South African capital cities

Even if many elements of South African society continue relatively unchanged since the demise of apartheid – with continuing social segregation in much of private life, huge disparities in wealth and a persistent broadly racial income distribution – it would be difficult to gainsay the enormity of changes in government. A thoroughly democratic constitution, disappearance of the bantustans which feigned separate government in fragments of the country, massive participation of the ‘rainbow nation’ in national and local elections, a peaceful succession of black presidents in the once white-minority-ruled state and vast personnel changes in administration: all these and more symbols of new forms of government, citizenship and power have become the norm.

Intriguingly, however, where formal political power is exercised at the national level appears at first sight little changed since the first democratic elections of 1994:

[When] the presidential inauguration of 1994...took place at the Union Buildings in Pretoria, home to successive South African governments for most of this century, and an architectural symbol of white rule... Afrikaans poets shared the stage with African gumboot dancers, while above, apartheid-era military jets swooped past, sketching out in the clear blue sky the new colours of the post-apartheid South African flag. (Silverman & Low 1998: 20)

There seems to be very little interest in the literature to date in the question of where state power is exercised in South Africa, and the implications as well as the framing of this ‘whereness’. The subtitle of Gill Hart’s (2002) book, Places of power in post-apartheid South Africa, may imply exploration of the subject, but in fact – and typically of the recent urban, regional and spatial literature, as well as the more political and sociological – her book addresses something else entirely – in this case, the industrial periphery.

Acknowledged universally as unusual in its division of the usual functions of a national capital city among several distant centres, South Africa has different legislative, executive and judicial capitals (usually named as Cape Town, Pretoria and Bloemfontein, respectively). The major theme of this chapter is the question of why South African democracy has continued the complexity of its multiple capitals and, in so doing, what has it made of them? First, the chapter traces some potential parallels between South Africa’s capital situation and those of other countries. Then the author poses the obvious dual question: why does South Africa have such a profusion of capitals, and what are the effects of this state of affairs? As the most important site of state political power in South Africa, and given its official status as
executive capital, it is necessary to treat Pretoria in more detail: the third and major section of the chapter does this. What is Pretoria today as the seat of executive and administrative government? What has shaped its form and its representations of power? What is happening to the city currently as a place of government? And how can Pretoria be situated and understood in relation to the other sites of political power, formal and informal, in South Africa today? The chapter concludes by examining some unresolved questions about the nation in South Africa and its implications for the capital city debate.

What parallels to South African capitals?

The South African capital city phenomenon is no different at one level from other countries: ‘Almost all social action…takes place somewhere, in some local setting. Capital cities are settings of power, exercise and contest, truly “landscapes of power”, notes Therborn (2006: 520). The concentration of politicians and others associated with power in government in capital cities seems to create a special case of the importance of place. ‘Virtual government’ is hardly a reality in present society.2 As seats of power, capital cities owe their site to the spatiality of power. Surely it is because of the existence of alternative possibilities for the physical location of the activities of government and the surrounding politics that the sites of capitals have been disputed and at times changed? It is often supposed that place, in addition to being shaped by actors, is also to some extent significant in moulding the actors. This idea is developed in various sources (cf. Cox 2001). The question here is whether the sense that a capital city may sometimes be critical in shaping the political and other actors of government – in Tbilisi for example (Therborn 2007) – can be generalised. Were the sole capital of South Africa Pretoria, with no national government activity in Cape Town, I imagine that the nature of government would be different and the interactions of actors would be different. I imagine that if all capital functions moved to Johannesburg from Pretoria, the nature of government might change owing to the changed range of social interactions in which political actors engaged. It is not possible to research counterfactuals, but it may be possible to explore some of the effects of locating the capital and other political matters in several places, which is certainly the South African case. Thus, this chapter necessarily engages with the issues which arise from the multiplicity of its capitals.

In addition to this general question of the consequences of particular sites for capitals, there are three particular features of South Africa which impinge on discussion of the capital question: that of dramatic political change; the setting of the African continent, a site of centuries of slaving and colonising, with the later shift to the creation of new, independent states in the 20th century; and the fact that South Africa’s overarching colonial past has parallels with many other British colonial territories. All three comparisons raise issues pertinent to the sites of political power in South Africa.

Firstly, the spatial question after momentous change occurs in the structure of the state and even the territory of a country. Revolutions can see the transfer of
the capital from one city to another: Russia comes to mind. Debate over the site of government in reunited Germany provides a useful set of areas of inquiry into the capital city question in South Africa. Are all major functions of government to be headquartered in the same city? Or is there reason to place some functions – a constitutional court, in the case of the German (or Georgian, or Czech) example – away from legislative or executive centres? Does the capital imply something larger than the country itself – an attempt to create a continental, as well as a national, base? What are the costs? And how does government choose to represent itself, the idea of the nation and its place in the world – through architecture, memorials and other imagery, especially in the capital(s) (cf. Cochrane & Jonas 1999; Davey 1999a, b, c, 2004)? The German comparison is not the only one which is relevant in thinking about South Africa, although it is more or less simultaneous with the South African case in the 1990s, and with many east European and central Asian cases.

Secondly, South Africa is of course an African country and the experience of decolonisation and the establishment of national capitals in Africa may offer some insights. The metaphor of new wine in old bottles comes to mind in thinking about many African capitals. But there have been both continuities and changes, not all being continuities of physicality framing changes of the cast of actors. Most significantly, the ‘stability of capital sites has prevailed since independence’ (Christopher 1985: 53). It is possible to think then of the changes and the lack thereof surrounding questions of capital cities in South Africa in the democratic period through similar questions relating to the postcolonial situation and its representation.

And thirdly, South Africa’s colonial history, along with its Dutch and other periods, reveals a predominantly British set of forms and connections in common with many territories in all continents. During most of the 20th century – indeed, with roots going back at least to the adoption of ‘responsible government’ in the Cape Colony in the 1870s – South Africa had many commonalities also with the ‘dominions’ of Australia, Canada and New Zealand, and by extension, the dominion capitals. In those cases, capital cities were established as something new and uniting – not in the old, established, larger cities (Melbourne, Montreal, Auckland), but either in existing lesser towns that were selected and consequently expanded through being allocated capital functions and investment in new buildings (e.g. Ottawa and Wellington) or, in the well-known Australian case, in an entirely new site with a design competition for a new capital city. Instead of following either of these routes, South Africa’s national unification convention in 1909 chose to split the capital functions among several of the capitals of the pre-union territories. However, the motivation was the same – a choice of capital spaces in an attempt to contribute to unity. Sharing among the existing, rather than submerging in the new, was the chosen solution. This potentially precarious path was selected in the context of many being reluctant to merge into a single state, federal or not.

