FROM INDEMNITY TO INTEGRATION:
ECONOMIC DECLINE IN LATE HELLENISTIC AITOLIA

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ABSTRACT

In the last two centuries BC, the mountainous region Aitolia on the north shore of the Corinthian gulf transformed from a densely populated landscape, home to a powerful, influential federation with an internationally integrated economy, to a dispersed, politically inactive backwater that at the time of Augustus’ reorganization of Greece showed few overt signs of socioeconomic complexity or connectivity. Commonly, the Roman indemnity of 189 BC, after which the region disappeared from the historical narrative, is thought to have caused this decline.

While the ultimate aim is a reconsideration of Aitolia as disconnected and “empty” in view of the synoicism of Nikopolis, this dissertation investigates the mechanisms and trajectories of the regional decline through a detailed study of relevant economic tendencies. An inclusive exploration of Aitolian literary, epigraphic, numismatic, archaeological and topographic data, which has never before been subjected to comprehensive study, serves to explain the rapid transformation as a complex socioeconomic phenomenon determined by not one but a series of factors. These include, among others, preexisting debt, an agrarian countryside in disrepair, unsatisfactory local coin production, the territorial conditions of the Roman indemnity, and most significantly, the characteristic structures and problem-solving mechanisms of the regional economy. This dissertation contextualizes these factors by placing regional change in a broader historical setting.

Aitolian decline was neither immediate nor complete. This study demonstrates that despite radically altered settlement patterns some Aitolian cities retained the connectivity needed for survival well into the imperial period. Thereby, it challenges the overly simplistic traditional reading of the Augustan reorganization of Greece and fills a major gap in modern scholarship on the Late Hellenistic period.

The transformative Greco-Roman interaction presented the Greek states with a multitude of problems, many of them socioeconomic in nature. By focusing on a deeply neglected region and its problem-solving mechanisms, this dissertation emphasizes the need for detailed appreciation of
their responses, reactions and activity in the last two centuries BC. Simultaneously, it invites consideration of evidence not commonly discussed in terms of economies and as a result, promotes a more inclusive approach to the ancient economy.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

To write a dissertation is a lonely task: so also this one. Yet, its completion would not have been possible without the aid of many persons and organizations. I must begin by acknowledging Princeton’s immense role in this project. Words cannot express my gratitude to my adviser W. Childs for making me think critically about the ancient world at large and for encouraging me to trot around the “backwaters” of Aitolia for the better part of my graduate education, thereby letting me develop into the archaeologist I am today. I am equally thankful to A. Stahl for turning me into a numismatist and B. Shaw for – perhaps accidentally – making me an economic historian. In my home department M. Koortbojian proposed I reconsider the mechanisms of socioeconomic institutions and N. Zchomedlise provided constant inter-carrel support in the important early stages of writing: I sincerely thank them both.

I thank Princeton’s Graduate School, the Program in the Ancient World, and the Department for Art and Archaeology for incredibly generous funding, collegiality, a continuously inspiring intellectual environment and the general support to see this dissertation through. This project would not have been possible without that support. On a related note, I extend my deepest thanks to Birgit and Gad Rausings Stiftelse för Humanistisk Forskning and Fredrika-Bremer-Förbundets Stipendiestiftelse for the princely research grants that enabled me to conduct extensive research in Greece.

An important part of any dissertation that rarely gets acknowledged is the simple footwork: in the case of this dissertation, that footwork was perhaps unusually taxing. Therefore, I want to especially acknowledge the staff at Marquand Library, Firestone Library, the Nordic Library in Athens, and the incredible people at Princeton’s Interlibrary Loan who constantly amazed me by meeting the most outrageous requests for never-published, incorrectly cited, entirely unknown books written in Greek before the formation of the modern state of Greece. Thank you. Moreover, I wish to thank the Princeton University Writing Center, both for its dissertation writing boot camps
and the invaluable tools needed for writing cheerfully, every single day. Our graduate secretary Diane Schulte is owed great praise for making truly everything run smoothly, and for always looking out for the graduate cohort.

I offer a special ευχαριστώ to all the nameless farmers and homeowners in Aitolia who let me walk their olive groves, pastures, farmsteads and backyards in my personal hunt for settlement evidence. The staff at the Archaeological Museum in Agrinion was extremely kind and I sincerely thank them for their help. The Swedish and Danish Institutes at Athens not only put a roof over my head but provided me – accidentally – with the perfect colleagues for bouncing ideas and exchanging homemade plan drawings. In Athens, Daniela Trifirò was my constant companion and helped me solve some important problems with my coins. Grazie!

Naturally, the idea for this dissertation would never have emerged if I had not been an Aitolian excavator in the first place. Thus I must thank my teams at Chalkis and Kalydon, and especially our director S. Dietz whose enthusiasm for Aitolia has remained a constant inspiration. E. Bollen’s work on our Aitolian pottery has been instrumental for this project and I cannot bear her a grudge for having got me – me! – seriously interested in pottery analysis.

In Rome, I learned everything I know about sigillata from A. Martin. That knowledge has proved vital for this dissertation and I extend my warmest thanks to A. M. McCann for sponsoring the Howard Comfort, FAAR ’29, Seminar in Roman Pottery. My pottery camp cohort in 2007 remains my favorite group of archaeologists in this world; their passion for what we do has been a constant inspiration while assembling this dissertation. I thank J. Pinto at Princeton for strongly suggesting I apply to the program. A. Meadows at the American Numismatic Society is also owed many thanks for his enthusiasm, help and advice in the beginning of this project.

Unsurprisingly, I could not have written this dissertation without the abundant “non-academic” support with which I have been blessed. Thanks are therefore owed to all my Princeton friends, those with two legs and those with four; the little graduate cohort in Classical Archaeology
whose cheer on the homestretch was absolutely great; Ingrid, Alexis, Kellam, Marion, Alex; Sandra, Adrian, Becca, Kate and the rest of the Dressler barn group; the highly unofficial but somewhat magical Dissertation Writing Group in Classical Archaeology; the participants in the numismatics seminars 2009 and 2011; and most of all my friend and fellow hoplite Joanna Papayiannis without whom the thousands of days at Marquand and McCormick Hall would have been both tragically unfashionable and substantially less entertaining.

My decision to pursue Classical Archaeology as a profession was made significantly less problematic by two teachers at Söderport High School, Kenneth Nyström and Gunnel Carlsson. In teaching me Latin and Greek, they laid the groundwork for an education that would otherwise have been difficult to obtain in a world where all good students must study Law or Medicine. Moreover, they instilled in me the conviction that any dream can be achieved through hard work and that although not all roads lead to Rome, most paths can take you to the Mediterranean – you just have to start walking. I offer them my heartfelt thanks for that little nudge out the door.

It seems almost rude to thank my family across the sea who never once questioned why studying a world separated from ours by two millennia, moving across a world ocean to pursue an advanced degree, traipsing around Mediterranean olive groves and writing a doctoral dissertation about something as uplifting as the Hellenistic equivalent of the Great Depression during a recession were good ideas. Their quiet support has been the fuel moving this dissertation toward completion. I am fully aware that I will spend the rest of my life thanking them.

Finally, I wish to acknowledge my husband Bob’s role in the completion of this dissertation. He has supported me every step of the way and without his strength, love and understanding, my fondness for this project would have dwindled long ago. He has been the Sam to my Frodo, only I have not carried this dissertation around my neck, nor has he stowed away our kitchen in his backpack. I dedicate this work to him and promise to finally go on vacation whenever he wants to.
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ABBREVIATIONS

The journal abbreviations follow those listed by the *American Journal of Archaeology* 104, 2000. Other abbreviations used in this study include:

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<tr>
<td>AAAG</td>
<td><em>Annals of the Association of American Geographers</em></td>
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<td>AD</td>
<td><em>Αρχαιολογικὸν Δελτίον</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>AE</td>
<td><em>Αρχαιολογικὴ Εφημέρις</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>AncMac</td>
<td><em>Ancient Macedonia</em></td>
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<td><em>American Numismatic Society, winter</em></td>
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<td>Archaiognosia</td>
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<td>CH</td>
<td><em>Coin Hoards</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>CSSH</td>
<td><em>Comparative Studies in Society and History</em></td>
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<td>DHA</td>
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<td>EcHR</td>
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<td>G&amp;R</td>
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<td>Pharos</td>
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<td>Φωκικά Χρονικά</td>
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<td>RIDA</td>
<td>Revue Internationale des Droits de l’Antiquité</td>
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<td>SBBerlin</td>
<td>Sitzungsberichte der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Klasse für Sprachen, Literatur und Kunst</td>
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1. Aetolia amissa.

The words are Cicero’s.¹ Uttered in the mid-50s BC, they are grounded in one of the most dynamic and transformational periods of classical antiquity. Speaking across the gulf of Greco-Roman interaction that over the past one and a half centuries had irrevocably impacted both Rome and the Greek states, the narrative seems less theatrical than it is concerned with the social, political, cultural and economic repercussions of that interaction. In that sense, Cicero’s concern appears almost contemporary. Characterized by multi-national warfare, economic trouble, disruptions, cultural fusion and infusion, civil wars and civic unrest, debt crises, liquidity crises and financial collapse, the Late Hellenistic period bears close parallels to the modern day. During the two centuries when Alexander’s world was transforming into what would soon become Augustus’, many experienced what we would call, euphemistically, a difficult time. In part due to the important social questions rooted in this context, in part due to the rich source material from the time period, Late Republican Rome and Late Hellenistic Greece have drawn much attention from scholars in a variety of fields and continue to do so, yet in this frenzy of scholarship some questions and indeed some regions tend to be neglected. Cicero’s “lost Aitolia” is one of them.

Indeed, Aitolia is amissa from almost all scholarship centering on this period. Considering the two major historical events bookending Roman involvement in Greece and their direct relationship with Aitolia itself, this is curious. The Roman indemnity of 189 BC, laid upon the Aitolian federation in punishment of having violated treaties and brought Antiochos III into Greece, has been considered a major turning point for Roman policy in Greece. The synoicism of Western Greece and the deliberate depopulation of Aitolia for the foundation of Nikopolis in the early 20s BC

¹ in Pisonem 96.
similarly function as an end point for most discussion on the freedom of Greece and the coming of Rome. Very oddly, the region that first felt the sting of the Roman gladius is almost wholly ignored in scholarly consideration of the last two centuries of Greek independence.

By the same token, scholarship on this transformative period is predominantly slanted toward questions of sociopolitical interaction and control, macroscopically and microscopically, from both Roman and Greek points of view. The ancient economy, so hotly debated and still so poorly understood, and unquestionably one of the most important aspects of ancient studies as a whole, is rarely addressed in scholarship on this time period. But nothing exists in a vacuum, and to ignore less known periods and less studied regions is ultimately detrimental to our broader understanding of classical antiquity. Naturally, economic life existed beyond the Zenon archives or the building accounts for the Periklean Akropolis yet studies on various aspects of the ancient economy rarely if ever consider non-canonical data from non-canonical regions and time periods.

An economic study of Aitolia is highly warranted. The broader historical relevance for our understanding of Early Roman Greece is monumental. In 1993 Alcock published the magisterial Graecia Capta, a volume that makes it adamantly clear that Greco-Roman interaction, its manifestations, consequences and results are highly complex, multi-faceted and organic, but predominantly set in the imperial period Graecia Capta does not address one monumental question: what happened to what we perceive as "the economy" during the social, political and economic metamorphosis from libera to capta?²

Similarly important is the scholarly relevance of such a study. The attitude toward non-canonical Greek regions is changing, but federations and the regions that housed them are still generally omitted from the overall discussion on the Hellenistic economy. In part, this is due to the lack of straightforward source material yet these regions participated in the same economic activities as kings and kingdoms; thus, to exclude them is ultimately to limit our understanding. At a

² Alcock 1993.
local level, to ask entirely new questions will undoubtedly improve our understanding of a region whose studies have almost exclusively focused on the political context of its federation in the third century BC.

Importantly, Late Hellenistic Aitolia is, in effect, a *tabula rasa*. Its lack of canonical economic data and scholarly scrutiny does not make it any less useful for our understanding of economic life in antiquity. Unburdened with the weight of a cumbersome debate on various aspects of the ancient economy, it allows for a wholly fresh approach. Moreover, the divergent source material invites new methodologies which ultimately may be useful to other regions and areas, both studied and unstudied.

2. An economic study.

This is not a mainstream study in economic history. The nature of the available data is such that ordinary methodologies and sets of questions rarely – if ever – apply. Yet, the increasingly stale debate on substantivist/formalist or modernizing/primitivist approaches to the ancient economy ceased to be informative long ago. It is clear that the Hellenistic world was a plurality of economic systems with varying degrees of integration, different kinds of institutions, different demographic compositions, and widely varied natural resources. It was not a monolith and to speak of a unified “ancient economy” is entirely misleading. Time and place play an important role in that we are highly unlikely to get the same impression from a Late Hellenistic Greek federation, Ptolemaic Egypt, or Late Roman Italy. Even within each such system, agency and engagement within the parameters of economic life differed; economic institutions did not mean the same thing to everyone, nor did all individuals within that system participate on equal terms, or with equal

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3 For a summary of the debate, see von Reden 2002. See also Cartledge 2002.
4 Reger 2003.
means, or even with similar kinds of means. Thus, we must refrain from engaging in queries in black or white, and moreover, avoid grand, unanswerable questions such as “what is the ancient economy?” Naturally, it is clear that “the economy” was not the same in antiquity as it is today, and we should consequently not expect to apply the same formal questions to the ancient material as we do the modern.

Due to the nature of the available source material, this approach is neither quantitative nor qualitative. Rather, we may call it inquisitive-observational. We must approach each group of evidence from a relevant point of view and subject it to an inquiry that generates meaningful answers for that specific set of data. To the historian, concepts of overall impressions can be equally helpful as numerical increases or decreases in output of consumption and since such numerical data is unavailable for Late Hellenistic Aitolia, this methodological openness is essential. The data requires a variety of approaches, and the aim to obtain maximum inclusion is paramount.

In 1981, Douglass North wrote “it is the task of economic history to explain the structure and performance of economies through time” (my emphasis). In this dissertation, I seek to fill a major lacuna in the discussion on a specific, transitional phase of human history by focusing on economic activity. I choose this focus for a number of reasons. First, both economically and psychologically, “activity” is more neutral term than “behavior”. Neutral terminology reduces the foreground noise of preconceived notions and outdated scholarship on the ancient economy, and encourages a broader approach to the appreciation of economic life in antiquity. Second, such terminology avoids contamination by the sometimes useful but often confusing preexisting “models” for the ancient economy. In fact, in this inquiry I deliberately avoid all available models, in part to avoid discipline isolation, in part to broaden the present, far too narrow approach to pre-

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5 Foxhall 2007.
6 In fact, Millett (2001) thinks numerical data are less helpful than concepts of overall improvement in welfare.
7 North 1981.
8 See the telling title of Davies 2008. For a more nuanced approach to models, see essays in Manning and Morris 2005, especially Davies 2005.
modern economies. Moreover, economic activity focuses our study to the economy on its most basic level; the interaction between human and human, human and environment, state and natural resources. By studying how these relationships change over time – thereby following North’s insistence on temporal parameters – we obtain a window into the formulation of economic strategies that are not readily apparent at first glance. Regardless of ones view on the primitivist/modernizing debate, no one can deny that the ancient economy possessed an ever-present agrarian component, the most fundamental economic activity there is. We must therefore ask whether economic strategies beyond food-survival were in place.10

I take economic activity to be inclusive rather than exclusive, informative rather than informed. This covers a broad range of transactions both in money and in kind, taxation, legislation and economic institutions, service and jobs, building and restoration, wealth accumulation and loss, monetary circulation and coin production. On a regional scale, it involves settlement expansion or contraction as well as land use and spatial division. Consequently, my approach is both macroscopic and microscopic, a method warranted by the available data.

3. Issues of economy.

The study of anything economic in classical antiquity is an act riddled with inherent problems. One such issue is the question of “embeddedness” which brought to light by Finley more recently emerged in the work of Hopkins and Duncan-Jones.11 Is the economy separate from the rest of society or is it embedded in a social framework? The answer depends entirely on what cross-section of society you examine and how you relate to the available data. It cannot be denied that

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9 To my knowledge, no serious model for a Hellenistic federation has yet been proposed. An emphasized focus on models may thus eliminate otherwise useful segments of antiquity – Aitolia being one of them.
10 Foxhall 2007.
11 The scholarship is extensive. See e.g. Duncan-Jones 1990, contra Hopkins 1980; cf. Finley 1999.
economic institutions were socially and politically embedded but so they are today.\textsuperscript{12} This does not presuppose, however, that economic institutions lacked sophistication or rationality, but it does bring attention to the crucial factor of data visibility.

It is a fundamental feature of any economy to produce food.\textsuperscript{13} The agrarian sector must necessarily constitute the largest portion of any pre-modern economy. Yet, to a very large extent evidence of this sector is almost entirely invisible, and the lack of information has turned our attention to other, more readily informative inquiries that ultimately do not correlate to the situation in antiquity. Despite the lack of evidence thereof I am convinced that Aitolia was no different than any other region in ancient Greece. Most people engaged in self-sustaining food production and thus their mobility and access to the greater world were limited. They may have paid their taxes in kind and made almost no use of monetary transactions. Nevertheless, they were not necessarily isolated as the market place provided by their polity functioned as a connection to the outside world.\textsuperscript{14} It remains to be seen to what extent the agricultural world was influenced by market transactions but in this dissertation, our primary assumption is that despite its invisibility, the agrarian aspect of Aitolia’s economy vastly overshadowed any other feature.

A more visible aspect of ancient economies is their monetary component. While some visibility derives from the recording of sums and transactions, the largest body of evidence is undeniably the coins themselves. The discussion on coinage and its role in ancient economies is however far from straightforward. It is clear that a multitude of types of economic transactions could occur under the same roof, and the use of money does not mean that barter or payment in kind have ceased to exist. But visibility is problematic here as well. A deeply monetized society with significant reliance on money for daily activities may impress upon us a much less positive image simply by lack of excavation and hoard retention, both of which are seriously affected by non-

\textsuperscript{12} Foxhall 2007, 23.
\textsuperscript{13} Reger 2003, 332.
\textsuperscript{14} Reger 2007.
economic factors.\textsuperscript{15} Thus, to understand the monetary aspect of any economy we must necessarily consider other parameters and groups of evidence beyond the coinage itself.

Of paramount importance for any study of the ancient economy is the nature and purpose of coinage, both of which are still debated.\textsuperscript{16} The economist must ask "is issuing coin a direct or indirect economic intervention?"\textsuperscript{17} In the ancient world, coinage has traditionally been thought to have been struck chiefly for purposes of army payment and military expenditure.\textsuperscript{18} This approach is clearly much too simplistic. Regardless of what coinage was initially invented for, its uses in antiquity were varied and numerous. Moreover, there is hard evidence that coinage was not struck solely for military purposes in the time period in question. Aitolia’s large indemnity payment has traditionally been thought to have been paid in freshly struck money but as chapters 5 and 6 will demonstrate, this is incorrect.\textsuperscript{19} Circulation of fractional bronze suggests everyday small transactions. Of course, finds of bronze coins do not necessitate that everyone used money on a daily basis; in fact, the percentage of people using coins, or the frequency of that use, can never wholly be verified. Yet, coins could be and were used for anything.\textsuperscript{20} The major functions of coinage – storage of wealth, unit of account, facilitation of trade and functionality as legal tender – were all active in antiquity and consequently we must take an inclusive approach when evaluating the monetary aspect of any economy, large or small.

Another issue is directly related to the paradigmatic attitude to economic data. There is no Zenon archive in Aitolia, nor does the region possess records of account or other types of data commonly used in economic analysis. Consequently, it cannot answer questions of credit, or capital, or risk – in fact, the data available may not look like economic data at all to an economist. Yet, the

\begin{itemize}
  \item Duncan-Jones 1990, 38.
  \item Foraboschi 2000.
  \item The loudest voice is undoubtedly that of Crawford (1970: 1977: 1985: \textit{RRC}).
  \item For a view that Aitolia’s indemnity was paid in freshly struck coin, see Losada 1965. See also Reger 2003, 348.
  \item Today this is admitted by most scholars although few may be as radically modernizing in their approach to ancient coinage as von Reden 2010.
\end{itemize}
available material has direct bearing on economic activity on the most fundamental level which an inclusive approach makes adamantly clear.\textsuperscript{21}

\textbf{4. The temporal setting – “from indemnity to integration”}

The historical background to 189 BC is well known.\textsuperscript{22} By accepting the peace terms presented by Rome, Aitolia bound itself to numerous clauses, clauses which set the tone for its Late Hellenistic activities. Aitolia had to respect the \textit{maiestas} of the Roman people, share in Rome's foreign policy and send hostages to Rome.\textsuperscript{23} Large tracts of land were removed from Aitolian control; this included all of Western Lokris, Phtiothian Achaia, Phokis and affirmed the separation of the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi from Aitolia.\textsuperscript{24} Moreover, the federation was to pay Rome 500 talents. All three aspects – the financial, geographic and sociopolitical – are intrinsically and extrinsically linked to the parameters for economic activity outlined above. By adhering to the treaty Aitolia was prevented from continuing many of its pre-war policies, territorial expansion being the most noteworthy one. Unsurprisingly, the indemnity of 189 BC constitutes a major historical event and a turning point in Aitolian history. Except for a few minor stories, the region virtually disappears from the historical narrative immediately afterward. Similarly, the indemnity is of vital importance from a broader historical perspective as a watershed in Greco-Roman interaction in the early second century BC: regardless of ones approach to concepts of Greek liberty and Roman

\textsuperscript{21} Fortunately, recent scholarship on the ancient economy shows a definite tendency toward moving away from exclusive approaches; see e.g. Archibald, Davies et al 2001: 2005: 2011.

\textsuperscript{22} Polybius 21.32; Livy 38.11. For a summary of the events, see Gruen 1984. The scholarship on the early years of the second century BC and Greco-Roman interaction is immense; see e.g. Eckstein 2006: 2008. See also chapter 2 of this dissertation.

\textsuperscript{23} The historically context of this clause is debated, especially from a sociopolitical point of view. Did the Aitolians understand what \textit{deditio in fidem} meant? See Freyburger 1982; Gruen 1982; Badian 1984; Piganiol 1950.

\textsuperscript{24} Delphi had already been removed from Aitolian control by Glabrio in 190 BC. On the Aitolians and Delphi, see Daux 1936; Flacelière 1937. On Glabrio and the Aitolians, see Eckstein 1995a; Ferray 1988.
sovereignty, the indemnity plays a central although understudied role in this highly transitional phase.\textsuperscript{25}

This was but one in a chain of indemnities imposed by Rome upon its enemies, indemnities that some scholars believe were difficult to pay.\textsuperscript{26} But not only the financial clauses would have had an effect on Aitolia; the territorial clauses too are of paramount importance. By removing large tracts of land from Aitolian control, the treaty reduced both part of the agrarian base of its economy as well as the federation’s ability to extract taxes there.

For one and a half centuries Aitolia remained largely outside the historical narrative. After Octavian’s victory at Actium, however, it was forcefully brought back on stage. In founding a city in memory of his deeds, Octavian subjected the populations of Western Greece to a large-scale synoicism. By moving the populations of Aitolia, Akarnania and Ozolian Lokris to the newly founded Nikopolis and the Roman colony at Patras, he forcefully and forcibly altered the demographic composition of those regions; if we are to believe most sources, they were emptied (Fig. 1).\textsuperscript{27} On Aitolia’s end it has been assumed that the process was not particularly involved. In the second century AD, Pausanias saw some of Aitolia’s cult statues at Patras, and Strabo comments on the ἑρμία of the region, suggesting that the population had already dwindled into nothing well before the synoicism.\textsuperscript{28} Augustus simply moved the scattered remnants of a near-extinct population to his newly founded city and their cult objects to Patras. Naturally, Strabo’s comments may in fact

\textsuperscript{25} The issue of Greek independence remains contested. For an early view, see Larsen 1935. The issue was recently discussed by Eckstein 2008. See also Gruen (1984) who clearly believes that Greece was “free” essentially throughout the Hellenistic period; his views are supported by Rich 1989 but opposed by Baronowski 1988.


\textsuperscript{27} Nikopolis and its territory have received rather ample attention since excavation of the victory monument began. See the edited volumes by Chrysos 1987; Zachos 2007. For the victory monument, see Murray and Petsas 1989; Zachos 2001. Also relevant are several essays in Isager 2001b. On the synoicism itself and the demographic composition of Nikopolis, see Kirsten 1987; Saricakis 1970; Ruscu 2006. On the numismatic and epigraphic evidence for the Roman colony at Patras, see Agallapoulou 1991; Rizakis 1989: 1995.

\textsuperscript{28} Pausanias 7.18.8-9; Strabo 7.7.6.
be simply rhetorical, and recent archaeological excavation tells us that the *eremia* is vastly exaggerated; indeed, the literary topos of *oliganthropia* was a common feature of the expansionist rhetoric at the time.\(^{29}\) Moreover, the synoicism itself is poorly understood. Conflating the accounts of Strabo, Pausanias and Suetonius may not necessarily remove the inherent bias of a victor’s rhetoric.\(^{30}\) Yet, it is regularly argued that Nikopolis was founded simply as a memento of Augustus’ victory, but there is indeed reason to question to what extent economic explanations may have played a role.\(^{31}\) Augustus’ reorganization and integration of Western Greece may consequently have been a much more complicated process than has previously been understood. The depopulation of Aitolia seems to have had dire consequences for the region as Pausanias notes the altered shoreline due to the Acheloos river washing down less mud, surely a function of agricultural hiatus – but if the accounts for the synoicism of Nikopolis and the Augustan reorganization of Western Greece are largely rhetorical, a new reading of the evidence is undeniably warranted.\(^{32}\)

These two major historical and economic events form the temporal framework for this study. The first changed Aitolia’s place in the world; by the other, Aitolia supposedly ceased to exist. The fundamental question is, of course, what happens between the two? Our general impression is one of decline, yet decline without a contextual discussion is meaningless.\(^{33}\) It is the aim of this dissertation to contextualize and illuminate the complicated process by which one of the most powerful regions in Hellenistic Greece met its proverbial end.

5. The physical setting – a regional study.

With the temporal parameters in place, we must now delineate the physical limits for this inquiry.

Studies that take a regional approach to a historical problem are quite naturally helped by the

\(^{29}\) Pothecary 1977; Isager 2001a.

\(^{30}\) Strabo 7.7.6, 10.2.2; Pausanias 5.23.3, 7.18.8-9, 10.38.4; Suetonius *Aug.* 18.2.

\(^{31}\) Hoepfner 1987.

\(^{32}\) Pausanias 8.24.5.

\(^{33}\) Shipley 1993.
application of topographical definition and delineation. Yet, to define a region is not a straightforward task. Borders tend to fluctuate; especially so in the dynamic Hellenistic period, and a region is more than its physical territory. Consequently, ambiguity is likely to occur, geographically, ethnically and politically. In the latter category we will face the important issue of some cities within the federation’s territory experiencing periods of foreign control; Pleuron, for example, was held by the Achaean federation in the 160s BC. Are these cities not Aitolian during their period of occupation? A related problem entails cities well outside the federation providing league officials. Moreover, at times we will find inscribed records issued by citizens from non-Aitolian territories dated by the Aitolian strategos, indicating that these individuals may in fact still recognize an affiliation to the Aitolian league. Political delineation for the region thus emerges as problematic.

Ethnically, we may define Aitolia as the home of those who identify as ΑΙΤΩΛΟΙ yet for the reasons just mentioned this is difficult. Similarly, it raises issues for the inclusion or exclusion of certain towns. One of these is Naupaktos which although originally inhabited by Lokrians, was handed over to the Aitolians by Philip II in the mid-fourth century BC and remained central to the Aitolian people and their federation throughout its existence.

Geographically, we may define Aitolia as a specific region on the map of modern Greece (Fig. 2). While some ambiguity is unavoidable, this approach to regional delineation is the least problematic. The caveat is, of course, that the geographic “Aitolia” in focus here may not have been considered a similarly delineated area in the Hellenistic period. Largely defined by water, this region is bordered to the south by the gulf of Corinth and to the west by the Acheloos river. Everything west of the Acheloos will be considered Akarnanian or non-Aitolian. This includes all

34 Binford 1964.
35 Reger 2011.
37 Stratos: strategoi in 178/7 BC, 172/1 BC, 169/8 BC, 161/0 BC, 148/7 BC. See Appendix 3A.
38 Numerous manumission records at Delphi are dated both by the Delphic archon and the Aitolian strategos.
39 See discussion in Grainger 1999. See also Antonetti 1987.
categories of evidence except for the sole instance of Stratos furnishing *strategoi* for the league.

Another river, the Mornos, will function as our eastern end, although some archaeological data will be included from its immediate east bank where the river spills into the Corinthian gulf. The most problematic "border" lies to the north beyond Mount Panaitoliko and the related range of mountains. Having received no direct site autopsy, this area of Greece seems to have been home to various ethnic tribes that at times in their history were incorporated into the Aitolian koinon, but the area is poorly understood and our northern border will thus at best be fluid (Fig. 3). Characterized by mountains, steep slopes and narrow gulfs, this region was both difficult to traverse and generally unsuitable for agriculture, a phenomenon that had a profound effect on the *modus vivendi* of its people.

Using the physical features of the landscape as our regional delineations enables a closer look at activity within that region without excluding some overlap between categories. Clearly, these physical features were not impermeable in antiquity; rivers were crossed, mountains traversed, ships sailed the seas. Yet, the visibility of these "borders" facilitates a more focused study on the sometimes less visible activity that occurred between them and while some cross-contamination of sources is unavoidable, to make use of geographical parameters for this regional setting is very clearly ideal.

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40 The Mornos river originates in the Oiti mountains and traverses several Greek regions before it crosses the plain of Naupaktos and meets the sea. Several of these regions were under former Aitolian control but were detached from the federation in 189 BC. The habit of some excavators to label this territory “East Aitolia” is directly unhelpful; most notably, this includes the work done at Kallion/Kallipolis. Note the revealing titles of Bakhuizen 1992 and Themelis 1979. To establish a formal "border" between Aitolia and Western Lokris, Phokis and Doris is not easy.

41 Diodorus 11.3; Strabo 9.5; Xenophon *Anab.* 1.2; Xenophon *Hell.* 6.1; Thucydides 5.51; Appian *Mac.* 1; Appian *BC* 2.10; Livy 41.22. Woodhouse (1897) considers the Dolopians, the Ainianes and the Apodotoi Aitolian tribes. He follows Pliny, who in *NH* 4.3 calls them *Aetolorum populi.*
6. Source material.

The material available for this inquiry does not resemble what an economist would perceive as economic data, and a brief introduction to its inherent problems is necessary. The epigraphic material mostly derives from the sanctuaries at Delphi, Thermon, Naupaktos and Kalydon; the geographical distribution is not broad. These documents cover a wide range of activities but only one is directly relevant for questions of price setting. Importantly, the epigraphic material brings to light a large group of indirect demographic and geographic data that would not otherwise be visible. Very often these documents are dated which is fortunate from the perspective of observing changes through time. On the downside, they represent a very narrow cross-section of society and beyond the single category that involves prices, do not record transactions that we immediately perceive as economic.

