Company" (Nan-A kōshi) in 1911 in Singapore, largely inspired by Prime Minister Katsura Tarō, a former Taiwan governor-general in 1896, who persuaded Inoue of the importance of working in Southeast Asia rather than returning to Korea as a colonial official. For the next twelve years Inoue stood at the front-line of Japanese economic development in Sumatra, North Borneo, and Mindanao, spending half his time in Southeast Asia.
Germanism, Pan-Slavism, and Pan-Americanism (Monroe Doctrine) in the West, Inoue called for a "Greater Japanism" (Dai Nihonshugi), which consisted of overseas migration and economic development in Southeast Asia. An advocate of Japan's "southern origins theory," Inoue believed that it was "natural" and "inevitable" for the Japanese to advance southward, since it would be "a return to their pre-modern homeland."\(^{410}\) In response to critics who questioned the suitability of Southeast Asia's climate for migration, Inoue pointed to Taiwan as proof that Japan possessed the experience and know-how to overcome tropical diseases, govern local natives, and cultivate tropical resources like sugar, coconut, and rubber.\(^{411}\)

Led by Uchida and Inoue, the Southeast Asia Association promoted travel, research, exhibitions, and other educational activities related to the region.\(^{412}\) The association taught Dutch and Malay language courses and held monthly lectures to increase awareness of the region among the Japanese public.\(^{413}\) The association's monthly journal, *Southeast Asia Association Bulletin* (Nanyō kyōkai kaihō)\(^{414}\), was distributed for free throughout the Japanese empire not only to members but also to commercial and industrial institutions, libraries, schools, government offices, and shipping companies with destinations in Southeast Asia.\(^{415}\) In addition, the association

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\(^{410}\) Inoue Masaji, "Nanyō to Taiwan (jō)," *Nanyō kyōkai zasshi* 7:3 (1921), 9-10; Yano [1975] 2009, 90.


\(^{412}\) Uchida remained vice-president of the association for nearly 20 years, while Inoue participated as an association member for 23 years. Yokoi Kaori, "Inoue Masaji to Nanyō kyōkai no nanshin yōin ikusei jigyō," *Shakai shisutemukan* 16 (2008), 77.

\(^{413}\) Some talks by entrepreneurs and specialists (researchers), who came back to Japan from Southeast Asia, were exclusively for members, others were open to the general public. Tōgō Yasu, "Nanyō kyōkai no genjō to sono shōrai," *Nanyō kyōkai zasshi* (1919), 116; Horiguchi Masao, *Nanyō kyōkai jūnenshi* (Tokyo: Nanyō kyōkai, 1925), 113-4, reprinted in Ryūkei Shosha, *Tankō tosho shiryō* 31 (2000).

\(^{414}\) The journal was named *Nanyō kyōkai kaihō* from 1915 to 1919, then *Nanyō kyōkai zasshi*, 1919-37, and then *Nanyō* during the Sino-Japanese War.

\(^{415}\) Tōgō Yasu, "Nanyō kyōkai no genjō to sono shōrai," *Nanyō kyōkai zasshi* 5:2 (1919), 107. For studies on Japanese colonial tourism in Taiwan, see Soyama Takeshi, *Shokuminchi Taiwan to kindai tsūrizumu* (Tokyo: Seikyūsha, 2003); McDonald 2011.
published books by its members—who ranged from officials and scholars to entrepreneurs—that served as references for Japanese who wished to travel or work in Southeast Asia. The association's travel guides included, for example, Koshimura Nagatsugu's *Things You Must Know for a Southeast Asia Trip* (1919), which explained how to apply for visas and contained an appendix of Malay phrases.\footnote{Koshimura Nagatsugu, *Nanyō tokō shuchi* (Taihoku: Nanyō kyōkai Taiwan shibu, 1919).}
It was emblematic that the Southeast Asia Association's main headquarters was initially located in the Taiwan Government-General's Tokyo office, as it was largely subsidized by the Taiwan authorities.\textsuperscript{417} Several of the association's founding members held close ties to Taiwan, including Nitobe Inazo (1862–1933, who revamped the island's sugar industry from 1901 to 1903), Yagyū Kazuyoshi (1864–1920, a former Bank of Taiwan president), and Den Kenjiro (1855–1930, a communications minister who later became Taiwan's first civilian governor-general in 1919).\textsuperscript{418}

Moreover, unlike the East Asia Association, whose main center of activity remained in Tokyo, the Southeast Asia Association's Taiwan Branch took over responsibility for the majority of the association's research duties.\textsuperscript{419} Established in Taipei in April 1916, the branch appointed Civil Governor Shimomura and Bank of Taiwan president Sakurai Tetsutarō as its chair and vice-chair. Branch advisors included colonial officials who specialized in Southeast Asia's economy, such as Katayama Hidetaro and Tōgō Minoru (both of whom later became head of Taiwan's Encyclopedia Bureau in 1919 and 1921, respectively), and Matsuoka Fumio (Yanagita Kunio's younger brother who administered sugar industries in Taiwan and the Philippines). The Taiwan Branch also recruited Taiwanese landed elite like Lin Xiongzheng (1888–1946), Lin Xiantang (1881–1956), Gu Xianrong (1866–1937), and Chen Zhonghe (1853–1930) as members.\textsuperscript{420} As investors in Bank

\textsuperscript{417}. The Tokyo headquarters was later relocated to a building in Yaesu. In addition to financial aid by the Government-General of Taiwan, the association was subsidized by the Japanese Foreign Ministry and the Commerce and Agricultural Ministry. With 79 members at its inauguration in January 1915, by 1923 the association consisted of 1,450 members. Lynn 1998, 74-5. From 1922 to 1937, over half of the association's head branch was subsidized by the Government-General of Taiwan. Kawarabayashi Naoto, "Teikoku Nihon no ekkyō suru shakaiteki jinmyaku, Nanyō kyōkai to iu kagami," in Nanyō guntō to teikoku, kokusai chitsujo, ed. Asano Toyomi (Tokyo: Jigakusha shuppan, 2007), 105.

\textsuperscript{418}. For Nitobe Inazo's biography, see Teruhiko Nagao, Nitobe Inazo: From Bushido to the League of Nations (Sapporo, Japan: Graduate School of Letters, Hokkaido University, 2006).

\textsuperscript{419}. The association also established branches in Singapore (1916), Batavia (1921), Palau (1923), Manila (1924), Davao (1929), Medan (1929), and in cities throughout Japan. However, the Taiwan branch was the only branch, other than the main branch in Tokyo, that published monographs related to Southeast Asia. Horiguchi 1925, 259-61; Lynn 1998, 75.

\textsuperscript{420}. Nanyō kyōkai kaihō 2:8 (October 1916), 4.
of Taiwan branches in South China and Southeast Asia, they later went on to participate in Southeast Asian ventures such as the South China Southeast Asia Bank (est. 1919) and Southeast Asia Warehouse (est. 1920). 421

Through its publications, lectures, and language training, the Southeast Asia Association aimed to reshape Japanese preconceptions of Southeast Asia. Articles in the *Southeast Asia Association Bulletin* reassured the Japanese public that the region's tropical climate was tolerable—or at least no worse than that of Taiwan—and that hygienic standards had risen due to progress in colonial medicine. Moreover, local natives in the Dutch East Indies and Philippines regarded the Japanese as "fellow Asians" and thus viewed them more favorably than their Western colonial rulers. In geocultural terms, Inoue Masaji contended that "Taiwan is an extension of, and therefore not separate from, Southeast Asia." 422 Inoue and other association leaders thus blurred what they believed to be arbitrary geographic distinctions between East Asia and Southeast Asia. With similar racial and cultural features between aborigines in Taiwan and Southeast Asia, Taiwan was now viewed as part of a more expansive Southeast Asia.

*The Taiwan Industrial Exposition of 1916*

In the same month (April 1916) that Civil Governor Shimomura opened the doors of the Southeast Asia Association's Taiwan Branch in Taipei, the Government-General of Taiwan hosted a "Taiwan Industrial Exposition" (*Taiwan kangyō kyōshinkai*) to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of colonial rule. The exposition aimed to: (1) showcase the economic development of


422. Inoue 1921, 8-18.
Taiwan to Japanese visitors from the metropole and foreign guests from China and Southeast Asia; (2) exhibit samples of agricultural and commercial goods from South China and Southeast Asia to stimulate further Japanese industry and research in the Southern Region; (3) educate the Taiwanese native population about the economic conditions of Japan and its other colonies (Korea and southern Manchuria). Shimomura used the exposition as an opportunity not only to advertise Taiwan's achievements in industry (tea, sugar, camphor), transportation (railways, roads), and hygiene (hospitals and medical research centers) but also to elevate Taiwan's status within Japan's empire as the central intermediary base to the Southern Region.

In addition to inviting distinguished officials, entrepreneurs, and scholars from the metropole—including Gotō Shinpei, Takekoshi Yōsaburō, and Nitobe Inazō—Shimomura also welcomed several officials from China and Southeast Asia. The Taiwan Industrial Exposition Assistance Committee, chaired by Bank of Taiwan president Sakurai Tetsutarō and composed of Taiwanese business elites including Lin Xionzheng, Gu Xianrong, and Chen Zhonghe, hosted Chinese representatives from Shanghai's Commercial Association, the Beijing government's Agricultural and Commercial Bureau, and the Fujian provincial government. The Government-General of Taiwan supplemented regular shipping routes between Japan, Taiwan, and South China and Southeast Asia with additional lines to accommodate its overseas visitors.

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425. Japanese associations that attended the exposition included the Japan Red Cross Society, Women's Patriotic Association, East Asia Association, Southeast Asia Association, Japan Education Association, Japan Mining Industry Association and other agricultural and industrial groups. Taiwan kanyō kyōshinkai kyōsankai, Taiwan kanyō kyōshinkai kyōsankai hōkokusho (Taihoku, 1916), 196-7; Noro Yasushi, "Taiwan kanyō kyōshinkai ni tsuite," Taiwan jihō (March 1916): 4.
426. "Taiwan kanyō kyōshinkai Shina no shuppin; Firipin nōsha," Taiwan nichinichi shinpō (April 7, 1916); Lü 2005, 236-8. For Zhang's travel report on Taiwan, see Hang Zunxu, Taiwan youji (1917), reprinted in 1960 by Taiwan yinhang jingji yanjiushi.
and May 9, a total of 809,830 people attended the exposition.428

The exposition was divided into two main exhibition centers, with Exhibition Center No.1 devoted to Taiwan and Japanese products. The first and second floors displayed 26,000 products from Taiwan, mostly from agriculture and forestry.429 The third floor displayed 16,000 goods from various prefectures in Japan as well as its colonies in Korea and southern Manchuria.430 Exhibition Center No.2 contained a "South China Southeast Asia Hall" with over 60,000 products from South China, Hong Kong, Indochina, Siam, Malaya, Borneo, the Dutch Indies, the Philippines, and even India and Australia (which fit within the exposition's definition of "Southeast Asia"). Taiwan Daily 428.

Among the total attendees, 112,270 Japanese and 171,885 Taiwanese visited Exhibition Center No. 2, which contained products from South China and Southeast Asia. Lü 2005, 232. 429. Exhibition goods were also drawn from the fields of education, health, arts, agriculture, forestry, marine products, food and drink, mining, industry, machines, construction and transportation, and aboriginal culture. "Taiwan kangyō kyōshinkai shuppin sōsū 4-man 9-sen yoten," Taiwan nichinichi shinpō (April 12, 1916); Lü 2005, 219. 430. "Kaiki iyo iyo kippaku seru Taiwan kangyō kyōshinkai" (1916).
advertised the hall as "a global Southeast Asian exhibition on an unprecedented scale." Exposing Japanese visitors to samples of rubber, tin, and timber resources from British Malaya and the Dutch Indies was designed to inspire "interest in the Southern Country" (*Nankoku shumi*) in Japan.431

Because not all Japanese from the metropole had the opportunity to travel and see Southeast Asia for themselves, Taiwan offered a shortcut to the "tropical experience." In addition to the South China Southeast Asia Hall, Exhibition Center No. 2 presented a "Philippine Farmhouse Exhibit" (*Firipin nōsha-kan*). Designed by Matsuoka Fumio, a colonial expert on the Philippine economy, the farmhouse was aimed to introduce visitors to an ostensibly "authentic" Philippine farming life. Besides shipping the necessary materials from the Philippines to make the farmhouse, Matsuoka sent over a Filipino couple and a translator from Manila as part of the exhibit. Living inside the farmhouse, surrounded by goats and coconut trees, the Filipino couple performed music and sold native products to make visitors feel "as if they had traveled to Southeast Asia."432 Next door to the Philippine farmhouse was an "Aborigine Exhibit," which contained a Taiwan aborigine couple (from the Tsou and Atayal tribes) living in an aborigine house. The live exhibition of aborigine natives was by no means new to the Japanese empire. At the 1903 Osaka Industrial Exposition, the Japanese displayed natives from Okinawa, Taiwan, and Hokkaido.433 Yet the Philippine Farmhouse Exhibit was a noteworthy case as the first live spectacle of natives who resided outside Japan's empire. Instead of celebrating the Japanese subjugation of colonized peoples, as in previous exhibitions, the Taiwan Exposition anticipated—if not promoted—the future expansion of Japanese control over natural and human resources in

431. Ibid.
432. "Taiwan kangyō kyōshinkai Shina no shuppin" (1916).
Southeast Asia.

Taiwan's Encyclopedia Bureau

To streamline its overseas research on South China and Southeast Asia, the Government-General of Taiwan established an "Encyclopedia Bureau" (chōsa-ka, literally "Research Bureau") in 1918. As indicated by its English name, which the Japanese chose themselves, this new office compiled and published reference works in collaboration with the Southeast Asia Association's Taiwan Branch, Bank of Taiwan, and South China Southeast Asia Bank. The bureau was headed by colonial officials with previous experience in statistical research, translation, and overseas surveys. Several of its leading researchers, such as Katayama Hidetarō, Haraguchi Takejirō, and Ogawa Naoyoshi (1869–1947), had earlier worked on Taiwan's "old customs surveys" (kyūkan chōsa), which included demographic, legal, and cultural research on Taiwan. A member of the Southeast Asia Association's Taiwan Branch and first head of the Encyclopedia Bureau (1918–9), Katayama Hidetarō had previously conducted economic surveys in South China and Southeast Asia between 1913 and 1917. Kamada Masatake (1885–1935) and Tōgō Minoru (1881–1959), the second and third heads of the bureau, respectively, also had prior overseas research experience.

434. The Encyclopedia Bureau was built upon its predecessor, the Statistics Bureau (tōkei-ka, 1908-18). It was later renamed the Foreign Affairs Bureau (gaiji-ka) in 1935, then the Foreign Affairs Department (gaiji-bu) in 1938. Mizushina Shichisaburō, the first head of the Statistics Bureau, is credited with having imported statistical research methods from Japan to conduct Taiwan's census surveys (tokō chōsa). Suehiro Akira, "Tasha rikai to shite no 'gakuchi' to 'chōsa','' in Iwanami kōza 'Teikoku' Nihon no gakuchi 6: Chiiki kenkyū toshite no Ajia (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2006), 11-2.
436. "Sanjikan Katayama Hidetarō Shinkoku e shukkoku wo meisu," Taiwan sōtokufu kōbun ruisan 2175-14, March 1, 1913; Katayama Hidetarō, Nanyō chōsa fukumeisho (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu gaijibu, 1918). Katayama's research in 1917 centered on the Dutch East India Company's administrative history. For biographical information on Katayama, see Wang 2005, 25-9.
Publications by the Encyclopedia Bureau focused on overseas agriculture, mining, and commerce, but also included current affairs and cultural studies.

During the inter-war period between 1920 and 1935, roughly one-third of its research was devoted to the Southern Region (Nanpō), one-third to South China, and one-third to individual colonies in Southeast Asia. In terms of Southeast Asia, nearly half of the publications were on the Dutch East Indies, one-quarter on the Philippines, and one-tenth on British Malaya. As these statistics illustrate, research on Southeast Asia focused on the Dutch Indies, which maintained an open-door policy to foreign investments—including Japanese rubber industries—until the mid-1930s, and the Philippines, which had the largest overseas Japanese population in the region working in agriculture.

Interestingly, research rarely covered Micronesia in the South Pacific, a former German colony that Japan had occupied as a mandate of the League of Nations after WWI. Encyclopedia Bureau officials defined "Southeast Asia" (Nanyō) as "areas with close commercial and business ties to Japan since WWI centered on the Malay islands."

What constituted "Southeast Asia,"


438. Japan's Foreign Ministry allocated Southeast Asia trade surveys to its consulates and the Commercial and Industrial Ministry, while Taiwan was in charge of research on Southeast Asian businesses. Haraguchi Takejirō, "Nanyō kigyō to Taiwan," *Taiwan jihō* (November 1926), 16.


441. Taiwan sōtokufu kanbō chōsaka, *Nanyō nenkan: Shōwa 4-nen ban* (Taihoku: Nanyō kyōkai
however, continued to change throughout the 1930s and 1940s as evidenced by the evolution of the bureau's encyclopedic *Southeast Asia Almanac* (published four times: in 1929, 1932, 1936, and 1943). The 1932 edition of the *Southeast Asia Almanac* added sections on Brunei and Timor, while the fourth edition of the almanac (1943) expanded the scope of "Southeast Asia" to include Burma, India, New Guinea, Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands.

The Encyclopedia Bureau's central figure was Haraguchi Takejirō (1882–1951), who oversaw its research activities from 1919 through 1936. A graduate of Waseda University in religion and philosophy, Haraguchi had studied abroad in the United States and Germany and learned English, German, French, and Dutch. After resigning from his professorship at Waseda in 1917 over university reforms, he moved to the Government-General of Taiwan as a specialist of economic resources in Southeast Asia. In line with Civil Governor Shimomura's vision of Taiwan as Japan's "southern advance base," Haraguchi advocated that the Encyclopedia Bureau provide information to help realize Taiwan's mission as a stepping stone for southern trade and investment.

The bureau on average employed 40–50 researchers, the majority of whom simultaneously worked for another Taiwan office (in industry, commerce, police, etc). In addition to commissioning outside scholars, journalists, and business experts to conduct overseas research, Haraguchi also consulted reports by Japanese consuls in South China and Southeast Asia, who were concurrently appointed as secretaries of colonial Taiwan. As in other Taiwan offices, the

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442. The *Southeast Asia Almanac* served as an encyclopedia that summarized the history, politics, and economics of each region in Southeast Asia.

443. Taiwan sōtokufu kanbō chōsaka, *Nanyō nenkan: Shōwa 7-nen ban* (Taihoku: Nanyō kyōkai Taiwan shibu, 1932); Taiwan sōtokufu kanbō chōsaka, *Nanyō nenkan: Shōwa 18-nen ban* (Taihoku: Nanyō kyōkai Taiwan shibu, 1943).

444. "Haraguchi Takejirō Nanshi Nanyō seido oyobi keizai chōsa ni kansuru jimu shokutaku," *Taiwan sōtokufu kō bun ruisan* 2888-34, June 1, 1918.


446. Japanese consuls concurrently served as secretaries of the Government-General of Taiwan in Batavia and Singapore (from 1912), Manila (1914), and Haiphong (1920); by 1935, consuls in Hanoi, Saigon, Bangkok, Davao, Medan, and Surabaya all did so. Kondō 1996, 78-9.
majority of officials appointed to the Encyclopedia Bureau were Japanese: a mere 23 Taiwanese were employed between 1919 and 1938. Only after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 did Taiwanese participation as overseas researchers grow.

With his study-abroad experience, Haraguchi stressed the importance of foreign languages for overseas research. In addition to having his colonial researchers take language courses in English, Dutch, and Malay, he also recruited Dutch experts from Java as well as Japanese personnel with linguistic skills in Chinese, French, Dutch, and Malay. Haraguchi hired Pieter Martin Lambach from Java to translate Dutch articles into English, as well as Yamagishi Yūichi from the Japanese consulate in Batavia as the resident Dutch speaker. The Encyclopedia Bureau also enlisted Itakura Masao, a French teacher in the Japanese Naval College, and Itō Kendō, a Buddhist priest of Higashi Honganji, to conduct research on Indochina and South China, respectively.

The daily task of research officials involved reading several dozen Western newspapers—such as the London Times, Manchester Guardian, and New York Times—and periodicals from colonial Southeast Asia published in English, French, Dutch, and Chinese. After translating and compiling an annotated report on articles related to their region of specialty, officials would publish their findings three times a month in the "South China and Southeast Asia Information"
Researchers also translated Western monographs related to colonial administration in law, industry, agriculture, and transportation. Between 1919 and 1945, the bureau's main publication series included *Domestic and Foreign Intelligence (Naigai jōhō)*, *South China Southeast Asia Survey Reports (Minami Shina oyobi Nanyō chōsasho)*, *Overseas Surveys (Kaigai chōsa)*, and the *Southeast Asia Almanac (Nanyō nenkan)*.

Activities were not solely limited to translations, however. Throughout the interwar period, colonial researchers were dispatched overseas to conduct "on-site surveys" (*jitchi chōsa*). Between 1920 and 1925, Haraguchi himself carried out research in the Dutch East Indies, Malaya, Indochina, and Siam on agricultural and mining resources suitable for Japanese investment. The Encyclopedia Bureau also commissioned outside researchers with expertise in the Southern Region. From 1923 to 1927, for example, the bureau hired journalists Miyakawa Jirō (editor-in-chief of Xiamen's *Quanmin xinribao*, a Chinese-language newspaper of the Government-General of Taiwan), Miyajima Saneyuki (editor-in-chief of the *Taiwan News*), and Karasawa Shinobu

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450. The bureau ordered Western books, bibliographies, and guidebooks from Maruzen Books (*Maruzen tosho*), while more specialized materials were obtained with the help of Japanese consulates and companies overseas. Sata 1978, 164-5.

451. For a comprehensive list of titles found in these series, see Yokoi 2008a. By the end of WWII, the Encyclopedia Bureau's library had collected an estimated 14,000 documents, nearly half of which were Dutch-language materials. The library was called the "Library of Southeast Asia Books" and was later renamed the "Southern Region Archive* (Nanpō shiryōkan) in 1942. Gotō 1987, 139-40.

452. On-site survey reports, translations, and edited primary documents each constituted roughly one-third of total publications. Yokoi 2008b, 40.

453. Haraguchi 1926, 8-11. Haraguchi went on several more survey trips abroad, including in 1927 to Hong Kong, the Philippines, Borneo, and Malaya; and in 1936 to Borneo, the Philippines, Dutch Indies, and Malaya to survey appropriate regions for Taiwanese immigration in light of the Japanese wartime policy of encouraging Taiwanese migration overseas. "Haraguchi Takejirō Eiryō kita Borneo, Firipin guntō, Ranryō Indo Oyobi Eiryō Maree ni okeru imin tekichi ni kansuru chōsa jimu wo shokutaku su," *Taiwan sōtokufu kō bun ruisan* 10252-43, February 1, 1937.
Miyakawa, who later became editor of the series *Taiwan, South China, Southeast Asia Pamphlets* (1926–7), published his findings in 1923 on Chinese anti-Japanese boycotts, Japanese educational and economic institutions, and the overseas Taiwanese community in Xiamen. The Encyclopedia Bureau also commissioned Ide Kiwata, a Taiwan customs official from 1916 to 1928, to conduct research on South China in 1923–4 and 1927. Over ten of his reports on South China's economy and politics were published in the bureau series *South China and Southeast Asia Surveys*. Ide later went on in 1928 to serve concurrently as a Taiwan Police Bureau translator and Encyclopedia Bureau researcher until 1935, during which time he published on the Chinese Nationalist Party's "Southern Government" in Guangdong, the overseas Taiwanese in South China, ethnic minorities in southwest China, and South China-Taiwan trade relations.

In sum, the Government-General of Taiwan used the Encyclopedia Bureau to streamline its overseas research on the Southern Region. Publications based on translations and overseas surveys by Haraguchi and his staff became standard reference works for Japanese officials, businessmen, and scholars interested in the region's economy and society. The *Southeast Asia Almanac* (1929–

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455. Miyakawa Jirō, *Amoi hai-Nichi undō no kiroku: Taishō 12-nen 3-gatsu yori 7-gatsu made* (Taihoku: Taiwan nichinichi shinpōsha, 1923); Miyakawa 1923a.
456. "Ide Kiwata kaishoku," *Taiwan sōtokufu kō bun ruisan* 10327-18, December 1, 1924; "Ide Kiwata Shina kokumin seifu no genjō oyobi shōrai ni kansuru chōsa jimu wo shokutakusu, ichiji teate," *Taiwan sōtokufu kō bun ruisan* 10213-18, January 1, 1927.
457. For Ide's biography and publications related to South China and Southeast Asia, see Kaneko Fumio, "Ide Kiwata to Nihon no nanshin seisaku," *Taiwan kingendaishi kenkyū* 3 (1981): 67-85.
458. "Ide Kiwata kanbō chōsaka kenmu wo meisu," *Taiwan sōtokufu kō bun ruisan* 10054-17, October 1, 1928; Ide Kiwata, *Shina no kokumin kakumei to kokumin seifu* (1-2) (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu kanbō chōsaka, 1928); *Shina saikin no jikyoku to bōeki kankei* (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu kanbō chōsaka, 1929); "Minami Shina no Taiwan sekimin ni tsuite," *Taihō geppo* 25:1 (1931): 25-41; "Seinan Shina no dozoku shiryō," *Nanpō dozoku* 2:2 (1933); "Yunnan no dozoku ni tsuite," *Nanpō dozoku* 3:2 (1934); Ide 1935.
43), in particular, became a standard reference work for the Japanese military administration later in occupied Southeast Asia during the Pacific War. In this way, the Encyclopedia Bureau formed the core nucleus of Japanese intelligence on Southeast Asia during the interwar period.

Taihoku Commercial College as a Training Ground for the Encyclopedia Bureau

One of the training grounds and educational pipelines to the Encyclopedia Bureau was Taihoku Commercial College (Taihoku shōgyō kōtō gakkō) established in Taipei in 1919. With its school motto, "South China Southeast Asia, Our Markets" (Nanshi Nanyō waga shijō), the three-year college aimed to train students for research and work in the Southern Region. Within Japan, commercial colleges in Yamaguchi and Nagasaki had been designated to educate future commercial talent for China and Korea. Similarly, Taiwan's first commercial college sought to cultivate Japanese who were equipped with the linguistic skills and knowledge necessary to work on Japanese interests further south. Whereas commercial schools in Japan taught courses on "East Asian Economic Affairs" focused on the Chinese continent, Taihoku Commercial College taught a

459. "Sankō shiryō kizōgata irai no ken," Taiwan sōtokufu kōbun ruisan 11497-12, March 1, 1943.
460. Taiwan Civil Governor Shitamura had conceived of the school in 1915 as a means to cultivate commercial talent for South China and Southeast Asia. Founded in 1919, the school was renamed Taipei Commercial Higher School (Taihoku kōtō shōgyō gakkō) in 1926, and then Taipei Economics Vocational School (Taihoku keizai senmon gakkō) in 1944. Kurosaki Jun'ichi, "Taibei gaodeng shangye xuexiao yu Nanzhi Nanyang yanjiu" (M.A. thesis, Guoli Taiwan shifan daxue lishi yanjiusuo, 2002), 2, 16.
461. Unlike Taiwan's Medical College and Industrial College, where Taiwanese students made up 52 and 20 percent of the student body, respectively, the majority of students at TCC were Japanese (even in 1935 only 6 percent were Taiwanese, or 14 out of 235). Gotō 1987, 136.
specialized course on "South China and Southeast Asian Economic Affairs" in addition to Chinese, Malay, Dutch, French, and German languages. In 1925, the school added courses on "Taiwan Affairs," "Colonial Law," "Colonial Policy," "Ethnology," and "Tropical Health." By 1942, the school offered eight different foreign languages and four southern Chinese dialects (Fuzhou, Xiamen, Shantou, and Guangzhou). Enrollment was initially limited to Japanese students ages seventeen and older, with half the students from the metropole and half from Taiwan. After the passing of the 1922 Education Ordinance, which permitted Taiwanese to study alongside Japanese students, the college began accepting an average of 10 Taiwanese students a year (roughly 12 percent per class).

The Government-General of Taiwan assigned Encyclopedia Bureau officials to teach as professors at the college. Katayama Hidetarō, who served as the first head of the bureau from 1918 to 1920, went on to become the second principal of Taihoku Commercial College from 1920 to 1923. It was quite common for research officials—such as Ogawa Naoyoshi, Maeda Naruyasu, and Sekiguchi Nagayuki—to hold concurrent posts as professors at the school. In turn, the

463. Xu Bing recalled that as Lin Xiongzheng's secretary he had the chance to play golf with Katayama Hidetarō, the second principal of the college. Xu stressed to Katayama the importance of the college teaching the Beijing dialect (Mandarin). With Katayama's approval, Xu recommended the Taiwanese Wang Deqin, his own Mandarin tutor, as the college's first professor of Mandarin. Hsu Boting, Hsu Hsueh-chi et al., Xu Bing, Xu Boting huixianglu (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo, 1996), 19-20. On the establishment of the school's Dutch language course in 1925, see "Nanyō hiyaku niwa warango wo manabuga kanjin: kōshō no Nanyō kengakudan kaeru," Taiwan nichinichi shinpō (July 26, 1925).


466. In 1929, the school stopped accepting Japanese students from the metropole. The specialized course in trade established in 1936 accepted more Taiwanese students. "Taibei gaodeng shangye xuexiao yu Nanzhi Nanyang yanju" (undated), 3.

467. Ogawa, who taught linguistics and ethnology and briefly served as the fourth principal in 1924, later went on to become a professor of Taiwanese linguistics at Taihoku Imperial University.
college's top graduates often entered the Encyclopedia Bureau. The Encyclopedia Bureau, Taihoku Commercial College, and later Taihoku Imperial University (est. 1928), were therefore closely interconnected with personnel migrating among the institutions.

An experienced researcher of the Dutch East Indies and British Malayan economy, Katayama oversaw the founding of the "South China Southeast Asia Economic Studies Society" (Nanshi Nanyō keizai gakkai) in 1922. The society hosted lectures and published research reports, travelogues, and translations by professors and students in its organ, South China Southeast Asia Research (Nanshi Nanyō kenkyū). Beginning in 1926, the school organized an annual "South China Southeast Asia Exhibition" on June 11 for its founding anniversary. The exhibition displayed commercial and cultural objects related to the Southern Region borrowed from colonial offices, customs, and museums. Films, musical performances, and plays were shown, including "Southeast Asian Ports," which was performed in multiple languages: English,

468. As Tanaka Yoshiharu, a graduate of the second class, recalled in the college's post-war alumni volume, five graduates of the third and fourth classes entered the Encyclopedia Bureau while four graduates went to the Industrial Production Promotion Bureau (shokusan-kyoku). Taihoku kōtō shōgyō gakkō dōsōkai ryokusui, Ryokusukai kinen tokushigō (Tokyo: Taihoku kōtō shōgyō gakkō dōsōkai ryokusui honbu, 1978), 37. Among the fourteen researchers on Haraguchi's editorial team for the first edition of the Southeast Asia Almanac (1929), seven had graduated from Taihoku Commercial Higher School, with the others from Waseda, Todai, and the Foreign Ministry. Gotō 1987, 137.

469. As a case in point, in 1930 Haraguchi Takejirō of the Encyclopedia bureau was concurrently hired by Taihoku Imperial University as a lecturer in the Science and Agricultural Studies Department to teach a course on "Southeast Asian Economic Affairs (Nanyō no keizai jijō); "Taihoku teidai ni shin kōza kōshi wa Haraguchi Takejirō shi," Taiwan nichinichi shinpō (June 2, 1930).

470. Katayama conducted overseas surveys of the Dutch East Indies administration system from June 1917 to January 1918. In 1918, he published his findings as "Report on the South Seas Survey" (Nanyō chōsa fukumeisho), "On Java's Industry and Trade" (Jawa no sangyō oyobi bōeki ni tsuite), and "On the Malayan Peninsula" (Malai hantō ni tsuite). Nakamura 1981, 214.

471. "Kōtō shōgyō no Nanshi Nanyō kenkyūkai," Taiwan jihō (March 1922). The journal totaled 148 volumes between 1923 to 1943, including 13 on the Southern Region economy, 21 on China and Manchuria, 27 on Southeast Asia (eight on French Indochina, Siam, India; 10 on the Dutch Indies; nine on the Philippines), 29 on Taiwan, and over 10 travelogues and overseas surveys. Endō 1942, 90; Kurosaki 2002, 107.
German, Malay, Dutch, Chinese, Taiwanese, Thai, and Japanese. In addition, lectures were presented by colonial officials like Haraguchi Takejirō, the Encyclopedia Bureau mainstay, who presented the keynote lecture in 1932 on Japan's "organic relationship" with Southeast Asia.

Taihoku Commercial College provided ample opportunities for its professors and students to travel overseas. Between 1921 and 1942, the Government-General of Taiwan granted 12 professors paid leaves to study abroad or conduct research. Professors Satō Yasuke (colonial law) and Yoshinari Tetsuo (colonial economy), for example, studied in the United States, Britain, and Germany in the 1920s. Between 1927 and 1941, Satō traveled abroad 14 times, including 11 trips to China. Starting in 1921, professors also took third-year students on annual class trips (shūgaku ryōkō) for fieldwork in China and Southeast Asia. Civil Governor Shimomura had first suggested overseas school trips in 1918 as a means for students to gain "first-hand experience" of the Southern Region, which he believed was far less traveled by Japanese than Central and North China. Upon their return to Taiwan, Taihoku Commercial College students and professors wrote up travelogues that they published in the student alumni journal, Wings (Hōyoku), and in the school's research periodicals, South China Southeast Asia Research and Southern Japan's Economy (Nanhō keizai).

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472. Endō 1942, 91; Yokoi Kaori, "Nihon tōchiki no Taiwan ni okeru kōtō shōgyō kyōiku," Gendai Taiwan kenkyū 23 (2002), 84.
473. Haraguchi 1932.
474. Kurosaki 2002, 104, 114-6, 119. Their research was published as journal articles and monographs for the Taiwan Encyclopedia Bureau's series, South China Southeast Asia Research Reports.
475. Satō's trips to China included research surveys of Shanghai, North China, Manchuria, as well as school trips to South China and Hong Kong. His research publications in the school's journal, South China Southeast Asia Research, included: "Criticism of China's Upheaval" (1928), "Criticism of Sun Yat-sen's Academic Theories" (1931), "Yagyū Sōichi and South China Southeast Asia" (1933). Kurosaki 2002, 120-3.
476. Trips ranged from one to three months over the summer. For a comprehensive chart on the 48 school trips between 1921 and 1941, see Yokoi 2002a, 81-2.
477. Shimomura 1918.
478. Southern Japan Economics was established in 1932 as an academic journal by Taihoku Commercial College professors to publish lectures and articles on the Southern Region, with a
The school trips relied on the network of Japanese consulates and businesses established in the Southern Region. Taihoku Commercial College professors and students sailed on Osaka Merchant Company ships and were greeted at each location by Japanese consuls and branch representatives of such firms as the Japanese Residents Society, Bank of Taiwan, Mitsui Bussan, South China Southeast Asia Bank, and Southeast Asia Warehouse. On the school's first overseas trip in 1921, the 28 students listened to lectures by the heads of the Guangzhou Business Company (Kanton jitsugyō kōshi) and Singapore Commercial Exhibition (Shingapōru shōhin chinretsukan) on the commercial situation of their respective cities.479

In Chapter Two, we saw how overseas Taiwanese schools in South China became important nodes for introducing Japanese and Taiwanese society to local Chinese. At the same time, these schools hosted Japanese visitors from Taiwan. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, Okamoto Yōhachirō, the principal of Xiamen Kyokuei School, served as a tour guide for Taihoku Commercial students. In 1923, for example, he took students to observe the Anglo-Chinese Academy, a Japanese hospital, and other sites in Xiamen. He also gave a lecture on the need for further Japanese collaboration with Chinese merchants: the reason why Japanese often failed in business in China, Okamoto contended, was that they relied too much on government aid and were too busy competing with each other instead of working with talented Chinese.480 By September 1924, Okamoto had established a "South China Geography Materials Office" (Nanshi chiri shiryōshitsu) inside Xiamen Kyokuei School, which became a teaching aid for tourists from Japan and Taiwan to learn about the commercial and environmental landscape of South China.481

In Southeast Asia, Taihoku Commercial College students also met with former alumni now total of twenty issues between 1933 and 1943. Kurosaki 2002, 107.
480. Taihoku kōtō shōgyō gakkō gakugeibu, Hōyoku 3 (1924), 117.
481. Amoi kyokuei shoin 1940, 2; Huang 1942, 148.
employed in the region. Among the graduates of the first four classes (1922–6), seven had been hired by the Arima Company (a Japanese firm that imported sugar from the Dutch Indies) for its Java, Surabaya, and Bandung branches, and by Southeast Asia Warehouse Company for its branches in Singapore, Java, and Surabaya.\footnote{482} In 1927, students of the seventh class trip went to Surabaya to observe the work done by alumni Sakai Masatoshi, Ōga Shūzō, and Sugii Mitsuru at Arima Company, and by Kubota Hiroshi and Suzuki at Southeast Asia Warehouse Company.\footnote{483} According to third-year student Nagai Naotoshi, the class was impressed by the alumni's oral fluency of Malay and English and the dexterity with which they handled Dutch, Chinese, and Malay employees and clients.\footnote{484}

Graduates from Taihoku Commercial College often went on to work in Taiwan's government offices, banks, and companies, or for further study at universities in Taiwan and Japan. The majority of graduates between 1922 and 1940 stayed in Taiwan (71 percent) or moved to Japan (16 percent), but as we saw above a handful also worked overseas in China (6 percent), Manchuria (4 percent), Southeast Asia (2 percent), and Korea (1 percent).\footnote{485} During the late 1920s, however, when students struggled to find jobs in Taiwan due to the economic depression, graduates like Moriwaki Akira and Masashi Fukumatsu moved to Southeast Asia and find employment through alumni connections or with subsidies from the Government-General of Taiwan.\footnote{486} With the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 and Pacific War in 1941, an increasing number of Japanese and Taiwanese graduates (an estimated 20 percent) were employed

\footnote{482} Taihoku kōtō shōgyō gakkō gakugeibu, Hōyoku 5 (1926): 281-4.
\footnote{483} Taihoku kōtō shōgyō gakkō gakugeibu, Hōyoku 6 (1927): 65, 70. Kubota would later go on to work in Celebes and Makassar's civil government office during World War II. Sugii Michiru fought for "Burmese independence" during the war; in the post-war period he worked on commercial affairs for the Japanese Embassy in Burma. Taihoku kōtō shōgyō gakkō dōsōkai ryokusui 1978, 74-5.
\footnote{484} Taihoku kōtō shōgyō gakkō gakugeibu, Hōyoku 6 (1927), 70.
\footnote{486} Taihoku kōtō shōgyō gakkō dōsōkai ryokusui 1978, 75, 79.
in South China and Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{487}

As a training ground for economic research on the Southern Region, Taihoku Commercial College sent its top graduates to the Government-General of Taiwan's Encyclopedia Bureau, Bureau of Industry Promotion, and Bureau of Domestic Affairs.\textsuperscript{488} Shiotani Iwazô (1903–80), who graduated in 1926, was a noteworthy example of someone who moved back and forth between Taihoku Commercial College and the Encyclopedia Bureau.\textsuperscript{489} Shiotani became one of Haruguchi's top disciples in the Encyclopedia Bureau from 1927 until 1934 as a specialist in British and Dutch colonial law and economy.\textsuperscript{490} In 1930, Haraguchi sponsored Shiotani to study abroad at Batavia Law University, where he learned Dutch and Malay.\textsuperscript{491} During his time abroad, Shiotani conducted surveys on Japanese farming and commerce in the Dutch East Indies, Borneo, Celebes, Moluccas, and western New Guinea. Upon returning to Taiwan, he published reports on trade relations between Japan and the East Indies, as well as on sugar and fuel production in Southeast Asia.