That choice reflects the fact that South Africa was a different dominion. Apart from the fact that 400 000 imperial troops had been required to defeat the strong challenge to British authority from the Boer Republics (1899–1902) – and many
thousands of others with African allies to defeat a series of African polities (Thembu 1878, Pedi 1878/9, Zulu 1879, Tswana 1895, etc.) – European power in southern Africa continued to be exercised by a minority, even if largely settled, in the face of an almost inevitably increasing majority. In that sense, the representation of government in South Africa would come to parallel that of colonies in other places where colonial settlers and administrators were a small minority – and the largest of those was India. Not coincidentally, the tricky job of designing a ‘seat of government’ for British India went to the same accomplished, complex tradition of architecture as did Pretoria. Those who visit both New Delhi and Pretoria never fail to remark on the dramatic similarity of the Lutyens-Baker Government House and its surrounds in the former to the Baker Union Buildings in the latter. The assertion of imperial power, at the same time symbolically sympathetic to its local setting, achieved through complex and indeed sometimes contradictory symbolism in the buildings made in local and locally workshopped materials, is a striking commonality, quite apart from the resemblance of the outline (on a rather different scale, however, with the Union Buildings being, not inappropriately, about a sixth of the size). 'East and west can and do meet, with mutual respect and affection,' Lutyens is reported to have said – although he came to this conclusion after a grand rejection of ‘adolescent’ and ‘hideous’ elements in Indian architecture (Hyam 2006: 21). However, Government House remains ‘one of the few pieces of colonial architecture to have received continuing critical acclaim’ (Ridley 1998); and the Union Buildings happen to be another. These comparisons between the South African and Indian capitals remind one that representations of power in capital cities are always complex and shift through time. There is nothing fixed about the landscape of London or of Dakar – although some features, many even, may mutate very much more slowly than other human artefacts and practices.

**South Africa: A profusion of capital cities**

There has never been an uncontested singular capital in South Africa. There have always been multiple sites of political powers, which have claimed degrees of at least cultural, in some ways political and sometimes national, autonomy. In the late 19th century, these capitals included Dithakong, Dzata, Mafikeng, Ulundi, Sekhukhuni and more. Some such places ended up being outside the colonial borders which ultimately became those of South Africa after 1910 – like Thaba Bosiu, in what is now Lesotho. Unlike many other places in the European colonised world, these capitals largely disappeared. Unlike northern Nigeria or most of India, pre-existing urban forms were eliminated and only Mafikeng survives as a sizeable urban place of African, as opposed to colonial, foundation. Different spatialities of power are captured at Mafikeng in the contrast between the Kgotla, a place of meeting and traditional leadership, and the Imperial Reserve, the place of colonial rule, almost next door to each other, but so different in form and style. Other textures of contest are reflected in surviving evidence of competition between numerous Boer – or, if preferred, Afrikaner – capital places, reflected in Winburg, Lydenburg, Schoemansdal, Potchefstroom, Vryburg and others.
At the end of the 19th century, the number of places of autonomous governmental power had declined to a handful. Except for Dzata, base of the Venda kingdom, African foundations had all but been totally subjected to colonial rule. Boer republican independence was governed from just two places: Bloemfontein (Orange Free State) and Pretoria (South African Republic, the Transvaal), the latter established in 1855 to foster unity across different factions in the territory north of the Vaal River – something which took time to accomplish. And despite occasional diversions, Cape Town and Pietermaritzburg were clearly established as the two British colonial capitals of pre-union territories. Cape Town in the Cape Colony was also the major base of British power in southern Africa and the headquarters of the high commissioner, whose role included oversight of all British colonies in southern Africa.

After the Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902, British rule extended and deepened throughout the region. At first, the new British colonial ‘state’ in the Transvaal was ruled from Johannesburg, where the chief British representative, Lord Milner, established himself. But in a few years – just as had been the case for at least a generation in the Cape Colony – settler rather than external political authority was re-established in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony. As early as 1904, a nascent new state developed contours as representatives of the different colonies worked together in the South African Native Affairs Commission and agreed on essentially common approaches to minority rule over the majority black population. In 1908, elected politicians from several territories, all essentially what we could term white settlers, met to negotiate an agreement to unify the territory of South Africa which could realise that vision and provide a platform for rapid capitalist development. In 1909, this ‘national convention’ reached agreement, which the British parliament approved in September 1909. The Union of South Africa became a dominion similar in status to Canada and Australia from May 1910 (Brand 1910; Thompson 1960). The century-old effects are still deeply etched in the geography of political power.

A key sticking point in the 1909 negotiations related to where unified government would be established. The convention agreed to give something to each of the four territories. Perhaps because of the association of Johannesburg with the imperious Milner regime during and immediately after the devastation of the war, it seems there was no question of Johannesburg being named a formal political centre. Nor was the contemporary Australian option of a new capital supported. Given the rivalries among different politicians, territorial groupings and cities, unity was instead fostered by sharing out the functions and institutions of the new state across three of the existing four colonial seats. The fourth, Pietermaritzburg, was compensated financially over the next quarter of a century, as was Bloemfontein, through a small annual payment towards the municipal debt of both cities (Section 133 of the South Africa Act 1909). The three-capital scenario was described in these words in the South Africa Act 1909:

(18) Save as in section twenty-three excepted, Pretoria shall be the seat of Government of the Union...(23) Cape Town shall be the seat of the Legislature of the Union...(109) The Appellate Division shall sit in Bloemfontein...
The distribution perhaps suited the personalities concerned: John X Merriman, the prime minister of the Cape, was a classic parliamentarian, but lost out on appointment as the first union prime minister to Louis Botha, a decisive Transvaal Boer general who had come back to politics after the war (Lewsen 1982; Meintjies 1970). The division continues to the present. It requires that every year at the start of the parliamentary session a large number of civil servants and politicians transfer from Pretoria to Cape Town for a sustained period. Of course, the two-hour air flight between the cities means that today it is more common for politicians and officials to commute between the centres during sittings of parliament than physically move. Fifty years ago, the day-and-a-half train trip meant made it a much longer and more dramatic process. A relic of that era remains in the maintenance of twin embassies in Pretoria and Cape Town by many countries, with a certain amount of competition between the inevitably dual diplomatic party circuits. However, Pretoria firmly became the main seat of the executive arm of government, and what probably remains South Africa's most remarkable government edifice was commissioned and built to house and represent that power – the Union Buildings (see Figure 10.1).