The literary evidence is problematic for several reasons. The Polybian bias in all questions related to Aitolia is well known, and Livy often relies on Polybius. Yet, a surprising amount of scholarship accepts Polybius’ accounts at face value – a dangerous attitude indeed. An overarching theme to the literary evidence for economic activity in antiquity is the ancient authors’ disinterest in what we today perceive as economy. Consequently, most information derived from literary sources is indirect. An important problem in using literary accounts involves quantification and numerical analysis. It is clear that numbers are often exaggerated or simply formulated to make a specific impression, thus lacking a fundamental basis in perceivable reality.

The archaeological record is equally problematic. Systematic excavations are still uncommon in the region and publication is rare. A prime example of the disconnection between excavation and publication is Thermon, which has produced no conclusive publication after over a

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43 The most noteworthy issue, but by no means the most problematic, is Polybius’ insistence on the Aitolians as brigands and pirates; see Perrier 2008.
44 See e.g. the most illuminating Scheidel 1996.
century of field work. Even when systematically excavated material has been published, evidence for the Archaic period has received considerably greater attention than materials from other time periods. The most common form of excavation in the region takes the shape of short, intensive rescue operations resulting in only a brief note in the *Archaiologikon Deltion*, often without illustrations or more detailed accounts of what was found. Subsequent publication rarely follows. A more complex issue is the matter of dating locally produced ceramic material. Aitolia’s ceramic tradition is notoriously difficult to date, leading excavators to either rely on imported wares or coin finds, both of which are often dated too broadly. For a chronologically focused inquiry such as this one, correct dating is crucial.

Deriving from excavated contexts and non-contextual coin hoards, the numismatic evidence presents a series of challenges. Unfortunately, some of those are directly related to current scholarly practice. When published, excavated coins are poorly illustrated and dated too broadly, which after the magisterial die study carried out by Tsangari is unacceptable. Coin finds, however, are very rarely published. Second, the issue of hoard retrieval is essential. It would be rash to assume that the known hoards form a representative sample of the situation in antiquity. Moreover, hoards tend to be retrieved by chance, and mostly due to modern activity. Consequently, their geographic distribution most closely reflects the practices of our time.

In sum, the methodological issues inherent in the available categories of data chiefly derive from a lack of secure dating, a dramatic discrepancy between what has been excavated and what has been published, and scholarly bias. To avoid confusion, material that cannot be dated securely has been omitted from discussion in this dissertation. Importantly, an immediate issue that arises

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45 For a summary of the first 100 years, see Karytsas 1998. For more recent seasons, see Papapostolou 2009.
46 The Danish excavators at Kalydon in the 1920s and 1930s seem to have ignored most Hellenistic and Classical layers in their work on the Archaic temple of Artemis Laphria. See Poulsen and Rhomaioi 1927; Dyggve 1948.
49 On hoard retrieval, see e.g. Duncan-Jones 1990, 38.
from the combination of these groups of material is the fact that the evidence they provide very rarely correlate: in fact, they sometimes contradict one another. This strongly emphasizes the need for a multi-faceted, inclusive approach as outlined above.

7. The downward slope? Chapter foci.

Within the temporal and geographic parameters defined above, I address the relevant material in a number of ways. My chapter division is both thematic and source-based. Prelude to indemnity briefly outlines the historical background and touches upon a few economic institutions and events that have direct bearing for my overall inquiry. Here I focus only on a select set of issues in order to best illuminate the changes Late Hellenistic Aitolia underwent after the indemnity.

In my first thematic chapter Landscape and settlement I investigate the physical setting for Aitolian economic activity in the Late Hellenistic period. Contractions and expansions in settlement patterns can be most illuminating for our understanding of a regional economy, and similarly important is the issue of how space is allocated and used. Agriculture, I argue, is a fundamental economic activity that dominated classical antiquity but its traces are largely invisible – yet it can be surmised through the allocation and distribution of land.

Towns and monuments explores the form and function of surviving sites. Here I focus in part on site expansion and contraction, in part on building activity within those sites. Beyond surviving archaeological data I consider the sociopolitical and economic setting of Aitolia’s towns: which were active in the federation? Which had active economic institutions of their own? Which seem to have participated in extraneous trade? What factors played a vital role in site survival? Against this background, I sketch some initial suggestions for the re-evaluation of Western Greece at the time of the synoicism of Nikopolis.
**Coin production and the Aitolian indemnity** considers monetization as related to coin striking and the economic functionality of money. I focus on production volumes and cycles in order to ascertain in what way and with what frequency Aitolia's coinage was struck, and thereafter evaluate the financial clauses of the Roman indemnity. Thereby I present a new angle to the discussion on Roman involvement in Greece in the second century BC, a discussion that for numismatically inclined historians has predominantly focused on the chronology of Greek coin production before and after the destruction of Corinth. Important questions in this chapter include common numismatic ideas of debasement, inflation and monetary control.

In **Coin circulation and monetary use** I address the complex data for how Aitolian coinage may have been used, both internally and outside the region. The changing political climate had noteworthy effects on Aitolian coin circulation which differs visibly from the previous century. Hoard composition sheds light on the available coin types in the region and thereby provides important insight into the functionality of Aitolia's monetary economy. Again, I address the imperative question of monetization, this time from a broader perspective.

**Economic institutions and state interference** first addresses the available evidence for institutions and their uses. These formal institutions were not arbitrary and in fact formed the background constraints for economic activity. Most political institutions have economic functions and the relevant evidence is here subjected to an inclusive study that assumes that market activity never occurs in isolation; consequently, grants of proxenia, ateleia, isopoliteia and asylia are taken to have direct bearing on economic activity. Issues of foreign policy are discussed through the lens of dedications, monetary circulation and physical presence. The issue of warfare and occupation is also discussed here, since warfare clearly had redistributive effects, and occupation has direct

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50 On New Institutional Economics, see North 1981: 1990. The arguments of NIE are tested in North and Weingast 1989. Not everyone believes this is a useful approach; Frier and Kehoe (2007) indicate that hypotheses of NIE can rarely be directly applied to ancient data. On market activity as relating to institutions, see Rawski 1996; Morley 2007.
consequences for taxation. Moreover, I evaluate the composition, size and ultimate end of the federation.

In Economic activity and the Aitolian people I focus on the activity discernible on an individual basis. I address legal as well as illegal activities and include the thorny issue of mercenary service. Records of manumission, the process whereby a slave purchased his or her freedom, are discussed in terms of price setting. In addition, I investigate the distribution of wealth visible in a number of sources and thereby add a valuable dimension to the demographic data. This chapter also includes a study of the debt crisis in the 170s BC and an assessment of the effects of regional population decline. Finally, I touch upon the Roman involvement in Aitolia in the first century BC.

From indemnity to integration takes a macroscopic approach to the evidence presented in previous chapters and generates a synthetic impression of the economic decline Aitolia experienced in the Late Hellenistic period. By contextualizing this “downward slope”, I offer a comprehensive reading of evidence previously omitted from most discussions on both the ancient economy and on Greek and Roman history of this time period, and thereby generate a more lucid explanation for the mechanisms of the Nikopolitan synoicism. Lastly, I outline a few brief suggestions for further investigations both for Aitolia per se and this exceedingly transformational period of Greek and Roman history as a whole.

8. Exclusions.

While my temporal and geographic parameters are strict, I have argued that an inclusive approach to source material is necessary. By focusing on economic activity, however, I must at times make a

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51 The relationship between warfare and economy in antiquity is contested. Some scholars believe war to have been detrimental to economic growth and stability while others believe the opposite. See Foraboschi 2000; Millett 2001, 29; Reger 2007, 479. Contra Cartledge 2002a, 29.
decision on whether or not to include a sociopolitical event that may or may not have indirect consequences for the period at hand. In order to maintain a strict focus on Aitolia, economy, and the Late Hellenistic period I have consequently chosen to exclude certain discussions from this dissertation. These include first and foremost the issue of Delphi. It cannot be denied that third-century-BC Aitolia gained substantial influence on Greek affairs through its control of the sanctuary and the amphiktyonic council. Yet, to gain full understanding of what impact that loss had on Aitolia as a region we would have to evaluate a large number of questions related to the sanctuary and the council through time, at a scale large enough to include all states, kings and federations that ever partook in council events. Such an inquiry simply does not fit the scope of this dissertation.

Moreover, since this is first and foremost a study of a region and not of a federation, to exclude Delphi seems the most rational choice, since I provide no discussion on other territories formerly controlled by Aitolia.

A related issue pertains to sanctuaries as independent systems or micro-economies operating on a mode different to the surrounding region. Such an inquiry would be unnecessarily involved and since Aitolia only possesses one comparatively well-excavated sanctuary, comparative data simply does not exist. The relationship between active cult and economic productivity will thus be ignored.

The final exclusion is perhaps the largest one: the eternal question of “Rome vs. Greece”.

While this issue remains historically relevant, for the sake of this inquiry it matters little whether the Roman government was actively interventionist or simply observational in the Late Hellenistic period. Naturally, the study at hand is bookended by two major “Roman” events and I place great emphasis of the transitional character of this time period. Inarguably, this inquiry sheds light on the effects of Rome’s presence on the structure and characteristics of this Hellenistic economy – but it does so indirectly. Clearly, the question of Greco-Roman interaction is much more complex and

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52 The question is indeed old: Larsen 1935; Eckstein 2008; Gruen 1984; Baronowski 1988.
nuanced than present scholarship can express, but maybe our understanding of this time period is best brought forward by refraining from repeating old questions. Indeed, by avoiding the mainstream debate that is too strongly painted in black and white, the shades of grey generated by an inquiry such as this one will without a doubt better illustrate the development and decline that led a Roman in the Late Republic to exclaim Aetolia amissa.
CHAPTER 2.

Prelude to indemnity.

1. Introduction.

How can we seriously discuss continuity and discontinuity between two historical phases, asks Alcock, if we base all reasoning on the assumption of a decisive break between the two? Comparative data is not only illuminating of processual changes whereby it takes a central place in economic history, but it is in fact vital for any serious study with temporal parameters. Historical events, economic institutions and change cannot be viewed in isolation without losing their significance. Despite its focus on the Late Hellenistic period, this dissertation aims at maximum visibility and consequently we must briefly touch upon a few relevant institutions and earlier events which form vital comparanda for our later material. In some cases we will observe unbroken continuity; in others, disruption and change. In each case, we must later inquire to the mechanisms involved and the results thereof.

This chapter focuses on two main themes. The first centers on territory and spatial division of land. Large tracts of land – in fact, entire regions – were removed from Aitolian control after the war with Rome and the pre-indemnity expanse of Aitolian territory is thus of some interest. After the defeat of the Gauls at Delphi in 279 BC, the koinon annexed a series of territories in a drawn-out process that was neither linear nor organic. I will briefly evaluate the economic merits of that territorial expansion.

Our second focus is certain economic institutions, their interpretations and historical context. Some of these are generally considered simple diplomatic tools but this was not necessarily their sole function. New Institutional Economics dictates that institutions provide the framework

54 "It is the task of economic history to explain the structure and performance of economies through time" (my emphasis). North 1981, 1.
for all economic activity, an approach to economic studies that is useful for inquiries such as this one, when data for quantification is lacking.

These two themes focus our attention on important socioeconomic structures which have not yet been fully explored. To generate a nuanced and more balanced view of these structures and the institutions that shape them is indeed crucial since little scholarship has moved beyond superficial observation. By identifying socioeconomic arrangements we are able to position Aitolia and its people in the wider scope of Hellenistic interaction and activity. This activity cannot be quantified but by observing how it functioned, and indeed how it was intended to function, we can better understand the economic decline Aitolia underwent in the Late Hellenistic period, and thereby further contextualize the coming of Rome and its impact on the Greek world.

2. Land and territory: settlement patterns and territorial expansion.

The settlement patterns of Hellenistic Aitolia diverge greatly from those of any other time period. A visible takeoff in the Early Hellenistic period generated an intense growth in site numbers; the Dutch survey counted no less than 214 sites with Hellenistic material. The contrast to the preceding and subsequent periods is profound. A densely populated landscape gave rise to a highly active, tightly linked settlement configuration which enabled greater inter-site connectivity. While rapidly changing settlement patterns rarely derive from a single impetus, it is likely that the concomitant territorial expansion was some extent related to the increased settlement density in Aitolia itself. In fact, greater settlement density may infer population growth. No demographic data is available for Hellenistic Aitolia but fourth-century-BC settlement data from Boiotia indicates a situation in which the countryside was so densely populated, it reached dangerously high

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55 See chapter 3.
56 On the importance of site-to-site visibility, see Horden and Purcell 2000.
57 Yet, Alcock invites caution in equating the two; Alcock 1993.
numbers. If Early Hellenistic Aitolia experienced similar demographic growth, its population may not have been able to sustain itself on available resources, and territorial expansion may thus have been inevitable.

Aitolian territorial expansion was neither linear nor direct, but when studied geographically, it follows a logical trajectory. The aim, it seems, was at locally connected neighboring states in Central Greece. Since the federation allowed maximum civic and social independence for its incorporated territories, the archaeological and numismatic records are of poor help in understanding this expansion; instead, the expansion is most visible in the composition of the Amphiktyonic council at Delphi. In 277 BC, Aitolia controlled two seats; in 262 BC seven; in 229 BC fourteen; in 226 BC fifteen; and in 220 BC, thirteen or twelve. These seats correspond to polities incorporated into the federation, their territories joined to Aitolia’s own.

While we cannot quantify the importance of the Amphiktyonic council, it seems clear that the states who held a majority of votes in the council could dictate its policy in a manner bestbefitting their own goals. It is generally assumed that involvement at Delphi was a permanent ambition of the federation, despite Flacelière’s insistence that Delphi itself was never incorporated in the koinon. Nevertheless, control of the Amphiktyonic council and thus greater influence on panhellenic affairs, ambitious in itself, cannot be a realistic explanation for Aitolian territorial expansion. Major alliances seem to aim at territorial expansion in general and not only toward states with seats on the council. Moreover, Aitolian expansion was not immediate; indeed, it spanned the greater part of the third century BC. Thus, control of the Amphiktyonic council seems more a bonus than an incentive. But why did the federation see fit to expand the territory it controlled? Political explanations for expansion and growth in the ancient world tend to focus on a

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58 See e.g. Bintliff 1991b. The Boiotia data is discussed in Chapter 3.
59 Flacelière 1937.
61 The clearest example is of course the alliance between Rome and Aitolia in 212/11 BC which gave Aitolia the freedom to annex any territory it wanted. See discussion in Grainger 1999. On the council as a peace-keeping organization, see Larsen 1944.
climate of inter-state competition for hegemony but in Aitolia’s case, reasons for territorial
expansion are best sought in an economic framework.  

Economic systems are sensitive; so especially agrarian systems that lack the transformative
mechanisms of rapid technological improvement. In such systems risk, productivity and general
improvement occur almost exclusively at the margin. Consequently, the least dangerous approach
to continued socioeconomic growth is to avoid decline in marginal productivity by capturing a new
energy subsidy. Ancient states regularly achieved this by territorial expansion. New input had the
potential to raise marginal productivity, and Aitolian expansion is best understood in this light. The
mountainous region was ill suited for agriculture and possessed no metal ores; thus, to achieve the
marginal productivity needed for socioeconomic improvement – or even status quo – was near
impossible without new input. Undeniably complex, Aitolia’s territorial growth appears to have
been a built-in problem-solving mechanism whose success rate was almost always guaranteed as
long as it was left unchallenged. It is only logical that the expansion was both gradual and sporadic;
only when marginal productivity was challenged, a new energy source was captured. When this
mechanism was threatened, however, marginal productivity could quickly change to marginal
decline which seriously affected the region’s ability to avoid system collapse. The economic decline
in focus for this dissertation is evidence thereof.

By expanding the territory it controlled, the koinon maintained marginal productivity, but
also obtained several secondary “tools” which could be used for socioeconomic improvement. First
and foremost, a larger territory equaled a greater number of people from whom to exact taxes and
to levy troops for army duty. In turn, this augmented Aitolian political power. A larger territory
facilitated greater population movement, both of Aitolians and non-Aitolians – an important factor
for trade. Epigraphic records reveal that some of the foreigners residing in Aitolia were

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62 Daux 1955. Hegemony, it seems, remains central to the debate on Greco-Roman interaction in the Late
Hellenistic period; ergo Morstein Kallet-Marx 1995a; Badian 1984.
63 Tainter 1988.
64 Mackil 2003.
merchants.\textsuperscript{65} Moreover, as Aitolian control of Central Greece grew spatially, so did the federation’s control of the amphiktyonic council at Delphi. Territorial expansion equaled federal expansion.

Yet, expansion was not simply predatory. Aitolia did not drain surrounding regions of resources and manpower.\textsuperscript{66} Inhabitants of annexed territories did not become Aitolians but their polities did become members of the \textit{koinon} and thereby, small, previously insignificant states gained a voice. That this symbiotic relationship was generally considered positive is strengthened by Aitolian grants of \textit{isopoliteia} to non-member states, indicating that there were several levels of incorporation, the highest of which was full membership.\textsuperscript{67} The importance of federal membership becomes clear when studying the epigraphic record at Delphi after 189 BC. There, numerous polities \textit{still} identify as Aitolian and date their records according to the traditional Aitolian dating formula – at a time when history tells us that they had been removed from Aitolian control.\textsuperscript{68} Consequently, while territorial expansion seems to have been a necessity for the population to maintain a viable socioeconomic balance, we understand that it was not solely beneficial to Aitolia itself.

3. Economic institutions. The background constraints.

How do we study economic activity without possessing quantifiable economic data? According to a 2007 study, by focusing on the complex relationship between [legal] institutions and the economy.\textsuperscript{69} In New Institutional Economics, institutions provide the framework within which

\textsuperscript{65} For foreigners in Aitolia, see Marek 1984. There are numerous epigraphic attestations of foreigners residing permanently in Aitolia; see e.g. \textit{FdD} III 3,186 and 187. For Aitolians living outside Aitolia, see the grants of \textit{asylia} discussed below as well as chapters 7 and 8.

\textsuperscript{66} Contra the interpretive core/periphery model; see Bintliff 1997.

\textsuperscript{67} The issue is best addressed in Larsen 1968. On the composition of Aitolia’s assembly, see Larsen 1945: 1952.

\textsuperscript{68} E.g. \textit{SGDI} II 1765, c. 170 – 150 BC: a manumitting owner from Kallipolis in West Lokris.

\textsuperscript{69} Frier and Kehoe 2007.
human beings interact and their economic activity occurs.\textsuperscript{70} These institutions form a set of rules which are designed to constrain or dictate the behavior of individuals in the interest of maximizing wealth or utility. Some of these institutions are seemingly political in nature, but since formal institutions are never arbitrary and in fact form the “rules of the game” for all economic activity, their economic intent and effect merit attention. Importantly, these institutions formalize constraints on behavior that the polity finds unacceptable. Thereby, they provide secondary evidence for economic policy and moreover, their study informs us of the institutional arrangements needed to achieve economic growth.\textsuperscript{71}

Aitolia made use of several such institutions: \textit{isopoliteia, politeia, asylia, ateleia, asphaleia}, and \textit{proxenia} (Appendix 2A). Known to us through the written records that formalize them, these unilateral grants have often been taken as evidence for certain types of unwanted socioeconomic behavior – most readily, piracy and plunder.\textsuperscript{72} They are either bestowed upon individuals and their families, or on the population of an entire city. A second group of institutions consists of \textit{symbola}, bilateral agreements between two states. These include \textit{symmachia} and \textit{sympoliteia}; in Aitolia’s case, they are exceedingly rare and will not be discussed here.\textsuperscript{73}

The most common institution is that of \textit{proxenia} given to an individual, sometimes in combination with grants of \textit{isopoliteia} or \textit{politeia}.\textsuperscript{74} Chiefly displayed at the federal sanctuary at Thermon, the documents recording the grant illustrate that the award was often sponsored by an influential Aitolian, even a \textit{strategos}. Consequently, it is likely that the foreign recipient had already proven himself a useful person to the awarding polity, perhaps through acts of euergetism, and that

\textsuperscript{71} Gabrielsen 2011.
\textsuperscript{72} The examples are numerous. See e.g. McShane 1964; Will 1966. On Aitolian grants as evidence for piracy, see Benecke 1934. See also Busolt 1920.
\textsuperscript{73} Gauthier 1972.
the grant was instigated either by the federation itself, or by an Aitolian citizen.\textsuperscript{75} The addition of privileges such as \textit{ateleia} indicates that the services rendered were at least to some extent economic, as the right to import or export goods without paying taxes created opportunities for economic activity.\textsuperscript{76} Yet, evidence from Delos shows that direct economic motives for these grants were rare.\textsuperscript{77} Nevertheless, activity in a socially embedded economy is rarely immediately visible, and it is clear that these institutions had wide-ranging economic consequences: to pay no taxes on goods, to receive personal security and access to a socioeconomic infrastructure in a foreign polity have the potential to generate a greater marginal return.

The \textit{xenia} background to \textit{proxenia} should not be discounted.\textsuperscript{78} In an integrated economy which lacks an independent, self-sustaining “market”, connectivity between individuals – and through them, between their respective states – is absolutely central. To reward certain services to the state through grants of civic privileges which themselves aimed at increased connectivity was only logical, as it both encouraged such positive behavior and served to further integrate useful individuals into the socioeconomic makeup of the region. Naturally, we cannot quantify or even estimate what effect these grants had on the Aitolian economy but it is vital to emphasize the frequency and regularity with which the federation made use of these institutions over the course of the third century BC. Quite obviously, the \textit{koinon} found these grants useful, as did the other states that used them. Interestingly, we note that Aitolians were awarded \textit{proxenia} by foreign polities – but not by the same polities to whose citizens Aitolia itself had issued grants (Appendix 2B).

From a historical point of view, the most noteworthy economic institution, and at the same time the most complex, is that of \textit{asylia}. The awarding polity granted the recipient inviolability which some scholars erroneously interpret in the realm of immediate legal responsibility – an error

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{75} Gauthier 1985.
\item \textsuperscript{76} On \textit{ateleia} see Rubinstein 2009. Cf. Gauthier 1985. See also Reger 2003.
\item \textsuperscript{77} Reger 1994.
\item \textsuperscript{78} Gerolymatos 1986. The earliest evidence for \textit{proxenia} is Classical in date. The formula was not fixed until the fourth century BC. See Knoepfler 2001.
\end{itemize}
which in turn has given rise to the notion of an Aitolian piratical state.\textsuperscript{79} In Aitolia’s case, \textit{asylia} is almost exclusively given to states and not to individuals. It has been argued both that \textit{asylia} represents a collective step \textit{away} from piratical behavior, and conversely, that the league actively employed piracy as a means of bullying other states into federal agreements whereby \textit{asylia} was granted as a relief.\textsuperscript{80} Neither approach is satisfactory. First, we note the manner in which the grant was issued. The foreign state appears to have initiated contact with Aitolia and been granted their specified request. Thus, Aitolia’s role is a passive one. Second, not a single case of the over 200 known \textit{asylia} grants makes use of an oath.\textsuperscript{81} Consequently, the grants are not legally binding, and moreover, very few grants include some form of repercussions for those breaking it. It is indeed difficult to determine what the institution really meant: neither legally nor religiously does the grant of “security from seizure” make much sense without an accompanying oath. Yet, the inherent ambiguity of the institution may very well have formed part of its attraction. As a cultural phenomenon firmly anchored in a Panhellenic ideal of diplomacy, neutralization and connectivity, each state was able to interpret – and use – the grant differently.\textsuperscript{82}

The geographic distribution of Aitolian grants is central to interpretation of how the federation used these institutions. Crucially, they do not correspond to epigraphically attested piratical attacks, nor to Polybian accounts of raids.\textsuperscript{83} To simply correlate \textit{asylia} to piracy is thus too simplistic an approach. Importantly, requests seem to almost exclusively have been bestowed upon geographically distant polities located in places well outside Aitolian territorial control.\textsuperscript{84} So why

\textsuperscript{79} Rigsby 1996.
\textsuperscript{80} Scholten 2000 contra Ormerod 1997.
\textsuperscript{81} Rigsby 1996.
\textsuperscript{82} Rigsby (1996) points out that to Rome, the request of Greek \textit{asylia} meant nothing beyond a general right to asylum, a very basic assumption that not necessarily held true for a Greek polity.
\textsuperscript{83} There is only one possible correlation – the case of Lousoi/Lusi in the Peloponnese, whence the Aitolians stole some sacred furniture when threatening the inviolability of the sanctuary. Rigsby doubts that the insignificant sanctuary was truly \textit{asylon}. More importantly, the inscription documenting the grant has been dated to 220 BC simply because of the Polybian account, but the date cannot be verified. See Rigsby 1996; cf. Polybius 4.18.11; IG IX\textsuperscript{1} 1:135.
\textsuperscript{84} McShane (1964, 52) adds too much weight to his statement that \textit{asylia} was sought from distant, \textit{dangerous} powers.
was Aitolia solicited for *asylia*, and why did it acquiesce to these requests? The question merits attention. Initially, we note that Aitolia was by no means the only Hellenistic state that made regular use of these institutions. To seek out the intervention of other states by appealing to commonly known institutions, to enter agreements and to establish treaties were frequently occurring phenomena in the Hellenistic age. A latecomer to the international stage, Aitolia had no rich history to advance its name and thus it had to make use of existing socioeconomic and political tools to best situate itself on that stage. Quite simply, the use of known economic institutions generated the background constraints needed for participation from which the federation might otherwise have been excluded.

It has been argued that the κατὰ ταῦτα mentioned in several grants insinuates a form of reciprocity.\(^8^5\) If that is the case, the presumed unilateral grants would in fact be bilateral, and Aitolia would gain every form of privilege it itself granted to the foreign polity. This would facilitate legal movement of Aitolians outside the borders of their home polity. Consequently, it is argued, Aitolia readily agreed to these requests as obtaining legal access to a foreign port helped advance its own piracy abroad. The argument is unsound. Rather, the readiness with which Aitolia granted foreigners and other states various forms of *politeia, asylia* and *asphaleia* emphasizes a marked, official stand against non-normative behavior.

Indeed, it is in that setting we must approach the institution of *asylia*. Aitolia seems to have used it with the aim of separating its own official policy and federal ideal from the misbehavior of certain individuals. The region had a longstanding reputation of preying on its neighbors, a mode of production in “the old way of life” well known in Central Greece.\(^8^6\) This raid mentality, I argue, was structurally essential for the socioeconomic framework available to the Aitolians, but was unacceptable to other Hellenistic states and consequently the *koinon* used these institutions to

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\(^8^5\) Gauthier 1972, 251.  
\(^8^6\) Thukydides 1.5.1-3.
separate its own policy from the traditional attitude of its people to praeda.\textsuperscript{87} Cleverly, it did so without binding legislation. By responding institutionally to other states’ general concern with safety, the federation achieved improved socioeconomic connectivity at a larger geographic scale than the territory it controlled itself, and thereby it maximized its potential for marginal growth.

4. Piracy, pirates and plunder.

As noted above, economic institutions have been taken to demonstrate widespread Aitolian piracy; indeed, to validate the existence of a state whose very foundations were predatory. Clearly influenced by Polybius’ repeated accusations of Aitolian misbehavior, modern scholars see in Aitolia a piratical state and consequently attribute to Aitolia several cases of piratical attacks in which the attackers’ identity is unknown.\textsuperscript{88} Such blanket characterizations are uninformative. Epigraphically attested examples of Aitolian piracy and brigandage beyond the inference of asylia grants do exist, but are not numerous; in fact, when analyzed closely, these attacks seem to contradict the notion of an Aitolian piratical state.\textsuperscript{89} First, the foreign states that were granted asylia were not the same that were attacked by pirates. Second, states that had already been attacked (even in cases where the origins of the pirates are unknown) did not solicit Aitolian protection. Third, and very importantly, the attackers seem to operate on their own, without federal support.

\textsuperscript{87} Gabrielsen 2001. Note Polybius 18.4.8-5.4, in which the Aitolians boast that they would “rather remove Aitolia from Aitolia than that custom”.

\textsuperscript{88} See e.g. Ziebarth (1929) who assigns several “nameless” attacks to the Aitolians; one of these supposed Aitolian attacks, on Salamis in the mid-third century BC is interpreted by Tarn (1913) to have been carried out by Cretans.

\textsuperscript{89} Naval attack on Naxos: IG XII 5,36 = Syll.\textsuperscript{3} 520; Pritchett 1974. Raid on Attica in the 240s BC: IG II\textsuperscript{2} 746. Seaborne raid on Lesbos in 208/7 BC: IG IX 1\textsuperscript{2} 1: 190; Bakhuizen 1993. Raids on Attica seem to have been common during the Chremonidean War in the 260s BC. See e.g. Scholten 2000, 109. Several scholars have attributed an epigraphically attested attack on Aigiale on Amorgos to the Aitolians. Nevertheless, as pointed out by Scholten, we are only given the name of the pirate captain, and there is nothing to suggest that he or his crew originated from Aitolia. See Scholten 2000, 109; Pritchett 1974, 277; Benecke 1935, 12-14; Ormerod 1997, 139-140. The inscription is Syll.\textsuperscript{3} 521.
Literary evidence for Aitolian brigandage is more plentiful. Polybius regularly accuses Aitolia of ignoring established normative behavior. At one point Polybius has Philip V say that the *koinon* refused to regulate its members’ “right to take booty from booty”.\(^90\) This has been interpreted as formal federal legislation allowing – or indeed encouraging – Aitolians to raid any territory they liked at any given time.\(^91\) Yet this cannot be so. The *koinon* did not consent to random plunder. Some grants of *asylia* include the added bonus of legal representation and access to Aitolian law courts for the sake of redress. Such a privilege would not have been granted in a state that legalized plunder. Indeed, the majority of Polybian accusations is set in a time of war, and it is within that framework we must situate Aitolian privateering; it was a military strategy that suited both the participating Aitolians and their federation. Plunder (and the havoc it caused) was a relevant contribution both to the ambitions of the military campaign – and thus, to the federation – and to the personal finances of the participating individuals.

In fact, piracy and plunder is best understood on an individual level and in socioeconomic terms – not on a state-wide level. The pirate is, after all, an individual, who operates outside the norms of society. The opportunistic attitude inherent in such practice is of paramount importance for any individual living at the margin. To capture a new energy subsidy, even temporarily, can make the important difference between decline and improvement (or death and survival). Aitolian opportunism was firmly anchored in a traditional raid mentality which improved odds of survival. This mentality was structurally essential for any individual situated in an economic system that was otherwise poorly suited to increased marginal return.

Aitolians seem to have regularly practiced privateering or looting in wartime, and moreover, to have been authorized by its federation to engage in such practice.\(^92\) Chances are that it some individuals seized any available opportunity, even in peacetime. Such an “ethnic habit” was

\(^{90}\) Polybius 18.4.8-5.4; Scholten 2000, 21ff.
\(^{91}\) Larsen 1968, 210ff.
\(^{92}\) Perrier 2008.
unacceptable to most other Hellenistic polities. Herein lies an important conflict. The *koinon* sought greater integration in the Hellenistic world which it could only achieve by adapting to established norms. It achieved this in part by relying on economic institutions readily used by other polities and by “playing the game” when asked to. The Aitolians, on the other hand, were used to an age-old mode of production which mandated capture of new energy subsidies whenever an opportunity presented itself. This conflict between socioeconomic tradition and sociopolitical attitude was never truly resolved. It is clear that some Aitolians engaged in downright piratical activities. The behavior of such opportunistic individuals, regardless of their ethnicity, forms the general backdrop to some states’ inquiries for Aitolian *asilia.*

5. Warfare and mercenary service.

Aitolia spent a significant portion of the third century BC at war. Since Aitolia had no standing army, soldiers had to be levied among the ordinary citizenry which removed people from their ordinary place of production in the agrarian-based economy. Agricultural societies are sensitive to shifts in manpower, and war-induced breaks in agricultural activity could have significantly negative effects. The positive effects of warfare are difficult to ascertain but territorial acquisition provided the new energy subsidy needed for marginal improvement. Major military alliances almost exclusively focus on such subsidies. Ancient states could use warfare as a means of improving their own odds but when studying the last three decades of the third century BC, a time period for which Polybius’ narrative is unusually rich and complete, the chance nature of utilizing warfare for

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93 If we envision a Greek family of six members, four of which are at an age where they can contribute a whole day’s work, the absence of only one of said four members will deprive the family of 25% of manual labor. If the age distribution is more slanted, in the case of a larger family with a greater number of younger children, the consequences of a single absentee adult are even greater. The land, too, suffered, both from invasions and from the simple removal of workers. Cf. Toynbee 1965. See also Chaniotis 2011.