In 1934, Shiotani returned to his alma matter, Taihoku Commercial College, where he taught as a professor through the end of WWII. In 1935, Shiotani took a one-month trip to the Philippines, Malaya, Siam, Dutch East Indies, and Hong Kong to collect teaching materials for his courses on commercial geography, commodities, and South China Southeast Asian economic affairs.\textsuperscript{492} By 1936, the school had established a one-year "Special Trade Curriculum" (bôeki

\textsuperscript{487} Yokoi 2002a, 86-7; Kurosaki 2002, 221.
\textsuperscript{488} Taihoku kôtô shôgyô gakkô dôsôkai ryokusui 1978, 37.
\textsuperscript{489} For Shiotani's republished diaries while studying abroad in Southeast Asia in the mid-1930s, see Shiotani Iwazô and Gotô Ken'ichi, \textit{Waga seishun no Batavia: Wakaki chôsaman no senzenki Indonesia ryûgakuki} (Tokyo: Ryûkei shosha), 1987.
\textsuperscript{490} Shiotani's first publication as a student was on Java's coffee industry. Shiotani Iwazô, "Java ni okeru kôhî oyobi sono senbai ni tsuite," \textit{Nanshi Nanyô kenkyû} 4 (1927).
\textsuperscript{491} "Tokufu chôsa kain ga Java ni ryûgaku: Zento ui na Shiotani Iwazô kun tokufu saisho no kokoromi," \textit{Taiwan nichinichi shinpô} (January 17, 1930). Shiotani later wrote that Haraguchi had sent him abroad to the Dutch Indies "as a reward for good work" on the first edition of the \textit{Southeast Asia Almanac} (1929), and as further preparation for the compilation of the almanac's second edition. Shiotani 1987, 360-2.
\textsuperscript{492} He also taught the Dutch language and on Taiwan affairs. Kurosaki 2002, 141-2.
senshūka) primarily for Taiwanese students with the aim of educating "commercial warriors" to work in Southeast Asian territories with large overseas Chinese populations. 493 Zheng Ximing, a Taiwanese student who took Shiotani's course on "Southeast Asia Economic Theories," recalled Shiotani telling students to "become active in overseas trade in the Southern Region." Another Taiwanese student, Xie Xirui, recalled that Shiotani encouraged him to head south as a Southeast Asia Association intern instead of studying in Tokyo, and even agreed to be Xie's guarantor. 494

As Taiwan's first commercial higher school, Taihoku Commercial College equipped graduates with economic knowledge about Taiwan and the Southern Region. While Tokyo Commercial College and Yamaguchi Commercial College trained students in Japan for work on trade and industry in China, Taihoku Commercial College tailored its curriculum and extracurricular activities for students to gain research and firsthand travel experience in South China and Southeast Asia. The college thus became a central training ground for prospective research officials in the Taiwan government and business employees of overseas Taiwan and Japanese companies.

Taihoku Imperial University and the Institutionalization of "Southeast Asian History"

In 1928, two years after Korea established its first colonial university, Keijō Imperial University (Keijō teikoku daigaku), the Government-General of Taiwan founded Taihoku Imperial University (Taihoku teikoku daigaku). Dissatisfied with Taiwan higher education limited solely to the vocational fields of medicine, commerce, and agriculture, Governor-General Izawa Takio (1869–1949, in office 1924–6) had conceived of the new university as a humanities and natural

493. In 1943, the Specialized Trade Program was renamed "Specialized Southern Region Economics Program" (Nanpō keizai senshūka). Ye 2010, 41.
What distinguishes the university is its Faculty of Literature and Politics curriculum in Southeast Asian History [Nanyō-shigaku] and Folk Customs and Anthropology [dozoku jinruigaku], unprecedented in other universities. Psychology is focused on ethnological psychology [minzoku shinrigaku], while linguistics takes East Asia and Southeast Asia as its teaching materials.... As for the Faculty of Science and Agriculture, it promotes research centered on Taiwan of the tropics [nettai] and sub-tropics [a-nettai], also unheard of in other schools.  

Izawa appointed his close friend Shidehara Taira (1870–1953) as head of the university planning committee in 1926. A former professor of East Asian history and an education administrator in Japan and Korea who in 1928 became Taihoku Imperial University president, Shidehara highlighted the relevance of studying Southeast Asian history. In his 1926 article titled "The Academic Value of Taiwan," he referred to the "experience of Japanese overseas expansion in Southeast Asia" that had culminated in seventeenth-century "Japan-towns" (Nihon-machi) throughout the Philippines, Java, Siam, and Vietnam: "To study Southeast Asia is thus akin to tracing back the proud past of the Japanese people." With Taiwan geographically situated "as Japan's sole foothold in Southeast Asia," Shidehara concluded that the island was the perfect base from which to study the peoples of South China and Southeast Asia—through ethnology, linguistics, literature, history—and their environment by the study of botany, zoology, medicine, and meteorology.  

As Izawa and Shidehara stated above, what distinguished Taihoku Imperial University from its counterparts in Japan was its institutionalization of Southeast Asian studies. Since the

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1910s, history departments in Japan had conventionally offered three concentration majors: "Japanese history" (Koku-shi, literally "national history"), "East Asian history" (Tōyō-shi, focused on China and Korea), and "Western History" (Seiyō-shi). Taihoku Imperial University's History Department replaced Western history instead with two new concentrations in "Southeast Asia History" and "Folk Customs and Anthropology." Murakami Naojirō (1868–1966) and Iwao Seiichi (1900–88), who were appointed as the university's first professors of Southeast Asian history, went on to become Japan's leading historians of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Southeast Asia and Taiwan up through the post-WWII period.

Figures 3.5-3.6: 1929 Taiwan Daily article on Murakami Naojiro and his lecture course on "Southeast Asian Studies" [Nanyō-gaku] (left); Postcard of Entrance to Taihoku Imperial University (right)

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499. Murakami also became chair of the history department from 1929 until 1935, when he returned to Japan. Iwao taught at Taihoku Imperial University from 1929 until 1945.
Both scholars had graduated from Tokyo Imperial University's history department (1895 and 1925, respectively) with formal concentrations in Japanese history and research interests in Japanese overseas relations with colonial Southeast Asia. Murakami, in particular, had received an eclectic history education at Tokyo Imperial University (1892–5) and in Europe (1899–1902). Having studied with the German historian, Ludwig Riess (1861–1928), who taught at Tokyo Imperial University from 1887 to 1902, Murakami was influenced by Riess's research on Japanese-European relations and the history of Western Christianity in Asia, including the period of Dutch colonial rule in Taiwan (1624–62).\(^{500}\) After studying abroad in Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands for three years, Murakami returned to Japan in 1902 where he taught history at Tokyo Imperial University and later served as president of Tokyo Foreign Language College and Tokyo Music College.\(^{501}\)

Taihoku Imperial University provided Murakami with the opportunity to conduct further archival research in Europe on colonial Southeast Asia. After Murakami was hired in 1928 as professor of Southeast Asian history, Shidehara Taira—now university president—granted him a year of paid-leave as an "overseas researcher" to gather research and teaching materials in the Netherlands, Britain, Spain, Portugal, and Java between 1928 and 1929.\(^{502}\) In 1929, Murakami's younger colleague, Iwao Seiichi, was also granted a research trip (of 20 months) to the Netherlands, Britain, and Java.\(^{503}\) With their extensive archival experience in Europe,

501. Murakami also went on official research trips to Taiwan in 1896-8, Macao and the Philippines (1906), the United States (1915), and again to Taiwan (1923). "Murakami Naojiro fushiryō hensan ni kansuru jimu wo shokutaku su," Taiwan sōtokufu kōbun ruisan 3752-38, July 1, 1923, 190-1.
502. Shidehara established an "overseas researcher program" (1926-9, modeled on that of Taihoku Commercial College) for 18 humanities and 19 science professors before they began teaching. Ye 2010, 45-7.
503. "Iwao jokyōju chonin," Taiwan nichinichi shinpō (1929); "Iwao Seiichi nin Taihoku teikoku daigaku kyōju, jo kōtōkan Gotō, honpō 12-kyūhō kashi, bunseigakubu kinmu wo meisu,
Southeast Asia, Taiwan, and Japan, Murakami and Iwao collectively pioneered the academic study of Japanese and Taiwanese relations with Southeast Asia during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.  

At Taihoku Imperial University, Murakami and Iwao drew on Japan's pre-modern history of "southern advance" to help legitimate twentieth-century Japanese expansion in Southeast Asia. First, Murakami traced Japan's "southern advance" back to the so-called Japanese "pirates" of the late Ashikaga period (1336–1573) who periodically raided the coasts of China and Southeast Asia. In particular, Murakami focused on late sixteenth-century Japanese attempts to occupy the Philippines and Taiwan. Drawing on Spanish documents from the early colonial Philippines (1571–90s), he examined heated contestations between the Spanish and Japanese over control of Manila. In his 1929 article in the *Taiwan Daily*, "Japanese Expansion in Southeast Asia Before the Kan'ei Seclusion [Laws of 1639]," Murakami described how 600 Japanese warriors, led by "Pirate General Shioko," had joined forces with over 60 Chinese pirate ships to attack Manila in 1574. Although the Spanish were able to drive back Shioko's men with the help of reinforcements, over a decade later the Japanese returned. Citing Manila magistrate reports to the Spanish King that he discovered in Seville's "Indian Archives," Murakami wrote that the Japanese lord of Hirado domain sent ships to Manila in 1587 with the threat of war unless the Spanish submitted. By the early 1590s when news of Japanese activity in the Philippines had spread to Toyotomi Hideyoshi, Hideyoshi dispatched an envoy, Harada Magoshichirō, to Manila demanding that the Spanish pay tribute or else face armed attacks. Refusing to accept Hideyoshi's demands, the Manila magistrate sent several Franciscan envoys in 1593 to negotiate with Hideyoshi and stall for more time.

Iwao called this period the "beginning of the early modern" (kinsei shotō). Iwao Seiichi, *Nanyō Nihon-machi no kenkyū* (Nan-A bunka kenkyūjo, 1940), 1.

Reeling from his failed invasion of Korea, by 1594 Hideyoshi gave up plans to attack Manila. Yet regardless of Japan's aborted plans to conquer the Philippines, Murakami pointed to the late sixteenth century as the high point of Japanese trade and migration between the two regions.

Second, Murakami and Iwao used European archival materials to document the wave of Japanese migration to Southeast Asia in the early 17th-century as a precursor of overseas migration in the twentieth century. Based on Dutch materials in Batavia's Regional Archives and the Hague's National Archives that he collected in 1928–9, Murakami published an article, "Jakarta's Japanese," in the 1934 *Taihoku Imperial University History Department's Annual Bulletin*.506 Murakami pointed to two waves of Japanese migration to Jakarta: between 1610 and 1620, and from the 1630s to the 1650s. In 1609, the Dutch had established trading ties with the Tokugawa government and built a commercial house in Hirado (Nagasaki). In 1613 and 1615, Dutch East India Company ships left Hirado with 70 and 60 Japanese passengers, respectively, the majority of whom were warriors. When the ships landed in Java, the Japanese were conscripted to serve in the Dutch army. At the time, the Dutch East India Company sought to increase Jakarta's population by encouraging Chinese and Japanese migration not for labor purposes but for mobilization in warfare. Murakami cited letters sent by the Batavia governor-general to the chief of the Hirado commercial house in 1618 requesting 25 more Japanese youth who could be used to fight in war.507 With the 1621 Tokugawa prohibition of exporting Japanese overseas, the number of Japanese soldiers in Jakarta soon after declined. Japanese ships were still allowed to trade in Southeast Asia, however; and with the Tokugawa Seclusion Laws (1633–9) that forbade Christianity in Japan, this time several tens of Japanese Christians emigrated to Jakarta. Drawing on name registers and marriage certificates from the Batavia and Hague archives, Murakami also


507. Murakami 1934a, 172.
found records of inter-marriage among Japanese, Dutch, and local natives: 33 Japanese
intermarried between 1619 and 1630, and 44 Japanese intermarried from 1635 to 1655.508

Murakami and Iwao also used archival Dutch records to research perhaps the most
heroized, if not mythical, Japanese figure related to Southeast Asia, Yamada Nagamasa (1590–
1630). Since the rise in "southern advance fever" in the 1910s, Yamada had been celebrated in
Japan as a pioneer of Japanese trade in Siam and a military leader who became a trusted aid of the
Siam king during the first-quarter of the seventeenth century.509 Because Murakami felt that
Japanese sources from the Tokugawa period (1600–1867) on Yamada "contained narratives that
read more like novels," he drew on Dutch records from the Hague Archives in an attempt to verify
Yamada's historical existence in his 1934 article, "Yamada Nagamasa Who Emerges in Dutch
Historical Records."510 The standard work in English, Sir Ernest Satow's Notes on the Intercourse
Between Japan and Siam (1885), had included material about Yamada based on the 1640 Dutch
book by Jeremias van Vliet, History of Siam Kings; but Murakami wished to use even earlier
Dutch records that were contemporary with Yamada's life events in the 1620s.511 Based on his
hunch that the Dutch commercial house in Hirado and Ayuthia commercial house (Siam) might
have exchanged letters related to Yamada, Murakami found over ten such letters during his

508. Ibid., 176, 178.
509. Yano Tōru has written a critical article debunking the historical veracity of Yamada
Nagamasa's "myth" largely based on the Ikoku Nikki (Diary of Foreign Countries), contending that
his Japanese name never appeared in the Dutch sources (as Nisaeijimon donne, or Nagamasa
donne), nor in Thai sources. Yano Tōru, "'Yamada Nagamasa' shinwa no kyōmō," in Tōnan Aija to
Nihon (Tokyo: Kōbundō, 1991), 64-86.
510. The one exception was the Japanese primary source, Notes on Foreign Countries (Ikoku
Nikki), which Murakami, Satow, and others relied on as a credible contemporary source. Murakami
listed Shamukoku Yamadashi kōbōki, Shamukoku jūdō gunki, and Yamada Hitoshi saemon kiji as
examples of "novelistic" sources, but did not provide their publication dates. Murakami Naojirō,
"Oranda shiryou ni arawaretaru Yamada Nagamasa," in Kinen kōenshū dai-3 shū (Taihoku: Taihoku
teikoku daigaku, 1934), 3.
511. The edition used by Sir Ernest Satow was the 1663 French translation of Jeremias van
Vliet's work, Relations historique du Royaume de Siam (Paris, 1663). During his research leave in
the Netherlands in the early 1930s, Iwao Seiichi found the original Dutch copy in the Hague
National Archives and brought back a photographed copy to Taiwan. Murakami 1934b, 3, 9.
research trip to the Hague National Archives. Dated between 1623 and 1632, the letters included
details of the deerskin, whale skin, and sapwood that the Japanese person, "Opra" (Obura),
imported from Siam to Japan, at times aided by Dutch ships and laborers. Murakami concluded:

Since "Opra" [in the Siamese language] refers to [the second-highest rank of]
leader, there is no doubt that the Japanese "Opra" here refers to Nagamasa. As Sir
Ernest Satow previously pointed out, if we compare Dutch documents with Notes of
Foreign Countries [a Japanese source], it is clear that "Opra" and Nagamasa
[Yamada] are the same person.512

While later Japanese historians in the post-WWII period, such as Yano Tōru, have questioned the
credibility of equating the Siamese word "Opra" with that of Yamada's name, Murakami's research
provided further historical ammunition to cement Yamada's heroic status within Japanese
studies.513

After returning to Taiwan from his 20-month research trip to Europe and the Dutch Indies
in 1932, Iwao Seiichi began his magnum opus on early seventeenth-century Japanese trade and
migration in the Philippines, Indochina, Cambodia, and Siam.514 Drawing on travelogues, ship
logbooks, and commercial reports that he collected in European and colonial Southeast Asian
archives, Iwao published "The Rise of Fall of Southeast Asia's Japan-Towns" in three installments
in Taihoku Imperial University History Department's Annual Bulletin between 1935 and 1937.515

512. Murakami listed the six ranks of leadership status in Siam, which the Dutch at that time
wrote as "Oija, Opra, Olaangh, Ockan, Oman, and Opan," with Oija as the highest-ranked.
According to Notes from Foreign Countries, Nagamasa had risen to the rank of Opra by 1626, and
thus was called "Opra Senap homophobic Raxa Muntrij." Murakami 1934b, 6-7.
513. Yano Tōru argues Yamada's Japanese name never appeared in the Dutch sources (as
Nisaeijimon or Nagamasa), nor in any Thai sources. According to Yano, historical studies of
Yamada began in the 1890s in Shizuoka. By the 1910s, with the boom in "southern advance" fever
in Japan, the history of Yamada in Siam had become part of mainstream historical scholarship.
514. "Iwao Seiichi nin Taihoku teikoku daigaku kyōju, jo kōtōkan Gotō, honpō 12-kyūhō kashi,
bunseigakubu kinmu wo meisu, Nan'yō-shigaku kōza tannin wo meisu, kōza shokumuhō 990 yen
kashi," Taiwan sōtokufu kōbu ruisan 10085-134, 1936, 981.
515. Iwao used European records from the Dutch Colonial Archives (Koloniaal Archief), the
He chronicled the "red-seal ships" system established by Tokugawa Ieyasu in 1604, which granted "red-seal" certificates to over 80 officials and merchants (including resident Chinese and Westerners) with the right to conduct overseas foreign trade. Based on Iwao's statistics, 321 red-seal ships traded in the ports of Zhangzhou, Taiwan, Indochina, Cambodia, Siam, Malaya, Malacca, Brunei, the Philippines, and the Molucca islands between 1604 and 1634. With an average of 200 people aboard each ship, an estimated 63,780 Japanese went abroad between 1600 and 1640, or approximately 100,000 travelers to Southeast Asia from the late-sixteenth to mid-seventeenth centuries.\(^{516}\)

Iwao classified the Japanese overseas communities in Southeast Asia, called "Japan-towns," into those solely consisting of Japanese and those mixed together with foreigners. The former were located in Dilao, San Migel, Faifo, Tourane, Pinhalu, Phnom-Penh, and Ayuthia; the latter, in Taiwan, Macao, Tonkin, Amboina, Banda, Ternate, Makian, Tidore, Batavia, Bantam, Malacca, Patani, Ligor, and even India.\(^{517}\) Iwao focused his case-studies on the Japan-towns in the Philippines, Siam, Cambodia, and Vietnam, with a total population of 7,000 to 10,000 at their peak.\(^{518}\) He attributed the rise of Japan-towns overseas to (1) the ability of Japanese migrants "to mutually cooperate with each other for economic interest, spiritual comfort, and military protection"; (2) the convenient conditions for trade in overseas markets; and (3) the preference of colonial rulers (e.g., Spanish, Dutch) to group foreigners together in fixed residential areas (i.e.,

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517. Ibid., 30.
518. The Japan-towns in the Philippines were the largest with an estimated population of 3,000 at their peak. Iwao 1940, 357.
Japanese in Japan-towns and Chinese in China-towns).\textsuperscript{519} Iwao attributed the "decline" of Japan-towns and overseas migration in Southeast Asia, however, to the enactment of the Tokugawa "closed country" policies in 1633–9, which prohibited travel overseas.

In this way, Taihoku Imperial University advanced academic research on Japan's historical relations with Taiwan and Southeast Asia. Although it was rare for scholars like Murakami and Iwao to explicitly tie their historical research on seventeenth-century Southeast Asia to contemporary Japanese interests in the region, their studies of Japan's "first southern advance" in Taiwan and Southeast Asia provided historical precedence for future overseas expansion and helped extend the Japanese imagination for a southern empire that included not only East Asia but continental and insular Southeast Asia. As we will see in Chapters Four and Five, Taihoku Imperial University professors not only in history but also ethnology and the natural and medical sciences were called upon by the Government-General of Taiwan to aid the Imperial Navy and Army in Japan's occupation of South China and Southeast Asia. Japanese surveys, ethnography, and conceptual mappings in Taiwan of the Southern Region that began in the 1920s and 1930s thus later became intricately tied to Japan's military southern advance in the Sino-Japanese and Pacific wars.

\textsuperscript{519} Ibid., 345-6.
Conclusion

During the interwar period Japanese colonial officials and scholars extended their research focus beyond South China toward Southeast Asia. In conjunction with the Southeast Asia Association, Taihoku Commercial College, Taihoku Imperial University, and its own Encyclopedia Bureau, the Government-General of Taiwan amassed a wealth of pre-WWII surveys on South China and Southeast Asia that, according to the post-war historian Yano Tōru, surpassed those produced in the metropole.\footnote{521} Even Western colonial governments in Southeast Asia, such as the

\footnote{520. From Iwao Seiichi, "Nanyō Nihonmachi no seisui 1," Taihoku teikoku daigaku bunsei gakubu shigakuka kenkyū nenpō dai-2 shū (1935).}

\footnote{521. According to Yano Tōru, the Japanese pioneer of "southern advance" history in the 1970s, during the interwar period the Japan's Foreign Ministry and Agricultural-Commercial Ministry had also begun conducting economic surveys of Malaya, Borneo, and Java. Yet he believes that those}
U.S. Philippines, paid attention to the Taiwan government's research activities and often requested copies of their English publications.\textsuperscript{522} Despite the 1920s economic depression in Japanese trade and investment in Southeast Asia, which diminished "southern advance fever" in the metropole from 1924 to 1936, Japanese colonial officials in Taiwan continued to subsidize Japanese businesses in, and research on, Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{523} Reports by the Government-General of Taiwan not only were published in the Taiwan media but also were re-distributed to Japanese ministries, companies, banks, and research institutions back in the metropole. In 1921, colonial authorities joined the "National Economic Research Association," whose office was located in the South Manchurian Railway Company's East Asian Economic Research Bureau in Tokyo. As a participating member, the Government-General of Taiwan was required to mail a copy of each of its publications to the association in Tokyo.\textsuperscript{524}

The geographical position of Taiwan, situated at the intersection of East Asia and Southeast Asia, was malleable to the interests of Japanese colonial officials and scholars. Just as the Government-General of Taiwan advocated for the island as an entryway into South China at the turn of the twentieth century, in the 1910s Japanese colonial leaders began envisioning Taiwan as Japan's tropical stepping stone for economic advance into Southeast Asia. Government-General of Taiwan publications on Southeast Asia reveal how Japanese colonialists used Taiwan—its physical location, people, and history—as one of the main geographical and cultural reference points for understanding the rest of Southeast Asia. Tropical products, diseases, and even aborigine natives were analyzed and compared in relation to Taiwan. As Uchida, Tōgō, and other Japanese colonial

\textsuperscript{conducted by Taiwan's Research Bureau were far superior both in quality and quantity. Yano [1975] 2009, 240. 
522. See for example, Department of State. U.S. Consulate, Taihoku, Formosa, Miscellaneous Correspondence Received, February 1909 to January 1910. United States Consular Records for Taipei, Taiwan, Compiled ca. 1887–1912. 
524. By 1937, the association had 137 participating research institutions. Wang 2005, 85-6.}
leaders contended, Taiwan's location and tropical experience provided Japanese colonialists with an advantage over their metropole counterparts when it came to studying the rest of the Southern Region.

After WWI, the Japanese term "Nanyō" referred to both Micronesia (which the Japanese had just occupied) and continental and insular Southeast Asia. While in the metropole Japanese Navy officials, journalists, and scholars turned their attention to Micronesia, or what they called "the Inner Nanyō" (Uchi Nanyō), the majority of Japanese overseas research in Taiwan focused on "the Outer Nanyō" (Soto Nanyō), or what is more or less today's Southeast Asia. In this way, Japanese conceptions and visions of the "south" differed throughout the Japanese empire depending on where one lived. Moreover, geographical definitions of "South China" and "Southeast Asia" remained elastic and continued to change throughout the 1930s and 1940s. Japanese colonial officials and scholars often grouped "South China Southeast Asia" as one interconnected and extended "Southern Region" decades before the Army-led Tokyo government officially declared Southeast Asia as part of Japan's "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" in 1940.
CHAPTER FOUR
Taiwan in Japan's Wartime Occupation of South China (1938–1945)

Introduction

With the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937, the Japanese Army invaded and occupied the major cities of North China (Beijing, Tianjin) and then the KMT capital of Nanjing (Central China) by the end of the year. But continuous rivalries and competing priorities between the Imperial Army and Navy resulted in little consensus over overarching Japanese strategic goals for the China theater in 1938. While the Army's strategic priorities lay in North and Central China and defending against the Soviet Union in the Russian-Manchurian border, the Navy wished to advance farther into South China, especially the southernmost island of Hainan that strategically lay at the cross section of Guangdong, British Hong Kong, and French Indochina in the South China Sea. Yet the Army initially remained hesitant about a Japanese invasion of the South China coast out of fear of instigating a military confrontation with the Western imperial powers over the South China Sea. Only after the British and U.S. began shipping military supplies

525.  Chiang Kai-shek's KMT government initially relocated its capital farther south to Wuhan (until it was seized by Japan in August 1938), and then to Chongqing in southwest China in October 1938. For Japanese atrocities committed in the infamous "Nanjing Massacre" of December 1937, see Joshua A. Fogel, The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).
527.  The Chinese were well aware of Hainan's strategic importance for Japan's southern advance and called for greater Chinese naval reinforcements on the island. The journalist Chen Yuan remarked in 1936 that Hainan's strategic value was comparable to that of Kyūshū in southwest Japan. The island's Yulin port, in particular, was a potential naval base for Japanese expansion into Southeast Asia. Chen Yuan, "Ribenren zhi zhushi Hainandao," Haishi yuekan 10:6 (1936), 29-34.
from Hong Kong into mainland China to support Chiang Kai-shek's KMT forces did the Army support the Navy's occupation of Xiamen in May 1938 in an attempt to form a military blockade of the South China coast.\textsuperscript{528}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure41.jpg}
\caption{1940 Map of Hainan (island in middle) in relation to Taiwan (top-right)\textsuperscript{529}}
\end{figure}

It was not only the Navy, however, that advocated for the further military occupation of South China coastal regions including Shantou, Guangzhou, and Hainan. With the 1936 appointment of the retired admiral Kobayashi Seizō (1877–1962, in office 1936–40) as Taiwan's first military governor-general since 1919, the Government-General of Taiwan became a key ally


\textsuperscript{529} Gaimushō tsūshōkyoku, \textit{Kainantō nōgyō chōsa hōkoku} (Tokyo: Nihon kokusai kyōkai, 1940).
for the Navy's strategic plans in South China. From mid- to late-1938, Japanese colonial officials in Taiwan drafted advisory reports to the Home Ministry with regard to the future occupation of South China in which the Government-General would be entrusted with the region's civil administration, while the Navy and Army remained in charge of military affairs. The Government-General of Taiwan even proposed a "Southern Region Government-General" (Nanpō sōtokufu) in late-1938 that would unify the regions of Hainan, Micronesia, and Taiwan under the rule of the Taiwan governor-general. Japanese colonial officials and entrepreneurs in Taiwan in fact had economic ambitions in Hainan and Southeast Asia that were slightly different from those of the Navy's military concerns. In order to expedite the development of Taiwan's heavy industry (e.g., shipbuilding and metals) to support Japan's war effort, the Government-General of Taiwan sought overseas administration over tropical regions like Hainan that could supply Taiwan with the necessary raw materials.

Because Western arms and munitions continued to be supplied to the KMT through South China and Southeast Asia, the Army finally agreed to the Navy's demands to occupy coastal Guangdong (October 1938) and Hainan (January 1939). However, the Government-General of Taiwan's greater ambitions for direct administrative authority over occupied South China were impeded by the Home Ministry, which established a "Rise Asia Office" (Kōa-in, 1939) to unify Japan's China policy under Army and Navy rule. Although the Government-General of Taiwan did not directly lead the administration of Shantou, Guangzhou, Xiamen, and Hainan (the former two were ruled by the Army, the latter two by the Navy), both military services actively relied on the

Colonial rule under military governors-general in Taiwan would continue until the end of WWII. For examples of Taiwanese opposition toward the re-militarization of the Taiwan Government-General, see May 1936 articles in the Taiwanese-owned newspaper, Taiwan xinminbao, cited in Kondō 1996, 27.

For more on how the Government-General of Taiwan used its semi-public, semi-private Taiwan Development Company (Taiwan takushoku kaisha, 1936) to secure raw materials—iron ore, rubber, oil, hemp, and timber—in Hainan and Southeast Asia, see Schneider 1998a and Chung 2007.
island's Japanese and Taiwanese personnel to help govern the occupied regions. Because of the Japanese military's unfamiliarity with South China's climate, people, and customs, the Army and Navy enlisted the cooperation of military, economic, and cultural personnel from Taiwan—both Japanese and Taiwanese—to help build infrastructure, provide medical treatment, grow food for troops, and disseminate pro-Japanese education and propaganda. Drawing on decades of research on, as well as political and economic ties to, South China, the Government-General of Taiwan mobilized its Japanese and Taiwanese subjects (some who were willing volunteers, others no doubt coerced) to help pacify the local Chinese population and exploit the region's economic resources.  

This chapter first introduces the Government-General of Taiwan's relations with Fujian and Hainan from the 1920s leading up to the Sino-Japanese War. Japanese colonial officials in Taiwan were instrumental in compiling economic and ethnographic intelligence on the two provinces, especially at a time when few Japanese officials in the metropole (including the military) paid attention to Hainan's economic or strategic potential. Government-General of Taiwan publications on Hainan from the 1920s and 1930s later became key reference materials for the Navy administration. In addition, the 1930s witnessed cooperative political and economic exchanges between the Government-General of Taiwan and the Fujian provincial government even as diplomatic Sino-Japanese relations became increasingly tense with the Japanese occupation of Manchuria and further incursions in North China.

I then turn to the international context of the 1930s where the expiration of Japan's naval armaments treaties with the Anglo-American powers resulted in increasing ambitions by the

532. The question of interpreting Taiwanese and Chinese agency is quite difficult as this chapter mostly relies on Japanese colonial sources that reflect the perspectives of the Government-General of Taiwan, Army, or Navy officials. When possible, I have incorporated Chinese-language newspaper reports and post–World War II oral histories by Taiwanese and Chinese witnesses or participants.
Japanese Navy for southern expansion. With a former admiral, Kobayashi Seizō, appointed as Taiwan's military governor-general in 1936 and a Naval Military Office installed in Taipei two years later, the Government-General of Taiwan worked increasingly closer with the Navy to develop, and later implement, military and economic initiatives in South China, especially Hainan. Indeed, Taiwan became not only a geographical staging area for Japan's military invasion of Guangzhou and Hainan in 1938–39 but also the colonial blueprint for administering and developing occupied South China.\footnote{Chung Shu-ming has contended that the Government-General of Taiwan "exported" its "Taiwan colonial experience" \textit{(Taiwan shokuminchi no keiken)} with the aim of developing Hainan into a "second Taiwan." Chung Shu-ming 2007.} In cooperation with the Japanese Army and Navy, Government-General of Taiwan officials deployed Taiwanese personnel whom they described as having the "cultural and regional knowledge" suited to working in coastal South China. Particularly in Hainan, the Government-General of Taiwan dispatched thousands of Taiwanese farmers to work as farmers, laborers, and military auxiliaries. Japanese colonial reports claimed that the Taiwanese were not only acclimated to the tropical environment but also could master the Hainanese language quicker than their Japanese counterparts since it was similar to the Taiwanese language.

I argue that despite its limited administrative powers over wartime South China, the Government-General of Taiwan's institutions and personnel—including its overseas Taiwanese subjects—were instrumental in Japan's military occupation and economic reconstruction of coastal Fujian, Guangdong, and Hainan. In contrast to previous studies of wartime China that have focused on occupied North China (Beijing, Tianjin) and Central China (Nanjing, Shanghai, Wuhan) as sites of Chinese collaboration and resistance vis-a-vis the Japanese military administration, this chapter examines how the Japanese military and Government-General of Taiwan's attempts to mobilize the Taiwanese overseas as imperial intermediaries engendered
multiple, often conflicting layers of imperial relations that were not only unique to South China but also had devastating consequences for Sino-Taiwanese relations in the post-war period.\textsuperscript{534}

\textit{The Government-General of Taiwan's Pre-War Relations with Fujian and Hainan}

The Government-General of Taiwan initiated economic and strategic interests in Fujian, Guangdong, and Hainan decades before Japan's military occupation of South China in 1938–9. Since the turn of the twentieth-century, Japanese colonial officials had extended banking, shipping, education, and other Taiwan-based economic and cultural institutions into Fujian and Guangdong. During the 1910s and 1920s, when various Chinese warlord factions ruled over Fujian, the Government-General of Taiwan made efforts to cultivate cooperation ties with local Chinese authorities.\textsuperscript{535} Even with Chiang Kai-shek's KMT unification of China during the Nanjing Decade (1927–37), Japanese officials in Taiwan continued to try to draw Fujian closer to Japan's political


\textsuperscript{535} For example, from February to March 1924, Fujian military officials visited to survey Japanese colonial institutions and resources in Taipei and central and southern Taiwan. In April 1924 the Chaoshan railway representative Zhang Gongliang and others went to observe the conditions of Taiwan's railway development for ten days. Two years later in April, Xiamen navy officials and police officials visited Taiwan for two weeks to observe Taiwan's colonial police system, and in October 1927 Fujian military officials went through the overseas Taiwanese Xi Lüxi's introduction to visit the Government-General of Taiwan and Taiwan Military headquarters. Taiwan sōtokufu, \textit{Taiwan sōtokufu jimu seiseki teiyō} (30) (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu minseikyoku, 1924), 200-1; \textit{Taiwan sōtokufu jimu seiseki teiyō} (32) (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu minseikyoku, 1926), 106; \textit{Taiwan sōtokufu jimu seiseki teiyō} (33) (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu minseikyoku, 1927), 106.
sphere of influence.\textsuperscript{536}

After Chiang Kai-shek installed Chen Yi (1883–1950), a high-ranking KMT official, as the Fujian Governor in 1934, the Government-General of Taiwan reached out to Chen to strengthen political and economic ties between Fujian and Taiwan. A graduate in 1920 of Japan's Army University and married to a Japanese wife, Chen Yi held close ties with Japan. With Fujian financially insolvent and heavily reliant on food imports from outside the province, Chen looked to Taiwan as an important model and resource for reviving Fujian's economy through agricultural and industrial reforms.