The Union of South Africa, 1910–1961, is historically analysed in a vast amount of literature and the present author does not attempt to repeat any of that here (various surveys can be found in Magubane 1979, Thompson 1990 and Worden 2007). Two major currents characterise the political history. One is the slow and chequered development of a united opposition to white rule – which seemed to have reached a point of strength in the 1950s, only to suffer massive defeat and a period of quiet in the 1960s. That theme saw a resurgence in the 1970s, rising struggle for power in the 1980s and ultimately victory in the 1990s. The installation of democracy and quite different political forces in government after 1994 is something to which this chapter returns.

The second theme is that of Afrikaner nationalism. Defeated militarily in 1902, Afrikaner nationalism grew nonetheless through the 20th century. Over decades of resurgence, compromise, setback, dispute, division and debate, twin goals remained: the advancement of the material position of white Afrikaans speakers, in particular the elite, and the stronger establishment of institutional and identity aspects of what came to be called 'Afrikanerdom' (Adam & Giliomee 1979). The movement created monuments of various kinds and scales across the landscape, but none matches the impressive site, design and proportions of Gerhard Moerdijk's Voortrekker Monument in Pretoria (see Figure 10.2). The monument was a private initiative, finally opened in 1948 (Fisher 2006a, 2006b) and installed as a remarkably successful competitor to Baker's Union Buildings on the other side of the valley. Subsequent National Party governments never produced a more impressive symbol. The very fact that this massive monument was a private rather than a government project illustrates the long struggle over the nature of the state and of its capitals in South African history. With the establishment of the republic in place of the union in 1961, Afrikaner nationalism could at last turn the Voortrekker Monument into an official representation of the past.
If power over the nature of the existing capitals remained contested, the multiplication of official sites of state power also marked the second half of the 20th century in South Africa. That was in large measure due to the immense project of creating multiple governments – the bantustan plan. By this means, from the 50s to the 80s, central government attempted to reduce the black majority to non-citizens of South Africa, instead making them citizens of supposedly ethnically defined fragments carved out of the national space and festooned with the symbols of national status. Government decided that there should be 10 such ethnic states – a number which grew over the decades. Taken to a conclusion, these bantustans had to take on the form of independent states. And to parallel other states, each bantustan thus had to have its capital. With only one exception – Umtata in the Transkei – that required the design and building of new capital ‘cities’. Between the early 70s and the late 80s, therefore, over perhaps a decade and a half, the notion of the ‘capital’ underwent an important deviation in South Africa as ‘national’ capitals were created in 10 new places, in addition to the three existing sites of branches of ‘real’ national government. These bantustan capitals allowed an outpouring of architectural and related attempts to create something new. In the case of Mafikeng (Mmabatho), with some naivety, architects welcomed such new building as a very special opportunity:

The president, Lucas Mangope, was a man of grandiose ambition, and he commissioned architects Michael Scholes and Bannie Britz to design a central government square, ministerial offices and civil service buildings in a brand new city which he called Mmabatho. As the official magazine of South African architecture, Architecture SA, noted: ‘The opportunity to design a building of this scale, having an importance for the Tswana people similar to the symbolic value of a building such as the Union Buildings, is rare…composed with considerable architectural sophistication…the intention here was to give architectural expression to…essentially white notions of tribal identity and to authenticate the spurious political legitimacy of a new homeland.’ (Silverman & Low 1998: 23).

The bantustan regimes came to an end with apartheid in 1994. A vital feature of the new regime was the negotiated re-incorporation of the former bantustans into the national polity. A key means to accomplish that end was the choice of a new kind of province as a subnational scale of government. The country was divided up once again for the era of democracy, and seven of the nine new provincial governments became a means of incorporating former bantustan civil servants – and in some cases politicians – into the new democracy (Khosa & Muthien 1998). In one case, the new Northwest province, it meant that a new provincial government was very largely based upon a former bantustan bureaucracy (that of Bophuthatswana). In another, Limpopo (at first called Northern province) served to draw officials from three former bantustans into provincial service. Apart from the extraordinary opportunities for corrupt practice which these changes created, a remarkable feature of the process was that only two of the bantustan capitals became the seats of new provincial governments. Elites largely failed in their bids to maintain some kind of capital status (Umtata, Ulundi and others).
Those who succeeded – in Mafikeng and Bisho – did so only after some struggle. One feature of their bids for provincial capital status was the reuse of the capital buildings created in bantustan imagery as new, democratic capitals, no longer pretending to be national seats of power but homes of regional governance under a democratic constitution. In some of the other provincial capitals, no government-style built environment existed. In two of the newly selected provincial capitals – Kimberley and Mbombela for the Northern Cape and Mpumalanga – the architecture of the new provincial government complexes consciously tries to create something hospitable to a new democracy (Noble 2007).

Other than Johannesburg, most prominent of the present provincial capitals is Cape Town. South Africa’s original colonial city, Cape Town began the long history of urban places established by soldiers, missionaries, governors, miners and speculators of European ancestry – the urban landscape which dominates the scene today. Well over three centuries old, Cape Town has always been a capital, and in addition to its large provincial installations, which in some respects still try to reflect their rootedness in the long history of ‘the Cape’, it is the legislative capital of the country and has continued to be so since 1994. Cape Town and some of the other urban places in the Western Cape province remain sites in which the large majority national population of more or less purely African ancestry makes up only a minority. Identity issues present themselves differently perhaps in this province from the rest of the country (cf. Bekker et al. 2000). The results include some hostility to the experience of the city for members of the majority – although it may be a bit strong to suggest that the demographies and geographies of Cape Town are experienced as ‘malevolent’ (Elder 2003). This point clearly played out in different directions for the dominant ANC in negotiations in the early 1990s: Cape Town could have been totally rejected as a national capital on the grounds of its being a hostile environment for wider democracy. Or, as Albie Sachs, now judge of the Constitutional Court and key figure in the negotiations, put it: ‘There were strong reasons to give up Cape Town as a capital. There was a purely parochial defence of Cape Town as site of parliament. But the point was the African minority and the role parliament being there could play in keeping, making the city more African. Which could be lost by removing parliament’ (Sachs interview, 9 September 2008). It seems that this is a crucial reason why Pretoria – or a third place – did not become a sole national capital at the dawn of democracy. And, of course, Cape Town provides a spectacular setting for displays of the attractions of South African society – a key reason for Fifa World Cup football matches to be played in a stadium in that city in 2010, to draw billions of viewers to impressive South African scenery and architecture – something much harder to accomplish in Pretoria. At the local scale in Cape Town the new, and very expensive, stadium abandons the township side of this segregated city in favour of a telegenic site between sea and mountains (see Figure 10.6). That controversial choice demonstrates that in the new democracy one should not necessarily expect new elites to favour the poor when it comes to representing the country to the world through their capital cities (see Adam, Moodley & Van Zyl Slabbert 1998; Dubresson 2008; McDonald & Smith 2004).
By contrast with Cape Town, except for its brief period as the base of Milner’s post-
Anglo-Boer War regime just over a century ago, Johannesburg had no history as a
capital city prior to 1994. However, ‘[s]ome felt Johannesburg should be capital in
1910. But in the 1909 negotiations it was marginalised. Because Milner had been
in Jo’burg, it was seen as merely a British imperialist implant, even though it was
the most vital city, the source of productivity. From a political point of view, the
exclusion of Jo’burg was very odd. Very incongruous’ (Sachs interview, 9 September
2008). Johannesburg was part of the territory of the old South African Republic and
the 1910–1994 province called the Transvaal. The capital of both was firmly Pretoria.
Therefore, when the new Gauteng (then called Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging,
or PWV) provincial cabinet first met in May 1994, its choice of Johannesburg as the
site of its new capital was greeted with shock in Pretoria – especially since some were
rather pyrrhically arguing for Pretoria to be the sole capital of the country at the time,
trying to build an alliance of Afrikaner nationalists and sections of the ANC hostile
to Cape Town (cf. Du Preez 1995).