94 Division of booty, for example, was a chief factor in an Aitolo-Illyrian alliance mentioned by Polybius: 4.16.9; 29.5. Cf. the alliance between Rome and Aitolia in 212/11 BC; Muylle 1969.
socioeconomic improvement becomes clear (Appendix 2C).\textsuperscript{95} Warfare, I have argued, provided individuals living at the margin with a chance to improve their own odds of survival, but Aitolia was not constantly at war, nor was such marginal improvement ever guaranteed, and thus, some individuals resorted to illegal activities such as piracy. Others sought military employment elsewhere as mercenaries.\textsuperscript{96}

Although by no means a Hellenistic invention, the use of paid non-citizen soldiers was an integral part of Hellenistic warfare. We find Aitolian mercenary soldiers in every royal army in the Hellenistic world, armies that had little or no connection with the koinon itself (Appendix 2D). Their service abroad was so frequent that contemporary authors made note of it.\textsuperscript{97} During the third century BC, the great majority of Aitolian mercenaries served the Ptolemies, but whether this is a result of strong diplomatic ties between kingdom and koinon, or simply an indication of Ptolemaic habits of military employment, we cannot say. In 200 BC, 6,500 Aitolians were employed in the Ptolemaic army.\textsuperscript{98} This is the largest group of Aitolians ever recorded outside the federation’s own territory. Their recruiter, the infamous Skopas from Trichonion, was paid the monstrous salary of ten minae per day in addition to his regular mercenary wages.\textsuperscript{99}

Unfortunately, no definitive figures survive for ordinary mercenary pay in the Hellenistic period.\textsuperscript{100} Griffith estimates that the composite pay of a citizen soldier may have varied between six and eight Attic obols per day, and suggests that by the end of the third century BC, mercenary

\textsuperscript{95} Too simplistically, Finley labeled the accumulation of booty an essential factor for financial growth in the Greco-Roman world (my emphasis): Finley 1977.

\textsuperscript{96} I am thankful to the participants of Strangers in a Strange Land, a graduate conference held by the University of Pennsylvania in 2011 where I presented a work-in-progress paper on Aitolian mercenaries in the third century BC, for their kind suggestions on the connections between mercenary service and economic gain.

\textsuperscript{97} Livy 32.34.5: “contrariae persaepe acies in utraque parte Aetolica auxilia habeant”.

\textsuperscript{98} Livy 31.43.

\textsuperscript{99} Polybius (11.25.16) notes that the men next in rank to Skopas, presumably also Aitolians, each received one mina daily.

\textsuperscript{100} The treaty between Aitolia and Akarnania notes the local rates for military wages in the first half of the third century BC. According to this treaty, a cavalryman would make one Corinthian stater per day, a hoplite 12 Corinthian obols, a peltast nine obols and a light-armed soldier seven obols. IG IX 1\textsuperscript{2} 1:3.
wages had risen to match that number. Such estimates require the Ptolemaic state to pay 6,500 Aitolian mercenaries 23,735 – 31,633 minae annually. Skopas’ own salary, discounting the lowly base salary, was 3,650 minae. If he was indeed paid regularly throughout his seven-year tenure, we arrive at 425 talents. It is a positively astronomical sum; close in size to the indemnity of 189 BC and greater than the fortune of the Aitolian Alexander who Polybius claims was the richest man in Greece. In the second century BC, manumission at Delphi seems to have averaged four minae, the equivalent of 3½ tons of wheat. The comparison challenges Polybius’ statement on Skopas’ grossly inflated salary but even if Polybius is correct, Skopas case is truly exceptional.

Yet, it is clear that mercenary service was attractive to the Aitolians. The base salary may not have been particularly high but was at least roughly on par with citizen-soldier wages. The added prospect of booty was naturally present, as was the opportunity for salaried enrichment through promotion. Numerous inscriptions attest to Aitolians holding high positions in these foreign armies, and it is likely that generals were paid substantially more than ordinary soldiers. In fact, the opportunity for personal enrichment seems to have been the main attraction of mercenary service, whether through plunder or promotion.

Aitolian mercenary service seems to have virtually exploded in the last two decades of the third century BC. Before this, Aitolian mercenaries are common but do not occur in large numbers. This surge is best explained in the light of the Social War, which was concluded with the Peace of Naupaktos in 217 BC. To the Aitolians, the following decade was a period of confusion. Not all citizens were advocates of peace, and even after the ratification of the peace treaty, some Aitolians protested against its provisions. The koinon was exhausted, Aitolian cities and sanctuaries had been destroyed, the agrarian base for the regional economy was harmed, and many people were simply had had enough. See also Grainger 1999, chapter 14.
greatly in debt. Skopas himself left Aitolia because of debt problems, and his case was not unique.\textsuperscript{106} Recruiters may have been unusually successful simply because they offered debt-ridden individuals some cash up front; Polybius tells us that when on a recruitment campaign in Aitolia, Skopas was given a large sum of money to advance to the newly recruited mercenaries.\textsuperscript{107} It is indeed likely that the willingness with which thousands of Aitolians accepted mercenary service was a direct result of the economic situation in Aitolia in the last decades of the third century BC.

But by accepting service abroad, the Aitolian mercenaries extended their absence from their regular agrarian duties. This occurred at a time when the agricultural base for the economy was already seriously hurt by long campaigns abroad and at home. While the individual incentive for mercenary service was powerfully financial, its economic effects on Aitolia itself were seriously detrimental, and the debt crisis deepened.

6. The debt crisis.

Comprised of three brief fragments in Polybius, the Aitolian debt problem is poorly understood.\textsuperscript{108} The Aitolians, Polybius claims, had suddenly and unexpectedly become enmeshed in debt. The strategoi Skopas and Dorimachos – prominent actors in Polybius unflattering account of the Social War – were charged with drawing up the legislation needed to solve the problem, but the proposal met with serious opposition and as a result, Skopas went into exile in Alexandria. That is the entire narrative.

Situated in the aftermath of the Social War and the following ten years of quarrels, the sudden emergence of a debt crisis is unsurprising.\textsuperscript{109} The countryside was in disrepair and the

\textsuperscript{106} On Skopas’ debt problems, see Polybius 13.2.3.
\textsuperscript{107} Polybius 15.25.16.
\textsuperscript{108} Polybius 13.1-3. Polybius considers Skopas’ proposals revolutionary and regards the ability to legislate away debt an example of constitutional instability; in reality, Grainger (1999, 343) is right in suggesting that this is evidence of the adaptability to unforeseen circumstances.
agrarian base disturbed. Wealthy Aitolians traditionally stored their riches at Thermon but the sanctuary had been sacked and all goods carried off.\(^{110}\) Some territories had been detached from the federation, removing both taxable population and natural resources from Aitolian control. For the agriculturally engaged population, vital marginal return had been seriously affected, clearly to the point of needing to borrow money. Cancellation of these debts meant that those who had loaned money would lose it, which the lenders presumably were unwilling to do.\(^{111}\) Consequently, the debt problem remained unsolved and the gap between lenders and borrowers grew.\(^{112}\) As a result, Aitolia suffered both a loss of physically available manpower (through voluntary exile for the purpose of mercenary service) and a reduction in available men for military service, since fewer men could now afford the equipment needed for warfare. For an economy that was sensitive to shifts in manpower, in a region where marginal return was of utmost importance for survival, the effects were profound. This “third-century-BC inheritance” had a serious impact on Late Hellenistic Aitolia and “the downward slope” must be understood against this background.

In the ancient world, economic crises were chiefly solved by capturing new resources, not by constitutional reformation or technological improvement. Territorial expansion, I have argued, was the easiest and most reliable way for Aitolia to obtain such resources. The late third-century-BC debt crisis indicates why the federation showed such dissatisfaction after 196 BC, and invites a new reading for the invitation of Antiochos III as *autokrator strategos* of the league.\(^{113}\) Only by territorial expansion could the region regain its socioeconomic footing. Unfortunately, the territorial clauses of the Roman indemnity prevented such expansion and Aitolia was doomed to economic decline.

\(^{110}\) Pritchett 1992a; Walbank 1940; Polybius 5.8.4-9; 13.1.
\(^{111}\) Grainger 1999, 344ff.
\(^{112}\) Walbank (1940, 109.2) believes that the legislation was passed There might be a connection between the surge of *proxenia* grants and the general economic depression at this time.
\(^{113}\) Polybius 18.38.21; 29. 22.
CHAPTER 3.
Landscape and settlement.

1. Introduction: landscape and survey.

To discuss civilization is to discuss space.\textsuperscript{114} The arrangement of human settlements in a specific location, their relationship, form and date offer a specific and often cohesive commentary on human activity and history. Rarely haphazard, this arrangement is dictated by certain rules that constrain and enable human activity. Such constraints are both immediately physical in nature – the availability of arable land, soil quality and natural resources – but also include human-induced constrictions such as political power, socioeconomic circumstances and cultural preferences. The various ways in which settlements are arranged in, and make use of, their surroundings invariably reflect changes and oscillations in the socioeconomic arrangement of that culture. This synthesis of human activity and geological formations, of people and place, is a defining characteristic of a landscape beyond the oversimplification of “territory”.\textsuperscript{115} Consequently, a landscape is not simply a physical space but also a social construct in that it is both an artificial human creation and a process.\textsuperscript{116} As a process, the landscape changes as activity therein transforms. This process reflects social, political, economic and demographic events, both internally and externally.\textsuperscript{117} Therefore, landscapes invite assessment of historical structures which if studied diachronically, allows for the evaluation of human activity over time, both in a Braudelian \textit{longue dûrée} and as \textit{histoire événementielle}: in fact, it can be argued that no study of civilization is complete without detailed

\textsuperscript{114} Braudel 1994.
\textsuperscript{115} Gottman 1973. The oldest analysis of the significance of territorial characteristics is Plato’s \textit{Laws}. Interestingly, Plato’s definition has much in common with modern attitudes: the territory is the very basis upon which the state exists. \textit{Laws} 4.704-10; 5.737.
\textsuperscript{116} Backhaus and Murungi 2002.
\textsuperscript{117} Smith 1990; Cosgrove 1985; Bintliff 1982.
understanding of its physical setting. Moreover, close examination of a landscape will shed light on interactions between local communities which can be most informative of socioeconomic change. In this dissertation, I use the term “landscape” in its broadest sense, thereby including the physical land, the settlements on that land, the activities it generated, and the spatial arrangement of sites against the backdrop of natural topography.

Any discussion of ancient landscapes must take into account the very specific vocabulary that existed in antiquity with regards to the land and the people inhabiting it. Strabo speaks of the eremia of desolate Aitolia in the first century BC and a century earlier, Polybius made note of general population decline and settlement abandonment all over Greece. Desolation and prosperity are key terms in the landscape vocabulary and despite their obvious moral values, have often been taken at face value. Yet, Alcock has demonstrated that oliganthropia, that is, desolation and population decline, is to a large extent a literary topos that made use of impressionistic generalizations to advance a specific political rhetoric on behalf of a victor. It is thus important to not automatically accept accounts of Late Hellenistic decline and we must look beyond the literary topoi. For this study, detailed evaluation of Aitolia’s landscape is essential. Poorly understood and largely unstudied, the socioeconomic decline in Late Hellenistic Aitolia must be evaluated organically, and without appropriate understanding of the landscape itself, the decline will remain detached from the very constraints that shaped its existence. Approaches to regional studies beyond purely literary analyses are many but the most valuable approach is still the surface survey. Data obtained through intensive and extensive survey form the basis for discussion in

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118 Renfrew 1978a. For detailed and still relevant analysis of the Annales School and its applications in archaeology, see Bintliff 1991a. La longue durée is addressed throughout Braudel’s works, but most readily in Braudel 1972. See also chapters 2 and 3 in Braudel 1994.
119 Renfrew and Cherry 1986.
120 Strabo 7.7.1; 10.2.3; Polybius 36.17.5-9.
122 Alcock 1993.
123 The history of surface survey is summarized in Barker 1991. For a summary of the most recent – and in some cases, still ongoing – surveys in the Mediterranean basin, see Alcock and Cherry 2004.
this chapter. It will generate the physical framework so desperately needed for a contextual reading of the monuments, coins, inscriptions and literary accounts of Late Hellenistic Aitolia, thereby defining for us the very landscape in which Aitolian activity took place.

2. Survey and settlement data: Studia Aetolica.

In the 1980s, a Dutch team previously engaged in the 1970s salvage excavations at Kallipolis conducted an extensive survey of a vast territory they called Aitolia. Their chosen area of study included the Aitolian portion of the prefecture Aitoloakarnania but also a large expanse of land east of the Mornos river, an area best known as West Lokris in antiquity but referred to as “East Aitolia” by the Dutch surveyors, as well as the mountainous area around the newly built Mornos reservoir (Fig. 6). Field walking combined with careful site autopsy and evaluation of previous reports and published accounts formed the basis of their study. Selection of sites for intensive field walking was done with great care, but several factors lead to intensive survey methods only being applied to select smaller tracts of the large area selected for investigation. Difficulty in accessibility was named the primary reason. The chosen territory was enormous and also very mountainous. The sheer size forced the survey to be extensive rather than intensive, as did the inaccessibility of many sites due to the extreme nature of the terrain. When sampling, the team made careful use of shard density and noted that the Aitolian landscape under autopsy generated less background noise than other parts of Greece. This suggested that the region was more densely inhabited – but not necessarily permanently settled – than other places and had seen substantial physical human activity.

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125 This area does not fully correspond to “Aitolia” as defined in this study; see chapter 1.
126 We note that the Dutch team did not produce a cohesive definition of “site” as opposed to a simple scatter. Ideally, a site should exhibit definable limits but it is not entirely clear whether this was always taken into account during the Dutch investigations. Cf. Doelle 1977.
127 Gallant 1986.
214 autopsied sites in *Studia Aetolica* generated datable Hellenistic material but not all could be securely categorized (Fig. 4).\(^{128}\) 48 sites were cemeteries, 66 habitation sites, 29 special purpose sites, and seven freestanding towers; the rest could not be categorized. Many sites severed more than one function, where habitation combined with a cemetery was the most common.

Naturally, not all these 214 sites are relevant to this study as few of them have produced securely datable Late Hellenistic material. Defining dating criteria based on a comparatively small amount of investigated material can be hazardous, and Northwestern Greece adds another level of difficulty in that there are no secure typologies for its nearly undatable local ceramics.\(^{129}\) Both terra sigillata and Hellenistic red slip occur in Aitolia but not at all Hellenistic sites, and any dating system based solely on ceramic imports can generate a slanted, not to say false chronology: after all, a site autopsy producing no imported Late Hellenistic wares need not imply that the site was inactive at the time. Moreover, there may have been problems of sampling; the Dutch team noted that inaccessibility of terrain sometimes prevented sufficient autopsy.\(^{130}\)

The Dutch team was aware of some problems in their first study. A 1995 reinvestigation of material autopsied from select sites in the large territory examined in the 1980s focused on Early Roman and Roman material, and allowed for the identification of a clear break between the Hellenistic and Roman periods.\(^{131}\) More importantly, the Dutch archaeologists detected a vivid break between the Hellenistic and Late Hellenistic periods. Sites having produced Hellenistic black glaze pottery but no terra sigillata vastly outnumbered sites that had produced both. Interpreted to have occurred between the first half of the second century BC and the end of the first century BC, this decline took place precisely in the time period investigated in this dissertation. Yet, although

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\(^{128}\) Observe that this number applies to Aitolia as defined in chapter 1. The Dutch team included a large area west of the Mornos river that was not under Aitolian control in the second century BC and should more correctly be considered West Lokris. Thus, the actual number of Hellenistic Dutch “Aitolian” sites is larger than the number used here.

\(^{129}\) Bommeljé and Vroom 1995.

\(^{130}\) Sampling in surface surveys is statistically problematic and the Dutch investigations did not account for several relevant statistical factors. Their overall sample may in fact have been too small, which could influence skewing. For a general overview of the problem, see Cowgill 1975.

\(^{131}\) Bommeljé and Vroom 1995.
the 1995 gazetteer aimed to be all-encompassing, further analysis of the available data is necessary in order to assess several essential variables. These include the number of sites, their distribution by date and function, their arrangement according to environmental variables, and their interrelationship.\textsuperscript{132} Moreover, the Dutch data itself needs close reevaluation, since some dating and site identification have been done solely based on travelers’ reports. In addition, several sites have experienced significant excavation since 1995, thereby providing additional information not available in the Dutch study. To this we must add coin hoards, which were largely ignored by the Dutch team, and settlement data obtained through close analysis of inscriptions.

3. The Aitolian data.

We begin with the epigraphic material. The extensive Dutch survey did incorporate inscriptions, but only as chronological markers, and most often too broadly so. Over 100 Late Hellenistic inscriptions have been found at eight sites in Aitolia. Many of them can be dated to within a year of their production simply by means of their own dating formula.\textsuperscript{133} Importantly, the inscriptions contain spatial information that cannot be obtained from any other source. They mention a large number of sites which have not been identified in the archaeological record but must have existed when the inscription was engraved, or at least slightly before (Appendix 1B). The sites are often mentioned in their adjectival form as simple demonyms. Thus, they can be tribes, or villages, or both, but clearly possess a geographic component in addition to their ethnic identity. These demonyms are used precisely in the same way as the known topographical adjectival forms “Kalydonian” and “Naupaktian”, which suggests that there is some merit in considering them localities and not ethnicities. Naturally, one does not identify as “Kalydonian” several generations after Kalydon has ceased to exist, and there is definite reason to interpret these place names as

\textsuperscript{132} Cherry and Shennan 1978.

\textsuperscript{133} On Aitolian dating formulas based on the league’s annually elected strategoi, see Grainger 2000.
living communities. The town Hypata, for example, has yet to be physically identified, but it furnished a repeat *strategos* in the second century BC and must have existed in a physical capacity.\textsuperscript{134} The second-century-BC inscriptions mention 58 sites in total.\textsuperscript{135} Thus, caution is indeed warranted when evaluating the Dutch data, since the epigraphic record broadly demonstrates that the data obtained from physical site autopsy and surface survey rarely tells the whole tale, an important point to keep in mind when evaluating said data below.

Careful reevaluation of the Dutch material – with an eye to secure dating – in combination with subsequently excavated material reveals a total number of 27 sites having produced Late Hellenistic material (Appendix 1A; Fig. 5). This includes the find spots for the abovementioned coin hoards which are five in number; two of these come from sites not included in the Dutch gazetteer.\textsuperscript{136} Of 27 identified sites, at least ten have a cemetery function, twenty can be considered habitation sites, eight are sanctuaries and three cannot be assigned an accurate function due to scarcity of evidence.\textsuperscript{137} Most sites combine two functions. Most commonly, habitation sites have an affiliated necropolis which defines them as cemetery sites.

### 3.1. Habitation sites.

16 sites can be labeled habitation sites. There is a clear tendency toward sites being classified as habitation sites if they have received scientific excavation, Angelokastro, Kalydon and Naupaktos being notable examples. Since sites located near modern habitation and infrastructure have received more attention that inland sites, this may prove to have generated a false bias in the

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\textsuperscript{134} This man, Eupolemos, was commander at Kynoskephalai in 197 BC. He was *strategos* for the first time in 189/188 BC when he also served as a *proxenos* sponsor for Athens, and was *strategos* again in 176/175 BC. He was denounced as anti-Roman by Lykiskos. Polybius 18.21.5, 28.4.6; Livy 41.25.3; *IG IX* 1\textsuperscript{2} 1:4b; *IG IX* 1\textsuperscript{2} 3:672; *SGDI* 1745, 1863, 1864.

\textsuperscript{135} It is not clear whether all 58 sites were located within our strictly defined geographical unit but an inclusive approach probably generates more reliable results.

\textsuperscript{136} Agrinion *CH I*, 76: Koniska *IGCH* 266; Naupaktos *IGCH* 244; Naupaktos *IGCH* 317; Vlachomandra *AD* 1889, E. Not included in the Dutch site gazetteer are Koniska and Vlachomandra.

\textsuperscript{137} Categorization relies chiefly on physical finds. Even when no graves have been found, a site is classified as a cemetery if it has produced funerary inscriptions.
distribution of settlements. Moreover, these 16 sites do not accurately correspond to the total number of contemporary habitation sites. To this equation we must add physically unidentified sites without known names. Therefore, caution is warranted when evaluating the clearly skewed data from this category. Nevertheless, based on the current archaeological evidence, we observe that 16 of 66 Hellenistic habitation sites have produced datable Late Hellenistic material. This infers a decline of roughly 75% and a loss of more than two thirds of Aitolia’s habitation sites.

Several habitation sites have a dual function; a combination of cemetery and habitation is the most common. Importantly, these 16 habitation sites were all inhabited well before 189 BC. The surviving habitation sites are distributed with relative evenness across the southern half of Aitolia and their locations meet at least two of four criteria. First, we observe that habitation sites are located near water: the coastline itself, a river, or Lakes Trichonion and Lysimacheia. Megali Chora, the site located the furthest away from a body of water, is still in close proximity of the west bank of the Acheloos. Second, they tend to control a comparatively large chora independent of one another. Distance between sites is always so great that visual connectivity is impossible. The only two sites that not quite meet this criterion are Vomvokou and Naupaktos which are located only a few kilometers apart. Mutual visibility between the two, however, does not occur. Third, habitation sites are generally situated in relative proximity to, or directly in, areas with arable soil. The large, fertile floodplain between Acheloos and Lake Lysimacheia was home to at least four habitation sites in the Late Hellenistic period, as was the coastal plain west of Naupaktos (Fig. 7, Fig. 33). Fourth, and most notably, with the single exception of Aspropyrgos, habitation sites are no longer located high up in the mountains. Located in the rolling hills around Lake Trichonion, Sitaralona, Dafnias and Gavalou are nevertheless in greater proximity to the lowland and the coast than to the mountainous hinterland (Fig. 37). Autopsy of the most anomalous habitation site, Aspropyrgos, is unfortunately lacking.
The marked concentration of habitation sites away from the hinterland toward the coast presents a sharp contrast to the situation in the earlier Hellenistic period, when habitation sites were scattered all over the region including the most inaccessible mountainsides. The surviving sites do not individually provide immediate reasons for their survival, but collectively, their arrangement across the landscape is of some value. The comparatively great distance between Aitolian sites suggests that each site controlled a relatively substantial farmable *chora*. Moreover, the interspacing of sites appears to take natural formations into some consideration. The habitation sites located along the coast, for example, are arranged in a way that allows individual access to the waterways; in other words, each coastal site had its own access point to the gulf, although we unfortunately do not know how many of them possessed natural or built harbors (Fig. 34–35).

The contraction of sites toward the coast and plains in combination with a preference for sites in control of arable soil indicates better survival odds for those habitation sites that could best support the agrarian economy. Arable soil and proximity of water, presumably for transport, ensured that the towns and villages could support their population without the need for long-distance movement of either workers or of produce. Smaller habitation sites located near the 15 surviving sites give the distinct impression of deliberate abandonment. This is extremely clear in the hills south of Lake Trichonion but also on the plain between Kalydon and Pleuron (Fig. 8). The populations of smaller villages may have simply abandoned their homes and relocated to the better suited larger site nearby in order to obtain optimum odds for survival. Unfortunately, the settlement data as such does not fully illustrate this process but it is clear that many habitation sites – 75% of them! – were abandoned, and we must ask which phenomena dictated the survival of these specific sites, a complex issue that we shall have reason to address throughout this study. Viewed chiefly as a consequence of the disrupted agrarian economy, the gradual disappearance of comparatively large fortified *poleis* in the mountainous hinterland does not seem very peculiar
since the mountains held less arable soil than the plains. This suggestion would also explain the virtually instant desertion of small, isolated farm sites located in rural areas with poor soil.

3.2. Cemetery sites.

Unsurprisingly, cemetery sites seem to decline at the exact same rate as habitation sites. Of 48 Hellenistic cemetery sites, eleven have produced Late Hellenistic material, which corresponds to a decline of roughly 80%. Most cemetery sites are located in close proximity to an active habitation site. In fact, an active cemetery site must necessarily indicate continued activity in the habitation site even when site autopsy has rendered no contemporary material. Generally, when lacking a dual function, cemetery sites are located in close proximity to another site. Agios Thomas, for example, is not located far from Kalydon. Isolated hinterland cemeteries do not survive with the exception of Kyparissos which is located on the north side of Mount Panaitoliko. Most cemetery sites appear to have been used continuously and only one appears to be a single-grave site. All Late Hellenistic cemetery sites were active in the previous period, except for Thermon.

3.3. Sanctuary sites.

In our next category, the decline is similarly marked as rural and nonurban sanctuaries are abandoned in great numbers. Eight Late Hellenistic sites can be classified as sanctuaries. Only two of these surviving six sites, Kryonneron and Skala, do not have an instantly identifiable secondary function, but we note that neither site has received scientific excavation. In fact, epigraphic evidence from Kryonneron strongly indicates that the ancient town of Phistyon must have been located in the immediate vicinity. The rest either double as sanctuaries or habitation sites, or in the case of Naupaktos, both. In general, rural or uninhabited sanctuaries have the poorest survival rate. Only one rural sanctuary survives, and in that case, in a changed capacity. While still in use as a sanctuary in the second century BC, the federal sanctuary Thermon saw a dramatic change in function in the first century BC when several graves were sunk into the floor of a public building.
Thermon was not used as a cemetery during its tenure as Aitolia’s federal sanctuary and no Classical or Hellenistic graves have been observed there, which emphasizes the dramatic alteration in the Late Hellenistic period (Fig. 9–10). Non-rural sanctuaries are either located *intra muros*, like the sanctuary of Artemis Laphria at Kalydon or the temple of Athena Polias at Naupaktos; *extra muros*, like the temple of Asklepios at Trichonion; or in a location very close to actively inhabited sites, like the temple of Asklepios *en Krounois* at Skala, probably not far from Bouttos and definitely close to Naupaktos. Urban sanctuaries seem to have fared better than their rural counterparts and most were active into the first century BC. There is a clear correlation between a sanctuary’s survival and its proximity to an inhabited site, or at least a site that saw regular human activity.

### 3.4. Unidentifiable sites and towers.

For three sites, classification is impossible. Two of these are coin hoards whose find context is unfortunately unknown. One is *IGCH* 271, the Agrinion hoard, which dating to the 120s BC was found somewhere near the modern city of Agrinion. Assigning it to Megali Chora is attractive but cannot be proven. The other, *IGCH* 266, dates to the early first century BC and was found at the small village of Koniska 20km northeast of Thermon. No excavations have been conducted in Koniska which situated on a steep mountain slope bears a strong resemblance to the small, rural sites that were scattered across the mountainous Aitolian hinterland in the Early Hellenistic period. The third site, Kato Khrysovitsa, is poorly understood and despite reports of Hellenistic and Roman finds, no autopsy has been conducted. Its location near Thermon suggests that it was a habitation site whose population perhaps filled a sanctuary-related function, but no such attribution is possible at present.

None of the freestanding towers that existed at seven sites in the earlier Hellenistic period have rendered any Late Hellenistic material, nor do other freestanding towers exist that can be dated to this period.
Most high intensity Dutch surveying was done in West Lokris, beyond the geographical limitations for the present study. Thus, it is extremely likely that the above presented site material would be both more detailed, and the sites greater in number, had intensive survey been conducted in their surroundings. The epigraphic record certainly strengthens this argument. Moreover, excavation and detailed site autopsy can greatly elucidate a site’s function and since excavation has been restricted to a few select sites, our data is highly biased in their favor. Nevertheless, some basic interim conclusions can be drawn.

4. Interim conclusions.

A comparison of Hellenistic and Late Hellenistic material strongly suggests that the decline was already in place at the time of Aitolia’s war with Rome. The problematic local ceramic tradition aside, the discrepancy between sites with both terra sigillata and Hellenistic black glaze or only Hellenistic black glaze emphasizes this assumption. This is an important observation as Rome’s involvement in Greek affairs in the early second century BC has traditionally been viewed as the primary cause for the decline of Greece. The settlement data presented above demonstrates that such an assumption is no longer valid. When Antiochos III arrived in Greece, Aitolia’s landscape was already in its initial stages of contraction.

The transformation of Aitolia’s landscape was rapid, in fact so rapid that it is difficult to ascertain its trajectory. Sites were abandoned wholesale regardless of function and location, leading to a drastically changed landscape. At a glance, it is immediately clear that Aitolia’s Late Hellenistic settlements are much fewer and spaced further apart than in the previous period. Large tracts of

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139 It should not be assumed that the Late Hellenistic period equals the definite end of human activity in Aitolia. Such an assumption is dangerous for interpretation of the material at hand. On the contrary, early imperial inscriptions and remains do exist. For a summary and brief discussion on Roman Aitolia, see Petropoulos 1991. Problematically, Petropoulos misreads some of the Dutch survey data from 1987 and
land that had previously been controlled by villages, towns and cities ceased to receive human activity and were abandoned indiscriminately. Both small and large sites disappeared, and even very large, fortified *poleis* ceased to generate visible activity. This abandonment led to the extreme contraction of a formerly highly dispersed landscape. The mountainous hinterland lost almost all signs of human activity, but the coastal plains were not immune to the contraction and here, too, sites seem to no longer have been inhabited or used. Our general impression is one of empty space, a region in ruins, indeed of silent hills.

In this “empty space”, 27 sites survived. Their survival seems to have depended upon two seemingly paradoxical factors, both directly related to the question of inter-site distance. First, we get the distinct impression that habitation sites in control of arable soil were best suited to support their populations and thus continued to exist. Only a small number of habitation sites are not located in direct proximity of good farmlands and in those cases, other criteria have been met to ensure their survival. In order for this compartmentalization of space to occur, many habitation sites located close to the surviving habitation sites were abandoned. This suggests that sites wanted to avoid sharing the easily farmed land, and that in order to survive, they needed to control a certain size *chora*. Yet, there is no direct evidence for surviving sites having absorbed the *chora* of abandoned sites which in turn suggests that the surviving population may have been or become smaller in size. Second, we note that sites with non-habitation functions had a better chance of survival if they were located relatively close to an active habitation site. In fact, this relative proximity appears to have been vital for the survival of both cemeteries and sanctuaries. This is only natural. Cemeteries, sanctuaries and domestic quarters all serve distinctly different functions for the same population; consequently, the different site types do not compete with one another.

erroneously reports Roman pottery in areas where the Dutch team noted none. For corrections of Petropoulos’ errors, see Bommeljé and Vroom 1995.

