PEACE FOR KEEPS:
UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING AND GOVERNMENT POWER

THOMAS LEO SCHERER

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In 1997, President Mobutu of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was overthrown by rebels. Throughout the civil war, President Mobutu repeatedly called for a UN peacekeeping operation (UNPKO). Strangely, however, Mobutu refused all other offers by international organizations and country leaders to broker a peace. Why would Mobuto want a UNPKO and nothing else?

I argue that besides encouraging peace, UNPKOs influence the government-rebel balance of power. More precisely, governments select into UNPKOs that help them stay in power for longer. To support this argument, I first examine the criteria for UNPKO deployment, particularly the issue of consent. I find that no UNPKO has deployed without host government consent, suggesting government consent is a necessary condition for UNPKO deployment. I next analyze the relationship between UNPKOs and government power using government tenure as a proxy for power. I find that of all the post-Cold War governments that experienced civil war those that have hosted a UNPKO have much longer tenures than those without.

To examine motives for consent and mechanisms for the power effect, I examine four cases. DRC President Mobutu consented to a UNPKO for as a means for power and not peace, but rebels fearing the UNPKO’s power effect preempted UNPKO deployment. In comparison, the next DRC Presidents Laurent and Joseph Kabila did receive a UNPKO and have used it to stay in power. In the Angola case the Dos Santos government is able to defeat Savimbi’s threatening rebellion through a UNPKO. Finally, in Cambodia the exiled government of Prince Sihanouk regains some power, but ultimately a UNPKO is not enough to retake control from Hun Sen’s regime.

Policymakers and academics alike must understand the complex roles and influences of UNPKOs. While the international community largely uses UNPKOs as instruments of peace, civil war belligerents view them as tools for power. This perspective helps us understand previously unexplained government and rebel actions. It also raises difficult questions on
the value of peace. Is a peace settlement always worth the price of entrenching incumbent governments? If not, then the UN must re-evaluate the role of peacekeeping operations.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

Mobutu Sese Seko, President of Zaire, finally sat at the table with Laurent-Désiré Kabila, head of the rebel force staged just outside the national capital. Between the two sat the esteemed peacemaker Nelson Mandela, who had spent great effort to bring the two together for their first in-person meeting. Earlier that day, Kabila had listed his most recent demands for the meeting, prompting the out-of-patience Mandela to give Kabila a choice, “You come here now or I’m leaving.” Thus, on May 4, 1997, the two adversaries met appropriately enough aboard a 21,000 ton icebreaker, the polar supply ship Outeniqua, the largest ship in South Africa’s navy.

This most recent iteration of the long-standing ethnic and geopolitical tensions in central Africa, which would eventually be called the First Congo War, was less then a year old when the leaders met. Kabila’s force, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération - AFDL) had organized just seven months earlier but had moved across the country quickly due in large part to the poor condition of the national army. Yet, the time for negotiations had already passed. As the United Nations Special Rapporteur describes the meeting, “By that point, Mobutu had nothing left to offer but his resignation; he did not, however, offer to resign.”

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1. Duke 1997a
next two weeks Mobutu would leave the capital, never to return, and Kabila would declare himself president of the now renamed Democratic Republic of the Congo.

President Mobutu’s refusal to negotiate on the Outeniquenga, even when the outcome of conflict was inevitable, is less surprising when one considers his consistent refusal of all other efforts to broker a peace settlement, including offers from the Organization of African Unity and the leaders of Kenya and Morocco. However, this refusal of peace negotiations is puzzling when compared to his long standing demand for a United Nations peacekeeping operation (UNPKO). If Mobutu truly sought peace, why did he spurn all other offers for mediation?

President Mobutu is not unique in exclusively pursuing a UNPKO as a paths to peace. Since the end of the Cold War, many governments have called upon the UN for peacekeeping operations. However, there have also been cases where governments have resisted the deployment of a UNPKO, or where a government initially allowed a UNPKO and then later demanded that the UNPKO withdraw. What explains this variation in government behavior?

I argue that the answer lies in how UNPKOs affect the ongoing power struggle between rebel groups and governments. If a government believes that a UNPKO will help it retain power, it will seek a UNPKO adamantly. However, if the government thinks the UNPKO has little to offer or imposes too high of costs, it will refuse the UNPKO. In the case of the First Congo War, Mobutu sought peace exclusively through a UNPKO because he believed a UN operation would have to create peace in the area in order to respond to the refugee humanitarian crisis. Doing so would require either a confrontation with the rebels or a transfer of control in the region from the rebels to UN, both of which would strengthen the government’s position in relation to the rebels.

Understanding the power effect also illuminates why in November 1996 the AFDL began attacking refugee settlements that it had ignored for months. What motivated the AFDL to suddenly invest time and energy into attacking refugees during the middle of the war? There appears to be no obvious strategic benefit; it is possible that they were worried about the refugee population draining area resources and causing unrest, but why would such concerns
rise just as the United Nations authorized a peacekeeping mission to address the refugee crisis? I argue that the AFDL actions were triggered by the governments aims in requesting a UNPKO. Specifically, the AFDL reacted to a fear that the deployment of a UNPKO would impede, and perhaps even prevent, the ADFL from overthrowing the government. Therefore, the ADFL began attacking refugees and driving them away immediately prior to the deployment of the UN authorized operation. Thus, when the UN advance force arrived and found that there was no longer a refugee crisis, the operation became moot.

Previous research on UNPKOs has focused on whether the operations are successful in their mandated task of creating and sustaining peace. While undoubtedly this is an important question for the international community, it does not necessarily help explain government and rebel behavior in relation to a UNPKO. This is because the governments and rebel groups are not typically asking whether or not a UNPKO will create peace. For them, the important question is whether a UNPKO will help them gain and/or maintain power. A UNPKOs ability to support peace may be part of that equation or consideration, but is not a prerequisite. If conflict reignites and the government defeats the rebel group, the UNPKO has failed while the government has succeeded.

In this dissertation, I question who truly benefits from United Nations peacekeeping. Do UNPKOs typically benefit governments or rebels? My thesis finds that, in general, UNPKOs benefit existing governments. This is because governments essentially have veto power over UNPKO deployment, and as such, only UNPKOs that benefit existing governments are actually deployed. Thus, we are left with an empirical record of UNPKOs benefiting governments and a mixed empirical record of government consent for UNPKOs.

In order to explore who benefits from UNPKOs, we must first understand how and why UNPKOs are created. Whose preferences matter in determining when UNPKO deploys? In this dissertation, I show that government consent - a concept often overlooked or misunderstood by academics and policy makers alike - is a necessary precondition for UNPKOs. In fact, since the end of the Cold War, no UNPKO has ever deployed without first acquiring the consent of the host government.
This importance of government consent provides us with a signal for what a UNPKO’s effect will be. If a government consents to a UNPKO, it must believe that the UNPKO will benefit it. Otherwise, the government would not give its consent, essentially vetoing the deployment of a UNPKO. Essentially, governments only select beneficial UNPKOs; non-beneficial UNPKOs are never realized.

As long as governments are generally able to accurately predict a UNPKO’s effect, it follows that the UNPKOs that actually occur generally benefit governments. Indeed, my examination of the relationship between UNPKO deployment and government tenure finds that UNPKOs are associated with longer tenures compared to leaders that experience civil war but never host a UNPKO.

The argument that incumbent governments act strategically towards peacekeeping operations seems obvious. However, it has been often overlooked in traditional studies of peacekeeping operations, largely because they tend to on whether UNPKOs create peace. In addition, scholars have under-appreciated the role of government consent. In studies of peacekeeping, the consent of the parties involved is often assumed based on the chapter of the UN Charter under which the PKO was authorized by the Security Council. PKOs authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter are referred to as consent-based missions, whereas Chapter VII PKOs are called enforcement missions. The implication is that only missions authorized under Chapter VI need consent. I find that all UNPKOs have consent regardless of what chapter is specified, if a chapter is specified at all.⁴

In the remainder of this chapter, I elaborate on the underlying problem motivating this research. I then discuss and define why the power effects on PKOs are so important to understanding civil wars. Next, I describe the contributions that this dissertation makes to the field and review the history of this puzzling gap in the existing literature that I am addressing. Finally, I discuss two initial concerns to this research and then conclude with a summary of the rest of the chapters.

⁴Many UNPKOs, including all three Angola operations, are authorized by the Security Council without any reference to a Chapter.
1.1 The Problem of Peace

At the root of this dissertation is the challenge of achieving desirable state outcomes such as peace, democracy, and economic development. If a country is failing on all three dimensions, the international community’s first priority is to create peace and stability before addressing governance and development. Peace is especially urgent when each day of violence creates casualties.

United Nations peacekeeping operations are the operational arm of the international community. The Capstone Doctrine defines a UNPKO as a field operation authorized by the United Nations Security Council and conducted under the direction of the United Nations Secretary-General in order to prevent, manage, and/or resolve violent conflicts or reduce the risk of their recurrence. Since some UN political missions could technically meet this definition, I add that UNPKOs are defined as UNPKOs by the United Nations. As a result, UN political missions and peacekeeping missions operated by other parties are not UNPKOs, regardless of UN-authorization. UNPKOs may undertake a wide range of activities, especially cease-fire monitoring, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of combatants, protection of human rights, and electoral assistance. UNPKOs are unique in that they follow three basic principles: consent of parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except to defend self or mandate.

UNPKOs are often tasked with achieving peace as quickly as possible. As part of the process, a UNPKO may hold elections or provide economic support if such actions contribute to ending the conflict. Every UNPKO has a significant impact on a country’s future government and economy by affecting the details of peace, particularly the power outcomes for the government and rebel groups. With the focus on achieving peace, these side-effects

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5These are the stated goals of OECD countries and, by extension, of many IGOs such as the UN Security Council. However, not all international actors agree that democracy is a desirable state outcome.
of peace often go unexamined. Thus, a UNPKO sent to establish peace may inadvertently disadvantage other desirable outcomes such as democracy. The first step to addressing this problem is to understand the policy options and their likely consequences. By examining how UNPKOs affect power outcomes, this dissertation explains some important and unexamined consequences of UNPKOs beyond the reasonable yet basic narrative that UNPKOs ultimately lead to peace and peace is a desirable outcome so UNPKOs must be good.

If the United Nations is fully aware of the potential negative consequences of successful UNPKOs, it begs the question of why the UN continues to deploy UNPKOs regardless of these consequences. One explanation could be that the outcome of peace is simply more important to the UN than development and democracy. Certainly in cases of regional instability, a civil war is a more pressing concern than autocracy. Another explanation could be that UN members prioritize short-term gains over long-term consequences, particularly in cases where more immediate factors such as public outrage drive UN action. That said, in some cases UN members were surprised by the outcomes of a UNPKO. One such case, Angola, will be explained in detail in Chapter 6.

UNPKOs are a popular target for criticism. A number of negative unintended consequences have been attributed to them, such as how peacekeepers distort the local economy or engage in sexual exploitation. The ongoing inquiry into whether UN peacekeepers introduced cholera to Haiti is the latest example. These critiques are well-founded and necessary, but encourage a false assumption that all unintended consequences are negative.

Yet the power effects inherent in UNPKOs may have negative consequences for other desirable outcomes. In analyzing these negative costs from peace, this dissertation joins the small group of scholars that discuss the potential benefits of war, echoing the views of Tilly (1990) that war and state-building go hand-in-hand. More recently scholars have questioned whether international intervention to end a conflict is actually effective for peace and development in the long term. Toft (2010) finds that civil wars with rebel victories

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9 Aoi, De Coning, and Thakur (2007) covers a wide range of such consequences.
11 Luttwak (1999) argues that the continuation and recurrence of war is partly due to outside intervention preventing a decisive victory and military exhaustion. Rotberg (2004) and Weinstein (2005) criticize the
have longer lasting benefits to peace and democracy, demonstrating that the final power
distributions of civil wars lead to different long-term outcomes. My work continues this
reasoning but focuses on how UNPKOs shape long-term outcomes by shifting the final power
distribution.

### 1.2 UNPKO Power Effects

I define the power effects of a UNPKO as the UNPKO’s effects on the rebel-government
balance of power. Understanding the power effects of UNPKOs is crucial for understanding
the outcomes of civil conflict in terms of government control. In addition, as the introductory
examples from the First Congo War highlight, the power effects also impact the behavior
of rebel groups and host governments in terms of their levels of consent and cooperation
well before the UNPKO ends and leaves the country. A government will not consent to a
UNPKO unless it believes that the UNPKO has relatively favorable power effects. Likewise,
assuming that resisting a UNPKO is costly, a rebel group has more incentive to resist a
UNPKO as its power effects increasingly favor the host government. Thus, recognizing the
power effects of UNPKOs makes it possible to design operations in order to achieve a certain
level of cooperation.

#### 1.2.1 Explanations of Power Effects

Where does a UNPKO’s power effect come from? Based on the existing literature, I draw
out five mechanisms through which a UNPKO has a power effect:

- changing expected utility of conflict
- offering material incentives such as foreign aid
- providing international legitimacy

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international community for intervening on behalf of failing states, perpetuating political entities that are
not strong enough to survive on their own.
- assisting in democratic elections
- granting an information advantage

I discuss these mechanisms in Chapter 4 and go on to examine whether they are present in the case studies. Whether each of these mechanisms benefits the government or the rebel group depends upon the unique characteristics of the given UN operation and the belligerents. For example, a government would benefit from a UNPKO with a strong mandate for election if the government was politically stronger than the rebels as opposed to militarily. However, this benefit would also rely on the UNPKO changing the expected utility of conflict by raising the costs of conflict. Otherwise, a rebel group could continue the conflict and ultimately overthrow the government by force. In consenting to a UNPKO, the government may also face sovereignty costs, which vary with a country’s history. For example, Algeria rejected international calls for a UNPKO because it faced high sovereignty costs due its recent colonial history.

1.2.2 The Importance of Power Effects

The power effects of a UNPKO affect the level of cooperation by both the government and the rebel group. Interestingly, a government’s level of cooperation can vary widely after consent is given. This is due to a reputational “sunk cost” that the UNPKO may experience as the UN becomes more sensitive to failure following increased involvement in a conflict. In addition, there is a moral sunk cost where the UNPKO develops connections through local humanitarian and development aid that cannot be severed without considering the costs to aid recipients. Thus, after welcoming a UNPKO, the government can be less cooperative with the UNPKO without fearing that it will leave.

Rebel groups do not have the power of consent in the deployment of UNPKOs, but in some cases they are able to prevent what they view as a detrimental UNPKO from deploying. Rebel action against refugees in the First Congo War is one example of this phenomenon. Upon UNPKO deployment, rebel group cooperation depends more on the
enforcement capabilities of the UNPKO. In some cases, however, a rebel group will fear that resisting even a weak UNPKO and forcing it to withdraw could result in a robust military intervention by a state, or coalition of states, in support of the incumbent government. Thus, weak UNPKOs can still garner rebel cooperation if the PKO is backed by the credible threat of a third-party intervention.

Furthermore, the power effects of UNPKOs may help explain third-party intervention by identifying a specific substitution effect. Third parties that wish to support a rebel group must support them directly. If a third-party wishes to support a government it could do so directly, but it would also have the option of encouraging a UNPKO, which the host government will only consent to if it is in its interests. Thus, where a third-party would have had to intervene directly to support a government, they may have the option to free-ride off the international community by supporting a UNPKO, recognizing that it will deploy only with the host government’s consent.

1.2.3 Policy Implications

Policymakers considering a PKO must consider what kind of peace the PKO will create. The absence of war is not the only desirable outcome. Indeed, UNPKOs have the ability to entrench weak or corrupt governments with long-term consequences. Of course, such a cost-benefit argument against intervention may be difficult to make when faced with news coverage of ongoing violence. However, a better understanding of the power effects of UNPKOs and their potential outcomes will facilitate an honest discussion about the purposes of UNPKOs and whether there are better alternatives.

If policy makers find the power effects of UNPKOs troubling, there are two ways to address it. First, the UN could change the standard operating procedures of UN peacekeeping so that it is less beneficial to host governments. This will help guarantee that the UN does not maintain ineffectual governments that otherwise would not survive, subsequently decreasing the demand for peacekeeping in civil wars. The second solution could be to make UN peacekeeping conditional on government actions, such as cooperation with peacekeepers
and improved service provision. With this solution the UN still risks perpetuating weak
governments, but will only do so as long as the government is taking steps to better serve
its constituents.

1.3 Contributions to the Field

This dissertation contributes to the study of conflict resolution and peace by addressing a
stark gap in the existing literature, by documenting new information on several case studies,
and creating a new dataset on peacekeeping consent and civil war outcomes. Certainly,
academics of international relations have studied the concept of power at length. Born out of
World War I, the field has focused on how individual states gain power through international
conflicts and outright victory. With this focus, the question of power distribution after war
can be simplified to studying how/why certain states win or lose. Even in limited wars
where states fight over parts of territory, the division of power in that territory is assumed
to be determined by the winning side. Research on this topic points to military capabilities,
effectiveness, and strategy, along with regime type, conflict selection, and civil military relations.[12]

As I noted before, the world has observed a dramatic increase in civil wars since the 1970s
while the number of interstate wars has fallen. Figure 1.1 shows the number of ongoing wars
that have reached the threshold of 1,000 deaths.[13] It is not surprising that interest in research
on civil wars grew after the 1990s with the end of the Cold War and the continued rise in the
number of civil wars. Scholars began exploring the causes of civil war, the puzzle of rebel
recruitment, and the role of different types of violence.

Research on civil war termination has focused on explaining why some civil wars are
longer in duration than others. Cross-national work suggests that resources such as oil,
intervening third parties, weak states, and ethnic divisions make for longer civil wars.[14]

[14] See, e.g., Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Ross 2006; Regan 2002; Cunningham, Skrede Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009; Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000
Figure 1.1 shows the total number of ongoing conflicts per year that meet the 1,000 death threshold, broken down into internal and external conflicts.

Many followed a rational bargaining framework and focused on the barriers to peace. Of these barriers, the challenge of making credible commitments is seen as especially difficult in civil wars since factions are rarely geographically divided and often a peace settlement can leave one faction advantageously in control of the government. This research focuses on how to end a civil war without speculating what the exact end would look like. This focus has continued with studies that have examined why certain settlements have failed. As long as the peace held, there was little concern about what that peace looked like.

Peacekeeping research has undergone three waves along with the evolution of social science methodologies and the changing prevalence of UNPKOs, as shown in Figure 1.2. The first wave of research during the Cold War focused on operations deployed for international

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17 Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Hoddie and Hartzell 2003; Mattes and Savun 2010.

18 Official list of PKOs and their dates operation taken from the UN website, available at https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/operationslist.pdf. For more on the three waves see the review article by Fortna and Howard 2008.
conflicts with detailed histories that are suggestive of mechanisms of peacekeeping. Initial empirical studies investigated whether UNPKOs were successful where success was determined by whether a conflict ended and if it later reignited. The second wave of research followed the post-Cold War boom and bust in UNPKOs where a record number deployed but international optimism was lost with the catastrophes in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia. As a result, researchers largely explored why peacekeeping failed. After of period of self-reflection, UNPKOs returned to the world stage with large missions including East Timor and Democratic Republic of Congo. The third wave of research returned to the question of success, defined as the absence of war, focusing more on research design and quantitative methods and emphasizing peacekeeping in civil wars versus international wars. These studies tackled the endogeneity of UNPKO deployment and generally found that UNPKOs can successfully maintain an established peace but are less effective in creating peace in the first place.

More recent research has considered different PKO characteristics and widened the scope of interest to outcomes beyond war and peace. These lines of inquiry are likely due to the rise in the frequency of settlements ending civil wars observed in the 1990’s as shown in Figure 1.3. The first extension asked whether peacekeeping has a democratizing effect, with mixed results. Scholars have since asked how intervention more broadly, and peacekeeping in particular has effected other variables of interest such as violence, human rights, and women’s rights.

This dissertation on peacekeeping and power outcomes looks beyond asking how peacekeeping affects another possible variable of interest. Understanding the power effects of peacekeeping is crucial to understanding the entire peacekeeping process as power effects shape the preferences and behavior of armed factions in relation to a UNPKO. In this way,

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19 Beardsley and Schmidt 2012; Fortna 2008; Mullenbach 2005; Gilligan and Stedman 2003
20 Hegre, Hultman, and Nygard 2012; Fortna 2008; Gilligan and Sergenti 2008; Doyle 2006
21 Via the Kreutz 2010 UCDP conflict termination dataset.
22 Paris 2004; Doyle 2006; Gurses and Mason 2008; Fortna and Huang 2012
Figure 1.2 shows the number of UNPKOs initiated over time and the number of UNPKOs ongoing over time, broken down by whether the UNPKO was for an international conflict or an intra-national conflict.
Figure 1.3: Conflict Terminations

![Conflict Terminations Graph](image)

Figure 1.3 shows the total number of conflict terminations over time and how many of those terminations were settlements, either cease-fires or peace agreements.

This dissertation conceptualizes peacekeeping not as a tool to encourage and achieve peace but rather as a continuation of a power struggle between civil war factions.

The second contribution is the creation of a dataset on consent for peacekeeping. For every civil war since 1989 I code whether the government consented to UN peacekeepers, the date of consent, and whether that consent was ever withdrawn.

The third contribution of this dissertation is the case study research. I build upon the rich collection of existing peacekeeping case studies by focusing on the power effects of peacekeeping and the motives of belligerents. I add these aspects to the case study literature through information collected from interviews with UN officials and NGO workers along with document evidence from the UN Archive in New York and Canada’s National Archive in Ottawa.

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24Amy Yuen has produced the only other data set on consent for a 2011 working paper.
1.4 Concerns

I argue that the UNPKOs that we observe shift the rebel-government power distribution in favor of the incumbent government because UNPKOs only deploy with host consent and incumbent governments only consent to UNPKOs that will be beneficial to them. This argument is relatively straightforward, but it quickly becomes complicated upon examining the details. There are two closely related concerns worth addressing up front.

The first concern is that consent is actually a meaningless aspect of UNPKOs. In the next chapter, I demonstrate the near perfect correlation between host governments consent and UNPKO deployment, but consent could be endogenous to another factor, such as the preferences of the P5. That is, UNPKOs may deploy where the UNSC wants, and once a decision to send a UNPKO is made, the host government is pressured until it gives coerced consent. If the government is only consenting because of this pressure, then it is unlikely that the UNPKO serves as a net positive for the government.

Admittedly, host governments can be pressured to allow a UNPKO through a variety of incentives and punishments. However, for this pressure to be effective, it must be perceived as more than cheap talk by the host government. That is, if external pressure is the deciding factor in a host government’s decision to consent, it still holds that the government perceived that consenting for a UNPKO would have a better outcome than withholding consent. Both choices may result in a government losing power, but as the host’s choice is limited to either giving consent or not, a host government will choose the lesser evil. This observation does raise the issue that a UNPKO may not always improve a government’s power share, rather it will only have a positive effect relative to not having a UNPKO.

A second concern is that UNPKOs are actively biased in favor of one side in a civil war and that this bias is influencing outcomes. The United Nations and especially the Department of Peacekeeping Operations publicly embrace a mantra of neutrality and impartiality, but in practice this ideal is difficult to realize. More recently, impartiality has been blamed for

\footnote{For initial work on UN bias see conference papers by Michelle Benson and Jacob Kathman.}
limiting the UN’s ability to denounce actors that break agreements and violate human rights. Indeed, as I discuss later, new UNPKOs have taken an increasingly aggressive stance with the Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of Congo as the most recent example.

As with the first concern, whether UNPKOs are biased does not affect the larger conclusion that governments select into beneficial UNPKOs. However, where my dissertation moves the decision of UNPKO deployment from the UN to the host government, this concern is useful in that it highlights how the UN may shape UNPKOs in order to gain host consent when it is in the UN’s interest. Thus, a peace-seeking UN could design UNPKOs to benefit governments in order to gain their consent.

1.5 Outline of the Dissertation

The next chapter of this dissertation analyzes the concept of consent. I review how UN officials and documents discuss consent and find a wide range of interpretations on the importance of consent. I then examine the academic literature and likewise find that consent has been addressed inconsistently. I introduce my own dataset on government consent in civil wars; after comparing it to UNPKO deployment I find that no UNPKO has deployed without host government consent, suggesting that host government consent is a necessary condition for UNPKO deployment.

In Chapter 3, I test whether UNPKOs have had a consistent power effect. Using government tenure as a measure of government power, I find that for all leaders who have experienced civil war, those that received a UNPKO remained in power for longer than those who did not. In a cross-sectional analysis, I find that governments without a UNPKO are more likely to lose power than those with UNPKOs. This is a remarkable result given that previous research had argued that weaker governments are most likely to receive UNPKOs.

Chapter 4 lays the groundwork for the case studies. It describes the case study selection and sources of information. It then details the research questions for the case studies and
how they will be answered. This includes examining five proposed mechanisms for the power effect based on the existing literature and from the case of El Salvador.

Chapter 5 establishes a case comparison between two governments of the Democratic Republic of Congo - President Mobutu and President Kabila. Both presidents consented to a UNPKO, but the case of President Mobutu is one of the rare instances wherein a request for peacekeepers was not met. These cases demonstrate government motivations for UNPKOs, how UNPKOs can keep a government in power, and the ways in which rebels can resist a UNPKO.

Chapter 6 examines the cases of Angola and Cambodia. Angola is a difficult case for UNPKO power effects as the government of Angola was relatively weak compared to the rebel group UNITA. The Angolan government was able to remain in power with a UNPKO present to the point where it was strong enough to withdraw consent, dismiss the UNPKO by withdrawing consent, and defeat UNITA militarily. Cambodia is an interesting case because the internationally recognized government did not have control of the state. This case suggests that the UNPKOs’ power effect is somewhat dependent on who controls the state, not who the world recognizes as the government.

Chapter 7 concludes with a review of the dissertation. I consider the implications of these findings on existing peacekeeping literature and what lessons future researchers should draw from this work. Finally, I also offer policy implications while taking into account that recent UNPKOs have shown larger power effects in favor of the government.
Chapter 2

Host Consent and UNPKO Deployment

Who should benefit more from UNPKOs, governments or rebels? I argue that UNPKOs benefit host governments more than they benefit rebel groups due to a selection effect: the incumbent government only consents to a UNPKO if it believes that particular PKO to be beneficial. In this chapter I examine the significance of host consent. That is, does a host country really have the power to decide whether it receives a UNPKOs? I find that host consent is a necessary condition for a UNPKO, which indicates that the host does indeed have selection power. In fact, since the end of the Cold War, no UNPKO has deployed without the consent of the host government.

In this chapter I discuss the long-standing uncertainty around the role and importance of consent for UNPKOs. Political scientists and international law scholars have largely assumed the importance of consent. UN documents and leader accounts show that the importance of consent varied greatly even within the UN. The lack of clear direction from the UN Charter led officials to develop their own principles, drawing on experience from early operations and from basic tenants of international relations such as state sovereignty. By these principles, consent is required for a PKO, but there has been disagreement among UN officials, especially around Chapter VII missions, rebel consent, and disappearing federal governments.
I then test whether consent is a necessary factor for intervention by creating a dataset detailing government consent in every civil war since 1989. I find that consent is a necessary condition as no UNPKO ever deployed without host government consent. I then consider the issues of forced consent using the Algerian Civil War as an example. I conclude with implications.

2.1 The Necessity of Consent

2.1.1 Research on Consent

In research on UNPKOs, scholars have often discussed the importance of the role of consent and its value for understanding the deployment and effects of UNPKOs. Fortna discusses how the presence or absence of consent indicates the preferences and capabilities of the belligerents involved. Doyle writes that consent is necessary for a PKO to have legitimacy and long-run stability, to achieve a peace agreement, and to prevent spoilers. He points to the lack of consent as a contributing factor to the poor outcomes in Somalia and former Yugoslavia.

Despite its importance for understanding peacekeeping operations, the role of consent has not been studied in a systematic way. For example, in case study research scholars have found that consent is important to deployment but found ambiguity in terms of whose consent is important. These difficulties have led authors to measure consent in different ways depending on their exact research question. So while Ratner considers levels of consent, in other case study research Howard codes consent as either all or nothing, and Pushkina combines consent and cooperation into a single measure.

The quantitative studies that make up the third generation of peacekeeping research continue with this lack of precision. Nearly all of these studies employ, or build upon, the
They classify PKOs into four different categories using the following descriptions:

1. A Monitoring or observer mission is an interim arrangement used in violent conflicts with the consent of the host government. In these conflicts, there is no formal determination of aggression. The purpose is to monitor a truce and help negotiate a peace through the presence of military and civilian observers.

2. Traditional peacekeeping involves the deployment of military units and civilian officials to facilitate the negotiated settlement of a conflict. It is based on the consent of the parties (normally authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter). Traditional peacekeeping operations (PKOs) typically establish and police a buffer zone and assist the demobilization and disarmament of military forces.

3. Multidimensional peacekeeping is also consent based and is designed to implement a comprehensive and negotiated peace agreement. It includes a mix of strategies to build a self-sustaining peace, ranging from those of traditional PKOs to more multidimensional strategies for capacity expansion (e.g. economic reconstruction) and institutional transformation (e.g. reforming the police, army, and judicial system; implementing elections; rebuilding civil society).

4. Peace enforcement is a (usually multilateral) military intervention, authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It is designed to impose public order by force if needed, with or without host government consent.

Each classification considers consent, but with varying precision. The first specifies consent of the host government, the second consent of the parties, the third is consent based, and the
fourth sometimes has government consent. Doyle also considers the chapter of authorization, and in later work he groups the first three classes as Chapter VI missions. Fortna similarly distinguishes the peace enforcement classification from the other three, which she refers to as consent-based peacekeeping or Chapter VI missions. To her credit, Fortna does discuss how the Chapter designation is used as shorthand and is technically a misnomer; many peace enforcement missions do have the consent of the belligerents, at least initially. Still we are left without an answer to the basic question - does consent affect UNPKO deployment?

Our understanding of UN peacekeeping operations has come a long way thanks to the case studies of early pioneers as well as more recent quantitative analyses. In these studies, the importance of consent is often considered, but it usually receives only a superficial treatment as it is rarely the focus of inquiry. Where researchers have looked deeper, they have encountered the issues of mission type and actor characteristics. In quantitative studies researchers were able to push forward with simplifying assumptions and shorthand notation, but those assumptions have grown into conventional wisdom as a consequence. Through repetition, useful assumptions have turned into untested truths.

### 2.1.2 The UN Charter

The UN Charter’s guidance for PKOs is rather sparse. As the recent Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guéhenno put it, “There is no mention in the United Nations Charter of ‘peacekeeping operations’. There is no definition for what it entails, no criteria for when operations are to be established, and no guidelines for how to plan and deploy them.” The initial institutional rules for UNPKOs are set in the UN Charter. Specifically, Chapters VI and VII of the charter give the UNSC the ability to take action to address acts of aggression or situations that threaten international peace. Under Chapter VI, Article 37, the Security Council can take actions in accordance with the settlement procedures agreed to by the parties as stipulated in Article 36. Chapter VII,
Article 42 allows the use of force to restore order regardless of the preferences of the parties involved, provided that lesser actions under Article 41 such as sanctions are inadequate.\(^9\)

The common interpretation of this is that missions authorized under Chapter VI require consent while Chapter VII missions do not. Indeed, a UN DPKO Officer informed me that the consent requirement was the only distinction\(^10\).

Chapter I, Article 2(7) speaks to the question of consent and Chapter VII missions, but doesn’t answer it. It reads,

Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

This Article affirms the principle of state sovereignty, implying that any UNPKO would require the consent of the state involved. Indeed, legal scholars have interpreted it as such\(^11\).

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\(^9\) *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945:

Chapter VI, Article 36(2): The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.

Chapter VI, Article 37(2): If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.

Chapter VII, Article 39: The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Chapter VII, Article 41: The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Chapter VII, Article 42: Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

\(^10\) Personal Interview, 2013.


On non-intervention, the court wrote in another case, “The principle of non-intervention involves the right of every sovereign State to conduct its affairs without outside interference: though examples of trespass
Yet, depending on the interpretation of the word *prejudice*, Chapter VII measures may not fall under the same rules and thus do not require consent. In terms of international law, it is not clear whether consent is always necessary for peacekeeping. As one scholar concluded, “Consent, neutrality/impartiality and the use of force in self-defense oscillate between legal fiction and legal reality.”

### 2.1.3 The UN in Practice

As the UN Charter’s rules for peacekeepers are so meager, UN officials have developed their own set of guidelines for PKOs. Kofi Annan, the Assistant Secretary-General of PKOs from 1993-1996 and then Secretary-General until 2006, writes that in 1973 then Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld codified five principles of peacekeeping. Annan summarizes them as:

1. Peacekeeping troops could be deployed only with the consent of the parties to the dispute.
2. Peacekeepers had to be strictly impartial in their deployment and activities.
3. Peacekeepers could use force only in self-defense.
4. Peacekeepers should be mandated and supported by the Security Council in their activities.
5. Peacekeeping operations had to rely on the voluntary contributions of member states for military personnel, equipment, and logistics.