The choice of central Johannesburg as home to a provincial government led to a
coalescence of interests between city and province on the ‘regeneration’ of the city
centre, an area generally held to have fallen into some decline through massive
suburbanisation, a degree of business (and white) flight and fears of crime and chaos
in the area (Bremner 2000). The reinvention of the city centre – an area of several
square kilometres even in a narrow definition – has been propelled by new agencies
created by provincial and municipal government. They found an extraordinary lever
to gear up the project in the creation of a home for a new institution of democratic,
national
government in the form of the Constitutional Court, established under the
new constitution.

Much has been written about the new court, its site and buildings in Johannesburg
(Gevisser 2004; Law-Viljoen 2007; Madikida, Segal & Van den Berg 2008; Noble
2007; Segal, Martin & Court 2006) (see Figure 10.5). Existing texts concern the
architecture, reconstructing memory and related subjects. The court is at the old
fort, a site of notorious prisons, with immense potential for heritage and memory
development, and next to the most densely populated part of the city, Hillbrow, a
site of extraordinary change over a generation (Morris 1999). Yet nothing seems
to have been published to date on the choice of Johannesburg as the site for the
court, as opposed to any other place. Since 1910, South Africa has had not one, but
three capitals, corresponding to the three branches of government – Bloemfontein
being the seat of the Appeal Court, the apex of the judicial system, completing the
geographical separation of powers created in 1910. Why would the new court not be
located there? Or why might another site in a less prominent city not have served –
as in the cases of Georgia, the Czech Republic and Germany?3

The newness of the constitutional court was a key reason not to place it in
Bloemfontein: ‘We wanted to emphasise that the Con. Court was not just a branch
of the Appeal Court, so it could not be cheek by jowl with the Appeal Court’
(Sachs interview, 9 September 2008). Explicit reasons provided by the ANC side in
negotiations were that Johannesburg provided the best site for the court because, according to Sachs, '50% of the bar is in Jo’burg, there are several universities here, the city has a very strong high court, and it was the most dynamic legal centre in the country at the time’. However, there was a further and more important reason as to why the ANC argued for a Johannesburg site, according to Justice Sachs, who played a central role in the choice:

...in the period of the 80s and before, Soweto [the vast township complex of Johannesburg] was the storm centre, the powerhouse of transformation. So in a way, Soweto had to be more than just a place bypassed. Bringing something to Johannesburg was meant to demonstrate new power on that basis. This was a very specific reason – but we couldn’t use that in the negotiations, it was subjective. So we had to give objective reasons. (Sachs interview, 9 September 2008)

The court site is far from Soweto, and, as Hlongwane (2007) points out, the routes of struggle for freedom and democracy created in Soweto ‘do not really lead to Con Hill’. But in the absence of a contest in negotiations, it was agreed that the Constitutional Court would go to Johannesburg. In a strange result, South Africa effectively acquired a fourth national capital city in the sense of a site of a key national institution. And of all the public architecture so far created in South Africa post-1994, it is the Constitutional Court building (Figure 10.5) which demonstrably represents an architecture of a discourse of human rights and democracy, albeit with contested attempts to realise an African expression in its architecture (cf. Noble 2007).

One thing that does not need much regeneration in Johannesburg is the presence of political power. The overwhelmingly dominant party in the country in the post-1994 period, the ANC, largely expresses and exercises its power in Johannesburg. The site of this power is Luthuli House in Sauer Street, central Johannesburg, where the ANC has had its headquarters since soon after the unbanning of the organisation in 1990. Newspaper headlines often demonstrate this place as a site of power, as evidenced by City Press, a Sunday paper aimed at a middle-class black readership, on 14 September 2008: ‘Luthuli House acts swiftly to oust Mbeki’ (the second democratic president, removed from office by choice of the political party), indicating that key decisions are those made in Johannesburg.

Indeed, political organisations in South Africa generally do not have their headquarters in Pretoria. The second largest party in the first period of democracy, the Democratic Alliance, is headquartered in Cape Town; the Inkatha Freedom Party in Durban; the Independent Democrats in Cape Town; and the United Democratic Movement is one of the few vaguely significant political bodies to have its base in Pretoria. The newer Congress of the People is based in Johannesburg. This diversity emphasises the obvious fact about the country’s governmental and political spatiality: it is diffused and centred in multiple ways through the major cities and sometimes through smaller places, and is by no means focused exclusively, or even primarily, on one capital city. The dispersion of the formal functions of government across four different cities today both captures and reinforces this, and it seems at
present very unlikely that rapid change could occur in this geography of state and informal political organisations. Each centre is an essential component of national political life, and all are deeply and increasingly tied together, yet each continues to assert its own linkages in diverse inward and outward directions. Nevertheless, one city does emerge above the others as the main site of government on a national scale – Pretoria, or Tshwane, to use its official municipal name. In the context of the dispersion of political power across the country, Pretoria may be thought of as a capital city which has the complex task of representing national governmental power both to itself and the world.