Again, we note that this number is by no means exact – sites mentioned in contemporary epigraphic and literary sources (but without archaeologically visible Late Hellenistic activity) have not been included here.
The distribution of sites across the region enables us to tentatively reconstruct the site-to-site partitioning of Aitolia’s active landscape.\textsuperscript{141} To some extent, the partitioning seems to follow natural boundaries such as hills, ridges and rivers, but in other cases it appears more arbitrary. Nevertheless, it is clear that habitation sites are arranged in a way that allows for maximum access to arable farmland. We can say very little about the political partitioning of the landscape in this period but the importance of distance between habitation sites certainly indicates that dominance relationships were expressed spatially.\textsuperscript{142} Here, it is crucial to emphasize that not only were old sites abandoned in large numbers, but no “fresh” sites were inhabited in this period. The surviving habitation sites survived because they had something that other sites lacked, and political power, both locally and regionally, seems to be one such factor. Subsequent chapters will evaluate this phenomenon. Yet, the arrangement of sites across the landscape does not only speak of general decline of Aitolian settlements: it also illustrates the highly complex strategies involved in site survival. Self-subsistence seems to have been a major priority. When the foundation for the agrarian economy suffered, Aitolia’s surviving habitation sites jealously guarded the available arable soil. It is in this light that we best view the contracting landscape. It was an involuntary process, but a process of which the population was acutely aware. The partitioning of Aitolian farmlands is so logical that it cannot be accidental. But with a greater distance between habitation sites, the local population became more disconnected from one another. Horden and Purcell imagine a Mediterranean countryside made up by microregions patterned by ties of mutual visibility.\textsuperscript{143} The loss of mutual visibility suggests loss of connectivity which in effect both implies and causes progressing economic decline as the isolated single sites gradually became fewer and distanced further apart.\textsuperscript{144}

\textsuperscript{141} The Aitolian data is unfortunately so small that any attempt at reconstructing the land in terms of weighted Thiessen polygons will inevitably be inaccurate. See Cherry 1987.
\textsuperscript{142} Renfrew 1981.
\textsuperscript{143} Horden and Purcell 2000, 125.
\textsuperscript{144} Chisholm 1968.
Over the course of two centuries 97% of Aitolia’s Hellenistic sites ceased to generate visible activity. A great social and demographic change must have occurred. Of the 27 sites that have produced datable Late Hellenistic material only nine have generated material that dates to the first century BC. The decline was thus not only rapid, and not only radical, but also continuous. Sites that managed to survive in the second century BC eventually lost their ability to do so. Unfortunately the settlement data as such only produces a very broad image of the landscape and fails to illuminate both the dynamics of inter-site interaction and the complexities of the decline, but we tentatively note that Strabo’s eremia may not be solely rhetorical. In comparison to the late third century BC, Strabo’s Aitolia was “empty”.

Nevertheless, a topographical reading of this data as “empty space” is too simplistic an interpretation, and the imbalance in our data cannot be stressed enough. The lack of a physical “dot” on a map does not simply imply a definite lack of human activity. It is, however, indicative of the bias inherent of this kind of query. Due to a lack of site autopsy, bias of survey methods, problems in dating, or merely absence of modern infrastructure, many ancient sites are undiscovered and thus lack a “dot”; the epigraphic record makes this adamantly clear. The importance of intensive surface survey and its merits over extensive survey cannot be stated enough.145

5. Comparative material.

The extreme contraction noted above is so noteworthy, it needs to be viewed in perspective and comparisons must be sought.146 The silent hills of Aitolia are not alone in the Late Hellenistic

145 Something as simple as the interspacing of field walkers can make an enormous difference for the data generated through surface survey. The most relevant discussion of the “blank space” phenomenon is still Plog et al 1978. For an interesting experiment regarding the impact of distributional biases, see Hamond 1980.
146 Alcock 1993, 54.
landscape, and similar contracting settlement patterns have been noted all over Greece.\textsuperscript{147} Below, I review some relevant examples.

\textbf{5.1. Boiotia.}

Carefully crafted and ideal in its intensive approach, the Cambridge/Bradford Boiotian Expedition combined excavation and intensive site investigation in order to study a landscape that was lacking both in scientific excavation and modern site activity.\textsuperscript{148} The diachronic approach generated a highly detailed picture of an active landscape whose fluctuations through time provided vital information on the spatial operation of human activity, especially regarding Late Hellenistic Greece. Boiotia’s settlement pinnacle occurred in the fourth century BC, when the entire region was dotted with so many sites that site density reached dangerously high numbers. Since settlement density is in some capacity dependent upon the biotope, harming or overexploiting the biotope can have drastic consequences.\textsuperscript{149} This appears to have happened in Boiotia where the landscape was farmed so intensely that nutrition deficiency occurred in the soil.\textsuperscript{150} Correlations for this interpretation do exist elsewhere, where the human impact on the ecosystem is both visible and has been scientifically ascertained through analysis of alluviation deposits.\textsuperscript{151} The intensely settled Boiotian countryside underwent a radical reorganization in the Late Hellenistic period. Settlements declined exponentially with the result that extremely few sites survived. The rural countryside was almost entirely abandoned, and the formerly extreme dispersal was replaced by severe contraction. Moreover, the surviving sites were physically smaller which adds another dimension to the dramatic reorganization of the landscape. Many larger sites, including actual towns, were fully

\textsuperscript{147} For an introduction of all surveyed regions in Greece until 1995 with comments and interpretations of their data, see Bintliff 1997. Summaries of more recent survey data are found in Alcock and Cherry (2004).
\textsuperscript{149} Hudson 1969.
\textsuperscript{150} Clark 1992. A safe ratio of exploitation to potential carrying-capacity of a landscape is c. 30\%. For Boiotia in the relevant period, Bintliff and Snodgrass (1985) calculate an exploitation rate of 80\%.
abandoned. At the site of Askra, for example, Snodgrass identified a clear break in activity during the second century BC, and the site was not repopulated again until the fourth century AD. The shrinking size of the few surviving settlements affirms that a population decline must have occurred. The landscape of Late Hellenistic Boiotia seems almost quieter than Aitolia’s silent hills. Notably, Boiotia’s surviving sites were all located reasonably close to the coast in what appears to be largely strategic locations.

5.2. The Peloponnese.

Several survey projects in the Peloponnese confirm the emergence of this contracting settlement pattern. The Berbati-Limnes survey, for example, identified quick oscillations in the Hellenistic landscape. In the late fourth or early third century BC, certain surveyed areas of the valley saw a great increase in settlement density, but then site numbers declined rapidly, and only a single second-century-BC site is preserved. The same oscillations were identified during the Southern Argolid survey. Here, settlement was sharply reduced in the third century BC. By 250 BC, many rural sites had disappeared and over 50% of small sites were abandoned. This decline lasted well into the imperial period. Wholesale abandonment of fields must have occurred as illustrated by the increase of maquis pollen in the sediments of Argive coastal lagoons. Dense, uncultivated shrublands thus replaced formerly farmed uplands. Additional geological evidence for increased runoff and sediment yield is constant with terrace degradation, which indicates a dramatic change for the rural Argolid as farming ceased to exist. Nearly all Argive sites were abandoned by the

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152 Snodgrass 1985.
153 Bintliff and Snodgrass 1985, fig. 19.
154 Wells et al 1989; Forsell 1996; Penttinen 1996; Wells and Runnels 1996. I am thankful that Berit Wells † invited me to discuss the Berbati-Limnes material in the spring of 2008.
156 Sheehan 1979.
157 Pope and van Andel 1984. While there is no reason to question this case, it is important to not interpret all sediment changes as anthropogenic. For a highly relevant discussion on the contested Younger Fill, see Wagstaff 1981. On terrace systems in antiquity, see Foxhall 1996; Rackham and Moody 1992. On Greek agriculture in general, see Wells 1992.
beginning of the Roman period, and only one Classical town – Hermione – showed evidence of continued habitation.\textsuperscript{158} The Argive data, then, mirrors that from Boiotia in its extreme contraction, loss of agrarian activity paired with a countryside in fallow, the abandonment of the rural sites, and a visible population decline.

In Achaia, we observe an overall decline in Roman times, but the situation here is more complex than in other parts of Greece. This is due in part to Achaia’s situation within the Roman administration, in part to the available data. The only well-surveyed area is the \textit{chora} of Patras and Patras itself, which endured a short final Hellenistic decline succeeded by immediate growth in the Early Roman period. In fact, maximum settlement density was achieved in this period. Late Hellenistic Patras expanded toward the sea, but investigation of the town’s periphery showed no settlement nucleation and the physical expansion of the town itself should reasonably have had some impact on its surrounding \textit{chora}. Yet, some disruption is visible in the Hellenistic period and only 17 of 33 Hellenistic sites continue to exist in the imperial period. Many of the abandoned sites were never reoccupied again. The territory around Patras, then, must have changed as indicated by the contracted settlement pattern.\textsuperscript{159}

A similarly interesting case is the town of Phlius on the northern edge of the Argolid. Here, investigations confirm growth in the Late Hellenistic and Early Roman period. At first this growth seems directly conflicting with other settlement data, but study of nearby areas attests to a general decline in this period.\textsuperscript{160} While Phlius and Patras are anomalous in their “health”, the settlement data from the Peloponnese seems to generally follow the same trajectory as observed in Boiotia and Aitolia. Neither Phlius nor Patras has received investigation as detailed as the Boiotia project which might in part explain their uncharacteristic growth. Yet, Phlius and Patras are both cities and not regions. Therefore, we should perhaps shift attention to the limited investigation of their \textit{chorai},

\textsuperscript{158} Runnels and van Andel 1987, 318.
\textsuperscript{159} Bintliff 1997, 4; Petropoulos and Rizakis 1994; Petropoulos 1994.
which in both cases demonstrate a contracting countryside. These two cases clearly demonstrate the need for an inclusive *chora* approach when evaluating data from Late Hellenistic sites.

### 5.3. Melos.

The researchers involved in the Melos survey set out to document all human activity within the region from the dawn of civilization to present day.\(^{161}\) This diachronic approach enabled the identification of oscillations within the landscape and thereby provided a long-term overview of the human use of the land. The island saw several phases of aggregation replaced by dispersal. In the Classical period, aggregation was limited, but in the Hellenistic period – which in this case “ended” in 146 BC – rural sites were abandoned in great numbers, and aggregation increased. People seem to have left the countryside in favor of Melos town. This changed in the Roman period which witnessed a dispersed, densely packed rural landscape lasting into the 400s. The broad time-span of studied material makes the Melian data particularly useful as an index against which material from other surveys can be compared. When viewed against the backdrop of Melos’ oscillating settlements, the contractions and dispersals observed across Greece emerge as reoccurring historical trends, and moreover, as natural shifts in the habitation and use of the Greek landscape.\(^{162}\)

### 5.4. Exceptions.

The impression of general decline and settlement change in the Late Hellenistic period seems prevalent but there are exceptions. In Epiros, for example, settlements increase exponentially over the course of the third century BC.\(^{163}\) An intense surface survey is greatly needed in this area, as it would shed valuable light on several important historical events; Aemilius Paullus’ enslavement of

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\(^{161}\) Renfrew and Wagstaff 1982; see esp. Cherry 1982; Wagstaff and Cherry 1982. See also Horden and Purcell 2000, 74-77.

\(^{162}\) The shifts between the dispersed and nucleated landscapes can in some cases be modeled, albeit only hypothetically. The most persuasive model is still that of Renfrew and Poston 1979.

\(^{163}\) Bintliff 1997, 3; Doukellis 1990; Darkaris 1971.
some 150,000 Epirotes in 167 BC is but one of them. Similarly incongruous is the expansion in both urban and rural settlements in Dalmatia which is Early Roman in date. Dalmatia's intensification of land use in combination with population growth stands in stark contrast to the situation in Greece but when viewed in its historical context does not seem so strange. In 33 BC, a Roman *colonia* was founded at Zadar, and old hill forts were given *municipia* status in the early first century AD. A similar takeoff is visible in Albania where rural expansion occurs in the Early Roman period. This dispersal seems inconsistent when compared to our other data. Yet, there is reason to not view Dalmatia, Epiros and Albania as canonically Greek, especially in topographical terms. Located on the periphery of the Greek cultural and socioeconomic sphere, these three regions are geographically closer to Italy, and their “boost” may be related to either Roman financial interests in the area, or in fact direct Roman presence. A socioeconomic approach to fluctuations in settlement density, then, seems appropriate both in cases of decline and aggregation.

6. Interpretations.

Although exceptions clearly exist, the evidence presented above demonstrates the existence of a similar situation throughout Greece. A settlement peak in the Classical and Early Hellenistic period was followed by a widespread decline so rapid it is likely to have been visible to its contemporaries. Unfortunately, we have only marginal evidence for how the Greeks addressed the tumultuous change, but we do possess some indication of how they reacted to it. In the Classical period, for which we have good evidence, relocation was often the response to socioeconomic problems. Populations were moved from less desirable locations to cities and regions that were better suited

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164 Polybius 30.15; Strabo 7.7.3. See Tartaron 2003.
166 Wilkes 1969.
167 Bintliff 1997, 3; Wilkes 1969; Blagg 1992. Note that no intense surface survey has been conducted in Albania.
168 Nepos says of Atticus that “all his income came from his possessions in Epiros.” *Atticus* 14.3.
169 Mackil 2004; Demand 1990.
to meet their needs, at times through large-scale synoicisms whereby populations of multiple villages and towns were joined into a single physical community. Many small sites thus became a single, larger entity. Our settlement data suggests that a similar reaction occurred in the Hellenistic period as some Hellenistic sites were abandoned for the sake of others: for example, the partial abandonment of the small sites around Patras which occurred simultaneously as the city expanded. We have few examples of organized synoicism in the Greek mainland, but the rapidly emptying countryside mandates that the population must have gone somewhere: where and how, however, we often do not know. Nevertheless, there is some tenuous evidence for communal interference in the process of abandonment. In the (late?) second century BC, Phokian Medeon entered a territorial sympoliteia agreement with its neighbor Stiris presumably with the aim to consolidate the two populations into the chora of Stiris, which was located in a less vulnerable area. The local communities seem to have been aware of the decline, which would explain the rise of oliganthropia as a literary topos.

Both generally and specifically, clear parallels exist between Aitolia’s settlement decline and that observed in other regions. Generally, the abandonment of rural sites led to a quick depopulation of the countryside which in turn caused an escalating contraction of the landscape, a situation adamantly clear in Boiotia but also at Melos and in the Peloponnese – so also in Aitolia. In some instances the contraction is continuous; in the first century BC, the Aitolian landscape was even more contracted than in the previous century, but in other cases, like Melos, it is slowly halted and then reversed. Specifically, hinterland sites appear particularly sensitive but urban sites are also affected by the decline. The chora of Patras seems to have been partially depopulated, and in Boiotia and the Southern Argolid, even the very largest sites show evidence of contraction and even abandonment. Here, too, the Aitolian settlement data corresponds closely to the rest of Greece.

170 IG IX 12 1:32 = Syll.3 647; Fossey 1986, 99; Walbank 1981, 151-2; Alcock 1993, 154; text also in Austin 2006.
171 For a detailed summary of all relevant regional data, see Bintliff 1997.
The process of landscape contraction follows similar trajectories all over Greece, and it is thus unsurprising that the results, too, are similar: fewer sites in a quiet landscape. Reasonably, the surviving sites will have faced similar socioeconomic problems. As activity dwindled in the contracting Greek landscape, the important mutual visibility articulated by Horden and Purcell seems to have ceased to exist, at least in part.\textsuperscript{172} This loss of connectivity must have had a negative effect on the surviving sites in the form of socioeconomic decline. If Aitolia's second-century-BC sites had possessed adequate collective strength to maintain the regional economic framework, more sites would probably have survived into the first century BC. The continuous decline in site numbers suggests otherwise. The surviving second-century-BC sites were simply not equipped with the tools needed for long-term survival in isolation. It has been argued that economic growth is directly related to the relative advantage of location, and economic decline is similarly a function of site isolation.\textsuperscript{173} Despite their strategic position in locations with fertile soil, Aitolia's sites were disadvantaged by their distance to one another. One by one, they ceased to exist. The same loss of connectivity is observed on Melos, in Boiotia, and in the Berbati valley, where sites most definitely experienced long-term isolation. We can only speculate to its articulation but it is clear that the economic framework changed dramatically.

Central to the change in settlement patterns is the disuse of the hinterland as an agricultural resource. In some cases the abandonment may have had geological consequences and settlement data clearly suggests that the anthropogenic activity in the natural landscape, even in the short term, can cause visible geological change.\textsuperscript{174} This is particularly relevant in a sensitive ecosystem such as Greece, where the very practice of agriculture in some cases had irreversible effects on the

\textsuperscript{172} Horden and Purcell 2000, 125.
\textsuperscript{173} Chisholm 1968.
\textsuperscript{174} Sheehan 1979. For a detailed analysis of anthropogenic effects on the natural environment in the Bronze Age, see Bintliff 1977.
Scientific study of riverbeds and lagoons confirms that large tracts of land were no longer farmed. Aitolia has not received the same intense geological study as the Southern Argolid but interestingly, Pausanias notes that the Acheloos river “washes down less mud” as a result of the depopulation of Aitolia. If the sedimentation of the Acheloos had truly changed so visibly, human activity must have been severely altered by the Early Roman period. Increased sedimentation generally corresponds to intensive farming and aggregate settlement, and a visible decrease in sedimentation thus strongly emphasizes the abandonment of those practices. Against the backdrop of Argive and Boiotian data there might indeed be reason to consider the “wilderness” of Late Hellenistic Aitolia as not only a literary *topos* but also a real indication of a changed natural landscape. Only more research can elucidate this process locally.

An abandoned hinterland, however, does not always correlate to a loss in population, and Alcock invites caution in equating site decline and population decline. In 1920, 77% of the Greek population lived in the countryside and roughly half of these in mountainous areas. Over the course of the twentieth century, a massive population displacement occurred leading to a renewed depopulation of the mountainous countryside. Nevertheless, the modern Greek population as a whole did not shrink and the abandonment of country villages simply resulted in the rapid growth of cities. Yet, not only does the geological evidence emphasize the altered nature of the Greek landscape in the Late Hellenistic period, but it also strongly suggests that populations shrank. The rise of *maquis* pollen in the coastal lagoons of the Argolid implies that the basis for subsistence farming was very greatly reduced. In turn, this presupposes either a population on the brink of

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175 We are reminded of Plato’s comment on the deforestation of his native Attica: *Critias* 3.75. See Wertime 1983.
176 Pausanias 8.24.5.
178 Alcock 1993.
179 Wagstaff 1968. In this case, it is the mountains that corrupt and not the sea; contra Horden and Purcell 2000.
starvation, or a shrinking population; in fact, we can probably assume a combination of the two.\textsuperscript{180} In Late Hellenistic Boiotia, inhabited sites were much smaller than in the previous period, which inevitably means that the population, too, was smaller. Consequently, it seems reasonable to suggest that the Greek landscape saw a contraction both in site numbers and in population size. This situation may have applied to Aitolia, too, and must be further analyzed.

The landscapes of Greece were already in decline at the time of Aitolia’s quarrels with Rome. The decline is visible in several regions across Greece, which makes pinpointing it to a specific historical event difficult. Nevertheless, it has been argued that the extreme change in settlement dispersal had purely socioeconomic causes, all of which are historically relevant. Variously related to exactions, warfare and piracy the change is difficult to explain simply in terms of chance, and it is unlikely to have been coincidental.\textsuperscript{181} But simply blaming pirates or prolonged wars for the incredible transformation of the Greek landscape is too one-dimensional. In Boiotia, agricultural overexploitation led to soil exhaustion, but the reasons for that overexploitation are highly complex, and both political and demographic parameters must be considered in addition to its socioeconomic setting. The economic, social, demographic and political decline of Late Hellenistic Greece is inarguably a poorly understood aspect of classical antiquity, yet, in comparison to Boiotia – for which the intensive surface survey has provided such detailed evidence – the complexities of Aitolia’s decline become almost incomprehensible.\textsuperscript{182} Clearly, the wars with Rome were not what caused the Aitolian \textit{eremia} but the situation is perplexing. At face value, the region seems to have essentially collapsed, but wholesale regional collapses are both unusual and difficult to understand and studies are therefore lacking.\textsuperscript{183} It is the aim of this dissertation to elucidate Aitolia’s complicated decline and to place it within its accurate context, socioeconomically and

\textsuperscript{180} Garnsey 1988. Garnsey notes that the most serious food crises in antiquity were caused by a combination of several harvest failures, war and epidemic disease. See also Garnsey 1998.

\textsuperscript{181} Jameson et al 1994, 396.

\textsuperscript{182} On the complexities of economic systems and social formations in view of survey data, see Vallat 1991.

\textsuperscript{183} Renfrew 1979. See also Renfrew 1978b.
historically. Although we will return to this question continuously, some provisional conclusions are necessary.

7. Landscape, settlement and survey: conclusions.

Close parallels exist between the Aitolian data and data from other Greek regions. Although Aitolia is the main focus of this inquiry, it is vital to not consider its decline in isolation. Its landscape transformed along trajectories identified elsewhere and further correlations may thus exist. Other Greek regions may thus benefit from the same multivariable analysis of socioeconomic factors as this dissertation subjects Aitolia to.

The survival of certain sites merits closer analysis. Not only are the surviving sites important as loci for human activity, but they provide invaluable evidence for the contraction of the Aitolian landscape. It has been argued that the maximum size of a community is determined by local natural resources and the effectiveness of its subsistence technology.\textsuperscript{184} In Boiotia, sites were both fewer and smaller which clearly indicates a smaller population: does this phenomenon apply to Aitolia as well? An evaluation of Aitolia’s surviving sites may similarly elucidate the complicated process by which the landscape became “empty”. Here, we are reminded of the decline of smaller sites in the rural chora of Patras at the same time as the city itself expanded. Clearly, the survival of certain sites over others mandates closer evaluation both of the chora of those sites and the demise of their neighbors. Did Phistyon survive at the cost of neighboring Thesteis, or independently thereof? Here, intensive but very local survey could greatly enhance our understanding of settlement dynamics as it is clear that settlements both expand (Patras, Phlius) and contract (Askra) within the contracting landscape. In the immediate urban territory of Kalydon a two-year surface survey has been conducted, which allowed for excavation of strategically chosen areas

\textsuperscript{184} Trigger 1978.
within the city.\textsuperscript{185} A similar city-to-\textit{chora} approach is indeed warranted for all excavations in Aitolia. Third, there is clearly room and indeed need for more surface survey as it is evident that the extensive survey type does not generate sufficiently specific data for detailed inquiry on landscape change. The intensive approach utilized in Boiotia and at Melos generated exceptionally detailed data which allowed for the reconstruction of a relatively complete picture, a picture that is sorely lacking in Aitolia. Due to its sheer size an intensive survey of all of Aitolia is impossible, but intensive investigation of strategically chosen areas may indeed enable a more complete understanding of the countryside. Such areas include the plain between Acheloos and Evinos and certain fortified hilltops around Lake Trichonion which have already rendered archaeological material.\textsuperscript{186}

In conclusion, the settlement data from Late Hellenistic Aitolia draws a stark picture of a depopulated landscape where rapidly disappearing sites become more and more isolated from one another. In fact, the countryside appears so empty it is difficult to envision a functional regional economic network – at least in the first century BC. Due to several factors all of which are a direct result of modern archaeological practice, the Aitolian settlement data is not as detailed as that from other regions and inarguably, a more detailed image is needed. The landscape itself both constrained and enabled activity, and the contracting settlement pattern is clearly the outcome of societal adjustments to certain constraints. Yet, our picture is ruefully incomplete. The gap between the 214 identified Hellenistic sites and Strabo’s \textit{eremia} is uncomfortably undefined; the decline is very vivid, but its trajectories, causes and determinants are not. Moreover, one must ask how the inherent socioeconomic features of landscape contraction manifest themselves in other categories

\textsuperscript{185} Methenitis 2011. That archaeological excavation can benefit greatly from initial surface survey has long been known yet the practice remains rare. A noteworthy example is the survey of Megalopolis’ very large \textit{chora} which helped elucidate the complicated nature of the city’s synoicism and territorial control: Lloyd, Owens et al 1985.

\textsuperscript{186} The site-to-site focus used in a survey at Leukas could be very useful in Aitolia; see Dousougli and Morris 1994. See also Gallant 1986. A similarly useful approach is the careful consideration of a “closed” geographical unit as conducted in the narrow Agiofarango valley on Crete: Blackman and Branigan 1975: 1977.
of evidence. With careful consideration of excavated material, literary and epigraphic sources and numismatic evidence I aim to place the socioeconomic factors involved in this decline within their accurate historical context and thereby simultaneously shed light on one of the more neglected areas of ancient Greece and address the socioeconomic complexities of this transitional phase in Greco-Roman history.
CHAPTER 4.
Towns and monuments.

1. Introduction: what is a town?

The contracting settlement pattern had obvious consequences for the region. An abandoned hinterland, a drop in site numbers and an inferred population decline must have had a serious impact on surviving sites, and this chapter evaluates the effect of that impact. Our general impression is of fewer sites existing in a quiet landscape, but how did these sites respond to such a profound change? How does the socioeconomic decline inherent in a dwindling landscape manifest itself in the form, function, connectivity and activity of the surviving Late Hellenistic sites? After his victory at Actium, Augustus allegedly moved the population of Aitolia to the newly founded victory city and all its cult objects to Patras and Nikopolis; how active were Aitolia’s towns at this time, and does archaeology confirm or contest our text-based historical narrative?

By viewing these towns as dynamic loci for human activity, interconnected and integrated in the wider “web” of the landscape, analysis of their content and relationship will contextualize the regional settlement contraction. Undeniably, towns are both the monuments that constitute their physical form and the socioeconomic infrastructure that enable activity therein; consequently, they must be understood organically. Regulated by the same wider legal framework, subject to the same economic rights and privileges, and home to a seemingly homogenous ethnic group, the towns of Aitolia share numerous characteristics with one another, yet several features set them apart. They can therefore not be treated as a simple collective, and individual analysis beyond initial settlement autopsy is crucial.

Several Hellenistic habitation sites have not received enough excavation in the habitation portion of the town to render any datable Late Hellenistic material, yet their cemeteries have done

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187 On cities undertaking direct economic action, see Salmon 1999.
so. The towns must thus reasonably still be active as habitation sites and will be considered as such. For simple convenience, all habitation sites will be called ‘towns’, but some may be mere villages and others in fact actual *poleis* – the distinction is unimportant. 27 sites have produced archaeological material datable to second and first centuries BC and several of them have known ancient toponyms; Agrinion, Arsinoe, Boukation, Chalkis, Ithoria, Kalydon, Lysimacheia, Naupaktos, Pleuron, Thermon, Trichonion (Appendix 1A).\(^\text{188}\) Notably, the surviving towns have at least Classical if not Archaic and Bronze Age antecedents.\(^\text{189}\) Most of these were already substantial, fortified *polis*-like settlements with comparably large *chorai* by the Early Hellenistic period; their “growth” had consequently already occurred at the time of Antiochos III’s arrival.\(^\text{190}\)

Not all have received autopsy beyond surface survey. 58 sites are only known as toponyms, as a place of origin for people mentioned in inscriptions and literature, and thus lack a known physical location (Appendix 1B). Some of these sites are better known than others; Bouttos, for example, had its own *archon* and regularly manumitted slaves at the temple of Asklepios at Skala until the late 130s BC, while Pholas furnished no less than four *strategoi* in the decades after 189 BC but then disappeared from the epigraphic record. In some cases we may be reasonably certain of the town’s location. The townspeople of Bouttos exclusively relied on Skala for their documentary needs, indicating that the town was located near the sanctuary.\(^\text{191}\) In other cases, not even guesswork is helpful; some sites are mentioned only once and may in fact not even be located in Aitolia. Being identified as a place of origin these 58 sites will be considered habitation sites and thus as towns.

\(^\text{188}\) Sites whose ancient toponyms are known will referred to by their ancient name; thus Arsinoe, not Angelokastro.

\(^\text{189}\) Pleuron is an exception; for its synoicism and third-century-BC foundation after the destruction of Old Pleuron, see Lippman 2004. On the date of its fortification walls, see Dinsmoor and Anderson 1950; cf. the conflicting date in Winter 1971.

\(^\text{190}\) In only one case can we approximate the size of the urban *chora*; Dietz (2011, 81) estimates that Kalydon comprised some 36 ha. This does not include non-urban/rural farmlands.

2. Local socioeconomic structures.

Analysis of the socioeconomic structures and activity taking place within these Late Hellenistic towns may provide a window into the formulation of economic strategies that are not otherwise apparent. Moreover, it can illuminate the complex relationship between archaeological data and the historical process.\(^{192}\) For the Aitolian population, the greater regional structure was naturally the federation itself. While largely non-interventionist in local affairs, it did provide certain socioeconomic features which applied to all member towns. As a legislative body, the *koinon* regulated various economic rights and privileges which enabled and constrained activity in local communities. The most important right was undoubtedly that of property ownership. By extending the right to own property throughout the region, the *koinon* provided townspeople access to a broader range of resources than were available in their immediate *chora*. Consequently, it offered member populations the opportunity for individual mobility, a phenomenon vital to economic success through maintained connectivity.\(^{193}\) Local socioeconomic structures were clearly reliant on the federal framework for their own functionality.

2.1. League participation.

The assembly of the Aitolian federation met at least biannually and all members were supposed to attend.\(^{194}\) On the smaller council, member cities were represented in proportion to population.\(^{195}\) All federal magistrates, including the eponymous *strategos*, were elected annually, presumably by the assembly but under the influence of the council. Intermittent league affairs included official agreements such as grants of *proxenia* and *politeia* to foreign states and citizens, agreements that required individual sponsors.\(^{196}\) Aitolia’s towns thus had several options for direct league

\(^{192}\) Vallat 1991.
\(^{193}\) Mackil and van Alfen 2006, 222; Horden and Purcell 2000.
\(^{194}\) Larsen 1952 contra Mitsos 1947. See also Rhodes and Lewis 1997.
\(^{195}\) Larsen 1968, 99.
\(^{196}\) On these institutions, see chapters 2 and 7.
participation, at least in theory. In reality, some towns openly monopolized important federal magistracies, especially the strategos, and it is clear that the larger towns with larger populations had a great say in the election of officials. This monopoly is visible throughout the second century BC, although with some geographic shifts. Between 189 and 167 BC, Trichonion, Stratos, Pleuron and Pholas held the strategia no less than 17 times. After 167 BC, a faint shift in power occurred (Appendix 3A). While Trichonion maintained its regular claim on the highest office, Kalydon began to furnish strategoi on a much more regular basis, and Arsinoe, which had provided no strategoi before 167 BC, had no less than eight thereafter. The recruitment base for hipparchoi and grammateis seems to have been broader but so few documents are preserved that conclusions are impossible.

For a town, there were overwhelming advantages of a townsperson holding the highest federal office. There is no evidence for tax cuts – indeed, there is no evidence whatsoever for taxation although it must have existed – yet such benefits may certainly have been expected. There were distinct possibilities for trade agreements arranged in the town’s favor. Moreover, improved connectivity was obtained in several ways. First, documents would be dated by the eponymous strategos, thereby injecting his hometown into numerous documents throughout Aitolia; indeed, throughout the Greek world. Second, federal agreements arranged under the supervision of the strategos regularly included sponsorship by people from his hometown. These agreements (proxenia, politeia, isopoliteia) gave the responsible sponsors an advantage both at home and abroad in the sponsored city. While the effects of such sponsorship cannot be determined, the eagerness for participation in federal sponsorship emphasizes its socioeconomic attraction, and it is evident that strategoi commonly favored sponsors from their own place of origin (Appendix 3B).