Requesting intervention in itself goes against the principle of self-determination. During the Cold War, the great powers justified intervention by arguing that it was supporting the host government’s self-defense against an externally supported insurrection. As the gridlocked UN Security Council was unable to act on documented cases of support for insurgency, the international community went along with counter intervention at the host’s consent, thus establishing a precedent of consent overcoming the principle of non-intervention.

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12 Tsagourias 2006, 482.
13 Annan and Mousavizadeh 2012, 33.

Affirmations of the principle of consent can be found repeatedly in UN reports and the statements of UN officials. Marrack Goulding oversaw peacekeeping operations from 1986 to 1993 as UN Under-Secretary-General (USG) for Special Political Affairs and was in charge of the creation of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in 1992. In a 1993 speech on the evolution of peacekeeping, Goulding states, “It had become established over time that peacekeeping operations could be set up only with the consent of the parties to the conflict in question.”\footnote{Goulding 1993, 454. Tsagourias (2006) argues that through repetition the requirement of consent of PKO deployment as transformed it into a “constitutional requirement.”} Concerning a UN plan for Morocco in 1990, Marrack Goulding recalls how an advisor in Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar’s office questioned the necessity of party consent, asking, “Could we not just present it to the Security Council and rely on ‘international pressure’ to bring the parties into line?” Goulding explained that these principles, established over 40 years, could not be ignored\footnote{Goulding 2002}.

In 2000, after receiving reports on the UN’s failures in Rwanda and Bosnia, Kofi Annan assembled a panel of experts to discuss reformations of UN peacekeeping to meet the post-Cold War world’s needs. The resulting Report of the Panel on United Peacekeeping, commonly called the Brahimi Report after the panel’s chair Lakhdar Brahimi, declares that consent of the local parties, impartiality, and force only for self-defense are the “bedrock principles of peacekeeping.”\footnote{U.N. General Assembly and Security Council. \textit{Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations} (A/55/305-S/2000/809), 21 August 2000.}
Consent, impartiality, and limiting force to self-defense are similarly upheld as the three basic principles of UNPKOs in the Capstone Doctrine. The UN Department of Field Support (DFS) and the DPKO created the Capstone Doctrine, officially titled *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* as part of the reform effort *Peace Operations 2010*. Its importance is included in the introduction: “Any subordinate directives, guidelines, standard operating procedures, manuals and training materials issued by DPKO/DFS should conform to the principles and concepts referred to in this guidance document.”

Thus, while the legal requirement is unclear, in practice the UN has consistently affirmed the importance of consent to PKOs.

Still, there are instances where the principle of consent was challenged. Goulding writes that he frequently had to give Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali the same message that he had given the advisor to de Cuellar on the necessity of consent, which may explain why Boutros-Ghali moved Goulding from USG of Peacekeeping, the department Goulding had just set up, to USG for Political Affairs in 1993.** In 1990, Brian Urquhart, who oversaw UNPKOs as USG of Political Affairs from 1971-1985, believed the necessity of consent was called to question; he wrote, “The consent of the parties may no longer be regarded as a *sine qua non* in all cases.”** The cases wherein the principle of consent is typically challenged are those grappling with whether consent is necessary for enforcement missions and whether consent is needed from non-state actors.

UN officials often speak of consent of the parties, but there are many different types of parties in any given conflict. The various PKO doctrines cited above generally require the consent of the belligerents without specifying whether that only applies to member states. However, one would expect that the United Nations rules and regulations only apply to its

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20 Goulding 2002

21 Urquhart 1990

*Sine qua non* is a latin phrase meaning indispensable or essential; literally, *without which not*. 

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members and its membership is made up of states\textsuperscript{22} In terms of PKO deployment, it would seem that the consent of rebel groups is not required. UN officials have not discussed this explicitly, but in his 1992 analysis of peacekeeping, Boutros-Ghali states that if one country in an international dispute gives consent then the UN could deploy to deter conflict but only to the requesting country\textsuperscript{23} Applying this to a civil war would allow the UN to deploy peacekeepers to government-controlled territory with the government’s consent in order to deter rebels. Often states will object to the UN even consulting with rebel groups since it is seen as de facto recognition and serves to potentially legitimize the rebel group. Still, as a practical matter, consent from all the parties is certainly desirable as it enhances a UNPKO’s legitimacy and efficiency\textsuperscript{24}

The question of whose consent is required also remains unclear in cases in which the internationally recognized government has lost control of the state\textsuperscript{25} In the discussion of state and non-state actors we must remember that the state is an abstract entity and that it is the government that represents the state that actually gives consent\textsuperscript{26} However, often a government does not speak for, or exercise control of, a state. This is especially true for governments amidst a civil war\textsuperscript{27} In some cases, the central federal government has such little control over a state to the point of disappearing, as was the case in Somalia for much of the 1990’s. Yet, as international law is strongly biased in favor of governments, the United Nations may still accept, or even require, consent from governments that have lost full control of the state as long as the government is still internationally recognized\textsuperscript{28}

The role of consent may also vary based on the type of PKO, such as whether the PKO is authorized under Chapter VI or Chapter VII, or the strength of the PKO’s mandate. Chapter VI PKOs are commonly described as consent-based peacekeeping, while Chapter VII

\textsuperscript{22}The European Union is the exception as a non-state actor that has observer status in the General Assembly. Since 1946 the United Nations identified Non-Self-Governing Territories on the recommendation of the Special Committee on Decolonization, but those territories have no standing in the UN.

\textsuperscript{23}Boutros-Ghali 1992

\textsuperscript{24}Tsagourias 2006, 475.

\textsuperscript{25}Cases of colonialism are similarly not straightforward.

\textsuperscript{26}Wippman 1996, 211.

\textsuperscript{27}Wippman 1996, 214.

\textsuperscript{28}Tsagourias 2006, 475.
operations are referred to as *peace enforcement*. Marrack Goulding distinguished between the terms *peacekeeping*, which requires consent, and *peace enforcement*, which does not.\(^\text{29}\) The Capstone Doctrine states that the UNSC may take enforcement action without the consent of the main parties as an enforcement operation and notes that the UNSC has already authorized enforcement missions carried out by coalitions or regional groups.\(^\text{30}\)

In practice, using the Chapter or mandate to predict the need for consent is problematic. Many PKOs are authorized without any chapter being explicitly cited. In some cases where Chapter VII is cited, it does not guarantee that the peacekeepers are conducting operations classified as peace enforcement. The UNSC occasionally cites Chapter VII to signal that a situation is especially serious or as a way to demonstrate that the enforcement option is within reach in the future if it becomes necessary.\(^\text{31}\) Using PKO mandates is difficult due to lack of clarity surrounding exactly where on the spectrum of action consent becomes necessary. In other words, “The dividing line between peace enforcement and PKOs with coercive components is very fine.”\(^\text{32}\)

## 2.2 The Empirical Record of Consent

Consent is crucial for understanding the possible selection bias in UNPKOs, yet neither UN doctrine nor previous research answer the question of whether consent matters. In this section I examine the relationship between government consent and UNPKO deployment through an observational study. To do so, I create an original dataset of government consent for all civil wars after the Cold War. I find that no UNPKO has deployed without the consent of the host government, which suggests a selection bias in favor of host governments.

I focus on government consent as opposed to rebel consent as there are several reasons to suspect that government consent should matter more than rebel consent. First, the

\(^{29}\) Goulding 2002.


\(^{31}\) Tsagourias 2006, 472.

\(^{32}\) Tsagourias 2006, 472.
UN charter recognizes states as members of the UN and grants them certain rights and privileges including sovereignty. Rebel groups receive no such recognition. Second, when the UN becomes involved in a civil war the host nation often forbids or condemns UN communication with the rebel group in the name of state sovereignty and to prevent lending the rebel group legitimacy. Third, there are several prominent cases where a UNPKO stayed even as a rebel group condemned or attacked it. The intervention brigade in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the UNPKO fighting ex-president Gbagbo in Côte d’Ivoire are recent examples. There are no such cases with governments, as governments can just withdraw consent to get a UNPKO to leave, as was the case in Angola.

2.2.1 The Universe of Cases

The universe of cases for this study involves 62 conflict situations between 1989 and 2011. I start with all civil wars that have been active in this time period. I limit myself to post-Cold War cases as the deployment of UNPKOs during the Cold War followed a distinct process. Much has been written on the gridlock on the Security Council during the Cold War, which was especially hindered UNPKO deployment. In Chapter 1, Figure 1.2 made clear that UNPKOs are more prevalent after the Cold War. This rise in UNPKOs could be explained by an increase in the number of civil conflicts in the world, but, as Figure 1.1 showed, the total number of ongoing conflicts has remained steady since early 1980.

To identify conflicts, I use the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. This identifies all armed conflicts that meet the following definition:

An armed conflict is a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.

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33 Not all scholars attribute this trend solely to great power interests. Jakobsen (2002) argues that the increased rate of globalization after the Cold War both increased the outbreak of civil conflicts and fostered an international community willing to intervene in the name of human rights and democracy.

34 UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, Version 4-2013: Gleditsch et al. 2002, Themnér and Wallensteen 2014
This definition excludes conflict between two non-state groups, such as conflicts between drug cartels or when a terrorist organization targets civilians. I limit my analysis to conflicts with over 1,000 cumulative battle deaths in order to focus on those conflicts that included a reasonable challenge to the state.\footnote{The UCDP codes a conflict for every year that it has over 25 battle deaths. Thus, conflicts that passed the 25 battle deaths per year but had fewer than 1,000 deaths over its entire durations were excluded.} This intensity threshold is lower than the common threshold of 1,000 battle deaths in a single year used in other datasets (i.e. the Correlates of War).\footnote{Sarkees and Wayman 2010} I use the lower threshold in order to capture the types of conflict that receive UNPKOs. Of the 132 total conflicts in the UCDP dataset that have taken place after 1989, 72 have reached the cumulative intensity threshold.\footnote{Only 45 reach the higher threshold of 1,000 deaths in one year. Note that Liberia’s civil war with the INPFL and NPFL in 1990 is miscoded as having fewer than 1,000 deaths in UCDP’s Armed Conflict dataset.} As examples, the following three conflicts from the UCDP/PRIO dataset do not meet the cumulative intensity threshold and are dropped:

- The Anjouan secession from Comoros in 1997, where the Comoros army was defeated in 3 days of fighting with an estimated 56 battle deaths.
- Mexico’s conflicts with the indigenous EPR in 1994 and Marxist EZLN in 1996, which saw 37 and 145 battle deaths respectfully.
- The 1990 three-day coup attempt in Trinidad and Tobago, which saw 34 battle deaths.\footnote{Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Date of retrieval: 2013/10/26) UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia: www.ucdp.uu.se/database, Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research — conflict-database@pcr.uu.se.}

From this list of conflicts, I make three additional adjustments to facilitate analysis. First, I combine multiple conflicts occurring simultaneously in a country into one conflict situation unless I find a good reason not to. This is to prevent over-counting conflicts with several rebel factions relative to other conflicts where rebels present a single, united front. This change is also appropriate to the research question as requests for and deployments of PKOs take into account a country’s entire security situation. The two exceptions are in Sudan,
where the UN had distinct operations for the situation in Darfur and the secessionist conflict with South Sudan, and Indonesia, where the UN missions in East Timor were unrelated to the secession movement in Aceh. For these two instances I allow separate and simultaneous conflicts.

Second, I break up conflicts into distinct time periods if a drastic regime change occurred. This prevents any inappropriate continuations of consent. If a government gives consent and then is overthrown, the incoming government must also give its consent; continued consent is not assumed. The best example is the Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire), which UCDP codes as at war with the rebel groups AFDL, MLC, RCD, and CNDP from 1997 to the present. I recode this situation as two distinct civil wars. In the first civil war from 1996 to 1997, the AFDL overthrew Mobuto’s government and Kabila became president. Shortly after, Kabila fell out of favor with many of his former forces, leading to a second civil war from 1998 to 2001 against with a different regime in power fighting against the same rebel groups.

Third, many conflicts will exit and reenter the dataset as the number of casualties dips below 25. This may reflect truces or ceasefires or a decrease in effort by the factions involved. I connect such gaps as long as they are less than five years. For example, Azerbaijan’s conflict with the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh enters the dataset in 1991-1994, 1997-1998, 2005, 2008, and 2012. With this change, I code this conflict as going from 1991-1998 and 2005-2012. This change makes it easier to connect conflicts to peacekeeping operations that may begin during a lull in the conflict.

Table 2.1 demonstrates what these changes look like in practice. The unadjusted data in 2.1A is a list of all post-Cold War conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Ethiopia that reach cumulative intensity as coded by the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset. The resulting conflict situations after the adjustments are shown in 2.1B. In the case of Ethiopia, I combine those conflicts that are coded for the same time periods. However, I add a break in 1991 when the EPRDF seized control of the capital and set up an interim government. With these adjustments I end up with a total of 62 conflict situ-
ations. The full list of conflict situations along with the associated PKOs is in the appendix.

Table 2.1: Example of Conflict Data Adjustments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Start</th>
<th>End</th>
<th>Conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>DR Congo (Zaire) - CNDP, AFDL, MLC, RCD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>DR Congo (Zaire) - CNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Ethiopia - EPLF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Ethiopia - EPRDF, Military faction (forces of Amsha Desta and Merid Negusie)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Ethiopia - OLF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Ethiopia - ONLF, AIAI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.1B - Adjusted Conflicts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Start</th>
<th>End</th>
<th>Conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>DR Congo (Zaire) - AFDL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>DR Congo (Zaire) - MLC, RCD, CNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>DR Congo (Zaire) - CNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Ethiopia - EPLF, EPRDF, Military faction (forces of Amsha Desta and Merid Negusie), OLF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Ethiopia - OLF, ONLF, AIAI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I match these conflicts with the UN peacekeeping missions using the UN’s official list of PKOs and their dates of operation. For each mission I identify the host country based on the UN’s official description of each mission. If a UN mission responded to multiple countries, I named all countries that saw UN troops as host countries. If a UN mission begins in a year with no ongoing conflict, I connect it to the most recently terminated conflict. The largest delay occurs in Liberia where the UN operation UNOMIL deployed in 1993 taking over from the ECOWAS intervention force that helped end the civil war in 1990.

The subset of conflicts with cumulative intensity nearly captures all of the relevant UNPKOs during this time period. Of the UN’s 52 total peacekeeping operation between 39

1989 and 2012, 34 are matched to intrastate conflicts in the host country. The other eighteen are made up of:

- Five operations were sent to Balkan conflicts that are considered independent of the original conflict from the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991; these fall below the cumulative intensity threshold.

- Five operations were deployed for international conflicts.

- Five operations were sent to Haiti although its conflicts have fallen well below the threshold of 1,000 total deaths.

- The operation MINURCA to the Central African Republic which does not have a matching conflict.

- UNOCI was deployed to Ivory Coast after the First Ivorian Civil War which technically falls short of the cumulative intensity threshold.

- UNMISS was deployed to South Sudan in 2011 at the start of its conflict, but at the end of 2012 the conflict had yet to meet the cumulative intensity threshold.

Of these, the only UNPKO relevant to the study of civil war outcomes is UNOCI. Thus, the cumulative intensity cutpoint is the most appropriate cut point of the common gradations of conflict intensity.

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40Kosovo hosted UNMIK, Macedonia hosted UNPREDEP, and Croatia hosted UNCRO, UNMOP, UNTAES, UNPSG. The conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina does meet the threshold to match with its PKO, UNMIBH.


42The five operations - UNMIH, UNSMIH, UNTMIH, MINPONUH, and MINUSTAH - overturned the 1991 coup, attempted to stabilize the country after the 2004 revolution, and provided humanitarian aid after the devastating 2010 earthquake. The 1991 and 2004 violence had estimates of 200 and 250 battle deaths respectively.

43The Central African Republic hosted MINURCA from 1998 to 2000 after the military mutinies of 1997 that does not make it into Uppsala’s dataset of armed conflicts.

44Battle death estimates from Ivory Coast range between 800 and 1,300, but the best estimate of 900 does not meet the threshold.
2.2.2 Coding Consent

For each conflict situation I code for government consent based on UN documentation, media reports, and case histories\[^{45}\] A summary of the consent coding for each conflict can be found in Appendix A.2 as well as a data table of conflicts, UNPKOs, and years of consent in A.1. In most cases the United Nations identifies the source of the consent in the Security Council resolution authorizing the operation. Consent is often given in the form of signature on a negotiated cease-fire or peace agreement.

When determining if the government gave consent, it is not always clear who exactly should be considered the incumbent government. If the party that controls the state is not internationally recognized as the government, I code the recognized party as the incumbent. For example, in the civil war in Sierra Leone I code President Kabbah’s regime as the incumbent government for the entire conflict, even though he was in exile for nine months after a military coup. The international community denounced the military junta and continued to recognize President Kabbah until an ECOWAS operation reinstated the president.

2.2.3 Results

The universe of cases includes 62 conflict situations, 25 of which involved UNPKOs. Of these 25, all had government consent. No UNPKO deployed to a civil war without government consent. The breakdown is shown as a 2x2 in Table 2.3. The Fisher’s Exact Test rejects the null-hypothesis that consent is unrelated to deployment\[^{46}\] This is strong evidence that government consent is a necessary condition for UNPKO deployment.

In three conflict situations consent was given but no UNPKO deployed. These cases of no deployment suggest that consent is not a sufficient condition, but it does seem to be a

\[^{45}\text{For each case I consult the Political Handbook, the Yearbook of the United Nations and specific UN documents, the UCDP conflict encyclopedia, and a directed search of newspaper databases with Proquest.}\]

\[^{46}\text{The p-value of } 2.22 \times 10^{-14} \text{ indicates that if the null-hypothesis were true that consent is unrelated to deployment, we would very rarely see a distribution this extreme. I use Fisher’s Exact Test instead of the Chi-Square Test because the observed data includes counts less than 10.}\]
necessary condition. This is true for all PKOs deployed to civil wars, not solely Chapter VI operations or classic peacekeeping versus peace enforcement.

The first instance of unanswered consent was from the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1997 where the government fought the AFDL. The UNSC authorized a peacekeeping operation, but while assessing the situation on the ground, the Canadian advance team found that the PKO’s mandate had already been fulfilled, indicating no need for the operation. Shortly thereafter, the rebels took Kinshasa and Kabila assumed the presidency.

The second instance was in the Republic of Congo in 1997 where President Lissouba endorsed the idea of a peacekeeping mission to end the conflict between his militia forces, the Cocoye, and the Cobra militia of General Sassou-Nguesso. The Secretary-General moved forward with a technical survey team to plan this operation and began negotiating with troop contributing countries while the Security Council established three necessary conditions for an international force: a ceasefire, a commitment to settlement, and international control of the airport. These conditions were nearly met in July, but the two sides could not agree on the powers of certain government officials in a new government. A few months later General Sassou-Nguesso’s forces surged into the Capitol, ending the conflict and marking the start of General Sassou-Nguesso’s presidency. He remains in power today, 18 years later.\footnote{See appendix A.2}

\footnotetext{47}

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Table 2.3: Consent and PKO Deployment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government Consent</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p-value = 2.22 \times 10^{-14} (Fisher’s Exact Test)
The third unanswered consent was from Afghanistan during the conflict from 1992 to 2001. In 1996 the Taliban toppled the government of President Burhanuddin Rabbani and set up its own state apparatus, but it was never officially recognized and Rabbani’s forces continued to fight. Around the time of Rabbani’s fall, Afghanistan made numerous requests for UN involvement through fact-finding missions, police forces, and border observations. After the terrorist attacks of 9-11, however, the United States lead a coalition force into Afghanistan, effectively preempting any UN action.

2.3 Forced Consent

Why do governments consent to UNPKOs? Is it because the government believes that the UNPKO will benefit it in some way, or do other international actors pressure the host into giving consent? When other states, especially the great power of the Security Council, believe that a UNPKO is in their best interests, they have a variety of side payments to promise and sanctions to threaten in order to persuade a potential host government to obtain consent. If a great power can threaten credibly to impose sufficient costs, a host government may consent to a peacekeeping operation as the less costly option. The consenting host is then worse off than a similar government in a civil war but without great power interest.

Such a concern is reasonable, but in reality is uncommon. Making side payments or imposing sanctions is a costly endeavor, and while great powers have extreme advantages with regards to resources, the host government typically has much greater resolve on the issue as its very survival is at stake. In those cases where a great power does have strong enough interests to render it willing to accept high costs, they will not leave the outcome up to the United Nations. In fact, instead of seeing UNPKOs where great power interests are at stake, one is more likely to see UNPKOs where great powers have lost interest and disengage from a conflict. At the end of the Cold War, proxy wars gave way to UN operations in Afghanistan, Angola, and throughout Central America.

\[^{48}\text{For citations and further information see A.2}\]

35
Cross-national studies of UNPKO deployment find little to no relationship between great power interests and the locations of peacekeeping operations. In summarizing her findings, Fortna writes, “The strategic interests of the great powers are not generally a good predictor of where peacekeepers go, with one notable exception. Peacekeeping is very unlikely in conflicts in or near these states’ territory.” Besides this one exception, her quantitative analysis of deployment shows that UNPKO deployment is unrelated to great power interests as captured by colonial history, political and military ties, and natural resources. Similarly, neither threats to international peace and security nor humanitarian crises drive deployment.

Quantitative analysis of PKO deployment is limited by the difficulty of coding and quantifying the international community’s interest in a state. State interests may be predicated on interests unrelated to alliances and resources; gauging these interests requires an effort that is beyond the scope of this project. Digging into the individual cases, however, offers some insights into the possibility of forced consent.

The cases of Serbia, Syria, and Somalia, cases we may think of as likely having forced consent given their outcomes, actually do not have clear evidence of forced consent. In 1991, before NATO became involved, the Serbian government gave clear signs of consent, both by telling the UN Special Envoy in person but also by writing to the Security Council. In Syria, the United States imposed sanctions, demanded Assad step down, and made ‘red line’ warnings after Assad had consented to a UNPKO in 2011. In Somalia, General Aidid did not want UNPKO, but Interim President Ali Mahdi was more supportive, at least initially.

The one case with evidence that consent was forced occurred in Indonesia, but even this case has some caveats. After East Timor’s landslide vote in favor of independence in the 1999 referendum, there was a startling wave of violence by gangs and militias which the government of Indonesia did not attempt to stop. This led the international community to apply

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{49} Fortna 2008, pp. 44.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{50} See appendix A.2.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{51} See appendix A.2. Warrick and Sly 2011, Ukman and Sly 2011, Ball 2012. It also helps that Syria had support on the UN Security Council from China and Russia, but the first veto of a Syria resolution, S/2011/612, wasn’t until October 2011, well after the UNPKO had already deployed and withdrawn.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{52} See appendix A.2.}
significant pressure, which increased until 10 days after the referendum when Indonesia’s President Habibie finally consented.

Some cases show a government resisting international pressure for a UNPKO. In the Republic of Yemen the government stalled the United Nations through false ceasefires and disagreements over peacekeeper nationalities so that it could achieve a military victory. Of all the non-consent cases, the Algerian Civil War saw the most sustained international pressure. The war started in the early 1990’s and continued until 2003 (or continues to this day if you include the fighting with the transnational al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)). In the late 1990s, the violence in Algeria rose to international attention and was followed by strong pressure to allow an international presence in Algeria, but Algeria successfully refused. In the next section I explore the Algeria case to examine a state’s ability to withhold consent.

2.3.1 Refusing Consent: The Case of Algeria

The case of Algeria provides an empirical example where a state refused to give consent to a peacekeeping force in the face of international pressure. Throughout the 1990s Algeria experienced an internal conflict for state control. The Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) demonstrated its political might by obtaining 53% of the popular vote in the 1990 municipal and provincial elections, threatening the tenure of the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) which had held power after its guerrilla struggle for independence and France’s ultimate withdrawal in 1962. In the 1992 legislative elections the FIS again showed its strength, taking 40% of the seats in the first round (the FLN took 3.4%) and aiming to have a two-thirds super-majority after the second round. The second round was canceled however after military leaders staged a soft-gloved coup by pressuring President Bendjedid into resignation and appointing a ruling Haute Conseil d’État (HCE). Once in power, the military aggressively cracked down on the FIS, causing sharp divides within the FIS over the group’s commit-

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53 See appendix A.2
54 See appendix A.2.
55 Algeria 2011, pp. 24-25
ment to non-violence. Many members felt it was time to take up arms, contributing to the emergence of the Armée Islamique du Salut (AIS) and the growth of the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA).  

Despite fighting a common enemy, the AIS and GIA subscribed to opposing ideologies and tactics. The GIA called for a total war to establish an Islamic state, while the AIS demanded a return to electoral politics. Tactically, the AIS focused on attacking military, police, and government targets. The GIA’s broader list of viable targets also included foreigners, intellectuals, and journalists. The AIS initially worked with the GIA, but the organizations began confronting each other in 1995 as the GIA sought to control the military field and declared itself the only legitimate Islamic group. In January 1996 the GIA declared war on the AIS.  

The violence evolved over time from assassinations and armed attacks to a focus on bombings from 1995 to 1998. The bombings initially targeted government and security targets but later targeted public places such as markets and restaurants. In 1997, there was a coordinated night attacks on entire villages became frequent. From November 1996 to July 1999 there were 67 recorded massacres. While the government forces or pro-government militias were blamed for some massacres, most evidence suggests that the GIA was responsible for these attacks.  

In the face of rising violence in 1997, the AIS unilaterally declared a cease-fire. This led to a permanent cease-fire between the government in 1999 and to the disbanding of the AIS in 2000. The decision to lay down its weapons reportedly arose from the AIS’s desire to disassociate itself and Islam from the massacres.  

The GIA’s tactics led the US State Department to designate it a terrorist organization in 1995. The group’s use of indiscriminate violence lost it any popular support it had and caused fractures within the organization. Hassan Hattab, a GIA amir, claimed that he left  

\[56\] Algeria 2011, pp. 32-33  
\[57\] Hafez 2000, 578, 580; Algeria 2011, pp. 32-33  
\[58\] Hafez 2000, 584-586  
\[59\] Hafez 2000, 590; Algeria 2011, pp. 33
the group because it was “spilling the blood of the nation.” Hassan Hattab went on to found the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédédication et le Combat (GSPC), which later affiliated with al-Qaida to become Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 2007. Later that year Hassan surrendered and appealed to his former GSPC colleagues to join him.[60] In terms of casualties, Figure 2.1 shows that the violence was most intense in the mid and late 90’s and stayed around or under 1,000 in the 2000s.

Figure 2.1: Battle Fatalities in Algeria Over Time

![Figure 2.1: Battle Fatalities in Algeria Over Time](image)

Figure 2.1 shows the annual fatality estimates resulting from the three main militant groups as from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, retrieved 08/08/2014. This graph uses the best estimates.

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Calls for Peacekeepers in Algeria

The international community was largely uninterested in the conflict in Algeria until 1997 when the increasing violence and publicized massacres led to calls for action. However, it was unclear exactly who should, or even could, take action. French citizens criticized its government for its inaction given its history, but government officials argued there were no real opportunities to intervene. The European Union was similarly hesitant; one diplomat explained, “The EU defers to the French, and the French are paralyzed.” US Ambassador to the UN Bill Richardson said that some UN action was possible including a UN-France joint action. Richardson speculated that the inaction could be explained by the extent of the violence and the UN’s experience in Somalia three years earlier, but the Algerian government had rejected any suggestion for mediation. Algeria also had a similarly negative experience to draw from when considering whether to welcome a foreign action, namely the French occupation and the war of Independence. When an FIS leader called for United Nations action, the government reportedly placed him under house arrest immediately, suggesting the government did not want to show any indication that international action was welcome or needed.

In September, the Algerian government criticized UN Secretary General Kofi Annan for responding to another FIS appeal, leading Annan’s spokesman to explain that Annan would not call for international assistance as long as Algiers regards UN action as interference. As the reports of massacres continued, more human-rights groups called upon the UN to get involved. In August 1997, Kofi Annan went so far as to suggest that it was no longer just an internal affair, but the government continued to reject any offer. When the U.S. suggested an international investigation, the Algerian government responded with a “categorical rejection of any idea of an international commission, no matter who proposes it and

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61 Mosely 1997
62 Donnelly 1997
63 Fisk 1997
64 U.N. secretary general steers clear of Algeria conflict 1997
65 Donnelly 1997
whatever its form or nature” and summoned U.S. Ambassador Cameron Hume to explain the comments.66

Non-UN Missions to Algeria

Eventually, Algeria allowed several international missions into the country. In January of 1998 Canada sent a special envoy and the EU dispatched a team of diplomats. This was followed by another EU mission in February and a UN fact finding mission in July. Each mission carefully crafted their stated purpose in order to gain the consent of the Algerian government. Even then, the Algerian government limited both the movement and access of the missions.

International pressure spiked with reports of 1,000 people massacred in the first weeks of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, which started December 30.67 The Canadians sent special envoy and former ambassador Claude Laverdure on a brief fact-finding mission. Mr. Laverdure was to meet with Algerian officials and offer to provide humanitarian aid. The Canadian government made it clear that Mr. Laverdure was not part of any U.S. or European action and described the visit as a “gesture” 67 During the two day mission Mr. Laverdure expressed Canada’s concerns and explained that Algeria had an image problem.68

The EU mission of three diplomats was also crafted carefully. Germany wanted the mission to inquire into the nature of the violence, but Britain feared the Algerian government would halt the mission if it felt it was being examined. The mission’s stated purpose moved away from inquiry and instead focused on expressing the EU’s concerns over the massacres and discussing ways to end the violence, even as the German foreign minister continued to label it a fact-finding mission.69 After initial talks the Algerian government rejected the mission but eventually relented. In Algeria’s own word, the EU mission would be limited to

66 Reuters 1998; Black 1998
67 McCabe 1998
68 Herbert 1998
69 Cranshaw 1998
continuing a political dialogue. They declared that exceeding that mandate by discussing responsibility for the massacres would be rejected as international interference.

After 24 hours in Algeria, the delegates worked to put the EU mission in a positive light. Britain’s junior minister declared, “We have made progress.” Any progress made was accompanied by a litany of disappointments. The EU mission had not been allowed to meet any Algerian civilian affected by the killings as they had wished. The delegates failed to convince the government to invite UN officials into the country. The Algerian government also did not respond to the EU’s offer of humanitarian aid, but it did accuse Britain of containing terrorists. Algeria’s foreign minister was pleased with the visit, calling it “a very useful talk.”

A second EU mission in February faced similar difficulties. The mission lasted five days but was again restricted to meeting with government officials, who again told the EU to police its own territory where allegedly Algerian opposition groups freely operated. When the delegation left, the government newspaper ran the headline “Bon voyage - and good riddance.”

The January spike in violence also led to discussion of a UN fact-finding mission later in the year; UN Human Rights Commissioner Mary Robinson hoped a visit could happen before March. Algeria continued to reject such a visit until July when it finally agreed to a fact-finding panel of experts without any conditions, reportedly after being urged by the Group of Eight.

Compared to the earlier operations, news during this UN mission were much more encouraging to the international community. The UN team were reportedly allowed to visit a massacre site and to talk to inmates at a high-security prison. Upon leaving Algeria two weeks later, the UN mission released a statement that it had met with the people it
had wished to talk to and had acted independently.\textsuperscript{76} In the final report, however, the UN mission declared that Algerian authorities had limited its ability to travel and meet with citizens. While the government had reportedly detained 20,000 people for terrorism, the UN mission largely had visited economic prisoners and only talked with one accused terrorist. In the report the panel lamented that it did not have the means nor the mission to investigate. Amnesty International compared the mission to the earlier EU missions and concluded that it was a whitewash.\textsuperscript{77}

While the violence continued for some time, it did not again reach the levels that incited international concern in the beginning of 1998. In the early 2000s, the GIA lost a series of leaders in quick succession\textsuperscript{78} AQIM took responsibility for a suicide bombing in 2007 but pressure from Algeria’s security forces minimized AQIM’s ability to operate.\textsuperscript{79} The GIA had a few more sporadic attacks in the next two years, but 2003 was the end of the group as a relevant force.

**Algeria’s Ability to Refuse**

The case of Algeria offers an example of a country that resisted calls from the international community to allow a peacekeeping operation or some other level of international intervention. It is true that Algeria did allow multiple international missions, but they were limited to small groups and even then, Algeria severely constrained their ability to operate. It is quite possible that the international pressure in this case was cheap talk, but the EU, UN, and Canada all took pains to gain access to Algeria.