**Pretoria: Executive capital of the Republic of South Africa**

Thabo Mbeki, president from 1999 to 2008, liked to use phrases such as: ‘In the name of the people, welcome to the Union Buildings, the seat of government...’ (Mbeki 2005). This narrowing of the idea of the seat of government from the capital city to the office of the president may be more characteristic of the Mbeki approach to politics and government than of South African perceptions in general, but it may also provide a clue to thinking about the phenomenon of the capital city in the case of Pretoria. At the same time as exploring this notion from various perspectives, this section aims to provide a geography of the layering of Pretoria, an ‘urban geology’, if you will, as well as an analysis of the representations of political power in the city.

Much difficulty surrounds discussion of any South African city, starting with a definition of the space of the city (municipal area? Something smaller or larger?) and continuing through the naming of the place to providing basic information, such as population numbers. In the case of the name ‘Pretoria’, there is no longer a local or municipal government with that name. Officially, the city, in the sense of a municipality, is now called Tshwane. The municipal area itself is very large, stretching over 70 kilometres from end to end. It is a creation of local government reform in post-apartheid South Africa, a metropolitan municipality in terms of the present framework which came into being in 2000 and which through a process of consolidation effectively replaced numerous pre-existing local authorities. The municipality’s move to change its name from Pretoria to Tshwane was controversial (Unisa 2004). The name Pretoria is still simultaneously widely used – certainly as a geographical expression which at minimum describes the older, inner-city parts of the urban space, perhaps extending for several kilometres in all directions from Church Square, the original heart of the city. Hence, on one hand, it is not clear whether government really thinks of the city as its essential ‘seat of power’, or rather a set of buildings; and on the other, if indeed it is the city, there is some uncertainty both about the scope and size of the area to be considered ‘the capital city’, and even about the naming of the place. This uncertainty also pervades the relationships between Pretoria as capital and other cities which concentrate both formal and informal political functions, as the previous section of the chapter noted.

National government in South Africa has a ministry for local government. The
minister concerned, Sydney Mufamadi, remarked in 2001, when Tshwane had been created more or less as it is today from many previous authorities, that:

The new political boundary of the City of Tshwane, for the first time in fifty years, reflects both the formal and the functional metropolitan region. This is significant, because it marks the first opportunity for equitable development for all the people of the region. A single area of political governance and administration means that the slogan that characterised the mass struggles in the 1980s: 'One City, One Tax Base', can now be realised. The constitutional, legal, administrative and budgetary prerequisites for an inclusive and people-centred city development strategy for Tshwane are in place. (Mufamadi 2001)

If there is some lack of clarity on spatial and place-naming issues in the wake of the consolidation of local into metropolitan government – not to mention the fact that it is very hard to separate Tshwane from other areas, including Johannesburg – there are also considerable differences in the descriptions of the city:

With the lilac splendour of jacarandas as its trademark, Tshwane has grown into a metropolis that encapsulates the rainbow nation. It is here where people of all races, colours and creeds gather. Tshwane resembles Africa with a touch of Europe and a pinch of oriental spice. Hooting taxis, cars old and new, buses and trains drive past hawkers selling an array of fresh fruit and other articles of interest.

Whereas the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality describes the place as cosmopolitan, others use different notions: 'Pretoria is the least African of South Africa's metropolitan areas'.

The disputed naming of Tshwane or Pretoria signifies distinct traditions. Pretoria was founded as a new capital. Like Abuja today, its foundation came about from an attempt to unify diverse factions – in Pretoria's case, of trekkers, Boers or early Afrikaners in the mid-19th century. Pretoria thus has long carried a Transvaal Afrikaner culture, but always pretended to its unity, never quite sealing it, never quite placing its comprehensive stamp upon other centres of Afrikaner power, whether in Potchefstroom or Bloemfontein or, more seriously, Stellenbosch or Cape Town. However, this was the capital of what Dunbar Moodie called the Afrikaner civil religion – indeed with its more overtly religious overtones. Suitably, there is no single religious centre to Pretoria. Church Square is without a church, and very much an urban public space shared by all today.

The city was settled originally between ridges which stretch across it east to west. Various pieces of monumental architecture also structure the sense of Pretoria. The Union Buildings stand on one ridge. The Voortrekker Monument crests one to its south-west. Across an incised valley to the east of this monument is the vast, modular, modernist complex of Unisa (the University of South Africa). And more recently, still in long-term development, on a ridge south of the city centre, is Freedom Park (Maré 2006).
Oldest and most impressive, the very architecture of the Union Buildings tries to blend the symbols of white South Africa a century ago, a precursor by Herbert Baker of his and Edward Lutyens’ New Delhi. It is too simple to appreciate the Union Buildings (1910–1912) as imperial architecture. The insertion of local elements and use of materials makes it perhaps an unlikely, but nevertheless a highly successful centre for the power of post-apartheid government. At the inauguration of Nelson Mandela as first president of all South Africans, hundreds of heads of state and governments from around the world were seated in the amphitheatre immediately below the building. The careful division of the crowd into three, separated by fences (dignitaries at the top, necessary members of the ceremony and close associates ranged down the gardens, and perhaps 100 000 ordinary people on the lawns below), prefigured the maintenance of a steep hierarchy in government and society after apartheid. Unlike the monuments of Washington or Brasilia, this is not a building which symmetrically dominates the city. It almost awkwardly faces only its own grounds. Just as these buildings do not dominate the city, government does not absolutely dominate either – commercial centres old and new, as well as major industrial areas, testify to that.

Diversity is present rather than a single ethos, just as there is an absence of monolithic dominance. Naboth Mokgatle (1971) described his struggle to insert himself into the city more than a generation ago, as so many unknown South Africans that came to the city – and in many cases came to the city from terribly disrupted and dislocated places. The city itself bears terrible scars from attempts to expunge traditions beyond those of the rulers, forced removals under the notorious Group Areas Act and other legislation being largely responsible (cf. Carruthers 2000; Friedman 1994; Ralinala 2002). Yet pieces of sites remain which demonstrate the failure to create a model apartheid city. Evidence of messier pasts abounds.