Relatively few towns are documented as having regular involvement in the federal framework but those that did, did so ambitiously, surely with an eye to their own survival. Other towns may have maintained the same ambition but due to a smaller population, lacked the
necessary power in the council. Indeed, the success with which Arsinoe, Trichonion and Kalydon monopolized the highest federal office suggests that the populations of these towns were considerably greater than most others.

2.2. Local officials.

Naturally, local socioeconomic structures existed parallel to, and independently of, the koinon itself. The evidence is limited but important. Naupaktos made use of at least two local magistracies; a grammateus and an agonothetes. These magistrates appear to have been annually elected and both were eponymous. Interestingly, after the first quarter of the second century BC, Naupaktian documents are dated exclusively by the local magistrate and there is no mentioning of the corresponding federal strategos. No less than 38 Naupaktian manumissions are dated by the local grammateus. This magistracy is attested as late as the late 140s BC, comparably to the agonothetes in 143 BC.197 The latter magistracy is comparatively uncommon in the epigraphic record of Naupaktos. The nearby Lokrians had an annually elected agonothetes in addition to the local boularchos and the emergence of this official at Naupaktos may indicate that the town was under intense Lokrian influence; in fact, a few local Late Hellenistic inscriptions are dated by means of the Lokrian boularchos.198 Sherk believes that the agonothetes at Naupaktos was a league official but the limited epigraphic evidence does not support this view.199 Nevertheless, Naupaktos is unique in dating its records solely by a local eponymous magistrate, vital testimony to the local importance of the official and the uniquely self-sufficient town.

Phistyon, Bouttos and Potidania had a local archon, a magistracy that was eponymous. Both Phistyon and Bouttos date their documents both by federal strategos and local archon.200

197 Agonothetes: IG IX 12 3:639,8; grammateus IG IX 12 3:624c.
198 IG IX 12 3:625a, IG IX 12 3:618. For the agonothetes of Lokris, see e.g. IG IX 12 3:676b.
199 Sherk 1990. Grainger (2000), for example, does not include the grammateus at Naupaktos in his account of Aitolian federal magistracies. Larsen (1968) is similarly hesitant.
200 Phistyon e.g. IG IX 12 1:97; Bouttos e.g. IG IX 12 3:638,11.
Surprisingly, Bouttians also date documents by the *grammateus* at Naupaktos. The latest mentioning of the local *archon* at Bouttos is 141 BC; at Phistyon, 163/2 BC. Potidania had three *archontes* as head of the city. The dating formula emphasizes the local nature of this magistracy as it clearly states "ἀρχόντων δὲ ἐπὶ πόλιος ἐν Φιστύοι Ἁγήσωνος" – Ageson, archon of the city at Phistyon.

Thus, at least four Aitolian towns possessed local political institutions. Crucially, these magistracies are only known because they are eponymous. Other local offices may have existed, offices that followed the same general pattern of annual election but filled different functions within the local community, politically, legally, and socially. Unfortunately, their existence cannot be attested. Here we note an important discrepancy. Kalydon and Trichonion were both active participants in the federation, furnishing many *strategoi* over the course of the second century BC. To date local documents by a local magistrate during a year when a townsperson held the highest federal office – an office that in of itself was eponymous – would have made little sense. Naupaktos, on the other hand, did not participate actively in the federation and consequently relied on its own chief magistrates for dating purposes. Nevertheless, it seems likely that most sites had some form of local government and not simply relied upon the federation for its institutional needs. Kalydon, for example, had a Late Classical/Early Hellenistic magistrate called a *damiorgos* but no such official is attested after 300 BC.

Local magistrates filled a wide range of functions which all fall within our broad definition of socioeconomic activity. They negotiated contracts, facilitated manumission and other legal exchanges, organized local taxation, and may have managed the town’s place within the league.

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201 *IG* IX 1² 3:639,5.
202 Bouttos: *IG* IX 1² 3:634a+b; Phistyon *IG* IX 1² 1:103.
203 Sherk 1990, 261; *SBBerlin* 27 (1936), 371.
204 *IG* IX 1² 1:97.
205 *IG* IX 1² 1:138.
Since the federation was notably non-interventionist in local affairs, their authority may have been considerable.\textsuperscript{206}

2.3. Manumissions: town visibility for documentary practices.

Manumission documents are our largest body of evidence for town-to-town contacts. Moreover, it is the only local legal practice with definably socioeconomic characteristics for which written Late Hellenistic evidence exists.\textsuperscript{207} Other such documentary practices may certainly have existed but none are preserved.\textsuperscript{208} The evidence provided by manumission decrees invites consideration of the towns and sanctuaries involved in this legal practice, especially from a chronological point of view. Over 150 Aitolian manumission records are known, and no less than 35 towns engaged in this widespread activity.\textsuperscript{209} A peak in the first half of the second century BC was followed by a sharp decline, and by the end of the second century BC, the practice was almost nonexistent.\textsuperscript{210} Several towns are only known through these documents and the decline in practice may indicate a loss of sites. Naturally, such an assumption is too general to be acceptable but to some extent, evidence for socioeconomic structures must mirror town survival.

As a documentary practice, the institution sheds light on site reliability. Visibility of the manumission document was crucial to its success and contracts were consequently only displayed at sites that the manumitting person and the slave regarded as active and well-connected. In the decade following the indemnity, Aitolians chiefly made use of the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi for these purposes. The federal sanctuary at Thermon, it must be noted, was never used for manumission.\textsuperscript{211} By the mid-second century BC, however, the Aitolians had largely abandoned

\textsuperscript{206} For a discussion on Aitolia’s federal government, see Larsen 1952.
\textsuperscript{207} This practice is discussed in detail in chapter 8.
\textsuperscript{208} These include marriage contracts, loans, property sales and inheritance issues.
\textsuperscript{209} This does not include Kallion and Delphi whose Aitolian populations kept manumitting as Aitolians for some time into the second century BC, nor does it include the \textit{katoikoi} at Naupaktos (\textit{IG IX 1}² 3:639,4).
\textsuperscript{210} A single document dates to the first century BC; \textit{IG IX 1}² 1:110 (Phistycon).
\textsuperscript{211} A single imperial (?) inscription does record the manumission of a woman but the inscription is so worn that no further interpretation is possible. \textit{IG IX 1}² 1:92.
Delphi and increasingly relied on three local sanctuaries; the Asklepeion en Krounois near Bouttos and Naupaktos, the sanctuary of Syrian Aphrodite at Phistyon, and later, the sanctuary of Artemis Laphria at Kalydon. Of these, the Asklepeion received the most activity with no less than 62 manumission documents dating to the second century BC. This habit mandated that people travel through the region, sometimes far from their hometowns. Deliberate population movement was an important factor for socioeconomic connectivity in a region that was otherwise patterned by inaccessibility and large site-to-site distances, and the documentary aspect of manumission helped fortify that important connectivity.

Chronological and spatial evidence for this socioeconomic structure is largely homogeneous but there are important local exceptions. The population of Kalydon, for example, did not engage in this activity until the 130s BC, and then they simply went to their own local sanctuary which interestingly was only used by the local population. No Kalydonian ever manumitted a slave away from home, nor was a non-Kalydonian slave manumitted in the local sanctuary. A similar habit is apparent at Phistyon. Of the six towns that manumitted slaves there, only one – Arsinoe – had previously manumitted slaves elsewhere. The preference for the sanctuaries of Asklepios and Syrian Aphrodite signals that these sites were considered reliable at the time of the manumission.

The manumission process improved site-to-site connectivity as well as local site activity, both for the nearby community and the participants themselves. Participants may have taken the opportunity to negotiate better personal odds for marginal improvement, an assumption that seems exceedingly likely considering the frequency with which witnesses traveled across vast distances to participate in a legal act that itself entailed no immediate personal gain. Similarly, local

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212 A single manumission document has been found at Arsinoe (IG IX 12 1:131).
213 Once at home in 184 BC (IG IX 12 1:131) and once at Delphi in 173 BC (SGDI II 1853). The other towns manumitting at Phistyon were Phistyon itself (IG IX 12 1:104, 1:105, 1:110), Boukation (IG IX 12 1:97, 1:99, 1:106), Proscheion (IG IX 12 1:101, 1:108), Philotaion (IG IX 12 1:96b) and Thermon (IG IX 12 1:102).
communities received a socioeconomic boost due to the activity in their urban sanctuaries.\footnote{The importance of location for survival is evaluated below as well as in chapter 9.}

3. **Towns and monuments.**

The material evidence from Aitolia’s towns and monuments is both biased and incomplete. This is largely due to the lack of scientific site autopsy and excavation in the region. In general, excavated sites tend to render “positive” evidence while sites that have only received brief investigation generate either “negative” evidence or no evidence at all. In other words, the more excavation a site has received, the more likely it is to have produced Late Hellenistic material, which is of some consequence for this inquiry. First, because of the uneven excavation record, physical evidence cannot reasonably demonstrate the nature of regional site-to-site hierarchies or how wealth was distributed across the region. Moreover, while it is essential to view site data in the context of overall landscape contraction, we cannot sensibly take independent sites as characteristic of the entire region. Consequently, we realize from the start that analysis of excavated contexts will not accurately contextualize the “downward slope” nor can such analysis demonstrate a region-wide phenomenon.

3.1. **Tombs and burials.**

Of the 27 sites that have produced archaeological material, only nine have produced tombs, yet burials are by far the most commonly excavated Late Hellenistic feature. In 1961, 226 graves had been excavated at Naupaktos; by now, the number is considerably greater.\footnote{Kolia and Saranti 2004.} Tombs and burials are a fortunate category to evaluate as even when reused, they tend not to change functions. Several tomb types have been identified ranging in size from very large to very small, and in grave goods from very rich to none at all. Poor burials in unlined pits are the most common, followed by tile-
lined graves and smaller cist graves. Pithos graves also exist. These smaller, “non-architectural”
graves rarely possess any grave goods beyond sparse ceramics, nor are they commonly used for
multiple, sequential burials.

Mid-size tombs consist exclusively of cist graves. Not rarely are they reused. A 1.90 x 0.80m
tomb in the East cemetery at Naupaktos, for example, was built in the late third century BC but
ceramic finds demonstrate that it was in continuous use into the first century BC.216 A larger mid-
size tomb type, the barrel-vaulted, single-chamber subterranean tomb, is known in a single example
at Kalydon. Misinterpreted as a heroon it is clearly just a tomb without cult offerings, but it is well-
built, constructed by tooled ashlar blocks, and with a side at just over 3m, must be considered
rather large.217

Much larger, however, is the Macedonian tomb type which is represented in five locations.
The Macedonian tomb at Naupaktos measures 7.10 x 6.52m and is constructed of well-fitting blocks
dividing the interior space into an antechamber and two chambers with klinai for the deceased (Fig.
11).218 Constructed in the second century BC, the tomb was used for several sequential burials,
seemingly into the first century BC. A similar tomb at Pleuron is almost identical in size, layout and
construction, with the notable exception that it does not appear to have been reused; moreover, the
grave goods found in the Pleuron tomb were much richer than those found at Naupaktos.219 A third
Macedonian tomb at Agios Thomas is slightly smaller at roughly 3.20 x 3.30m but mimics the
careful construction of the previous examples. The fourth was discovered in 2009, 1 km north-east
of Kalydon, and the fifth belongs to the Heroon at Kalydon.220 The built Macedonian tomb is
uncommon outside Northern Greece; in fact, of the 71 known examples, only seven are in

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217 Dyggve 1951.
219 AD 44 (1989), B1, 139-141.
220 For Heroon, see section 3.2 below. The fourth tomb is unpublished apart from brief initial mentioning in
Stavropoulou-Gatsi 2010. While certainly Hellenistic, it does not necessarily date to the Late Hellenistic
period.
“Southern” Greece.\textsuperscript{221} Andronikos maintains that their form was designed to meet funerary customs that were distinctively Macedonian.\textsuperscript{222} Their appearance in this part of Greece is difficult to explain and the type bears no close resemblance to any architectural form represented in Aitolia. Without a doubt, it is the only new tomb type introduced at this time, but curiously so at a time of general socioeconomic decline. Perhaps these monumental tombs are best seen as evidence of conspicuous consumption by an increasingly competitive elite.

In poorer burials, grave goods consist of ceramics ranging from locally produced fine ware to shards so small that they cannot be studied, and occasionally include a local bronze coin. Unsurprisingly, most of Aitolia’s built tombs have been at least partially robbed out which prevents interpretation of the wealth of the deceased person. Yet, some very fine jewelry, precious objects and inscribed stelai have been recovered in excavation of Aitolia’s cemeteries. From the cemetery at Trichonion come an elaborately cut cameo inset in gold and a large gold wreath among numerous other precious objects.\textsuperscript{223} The same cemetery has provided several inscribed grave stelai, including a large limestone stele decorated with an elaborate Triton below whom two lions are attacking a boar (Fig. 12 – 13).\textsuperscript{224} Leaves from golden wreaths have been found at Arsinoe, whose cemetery has also produced several grave stelai including one with unusually well-carved architectural moldings (Fig. 14).\textsuperscript{225} At the necropolis of Pleuron, silver vessels, gold leaves and gold dust, silver coins and inscribed stelai have been found, in addition to a statuette of Silenus in solid silver (Fig. 15).\textsuperscript{226} The cemeteries at Naupaktos have rendered fewer precious Late Hellenistic objects but in return the town has produced one of the most important funerary stelai of the period. This non-contextual stele dates to after 21 BC and chronicles, in Latin, the death of a Roman veteran serving in the legio

\textsuperscript{221} Andronikos (1993) counts 70, not 71 tombs; unsurprising, since the most recent Macedonian tomb in Aitolia was only discovered in 2009. On the tomb type in general, see Tomlinson 1987; Miller 1993.
\textsuperscript{222} Andronikos 1993: 1987.
\textsuperscript{223} Stavropoulou-Gatsi 2009, 401ff, nos 699 and 702.
\textsuperscript{224} Agrinion archaeological museum inv. no 27; Stavropoulou-Gatsi 2009, 402, no 700.
\textsuperscript{225} AD 31 (1976) B1. Agrinion archaeological museum inv. no 65.
XII Fulminata at Patras. This is the latest datable Late Hellenistic funerary inscription from Aitolia and signals an important change around the Corinthian gulf: the permanent installation of three veteran legions at Patras and Dyme after the foundation of Nikopolis and the inescapable change in the ethnic makeup of the region.

The tombs and burials of Late Hellenistic Aitolia indicate an extreme division of wealth. The very wealthy grave goods, itself dating to the Late Hellenistic period (thus, no heirlooms), is suggestive of the purchasing power of the elite. Moreover, members of the Aitolian elite quite clearly attempted to emulate elite ideals observed elsewhere which is expressed through their choice of a highly visible, foreign tomb type.

In the second century BC, most tombs seem to have been placed in preexisting cemeteries. Over the course of the first century BC, however, graves begin to appear in locations that had previously had no cemetery function. The most extraordinary example is naturally Thermon where graves were sunk into a public building in the agora, but the change in funerary customs is visible throughout Aitolia. At Naupaktos, for example, numerous Early Roman graves appear in places whose function had previously been exclusively domestic. In the first years of the first century AD, for example, 12 pit graves were sunk into a Hellenistic house on Apokakou road, and at the Alonaki plot, several sparse graves were dug into a preexisting Hellenistic building at the end of the first century BC. This can only be indicative of changing urban conditions.

3.2. The town and its monuments: Kalydon.

Situated in an ideal location on two large hills overlooking the fertile coastal plain and the Evinos river corridor, Kalydon was a significant city in the Late Hellenistic period and it figures

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228 The Aitolian elite is discussed in chapter 8.
prominently in scholarship on the reorganization of Western Greece. Its population is thought to have been forcibly moved to Nikopolis in the late first century BC and in the second century AD, Pausanias saw the dislocated cult statues of Kalydonian Artemis Laphria and Dionysos in Patras. For this inquiry, it is the only site that has received sufficient excavation and site autopsy to provide the detailed data needed to safely reconstruct the effects of Aitolian decline on an individual town. At first glance, however, the evidence seems to contradict the socioeconomic deterioration inherent in landscape contraction. Several large building projects took place after the Roman indemnity, projects that even without the related finds are so substantial in size, quality and decoration that they can only indicate extensive wealth; moreover, the finds demonstrate a surprising level of connectivity with the greater Mediterranean world. A detailed review is necessary.

On the Akropolis, a large domestic building was erected in the second century BC. Only partially excavated, its layout has been documented through geomagnetic survey. Its reconstructed outer dimensions exceed 40 x 30 m, and it is a large enough building to dominate the entire west portion of the Akropolis (Fig. 16 – 17). Elaborately painted architectural terracottas and unfluted Doric columns with square capitals combined with late second-century-BC mosaic floors give the unmistakable impression of a very wealthy person’s domicile. The floors themselves are curious as their construction is rare in the Eastern Mediterranean. Consisting of decorated mortar employing white tesserae for geometric motifs, their construction signals Central Mediterranean, i.e. Italian, influence (Fig. 18). Excavation of the building produced mostly Hellenistic pottery but

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231 Pausanias 7.18.8-9: 7.21.1; Strabo 7.7.6.
232 The only possible testimony to any effect brought about by the upheavals in the early second century BC is the deliberate abandonment of a pottery kiln. It is, however, more likely that the kiln was taken out of use when the project for which it provided roof tiles – the Peristyle House – was completed. See Ljung 2011.
234 Measurements reconstructed from Dietz 2011, Fig. 174.
235 The type is almost exclusively found in domestic contexts. For examples at Delos, see Bruneau 1972.
236 Dietz 2011b, 244.
also several Early Roman cups and lamps dating to the first century AD, plus a Roman sestertius dating to 25 BC.\textsuperscript{237}

Dating to roughly 100 BC, the so-called Heroon at Kalydon is one of the most discussed buildings in Aitolia (Fig. 19 – 20).\textsuperscript{238} It consists of a peristyle courtyard flanked by a series of banquet rooms to the east and another row of rooms to the north, where a group of imagines clipeatae and some freestanding sculpture were displayed. The surviving eight imagines and sculpture fragments form the basis for almost all discourse on the structure including its contested date.\textsuperscript{239} An extension to the north provides access via a staircase to a subterranean vaulted Macedonian tomb with elaborately carved klinai and footstools which still bear traces of paint (Fig. 21 – 22). Originally interpreted as a shrine to the local hero Leon whose portrait is supposedly represented among the sculpture fragments, scholars now emphasize the form of the palaestra.\textsuperscript{240} The supposed portrait of Leon has the cauliflower ears indicative of a wrestler or a boxer, suggesting that an athletic victory may have originally generated his cult.\textsuperscript{241} Yet, the overall layout and lack of infrastructure for other sports prevents the Heroon from having been Kalydon’s chief gymnasium, which implies that it may in fact have been a clubhouse for a specific athletic association. Unfortunately, there is no further indication of its function and the activity that took

\textsuperscript{237} Alexopoulou and Sidiropoulos 2011, no 113; Bollen 2011b; Bollen and Eiring 2011a.
\textsuperscript{238} Dyggve, Poulsen et al 1934.
\textsuperscript{239} Agrinio archaeological museum inv. nos 28 – 36. Bol 1988; Ridgway 2002. While most scholars rely on the excavator’s analysis of Eastern sigillata found in the foundation trenches for the building, others have interpreted the sculpture group as Roman copies of Greek originals and thus maintain an imperial date for the entire complex; e.g. Charatzopoulou 2006. Nevertheless, the sculpture group can be dated stylistically to c. 100 – 60 BC and roughly contemporary parallels for the unusual imagines clipeatae do exist. The best known example is the monument of Mithridates VI Eupator at Delos, dating to 102/1 BC: see Webb 1996. The Kalydon group has also been compared to the tondi from the Madhia wreck, see von Prittwitz und Gatton 1994. See also von Prittwitz 1988. The freestanding statue of Krateia is closely paralleled by the over-life-size statue of Baebia from Magnesia on the Maeander which dates to the last years of the second century BC: Eule 2001; Pinkwart 1973.
\textsuperscript{240} Dietz 2011a, 155; cf. Hughes 1999.
\textsuperscript{241} Charatzopoulou 2006.
place at the Heroon although epigraphic evidence suggests that activity lasted at least into the Augustan period.242

Most of the material used for the construction of the Heroon is local. Yet, the imaginæ are made of Pentelic marble, leading Bol to suggest that they were carved in Athens and then exported to Aitolia.243 But several heads show signs of re-carving; the Meleager (Fig. 23), Apollo and Eros appear to first have been carved separately in the round, perhaps to be inserted into a bust, and others have added pieces suggesting that they are not originals.244 Only the head of Leon is freshly carved from a single piece of marble. Ridgway tentatively suggests that the imaginæ were carved in Aitolia by Athenian masters.245 This may certainly have been the case, but the more important fact is that preexisting sculpture was reused and re-carved for this Late Hellenistic building. While the building complex was undoubtedly a substantial investment, economic strategies were certainly in place. The head of Leon demonstrates that import of marble from Athens, or indeed of freshly carved marble sculpture, was still possible in the early first century BC, yet the commissioners of the imaginæ clipeateae chose to use preexisting marble sculpture for the rest of the heads which undoubtedly was less costly than freshly carved images.

Situated in the central town, the recently excavated Peristyle Building (Fig. 24–26) bears close resemblance to the Heroon despite being smaller in size and predating the later construction by roughly a century.246 The similarities in form, features and finds indicate a similar or related function. Just like the Heroon, this building consists of a peristyle courtyard flanked by series of rooms to the north and east, and a multitude of precious objects, including sculpture, was found in the north rooms. The unexcavated rooms along the east side were interpreted as banquet rooms, a

242 IG IX 1:141 – 1:142. There is no need to follow Charatzopolou’s suggestion that 1:142 dates to the second century AD.
244 The head of Zeus shows the groin and thighs of youthful statue from which it was made. See Ridgway’s (2002) comments.
245 Ridgway 2002.
246 Dietz 2011a: 2011c. See also the preliminary reports in Dietz 2005; Dietz, Kolonas et al 2007; Dietz and Stavropoulou-Gatsi 2009. The building is securely dated through close analysis of the late third-century-BC pottery found below its foundations (Bollen 2011a). See also Bollen and Eiring 2011a: 2011b.
conjecture based on evidence from the Heroon. The precious finds are exclusively Late Hellenistic and include several large objects in imported Parian, Naxian and Pentelic marble. These include a Naxian marble head of a goddess wearing a *corona muralis*, whose hair still preserved traces of gold dust and paint at her recovery in 2003 (Fig. 27).\(^{247}\) The cult statue, interpreted as the goddess Meter, strongly suggests that the northwest room had religious functions which other finds confirm. Other marble finds consist of a Pentelic lion (Fig. 28), the separately carved head of a herm whose limestone shaft and base are inscribed ΛΑΝΙΚΟΣ: ΕΡΜΑΙ (Fig. 29), cult vessels and miniature herms. While the aforementioned objects have been dated to the first half of the second century BC, the North rooms in the Peristyle Building have also produced later dedications. The lunate epsilon, omega and sigma on a miniature limestone altar dedicated by Thrason to Artemis suggest a date well into the first century BC (Fig. 30), and a large statue base dedicated by Sosikles to the gods and to the city dates to the late second century BC (Fig. 31). The inscription tells us that the sculptor was an Alexandros from Sikyon, thus not a local master. Non-precious contextual objects include a great number of locally made incense burners and drinking vessels. Importantly, the latest locally made pottery shows a strong influence of sigillata production. The cult was active into the first century AD and the deposits of finds indicate no decline in either activity or quality of goods until the building collapsed.

In general, Late Hellenistic material at Kalydon gives a convincing impression of a well-connected town whose population – or at least its elite – was considerably well off. The expenditure involved in the construction of the aforementioned buildings must have been substantial, and materials from all three complexes indicate financial involvement – and thus, storage of wealth – beyond ordinary expenditures. In fact, Kirsten and Kraiker argue that Kalydon experienced its absolute height in the second century BC, establishing that the sanctuary of Artemis Laphria in

\(^{247}\) Kalydon notebooks for Area D, 2003.
many aspects equaled that of Apollo at Thermon in regional importance. Moreover, the finds at Kalydon indicate an unprecedented level of connectivity, both in terms of visibly extraneous cultural influences and the imported materials themselves. The observed landscape contraction should entail a gradual loss of connectivity, yet non-regional forms and materials attest to cultural exchange and trade well beyond the local community. Not only does this apply to the elite dedications reviewed above, but also to more regular finds throughout the town. Here, a large amount of foreign coins dating to the first century BC verifies that Kalydon was indeed not isolated from the greater Mediterranean world despite Aitolia’s supposed eremia. This is further attested by ceramic data. Imported fine wares in a grey fabric, clearly imitating silver, become increasingly common from the mid-second century BC onward. Some can be linked to Corinth and Athens. Another prominent group of Hellenistic imports are hemispherical, mold-made drinking bowls but plain table wares were also imported. In the early years of the first century AD, imported Arretine fine ware and Italian-made lamps appear both in the Peristyle Building and on the Akropolis. There is only limited evidence for imitative sigillata production beyond the finds from the Peristyle Building, yet many locally produced Late Hellenistic vessels are coated in a dull, red glaze, an undeniable sign of local potters being influenced by external trends.

But sustained connectivity is not the only way in which Kalydon contradicts the traditional understanding of Late Hellenistic Aitolia. Vitally, until its sudden abandonment in the mid-first century AD, activity at Kalydon was unbroken, its intensity and functions unaltered. Contrary to popular belief, the reorganization of Western Greece in the 30s and 20s BC had no visible effects on

248 Kirsten and Kraiker 1967, 772.
249 Alexopoulou and Sidiropoulos 2011. See also chapter 6.
250 Bollen 2011a.
251 To link these imports to the activities in the Heroon and the Peristyle Building is attractive.
252 On the ways in which ceramic assemblages reflect trade and openness to trade, see Martin 2005. On early Italian pottery in the Eastern Mediterranean, see Lund 2004.
253 Apart from four sling bolts found in Late Hellenistic contexts, there is no sign of disturbance. Burns 2011.
In fact, there is no indication whatsoever of a large-scale removal of its population for the synoicism of Augustus; indeed, the evidence from Kalydon directly challenges the traditional historical narrative. Permanent population removal invariably creates a drop in or loss of site activity, yet the continuity and retained intensity of site activity through the Augustan period can only indicate that at large, the population of Kalydon was not part of the synoicism of Nikopolis. In addition, nothing legitimizes the notion that the cult statues from the sanctuary of Artemis Laphria were moved to Patras at the time of the synoicism of Nikopolis. To conflate Pausanias’ and Strabo’s observations for a single narrative on Roman reorganization of Western Greece can no longer be considered a pertinent approach.

In addition, the connectivity observed at Kalydon disagrees with the general theory of settlement contraction generating a loss of connectivity and thus a decline of socioeconomic activity. Horden and Purcell’s interpretive model dictates that connectivity within microregions was vital to site survival and puts forth mutual visibility as the key feature for success. Yet, finds at Kalydon exhibit a high level of inter-regional connectivity at a time when landscape contraction had robbed surviving sites of a direct line of sight; clearly, the interpretation of connectivity must be extended to include factors beyond mutual visibility. Indeed, we must consider a more nuanced approach to the mechanisms of landscape contraction.

In conclusion, recent excavations at Kalydon invite a new reading of the historical narrative for Western Greece, a reading that will have tremendous consequences for our understanding of Greco-Roman interaction and Roman territorial reorganization; indeed, for the entire sociopolitical debate on Cicero’s Aetolia amissa. If Kalydon was not part of Augustus’ “large-scale” reorganization of Western Greece – and the archaeological material indicates that it was not – what really happened? How and when was Aitolia integrated into the new provincia, if at all? To what extent is

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254 Contra Kirsten and Kraiker (1967) who argue that the synoicism of Nikopolis was Kalydon’s terminus.
255 The cult of Artemis Laphria seems to have continued until the late third century AD as demonstrated by lamps found in the sanctuary, and there is indeed reason to question at what time the cult statues were moved to Patras. Kristen and Kraiker 1967, 772; Dyggve 1948.
Strabo's *eremía* simply a literary trope intended to advance a specific political rhetoric? A careful inquiry into the mechanisms of Late Aitolian decline is undeniably worthwhile.

3.3. Archaeological evidence from other sites.

In contrast to Kalydon, most Aitolian sites are in desperate need of excavation and further site autopsy. Consequently, the detailed analysis critical for individual assessment cannot be obtained, which considering the nature of this inquiry is most unfortunate. We have no way of ascertaining whether Kalydon is unique or in fact reasonably representative. Nevertheless, useful Late Hellenistic material has been observed at a number of sites. In several cases, the material closely mirrors the changes visible in the contracting landscape, but other sites retain continuity of form and function into the Augustan period and beyond.256

We start at Thermon. The sanctuary of Apollo was the official meeting place for the Aitolian koinon and if the federation had a capital, it was Thermon. The sanctuary itself was central to Aitolian ethnos with roots in the Bronze Age.257 Hundreds of inscriptions and dedications attest to its federal importance in the fourth and third centuries BC. On the contrary, the sanctuary received almost no new construction in the second century BC; only two monumental bases are known, although inscriptions and coins demonstrate that the site still received regular activity.258 Unfortunately, its Late Hellenistic fate is difficult to assess. A destruction layer reportedly corresponding to the “disasters” in 167 BC has been found along the side of the East stoa, yet the connection is tenuous and there is in fact no actual testimony to the debt crisis manifesting itself in the physical destruction of buildings.259 In the last years of the second century BC there are virtually no signs of activity at Thermon; in fact, the sanctuary appears to have been essentially abandoned at the dissolution of the koinon. A Roman denarius dating to c. 90 BC is the only indication that the

256 For a general introduction to Aitolia in the Roman period, see Petropoulos 1991.
257 On Thermon’s earliest structures, see e.g. Papapostolou 2004.
site still received visitors. Later in the first century BC, seven graves were sunk into a public building in the agora – undeniable testimony to a radical change in function and activity.

The non-rural sanctuaries at Bouttos, Trichonio and Naupaktos have produced several inscriptions that attest to their activity through the second century BC but since excavation is lacking at all sites, no further comment is possible.

Archaeological evidence for domestic activity is restricted to a small number of locations. At Chalkis, dining ware and plates dating to the second and first centuries BC have been found in the inhabited parts of the town but no buildings can be dated to this period. Unsurprisingly, the most evidence comes from Naupaktos which has received more excavation of Hellenistic levels than all other Aitolian sites but Kalydon. Several Late Hellenistic domestic buildings have been found in the center of the modern city. At the Gribovo plot a large building consists of 16 smaller rooms surrounding a 6 x 6.3m courtyard (Fig. 32). It was constructed in several phases, one of which saw plenty of Late Hellenistic fine ware combined with early sigillata. That ceramic mixture is noted at numerous plots throughout Naupaktos. Another large building, also seemingly domestic, was found at the corner of Farmake and Bardakoula roads. Five separate phases of construction can be identified, one corresponding to the Late Hellenistic period. In this phase, the inhabitants made use of a wide range of locally made pottery, both fine and undecorated, as well as several mould-made vessels. A gold ring was also found in the complex.