\textsuperscript{76} \textit{Algeria: Armed Islamic Group was created in Peshawar, defector says} \textbf{1998}
\textsuperscript{77} Amnesty International \textbf{1998}
\textsuperscript{78} Security forces reportedly killed Antar Zouabi in February 2002 (Phillips \textbf{2002}); Rachid Abou Tourab may have been killed in 2002 or 2004 or arrested in 2003 (\textit{Europa World Year Book} \textbf{2004}; Naylor \textbf{2006}; Belkadi \textbf{2005}); Noureddine “the RPG” Boudiafi was arrested in November 2004 (\textit{Algeria politics: Islamist armed groups in retreat} \textbf{2005}); Younes Chaabane died in a security sweep by early 2005; Boulenouar Oukil was captured in April 2005. (\textit{Algeria politics: Islamist armed groups in retreat} \textbf{2005}; Anonymous \textbf{2005})
\textsuperscript{79} Senate Foreign Relations Committee \textbf{2009}
Many would not have expected a UN peacekeeping operation in Algeria in the first place. As discussed previously, peacekeeping operations are most common when weaker governments face stronger rebel groups, which was not true in Algeria. Scholars have also found that former colonies are much less likely to host a peacekeeping operation.\footnote{Fortna 2008, pp. 43.} One possible explanation is that the former colonizer, often a member of the P5, will hesitate to act for fear of appearing to have renewed colonial ambitions. In the case of Algeria, France clearly had no interest in getting involved in the crisis. France’s desire to maintain good relations with Algeria may have hindered Europe’s efforts to take action, but in the end, France did support the EU mission to Algeria.\footnote{Reuters 1998; Cranshaw 1998} Another other explanation could be that former colonies are especially sensitive to any foreign intervention, but this assumes that the former colony to have the ability to prevent any such intervention.

When asked to explain the crisis, a former diplomat involved in one of the missions confirmed that Algeria’s bloody struggle for sovereignty weighed heavily on national attitudes towards international involvement. He explained that the missions that did occur were the result of a slight overlap between Algeria’s desires and those of the international community. The Algerian government felt that the international community was unfair in alleging that the government was involved in the massacres. The government’s decision to allow the visits then was to lend credibility to the government’s statements that insurgents were responsible for the massacres. Thus, Algeria only needed to show the foreign visitors what was necessary to support the government’s claims, and in that the government was successful. After visiting a massacre site for which the international media indicted the national army, the diplomat was left with no doubt that the GIA was to blame and reported it as such to his government. As for the international community, the missions were the result of an internal debate regarding how far the Algerians could be pushed before they would refuse any international action.\footnote{Email exchange, Algerian mission diplomat, 2012.} In this example, the international community shaped their missions around the need for Algeria’s consent.
2.4 Conclusion

Scholars and UN officials have discussed frequently the role of consent in the deployment of UN peacekeeping operations, they display a wide range of beliefs regarding when consent matters and how much it matters. In this chapter, I have shown that empirically the consent of a host government is a necessary condition for a UN peacekeeping operation. Since the Cold War, no UN peacekeeping operation has deployed to a country without the consent of the host government. This is true for all missions, no matter whether they are classified as peacekeeping or peace enforcement or whether they are created under the auspices of Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the UN charter.

It is possible that in some cases, or even many, foreign actors may coerce the host government to consent by imposing costs and offering incentives. However, the empirical record suggests that this is not the case; quantitative studies show that great power interests do not explain UNPKO deployment. The case of Algeria serves as an illustrative example of a case where a country resisted international pressure for intervention and dictated the terms for a few limited missions. Still, this issue is ripe for further research with more sophisticated quantitative measures and more intensive qualitative case work.

The importance of host government consent suggests the presence of a selection effect. Host governments should only consent to a UNPKO when it is beneficial to the host government, at least when compared to the alternative of not consenting. In the next chapter, I test for this effect by examining the relationship between UNPKO deployment and host government tenure.
Chapter 3

Cross-National Analysis

My thesis is that UNPKOs shift power outcomes in favor of the incumbent government relative to rebel groups. To test this statistically requires a measure of power, something that remains a challenge in the field of international relations. As a simple measure of a

\[1\] Baldwin (2013) reviews power in international relations and finds a lack of consensus on the role of power in international relations. He starts by quoting Morgenthau (1948), “the concept of political power poses one of the most difficult and controversial problems of political science.” Early examinations of power in politics and international relations looked to the resources or elements of power, such as the size of an army Gulick (1955) pp. 39-54). This approach to power is seen in the Correlates of War (COW) project, which creates an index of state material capabilities that considers a state’s military, population, industrial production, and energy consumption (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). The creators of the COW’s Composite Index of National Capability are clear that the index is only a proxy for material capability and that material capability is only one of many possible sources of state power (Singer 1988 p. 275). Indeed, according to Dahl (1984 pp. 39-54), defining power in terms of resources alone is a fallacy. It relies on the assumption that resources map directly onto power. Dahl draws a connection between an individual’s resources and power, but that relationship varies with the situational context, the proportion of resource an individual devotes to seeking power, and the skill with which he or she uses those resources. A resource rich country may have great potential power, but its actual relational power depends on how those resources are used.

An alternative to the resources of power approach is to view power as relational (Dahl 1957 pp. 39-54). This approach draws upon the Weberian definition of power as the probability that one actor in a relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests (Weber 1947). That is, Actor 1’s power is realized in Actor 1’s ability to get Actor 2 to do something that Actor 2 would not do. For power to be used as a causal concept where Actor 1 causes Actor 2’s behavior, that power must be attached to a specific scope, the area of Actor 2’s behavior that Actor 1 can affect, and domain, or who exactly Actor 2 is (Baldwin 2013). Actor 1’s power can also vary in its weight (probability of affecting Actor 2’s behavior), cost (both to A for influencing B and to B for complying), and means (economic, military, diplomatic, etc). Nye (1990) discusses the range of forms that power can take from command and coercion to agenda-setting and attraction. Other soft powers include shaping other actors’ beliefs and preferences. Understanding power as relational is conceptually useful, but it does not answer the question of measuring power. In a 1989 conference paper, “The Location and Measurement of Power: A Critical Analysis,” Frey charges that scholars faced with the challenge of measuring power often resort to redefining what power means (Baldwin 2013, Dahl 1984 pp. 51-53) suggests several methods to measure someone’s power: observe her position in a hierarchy, ask expert judges, and close analysis of

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government’s power, I look at government tenure and how tenure lengths are related to the presence of UNPKOs. The cross-sectional analysis finds that governments that receive a UNPKO have longer tenures than those who do not.

### 3.1 Tenure as a Measure of Power

For this study, I operationalize a government’s power by using the duration of a leader’s tenure, which represents the ability of the government’s leader to achieve her goal of staying in power. This measure follows from a common assumption about government preferences in studies of government behavior. Bates put it simply, “Governments want to stay in power.”

Bueno de Mesquita and Smith are also succinct, “Survival is the primary objective of political leaders.” People certainly can have many objectives in life besides political survival. Children across the United States learn the legend of George Washington refused to be crowned king after the American Revolution (or at least refused to run for a third presidential term). While such examples do exist, they are typically the exception that proves the rule. Overall, it makes sense that those who care about political survival are also the people most likely to end up in higher office.

Recently economists and political scientists have focused on a government’s ability to improve the welfare of its citizens as a measure of government success, assuming at least implicitly that governments focus on public well-being. In some cases, scholars have used approval ratings as a regular measure of a government’s success. These measures typically are applied to developed democracies where public approval and social welfare may influence voting behavior and ultimately decide a leader’s tenure.

In other nations with no voting or unreliable electoral practices, this type of measure if ineffective. Leaders of these nations may not face the threat of being voted out, but they decision making. Each method has its own limitations, which can be addressed by using multiple methods. However, none of these measurement methods are especially conducive for a quantitative analysis.

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2 Bates 1984
3 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010
4 Bueno de Mesquita 2003
are more likely to face a revolutionary challenge in the form of a coup or rebellion. While all governments are concerned of losing power due to foreign actions such as an invasion, this threat is greatest among developing nations, especially since the end of WWII.

Tenure captures the three main challenges to government survival: elections, domestic revolution, and foreign action. For tenure to be appropriate, we must assume that a government can transform power into tenure. This raises the question of what government survival depends on exactly. Under selectorate theory each leader must build a winning coalition, defined as a group that control enough political instruments to keep a leader in power, whether those instruments are votes, wealth, guns, alliances, or some other form. An elected leader’s winning coalition could be the half of the population that votes for him, whereas an autocratic dictator’s coalition may be a few key national figures. A leader collects resources through taxation and other sources and distributes them as some amalgamation of public and private goods to gain the support of a winning coalition. It follows that tenure results from a leader having sufficient resources and distributing them in a way that builds a winning coalition. The amount of resources needed, the distribution methods, and the compositions of these coalition vary across countries, leaders, and even over time during a single leader’s tenure, but the result of success remains the same - longer tenure.\footnote{Bueno de Mesquita 2003}

Studies of tenure typically focus on the leader as the unit of analysis. This focus on leaders avoids the complicated question of what exactly constitutes a change in government by examining solely whether the leader change. In some instances, it is challenging to determine whether the president, prime minister, or some other official should be designated the ‘leader’.

However, relying upon a leader as a proxy can be analytically problematic. For example, a leader is an inappropriate proxy when a strong government remains in power through a change in leadership, or if a strong leader remains in power as her government fails. The former would over count government failures, and the latter would undercount failures. In practice, neither are uncommon. Governments frequently remain through leadership change,
especially in established democracies where leaders face term limits. Leaders of all government types face threats completely unrelated to government power, namely, death. A change in leadership due to natural death from old age and illness is certainly unrelated to government power; man-made leadership change from assassination is also arguably unrelated to government power. While a stronger government may develop a stronger protection structure for its leader, cases like that of US President John F Kennedy show that even leaders of strong governments are vulnerable. The death of a leader, natural or not, can still give rise to a change in government as opposition factions may seize this as an opportunity to take power. However, in many cases leadership simply transfers to the next in line such as a Vice President or Prince. Clearly such a leadership change is not indicative of a weak government.

There are also examples of strong leaders surviving drastic changes to their country’s government. A dictator may oversee a sincere transition to democracy and win the first election. Similarly, an elected leader may toss out the constitution and become the dictator of a new system. In these cases, however, the leader is arguably the appropriate unit of analysis. Using leadership changes to mark the end of tenure biases the results of a study if the probability of leadership changes for reasons unrelated to government power differs between leaders that receive UNPKOs and leaders that do not. One could imagine that a leader supported by a great power is more likely to receive both better medical treatment and peacekeeping operations, and UNPKOs may provide a greater benefit to democratic countries wherein leaders also face term limits.

3.1.1 Past Analysis of Tenure

Existing work on the tenure of state leaders has largely focused on international war and how its effect varies based on regime type and conflict outcome. For example leaders of autocracies are likely removed in losses or draws and gain no benefit from winning international conflict.\footnote{Chiozza and Goemans 2004}

In additional research, autocratic leaders with war victories may experience some gains to
tenure. Democracies however are largely unaffected by conflicts and their outcomes. The effects of conflict have been found to vary based on whether a leader is culpable for the war in that they were in office when the conflict began or were directly connected to the decision to start the conflict; culpable leaders are more likely to face domestic punishment.

No one has studied the effects of civil war on tenure directly. The studies on the effects of international war often include incidence of civil war as a control measure while testing other variables. These studies generally find that civil war increases the risk of losing office. Sometimes civil war seems to have no effect. However, as civil war was only included as a control variable and was not the focus of these studies, we do not know if the effect of civil war varies with outcome and regime type as it does for international conflicts.

3.1.2 Endogeneity Bias

As with any observational study, endogeneity bias is an issue with this research. If I do find that governments that host UNPKOs have longer tenures than governments that do not, is it due to the fact that UNPKOs help regimes stay in power, or is it because strong, durable regimes are more likely to receive UNPKOs than weaker governments? Researchers have not yet found a satisfying natural experiment to answer this question and thus far attempts of matching have not been particularly convincing.

Based on previous research on UNPKOs, the endogeneity bias works against my theory. A weak government is more likely to receive a UNPKO than a strong government. This argument is most convincingly made by Fortna (2008). Figure 3.1 clearly shows the relationship: at the extreme strength distributions government and rebel victories do not get

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7Debs and Goemans 2010
8Croco 2011 Leader tenure itself can have important influences on international politics. Recent work suggests that leaders make a difference in economic growth, at least in autocracies (Jones and Olken 2005). Jones and Olken (2009) look at the exogenous treatment of whether an assassination attempt is successful and find that autocrat assassinations produce a sustained move towards democracy through a substantial, and perhaps prolonged, effect on institutions. Leadership change seems to have mixed effects on conflicts, hastening the end of intense conflicts but exacerbating more moderate conflicts. See also Quiroz Flores (2012).

9Debs and Goemans 2010 Licht 2010
10Chiozza and Goemans (2004) find that civil war increases risk.
11On the issues with matching see section 4.2
UNPKOs, but in the middle the weaker the government is the more likely it will receive a UNPKO.

If Fortna is correct, then one would expect to find a negative relationship between UNPKOs and government tenure, as the presence of a UNPKO would serve as a signal for government weakness, assuming that weaker governments have shorter tenures. For a brief formalization of this point, see Appendix A.4.
3.2 Descriptive Analysis

3.2.1 Data Sources

To examine the relationship between UNPKOs and leader tenure, I compile a dataset of leader-months from 1946 to 2013 to allow for comparisons between the post-Cold War period and the post WWII period. Studies of leader tenure usually use years, but using months allows for more precise assessments of tenure length. In addition, using months while merging different datasets helps with temporal accuracy by making sure that temporal events such as conflict and interventions which are applicable to only a part of a year are assigned to leaders in power at that time.

Leader Tenure

Leadership data comes from the Archigos dataset and the extension by Mike Ward.\(^\text{12}\) Archigos’ coverage begins in the 1840’s and goes through 2004. Ward’s extension carries through 2013. Using the start and end dates for each leader, I expand the dataset into a leader-month panel.

Conflict

For data on conflict, I use the datasets of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). First, the UCDP/PRIIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2014 covers conflicts from 1946 to 2013.\(^\text{13}\) This dataset contains all armed conflicts over government or territory where at least one actor is a state government and where the conflict has resulted in at least 25 battle-related deaths. Initially, each data point is a conflict-year with a list of actors on side A and side B. To match these conflicts with state leaders, I created a unique entry for each state actor listed

\(^\text{12}\) Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009. Thanks to Henk Goemans for informing me of Mike Ward’s extension.

\(^\text{13}\) Thennér and Wallensteen 2014. Original data by Gleditsch et al. 2002. Codebook by Thennér N.d. While working with the data I found that the conflict between India and the ULFA is recorded as ending September 3rd, 2011, but was missing the year 2011. I added the missing entry.
on either side along with all the characteristics of that conflict-year. I then expanded the
annual data into months for each month while the conflict was active.

The other two UCDP datasets add further information about the conflicts. The UCDP
Conflict Termination dataset v.2010-1 includes further details about the outcome of all con-
flicts that ended from 1946 to 2009.\textsuperscript{14} Specifically, it records if a conflict ended with victory
for one side, with a peace-agreement or ceasefire, or with some other outcome. The UCDP
Battle-Related Deaths Dataset v.5-2014 has annual battle death estimates for conflicts be-
tween 1989 and 2013.\textsuperscript{15} Because I use months, the annual battle death estimates were
divided by the number of months of active conflict for each year. This assumes a constant
rate of battle deaths over a year, which we know is not true. Operational and strategic
changes happen throughout the year with varying results. For example, the recent conflicts
in Iraq and Afghanistan showed regular seasonal variation in battle deaths. Thus, the effect
of battle-deaths should be interpreted as representing a more intense year of fighting. After
merging these three datasets by UCDP’s conflictID numbers, I collapsed the data to obtain
monthly counts of the number of conflicts active in each state along with several important
characteristics like the total number of battle deaths.

Peace Keeping Operations

I use the UN’s official list of PKOs and their dates of operation.\textsuperscript{16} If a UN mission responded
to multiple countries, I named all countries that saw UN troops as host countries. I do not
incorporate UNPKOs that are focused on international conflicts. In such conflicts UNPKOs
are often limited to monitoring borders and should not necessarily strengthen a government
in relation to rebel groups. In addition, both sides to such conflicts are state governments,
which changes the consent dynamic.\textsuperscript{17} I identify these international UNPKOs through the

\textsuperscript{14}Kreutz 2010
\textsuperscript{15}Sundberg 2008
\textsuperscript{17}In practice, even UNPKOs to international conflicts may have interesting consent dynamics. UNIFIL,
the UNPKO created in 1978 to monitor Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon, did not have Israel’s consent.
Indeed, Israel refused to withdraw completely until 2000, and then refused to let UNIFIL monitor Israel’s
side of the border. See Appendix A.2
UNPKOs mandate and background and by the UNDP/PRIO coding of the relevant conflict. I also disregard UNPKOs responding to conflict coded as extrasystemic and interstate, limiting this analysis to UNPKOs responding to internal or internationalized conflicts. In most cases the UNDP/PRIO coding, operational mandate, and background fit clearly into a category.

### 3.2.2 Leader Tenure Overview

Between 1946 to 2013, the world experienced 2,042 leader-periods. The average tenure length was 58.7 months, which is just under 5 years. The median tenure length was 33.0 months or nearly 3 years. A histogram of the tenure length data, shown in Figure 3.2, shows the obvious left skew.

![Figure 3.2: Leader Tenure Lengths](image)

Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of leader tenure lengths for all leaders in power between 1946 and 2013. Figure A.2 replicates this figure using log values of tenure lengths.

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\(^{18}\)A leader may have two leader periods if she held power for two non-contiguous periods.
Figure 3.2 also indicates clear spikes, first at 1 and 2 months, and then at the end of years 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, and 12 due to term limits in democracies. To see how tenure length varies with civil war and UNPKOs, I create four categories of leaders:

- Leaders that experienced a civil war and a UNPKO
- Leaders that experienced a civil war only
- Leaders that did not experience civil war but led a country that experienced a civil war during the time period
- Leaders of countries that never experienced a civil war

The first two categories are straightforward for the research question - how do UNPKOs affect the power outcomes of civil war leaders as measured by tenure length? I created the third category, leaders that never experienced civil war themselves but ruled countries that experienced a civil war at some point since WWII, as a comparison category to leaders that did experience civil war. If we assume that there is a basic difference between countries that experience civil war and countries that do not, this third category is a more appropriate comparison to civil war leaders than grouping together all leaders that never experienced a civil war. The Civil War & PKO leaders are listed in A.2.

I consider leaders across three temporal subgroups. First, I consider all leaders after 1945 or the end of WWII; this is when the United Nations came into being and a UN peacekeeping operation became conceivable. However, while UNPKOs have been possible since 1945, as shown in Figure 1.2, they did not become a common feature until after the Cold War. While 15 UNPKOs deployed in the UN’s first 33 years until 1988, 34 deployed in the 10 years following. Consequently, as a second subgroup I consider the full tenure of any leader who was in power in or after 1989. The third subgroup considers the same leaders, but only counts their time in office after 1989. For example, President Mobutu of Zaire held office from 1965 to 1997, having a tenure of 32 years for the second subgrouping and a tenure of

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19 See Appendix A.6
8 years, 1989 to 1997, for the third grouping. Group two accounts for time in office before the end of the Cold War, while group three focuses only on the time period when UNPKOs became prevalent.

Figure 3.3 shows the median tenure lengths with confidence intervals of the four leader categories across the three subgroups. Looking across the subgroups, we see that the two left categories, leaders who never experienced a civil war, tend to have shorter tenures than the right two categories, leaders who did experience a civil war. Among the civil war leaders those who received a PKO tend to stay in power longer, especially when focusing in on the post-Cold War years.

The increasing difference between war leaders without a UNPKO and war leaders with a UNPKO when moving from post-Cold War Years and to post-Cold War Leaders indicates that civil war leaders without UNPKOs had more time in office before the end of the Cold War. Of those leaders that experienced civil war and who were in power at the end of the Cold War, those in office the longest before 1989 were less likely to get a UNPKO.

To show the differing tenures another way, I plot the Kaplan-Meier survival curves for the four different types. The survival function captures the probability that an event will not happen by a certain time. In this case, the event is either removal from office or the end of the dataset, while the time until those events is the leader’s tenure. Those leaders still in office at the end of the time period covered in the data are considered right-censored. The Kaplan-Meier estimator estimates survival functions from a dataset of final outcomes and time until outcome. Figure 3.4 shows the survival curves of the different types. Early in their tenures, No War leaders have the highest survival rate, but a few years in War & PKO Leaders have the highest survival rate of all the types.
Figure 3.3 contains three plots showing the average tenure in months for four categories of leaders along with the 95% confidence interval and the number of leaders that fit that category. The categories are (1) leaders of countries that never experienced civil war since WWII; (2) leaders of countries that have experienced civil war since WWII, but not during their tenure; (3) leaders that experienced civil war but never hosted a UNPKO; and (4) leaders that experienced civil war and hosted a UNPKO. The first plot shows all leaders that have been in power since the end of WWII; the second plot shows all leaders since the end of the Cold War; the third is the same leaders as the second but does not include their time in power before the end of the Cold War. Figure A.3 replicates this figure using log values of tenure lengths.
Figure 3.4: Survival Curves of Post-Cold War Leaders

Figure 3.4 shows the Kaplan-Meier survival curve for post-Cold War leaders based on four leader types: (1) leaders of countries that never experienced civil war since WWII; (2) leaders of countries that have experienced civil war since WWII but not during their tenure; (3) leaders that experienced civil war but never hosted a UNPKO; and (4) leaders that experienced civil war and hosted a UNPKO. Figure A.4 replicates this figure using log values of tenure lengths.

3.2.3 Survival Model

For the cross-sectional analysis, I focus on those leaders that take power after the Cold War and experience a civil war at some point. I start by modeling tenure as a function of conflict and UNPKO. I next consider a model that accounts for conflict outcomes, then a model that includes state characteristics and finally a model with both. The conflict outcomes result from the UCDP Conflict Termination dataset v.2010-1. I group UCDP’s outcome categories into three groups: government victory, low activity, and other are coded as Government.

\[ \text{20I examine three additional subsets: all leaders since the end of World War II, all leaders after World War II that experienced a civil war, and all leaders that take power after the Cold War. The results are similar except for the fact that including non-war leaders diminishes the significance of the UNPKO coefficient.} \]
Victory; peace agreements and ceasefire agreements are grouped as Settlements; rebel victory is coded as Government Loss. Outcomes are only coded for conflicts that reach 1,000 cumulative battle deaths.

For covariates I include the base variables from Chiozza and Goemans (2004); Population, Energy Consumption per capita, and GDP per capita are from the World Bank. To get a single value for each of these variables for each leader, I take the natural log of the median value from each leader’s years in power. I also take the median values of Polity and Polity Squared, the standard measure of autocracy and democracy along with the values squared in order to allow a non-linear relationship between polity and tenure. Based on the observations from the overview, I also include a dummy for leaders of countries that have a conflict at some point. Table 3.1 shows the descriptive statistics for these variables.

Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>St. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil UNPKO</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Conflict</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov Victory</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov Loss</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Conflict Country</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log(median GDP)</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>7.13</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>4.84</td>
<td>10.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log(median Energy)</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>4.74</td>
<td>8.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log(median Pop.)</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>17.28</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>14.80</td>
<td>20.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>median Polity</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td>5.30</td>
<td>-7.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(median Polity)$^2$</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>38.50</td>
<td>29.29</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I use a Cox Proportional Hazard regression to model the hazard of leader $i$ at time $t$ as

$$\lambda(t|X_i) = \lambda_0(t) * \exp(X_i\beta)$$

where $\lambda_0(t)$ is an unspecified baseline function, $X_i$ is a set of explanatory variables and $\beta$ are the coefficients. In this case, the explanatory variables include whether a leader experienced

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21 Energy use is in kg of oil equivalent. GDP per capita is in constant 2000 US dollars.
conflict, received a UNPKO, and experienced a certain conflict outcome along with other state characteristics. Regression results are shown in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2: Time Invariant Cox Model: Post-Cold War Conflict Leaders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent variable:</strong></td>
<td>Leader Tenure</td>
<td>Leader Tenure</td>
<td>Leader Tenure</td>
<td>Leader Tenure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil UNPKO</td>
<td>−0.88***</td>
<td>−0.80***</td>
<td>−1.14***</td>
<td>−1.18***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td>(0.40)</td>
<td>(0.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement</td>
<td>−0.64**</td>
<td>−1.05***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov Victory</td>
<td>−0.83***</td>
<td>−0.93***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov Loss</td>
<td>−0.20</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.73)</td>
<td>(0.81)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log(median GDP)</td>
<td>−0.45***</td>
<td>−0.72***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log(median Energy)</td>
<td>0.46**</td>
<td>0.61***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log(median Pop.)</td>
<td>−0.16*</td>
<td>−0.24**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>median Polity</td>
<td>0.05*</td>
<td>0.07**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(median Polity)^2</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R^2</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>−502.11</td>
<td>−491.19</td>
<td>−393.94</td>
<td>−379.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The variable of interest, UNPKO presence, has a negative coefficient, suggesting that UNPKOs increase tenure. The estimated coefficient indicates that among leaders experiencing a civil war, those with UNPKOs are only about 30% as likely to lose power as their non-UNPKO colleagues. To show this another way, I run simulations of hypothetical leaders by using parameter estimates drawn from a normal distribution of values based on the
Model (4) from Table 3.2 and then by finding the relative hazard of having a UNPKO vs. not having one. Figure 3.5 shows the results of 10,000 simulations.

Figure 3.5: Simulated Relative Hazard by UNPKO Presence

The simulation and the resulting graph use the R package simPH (Gandrud 2015). Figure is based on 10,000 simulations.

Conflict outcomes and country characteristics show varying results across the different models. Gov Victory and Settlement are the only consistent variables, both associated with longer tenures. Counter-intuitively, Gov Loss also seems somewhat associated with longer tenures. This observation highlights a problem with the cross-sectional analysis in that the models are blind to where in a leader’s tenure an event took place. It could be that governments that lose a conflict somehow learn from their mistake and are able to hold power longer, but it seems more likely that leaders that hold onto power for long periods of time will only leave office by force. By this narrative, Gov Loss would have a negative

\footnote{This follows the recommendation of King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000).}
coefficient, but losing a conflict would also be that leader’s downfall, in most cases ending his rule.

The results hold when if I repeat the analysis for all leaders that were in power in or after 1989, even if they came to power before the end of the cold war. Model (4) does see a slight drop in significance from the .01 level to the .05 level, as shown in Table 3.3. When I include country fixed effects, there is a greater drop in significance across models as shown in Table 3.4. This is unsurprising as the N of 147 in model (1) includes 43 countries, 10 of which only have one leader in the dataset. The results also hold when I exclude leaders of P5 countries who are credited as being involved in intrastate wars: Bush and Obama from the US, Blair, Major, and Thatcher from the UK, and Medvedev, Putin, and Yeltsin from Russia.

3.3 Conclusion

In this chapter I analyzed the relationship between UNPKO presence and government power as measured by leader tenure. In a simple comparison and with a cross-sectional Cox proportional hazard regression, I find that among leaders experiencing a civil war, those that received a UNPKO had longer tenures. In the next chapters, I turn to case studies as another test of the theory that UNPKOs benefit host governments as host governments select into beneficial UNPKOs.
Table 3.3: TI Cox Model Including Pre-CW Entry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Leader Tenure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil UNPKO</td>
<td>$-0.62^{***}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement</td>
<td>$-0.49^{**}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov Victory</td>
<td>$-1.06^{***}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov Loss</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log(median GDP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log(median Energy)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log(median Pop.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>median Polity</td>
<td>0.11***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(median Polity)$^2$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R$^2$</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: $^{*}$p$<$0.1; $^{**}$p$<$0.05; $^{***}$p$<$0.01
Table 3.4: TI Cox Model with Country Fixed Effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Leader Tenure</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil UNPKO</td>
<td>−1.53**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement</td>
<td>−1.30***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov Victory</td>
<td>−1.63***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov Loss</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log(median GDP)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log(median Energy)</td>
<td>4.33***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.50)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Log(median Pop.)</td>
<td>−12.47***</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(2.24)</td>
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<tr>
<td>median Polity</td>
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<tr>
<td>(median Polity)^2</td>
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<td>R^2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>−471.42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Chapter 4

Case Study Overview

The previous chapters have established two relationships. First, UNPKOs do not deploy to conflicts where they do not have the consent of the governments. Second, leaders of conflict governments that receive UNPKOs stay in power for longer than those who do not. These observations support my narrative that UNPKOs are used by host governments as a means of holding on to power. The first relationship shows that governments can select only those UNPKOs that will benefit them, and the second relationship indicates that UNPKOs could confer real benefits to a government.

However, these two relationships tell us nothing about the motives of the parties involved. They also tell us nothing about how exactly a government benefits from the presence of a UNPKO. To look more closely at these two issues, I turn to case study analyses of four civil wars: the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1996, the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1997, Angola, and Cambodia. For each case I draw from historic narratives, archive documents, and interviews to examine the motivations and actions of the host government, rebel groups, and UN and to determine how these factors relate to the outcomes of each case. In this chapter I discuss the research questions for the cases and the case selection.
4.1 Case Study Research Questions

In each case I focus on two components of my theory. First, I propose that a government’s consent for a UNPKO is motivated by a desire for power, not for peace. In each case I examine what motivates each government to request a UNPKO. Do governments seek a UNPKO as a means to peace or as a tool for power? Second, if governments use UNPKOs to stay in power, then there must exist mechanisms through which a UNPKO affects power outcomes. For each case I ask if such mechanisms exist and what exactly they are. Here I discuss possible answers drawing upon examples from other peacekeeping cases.

4.1.1 Government Motives

The two likely motives for a government to consent to a peacekeeping operation are to achieve peace or to gain power. These motivations are not mutually exclusive, and in fact may directly affect each other. A government may consent to a UNPKO to achieve peace in order to stay in power. The academic literature’s focus on whether UNPKOs create peace has emphasized peace-seeking as the default motivation or null hypothesis based on the stated purpose of UNPKOs.

In one of the few pieces to explicitly examine the demand for UNPKOs, Fortna and Martin (2009) offer an example of how peace itself serves as the motivation. They model a government’s offer to include peacekeepers as a signal of peaceful intentions to the rebel group. In this model, if the rebel accepts the peace agreement the government receives a positive payoff which they define as a function of the costs of war. Thus, peace itself has a value by removing the cost of war. This formulation of the benefits of peace follows from a maxim in the conflict literature: war is costly. As a result, peace itself becomes beneficial through avoiding the costs associated with war.

To determine a government’s motivation for a UNPKO, I look at the government’s peace-seeking behavior prior to consenting to a UNPKO. If a government has already sought a negotiated peace with a rebel group with reasonable settlement offers but failed due to
the barriers of uncertainty and credible commitment, then consent for a UNPKO is likely motivated by a desire for peace. However, if a government has not attempted a reasonable negotiated settlement, then peace is less likely to be the main motivation.

When they are available, a government’s internal discussions offer another measure of motivations. A government motivated by peace will discuss a possible UNPKO in terms of whether it can help secure peace that otherwise may be elusive. A government motivated by power will discuss a possible UNPKO in terms of whether it could lead to a better outcome than a negotiated settlement would. Public statements by government officials are another source of information regarding motives, but they are less likely to serve as an honest representation of a government’s motives, particularly when its primary motivation is to retain power. Admitting that it wanted a UNPKO in order to stay in power would inevitably discourage international support for the UNPKO.

I also look at the perceptions from other relevant parties, specifically international allies and UN officials. These sources are also likely biased depending on the narrative that is most flattering for them, which will vary with the outcome. For example, if a UNPKO did not lead result in sustained peace, officials involved with that operation may blame the host government as an unwilling partner to peace regardless of the government’s true motives.

4.1.2 Power Mechanisms of UNPKOs

If governments use UNPKOs for power, it follows that there should be identifiable mechanisms through which UNPKOs affect the power distribution between rebels and governments in the government’s favor. A lack of such mechanisms that affect power, the presence of mechanisms that equally support both sides evenly, or even the presence of mechanisms that favor the rebel group presents a challenge for my thesis. It is possible that host governments consent to UNPKOs expecting they will help them stay in power but end up miscalculating their effect.

Besides testing my theory, this line of inquiry seeks to develop a more systematic understanding of how peacekeeping missions work. In this way, it follows the example of Fortna.
and her examination of the mechanisms through which peacekeeping missions keep peace. I develop a list of potential mechanisms for how a UNPKO may aid a government’s attempt to stay in power based on Fortna’s mechanisms, on mechanisms observed on other UNPKOs, and on the larger literature.

### Changing Military Expectations

The first-order mechanisms for host government survival involve diminishing the government’s risk of military defeat. In cases where the government has the military advantage or is at a stalemate, the rebel group may already be willing to enter into a peace process legitimized and supported by the UN. For weak governments, however, a UNPKO may first have to change the military situation in the government’s favor to mitigate the government’s risk of defeat.

A UNPKO can change the payoffs for military action by engaging directly with armed groups, or by threatening to do so as a form of deterrence. A Canadian peacekeeping officer on the observer mission in Dominican Republic in the 1960s wrote, “It must be remembered that the peace-forces were trying to make contestants realize that to attack their normal opponent, they must attack a third party who was superior in manpower, fire-power, and equipment.”\(^1\) Even a weak peacekeeping force may act as a tripwire for a more robust force or a non-UN intervention. In Sierra Leone, for example, the deterioration of the UNPKO contributed to British paratroopers deploying in Operation Palliser in May 2000, rebelling the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) from around the capital. A month later UN forces defeated RUF forces while breaking the siege of Kailahun and freeing the trapped UN infantry companies.