Mufamadi (2001) made the following summary of the city’s historical geography:

For many decades, the previous government together with the former City Council of Pretoria attempted to plan and administer Pretoria as a model apartheid city. The first phase of this process came with the forced removals of Bantule, Marabastad, Lady Selbourne, Eastwood, Highlands and Newlands and the creation of segregated townships on the urban periphery such as Atteridgeville, Mamelodi, Eersterus and Laudium. This had the effect of displacing those who could least afford it furthest away from places of work and economic opportunity. It also destroyed the economic livelihood of many families. The second phase, at the height of ‘grand apartheid’, came with the establishment of townships such as Winterveld, Mabopane, Soshanguve, Hammanskraal and Ekangala. The aim was to create a whites-only city with decentralised industrial areas such as Rosslyn and Babelegi served by black labour located in ‘homelands’… The spatial consequences of displaced urbanisation can be seen in the way Tshwane functional metropolitan region is shaped today: An urban core, surrounded by an inner periphery, where 40% of the population lives, and
which produces 91% of the economic output; an outer periphery in the north-west and north-east, home to 60% of the population; high volumes of long-distance commuting, requiring huge transport subsidies, between the outer periphery and the urban core every day.

Pretoria is a place where ruling regimes have wielded power, but several times lost it dramatically too. That happened in 1877, when a column of British troops raised the Union Jack and extinguished Boer republican power – only to concede to its reassertion four years later. Early in a bitter war which caused incredible destruction to rural life and forever altered Pretoria’s relationship to rurality and to the other cities of the region, British troops again occupied the city in 1900. The resulting colonial regime gave way to settler authority in the Union of South Africa, establishing Pretoria as the executive among three capital cities from 1910. However minor they may appear from the outside, the three occasions on which elections or parliamentary votes ended white regimes (1924, 1939, 1948) all brought traumatic changes to government in Pretoria – especially in the aftermath of the ‘apartheid’ election of 1948.

Then in 1994, the world gathered in Pretoria to celebrate the commencement of democracy in South Africa as Nelson Mandela was installed as the first black president of the country. As the adopted capital city of post-apartheid government – adopted in the sense that non-racial (largely black) government took over the buildings, offices and symbols of the previous regime – there was remarkably little symbolism of a challenge to power to build on, much less so than in Johannesburg, as mentioned earlier in the chapter, in relation to the siting of the Constitutional Court there. Never having strongly expressed itself except in some highly symbolic, but ultimately rather pyrrhic, demonstrations in the past (the women’s march to the Union Buildings of 1956 being perhaps the best example [Kros 1980]), there is nonetheless a sense of settled and changed governance about the city. The presence of a very large diplomatic corps, with embassies of almost every African country, adds to at least a superficial sense of cosmopolitan Africanism. Although this may not be what Achille Mbembe terms ‘afropolitan’, Pretoria somehow expresses the possibility of this ideal.

However, away from the busy diplomatic context of inner Pretoria, to the north, north-west and north-east of the city centre, is evidence of something to be found in other major South African cities such as Durban or East London: not quite urban settlements and related forms of displaced urbanisation situated relatively close to a major city and its markets. Once a city straddling a bantustan boundary (Bekker 1991) and later a city with sections in different provinces, its tortuous historical geography reveals a huge diversity of character across different parts of the city. In the north-west, for example, there is a distinct sense of a new African urbanism rapidly being made. This is why Maliq Simone (2004) focused one of his four case studies in *For the city yet to come* on Winterveld to the north-west. Here, special forms of associational life allow the survival and even the flourishing of life. And in many ways, the ‘townships’ – Atteridgeville, Mamelodi, GaRankuwa – are sites of similar ways of being.
In stark contrast, Pretoria may also be the place where poor whites are most prominent: left aside by the demise of race-reserved, basic bureaucratic jobs, the closure of the old iron and steel works and other industries, railway employment shrinkage – a phenomenon which some other older cities share (Schuermans & Visser 2005). Yet despite these remarkable and dynamic features of urban change, Pretoria is not the best served city in South Africa from the point of view of scholarly or, indeed, other types of literature. The presence of power seems to have attracted little creative or academic writing (but see Horn 1998). Some of that writing could expand on the massive suburbanisation which has taken place, particularly towards the south and east of the city. Here the impacts of current globalisation – wired areas, decentralised office parks, giant shopping malls, gated neighbourhoods, multinational corporations and the related enclaves of globalised privilege – spread across the landscape, as they do around all other South African cities from Mbombela to Cape Town.

At the same time, it has become impossible – it has been so for perhaps half a century – to appreciate the nature of Pretoria without inserting it into the wider context of an urban region which has its northern limits at the northern edge of Pretoria, but which stretches more than 100 kilometres to the south – an urban region centred on Johannesburg much more than on Pretoria. The original centres of the two cities are 60 kilometres apart, and the newcomer to the south is thirty years younger – but it is also several times the weight in economic and other terms.

Pretoria lost its function as the capital of the richest South African province, and over more than 10 years as the site of the new Gauteng provincial government, which chose Johannesburg as its seat, removed provincial activities from Pretoria, while others migrated to Polokwane, Mafikeng and Mbombela as the capitals of the three new provinces which covered most of the rest of former Transvaal territory (a small piece also went to KwaZulu-Natal). At the same time, the scale of national government administration has continued to expand and there is little visible impact of the loss of this provincial function today – except that, given the long history of Pretoria as the capital of the Transvaal, the old legislature (Raadsaal on Church Square and some other buildings) now has a rather incongruous presence in the landscape.

Increasingly part of a larger city region, Pretoria is also at the time of writing being physically more closely tied into it. The largest infrastructure project in the country at present is the construction of a new railway for a fast passenger service to connect Johannesburg, its suburban areas, Pretoria and their common international airport. This system is named Gautrain, and is supposed to be the solution to massive road congestion. Thus in some respects one might be tempted to think of the capital of South Africa today as the Gauteng city region, with its presidential seat at the Union Buildings and many other parts, including the Constitutional Court, spread across the rest of the region. Furthermore, with Johannesburg as the main base of the political elite presently in power, the usefulness of describing Pretoria as the capital may even be declining.

The diffuse character and dispersed geography of political power and its centres
in South Africa form a key theme of this chapter. Not surprisingly, protest from many points of the political compass has been directed at those in power. Pretoria is a common, but far from exclusive, physical focus of such protest. There has undoubtedly been a spreading of protest in the post-apartheid period (Desai 2002: 1). However, much of this protest action takes place in isolated sites, often within poorer communities, and not with any particular focus on the capital cities.

Parliament in Cape Town is one particular target of protest. For example, disgruntled defence force soldiers as well as Christian conservatives have mounted demonstrations outside parliament. Some of the more vigorous have been concerned with housing questions. And early in 2009, sex workers protested against police harassment.7

Pretoria does of course offer sites for protest action. The most well-known protest in Pretoria in earlier eras was probably that of 9 August 1956, when thousands of women marched on the Union Buildings to protest against the extension of passes – the notorious identity documents used to control movement during apartheid – to women (Kros 1980). The often ignored downside, however, of this much celebrated event, is that it did absolutely nothing to deflect the then government from its course. And indeed, despite the importance of protest action in broad ways and in very diverse places – mostly in the townships – in edging apartheid government towards negotiation, it would be hard to identify an event in which large crowds achieved significant reform during that period. Pretoria was never the site of Prague-style mass events which rocked the foundations of a regime.