In July 1934, Captain Sugaji Hikojirō of the Japanese Navy met with the Fujian government official Lin Zhiyuan to discuss the importing of Japanese technology and capital from Taiwan to Fujian. Lin obtained a loan from the Bank of Taiwan for a Fuzhou paper company and Japanese agricultural experts from Taiwan for a three-year agricultural reform plan.\textsuperscript{537} Four months later, the Government-General of Taiwan invited Chen Yi to dispatch a "Taiwan Investigation Team" (Taiwan kaochatuan) of 22 Fujian officials and engineers to survey Taiwan for 10 days. Led by Chen Ticheng, the Fujian Government Construction Minister, the team studied Taiwan's Monopoly Bureau, agricultural research centers, sugar companies, tea factories, and hydroelectric power station.\textsuperscript{538} According to the Taiwan Daily, Chen Ticheng admired Taiwan's transportation infrastructure and hoped to emulate Taiwan's agricultural production of rice and sugar.\textsuperscript{539}

\textsuperscript{536} Wang 2009.
\textsuperscript{537} Matsuura 2010, 281.
\textsuperscript{538} Chen Ticheng later published his survey of Taiwan as Reports from Our Investigation of Taiwan (Taiwan kaocha baogao, 1935). See Fujian sheng zhengfu 1935.
\textsuperscript{539} "Fukken kōsatsudan Amoi de Taiwan shisatsu no kansō happyō: kyōiteki hattatsu wa seifu no jitsuryoku to Nihonjin no nintai, jū bun na shikin ni yoru; Shina seifū wa jinmin wo semeru nomi," Taiwan nichinichi shinpō (December 1, 1934).

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Japanese colonial officials and Taiwanese economic elites in Taipei played key roles in forming economic partnerships with the Fujian government. During Chen Ticheng's visit to Taipei, South China Bank official Taketō Mineharu and Taiwanese entrepreneur Lin Xiongxiang began negotiating with Chen about potential trade for Taiwan sugar and capital loans for Fujian's industries. In early 1935, Chen Ticheng and Chen Yi asked Lin for Taiwanese capital to construct Fuzhou's waterworks facilities, and with Taketō they agreed to trade Fujian steel (molybdenum) in exchange for Taiwan sugar. In May 1935, the Government-General of Taiwan also dispatched the Taiwanese political and economic elite Gu Xianrong, to further discuss with Chen Yi of the importance of economic cooperation between Fuzhou and Taiwan for improving Sino-Japanese

540. Fujian sheng zhengfu, Taiwan kaocha baogao (1935), 107.
relations. Chen told Gu not only that Japanese aid was preferable to that of the Anglo-American powers, but also that exchanges with Taiwan was more efficient than with the Japanese metropole.  

In October 1935, Chen Yi was invited by the Government-General of Taiwan to attend the Taiwan Industrial Exposition in commemoration of 40-years of colonial rule. When Chen arrived in Taipei on October 22, 1935, he was quoted in Taiwan's Ōsaka Daily as follows:

We have invited Japanese experts [from Taiwan] to help develop Fujian's irrigation, agriculture, and industry based on Japanese-style industrial organizations.... We welcome Japanese capital and expertise in agriculture, mining, and various other industries. Although Fujian has potential in these areas, unfortunately thus far we have lacked the personnel and capital to develop them.

As honorary guests of the exposition, Chen and 32 other Fujian officials surveyed Japanese colonial irrigation, mineral production, agriculture, and industry. In his formal meeting with Governor-General Nakagawa Kenzō (1875–1944, in office 1932–36) in the Taipei official residence, Chen and Nakagawa decided on the terms of further cross-straits economic collaboration. Nakagawa agreed to send Japanese colonial experts in irrigation, rice production, fruit, and forestry to Fujian. He also supplied Chen with Taiwan reference works on Japanese colonial law, industry, agriculture, and commerce.

Over the next two years, the Government-General of Taiwan sent Japanese and Taiwanese agricultural experts—such as Iso Eikichi and Xu Qingzhong—to meet with Fujian officials. Among the colonial experts in Taiwan who participated in Fujian agricultural reform in the mid-1930s was Iso Eikichi (1886–1972), a professor of agricultural studies at Taihoku Imperial University. Iso, a specialist of Taiwan agriculture—especially rice—and three other experts (specialists in forestry and gardening), led a one-month survey to Fujian in the spring of 1937 to investigate agricultural conditions and meet with Chinese agricultural officials in Xiamen, Fuzhou, Zhangzhou, and Quanzhou. Iso and his colleagues submitted their findings to the Fujian Provincial Government with further proposals for reform. During his trip, Iso visited the Science


546. "Fujiansheng zhengfu guanyu Taiwan nonglin zhuanjia lai-Mín shicha gei Xiamenshī zhengfū de xunling" (February 12, 1937), in *Fujiansheng dang'anguan* 1993, 666-7.

Institute of Fuzhou, where he gave a speech on Taiwanese agriculture. He stated that 30 years ago Taiwan "only yielded a mere 2 million piculs of rice per year, but with the application of scientific methods of farming, Formosa [Taiwan] now produces more than ten million piculs annually." He urged the Chinese in Fujian to adopt new methods of cultivation and industrial agriculture, while his colleagues spoke about the need for topographic surveys and irrigation technology.\(^{548}\)

Because of the start of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937, however, the Fujian government was unable to implement large-scale agricultural reforms based on Japanese aid and expertise from Taiwan. Yet amidst the growing military hostilities between the Japanese Army and Chiang Kai-shek over North China in the mid-1930s, cross-straits regional diplomacy between the Government-General of Taiwan and the Fujian Provincial Government resulted in surprisingly closer political and trade relations between the two regions. Taiwan-based Japanese companies not only contributed to Fujian's economic reforms but also became intermediaries for trade between South China and Manchuria, where Fujian paper and tea were exchanged for Manchurian soybeans.\(^{549}\)

In addition to cultivating cross-straits networks with Fujian, the Government-General of Taiwan promoted Japanese economic interests in Hainan years before the island became strategically relevant to the Navy in the mid-1930s. Administratively part of Guangdong province, Hainan was located at the heart of the South China Sea between Taiwan, Hong Kong, Guangzhou, Indochina, and Singapore. Since the end of the nineteenth century, Hainan had been the target of the Western imperial interests due to the island's untapped agricultural resources and minerals, including rubber and iron ore. In 1897, the French placed Hainan under its de facto sphere of

\(^{548}\) Ibid.
\(^{549}\) "Taiwangun no Fukken keizai kōsa no ken," November 11, 1936, JACAR C01004228200; Matsuura 2010, 283-4. For more on trade relations between Taiwan and Manchuria after 1931, see Lin Man-houng, "Nihon no kaiunryoku to 'kyōkyō' no chūtai: 1930 nendai no Taiwan-Manshū kan bōeiki wo chūshin ni," in Shōwa Ajia shugi no jitsūzō: teikoku Nihon to Taiwan 'Nanyō' 'Nanshi,' ed. Matsuura Masataka (Tokyo: Minerva shobō, 2007), 344-71.
influence by signing a "non-cession agreement" with the Qing government not to cede the island to a third party. Japan and France signed an additional agreement in 1907 confirming France's ascendant position in Hainan. Despite its nominal claim to the island, however, France did little to cultivate Hainan into an economically viable sphere of influence. By the 1930s, the French had established two schools, a church, and a hospital, but little economic infrastructure. Only two to three French merchants remained in Hainan as French shipping between Indochina and Hainan declined. In fact, by 1938 the United States was the largest foreign cultural presence with 49 missionaries and doctors based in schools, churches, and hospitals in northern Hainan. In addition to building a Texas oil company branch in Hainan, Americans obtained rights from Chinese authorities in 1916 to build a railway across the island, though such plans never came to fruition.

Meanwhile, as early as the 1910s Government-General of Taiwan officials believed that Hainan had the potential of becoming an important military and economic base for Taiwan at some point in the future. In 1908 the Government-General of Taiwan first sent Japanese agricultural officials to survey the island's potential resources led by Tokuichi Shiraki (1882–1970), an expert in horticulture. Less than a decade later, the Taiwan Monopoly Bureau sent forestry officials to study the island's potential for camphor production in northern Hainan, which had the same latitude as southern Taiwan. When the Monopoly Bureau Chief Ikeda Kōjin surveyed Hainan

551. Shimomiya Atsuyuki, "Yutakanaru Kainantō (Kainantō tokushū)," *Taiwan jihō* (March 1939), 255.
554. Tokuichi Shiraki later became a professor at Taihoku Imperial University and then the head of the Southern Region Archives (*Nanpō shiryōkan*). Tokuichi Shiraki, *Omoidasu mamani* (Tokyo: Tokuichi Shiraki sensei beiju kinen shukuga jigyōkai, 1969).
first-hand in 1917, he discovered the island to be rich in rubber, coconut, ore, and other minerals. Through the help of Katsumata Zensaku (1874–1940), the pioneering Japanese merchant who worked in Hainan since 1896, Ikeda and the seventh Taiwan governor-general Akashi Motojirō (1864–1919, in office 1918–9) sought to collaborate with Guangdong warlords—Long Jiguang, then his successor Mo Rongxin—on Hainan development by using Japanese capital and agricultural experts.\(^{556}\) Mo partnered with Ikeda to establish the Hainan Development Company (\textit{Hainandao kaifa gongsi}). But with the death of Akashi in 1919 and Mo's loss of power soon thereafter, the company quickly dissolved.\(^{557}\) Akashi's successor, Governor-General Den Kenjirō (1855–1930, in office 1919–23), continued negotiations with Chinese warlords about exploiting Hainan's resources. However, after a Shanghai newspaper spread rumors that Guangdong officials were willing to sell Hainan to the Japanese, Guangdong officials withdrew from negotiations with Den.\(^{558}\)

While the Japanese Army and Foreign Ministry's geopolitical focus remained on North and Central China in the 1920s, the Government-General of Taiwan continued to compile intelligence reports on Hainan's economic and political situation. The Taiwan Encyclopedia Bureau published Japan's first comprehensive report on Hainan in 1922, \textit{Hainan's State of Affairs} (\textit{Kainantō jijō}), followed by \textit{Survey of Hainan Agriculture and Industry} (\textit{Kainantō ni okeru nōsangyō chōsa}) in 1929.\(^{559}\)

\(^{556}\) Katsumata managed a pharmaceutical company in Hainan and would later establish ties with the Government-General of Taiwan and Taiwan Development Company during the Japanese occupation of Hainan from 1939. Shimomura Hiroshi, "Kainantō to Taiwan wo kataru," \textit{Taiwan no senbai} 19:2 (February 1940), 12; Shimizu Onkō, \textit{Nankai no hōko Kainantō: danko toshite kore wo kōryakushi kyōdo no yabō wo hōsatsu seyo} (Tokyo: Seisen kantetsu dōmeika jimusho, 1938), 45.

\(^{557}\) Kaku Sagatarō, "Taiwan to Kainantō: Akashi sōtoku no Kainantō kaihatsu keikaku," \textit{Taiwan jihō} 233 (1939): 256-7; Kan Isamu, \textit{Shina wo dōsuruka} (Fuji shobō, 1939), 92-3; Nanyō kyōkai Taiwan shibu, \textit{Dai Shina no katame: Kainantō taiken jikki} (Taihoku: Nanyō kyōkai Taiwan shibu, 1939), 6-16.

\(^{558}\) Chung 2007, 315.

\(^{559}\) Taiwan sōtokufu kanbō chōsaka, \textit{Kainantō jijō} (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu kanbō chōsaka,
By the 1930s when France's "sphere of influence" over Hainan had become tenuous, Japanese Navy officials developed strategic interests in the island and thus turned to the Government-General of Taiwan not only to help plan for but also to implement the military occupation of Hainan in 1939.

**The Imperial Navy and Government-General of Taiwan's Alliance for Military Advance into South China**

The military occupation of Manchuria in September 1931 by the Kwantung Army (Japan's field army in southern Manchuria) marked a new era of Japanese northern expansion and rising tensions between Japan and the Western powers. When the League of Nations' Lytton Report in 1933 declared "Manchukuo" an illegitimate puppet-state of Japan, Japanese diplomats withdrew from the League of Nations. Meanwhile, during the mid-1930s a "fleet faction" within the Japanese Navy emerged to take a more hard-line stance against the Western powers. Having allowed the Anglo-American naval treaties from the Washington Conference (1921–2) and the London Naval Conference (1930) to expire in 1936, the Navy increased not only its armaments but also its strategic relevance for Japan. At the August 1936 "Five Ministers Conference" (Prime, Foreign, Finance, Army, and Navy ministers), the Tokyo central government adopted the "Fundamentals of National Policy" (*Kokusaku no kijun*), which elevated the Navy's "southern advance" (*nanshin*) to the level of official policy with equal priority as the Army's "northern advance" (*nanshin*).
advance" (*hokushin*).\(^{562}\) The policy advised against instigating direct military conflict with the Western powers but rather promoted "economic advance" by strengthening Taiwan and Micronesia as economic bases for further expansion into Southeast Asia.\(^{563}\)

As part of transforming Taiwan into an "advance base" (*shinshitsu kichi*) for southern advance, the Tokyo central government granted the Navy permission to re-instate a military governor-general (*bukan sōtokufu*) in Taiwan. Despite opposition by Taiwanese political leaders toward the re-militarization of the Government-General of Taiwan, Taiwan's seventeen-year period of civilian rule (*bunkan sōtokufu*, 1919–36) came to an end in September 1936 when the Navy chose the retired admiral, Kobayashi Seizo (1877–1962, in office 1936–40), as military governor-general.\(^{564}\) Interestingly, the Taiwan Army—which since 1919 was a separate institution from the Government-General and followed orders from the Imperial Army—also objected to a military governor-general. Wanting to maintain complete autonomy over Taiwan's military activities without interference from the governor-general, the Taiwan Army requested the Army Minister to prevent Kobayashi's appointment but without success.\(^{565}\) In this way, the inter-service rivalry between the Army and Navy in Japan simultaneously also manifested itself in Taiwan between the Navy-affiliated governor-general and the Taiwan Army.

Upon becoming governor-general in fall 1936, Kobayashi promoted the following three principles for his rule over Taiwan: (1) *kōminka*, or the "Japanization" of Taiwanese subjects; (2) heavy industrialization (*kōgyōka*) drawing on raw materials from South China and Southeast Asia;

563. The policy stated: "We will promote economic expansion throughout the Southern Region Ocean [*Nanpō kaiyō*], especially in the Outer Nanyō [*Soto Nanyō*], through gradual and peaceful measures that avoid instigating other countries." Liang Hua-huang, *Taiwan zongdufu nanjin zhengce daolun* (Taipei: Daoxiang, 2003), 87.
564. Colonial rule under military governors-general in Taiwan would continue until the end of WWII. For examples of Taiwanese opposition toward the re-militarization of the Taiwan Government-General, see May 1936 articles in the sole Taiwanese-owned newspaper, *Taiwan xinminbao*, cited in Kondō 1996, 27.
and (3) the mobilization of Taiwan as a southern advance base (Taiwan no nanshinka). After the start of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937, the Government-General of Taiwan and Taiwan Army turned their attention to aiding the Army and Navy in the China theater. Between July and December 1937, the Japanese Army occupied Beijing and Tianjin in North China and Shanghai and Nanjing (the Chinese Nationalist Government capital) in Central China. In the fall of 1937, the Taiwan Army dispatched "mixed brigades" (Taiwan konsei ryodan) to Shanghai that included Taiwanese "military auxiliaries" (gunpu). Taiwanese auxiliaries served the Japanese Army and Navy as unarmed translators and transporters of food, ammunition, and other military supplies.

In support of Chiang Kai-shek, the Anglo-American powers delivered KMT forces with military supplies through Hong Kong. In an attempt to cut off Western arms and munitions to Chiang, the Imperial Navy blockaded the South China coast and occupied Xiamen on May 10, 1938. Two weeks later, Navy officials met with Japanese consuls (Foreign Ministry representatives) and Government-General of Taiwan officials (including Japanese heads of Taiwan's Research, Finance, and Police bureaus) in Xiamen to discuss the future administration of the city. Navy officials proposed "Administrative Plans for Xiamen" (Amoi shori hōshin) whereby the Navy and Foreign Ministry would establish a "Xiamen Reconstruction Committee" (Amoi fukkō iinkai) in charge of a "Self-Government Committee" (jichi iinkai) consisting of Japanese, overseas Taiwanese, and local Chinese elites from Xiamen. The Navy would entrust the

567. Chiang Kai-shek relocated his capital to Wuhan (until it was seized by Japan in August 1938), and then to Chongqing in southwest China in October 1938.
570. The Reconstruction Committee was made up of officials from the Navy (three), Foreign Ministry (three, including the consul of Xiamen, Uchida Gorō), and the Government-General of Taiwan (four). They oversaw the local Chinese puppet government, "The Peace Preservation
Government-General of Taiwan to station its colonial police officials to maintain order while Taiwan-based companies such as the Bank of Taiwan and Greater Fujian Company (Fukudai kōshi, est. 1937 as an affiliate of the Taiwan Development Company) would oversee the city's economic development.571

With ambitions to occupy the remaining strategic regions along the South China coast—Guangzhou, Shantou, and Hainan—the Navy and the Government-General of Taiwan sought to convince the Army of the need for further military invasion in South China. In April 1938, the Navy had installed a Naval Military Office (kaigun bukanfu) within the Government-General of the Taiwan. The chair of the Taiwan Naval Military Office, Admiral Fukuda Ryōzō, worked together with Japanese colonial officials and scholars in Taiwan to consolidate research for Japanese military policy in Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, and Hainan.572 The Government-General of Taiwan's Provisional South China Research Bureau (Rinji Nanshi chōsakyoku, est. August 1938) conducted on-the-ground surveys of Guangzhou and Hainan and compiled intelligence reports for administering South China based on decades of research by Taiwan's Encyclopedia Bureau.573

In September 1938, the Government-General of Taiwan drafted a series of ambitious

571. According to Kondō Masami, the Navy's proposal matched the content of "Principles for Measures in Xiamen" (Xiamen hōmen taisaku yōkō) drafted by the Government-General of Taiwan prior to the Navy's May plans. One can thus surmise that the Navy was influenced by the Government-General of Taiwan's proposals for Xiamen administration. Kondō 1996, 115-6.
573. For more on activities by the Encyclopedia Bureau, see Chapter Four. Taiwan sōtokufu, Taiwan sōtokufu jimu seiseki teiyō (44) (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu minseikyoku, 1938), 93-4; "Taiwan kōgyōka ni zenryoku, Nanshi kaihatsu mo keikaku: saki nyūkyō Kobayashi sōtoku kataru," Asahi shinbun, May 20, 1939. For a list of the members of the Provisional South China Research Office see Taiwan sōtokufu gajibu, Shina jihen Daitōa sensō ni tomonau tai-Nanpō shisaku jōkyō (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu gajibu, 1943), 6-7, 13-5.
proposals for the Japanese occupation of Guangzhou, Shantou, and Hainan.\footnote{Chung Shu-ming, Adam Schneider, and Aizawa Kiyoshi believe that the Naval Military Office head Fukuda Ryōzō was the main author of the proposals, but I have yet to find confirming evidence of this. Aizawa Kiyoshi, "Kaigun ryōshikiha to nanshin: Kainantō shinshutsu mondai wo chūshin ni shite," Gunji shigaku (1990), 182; Schneider 1998a, 237; Chung 2007, 317. Although it is unclear if the Government-General of Taiwan's proposals were directly presented to the Army, Kondō Masami has concluded that they were received by the Home Ministry in Tokyo. Kondō 1996, 112.} As outlined in "Administrative Plans for Guangzhou" (Guangzhou shori hōshin) and "Administrative Plans for Shantou" (Shantou shori hōshin), the Japanese military\footnote{The original documents use the Japanese term "gun" (military) and do not specify whether it was Army or Navy personnel who would be in charge.} would establish a "Special Municipal Government" (tokubetsushi seifu)—presumably a puppet regime of local Chinese and Taiwanese elites—while the Government-General of Taiwan would aid the military in civil administration and economic development. Japanese and Taiwanese police officials, medical teams, school teachers, and propaganda units would be dispatched from Taiwan to govern Guangzhou and Shantou, while branches of the Taiwan Development Company and Bank of Taiwan would be given rights to exploit local agriculture, minerals, and industry.\footnote{Taiwan sōtokufu, "Guangzhou shori hōshin" (1938); Taiwan sōtokufu, "Shantou shori hōshin" (1938), reprinted in the primary source collection by Inaba Masao, Gendai shiryō 10: Nitchū sensō 3 fu nanshinron (Tokyo: Misuzu shobō, 1963), 442-63.} As described in "An Outline for Developing South China's Industry" (Nanshi sangyō kaihatsu kōryō), the Japanese developmental goals for occupied South China would be to drive out Western capital and integrate South China's economy with the Japan-Manchuria-China Economic Bloc (Nichi-Man-Shi keizai burokku).\footnote{Taiwan sōtokufu, "Nanshi sangyō kaihatsu kōryō" (1938), reprinted in Inaba 1963, 423-41.}

Interestingly, the Government-General of Taiwan drew up separate "Administrative Plans for Hainan" (Kainantō shori hōshin) that were distinct from its plans for the rest of South China. In contrast to the Navy, for which Hainan was strategically valuable as a military base against the Western powers in Southeast Asia, the Government-General of Taiwan eyed Hainan for its agricultural and mineral resources that could be imported to Taiwan to advance the island's heavy
industrialization. The plans proposed for Hainan to be developed into an overseas colony "by applying the experience of Taiwan rule" (Taiwan tōchi no keiken wo katsuyōshi). The goal would be to economically develop Hainan up to the level of Taiwan within the next ten years by exporting colonial institutions and personnel—including Taiwanese—from Taiwan.\(^{578}\) Specifically, the developmental aims would be to (1) make Hainan self-sufficient in food production; (2) construct basic shipping and railway infrastructure; (3) secure raw materials such as metals for Taiwan's heavy industrialization; and (4) import Japanese and Taiwanese laborers from Taiwan until a more permanent Japanese immigration policy was implemented.\(^{579}\)

In "Principles of Strengthening and Expanding Ruling Institutions of the Southern Region Colonies" (Nanpō gaichi tōchi soshiki kakujū kyōka hōshin, Sept. 1938), the Government-General of Taiwan went one step further by proposing that it become the head a "Southern Region Government-General" (Nanpō sōtokufu) that would unify Hainan, Micronesia, and the South China Sea islands—Pratas (J. Tōsatō, C. Dongshadao), Paracel (J. Seisatō, C. Xishadao), and Spratly (J. Shinnan guntō, C. Xinnan qundao)—under its rule.\(^{580}\) The proposal thus demonstrated the Government-General of Taiwan's ambitions for greater administrative powers outside the borders of Taiwan. By extending its political and economic sphere of influence across the South China Sea, the Government-General of Taiwan would be able to elevate its strategic importance within Japan's growing southern empire.

Despite such proposals in the fall of 1938, the Japanese Army refused to agree to a naval invasion of Hainan.\(^{581}\) Army officials remained wary about an extended naval occupation of

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578. Administrative policies in Hainan such as the nationalization of land, Japanese-language education, and aborigine rule would be modeled on those of Taiwan. Kondō 1996, 113.
579. Taiwan sōtokufu, "Kainantō shori hōshin" (1938), reprinted in Inaba 1963, 453-4; Schneider 1998a, 239.
581. Although it is unclear if the Government-General of Taiwan's proposals were directly presented to the Army, Kondō Masami has noted that they were received by the Home Ministry in
Hainan for fear that it might hinder a negotiated settlement of the war with Chiang Kai-shek. Instead, in order to cut off Western military supplies to Chiang's KMT forces through Hong Kong, in October 1938 the Army captured Guangzhou where it established its own military administration. However, Western supply routes then shifted from Hong Kong to Indochina and Burma beyond the current range of Japanese bombers from Taiwan. The Navy appealed to the Army for Hainan's strategic value for blockade operations that would allow Japanese bombers to cut off Southeast Asian routes to the KMT capital of Chongqing. Hainan's coastal cities of Qinglan and Yulin, moreover, were potential steamship ports for military and commercial shipping.

The Army and Navy finally agreed on January 19, 1939, to a joint invasion of Hainan. On February 10, the Number Five Fleet and Number Twenty-One Army forces, which included 10,000 troops from the Taiwan Army—subordinate to the Imperial Army—landed on the shores of Hainan. Within days the navy captured the port cities of Haikou, Sanya, Yulin, and Yaxian, as Chinese forces retreated into the interior mountains of the island. In protest of Japan's invasion, Chiang Kai-shek's Foreign Office in Chongqing issued a statement on February 11 to Western reporters in the hope of an Allied intervention. Chiang referred to the invasion as the "Manchurian Incident of the Pacific Ocean" as he likened Hainan to a "second Shenyang [Manchuria's capital]"

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582. Schneider 1998a, 235.
583. The Shanghai newspaper Shenbao reported that due to the Munich Agreement (September 1938), where Britain and France compromised with Germany at the expense of Czechoslovakia, the Japanese believed that Britain and France would react similarly in East Asia just as they did in Central Europe, despite Guangzhou being Hong Kong's "lifeline." See "Invasion of South China Direct Result of Munich Accord," The China Weekly Review, October 22, 1938.
in terms of its strategic importance in the south.\footnote{Phillips 1980, 96. For Chiang's full statement, see Tian Peng, \textit{Riben qinzhan Hainan gedao zhi jiangtao} (Hangkong weiyuanhui zhengzhibu, 1940), 23-4.}

In response, the French, British, and American ambassadors issued protests to the Japanese Foreign Ministry in mid-February. A Japanese military base in Hainan threatened Western colonial interests in Indochina and Hong Kong, especially trade and communication routes in the Gulf of Tonkin and between Hong Kong and Southeast Asia.\footnote{Rikugunshō, Kaigunshō, \textit{Yasukuni no emaki} (Rikugun bijutsu kyōkai, 1940).} Foreign Minister Arita Hachirō (1884–1965) defended Japan's actions by contending that Hainan was critical for the war against China, but that Japan had no territorial ambitions further southward. However incredulous the Western powers were about Japan's future military plans, in the end they did not intervene because their focus in early 1939 was on rising tensions in the European theater over Germany and Italy: the British and French did not want to focus their military resources on limiting Japan's advance in South China.\footnote{Shina jihen ni okeru Fukkoku no tai-Nichi seisaku oyobi Nihon no tai-Futsu seisaku (Nichi-Man zaisei keizai kenkyūkai, 1939); Tōyō kyōkai chōsabu, \textit{Genka no Kainan jijō} (Tokyo: Nihon tosho sentā, 1939), 28-9.}

\footnote{Aizawa Kiyoshi, “Taihei'yōjō no 'Manshū jihen'? Nihon kaigun ni yoru Kainantō senryō,}
From February 1939 until the end of WWII, the Japanese Navy formally administered Hainan with the help of the Government-General of Taiwan.

In the fall of 1938, the Government-General of Taiwan had initially sought a significant role in the civil administration of the newly occupied regions of South China—Xiamen, Guangzhou, and Shantou—as reflected in its September 1938 proposals above. That fall, however, the Home Ministry prepared to establish a "Rise Asia Office" (Kōa-in) to unify Japan's wartime policy in the occupied areas of North, Central, and South China. When the Home Ministry proposed in October to install a Rise Asia Office "South China Branch" in Xiamen as the main governing institution in the region, Taiwan's Director-General Morioka Jirō sent a missive to the Prime Minister's office. After recounting the past history of economic and cultural activities that the Government-General of Taiwan had managed in South China, Morioka requested that the South China Branch of the Rise Asia Office be placed in Taiwan. Were it necessary that the South China Branch be installed in Xiamen, Morioka implored that the Government-General of Taiwan at least be permitted to maintain close working relations with the branch.  

On December 16, 1938, Prime Minister Konoe responded to Morioka:

In the past, the Government-General of Taiwan managed affairs [in South China] related to Taiwan colonial rule (especially in Fujian where it had established its own institutions). However, in the future if we establish a Rise Asia Office institution in the region mentioned above [South China], then we will negotiate a way to have Government-General of Taiwan officials dispatched there to serve as concurrent Rise Asia Office personnel in order to avoid a conflict between the two institutions.

In this way, the Home Ministry wished to keep the Government-General of Taiwan subordinate to tōchi, Bōei kenkyūjo kiyō 2:1 (1999): 111-2.

the Tokyo central government with respect to foreign policy in China. The Rise Asia Office South China Branch was soon after installed and so the Government-General of Taiwan failed to obtain direct political control over Xiamen, Guangzhou, and Shantou. Yet the Rise Asia Office did approve of the Government-General of Taiwan's dispatching of personnel—Japanese and Taiwanese—to serve in the South China Branch to aid military, economic, and cultural administration of the occupied region.

Indeed, although the Army and Navy was formally placed in charge of South China administration through the Rise Asia Office—the former in Guangzhou and Shantou, and the latter in Xiamen and Hainan—both institutions relied on the cooperation of the Government-General of Taiwan to maintain public order and restore the regional economy. The Army and Navy enlisted various Government-General of Taiwan's institutions, expertise, and personnel—especially Taiwanese—with the economic and cultural knowledge of South China unavailable in the Japanese metropole. In Xiamen, for example, the Rise Asia Office employed Government-General of Taiwan officials as contractee officials (shokutaku) of the Xiamen Peace Preservation Society (Xiamen chian ijikai) to employ Japanese and Taiwanese settlers from Taiwan for the following duties: (1) construct new transportation and communication infrastructure; (2) increase agricultural production to feed the military and local population; and (3) disseminate Japanese-language education as well as Japanese- and Chinese-language cultural propaganda (e.g. radio and film) aimed at the local Chinese.

593. The Taiwan Army also opposed the Government-General of Taiwan's proposal to participate in Guangzhou's wartime civil administration. In the fall of 1938 the Taiwan Army in fact requested the Army Ministry not to allow the Government-General of Taiwan to take control of South China administration. Kondô 1996, 122.
595. Ōkubu Tachimasa, Shōwa shakai keizai shiryō shūsei 8 (Tokyo: Daitō bunka daigaku Tōyō kenkyūjo, 1984), 281-98.
In coordination with the Rise Asia Office, the Government-General of Taiwan established new branch offices of Taiwan-based companies (e.g., the Taiwan Development Company, Fukuda Company, Taiwan Electric Company) in Fujian, Guangdong, and Hainan to facilitate economic growth. In 1939 the Government-General of Taiwan established Japanese shipping routes between Taiwan and Hainan. Osaka Mercantile Company, Japan Mailboat Company, South Japan Steamship Company, and Hainan Shipping Company (est. 1941 as a subsidiary of Taiwan Development Company) extended shipping from the Taiwan ports of Jilong and Gaoxiong to the Hainan ports of Haikou and Sanya. Based on the Navy's request, the Government-General of Taiwan also launched military air routes between Jilong, Haikou, and Sanya, and later between Taipei and Xiamen, Guangzhou, and Shanghai. By 1941, there was round-trip air transportation from Taipei to Sanya via Haikou twice a week.

Overseas Taiwanese in Japan's Wartime "Reconstruction" of South China

The outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 had major repercussions on the overseas Taiwanese population in South China. On the eve of the war, the Japanese subject population in the South China coastal cities had grown to a total of 15,710 with 12,925 overseas Taiwanese compared to 2,816 ethnic Japanese. While the ethnic Japanese outnumbered the overseas Taiwanese in Guangzhou (416 to 147) and Hong Kong (1,427 to 179), the overseas Taiwanese included the Bank of Taiwan and South China Bank. "Kanton no Taiwan kankei shōsha kakushu chōsa wo ichigenka: kyōryoku kokusaku suikō ni maishin," Taiwan nichinichi shinpō, September 21, 1941.


Taiwan sōtokufu gaijibu 1943b, 10, 226.
dwarfed the ethnic Japanese in Xiamen (10,217 to 420), Fuzhou (1,777 to 385), and Shantou (605 to 135) due to Taiwanese linguistic and family ties with the latter three cities. When the Japanese Army invaded North China in July 1937, Japanese subject populations in Central and South China became vulnerable to Chinese attacks since there were no Japanese military reinforcements in the latter regions. Japanese consular officials ordered the Taiwanese in Xiamen, Fuzhou, and Shantou to evacuate to Taiwan. The Japanese shut down Taiwan-affiliated cultural institutions including the overseas Taiwanese schools in Xiamen (779 students, 27 teachers), Fuzhou (333 students, six teachers), and Shantou (75 students, four teachers), as well as Benevolent Society hospitals. According to Government-General of Taiwan statistics, the Taiwanese population in South China declined from 12,805 in July 1937 to 3,999 in October 1938. As for contemporary Chinese newspapers in Fujian, they estimated that by August 1938 only 200 Taiwanese remained in Fuzhou (with 1,800 having evacuated) and 1,000 Taiwanese in Xiamen (with 12,000–13,000 having left for Taiwan). Those unwilling to take refuge in Taiwan were described as an "older generation of Taiwanese" (C. jiupai Taimin) who had resided in Fujian for over a decade, owned Chinese property, or intermarried with local Chinese.

601. Tanaka Ichiji, Kūbakuka no Minami Shina (Taihoku: Dai Nihon kokubō seinenkai Taiwan sōshibu, 1938), 9-10, 18.
602. Most overseas Taiwanese elites took refuge in Taiwan, but some like Lin Mutu went to Hong Kong. Kondō 1996, 450.
603. Taiwan sōtokufu, Taiwan sōtokufu jimu seiseki teiyō (43) (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu minseikyoku, 1937), 848-9; "Shōji Tokutarō hoka sanjūyon mei taigan haken kundō," Taiwan sōtokufu kōbun ruisan 10254-58, August 1, 1937, 326-7. After reopening in 1938, by 1941 the Xiamen Kyokuei School had 1,163 students (37 teachers) while Shantou Tōei School had 183 students (6 teachers). Fuzhou Tōei School did not reopen.
604. Taiwan sōtokufu, Taiwan sōtokufu jimu seiseki teiyō (47) (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu minseikyoku, 1938), 277; Taiwan sōtokufu gaijibu 1943b, 70.
605. "Xiamen-shi Ri-Tairen chetui hui Tai qingxing," Jiangshengbao (August 26, 1937), in Fujiansheng dang'an'guan 1993, 80-1, 85. Those who did evacuate to Taiwan left their property with their Chinese spouses and relatives. Huang 2012, 74-5.
606. "Fuzhou Taimin yi chetui hui Tai," Jiangshengbao (August 21, 1937), in Fujiansheng dang'an'guan 1993, 80, 82; Xiamenshi dang'anju and Xiamenshi, Jindai Xiamen shewai dang'an shiliao (Xiamen: Xiamen daxue chubanshe, 1997), 159.
In colonial Taiwan, Japanese official newspapers reported that the overseas Taiwanese who remained in South China after the summer of 1937 faced severe retaliation at the hands of the Chinese military. An estimated 2,000 Guangdong Army troops entered Xiamen that summer and imprisoned Taiwanese residents who were suspected as "traitors of China" (hanjian) or spies for the Japanese military. Chinese authorities had apparently conducted a strict census and issued "good subject certificates" (liangmin zheng) to Chinese nationals. Taiwanese residents who did not have this certificate were denied leave from Xiamen, imprisoned, or even executed by Chinese troops. The British newspaper in Shanghai, The North China Herald, reported in October 1937 that Chinese military guards had shot around 80 Taiwanese in Xiamen. Taiwanese sentenced to death as "sympathizers of Japan" included leaders of the overseas Taiwan Association such as Li Qifang and Chen Chunmu. Although Japanese-language newspapers in Tokyo and Taiwan no doubt exaggerated the victimization of Taiwanese subjects at the hands of Chinese officials, even contemporary mainland Chinese newspapers reported that the overseas Taiwanese had an infamous reputation among the Chinese either as Japanese imperial intermediaries or as ruffians.

609. "Amoi kōbukyoku no bōjō: Taiwan sekimin gyakusatsu wo shiiji," Yomiuri shinbun (June 14, 1938); "Shinagun masu bōgyaku: Amoi taigan, kyōfu no donzoko," Yomiuri shinbun (June 17, 1938).
operating illegal opium, gambling, smuggling, and prostitution rackets. Accounts in the British newspaper, *The China Press*, also recounted how Taiwanese who even took refuge in Hong Kong had been attacked by anti-Japanese Chinese mobs. On January 2, 1938, an anti-Japanese group of about 40 Chinese assaulted two Taiwanese, Wang Zuzhou and Lin Shiqing, formerly owners of a printing plant in Xiamen, and one Chinese colleague, who were transporting 40 cases of printing machinery from a Kowloon warehouse.

With Japan's military occupation of Xiamen in May 1938, however, the Imperial Navy and Government-General of Taiwan police officials landed in Xiamen to release Taiwanese prisoners from KMT custody. Among those freed was Xu Zhiting, a 35 year-old Taiwanese who had been detained by the KMT police for eight months. A graduate of Shanghai Southern University (*Shanghai nanfang daxue*) and vice-principal of Xiamen Chinese Middle School (*Zhonghua zhongxue*), Xu had been imprisoned by the KMT on the charge of being an "unregistered" resident. Upon his release in May, Xu worked as a translator for the Japanese military.

Indeed, many overseas Taiwanese—both those who had evacuated to Taiwan, and those who had remained in South China—became employed by the Japanese military and Government-General of Taiwan, including several Taiwanese elites who had previously thrived as entrepreneurs in Overseas Taiwanese in Xiamen Protected by the Japanese Occupation Military.

"Amoi no chian kaifuku," Taiwan nichinichi shinpō (May 25, 1938).
Xiamen in the 1920s and 1930s. Starting in the fall of 1938, the Government-General of Taiwan encouraged thousands of former "overseas Taiwanese" to relocate from Taiwan back to Xiamen, Guangzhou, Shantou as entrepreneurs, military auxiliaries, police officials, doctors, farmers, educators, and Taiwan-affiliated company employees. While many Taiwanese who went to South China between 1938 and 1945 were coerced by the Government-General of Taiwan and Taiwan Army, a large number of Taiwanese also voluntarily went to South China for economic and political opportunities as well as higher social status. Japanese colonial officials granted economic incentives and privileges to Taiwanese to establish new companies to help develop South China's trade, food supplies, clothes, daily goods, and factory production. According to contemporary Fujian provincial government reports, the Government-General of Taiwan aimed to use the Taiwanese "to pillage mainland Chinese property and industries, as well as disseminate pro-Japanese propaganda." Moreover, Japanese officials provided Taiwanese settlers with the following privileges: (1) Taiwanese could seize stores and farming land from local Chinese and administer them with the backing of the Japanese military; and (2) Taiwanese merchants were granted special customs rates to sell their goods in South China.  