At first glance, the archaeological remains in Aitolia seem to follow the general trajectories of decline inherent in settlement contraction yet it is important not to equate lack of excavated material to a lack of material. In fact, only sufficiently excavated sites can fully contextualize the rapidly changing landscape yet this type of data is precisely what is lacking. It stands to repeat the

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260 L PISO L F FRUGI = RRC 340.1.
262 AD 31 (1976) B1,165-166.
263 E.g. AD 48 (1993) B1, 144; AD 44 (1989) B1, 142.
264 A skyphos can be dated to 145-100 BC by comparison to no 336 in Rotroff 1982.
observation that the more scientific excavation a site receives, the greater the chance of it producing Late Hellenistic material. While the evidence at Thermon most certainly follows a trajectory of visible degeneration, the case study of Kalydon invites caution for too dramatic an interpretation. Unfortunately, Aitolia’s towns are still too much of a tabula rasa in terms of scientific excavation to safely and effectively evaluate their individual Late Hellenistic history and moreover, cannot be interpreted to collectively have followed a certain trajectory. Nevertheless, when assessed in terms of local change and connectivity, archaeological data does signal a series of dramatic changes occurring over the course of the second and first centuries BC, changes that may be related to regional socioeconomic decline.


Consideration of Aitolia’s towns in isolation enables a valid reading of local changes. When contrasting the Late Hellenistic data to earlier material, certain local differences become apparent. These changes manifest themselves both in the function and activity of sites. The most commonly occurring change is the termination of activity as the town simply ceases to exist. Naturally, this interpretation rests on halting categories of evidence and may not be as spectacular as at first glance. Yet, while perhaps not as large-scale as we are lead to believe, this scenario is not unexpected in a sensitive economic system where sustained growth only occurred at the margin. Prolonged marginal decline equaled extinction. This form of response closely follows the pattern of settlement contraction. The settlement data observed in the previous chapter gives a distinct impression of rapid landscape contraction resulting in a silent, uncultivated hinterland and sites too distant from one another to maintain healthy connectivity. Under such conditions, termination of activity was inevitable for all but the most self-sufficient, well-connected sites.

265 For example, towns are unlikely to have ceased to exist the moment townspeople stopped manumitting slaves; the epigraphic record does not necessarily reflect immediate changes in habitation.
Several sites were subjected to a change in both form and function, sometimes dramatically so. At Thermon, we observed first-century-BC graves sunk into a public building in the agora, signaling not only a change in function from sanctuary to cemetery but also a significant loss of the activity that until the Late Hellenistic period had defined its very purpose. When the sanctuary lost its identity as a chief federal location – a direct consequence of the collapse of the koinon itself – it also lost its function as a sanctuary, a function it had filled since the Late Bronze Age.

This scenario, tombs appearing in an area that had previously had no funerary function whatsoever, is in fact the most readily identifiable change besides termination of activity. We witness it across Aitolia but most readily at Naupaktos. Here, numerous Early Roman graves appear in places whose function had previously been domestic. In the first century AD, for example, 12 pit graves were sunk into the Hellenistic house on Apokakou road. Undeniably, such changes demonstrate a drastic reorganization of civic space; moreover, it strongly suggests demographic changes, particularly in terms of population decline. Other non-funerary alterations in local functions are similarly indicative. At the intersection of the Kapourdeli and Karakoulaki roads in Naupaktos, an Early Roman bath was installed through the foundations of a Late Hellenistic domestic building, thereby introducing a foreign type of architecture into an Aitolian town.

Yet, we must also consider continuity of form and function. At Kalydon, for example, we witnessed unbroken activity as well as unchanged functions through the Late Hellenistic period and into the imperial era, a scenario that fundamentally contradicts the traditional view on Aitolian eremia. In fact, the town was not abandoned until some 70 years after the foundation of Nikopolis and its infrastructure was in active use until its abandonment. Several plots in Naupaktos retained similar continuity throughout the Late Hellenistic period. A Hellenistic house on Farmake road, for example, was in continuous use through the Roman period, as was a large domestic building on the

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267 AD 43 (1988) B1. Another large Roman bath was constructed on the plain between Pleuron and Kalydon, South of Agios Thomas. The complex dates to the later part of the first century AD (Fig. 36). See Katsaros 2004.
corner of Faramke and Bardakoula roads. In a domestic complex on Psarrou 15, an Early Roman building rests on Hellenistic foundations, using the exact same layout. Similarly, a Hellenistic building with a distinct Roman phase has been noticed at Sitaralona East of Lake Trichonion. Even in places that have only rendered pottery and no architecture, we often notice a mix of the same type of Late Hellenistic and Early Roman wares.

Nevertheless, literary and epigraphic evidence for Aitolia’s towns in conjunction with the archaeological evidence they have provided generate an image that largely supports the evidence for landscape contraction. While detailed analysis of these categories of evidence will follow in subsequent chapters, a short summary of the present evidence is necessary. First, fewer towns participated in federal activities in the second century BC than before 189 BC; perhaps not at their own volition, but they did. Most sites that are only known as toponyms vanish from the epigraphic record before the mid-second century BC; naturally, this is in part a consequence of epigraphic habits, yet known socioeconomic structures also disappear over the course of the second century BC, indicating that there is some merit in considering loss of site evidence as a loss of site.

Manumission activity, for example, comes to a gradual halt in the third quarter of the second century BC and there is no evidence for any government, local or federal, after the 120s BC. Next, the drastically altered function for several sites reflects a serious social, economic and political change in local urban environments. In addition, the appearance of graves in numerous locations that had previously filled a solely domestic function suggests that Aitolia’s population was smaller at the beginning of the Early Roman era than in the Late Hellenistic period. Undeniably, the rapidly contracting landscape did affect the towns and sanctuaries in Aitolia, and the gradually loss of socioeconomic power is visible throughout the region. Yet, some towns fared infinitely better than

270 Bommeljé et al 1987, 106; Bommeljé and Vroom 1995.
271 The Gribovo plot and the Messene road in Naupaktos, Megali Chora, Dafnias, Aspropyrgos, Kalydon and Kato Mammako among others (Appendix 1A); also the West stoa at Thermon: *Ergon* 1987, 83.
others, successfully adapting to the constraints placed upon them by the rapid regional socioeconomic decline. Their success relied on a single factor: connectivity.

5. Connection despite contraction: site-to-site connectivity in view of regional decline.

To Horden and Purcell, Mediterranean microregional connectivity is patterned by ties of mutual visibility, yet as a socioeconomic phenomenon, its manifestations and mechanisms are naturally more complicated. In this context, I take connectivity to mean the distribution and sharing of resources; the movement of physical goods and people; the coordination and organization of individuals and groups; the exchange and reception of non-tangible knowledge, influences and ideas; the legal rights and privileges regulating such phenomena; and the socioeconomic expression of these connections.

In the previous chapter, we noted that proximity to arable soil and indeed sufficient distances between sites were vital factors for initial site survival. Nevertheless, such spatial partitioning does not account for the ways in which towns maintained essential connectivity despite concomitant landscape contraction. Clearly, the surviving towns were in some way predisposed for survival in a way that others were not, but the archaeological evidence is not indicative of what those factors may have been, and further investigation is necessary. Here we note that lines of communication were not broken despite sites losing lines of mutual visibility. Reed has successfully showed that dominance relationships are expressed through a hierarchy of connectivity. We may then begin to consider the surviving towns and sanctuaries as not simply participants but as key controllers within the regional matrix of communication, indeed as determinant nodes.

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272 Horden and Purcell 2000, 125.
273 Reed 1970.
Such a reading is supported by the majority of visible features. First, towns that were deeply integrated into the larger framework of the *koinon* – thus placed in key “locations” within the socioeconomic matrix – and had substantially large populations were initially better equipped to absorb the exogenous shock of the indemnity. By controlling and manipulating league policy in their own favor, they managed to adjust the new constraints to best suit their own interests. For a town to achieve such influence in the league it not only needed a large population but also a comparatively wealthy, politically active elite. This elite actively engaged in other forms of distribution within the regional matrix which reinforced the position of their local hometowns therein. This is quite clearly the case of Naupaktos which never sought to control the federation through monopolization of its highest offices yet retained sufficient connectivity through the first century BC. Detailed analysis of the population and the federation itself from the point of view of socioeconomic structures will invariably illuminate this phenomenon.

But site survival did not only depend on the composition and activities of the local population and their manipulation of federal offices. Other factors were essential in sustained connectivity in the long-term although none are readily apparent. A balanced integration of monetary and agrarian systems may have constituted one such factor which detailed evaluation of Aitolia’s coin hoards may serve to illuminate. Storage of accumulated wealth is a major factor in managing risk and unlike grain and olives, silver and bronze do not spoil with extended storage.

Yet, in the case of Late Hellenistic Aitolia, connectivity must also have relied on physical location, especially after the *koinon* had ceased to exist. When considering low levels of connectivity – which is hard to document in any period because of the limited traces it leaves in permanent records – we observe that the sites that survived the longest had a physical advantage that others lacked. Our analysis of the Aitolian landscape illustrated that location was a chief factor for survival in the contracting landscape. Clearly, ecological factors must have been essential in this

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274 Horden and Purcell 2000, 160.
predominantly agrarian economy. Towns in possession of easily farmed *chorai*, in relative proximity of pastoral uphill lands and near corridors, passages and navigable waterways that facilitated the movement of goods and people were undeniably better suited to meet the constraints of the contracting landscape (Fig. 36).²⁷⁵

**6. Some preliminary observations on the synoicism of Nikopolis.**

The evidence presented above demonstrates the need for a new contextual reading of the synoicism of Nikopolis and the Roman reorganization of Western Greece. Late Hellenistic Aitolia can no longer be considered an empty, isolated region; while certainly in continuous decline and vastly different than at the height of its *koinon* in the third century BC, several sites successfully maintained connectivity until the synoicism of Nikopolis, connectivity that confirms sustained contacts and participation in the greater Mediterranean world. Archaeological evidence at Kalydon, moreover, mandates a complete reconsideration of the mechanisms of the Nikopoliteian synoicism and indeed of the literary sources that have formed the basis for scholarly consideration of this event.

First, Pausanias’ interpretations of Augustus’ moving all Aitolian cult objects to Patras and Nikopolis at the time of the synoicism can no longer be taken at face value.²⁷⁶ The archaeological material from Kalydon makes a strong claim to that effect. Against the background of the unbroken, unchanged and regular activity in this important town, I posit that Pausanias may in fact have conflated a series of events that predated his time and were not necessarily concomitant. In the late first century BC or early first century AD, the Roman colonists in Patras were supposedly given some measure of control of the Kalydonian *chora* although we do not know the legal apparatus

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²⁷⁶ Pausanias 7.18.8-9, 7.21.1.
behind that territorial grant. Importantly, this does not seem to have immediately interfered with activity at Kalydon. Consequently, the cult statues of Artemis and Dionysos may have been moved across the gulf at the incentive of the colonists themselves at a time when Kalydon was no longer an active town, perhaps in the middle of the first century AD. There is indeed no reason to immediately fuse Pausanias’ statements with Strabo’s account of the Nikopoliteian foundation in the late first century BC. A reexamination of the material from the sanctuary of Artemis Laphria itself could help inform this new interpretation.

Furthermore, Kalydon invites reconsideration of the manner in which Nikopolis was founded. Unbroken, unchanged, and indeed undiminished activity in the town can only indicate that the population was not forcibly moved to Nikopolis and there is consequently no need to immediately add Aitolia to Strabo’s list of synoicized territories. Yet, later sources make clear that part of Aitolia’s population did, in fact, end up in Augustus’ town. This suggests that the synoicism was more complex than has hitherto been acknowledged and indicates that population movement may have been continuous yet occasional, spanning several decades if not generations. If the inhabitants of Aitolia’s largest town refused to leave, what mechanisms enforced the movement of people in other areas? In Aitolia, were only people not directly living in the surviving towns asked to leave? Did the synoicism in fact contain a measure of force, as implied by Pausanias and Cassius Dio? What does Strabo’s eremia truly mean – an empty region, or simply a small number of cities? The chronology, mechanics and rhetoric of the foundation of Nikopolis must be assessed within a framework obtained through study of regional socioeconomic evidence provide. There is indeed reason to carefully reevaluate the entire traditional narrative on the reorganization of Western Greece.

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277 Strabo (10.2.1) mentions that the Romans at Patras controlled the fishery in the “lake at Kalydon”.


279 Pausanias 10.38.4.

280 Cassius Dio 51.1.3; Pausanias 5.23.3, 7.18.8f. See discussion in Hoepfner 1987.
CHAPTER 5.
Coin production and the Aitolian indemnity.

1. Introduction.
The production of struck metal in the form of coined money is one of the more poorly understood aspects of economic life in antiquity. Considering the sociopolitical implications of coin production and their historical value, this is surprising. A state's decision to strike its own coinage is intimately connected to questions of social and cultural identity as well as governmental practices, and changes in coinage patterns have at times been used to demonstrate an upheaval in government or an alteration within the political system. Thus, while the disappearance of a coinage may not necessarily be a deliberate political act – although in some cases it certainly was – it could clearly be a corollary thereof. A study of Aitolia's Late Hellenistic coinage is therefore of utmost importance for this inquiry. More hands-on implications include the accessibility of resources – in this case, metal – and the measure of governmental control needed to maintain a functional coin production. The value of these categories of information for any historical inquiry is great and mandates a nuanced approach. Nevertheless, it has been superficially but persuasively argued that in antiquity, money was struck solely for military purposes, an idea that despite the lack of solid data, has helped shape modern scholarship on the ancient economy. Thus, coin production has been shifted to the background in the study of economic relationships in antiquity.

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281 The connection between coinage and economy is naturally not a newly identified issue but has been poorly explored: for a surprising lack of consideration, see Finley 1999 and Rostovtzeff 1926. Fortunately, attempts at clarification are becoming increasingly numerous: Kraay 1964; Howgego 1990; Meadows and Shipton 2001.
284 Crawford 1970: 1977: 1985: RRC. Although not entirely, Hopkins (1980) follows Crawford's conclusions Crawford and Hopkins focus on Rome, and neither takes into account the many examples of states striking coins during peace time, Late Hellenistic Aitolia being one obvious example. More recent discussions have fortunately taken a more nuanced approach both to coin production and to the nature of military expenditure in antiquity. For one such a discussion focusing on military expenses from the point of view of public finances, see Migeotte 2000.
Clearly, to equate coin production to military expenditure is too crude an explanation, and the advantages of an inquiry on the production of coinage are too numerous to not be considered in detail. For this specific study, coin production is in fact of paramount importance. If the manufacture of coins necessitates some form of governmental control, a study of Aitolia's Late Hellenistic coinage would inevitably shed light on its federation. Since our sources on the functionality of the *koinon* after 189 BC are exceedingly few, the numismatic data may prove most illuminating. Moreover, it is unclear why Aitolia kept striking coins in the second century BC when it was no longer involved in military conflicts. In addition, a study of Aitolia's coin production may elucidate the complicated circumstances of the Roman indemnity, and most importantly, how it was paid and what consequences it may have had for the production of Aitolian silver coins and as a result, for the regional economy. Finally, the numismatic data may either corroborate or contest the gradual decline identified in settlement patterns and site activity.

To study ancient coin production is to rely on statistics. This poses a fundamental question which in turn has caused a conflict among numismatists: how far can you extrapolate numismatic data against a statistical formula? It is likely that calculated or estimated numbers can never be exactly right, but nevertheless, a statistically ascertainable number can provide a valuable framework for further thought as a means by which to visualize and contextualize beyond the surviving – at times meager – corpus of coins. While certain statistical problems always need to be considered, for example the matter of random sampling and the sample being large enough, I believe that the contextualizing abilities of a generated number by far outweigh the issues posed by said number being “imaginary” or “wrong”. Still, I must stress that none of the calculated

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285 The most vocal opponent of statistical extrapolation of coin volumes is Buttrey 1993: 1994. See also Buttrey and Buttrey 1997. Buttrey strongly argues that if a number is not right, it is wrong, and thus should not be considered. On the other side of the proverbial fence is de Callataÿ 1984: 1995.

numbers presented below are absolute.

2. The coinage of the Aitolian koinon.

Throughout the Hellenistic period, the Aitolian koinon struck a series of coins in gold, silver and bronze on two different weight standards, the Attic and the reduced Aiginetan/Corcyrean. In her magisterial 2007 publication, Tsangari organized the Aitolian material into five series.\(^{287}\)

Corroborated by the composition of coin hoards, these divisions are based on a detailed die-study which enabled Tsangari to identify not only single out larger groups – that is, series – within the corpus, but also smaller subsets – issues – within each series.

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Series 1.</td>
<td>Second half of fourth century BC</td>
<td>Triobols</td>
<td>Tetrobols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Series 2.</td>
<td>323 – 300/290 BC</td>
<td>Triobols</td>
<td>Hemiobols, tetrobols, chalkous</td>
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<tr>
<td>Series 3, i.</td>
<td>300/290 – 220 BC</td>
<td>Hemiobols, tetrobols, chalkous</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Series 3, iii.</td>
<td>239 – 229 BC</td>
<td>Staters, drachms, triobols</td>
<td>Tetradrachms, triobols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Series 4, i.</td>
<td>220 – 205 BC</td>
<td>Staters, drachms</td>
<td>Didrachms, drachms, triobols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Series 4, ii.</td>
<td>220 – 205 BC</td>
<td>Hemiobols, tetrobols, chalkous (reduced)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Series 5.</td>
<td>205 – 150 BC(^{288})</td>
<td>Triobols</td>
<td>Hemiobols</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{287}\) Tsangari 2007.

\(^{288}\) Tsangari's research does indicate the possibility that the koinon continued to strike coins into the 140s BC which considering the fine condition of several late Aitolian issues in the Agrinion 1959 hoard cannot be considered too late a date: in fact, a date in the late 130s or early 120s BC is equally feasible. This is an important contribution to numismatic scholarship as it contests the traditional bracketing of Aitia's coinage into 279 – 168 BC, a bracketing that is solely based on historical events (the Aitolian defeat of the invading
The surviving corpus is not large. Tsangari accounts for 43 gold, 863 silver and 1752 bronze coins which gives us a total number of 2,658 coins for all five series. Of these 2,658 coins, some 800 belong to Tsangari’s Fifth series; 367 silver triobols and 456 bronze hemiobols, which correspond to roughly 30% in total. The Fifth series triobol, struck on the reduced Aiginetan weight standard, weighs roughly 2.5g, and is similar both in weight and iconography to its third century BC. antecedents. On the obverse, a female head faces right, wearing a *kausia*. She is commonly interpreted as Atalanta. Sometimes a discreet moneyer’s mark is placed behind her head. On the reverse, the Kalydonian boar stands or runs toward the right above the exergue, which it sometimes uses as its ground line. The ethnic ΑΙΤΩΛΩΝ is placed horizontally above its back, and we find a spearhead in the exergue. At times, we observe a monogram below the boar’s belly, above the ground line. All triobols of Tsangari’s Fifth series follow this iconographic standard. The bronze hemiobol weighs around 4.6g. On the obverse, Athena faces right, wearing a Corinthian helmet. On the reverse, Herakles stands posed frontally with a club in his outstretched right hand. On his left we read the ethnic ΑΙΤΩΛΩΝ which is placed vertically across the coin.289

3. Minting practices.

It is generally assumed that ancient coinages were minted under a measure of governmental control. In Aitolia’s case, coin production appears to have been a tightly controlled practice. The ethnic ΑΙΤΩΛΩΝ which marks all Aitolian coins tells us that this is the currency of the Aitolian Gauls at Delphi and the Third Macedonian war) and has no foundation in numismatic data. This chronological division was first introduced in 1883 by Gardner and Poole and is still in use today, despite the obvious problems that such a broad chronology presents. The generic bracketing has been repeated multiple times, in particular in publications of excavated coins; Thompson 1939; Seltman 1955; Kravartigiannos 1981: 1982: 1993; Alexopolou 2000: 2004. Voices against the traditional chronology include Scheu 1960; Noe 1962; de Laix 1974; Picard 1981; Scholten 1987; Liampi 1988.

289 These second-century-BC bronze coins form a marked iconographic departure from the well-known Aitolian motif of a jawbone/spearhead on the reverse and a youthful male head on the obverse. For the third-century-BC iconography, see Liampi 1998. Tsangari (2007, 255, n. 432) notes that this iconographic type of Herakles is common on second-century-BC coins of the Oitaiai.
koinon, not that of a specific city within the region. Moreover, the coins bear a control mark which also indicates strict organization, and Tsangari has good reason to believe these to be either the initials of the magistrates in charge of minting, or an allusion to their name. The koinon maintained this practice of utilizing control marks throughout the entire existence of its coinage and there is no deviation from this practice, no matter the size of the issue; both very small and comparatively large issues carry a control mark. Until the end of its production and without exception, Aitolia’s coinage bore both ethnic and control mark. Unlike in Achaia, where the federal coins always bear the legend of their minting city, Aitolian coinage reveals nothing of its place of manufacture. Attempts at locating the federal Aitolian mint have taken place, but so far, without success.

Two closely related minting issues warrant attention. First, we must determine whether the koinon used one mint or several in tandem. Tsangari, for example, speaks of l’atelier in the singular. Second, in order to better understand the koinon’s practices of production, we must assess the breaks in manufacture visible in the die-links. Let us begin with the second problem. Several issues of the Fifth series are closely die-linked and it is clear that they were struck in sequence, interchangeably, and in close temporal and physical proximity. Other issues share no die-links whatsoever; issue 76a, for example, which survives in a comparatively large number of 19 pieces, exists without known or identifiable links. “Breaks” like this, in which an issue is not linked to

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290 In contrast, member cities of the Achaian koinon minted coins of their own accord within the federation, and marked them with their own city legends. There is no reason to doubt that the coin “ID” must also be the place of its manufacture: why would Dyme, for example, strike coins in Megalopolis? 
291 Tsangari 2007, 191. It was formerly believed that these marks represented the league’s strategoi, which is impossible. See Reinach 1911.
292 The excavations at Kalydon launched an investigation in 2003, using ground-penetrating radar with subsequent excavation; Dietz and Moschos 2003; Ljung 2011. No metal kiln has yet been excavated there. For a structure interpreted as the mint of Pella, see Oikonomidou 1993.
293 For example, we observe that obverse die D114 was used for issues 66r, 66s and 66v, but not for issue 66t; 66t is however linked to 66s by D116 and D118; D118 was also used for issue 66u.
another, are not uncommon in the Fifth series material. A logical reason for their existence is the possibility that the issues were struck at different points in time. Against the background of die-links, Aitolia’s coinage in general does not appear to have been struck annually or regularly. Nevertheless, the relatively common occurrence of die-linkage among the Aitolian triobols seems to suggest that certain issues were struck very closely in time, perhaps even on the same day; the use of obverse die D127 for issues 66aa, 66ab, 67b, 67d and 67e indicates that those issues were struck essentially at the same time, especially since several other dies were shared between the issues.

Furthermore, it seems exceedingly likely that these multi-linked issues were struck in the same mint, perhaps even at the same anvil. Buttrey identifies two anvils in the striking of Crepusius’ denarii, and this is a production setting that would make much sense for those tightly linked Aitolian issues. This leads us back to our first concern; the number of Aitolian mints active at any given time, an issue that is intimately tied to the size and volume of Aitolian coin production.

4. Sizes, volumes and weight.

367 Aitolian triobols of Tsangari’s Fifth series survive, preserving 116 different obverse dies. Using Carter’s simplified method, we arrive at an original number of 163.65 dies, which we may round off to 164. Initially, we note that this is not a particularly large number. For one of the best studied

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294 For the first group of issues, we identify one such “break” between each issue. 65a and 65b are not die-linked. 66a shares no dies with 66b, 66b shares none with 66c, 66c shares none with 66d, 66d shares none with 66e.

295 D122 is shared by 66y, 66aa, 66ab; D123 by 66y, 66z, 66ab, 67a, 67c and 67d; D124 by 66z, 66aa, 66ab and 67b. Examples are plentiful and not rarely is a die shared by three or more issues.

296 Buttrey 1976. The Crepusius material is also discussed by Carter 1981.

297 Carter 1983. This method is only one of several proposals for calculating the original number of dies from die link statistics. Extremely useful but likely too complicated for a non-statistician is Esty 1984 which unfortunately requires some initial input data that is impossible to obtain from the coinage in question. Carter’s method is based on computer simulation and takes standard deviation into account, yet it is not flawless as it cannot account for dies that were used extremely few or extremely many times (my italics). Moreover, the method becomes unsound when the ratio of coins/dies goes below three. In this case it is important to note that n > 3d can be used for n = the total number of triobols for the Fifth series and d = the total number of dies for the Fifth series, but this does not apply to all individual issues within the Fifth series;
groups of ancient coins, the denarii of P. Crepusius struck in 82 BC, a total number of 473 or 479 obverse dies have been estimated against an actual number of 373 known obverses for 1075 known coins.\textsuperscript{298} The denarii were all struck in the single year Crepusius was \textit{vir monetalis} and thus, all dies had to be used for that specific volume of coins.\textsuperscript{299} In comparison, Aitolia’s second-century-BC silver coinage survives in comparatively small numbers, and used fewer obverse dies for its entire production than Crepusius did in a single year.

Estimating the size of any coinage in the pre-modern world beyond the initial calculation of obverse dies involves consideration of several problematic parameters. First, we do not know for how long a die lasted, or how equal their distribution was across time and use. Second, it is by no means safe to assume that all dies struck equal numbers of coins.\textsuperscript{300} Data for modern, industrially produced coinages shows great variations in output between dies.\textsuperscript{301} Moreover, it cannot be assumed that all dies were used until they broke, that their failure is numerically predictable, or that the number of dies restricted the quantity of coins that were struck.\textsuperscript{302} Broad generalizations based on known and estimated production volumes are not uncommon but unfortunately, most such generalizations rely on historical rather than numismatic data.\textsuperscript{303} They certainly warrant the criticism they have received. Nevertheless, estimations closer to factual numismatic data do exist, and a 1963 experiment in minting technique has provided useful comparative numbers.\textsuperscript{304}

\begin{itemize}
\item in fact, for issue 66ab, n < 2d, which is of immediate consequence. See criticism in de Callataÿ 1995. For an average estimate, however, it is a reliable as well as user-friendly method.
\item Buttrey’s estimate of 479 probable obverse dies was adjusted by Carter to 473. Buttrey 1976; Carter 1983, 203. See also Table 5 in Carter 1980.
\item RRC 652.
\item See Esty 1986, 187 on the equal-output hypothesis.
\item Data for the US mint in the late 1900s available to Esty and Carter (1991-92) indicated that some dies produced over one million quarters but others fewer than 100,000, indeed a very large difference in output.\textsuperscript{302} Buttrey (1994, 346) is correct in emphasizing that it is the \textit{order} of coins that is fixed, not the number of dies.
\item RRC 694; Hopkins 1980; Mattingly 1977. Crawford, Hopkins and Mattingly primarily make use of historical data from literary sources and project their estimates backward based on military campaigns. In a study of the fourth-century-BC amphictyonic coinage at Delphi, Kinns (1983) uses epigraphic evidence to extrapolate his numbers. Kinns discarded a previous die-study by Raven 1950. In a relatively recent article, Marchetti (1999) disproves Kinns’ chronology and argues that the output cannot be accurately quantified.
\item Thompson 1961.
\end{itemize}
importantly, a significantly large hoard found at Apamea struck from a single pair of dies provides useful corroborative evidence. Against the background of this hoard, Sellwood’s experiment and Thompson’s general observations become quite convincing, as the hoard demonstrates first-hand that the striking of 6,000 coins from a single die actually happened in antiquity. Consequently, I find good reason to follow Sellwood’s and Thompson’s estimates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Kinns</th>
<th>Crawford and Hopkins</th>
<th>Mattingly</th>
<th>Sellwood</th>
<th>Thompson and Apamea hoard</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average output per obverse die</td>
<td>23,333 – 47,250</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aitolian Fifth series triobols, totals</td>
<td>3,826,612 – 7,749,000</td>
<td>4,920,000</td>
<td>2,460,000</td>
<td><strong>1,640,000</strong></td>
<td>984,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aitolian triobol issues 65, 66, 67</td>
<td>3,476,617 – 7,040,250</td>
<td>4,470,000</td>
<td>2,235,000</td>
<td><strong>1,490,000</strong></td>
<td>894,000</td>
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</table>

Even with the largest estimate of coins per die, Aitolia’s coinage was not large. Following Sellwood’s estimate of circa 10,000 coins per obverse dies, we arrive at roughly 1 ½ million coins for Aitolia’s entire second-century-BC silver production, or slightly below 1 million if we use the Apamea hoard as concordance. Inarguably, the coinage was not large enough to warrant two concomitant mints. Yet, 1 million triobols is a difficult quantity to appreciate as it has no correlation in the modern world; moreover, the calculated numbers presented above are not easily situated in a historical inquiry. Instead, Aitolia’s calculated coin production is better illuminated when translated into weight.

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305 de Callataÿ 1995; Sellwood 1963. The latter experiment is problematic in that Sellwood did not keep striking coins until the die broke; instead, he stopped when his obverse die had reached 7,786 coins, yet noted that the die itself was not greatly worn out.

306 All numbers are calculated by multiplying the estimated number of obverse dies (per Carter’s simplified equation 1983) with the estimated average number of coins per die.
For its entire Fifth series, the Aitolian *koinon* made use of less than five metric tons of silver: half of that, if we follow the Apamea hoard evidence precisely. It is not a large weight of metal. In comparison, the silver mines at Cartagena in south-east Spain yielded the equivalent of 25,000 drachmae per day, or some 35 metric tons per year.\textsuperscript{309} Pliny tells us that three other regions in Spain annually produced 20,000 lbs of gold.\textsuperscript{310} The origins of Aitolia's metal are unknown but the federation does appear to have reused old coins and perhaps also metal objects when striking new issues. This notion is in part based on the absence of mines in the region, but also on the rarity of surviving third century BC material as well as a visible tendency in Aitolian hoards toward hoarding very old silver coinages, local and non-local.\textsuperscript{311} Presumably, the old coins were eventually collected and used to strike new coins. Important parallels to this practice exist elsewhere. In Ptolemaic Egypt, for example, foreign coins were collected and used as bullion for the striking of new Ptolemaic coinage.\textsuperscript{312} Another corollary of fresh coins struck from metal not immediately derived from a mine is the Athenian stephanophoric coinage, which was presumably struck from metal collected through Delian commercial activity.\textsuperscript{313} Nevertheless, the coins themselves do not

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
& [Kinns]\textsuperscript{307} & [Crawford and Hopkins] & [Mattingly] & Sellwood & Thompson and Apamea hoard \\
\hline
Aitolian Fifth series triobols, total weight in kilos\textsuperscript{308} & 9,566.53 - 19,372.5 & 12,300 & 6,150 & 4,100 & 2,460 \\
Aitolian triobol issues 65, 66, 67 weight in kilos & 8,691.54 - 17,600.6 & 11,175 & 5,587.5 & 3,725 & 2,235 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\textsuperscript{307} Kinns, Crawford and Hopkins, and Mattingly are solely included for comparison.
\textsuperscript{308} The total weight is calculated on a base average weight of 2.5 grams per triobol, attrition rate not considered.
\textsuperscript{309} Strabo 3.2.10.
\textsuperscript{310} Pliny *NH* 33.21.78.
\textsuperscript{311} Ancient mining left visible traces upon the earth and no such traces have been detected in Aitolia. For the most well-documented mine in Greece, see e.g. Cunningham 1967; Hopper 1953: 1968; Jones 1982; Wilson 2002. For a discussion on the sources of silver in the ancient world, see Panagopoulou 2007.
\textsuperscript{312} P. Cairo Zenon 59022. See discussion in Howgego 1995, 5-21; Mørkholm 1991.
\textsuperscript{313} Bresson 2005.
demonstrate to what extent Aitolia engaged in this practice, but the issue remains important as it is intimately connected to the indemnity payment of 189 BC.