A UNPKO can diminish a rebel group’s stock of weapons and soldiers by providing economic resources and legitimacy to a disarmament and demobilization plan. The peace process also brings rebel fighters out into the open where they are vulnerable if conflict

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were to resume. For example, in El Salvador the FMLN were forced to produce a list of ex-combatants eligible for the land titling program, providing the government with valuable intelligence to use if the conflict resumed.\(^2\) When the FMLN suspended demobilization, US officials saw the FMLN delays as natural, understanding that the FMLN wanted to be sure it had gotten all the concessions it could before going through final demobilization.\(^3\)

Government militaries may also be the target of demobilization efforts, though rarely to the same extent as rebel groups. At the end of a peace process, the expectation is that the central government will have a standing army of some form. A peace agreement will often require a new military to be created by combining the existing government forces and rebel armies to prevent any side from having a significant advantage. Even when these integrated forces are created, governments can still find ways to keep a favorable balance of power. In Peru the rebels accused the government of demobilizing its troops straight into the police-force, thus creating a governmental paramilitary force.\(^4\)

**Material Gains**

In her research on how UNPKOs make peace, Fortna (2008) finds that in some cases UNPKOs can use aid and other material incentives as an incentive to discourage violence. She finds that its efficacy depends upon the economic situation of the factions. Could a government use these material incentives to preserve power?

Leaders have certainly considered material gains in their decision to give consent. In the case of Somalia, leader support for foreign military action apparently stemmed from humanitarian components.\(^5\) For example, one humanitarian component is basic infrastructure. In discussing the international military action into Somalia, National Security Advisor


Brent Scowcroft said that humanitarian rehabilitation work including repairing roads and generating electricity would naturally happen as part of any intervention.\textsuperscript{6}

Whether UNPKO related infrastructure projects could help a government stay in power is much debated. By selectorate theory, providing public goods such as infrastructure is an efficient way to win support from large groups of people.\textsuperscript{7} However, evidence from other conflict zones has found that large development projects do not reduce violence, suggesting that they may not help garner civilian support.\textsuperscript{8} This outcome could be because such projects reward government supporters and detractors alike, thus failing to incentivize government support. Alternatively, it is possible that these types of projects do earn support, but only for the UNPKO and not necessarily for the government.

International Legitimacy

The presence of the UNPKO provides the international community with a supposedly unbiased source of information about the parties to the conflict. Information about which factions are cooperating with a peace effort and which are not can influence whether other nations support one side or the other by providing arms, aid, or legitimacy.

What is considered cooperation may be different for the government and the rebels since the government is expected to have some military capabilities. In the El Salvador case, noncompliance by the FMLN was strongly denounced by the UN while government noncompliance was merely mentioned by the UN in a report. For example, the FMLN responded to delays in the implementation of the peace process with demonstrations. The right to do so was guaranteed by the constitution, and the FMLN assured the government that the protests would be peaceful and that proper advance notice would be given. Yet, the UN reports that the protests were denounced by the government as a threat and a form of blackmail. After the FMLN revealed that it possessed hidden deposits of weapons, the UN challenged

\textsuperscript{7}Bueno de Mesquita 2003
\textsuperscript{8}Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2009
the rebel organization’s credibility and their legal status as a political party was called into question.\textsuperscript{9}

In contrast, the government armed forces’ resistance to recommendations by the Commission on the Truth, the government’s long delay in dismantling an abusive national police, and the government’s unconstitutional use of force to repress a protest of bus drivers are simply reported by the UN without any denunciations or questioning of the political future of the incumbent government. In each case, the government can justify its actions as promoting national security and maintaining order. In addition, the government is legally responsible for investigating the unsolved assassination of FMLN leaders, an action for which the government might be culpable.\textsuperscript{10}

\textbf{From the Battlefield to the Ballotbox}

Following war termination, the incumbent government and rebels will still compete with each other; however, now they do so in the political arena rather than on the battlefield. The UN’s standard operating procedure after violence has ended is to create a temporary transition government and then oversee elections. In her research on UNPKOs, Severin Autesserre uses the phrase “election fetish” to describe the UN’s modus operandi in these circumstances.\textsuperscript{11}

The incumbent government has several advantages in this transition and will likely have a greater probability of winning an election against the rebels compared to winning a war. The government has political experience and an organizational structure already established. The rebel group may have some experience running a shadow government in its area of control, collecting informal taxes and providing security and public goods, but they do not have experience in democratic political competition. Case studies show that the transformation of a rebel organization into a political party is a complex and difficult process and requires the group to make changes in its organizational structure and leadership.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{11}Autesserre 2010
\textsuperscript{12}De Zeeuw and Clingendael 2008
Even if the rebel group is able to transform successfully into a political party, the incumbent government can create an institutional legacy that gives it an advantage in the political arena by filling the bureaucracy with sympathizers and leaving beneficial laws in place.\textsuperscript{13} Furthermore, if insurgent rebel groups had information advantages during conflict, the incumbent is likely to have informational advantages in the political sphere.

**An Informational Advantage**

Governments may have an informational advantage over rebel groups when it comes to UNPKOs. Due to a UNPKO’s reliance on the government for consent and as a UNPKO works closely with government institutions on issues like elections and rule of law, the government will have more information on a UNPKO’s actions compared to a rebel group. A UNPKO that wants to stay in the field must maintain close contact with the host government throughout its mission. The HQ for a UNPKO is often in, or near, a country’s capital city, the center of power for the government. The close proximity to the seat of government leads to more contact and communication between a UNPKO and government officials. It also makes it easier for the government to covertly collect information on a UNPKO. In the Dominican Republic, one peacekeeping officer found that the government was renting the rooms surrounding his hotel room. In addition, the government had bugged UN phone lines at their hotel and office space, probably even before the UN had arrived\textsuperscript{14}

Just as information is crucial to success during war, it is also critical for success during times of peace. Hoddie and Hartzell (2003) describe the ambiguity inherent in peace settlements. As a result, in each step of the implementation of the settlement, the actors are discovering whether their actual benefits from the peace settlement coincide with what they expected. This often ties into elections, a common component of peace settlements that

\textsuperscript{13}The nuanced electoral laws left by the Pinochet government of Chile are a great example. For each congressional district the two top parties both won seats unless the top party won by a margin of 2 to 1. This left Pinochet’s party with near parity representation even as it consistently trailed in polling.

bring an additional level of uncertainty. A party may agree to a peace settlement incorrectly assuming that they would win a subsequent election, thus exchanging their military power for much less political power. If the government gained an information benefit from UNPKOs, they can be savvier about possible outcomes. In addition, with information about the capabilities and actions of the UNPKO, the government knows where and how they can break a peace agreement without repercussions.

4.1.3 Additional Case Study Questions

The case studies also explore two puzzles that arise from my argument that governments select into UNPKOs by giving their consent when they believe that a UNPKO will be beneficial. In Chapter 2 I found that historically governments have only consented to a UNPKO in 26 of 65 conflict situations. The first puzzle asks what explains the decision to give consent? That is, what determines whether a government believes that a potential UNPKO will be beneficial? The second puzzle is if UNPKOs are beneficial to governments, why do rebel groups allow them? What agency, if any, do rebel groups have with respect to a UNPKO?

With regards to the first puzzle, there are a few possible answers. It could be that not all UNPKOs are beneficial, or at least that governments do not always expect a UNPKO to be beneficial. This may be because a UNPKO does not always benefit the government as compared with the rebel group, or it may also be due to other domestic costs unrelated to the conflict; the previous example of Algeria suggests that the government feared the sovereignty costs of a UNPKO, likely in the form of popular disapproval or UN interference in government actions. There may also be costs from a UNPKO in the international sphere, such as the loss of direct state support. Recently, Ukraine has raised the prospect of UN peacekeepers in the face of pro-Russian militants, but does not seem to have made an official request.

\[\text{Stedman and Rothchild 1996}\]

\[\text{The Associated Press 2015b; Chappell 2015}\]
The Ukraine example also raises the possibility that states are knowledgeable on the likelihood of receiving and UNPKO and do not ask for peacekeeping operations that they know they will not get. If a government is fighting against a group supported by one of the P5, they may assume that a UNPKO will never be approved. In these circumstances, the decision to consent is a matter of signals. By consenting, a government can signal to the international community that they are a credible partner in peace seeking and can pressure the rebel group to show that they are as well. On the other hand, requesting a UNPKO can signal to the rebels that the government is militarily weak or at least does not expect a conventional victory.

As for why rebel groups allow UNPKOs, one answer is that sometimes, they do not. Most peacekeeping fatalities are due to illness or accident, but over 800 peacekeepers have died due to violence.\textsuperscript{17} Some of those were unintentional, such as when a UN peacekeeper was killed in January 2015 as Hezbollah and Israel exchanged fire.\textsuperscript{18} Other peacekeeper fatalities are clearly deliberate, such as those in Somalia, which was perhaps the most notable case of rebel resistance to a UNPKO. There, General Aidid’s militia is suspected of carrying out numerous deliberate and fatal attacks on UN peacekeepers, ultimately contributing to their withdrawal.\textsuperscript{19} It was a challenge to get General Aidid to agree to even 50 monitors and seemed to require international pressure and promises of further aid to Somalia.\textsuperscript{20}

In the Cambodia case, the Khmer Rouge withdrew consent of the UNPKO but did not take violent action to chase the UN out of Cambodia, suggesting that the perceived costs of

\textsuperscript{17}UN fatality data available at \url{http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/fatalities.shtml}
\textsuperscript{18}The Associated Press 2015
\textsuperscript{19}Richburg 1993
\textsuperscript{20}In August 1992 negotiators got General Aidid to agree to 50 military observers, and later to additional UN security forces to guard Mogadishu Port and humanitarian relief convoys.
militarily confrontation with the UN were too high\textsuperscript{21} A rebel group may wish to reject a UNPKO but cannot express that preference out of strategic considerations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.1: Case Study Questions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government Motives for UNPKO</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- To secure peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- To stay in power</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Power Mechanisms of UNPKO</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Military Effect</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Material Gains</td>
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<tr>
<td>- International Legitimacy</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Shift to Elections</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Informational Advantage</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Rebel relationship with UNPKO</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Attitude towards UNPKO presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Ability to act on preference</td>
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</tbody>
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### 4.2 Case Selection

I choose four case studies. The first two cases are a paired comparison between two consecutive regimes in the Democratic Republic of Congo that faced similar rebel threats. Though both regimes consented to a UNPKO, only one regime received it. Angola serves as a hard case with a weak government to test the limits of a UNPKO's benefits to its host. Cambodia is the fourth case and was chosen for its unique situation where one regime controlled the state and another was recognized internationally. This case allows us to ask which characteristic is more conducive to UNPKO benefits.

The ideal test of whether UNPKOs shift power in the government’s favor would be to randomly assign UNPKOs to civil wars. A second choice would be to study near-random or quasi-experimental cases. After that, the next best option is to find similar civil wars where one got a UNPKO and one did not. This is a common strategy in peacekeeping research. However, from the chapter on consent, we know that there is almost perfect alignment between host consent and UNPKO deployment. Even if cases are closely matched, they

\textsuperscript{21}See Section 6.2.2
will still differ on whether the host government asked for a UNPKO. This means that the cases still differ on government expectations of a UNPKO’s effect, a strong indicator that UNPKO outcomes are still endogenous to the deployment process even when other variables are matched.

For example, Gilligan and Sergenti (2008) match cases based on conflict and country characteristics for their analysis of whether peacekeeping operations shorten conflicts. They point to the matched-pairs of Liberia 1995 with Guinea-Bissau June 1999 and El Salvador 1992 with Peru 2000 to highlight how the matching leads to similar pairs. In these pairs, Liberia and El Salvador had received UNPKOs. Indeed, those pairs are similar on battle deaths, population, military personnel, GDP per capita, and other variables, but they do not match on consent to a UNPKO. Guinea-Bissau had an ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group to resolve the 1998 coup. The ECOWAS troops departed in March 1999. Two months later, the government was overthrown by a military junta in a day. There was barely time for the government to react, much less call for and receive a UNPKO. Liberia, on the other hand, had been fighting for years and ended with an ECOWAS brokered cease-fire, a unity government, and elections.

For El Salvador and Peru, one can clearly see the difference in the UCDP Battle Death data shown in Figure 4.1, even if it only goes back to 1989. In Peru, the number of battle deaths dwindled during the 1990s. After 1992, it never again exceeded 1,000, the cut-point to qualify as a conflict in some datasets. El Salvador also saw a drop in battle deaths before the conflict ended, but compared to Peru, El Salvador’s battle death count was much higher near the end of the conflict. Even without knowing what happened before 1989, we could guess that El Salvador faced the greater rebel threat, which would explain El Salvador’s consent to a UNPKO and Peru’s lack thereof. As a result, the pairs that are chosen to exemplify successful matching to explain UNPKO effects fail to control for factors that are important for both UNPKO deployment and the outcome of the conflict.
4.2.1 Democratic Republic of Congo: Paired Comparison

A better solution would be to find to similar cases that differ on receiving a UNPKO, but not on giving consent. This is a difficult task given the near perfect correlation between consent and a UNPKO. The cases of the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1996 and in 1997 are the only exception where both governments consented but only one government received a UNPKO.

In 1996, President Mobutu faced a significant challenge from the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération (AFDL) du Congo-Zaire which arose as an umbrella organization for several factions. President Mobutu consented to a peacekeeping mission and the UN Security authorized such a mission, but in December of 1996, the Canadian advance party recommended against the initial deployment. The AFDL took Kinshasha in May of 1997, and the AFDL leader, Laurent-Désiré Kabila, named himself president.
After taking power, Laurent Kabila antagonized his former allies. In August 1998, former members of AFDL and associates of Mobutu’s regime came together to form the rebel group Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie, or Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD). The rebels made some initial gains, but foreign reinforcements to Kabila’s Forces Armes Congolaises (FAC) led to a military stalemate, which was soon followed by a political stalemate as the peace process failed to move forward. In 2000, a UNPKO deployed with government consent. However, it had a minimal effect until 2001 when Laurent’s son, Joseph Kabila, took power after his father died. Joseph put more effort into peace negotiations and soon, the UNPKO quickly grew in size and impact.

By comparing the experiences of Mobutu’s government with the Kabila regime, I am able to control for many things that may affect outcomes, such as country and rebel threat. Most importantly, both regimes consented to UN peacekeepers, suggesting that in both cases the leaders thought a UNPKO would be beneficial for their situation.

4.2.2 Angola and Cambodia: Hard Cases for Governments

I use the other cases to examine how exactly a UNPKO can benefit a government and to test the limits of that benefit. To do so, I select conflicts where the government appears to be at a distinct disadvantage. These can be considered hard cases in that they are cases where a UNPKO will have to shift power significantly in the government’s favor for the government to retain control. Additionally, they are also hard cases in that the host government should be more cautious about manipulating the UNPKO lest the UNPKO become upset and withdraw.\footnote{Personal Interview, Senior UN Advisor, 2013.} If UNPKOs can keep a government in power in these cases, then it is likely that a UNPKOs can significantly benefit governments in many other cases.

In Angola, the collapse of the USSR boded ill for President dos Santos and his Soviet-sponsored government and its conflict with the US supported rebel group the União Nacional para a Independência Total (UNITA) led by Jonas Savimbi. UNITA and Savimbi’s power took on different manifestations throughout the conflict and subsequent peace process; at
different times UNITA pressured the capital, Savimbi was expected to be elected president, and dos Santos offered Savimbi large payouts for peace, which Savimbi was confident enough to refuse. However, now in 2015 dos Santos is approaching his 36th year in office. Did the UNPKOs present from 1989 to 1997 contribute to dos Santos’ continued reign, and if so, how?

In Cambodia in the late 1980s, even though the government of Hun Sen controlled the state institutions, the UN officially recognized the exiled Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), led by Prince Nododom Sihanouk. This situation was further complicated by the continued presence of the Khmer Rouge. In this case, I examine how a UNPKO’s benefits differ for the de jure CGDK government and the de facto government of Hun Sen, who also remains in power to this day.

These cases also allow a comprehensive evaluation of how a UNPKO can shift power towards a government. Governments may have diminishing returns to a UN presence; for example, a UNPKO may impose sovereignty costs on a government that are only worth paying until the immediate threat of rebel victory is removed. In such cases, once a government feels secure, it may limit a UNPKO or even withdraw consent, thus censoring any other benefits that a UNPKO might have bestowed. By selecting the cases where governments face the greatest threats, I am likely to observe more mechanisms through which the government benefits from the UNPKO presence.
Chapter 5

The Matched Cases of Congo-Kinshasa

The primary challenge with studying the effects of UNPKOs according to any method is controlling for other variables that may be related to UNPKO deployment. I argue that governments in a civil war are selecting strategically into UNPKOs, making the request for peacekeepers and important factor to control for. However, this is difficult given the near perfect alignment between government consent and UNPKO deployment.

One exception is the case of President Mobutu and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1996. In this case, President Mobutu frequently and adamantly asked for a UNPKO. Eventually the Security Council authorized a mission, but the advance reconnaissance team came back and recommended that the UNPKO not be deployed. Before long, the rebels took the capital Kinshasa, and rebel leader Laurent-Désiré Kabila took power.

We only have to wait a year for a comparable civil war where a government consented and did receive a UNPKO. Shortly after Laurent Kabila took power in May 1997, he estranged members of his rebel alliance so much that they joined with Mobutu loyalists to launch their own rebellion in August 1998. The government and rebels reached a cease-fire in 2000 and welcomed or - at least tolerated - a UNPKO to little effect. It was not until 2001 when Laurent was killed and his son Joseph was named president that the UNPKO really
developed and began to have any impact. As of 2015, the DRC continued to host a UNPKO as various rebel groups continue to operate in the country.

The main comparison in this chapter lies between President Mobutu and the Kabila administrations as these are two cases where the DRC government consented to a UNPKO but only one operation actually deployed. In addition, the comparison of Laurent Kabila and Joseph Kabila offers a lesson in how levels of consent affect a UNPKO’s impact.

In these cases, I find that their motives for a UNPKO included staying in power. From the case of Laurent and Joseph Kabila, I find that a UNPKO can benefit the host government in a variety of ways. If Mobutu had received a UNPKO, he likely would have stayed in power for some time, whereas Kabila would have faced many more challenges if did not receive a UNPKO.

5.1 Mobutu and the AFDL

The Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération - AFDL) du Congo-Zaire arose in October 1996 as an umbrella organization for several different factions ultimately led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila. The main group, the People’s Democratic Alliance (Alliance Démocratique des Peuples - ADP), was founded and led by Déogratias Bugera and comprised mainly of the Banyamulenge, a relatively wealthy Tutsi group that Mobutu demonized as part of a divide-and-rule strategy. The animosity turned violent in the 1990’s, and then intensified when over a million Hutus, including the genocidal militia the Interahamwe, were pushed into the region from Rwanda. From the Hutu refugee camps, the Interahamwe launched attacks into Rwanda and against the Banyamulenge.

Along with the ADP, three other groups joined the AFDL: the Mouvement Révolutionnaire pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire, a group from South Kivu led by Anselme Masasu Nindada; the Conseil National de Résistance, a Lumumbist guerrilla group led by Kissasse

\[\textit{Uppsala Conflict Data Program} 2012\]
Ngandu and the Parti de la Révolution Populaire, a Marxist group with a military wing led by Laurent Kabila. Initially Kabila was the spokesman for the AFDL and Ngandu was the military commander, but Ngandu was killed after a month. The official story is that Ngandu was killed in an ambush by the Zairian army, but many suspect that Kabila was involved. Rwanda and Uganda supported the AFDL with arms and training and may have had a hand in organizing the AFDL.

Aside from a ceasefire that lasted three weeks in November, the AFDL moved quickly across the country. The rebels faced little resistance from a government where “all was improvisation, corruption, demoralization, and policy changes” and from an army that was demoralized and unpaid. On May 17th, just seven months after it was founded, the AFDL entered the capital and Kabila declared himself the president.

5.1.1 The Undeployed UNPKO

President Mobutu of Zaire repeatedly requested UN involvement throughout the crisis. In May 1996, even before the AFDL had formed, the Secretary-General reported that President Mobutu had requested UN observers to be deployed to North and South Kivu to monitor the movement of goods and people through regional airports and the borders with Rwanda and Burundi. After a meeting between Mobutu and the Secretary-General’s special envoy to the Great Lakes region, Raymond Chrétien, Chrétien reported to the UNSC that Mobutu “welcomed any humanitarian assistance that would result in the early return of the refugees.

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2 Turner 2007
3 Democratic Republic of the Congo 2005
4 Clark 2002
5 Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2012
6 UN General Assembly, Human Rights Questions: Human Rights Situations and Reports of Special Rapporteurs and Representatives (A/52/496) 17 October 1997; Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2012
7 UN Security Council, Letter Dated 4 June 1996 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council (S/1996/420) 11 June 1996.

and would not put into question the territorial integrity of Zaire.\textsuperscript{8} When the Secretary-General came to the UNSC with a recommendation for a multinational force, Zaire wrote the UNSC’s president the next day to inform them that they agreed to a multinational force and whatever peacekeeping force deemed necessary.\textsuperscript{9}

The Secretary-General initially responded in June by sending a technical mission to the area to gather information so he could make recommendations for the eventual observer mission.\textsuperscript{10} Due to the dangerous conditions, the technical mission was not able to access eastern Zaire; instead it met with government officials and prepared the way for an incoming special envoy.\textsuperscript{11} On November 8th, the Secretary-General, based on the initial information from the special envoy and the consent from President of Mobutu, recommended a multinational humanitarian mission to address the refugee crisis with the details to be decided later.\textsuperscript{12}

The mission came together quickly. On November 14th Canada offered to take the lead in organizing and commanding a multinational force, and Mali offered support for any intervention force the week later.\textsuperscript{13} The mission had regional support from the Organization of African Unity Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution.\textsuperscript{14} The UNSC authorized a multinational force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter on November 15th.\textsuperscript{15} The Secretary-General also reported that several states were willing to contribute

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{8}UN Security Council, Letter Dated 12 December 1996 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1996/1036) 12 December 1996.
\item \textsuperscript{9}UN Security Council, Letter Dated 8 November 1996 from the Charge D’Affaires A.I. of the Permanent Mission of Zaire to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1996/920) 8 November 1996.
\item \textsuperscript{10}UN Security Council, Further Report of the Secretary-General of the Situation in the Great Lakes Region of Africa (S/1996/1063) 20 December 1996.
\item \textsuperscript{12}UN Security Council, Letter Dated 7 November 1996 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1996/916) 7 November 1996.
\item \textsuperscript{13}UN Security Council, Letter Dated 14 November 1996 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1996/941) 14 November 1996.
\item UN Security Council, Letter Dated 8 November 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Mali to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General (S/1996/969) 22 November 1996. Mali also declared a national day of solidarity with the children in the conflict zones with a statement to be read in every Mali classroom at the same time.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
the voluntary trust fund set up to finance African participation in the multinational force once the details of the force were worked out.\(^\text{16}\)

The same day that the mission was authorized, Zaire wrote to the UNSC to declare its position. Zaire confirmed that the key to the crisis in Eastern Zaire is the refugee situation. Zaire also believed that the mission should be political, as well as humanitarian, and that “it must be supported militarily, if necessary.” While supportive of the mission, the government was concerned that a team of planners went to Kigali, Rwanda. They argued that a force to be deployed in Zaire should be planned in Zaire. Additionally, Zaire wanted actors to refrain from interacting with any rebel groups, who they referred to as the aggressors.\(^\text{17}\)

However, when the Canadians arrived they found a different refugee situation than what had been reported. The Canadian forward planning forces conducting flyovers in the area estimated that ten percent of the initial refugee population remained. In mid-December with the camps largely empty the Rwandan government said the UN was no longer willing to host the MNF, such as the liaison team in Kigali\(^\text{18}\). General Baril, the Canadian force commander for the planned PKO, concerned that his advance team was in danger of being drawn into the larger conflict, recommended the end of operations before they could really begin.\(^\text{19}\)

On December 5th, Canada’s permanent representative informed the Security Council that a large number of refugees had returned to Rwanda and that the humanitarian organizations enjoyed limited, but improved, access\(^\text{20}\).

After additional aerial and ground reconnaissance, Canada wrote on December 13th that they were going to withdraw from the multinational force since the original reasons for going had largely abated. Figure 5.1 shows the sudden drop in refugees as seen by the advance force. The Canadians went so far as to recommended that the UNSC terminate


\(^\text{18}\)Hennessy 2001

\(^\text{19}\)3350-1 *(Op Assurance-Comd)* 3 Dec.96 to CDS, AIA (A) 96-1168., as cited by Hennessy (2001).

the mandate. After the Canadians briefed the UN Steering Group, the group decided to recommend terminating the mission, despite the opposition of France, the Netherlands, and Senegal, as well as from a representative from Zaire that intruded on the meeting and desperately called once more for a large MNF force.

Figure 5.1: DRC Refugee Population

![Graph showing DRC Refugee Population]


Ultimately, the mission was never deployed because the refugee situation was found to be largely resolved shortly after the mission was authorized. Similarly, Special Envoy Chrétien had reported on December 12th that the need for the multinational force has changed since its authorization. Although the Secretary-General believed that serious challenges remained for the region, the apparent return of approximately 560,000 refugees to Rwanda and 235,000

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22 Record of MNF Steering Group Mtg 13 December.96, 3451-DCDS-12, 16 Dec.96 AIA (A) 96-1168., as cited by Hennessy 2001.

to Tanzania ameliorated the humanitarian crisis. As a result, the Secretary-General decided not to recommend a PKO and even decided that a Special Envoy of senior rank was more appropriate than including a Special Representative of the Secretary-General\textsuperscript{24}

5.1.2 Analysis

Mobutu’s Motives

Why was Pres. Mobutu so supportive of the peacekeeping mission? Is it because he believed it would improve his final war outcome with respect to the rebels? Or is it because he wanted to solve the refugee problem because it was a drain on resources and was harmful to his citizens?

Chrétien’s description of his meetings with government officials strongly suggests the former explanation:

The Zairian Government reaffirmed the assurances given to me by President Mobutu and declared its readiness to be as flexible as possible in order to enable urgent humanitarian assistance to reach refugees and internally displaced persons. This flexibility became increasingly evident in subsequent meetings with these officials. They welcomed the early deployment of the multinational force, which they believed would lower tension in the region. They were of the view that, however urgent and noble the humanitarian mandate of this force, its action would not be effective in the absence of peace and security in the region\textsuperscript{25}

The government of Zaire believed that in solving the refugee problem, the UN would have to address the security situation, which would inevitably require some action towards the rebel groups. The government expected that the UN mission would help deal with certain factions of the rebellion, a point made clear by the government’s emphasis that they were responsible for one faction, the Banyamulenge rebels, implying that someone else - the UN - was responsible for the other rebels groups. Government officials were also against an international conference; they argued that such an event should wait until the multinational


force had time to “do its work.” The government believed that the UN force would improve its bargaining position for future negotiations.26

The government of Zaire was not the first to believe a humanitarian mission would have a significant security impact; the notion that a humanitarian operation would have to deal with insecurity had been brought up before by the UN in the context of Somalia. According to Kofi Annan, the UN’s principal aims in Somalia - humanitarian aid, political reconciliation, and refugee repatriation - required a secure environment by international military forces. Annan said these areas were critical and “inextricably linked.”27 In the Zaire case, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs at the time, George Moose, agrees that it would have been simply unworkable to protect refugees and avoid a confrontation with the rebels.28

As further evidence of the government’s motives, a UN investigation into violence in Eastern Zaire noted that the government opposed any international attempts to remove the refugees that did not include the multinational force. Repeated requests by the UNHCR and the Special Rapporteur were opposed. These actions support the conclusion that the government’s interest in UN involvement was not to solve the humanitarian crisis.29 The government was highly sensitive to any actions that could hinder the deployment of the UNPKO. Zaire’s Armed Forces chief, General Eluki Monga Aunda, one of the four most powerful men in the army, was suspended for calling a multinational force unnecessary.30

The United States’ decision not to send combat troops drew fiery criticism from Information Minister Bogu Makeli who told AFP, “The whole world, with few exceptions, finds itself

28Personal interview, former US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs George Moose, 2015.
30IRIN Emergency Update No. 34 on Eastern Zaire 1996.
under the boot of the Yankees. Zaire would prefer to disappear from the world map with
dignity and honour than accept the dictates of this great power of shame and injustice.”

The government also eschewed any other peace negotiations, preferring a UN operation
to strengthen the government’s position beforehand. A report by the Special Rapporteur for
the UN recorded the government’s lack of effort in reaching a directly negotiated settlement.
Numerous attempts by international organizations and neighboring nations could not con-
vince Mobutu to negotiate. To calls for peace negotiations by Joint UN/Organization of
African Unity representative, the Deputy Prime Minister of Zaire responded that outsiders
should not interfere in Zaire’s internal affairs. The explanation may be that Mobutu and
his government were especially short sighted and arrogant, but the government’s actions
were also consistent with an expectation that they would do better with a UN operation.
In comparison, a traditional understanding of UNPKOs as a path to peace cannot explain
this behavior; it would predict that belligerents who sought a PKO simply for the purpose
of peace would also pursue other methods.

Rebel Recourse

As for the ADFL’s views, the Canadian advance force threat assessment warns that the
ADFL would not accept a multinational force that prevented it from dealing with Interhamwe
militias and former Rwandan Hutu militants but could allow humanitarian responses.
Initially, Rwanda told the Secretary-General that it did not think that such a mission would
be appropriate. After meeting with Rwandan officials, Chrétien reported that Rwanda
welcomed a neutral force, provided that it was exclusively humanitarian with no hidden

31 IRIN Emergency Update No. 32 on Eastern Zaire 1996
32 The Special Rapporteur’s report lists a December symposium in Nairobi, a meeting in Pretoria, and
efforts by the president of Kenya, the king of Morocco, and the Organization of African Unity. UN General
Assembly, Human Rights Questions: Human Rights Situations and Reports of Special Rapporteurs and
Representatives (A/52/496) 17 October 1997
33 UN General Assembly, Human Rights Questions: Human Rights Situations and Reports of Special Rap-
porteurs and Representatives (A/52/496) 17 October 1997
34 Library and Archives Canada, Department of External Affairs fonds, R219-168-7-E Military Actions
Situation,” page 2.
35 UN General Assembly, Human Rights Questions: Human Rights Situations and Reports of Special Rap-
porteurs and Representatives (A/52/496) 17 October 1997.
agenda; however, Rwanda questioned whether a multinational force was still necessary given the recent refugee movement. Instead of a multinational force, Rwanda argued that the refugees really needed assistance with rehabilitation and reconstruction. Throughout the conflict, Rwanda understated the rebels’ strength and stamina and claimed that no action was necessary.\(^\text{36}\)

In this case the migration of the refugees was a crucial determinate of UN deployment and seemed to happen at just the right time to preempt a UNPKO. The refugee movement was caused by a series of brutal attacks on the refugee camps by rebel groups which killed many and caused the rest to flee. A UN investigation of the attacks suggested that “a decision was taken to eliminate this part of the Hutu ethnic group,” but this doesn’t explain the deliberate mass displacement.\(^\text{37}\)

A better explanation that fits with the timing is that the rebel groups deliberately and forcefully relocated refugees in order to prevent the deployment of the UNPKO force. On November 14, James Bartleman, diplomatic advisor to the UN’s Special Envoy Raymond Chrétien, received an intelligence report from an another country saying that if Canada succeeded in gaining Security Council support for a UNPKO, the rebels would act to move the refugees back to Rwanda. The report explained that the rebels and Rwanda did not want an international force to come into the area and then hand control back to the government of Zaire.\(^\text{38}\) Later, Paul Kagame, the Rwandan defense minister and Vice President, acknowledged that the passage of Resolution 1080 did factor into the decision to attack the camps.\(^\text{39}\)

The attacks were effective in eliminating any notion of sanctuary for the refugees and in chasing refugees out of the reach of humanitarian groups. Along with the attacks, the rebel forces had set the stage for refugee movement by unilaterally declaring a ceasefire of three weeks on November 4th to allow for repatriation of refugees; on the 10th, Kabila promised

\(^{36}\)UN General Assembly, *Letter Dated 12 December 1996 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1996/1036) 12 December 1996.*


\(^{38}\)Bartleman 2011, pp 196-197

\(^{39}\)Smith and Hay 1999, p 99
to open what he called a “humanitarian corridor” for refugees to leave, as well as aid groups that cooperated with the AFDL. It was not until 1997, after the displacement attacks of 1996, that the AFDL’s attacks seemed to shift from displacement to death. Rebel forces used radios to publicize incoming humanitarian aid in order to convince hiding refugees to come out of the forest. Once refugees gathered, the rebels attacked; aid groups only found bodies when they arrived.