Although we should be cautious of possible exaggerations made by the Chinese official reports, the historians Lin Man-houng, Caroline Hui-yu Tsai, and Chou Wan-yao have convincingly argued that during the Sino-Japanese and Pacific wars a "volunteering fever" grew among Taiwanese who went overseas both as non-military (e.g. economic) personnel and military auxiliaries. The overseas Taiwanese population in South China gradually increased to 7,779 in April 1939 and 13,372 by April 1940. With the Government-General of Taiwan's active emigration

617. Ts'ai estimated that about 100,000 to 160,000 Taiwanese soldiers emigrated overseas during the Sino-Japanese War, while Lin approximates that about 60,000 non-military Taiwanese personnel went overseas during this period. Ts'ai 2005, 142-6.
policy and loosening of cross-strait travel restrictions in 1941, the overseas Taiwanese population in South China ballooned up to 22,935 by July 1943.\textsuperscript{618}

According to a Hong Kong newspaper report, Japanese officials in Xiamen granted economic privileges to the Taiwanese to establish new companies in South China's trade, food supplies, clothes, daily goods, and factory production. Chen Changfu and Lin Mutu, two leaders of the Xiamen Overseas Taiwanese Association, returned from Taiwan to manage Xiamen businesses in water supplies, lamps, and telephones, while Chen Xuehai and Fang Binhui opened new lucrative businesses in vegetables and fisheries, respectively.\textsuperscript{619} Several Taiwanese who were prominent entrepreneurs in South China before the Sino-Japanese War were appointed by the Rise Asia Office as economic officials in the newly established municipal puppet governments in Xiamen, Guangzhou, and Shantou. The Rise Asia Office assigned Lin Jichuan, a representative of the Xiamen Overseas Taiwanese Association, as chief of Xiamen's Monopoly Bureau to oversee the salt and opium trade.\textsuperscript{620} Lin Huikun, another overseas Taiwanese elite, was hired as the new head of the Xiamen Bureau of Finance, Construction, and Industries.\textsuperscript{621}

By the fall of 1938, 389 out of 460 companies in Xiamen were owned by overseas Taiwanese.\textsuperscript{622} According to British newspaper in Shanghai, \textit{The North China Herald}, the Taiwanese had taken over as "the real rulers of the city":

Every business of any value has become their property; the method of transfer being simple: just registering their names as owners at the office of the Naval Headquarters and raising the Japanese flag above the entrance. They are arrogant.

\textsuperscript{618} Lin 2011, 312.
\textsuperscript{620} Ibid., 200.
\textsuperscript{621} \textit{Huazi ribao} (February 12, 1939), in Fujiansheng dang'an guan 1993, 577; Ibid., 151, cited in Lin 2012, 414-5.
\textsuperscript{622} Lin 1999, 204.
and dictatorial and assert their demands even in the Japanese Consulate itself.\textsuperscript{623}

Mainland Chinese who returned to a Japanese-occupied Xiamen in 1938 thus found that much of their property had been seized by Taiwanese subjects.\textsuperscript{624} By 1941, contemporary Chinese sources reported that the majority of companies in Xiamen were Taiwanese-run compared to Japanese- and Chinese-run companies.\textsuperscript{625}

In coordination with the Government-General of Taiwan, the Japanese Army and Navy thus employed Taiwanese economic elites to help administer South China from the fall of 1938. During the first year of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 when Japanese military forces were committed solely to North and Central China, the majority of Taiwanese residents in South China had evacuated to Taiwan for fear of a Chinese backlash. Those who remained were persecuted by KMT soldiers. Yet once Japan occupied Xiamen, Guangzhou, and Shantou by October 1938, Taiwanese returned to South China as economic intermediaries of the wartime Rise Asia Office administration. Contemporary Chinese newspapers in Fujian reported that several Taiwanese who settled in wartime South China brazenly pillaged and murdered local Chinese residents with the backing of the Japanese military.\textsuperscript{626} Post-WWII mainland Chinese memoirs compiled by the Chinese Communist Party also corroborate that under Japanese occupation overseas Taiwanese such as Chen Mushi and Lin Shen abused their economic rights as Xiamen construction managers by confiscating private property of local Chinese.\textsuperscript{627} From Japanese and Chinese official sources it is difficult to accurately assess to what degree Taiwanese participation was voluntary since many

\textsuperscript{624.} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{625.} For a list of company names, see Fujiansheng dang'an guan 1993, 640-44.
\textsuperscript{626.} \textit{Qiaosheng ribao} (May 17, 1938) and \textit{Fujian yu huaqiao} (May, June 1938), cited in Huang Junling, \textit{Kangzhan shiqi Fujian Chong'anxian de Taiwan jimin: xintaishi shiyue xia de kaocha} (Beijing: Jiuzhou chubanshe, 2010), 88-9.
\textsuperscript{627.} "Wuwang guoqu," \textit{Xiamen wenshi ziliao} 2 (1961), reprinted in Fujiansheng dang'an guan 1993, 75.
were under duress from the Japanese military. Yet from the accounts above the overseas Taiwanese appeared to generally profit from Japanese rule in South China in spite of risks of becoming the target of Chinese animosities.

_Taiwanese as Police, Intelligence, and Translation Officials_

To enforce public order, gather military intelligence, and provide medical treatment in occupied South China, the Japanese Army and Navy also looked to import colonial models and personnel from Taiwan. The Government-General of Taiwan's police forces were experienced in suppressing anti-Japanese uprisings by Han Chinese and aborigine subjects within Taiwan. By the 1930s the Government-General of Taiwan had also integrated Taiwanese subjects into the police force.628 In accordance with the Navy's request, the Government-General of Taiwan provided hundreds of Japanese and Taiwanese police officials to serve in South China.629 In May 1938 the Taiwan Police Chief Hosoi Hideo led 107 police officers—18 who were Taiwanese—from Taipei, Xinzhu, Taizhong, and Tainan to serve in the Navy's Police Corps (Kaigun keisatsu tai) in Xiamen.630 In 1939, an additional 115 colonial police officials—including 55 Taiwanese—were deployed to Xiamen to supervise Chinese officials.631 One of the more celebrated Taiwanese police officials was Zhong Rihong, a native of Xinzhu, who was assigned as head of the Shantou Police Bureau in 1939 to oversee its Chinese officials. After stepping down in 1941, Zhong worked for the Japanese army to monitor the Shantou police, impede Chinese enemy tactics, and protect the

628. During the last major aborigine uprising, the "Musha Incident" (J. _Musha jiken, C. Wushe shijian_), Taiwanese helped the Japanese police and soldiers put down the uprising. See _Taiwan Musha hōki jiken kenkyū to shirō_ (Shakai shisōsha, 1981), 551; cited in Kondō 1996, 351.
629. "Chōsabān ya keisatsukan nado wo Taiwan yori Amoi ni haken," _Yomiuri shinbun_ (June 17, 1938).
630. _Taiwan sótokufu gaijibu_ 1943b, 91-3.
631. Ibid., 102-6.
Beginning in 1940, the Government-General of Taiwan initiated cross-strait police training exchanges between South China and Taiwan. Chinese police officials from Xiamen, Guangzhou, and Shantou were invited to Taiwan's "police official training centers" (keisatsukan renshūjo) for six months of study (Japanese-language and police training) before returning to their respective cities. According to Liu Zhikun, a Chinese policeman in the first Guangzhou training group in 1940, the Chinese not only received Japanese police instruction but also traveled to Taipei, Xinzhu, Taizhong, Alishan, and Gaoxiong to observe how the colonial police conducted demographic surveys and managed the local population.

Figure 4.6: Mainland Chinese Studying as Police Officials in Taiwan, 1943

632. Zhong received awards from the head of the Shantou military and Shantou mayor for capturing a Chinese insurgent who had committed two bombing attacks on the city. "Homare no Zhong Rihong kun ni kenpeitaichō Swatou shichō kara shōjō to kanshajō," and "Moridōri kō-A no hito: umareha Shinchiku kansai shō," Taiwan nichinichi shinpō, November 5, 1941.
634. There were six training visits by Xiamen police officials and eight training visits by Guangzhou police officials between 1940 and 1942. Taiwan sōtokufu kanbō jōhōka, Daitōa sensō to Taiwan (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu kanbō jōhōka, 1943), 175.
636. Taiwan sōtokufu kanbō jōhōka 1943, 175.
Upon the Navy's occupation of Hainan in 1939, an even greater number of Japanese and
Taiwanese police officials were sent to aid the military administration of the island. Between 1939
and 1942, the Government-General of Taiwan dispatched over 1,000 colonial police officials to
Hainan. 637 Taiwanese deployed as low-ranking police assistants (junsaho) received promotions as
first-rank police officials (ittō junkei) within two years. 638 As the Tokyo politician and journalist,
Ishiyama Kenkichi (1882–1964), observed in his 1942 travelogue on Hainan: "It is far more
effective to bring police officials from Taiwan [to Hainan] than from the metropole. Not only are
they accustomed to the climate, but they also have prior experience dealing with aborigines." 639
The "aborigines" referred to here by Ishiyama were the ethnic Li and Miao residents of Hainan,
whom the Japanese likened to the aborigines of Taiwan in terms of their daily customs. 640
Statements like Ishiyama's, however, may have exaggerated the ability of Japanese and Taiwanese
police officials to communicate with the Li and Miao natives. Although the Hainanese language
was known to be a sub-group of the Fujianese language, there is little documentary evidence that
the Taiwanese were able to converse in the local Li and Miao languages. 641

The Japanese Navy and Army also found educated Taiwanese to be ideal candidates as
military intelligence officers in South China since they generally understood the spoken Chinese

637. It was reported that those sent abroad to coordinate with Hainan navy authorities were
chosen among the best police in Taiwan. "Chian no jūseki wo hatashi: Kainantō haken keisatsu tai
kaeru," Kōnan shinbun (May 16, 1942); "Minami Shina oyobi Kainantō ni taisuru Taiwan
sōtokufu no kyōryoku gaikyō," Nanshi Nanyō jihō 26 (September 1942).
638. Zhang Zijing, Taiwān moto Nihon kaigun rikusentai gunjin gunzoku izukoni (Taichū:
Renpō shokyoku, 1984).
640. The Japanese viewed the Li (lizu) as comparable to the unassimilated "raw" Taiwan
aborigines (J. seiban, C. shengfan), while the Miao (miaozu) were likened to the "cooked" Taiwan
aborigines (J. jukubani, C. shufan) who had assimilated to Han Chinese customs.
641. According to a Hainanese language reader published in Taiwan, the Hainanese language
was a sub-group of the Fujianese language with seven tones. Taiwan Nanpō kyōkai, Kainantōgo
kaiwa (Tokyo: Sanseidō, 1941).
languages in Fujian and Guangdong, or could at least learn them quickly. For example, the
Taiwanese Wang Changsheng had fled from Xiamen to Hong Kong in mid-1937, but after 1938 he
returned to South China as a Shantou Municipal Government official and a military intelligence
advisor to the Rise Asia Office in Xiamen. Wang founded an "Iron Association" (J. tetsukōgan,
C. tiegongguan) in Xiamen where Taiwanese and Chinese compiled intelligence reports who
worked for Japan.

Taiwanese merchants like Chen Chenren and Chen Di managed Taiwanese "companies"
that in fact functioned as Japanese intelligence organizations. Chen Chenren's Jiantai Company
gathered intelligence for the army between Shanghai and Fujian, while the Taiwanese merchant
Chen Di managed the Jiehe Fruit and Plant Company, which also served as a de facto intelligence
organization. The Taiwanese Lin Bosheng and Tang Fangxiang headed Chinese propaganda
offices in Guangzhou and Shantou, respectively, to disseminate Japanese Pan-Asian ideals to
combat anti-Japanese education by Chinese Nationalists. Lin's Chinese-language radio
broadcasts spread the slogan of "The Greater East Asia War for the Liberation of East Asia" based
on the alliance of Japan, China, and Manchukuo against the Western powers. Lin also advocated
for a "peaceful" "East Asia People's Movement" (Dongya guomin yundong) and the building of
Sino-Japanese friendships for the "construction of an East Asian New Order" (jianshe Dongya

643. Ibid., 157.
645. Akinaga Hajime, "Kanton no fukkō wo wahei undō no gendankai (jō)," Taiwan nichinichi
shinpō (August 27, 1941); "Swatou kensetsu ni teishin: Shinchiku shushhin no Tangfang Guoxiang
shi," Taiwan nichinichi shinpō (September 18, 1941). Lin Bosheng hosted the representatives of
the East Asia Journalist Conference (Tōa kisha taikai). At the East Asia Journalist Conference Lin
lectured on the importance of the East Asia League (Dongya lianmeng) founded upon Sun Yat-
sen's theory of Greater Asianism (Dongya da Yazhou zhuyi) and his Three People's Principles
(Sanmin zhuyi). The four principles of the East Asia League were political independence,
economic cooperation, cultural communication, and military alliance. See picture of Lin at the
conference. "Lin senden-buchō Tōa kisha taikai daihyō shōtai," Taiwan nichinichi shinpō (August
5, 1941).
xinzhixu) as an alternative to anti-Japanese resistance.\textsuperscript{646}

Starting in the fall of 1938, the Japanese military in South China employed hundreds of Taiwanese volunteers to translate military intelligence, guide armed forces, and mediate between Japanese and Chinese officials.\textsuperscript{647} The Government-General of Taiwan recruited educated Taiwanese to translate spoken Mandarin (Beijing guanhua), Fujianese (Minnanhua), and Cantonese (Guangdonghua) languages.\textsuperscript{648} The Taiwan Education Bureau recommended 80 Taiwanese teachers of Taiwan elementary schools, as well as 25 overseas Taiwanese who had evacuated Fujian and Guangdong, to enlist as translators for the Imperial Navy and go back to South China.\textsuperscript{649} The Japanese also hired graduates of the overseas Taiwanese schools in Xiamen, Fuzhou, and Shantou, which included Taiwanese females.\textsuperscript{650} Other Taiwanese women with a Japanese-language college education, such as Xue Liangying, enlisted as military translators in South China. Born in Xinzhu and a graduate of Tokyo Girls' Dental Medical School, Xue was an overseas Taiwanese who had been imprisoned in Xiamen for eight months by Chinese officials in 1937–8. Upon being released by the Japanese military, Xue went to Shanghai to work as a military translator.\textsuperscript{651} In the Japanese-language media, Taiwanese translators were celebrated as model

\textsuperscript{646} Lin Bosheng, "Da Dongya zhanzheng yu Chongqing," Jinglun yuekan 3:5-6 (1941), 136-8; Lin Bosheng, "Donglian yundong zhi lilun: zai Dongya xinwen jizhe dahui zongzuotan hui yanjiang," Dongya liameng yuekan 8, 1941, 9-11.

\textsuperscript{647} Zhang 1984. For example, see picture of the Taiwanese Huang Haibo, who worked as a translator of Fujianese for the Xiamen Self-Government Administration head Mo Qinghua. "Huang Haibo xiansheng fang wen jilu," in Koushu lishi 6: Riju shiqi Taiwanren fu Dalu jingyan (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo, 1995), 185.

\textsuperscript{648} Ethnically Han Taiwanese were often fluent in the Fujianese dialect, Hakka dialect, or both. Taiwan sōtoku fu rinji jōhō, "Hontō seijin jūgōun tōyaku toshite seisen ni sanka," Buhō 43 (November 11, 1938), 18, reprinted in Taiwan sōtoku fu rinji jōhōbu 'Buhō' 4 ed. Katō Kiyofumi, Yagashiro Hideyoshi, (Tokyo: Yumani shobō, 2005), 292; Shirai Asakichi and Ema Tsunekichi, Kōminka undō (Tahoku: Higashi Taiwan shinpōsha Taihoku shikyoku, 1939), 167; Taiwan sōtoku fu kanbō jōhōka 1943, 35.

\textsuperscript{649} Taiwan sōtoku fu kanbō jōhōka, Daitōa sensō to Taiwan (Tahoku: Taiwan sōtoku fu kanbō jōhōka, 1943), 9.

\textsuperscript{650} Female graduates also enlisted as nurses in the Shantou Benevolent Hospital. Matsunaga Kenya, Nanshi senzen kyōiku jūgunki (Tokyo: Shōwa shobō), 187-8.

\textsuperscript{651} "Amoi kangoku de hakkagetsu shinginshita ichi sekimin: waga senryō ni yori kisekiteki ni
subjects and heroes of the South China warfront. Despite the duress under which Taiwanese participated as translators, Japanese newspapers depicted the Taiwanese as "grateful for their opportunity to participate in the holy war against China" and "willing to die for the sake of Japan." 652

Interestingly, at a time when the general Taiwanese population was subjected to wartime "Japanization" assimilation policies (kominka seisaku, 1937-45), including the suppression of spoken Taiwanese (Fujianese) in public and in the home, the Government-General of Taiwan recruited Taiwanese as translators for spoken Fujianese, Cantonese, and Mandarin in China. In

653. Takeuchi Kiyoshi, Jihen to Taiwanjin (Taihoku: Taiwan shinminpōsha, 1939), 20, 118.
1938, the Government-General of Taiwan held three-month long "preparation courses for entering South China" (Nanshi shinshutsu kōshūkai) in Taipei. Held at Taihoku Commercial College, a "South China Curriculum" was taught to classes of 50 students who had graduated from Taiwan elementary school or were over 18 years-old. The curriculum included Mandarin Chinese (96 hours), current affairs of South China (49 hours), general knowledge of South China (24 hours), and South China geography, history, and economics (24 hours). Over 100 Taiwanese youth completed this crash-course before being sent to Hainan as military translators. By the start of the Pacific War in 1941, there were an estimated 240 Taiwanese translators, 1,500 Taiwanese military auxiliaries, and over 2,000 Taiwanese civilians (farmers) who made up two-fifths of the Japanese subject population in Hainan. The Government-General of Taiwan also founded the Taipei Overseas Travel Society (Taihokushū tokō kyōkai) and United Taiwanese Society (Taiwan kyōjin hakkōkai) in 1939 and 1940, respectively, to cultivate translators for South China. The two societies sought to increase Taiwanese understanding of, and participation in, the reconstruction of South China. In addition to language training, the societies organized Taiwanese observation tours of Xiamen, Guangzhou, and Shantou.

The curriculum also included the study of ethics and Japan's mission in East Asia; national spirit; Sino-Japanese harmony and Japanese economic development in South China. "Nanshi e yūhisuru: seinen no kōshūkai, kōshi ni tōnai kenisha wo itaku, Taiwān nichinichi shinpō (June 12, 1938); "Ide Kiwata Nanshi hōmei shinshutsusha yōsei kōshūkai kōshi wo meisu," Taiwān sōtokufu kōbin ruisan 10093-189, June 1, 1938.

"Minami Shina oyobi Kainantō ni taisuru Taiwan sōtokufu no kyōryoku gaikyō," Nanshi Nanyō jihō 26 (September 1942); Taiwan sōtokufu gaijibu 1943b, 10.

"Minami Shina oyobi Kainantō ni taisuru Taiwan sōtokufu no kyōryoku gaikyō," Nanshi Nanyō jihō 26 (September 1942); Taiwan sōtokufu gaijibu 1943b, 10.

"Kantongo tsūyaku ni hontōjin tasū ōbo," Taiwān nichinichi shinpō (August 24, 1941).

"Hakkō kaiin: chikaku Nanshi hōmen shisatsu," Taiwān nichinichi shinpō (October 3, 1941). The United Taiwanese Society also coordinated with the Guangzhou Xingaohui (Kanton Shinkōkai), Shantou Co-Prosperity Society (Swatou kyōeikai), Xiamen Zhichenghui (Shisetsukai) and Yuellihui to mold overseas Taiwanese into "good imperial subjects." Taiwān shihō hakkōsho, "Nanshi Nanyō ni okeru honōjin," 166.
With the growing Japanese and Taiwanese settler population in South China, the Japanese demand for Fujianese, Cantonese, and Hainanese language primers in Taiwan grew. Based on his fieldwork in Guangzhou, Kōsaka Jun’ichi (1915–2003), a Japanese linguistics professor at Taihoku Commercial College, published *Research on Cantonese* (1942) and *Comparative Research on Beijing and Cantonese Languages* (1943). In 1941, Wang Jinxiu and Chen Shaozong, who both worked both as navy translators and Japanese-language teachers in Hainan, compiled *A Practical Intensive Hainanese Reader*. That same year, the Taiwan Southern Region Association (*Taiwan Nanpō kyōkai*) published *Hainanese Conversation* by the police official Matsutani Miyabi.

**Figure 4:8: 1944 Advertisement for Taihoku Commercial College**

Professor Kōsaka Jun’ichi's *Comparative Research on Beijing and Cantonese Languages* and *Conversational Cantonese Dictionary*

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661. *Taiwan Nanpō kyōkai* 1941.

662. Book advertisement in *Minzoku Taiwan: Fūzoku no shūkan no kenkyū to shōkai* 4:1
Deploying Taiwanese Agricultural and Medical Personnel to China

Taiwanese involvement in the Japanese occupation of South China was not limited to educated subjects. With large numbers of Chinese farmers and laborers having fled from Central and South China to the southwest hinterland during the initial years of the Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese military faced severe shortages of food. By the end of 1937, the Japanese had occupied Shanghai, Nanjing, Xuzhou, Anqing, and Wuhan in Central China. While retreating from Central China, however, Chinese Nationalist troops had burned much of the region's cultivable land to prevent the Japanese from obtaining enough food for their troops. In the months that followed, the Japanese Army sought help from the Government-General of Taiwan to revive agricultural production in the region. In February 1938, Iso Eikichi and Okuda Aru (1893–1961), agricultural studies professors at Taihoku Imperial University, were sent to Central China to survey conditions for military food production, the results which they submitted as *Guidelines of Vegetable Cultivation for the Military*. With requests from the Army for agricultural manpower, the Government-General of Taiwan dispatched its first group of Taiwanese farmers, euphemistically called "Taiwan Agricultural Volunteers" (nōgyō giyūdan), to Shanghai in 1938. Alternatively called by Japanese officials as "plough warriors" (kuwa no senshi) or "military farmers" (gun nōfu), the average age of Taiwanese agricultural volunteers was 24- to 25-years old. Because salaries for agricultural volunteers were equal to those of Taiwan police officers (30 yen per month), an estimated 3,000
Taiwanese applied for the first group of 1,000 farmers.\textsuperscript{665} According to a post-WWII interview conducted by the historian Shao Mingguang, Li Taiping was an example of a Taiwanese who volunteered because of the high pay; he later went on to became a platoon leader.\textsuperscript{666} In July 1939, a second group of 700 Taiwanese farmers was dispatched to Shanghai, Nanjing, Hankou, Wuhan, and Anqing to increase food production for tens of thousands of Japanese soldiers.\textsuperscript{667}

In occupied South China, Taiwanese agricultural laborers were viewed by the Japanese as particularly suited to the region because of its similar climate and latitude to Taiwan. Between 1939 and 1942, the Government-General of Taiwan sent hundreds of "agricultural advisers" (nōgyō shidōin)—agricultural engineers and farmers—to raise the production of rice and vegetables in the coastal cities of South China.\textsuperscript{668} Taiwan Agricultural Affairs officials such as Fujioka Yasuo went to Guangzhou to survey the potential of rice production and to import Taiwan cultivation methods. Fujioka became chief advisor for the Xingyue Company founded for military rice production while other Taiwan-based Japanese companies were brought into South China for sugar production and mineral excavation.\textsuperscript{669}

In Hainan, the Taiwan Development Company led the Government-General of Taiwan's initiative to transform Hainan into a productive agricultural base. The semi-official semi-private company had been established in June 1936 with the following four aims: (1) develop uncultivated

\textsuperscript{665} Taiwan sōtokufu gaijibu 1943b, 32.
\textsuperscript{666} Shao 2007, 99.
\textsuperscript{667} According to the scholar Zheng Liling, several of the second group of volunteers who returned to Taiwan in 1940 were later sent to farms in the Philippines and New Guinea during the Pacific War. Other volunteers stayed on in China to work in farms or as translators. "Nanshi oyobi Kainantō ni taisuru Taiwan sōtokufu no kyōryoku gaikyō," \textit{Nanshi Nanyō jihō} 26 (September 1942), 65; Zheng Liling, \textit{Zhanshi tizhixia de Taiwan shehui (1937-1945): Zhi'an, shehui jiaohua, junshi dongyuan} (M.A. Thesis, Qinghua daxue lishi yanjiusuo, 1994), 79, 115-123; Kondō 1996, 360.
\textsuperscript{668} Taiwan sōtokufu gaijibu 1943b, 66.
\textsuperscript{669} By May 1942, there were 3,583 overseas Taiwanese (1,564 households) working in Guangzhou. "Taiwan sekimin Kanton de katsuyaku: sōkei itsuni sanzen gohyaku yomei," \textit{Taiwan nichinichi shinpō} (June 20, 1942); Taiwan sōtokufu gaijibu 1943b, 165.
land in Taiwan; (2) increase economic trade and investment from Taiwan with its southern neighbors; (3) grow multiple strands of rice; and (4) promote Taiwan's heavy industrialization by importing natural resources from South China and Southeast Asia. After the Japanese occupation of Hainan, the company invested the majority of its overseas capital and personnel in the island's agriculture, livestock, construction, and transportation enterprises based on Taiwan's developmental model.\textsuperscript{670}

Prior to Japan's occupation, Hainan had been a net importer of rice from the Chinese mainland, Indochina, and Thailand. The Taiwan Development Company brought over agricultural researchers and farmers to Hainan to establish irrigation facilities and to introduce what the Japanese believed to be the superior rice strand known as the Taiwan "hōrai" strand.\textsuperscript{671} In 1940, the company began experimenting with hōrai rice cultivation in its Hainan pilot farms, which proved to be 30 percent more productive than the "zairai" strand previously grown in Hainan. According to Ōmori Shirō, one of the agricultural experts who managed the company's Sanya farms, Hainan was suitable for rice production because it had fewer seasonal rain storms compared to Taiwan.\textsuperscript{672} With the planting of hōrai rice by hundreds of Taiwanese farmers, by 1942 Hainan rice production doubled.\textsuperscript{673} By the end of World War II, a total of 25 Japanese agricultural companies had invested millions of yen to grow not only Hainan rice but also sugar, sweet potato, peanuts, and fruit.\textsuperscript{674}

\textsuperscript{670} Schneider 1998a, 253-6; Chung 2007, 324.
\textsuperscript{671} For a chart comparing the disadvantages of Hainan's "zailai" rice versus Taiwan's "hōrai" rice, see Kuwahara Masao, Taiwan to Nanshi Nanyō no jissai mondai: sonohoka jiji (Taihoku: Taiwan keizai kenkyūkai, 1941), 12-3.
\textsuperscript{672} "Kainantō wa beisaku tekichi: Ōmori Taitakushi kataru," Kōnan shinbun, October 5, 1941.
\textsuperscript{673} Such Taiwanese farmers were officially called "agricultural volunteer advisor groups" (nogyō shidō teishindan) or "agricultural volunteer corps" (nogyō giyūdan). Although Taiwanese went to Hainan as brick makers, stone masons, livestock workers, and construction laborers, the majority went to work in agriculture. There were about three times as many Taiwanese than Japanese working TDC agricultural operations. "Nōgyō teishindan wo haken: Kainantō no zōsan shidōni," Kōnan shinbun (August 9, 1942); Taiwan sōtokufu gaijibu, Taiwan no Nanpō kyōryoku ni tsuite (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu gaijibu, 1943), 73; Schneider 1998a, 277-8.
\textsuperscript{674} Among the 25 companies were several Japanese sugar companies from Taiwan led by Greater Japan Sugar Production Company (Dai Nihon seitō kabushiki kaisha), which moved its
Japanese and Taiwanese scholars from Taihoku Imperial University's Agricultural Studies Department also played a significant role in agricultural policies towards Hainan. Professor Tanaka Chōzaburō, a pioneering researcher of Hainan agriculture even before the occupation, published reports in March 1939 on the need for better irrigation infrastructure to exploit Hainan's cultivable land. Tanaka also systematically compared Hainan and Taiwan's natural resources and identified the economic potential of Hainan rubber, sugar, coconut, coffee, pineapple, tobacco, and tea. The Imperial Navy appointed Tanaka on its Hainan Agricultural Administration Committee, and his work became the foundation for later research on Hainan botany and horticulture.

The Imperial Navy also commissioned Taihoku Imperial University to dispatch "Hainan Scientific Research Groups" of professors and students—both Japanese and Taiwanese—to survey Hainan in 1941 and 1942. Led by the Agricultural Department Chair Tokuichi Shiraki, the research groups published their findings on Hainan's climate, agriculture, livestock, forestry, geology, and ethnology as No. 1 Hainan Scientific Research Report (1942) and No. 2 Hainan...
In 1943, the university's Southern Region Resources Scientific Research Institute (Nanpō shigen kagaku kenkyūjo) established a "Hainan Laboratory" (Hainan jikkenshitsu) to conduct tropical agriculture research experiments.  

The Japanese viewed the Taiwanese as suitable settler migrants to spearhead economic development in Hainan. Not only were the Taiwanese already acclimated to the tropical environment, but they could also supposedly master the Hainanese language quicker than the Japanese since it was similar to Fujianese and Cantonese. Just as the Japanese had successfully developed Taiwan's agricultural economy over the span of four decades, the Navy and Government-General of Taiwan hoped that Japanese and Taiwanese settlers from Taiwan could "uplift" Hainan's economy and culture within a few decades. Within the imperial hierarchy of Hainan, the Taiwanese were second-class imperialists below Japanese managers but above local Hainanese laborers. The Navy administration in Hainan assigned Taiwanese with previous agricultural experience to supervisory positions as "agricultural advisors" (nōgyō shidōin) to oversee Chinese and aborigine laborers (J. dojin, C. turen), whom the Japanese criticized as "lazy in character" (taida na seikaku). Taiwanese employees in Hainan were in fact paid salaries equal to their Japanese peers that were higher than local Hainanese workers.  

Within Taiwan, the Japanese colonial media propagated positive images of overseas
Taiwanese workers for their contribution to Hainan development.\textsuperscript{686} Japanese officials who visited Hainan from the Japanese metropole, such as parliamentary representative Koike, spoke glowingly in the \textit{Rise South News} of Taiwanese youth he observed guiding local farmers or constructing military roads.\textsuperscript{687} Similarly, former Taiwan governor-general Kobayashi spoke of his high expectations for Taiwanese youth in Hainan as military assistants and soldiers.\textsuperscript{688} Yet in fact Japanese military and colonial officials in Hainan continued to hold racist attitudes toward both Taiwanese and Hainanese. A 1943 Japanese official report from Hainan stated that in terms of work productivity "one Taiwanese worker was the equivalent of two-thirds of a Japanese and two Hainanese." Thus despite the rosy rhetoric in the colonial Taiwan media about the "heroic participation" of Taiwanese laborers in Japan's economic and military southern advance, the Japanese maintained an imperial hierarchy within which the Taiwanese remained second-class subjects.

Aside from restoring public order and growing food, the most pressing issue that the Japanese military faced in the South China warfront was providing medical care for Japanese and Taiwanese settlers as well as local Chinese residents. In Guangzhou and Hainan in particular, the military lacked the facilities and personnel to treat cholera and malaria epidemics. The Navy thus called on the Taiwan-supported Benevolent Society doctors and Taihoku Imperial University Medical Department to provide vaccines and other medical treatment for the local Chinese and Japanese population.\textsuperscript{689} As introduced in Chapter Three, the Government-General of Taiwan had

\textsuperscript{686} "Hontōjin sangyō senshi kōhyō: Kainantō wa yahari nōgyōga omoni, Kusui Taidai kyōju shisatsudan, \textit{Kōnan shinbun}, March 12, 1942.

\textsuperscript{687} "Kainantō ni okeru hontō seinen no katsuyaku wa mattaku mezashi: ki-Tai shita Koike daigidan," \textit{Kōnan shinbun}, May 13, 1941.

\textsuperscript{688} "Hōko Kainantao dewa hontō seinen no shinshitsu wo kitai: Kobayashi mae sōtoku no shisatsukan sōdan," \textit{Kōnan shinbun}, March 2, 1941.

\textsuperscript{689} Taiwan sōtokufu, \textit{Taiwan sōtokufu jimu seiseki teiyō (45)} (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu minseikyoku, 1939), 761. Founded in 1919 as the Taiwan Medical Vocational School (Taiwan
established Benevolent Society hospitals in Xiamen (1918), Fuzhou (1919), Guangzhou (1919), and Shantou (1924) with medical staff from Taiwan. Inspired by Anglo-American medical missions in China, the Japanese used medicine as a philanthropic activity to legitimize their presence in China and cultivate pro-Japanese sentiment. Although the Benevolent Society hospitals closed down temporarily in 1937 with the start of the Sino-Japanese War, by 1939 the Benevolent Society had not only re-opened its hospitals but also added new ones in Jinmen and the Hainan port cities of Haikou and Sanya, as well as medical clinics (shinryōsho) in Hainan's Nada, Huangliu, Yaxian, Lushui, and Jiaji.

A month after the navy occupation of Jinmen in October 1937, the Fuzhou Benevolent Society doctors led a "hygienic survey team" (eisei chōsahan) to inspect Jinmen's water and take preventive measures against malaria. In February of the following year, the head of the Xiamen Benevolent Society Hospital, Hara Yōzō, founded a medical clinic in Jinmen. Similarly, in 1939 the Benevolent Society played a key role in the hygienic policies of newly-occupied Hainan. In March 1939, the former chief of the Shantou Benevolent Hospital, Kawata Kōichirō, led a "medical treatment and prevention team" (shinryō bōeki ban) to Hainan to treat diseases and provide drugs and blood serums. Staff members from the Guangzhou Benevolent Society Hospital were responsible for establishing new hospitals and clinics in Hainan, where Japanese and Taiwanese doctors provided vaccinated the local population, sterilized houses, inspected food

igaku senmon gakkō), the school became Taihoku Imperial University's Medical Department (igakubu) in 1936. The department's Tropical Medical Research Center (Nettai igaku kenkyūjo) focused on malaria research and disease prevention.

691. In 1942 the Rise Asia Office (Kōa-in) transferred hospital administration in Hainan from the Benevolent Society over to the Dojinkai. Taiwan sōtokufu gaijibu 1943b, 20, 221-2.
692. Ibid., 125.
693. Taiwan sōtokufu keimukyoku eiseika, Taiwan no eisei (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu keimukyoku eiseika, 1939), 141; Shimojō Kumaichi, "Nanpōken to waga nettai igaku kenkyūjo," Taiwan jihō (January 1942), 70.
and water for bacteria, and treated patients afflicted with cholera and malaria.\textsuperscript{694}

The Taihoku Imperial University Medical Department played an equally active role in the hygienic administration of wartime South China. In the summer of 1939, Taihoku Imperial University professors and students were dispatched to South China to form "medical volunteer teams" (igaku hōshidan) with the Guangzhou Benevolent Society Hospital, where they worked on their respective specialities of surgery, internal medicine, ophthalmology, and dentistry.\textsuperscript{695} Medical professor Ōmura Yasuo led a group of 18 university personnel—10 students and eight staff—to Hainan to examine soldiers, officials, and school children for malaria and other diseases.\textsuperscript{696} The Navy's chief doctor praised Ōmura's team for "knowing more about South China's medical problems than Japanese from universities in the metropole." Indeed, Ōmura noted that "the illnesses we found in Hainan were exactly the same as those in Taiwan with no new diseases to be found."\textsuperscript{697} Due to preventive shots given by the Benevolent Hospital, Ōmura did not find any cases of cholera. Although malaria and tropical neurasthenia (nettai shinkeibyō) remained prevalent throughout the war, the Japanese were able to virtually eliminate cholera and decrease the number of cases of plague and typhus in Hainan.\textsuperscript{698}

Throughout the wartime period, Hainan continued to serve as a medical laboratory for Taihoku Imperial University students. During summer vacations, the university dispatched teams of medical, agriculture, and forestry students to Haikou, Sanya, and Lushui, to survey tropical

\textsuperscript{694} Shimomiya 1939, 251; Taiwan sōtokufu gaijibu 1943b, 220-2.
\textsuperscript{695} Tsutsui Tsuo, 
\textsuperscript{696} 20 students went with Professor Murakami to Guangzhou (July 1939) to survey hygiene in Guangzhou. Taiwan sōtokufu keimukyoku eiseika 1939, 141.
\textsuperscript{697} Ōmura Yasuo, "Kainantō no igaku hōshi yori kaerite," \textit{Taiwan jihō} (November 1939), 129-30, 133. See picture of Ōmura and his students in Haikou. Taiwan sōtokufu rinji jōhobu, "Hontō seinen jūgun tsūyaku toshite seisen ni sanka," \textit{Buhō} 74 (September 21, 1939), 12-3, reprinted in \textit{Taiwan sōtokufu rinji jōhobu 'Buhō' 7} ed. Katō Kiyofumi, Yagashiro Hideyoshi, (Tokyō: Yumani shobō, 2005), 84-5.
\textsuperscript{698} Fujisaki Haruo, "Taihoku teidai igaku hōshidan Kainantōki," \textit{Taiwan jihō} (September 1939), 135; Hirakawa Shō, "Taihoku teikoku daigaku Kainantō haken gakutodan hōkokusho," \textit{Taiwan jihō} (October 1940), 101.
diseases and agriculture. With the help of navy authorities, medical students surveyed the effects of tropical climate on local workers, particularly those who suffered from tropical neurasthenia or malaria. Other malaria prevention experts (bōatsu gijutsuin) from throughout Taiwan studied at Taihoku Imperial University's Institute for Tropical Medicine (est. 1939) for half-a-year before traveling to Hainan to work on malaria prevention. In this way, the Japanese occupation of South China extended opportunities for colonial Japanese and Taiwanese medical students to further develop research in the field of tropical medicine beyond the borders of Taiwan.