5. The indemnity of 189 BC: monetary aspects.

Polybius tells us that Aitolia was forced to pay 500 Euboic talents on a standard not inferior to the Attic: “ἀργυρίου μὴ χείρονος Ἀττικοῦ παραχρήμα μὲν τάλαντα Εὐβοϊκὰ διακόσια”. If they so pleased, the Aitolians were offered an exchange rate of 1 mina gold to 10 minae silver (“τῶν δέκα μνῶν ἀργυρίου χρυσίου μνᾶν”). 200 talents were to be paid immediately followed by six yearly installments of 50 talents.314 The terms seem somewhat unspecific but it is clear that the Romans are asking for metal of a specific purity and more specifically, of a purity equivalent to the well-known Attic tetradrachm. Moreover, we note that the talent is a weight measure and not a coin type: thus, the Romans ask for a specific weight of metal at a certain level of purity, and not for a number of coins or a sum of money. This must be strongly emphasized as it is commonly but wrongly assumed that the indemnity specifies coins, that is, minted metal of a certain type.315 The demand for a specific weight is corroborated by the terms of the Antiochene treaty, which stipulates that Antiochos III must pay to the Romans 10,000 talents of Attic silver with each talent weighing no less than 80 λίτρα; in fact, Polybius gives the terms as ἀργυρίου Ἀττικοῦ ἄριστου: “best Attic silver”.316 Again, the Romans very specifically ask for a specific weight and purity of silver; not a coin type. In total, Antiochos III was asked to pay 26,200 kilos of silver per year at a

314 Polybius 21.31. Livy simply follows Polybius: 38.11. The monetary aspect of Aitolia’s indemnity has not received much attention; the only one that merits mentioning is Losada 1965. The other conditions, however, as intimately tied to broadly applicable questions of Greek independence and Greco-Roman interactions have been treated in detail; see e.g. Moschovich 1974; Freyburger 1982; Gruen 1982. See also Piganiol 1950; Gruen 1984; Eckstein 1995a.

315 Losada (1965), for example, believes that the indemnity was paid in freshly minted coin.

316 Polybius 21.42ff. For an old but still relevant discussion on the Apamea treaty, see Polaček 1969: 1971. For a view on the social consequences of the peace, see Burstein 1980.
total weight of 312,000 kilos. A decade earlier, Carthage had been asked for a similarly large indemnity; 10,000 Euboian talents.\(^{317}\)

An Attic talent weighs roughly 26 metric kilos and weight-wise, can be divided into 60 Attic minae or 6,000 Attic drachms.\(^{318}\) A Euboic talent, however, is a less straightforward measure. Appian tells us that a Euboic talent is equal to 7,000 Alexandrian drachmae, and since the Ptolemaic (Alexandrian) talent is calculated at a weight of 6/7 of the Attic, we understand that the Euboic and Attic talents weigh roughly the same.\(^{319}\) Thus, The Romans asked the Aitolians for some 13,000 kilos of Attic quality silver. Interestingly, the entire second-century-BC production of Aitolian silver coinage, calculated above at less than 5,000 kilos, was not nearly large enough to meet the Roman demands.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Payment</th>
<th>Greek weight in Euboic talents</th>
<th>Metric weight in kilos</th>
<th>Payment translated into coin volumes (local Aitolian triobols)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immediate payment</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>5,200</td>
<td>2,080,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual payment x 6</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>520,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indemnity total</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>5,200,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The indemnity must have been paid. Polybius and Livy voice no Roman complaints over late Aitolian payments, as they do in the case of Antiochos III.\(^{321}\) Yet, the way or ways in which it was paid is a complicated question without an immediate answer. Based on the “Attic silver” clause it has been argued that the Aitolian and Seleucid indemnities were paid in coined silver; that is, not in

\(^{317}\) Polybius 15.18.7.

\(^{318}\) There is a difference between the commercial weight of a talent and its coin weight, at least in Classical Athens. See Mørkholm 1982.

\(^{319}\) Appian 5.2. See Hussey and Collingwood 1836. This is corroborated by two passages by Polybius and Pliny about Carthage’s 201 BC indemnity which Polybius outlines at 10,000 talents and Pliny at 800,000 [Roman] pounds. Polybius 15.18.7; Pliny NH 33.15.51. Crawford (RRC 590ff) proposes a slightly talent weight of 25.92 kg. The difference is marginal.

\(^{320}\) Attrition rate not accounted for; triobol calculated at an average weight of 2.5g.

\(^{321}\) The last payment should have come in 177/6 BC but the Seleucids made a payment in 174/3 BC and still owed Rome 2,000 talents in 162/1 BC. Livy 42.6.6. See also le Rider 1992; Bresson 2005.
This, however, is an assumption. To test the purity of the metal against the required Attic standard it must have been melted down, and the requested indemnity metal could thus have had any shape or form. Aitolia consequently seems to have had a number of options as long as the existing criteria – weight and purity – were met. First, the *koinon* could have used old coins, both local and non-local; second, it could have struck new coins or obtained new coins struck by another federation or city-state; third, it could simply have amassed quantities of metal objects in bullion form; and fourth, used a combination of the three. Of these options, we have no insight into non-local coins (new and old). Yet, Losada believes that the indemnity was paid in freshly minted Athenian tetradrachms, a theory solely based on the existence of Athenian New Style tetradrachms in the Agrinion hoard.\textsuperscript{323}

Aitolia itself did not strike enough coins over the entire second century BC to pay the indemnity in freshly minted currency. The estimated metal weight of its Late Hellenistic silver coinage is too small, and moreover, the coinage was struck over too large a period of time to meet the Roman time constraints. More importantly, it would have made little sense to strike new coins for the sole purpose of paying a metal weight indemnity. To strike coins is a costly enterprise and since the indemnity asked for weight and purity, it is likely that Aitolia simply paid it in bullion, bullion that may have included both new and old coins, local as well as non-local, but coins that were treated as bullion and not as coins. This bullion may have included Aitolian third-century-BC silver coins. Of particular interest here are the Aitolian tetradrachms on the Attic standard, a standard that was no longer used in Aitolia in 189 BC.\textsuperscript{324} Larsen believes that the 118,000 Attic tetradrachms taken as booty from Aitolia and Kephallonia by Fulvius Nobilior in 187 BC were

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{322} Le Rider 1992, 272.
  \item \textsuperscript{323} Losada’s (1965) reasoning is problematic, especially in terms of chronology. The indemnity was paid in six years (200 + 50 + 50 + 50 + 50 + 50 talents) and thus ought to have been paid off by 180 BC, but the sequence of Athenian tetradrachm in the Agrinion 1959 hoard does not fit that date: Thompson (1968) identifies an unbroken sequence of Athenian issues beginning in 190/89 BC and ending in 169/8 BC. Even if one does not account for the correct lower chronology for the New Style silver, Losada’s chronology still fails. For the lower chronology, see Mattingly 1969. Cf. Lewis 1962.
  \item \textsuperscript{324} For general commentary on these tetradrachms, see Tsangari 2007; Scheu 1960; Gardner 1883: 1877/1878.
\end{itemize}
Aitolian. If that assumption is correct, we understand that the old tetradrachms had already been officially collected prior to Nobilior obtaining them, and to consider them bullion for the purpose of an indemnity payment might not be out of place.

Intense striking occurred in the beginning of the Fifth series. Issues 65, 66 and 67 are massively die-linked and consist of numerous sets. Compared to the rest of the Fifth series, issues 65, 66 and 67 are large: at a calculated obverse die total of 149, they make use of 90% of the Fifth series obverses. Seemingly struck in great haste, these issues have not been specifically identified as relating to the indemnity and I do not believe they were struck in order to pay the actual indemnity for the reasons outlined above. Nevertheless, the heavy die-linkage and speed of production clearly suggests that the issues may have been struck for a specific purpose. They may relate to the aftermath of the Antiochene war or even to the war itself; maybe to pay troops, or to repay wartime loans from other states, or simply for political purposes when international political power had so visibly just been removed from the koinon.

6. Minting trajectory.

The discrepancy in volume and speed between issues 65, 66 and 67 and the remainder of Aitolia’s Fifth series brings valuable attention to the trajectory by which Aitolia’s second-century-BC coinage was struck. The issue of production trajectories is better discussed against the evidence provided by coin hoards but a few points warrant mentioning here. First, the koinon never debased its silver coinage. In the early second century BC, the koinon saw intense minting, probably in connection with the war and related social upheaval in the region. These early Fifth series issues appear both in early and late hoards and thus remain in circulation for some time. But when studied in sequence, not all Fifth series issues are similar in size (Fig. 39). We note issues of similar size at the

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325 Livy 39.5.14-17; Larsen 1968.
326 Tsangari (2007, 141) notes this peculiarity but does not comment upon it further.
beginning and end of the sequence but the issues in between vary in size. When projected linearly, the trend is slightly negative but not much; in fact, the silver production does not truly seem to crash (Fig. 40). Moreover, when isolated to the later Fifth series issues, the linear trend does not decrease at all (Fig. 41). Production, then, did not gradually become smaller until it ceased to exist but rather, came to an abrupt, “clean” end. This observation applies primarily to silver coinage as bronze is more difficult to track. Nevertheless, Aitolia’s bronze coinage does appear to follow the trajectory of silver production and is at least produced roughly at the same time, if not in the same year. We assume that the production of bronze ceased when silver striking stopped, but that is an assumption. Furthermore, if we focus on hoard composition only, bronze disappears before silver: the latest hoard containing Aitolian bronze is Naupaktos 1967 which dates to 175 – 150 BC. Since bronze is rarely hoarded, this is nevertheless difficult to assess.

Struck intermittently at least into the 130s BC, Aitolia’s coinage demonstrates that the koinon must have existed after the Roman “conquest” of Greece, and moreover, that it was relatively active well past the Achaian war. The trajectory of its minting strongly suggests that the koinon remained fully functional for several decades after the indemnity, a suggestion supported by epigraphic evidence. Unlike the epigraphic evidence, which is less full for the second half of the second century BC than for the beginning of the century, Aitolia’s coin production does not seem to shrink when projected over time. This is noteworthy and raises the fundamental question of why it in fact ended.

7. Purpose and end.

Aitolia struck silver and bronze coinage for roughly half a century after the indemnity. Consequently, its coinage cannot simply have been minted for war-related expenses as second-

327 Contra Pausanias 7.16.9, who claims that Rome abolished all Greek federations in 146 BC.
328 See chapter 7.
century-BC Aitolia did not engage in regular – or even irregular – warfare.\textsuperscript{329} Its purposes are however still unclear but must to some extent be connected to its use.\textsuperscript{330} Interestingly, the \textit{koinon} struck roughly the same \textit{number} of coins in the second century BC as it had done in the preceding century (Fig. 42), although it made use of much less metal.\textsuperscript{331} This suggests that coin production was not only economic and fiscal in nature, but also sociopolitical. The continued coin production may have been a matter of prestige, habit or federal identity, something that the federation was used to doing, and thus kept doing. Of some consequence here is the continued minting practice which did not change in shape or form whatsoever for the duration of the coinage’s existence. Until the very end coins are struck on the same legend, with the same iconography, with the same moneyer’s control marks. There are \textit{no} unusual issues. This unbroken habit stands in stark contrast to other groups of evidence. For example, the gradually escalating decline and disruption so visible in settlement and site data are wholly absent in the coin production data. We observe a slight decrease in volumes over time but it is marginal. While not surprising this is still an important observation as it demonstrates that the federation ceased to strike coins \textit{before} the regional economy collapsed. Moreover, it provides a general time frame for when the \textit{koinon} itself ceased to exist.

The indemnity did not immediately eradicate Aitolia’s coinage nor did the Third Macedonian war put an end to this federal coinage, but the reasons for the cessation of coin production are undeniably complex.\textsuperscript{332} Most signs point to a bullion shortage. Normally, coins were

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{329} The last known Aitolian altercation dates to 155 or 150 BC and consists of a military attempt at ceasing Herakleia from the Achaian \textit{koinon} which had annexed the formerly Aitolian city, located well outside Aitolian territory. This military expedition is mentioned only by Pausanias (7.14), who is vague at best.
\item \textsuperscript{330} See chapter 6.
\item \textsuperscript{331} Applying Carter’s simplified method to the surviving material without accounting for statistical deviations within individual issues, we arrive at a total production of 8.09 obverse dies for the tetradrachms, 46.58 dies for the didrachms, 38.316 for the drachms and 66.165 for the triobols. Note that \( n = 2 \) to 3d for the drachms and triobols. For the tetradrachms and the didrachms, \( n > 3d \). The didrachms and tetradrachms struck in the third century BC weigh 10 – 10.5g and c.16.5g on average and are thus significantly heavier than the 2.5g triobol.
\item \textsuperscript{332} Tsangari’s study emphasizes the need to abandon the incorrect chronological bracketing of 278 – 168 BC for Aitolia’s coinage.
\end{itemize}
minted, entered into circulation, and then slowly rotated back into state coffers through taxation, which enabled metal to be recycled for the purpose of minting new coins when needed. This time, however, the metal left the region permanently which hindered the re-absorption of bullion. The loss of bullion had explicit economic consequences but these were not immediately apparent as federal production was neither annual nor regular, nor did the federation presumably utilize reasonably new coins to strike new issues. Over time, however, bullion shortage had visible effects as it eventually became both pointless and impossible for the *koinon* to keep striking new issues; pointless, because it cost too much to produce a very small issue, and impossible, because there was simply not enough bullion available to strike large enough an issue. Eventually, Aitolia’s coinage ceased to exist.

The gradual effects of the indemnity were disastrous but this was unlikely to have been Rome’s objective. If the senate was intent on destabilizing the region to the point of destruction, there were easier and more direct ways of achieving that goal. Moreover, in comparison to Antiochos III’s indemnity, Aitolia’s was extremely small. Rome wanted to get paid and thus did not ask for a fantastical number. Still, the senate was unaware of the federation’s monetary practices and thus, asked for what Aitolia in the long term could not sustain.

The act of producing a state coinage expresses unity of community and thereby infuses the socioeconomic framework with symbolic and ideological advantages which while difficult to assess, were undeniably important. Losing those advantages only served to accelerate Aitolia’s socioeconomic decline. The long-term consequences of the indemnity can only be considered catastrophic. Bullion leaving Aitolia without returning ultimately caused the end of the federal silver coinage. When the coffers were depleted, the federation was unable to strike new coins, and without a silver coinage, Aitolia lost a vital monetary aspect of its economy, a loss from which the

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333 The events in Epiros in 168 BC and at Corinth and Carthage in 146 BC provide ample testament to that effect. See discussion in Gruen 1984.

region never recovered. Interestingly, there are indications that the Aitolians were to some extent aware of this issue and attempted to solve it by equating another currency to their own.\textsuperscript{335}

Yet, the end of Aitolia’s coin production is not solely related to the loss of bullion, but most likely also connected to the sociopolitical framework of the region’s government. One major aspect of the koinon’s policy on coin manufacture was the tight control of its production. The currency was that of the federation of the Aitolians and unlike the practice of the Achaian league, was not affiliated with a specific city. When the federation eventually lost control both of its territory and its public policy, the ability to and interest in producing a federal currency also disappeared. Notably, the last epigraphic reference to a fully functional koinon is roughly contemporary with the last federal silver issues which further attests to the importance of governmental control in Aitolian coin production.\textsuperscript{336} There is no evidence whatsoever that the cities of Aitolia attempted to take over Aitolian coin production once the koinon ceased to exist, presumably because the thought never occurred to them, and because they lacked both infrastructure and resources. Without a fully functional federation, there could be no coinage.

Here a major caveat is necessary. The cessation of Aitolian coin production does not automatically infer that all Aitolians were poor, nor does it automatically exclude the regional economy from possessing a functional monetary component. In fact, coin circulation and coin use in the region suggest the opposite. Other coinages circulated in Aitolia, some in larger numbers than the Aitolian triobol itself.

\textsuperscript{335} See chapter 6.
\textsuperscript{336} The last datable strategia was 129/8 BC; Grainger 2000, 72. See chapter 7.
CHAPTER 6.
Coin circulation and monetary use.

1. Introduction.

Substantial presence of low value coins, argues Howgego, is a reliable indicator of the level of monetization of any economy.\(^\text{337}\) If that holds true, Aitolia’s economy cannot be considered to ever have been fully monetized, despite possessing a valuable monetary component. Its striking was too sporadic and too irregular, and moreover much too small, to satisfy Howgego’s criterion.\(^\text{338}\) Still, the federation did strike coins and its population used money, that much is certain, although the extent to which money penetrated transactions of daily life can never fully be explored due to the lack of evidence.\(^\text{339}\) Yet, the three main characteristics of money – storage of wealth, unit of account, and its ability to facilitate trade – make it a valuable tool in monetary economics as within the parameters of these characteristics, we are able to study its behavior. In the ancient world, money was never a homogeneous entity and local irregularities in use and coin supply were simply structural characteristics of any economy.\(^\text{340}\) These irregularities are sometimes, but not always, situated within historical, pseudo-economic limits – in Aitolia’s case, one such limit is the 189 BC indemnity, another is the synoicism of Nikopolis. Naturally, the indemnity did not cause or mandate a deliberate change in monetary policy but in its wake, the Aitolians experienced an economic decline so dramatic that the population was forced to respond. The ensuing system collapse provides a central question in this chapter: what happens to a money-using economy when money suddenly

\(^{337}\) Howgego 1992.
\(^{338}\) See chapter 5.
\(^{339}\) Andreau (1999) argues that it is impossible to quantify the gauge of monetization in the ancient world but reiterates Howgego’s sentiment. For a few very specific places and time periods in the ancient world, however, we do possess the important “middle step” between the physical coin and the use to which it was put – the most readily available example being the very detailed accounts for the Periklean building programs on the Athenian Akropolis; Dinsmoor 1913 and subsequent publications in the *AJA.*
\(^{340}\) Bresson 2005.
ceases to be available? Were the monetarily engaged Aitolians aware of the decline and if so, how did they attempt to counteract it?

A related question pertains to the circulation of money. Movement of coinage adds a geographic dimension to any coin study and consequently, analysis of the patterns which the coinage follows may provide testimony to trade that cannot otherwise be attested. In fact, in Aitolia’s case, the numismatic data is the sole type of evidence available for an inquiry on trade. With which areas did the Late Hellenistic federation and its population trade after the Romans had removed large tracts of annexed territories and physically altered Aitolian space?

Our source material derives from two categories: excavated coins and hoards, neither of which is unproblematic. From a comparative point of view, hoarding seems to have been a rare occurrence in the third century BC and the few hoards found in Aitolia all date to the very last decades of this century. Tsangari argues that there was no hoarding before this time because the coinage was not struck regularly enough and because Aitolia was hard to invade. The hoards themselves, both those found in Aitolia and elsewhere, often suffer from issues of dating, especially those hoards whose dates rely on Achaian federal triobols, a coin type whose chronology is notoriously contested.

Equally problematic is Aitolia’s excavated record. Excavated coin contexts

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341 Naturally, trade is but one of numerous explanations for the circulation of coinage.
342 These include the Naupaktos c. 1910 hoard (IGCH 196), the Aitolia? 1957 hoard (IGCH 208), the Naupaktos 1955 hoard (IGCH 174) and possibly the Western Greece? 1964 hoard (IGCH 224) which might have been found in Antirrion. Clearly, only the two Naupaktos hoards have a definite Aitolian provenance. The provenance for IGCH 208 is highly contested. A single hoard found in Aitolia has an earlier date. IGCH 72, the Palaionmania Xiromero hoard, was buried c.350-325 BC but contains no Aitolian material. See IGCH and entry in Varoucha-Christodouloupolou 1962.
343 Tsangari 2007.
344 Broadly defined, the “new landscape” in Peloponnesian coinages entails a significant down-dating of Achaia’s Final group of federal coins. Instead of adhering to traditional, historically driven chronological divisions, proponents of the “new landscape” argue that the Final group was struck well into the first century BC. Their discussion is based on the composition of the Poggio Picenze (IGCH 2056) and Caserta hoards (IGCH 2053) in combination with the famous Damon inscription from Olympia (SEG XV, 254). On IGCH 2056: Campanelli 1991. Despite the hesitancy among many – chiefly Greek – numismatics-driven historians and numismatists to accept the new chronology, it is clearly accurate. See Boehringer 1991: 1997: 2008. Warren (1969: 1993b: 1997: 1999a: 1999b: 2007: 2008) has further elaborated and expanded upon Boehringer’s arguments and conducted the necessary research to demonstrate its accuracy. The reviewers of Warren’s large 2007 publication agree; Fischer-Bossert 2008. Much of Warren’s argumentation is based on the Megara
are rarely published and when they are, the coins suffer from a broad dating and a distinct lack of photographs which makes any further analysis impossible. The available data is thus far from straightforward.


The nature of coinage in the pre-modern world, its purpose, uses and users, indeed the reason for its very existence remain central to any treatment of the ancient economy but basic statements vary wildly; therefore, we must initially establish a few working assumptions. In very general terms, we tend to identify two economic “agents” in the ancient world. The first is the government, state or city council which in Aitolia’s case constitutes the koinon’s federal government or more broadly, the federation itself. Responsible for making money, it uses money for military expenditure, public works, public salaries, federal gifts, federal dedications, governmental infrastructure and the manufacture of new coins. It obtains money through taxation, war indemnities and booty, and gifts from other states.\textsuperscript{345} We assume that the state itself has economic and political contacts with other states, although only in rare cases does evidence attest to the existence of official economic policy.\textsuperscript{346} There were no known fiscal institutions within the Aitolian koinon and socioeconomic procedure was likely formulated by the annually elected political magistrates.\textsuperscript{347}

The second agent is the individual person. The individual spends money in the market place on small everyday non-barter transactions, on taxes to its own government, salaries to workers,
debt payments and loans to others. Literary and archaeological sources tell us that this agent could become very wealthy. There is probably a wide discrepancy within this group in terms of what ways and how often it used money and moreover, in the volume of coinage that was available at any given time. It is assumed that these two agents in general – but not always – behave differently. Similarly, bronze and silver coins are generally presumed to fill different needs. While such an assumption in part rests on the size of the coin in question and in part on the relative value of metals, one must not immediately attribute silver exclusively to the first agent and bronze to the second, nor assume a strict agent division within monetary use. It is however quite likely that low-value bronze coins were more often used for small, everyday non-barter transactions, transactions for which most silver coins were impractical due to their higher value. Consequently, bronze coins chiefly circulate locally, a habit not generally applicable to silver.

It should be noted that in some time periods and regions in the ancient world we can identify a third agent; a group of people, a guild or a bank, but none such is attested in Late Hellenistic Aitolia.

This distinction in agency and the discrepancy in how money might be used invite caution when evaluating the numismatic evidence, especially in Aitolia’s case where the distinct lack of literary accounts has deprived us of the visible connection between the surviving coins and the activity or purchased object we think they was used for and thereby of any commentary on relative values. Sums are rare in Aitolia’s sparse epigraphic record and while triobols are mentioned in

348 We are reminded of Alexander the Isian’s private fortune of 200 talents: Polybius 21.26. On the social status of these agents, see Andreau 2002.
349 On bronze as “small change”, see Kraay 1964; Kim 2002. See also Howgego 1990.
350 On the functions of coinage within ancient economies and the micro-economics of monetary use, see von Reden 2002.
351 Kagan (2006) argues that large denominations were functionally limited to high-value transactions.
352 On the size of bronze vs. silver within the [ancient] economy, see Hopkins 2002.
some epigraphic sources, none of these come from Aitolia. Instead, Aitolian transactions use weight measures.\textsuperscript{354}

Our last assumption details that the movement of coinage attests to its acceptance as a unit of account.\textsuperscript{355} As has already been noted, its ability to circulate can provide physical testimony to trade and trade networks that would otherwise be unknown to us. Thus, in places where Aitolian coinage appears in sufficient quantities large enough not to be accidental, we presume it was accepted as legal tender and moreover, that this geographical unit engaged in trade with Aitolians. The important \textit{caveat} is, of course, that the coins themselves cannot verify the ethnicity of the agent: hence, we must consider the quantities and regularity with which coins appear before we can demonstrate meaningful circulation.

3. Regional circulation and coin use: excavated contexts.

Based on the scanty published evidence, local bronze appears to be the most commonly occurring coin type in Aitolia. The most glaring example of Aitolia’s lacking publication record is the sanctuary of Apollo at Thermon where the century-long archaeological investigations have unearthed Aitolian bronze coins representing all five series and thus cover the entire chronological span of Aitolian bronze coin production, but have yet to publish any of these coins.\textsuperscript{356} Considering the wealth of information otherwise available at Thermon in conjunction with the sanctuary’s extreme

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{354} This has already been observed to be the case in the indemnity treaty and is in fact not an exceptional case. Triobols are mentioned in the following Hellenistic inscriptions: \textit{IG} VII 4139 (second century BC, Boiotia); \textit{IG} VII 2420 (late third century BC, Boiotia) and \textit{IG} VII 3073 (second century BC, Boiotia); \textit{SEG} 25:501 (first century BC, Tanagra: this is a list of victors at the Sarapeia games). Triobols also mentioned in three much earlier documents from Delphi: \textit{CID} 2:113 (fourth century BC); \textit{FfD} III 5:85 (fourth century BC); \textit{FfD} III 5:49 (336 BC). Note that all inscriptions derive from Central Greece.


\textsuperscript{356} For a brief introduction to the more recent excavations, see Papapostolou 2009. On the excavations in general: Karytsas 1998.}
importance as the federation's meeting place and chief sanctuary, this is most unfortunate. The only scientifically excavated sites that have published its coins are Chalkis and Kalydon.

During the excavations of the Classical and Hellenistic portion of the city of Chalkis, 94 coins were found; only four of these are silver. Interestingly, many bronze coins are foreign or non-Aitolian. The Peloponnese is represented by coins from Agros, Dyme, Elis, Kleitor, Megalopolis, Sikyon and Corinth and also by four federal Achaian bronzes. Most of the material dates to the third century BC with the inclusion of some Late Classical coins. East and Central Greece is represented by coins from Atrax, Crannon, Lamia, Histiaia, Eretria, Euboian Chalkis and Phokis. Here, too, we deal chiefly with fourth- and third-century-BC material; none dates to the second century BC. A most curious inclusion is a Carthaginian bronze, a coinage almost never found in Greece and certainly not in Aitolia. Similarly odd is a bronze coin from Miletos. In the second century BC, coins appear to have come exclusively from Sikyon apart from Aitolia itself. The Chalkis material contains a lot more foreign bronzes than one would usually expect to find in a comparatively small and supposedly insignificant town and more importantly, these coins have a broad geographic range. Many coins are worn, and the Classical coins appearing in Hellenistic contexts signal prolonged circulation, in some cases well over a century.

Generally, there is very little material at Chalkis that dates to the second century BC which suggests that the city was in decline at this time, and the numismatic record support this thesis. Nevertheless, in addition to the Sikyonian coins which have a firm date in the second century BC,

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357 A few Aitolian triobols have also been found at the sanctuary although bronze seems to be vastly more common. Tsangari 2007, 238.
358 The Chalkis publication is not without fault as its author relies on the very broad and inaccurate traditional chronological bracketing of Aitolia’s coinage; Alexopoulou 2000: 2004. Fortunately, this reliance has been rectified in the author’s treatment of the Kalydonian material; Alexopoulou and Sidiropoulos 2011.
359 Note that all coins were found in trenches with predominantly Hellenistic ceramic material. See trench notebooks from 1999 and 2000 as well as Alexopoulou 2000: 2004.
360 SNG Cop 299.
361 Obv. Head of Tanit, rev. horse standing r. in front of palm-tree; see Plant 1979, no. 1215, 76. For the electrum type of the coin, see no. 879 in Head 1887, no. 879.
some Fifth series bronzes can be identified at Chalkis; Alexopoulou’s 44 is identical to Tsangari’s issue 87, for example.

The material from Kalydon differs from that from Chalkis, chiefly in terms of geographic and temporal distribution. The 162 coins found at Kalydon during the 2002-2005 excavations not only represent polities in Central Greece and the Peloponnese but also Western Greece, Attica, Asia Minor and Rome. Moreover, while in the second century BC, only Sikyon and the Aitolian koinon supplied Chalkis with coins, Kalydon made use of a wider range of coinages. In addition to the Aitolian Fifth series triobol, these include Athens, Elis, Epiros, Leukas and the Achaian league. Furthermore, the numismatic data for Kalydon reveals continued influx and circulation of coinage in the first century BC. Roman republican coins struck by Rome’s moving armies circulate parallel to coins struck by the Achaian mint at Patras in the 30s BC and coins from Lycia. No less than 15% of the coins at Kalydon have a secure date in this century.\footnote{Even some early imperial coins appear at Kalydon, the latest being an issue struck by the colonia in Corinth in 2/1 BC.} Even some early imperial coins appear at Kalydon, the latest being an issue struck by the colonia in Corinth in 2/1 BC.\footnote{363}

4. Regional circulation and coin use: hoards.

Seven Late Hellenistic hoards have been found in Aitolia to today’s date; five silver, one bronze, and one with mixed contents. Never studied collectively, there are visible discrepancies in how they have been dated and consequently detailed analysis of their contents is necessary.

The earliest hoard is Agrinion 1968 [CH I, 76] (Appendix 4.1) which was found in or near Agrinion in 1968. Consisting of some 100+ silver coins, it was dispersed on the market right away and not much is known about it. The majority of the coins consisted of Aitolian triobols from Tsangari’s Fourth and Fifth series but coins from Central Greece and Sikyon were also represented.

\footnote{362 The number may increase with the creation of a tighter chronology for certain coinages, including Ainianes, Elis and Epiros.}
\footnote{363 Kalydon no. 158.}
Most coins were reported to be worn but a specimen of Tsangari’s Fifth series 66t is in comparatively good condition. Notably, this is the latest coin in the hoard.

The Agrinion 1968 hoard has been dated to the first decade of the second century BC. Tsangari places the hoard in the context of the Antiochene war. Since at least the 66t issue coin is so notably fresh, it needs not have been in circulation for very long before being buried and it is not unlikely that this applies to the unknown bulk of Aitolian material in the hoard as well. A tentative burial date in the first two decades of the second century BC would thus seem appropriate, perhaps between 190 and 180 BC.

The Naupaktos 1967 hoard [IGCH 244] (Appendix 4.2) is a bronze hoard now housed in the Numismatic Museum in Athens. Predominantly consisting of local Aitolian bronzes, it also contains seven coins struck by the Oitaians, a local Central Greek tribe. The Aitolian material belongs to Tsangari’s Third, Fourth and Fifth series although some coins are illegible. Many of the issues represented in the hoard have been found in excavated contexts throughout Central Greece. Although the hoard is comparatively large, it has not been extensively studied. Grainger believes that the hoard was deposited by Aitolians who had “deliberately collected local coins”. Little is known of the Oitaian coins which all appear to be of an Aitolian type. The IGCH suggests a burial date of 175 – 150 BC, which Tsangari does not dispute. The worn condition of several coins in the hoard indicates a long period of circulation and despite the fact that many of the coins seemingly were struck in the second half of the third century BC, the date proposed in the IGCH seems sufficient.