Once the former apartheid government conceded to negotiations for a transfer of power, the period of negotiation – sometimes euphoric and sometimes tense – between 1990 and the first democratic elections of 1994, revealed quite different forces using the spaces of Pretoria to protest in very diverse ways against the direction of the last white government of FW de Klerk. In January 1991, for example:

> Police used batons and tear gas...to arrest protesting farmers who paralyzed traffic in the capital city by parking 1,000 farm vehicles on downtown streets. Police also declared the city centre an unrest area – an action usually reserved for demonstrations in black townships. Officers arrested about 120 of the estimated 5,000 white farmers protesting high interest rates and low prices for their produce. [A] Supreme Court justice…ordered farmers to remove their trucks, tractors...8

A narrower protest occurred at much the same time, when an ambitious, but ultimately laughable, leader of the white right wing, Eugene Terreblanche, fell off his horse in what was meant to be a highly symbolic demonstration against democracy and in favour of Afrikaner power, in Church Square, Pretoria.

And in 1992, newspapers around the world reported that ‘Mandela leads blacks in huge demonstration in Pretoria, South Africa.’9 ‘Nelson Mandela led 100,000 cheering black marchers to the seat of white power, Wednesday, in one of the biggest demonstrations ever to demand an end to President FW de Klerk’s government’, the report went on to say.
Yet, as Barbara Harmel noted at the time, ‘[a]n impressive display of mass opposition by the African National Congress, these protests alone posed no serious challenge to the De Klerk government’.10

A peculiar feature of political authority over the state in South Africa since the end of apartheid is that it has largely been wielded by an alliance which sometimes shows cracks. Thus an oddity has been the types of protests whereby supporters of government march to demand changes in policy. The Union Buildings remain an occasional site of such events. Indeed, one may imagine that the lawns below the impressive executive buildings will remain the key site of protest action in Pretoria, although the direction of political action in coming years may vary greatly from the established patterns of recent decades. For in the second decade of the 21st century, old certainties of South African politics, like those of many other parts of the world, seem to have washed away. In this context, contest not only over government policy, but also over the nature of the state itself, and thus over the form and experience of its capital city, is to be expected.

What kind of capital for democratic South Africa?

Faced with the complexity of South African cities, many authors have noted that there are alternative centres of power in South African life. These centres are essential components of national political life, deeply and increasingly tied together, yet each continuing to assert its own linkages in diverse inward and outward directions. The country is complex, and the idea of the nation elusive. For this reason as much as any, the question of the capital city is not resolved. Why it is not resolved and some lines of approach are the subject of this last section of the chapter.

What kind of capital could be expected or might be possible for South Africa? The phrase ‘nation building’ is frequently heard and read in South Africa. It is an unstable concept. The ANC, the party of power since 1994, preparing for its convention in 2007, put out a discussion document which noted that ‘[t]he national question can never be fully resolved...as we seek to integrate South African society across racial, language, ethnic and other barriers, we are also engaged in the process of developing those individual elements that distinguish these various communities from one another’.11

Between powerful political forces, revival of traditional leadership (Van Kessel & Ooman 1997) and diverse portrayals of the country as perhaps on varied Creole pathways (Nuttall 2002), it is obvious that the concepts of the nation, democracy, unity and the representation of these ideas will be contested. Chipkin (2007) has argued that South Africans as a nation share little more than a democratic polity. Yet the (apartheid) cities have not been ‘re-mapped’ as ‘spaces of democracy’ (Robinson 1998). As Shepherd and Murray (2007: 10) put it, ‘South African cities are caught between continuing forces which reproduce similar patterns to those which made them in the past, and enormous social and political changes, the full effect of which on built and other environments are still very much seeking to be seen.’ Thus the
capital city or cities of South Africa will continue to demonstrate the most enduring feature of South African cities: that whilst they accommodate diverse and parallel lives with severe separations, they also involve their citizens in a shared series of spaces and institutions. In this they are not unique, but perhaps provide a hopeful example of ways in which urban societies can cohere and continue, despite high levels of hardship and tragic histories of state violence, including bitterness and rancour, finding ways to endure.

Such conditions hardly facilitate the development of Pretoria as an uncontested and coherent capital city. Yet at the same time, parts of government focus new attention on making Pretoria look and feel more like the capital of Africa’s wealthiest country. The very fact of the lack of ‘capitalness’ justifies such attempts. Then City Manager Blake Moseley Lefatola complained in 2005 that ‘coming in from south, east, west and north of the city, you have no idea that you are entering the administrative capital of the country’, and went on to indicate that the city was thinking of creating landmarks to demarcate its status and shape to travellers.12

Such schemes were far from the first to seek to change the impression created by the city. Perhaps the earliest was Herbert Baker’s unimplemented scheme in relation to his design of the Union Buildings. He proposed to create a capital precinct, not in front of his masterwork (unlike, say, the Mall in Washington), but to its side. Decades later, something similar again emerged. In the period of reconstruction after World War II (Mabin 1998), Pretoria, like other South African cities, sought a new plan. Into this context came (Lord) William Holford directly from his inner-London rebuilding activities, hired by the Pretoria City Council to produce proposals for the central area of the city (Mabin 1994). Innumerable meetings during the period discussed ways and means of improving the housing of government departments and the impact that reconstruction in this regard could have on the urban scene in the capital. ‘Pretoria has a chance to develop into a new kind of capital city...’ Holford remarked in August 1949 when presenting his draft report.13 The central feature of his plan for Pretoria’s central area was the idea of a government precinct along the sole central city street (Struben Street), which provided an impressive view of the Union Buildings on the hill to the east. The scheme entailed expropriation, widening and a gradual concentration of new government buildings in that area. However, the council failed to persuade government that the best feature of the plan should be implemented. Once the then provincial administration undercut the scheme with huge new buildings near Church Square instead of along Struben Street, the idea of a government precinct for the capital faded away.