The sociologist Lo Ming-cheng has contended that Taiwanese doctors were dispatched to wartime South China and Southeast Asia not only to aid the Japanese military but also "to win over the hearts of local residents" with their medical services. While it is questionable how successful Japanese overseas medical missions were in changing local Chinese views of Japanese imperialism, Japanese and Taiwanese doctors from Taiwan did effectively reduce the number of tropical disease cases in South China, especially in Hainan. The Government-General of Taiwan attempted to elevate its importance in the military administration of South China by contending that Taiwan's police, military, and medical personnel were more experienced and suited to conditions in Fujian, Guangdong, and Hainan than Japanese personnel from the metropole. In the process, the Japanese colonial media celebrated the Taiwanese who participated in the warfront as "imperial heroes," although such idealized images no doubt whitewashed the harsh realities of serving the

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700. "Kainantō wa kenkōchi: Taiwan ni iruyōna kimochi: kinrō hōshi wo oete Taidaisei kaeru," Kōnan shinbun, August 19, 1941.
702. After the Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia in 1942, Japanese and Taiwanese doctors from Taihoku Imperial University were also dispatched to treat tropical diseases. That year, Taihoku Imperial University Medical Professor Morishita Kaoru proposed to found a Taiwan center called the "Welfare Community of the Co-Prosperity Sphere" (Kyōeiken kōsei buroku). Lo 2002, 112.
Japanese empire.

Yet while Japanese colonial discourse lionized the overseas Taiwanese as imperial pioneers, contemporary Chinese reports in occupied regions such as Hainan criticized Taiwanese personnel—who made up the majority of Japanese nationals in the island by the end of the war—taking advantage of their status as agricultural supervisors or imperial police by lording it over the local Hainanese or mistreating allied prisoners of war. Such behavior by the Taiwanese no doubt contributed to Chinese retaliation against resident Taiwanese after the fall of the Japanese empire in August 1945.

_Taiwan's Cross-Straits Education and Propaganda Channels in China_

While Japanese military officials in South China relied on Taiwanese translators and Sino-Japanese bilingual rule, they simultaneously disseminated Japanese-language education so as to gradually acculturate the local Chinese into loyal imperial subjects. Due to the Government-General of Taiwan's nearly three decades of experience in administering Japanese-language schools in Fujian and Guangdong, during the war the Japanese Army and Navy continued to import education personnel from Taiwan. At the start of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937, the three overseas Taiwanese schools in South China—Xiamen Kyokuei School, Fuzhou Tōei School, and Shantou Tōei School—had closed down as their teachers and students took refuge in Taiwan. After Japan's occupation of South China a year later, the Government-General of

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704. Su Yunfeng, *Hainan lishi lunwenji* (Haikou: Hainan chubanshe, 2002), 172; Schneider 1998a, 281. Chung Shu-ming estimates that there were around 20,000 Taiwanese in Hainan at the peak of the war. Chung 2007, 333-4.

705. For more on anti-Taiwanese backlash in China after the war, see Jiu-jung Lo, "Trials of the Taiwanese as Hanjian Or War Criminals and the Postwar Search for Taiwanese Identity," in _Constructing Nationhood in Modern East Asia_, ed. Kai-wing Chow et al. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), 279-316.

706. Taiwan sōtokufu rinji jōhobu (1938), reprinted in _Taiwan sōtokufu rinji jōhobu 'Buhō' 2_ ed.
Taiwan Education Bureau re-sent its teachers to the overseas Taiwanese schools. With the reopening of Xiamen Kyokuei School and an increase in Chinese and Taiwanese student enrollment, with the help of overseas Taiwanese donations the Education Bureau built additional classrooms and a new auditorium.707

The Japanese military also requested Japanese and Taiwanese teachers from the island to develop new "Japanese-language training centers" (J. Nihongo kōshūjo, C. Riyu jiangxisuo) for Chinese youth in South China.708 The Co-Prosperity Society (J. Kyōeikai, C. Gongronghui), established by the Government-General of Taiwan in 1938 for Japanese and Taiwanese subjects "to promote the public welfare of local Chinese communities," founded Japanese-language training centers in Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan, and Hong Kong.709 By 1941, Xiamen alone had established 44 Japanese-language training centers with 3,000 local Chinese having completed the curriculum and 2,000 currently enrolled.710 In Guangzhou, the Co-Prosperity Society also founded a "South China Academy" (Huanan xueyuan) for advanced students to study the Japanese-language and "Pan-Asian" curriculum.711

Katō Kiyofumi, Yagashiro Hideyoshi, (Tokyō: Yumani shobō, 2005), 246-49. 707. Overseas Taiwanese donated 60,000 yuan for this renovation: Chen Changfu (20,000 yuan), Chen Xuehai (10,000 yuan), Shi Tianfu (3,000 yuan), Chen Jijin (1,500 yuan), etc. "Shinsei Amoi dayori: Amoi shikyoku ichikisha," Kōnan shinbun, March 9, 1941.
709. The Co-Prosperity Society had branches in Xiamen, Guangzhou, Shantou, Foshan, Chaozhou, and Haikou. The Xiamen branch, for example, consisted of 115 Taiwanese and 109 Japanese members. Yang Dicui, Xin Xiamen zhinan (Huanan xinribao, 1941), 135.
710. Ibid., 125.
In order to develop new textbooks for South China, the Taiwan Education Bureau formed a "South China Elementary School Textbook Editing Committee" consisting of Japanese professors from Taihoku Imperial University and Taihoku Commercial College, as well as Japanese and Taiwanese teachers from Taiwan's elementary schools.\textsuperscript{712} The textbook committee edited new Japanese language primers to be used by native speakers of the Xiamen, Fuzhou, Shantou, Cantonese, or Hainanese languages.\textsuperscript{713} Language primers adopted in Chinese elementary schools included \textit{Shortcut to Japanese-Language} (Riyu jiejing), \textit{Japanese-Language Textbook} (Riyu jiaoben), and \textit{New National Language Reader} (Xin guoyu duben).\textsuperscript{714} The goal of "pro-Japanese" education was not only to acculturate Chinese to Japanese language and customs, but also to combat anti-Japanese education propagated by Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Government.

Education in occupied South China promoted the Japanese ideals of the "East Asia New Order" (J. \textit{Tōa shinchitsujo}, C. \textit{Dongya xinzhixu}), which stressed "Sino-Japanese harmony" and "Pan-Asian cooperation."\textsuperscript{715}

Japanese colonial educators were invited from Taiwan to provide lectures and pedagogical training to Chinese teachers in South China with the help of Taiwanese translators. In July 1939, for example, Taihoku Commercial College Professor Satō Tasuku guest-lectured on "East Asian Culture" (Tōyō bunka) to Chinese elementary and middle school teachers. That same year, the Japanese military appointed Miyamoto Nobuhito (1901–89), an anthropology lecturer at Taihoku Imperial University, to instruct Guangzhou elementary school teachers on the goals of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.\textsuperscript{716} Along with five other Taihoku Imperial University professors, Wang Lianyuan (Xiamen zhanqu jiaoyu dudaoyuan), "Diwei shishi nuhua jiaoyu qingxing" (December 8, 1943), in Xiamenshi dang'anguan and Xiamenshi dang'anju, \textit{Xiamen jiaoyu dang'an ziliiao} (Xiamen: Xiamen daxue chubanshe, 1997), 186-7.

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{712} Taiwan sōtokufu gaijibu. 1943b, 178-180.
\bibitem{713} Ibid., 9-10.
\bibitem{714} Chung 2007, 323.
\bibitem{715} Yang 1941, 120.
\bibitem{716} After graduating from Keio University's History Department in 1928, that year Miyamoto
\end{thebibliography}
Miyamoto lectured to 70 to 80 Chinese teachers on East Asian history, geography, and ethnology for two months. Because they could not speak Cantonese, the Japanese professors relied on three Taiwanese elementary school teachers to serve as translators. Other Japanese and Taiwanese teachers from Taiwan visited Xiamen (1940) and Guangzhou (1941) for several weeks to demonstrate Japanese-language teaching methods to local Chinese teachers. In turn, Taiwan welcomed Chinese elementary school teachers from Xiamen to Taipei (10 teachers in 1940; 15 teachers in 1941) for several months of "re-education" in Taiwan's "East Asia Co-Prosperity" curriculum. According to Government-General of Taiwan reports, Chinese teachers would observe schools, tour the island, and attend lectures by Japanese and Taiwanese educators on how to educate Chinese children on Taiwan's affairs with the supposed aim to improve cross-straits mutual understanding.

As noted in Chapter Two, one of the main weaknesses of pre-1937 Japanese-language education in South China was its lack of opportunities for secondary and higher education. Based on Chinese demand for secondary commercial education in Xiamen, however, in 1942 the Taiwan Education Bureau dispatched four Japanese instructors from Taihoku No. 2 Commercial School to become an assistant instructor for Taihoku Imperial University's History Department to teach the curriculum on "local customs and ethnology" (dozoku jinshugaku). In 1940 he was promoted to full-time lecturer, and in 1943 he became Assistant Professor of the university's "Southern Region Humanities Research Center" (Nanpō jinbun kenkyūjo). After the war, the Chinese Nationalists hired Miyamoto to stay on at the university until 1948, and in 1949 he moved back to Tokyo to teach at Tōkai University. In 1966 he returned to Taiwan as a visiting professor at National Taiwan University before retiring in 1972. Miyamoto Nobuhiro, Wo de Taiwan jixing, trans. Song Wenxun and Lian Zhaomei (Taipei: Nantian, 1998), 212.

717. Ibid., 193.
718. Taiwan sōtokufu, Taiwan sōtokufu jimu seiseki teiyō 46 (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu minseikyoku, 1940), 786; Taiwan sōtokufu gajibu, 1943b, 123, 180. In April 1942, the Government-General of Taiwan dispatched five Japanese instructors from Xinzhu Commercial School, Taipei No. 3 Middle School, and Xinzhuang Agricultural School to teach for half-a-year at the Hainan Short-Term Teachers School to train local Chinese teachers. Taiwan sōtokufu kanbō jōhōka 1943, 175.
719. "Mizusawa Kōichirō hoka yomei Chūka minzoku Amoi kyōin kōshūkai shoki wo meisu," Taiwan sōtokufu kōhōn ruisan 10109-10, January 1, 1941, 88-91, 96; Taiwan sōtokufu, Taiwan sōtokufu jimu seiseki teiyō (46) (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu minseikyoku, 1940), 786.
teach at the newly established Xiamen Commercial School located within the Xiamen Kyokuei School campus. The Co-Prosperity Society also founded a "Co-Prosperity Academy" (Kyōei gakuin, est. 1940) in Xiamen for Chinese elementary school graduates who had completed the Japanese-language training curriculum. The academy comprised of two tracks: a two-year "normal curriculum" (honka) of Japanese-language, ethics, music, physical education, etc., for Chinese middle school students; and a one-year "special curriculum" (tokubetsuka) for Chinese officials, teachers, company employees, and other educated adults. Starting in 1942, the Co-Prosperity Society also provided scholarships for outstanding Chinese students in Xiamen and Guangzhou to continue on to secondary schools in Taiwan to study industry and commerce.

![Figure 4.9: Zhang Zuyan studying civil engineering in Taihoku Industrial College](image)

720. For its first class, Xiamen Commercial School accepted 40 Chinese students out of 70 applicants. Taiwan sōtokufu gaijibu 1943b, 122.
721. In 1941, the Co-Prosperity Academy enrolled 95 Chinese students for its "normal curriculum" and 57 students for its shortened "special curriculum." Similar middle school academies were founded by the Co-Prosperity Society branches in Shantou and Guangzhou. Taiwan sōtokufu gaijibu 1943b, 34.
722. Taiwan sōtokufu jimu seiseki teiyō (48) (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu minseikyoku, 1942), 640-1; Taiwan sōtokufu gaijibu 1943b, 34.
Aside from promoting "pro-Japanese" education, the Government-General of Taiwan helped disseminate wartime cultural propaganda in South China's mass media. In cooperation with the Co-Prosperity Society, the Government-General of Taiwan's Provisional Information Bureau (Ringji jōhōbu, est. August 1937), staffed by Japanese and Taiwanese personnel, produced Japanese- and Chinese-language publications, radio, and film for Chinese and Taiwanese audiences extending from Fujian, Guangdong, and Hainan to Southeast Asia. While there had been two pre-war Chinese-language newspapers in Fujian subsidized by Taiwan, Fuzhou's Minbao and Xiamen's Quanmin ribao, after the start of the Sino-Japanese War the Taiwan Information Bureau established new Japanese- and Chinese-language newspapers in Guangdong and Hong Kong to disseminate pro-Japanese news: South China Daily and Guangzhou Dispatch in Guangzhou; Eastern Guangdong Report and Shantou Daily in Shantou; and Hong Kong Daily, Hong Kong News, and The Hong Kong Governor-General Public Report. Japanese journalists in Taiwan with experience writing on South China such as Karasawa Shinobu were hired as editor-in-chief of the newly-found Guangzhou Dispatch.

In addition to newspapers aimed at the local Fujian and Guangdong population, the Japanese began publishing Chinese-language newspapers directed at the overseas Chinese population in Southeast Asia. South China newspapers like The South China New Daily (Huanan xinribao), The Luijiang Pictorial (Luijiang huabao), The Overseas Chinese Daily (Huaqiao ribao), and Voices of the People (Minshengbao), attempted to dissuade the overseas Chinese from aiding Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists and instead support the pro-Japanese Wang Jingwei regime by

725. Yang 1941, 135.
726. Xu Qingmao et al., Minnan xinwen shiye (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe), 95-122.
727. Taiwan sōtokufu kanbō jōhōka 1943, 168-9; Kondō 1996, 117.
728. Minami Shina kenkyūjo 1939, 41.
sending their remittances to banks in occupied China. The South China New Daily, founded in 1938 with a circulation of 6,000 in Xiamen and Southeast Asia, for example, published A Guide to the New Xiamen (1941) by the overseas Taiwanese, Yang Dicui. The guide praised the Japanese "reconstruction" of Xiamen as a vast improvement over Chinese rule and also promoted the companies of overseas Taiwanese entrepreneurs such as Lin Mutu, Chen Changfu, and Lin Jichuan through printed advertisements.

Taiwan's Information Bureau also produced Chinese-language propaganda posters in Fujian illustrating Sino-Japanese harmony. One poster, for example, depicted Chinese in Xiamen waving the Japanese national flag and welcoming Japanese troops; another poster showed Japanese and Chinese troops happily shaking hands with each other. The Co-Prosperity Society also established printing houses in South China to publish Japanese- and Chinese-language propaganda pamphlets, postcards, and popular magazines such as New Asia, South Star, Children's Paradise, and Women's World.

In addition to printed materials, the Taiwan Information Bureau used radio to disseminate wartime propaganda not only to Taiwanese and Chinese residents in South China but also to overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, the majority of whom immigrated from South China and thus were Fujianese or Cantonese speakers. In collaboration with the Taiwan Radio Association (est. 1931 in Taipei), the bureau initiated overseas radio news broadcasts in 1937 in three different languages: (1) Southern Fujianese (Minnanhua)—what the Japanese called the "southern advance language"—aimed at Chinese in Fujian and Southeast Asia; (2) Mandarin for Chinese officials and non-Fujianese speakers in South China; and (3) English for Europeans and Americans in the

729. Taiwan sōtokufu gajibu 1943b, 107-8, 114.
731. Ibid., 4, 50, 65, 148.
733. Ibid., 34.
region.735 The radio association dispatched technicians and personnel from Taiwan to install broadcasting stations in Xiamen, Guangzhou, and Hong Kong.736 Radio programs included wartime news, propaganda lectures by pro-Japanese Chinese officials, and Japanese-language lessons. Propaganda lectures explained Japan's goals for fighting a "holy war" against the West and creating a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere."737 Because radios were not widely available in Chinese households at the time, the Japanese provided free radiosets to large stores and other public areas for mass Chinese consumption.738

The Japanese also screened wartime propaganda films for Chinese audiences in South China and Southeast Asia.739 Branches of the Co-Prosperity Society in Xiamen, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, and Shantou hosted "touring film groups" (J. junkai eigaban, C. xunhui yinghuaban). In 1938, the Co-Prosperity Society and Information Bureau began constructing movie theaters, such as Xiamen's Lujiang Theater and Shantou's Zhonghuang Theater.740 Japanese colonial statistics claimed that the society hosted 83 film screenings supposedly to a total of 106,190 viewers in 1941 alone.741 By 1941, 10 new Japanese theaters in South China had screened Chinese-
and Japanese-language films to an estimated two-and-a-half million viewers. Chinese students from local schools were invited to theaters to watch "educational films" legitimating Japan's war in China. Films included An Ever Brighter Xiamen (J. Akeyuku Amoi) produced by the Greater Japan Moving Pictures Company with funding from the Imperial Navy. With versions both in the Xiamen dialect and in Japanese, An Ever Brighter Xiamen celebrated the transformation of Xiamen under Japanese occupation by depicting a revived, stable city. Renowned Chinese actors were used to attract not only local Chinese audiences but also overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. An Ever Brighter Xiamen was shown in Xiamen, Guangzhou, Shantou, Taiwan, as well as at the Japanese consulates in Thailand and Singapore. Another film, The Beauty of a Rising Asia, produced in Cantonese by the Taiwan Information Bureau for the Japanese South China Army, promoted Sino-Japanese harmony and trumpeted the achievements of Taiwan's industry and culture. While there is little documentary evidence that verify the effectiveness of radio and film propaganda on Chinese audiences, such cultural activities illustrate the efforts made by the Taiwan

Singapore, etc.), to screen films for overseas Chinese audiences. Taiwan sōtokufu gaijibu 1943b, 116-7.
742. New theaters were in established in Xiamen (3), Guangzhou (3), Shantou (1), Foshan (1), Chaozhou (1), and Haikou (1). The Haikou theater, built in 1941, was said to have screened films to 272,863 viewers. A newspaper article in the Yomiuri News noted that the Co-Prosperity Society was "catching up" with Manchuria and Central China in mobilizing film for cultural work." See "Nanshi e Hōgaku shinjun haikyū mōkyōka naru: Shina e no susumiiku bunka kōsaku," Yomiuri shinbun (January 19, 1940); Taiwan sōtokufu gaijibu 1943b, 110-1, 169, 183, 216.
746. Other films were produced by the Japanese-backed South China Film Company (Huanan yingpian gongsì), which actively recruited Chinese actors who appealed to Chinese audiences in South China and Southeast Asia. Many Japanese propaganda films produced in South China were also distributed in Taiwan to introduce Taiwanese audiences to the Japanese "reconstruction" (fuxing) of cities like Xiamen. Taiwan sōtokufu rinji jōhobu, "Akeyuku Amoi' sho jōei," Buhō 71 (August 21, 1939), 24, reprinted in Taiwan sōtokufu rinji jōhobu 'Buhō' 6 ed. Katō Kiyofumi, Yagashiro Hideyoshi, (Tokyō: Yumani shobō, 2005), 424; Taiwan sōtokufu gaijibu, 1943b, 110-1; Kondō 1996, 116-7.
Co-Prosperity Society to promote positive images of Japanese wartime rule in South China and Southeast Asia.

Figures 4.10 and 4.11: Advertisement for the Japanese wartime propaganda film Canton [Guangzhou] (left); Xiamen's Lujiang Theater, which screened wartime propaganda films (right).  

Conclusion

This chapter has argued for the pivotal role of the Government-General of Taiwan's institutions and personnel—especially the Taiwanese overseas—during the Japanese wartime administration of South China. Although Government-General of Taiwan officials initially failed to achieve the greater political ambitions to rule over an extended "Southern Region" that included 

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Hainan and Micronesia, they still participated in cultural and military activities aimed to improve ethnic relations within Japan's expanding southern empire. The Government-General of Taiwan deployed Japanese and Taiwanese subjects with the relevant linguistic skills, regional knowledge, and professional expertise to Fujian, Guangdong, and Hainan to participate in economic development, food production, police and intelligence work, medical treatment, education, and cultural propaganda. Subjects from Japan's first "tropical" colony of Taiwan, the Government-General of Taiwan contended, not only had previous experience ruling a multi-ethnic society consisting of both Chinese and aborigines but also were better acclimated to South China's climate than their peers from the Japanese metropole. Taiwan's medical and agricultural personnel also found their research and techniques in Taiwan to be applicable to South China. The Taiwan Development Company achieved substantial results in Hainan's rice production by adopting superior rice strains and cultivation methods from Taiwan.\(^{748}\)

The overseas Taiwanese in South China initially found themselves in a precarious situation at the start of the 1937 Sino-Japanese War. Facing the backlash of anti-Japanese violence, the majority of overseas Taiwanese who resided in pre-war Xiamen, Fuzhou, and Shantou evacuated to Taiwan by the end of 1937. Those who remained were either imprisoned or executed as "Chinese traitors." Yet with the Japanese occupation of South China in the fall of 1938, the fortunes of overseas Taiwanese turned again as economic opportunities opened up at the Chinese warfront. Although many of the Taiwanese were no doubt coerced into working in South China, contemporary documents (though the majority from Japanese colonial sources) reveal that many Taiwanese volunteered for higher pay and occupational statuses unavailable to them within Taiwan.\(^{749}\) As Chung Shu-ming has observed, the war gave birth to "multiple layers of

\(^{748}\) In contrast, the company did not succeed in producing non-food crops—such as cotton and tobacco—due to the difficulty of their adopting to Hainan's environment. Schneider 1998a, 256-9.

\(^{749}\) Arakawa Teizō, a Japanese military journalist sent from Taiwan as the head of the South China Expeditionary Force News Office (Nanshi hakengun hōdō buchō), noted in 1939 that
colonialism” with the triangulation of imperial relations among Japan, Taiwan, and South China. Overseas Taiwanese administrators, military attaches, and workers remained "colonized" by the Japanese while simultaneously participating as "imperial colonizers" of the Chinese.

Taiwanese in the South China military "were not treated differently from Japanese in terms of salary." Yet he also observed that Japanese remained suspect of their Taiwanese peers as potential collaborators with the Chinese. Arakawa Teizō, *Dai Kanton* (Taihoku: Sugita shoten, 1940), 108-9. Chung 2007, 335.
CHAPTER FIVE

Taiwan in the Making of Japan's Southern Co-Prosperity Sphere (1936–1945)

Introduction

On December 5, 1941, two days before Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor and the start of the Pacific War, Sakamoto Takumatsu (1908–88) of South Manchurian Railway Company's East Asia Economics Research Bureau hosted a round-table conference at the Taipei Railway Hotel titled, "Research for Developing the Southern Region" (Nanpō kaihatsu no kenkyū). In attendance were thirteen of the leading Japanese colonial scholars of Southeast Asia, nine of them professors at Taihoku Imperial University, who studied the region's economy, politics, medicine, history, and ethnology. With Japan's military occupation of northern Indochina in August 1940 and rising tensions with the Anglo-American powers over Southeast Asia, Japanese ministries and research institutes throughout the empire—including the South Manchurian Railway Company—increasingly looked to Japanese colonial scholars in Taiwan for intelligence and experience on how to further develop studies on the Southern Region. During the Taipei conference, Sakamoto

751. The nine professors were Iwao Seiichi (Southeast Asian history), Kanaseki Takeo (medical anthropology), Miyamoto Nobuto (ethnology), Kusui Ryūzan (economics), Akinaga Hajime (politics), Morishita Kaoru (medicine), Shibuya Tsunenori (agriculture), Negishi Benji (agriculture), and Tazoe Hajime (forestry). The other four were researchers at the Taiwan Development Company, Bank of Taiwan, Taiwan Foreign Affairs Section, and colonial agricultural laboratory. Sakamoto Takumatsu, "'Nanpō kaihatsu no kenkyū' zadankai," Shin Ajia 4:4 (April 1942), 54.

752. Southern region research institutions in the metropole by the early 1940s included the South Manchurian Railway Company East Asia Economic Research Bureau, the East Asia Research Institute, the Foreign Ministry Research Bureau, the Greater East Asia Ministry's Southern Region Office, the Pacific Association, the Southeast Asia Economic Research Institute, and the Muslim Sphere Research Institute. Kuno Yoshitaka, Nanpō minzoku to shūkyō bunka.
and the Taiwan-based Japanese scholars discussed how research on the Southern Region's natural resources had thus far been overemphasized at the expense of studying the region's natives peoples. Kusui Ryūzan, Kanaseki Takeo, Miyamoto Nobuto, Iwao Seiichi, and Asai Enri highlighted the importance of studying the diverse history, customs, and languages of the Southern Region as critical to the future success of Japanese migration to, as well as administration of, the region.

Figure 5.1: Taihoku Imperial University Scholars at the Taipei Conference on "Research for Developing the Southern Region," December 1941

Since the 1931 military takeover of Manchuria and the establishment of the puppet state, Manchukuo, Japanese officials and scholars in the metropole had provided ideological legitimacy for northern expansion through Pan-Asianist discourse on the ethno-political unity of Japan, Manchuria, and China in northeast Asia. Previous historians have pointed to August 1940 as a major turning point in Japanese Pan-Asianism with Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yōsuke's official

754. Even the Greater Asia Society (Dai Ajia kyōkai), founded in 1933 with branches in Taiwan and the Philippines, focused the attention of its magazine Greater Asianism (Dai Ajiashugi) on China and Manchukuo. Only after the start of the Pacific War in 1942 did the magazine publish articles advocating for "Japan's liberation of Southeast Asia from Western rule." Gotō 2003, 20-1.
declaration of the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" (Daitōa kyōeiken), which placed Japan at the head of a Pan-Asian family of nations extending from Manchukuo in the north to Southeast Asia in the south. Yet a full decade before the official proclamation of a Pan-Asian sphere that included Southeast Asia, Japanese colonial scholars in Taiwan—especially professors in Taihoku Imperial University—were advancing knowledge of a "Southern Regional Sphere" (Nanpō-ken) based on ethnological and historical studies. Since the founding of Taihoku Imperial University in 1928, Japanese ethnologists and historians had propagated a competing discourse of a "Southern Region" unity based on geocultural connections uniting the peoples of Taiwan, South China, Southeast Asia, and the South Pacific. With Japan's military occupation of South China in the late 1930s and Southeast Asia in the early 1940s, the Imperial Army and Navy drew on the experience of Taiwan's "southern studies" by employing Taiwan-based scholars to provide ideology legitimacy and ethnographic expertise to help administer Japan's "Southern Co-Prosperity Sphere" (Nanpō kyōeiken).

This chapter examines the critical role of Taiwan—not only its Japanese colonial officials and scholars but also its Taiwanese subjects—in Japan's military expansion into Southeast Asia. While previous studies on Japan's wartime southern advance have focused on rivalries between the Imperial Army and Navy, they have generally neglected the Government-General of Taiwan's role in Japan's military expansion into the region.

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755. For example, Hotta, 2007; Aydin 2007. The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in September 1940 centered on Japan, Manchukuo, and China and included the Micronesia Mandate, Indochina, Siam, Malaya, Borneo, Dutch Indies, Borneo, Australia, New Zealand, and India. Yano 1975 [2009], 115.

756. Japanese ethnography in the service of military administration was not unique to Japanese imperialism, however. As Jan van Bremen has pointed out, anthropologists have served state wartime interests throughout the twentieth century in the United States, Soviet Union, Germany, Japan, and China, among others. Ethnographers compiled documentary research and conducted overseas fieldwork that informed military strategy and civil administration; in turn, the military occupation of territories enabled ethnographers with greater access and opportunities to advance their own research. Jan van Bremen, "Wartime Anthropology: A Global Perspective," in Wartime Japanese Anthropology in Asia and the Pacific, ed. Akitoshi Shimizu and Jan van Bremen (Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology, 2003), 16-7.
in Japan's multi-institutional effort to understand and administer the diverse peoples of the Southern Region. In the late-1930s, the Government-General of Taiwan initially sought greater administrative powers overseas by proposing to head a "Southern Region Government-General" that would unify Hainan and Micronesia under its rule. Although the Government-General of Taiwan ultimately failed to achieve these political ambitions, it still became an active participant in cultural and military activities aimed to improve ethnic relations in Japan's southern empire.

I argue that Japanese colonial scholars in Taiwan contributed to early Japanese knowledge, if not imagination, of an expansive Southern Region intricately tied to Taiwan and Japan's geopolitical and cultural interests. Japanese ethnologists and historians from Taihoku Imperial University advanced colonial studies of the "Southern Region peoples" (Nanpōjin), which included not only local aborigines but also the "overseas Chinese" (kakyō). The second-half of the chapter will then shift the focus to initiatives by the Government-General of Taiwan to deploy Taiwanese subjects overseas as potential solutions to ameliorate the problem of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, whose anti-Japanese movements threatened Japanese economic and political interests in Southeast Asia. Japanese colonial officials viewed the Taiwanese, with their shared linguistic and ethnic ties to the overseas Chinese, as ideal economic intermediaries for Japanese companies and military auxiliaries for the Army and Navy. Due to shortages in manpower in the Southeast Asian warfront, Taiwan aborigines were also deployed as military auxiliaries in the tropical jungles of the Philippines and Indonesia.

As Taiwan Army Chief of Staff Officer Wachi Takaji (1893–1978) stated in 1941 in colonial Taiwan's Rise South News: "Every Taiwanese can contribute in China, and they can also be translators for the overseas Chinese in the Southern Region, Philippines, and wherever else where they have economic clout. Taiwanese also interact and understand all types of local aborigines. They should thus use what they have learned in Taiwan and cooperate to help form our Co-Prosperity Sphere." Kōnan shinbun (December 14, 1941).
During the 1930s the Government-General of Taiwan's main ally in extending its economic and administrative reach further south was the Imperial Navy. After the expiration of the Anglo-American naval arms agreements in 1936, the Navy convinced the Tokyo central government in August of that year to officially declare "southern advance" to be of equal priority to the Army's "northern advance." With the former admiral Kobayashi Seizō appointed as the Taiwan Governor-General in September 1936, the Navy sought to help mobilize Taiwan into an economic and military "base" (kichi) for further southern advance into Southeast Asia. The Navy itself began to research and strategically plan for the further acquisition Southeast Asian raw materials, especially oil from British North Borneo and the Dutch Indies that its fleet depended on. The Navy's "Research Committee on Plans Concerning the Nanyō" (Tai-Nanyō hōsaku kenkyūkai iinkai, est. 1935), conducted research on Southeast Asian colonial administration, geography, history, and resources.  

Chūdō Kankei (1894–1985), the naval officer who helped found the research committee, had served in Taiwan's Magong port in 1930 and was said to have been inspired by the research materials produced by the Government-General of Taiwan on the Nanyō.  

Meanwhile, in the mid-1930s the Government-General of Taiwan actively sought to expand both its economic and administrative influence in South China and Southeast Asia. Japanese colonial officials and intellectuals in Taiwan voiced resentment toward the Tokyo central government for Taiwan's heretofore subordinate role within the empire as an agricultural "appendage" supplying food to the metropole. The semi-official semi-private Taiwan Development Company's growing trade and investments in the late-1930s, starting with Hainan

760. "Nanyō-kyoku no shinsetsu to Nanpō shisaku: Taiwan wo motsuto katsuyō subekida," Taiwan nichinichi shinpō (November 15, 1940); Gotō 2004, 34-5.
and Indochina and later in the Philippines and East Indies, reflected what Adam Schneider has called Taiwan's "developmental imperialism": the promotion of Taiwan's heavy industrialization by importing raw materials from further south in order to elevate the island as the economic center of the Southern Region.\textsuperscript{761}

At the same time, the Government-General of Taiwan made efforts to extend its administrative jurisdiction over Japanese territorial interests in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. The Navy first made the suggestion in 1936 that the Government-General of Taiwan establish a "Government-General of the Southern Region" (Nanpō sōtokufu), whereby the Taiwan governor-general would concurrently oversee both Taiwan and the Micronesia Mandate.\textsuperscript{762} Since Japan's colonization of Micronesia in 1914, up until the 1930s the Government-General of Taiwan had previously paid little attention to the region.\textsuperscript{763} In the Japanese metropole the Micronesian islands were known for their sugar production, yet from the perspective of Taiwan the islands remained outside the heart of Nanyō centered on continental and insular Southeast Asia. Although Taiwan's experience in sugar production had served as a model for Micronesia in the 1920s, there were only a handful of Taiwan publications on the region during the inter-war period.\textsuperscript{764}

The sudden interest in placing Micronesia under Taiwan administration no doubt resulted from Japanese colonialists' aim to elevate Taiwan's status as the imperial center of the Southern Region. In September 1938, the Government-General of Taiwan went one step further and proposed "Principles of Strengthening and Expanding Ruling Institutions of the Southern Region\textsuperscript{765}

\textsuperscript{761} Schneider 1998a, 183.
\textsuperscript{762} "Taiwan, Nanyō wo ichimaru ni Nanpō sōtokufu wo settchi: sōtoku ni kaigun gunjin kiyōron," Manshū nichinichi shinbun (February 9, 1936).
\textsuperscript{763} The Micronesian islands were called in Japanese the Nanyō Archipelago (Nanyō guntō) or Inner Nanyō" (Uchi Nanyō) in contrast to the "Outer Nanyō" (continental and insular Southeast Asia).
\textsuperscript{764} Yamada Atushi, "Shokuminchi Taiwan kara i'nin tōchi Nanyō guntō e: nanshin kōzō no kyojitsu," in Nanyō guntō to teikoku, kokusai chitsujo, ed. Asano Toyomi (Tokyo: Jigakusha shuppan, 2007), 152, 161.

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Colonies" (Nanpō gaichi tōchi soshiki kakujū kyōka hōshin) to the Tokyo central government. The proposal called for the Government-General of Taiwan to unite the discrete territories of Taiwan, the Micronesia Mandate (Nanyō guntō), the Spratly Islands (Shin Nanguntō), and Hainan as a unified "Southern Region Colony" (Nanpō gaichi) under the jurisdiction of the Government-General of the Southern Region. As the imperial intermediary between the Japanese metropole and the Southern Region, the Government-General of Taiwan would serve concurrently as the Government-General of the Southern Region. For the Government-General of Taiwan, administrative control over the Southern Region would help accelerate the import of southern raw materials for Taiwan's heavy industrialization.

On March 20, 1939, the Navy annexed the Spratly Islands and the Tokyo Home Ministry agreed to place them under the sovereignty of the Government-General of Taiwan. Since 1917 the Navy had viewed the small coral reef islands, located in the South China Sea midway between Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indochina, as valuable for its minerals, fisheries, and coconut production, as well as for their strategic location as the "Balkans of the South China Sea." Even though France had claimed the islands as part of Indochina since 1933, in 1939 the Navy seized the islands based on the pretext that Japanese entrepreneurs had developed the island's mineral phosphates and guano since the 1920s. However minor the Spratly Islands' economic and

767. "Hitō no nishi no mujintō ni mujinzō no rinkō hakken: Kawasaki kisen no Tōyūmaru ga unto saishu shite saku mimei Yokohama ni nyūkō: Shin Nanguntō to meimei su," Banchō-hō (April 27, 1928); "Miyo, itaru tokoro 'Nihon' no kiseki wa katsudō itsukatari: 'Dai Nihon teikokuryō' no hyōchū Futsukoku no sensen wa shōsaiku nomi, Ōsaka mainichi shinbun (1933.9.6).
768. The French, British, Dutch, and Americans protested that Japanese control of the strategically located islands threatened Western colonial interests in Southeast Asia. The islands were one-and-a-half hours by plane to Indochina and British Borneo, and less than four hours by plane to Singapore. "Threat to Interests of Four Powers Seen in Japan's Spratly Seizure," The
strategic importance were to the Japanese empire, the Government-General of Taiwan's administrative rule over the islands starting in April 1939 symbolically reinforced its status as an imperial base for Japanese southern expansion.\textsuperscript{769}

Between 1938 and 1940, Japanese colonial officials and intellectuals in Taiwan continued to advocate for a Taiwan-led Southern Region administrative bloc that would unite Taiwan, the Spratly Islands, and Micronesia.\textsuperscript{771} Taihoku Imperial University Economics Professor Kusui Ryūzō (1899–1991), for example, insisted on Taiwan's relative importance vis-a-vis Micronesia in the imperial south. Kusui contended that Taiwan was much more strategically valuable for its human and natural resources as well as its geographic proximity to Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{772} According to Kusui

\textit{China Weekly Review}, April 8, 1939.

\textsuperscript{769} Taiwan sōtokufu jōhōbu, \textit{Jikyokuka Taiwan no genzai to sono shōrai} (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu jōhōbu, 1940), 15.

\textsuperscript{770} "Shin Nanguntō no kankatsu kettei," \textit{Asahi shinbun} (April 18, 1939).