In the final tally, the Commission on Human Rights’ Special Rapporteur recorded that “the arrival of the rebels and the attacks on the camps prompted some 600,000 Rwandan and 100,000 Burundi refugees to return to their countries at their own risk.” A review of Canada’s planning and preparation states that some 400,000 refugees had crossed into Rwanda at Goma by November 22 in a deliberate move by the rebels to prevent UN deployment. The number of refugees remaining after mid-November will never be known. Estimates ranged from 20,000 to 400,000. The uncertainty about the number of refugees in Eastern Zaire was also deliberate; Paul Kagame, employed information warfare techniques learned at Fort Leavenworth to create an “information vacuum” and hinder the international community’s ability to act.

The US has admitted to providing training to Rwanda’s military and has had a presence in Rwanda since 1995, but officials claim that they were unaware of plans to remove Mobutu. Instead, they were concerned about Rwanda’s military publicly launching cross-border strikes against Hutu militias in the refugee camps. Instead, Kagame supported rebel forces and even joined in attacks on refugee camps to get at Hutu extremists, a move that surprised the US, even as the US and Kagame were discussing options for addressing the camps. In

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43 Hennessy 2001
44 Dorn 2005 p 454
45 Smith and Hay 1999 pp 103-104

90
1996, Kagame warned senior Clinton officials that Rwanda might act if the UN did not; the officials knew Kagame might try something but were not sure what. 

5.2 Laurent and Joseph Kabila

Laurent Kabila assumed the presidency of the newly named Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in May 1997; the country was eager for a change after Mobutu’s rule. Any hopes for a break from war, however, were soon dashed. Concerned about unrest along the Rwanda and Uganda borders and afraid that Rwanda wanted to overthrow his government, Kabila ordered all foreign troops to exit the DRC in July 1998, officially ending military-cooperation with his former Ugandan and Rwandan allies. Within a few weeks, government soldiers were under attack in the East and near Kinshasa. Kabila’s former supporters joined with Mobutists to form the Congolese Rally for Democracy (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie - RCD) under the leadership of Chairman Ernest Wamba dia Wamba.

The RCD quickly took control of much of the country and were moving towards the capital in late August when Kabila’s government forces received reinforcements from Zimbabwe, Angola, and Nambia, leading some to call the conflict Africa’s First World War. In November another rebel group joined the conflict. Where the RCD was based in the East and supported by Rwanda, the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo - MLC), led by Jean-Pierra Bemba, was based in the Northwest and was supported by Uganda.

In July 1999, the six nations and rebel groups signed the Lusaka Peace Accords. The rebel groups had some issues deciding who should sign the accord, at times resorting to violence.

46 Duke 1997 pp 196-197. There are reports that the US actually sought to undermine the operation even as they its encouraged planning (see Dorn 2005 p 454, Smith and Hay 1999 p 97, Bartleman 2011 p 195. According to former Assistant Secretary of State George Moose, the US’ interests were (1) humanitarian (2) prevent Rwanda génocidaires from taking advantage of refugee camps and (3) prevent further Rwanda intervention (Personal Interview, 2015). This may have been a case of different branches of the government having different goals. This was true for Canada; Paul Heinbecker, the Canadian diplomat chairing the steering group meeting that decided to cancel the operation had been briefed beforehand that the prime minister wanted the intervention ended and that the minister of foreign affairs wanted it to continue (Smith and Hay 1999 pp 101).

47 Kisangani 2010 Democratic Republic of the Congo 2014
They eventually reached a compromise and had 50 rebel officials sign the agreement.\footnote{Fisher 1999; Rwanda and Uganda Battling To Control Key City in Congo 1999} In the agreement, the parties agreed to a cease-fire, and a Chapter VII UNPKO named the Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). In the accord, the UNPKO’s mandates contained common peacekeeping roles such as supervising the agreement and providing humanitarian assistance, as well as coercive peace-enforcement tasks, including tracking down and disarming armed groups, screening mass killers, and repatriation. The government, RCD, and MLC agreed to an open national dialogue for national reconciliation and to the formation of an integrated national army.\footnote{UN Security Council, Letter Dated 23 July 1999 from the Permanent Representative of Zambia to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1999/815) 23 July 1999.}

The Lusaka Accords did not usher in the peace that was intended. While all parties violated the agreement, President Laurent Kabila was especially resistant to the peace process.\footnote{Democratic Republic of the Congo 2014} The UN noted Kabila’s refusal to hold an inclusive dialogue with political parties and civil societies.\footnote{United Nations Department of Public Information 1999, p. 82} In November the MLC accused the government of continued bombings. However, the UN survey team could not verify the claims since they were confined to the capital following insufficient governmental support. The government indicated that it still was poised for combat. The foreign minister stated that the army was prepared to liberate the country saying, “We will not begin the next century under rebel occupation.”\footnote{Onishi 1999} This followed a war-minded propaganda campaign featuring the slogans “Peace has to be earned” and “Fight for Peace.”\footnote{Jeter 1999; Vick 1999} The government claimed these messages were for internal consumption in the face of rebel threats, but the heaviest fighting in the country’s north coincided with government shipments of recent arm purchases.\footnote{Vick 1999}

The government’s continued belligerence also constrained the 5,000 personnel UNPKO that had been authorized in early 2000.\footnote{UN Security Council, 4104th meeting. Resolution 1291 (2000) (S/RES/1291(2000)) 24 February 2000.} However, as shown in Figure 5.2, the mission
actually had about 250 people for a year. The Secretary General blamed the lackluster deployment on the government and on the limitations it put on the UN by limiting its movement and failing to guarantee the UN’s safety. In fact, the UN suspected that the government was fomenting public protests at the UN headquarters. This was part of a sustained campaign of vilification of the UN. In fact, the protests had started in 1998 with signs reading “No to the UN” and “No to the xenophobe Kofi Annan.”

However, it seems the government was not fundamentally anti-UN, but rather wanted a controlled UN. In the months after the Lusaka accords the government continued to send letters to the Security Council about attacks and massacres and asked for the UN to send special envoys to Rwanda and Uganda. In his report the UN’s Special Rapporteur describes how Kabila wants the international community to remove the foreign forces and to provide technical and financial assistance while ignoring the issues of democracy, human rights, and civil society.

56 Peacekeeper data is from Kathman 2013.
61 The report reads, “ the President thinks that the country should be helped to expel the aggressors and that the international community should not bring up the subject of democracy or human rights.” UN Economic and Security Council, Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in any Part of the World: Report on the situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Roberto Garretón, in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1999/56 (E/CN.4/2000/42) 18 January 2000. p 13.
5.2.1 Joseph Kabila Changes Course

In 2001, the government’s attitude towards the UN shifted drastically due to a sudden and dramatic change in leadership.\textsuperscript{61} On January 17th, President Kabila was shot by his own bodyguards for unknown reasons.\textsuperscript{62} The ministers and parliament replaced him with Laurent’s son and Chief-of-Staff Joseph Kabila, who brought to the region the prospect of peace especially as Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Uganda, and Rwanda were all interested in ending their involvement.\textsuperscript{63} With an aptitude for international connections and international minded advisors, Joseph Kabila went on an international diplomatic blitz, including a visit


\textsuperscript{62}Stearns 2011

\textsuperscript{63}\textit{CONGO-KINSHASA: Kabila death could revive war} 2001
to the Secretary General in New York. The UN mission’s personnel went from 200 in February to over 2,300 in June as Joseph Kabila supported national reconciliation talks and appointed a new cabinet that was will to negotiate. In March all belligerents pulled back 13 km to create a buffer zone monitored by UN observers. At the same time, however, the Congolese army admitted supplying guerrillas fighting behind enemy lines. Nevertheless, as shown in Figure 5.2, the number of battle deaths fell in 2001.

Figure 5.3: Battle Fatalities in the Democratic Republic of Congo

A series of peace negotiations in 2002 eventually led to agreements that prompted Rwanda and Uganda to withdraw their troops. These deals led to further talks that ultimately resulted in the Global and Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the Democratic Republic

64 Personal Interview, UN MONUSCO Officer, 2013.
of Congo; this agreement led to a Transitional Government with Kabila as president and created four vice-presidents to represent the various rebel and opposition groups, including Jean-Pierre Bemba of the MLC and Azarias Ruberwa, who had risen to secretary general of the main RCD faction. Whether the Vice Presidents had any real power is debatable. Ruberwa was given the defense and security portfolio, but Kabila continued controlling the military through a parallel structure, the Maison Militaire. Ruberwa reportedly did not even receive daily briefings.\footnote{International: Things fall apart?; Democratic Republic of Congo; 2004}

In 2004, a rebel group led by Laurent Nkunda took the major city of Bukavu in the East. As the rebels advanced on the city, the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo - FARDC) fled the city, some seeking refuge in the MONUC compound. The government blamed MONUC for not preventing Laurent Nkunda and his forces from capturing of Bukavu, and a series of violent and destructive demonstrations against MONUC, UN humanitarian agencies, and NGOs followed.\footnote{UN Security Council, Third special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (A/59/61) 16 August 2004} Kabila also blamed MONUC, telling one newspaper, “Despite its arms and its mandate, the UN mission did not avert the fall of Bukavu.”\footnote{Cobb 2004}

Whether Kabila expected MONUC to hold off the rebels or just used MONUC as a convenient scapegoat for the FARDC’s failure, the country certainly expected MONUC to enforce peace, even though it had neither the mandate nor the resources to do so. After Bukavu, the Secretary General requested additional infantry battalions and attack helicopters for the mission, and the Security Council expanded MONUC’s mandate to include the use of all necessary means to protect the transition government and improve security conditions in areas receiving humanitarian assistance.\footnote{UN Security Council, Letter dated 3 September 2004 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2004/715) 7 September 2004. UN Security Council, Resolution 1565 (2004): Adopted by the Security Council at its 4797th Meeting, on 1 October 2004 (S/RES/1565(2004)) 1 October 2004} The Foreign Ministers of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda wanted MONUC’s mandates to go even further.
and requested that they be amended to include the disarmament of all armed groups by any means necessary.\footnote{UN Security Council, Letter dated 25 October 2005 from the Permanent Representative of Uganda to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2005/667) 25 October 2005}

With the more ambitious mandate, MONUC provided greater support to the FARDC and engaged in joint operations, including an “area domination operation” on the border with Sudan.\footnote{UN Security Council, Twentieth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2005/832) 28 December 2005} Later MONUC even also went on the offensive without the FARC, dispatching a special forces unit from Guatemala to Garamba National Park after receiving reports that the Lord’s Resistance Army was in the area.\footnote{Eight Guatemalans died when the unit was attacked while approaching an LRA camp. UN Security Council, Twenty-first report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2005/832) 28 December 2005} This cooperation with the FARDC was in line with the regional governments’ requests that the UN take a more robust stance, but in doing so, MONUC subsequently became associated with the FARDC, which was accused of human rights abuses of civilians and sexual abuse of child ex-combatants.\footnote{UN Security Council, Twenty-first report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2006/390) 13 June 2006} However, MONUC had just been investigated in 2004 following reports of sexual exploitation by peacekeepers.\footnote{UN General Assembly, Investigation by the Office of Internal Oversight Services into allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse in the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (A/59/61) 5 January 2005}

Politically, the DRC seemed to be steadily transitioning towards democracy. In 2004 Kabila’s provisional government appointments included representatives of civil organizations, opposition parties, and rebel groups, and in 2005 Kabila signed a new constitution drafted by the legislature.\footnote{Democratic Republic of the Congo 2014} Presidential elections, the DRC’s first since 1960, were scheduled for 2006.

The first round of elections in July saw Kabila with 45% of the vote, Jean-Pierre Bemba with 20% and Antoine Gizenga, the Prime Minister from 1960 who had been exiled, with 13%. Due to the lack of a majority, a runoff between Kabila and Bemba took place in November 15. President Kabila won that vote with 58% after gaining Gizenga’s support by
promising to name him Prime Minister. Bemba appealed the results of the runoff to the Supreme Court, but ultimately accepted their decision to officially name Kabila president.\footnote{UN Security Council, \textit{Twenty-third report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo} (S/2007/156) 20 March 2007}

International and domestic election observers regarded the elections as technically sound, transparent and credible\footnote{UN Security Council, \textit{Twenty-third report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo} (S/2007/156) 20 March 2007}. However, before the election, the UN raised concerns about “limitations on civil liberties, the widespread misuse of public funds, endemic corruption and the arbitrary detention of political party members.”\footnote{UN Security Council, \textit{Twenty-first report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo} (S/2006/390) 13 June 2006, p 15.} One UN MONUSCO Officer called both the 2006 and 2011 elections massive frauds.\footnote{Personal Interview, UN MONUSCO Officer, 2013.}

These differing views suggest that the actual voting on the day of the election was fair, but the candidates took every advantage they could before and after the election. In Kinshasa, there was a sense that Kabila took full advantage of his incumbency before the election.\footnote{Mahtani 2006} With a monopoly on state television, Kabila was able to air his campaign rallies freely.\footnote{Clayton 2006} As Kabila’s opponents gained popularity, they ran into bureaucratic issues that left their flights grounded and campaign materials impounded.\footnote{Clayton 2006} After voting day, most election observers left before the actual counting, which was described as messy. “The counting centre in Kinshasa is an absolute nightmare,” said one observer who had stayed.\footnote{Bloomfield 2006a}

The election season also saw a number of violent incidents. Most were relatively minor confrontations between supporters of different parties, but there was one suspicious case where a journalist for an opposition newspaper was murdered execution style.\footnote{Bloomfield 2006b} Before the second round of elections, Kabila’s challenger Vice-President Jean-Pierre Bemba and his guards often clashed with state forces. National Police and Bemba supporters exchanged fire at a Bemba rally and at Bemba’s Kinshsha residence, while reports surfaced that chil-

\footnote{Personal Interview, UN MONUSCO Officer, 2013.}
\footnote{Mahtani 2006}
\footnote{Clayton 2006}
\footnote{Bloomfield 2006a}
\footnote{Bloomfield 2006b}
\footnote{Other foreign journalists were expelled or not allowed to enter the country. \textit{Analysis: Crackdown on DRCongo media in run up to 30 July poll}, 2006}
dren of Bemba’s guards had been killed. Most dramatically, the Republic Guard, the forces charged with protecting Kabila, attacked Bemba’s house during a meeting of the International Committee in Support of the Transition. The Republican Guard eventually withdrew, but not before destroying Bemba’s helicopter.\footnote{UN Security Council, Twenty-second report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2006/759) 21 September 2006}

Any hopes that the elections would bring peace were soon dashed. In the South, the 2007 elections sparked protests from the Bundu Dia Kongo (BDK) movement, leading to several clashes with police and a government ban against the party. The situation also deteriorated in the East. In late 2006, Laurent Nkunda organized the National Congress for the Defense of the People (Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple - CNDP) to protect the Tutsi population from the DRC army and from Hutu militias which had organized themselves as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda - FDLR). In 2011 President Kabila defeated a coup attempt and went on to win reelection in November in another disputed vote.\footnote{Democratic Republic of the Congo 2014} He remains in power today.

### 5.2.2 Analysis

Both Presidents Laurent and Joseph Kabila seem to have been more interested in using a UNPKO as a tool for power rather than as a path to peace, but the ways in which they did so differed. Laurent kept the UNPKO small and constrained, controlling its size and where it deployed. With this method, Laurent sought to benefit from the UNPKO’s military and technical aspects as he pursued military victory while minimizing the UNPKO’s agency on the issues of democracy and human rights. As Laurent was killed shortly after the UNPKO arrived, we cannot say whether his strategy would have worked.

Joseph embraced the UNPKO and the peace process, at least much more than his father had. Just a year after assuming power, Joseph had reached agreements with the main rebel groups and their sponsors. By welcoming his chief rivals into a Transitional Government,
Joseph split his challengers into two realms. While some rebel groups were kept out of the process and remained violent towards his regime, Joseph was able to bring his main challengers into the political realm where he had numerous advantages as the incumbent. He was able to exploit those advantages even as the UN ran the election and the international community observed since those actors focused on the technical aspect of the actual voting. UN staff generally focused on the technical aspect of elections because it was the part that they knew how to handle. From their perspective, running a free and fair election was like running a vaccination campaign; whether you were intervening with vaccines or ballots, to succeed you just had to get them to the right people. This left Kabila free to capitalize upon his other advantages, such as his access to media and his ability to move around the country to tilt the playing field in his favor.

While Kabila held off the RCD and MLC in the political contest, he also used MONUC to his military advantage by getting MONUC to play a larger role in providing security. Kabila was open to agreements in some cases, but he did not see peace as an option with other rebel groups. In 2004 Kabila told visiting Security Council members that he believed the only way to end the conflict with the genocidaires was to crush them militarily. Kabila declared, “If you want peace, you have to make war.”

Forming the transitional government also benefited President Kabila on this front by causing the UN to designate the Congo optimistically as a post-conflict situation. This meant that instead of a seeing actors as governments and rebels, MONUC staff instead saw only legitimate actors that they would work with - the parties in the transitional government - and illegal actors that they could not even speak to. For example, MONUC staff were banned from meeting with Nkunda as he was an illegal actor, making it difficult for MONUC when Nkunda captured Bukavu and the UN had to negotiate with him.

Having MONUC assume a greater role in security not only helped against external threats but also allowed Kabila to maintain a weak military. After the election, the Secretary-

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88 Autesserre 2010, p 109
89 Farley 2004
90 Autesserre 2010, p 102
General reported that the FARDC suffered from “weak command and control; high levels of corruption; poor operational planning and tactical skills; poor administrative and logistical capacity to oversee the deployment, payment, sustenance and equipping of troops; very limited training capacity; and questionable loyalty on the part of some troops.” Keeping the FARDC weak was facilitated by MONUC shouldering the responsibility and receiving the blame when armed opposition groups gained ground.

Keeping the military weak also allowed Kabila use its assets elsewhere, including foreign resources earmarked for the military. MONUC found that every month, eight million dollars slated for troop salaries disappeared. Reportedly, much of the foreign aid, which in 2005 amounted to 60 percent of Congo’s budget and 90 percent of the election costs, was embezzled.

### 5.3 Conclusion

The cases of President Mobutu and Presidents Joseph and Laurent Kabila offer a paired comparison to test the effect of UNPKOs. While important differences between the two cases remain including the support Laurent Kabila received from Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia, but it is a uniquely useful comparison as it includes variation on UNPKO presence while controlling for host country consent.

On the question of motives, it seems clear that Mobutu and his regime wanted a UNPKO in order to stay in power and not for peace, or in this case, not to solve the refugee crisis in the East. Mobutu’s refusal to engage in any other peace efforts and the internal discussions of his regime support this conclusion. The rebels also thought the UNPKO would have a significant effect on power and not in their favor. Thus, the AFDL worked to make sure the UNPKO did not deploy by removing its purpose: the refugee crisis. Joseph Kabila’s motivations are difficult to tease out as he spoke well of peace and embraced the peace process in relation

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92 Kambale 2005
to the RCD and MLC, but with other rebel groups he certainly emphasized the UNPKO’s military capabilities over its peacemaking expertise. These motives are summarized in Table

Table 5.1: Case Study Questions, Consent: Mobutu and Kabila

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government Motives for UNPKO</th>
<th>Mobutu Sese Seko</th>
<th>Joseph Kabila</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- To secure peace</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- To stay in power</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel relationship with UNPKO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Attitude towards UNPKO presence</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Ability to act on preference</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the macro level, these cases support the hypothesis that incumbent governments benefit from UNPKOs to which they consent. Mobutu did not receive a UNPKO and subsequently lost power while Joseph Kabila embraced a UNPKO and has been in power for 18 years. Do the counterfactuals seem reasonable? It would be presumptuous to say that a UNPKO would have kept Mobutu in power or that Kabila’s regime would have fallen without a UNPKO; however, it seems safe to say that if Mobutu’s UNPKO had deployed, Mobutu would have had at least a reprieve as the AFDL either waited until the UNPKO fulfilled its mandate or attempted to circumvent the UN. Without a UNPKO, Joseph Kabila would have tested the patience of his allies and had a harder time bringing the MLC and RCD to the political battlefield.

Moreover, Kabila would have found it much more difficult to build a winning coalition without the many benefits that the UNPKO provided. The UNPKO provided, and continues to provide, Joseph Kabila with legitimacy, foreign aid, security, and electoral support. These benefits, which support all of the identified mechanisms except for the informational advantage, are summarized in Table 5.2 As Mobutu never received a UNPKO, we can only speculate as to how a UNPKO would have assisted him, but certainly Mobutu and his regime believed that it would have a strong military effect, while also providing services to and gathering information about an area that otherwise had little government involvement.

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Table 5.2: Case Study Questions, Power: Kabila

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power Mechanisms of UNPKO</th>
<th>Joseph Kabila</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Military Effect</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Material Gains</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- International Legitimacy</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Shift to Elections</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Informational Advantage</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 6

Angola and Cambodia

How much can a UNPKO really affect civil war outcomes? Compared to other factors known to shape civil war outcomes - army size, institutional strength, international support, and rugged terrain - does a UNPKO have a significant impact? If so, in what ways?

In this chapter I examine two cases where the internationally-recognized government faced a significant domestic threat for state control. In Angola, President dos Santos faced hard challenge from the rebel group UNITA. In Cambodia, the internationally recognized Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea under Prince Sihanouk existed in exile while Hun Sen’s Cambodian People’s Party controlled the state structures. In both cases the government consented to and received substantial UNPKO operations; in neither case was there a conventional outcome. In Angola, the government eventually asked the UNPKO to leave in order to fight the rebel group. In Cambodia, the UNPKO left after an electoral impasse resulted to a coalition government. However, shortly after the UN pulled out, Hun Sen retook complete control of the government.

In both of these cases, I find that a UNPKO can, indeed, offer tangible benefits to a government, but not without limitations. The dos Santos government was able to win international support away from Savimbi, which helped weaken UNITA to a point where dos Santos confident enough to withdraw consent from the UNPKO so that his government could defeat UNITA on the battlefield. In Cambodia Prince Sihanouk acquired more power
through the UNPKO then he could have otherwise, but once the UNPKO left Sihanouk’s gains could not be sustained. Sihanouk had selected into a UNPKO as his best chance for power, but because the UNPKO relied on the existing state structures it reinforced Hun Sen’s regime even as it created space for Prince Sihanouk to challenge it.

6.1 Angola - UNITA

6.1.1 The Angolan Civil War

By the 1990s, the Angolan Civil War continued as a holdover of the Cold War. In 1974 three independence movements in Angola saw the end of Portugal’s colonial rule. The three movements created a coalition government, but it promptly fell apart as all three movements declared the independence of their own state. South Africa along with Zaire and the United States supported UNITA and saw it as the legitimate government of Angola. President Reagan went so far as to hail Savimbi as Africa’s Abraham Lincoln. On the other side, the MPLA found support from Cuba and the Soviet Union. The MPLA successfully pushed UNITA back in 1980, and the civil war shifted to guerrilla warfare.

In 1988 the MPLA government and UNITA signed the Gbadolite Agreement, which included the provision of UN military observers, and the government formally requested that the UN set up a military observer group. The UNSC passed a resolution creating the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) to verify the withdraw the Cuban troops from Angola. President dos Santos of the MPLA and Savimbi of UNITA signed the Bicesse accord in 1991, laying out the country’s transition to democracy under a revamped UN mission, UNAVEM II. The plan for the UNPKO was to hold elections, under the assumption that they would lead to peace, and then leave in the following days.

1Personal Interview, former US Diplomat to Angola, 2015.
2French 2002
4Strangely, no chapter is cited in this resolution
5Personal Interview, former US Diplomat to Angola, 2015.
In 1992, Angola held elections. Both sides had promised to participate in the new government, leading the UN to optimistically and pre-emptively begin discussions on repositioning UNAVEM elsewhere in the world.\(^6\) UNITA performed poorly in the first round of elections, much to the surprise of the USA, the UK, and to Savimbi himself, who subsequently declared the elections unfair and returned to war.\(^7\) It was difficult to refute UNITA’s accusations due to a lack of election observers. However, according to one UN DPKO Officer, it is more likely that Savimbi overestimated his own popularity.\(^8\) While the pre-election demobilization effort largely failed because both sides maintained their own armies, handing in only old and obsolete weapons, the MPLA demobilized to a larger degree than UNITA, giving UNITA the initial advantage.\(^9\) After two more years of fighting, another agreement was reached in November 1994. The Lusaka peace accord was signed with UNITA once again in a position of weakness.\(^10\)

The UNSC authorized UNAVEM III with 7,000 troops in February of 1995, but deployment was slow until an especially cooperative meeting between UNITA’s Savimbi and dos Santos.\(^11\) Soon thereafter, Savimbi accepted a peace deal that would make him the Vice President of a unified country.\(^12\) The national unity government was officially formed in April 1997. UNITA had 70 members in the national assembly and four cabinet posts, including the important position of Minister of Health; Savimbi assumed the title “Official


\(^8\)Personal Interview, UN DPKO Officer, 2013.


\(^10\)Oxford Analytica 1994

\(^11\)Oxford Analytica 1995

\(^12\)Meyer 1995
Leader of the Opposition” and received a salary, housing, body guards, and official press privileges.\(^\text{13}\)

The new agreement called for only UNITA’s disarmament. Keeping with the agreement, UNITA did send soldiers to the disarmament camps; however, UNITA kept its best resources hidden along with its command posts and communications network.\(^\text{14}\) As for the disarmed soldiers, UNITA may have viewed disarmament it as a chance for troops to rest and eat well before rearming.\(^\text{15}\)

With the unity government formed in April, the UN transitioned from UNAVEM III to the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (Mission d’Observation des Nations Unies à l’Angola - MONUA) in June 1997. Shortly thereafter, the UN expressed frustration over UNITA’s lack of compliance and increase in violence. In June 1998, the UN authorized MONUA under Chapter VII to freeze the economic assets of UNITA. The situation continued to deteriorated throughout the year. The government asked the UN to stop working with Savimbi and then later requested an early end to MONUA, reportedly so that the government could pursue an all-out war with UNITA.\(^\text{16}\) Figure 6.1 shows the UN’s withdrawal in 1999.\(^\text{17}\)

With the UN removed, the conflict resumed. In May 1999, UNITA, funded with diamond wealth, launched a counter offensive that took control of over half of the country, but the gains were short lived.\(^\text{18}\) The government learned from past mistakes and took control of UNITA’s political headquarters and main airstrip in November 1999. By then, the military situation had shifted greatly, and UNITA was forced to resort to guerrilla tactics.\(^\text{19}\)

In 2001 the government put forth a four-point peace plan, an amnesty program, and an election schedule, all of which included UN involvement. The UN sent planning missions in September 2001 and January 2002 to devise a plan of action. However, the situation changed again following the combat death of Savimbi in February 2002. The government

\(^{13}\) Oxford Analytica 1997
\(^{14}\) Oxford Analytica 1996
\(^{15}\) Spears 1999
\(^{17}\) Peacekeeper data from Kathman 2013
\(^{18}\) Oxford Analytica 1999, 2002
\(^{19}\) S/2000/23
ceased offensive actions as UNITA settled its internal power vacuum. In April UNITA signed a cease fire and a memorandum of understanding which included the UN provision of military observers and technical support.\textsuperscript{20} The UN established the United Nations Mission to Angola (UNMA) in August 2002 without a chapter designation. The mission lasted until February 2003, when the Secretary General reported that all political tasks were complete.\textsuperscript{21}

### 6.1.2 Analysis of UNPKO effects

According to my theory, governments use peacekeeping missions to shift the terms of peace in their favor. The Angola case seems to challenge this concept as the rebel group, UNITA, often exploited the complacent United Nations peacekeeping missions to UNITA’s benefit. Even though Savimbi was confident that he would win the 1992 elections (as was the United

\textsuperscript{20} Oxford Analytica 2002 S/2002/483

\textsuperscript{21} Xinhua 2003
States), UNITA stock piled weapons and kept forces ready as voting day approached. The small percentage of UNITA forces that did report to UN supervised camps continued to function as organized and disciplined units. Savimbi even went so far as to announce publicly that he would not accept any election results that did not name him the victor. In this case, UNAVEM II made little effort to raise the material costs of a return to conflict as it was notoriously understaffed and backed by an uninterested Security Council. If it did raise the costs of conflict at all it was through reputation; following the election, the Security Council accused Savimbi of re-instigating violence, and he subsequently accused them of damaging his credibility. The following year, Savimbi complained that his opposition had hardened their position because of the UN’s condemnation; however, Savimbi again became supportive of the UN presence when UNITA was in a weaker position.

After the 1994 Lusaka peace agreement, the sides cooperated during the gradual demobilization of troops and the negotiations regarding Savimbi’s title in the unified government suggested cooperation. However, sources suggest that only Savimbi’s lowest quality troops demobilized and used the UN camp as a place for free meals and a retreat from the harsh life of a rebel. Savimbi never really bought into the peace agreement and did not trust the government; the government’s offensive right before formally signing the Lusaka agreement only confirmed his suspicions.

Throughout this period, UNITA repeatedly violated the agreements. The UN and the international community discussed Savimbi’s broken promises, UNITA’s radio attacks on against the Special Representative of the Secretary General Margaret Anstee, and the build-

\[\text{References}\]

22. Spikes 1993; Brittain 1998
23. Brittain 1998
24. de Oliveira 2011
28. Spears 1999
up of UNITA troops even as Savimbi spoke of peace.\textsuperscript{29} Up until 1997 the United Nations had largely accepted UNITA’s malfeasance, reassuring Savimbi and signaling to the MPLA to lower its expectations of UN support.\textsuperscript{30} In 1997, however, the UN’s patience expired and it began expressing frustration with UNITA, which later developed into blaming Savimbi for the conflict and eventually imposing sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.\textsuperscript{31}

UNITA certainly took advantage of weak UN involvement and exploited it in numerous ways, but MPLA was also able to capitalize on UN involvement. It is possible that Savimbi would have agreed to hold elections even without the UN if he intended to ignore any unfavorable results. However, the UN’s declaration that the election should be considered generally free and fair undermined Savimbi’s image as a defender of democracy and compromised his reputation in the United States and Europe.\textsuperscript{32} Savimbi made the mistake of overestimating his chances in the election, assuming that he would win if the contest was free and fair.\textsuperscript{33} Part of this confidence may have been self-delusion, but other parties did agree that Savimbi be victorious. A more likely explanation is that Savimbi did not account for the incumbent advantages enjoyed by the MPLA, such as access to the state run media and control of the administrative process.\textsuperscript{34}


\textsuperscript{30}Brittain 1998

The exception is Russia, who in 1993 called for the Security Council to make it make it clear that UNITA was to blame and that Savimbi wanted to destroy Angola and the UN. “Security Council: Report on Activities”, 5 March 1993, in file Department of Political Affairs (DPA) 1993-1993, S-1082-0033-01, United Nations Archives.


The Security Council gave UNITA a 10 day ultimatum to engage in the peace process or face sanctions in what the US called a “trumpet call to peace.” At the end of those the US requested giving UNITA one last chance, but the rest of the council argued that if UNITA couldn’t act in ten days, it probably won’t act in two.


\textsuperscript{32}S/24683, Kraft 1992; Philadelphia Newspapers 1992

\textsuperscript{33}Kraft 1992

\textsuperscript{34}Pearce 2005; Messiant 2004
of establishing riot police, rigging the election, using fake polling stations, and committing general fraud.\footnote{35}

The electoral loss marked the beginning of UNITA’s isolation from the international community, a sharp turn from the Western support it had enjoyed as a counter to the USSR-supported MPLA. While UNITA was able to violate the peace accord without immediate punishment, the damage done to its reputation left UNITA without international support. By exercising patience and cooperating with the UN, the MPLA could then justify asking the United Nations to leave in 1999 in order to pursue an unlimited war without objection. Even after the government requested the departure of the UN, the international body still consolidated UNITA’s pariah status\footnote{36} This is not to say that the MPLA followed its obligations without fault, but it was able to use its position to subvert its obligations discretely. One UN official is quoted as saying, “UNITA violated the agreement by day, the government by night.”\footnote{37}

When drawing conclusions from this case, it is important to consider the overconfidence of Savimbi. A US Diplomat to Angola described the ways in which Savimbi terrified everyone, creating a personality driven conflict.\footnote{38} As mentioned before, he overestimated his chances in the elections. Likewise, he also overestimated his ability to achieve a military victory, which explains why he turned down the significant concessions he would have received in peace deals in 1992 and 1995. According to one UN DPKO Official, Savimbi’s overconfidence was based on his belief that his effort was backstopped by US and South Africa support.\footnote{39} Clearly these supports were ineffective, but how much does the outcome of this case depend on Savimbi’s confidence? For example, if he had taken a settlement deal, could he have led his opposition party to electoral victory? As we shall see in the case of Cambodia, it is difficult for an opposition leader who is brought into government to get control of the

\footnotetext{36}{de Oliveira 2011}
\footnotetext{37}{Messiant 2004}
\footnotetext{38}{Personal Interview, 2015.}
\footnotetext{39}{Personal Interview, UN DPKO Officer, 2013.}
state instruments of power, but perhaps if Savimbi had accepted a deal early, prior to losing credibility at home and abroad, he could have eventually achieved the presidency.