One cannot identify more than some motley incursions of large new buildings and continual tinkering over the long period of National Party apartheid rule as regards the development of Pretoria as a grand capital. The addition of the State Theatre and the adjacent Strijdom Square – where the bust of an apartheid-era prime minister conveniently crashed off its pedestal after the installation of democracy – could be mentioned among the more coherent schemes. Thus, at the dawn of democracy in 1994, Pretoria remained a rather eclectic collection of private and public buildings.
and spaces, almost as though it had been waiting for a new direction to reorganise and re-present its capitalness.

Some debate around other possibilities then took place. One idea was to move the capital away from Pretoria – which seems not to have been considered very seriously. The question of what to do with Pretoria dragged on for years. Cabinet kept the matter on its agenda, it seems, from October 1997 to February 2001. At that point, it took the decision that national government headquarters would remain located in ‘inner city Tshwane’, in part ‘to promote urban renewal’, and although things moved slowly, within the next three years a new directive emerged. In June 2004, the president mandated the Departments of Public Works (the government’s internal landlord) and the Department of Public Service and Administration to ‘develop a framework to improve the physical work environment for the public service’. This programme, which has become called Re Kgabisa, was in principle approved by the cabinet in May 2005 (Department of Public Works 2005).

In some respects, the programme is surrounded by the kinds of myths which seem typical of capital city development programmes. In Berlin, the notion of restoring a past glorious centre has framed rather more grandiose plans than the real scale and significance of what has actually been achieved by the city (Cochrane & Jonas 1999). In Pretoria, the exaggerated notion of the continental and global importance of South Africa, symbolised by the mantra of ‘our vast diplomatic community’, serves similar purposes and sometimes drives a sense of the need for Pretoria to be something quite different from what it has yet become. Some ministries have been rehoused in major new buildings since the late 90s, but thus far there has not been a major plan or implementation which has accomplished a significant alteration to the physical nature of the city.

Nevertheless, a large amount of planning and design work has been going on intended to bring a new sense of organisation and power to Pretoria (see Figure 10.3). There are several components of this work, portrayed as likely to stretch ‘over 10 to 14 years starting 2005…’ (Department of Public Works 2005). Its purpose is summarised as:

- Exploring African-ness: giving content to the notion of an African city using urban art as a metaphor for social dialogue.
- Re Kgabisa Tshwane Programme: R20 billion government physical reinvestment in the CBD.
- City Living Initiative: institutional housing intervention based on a coherent urban design framework with viable typology and packaged as bankable projects.
- Tshwane Kopanong/Crossing: vibrant public square, establishing a growth node between Hatfield and CBD while revitalising Sunnyside (also residentially) (these being areas adjacent to the city centre).

The proposals which have emerged thus far have been more about incremental change than grand plans. The historical role of the Union Buildings is assured, it seems – documents describe them as being ‘the host precinct to the Presidency, the top level of government and heart of governance’ (Department of Public Works...
But perhaps there is a gathering pace of change towards something different in Tshwane. One corner of the re-imagining and re-presentation of Tshwane-Pretoria has indeed developed in recent years under the aegis of the Mbeki government. This is Freedom Park, the largest expression of something new and different in the city, another hilltop site which has been developed as a place of memory (see Figure 10.4). It is a major attempt to alter the iconography of the city. Freedom Park could be read as an attempt to do something towards the deep-seated feeling that South Africa’s cities have not changed enough to reflect the new era. Freedom Park monumentalises those who died in numerous wars involving South Africans, ending with the struggle for liberation. Its architecture is certainly new from the perspective of the monuments and major government structures of the past. In its early stages, however, the new precinct remains somewhat peripheral to Pretoria’s life – not easy to find and less easy to enter and explore. Despite the expenditure of considerable effort, such seems the fate thus far of attempts to remake the physical, as well as symbolic, sense of the city. Indeed, the same sense is present in proposals to change road names from those of the 19th century and the apartheid era to something more diverse. And exaggerating the possible effects of this symbolic change seems tempting – as was the case, for example, when the speaker of the Tshwane Council suggested that ‘[t]he process intends to undertake a comprehensive reconstruction and transformation of the image of the city’.14

In short, in a context of lack of clarity about the nation, multiple capitals and diffuse political power, Pretoria is definitely not a ‘total capital’, ‘dominant culturally and economically as well as politically’, which one would have ‘expected (other things being equal) to favour socially and culturally cohesive political elites, and through them more consistent public policies’ (Therborn 2002: 516). It is not yet, at least, a place ‘where governments are installed, and where governments lose their power’; and it is far from being the sole ‘center of political debate about the orientation of the country...[a place] where national differences are made’ (Therborn 2002: 513).

Pretoria is not the most cosmopolitan nor most globalised part of South Africa. Pretoria today remains a place where the ‘political iconography of the city’ (Sonne 2003) is perhaps more in flux, less clearly developed, than in many other capitals. Although there is a growing attempt to place a new impress on this city – and the other South African capitals – the underlying diffuse nature of power in the country, and the lack of cohesion around the idea of the nation, let alone its capital, are likely to preserve the perhaps disordered, and indeed perhaps more human, character which Pretoria seems to have settled into in the early decades of democracy. Of course, there is a chance that this picture will change radically under a new, more centralising president, or under still more fractured political circumstances.
Notes

1 Stacey Leader provided creative research support in the production of this chapter.

2 Physical spatiality is obviously reduced by intensive virtual space contact through electronic means – e.g. cellphones and email, which free people up from particular desks and landlines. However, how much difference this means for places of human action and interaction since the telegraph is not well studied.

3 The Constitutional Court of Georgia moved from Tbilisi to Batumi in July 2007; the Czech court is in Brno; and the German court established during the divided years in the west remains in Karlsruhe, intentionally dislocated from the other federal institutions, which are mostly in Berlin.

4 According to the 2001 census, Tshwane has a population of 1.985 million in a municipal area of about 2 200 km². Urban development is continuous beyond its boundary in several directions. It is the fifth largest municipality by population. Its rate of growth has been declining – from over 4% per year a generation ago to around 3% in the 1990s, and less than 1% today. The number of households, however, is growing at over 5% per year. Unemployment is over 30%; monthly income for those employed averages about $1 000. Informal types of housing accommodate perhaps 22% of the households, a decline from around 25% five years ago, indicating rapid construction of formal housing. 90% of households have electricity connections, but only 78% have weekly refuse collection. In other words, this is a middle-income, slowly growing city with a wide disparity in incomes, but signs of progress in development and social indicators – except for health: largely as a result of HIV/AIDS, there has been a rapid fall in life expectancy in the last decade.


13 Sources for this material are Transvaal Archives, Pretoria (TA), Pretoria Town Clerk series (MPA), cited in Mabin (1994).

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