\textsuperscript{771} "Teikoku Nampō keirin no ichigenka to zen'ei, Taiwan no jūdai shime: waga nanshin-saku no kansui soko Daitōa kensetsu no kagi," \textit{Ōsaka asahi shinbun} (May 22, 1939).

\textsuperscript{772} Kusui Ryūzō, "Nanshin kichiron: kyotensei yori kichisei e," \textit{Taiwan jihō} (November 1941),
and his colleague, Professor Nakamura Akira (1912–2003), a Taiwan Governor-General simultaneously in charge of Micronesia would help ease institutional dissent over southern policy. Just as the Manchukuo government coordinated with Northeast Asia's regional administrations to maintain a "Northern Regional New Order" (Hokkō no shinchitsujo), Nakamura argued that a Southern Government-General would unite Japanese policy between Taiwan, Micronesia, South China, and Southeast Asia to develop a "Southern Regional New Order" (Nanpō no shinchitsujo). Only then could colonial Taiwan coordinate economic policy with Southeast Asia to promote its own heavy industrialization program. Despite backing from the Colonial Affairs Ministry (Takumushō, which oversaw the Government-General of Taiwan) for a Taiwan-centered Southern Region Government-General, in the end Micronesia and Hainan were never merged with Taiwan rule. The Japanese administration of the Micronesia Mandate (Nanyō-chō) opposed the idea by citing the incompatibility of Taiwan and Micronesia's economic and strategic interests.

During the latter-half of the 1930s, the Imperial Army also remained wary of extending the Taiwan Government-General's administrative power in China and Southeast Asia. With its strategic concerns focused on consolidating control over North China and military tensions with

the Soviet Union, the Army wished to avoid expansionist activities across the South China Sea by the Navy and Government-General of Taiwan that could instigate the Anglo-American powers.\footnote{For example, during the 1935 Tropical Industry Research Conference in Taipei when Government-General of Taiwan officials met with representatives from the Foreign Ministry, Army, and Navy to discuss extending Japanese trade and investments from Taiwan into South China and Southeast Asia, the Army representative Ogisu Rippei (1884–1949) urged that the Government-General of Taiwan's focus remain on South China rather than on Southeast Asia.\cite{naka88} Nagaoka Shinjirō, "Kanan shisaku to Taiwan sōtokufu: Taiwan takushoku, Fukudai kōshi no setsuritsu wo chušin toshite," in \textit{Nakamura 1988}, 255-6.}

In September 1936, the Navy had hoped to use the Beihait Incident in South China—when a Japanese store owner was murdered by a Chinese mob in Guangxi—as a pretext for occupying Hainan, but the Army rebuffed the proposal.\footnote{Hatano Sumio, "Nihon kaigun to 'nanshin': sono seisaku to riron no shiteki tenkai," in \textit{Ryōtaisen kanki Nihon, Tōnan Ajia kankei no shosō} (Tokyo: Ajia keizai kenkyūjo, 1986), 223-4.} Even after the Army and Navy occupied coastal South China in 1938–9 in an attempt to cut off Western supply routes from Hong Kong to Chiang Kai-shek's forces, the Army limited the Government-General of Taiwan to a complementary role. The Army enlisted the help of thousands of Japanese and Taiwanese economic, cultural, and military personnel from Taiwan, but administrative powers over South China ultimately remained with the Army (Xiamen, Guangzhou, Shantou) and the Navy (Hainan).

Japan's stalemate in the Sino-Japanese War and the start of World War II (1939–45) in Europe, however, led the Army to support a military advance in Southeast Asia by the fall of 1940. Although the Army had committed over 600,000 troops in China by 1938, Japanese soldiers were unable to control the countryside and faced constant guerrilla attacks from Chinese soldiers.\footnote{Gordon 2003, 206.} Having failed through military and diplomatic efforts to obtain a quick surrender from Chiang Kai-shek, the Army began to plan for an invasion of Southeast Asia to obtain the oil, rubber, and tin necessary for a protracted war in China.\footnote{Peattie 2011, 40.} After Germany's occupation of France in June 1940, Japan negotiated with France the following month to station troops in northern Indochina in order

\footnote{777. For example, during the 1935 Tropical Industry Research Conference in Taipei when Government-General of Taiwan officials met with representatives from the Foreign Ministry, Army, and Navy to discuss extending Japanese trade and investments from Taiwan into South China and Southeast Asia, the Army representative Ogisu Rippei (1884–1949) urged that the Government-General of Taiwan's focus remain on South China rather than on Southeast Asia. Nagaoka Shinjirō, "Kanan shisaku to Taiwan sōtokufu: Taiwan takushoku, Fukudai kōshi no setsuritsu wo chušin toshite," in \textit{Nakamura 1988}, 255-6.}


\footnote{779. Gordon 2003, 206.}

\footnote{780. Peattie 2011, 40.}
to cut off Anglo-American supply routes to southwest China. In response, the United States and
British issued economic sanctions against Japan with an export embargo on petroleum and iron.\footnote{781}

In August 1940, the Japanese Army and Navy agreed to use Taiwan as a military advance
base (kiichi) for the strategic planning of a southern campaign.\footnote{782} Because the Army's previous
military research was focused on the colder regions in Northeast Asia, the Army was unprepared
for tropical warfare. In October, Army Minister Tōjō Hideki (1884–1948) began making plans for
a "Taiwan Army Research Section" (Taiwan-gun kenkyūjo) to compile research on military
strategy for Southeast Asia.\footnote{783} In January 1941, Lieutenant-Colonel Tsuji Masanobu (1900–68),
who had previously served in Central China, was appointed as the officer in charge of the Taiwan
Army Research Section.\footnote{784} According to Tsuji's post-war memoir\footnote{785}, the section consisted of thirty
Japanese officers and secretaries drawn from the Army Ministry, none of whom had previous
experience with the tropics.\footnote{786} Tsuji and his staff were to collect intelligence on various aspects of
tropical warfare including military strategy, tactics, weapons maintenance, and hygiene for
Malaya, the Philippines, East Indies, and Burma.\footnote{787}

With a paltry budget of ¥20,000 and a mere six months to report back to the Army
Headquarters in Tokyo, the Taiwan Army Research Section turned to the Government-General of
Taiwan for help:

\footnote{781. Ibid.} \footnote{782. Gotō 2004, 32.} \footnote{783. "Taiwango kenkyūbu rinji hensei yōryō dōsaisoku no ken," November 5, 1940, JACAR C01005520600.} \footnote{784. The Japanese also called the research section the "Doro Nawa Unit," which Mark Peattie has translated as "the unit put together at the last minute." Peattie 1996, 227.} \footnote{785. Tsuji's memoir was originally published in Japanese in 1951 and was later translated into English in 1960. Tsuji Masanobu, Singapore, the Japanese Version, trans. Margaret E. Lake, ed. H. V. Howe (Sydney: R. Smith, 1960).} \footnote{786. Tsuji joked that Japanese soldiers barely understood what the words "jungle" or "squall" even meant. Ibid.} \footnote{787. Tōjō emphasized the need for tropical medical knowledge to prevent soldiers from dying from tropical diseases. "Taiwango kenkyūbu shodobi fuyō eisei zairyō kōfū no ken," December 21, 1940, JACAR C04122531100; Gotō 2004, 33.}
Having such a meagre household for carrying out our work, we cast our eyes on the headquarters of the Governor-General of Taiwan, like an old pioneer family trying to make a suitable alliance with a man of wealth. We secured the support of the headquarters, and with a humble language and extravagant gratitude we sought assistance from all available men of talent and knowledge from all possible sources. Apart from this help we were undermanned.788

Japanese colonial researchers and Taihoku Imperial University professors from the Taiwan Southern Region Association (Taiwan Nanpō kyōkai, est. 1939) were particularly helpful. The Taiwan Southern Region Association provided Tsuji with tropical knowledge including climatic studies on topography, atmospheric phenomena, disembarkation methods, and coastal conditions. The Bank of Taiwan and commercial firms in Taiwan gave advice on Southeast Asian banking and trade, while Taihoku Imperial University professors advised the Army on tropical health and sanitation and counter-measures against malaria.789

In mid-February, the Taiwan Army Research Section began practicing naval maneuvers from Taiwan to the coast of Kyūshū in southwest Japan with military equipment that would be used in tropical warfare. In June, under the command of the 23rd Army the Taiwan Army carried out secret maneuvers to Fuzhou where it practiced transporting and disembarking men, horses, and equipment in packed ships with temperatures of 120 degrees fahrenheit.790 Lastly, Tsuji's unit carried out tropical military exercises in Hainan with infantry, artillery, and engineers.791 Tsuji claimed that such maneuvers in Hainan, Fujian, and Kyūshū contributed to the later success of Japan's Malaya campaign (1941–2)—which Tsuji also led—at the start of the Pacific War.

Although Tsuji's memoirs may have exaggerated the efficacy of the Taiwan Army Research

789. Ibid., 6-7.
790. According to Tsuji, the goal was to see the limits of soldiers' endurance by placing three soldiers to a mat (six feet by three feet) and giving them only a ration of water for one week. Ibid., 9-10.
791. Ibid., 11; Gotō 2004, 33.
Section, in 1941 the Japanese Army did indeed draw on Taiwan's strategic location and tropical knowledge to prepare for its military campaign in Southeast Asia. The culmination of the Taiwan Army's Research Section's work was the mid-1941 publication of the pamphlet *Read This Alone and the War Can Be Won*. According to Tsuji, 40,000 copies were distributed to Army officers as they embarked for Southeast Asia during the Pacific War since the pamphlet was the sole instruction manual on tropical warfare available to the Army.\(^792\)

By June 1941, a month before the Army advanced into southern Indochina and moved Japan one step closer to war with the Anglo-American powers, the Tokyo Cabinet acknowledged the Government-General of Taiwan's increasingly important role in the military southern advance. Yet at the same time it made sure to restrict the Taiwan government's autonomy in the Southern Region. On June 24, 1941, Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro issued a statement titled "On Taiwan's Position in the Southern Region Policies," which stated: (1) Due to its geographical position and unique characteristics, Taiwan was the advance base for the imperial south; (2) The Government-General of Taiwan should comply with the Tokyo central government's southern advance policies by contributing any resources, personnel, and colonial experience necessary for Japanese military and administrative institutions in the Southern Region defined as Hainan, Indochina, and Siam.\(^793\) Prime Minister Konoe thus made it clear that Taiwan was to complement, rather than compete with, the Tokyo government's vision of southern expansion.\(^794\)

With Japan's occupation southern Indochina in July 1941, the United States countered with an international embargo cutting off all foreign oil to Japan. President Roosevelt then proposed to lift the embargo if Japan would withdraw all of its troops from China, but in October the Japanese

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\(^{792}\) Tsuji 1960, 12-3.

\(^{793}\) Naikaku, "Nanpô seisaku ni okeru Taiwan no chii ni kansuru ken," 1941, JACAR A03023596700, 164-5; Gotô 2004, 33.

\(^{794}\) Nakaoka Shinjirô, "Nanpô seisaku to Taiwan sótokufu gaijibu," in *Sakoku Nihon to kokusai kôryū (gekan)*, ed. Yanai Kenji (Tôkyô: Yoshikawa kôbunkan, 1988), 637.
government rejected the offer. With the start of the Pacific War in December 1941, the Japanese military swiftly took over Hong Kong, Malaya, Burma, the Philippines, and the East Indies by mid-1942. In September, the Japanese government founded the Greater East Asia Ministry (Dai Tōa-shō) to oversee the wartime administration of occupied South China and Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{795} Meanwhile, the Colonial Affairs Ministry (Takushoku shō) was abolished and the Government-General of Taiwan was moved to the Home Ministry.\textsuperscript{796} The transfer of Taiwan, Korea, and Micronesia to the Home Ministry signified the accelerated "Japanization" (kōmin\(k\)a) of these "old colonies" (kyū gaichi) into a "second-level metropole" (dai-ni no naichi).\textsuperscript{797} The Home Ministry even began planning to grant Taiwanese and Korean subjects full rights and duties equal to that of ethnic Japanese, although none were implemented before the end of the war.\textsuperscript{798}

In response, many Japanese colonial officials and intellectuals in Taiwan, such as Taihoku Imperial University Professor Kusui Ryūzan, worried that Taiwan's exclusion from the new Greater East Asia Ministry would mean a decrease in Taiwan's participatory role in Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{799} Kusui believed that even if the Government-General of Taiwan was now under the Home Ministry, it should still actively coordinate with the Greater East Asia Ministry to mobilize Taiwan's resources and experiences for administering the Southern Region.\textsuperscript{800}

\textsuperscript{795} Gotō 2004, 33-4.  
\textsuperscript{796} The Colonial Affairs Ministry, which had overseen the colonial administrations of Taiwan, Korea, and Micronesia was abolished in September 1942.  
\textsuperscript{797} Kusui Ryūzan, "Dai tōa shō setchi to Taiwan," \textit{Taiwan jihō} (October 1942), 24-5.  
\textsuperscript{798} The Government-General of Taiwan in 1942 did make concessions to the Taiwanese in exchange for their support for war mobilization: they granted local elections for Taiwanese at the city, district, and town levels, and they also desegregated elementary public schools. Lo 2001, 286.  
\textsuperscript{799} Kusui 1943, 56.  
\textsuperscript{800} Kusui Ryūzan, "Daitōa shō setchi to Taiwan," \textit{Taiwan jihō} (October 1942), 27.
Despite failing to extend its formal administrative reach over Japan's expanding southern frontier between 1937 and 1942, the Government-General of Taiwan actively participated in Japanese economic and cultural development farther south. The Taiwan government's annual budget for the Southern Region increased ten-fold from one million yen in 1937 to ten million yen by 1942.\textsuperscript{801} Through its Taiwan Development Company, Japanese colonial officials and entrepreneurs (including Taiwanese) secured raw materials—iron ore, rubber, oil, hemp, and timber—in Hainan and Southeast Asia necessary for the industrialization of Taiwan. In Indochina, for example, in the late 1930s the Taiwan Development Company mined and exported iron ore from French Indochina to Taiwan and Japan even before the Japanese military occupation in 1941.\textsuperscript{802} After the Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia in 1942, the company also dispatched agricultural experts and laborers to the Philippines, Malaya, East Indies, and Siam, just as it had to occupied regions in South China as illustrated in Chapter Four.

While the Taiwan Development Company aided overseas economic development, the Government-General of Taiwan drew on colonial experts from Taihoku Imperial University to help educate prospective Japanese and Taiwanese settlers of the Southern Region. In December 1939, the Government-General of Taiwan founded the Taiwan Southern Region Association to promote research and educational activities related to South China and Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{803} Enlisting scholars of Taihoku Imperial University, Taihoku Commercial College, and other research institutes, the

\textsuperscript{801} The budget for the Southern Region was four million yen in 1939 and eight million yen in 1941. Ide Kiwata, \textit{Nanshin Taiwan shikō} (Tokyo: Seibi shokaku, 1943), 157.

\textsuperscript{802} See Adam Schneider's dissertation chapter on "Development Imperialism: The TDC in Indochina," Schneider 1998a, 183-228.

\textsuperscript{803} Xu Bing and Lin Anfan, two prominent Taiwanese economic and political elites, were also selected as board members of the association. "Taiwan Nantō kyōkai sōritsu saru," \textit{Taiwan jihō} (December 1939).
association taught foreign languages, administered the Southern Region Archives (Nanpō shiryōkan, est. 1940), and disseminated knowledge on overseas political, economic, and cultural conditions to the general public. Languages relevant to Southeast Asia that were taught included Malay, Thai, Vietnamese, Cantonese, Filipino, Indonesian, Dutch, Spanish, and French. For languages such as Vietnamese, which were rarely studied in Taiwan, the association recruited teachers directly from Indochina to Taiwan.

The Taiwan Southern Region Association's Research Committee, which included Taihoku Imperial University ethnologists, historians, and economists, compiled research on the warfronts, cultures, economy, agriculture, and industry of Southern Region. In addition to publishing educational reports, the Association hosted public lectures and film screenings for Japanese and Taiwanese youth to learn more about the "Southern Region problem" (Nanpō mondai) and Taiwan's importance in southern expansion. In February 1941, for example, Taihoku Imperial University Professor Tanaka Chōzaburō (1885–1976) lectured on "Agricultural Resources in the Southern Region" while the association head discussed current affairs in Thailand. Afterwards, the association screened the documentary film Travels in Indochina. In order to further increase the

804. "Nanpō hatten no soseki: tanjō wo mita Taiwan Nanpō kyōkai," Taiwan nichinichi shinpō (November 15, 1939), 7. From 1941 onward the archives became its own independent organization no longer administered by the Taiwan Southern Region Association. By the end of the war in 1945, the Southern Region Archives contained 42,180 volumes (Japanese-, Chinese- and Western-languages) including 14,579 volumes on Southeast Asia. The archival collection is currently held in the National Central Library Taiwan Branch in Taipei. Chen Hongyu, "Taiwan de Dongnaya yanju: huigu yu zhanwang," Dongnaya jikan 1:2 (1996), 67.

805. Taihoku Imperial University professor Shimada Kinji (1901–1993) oversaw French language instruction. A total of 792 people took association courses in foreign languages. Taiwan sōtokufu, Taiwan sōtokufu jimu seiseki teiyo (48) (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu minseikyoku, 1942), 642-3; Ye 2010, 137.

806. Taiwan Nanpō kyōkai, Taiwan Nanpō kyōkai jigyō jitsū jōkyō hōkokusho (Taihoku: Taiwan Nanpō kyōkai, 1939), 18.

807. The association published educational primers such as Colloquial Hainanese Language (1941). Taiwan Nanpō kyōkai, Nanpō dokuhon (Taihoku: Taiwan Nanpō kyōkai, 1942), preface; Ye 2010, 142.

808. "Nanpō chishiki fukyū no jikyōkai dai kōeinkai," Könan shinbun, April 22, 1941.

809. Taiwan Nanpō kyōkai 1939, 17-8; "Jikyōku kōen eigakai raijō kangei," Könan shinbun,
Japanese and Taiwanese public's "will to contribute to the Southern Region," the association also sponsored song-making competitions for themes related to the mobilization of Taiwan as a southern base. Throughout 1941, the Taiwan newspaper *Rise South (Kōnan shinbun)* advertised reader submissions for a "Song of the Southern Advance" (nanshin no uta), which were judged by Taihoku Imperial University and Taihoku Commercial College professors as well as Education Bureau officials. In November 1941 the selected songs for "Song of Southern Advance" and "The Honour of Taiwan Volunteer Soldiers" (Homare no Taiwan shiganhei) had been completed. Lastly, the Taiwan Southern Region Association invited Southeast Asian youth, including overseas Chinese, to study abroad in Taiwan to improve cultural and economic relations in the Southern Co-Prosperity Sphere. The association provided funds to natives of Thailand, Indochina, the Philippines, East Indies, Malaya, and South China to study Japanese-language and commercial skills in higher schools like Gaoxiong Commercial College. Southeast Asians were also invited to intern in Taiwan agriculture centers and companies.

The Government-General of Taiwan thus promoted Taiwan as the "Japanese cultural center of the Southern Region" where Southeast Asian youth could learn about Japanese culture and return to their societies with increased pro-Japanese sentiment and commercial skills to serve as economics intermediaries. In May 1942, the Government-General of Taiwan hosted a "Southern

February 1, 1941.

810. See advertisement in "Nanshin no uta' kenshō boshū: iza taken minami no shin tenchi," *Kōnan shinbun*, March 7, 1941.

811. See lyrics for songs in "Saa utaou hogarakani 'Homare no Taiwan shiganhei." "Nanshin no uta" sakkyoku kansei," *Kōnan shinbun*, November 19, 1941.

812. Taihoku Imperial University linguistics professor, Asai Erin, even personally recommended a Javanese student to study at his university from 1940 to 1941, who afterwards became a Malay-language teacher at Gaoxiong Commercial College. Taiwan Nanpō kyōkai 1939, 24; *Nanshi Nanyō jōhō* 9 (February 1941), 3-4; Taiwan sōtokufu kanbō jōhōka 1943, 175.

813. Taiwan sōtokufu, *Taiwan sōtokufu jimu seiseki teiyō* (46) (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu minseikyoku, 1940), 812; Taiwan sōtokufu, *Taiwan sōtokufu jimu seiseki teiyō* (47) (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu minseikyoku, 1941), 641.

814. "Taiwan ga bunka no chūshin: Maraijin o hontō ni ryūgaku saseyo,"*Kōnan shinbun*, June 11, 1942; Taiwan Nanpō kyōkai 1939, 18.
Region Co-Prosperity Sphere Youth Conference" in Taipei for "youth representatives" from China, Thailand, the Philippines, East Indies, and Indochina. As students and interns of Taiwan schools, companies, and government offices, the representatives discussed the importance of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.\(^1\) In sum, despite the Government-General of Taiwan's inability to directly administer parts of occupied South China and Southeast Asia, it nonetheless promoted Taiwan as an integral wartime base for Japanese cultural activities related to the Southern Region.

*Japanese Wartime Ethnography and History on the Southern Region*

As introduced in Chapter Three, the Government-General of Taiwan had founded Taihoku Imperial University as Japan's first institution of higher education for the study of the natural sciences and humanities of South China and Southeast Asia. While colonial research in Korea and Manchuria focused on the ethnographic study of the northern Asians (e.g. Koreans, Manchurians, Mongolians), research on the "Southern Region Peoples" (*Nanpōjin*) was pioneered by Taihoku Imperial University's Institute of Ethnology (*Dozoku jinshugaku*, est. 1928), a sub-field in the History Department. The institute's director, Utshishikawa Nenōzo (1884–1947)\(^2\), and his assistant Miyamoto Nobuhide (1901–1989, later made professor in 1940)\(^3\) taught courses on

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815. *Taiwan sōtokufu, Taiwan sōtokufu jimu seiseki teiyō (48)* (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu minseikyoku, 1942), 642.

816. A native of Fukushima, Utsushikawa graduated from the University of Chicago in 1914 before receiving a Ph.D. in anthropology from Harvard University (1919) with a dissertation on "Some Aspects of Decorative Art of Indonesia." He taught at the preparatory schools affiliated with Keio University and Tokyo University of Commerce (today's Hitotsubashi University) before moving to Taihoku Imperial University in 1928. Utshishikawa's opus magnus was *The Taiwan Aborigines: A Genealogical and Classificatory Study* (1935), for which he was awarded the Imperial Academy prize (Nihon teikoku gakushi shō). Kokubu Naoto, "Utshishikawa Nenōzo: Nanpō minzoku bunka kenkyū no paionia," in Ayabe Tsuneo, *Bunka jinruigaku gunzō* (Kyoto: Akademia shuppankai, 1985), 171-3.

817. After graduating from Keio University's history department in 1928, Miyamoto became an assistant instructor for ethnology at Taihoku Imperial University. In 1940 he was promoted to lecturer, and in 1943 he became Assistant Professor for the university's Southern Region.
ethnology and linguistic studies of Taiwan, Southeast Asia, and the South Pacific. Utsushikawa collaborated with Taihoku Imperial University professors in linguistics, history, archaeology, and medicine to form the "Southern Region Ethnology Association" (Nanpō dozoku gakkai, est. 1929), which published the journal Southern Region Ethnology (Nanpō dozoku) from 1931 to 1944. Although Utsushikawa and his colleagues including Miyamoto, the medical anthropologist Kanaseki Takeo (1897–1983), and the linguist Asai Erin (1895–1969) for the most part conducted local surveys and archaeological projects within Taiwan, their interests in ethnology spread far outside the island. The Ethnology Association's definition of "Southern Region" referred to areas with ethno-historical connections to Indonesian, Melanesian, and Polynesian aborigines ranging from Taiwan to South China, Okinawa, Micronesia, Southeast Asia, and even northeast India and the Madagascar islands of the Indian Ocean.

With Utsushikawa as its editor-in-chief, Southern Regional Ethnology was an interdisciplinary journal that published ethnographic and historical articles by Taihoku Imperial University professors and colonial researchers in the Government-General of Taiwan. In 1936 the journal's preface explicitly stated that one of its main aims was to prove historical links between Taiwan aborigines and Southern Region peoples in neighboring regions. Utsushikawa's own articles focused on material, linguistic, and religious connections between Taiwan aborigines and natives of the Philippines, Dutch Indies, and the South Pacific in an attempt to trace a "Southern Region ethnic genealogy" (Nanpō keitō no minzoku).
linguistic professors Ogawa Naoyoshi (1869-1942) and Asai Erin (1894-1969) contributed articles on linguistic commonalities between the Austronesian languages of Taiwan and the Philippines.

Utsushikawa and his colleagues made efforts to increase Taiwan's collection of aborigine artifacts not only from Taiwan, but also from neighboring regions in Southeast Asia. From the start of colonial rule in 1895, the Government-General of Taiwan had conducted ethnographic studies of Taiwan aborigines for administrative purposes. On the one hand, Japanese colonial officials wished to assimilate and "civilize" the aborigines, yet at the same time they collected aboriginal


823. Ogawa worked as an official in Taiwan from 1901. Linguistically talented, he quickly learned the Fujianese/Taiwanese dialect (Minnanhua) and published The Large Japanese-Taiwanese Dictionary (Nichi-Tai dai jiten), 1907. He studied the Indochinese, Malay-Polynesian languages in 1916 in China, Indochina, India, and insular Southeast Asia. He became a translator official for the Encyclopedia Bureau (1918) and Professor of Taihoku Commercial College where he lectured on ethnology, linguistics, before becoming college president while also working as bureau chief for the GGT Library's Editing Section. From 1928 he taught at Taihoku Imperial University, where he established the university's first linguistics lecture in March 1930 before retiring in 1936. Ye 2010, 59, 77; Ogawa Naogi, Ogawa Naogi ronbunshū (fukkōban): Nihon tōchi jidai ni okeru Taiwan shogengo kenkyū (Tokyo: Sangensha, 2012).

824. Asai was a graduate of linguistics from Tokyo Imperial University in 1918, where he learned the Malay language. He conducted ethnographic surveys in Taiwan's Lanyu on the Yameizu language in 1923, 1928, and 1931, whereupon he discovered that the Yamei and Indonesian language in the Ibatan Island were very similar. In 1936, he earned a doctorate from Leiden University with a dissertation titled, "A Study of the Yami Language: An Indonesian Language Spoken on Botel Tobago Island," before becoming a professor at Taihoku Imperial University. In 1942 Asai was enlisted by the Imperial Navy to conduct surveys on the Lizu language in Hainan. Ye 2010, 81-2.

825. Ogawa Naoyoshi and Asai Erin compiled their research to co-publish Collection of Taiwan Aborigine Legends Based on Their Original Language (Gengo ni yoru Taiwan takasagozoku densetsushū, 1935). Asai Erin, "Gengo mo fūzoku mo chigau 50-yo no shuzoku," in Nanpō no shōrai sei: Taiwan to Ran'in wo kataru, ed. Shimoda Shōbi (Osaka: Ōsaka mainichi shinbunsha, 1940), 210-13; Hashida Yūichi, "Shōnantō tanjō kinen hyōjun Mareigo kōza," Taiwan jihō (March 1942), 2.

826. The Japanese anthropologists Torii Ryūzō, Ino Kanori, and Mori Ushinosuke pioneered large-scale field investigations to classify the aborigines. Barclay 2001.
artifacts as a means to "preserve" aborigine culture. The Government-General of Taiwan Museum (Taiwan sōtokufu hakubutsukan), established in Taipei in 1908, exhibited aborigine clothing, tools, and other artifacts from Taiwan. As members of the museum's board, Utsushikawa, Miyamoto, and Iwao Seiichi and Murakami Naojirō (professors of Southeast Asian history) helped curate museum exhibitions and publish articles based on its collection throughout the 1930s.

Miyamoto, for example, conducted comparative studies of Borneo and Taiwan aborigines using the museum's collection of weaponry such as bow and arrows, swords, and shields. By 1938, the museum contained a total of 13,615 artifacts, including 3,076 for its aborigine section, 2,876 for its history section, and 1,190 for its section on South China and Southeast Asia.

828. For example, Iwao Seiichi, "Kōsha sekidai Nichi-Tai kōtsū shinshiryō : sōtokufu hakubutsukan rekishibu shinchaku chinretsuhin," Kagaku no Taiwan (November 1933): 12-3.
829. Miyamoto Naoto, "Taihoku hakubutsukan kenbutsu: Nanyō dozoku no bu," Taiwan jihō (January 1935), 118-123. Miyamoto also wrote another article based on the museum's Southeast Asian collection of stone Buddhist sculptures and masks from Java. Miyamoto Naoto, "Taihoku hakubutsukan kenbutsu: Jabatō no sekibutsu to Borubudouru busseki," Taiwan jihō (June 1935), 106-9.
830. In addition, there were 2,225 items in the geology and minerals section, 3,516 in the animals section, 448 in the botany section, and 286 in the miscellaneous section, for a total of 13,615 items. Taiwan sōtokufu hakubutsukan, Sōritsu sanjūnen kinen ronbunshū (Taihoku: Taiwan hakubutsukan kyōkai, 1939), 6-7.
Within Taihoku Imperial University's Institute of Ethnology, Utsushikawa amassed a separate collection of aborigine artifacts for research and teaching purposes. The majority of the institute's collection related to Taiwan aborigines (an estimated 2,500 items by 1936), but Utsushikawa also collected artifacts of the Papua aborigines in New Guinea, the Irongot aborigines of the Philippines, and the aboriginal peoples of southern China. Contemporary documents do not reveal whether such artifacts acquired before 1938 were seized by Japanese scholars without the consent of local natives. However, it is clear Japan's military occupation of South China and Southeast Asia provided Utsushikawa and his colleagues with new opportunities to seize valuable artifacts and bring them back to Taiwan under the so-called guise of "cultural preservation."

After the Japanese invasion of Xiamen in 1938, the Government-General of Taiwan

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831.  Taiwan sōtokufu hakubutsukan, Sōritsu sanjūnen kinen ronbunshū (Taihoku: Taiwan hakubutsukan kyōkai, 1939).
dispatched Utsushikawa, Miyamoto, and the Chinese literature professor Kanda Kiichirō as "military auxiliaries" (gunzoku) of the Imperial Army. With Japanese explosives and incendiary missiles having blown up parts of Xiamen University's campus, Utshishikawa's team went to organize what remained of the Xiamen University library and artifact collection. As recollected by Miyamoto in a post-war oral interview, within the university he and his colleagues found ancient Chinese historical relics shattered on the floor, such as Chinese animal pottery from the Han and Tang Dynasty, which they shipped back to Taihoku Imperial University along with several library books. After the packages arrived in Taipei a month later, they spent the next several months restoring the relics in their institute while the books were catalogued in the university library. A year later, Miyamoto was dispatched this time to Guangzhou to inspect damages at Sun Yat-sen University and the Guangzhou Museum (Guangzhou bowuguan). Although Miyamoto deemed it unfeasible to re-open either institution, he managed to purchase three rare copper-drums (J. dōko, C. tonggu) with frog and bird images at a Guangzhou antique store for thirty yen, which he shipped back to the Taiwan Government-General Museum.


834. Miyamoto 1998, 169176; Miyamoto Naoto, "Amoi kyōkijī," *Taiwan dozoku* 5:1 (December 1938), 63-4. After the war ended in 1945, the Xiamen Chinese authorities demanded that the cultural relics be returned to Xiamen University, and so the Chinese took the relics and books back to Xiamen. Miyamoto credits himself with protecting the relics from Chinese thieves during the war.

835. See pictures in Miyamoto 1998, 198-201.
Upon occupying Hainan in January 1939, the Imperial Navy also enlisted Taihoku Imperial University scholars to conduct ethnography surveys that would aid military and economic administration of the island. Taihoku Imperial University dispatched two "Hainan Scientific Research Groups" of professors and students—both Japanese and Taiwanese—to survey Hainan in 1940 and 1941, respectively. Led by the Agricultural Department Chair Tokuichi Shiraki, the groups published their findings on Hainan's climate, agriculture, livestock, forestry, geology, and ethnology as No. 1 Hainan Scientific Research Report (1942) and No. 2 Hainan Scientific Research Report (1944). Researchers included ethnology professor Miyamoto, linguistics professor Asai, sociology professor Okada Yuzuru, and anatomy professor Kanaseki Takao (1897–1983), all of whom were frequent contributors to the Southern Region Ethnology journal.

837. See Taihoku teikoku daigaku 1942; Taihoku teikoku daigaku daigaku 1944.
838. A graduate of Kyoto University's Medical Department, Kanaseki worked as an assistant at the university's anatomy section where he collaborated with archaeologists and physical and cultural anthropologists. After studying abroad in Europe between 1934 and 1936, Kanaseki joined Taihoku Imperial University in 1936 to teach courses on physical anthropology and the ethnology of Taiwan's Han and aborigine residents. He worked at the university even after the war ended until 1948, when he moved to Kyushu University. Kokubu 1985, 248.
Although the focus of the surveys was on Hainan's agricultural resources and tropical climate, Miyamoto and Kanaseki were placed in charge of studying the island's aborigine population: the Li (Lizu), Miao (Miaozu), Hui (Huizu), and Dan (Danzu) peoples.\(^{839}\) While Miyamoto conducted ethnographic reports on the Li, whom he observed had assimilated to Han Chinese culture and were akin to Taiwan's "cooked aborigines" (J. jukaban, C. shufan), Kanaseki observed the linguistic and religious cultures of the Hui and Dan residents.\(^{840}\) According to Kanaseki, the Dan spoke a Fujianese dialect and held religious practices similar to those of the Han. As for the Hui, they spoke a Cantonese dialect with Han residents but an Arabic dialect among themselves. After consulting with Taihoku Imperial University linguists, Kanaseki concluded that the Hui language also contained a mixture of Li and southern Chinese dialects.\(^{841}\)

After returning from his first survey trip to Hainan in 1941, Kanaseki collaborated with Japanese and Taiwanese intellectuals to publish a new magazine aimed at the wider public, *Taiwanese Folklore: Research and Introduction to Southern Region Customs (Minzoku Taiwan: Nanpō shūzoku no kenkyū to shōkai, 1941–45)*, which aimed at a more popular audience outside the academy. Taiwanese writers included Chen Shaoxin (affiliated with Taihoku Imperial University's Institute of Ethnology) and Huang Deshi (journalist for the GGT wartime organ *Rise South News [Kōnan shinbun]*).\(^{842}\) Like *Southern Region Ethnology*, the journal introduced

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840. Miyamoto claimed that the Li people's funeral rites were exactly like those of the Han Chinese, and their temples matches those of Taiwan (Mazu). Miyamoto Naoto, "Kainantō no genjūmin yobi chōsa (1)," *Nanpō minzoku* 6:3 (April 1941), 25; Miyamoto Nobuhito, *Kainantō no dozokuteki kenkyū chōsa: Reizoku no ichibu ni tsuite* (Taihoku: Taiwan sótokufu gaijibu, 1942), 4.


ethnographic and historical studies of aborigine customs from Taiwan, South China (Hainan), and Southeast Asia, yet it was more explicit in its Pan-Asianist political aims: to further cultural understanding of the diverse ethnicities of South China and Southeast Asia as a means to facilitate harmony and cooperation between the Japanese and the native peoples of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (Daitōa kyōeiken). In addition, Taiwanese Folklore differed from Southern Region Ethnology by including the study of "Han Chinese folklore" in Taiwan. Kanaseki and fellow contributors Nakamura Akira and Kano Tadao viewed Taiwan's Han Chinese customs as a subset of South Chinese customs; thus the study of South Chinese and Taiwanese customs went hand in hand. Because the Han Taiwanese and overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia were both originally from South China, Kanaseki and his colleagues claimed that the study of the Han Taiwanese was also a shortcut to understanding the customs of the overseas Chinese.

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844. Minzoku Taiwan: Fūzoku no shūkan no kenkyū to shōkai 3:4 (Taihoku: Taihoku tōto shoseki, 1943), 2.