At the end of the conflict, the MPLA bested UNITA and solidified its hold on Angola. As one history of the war puts it, “Under the smokescreen of war, the constitution was sidelined in a way that helped to concentrate power in the hands of Jos Eduardo dos Santos.”

Furthermore, the MPLA used the strong presidency to privatize public resources for its own profit. The UN continued to serve the MPLA towards this end with a humanitarian presence that aided the poor and hungry, a mandate that the MPLA neither wanted nor could fulfill. The MPLA’s strategy also won what is described as its international struggle for recognition.

Consider the likely outcomes if Angola had not consented to a UNPKO. Assuming they still held elections, Savimbi would have likely resorted to violence after the election returns came out against him. However, without the United Nations to verify the validity of the elections, the diplomatic costs to Savimbi would have been less drastic. Additionally, without the UN to document UNITA’s violations of the peace agreements, UNITA would have maintained its international support longer, a crucial factor in UNITA’s ability to sustain itself. With that higher level of international support, UNITA would likely have presented a greater threat to the MPLA.

If the MPLA could have emerged victorious in spite of all of this, it would have been worse off in one aspect compared to the actual outcome. Without adhering to the international community’s rules and appearing to embrace the pursuit of peace, dos Santos could have easily been characterized as a corrupt, war-hungry dictator of a faux-democracy. There certainly would have been good reason to criticize the government; one author termed the MPLA’s outcome as an “authoritarian hegemonic dispensation adapted to the multiparty electoral politics.”

40 Pearce 2005
41 Messiant 2004
42 de Oliveira 2011
43 Messiant 2008
Looking back on the situation, former Assistant Secretary of State George Moose agreed that the UNPKO served to reinforce the government. In this case, three mechanisms stand out. First, the UN’s standard operating procedure of electoral competition plays to the strengths of the incumbent government. In this case, the MPLA achieved a significant victory even as UNITA expected to win. Second, resisting a UNPKO is costly for rebel groups; in this case, the cost was to UNITA’s reputation and legitimacy. Third, once the MPLA was accepted as a legitimate actor, it was able to control the UN presence by revoking its consent for a PKO, again reinforcing the importance of government consent.

6.2 Cambodia

By the time the United Nations became involved in 1991, Cambodia had already experienced decades of conflict, starting shortly after gaining independence from France in 1953. In 1970, General Lol Nol ousted Prince Norodom Sihanouk while he was visiting China and proclaimed Cambodia the Khmer Republic. From exile, Prince Sihanouk nominally led the National United Front of Cambodia (Front Uni National du Cambodge - FUNC) and allied with the Khmer Rouge, the North Vietnamese, and other actors to oppose Lol Nol’s government. The United States of America supported the Lol Nol government and eventually used half a million tons of ordnance on Cambodia, mainly against North Vietnamese and Viet Cong targets as part of the Vietnam War, but also in an attempt to hold back the FUNC.

The FUNC and Khmer Rouge took the capital in 1975, renaming the country Democratic Kampuchea, with Pol Pot as prime minister and leader of the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK). Prince Sihanouk essentially became a political prisoner and took refuge abroad after the regime sent him to speak at the UN. Pol Pot’s deadly rule brought the

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44 Personal Interview, 2015.
45 Democratic Republic of the Congo 2014
46 Shawcross 1979
phrase “killing fields” to the world’s attention and left an estimated 2 million people dead.\(^{47}\)

Border conflicts with Vietnam escalated, leading to an all-out war in 1978 which ended Pol Pot’s rule. The government of the newly named state, the People’s Republic of Kampuchea, eventually would be led by Prime Minister Hun Sen, a former Khmer Rouge member who had defected to Vietnam and helped overthrow Pol Pot.\(^{48}\)

The Hun Sen government faced a threat of three loosely allied resistance groups: Prince Sihanouk’s National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique et Coopératif - FUNCINPEC), the remaining Khmer Rouge (KR), and the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF) led by Son Sann. These groups had Western and Chinese support against the Soviet and Vietnamese supported State of Cambodia (SOC), renamed by Hun Sen in 1989. Those supports, along with Vietnam’s troop presence, decreased with the end of the Cold War.\(^{49}\)

### 6.2.1 The United Nations on Kampuchea, Pre-UNTAC

The UN condemned Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia as a clear breach of the UN charter, despite the international community’s relief at the end of the Pol Pot regime. A Security Council resolution condemning Vietnam for its act and “commending the heroic struggle being waged by Democratic Kampuchea” received 13 of 15 votes in favor but was vetoed by the USSR.\(^{50}\) However, there are no vetoes on the UN Credentials Committee advising the General Assembly on proposed delegations of member states. In the 1979 Credential Committee meeting, the USSR argued that Hun Sen’s government was the legitimate representative of Cambodia, stating that it was willing to go along with Congo’s suggestion to leave the Cambodia’s seat empty pending further review. Other committee members disagreed, saying

\(^{47}\)Conservative estimates using available electoral records put the count between 1.2 and 3.4 million. 

\(^{48}\)Democratic Republic of the Congo 2014

\(^{49}\)UN Security Council, China: draft resolution (S/13022) 11 January 1979.

\(^{50}\)UN Security Council Official Records, 2112th Meeting (S/PV.2112) 15 January 1979
that as deplorable as Pol Pot’s Democratic Kampuchea was, its credentials were in order. That year, the out-of-power Democratic Kampuchea kept the UN seat by a vote of 6 to 3.\textsuperscript{51} This same dispute arose for the next ten years, and every year the Democratic Kampuchea maintained control of the seat.\textsuperscript{52}

Throughout the 1980s, Prince Sihanouk and his allies took advantage of their UN recognition by sending a barrage of letters to the UN. For example, in 1982, Democratic Kampuchea sent letters about its successful military operations, crimes committed by the Vietnamese army, evidence that the Hun Sen regime was a puppet of Vietnam, allegations of chemical attacks by Vietnamese forces, and declarations of a new coalition government to replace Hun Sen.\textsuperscript{53} While Vietnam and the USSR submitted letters to counter some of these claims, UN recognition gave Prince Sihanouk and his allies a distinct international platform unavailable to Hun Sen’s SOC.

At this point, the four factions seemed to agree to the idea of peace, provided they each got what they wanted. Prince Sihanouk wanted a UN-supervised withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and a new coalition government in place of the SOC.\textsuperscript{54} In a 1989 interview, Hun Sen said that he was willing to incorporate Prince Sihanouk into the government as head of state (likely as a figurehead), but he stated that in no case would he accept the dismantling of the SOC. Hun Sen claimed to be open to elections, but he rejected international election observers or a UNPKO to monitor Vietnam’s withdrawal.\textsuperscript{55} The interviewer noted that when Hun Sen spoke of peace, he really was really speaking about his government staying in power.

Leading up to the deployment of a UNPKO, this dynamic continued: an outspoken Prince Sihanouk called for greater UN involvement, and the UN then asked Hun Sen and

\textsuperscript{51}UN General Assembly, Credentials of Representatives to the Thirty-Fourth Session of the General Assembly: First Report of the Credentials Committee (A/34/500 Add. 1) 20 September 1979

\textsuperscript{52}Ratliff 1999


\textsuperscript{54}UN Security Council, Letter dated 6 April 1989 from the Permanent Representative of Democratic Kampuchea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/20571) 6 April 1989

\textsuperscript{55}Weymouth 1989; UN Security Council, Letter dated 22 February 1989 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Indonesia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/20477) 22 February 1989

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the Khmer Rouge to cooperate. In 1989 the SOC welcomed a UN fact-finding mission after initial opposition. A month later, peace talks in Paris collapsed as the factions failed to reach an agreement on multiple issues, including verification of Vietnam withdrawal. Hun Sen reportedly made it clear that the UN would not be involved as long as it recognized Prince Sihanouk’s government. However Hun Sen did allow five more fact-finding missions the next year.

Prince Sihanouk, frustrated with the Khmer Rouge and SOC opposing or rejecting every plan proposed a new “Plan Sihanouk.” This plan included a strong, armed contingent of “UN Blue Helmets” drawn from the armies of the P5 and under the command of UN Secretary-General Javier de Cuellar. This UN force would be charged with neutralizing the armies of the different factions, some of which, Sihanouk warned, would likely try to violate the cease-fire. While wildly optimistic, this plan, clearly demonstrates that Prince Sihanouk saw UN involvement as a path to power, even as he declared that the plan is really for ”the small citizenry of Cambodia.”

In September of 1990, the factions agreed to the formation of the Supreme National Council (SNC) as Cambodia’s legitimate body and external representation, occupying Cambodia’s UN seat. Eventually Prince Sihanouk was named President of the SNC and resigned from his role as leader of the opposition in order to be an unbiased and non-partisan chairman. In November, the P5 agreed on a “Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict,” which included the creation of a UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). However, the four factions remained unable to reach an agreement on the UN proposal. The SOC, in particular, had three complaints. First, the SOC was concerned

57 CAMBODIA: Talks Collapse 1989
58 UN General Assembly, The Situation in Cambodia: Report of the Secretary-General (A/45/605) 10 October 1990
59 UN Security Council, Letter dated 9 April 1990 from the Chargé d’affairs a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Cambodia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/21240) 9 April 1990
60 UN Security Council, Letter dated 18 September 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Cambodia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/21788) 18 September 1990
61 UN Security Council, Letter dated 18 July 1991 from the President of the Supreme National Council of Cambodia addressed to the Secretary-General (S/22808) 18 July 1991
that by including the Khmer Rouge and ignoring the atrocities, the plan allowed the Khmer Rouge to legitimize itself. Second, the plan gave UNTAC sweeping power over five ministries, which, the SOC complained, would dismantle the current government, a key goal of the opposition factions and an unprecedented move for the UN. Third, the SOC worried that UNTAC would only have the ability to demobilize armies that were easy to find, such as the SOC forces, and not the hidden guerrilla armies of the Khmer Rouge.  

The SNC, which included Hun Sen as a representative, slowly ramped up consent for a UNPKO, first requesting a survey mission and then 200 observers. With that request, the Security Council authorized the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) peacekeeping operation. The resolution, however, failed to designate a chapter and the Secretary-General’s report recommending UNAMIC noted that it had not confirmed the commitment of all the factions.

These questions would be laid to rest, at least temporarily, when all four factions signed onto the Paris Peace Accords in 1991. The Paris Accords explicitly invited the UN to establish UNTAC with a list of recommended mandates. This included giving UNTAC control of the ministries of foreign affairs, national defense, finance, public security, and information. With this agreement in place, the UN Security Council authorized the creation of UNTAC in line with the Secretary-General’s recommendations of a military force of 15,900, a police force of 3,600, and a budget of $2 billion for the 15-month operation.

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63 UN Security Council, Letter dated 18 July 1991 from the President of the Supreme National Council of Cambodia addressed to the Secretary-General (S/22808) 18 July 1991
UN Security Council, Letter dated 24 September 1991 from the President of the Supreme National Council of Cambodia addressed to the Secretary-General (S/23605) 24 September 1991
65 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Cambodia (S/23097) 30 September 1991
67 CAMBODIA: Peace Prospects 1991
UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Cambodia (S/23613) 19 February 1992
6.2.2 The Khmer Rouge Resist

Of the UNTAC period, Benny Widyono, UNTAC’s Director for Siem Reap province, writes, “I was fascinated by how [UNTAC head] Akashi, Sihanouk, and Hun Sen, heads of the three governing entities, were engaged in an intricate dance of governance with Pol Pot, the Khmer Rouge chief, disrupting everything from his jungle redoubts.” Of the two contests of wills, it was the Khmer Rouge’s disruptions that received international attention. The Security Council’s resolutions on Cambodia during this time period repeatedly deplore or condemn the PDK’s failure to comply with its obligations. Even before UNTAC was authorized, the Khmer Rouge attacked a UN helicopter and wounded the Australian contingent’s commanding officer. These attacks escalated, including detainment of UNTAC personnel, vitriolic radio attacks inciting violence UNTAC, ransacking an UNTAC office, and a mortar and small arms attack on an UNTAC outpost. These attacks continued even as UNTAC struggled to convince the Khmer Rouge to rejoin the peace process. In one case, a commander in the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK), the PDK’s armed forces, dined with Bulgarian peacekeepers and then returned later that night with soldiers and opened fire, killing three peacekeepers.

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68 Widyono 2008, p 43
70 Reuters 1992b
UN Security Council, Letter Dated 26 April 1993 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/25669) 27 April 1993
72 UN Security Council, Letter Dated 26 April 1993 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/25669) 27 April 1993
Upon signing the peace accords, it was expected that the Khmer Rouge would cheat on its obligations, but no one expected a violent resistance of this caliber. The KR’s resistance arose from complaints that UNTAC had neglected to uphold its end of the peace accord by failing to bring the SOC government branches under UNTAC control and by allowing Vietnamese people to remain in the country. There was no evidence of the latter, but the former was certainly true. Whether the KR wanted UNTAC to leave is unclear, but KR had clearly withdrawn from the peace process. Still, they showed was no coordinated effort to force UNTAC to withdraw. Perhaps their strategy was to allow the international aid to continue and hope that it would eventually destabilize the government by fueling inequality and corruption.

Before the election, the KR cut off formal contact with UNTAC, leaving the headquarters in Phnom Pehn and dismissing the UNTAC personnel from its military headquarters.

Before leaving Khieu Samphan, the leader of the KR indicated that the KR would continue disrupting elections. The KR officially boycotted the elections and continued sporadic attacks on UNTAC election teams. NADK abused UNTAC electoral registration teams and burnt or torched the houses of UN police monitors. However, if the true intent was to prevent the election, it was not evident. Again, they may have been stalling, waiting for government corruption to erode its legitimacy. While KR waited, they kept violence levels low enough to avoid attracting further international condemnation or prevent any future domestic agreement. As a practical matter, if the KR used violence to discourage voting within its geographic reach they would mainly lose votes for FUNCINPEC, its former ally.

73 CAMBODIA: Darkening Outlook 1992
74 CAMBODIA: Threatened Peace 1992
75 CAMBODIA: Coalition Construction 1993
76 CAMBODIA: Coalition Construction 1993
79 CAMBODIA: UN Predicament 1993

119
6.2.3 The Fraught Coalition Government

The head of UNTAC, Yahushi Akashi, declared that the elections had been conducted freely and fairly. FUNCINPEC came out ahead with 45.7% of the vote compared to 38% for the SOC Cambodian People’s Party (CPP). The SOC’s pre-election intimidation and violence were not enough to overcome FUNCINPEC’s popular appeal, but Hun Sen still had leverage. The CPP threatened to reject the election results unless the UN held new voting in four provinces where the CPP perceived irregularities. The CPP mobilized its army and placed its police militia on full alert to demonstrate the severity of their claims. Fearing further violence, Prince Sihanouk reached out to both parties to find a peaceful settlement to the election crisis. Sihanouk’s first coalition government deal collapsed because the new head of FUNCINPEC, Sihanouk’s son Prince Ranariddh, had reservations that he and Hun Sen could govern together effectively. A week later, however, Prince Ranariddh agreed to a deal where he and Hun Sen were named co-presidents and Prince Sihanouk remained head of state.

With a somewhat legitimate government in place, UNTAC withdrew. The Security Council welcomed Mr. Akashi back as a hero for UNTAC’s success, applauding his “brilliant role” as a “founding person of a new state.” Cambodia’s Prime Ministers reportedly requested that UN military observers of liaison officers remain after UNTAC withdrawal but the Secretary-General thought a clean break was best, especially when there was a demand for peace-keeping services elsewhere. The Security Council ended up leaving 20 military liaisons for six months, gradually drawing down to a UN representative.

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81 CAMBODIA: Coalition Construction 1993
82 Shenon 1993b
83 Shenon 1993c
84 Shenon 1993a
years, the political dance between Hun Sen, Sihanouk, and Prince Ranariddh continued with the Khmer Rouge alternatively playing the role of public enemy and private asset. Hun Sen assumed the role of strongman with his military and institutional power base. By then, he also had an internationally recognized government with a constitution and a national assembly, two tools he learned to use effectively to outmaneuver Sihanouk\textsuperscript{88} Sihanouk tried to take full power of the country by proposing a government reorganization, but he succumbed knowing that without Hun Sen’s permission any power grab would culminate in the use of force\textsuperscript{89}.

Prince Ranariddh and the FUNCINPEC party remained frustrated with the situation. A FUNCINPEC closed door session in January 1996 often turned into attacks on Hun Sen and resolved to strive for military parity with CPP. In March, Ranariddh lamented the situation, referring to himself as the first puppet prime minister and warning that FUNCINPEC would rather withdraw than continue to betray the government and the Khmer People. They went back to Widyono, now the Secretary General’s Political Representative to Cambodia, to check for any clauses in the Paris Accords to force the CPP to share power. However, the Paris Accords contained so such article as they had expected a straightforward election with a winner\textsuperscript{90}.

The tension came to a head July 5th, 1996. According to Alvaro de Soto, the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, both CPP and FUNCINPEC had been mobilizing and positioning their forces during the month before. FUNCINPEC was also negotiating with the Khmer Rouge in an attempt to re-integrate them and strengthen their position, militarily and electorally, while the CPP accused FUNCINPEC of deploying Khmer Rouge into the capital. It is still not clear how it started, but at some point the fighting commenced and continued until Hun Sen’s forces took control of the city two days later. Prince Ranariddh was in France at the time and publicly called the incident a coup. Hun Sen, who had

\textsuperscript{88} Widyono 2008, p 165
\textsuperscript{89} Widyono 2008, p 160, 163
\textsuperscript{90} Widyono 2008, p 214-216
been away on vacation when the fighting started, labeled Ranariddh a traitor and called on FUNCINPEC to name a new First Prime Minister. This lent enough support to Hun Sen’s claim that this was not an attempt to overthrow the government to give the international community pause.\footnote{As quoted by Widyono 2008, pp 254-256} Hun Sen also invited international scrutiny of the regime and pledged to hold elections in an effort to ease international concern, which was enough for Sihanouk to signal acceptance of Hun Sen’s authority.\footnote{Smith 1997} FUNCINPEC officials initially hid after the violence, but with Hun Sen’s reassurances many FUNCINPEC ministers and parliament members returned to work and elected Ung Huot to replace Prince Ranariddh.\footnote{Widyono 2008, pp 260}

In the 1998 elections, the CPP won 41.1\% of the vote to FUNCINPEC’s 31.7\%. This left CPP short of the number of seats needed to form a new government, and the other main parties refused to accept the election results creating another electoral crisis. Again, King Sihanouk brokered a coalition government, this time with Hun Sen as the sole prime minister and naming Prince Ranariddh, who had returned to Cambodia with a pardon by Sihanouk, as President of the National Assembly. The 2003 election had similar results, but by 2008 Hun Sen had enough votes to rule without negotiating a coalition deal.\footnote{Democratic Republic of the Congo 2014}

### 6.2.4 Analysis

The case of Cambodia is unique since in most states, the internationally recognized government controls the state. In Cambodia, the international community recognized the government of Prince Sihanouk in exile while the government of Hun Sen controlled the state, and both governments wanted what the other had. Which side would benefit more from a UNPKO? As the internationally recognized government, Prince Sihanouk’s power of consent should allow it to accept only a self-beneficial UNPKO. However, with control of the state institutions, Hun Sen’s regime could benefit from the material resources and international legitimacy provided by the UN.
In the long term, Hun Sen’s government was the clear winner. As Widyono writes, “In 1979 the troika of Hun Sen, Heng Samrin, and Chea Sim established the People’s Republic of Cambodia. In 2006, they again ruled as prime minister, National Assembly president, and Senate president. It was like nothing changed, except now their government was recognized by the whole world with a pledge of $601 million from the world bank.”\(^95\) In the UN, after years of the CPP and FUNCINPEC sharing Cambodia’s seat, it was left empty in 1997, then filled by the CPP in 1998 after Hun Sen’s electoral victory\(^96\) Hun Sen’s reputation suffered when he resorted to force, though he was able to minimize the fallout by waiting for a situation where both leaders were culpable. The US only suspended aid for 30 days, Australia suspended military aid but not civil aid, and Japan and France did not express disapproval. China actually appeared sympathetic to Hun Sen\(^97\) In the end, Hun Sen won his legitimacy.

However, Sihanouk was able to return to Cambodia and FUNCINPEC did win a popular vote, gain control of a large share of congress, and have a co-prime minister for four years. It is somewhat puzzling that the CPP, with all its institutional might and advantages, was unable to win the election outright\(^98\) This may be due to the UN largely running the election itself rather than relying on the pre-existing SOC structure. The 1998 election, by comparison, had more reports of fraud and saw the CPP win by a large margin\(^99\)

Ultimately FUNCINPEC failed to take power. FUNCINPEC had hoped that the Hun Sen government would collapse under the burden to legitimate rule and turn to Prince Sihanouk for help, making Sihanouk the savior of the nation\(^100\) The SOC did not collapse, however, leaving FUNCINPEC in an no-win situation made tolerable to FUNCINPEC leaders by their share of the foreign aid that poured in\(^101\) That said, FUNCINPEC’s gains in

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\(^{95}\) Widyono 2008, p 276

\(^{96}\) Ratliff 1999

\(^{97}\) Widyono 2008, p 258, 261-262

\(^{98}\) Doyle and Suntharalingam 1994


\(^{101}\) Widyono 2008, p 165-166

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political power remained hollow without the necessary institutional power to effect change or the military power to back it up.

In some ways the Khmer Rouge’s decision to withdraw from the peace process was vindicated. They were right that UNTAC failed to take control of the SOC government and that the SNC never gained the power to fulfill its mandates from the Paris Accords. At one point, the DKP proposed a 4-week demobilization schedule where the DKP would demobilize larger shares of troops and the Phnom Party would demobilize government ministries, with the SNC and UNTAC taking over.

From the UN’s perspective, the unachievable mandates were necessary for any chance of peace. On the SOC’s continued control of state structures, Goulding writes, “UNTAC cannot be held responsible. The task of controlling SOC was an impossible one and SG Pérez de Cuéllar knew it, but to leave that goal out of the Paris Accords may have meant no agreement at all. Better to have an impossible peace agreement and hope for the best than to have no peace agreement.” By including this goal, the Paris Accord was able to appease FUNCINPEC, but because the agreement had no enforcement mechanism for non-compliance the SOC was still willing to go along with it.

Once the agreement was in place, UNTAC and the UN thought that dislodging the SOC, the only real administrative structure in most of the country, would cause more harm than good. As Mr. Akashi told the Secretary-General, the existing administrative structures had to function if complete chaos was to be avoided. Responding to the KR’s accusations

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104 Goulding 2002, p 254-255

105 Widyono 2008, p 83


that the UN was biased in favor of the SOC, Goulding writes that positioning UNTAC headquarters in Phnom Pehn alongside the SOC’s apparatus led to “an inevitable tendency to deal with the Phnom Pehn regime as the government of Cambodia” (original emphasis).\textsuperscript{108} UNTAC often depended on SOC to operate, even borrowing their radio transmitter to start broadcasting UNTAC radio.\textsuperscript{109}

Looking back, Goulding places UNTAC somewhere in the middle of the UNPKO success scale. He acknowledges that the KR insurgency continued, and the country experienced what he calls “unconstitutional episodes,” but Goulding also credits the UN with the cessation of a war fueled by major power, the return of hundreds of thousands of refugees, new human rights organizations, and democratic elections; Goulding concludes, “The success is not yet total, but it is a success.”\textsuperscript{110} Goulding is certainly biased, but UN scholars generally agree.\textsuperscript{111}

It is difficult to imagine how the situation would have developed without a UN presence, but it seems misleading to call Cambodia a UN success. If anything, the UN empowered FUNCINPEC enough to pose a challenge to the Hun Sen regime’s control of the state. After the UN left, FUNCINPEC’s challenge turned violent and Hun Sen prevailed, securing his rule for the next 20 years.

\section*{6.3 Conclusion}

As two cases in which the government faced a significant rebel threat, Angola and Cambodia are well-suited for testing how a UNPKO can shift power and for indicating how great that shift can be. In Angola, President dos Santos successfully eroded the international legitimacy of UNITA and its leader Savimbi through patient cooperation and electoral success. While


\textsuperscript{110} Goulding 2002, p 265

\textsuperscript{111} Doyle and Sambanis classify UNTAC as a success, and in Fortna’s dataset of peace agreements and cease-fires, Cambodia is coded as a peace agreement that never failed under a UNPKO. (Doyle 2006; Fortna 2008, p 209-223)
the UNPKO did not augment the government’s military capabilities, the effects on legitimacy helped weaken UNITA to the point where dos Santos felt confident enough to ask the UN to withdraw and to let the government finish the conflict on the battle field. Table 6.1 contains the breakdown of motives, relationships, and mechanisms for these two case studies.

Table 6.1: Case Study Questions: Angola and Cambodia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government Motives for UNPKO</th>
<th>dos Santos</th>
<th>Sihanouk (gov)</th>
<th>Hun Sen (state)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- To secure peace</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- To stay in power</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power Mechanisms of UNPKO</th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Military Effect</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Material Gains</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- International Legitimacy</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Shift to Elections</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Informational Advantage</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rebel relationship with UNPKO
- Attitude towards UNPKO presence | Negative | Negative |
- Ability to act on preference    | Limited   | Unrealized |

The motivations of each actor are difficult to tease out in the case of Angola. From Savimbi’s rejection of any peace deal, it follows that he would settle for nothing less than control of the country. UNITA was able to slow the deployment of UNAVEM III, but its verbal attacks on the operation and the Special Representative had no real impact except to damage its reputation further. For dos Santos, the UNPKO may have represented a path to peace given the substantial concessions that dos Santos offered Savimbi. Finally, after eight years of cooperating with the UNPKO, dos Santos did use force to end the conflict, but only after Savimbi had made it clear that there was no other way.

In Cambodia, peace was the goal for both Sihanouk and Hun Sen as long as it mean they were in power. What is unique about this case is that the internationally recognized government ruled in exile. Where most governments seek a UNPKO to stay in power, Sihanouk wanted to use a UNPKO to take power. Through UNTAC, Sihanouk saw significant gains. Sihanouk returned to Cambodia politics as a sort of head of state, and his son Prince Ranariddh took over his political party and won a majority in the elections.
by threatening violence did Hun Sen achieve a deal where he and Prince Ranariddh were named co-Prime Ministers.

Ultimately, however, Sihanouk and UNTAC were unable to take control of the state structure from Hun Sen and the SOC. Hun Sen did wait until the UN left to retake complete control of the government, which suggests that UNTAC’s presence may have deterred Hun Sen from using force. In exchange for temporarily cooperating with UNTAC (or at least for tolerating UNTAC) Hun Sen was able to legitimize his regime and make significant gains in foreign aid. He was even able to earn a seat at the UN.

A final point from Cambodia is that while Hun Sen and Sihanouk were the main contenders for power, UNTAC was focused on the Khmer Rouge and on trying to bring them into the process. The Khmer Rouge withdrew itself from the peace process and showed some resistance through sporadic attacks, but it never made a concerted effort to force UNTAC’s departure. If the Khmer Rouge had organized its attacks, there is a good chance that UNTAC would have left, but the likely outcome then would have been for Hun Sen to retake full control of the government and for the SOC and Khmer Rouge to remain in a stalemate.
Chapter 7

Conclusion

This dissertation examines the effects of UN peacekeeping on the power distribution between a government and rebel groups. I argue that host government consent is a necessary condition for a UNPKO, which gives host governments the ability to select into UNPKOs that they believe will benefit them in terms of power. Indeed, civil war leaders that receive a UNPKO have longer tenures than leaders that do not.

To understand the relationship between UNPKOs and government power, I examine the role of UNPKOs in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Angola, and Cambodia. In many of these cases, I find that the government’s motives for a UNPKO involved some combination of peace and power, with some leaders, such as Mobutu, clearly focused on the power implications, and others, like Dos Santos, seemingly willing to give up some amount of power in exchange for peace.

If governments are using UNPKOs to gain a power advantage, why are rebel groups not resisting them? It turns out they do resist, just not always directly. In the DRC, the ADFL removed the refugee population and prevented the deployment of a UNPKO authorized to deal with the refugee crisis. In other cases, rebel groups withheld or delayed the use of force when a UNPKO was present. In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge withdrew from the peace process and attacked peacekeepers several times, but it never organized systematic violence against the UNPKO, perhaps because it wanted to maintain foreign and domestic credibility.
Hun Sen was willing to take control of the government by force, but he waited until the UN had left and the international community had redirected their interests elsewhere.

The cases explore the different mechanisms through which governments can benefit from a UNPKO. A summary of when these mechanisms appeared is listed below in Figure 7.1. These cases suggest that a UNPKO’s non-military benefits for benefits are as important, if not more important, to states than the military benefits. There also seems to be a pattern wherein states benefit most in the areas in which they need the most help. This could be partially due to measurement issues, as it is difficult to assess benefits in areas where a government is already doing well, but it also fits with the selection story. It seems unlikely that Sihanouk would have consented to a UNPKO that offered additional international legitimacy but lacked military support.

Table 7.1: Power Mechanisms of UNPKOs

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>J Kabila</th>
<th>Dos Santos</th>
<th>Sihanouk</th>
<th>Hun Sen</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Military Effect</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>- Material Gains</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Informational Advantage</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Cambodia case is especially interesting for distinguishing how a UNPKO benefits an internationally recognized government versus whoever controls a state’s institutions. In this case, gains in resources and international legitimacy from a UNPKO seem to go to the state regime more than the recognized government. This finding makes sense given a UNPKO’s dependence on the state structures to provide standard public goods. The informational advantage story did not come out in my research, however this may also be an issue of research measurement. Covert information gathering efforts by states, if done right, will remain covert.
7.1 Lessons for International Relations

Understanding that host nation consent is a necessary condition for UNPKO deployment shines a new light on previous studies of peacekeeping. First, it calls into question attempts to study the effects of UNPKOs by comparing conflicts with UNPKOs and conflicts without. In any study on the effects of UNPKOs, we cannot say whether the effect is due to the UNPKO or due to another factor related to the government’s decision to give consent in the first place. The endogeneity issue cannot be overcome by controlling for conflict characteristics or by using matching, at least not without further research into the origins of government consent.

Second, this dissertation helps us to understand conflict processes by clarifying the relationship between the UN and the belligerents, particularly the government, and by highlighting the differences in preferences between the actors. For example, in her research on whether UNPKOs can help maintain a ceasefire, Fortna (2008) codes the case of Angola as a failure with a UNPKO present, implying that UNPKOs fail to maintain peace. However, from the perspective of Angola’s President Dos Santos, the UNPKO was a great success in that it set him up for a military victory and a long reign. When studying UNPKO effects and conflict outcomes, we must understand that the UN and the host government have different goals that do not always align, and the host government is able to decide whether the UN achieves its goal by controlling UNPKO deployment and duration.

Third, this dissertation challenges how we apply formal analyses of conflict interventions to UNPKOs. In game models, unbiased interventions are formalized by having their utility dependent on whether fighting continues and unrelated to the utilities of the belligerents. While I still agree that a UNPKO is different from a clearly biased intervention such as NATO’s support for the Afghan government or against the Libyan government, we cannot treat a UNPKO as an impartial intervention either, at least not in terms of its effects. One way to capture this is to incorporate the UNPKO’s dependence on host consent by allowing

\[1\] More precisely, Fortna (2008) divides the Angola conflict into 5 periods, each with UN peacekeeping present and two of them marked as cease-fire failures.
the host government to veto or to remove a UNPKO, or by allowing a UNPKO to propose an intervention with certain effects that the host government can choose to accept or refuse.

7.2 Policy Implications

What are the policy implications of this research? Does it matter if host governments use UNPKOs to stay in power? Maybe such an effect is useful or even desirable for the UN or the international community, or perhaps it is a regrettable but unavoidable side effect of peace-securing UNPKOs. I argue that the use of UNPKOs as a means of ensuring power does indeed matter, but there is no easy alternative model to turn to.

7.2.1 Problems with Pro-Government PKOs

There are several scenarios where government-supporting UNPKOs can be problematic. The most obvious is the case of poor governance. Poor governance is easier to define as the opposite of good governance. What good governance means is still debated but some common themes have emerged. The UN High Commission for Human Rights identifies five key traits of good governance: Transparent, Responsible, Accountable, Participatory, and Responsive.\(^2\)

If a host government with none of these traits requests a UNPKO, it seems problematic if a side-effect of that UNPKO is to keep that government in power. A UNPKO could allow such a regime to move even further from good governance, as it can depend on the UNPKO to keep it in power and reallocate government resources, plus increased foreign assistance, for personal gain and patronage. Besides the negative impact this may have on the country’s future, the UN pays a cost in reputation and credibility, two of its main assets, as government actions reflect back on the UN. In the DRC, as the UNPKO worked closer with the national army, the UN became guilty by association with the army’s human rights abuses.\(^3\)

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\(^3\)Personal interview, Senior Official in UN Dept. of Field Support, 2013.
Formal models of mediation suggest that the pro-government benefits of UNPKOs may also hinder its ability to achieve a peace. Rauchhaus (2006) finds that impartial mediators outperform biased mediators. Favretto (2009) agrees that unbiased mediators are better than slightly biased mediators, but adds that strongly biased interventions that use force also perform well. The insight from Kydd (2003) is especially troublesome; he finds that belligerents will only adhere to a mediator’s advice to show restraint when the belligerent thinks the mediator is a friend. If this is true, then rebels that perceive a UNPKO to be favoring the government are less likely to trust calls to disarm, as was the case of the Khmer Rouge. However, Svensson (2007) argues that government-biased mediators help achieve negotiated settlements, but this argument depends on the questionable assumption that governments sacrifice more in any negotiated settlement than rebels.