845. Minzoku Taiwan 1:4 (1941), 1; Hui 2003, 197.
In addition to Japanese colonial ethnologists, Taihoku Imperial University historians also participated in the wartime knowledge production of South China and Southeast Asia. Professors of East Asian history (Tōyōshi) wrote Japanese-language academic and newspaper articles on

847. Stefan Tanaka has translated "tōyōshi" as "Oriental history," but I believe that "East Asia" is a better translation because it signifies the geographic area that includes Korea, Manchuria, China, and Mongolia excluding Japan.
the history of Hainan island using Chinese historical documents. In the March 1939 Taiwan News special edition on Hainan in celebration of Japan's acquisition of the island, Professor Yanai Kenji published an article on "Hainan and the Pirates [wakō]."848 Drawing on Chinese documents from Guangdong province, Yanai traced the history of Japan's relations with Hainan back to the Ming period (1368–1644) during which Sino-Japanese pirates from Kyūshū (southwestern Japan) attacked and plundered the coasts of Hainan over ten times between 1378 and 1580. Although Yanai pointed out that the "wakō" pirates recorded in Chinese documents often were not solely from Japan but often originated in China, he underlined what he saw as their pioneering role in Japan's pre-modern expansion in South China.849

Kobata Atsushi (1905–2001), a Taihoku Imperial University historian of medieval Sino-Japanese relations, also wrote academic monographs and newspaper articles on South China during the war.850 Since arriving at the university in 1930, Kobata's main research had focused on Japanese-Ryukyu-Chinese trade relations from the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries.851 In 1937, Kobata went with the Imperial Navy and Government-General of Taiwan on a trip to Fuzhou, where he surveyed the former Ryukuan embassy (Ryūkyūkan), temples, and other historical sites related to the Ryukyuan-Ming tribute trade. Thanks to an introduction from his colleague Professor Imamura Kandō, the Chinese writer Yu Dafu served as Kobata's local guide.852 After Japan's

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848. Yanai Kenji graduated from Tokyo Imperial University's Japanese history department in 1934 with a thesis on early modern Japan's relations with Spain. After studying Tokugawa-European relations in graduate school, he began teaching at Taihoku Imperial University in 1936. Ye 2010, 63.
849. Yanai Kenji, "Kainantō to wakō," Taiwan jihō (Tokushū Kainantō no genbō, March 1939), 244-8.
850. Kobata taught history at Taihoku Imperial University from 1930 to 1944, when he became an army lieutenant. He stayed after the war as an assistant professor of National Taiwan University until 1946, when he returned to Japan.
851. In 1935, Yanai traveled to Okinawa and collected the Rekidai hōan, based on which he published his magnum opus, Chūsei Nantō tsōkō bōekishi no kenkyū (Tokyo: Nihon hyōronsha, 1939).
occupation of South China in 1938, Kobata returned for additional surveys of the region and
published a series of journalistic articles on the history of Japanese relations with Fujian and
Guangdong: "The History of Our Country [Japan] and Fujian" (Southern Region Ethnology, 1940),
"Historical Relations Between Our Country [Japan] and the Chaoshan Region" (Taiwan News,
1940)," and "The Fujianese and Modern Sino-Japanese Relations: Especially the People Who
Made Cultural Contributions" (Taiwan Daily, 1941).853 His articles were then edited and re-
published as The History of Japan and South China (1942) for wider distribution in the Japanese
metropole.854 That same year, the Imperial Navy employed Kobata to compile a history of Hainan.
Based on Chinese documents and survey trips to Hainan, Kobata wrote A History of Hainan that
the navy published in late 1943.855

During the Sino-Japanese War, tensions increased between Japan and the overseas Chinese
in Southeast Asia who initiated anti-Japanese boycotts in support of the Chinese Nationalist
Government.856 In light of what the Japanese called the "overseas Chinese problem," professors
Kobata Atsushi, Kuwata Rokurō, and Yanai Kenji turned their attention to the historical study of
overseas Chinese migration from Fujian and Guangdong to Southeast Asia. Referring to the
mid-16th century as "the starting point of the modern Overseas Chinese" (kindai kakyō no kiten),
Kobata and his colleagues traced the historical causes of Chinese emigration: South China's
paucity of cultivable land, overpopulated communities, proximity to the ocean, and frequent trade

(1937); Zhang Xiurong, Taibeı dida de shenghuo: guoli Taiwan daxue chuangli qishi zhounian
xiaoqing tekan tekan (Taibei: Guoli Taiwan daxue, 1999), 226-7.
853. Kobata Atsushi, "Rekishijō yori mitaru waga kuni to Fukken-shō to no kankei," Nanpō
dozoku 6:1 (April 1940); Kobata Atsushi, "Rekishijō yori mitaru waga kuni to Chōsan chihō to no
kōshō," Taiwan jihō (June 1940); Kobata Atsushi, "Fukkenjin to kindai no Ni-Shi kōshō: toku ni
bunka ni kōshitaru hitobito," Taiwan nichinichi shinpō (July 8-10, 1941).
855. See advertisement for the book in Minzoku Taiwān 4:1 (1944); Kobata Atsushi,
Kainantōshi (Kainan: Kaigun tokubu, 1943); Zhang 1999, 226-7.
with foreign countries in need of additional laborers.\textsuperscript{857} Kuwata Rokurō's (1894–1987) study on "Historical Reflections on South China's Culture" (1940) focused on economic ties between South China and Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia from the sixteenth to nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{858} Yanai Kenji, whose field of expertise was on sixteenth and seventeenth-century European relations with Southeast Asia,\textsuperscript{859} began offering lecture courses on "The Development of Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia" in the summer of 1940, and he later published articles on the early history of overseas Chinese migration in colonial Southeast Asia, such as the Philippines under Spanish rule.\textsuperscript{860}

As for historical research on Japanese relations with Southeast Asia, as introduced in Chapter Four Professor Iwao Seiichi had pioneered the academic study of Japanese trade and migration to Southeast Asia during the 16th- and 17th-century. Throughout the 1930s, Iwao had rarely explicitly linked his historical research on Southeast Asia with contemporary Japanese interests in "southern advance," even in his seminal monograph, \textit{Research on Japan-towns in the Nanyō} (1940), which received an Imperial Academy Award (\textit{Nihon teikoku gakushiin shō}) in 1941.\textsuperscript{861} Yet with Japan's occupation of northern Indochina in 1940 and increasing calls among Japanese officials both in the metropole and Taiwan for a military southern advance, Iwao became much more active in engaging a wider, non-academic Japanese public through newspapers (e.g., \textit{Taiwan Daily, Taiwan News}), lectures, exhibitions, and even as a consultant for propaganda history

\textsuperscript{857} Kobata Atsushi, "Rekishijō yori mitaru waga kuni to Chōsan chihō to no kōshō," \textit{Taiwan jihō} (June 1940), 29.
\textsuperscript{858} Kuwata Rokurō, "Nanshi bunka no shiteki kaiko," \textit{Nanpō dozoku} 6:1 (April 1940): 1-26. Kuwata was Professor of East Asian history at Taihoku Imperial University from 1928, and in 1943 became a member of the Southern Region Humanities Research Center. Ye 2010, 75.
\textsuperscript{859} Yanai Kenji, "Augienshia sōsetsu ni kansuru ichi kōsatsu," \textit{Taihoku teikoku daigaku bunseibu kenkyū nenpō} 6 (1940); Yanai Kenji, "Kinsei no gaikō," in \textit{Nihon gaikōshi} (Tokyo: Yūzankaku, 1941).
\textsuperscript{861} Ye 2010, 63.
films. In this way, Iwao applied his historical research on early modern Japanese migration to Southeast Asia to legitimate Japan's wartime expansion into the region.

Starting in 1940, Iwao's articles on the history of overseas Japanese trade and migration were published in the main Taiwanese newspaper, *Taiwan Daily*, and the colonial organ, *Taiwan News*.

In 1941 the Government-General of Taiwan requested Iwao to speak on Taiwan's role in Japan's early modern activities in Southeast Asia for its propaganda film, *The History of Expansion into the South by Powerful Men of the Sea (Nanpō hattenshi: umi no gōzoku)*. The Government-

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863. For example, a series of Iwao's articles on early modern Japanese migration to Java appeared in *Taiwan Daily*. Iwao Seiichi, "Nanyō wa ugoku: Ran'in no jitsujō (1-4)," *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō* (May 12-15, 1940).
864. The film aimed to "provide the historical evidence for the necessity of Japan's southern expansion to the world," and included Japan's historical relations with Taiwan centered on the protagonist Hamada Yaheiei. Iwao Seiichi, "Nanyō no Nihon-machi to Taiwan," *Taiwan jihō* (August 1941), 74.
General of Taiwan transcribed Iwao's oral response and published it as an article attached with his byline in the *Taiwan News*, titled, "Japan-towns in Nanyō and Taiwan" (August 1941). According to Iwao, Taiwan had served a historically important role as a gate for early modern Japanese trade and migration into Southeast Asia. Tokugawa "red-sealed ships" (*shuinsen*) landed in Taiwan as a midway port of call before going to the Philippines, Indochina, Siam, Cambodia, Malaya, and Indies.\(^{865}\)

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**Figures 5.9-5.10:** Advertisements for the Taiwan Propaganda Film, *The History of Expansion into the South by Powerful Men of the Sea*, for which Iwao Seiichi served as a historical consultant\(^{866}\)

865. Iwao Seiichi, "Nanyō no Nihon-machi to Taiwan," *Taiwan jihō* (August 1941), 53; "Nanshin no rekishi wo tsuzuru eiga 'Nanpō hattatsushi': Hamada Yaheiei no katsuyaku o chūshin ni Taiwan sōtokufu ga tsukuru," *Kōnan shinbun*, April 16, 1941; "Nanpō hattenshi: umi no gōzoku (shinario)," *Taiwan jihō* (October 1941), 140-1.

In addition to contributing to Taiwan's mass media, Iwao also began to give lectures outside the university for associations promoting southern expansion. In May 1942, for example, he gave a talk for the Taiwan Technology Association that had been established in 1936 for developing technology not just within Taiwan but also for economic interests in South China and Southeast Asia. In the title of his talk, "The History of Japanese Expansion in the Southern Region in the Early Modern Period" (Kinsei Nihon minzoku Nanpō hatten no rekishi), Iwao claimed that the reasons for Japanese southern expansion in the seventeenth- and twentieth-century were quite similar: geographical proximity, Japan's scarcity of raw materials that were available in Southeast Asia, and Japanese competition with West over these resources. What differed in the seventeenth-century case was that Japanese southern trade and migration had been additionally spurred on by Ming China's ban on Japanese trade and Tokugawa anti-Christian policies that led Japanese Christians to seek refuge in the Japan-towns of Southeast Asia.

As the case of Iwao and others above illustrate, during the Sino-Japanese and Pacific wars Japanese colonial scholars in Taiwan willingly provided support—both scientific and ideological—for Japan's southern advance. While colonial and military officials no doubt applied much pressure on such scholars to participate in Japan's wartime mobilization, one cannot deny their complicity in southern expansion. At the height of the Pacific War, Taihoku Imperial University scholars served as Taiwan Government-General advisors on the "Southern Region Committee" (Nanpō iinkai) for economic and cultural policy regarding South China and Southeast Asia. In 1943, the Government-General of Taiwan assigned the committee to a three-year

869. For example, in January 1942 Governor-General Hasegawa invited professors Utsushikawa, Okuda, and others to give 20-minute lectures each on Southern Region's various problems (political, economic, medical, and cultural). "Nanpō chishiki fukyū no jikyoku dai kōenai," Kōnan shinbun, September 21, 1941; "Minami e 'kagaku suru kokoro': Taihoku teidai no...
project where its scholars, including Utsugawa, Iwao, and Kanaseki, synthesized previous Taiwan research to publish a series of *Southern Region Compendia (Nanpō taikei)*. That same year, Taihoku Imperial University established a Southern Region Humanities Research Institute (*Nanpō jinbun kenkyūjo*) to consolidate the study of the region's politics, economics, and culture. The Humanities Research Institute complemented the university's Southern Region Resources Scientific Research Institute (*Nanpō shigen kagaku kenkyūjo*) and Tropical Medical Research Institute (*Nettai igaku kenkyūjo*) founded in 1942.

Directed by the ethnologist Utsushikawa Nenozō, the Humanities Institute conducted surveys aimed to facilitate military administration over the native (aborigine) and overseas Chinese population in Southeast Asia. In 1943, Utsuhikawa, Kuno Yoshitaka (1898–1944), and Utshushikawa's disciple Mabuchi Tōichi (1909–1988) reported on Southeast Asian aborigine ethnicities, religious customs, and customary laws. The economist Kusui analyzed economic customs of Southeast Asian aborigines while his colleague Azuma Yoshio investigated relations

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870. "Hontō no gakujutsuteki unchiku gishū dai 'Nanpō taikei' wo hensan: Nanpō shisaku e no kiyo kengen," *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō* (May 14, 1943); "Nanpō shisaku e no kiso shiryō 'Nanpō taikei' kankō kettei: Nanpō-ken jitchi chōsa wo mo jisshi," *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō* (August 3, 1943).


873. Kuno was a graduate of Indian philosophy from Tokyo Imperial University in 1926. From 1936 to 1938 he studied abroad in India, Germany, France, and England, and in 1941 he traveled around Southeast Asia. In April 1943 he became professor at Taisho University, and the following month he moved to become professor at Taihoku Imperial University's Institute for Southern Humanities. He published articles on religion in Vietnam, Siam, India, and edited *Nanpō minzoku to shūkyō bunka*. Kuno 1943; Ye 2010, 72.
between the overseas Chinese and aborigine agricultural economy in Southeast Asia. The psychologists Fujisawa Shigeru and Rikimaru Jien reported on Southeast Asian aborigine psychology, with the latter focusing on aborigine senses (kankaku) and the climatic effects of the tropics on Japanese migrants.874

Colonial Taiwan ethnologists thus participated in what Chon Kyongsu has termed wartime "military-assistance anthropology" (gunzoku jinruigaku).875 Between 1943 and 1945, the Japanese military employed the ethnologists Utsushikawa, Kuno, Mabuchi, and Miyamoto for research overseas in Southeast Asia. While Miyamoto assisted the Imperial Army, Utsushikawa, Kuno, and Mabuchi were transferred to Celebes to conduct customs surveys for the Imperial Navy's Makassar Research Institute (est. July 1943). The institute's goal was to provide research on agriculture, geology, hygiene, and native customs for Japanese governance and development of Indonesia.876 Mabuchi Tōichi was especially suited for fieldwork in Celebes and Java since he had previously published on the political, religious, and legal culture of Indonesian aborigines while working at the Southern Manchuria Railway Company's East Asia Economic Research Bureau (1940–3) and Taihoku Imperial University (1943–4).877 In this way, early investment in scholarly activities in

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874. The linguist Asai Erin studied ways to standardize the Malay language in Indonesia. As for the historians, Iwao Seiichi worked on his history of Japanese migration to Southeast Asia; Kuwata Rokurō on historical sites in the Southern Region; and Yanai Kenji on the history of Christian missionaries in the Philippines. Taihoku teikoku daigaku kōnai, Nanpō jinbun kenkyūjo yōran (Taihoku: Taihoku teikoku daigaku kōnai, 1943), 1-14. For the list of Southern Humanities Research Institute survey titles for 1944, see Ye 2010, 295-6.

875. Chon 2006, 121.

876. Tokyo University's Agricultural Studies Professor Sonobe Ichirō was the director of the institute. Nakao 2003, 246, 250, 252.

877. After graduating from Taihoku Imperial University in 1935, Mabuchi had worked as an assistant to Furuno Kiyoto (1899–1979) to help edit his Indonesian Customs Law Dictionary. While working as a temporary researcher at the Southern Manchuria Railway Company's East Asia Economic Research Bureau, he traveled several times to Indonesia and published the articles "Religious and Political Movements by Indonesia's Uncivilized Peoples" (Indonesia mikaimin ni okeru shākyō, seiji undō, 1941), "Food Culture of Indonesia" (1942), "Indonesia's Material Culture from the Perspective of Language," "Political Organizations of Indonesia's Uncivilized Peoples," and "Societies of the Southern Regional Sphere" (1943) before returning to Taihoku Imperial University as an assistant professor of the Southern Region Humanities Research Institute in June.
southern ethnology and history paid off as the island became the go-to center for academic knowledge on South China and Southeast Asia during the Sino-Japanese and Pacific wars.

Mobilizing the Overseas Taiwanese to Combat the "Overseas Chinese"

In addition to deploying Japanese colonial researchers overseas to help the Imperial Army and Navy with research on Southeast Asian natives, the Government-General of Taiwan sought to combat the "Overseas Chinese problem" (kakyō mondai) in the Southern Region. With a population of over 10 million in Southeast Asia by the 1930s, the overseas Chinese held great commercial influence throughout the region as entrepreneurs, merchants, and laborers. Due to economic and political ties to mainland China, however, many overseas Chinese were not sympathetic to Japan's imperial incursions in China. Since the 1928 Ji'nan Incident in Shandong and the 1931 Manchurian Incident, overseas Chinese leaders such as Tan Kah-kee of Singapore initiated overseas Chinese fund-raising campaigns and boycotts of Japanese goods that disrupted Japanese trade with Southeast Asia. 878 After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, Tan organized a Singapore-based "Nanyang Chinese Relief Association" with affiliates throughout Southeast Asia in support of Chiang Kai-shek's Chinese Nationalist Party. From 1938 to 1941, Tan raised nearly 178 million yuan for China's war effort, with contributions coming from overseas Chinese in Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, and the Philippines. 879


878. A wealthy rubber entrepreneur, Tan became a philanthropist of education by financing schools in his native village of Tong'an in Fujian and by founding Xiamen University as a major educational center for both local and overseas Chinese. Kuhn 2008, 272.

879. In 1928, Chiang Kai-shek had founded an Overseas Party Affairs Department that mobilized overseas Chinese political and economic support. Ibid., 266-7, 273-5.
Japanese War, the Government-General of Taiwan and its affiliated institutions—the Bank of Taiwan, Taiwan Development Company, Taiwan Southern Region Association, etc.—increased their survey publications on the overseas Chinese such as *The Nanyō Overseas Chinese in the Sino-Japanese War* (1938) and *The Nanyō Overseas Chinese and South China's Economy* (1938). Along with the Foreign Ministry and South Manchuria Railway Company's East Asia Research Bureau, Taiwan became a key wartime center for overseas Chinese surveys. As the scholar Huie-ying Kuo has pointed out, Japanese discourse on the overseas Chinese changed in the late 1930s. Surveys no longer grouped the overseas Chinese together as a monolithic "Chinese race" (*Shina minzoku*) but differentiated them by geographical origin (Fuzhou, Xiamen, Shantou, etc.) and regional and ethnic languages (Fujianese, Cantonese, Hakka).

880. *Jihenka no Nanyō kakyō* (Taihoku: Taiwan nichinichi shinpō, 1938); *Fukudai kōshi kikakuka, Nanyō kakyō to Nanshi keizai* (Taihoku: Fukudai kōshi kikakuka, 1938); *Takao Tameo, Nanyō kakyō jijō* (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu kanbō gaimubu, 1938); *Taiwan sōtokufu kanbō gaijika,* *Eiryō Marai to kakyō* (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu kanbō gaijika, 1938); *Yamamoto Zenkichi* (Taiwan ginkō riiji), "Amoi to Fukken kakyō,", *Taiwan jihō* (July 1938); Ishii Kinosuke, "Nanpō taisaku yori mitaru kakyō," *Taiwan jihō* (July 1938); *Taiwan takushoku kabushiki gaisha chōsaka,* *Shina jihen to kakyō* (Taihoku: Taiwan takushoku kabushiki gaisha chōsaka, 1939); *Taiwan sōtokufu rinji jōhōbu, Nanyō kakyō chōsa* (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu rinji jōhōbu, 1939); *Taiwan sōtokufu rinji jōhōbu, Kakyō senden jitsushi genkyō* (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu rinji jōhōbu, 1939); Kishi Masasuke (Taiwan ginkō kensa kachō), "Swatou no kinyū jijō to kakyō mondai," *Taiwan jihō* (July 1939); *Taiwan Nanpō kyōkai, Firipin no kakyō* (Taihoku: Taiwan Nanpō kyōkai, 1941).


882. For example, see *Taiwan sōtokufu gaijibu,* *Nanpō kakyō dantai chōsa* (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu gaijibu, 1943); Huei-Ying Kuo, "Social Discourse and Economic Functions: The Singapore Chinese in Japan’s Southward Expansion, 1914-1941," in *Singapore in Global History*, ed. Derek Thiam Soon et al. (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011), 128-30.
Historians and social scientists at Taihoku Imperial University also researched and lectured on the overseas Chinese. Historians of Japanese, Chinese, and Southeast Asian history, including Kobata Atsushi, Kuwata Rokurō, Yanai Kenji, Murakami Naojirō, and Iwao Seiichi wrote about the overseas Chinese and their relations with the Western colonial powers, South China, or with Japan. Iwao's student in Southeast Asian history, Nakamura Takeshi, went on to write articles in the journal *South China Southeast Asia (Nanshi Nanyō)* on the contemporary situation of overseas Chinese political organizations and cultural institutions (newspapers, schools, etc.).

In addition to Japanese ethnologists who studied ethnic connections between South China, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia, contributors to Kanaseki Takeo's *Taiwan Folklore* including sociologist Okada Yusuru studied cultural ties between the overseas Chinese and their ancestral villages in South China. With Japan's growing need to communicate with the overseas Chinese in their respective languages, moreover, Taihoku Commercial College linguistics professor Kōsaka Jun'ichi (1915–2003) conducted language surveys of South China and published the 1943 language primer *The Keys to South China Overseas Chinese Conversation (Japanese, Cantonese, and Fujianese Language Translations).* With Fujianese (Minnanhua) considered by Japanese to be the "Southern Region lingua franca," Fujianese language primers proliferated in Taiwan during the war.

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885. See advertisement for *Nanshi kakyō kaiwa yōketsu: Nihongo, Cantongo, Fukkengo taishō* in *Minzoku Taiwan* 3:3 (21). See also his article, "Ingo yori mitaru Canton shakaizō," *Minzoku Taiwan* 3:3 (1943).
In Taiwan and South China, Japanese officials initiated Fujianese-language radio broadcasts to spread pro-Japanese propaganda directed at the overseas Chinese. For example, the Taipei Radio Bureau broadcast impressions of Chinese in Xiamen who had been invited to travel in Taiwan and Japan to observe the "civilizational advances" of Japan.\(^{887}\) Taiwan's Fujianese-language broadcasts were said to reach an audience of at least six million in South China and two million in Southeast Asia.\(^{888}\) As the Chinese propaganda ministry head in occupied Guangzhou, the Taiwanese Lin Bosheng also disseminated propaganda in South China and Southeast Asia that

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886. *Minzoku Taiwan* 3:3 (1943).
888. Shii Kinosuke, "Nanpō taisaku yori mitaru kakyō," *Taiwan jihō* (July 1938), 126.
attacked Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists and Anglo-American imperialism. Lin's radio broadcasts spread the slogan of "The Greater East Asia War for the Liberation of East Asia" based on the alliance of Japan, China, and Manchukuo against the Western powers. In August 1941, Lin hosted an "East Asia Journalism Conference" (Tōa kisha taikai) with Chinese journalists where he called for a "peaceful East Asian people's movement" based on "Sino-Japanese friendship" as an alternative to anti-Japanese resistance. He lectured on the importance of the East Asia League (Dongya lianmeng) founded upon Sun Yat-sen's ideas of Greater Asianism and Three People's Principles.

In addition to dispatching Japanese-language teachers and publishing local pro-Japanese newspapers directed at overseas Chinese, the Government-General of Taiwan sought to mobilize the Taiwanese overseas as a means to combat overseas Chinese "terrorism" (tero) against Japanese economic interests. Japanese colonial officials envisioned the overseas Taiwanese as the perfect commercial and cultural intermediaries for Japanese companies since they shared the languages and hometowns of the overseas Chinese. As a Taiwan News article stated in 1940:

889. Akinaga Hajime, "Kanton no fukkō wo wahei undō no gendankai (jō)," Taiwan nichinichi shinpō (August 27, 1941); Lin Bosheng, "Dui Nanyang qiaobao de hua," Qiaosheng 5:2 (1943), 14.
891. The four principles of the East Asia League were political independence, economic cooperation, cultural communication, and military alliance. See picture of Lin and others at the conference. "Rin senden bukō Tōa kisha taikai daihyō shōtai," Taiwan nichinichi shinpō (August 5, 1941).
893. In 1942 the Government-General of Taiwan helped establish the Japanese-language Bangkok Daily and coordinated with the Foreign Ministry to purchase Zhongyuan Report, the main overseas Chinese anti-Japanese paper. The Government-General of Taiwan sent 34 Japanese-language teachers to schools specifically aimed at the overseas Chinese, while the Taiwan Co-Prosperity Society branch in Indochina established Japanese-language clinics for the overseas Chinese. Taiwan sōtokufu kanbō jōhōka 1943, 171, 174; Nanshi Nanyō jōhō 7 (January 1941), 3-4; Taiwan sōtokufu, Taiwan sōtokufu jimu seiseki teiyō (48) (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu minseikyoku, 1942), 643.
894. Kanda Masao, "Nanyō mondai to Taiwan no sekimin (2)," Kōnan shinbun, April 2, 1941; Ide Kiwata, Shina minzoku no Nanpō hattenshi (Tokyo: Tōei shoin, 1943), 371-3.
The 10 million or so overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia come from the two provinces of Fujian and Guangdong just like the Taiwanese. In terms of language and ethnicity the two groups are well matched with each other. There is no question that our basic strategy for commercial development in the Southern Region entails the penetration of overseas Chinese economic institutions by the Taiwanese. There is no better competitor against the overseas Chinese than the Taiwanese.  

Moreover, the Japanese viewed Taiwanese settler migration to Southeast Asia as a way to help solve the island's demographic problem of overpopulation. Because of improvements in hygiene and living standards, Taiwan's population had increased from 2,790,000 in 1895 to over 5,310,000 by 1935, a 90% increase in 40 years. Taiwan's birth-rate was substantially higher compared to Japan and Korea, and in fact was one of the highest in the world. Taiwanese migration to a less densely-populated Southeast Asia would thus help mitigate problems related to both the overseas Chinese and Taiwan's demography.

Japanese colonial officials and entrepreneurs claimed that the Taiwanese not only had linguistic and cultural advantages over the Japanese in Southeast Asia, but also climatic ones as well. According to Hirooka Shinzaburō, the Taipei branch head of Mitsui Company, the Taiwanese were more acclimated to tropical life (nettai seikatsu) and less susceptible to tropical diseases such as neurasthenia. Indeed, Japanese colonial experts of tropical health and agriculture warned of potential "racial degeneration" that Japanese migrants faced in Taiwan and Southeast Asia, but

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895. Ueda Kōdō (Taiwan nichinichi shinpōsha kikaku buchō), "Nanpō seisaku to Taiwan no tokusei," *Taiwan jihō* (February 1940), 20.
896. Taiwan's population was estimated to have surpassed 10 million by 1960. Taiwan takushoku kabushiki gaisha chōsaka, *Hontōjin no Nanyō imin jijō* (Taihoku: Taiwan takushoku kabushiki gaisha chōsaka, 1940), 4-6.
which did not necessarily apply to the Taiwanese.899

However, Government-General of Taiwan officials also worried about the need for Taiwanese to fully assimilate as Japanese subjects before migrating overseas. If the overseas Taiwanese were not sufficiently "Japanese" in language, thought, and patriotism, they contended, they would merely immerse themselves in the overseas Chinese communities and lose their potential impact as Japanese intermediaries.900 Japan's success in the wartime mobilization of the Taiwanese overseas as "the southern advance vanguard" to serve as "model guides for the Southern Region peoples" would thus depend on effective "Japanization" of the Taiwanese beforehand.901

Indeed, many of the Taiwanese who had settled in Southeast Asia before the 1930s had integrated themselves among the overseas Chinese communities and cut ties with Japan. Many did not speak Japanese and hid their Taiwanese status, and some even joined anti-Japanese movements with their overseas Chinese peers. Unlike South China's substantial overseas Taiwanese communities, according to Japan's Foreign Ministry statistics the Taiwanese population in Southeast Asia totaled only 1,383 in 1937: 728 in the Dutch Indies, 270 in Singapore, 144 in the Philippines, 136 in Borneo, 76 in Indochina, and 69 in Thailand.902 Ide Kiwata, an ex-Taiwan research official who became an overseas Chinese expert for the South Manchurian Railway, estimated the actual population to be as large as 3,000 since many Taiwanese failed to register with

899. Ogasawara Kazuo, "Nanpōken no kikō (Nanpō no kagaku ninshiki)," *Taiwan jihō* (July 1942), 91.
901. "Shokumin seisaku o seisan: hontōjin wa nanshin no kokuhōteki sonzai, Ōta gaijibu dai ni kachōdan," *Kōnan shinbun*, February 6, 1942; Taiwan sōtoku gaijibu, *Nanpō kyōeiken kensetsuji no okeru Taiwan no chii ni tsuite* (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtoku gaijibu, 1943), 17, 20. For more on the "Japanization" (kominka) policies in wartime Taiwan, see Chou 1996, Ts'ai 2009.
902. As Lin Manhoung and Gotō Ken'ichi have illustrated, before the 1930s the Taiwanese were most active overseas in the Dutch Indies, where they conducted business without much support from the Government-General of Taiwan. Lin Man-houng, "Nihon seifu yu Taiwan jimin de Dongnanya touzi (1895–1945)," *Jindaishi yanjiusuo jikan* 32 (1999): 1-56; Gotō 2004, 20-1.
their local consuls. He too observed that the overseas Taiwanese often did not reveal their Japanese nationality, especially in regions where anti-Japanese sentiment was high, and in fact lived similar existences to the overseas Chinese.

Ide attributed the low number of overseas Taiwanese, in contrast with their overseas Chinese counterparts, to the stability of Taiwan versus the volatility of South China. According to Ide, South China's lack of political order and public safety, as well as its overpopulation and scarcity in food pushed many Chinese to migrate overseas. In Taiwan, however, Taiwanese subjects were "blessed with plenty of food and clothes and a stable life" and therefore had fewer reasons to leave for work overseas in faraway places. Ide's claim that the Taiwanese were politically and economically more content than the Chinese across the straits in South China remains dubious. A more likely reason for the smaller numbers of Taiwanese to Southeast Asia than to South China was that they had fewer family and economic ties to the former region. In addition, the Government-General of Taiwan maintained stringent emigration policies for Taiwanese subjects to the region. While Taiwanese managed to smuggle themselves into South China via Japan or through junks, the greater distances and infrequency of ships from Taiwan to Southeast Asia perhaps made smuggling to the latter less desirable. With the exception of the Dutch East Indies (from 1910 onward), Taiwanese subjects also did not enjoy extraterritorial privileges in colonial Southeast Asia as they did in South China, and so the economic incentives for migration to the latter region were much greater.

Incidentally, Ide Kiwata, the main researcher in charge of overseas Chinese surveys for the South Manchuria Railway Company, was a former research official for Taiwan in the 1920s-30s. A specialist of Chinese economics, he had written on Chinese customs, overseas Taiwanese in South China, and southwestern Chinese minorities before focusing on the overseas Chinese from 1938 up to 1942.

Ibid., 369-70.

Guo Chunyang was a representative example of a Taiwanese who used - 258 -
Before the 1930s, attempts by the Government-General of Taiwan to mobilize the Taiwanese as economic intermediaries in Southeast Asia had ended with mixed results. In 1915, Japanese officials recruited 1,000 Taiwanese farmers from Gaoxiong and Tainan and sent them to North Borneo (Sandakan) to cultivate land, but with the post-WWI depression they dispersed and engaged in small commercial trade.\(^\text{908}\) Japanese colonial officials were more successful in getting Taiwanese entrepreneurs like Lin Xiongzheng (1888–1946) to invest in Southeast Asian branches of the Bank of Taiwan and South China Southeast Asia Bank (est. 1919), which targeted overseas Chinese capital.\(^\text{909}\) However, due to the post-war depression and anti-Japanese boycotts, by 1928 the branches of the South China Southeast Asia Bank in Saigon, Hanoi, and Haiphong were forced to close.\(^\text{910}\)

In an effort to step up its ambitions for "economic southern advance" (keizai nanshin) in the mid-1930s, the Government-General of Taiwan established the Tropical Industry Research Association (1935) and Taiwan Development Company (1936) to promote Taiwan investment, trade, and migration to Southeast Asia. Taiwanese invited as association members and company shareholders included the entrepreneurs Lin Xiongzheng (South China Bank), Yan Guonian (Taiyang Mining Co.), and Gu Xianrong (Southeast Asia Warehouse Co.).\(^\text{911}\) In the late-1930s the Taiwan Development Company began to dispatch Taiwanese engineers and farmers to Indochina,

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\(^{908}\) Ide 1943, 371-3.
\(^{909}\) Bank branches were in Hanoi, Haiphong, Singapore, Saigon, Medan, etc. For more on Lin Xiongzheng's role as manager of the South China Southeast Asia Bank, see Xu Xueji, “Taiwan zongdufu de 'xielizhe' Lin Xiongzheng: Ri ju shi qi Banqiao Lin jia yanjiu zhi er,” *Jindaishi yanjiusuo jikan* 23:2 (1994): 53-88. On Lin Xiantang, see Huang Fusan, *Lin Xiantang zhuan* (Nantou: Guoshiguan Taiwan wenxianguan, 2004).
\(^{910}\) By 1937 the remaining Southeast Asian branches of the Bank of Taiwan were in Singapore, Surabaya, and Batavia; and in Singapore and Sumaran for the South China Southeast Asia Bank. Ōta 1942, 693.
\(^{911}\) Nagasoka Shinjirō, "Nettai sangyō chōsakai kaisai to Taiwan sōtokufu gaijibu no setchi," *Tōnan Ajia kenkyū* 18:3 (1980), 453.
the Philippines, Malaya, and the Dutch Indies for agricultural development. Japanese and Taiwanese agricultural advisers exported Taiwan "hōrai" rice strains to Indochina and the Philippines—based on the previous model of success in Hainan—with the aim of producing more rice for Japanese troops and settlers. They also helped extract rubber in Sumatra and oil from Java. In addition to the Taiwan Development Company, the Government-General of Taiwan Ministry of Industry enlisted 500 Taiwanese in 1941 as "agricultural specialists" (nōgyō gijutsuin) for purposes of "overseeing" local farmers in Southeast Asia. Taiwanese males between ages 18 and 35 with an elementary school education or previous experience in farming were selected for one-year of training before deployment.

To further encourage Taiwanese to work in Southeast Asia, the Government-General of Taiwan reversed its strict emigration policies by abolishing passport requirements for Taiwanese who wished to travel to the region. Japanese officials also provided economic support to Taiwanese merchants in Southeast Asia who faced anti-Japanese boycotts by overseas Chinese. Until 1937, the majority of Taiwanese merchants in Thailand had sold Taiwanese tea to the overseas Chinese community, but with the Sino-Japanese War they faced "anti-Japanese terrorism" (kō-Nichi tero kōi) with the murder of several Taiwanese. Others like Wang Jingqu and Hong Zhaohan who had their lives threatened by the overseas Chinese, relocated to South China. The

912. "Futsuin no sangyō to Taiwan hontōjin no shinshutsu ni kōteki," Taiwan nichinichi shinpō (August 26, 1941); "Nanpō kyōryoku ni Taiwan no keiken: Futsuin ni kōma saibai: Hontō kara gijutsu to shushi o teikyō," Kōnan shinbun, March 4, 1942; Ide Kiwata, Nanshin Taiwan shikō (Tokyo: Seibi shokaku, 1943), 192.
913. Amanoya Risuke, "Taiwan nōgyō Nanpō e iku," Taiwan jihō (August 1942), 44; Katō Kyōhei, "Nanpō kensetsu to Taitaku no jigyō," Taiwan jihō (October 1943), 75; Taiwan sōtokufu gaijibu, Taiwan no Nanpō kyōryoku ni tsuite (Tahoku: Taiwan sōtokufu gaijibu, 1943), 48-50, 63; Kuwahara Masao, Taiwan to Nanshi Nanyō no jissai mondai: sono hoka jiji (Tahoku: Taiwan keizai kenkyūkai, 1941), 14-5. See also Schneider 1998a, 183-228.
916. "Tai ni hataraku Taiwanjin (jō): kō jōken ni megumarete shinshutsu shōgyōkai no dai-issen
Government-General of Taiwan provided financial aid to Taiwanese merchants who remained in Bangkok to continue selling Japanese products. The Taiwanese who remained, such as Chen Dacong, Hong Peiyan, and Huang Shumu, made up the core of the Thailand's Taiwan Association (Taikoku Taiwan kōkai) established in 1939 to facilitate commercial networking and Japanese-language education for the Taiwanese community. The Government-General of Taiwan employed Taiwanese graduates of Taihoku Commercial College to work for Mitsui Bussan and Osaka Shipping Company in Bangkok, and it also granted travel and language-study funds to Taiwanese youth to work as local commercial interns or military translators.

In addition to supporting Japan's commercial interests, overseas Taiwanese merchants contributed to Taiwan's intelligence on Southeast Asia. Taiwanese economic elites like Weng Zhongci and Wu Shouquan who worked in the East Indies supplied Japanese-language reports to the Government-General of Taiwan on the political and economic conditions of the overseas Chinese. These were published in the Taiwan newspaper, The Rise South News, a rare case of documentary evidence left by the overseas Taiwanese themselves. Weng Zhongci, for example, a native of Tainan and a graduate of Keio University's Economics Department in 1928, worked for ni Bankoku nite Wakabayashi tokuhain," Taiwan nichinichi shinpō (October 11, 1941); "Tai ni hataraku Taiwanjin (ge): seikōshita senkusha wo kōen Nichi-Tai shinzen no kusabi ni Bankoku nite Wakabayashi tokuhain" Taiwan nichinichi shinpō (October 12, 1941).
917. "Tai koku shinshutsu no kōki Hontōjin ga mottomo yūbō," Taiwan shinminpō, January 10, 1940.
918. Kabushiki gaisha Kanan ginkō, Bankoku ni okeru Taiwan sekimin no gaikyō (Bankoku: Kabushiki gaisha Kanan ginkō, 1941), 1-7; Ōta 1942, 683.
919. Subsequent students of Taihoku Commercial College who traveled to Thailand for one-site surveys stayed at the Taiwan Association headquarters in Bangkok, headed by Hong Peiyan. The Association provided talks to Japanese visitors on the state of overseas Chinese and Taiwanese in Thailand. Taihoku kōtō shōgō gakkō, "Tai, Futsuin kikō," Nanshi Nanyō kenkyū 36, May 1942, 19-20, 62, 71; "Tai ni hataraku Taiwanjin (jō): kō jōken ni megumarete shinshutsu shōgōkai no dai-issen ni Bankoku nite Wakabayashi tokuhain," Taiwan nichinichi shinpō (October 11, 1941); "Tai ni hataraku Taiwanjin (ge): seikōshita senkusha wo kōen Nichi-Tai shinzen no kusabi ni Bankoku nite Wakabayashi tokuhain" Taiwan nichinichi shinpō (October 12, 1941); Ōta 1942, 679; Taiwan sōtokufu kanbō jōhōka, Dai Tōa Sensō to Taiwan (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu kanbō jōhōka, 1943), 176, 185.
the Japanese company Katō Bussan in Batavia, Sumatra, and Surabaya for over ten years. In a series of 1941 articles, Weng reported from Batavia on the success of the overseas Chinese in monopolizing the regional markets as industrialists, entrepreneurs, sugar producers, bankers, traders, and coolies. An advocate of Taiwan's heavy industrialization program, Weng discussed how Taiwan needed to import more natural resources from Southeast Asia and then export finished products back to Southeast Asia. Weng also supported further Taiwanese emigration to the East Indies as Japan's "forerunners" (senpō) on account of their sharing the "same race and same language" (dō bun dō shu) as the overseas Chinese.

Wu Shouquan, an overseas Taiwanese employee for Mitsui Bussan in Sumaran, asserted in a 1942 newspaper report that the Taiwanese in Java had no trouble communicating in spoken Taiwanese, which was close to the Fujianese languages spoken by the overseas Chinese. According to Wu, 80% of the overseas Chinese were of Fujian descent while 20% were of Guangdong descent, and even the Cantonese overseas Chinese were able to communicate in Fujianese languages. Wu contended that there was no need for the Taiwanese to even learn the Malay or Javanese language since most business was conducted with the overseas Chinese anyway. Huang Wenxian, a Taiwanese doctor in Kuala Lumpur, noted in his report from Malaya the same year that although the region's overseas Chinese were half Fujianese and half Cantonese, in Penang they were 90% Fujianese while in Kuala Lumpur they were 80% Cantonese. Still, the Cantonese Chinese were also able to communicate in Fujianese languages.

920. Weng Zhongci, "Ranryō Indo no genjō (1-5)," Kōnan shinbun, March 11-15, 1941.
921. Weng Zhongci, "Ranryō Indo no genjō (5)," Kōnan shinbun, March 15, 1941.
922. Wu noted that in Java's countryside people did not speak Malay but spoke Javanese, while only in the Indonesian ports only Malay was spoken. "Fukkengo ga hyōjungo: kakyō aite no shōbai ni wa Taiwango de kekkō tsūyō," Kōnan shinbun, January 24, 1942; "Bussan hōmen de seikō: hyakuman ni hyakuman zara in iru," Kōnan shinbun, January 27, 1942.
Despite such positive media reports by overseas Taiwanese representatives in Southeast Asia, no doubt due to pressures by Japanese official censors, up through the early 1940s the Taiwanese faced severe anti-Japanese backlash from overseas Chinese communities. Overseas Taiwanese such as Cai Yingbin, an employee for the Mitsui Bussan Bangkok branch, had been physically assaulted by overseas Chinese in retaliation for Japan's total war against China.\textsuperscript{924} Despite the formation of Taiwan associations in Southeast Asia, Taiwanese often still hid their colonial identity when conducting business with overseas Chinese out of fear of discrimination.\textsuperscript{925} It was not unusual for Taiwanese to be self-proclaimed "overseas Chinese" to avoid being the object of anti-Japanese hostility.\textsuperscript{926} According to the 29-year old Taiwanese in Manila, Li Fengyu, by 1941 the Taiwanese Association in Manila consisted of merely 12 members after facing persecution by overseas Chinese anti-Japanese associations. Many Taiwanese were derisively called "the feet of the Japanese, or the Jews of East Asia" and beaten.\textsuperscript{927} Yet after the Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia in December 1941, the number of Taiwanese merchants steadily grew in regions like Indonesia where there were an estimated 2,000 Taiwanese by February 1942, led by the overseas Taiwanese leaders Lin Yuxuan (head of the local Taiwan Association) and Wu Shouquan (Mitsui Bussan employee).\textsuperscript{928}

\textsuperscript{924}. Cai’s overseas Chinese attackers had told him, "You're Japanese, and we need to take care of the Japanese at this time." Honkai chōsa hensanbu, "Nanshi jihen to Nanyō," \textit{Nanyō} 23:10 (October 1937), 115.
\textsuperscript{925}. "Songun no kōzan Nihon kōgyō ga keiei," \textit{Kōnan shinbun}, December 9, 1942.
\textsuperscript{927}. Amoi shikyoku, "Shisan tōketsu ni munen hikiage Nanpō shinshutsu no hontōjin Amoi de Firipin, Ran'in wo kataru zadankai," \textit{Taiwan nichinichi shinpō} (November 7, 1941).
\textsuperscript{928}. Lin Yuxuan had gone to Java in 1913 (as a 20-year old) to open his own store and later made a fortune in the tobacco rolling paper business (with 1,000 employees), becoming one of the most successful overseas Taiwanese with two million yen in capital. "Hontōjin yūitsu no seikōsha: Jaba de anhi o kizukawaru Lin Yuxuan shi," \textit{Kōnan shinbun}, February 23, 1942; "Nanpō kyōryoku e no kōsō (1): Hontō no shisanka yo shinen na kimochi o mottee minami e ike, Mitsui shitenchō Yamada Seiji shi dan," \textit{Kōnan shinbun}, February 27, 1942.
Between 1941 and 1945, overseas Taiwanese merchants were joined by thousands of Taiwanese military auxiliaries (unarmed translators and transporters of military supplies). With the outbreak of the Pacific War, the Government-General of Taiwan initiated large-scale recruitment of Taiwanese military laborers to aid the Imperial Army and Navy in the Southeast Asian warfront. Since 1938, Taiwanese had been deployed to occupied South China as "agricultural volunteers" (nōgyō giyūdan) and "military laborers" (gunpu) to serve as farmers, translators, police assistants, prison guards, and construction workers. Starting in June 1941 Taiwanese military assistants (and later soldiers) were also sent to Indochina, Malaya, the Philippines, and the East Indies. By the end of the war in August 1945, an estimated 207,200 Taiwanese had been mobilized as "volunteer soldiers" (shigan jūgun) with over 60,000 deployed to Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, over 23,000 to China, and over 10,000 to Japan.

The Government-General of Taiwan instituted systematic recruitment for Taiwanese military volunteers with the Army Special Volunteer System (July 1942) and Navy Special Volunteer System (August 1943). Taiwanese youth displayed "volunteer fever" (shigan netsu) as...
applicants outnumbered available positions by about four hundred to one. As the historians Caroline T'sai and Chou Wan-yao have contended (with the support of Taiwanese oral testimonies), volunteer programs were received much more enthusiastically by Taiwanese youth than their colonial Korean counterparts. According to statistics by T'sai and Chou, Taiwanese army volunteers numbered 425,961 (for 1,020 positions) in 1942; 601,147 (for 1,008 positions) in 1943; and 759,276 (for 2,497 positions) in 1944.

However, it is important to note that the system was not wholly voluntary but was closer to "forced volunteering" under Japanese threat. Contemporary Taiwan newspapers propagated testimonies by Taiwanese youth who praised the volunteer systems as a way for Taiwanese to realize themselves as true "imperial subjects" (kōkokumin) of Japan since military service was the highest national duty. Advertisements posters by the Patriotic Service Association of Imperial Subjects (Kōmin hōkōkai, 1941), led by colonial Japanese and Taiwanese elites, were publicly distributed to encourage Taiwanese to sign up as "glorious military laborers" (homare no gunpu). The Government-General of Taiwan also "recruited" (in most cases forced) Taiwanese women as "war nurses" (gun kangofu) and "military comfort women" (jūgun ianfu)—a Japanese euphemism for "war comfort women" that was common in other occupied regions.

On colonial Korean soldiers in the Pacific War, see Utsumi Aiko, "Japan's Korean Soldiers in the Pacific War," in Asian Labor in the Wartime Japanese Empire: Unknown Histories, ed. Paul H. Kratoska (Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 2005), 81-9. To the dismay of many Taiwanese who wanted to enlist, the military volunteer system had been implemented four years after Korea (1938).

"Shiganhei seido o ōuka," Kōnan shinbun, July 3, 1941.

for military sex slaves, to serve the Japanese military in South China and Southeast Asia.\footnote{937} According to historian Shao Minghuang, many Taiwanese women were forced into become comfort women in Taiwan after being recruited under the false pretense of joining the youth corps or becoming nurses.\footnote{938} Between 1938 and 1941, approximately 409 Taiwanese comfort women—along with 1,225 Japanese and 689 Korean comfort women—were sent from Taiwan to China (with about 350 of the Taiwanese to South China).\footnote{939}

\begin{figure}
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\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{figure5.12}
\caption{A Taiwanese Military Volunteer\footnote{940}}
\end{figure}

938. A total of approximately 400,000 women from mainland China, Taiwan, Korea, and Southeast Asia were forced as "comfort women" of the Japanese military. Shao 2007, 101-2.
939. Taibeishi fūnū jiyuuan jijinhui, \textit{Taiwan weianfu baogao} (Taipei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1999), 46-58. Zhu Delan has noted that during this period there were an additional 707 Taiwanese "sex workers" (\textit{J. karyūgyōsha}, C. hualiuyezhe) sent from Taiwan to China (along with 1,212 Japanese and 226 Koreans). I have not found statistics of how many Taiwanese comfort women were sent to the Southeast Asian war front. Zhu Delan, \textit{Taiwan sōtokufu to ianfu} (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2005), 87-8.
Taiwanese military aids also included Taiwan aborigines who were recruited as "Aborigine Patriotic Volunteer Corps" (Takasago giyūtai) starting in March 1942.\textsuperscript{941} While hardly any aborigines went to the South China war front, the Japanese military viewed aborigines as well-suited to the challenges of "tropical warfare" (nettaisen) and "mountain warfare" (sanchisen) in the mountainous jungles of the Philippines and New Guinea.\textsuperscript{942} Supposedly acclimated to farming and hunting in the mountainous regions of Taiwan, aborigines were deemed by the Japanese as invaluable labor as military transports and construction workers in Southeast Asia.

Drawing on colonial ethnological discourse, Japanese officials believed that since the aborigines were ethnically and linguistically related to Filipino and Indonesian natives, they could perhaps also serve as local translators and intermediaries.\textsuperscript{943} Between 1941 and 1945, the Government-General of Taiwan "recruited" ten rounds of aborigines (4,500 out of a total population of 150,000).\textsuperscript{944}

\textsuperscript{941.} Like the Taiwanese military "volunteers," the first and second groups of the "Aboriginal Volunteer Corps" were voluntary, but members of the later groups were drafted. Chou Wan-yao, "The 'Kōminka' Movement: Taiwan Under Wartime Japan, 1937-1945," (Ph.D. Diss., Yale University, 1991), 197.
\textsuperscript{942.} For lyrics to Aborigine Volunteer Group anthems, see Taiwan sōtokufu keimukyoku ribanka, Riban no tomo (1942, reprinted by Ryokuin shobō in 1993), 9.
\textsuperscript{943.} For example, Nakamura Bunji, the Japanese colonial police official for the Aborigine Rule Section, wrote how the Taiwan aborigine languages of the Ami and Paiwan groups contained similar pronunciation to the Igorot aborigine language in the Philippines. Nakamura Bunji, "Hitō zakkan," Taiwan keisesatsu jihō 320 (August 1942), 26-8.
\textsuperscript{944.} Based on oral histories I have examined, some aborigines willingly volunteered while others were either tricked or coerced by Japanese colonial officials to serve in the warfront. Tsai 2005, 116. For a complete list of the ten aborigine recruitment groups, their numbers, and the regions where they fought, see Kadowaki Chōshū, Taiwan Takasago giyūtai: sono kokoro niwa imamo nao Nihon ga: gojūnen-go no shōgen (Tokyo: Akebonokai, 1994), 19.
The Pacific War marked a transformation in Japanese colonial discourse on the Taiwan aborigines. In contrast to previous Japanese depictions of the aborigines as "head-hunting savages" who were "backward" and "uncivilized," the Government General of Taiwan now lauded aborigines for having absorbed the "enlightening" effects of colonial rule and becoming loyal subjects. As one wartime publication, *The Greater East Asia War and Taiwan* (1943), stated:

> While in the past we assumed the aborigines to be coarse and ignorant, they are in fact simple, innocent, and full of loyalty. They place faith in our officials, and if they are properly educated and trained it is not hard for them to become good imperial subjects.  

The Taiwan Army deployed its first group of "aborigine volunteers" in 1943 to the Bataan warfront where the Japanese military had been suffering from tropical diseases, especially malaria. Desperate for additional manpower, the Army armed the aborigines with weapons to fight in the jungles of Bataan (Philippines) and Morotai (Indonesia). In the Taiwan press, Japanese colonial

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946. Taiwan sōtokufu kanbō jōhōka, *Daitōa sensō to Taiwan* (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu kanbō jōhōka, 1943), 41.
and military officials wrote encomiums about the aborigines' supposed patriotic spirit, courage, and physical resilience. They celebrated the aborigines for their immunity to malaria and their "jungle expertise" such as opening up new passes in the forests with their traditional knives, constructing barracks, and transporting military and medical supplies. Other official Taiwan publications like *Aborigine Volunteer Corps* (1943) celebrated the Taiwan aborigines as intermediary guides of the Filipino natives. The linguistically gifted Zheng Jiangshui, an aborigine from Taidong, for example, had picked up several of the Filipino aborigine languages and was able to communicate with the local population.

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948. Nakamura Bunji, "Nanpō ni tatakau Takasagozoku," *Taiwan keisatsu jihō* 319 (June 1942); Nakamura Bunji, "Hitō ni Takasago giyūtai wo tazunete," *Taiwan kōron* (July 1942); "Hitō senzen ni kōseki batsugun 'mitsurin no tsuwamono': Takasago giyūtai (Taihoku-shūtai Shinchiku-shūtai) homare no jōshi wo juhatsusaru," *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō* (September 17, 1942); Asahi shimbunsha, *Nanpō no kyoten: Taiwan shashin hōdō* (Tokyo: Asahi shimbunsha, 1944), 43.


In contrast to Japanese official discourse, what were the actual experiences of Han Taiwanese and Taiwan aborigines who participated in military service overseas? Among Han

952. In the past two decades, there has been a proliferation of oral histories and memoirs by ex-Taiwanese soldiers, many of them edited by Academia Sinica's Institute for Taiwan Studies. Although there is insufficient space here to fully draw on these oral histories, I will briefly introduce a few points that I hope to expand upon in later research. Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo koushu lishi, *Riju shiqi Taiwanren fu dalu jingyan 6* (Taipei: Zhongyang
Taiwanese and aborigine "volunteer laborers," many were volunteers in name only as they had been coerced by the colonial police. Those who did volunteer did so either because of the attractive salary or out of patriotic feelings toward Japan, or both. In the case of aborigines volunteers like Liu Delu (Japanese name, Takeyama Katsuo) and Zhengwang Jinzong (Amei name, Pasao), although they willingly joined the Aborigine Volunteer Corps they were not told in advance that they would be deployed overseas to the warfront. In the case of Zhengwang, he did not know he would be working overseas until his unit landed in the Philippines in 1942. In Luzon, he helped transport weapons and medical supplies to Japanese soldiers to fight against U.S. military forces, and he recalled that the work was not intensive yet well compensated. In his free time he learned the Filipino languages of Tagalog and Visayan from local children, noting that his Amei language was quite similar to that of Visayan since they were from the same Micronesian-language family.

Despite official Japanese discourse that celebrated Taiwanese military volunteers as "loyal Japanese subjects," there remained Japanese mistrust of, and discrimination towards Taiwanese

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colleagues. Taiwanese and aborigine volunteers were not armed, and as Wang Qinghuai, a former Taiwanese cook in two platoons recalled, "The bottom line was that the Japanese did not trust us Taiwanese. We civilian employees were placed in the second or third line as clerks, agricultural experts, civil engineers, machinists, construction workers, drivers, nurses, chemists, and so on." As Wu Pingcheng, a Taiwanese who served as a military doctor in Southeast Asia in 1944, recalled, the Taiwanese overseas remained in an ambiguous position as "half-colonized" (han-seifukusha) subjects under the Japanese. Yet at the same time Wu admitted that he and other Taiwanese also benefited from the respect and privileges that accompanied their elevated status as imperial military officers. His colleague, Zhang Zhenxian, for example, worked his way up to become a high-ranking police official in Malaya with a much higher status than he had in Taiwan.

As for relations between Taiwanese volunteers and local natives in Southeast Asia, many Taiwanese displayed attitudes of what I call "refracted Orientalism." Zheng Chunhe (b. 1920), a native of Tainan, joined the first class of Special Army Volunteers in 1942, and in 1943 he was sent to the East Indies warfront. According to Zheng, he and other Taiwanese soldiers had cordial relations with the Indonesian natives. However, after interacting with them for an extended period of time he did not respect them as cultural equals. Zheng realized that his discriminatory views toward Indonesian natives was no doubt similar to how many Japanese colonialists had looked down on Taiwanese like himself: "In fact in the East Indies I too felt that the natives here were inferior to us Taiwanese, which made it difficult for us to respect them." Taiwanese laborers in Hainan like Lin Denghuang (b. 1924) similarly regarded the Li peoples (Lizu) with contempt for

960. T'sai 2008, 58.
their lack of economic development and hygiene.\textsuperscript{961}

\begin{figure}[h]
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\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure5.17.png}
\caption{Taiwanese Military Guards and Indian Prisoners-of-War in Hainan\textsuperscript{962}}
\end{figure}

The Japanese wartime mobilization of Taiwanese overseas as merchants and military assistants thus placed Taiwanese subjects in a complicated position as "colonized imperialists." Like their Korean and Chinese counterparts who also served as imperial "collaborators" throughout Japan's wartime empire, the Taiwanese were placed in the middle of the Japanese imperial hierarchy. Though unable to attain the equal imperial status of ethnic Japanese subjects, in occupied China and Southeast Asia the Taiwanese were able to wield imperial power of their own over other subalterns. Although we should remain skeptical of Japanese colonial sources that propagated "volunteer fever" among the Taiwanese, perhaps one reason that some Taiwanese

\textsuperscript{961} Chen 2001, 79-81. Taiwanese non-military laborers in Hainan, such as Huang Shunkeng (b. 1916) discussed similar criticisms of the Li for lacking any understanding for money. "Huang Shunkeng xiansheng fang wen jilu," in \textit{Koushu lishi 6: Riju shiqi Taiwanren fu Dalu jingyan} (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo, 1995), 134-7.

\textsuperscript{962} Pan Guozheng, \textit{Tennō heika no sekishi: Shinchikujin, Nihonhei, sensō keiken} (Shinchiku: Shinchiku shiritsu bunka chūshin, 1997), 27.
willingly served in Japan's military was not only to increase their wages and social status, but also to gain empowerment over other Asians even lower on the imperial totem pole (e.g. Chinese, Indonesian natives).

Conclusion

During the Sino-Japanese and Pacific wars, Taiwan became an integral base for the Japanese occupation of South China and Southeast Asia. Japanese military officials and research institutes in the metropole turned to Taiwan's archive of knowledge on both the natural and human resources of the Southern Region. Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, Japanese conceptions of the "Southern Region" changed depending on the time, place, and ambitions of each Japanese institution. Political advocates of a "Southern Region Government-General" in Taiwan wished to unite the Japanese tropical territories of Taiwan, Micronesia, the Spratly Islands, Hainan, and even Okinawa under the rule of the Taiwan Governor-General. Economically, the semi-official Taiwan Development Company equated the Southern Region with Hainan and Southeast Asia as the main source of raw materials that would be imported to assist Taiwan's heavy industrialization. And from the perspective of Japanese colonial ethnologists in Taiwan, the Southern Region referred to areas with ethno-historical connections to the Malay-Polynesian aborigines of Taiwan that included South China, Southeast Asia, the South Pacific, and later even northeast India and the Madagascar islands of the Indian Ocean.  

With the Japanese occupation of Hainan in 1939 and Southeast Asia in 1942, the Army and Navy enlisted Japanese colonial scholars from Taiwan to help with economic and cultural research to aid wartime administration over the Southern Region. As the case of the Army's 1940

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installation of a "Taiwan Army Research Section" in Taipei for strategic research on Southeast Asia illustrates, the Army was wholly unprepared to navigate the region's geography, customs, and peoples. Although many Japanese and Taiwanese scholars no doubt participated under political duress, this chapter has shown how colonial ethnology and historical studies were mobilized by Japanese colonial and military officials to support Japan's southern advance. Anthropologist Akitoshi Shimizu has aptly called the wartime alliance between scholars and the military the "scientific mobilization" of the social sciences. Yet Shimizu has stated that scientific mobilization "started in Manchuria and extended to the South as the military frontiers moved southwards," and thus "scientific mobilization by the military authorities was delayed" in the Southern Region since "there existed no counterparts of the Mantetsu [South Manchurian] Research Department in charge of the South." On the contrary, this chapter has illustrated how Taihoku Imperial University scholars participated in parallel, if not competing, lines of scientific mobilization during the war.

When the South Manchurian Railway Company East Asian Research Bureau turned its attention to assisting military intelligence on Southeast Asia in the late-1930s, it recruited research personnel from Taihoku Imperial University and Taiwan's Encyclopedia Bureau, including Nakamura Takeshi (Southeast Asian history), Ide Kiwata (Chinese economics and society), and Mabuchi Tōichi (Southern Region ethnology). The head of the South Manchurian Railway Company East Asia Research Bureau, Sakamoto Takumatsu, who hosted the 1941 Taipei conference with Taihoku Imperial University professors, praised Taiwan for possessing large

966. Others recruited from the Encyclopedia Bureau were Iwao Hiroshi, Miyachi Naohiko, and Miyahara Yoshito. Gotō 1987, 139.
amounts of data and research not available in Tokyo, and he advocated the use of Taiwan's experience for metropole-based Japanese studies of Southeast Asia. The East Asia Research Bureau journal, New Asia (*Shin Ajia*), advertised Taiwan publications that were "must-reads to understand Southeast Asia," including the Taiwan Encyclopedia Bureau's *Southeast Asia Almanac*. The journal published not only research articles by the ethnologist Utushikawa Nenozō and the historian Iwao Seiichi but also compendia such as *Southern Region Asian Ethnicities and Societies* (1942) that included their work. Similarly, the Pacific Ocean Association (*Taiheiyō kyōkai*) in Tokyo edited volumes on Southern Region ethnology that drew heavily on research by Taihoku Imperial University scholars.

Japan's military southern advance resulted in elevating Taiwan's strategic importance within the empire not only for its "southern studies" expertise but also for its "tropical human resources"—the Han Taiwanese and aborigines. At least in Japanese official discourse, the Taiwanese were portrayed as ideal military auxiliaries since they were already acclimated to the tropical climate and could speak the same southern Chinese languages as the overseas Chinese. Indeed, what distinguished Han Taiwanese and Taiwan aborigines from other colonial subjects like the Koreans were their apparent linguistic and ethnic affinities to the respective overseas Chinese and aborigine populations of Southeast Asia. Yet more research on post-war oral testimonies by Han Taiwanese and Taiwan aborigine participants is required to understand the degree to which

967. "Nanyō wo shiruniha donna hon wo yomeba iika (1)," *Shin Ajia* 3:4 (1941); "Nanyō wo shiruniha donna hon wo yomeba iika (2)," *Shin Ajia* 3:5 (1941).
969. For example, *Taihei'yōken: Minzoku to Nanpō bunka kōza: Rekishihen* (Tokyo: Sanshōdō, 1944), included articles by Koyata Jun ("Historical Relations Between Japan and Sumatra"), Tomiya Yoshirō ("Village Communities in South China"), Kuvata ("Dan Peoples As Reflected in Historical Documents"), Ogawa Naoyoshi ("The Place of Taiwan Aborigines in the Indonesian Language"), and Kano Tadao ("The Orchid Island Yami and Flying Fish").
these "imperial intermediaries" were able to mitigate anti-Japanese sentiment among the overseas Chinese or improve ethnic relations with natives of Southeast Asia. Indeed, as one Taiwanese scholar, Dai Guohui, recalled from his 1960s research trip to Southeast Asia, especially in Singapore—where the Japanese Army massacred thousands of ethnic Chinese in March 1942—970 the Taiwanese remained infamous for their wartime participation in Japan's occupation not only in Singapore but also in Celebes and the Philippines.971

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970. The massacre was known in Singapore as "Sook Qing" (C. suqing) or the "purging of the overseas Chinese" ("kakyō shūsei") in Japanese.
CONCLUSION

This dissertation has examined the vital role of colonial Taiwan—not only the Government-General of Taiwan and its affiliated institutions but also Japanese and Taiwanese subjects—as Japan's regional center for imperial expansion into South China and Southeast Asia between 1895 and 1945. I have argued that Japan's southern advance was not a monolithic process that emanated solely from the metropole but rather a complex operation consisting of several vectors from multiple competing institutions that included the Foreign Ministry, Army, Navy, and colonial governments. By examining Japanese and Taiwanese imperial activities that extended beyond Taiwan's borders, I have attempted to delineate the polycentric nature of Japanese empire-building in the south. In conclusion, I will briefly resituate the Government-General of Taiwan's initiatives for southern expansion in a broader and more comparative context of Japan's empire as a whole.

As illustrated in Chapter One, from its inception in 1895 the Government-General of Taiwan had imperial ambitions that went beyond developing the island into an agricultural appendage of Japan. Taking advantage of Taiwan's geographical location between East and Southeast Asia, Japanese colonial leaders initiated cross-straits "overseas Taiwanese" networks to compete with the Anglo-American powers for hegemony in South China. By doing so, the Government-General of Taiwan redirected the contours of Japan's "southern advance" (nanshin) between 1895 and World War I. While in the 1870s and 1880s the Imperial Navy had promoted the Pacific islands and insular Southeast Asia as promising destinations for Japanese development, the Government-General of Taiwan shifted away from a maritime-based advance to a continental-
centered strategy in South China. Japanese colonial leaders in Taiwan advocated for Fujian province across the Taiwan Straits as the southern gate into China and an alternative to the northern gate of Manchuria.

The Government-General of Taiwan's rationale for expansion into South China was three-fold: (1) to defend Taiwan's borders against attacks by anti-Japanese Chinese insurgents; (2) to extend Japanese economic and cultural interests across the straits; and (3) to elevate colonial Taiwan's prestige and strategic relevance within Japan's empire. In order to extend its sphere of influence in South China, the Government-General of Taiwan initiated its own imperial ideas and practices that differed from, though at times also paralleled, those of Japan's northern advance in Korea and Manchuria. Unlike Korea, Manchuria, and the treaty ports in North and Central China, where Japanese from the metropole settled in droves to exploit economic opportunities, the Fujian treaty ports of Xiamen and Fuzhou attracted very few Japanese settlers. To the surprise of Japanese consular and colonial officials, however, a growing number of Chinese in Fujian and Guangdong eagerly acquired Taiwanese subjecthood to take advantage of Japan's extraterritorial privileges that included tax exemption and consular protection. Japanese colonial officials in turn encouraged the growth of an "overseas Taiwanese" population in South China to reinforce Japan's imperial claims over the region.

The Government-General of Taiwan thus pioneered what I have called "frontier imperialism by colonial proxy," where it could legitimate military and police intervention in South China on account of "defending" overseas Taiwanese subjects. During the 1900 Xiamen Incident, for example, when the Imperial Navy temporarily occupied Xiamen, Japanese colonial officials promoted a discourse of "protecting overseas Taiwanese from Chinese violence" as a pretext for invasion. This precedent of military intervention to ostensibly protect overseas colonial subjects became a helpful model for the borderlands of Korea and Manchuria in the 1920s as Koreans, too.
became colonial proxies of Japanese northern expansion in Manchuria.\textsuperscript{972}

Indeed, there were several parallels in how the Government-General of Taiwan and Government-General of Korea respectively attempted to mobilize Taiwanese and Korean subjects as imperial intermediaries in China. In both cases, Japanese colonial officials and entrepreneurs actively collaborated with Taiwanese and Koreans to advance economic interests in Chinese industries, including illicit businesses in opium and smuggling.\textsuperscript{973} In official and popular discourse, the Japanese regarded the Taiwanese and Koreans as "fellow compatriots" (dōhō) who were superior to the Chinese in legal and civilizational status due to their Japanese subjecthood. The Japanese even promoted a similar irredentist discourse that justified Korean and Taiwanese mobility to Manchuria and South China as a "return" to their respective homelands.\textsuperscript{974}

Major differences also existed between the Korean and Taiwanese diaspora in China. Japanese archaeological and historical discourse that promoted common ancestral and cultural ties between the Japanese and Koreans did not exist for the Taiwanese, who were ethnically categorized by the Japanese as Han Chinese.\textsuperscript{975} Japanese officials saw opportunities in the overseas Taiwanese precisely because they were "ethnically and culturally the same" as the southern Chinese. With linguistic and familial ties to South China, the Taiwanese served as intermediaries not only for Taiwan-affiliated industries but also for cultural institutions such as schools, hospitals, and newspapers in Fujian and Guangdong. Many of the so-called "overseas Taiwanese" in South China were in fact wealthy Chinese elites who had naturalized as Taiwanese subjects to capitalize on economic and legal advantages of Japanese subjecthood. In contrast, the

\textsuperscript{972} Esselstrom 2009; Brooks 1998.
\textsuperscript{973} In both Manchuria and South China Japanese officials often turned a blind eye to Taiwanese and Korean illicit behavior. Kingsberg 2013; Brooks 2000, 112, 118.
\textsuperscript{974} Schmid 2002; Park 2005; Uchida 2011.
\textsuperscript{975} Japanese official and scholarly discourse claimed Japan's annexation of Korea in 1910 as the return of a "branch family" (Korea) to the "main family" (Japan). Duus 1995; Brooks 2000, 115; Uchida 2011. Taiwanese subjects (excluding aborigines) were divided into even smaller sub-categories of Fujianese, Cantonese, and Hakka.
majority of Koreans who migrated to Manchuria were impoverished farmers who sought opportunities to cultivate new land. Korean farmers in Manchuria often tried to acquire Chinese nationality, which was required to own farmland. While Japanese consular officials tried to prevent Koreans from naturalizing as Chinese since it would place them outside the reach of Japanese sovereignty, there were very few cases of overseas Taiwanese who wished to naturalize as Chinese.

Throughout the 1920s and 1930s—especially after Japan's military takeover of Manchuria in 1931—the Japanese relied on Korean farmers to apply their expertise of wet-rice cultivation in Manchuria. As I have shown in Chapters Four and Five, during the Sino-Japanese and Pacific wars the Japanese Army and Navy similarly looked to the Government-General to export its "tropical knowledge and personnel" to the occupied regions of South China and Southeast Asia. The Japanese deployed Taiwanese farmers to Xiamen, Shantou, Guangzhou, and Hainan since they were believed to have already acclimated to the tropical environment and could speak, or at least quickly learn, the local Chinese languages. Taiwanese military auxiliaries—including doctors and nurses—who "volunteered" (or were coerced by Japanese officials) were sent to war fronts in Southeast Asia where they could communicate with the overseas Chinese (who also originated from South China). The Japanese even employed Taiwan aborigines as military auxiliaries for "tropical skills" supposedly suited for jungles in the Philippines and the East Indies.


977. Exceptions were anti-Japanese Taiwanese subjects who naturalized as Chinese to symbolize their loyalty toward China. For example, see the case of the scholar Lian Heng (1878–1936), who published the first comprehensive history of Taiwan, Taiwan tongshi (1920). Jiang Yiguang, "Lian Heng zai Zhongguo," in Rizhi shiqi Taiwan zhishenzi zai Zhongguo, ed. Lin Qingzhang (Taipei: Taibeishi wenxianhui, 2004), 1-27.

978. On the post-war aftermath of Taiwanese military auxiliaries, especially those who were tried as war criminals, see Lo Jiu-jung, "Trials of the Taiwanese as Hanjian or War Criminals and the Postwar Search for Taiwanese Identity," in Constructing Nationhood in Modern East Asia, ed.
A common perception today is that the overseas Taiwanese were less defiant of Japanese authorities than their Korean counterparts, many of whom took refuge in Manchuria and Shanghai between the 1920s and 1940s to stage anti-Japanese resistance movements. As Chapter Two has illustrated, however, Japanese colonial and consular officials were equally anxious about the political loyalties of Taiwanese subjects who resided outside Taiwan. The Government-General of Taiwan established "overseas Taiwanese schools" and cross-straits education channels in an effort to acculturate the growing Taiwanese population in South China into "loyal Japanese subjects." Despite such Japanese initiatives, by the 1920s hundreds of Taiwanese youth attended Chinese and Anglo-American schools in South and Central China where many formed anti-Japanese alliances with Chinese and Korean nationalists. Although it is beyond the scope of this dissertation, an in-depth comparison of such Taiwanese and Korean subjects who went on to fight with KMT and CCP forces in the Sino-Japanese War (1937–45) awaits further research.

In addition to shaping Japan's trans-regional circuits of imperial mobility among Taiwan, South China, and Southeast Asia, the Government-General of Taiwan pioneered Japanese southern area studies decades before the Imperial Army and Navy embarked on their military southern advance. Japanese colonial officials and scholars in Taiwan initiated overseas surveys, intelligence reports, and academic research on South China and Southeast Asia in order to promote Japanese economic and cultural interests farther south. Japanese colonialists in Taiwan conceptualized "South China" (Minami Shina)—centered on Fujian and Guangdong provinces—as a geocultural


For example, see J. Bruce Jacobs, "Taiwanese and the Chinese Nationalists, 1937–1945: The Origins of Taiwan's 'Half-Mountain People' (Banshan Ren)," Modern China 16:1 (1990): 84-118; Wang Zhengwen, Taiwan yiyongdui: Taiwan kang-Ri tuanti zai dalu de huodong, 1937–1945 (Taibei: Taiwan shufang, 2011).
extension of Taiwan that needed to be secured for the island's strategic and economic welfare. As shown in Chapter Three, the Government-General of Taiwan's interest in economic and ethnographic research in Southeast Asia arose two decades later during World War I, when the Imperial Navy acquired Micronesia, and Japanese trade with Southeast Asia surged due to Europe's temporary withdrawal from the regional market. As early as the 1910s, Japanese colonial officials and scholars began to study the "Outer Nanyō" (referring more or less to today's Southeast Asia) as a region geographically, ethnically, and historically connected to South China and Taiwan. Whereas late-nineteenth century Japanese writings—by Navy officials and journalists who accompanied the Navy's Pacific tours—had classified "Nanyō" as centered on the Pacific islands and outside of "Asia" (Ajia), Japanese colonialists in Taiwan began to envision an "Outer Nanyō" (continental and insular Southeast Asia) as the southern part of "Asia," a geographic conceptualization that survives to the present.

In this way, Japanese colonialists in Taiwan began to re-discover Pan-Asian connections between Southeast Asia and East Asia to help undermine the rationale of Western colonialism in the south. Just as the Government-General of Korea founded Keijō Imperial University (1926) to further historical studies of Korea, Manchuria, and Mongolia, with the founding of Taihoku Imperial University (1928) the Government-General of Taiwan pioneered historical and ethnological studies that provided ideological justification for Japanese southern expansion. I am not suggesting that Taiwan's southern studies in the 1920s and 1930s necessarily resulted in Japan's occupation of South China and Southeast Asia by 1942. Such studies did, however, contribute to the Japanese imagination of an expansive Southern Region with a range of possibilities for the empire.

Many of the Government-General of Taiwan's larger imperial ambitions for southern advance initially faced resistance from other government institutions in Tokyo—especially the
Foreign Ministry, Home Ministry, and Army. Although Taiwan Governor-General Kodama Gentarō supported the Japanese military occupation of Xiamen in 1900, the Home Ministry aborted the mission in order to avoid a diplomatic clash with the Anglo-American powers. As shown in Chapter Four, after the Imperial Army and Navy occupied coastal South China in the late-1930s, Japanese officials and scholars in Taiwan advocated extending the Government-General of Taiwan's administrative powers into South China and governing Taiwan, Hainan, and Micronesia as a united "Southern Region colony." Ultimately, however, the Tokyo central government limited the Government-General of Taiwan to a cooperative, rather than leading role in Japan's wartime administration of South China and Southeast Asia.

Yet as Chapters Four and Five have shown, once the Imperial Navy and Army proceeded with their military southern advance in the late-1930s and early-1940s, both institutions turned to the Government-General of Taiwan for regional expertise and personnel—Japanese and Taiwanese—to help navigate South China and Southeast Asia's tropical climate, resources, customs, and native peoples. Particularly in the administration and economic development of Hainan, the Navy relied heavily on the "tropical experience and knowledge"—in farming, hygiene, ethnology, etc.—of Japanese and Taiwanese personnel from Taiwan. When the Imperial Army decided at the end of 1940 to prepare for a military invasion of Southeast Asia, it established a Taiwan Army Research Section that relied on the Government-General of Taiwan for knowledge on "tropical strategy." Indeed, much of the 1942 Malayan campaign's success was attributed to the findings of the Taiwan Army Research Section.

Ultimately, the militaristic nature of Japan's southern advance seems in retrospect to have been an obvious endpoint for the imperial project, but as we have seen in this dissertation the road to imperial perdition was also paved with ostensibly benign intentions by Japanese colonial officials and scholars in Taiwan. It was a process that contained previously unrecognized costs.
along with tantalizing potential. With the Army and Navy's desire to make the concept of a Southern Region a reality, however, the militarization of the Taiwan Government-General's work ironically undermined, in just a few years, several decades of colonial administration and research.
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