7.2.2 Holding Peace Hostage

If there are negative consequences of a UNPKO benefiting a government, then why not change UNPKOs to make them more equitable? Or, alternatively, why not leverage those benefits by threatening to withhold or to withdraw the operation if the government fails to meet certain requirements? The problem is the United Nations sees withdrawing or withholding a peacekeeping operation as undesirably costly in many dimensions. Foremost, the UN believes in the counter-factual that no matter how bad a situation appears, it would have been worse without a PKO.\(^4\) There are several elements at play in this belief. First is the assumption that the United Nations makes a difference. One former UN Ambassador used the phrase “Turtle Bay Vision” to describe the UN’s belief that it can create reality.\(^5\) Once the United Nations gets involved in a situation, it becomes sensitive to continued destruction and bloodshed, either out of a deep sense of morality or out of dedication to the UN Charter’s mandates of ending conflict. These two dynamics are captured well by Cape Verde’s comments to the Security Council regarding the two options for Angola after the a

\(^4\)Personal interview, UN MONUSCO Officer, 2013
\(^5\)Personal Interview, former UN Ambassador, 2013.
peace agreement proved impossible: let the two parties fight it out, or pick the side meeting UN requirements and support it “in bringing peace to the country.” Between these choices, Cape Verde argued the first had to be rejected due to further devastation and because the UN had made clear that there was no military option. Better to sacrifice the neutrality of the UN than for a country to further suffer the ravages of war.

Another important element is the temporal focus on the past or present and less so on the future, particularly the distant future. Soon after UNAVEM’s start, Boutros Boutros-Ghali relayed a conversation with President Dos Santos, “The President remarked that even if both sides agreed to a military presence on the ground, the question remained of what would happen in the long term. He understood that the primary goal was to stop the bloodshed now, but wondered what would follow thereafter.” This sort of contemplation about the future is often put aside because the primary goal is pressing; specifically, the UNPKO has to be there to stop the bloodshed now. A MONUSCO officer echoed this sentiment, explaining that no one thinks about long-term solutions.

Beyond the mission at hand, the UN also fears spillover effects and reputation costs of withdrawing a PKO. During UNAVEM II, the Russian delegate often raised the prospect of a domino effect to justify increasing the operation’s troop level. The reasoning was that if the UN failed in Angola, it would have detrimental effects on the missions in Bosnia, Cambodia, and Somalia. Reputation costs were also at stake in Angola. At one Security

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8 Personal Interview with UN MONUSCO Office, 2013.
Council meeting, the Brazil delegate warned that UN prestige would suffer seriously if Angola descended into further chaos.\(^{11}\)

Once habits have been set, they can become difficult to change for a variety of reasons. Institutions develop, and networks are solidified. Those that benefit from common practice are empowered and are able to resist change. In the case of Angola, the Secretary General once boldly recommended that the Security Council allow UNAVEM II to expire if the factions could not reach an agreement. The delegates were outraged at the idea. Different members called it alarming and far-fetched, saying that UNPKOs in Bosnia and Cambodia continued even as parties could not reach an agreement. New Zealand said that allowing UNAVEM II to expire would be “a gross dereliction of duty to allow this sort of differentiated treatment.”\(^{12}\)

I also found interesting dynamics at the ground level of a peacekeeping operation. In her book *The Trouble with the Congo*, Autesserre raises the issue of UN and diplomat culture to explain UN behavior towards Kabila. A key duty for diplomats is to maintain good relations with a host government. As one MONUC official explained to her, “Instinctively, as a diplomat, you are taught that you don’t argue with presidents.” The higher the official, the more deference is shown, so even though the President and Vice Presidents in Angola’s Transitional Government were constitutionally equivalent, MONUC staff were especially careful not to pressure President Kabila.\(^{13}\) Habits are hard to change.

As issues develop between faction leaders and the prospect for a peace agreement fades, the in-country UN staff is often still a proponent for a continued presence. There is a sense that even as a country falls apart, there is still something a UNPKO can do. After the United Nations concluded that there would never be a negotiated peace during the genocide

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\(^{13}\)Autesserre 2010, p 101
in Rwanda, the commander of the UN Mission Roméo Dallaire decided it was still better that the operation remain in place, at least to bear witness to the events as they unfolded.\[^{14}\]

For staff on the ground, the idea that things would be worse if they left can be especially salient, as interactions with the local populations give concrete examples of lives that the UN improved.\[^{15}\] How difficult is it to tell those local connections that the UN has decided to leave? Then again, one former Permanent Mission Advisor on Peacekeeping had a more cynical rational for why UNPKO staff may want to continue an operation that is unable to bring peace or that may have negative long term consequences. If the UNPKO leaves, the staff have to find new jobs.\[^{16}\]

### 7.3 The Intervention Brigade

As we think about UN peacekeeping in the future, it is useful to consider the ongoing trial of the UN Intervention Brigade in the DRC. Although the Security Council had downplayed the Intervention Brigade as a one-time event, it seems the natural next step for UNPKOs in terms of the rules of consent and supporting the host government. It is the option suggested by Cape Verde for situations where a peace settlement is impossible.

In 2012, the DRC’s long conflict continued with the rise of the M23 militia in Eastern Kivu. The M23 drew from former members of the CNDP dissatisfied with the implementation of the 2009 peace deal and found support from Rwanda and Uganda. The United Nations peacekeeping operation MONUC was renamed the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and given new mandates as a move towards drawing down the UN presence in light of the improving situation after the 2006 elections.\[^{17}\] The increase in violence afterwards was noted in 2012 as the Security Council extended MONUSCO’s mandate but declined to expand it.\[^{18}\] In 2013,

\[^{14}\]Dallaire 2003
\[^{15}\]Personal Interview, UN MONUSCO Officer, 2013.
however, the resolution extending MONUSCO also gave it an Intervention Brigade. In addition to the usual UNPKO tasks of monitoring the arms embargo and protecting citizens, the Intervention Brigade is tasked with “neutralizing armed groups.”

The creation of the Intervention Brigade might have been easy to overlook in a long conflict where the UN presence has become the norm, but those that did notice emphasized its importance. The Economist put it succinctly, “Almost unnoticed, the UN is about to fight its first war.” How unique is the Intervention Brigade, and what does this mean for the future of UN peacekeeping?

The United Nations has certainly undertaken more offensive measures in the past besides the cooperation with the DRC army discussed in Chapter 6. In 1950, the Security Council recommended UN members assist South Korea to repel North Korea’s invasion. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan was only authorized in 2001 by the United Nations to assist the Afghan Interim Authority to maintain security in and around Kabul and was arguably a NATO operation from the outset. In 2011, the UN Security Council authorized NATO and an international coalition to enforce a no fly zone under Chapter VII. The resolution allowed for all necessary measures to protect civilians, but specifically excluded “a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory.”

19 UN Security Council, 6973rd Meeting. Resolution 2098 (2013) (S/RES/2098(2013)) 28 March 2013. The relevant portion of the resolution is quoted for its deliberate word choice:

9. Decides to extend the mandate of MONUSCO in the DRC until 31 March 2014, takes note of the recommendations of the Special Report of the Secretary General on the DRC and in the Great Lakes Region regarding MONUSCO, and decides that MONUSCO shall, for an initial period of one year and within the authorized troop ceiling of 19,815, on an exceptional basis and without creating a precedent or any prejudice to the agreed principles of peacekeeping, include an ‘Intervention Brigade’ consisting inter alia of three infantry battalions, one artillery and one Special force and Reconnaissance company with headquarters in Goma, under direct command of the MONUSCO Force Commander, with the responsibility of neutralizing armed groups as set out in paragraph 12 (b) below and the objective of contributing to reducing the threat posed by armed groups to state authority and civilian security in eastern DRC and to make space for stabilization activities;

20 Art of darkness 2013


One of the most aggressive actions by a UNPKO may have occurred in Côte d’Ivoire in 2011. As part of Operation Unicorn, French forces in the country supported the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) that had taken over from ECOWAS in 2014. When results of the 2010 election showed incumbent president Laurent Gbagbo losing, Gbagbo declared the election void and demanded that UNOCI leave the country threatening that any UN forces that remained would be treated as rebels. In the fighting that followed UN troops regularly returned fire when attacked and, most notably, UN gunships fired on Gbagbo’s military camps and residence. Ban Ki-Moon defended the actions, saying that the UN targeted heavy weapons that had fired upon peacekeepers and civilians in Abidjan, which was within the operation’s mandate to defend itself and protect citizens. Thus, although the UN has certainly approved and been a part of more aggressive actions, the International Brigade is technically the first instance of solo offensive actions by the United Nations.

As for whether it will be effective, there is a certain optimism around the military prospects of the mission encouraged by reports that Rwanda no longer supports the rebels, that rebel defections increased, and that rebel faction leader Bosco Ntaganda’s surrendered. Still, the Intervention Brigade of only 3,000 faces a seemingly impossible task of confronting the numerous armed factions and engaging in guerrilla warfare in dangerous terrain and with undependable local allies. The resolve of the main contributors (Tanzania, Malawi, and especially South Africa) will be seriously tested.

Let us imagine, though, that the Intervention Brigade does succeed in its task. What are the implications for the DRC? Drawing from Chapter 6, as the UN operation there grows, Joseph Kabila’s regime develops more leeway in how it allocates resources. However, there have not been any indications that this additional support will lead to improvements in governance and institutions. Certainly institutions take time to develop and the DRC faces incredible challenges. With conflict continuing, despite having a UNPKO for nearly 20
years, it is hard to understand how the International Brigade will bring about any significant positive effect.

7.4 The Future of UN Peacekeeping

It is easy to be pessimistic about the United Nations, an often unwieldy organization subject to the preferences of the nearly 200 member states. As the world’s organization of states, the UN’s limited budget does not match its massive mandate to create world peace. The result is that UNPKOs are deployed to difficult conflict situations with few resources and near-impossible mandates (sometimes called “Christmas Tree Mandates”).

I have shown how UNPKOs are created, shaped, and sometimes beholden to the factions involved in the conflict. I find that historically, government consent has been a necessary condition for a UNPKO, which allows governments to select into UNPKOs that they believe will be beneficial. I show that regimes facing a civil war, on average, stay in power longer if they receive a UNPKO. In four cases, I explore these relationships and find that UNPKOs can shift power towards a government through different mechanisms depending on the most pressing needs of the government.

In this chapter, I have discussed why this state of UNPKOs is undesirable but is also so hard to change. In fact, using the Intervention Brigade as a barometer, it seems likely that UNPKOs of the future may be even more beneficial for host governments. My advice to the peacekeepers of the future is to think critically about the effects that a UNPKO can have, including effects that may develop 10 or 20 years into the future. In many cases, supporting a government with some flaws serves to end a destructive war, but sometimes the UN may be better off focusing on preventing the spread of a conflict rather than ending a conflict outright. This is a tough decision to make, and a tougher decision for a country’s population to live with, but these factors alone are not enough to disregard the conflicts of the future.

27 Personal interview, Senior Official in UN Dept. of Field Support, 2013.
Appendix A

This appendix contains a dataset of conflicts, consent, and peacekeeping, along with further information on the consent codings.

A.1 Conflict, Consent, and Peacekeeping Dataset

Table A.1 contains the universe of conflict cases as detailed in Chapter 2, the duration of the conflict (Conf Start and Conf End), the year of consent for a UNPKO, the UNPKO associated with the conflict, the duration of the PKO, and the outcome of the conflict from the government’s point of view: victory, defeat, outside regime change, a government-favoring settlement, a rebel-favoring settlement, ongoing, or no identifiable government.
## Table A.1: Conflicts, PKOs, and Outcomes by Country over Time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Conf Start</th>
<th>Conf End</th>
<th>PKO Consent</th>
<th>PKO Start</th>
<th>PKO End</th>
<th>Gov Outcome</th>
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<td>2001</td>
<td>2012</td>
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<td>ongoing</td>
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<td>Yemen - Democratic Republic of Yemen</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1994</td>
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<td>victory</td>
</tr>
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<td>Yemen - AQAP</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2012</td>
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A.2 Consent Codings

Afghanistan 1996

Afghan officials wrote numerous letters to the United Nations in 1996 concerning the presence of Pakistan commandos in Afghanistan and regarding their supporting of Taliban. In September, Afghanistan’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Najibullah Lafrā’ie requested a fact-finding mission to witness the presence of Pakistani armed groups. In October, the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Abdul Rahim Ghafoorzai, sent three letters accusing the Taliban of using chemical weapons and listing Pakistani fighters that the government had captured while fighting against the Taliban, further establishing Pakistan’s involvement. In these letters, Ghafoorzai asked the UN to monitor the border crossings and investigate the accusations against Pakistan. In November, Abdul Rahim Ghafoorzai, now the Acting Foreign Minister, argued that the Security Council was required to determine whether Pakistan had committed an act of aggression and if so to take measures against Pakistan in accordance with Chapter VII Article 39 of the UN Charter. Article 39 allows the UN to impose sanctions or use force against belligerents and is the basis for Chapter VII peacekeeping missions, often called peace enforcement missions.

In these letters, the Afghan government never explicitly requests UN peacekeepers. However, it asked for a greater UN presence, especially for monitoring the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, an activity common for Chapter VI peacekeeping missions, and for actions covered allowed under Chapter VII, Article 39. Thus, while Afghan officials never give the clear cut

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3 UN Security Council, 51st Year. Identical letters dated 4 November 1996 from the Acting Foreign Minister of Afghanistan addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council (S/1996/909) 4 November 1996.
consent for peacekeeping, since no UN deployed in this case I code this as consent in order to bias the coding against my hypothesis.

Algeria non-consent

In 1997, reports of massacres and an appeal by the rebel group FIS drew international attention to the conflict in Algeria, but the government strongly opposed to any foreign mission. In September, the Algerian government criticized UN Secretary General Kofi Annan for responding to an appeal for UN intervention to end the violence by an FIS leader. The government immediately placed the leader under house arrest, and Kofi Annan’s spokesman made a statement explaining that Annan would not call for international assistance as long as Algiers sees any UN action as interference. However, further violence led to continued calls for action.

The Algerian government ultimately budged, but not by much. It allowed a limited number of official visits and fact-finding missions. A Canadian special envoy, two EU missions, and a UN team were allowed into the country for short visits. Nevertheless, the government never consented to a larger UN presence.

Angola 1988

The Angola government signed the 1988 Gbadolite Agreement, which stipulated that the parties of the conflict would request the UN to verify the withdrawal of the Cuban troops. The government formally made this request on December 17. In the following years, the government continued to signal consent for the UN presence. In 1991, the government similarly sent a formal request that UNAVEM stay in place after the government and UNITA

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7 For further details see Section 2.3.1
signed another set of peace accords. The Secretary-General reported that during negotiations in late 1993 the government and UNITA wanted to review the UNPKO’s mandate in order to strengthen its role.

The government began expressing doubt for a UN presence in 1998 when President Jose dos Santos called for an early termination to MONUA in December in a speech to his congress. In a letter to the Secretary-General, President dos Santos stated that the “conditions for maintaining in Angola the presence of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) have ceased to exist.” Kofi Annan informed the Security Council of the government’s decision and affirmed that the UN could not stay without government consent. The Security Council asked an Angolan official for a continued UN presence, but Vice Minister for Territorial Administration Higino Carneiro turned them down. MONUA was liquidated once its mandate expired on February 26.

Azerbaijan non-consent

The Armenian populated Nagorno-Karabakh region has been a course of conflict for Azerbaijan since the country gained independence in 1991. Various actors such as US Congresswoman Barbara Boxer have called for a UN peacekeeping force. The supreme soviet of Nagorno-Karabakh asked the UN to take several actions to end the conflict including deploying peacekeepers. After an offensive where Azerbaijan killed more than 200 Armenians, the Armenian president demanded sanctions and proposed a UNPKO.

13 Leopold 1999
15 Falk 1991
16 Simmons 1992
17 NAGORNO-KARABAKH; 200 Armenians killed in Azerbaijani offensive: [Final Edition] 1992
The Azerbaijan government at times indicated some interest in a peacekeeping operation, but never gave a clear signal of consent. The government reportedly called for UN peacekeepers to patrol the Azerbaijan-Armenia border and prevent violence in Nagorno-Karabakh.\footnote{Azerbaijan calls on UN to send peacekeepers to war-wracked region 1992; Berberian 1992} However, just two weeks later, new President Yagub Mamedov clearly voiced a lack of consent for a UNPKO saying, "We are against the arrival of troops from any country, including the United Nations."\footnote{Azeri president rules out using UN monitors: [FINAL Edition] 1992} Given Russia’s interest in the conflict, it may be that Azerbaijan withheld consent assuming that Russia would veto any such operation anyway. The Commonwealth of Independent States indicated a clear resistance to third party intervention, including the United Nations.\footnote{O'Neill 1992} However, after Russia mediated a truce following the failure of another ceasefire, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev said that if this truce failed, the only alternative would be to send a UNPKO.\footnote{Ceasefire Scuttled 1992}

**Bangladesh non-consent**

The conflict in Bangladesh from 1989-1991 never appears in UN documents as summarized by the UN yearbooks. News searches similarly show no connection between the conflict and the prospect of UN peacekeepers. Negotiations between the government and the Chittagong Hill Tracts People’s Coordination Association/Peace Force (Parbattya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samiti/Shanti Bahini - JSS/SB) finally resulted in peace accords in 1997. Towards the end of these negotiations, the United People’s Party of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti - PCJSS), a political party of the Chittagong indigenous people, wanted to include the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, but the government refused\footnote{Chakma leaders seek U.N. help in Chittagong crisis 1996; Chakmas are unsure of Dhakas intentions 1997}. 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992

The government of Bosnia-Herzegovina showed clear consent for a UN peacekeeping operation in 1992. In January, President Alija Izetbegovic pressed UN Special Envoy Cyrus Vance for a UNPKO. However, in later requests, the UN appeared skeptical of such an operation. The Foreign Minister of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr. Haris Silajdzic, requested a UNPKO directly from the Security Council, but the council thought the European Community might be better suited for the job. As the violence escalated in May, the president of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic, urged the dispatch of UN peacekeepers to his republic, but UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali expressed doubts given limited resources in the face of such widespread violent. In September, the UN expanded UNPROFOR, the UNPKO in Croatia, to support the delivery of humanitarian relief and to defend safe areas.

Burundi 2003

Burundi’s prime minister Sylvie Kinigi actually called for an international intervention force in 1993 during the military coup. The UN’s special envoy responded that the request would not be considered realistic, citing the UN’s difficulties with mobilizing troops for the existing missions. In further discussions, Burundi’s Army Command indicated that it was still loyal to the government, and within days, the Prime Minister indicated that the government had re-established its authority, albeit from the French Embassy compound. Still, the government repeated its request for an international force that would “help to dispel distrust.
and reassure . . . the many displaced persons as regards their return to their home.”

The Security Council responded by asking the UN to send a fact-finding team and to explore how the UN could assist a mission by the Organization of African Unity. After OAU sent a small protection force, the Burundi government stopped requesting a UN presence. After President Ntaryamira was assassinated when his plane shot down, the government of President Ntibantunganya continued this new trend and rejected UN suggestions for a humanitarian base in Burundi or a rapid intervention force in Zaire. The government went on to deny it ever requested an intervention in the first place.

The UN continued contemplating an intervention, with the Secretary General suggesting a standby force authorized under Chapter VII. Tensions in the country prompted the President and Prime Minister to leave their offices, and the armed forces appointed Major Pierre Buyoya as President. As the UN continued exploring a possible UNPKO, the Secretary-General warned of the lack of consent.

I wish to reiterate that such an operation cannot be deployed without the consent of the parties. Although the volatile situation in Burundi is being kept under close review, the conditions necessary for the successful deployment of a peacekeeping operation do not appear at present to exist.

The conflict continued without calls for peacekeeping by either the belligerents or the international community. In the early 2000s the factions negotiated a peace agreement and a ceasefire. The 20th summit for the Great Lakes Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi was attended by representatives of Burundi’s transitional government and the CNDD-FDD rebel

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29 UN Security Council. Note By The President of the Security Council (S/26757) 16 November 1993.
group, but not by the Palipehutu-FNL, the other significant rebel faction.\textsuperscript{34} In May 2004, the Security Council authorized the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) under Chapter VII. Within the resolution, the Council noted that the Palipehutu-FNL had not yet ceased hostilities or reached an agreement with the transitional Government.\textsuperscript{35}

**Cambodia 1991**

Cambodia presents a strange case where the government recognized by the UN, that of the Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique et Coopératif (FUNCINPEC) led by Prince Sihanouk, was different from the State of Cambodia (SOC) regime led by Hun Sen that controlled the state structures. Prince Sihanouk strongly supported a UNPKO to supervise the withdrawal of Vietnam.\textsuperscript{36} In this case, the UN waited until it had the consent of Hun Sen as well, who had long declared that the UN would not be involved as long as it recognized Prince Sihanouk’s government.\textsuperscript{37}

In September 1990, FUNCINPEC, SOC, and two other armed groups, the Khmer Rouge (KR) and the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF), agreed to the formation of the Supreme National Council (SNC) as Cambodia’s legitimate body and external representation, occupying Cambodia’s UN seat.\textsuperscript{38} Eventually Prince Sihanouk was named President of the SNC and resigned his role as leader of the opposition in order to be an unbiased and non-partisan chairman.\textsuperscript{39}

The SNC, which included Hun Sen as a representative, slowly ramped up consent for a UNPKO, first requesting a survey mission and then 200 observers.\textsuperscript{40} With that request, the


\textsuperscript{36} UN Security Council, *Letter dated 6 April 1989 from the Permanent Representative of Democratic Kampuchea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General* (S/20571) 6 April 1989

\textsuperscript{37} CAMBODIA: Talks Collapse 1989.

\textsuperscript{38} UN Security Council, *Letter dated 18 September 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Cambodia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General* (S/21788) 18 September 1990

\textsuperscript{39} UN Security Council, *Letter dated 18 July 1991 from the President of the Supreme National Council of Cambodia addressed to the Secretary-General* (S/22808) 18 July 1991

\textsuperscript{40} UN Security Council, *Letter dated 18 July 1991 from the President of the Supreme National Council of Cambodia addressed to the Secretary-General* (S/22808) 18 July 1991

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Security Council authorized the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) peacekeeping operation. However, the resolution, failed to designate a chapter and the Secretary-General’s report recommending UNAMIC noted that it had not confirmed the commitment of all the factions. These questions would be laid to rest, at least temporarily, when all four factions signed onto the Paris Peace Accords in 1991. The Paris Accords explicitly invited the UN to establish the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) with a list of recommended mandates. This included giving UNTAC control of the ministries of foreign affairs, national defense, finance, public security, and information.

While UNTAC faced many challenges during its existence, of particular note was the Khmer Rouge’s withdrawal from the peace process. However, the KR did not make a coordinated effort to force UNTAC to withdraw. KR’s strategy may have been to allow the international aid to continue in the hopes that it destabilizes the coalition government by fueling inequality and corruption. The Khmer Rouge went on to boycott the elections and attack UNTAC election teams and civilians. Yet, despite this animosity, UNTAC remained until elections were completed and a new government was in place. For further detail on this case, see section 6.2.1.

Chad 2007

In 2007, the Secretary General informed the Security Council that Chad agreed to the deployment of a UN force although President Déby had reservations about a military compo-

UN Security Council, Letter dated 24 September 1991 from the President of the Supreme National Council of Cambodia addressed to the Secretary-General (S/23605) 24 September 1991
42 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Cambodia (S/23097) 30 September 1991
43 Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, concluded in Paris, 23 October 1991. [UN chief wants 26,000 peacekeepers in Cambodia: [NORTH SPORTS FINAL, C Edition]
Chad’s Minister Foreign Affairs, Ahmad Allam-Mi contacted the Secretary-General to emphasize the government’s consent for a humanitarian protection police.

The mission ended in 2010 when the Government of Chad requested the withdrawal of MINURCAT citing improved security. The government had always been suspicious of MINURCAT, especially the military components. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon was concerned about the withdrawal due to the ongoing humanitarian situation. Reflecting on the MINURCAT experience, Ban said that the consent of the host government must be nurtured even when freely given, as it can be withdrawn just as quickly if situations change.

Colombia non-consent

There is no evidence that Colombia’s leaders ever considered a UNPKO during their long war against various rebel groups, nor did the conflict really feature on the United Nation’s agenda. When Ecuador’s Security Minister, Gustavo Larrea, proposed stationing UN peacekeepers on the Ecuador-Colombia border, Colombia opposed the proposal.

Congo 1997

In June of 1997, President Lissouba, fearing a coup by former president General Sassou-Nguesso, ordered his Cocoye militia to detain Sassou-Nguesso and disarm his Cobra militia. The move started an all-out war in the capital. Just weeks later, the Congo government endorsed the idea of a peacekeeping force and awaited UN action “with interest and impatience.”

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49 Anonymous 2010; Chad, UN at Odds Over Peacekeeping Force 2010
50 Ecuador may seek to send UN peacekeepers to Colombia border 2008
52 UN Security Council, Letter Dated 26 June 1997 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1997/495) 26 June 1997
The Secretary-General moved forward with planning by sending a technical survey team and meeting with troop-contributing countries. The Security Council laid out three conditions that had not yet been met that were necessary for an international force: a viable ceasefire, international control of Brazzaville airport, and a commitment to a negotiated settlement. The two sides did reach a limited ceasefire in July and nearly agreed on an accord that included the deployment of a peacekeeping force, but they were unable to agree on the powers of the Prime Minister. Then, the situation in Brazzaville drastically changed when General Sassou-Nguesso captured the capitol.

Croatia 1992

President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia, along with the President Milosevic of Serbia and General Kadijevic, told UN envoy Cyrus Vance that they wanted a UN Peacekeeping operation as soon as possible. Later, President Tudjman raised what he called some “technical issues” while still accepting the terms of the UN peace plan. By the end of the month, the Security Council established UNPROFOR, which included UN protection areas in Serb-controlled Croatia.

In early 1993, President Tudjman expressed dissatisfaction with UNPROFOR, especially in the areas of returning refugees, controlling the borders, disarming the Serbian paramilitaries, and restoring Croatian government authority; he informed the UN that Croatia would

53 UN Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/1997/43) 13 August 1997
54 General Sassou-Nguesso was allegedly supported by troops, tanks, and planes from Angola. Angola admitted that it had troops in Congo, but claimed they were chasing UNITA rebels. UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-general on the Situation in the Republic of the Congo (S/1997/814) 21 October 1997; UN Security Council, Identical Letters Dated 16 October 1997 from the Permanent Representative of Angola To the United Nations Addressed To the Secretary-General And To the President of the Security Council (S/1997/802) 16 October 1997.
55 UN Security Council, Letter Dated 24 November 1991 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/23239) 24 November 1991
not accept an extension of UNPROFOR without changes to its mandate.\textsuperscript{58} Not seeing positive changes, President Tudjman began giving consent for only limited time periods and threatened to withdraw consent completely in November if changes were not made.\textsuperscript{59} The operation was given a little more time, but in January 1995, President Tudjman wrote the Secretary-General to withdraw consent officially:

Therefore, as the President of the Republic of Croatia, I have the honour to inform you that the UNPROFOR mandate is hereby terminated effective 31 March 1995 in accordance with Security Council resolution 947 (1994).\textsuperscript{60}

On March 31st, the Security Council did not extend UNPROFOR, but instead created United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO) with greater mandates to assuage President Tudjman.\textsuperscript{61}

**Democratic Republic of Congo - AFDL 1996**

President Mobutu of Zaire repeatedly requested UN involvement throughout the crisis. In May 1996, even before the AFDL had formed, the Secretary-General reported that President Mobutu had requested UN observers be deployed to North and South Kivu to monitor the movement of goods and people through regional airports and the borders with Rwanda and Burundi.\textsuperscript{62} The UN started searching for funders and leaders and the UNSC authorized a

\textsuperscript{58}UN Security Council, Letter Dated 19 March 1993 from the Permanent Representative of Croatia to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General (S/25447) 22 March 1993.


\textsuperscript{62}UN Security Council, Letter Dated 4 June 1996 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council (S/1996/420) 11 June 1996.
multinational force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter on November 15th. The mission never deployed because its humanitarian mandate to assist the refugee population in the West was preempted where rebel groups chased the refugees out of the area by force where necessary. On December 5th, Canada’s permanent representative informed the Security Council that a large number of refugees had returned to Rwanda and that humanitarian organizations enjoyed limited but improved access. After the Canadians briefed the UN Steering Group, the group decided to recommend terminating the mission, despite the opposition of France, the Netherlands, and Senegal, as well as a representative from Zaire that interrupted the meeting and desperately called once more for a large MNF force. Refer to section 5.1.3 for additional discussion.

**Democratic Republic of Congo - MLC, RCD, CNDP 1999**

After two years of war, the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo signed the Lusaka Peace Accords along with numerous rebel groups and neighboring countries. In the agreement, the parties agreed to a Chapter VII UNPKO, the Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). Refer to section 5.2 for additional discussion.

**El Salvador 1990**

In a phone call in 1990, the President of Costa Rica asked the UN Secretary-General what was needed to get the UN involved. The SG answered that it needed a request from parties. El Salvador’s President Christiani soon sent such a request. The planning took some time,

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64 UN Security Council, *Letter Dated 5 November 1996 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1996/1013) 6 December 1996*.

65 Record of MNF Steering Group Mtg 13 December.96, 3451-DCDS-12, 16 Dec.96 AIA (A) 96-1168., as cited by Hennessy 2001.

66 Fisher 1999; *Rwanda and Uganda Battling To Control Key City in Congo* 1999


68 Juhn 1998
but in May 1991 the UN Security Council authorized the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL)\(^{69}\)

**Ethiopia non-consent**

There is no evidence that Ethiopian leaders ever considered a UNPKO during their long war against various rebel groups, nor did the conflict ever appear on the United Nation’s agenda.

**Georgia 1993**

In late 1992, the Head of State of the Republic of Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze wrote the Secretary-General and asked him to reassess the situation in Georgia so that “new practical steps may be taken.”\(^{70}\) Later, Mr. Shavardnadze was more direct, sharing his idea that the Security Council adopt a new resolution that included sending a UNPKO to the Abkhazian region.\(^{71}\) The government wanted the PKO to monitor the Georgian-Russian border and to protect the transportation and communication links.\(^{72}\)

The Security Council authorized UNOMIG in August of 1993\(^ {73}\). Shortly after, Abkhaz forces broke the cease-fire by launching several attacks, preventing UNOMIG from patrolling or fully deploying. The Secretary-General declared UNOMIG’s mandate invalidated.\(^ {74}\)

As the conflict worsened again in early 1994, the Secretary-General pointed out a paradox whereby both parties expressed interest in additional UN forces, but the Abkhaz side was taking political positions that kept the situation from meeting conditions that the Security Council required before it would consider deploying such forces. Thus, UN conditions and

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rebels actions were preventing further deployment. Such actions were understandable, as the Abkhaz side believed that a peacekeeping operation would be an occupying force throughout the country.\footnote{UN Security Council, \textit{Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Abkhazia, Republic of Georgia} (S/1994/253) 3 March 1994.}

**Guatemala 1994**


**Guinea-Bissau non-consent**

India non-consent

The civil wars within India have garnered little attention compared to the India-Pakistan conflict. However, the distinction between the two blurred around Kashmir. While the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) has watched the India Pakistan border since 1949, India has made it clear that a UNPKO is not welcome in Kashmir. In discussions at the UN, Pakistan has claimed that the United Nations was giving “undue emphasis” on the concept of host country consent. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his first press conference as Secretary General, made clear that the UN would not get involved in Kashmir without India’s explicit consent.

Indonesia - Fretilin 1999

Indonesia did not register on the UN’s agenda until 1999, when Portugal and Indonesia agreed to have the UN establish a mission to hold a referendum in East Timor on whether East Timor wished to be autonomous. Thus, Indonesia consented to the first UN operation, leading the Security Council created the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET). In the referendum on September 3rd, the people of East Timor strongly voted for independence. This sparked massive violence by gangs and militias with the acquiescence of Indonesia, leading to international criticism and one of the greatest applications of international pressure for UNPKO consent. Indonesia’s foreign minister, Ali Alatas, bristling at the international pressure, said in an interview, ”Why should we be the subject of so much abuse, so much accusations, so much pressuring? Don’t hector us. Don’t pressure us.

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80 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his first press conference as Secretary General, made clear that the UN would not get involved in Kashmir without India’s explicit consent.
81 No free mandate for U.N. force: India 1988
82 Sikri 1992
83 UN Security Council, Question of East Timor; Report of the Secretary-General (S/1999/513) 5 May 1999.
84 UN Security Council, Question of East Timor; Report of the Secretary-General (S/1999/595) 22 May 1999.
85 UN Security Council, Letter Dated 3 September 1999 from the Secretary-general Addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1999/944) 3 September 1999.
86 Goldman and Lamb 1999
Don’t give us ultimatums.” As the days passed, the pressure increased. The US suspended military sales to Indonesia, New Zealand suspended military cooperation, and France sent a warship to the area. The Security Council condemned Indonesia for letting the situation deteriorate to such extremities, and Kofi Annan said that Indonesia would face responsibility for crimes against humanity if it continued to refuse a UNPKO. Portugal’s ambassador to the UN thought peacekeepers should go ahead without Indonesia’s consent. However, the United Nations waited until finally, ten days after the referendum, President B.J. Habibie finally invited the United Nations to send a peacekeeping force.

**Indonesia - GAM non-consent**

There is no evidence that Indonesia ever considered a UNPKO with regard to the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka - GAM), nor did the conflict ever appeared on the United Nation’s agenda.

**Iran non-consent**

There is no evidence that Iran’s government ever considered a UNPKO during their long-lasting conflicts against various rebel groups, nor did the conflict ever appeared on the United Nation’s agenda.

**Iraq non-consent**

There is no evidence that Iraq’s government ever considered a UNPKO during their long-lasting conflicts against various rebel groups, nor did the conflict ever appeared on the United Nation’s agenda. There were a couple of calls by other stakeholders. After the Gulf War I, the Turkish President raised the prospect of UN peacekeepers to help the situation with...
the Kurds. In 1994, a leader of the KDP suggested the UN should deploy following the collapse of Kurdistan. However, nothing came of these.

Israel non-consent

After a rise in violence in 1990s, the Palestinian Liberation Organization called for UN peacekeepers and the US showed some support while Israel held that any deployment to those territories would violate Israeli sovereignty. Israel also constrained the peacekeeping mission in Lebanon, UNIFIL, by preventing peacekeepers from deploying up to the border as required in UNIFIL’s mandate. The United States did veto a resolution that would have sent a commission to Israel to determine ways to ensure the safety of “Palestinian civilians under Israeli occupation.” The Security Council unanimously passed three other resolutions, though that expressed concern over the situation and criticized Israel. Overall, Israel gave no consent and the UN deployed no PKO.

Laos non-consent

There is no evidence that the government of Laos ever considered a UNPKO during its conflict with the LRM, nor did the conflict ever appeared on the United Nation’s agenda.

Lebanon non-consent

There is no evidence that the government of Lebanon ever considered a UNPKO in relation to its conflict with domestic forces, nor did that conflict ever appeared on the United Nation’s agenda. However, Lebanon was already hosting a UNPKO, UNIFIL, authorized in

91 Iraq attacks rebel town, forces out more Kurds: Baghdad declares uprisings crushed, criticizes U.S. relief
1991
92 Rugman 1994
94 Black 1990
95 UN Security Council, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Ethiopia, Malaysia, Yemen, and Zaire: draft resolution (S/21326) 31 May 1990.

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1978 to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces. Given this UNPKO’s international focus and no record of the UNPKO even acknowledging those domestic forces, I do not include this UNPKO; this counts Lebanon as no consent and no UNPKO. However, if we included UNIFIL, the fact that it had consent would put in the UNPKO with consent category, thus still supporting the relationship between host consent and deployment.

**Liberia - INPFL, NPFL 1993**

In 1990, President Samuel Doe, with the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) rebel group led by Charles Taylor just 25 miles outside the capitol, said he would welcome an international peacekeeping mission. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) agreed to send a peacekeeping force, inspiring Charles Taylor to make a final push to kill President Doe before the peacekeepers arrived. They failed, but President Doe was killed that September by another rebel group led by Prince Johnson. Afterwards, the conflict changed. The ECOWAS peacekeepers in Monrovia supported the Interim Government for National Unity (IGNU) and fought against Charles Taylor’s forces. Prince Johnson’s forces initially supported IGNU but fell apart over internal disagreements over how much to cooperate with ECOWAS.

The Cotonou agreement, signed 25 July 1993 by the President of IGNU and by the Vice President of the (NPFL), created a major role for a United Nations Observer Mission to monitor and verify the implementation of the agreement by Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Recognizing this as consent, the UN Security Council established the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL).

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98 Liberia begins peace talks with rebels 1990
99 Liberian rebels hope to win before peacekeepers arrive: 1990
100 Shiner 1992
Liberia - LURD, MODEL 2003

After 10 years of relative peace, in 2000 a Guinea-supported rebel group, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), emerged to challenge the government of Charles Taylor. In 2003 they were joined by another group, the Ivorian-supported Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL). Charles Taylor, besieged by the rebel groups and by the international community, accepted an offer of political asylum in Nigeria on the condition that Liberia received a US-led peacekeeping force. However, Charles Taylor did not want to leave until there were peacekeepers in the country, an issue complicated by the fact that President Taylor had been indicted by a UN-backed court in Sierra Leone. To manage Taylor’s departure, the Security Council authorized member states to establish a multinational force (i.e. ECOWAS) and declared itself ready to establish a UNPKO to support the transitional government. This is exactly what happened. Taylor left the country for Nigeria on August 12. On August 18th, the transitional government joined the two rebel groups in signing a Comprehensive Peace Agreement, in which the parties requested that the United Nations deploy a Chapter VII peacekeeping force. The Security Council did so on September 19th.

Libya non-consent

Even before Colonel Gaddafi was killed in October, the international community was preparing for a post-Gaddafi Libya. UN contingency plans included approving a multinational force to be followed by a UN peacekeeping force. However, no UNPKO would be created. In September, the UN General Assembly voted to officially give Libya’s UN seat to the National Transitional Council (NTC), essentially recognizing the NTC as the legitimate government.
of Libya. The NTC did seek assistance from the UN, however the NTC’s list of priorities did not include peacekeeping troops. The next day, the UN Security Council created a political mission, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), not a peacekeeping mission.

Morocco 1988

In 1988 the Secretary-General presented a document called “the settlement proposals” to the Morocco government and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguía el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO), which laid out a plan for a transitional period to prepare for a referendum for the people of Western Sahara to vote whether they want independence from Morocco. The referendum would be guided by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General and MINURSO, the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, which would include a military unit to monitor the cease-fire and the demobilization of the troops.

Given that MINURSO remains in the field to this day, one might wonder how long it takes to run a referendum. While the issues with MINURSO are too many to address in this paper, one issue highlighted in Marrack Goulding’s biography that arose at the very beginning offers an interesting insight into how consent (or lack of) can be interpreted. The proposal presented to the Security Council had undergone some revisions and negotiations with the parties, but had not yet reached a consensus between everyone involved. The Secretary-General was thus guarded in his presentation to the Council, saying only that he had “taken into account, as far as possible, the viewpoints expressed by the parties.” The Council members interpreted this as the parties had consented to the presented plan and unanimously approved of the plan. However, as the plan went into effect, problems quickly

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109 UN Security Council, Letter dated 15 September 2011 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2011/278) 15 September 2011.
arose. Marrack Goulding writes, “it became evident that, as most of us knew, the parties had not actually given their consent to the plan and major differences remained unresolved.” In this case, consent was still a necessary condition for deployment; however, it shows that there may be a gap between the actual level of consent and the perceived level of consent.\footnote{Goulding 2002}

**Mozambique 1992**

After a long negotiation process, Mozambique and the Mozambican National Resistance (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana - RENAMO) signed a general peace agreement in October of 1992\footnote{The negotiations are detailed in Walter 1999.}. In President Chissano’s letter to the Secretary-General, he requested that the Secretary-General inform the Security Council of the need for a UN team to monitor the agreement\footnote{UN Security Council, Letter Dated 6 October 1992 from the Permanent Representative of Mozambique to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General (S/24635) 8 October 1992.}. It took two months, but the Security Council did finally authorize the United Nations Operation in Mozambique in accordance with the general peace agreement\footnote{UN Security Council, 3149th Meeting. Resolution 797 (1992) (S/RES/797(1992)) 16 December 1992.}.

**Myanmar non-consent**

There is no evidence that the Myanmar government ever considered a UNPKO, even as other domestic organizations lobbied the Security Council for a mission\footnote{Burma: Democracy party members sought UN intervention 2003}. Myanmar has been more likely to supply UN peacekeepers than to demand them\footnote{Lee 2014}. The UN has shown concern in Myanmar’s human rights conditions, but has not to the point of sending peacekeepers. The one Security Council resolution on Myanmar would have called on the government to allow international humanitarian organizations operate in the country, but the resolution was vetoed by China\footnote{UN Security Council, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution (S/2007/14) 12 January 2007.}. 

Nepal non-consent

Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN-M) signed a comprehensive peace agreement in 2006 that agreed to canton combatants and arms. To facilitate the agreement, the parties requested the UN to monitor the proceedings. In response, the UN established the United Nations political mission in Nepal (UNMIN). There is no indication that the possibility of peacekeepers ever entered into these negotiations. When the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Nepal was asked about UNMIN’s limitations, he explained, “If UNMIN had been asked to control cantonments ... then Nepal would have asked for a very substantial peacekeeping force. And nobody wanted that. What was asked for was a very light monitoring operation.”

Nicaragua 1989

The United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) was established in 1989 to support peace among, and within, five Central America countries. ONUCA’s role in Nicaragua grew substantially in April 1990 when almost all of the parties to the conflict requested that ONUCA monitor a new cease-fire and separation of forces. Only Nicaragua’s southern resistance did not sign the agreements. Nevertheless, the Security Council adopted approved of these proposals the next day.

Nigeria non-consent

There is no evidence that Nigeria ever considered a UNPKO during its conflict starting in 2009. Within the UN, Nigeria only came up in terms of Nigeria’s peacekeeper contributions,

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119 UN Security Council, Letter dated 22 November 2006 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council (S/2006/920) 27 November 2006.
121 Martin 2008
122 UN Security Council, Letter dated 19 April 1990 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/21257) 19 April 1990.
123 UN Security Council, Letter Dated 20 April 1990 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/21259) 20 April 1990.
the Boko Haram attack on the UN compound in Nigeria, and Nigeria’s support for reforming
the UN.

Pakistan non-consent

There is no evidence that the government of Pakistan, a major peacekeeper-contributing
country, ever considered receiving a UNPKO, nor did the UN or any other actor suggest
such a mission.

Paraguay non-consent

There is no evidence that the government of Paraguay ever considered a UNPKO around
1989, nor did the conflict ever appeared on the United Nation’s agenda.

Peru non-consent

There is no evidence that Peru ever considered a UNPKO with respect to the MRTA or
Sendero Luminoso, nor did the conflict ever appeared on the United Nation’s agenda.

Philippines non-consent

There is no evidence that neither the Philippines nor the UN ever considered a deploying a
UNPKO to the Philippines.

Russia non-consent

There is no evidence that Russia ever sought a UNPKO during its conflicts, but members
of the international community may have wished for such an operation. In 1999, the world
powers were able to pressure Russia’s foreign minister to allow an OSCE mission to Chechnya.
US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called it a “foot in the door,” suggesting she may
have desired further future engagement. Of course, being a member of the P5 Russia would have been able to veto any operation it did not approve of.

**Rwanda - FPR 1993**

During the peace negotiations in Arusha in 1993, the Rwandan government and the Rwandese Patriotic Front agreed that the peace agreement required a neutral international force and that the UN should command it. After getting the report from a reconnaissance mission, the Security Council established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). As the situation unfolded, UNAMIR’s mandate was adjusted five times and closed in 1996. In his final report on UNAMIR the Secretary-General described three possible mandates for UNAMIR, but then lamented that the Rwandan government had not consented to any of the options, leaving no alternative but withdrawal.

**Rwanda - ALiR, FDLR non-consent**

There is no evidence of Rwanda seeking a new UNPKO, nor is there any evidence of the UN wishing to re-establish peacekeeping work Rwanda.

**Senegal non-consent**

There is no evidence that Senegal ever considered UN peacekeepers during its long conflict with the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance. The United Nations only paid attention to Senegal’s conflict with the MFDC when it crossed into Guinea-Bissau, which was hosting a UN political mission.

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125 Thompson 1999
129 United Nations Department of Public Information 2003 pp 187-190, United Nations Department of Public Information 2005 p 224, United Nations Department of Public Information 2009 p 246
Serbia (Yugoslavia) 1991

President Milosevic of Serbia, along with President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia and General Kadijevic, told UN envoy Cyrus Vance that they wanted a UN Peacekeeping operation as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{130} Around this time, the Permanent Representative of Yugoslavia (which still included Serbia) wrote to the Security Council to directly request a peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia and sharing his expectations that the Security Council would act promptly to deploy such an operation as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{131} By the end of the month, the Security Council established UNPROFOR which included UN protection areas in Serb controlled Croatia.\textsuperscript{132}

Serbia (Yugoslavia) - UCK 1999

International recognition is the common criteria for when a state actually becomes a state, but this case is difficult due to the incomplete recognition of Kosovo. As of August 2015, only 58\% of UN member nations have recognized Kosovo as a country.\textsuperscript{133} For the coding of consent, I code Kosovo as part of Serbia and accept consent from either Serbia or Yugoslavia.

In 1996, the Kosovo Liberation Army (\textit{Ushtria Çllirimtare e Kosovës - UCK}) demanded autonomy for Kosovo and started attacking Serb police forces.\textsuperscript{134} Serbian forces moved into Kosovo in response. As the violence and repression continued, the international community criticized Serbia’s actions and threatened NATO airstrikes multiple times but did not follow through.\textsuperscript{135}

Serbia eventually gave in to international pressure and consent to an international force, but the government was particular about the terms. It did not sign the Rambouillet Accords, which would have invited the UN to endorse the establishment of a multinational force, in this

\textsuperscript{130}UN Security Council, \textit{Letter Dated 24 November 1991 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/23239)}
\textsuperscript{131}UN Security Council, \textit{Letter Dated 26 November 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Yugoslavia to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/23240)}
\textsuperscript{133}As tracked by www.kosovothanksyou.com, accessed August 14, 2015
\textsuperscript{134}Vickers 1996
\textsuperscript{135}\textit{INTERNATIONAL: Kosovo Strikes} 1998
case most likely led by NATO. Interestingly, although only Kosovo signed the Rambouillet Accords, they were still presented to the UN without the missing signatures as shown in Figure A.1. This may have been an attempt to portray Serbia as obstructing peace.

Figure A.1: The signature page of the Rambouillet Accords: Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo. Only Kosovo signed the agreement.

Yugoslavia and Serbia did inform the Security Council that they accepted the principles of the G-8, including a UN presence to be established by the Security Council, with the “cessation of the aggression of NATO” as a precondition. The leadership of Yugoslavia and Serbia elaborated on these principles. Citing this letter, the Security Council passed Resolution 1244 which allowed the UN to established the United Nations Interim Adminis-

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Yugoslavia later confirmed that it “has accepted the deployment of the international security and civil presences in Kosovo and Metohija under the auspices of the United Nations and with its mandate.”

Sierra Leone 1994

The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) launched their rebellion from Liberia in 1991. In 1994, Sierra Leone’s Head of State asked the UN to facilitate negotiations with the RUF. This eventually led to a UN Assessment Team, which decided in January 1997 that a peacekeeping operation would be more appropriate than a group of unarmed observers as originally requested. Kofi Annan developed a plan for a peacekeeping operation, but it was set aside because the US showed resistance to paying the UN its arrears. Senior UN officials loudly lamented the lack of action when the government was overthrown in May in a coup d’état by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.

An ECOMOG operation led by Nigeria helped restore President Kabbah to power, and this time the UN was quick to act. The Security Council authorized a mission in July 1998 and then went back to President Kabbah to get his approval of the terms of the status of missions agreement. There is no indication that such approval was sought from any other factions.

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141 UN Security Council, Letter Dated 1 February 1995 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1995/120) 7 February 1995.
142 United Nations Department of Public Information 2000, p 132
143 Tran and McElroy 1997, p 132
Despite the relatively high levels of violence, Somalia did not garner much international attention until President Barre was overthrown in 1991, nor is there any evidence that Somalia’s government sought a UNPKO.

Somalia - USC/SNA 1992

After President Barre was ousted, Somalia descended into a clan-based civil war with the main factions supporting appointed Interim President Ali Mahdi or General Aidid. Following up on negotiations, in March of 1992, the UN sent a technical team to discuss the possibility of a larger UN presence in Somalia. Ali Mahdi said that without a large UNPKO, security and stability was impossible. General Aidid, conversely, expressed concerns over the possibility of a UN military presence. Nevertheless, both leaders signed letters agreeing to the deployment of UN security personnel tasked with monitoring the situation and assisting with aid distribution. With this sign of consent, the Security Council authorized the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM).

The UN technical team noted continued support in August. In November, the report was much more ominous, when both General Aidid and Mr. Ali Mahdi making demands of the UN; the UN received reports that the two sides had moved closer against a common enemy: the United Nations. The Special Representative also noted an absence of a government. Additional UN forces were held back as they waited for consent from the factions with some at the UN arguing that consent was no longer needed.

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145 UN Security Council, The Situation in Somalia; Report of the Secretary-General (S/23829) 21 April 1992. In the letter, the faction leaders agreed to 50 observers and “The deployment of adequate United Nations Security personnel to protect its personnel and safeguard its activities, the number to be determined by the United Nations in consultation with the parties when the plan is formalized.” See also 4.1.3.


It is difficult to say what happened in 1993. The Security Council expanded UNSOM into a Chapter VII peace enforcement mission called UNOSOM II and loosely affiliated if with the U.S. led Unified Task Force.\(^{150}\) In the two years that followed, the violence continued. This included the infamous Black Hawk Down event that left 18 Americans dead and 78 wounded and resulted in the withdrawal of US forces.\(^{151}\) In terms of consent, there are a few ways to interpret this period of time. One interpretation is that the U.N. simply remained without host consent. Another interpretation is that the U.N. did not have the consent of General Aidid with whom U.N. forces repeatedly engaged, but continued to have the tacit consent of the internationally recognized head of state Ali Mahdi, even if his span of control was limited to a piece of Mogadishu. A third interpretation is that UN rules no longer applied in Somalia because there was no government to authorize consent.\(^{152}\) All three are worth considering, but in terms of coding this case, my rules point two the second interpretation. Mr. Ali Mahdi had clearly given his consent and there is no evidence of him withdrawing that consent, either in word or in deed, unlike General Aidid who did both.\(^{153}\)

**Somalia - ARS/UIC, Al-Shabab non-consent**

In this period there are no indicators that the Somali government sought a UN peacekeeping operation. The Security Council sent a technical assessment team to Somalia in 2007 to explore the possibility on an operation as the Africa Union mission (which had been UN approved) was leaving, but the closest the team got to government consent was that “most interlocutors expressed the belief that a window of opportunity existed for a political process to take root in Somalia, with the firm support of the international community, including a peacekeeping operation.”\(^{154}\) Later that year, the Secretary-General reported that a mission in Somalia was not realistic or viable and that the UN could not send another assessment


\(^{151}\)Pine 1993

\(^{152}\)Longworth 1993

\(^{153}\)Lorch 1993

mission to Somalia. The closest his report gets to government consent is to say that while leading a Somali delegation in Saudi Arabia, King Yusuf discussed the possibility of sending peacekeepers from Africa and Arab countries in order to withdraw foreign forces. Other Somali delegates rejected this idea.\footnote{UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia (S/2007/658) 7 November 2007.}

**Sri Lanka non-consent**

The United Nations said little about Sri Lanka’s fight against the three rebel groups. Only the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was ever discussed and only when 250,000 civilians were trapped by heavy fighting in northern Sri Lanka.\footnote{Doctors without Borders 2009, United Nations Department of Public Information 2013, 397-398} There is no evidence that Sri Lanka has ever asked the UN for peacekeepers.

**Sudan - SPL/A 2005**

In the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Sudan government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPL/A), the parties agreed to request a UN Peace Support Mission, including any force protection element, to monitor the agreement.\footnote{UN Security Council, Letter dated 8 February 2005 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2005/78) 10 February 2005.} This request was noted in the Security Council resolution creating the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS).

**Sudan (Darfur) - 2007, 2011**

With the peace process with the SPL/A in place, the international community looked to Sudan’s other conflicts in Darfur and Abyei regions. To Darfur, the UN created the African UnionUnited Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir initially resisted the push for new peacekeepers; a year earlier, he declared the blue helmets a neocolonial force that he would personally lead a resistance against. However,
he changed his mind to the point where Sudan agreed to the hybrid force.\textsuperscript{158} President al-Bashir relayed his approval to a Security Council mission that was visiting Sudan in June of 2007.\textsuperscript{159}

With respect to Abyei, the Sudan government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) signed an agreement in 2011 that included the creation of an Interim Security Force for Abyei (ISFA), a mission approved, authorized, and financed by the UN.\textsuperscript{160}

**Syria - FSA 2012**

The United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) was the short-lived culmination of intensive diplomatic efforts by the international community, and particularly Kofi Annan, the Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and League of Arab States. In March 2012 Mr. Annan prompted the Syrian government to agree to a six-point plan; the second point of the plan stated that “the Syrian government should work with the Envoy to bring about a sustained cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties with an effective United Nations supervision mechanism.”\textsuperscript{161} The Secretary-General said that with the six-point plan the Syrian government indicated consent to an effective UN supervision mechanism.\textsuperscript{162}

This interpretation may have been a stretch, but the preliminary understanding that was reached with the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic was a clearer indication of government consent.\textsuperscript{163} Syria’s spokesman for the Foreign Ministry referred to the text of the preliminary understanding when justifying Syria’s decision to deny visas to three UN observers.\textsuperscript{164} Indeed, the agreement gave the Syrian government significant control over what

\textsuperscript{158} Osman and de Montesquiou 2007

\textsuperscript{159} United Nations Department of Public Information 2010, p 236

\textsuperscript{160} UN Security Council, Letter dated 23 June 2011 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2011/384) 24 June 2011. The agreement was titled, “Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement on temporary arrangements for the administration and security of the Abyei Area.”


\textsuperscript{162} UN Security Council, Letter dated 19 April 2012 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2012/238) 19 April 2012.

\textsuperscript{163} UN Security Council, Note by the Secretary-General (S/2012/250) 23 April 2012.

\textsuperscript{164} Syria denies political considerations in accepting UN observers 2012
the UN observers could do, including where they could go and for how long and whether they could negotiate with opposition forces. After the intense effort to persuade Syria to accept such a deal, the West became concerned that the observers would have the authority or power to support peace. Their concerns were soon vindicated. Two months after the Security Council authorized the mission, it was suspended due to violence. Head of UN peacekeeping, Herve Ladsous, predicted that barring a miracle, the mission would not be extended when it expired in July. The Security Council gave the factions an additional 30-days to reduce the level of violence and to cease using heavy weapons before letting the mission expire.

Tajikistan - UTO 1994

During the Inter-Tajik peace talks in 1994, the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) and the government of Tajikistan signed an agreement establishing a Joint Commission consisting of government and opposition officials. The agreements declared that, “at the request of the Tajik Parties, which is contained in the Agreement, the United Nations shall, through the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan, assist the work of the Joint Commission.” From this agreement, the UN Security Council established the United Nations Mission of Observers to Tajikistan (UNMOT).

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165 Lopez 2012
166 Reuters 2012
168 Al-Hariri 2012
Thailand non-consent

The United Nations offered to mediate, but there is no evidence that the United Nations or the government of Thailand ever considered the use of UN peacekeepers for this conflict.173

Turkey non-consent

There is no evidence that the UN or the government of Turkey ever sought a UN peacekeeping operation on Turkish soil to address the conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan - PKK). Turkey was a strong supporter of UN peacekeeping in Iraq in 2003, partly to garner US support in cracking down on the PKK in Iraq.174 Turkey similarly supported efforts to stabilize Syria in 2012, including the deployment of a joint Arab-UN peacekeeping operation to prevent the PKK from using Syria as a staging ground for attacks.175

Uganda non-consent

Uganda has consistently faced multiple rebel groups since the late 1970’s, most notably the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) created by Joseph Kony in 1987 and the Alliance for Democratic Forces, which gained attention in western Uganda in late 1996. Uganda has been a proponent of, and a critic of, UN peacekeeping forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo and to a lesser extent Sudan.176 As rebel groups, especially the LRA, are able to freely cross borders to evade confrontation with the Uganda military, progress in this conflict requires the support of the armies in those other nations, be it government or peacekeeper. Uganda saw no need for UN forces within its own country. According to the commander of the army, Major General Aronda Nyakairima, “We shall never ask for foreign armies

173 Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2015
174 Chandrasekaran 2003
175 Bluwi 2012
176 Wallis 2003; Museveni rejects proposed UN force on border between DR Congo, Uganda 1999; UN peacekeepers deploy in Congolese town bordering Uganda 2003; Belgian army to establish base in Uganda 2004; Uganda calls for more action against rebels in Congo 2006; Uganda’s Foreign, Defence Ministers Brief Security Council, Call for Strong Measures to Disarm Lord’s Resistance Army 2006

179
from France, Bangladesh or Uruguay among other countries to come and protect our people against Joseph Kony’s lunatics.\textsuperscript{177}

**United Kingdom non-consent**

There is no evidence that the United Kingdom ever considered a UNPKO during their conflict with the Provisional Irish Republican Army, nor did the conflict ever appeared on the United Nation’s agenda, except when Libya provided the UK info on the Irish Republican Army in exchange for better relations with the UN\textsuperscript{178}

**United States of America non-consent**

There is no evidence that the United States of America or the UN ever considered sending an UNPKO to the USA during its conflict with al-Qaida. That this case matches my criteria of included cases calls to question its classification in the Uppsala dataset.

**Yemen - Dem. Rep. of Yemen non-consent**

The Yemeni Civil War gained attention in 1994 as heavy civilian casualties were reported out of Aden\textsuperscript{179} UN efforts to end the civil war in Yemen failed to secure even a temporary ceasefire. The Secretary-General wrote in his report, “On eight occasions, dates and hours were agreed for the cease-fire to enter into force. On eight occasions, the cease-fire did not hold for more than a few hours. Indeed, on some occasions, the designated time came and went, and the fighting did not even stop momentarily.” He concludes that the much stronger side sought a military solution. On July 6, the government forces captured the main cities of the South, effectively ending the fighting\textsuperscript{180} In June, the Security Council had unanimously approved a small monitoring force that would only deploy after a ceasefire takes hold, but

\textsuperscript{177} Uganda not to invite peacekeepers: army commander 2004
\textsuperscript{178} Reuters 1992b, United Nations Department of Public Information 1997 410
\textsuperscript{179} Meisler 1994
of course a cease-fire never took hold. In discussions the Yemen government (the North) was initially opposed to peacekeepers, then couldn’t agree on the nationalities of possible cease-fire observers, essentially preventing progress on any peacekeeping mission as it sought a military solution.

**Yemen - AQAP non-consent**

In 2009, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) declared Yemen the home base in its fight to establish an Islamic State. There is no evidence that Yemen ever sought a UNPKO around this conflict. The UN Security Council passed several resolutions voicing its concern over Yemen’s humanitarian situation, lack of security, and the threat of AQAP, but took no other action then to stay actively seized of the matter.

**A.3 Leader Tenures**

**A.4 Formalization of Endogeneity Bias**

The issue of endogeneity bias stems from that fact that it is impossible to observe a government’s outcomes simultaneously with a UNPKO and without it. In formal notation, for government $i$, outcome $Y$, and UNPKO status $O \in 0,1$ we cannot calculate the effect of a UNPKO by subtracting

$$Y_i(O = 1) - Y_i(O = 0)$$

because one of these values will never be observed; Paul Holland called this the Fundamental Problem of Causal Inference.

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181 Lyons 1994; Yemen: Risky War, Cautious Response: [Editorial] 1994
182 Meisler 1994
184 Holland 1986
Table A.2: Civil War & PKO Leaders

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<th>Leader</th>
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<th>Exit Date</th>
<th>Tenure (months)</th>
<th>Post-CW Tenure</th>
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This is especially an issue in this case because my theory is based on a selection effect; that is, only leaders that expect a benefit from a UNPKO will consent to a UNPKO. Past research has shown that weak governments are most likely to receive a UNPKO. This suggests that governments that receive UNPKOs differ fundamentally from governments that do not, which raises skepticism that using control variables allows for meaningful comparisons between UNPKO and non-UNPKO cases.

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185 Fortna 2008
However, if the effect of a UNPKO is great enough, analyses may be able to find evidence that the effect is positive. To show this, I divide governments into two types. For type $p$ a UNPKO has a positive effect:

$$Y^p_i(O = 1) - Y^p_i(O = 0) > 0$$

For type $n$ a UNPKO has a negative effect:

$$Y^n_i(O = 1) - Y^n_i(O = 0) < 0$$

In this world, my theory predicts that we will only observe two of the four outcomes, $Y^p_i(O = 1)$ and $Y^n_i(O = 0)$.

My theory does not predict how these two outcomes should relate to each other, but previous research has theorized, and demonstrated, that weaker governments are more likely to receive a UNPKO. This suggests that if neither type received a UNPKO, the type that would have benefited from, and normally received, a UNPKO should fare worse:

$$Y^p_i(O = 0) < Y^n_i(O = 0)$$

Rearranging the previous equations, I define a UNPKO effect $U$ for realized UNPKOs. For states that would consent to a UNPKO:

$$Y^p_i(O = 1) - Y^p_i(O = 0) = U$$

I define the strong benefit $S$:

$$Y^n_i(O = 0) - Y^p_i(O = 0) = S$$

Returning to the two outcomes that we observe, we can now make the following comparison:

$$Y^p_i(O = 1) - Y^n_i(O = 0) = (Y^p_i(O = 1) - Y^p_i(O = 0)) - (Y^n_i(O = 0) - Y^p_i(O = 0)) = U - S$$
If I observe that governments with UNPKOs fare better than governments without UNPKOs, then $U - S$ is positive, indicating that $U > S$. Since past work has shown $S$ to be positive, such a finding would suggest that $U$, the treatment effect of a UNPKO among states that receive it, is also positive.

Note that the opposite observation - governments with UNPKOs fare worse than governments without UNPKOs - does not mean that UNPKOs have a negative effect. It just indicates that $U < S$, and since $S$ is positive than $U$ could be either positive or negative.

### A.5 Quantitative Analysis with Log-Normal Scaling

Because the leader tenure data follows a log-normal distribution, this section duplicates the figures and results from Chapter 3 while using the log value of leader tenure.

### A.6 Leader Tenure and Term Limits

To verify that spikes in observed leader tenure lengths at 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, and 12 years are due to term limits, I check the polity scores of leaders with tenures of these lengths, assuming that term lengths are more common among democracies. Figure A.5 plots the tenure length and average polity score for every leader, distinguishing those leaders whose time in office appears to be affected by term lengths. I add cubic splines with standard errors to visualize the relationships for the two leader types. As we would expect, the average polity scores for leaders with those peak tenure lengths trend towards democratic, except for the dip in polity scores after 75 months due to the 6-year leaders who have an average polity score of .50. Closer examination shows that this is partly due to the low scores from leaders of Lebanon and Mexico, both of which have 6 year term limits, ultimately supporting the idea that the spikes in the distribution of tenures are due to term lengths.

Re-plotting this figure using the natural log of leader tenure leads to similar conclusions, as shown in A.6.
Figure A.2: Log Leader Tenure Lengths

Figure A.2 duplicates Figure 3.2 but plots the distribution of leader tenure lengths in *log months* for all leaders that were in power between 1946 and 2013.
Figure A.3 duplicates Figure 3.3 but takes the log value of tenure lengths. The three plots show the average tenure in log months for four categories of leader along with the 95% confidence interval and the number of leaders that fit that category. The categories are (1) leaders of countries that never experienced civil war since WWII, (2) leaders of countries that have experienced civil war since WWII, but not during their tenure, (3) leaders that experienced civil war but never hosted a UNPKO, and (4) leaders that experienced civil war and hosted a UNPKO. The first plot shows all leaders that have been in power since the end of WWII; the second plot shows all leaders since the end of the Cold War; the third is the same leaders as the second but does not include their time in power before the end of the Cold War.
Figure A.4: Survival Curves of Post Cold War Leaders

Figure A.4 duplicates Figure 3.4 but takes the log value of tenure lengths. It shows the Kaplan-Meier survival curve for Post Cold War leaders based on four leader types: (1) leaders of countries that never experienced civil war since WWII, (2) leaders of countries that have experienced civil war since WWII, but not during their tenure, (3) leaders that experienced civil war but never hosted a UNPKO, and (4) leaders that experienced civil war and hosted a UNPKO.
Figure A.5: Average Polity Scores by Leader Tenure Lengths
Figure A.6: Average Polity Scores by Log of Leader Tenure Lengths
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