366 AD (1968) Chron. 23, 12.
367 These include Thermon (issues 10, 49, 54, 55, 57, 58) Kallion (issues 10, 52, 58), Delphi (issues 10, 12, 49, 53, 55, 57, 58), Lamia (issues 10, 49), Volos (issue 10), Thessaly (issue 58), Thebes (issue 58) and Stratos (issue 52). Corinth (issue10) and Olympia (issues 52, 57) also share Aitiolian issues with this hoard.
368 Grainger 1999.
The Kalydon 1973 hoard [CH IV, 54] (Appendix 4.3) consists of 52 silver drachms and triobols struck by various cities in the Peloponnesse and the Achaian league; none of the Achaian material belongs to the Final group. The hoard contained no Aitolian material and the single non-Peloponnesian coin was struck by Opuntian Lokris. Its find context is unknown and its association with Kalydon unsubstantiated. Papageorgiadou-Bani assigns the hoard a burial date of 165 – 147 BC while the editors of the CH take a conventional historical standpoint and place the hoard in “168/7 BC or later.”

A mixed hoard containing some 30 silver and four bronze coins was found at Vlachomandra in 1886 (Appendix 4.4). It included issues from Elis, Sikyon, Lysimachos and the Roman republic. It is not clear if the all the reported material comes from a single deposit, or from several in the same area. Its whereabouts are unknown and no further information was recorded about its contents. The coins of Lysimachos point to a date around the First Macedonian War, which Papageorgiadou-Bani emphasizes in her short assessment of the hoard. There is however nothing that prevents a date anywhere in the second century BC and since the hoard is inaccessible, no further comment is possible.

Agrinion 1959 [IGCH 271] (Appendix 4.5) is by far the largest hoard found in Aitolia and has also received the most scholarly attention. It contains 1,348 coins from almost every minting state in Central Greece and the Peloponnesse and also two states whose coinages are not ordinarily found in Aitolia: Athens and Rome. Chronologically and geographically, the material can be divided into two main groups; early autonomous material from Central Greece (Chalkis, Lokris, Boiotia) plus a few cities in the Peloponnesse (Sikyon, Argos), and later federal material from Aitolia and the Achaian federation plus Athens and Rome. The early material has a date range from the fourth

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370 Papageorgiadou Bani 1996.
371 AD 1889, E. 103, ill. 5.
373 The original two-part publication: Thompson 1968; Thomsen and Crawford 1968. This publication was immediately reviewed, not without criticism; Mattingly 1969. Even before its publication, the hoard received ample attention: Losada 1965; Hersh 1966.
through the third centuries BC while the later material dates to the second century BC. The hoard’s highly contested burial date hinges on the later material.

The federal Achaian triobol is the most common coin type in the Agrinion hoard, represented by 838 specimens of the Early and Late group; in fact, the hoard contains almost every issue of the Early group and the majority of the Late group but no Final issues. Thus, Warren soundly assumes that the hoard was buried before Achaia began striking its Final issues. In her original assessment of the material, Thompson noted that the Athenian New Style tetradrachms in *IGCH 271* formed an unbroken sequence of issues lasting over twenty years. On the corrected lower chronology for the New Style coinage, this sequence ends in 129/8 BC. Mattingly observes that the Agrinion coins of this Athenian issue were not *f.d.c.*, and consequently had been in circulation for some time before their burial. Several of the Roman coins are in fine condition to *f.d.c.* and their circulation must thus have been brief. The latest denarius in the Agrinion hoard is *Syd. 477*. It belongs to the moneyer Q. Pilipus whose issue Crawford dates to 129/8 BC.

The 97 Aitolian triobols are represented by 37 issues. The vast majority belongs to the Fifth series: only 20 are equally divided between the Third and Fourth series. Not all issues from Tsangari’s Fifth series are present in the Agrinion hoard but those that are, are often represented by more than one coin. The last triobol to be struck by the *koinon*, Tsangari’s 77b, is represented by not fewer than seven coins.

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374 Thus, in *IGCH 271* we find an almost complete record of active Achaian mints. These include Corinth, Sikyon, Patras, Argos, Koronai, Messene, Elis, Antigoneia, Megara, Megalopolis, Sparta, Caphyae, Pheneos, Pellene, Epidaurus, Kleitor, Aegion, Dyme and Aegira. Notably absent are the mints of Pallantion and Tegea, whose issues occur both in the Caserta and Western Greece hoards. See Thompson 1968, 110-115.

375 Warren 1999b.

376 Thompson 1968, 80.


378 Mattingly 1969, 331. Thompson (1968, 80-82) confirms this.


380 Thomsen and Crawford 1968, Pl. LVI, no. 717.

381 *RRC*. 
Due to the chronological discrepancies noticeable in the hoard, the burial date of *IGCH 271* is debated; yet, there is no reason to assume that it has been adulterated.\(^{382}\) Thompson cautiously assigned the hoard a burial date in the middle decades of the second century BC which was subsequently tightened to 145 – 135 BC in the *IGCH*.\(^{383}\) The Roman denarius *Syd. 477*, however, makes any burial date before 129/8 BC impossible, a *terminus post quem* supported by the latest Athenian New Style tetradrachm. Incidentally, a burial date around 129 BC is favored by the two champions of the lower chronology for the coinages of Achaia, Warren and Boehringer.\(^{384}\) Since the hoard contains no examples of the Final group of Achaian coins, it must reasonably have been buried before that group began to circulate, or only shortly thereafter. Since the Agrinion hoard so clearly possesses an almost complete list of Achaian issues, a burial date at a time when the Final group was in production would seem strange.\(^{385}\) Thus, a burial date in the 120s BC is not only reasonable, it is the most accurate estimate we can make based on the numismatic evidence.\(^{386}\)

Its sheer size sets *IGCH 271* apart from all other Aitolian coin hoards. The complete sequence of Athenian tetradrachms, the almost complete sequence of Achaian Early and Late issues, the inclusion of Roman denarii and the addition of very old Central Greek silver, plus the combination of separate coin standards draw attention to the unusualness of *IGCH 271*. We must

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\(^{382}\) Attempts have been made to disassociate the Roman contents of the hoard from the Greek: Most recently, Papageorgiadou-Bani (1996, 218-220) has argued that the Roman coins in no way belong with the rest of the hoard. She assigns the Greek portion of the Agrinion hoard a burial date of 165 – 147 BC and places the Roman portion shortly after 130 BC. Similarly, Touratsoglou and Tsourti (1991) argue that the Agrinion hoard in fact consists of two separate hoards that were collected at an interval of 20 years and then buried together. Yet, Thompson (1968, 2, n. 3) observed that all coins, old and new, were covered with the same kind of green copper encrustation. Moreover, some of the coins were coated with a dark accretion which presumably consisted of sulphuric oxide mixed with limestone. The evidence is uncontestable: all the coins must derive from the same physical context.

\(^{383}\) Thompson 1968, 108.

\(^{384}\) Boehringer 1991, 163, n. 8; Warren 1999, 102-103.

\(^{385}\) Thompson 1968, 86: “Every known issue of what may be called the civic coinage…. is represented.” Had the hoard contained significantly fewer Achaian coins, and had fewer Achaian mints of the Early and Late groups been represented, one might have accepted the suggestion that the Final Group was already in circulation when the hoard was buried, but that is not the case.

\(^{386}\) With regards to the condition of the Aitolian triobols, Tsangari (2007, 231) sees no problem in assigning the hoard a burial date in c. 129 BC. There is no need to follow Mattingly’s (1969, 331-332) parallels between the incursion of a horde of Celts down the Adriatic coast in 119 BC and the interment of the hoard. Cf. Florus iii, 4. 1-3.
ask why 1,348 silver coins were buried in central Aitolia in the last quarter of the second century BC, and what this anomalous collection of coins was at the time of its burial. Thompson suggested that the hoard was a currency deposit; Tsangari simply interprets it as an ensemble of coinages that circulated in the area at that time.\textsuperscript{387} Neither answer is satisfactory. The hoard is so much larger than anything found in Aitolia that we must question its ownership and the manner of its assemblage. Unfortunately we lack any supporting evidence but it seems likely that the only coin-using body that would receive coins on a regular, annual basis is the \textit{koinon}. Annual taxation may account for the nearly complete year-by-year issues represented in the hoard. If so, the Agrinio 1957 hoard may in fact be part of the \textit{koinon}'s coffers and would consequently attest to the existence of a functional federal government in the 120s BC.

\textit{Naupaktos 1967 [IGCH 317]} (Appendix 4.6) is a small silver hoard, supposedly originating from Naupaktos. It contains only four coins and is suspected to originally have been part of a larger hoard.\textsuperscript{388} The Athenian New Style tetradrachm belongs to series ΗΡΑ-ΑΡΙΣΤΟΦ which on the corrected lower chronology for the New Style silver dates to 136/5 BC.\textsuperscript{389} The coin is in good, but not mint, condition.\textsuperscript{390} The three Roman denarii are somewhat later in date than the Athenian tetradrachm. Crawford dates the coin struck by the moneyer Q. MINV to 122 BC, that of C. PLVTI to 121 BC, and that of MN AEMILIO LEP to 114 or 113 BC.\textsuperscript{391} The last denarius consequently forms the \textit{terminus post quem} for the small Naupaktos hoard. It appears to be in very good condition and cannot have been in circulation for long prior to its interment. Thus, Papageorgiadou Bani supports the \textit{IGCH} claim of a burial date at the end of the second century BC and there is no reason to

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{387} Thompson 1962, 321; Thompson 1968, 108; Tsangari 2007, 230. Tsangari suggests that the Roman denarii arrived in the area during the Achaian war, which is a chronological impossibility.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{388} \textit{ADelt} 23 (1968) Chron. 13, Pl. 6, nos. 9 – 12.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{389} Mørkholm 1984; Thompson 1961, 136, Pl. 34, no. 344.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{390} Papageorgiadou-Bani 1996, 215, Pl. 1, no. 1.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{391} \textit{RRC} 296, no. 277 and 297, Pl. 39; 305, no. 291, Pl. 40. Note that the original entry in the \textit{ADelt} assigns the second denarius a date of 137 – 134 BC.}
\end{footnotes}
challenge this.392

The latest hoard found in Aitolia is the Koniska 1962 hoard [IGCH 266] (Appendix 4.7). This small silver hoard was found in the village of Koniska northeast of Thermon in c. 1962.393 Its contents are both geographically and chronologically mixed, suggesting that freshly minted Aitolian coins were no longer available at the time of its burial. This hoard contains the only known coin of the Final Achaian group found in an Aitolian hoard. Originally dated to the mid-second century BC, the Aigion issue marked with the name of Aristodamos (APICTO) points to a date in the first century BC for the hoard.394 This Final federal issue of Aigion with the name Aristodamos in full is present in the Caserta hoard in an astonishing 63 coins, which makes dating the Koniska hoard to the mid-second century difficult since the Caserta hoard was buried in the first century BC. While some coins in the hoard certainly antedate the burial of the hoard by a substantial period of time – the tetradrachms of Ptolemy I, for example – the evidence presented by the Achaian issues indeed points to a date in the early first century BC.395

A few brief conclusions on hoarding are necessary. First, in comparison to the numismatic record of other regions and time periods in classical antiquity, we realize that Aitolia’s seven Late Hellenistic hoards are few. We have already noted that hoarding did not occur in Aitolia until the late third century BC. These seven hoards, then, reflect some change in attitudes, indicative of either internal or external stress. Moreover, we observe that no hoard burial dates correspond to known historical events. Interestingly, hoards are still being buried after that the federation has ceased striking its own coinage. Money, consequently, was still used at a time when the government no longer functioned. Lastly, the hoards unequivocally demonstrate the wide circulation of foreign silver coins in Late Hellenistic Aitolia.

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393 ADelt 19 (1964), 9-10.
394 Papageorgiadou-Bani 1996, 219; Boehringer 1991, 165. The first-century-BC date is strengthened by the use of the lunate sigma; see Warren 1993b, 91.
395 On the circulation of Ptolemaic coins in Central Greece, see Varoucha-Christodouloupolou 1941. On the Ptolemaic “closed” economic system, see de Callataj 1999.
5. The circulation of foreign coins in Aitolia.

Many foreign states are not represented at all in Aitolia’s numismatic record, Macedonia, Akarnania and Illyria being the most noteworthy absentees. The almost complete absence of Akarnanian coins is particularly odd in view of the very long physical border shared by the two federations. Aitolian coins have shown up both in excavated contexts at Stratos and in the Stratos 1967 hoard, but Akarnanian issues occur neither in excavated Aitolian contexts nor hoards. The separation between the coinages of Aitolia and Akarnania becomes plain when one observes the rarity with which the two coinages occur together; only one hoard exists in which coins of both regions are observed.

Still, as demonstrated both by the composition of hoards and excavated contexts, foreign coinages circulated in second-century-BC Aitolia in not insignificant numbers. The geographic representation of coins is comparatively broad. The presence of older foreign coins is a common feature in most Hellenistic hoards, but the regularity of old silver here is noteworthy. Struck by various states in Central Greece, these older silver coins derive both from states that used to be part of the federation and from states that were not. Of varying size and weight, these coins share a common denominator in that they were all circulated for much longer than expected. We do not know at what point during their lifetime these coins entered Aitolia but it seems likely that this...

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396 Coins of Macedonian kings have been observed in Aitolia, but exclusively in Late Classical and Early Hellenistic contexts. These include the Makryneia 1859 hoard [IGCH 92] which contains coins of Philip II, Alexander III, and Philip III, and the Aitolia? 1959 hoard [IGCH 208] which contains bronzes of Philip II, Demetrios Poliorketes, Antigonos Gonatas and Demetrios II. In the second century BC, Macedonian coins do occur in the areas around Aitolia, e.g. the Lokrian Oiantheia 1969 hoard [IGCH238/CH II, 85], which contains coins of Philip II, Alexander III, Kassander, Demetrios III, and Perseus. This hoard comes from a Macedonian shipwreck and is not necessarily indicative of the monetary circulation in the area. The absence of Illyrian coinage is unsurprising, as it tended circulate only locally.

397 A single coin of Argos Amphilochikon, a city technically in Akarnania but autonomous and not striking coins for the league, was found in a third-century-BC context at Chalkis; Alexopoulou 2004, 192 – 193: 199, no. 9. A federal Akarnanian tetrachalkon, dating to the third century BC, has been found at Kalydon; Alexopoulou and Sidiropoulos 2011, no. 33.

398 This hoard, CH II, 74, reportedly comes from Western Greece and may have been found in 1973. It is not clear whether it actually contains Aitolian coins; Tsangari (2007, 231) mentions the possibility thereof, but the contents of the hoard have been seen in trade and the hoard has not been studied. On Akarnanian coinage in general, see Stoyas 2004.
happened when most of Central Greece was under Aitolian control, at some point during the third century BC. Thompson suggests that these older coins were in fact used as currency in Aitolia before the region began to strike its own coinage.\(^{399}\)

But freshly struck foreign coins also circulated in Aitolia. Never common in the Greece, the Roman denarius was particularly rare before the Sullan period and only occurs in four known hoards; Vonitsa 1993, Agrinion 1957, Naupaktos 1967 and Stobi.\(^ {400}\) In addition, single coins have been found at Thermon, Kalydon and the Atalante plot in Naupaktos.\(^ {401}\) To find denarii in two Aitolian hoards is unexpected, especially in view of Aitolia’s comparatively sparse numismatic record and the absence of coinages from states located in greater proximity to the Aitolian heartland (Akarnania, Thessaly). Their presence has given rise to some debate, but Crawford remarks that “it would be extremely rash to argue for meaningful circulation of the denarius in Greece on the basis of these three hoards [Agrinion, Naupaktos and Stobi]”.\(^ {402}\) It is inarguably correct that *meaningful* circulation of the denarius cannot be attested based on these three hoards alone yet the concentration of this unusual foreign coinage to Aitolia alludes to active contacts at a time when the historical record is otherwise silent.\(^ {403}\) Similarly anomalous is the appearance of Athenian New Style tetradrachms which belong to a weight standard that Late Hellenistic Aitolia no

\(^{399}\) Thompson 1939, 118. Since Tsangari has convincingly showed that the Aitolian coinage began in the second half of the fourth century BC, Thompson’s explanation cannot be accepted, but there is no evidence whatsoever that the koinon ever legislated against the circulation of foreign coinages.

\(^{400}\) One could argue that the tetradrachms struck by Sulla in Athens are in fact a Greek coinage and not Roman at all since both denomination and weight standard are Greek. This Stobi hoard was buried in close chronological proximity to the Agrinion 1959 hoard at some point in the 120s BC; Crawford 1973. It must be noted that Roman coins do occur elsewhere in Late Hellenistic Greece, albeit in small quantities and poorly documented contexts. A context at Kalaureia supposedly contained eight Roman coins but the circumstances of its finding are unknown: see Crawford (1974), 57. A single denarius was found at Thebes; Hackens 1969. This specific denarius is of the type Syd. 320 dating to c. 155 – 150 BC.


\(^{402}\) Crawford 1985. The Vonitsa hoard, found in 1993, was of course unknown to Crawford at this time.

\(^{403}\) Cf. the early imperial hoard of Roman bronze coins found at Aitolian Gavalou; Alexopoulou 2001.
longer used. The Agrinion 1957 hoard contains an almost complete annual sequence of Attic silver, but to assign the coinage of Athens a function within the Aitolian economy is foolish.\footnote{Contra Losada 1965.}

The most common foreign silver coinage in Aitolia is undoubtedly that of Achaia. In the second century BC, this federal coinage entered Aitolia in unparalleled quantities; in fact, the Aitolian hoards contain a greater number of Achaian coins than Aitolian. The Achaian coin has the same weight, size and metal quality as its Aitolian counterpart (and thus the same value, we assume) and while it is not the same coinage, it is the same currency. Its appearance in Aitolia is only strange of one accepts Polybius’ assessment of Aitolian-Achaian hostilities wholesale. Clearly, the Aitolian population had no difficulty accepting the Achaian triobol as payment; otherwise, it would not have been hoarded.\footnote{The phenomenon of “bad” money circulating more widely than “good” and “good” money more often being kept and thus hoarded, a notion commonly referred to as Gresham’s law, is discussed in Rolnick and Weber 1986.}

Early and Late issues are represented in almost complete sequences in the Agrinion 1957 hoard but there is a sharp cutoff in the circulation of Achaian triobols between the Late and Final groups. Final group issues only appear at Kalydon and in the Koniska hoard.

Circulation of foreign bronze seems to have changed rather dramatically after 189 BC. While its third century population circulated a wide range of foreign bronze coinages, second-century-BC Chalkis almost exclusively relied on locally produced bronze, a situation echoed in the Naupaktos 1967 hoard (\textit{IGCH} 244). The evidence is unfortunately limited but if generally applicable, this situation would entail a sharp shift in everyday monetary contacts between Aitolians and non-Aitolians, and perhaps also in the presence of foreign individuals in Aitolia. Yet, circulation of foreign coinage depended on successful connectivity, which the Kalydon material clearly attests to. While most of Aitolia had lost that connectivity, some towns apparently maintained it.

How did these foreign coins enter Aitolia? The ways seem as numerous as the coin types themselves. The composition of bronze coins at Chalkis in the third century BC is both diverse and
eclectic enough to suggest the presence of foreigners, perhaps tradesmen moving from port to port.

Third-century-BC Aitolia issued several grants of *isopoliteia* to foreign individuals and there may be some association between those grants and the presence of foreign bronze coins. Before the end of the century, the federation halted this practice and no more grants were issued, and foreign bronze coins became increasingly rare.\(^406\) Another possible explanation is the large-scale migration of Aitolian mercenaries across the Mediterranean in the second half of the third century BC. Some of these mercenaries returned to Aitolia and could have brought foreign coins along; presumably, they were paid in coin.\(^407\) The old Central Greek silver, by contrast, was likely officially collected through taxation at a time when a larger area was under Aitolian control and thereby absorbed into the monetary makeup of the region. Its appearance in second-century-BC hoards is chiefly indicative of the paucity of circulated silver in Aitolia at this time.

The large quantity of Achaian federal triobols may have entered Aitolia through Naupaktos; in fact, Papageorgiadou-Bani believes the city to have been under Achaian control between the Third Macedonian War and the destruction of Corinth, a period of over 20 years.\(^408\) Literary accounts attest to Achaian interests in Aitolia at this time – Pleuron, for example, seems to have been annexed by Achaia in the mid-160s BC only to be released from that yoke through Roman interference – and physical Achaian presence on the Aitolian coast would undoubtedly facilitate the influx of Achaian coinage into the region.\(^409\) Thompson suggests that some of the Achaian silver may have arrived in Aitolia during Achaia’s campaign against Herakleia, and perhaps she is right in that Achaian presence in Aitolia was military in nature.\(^410\) Yet, whatever the manner of its arrival, Achaia’s triobol filled the same function as its Aitolian counterpart. In combination with its sheer volume this indicates that it was deliberately circulated in order to support the economy. Its

\(^{406}\) See discussion in chapters 7 and 8.
\(^{407}\) On Aitolian mercenary service, see chapters 7 and 8. On mercenary service in the third century BC, see chapter 2.
\(^{408}\) Papageorgiadou-Bani 1996, 217.
\(^{409}\) See e.g. Walbank 1957.
\(^{410}\) Thompson 1968, 98.
circulation in Aitolia seems to have begun in the 180s BC and IGCH 271 illustrates that it remained regular until the very end of the Late group, that is, through the 130s BC and most likely into the 120s BC. Finds at Kalydon demonstrate continued circulation of the Final group until its very end, but in significantly smaller, solely locally occurring quantities.

Athenian tetradrachms, on the other hand, are a less straightforward case. Thompson attributes their presence in the Agrinion 1957 hoard to cordial relations between Athens and Aitolia.\footnote{Thompson 1962.} Losada argues that Aitolia directly imported Attic tetradrachms for the purpose of paying the Roman indemnity.\footnote{Losada 1965.} But the numismatic evidence does not readily support either theory, nor do we possess any literary accounts to that effect, and the fact that only two hoards contain tetradrachms – and of those, one only contains a single coin – suggests that the presence of Athens’ coinage in Aitolia is best viewed in terms of individual contacts, and not on a state-wide level.\footnote{For the ten Aitolians buried at Athens, see Osborne and Byrne 1996.}

The Athenian coins at Kalydon attest to the city’s sustained connectivity through the Late Hellenistic period.

Least straightforward of all foreign coinages, the presence of the Roman denarius in Aitolia in the second century BC cannot easily be explained in social, political or even economic terms. The concentration of Roman first-century-BC coins to Kalydon, however, are reasonably connected to the movement of Roman armies through the area; unsurprisingly, some of these denarii were struck by the mint moving with the army.\footnote{Examples include Kalydon coin 110 = \textit{RRC} 513, 497/3 Pl. 60 (Octavian, 42 BC); Kalydon coin 112 = \textit{RRC} 541, 544.25 (M. Antonius, 32/31 BC).}

6. Money supply and coin use.

The image of coin use and circulation in Late Hellenistic Aitolia is a conflicting one. On the one hand, coin production was a tightly controlled practice until the very end, but the coin data presented
above illustrates that a very wide range of silver coinages and coin types were accepted. The willingness with which foreign silver coinage was incorporated suggests that Aitolia’s own silver coinage was not available in sufficient quantities to meet the demands of the local economy. The reintroduction of very old Central Greek coins also points in this direction.

At first glance the numismatic evidence hints to the existence of a double currency system. Such a system, however, necessitates governmental intervention for which we have no evidence.\footnote{For an insightful discussion of the situation in Thessaly, see Kremydi-Sicilianou (2004) who makes a sharp distinction between a governmentally controlled inclusion of a second coin type, and when foreign coins are incorporated into the economic makeup of a state without official authorization. Clearly, our Aitolian case belongs to the second category. A related discussion touches upon communities within communities, using different coinages as their primary means of exchange. No such evidence exists for Aitolia but for comparative data from Macedonia, see Edson 1975.}

Moreover, many Hellenistic states chose a mixed system where both local and regional currencies were admitted in circulation; in fact, when closely studying hoard composition and reports for Hellenistic contexts in mainland Greece, a mixed system seems to be the norm.\footnote{Marcellesi 2000.} Aitolia’s system was clearly both open and mixed. Flexibility in the mode of exchange was instrumental in facilitating commerce. Yet, fact remains that foreign silver is more common in Aitolian hoards than Aitolia’s own coinage, a rather unusual phenomenon which illustrates the economic and fiscal issues caused by insufficient coin production. Contrary to what has commonly been argued, Bresson argues that people in antiquity were not unaware of the significance of money supply, and data for Aitolia mirrors Bresson’s argument.\footnote{Bresson 2005. Contra Finley 1999.}

What we observe is a population attempting to maintain its everyday monetary practices and failing to do so with the inadequate coin supply produced by its own government. Thus, the population was forced to accept a variety of foreign coins struck on a variety of weight standards, coins both old and new, and a mixed system emerged. Nevertheless, the insufficient supply may not have been a situation exclusive to the second century BC. Tsangari argued that there was no hoarding in the third century BC because Aitolia did not strike enough coins, and Thompson suggested that Aitolia used foreign coins before it began
striking its own. The shortage of coin supply was chronic to the ancient world, argues Finley, and not only restricted to certain regions.\(^{418}\) It does seem likely Aitolia’s own silver supply was never large enough to meet the demands of its population. If so, the main difference between how the Aitolians used money in the third and second centuries BC is a simply conceptual one based on the activity of hoarding.

The supply of bronze must have been similarly small. Here, however, we note the distinct difference between the century prior to the indemnity and the decades following it. Foreign bronze, so common at Chalkis in the third century BC, appears to essentially have stopped circulating in most Aitolian towns; again, Kalydon is an exception. Bronze, I have argued, was chiefly by individuals for local transactions. Something changed in the supply of foreign bronze coins post-indemnity; the international dynamic is lost.

The evidence is inconclusive regarding the frequency with which the Aitolians used coined money. Hoards are not common and excavated contexts rarely published, leaving our data uncomfortably uneven. The extent to which the local market was infused with coined money cannot be ascertained. The production of Aitolian coinage and the physical appearance of coined money throughout Aitolia naturally emphasizes that coins circulated and thus were used. Yet, based on the present evidence, we cannot say that coinage played a *significant* role as a means of *everyday* exchange. Moreover, the population was financially and economically heterogeneous and while literary and archaeological sources make it clear that certain groups were comparatively wealthy and participated monetarily in economic activities on a regular basis, the numismatic evidence for widespread, everyday coin use simply does not exist.\(^{419}\) With a small available money supply, sporadic striking and irregular coin use on behalf of its population, Aitolia’s economy cannot

\(^{418}\) Finley 1999.

\(^{419}\) Better attention to the publication of already excavated coins may serve to elucidate this problem.
reasonably be considered fully monetized.\footnote{Howgego 1992.}

7. Legal tender and the triobol as the official unit of account.

In the second century BC, the koinon’s silver production was restricted to triobols alone. Despite the lack of written records we can conclude that this was Aitolia’s official unit of account. This coinage was struck on the reduced Aiginetan or Corcyrean weight standard, the same standard as Achaia’s mass-produced federal triobol. The fact that the coinages were essentially identical enabled the Achaian triobol to circulate parallel to Aitolia’s own and to be accepted on similar terms. Yet, regardless of the triobol’s official status as the region’s unit of account, it is clear that the federation could not and did not control the circulation of foreign silver within its own borders.\footnote{For a state that successfully controlled all aspects of its own monetary policy, see Figueira 1998.} Aitolia’s triobol, moreover, was part of an economic system that circulated too little silver to meet its own needs and thus, the agents within that system could not rely on a single unit of account. Consequently, foreign silver coinages struck on a different weight standard and of different types had to be accepted as legal tender; if not at face value, most likely by weight – silver, after all, is silver regardless of form.\footnote{Finley (1999) argues that coins were almost always weighed.}


External circulation of a coinage suggests that the coinage was accepted as legal tender in a region other than its own, but also sheds light on trade networks, an important aspect of ancient economies about which we are often poorly informed. In this section, our data almost exclusively
derives from hoards. Aitolia’s triobol continued to circulate outside its borders well into the first century BC, long after the koinon had ceased striking. It occurs in Late Hellenistic hoards in Achaia, Central Greece, the Peloponnese, Western Greece and Italy (Fig. 43). No Aitolian coins have been identified in hoards in Epiros, Macedonia, Thessaly, Northern Greece, Attika, Crete or Asia Minor, nor does it occur in Carthage or Spain.

8.1. Central Greece.

In Central Greece, Aitolian coins appear in three Late Hellenistic hoards. The Makrakomi 1932 hoard [IGCH 214] (Appendix 4.8), found in the modern province of Phthiotis, was first reported in 1933 and has received little attention since then. Its mixed bronze contents represent various states in Central Greece and the Peloponnese as well as Macedon and Rome. Its chronology, too, is mixed. The four Aitolian bronze coins belong to Tsangari’s Fifth series, the latest included being issue 85f. Other coins date to the third or the second century BC while the Roman bronze coin was randomly assigned a date in the first century BC in the original report. The IGCH dates the hoard to the end of the third or the beginning of the second century BC, with which Tsangari agrees. Considering the significant wear, a date well after the first quarter of the second century BC is more reasonable.

The Oreus 1902 hoard [IGCH 232] (Appendix 4.9) is enigmatic. In 1902, a pot hoard containing some 1300 silver coins was reported to have been found at Oreus on Euboia but unfortunately, only 646 coins reached the Numismatic Museum in Athens. Any evaluation of the

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423 The issue of hoard dates cannot be overemphasized. Many of the hoards in which Aitolian coins occur have been dated based on historical events and not necessarily on the numismatic data itself. The contested dating of Achaia’s federal triobol and that of other autonomous Peloponnesian coinages – the “new landscape” discussed above – have also contributed to the issue and caution is thus warranted when assessing external circulation of the Aitolian triobol.

424 The Larissa hoard (CH VIII, 517) is a modern collection and not a hoard; Tsangari 2007, 242.

425 See the short notice in Béquignon 1933.


427 Svoronos 1902.
composition of the hoard will thus be tentative at best. It has however been noted that the known portion of the hoard shows a curious absence of local coinages.\textsuperscript{428}

The hoard contents are mixed, both chronologically and geographically – the coins of Chalkis, for example, date to the fourth century BC.\textsuperscript{429} The Oreus 1902 hoard is the only Central Greek hoard containing Aitolian silver coins, and Aitolia is only represented by two triobols which interestingly are rather old; they belong to Tsangari’s Fourth series, issue 34d. Tsangari notes that these triobols are exceedingly worn, as are other coins in the hoard. Conversely, the federal Achaian triobols are in very good condition, an interesting contrast since these coins belong to the Early Group.\textsuperscript{430} The coins of Perseus are in excellent condition and are reported to be the latest in the hoard.\textsuperscript{431} Since they are not on a reduced weight standard, Mamroth places the coins in the early days of Perseus’ reign and assigns the hoard a burial date of 173 BC.\textsuperscript{432} Tsangari emphasizes the danger in assuming that the hoard as originally buried did not contain any late issues of Perseus but there is nothing in the hoard as preserved that points to a date later than the Third Macedonian War.\textsuperscript{433} To assign the hoard a burial date around 171 – 169 BC does consequently not seem out of place. It is clear that the Aitolian coins have been in circulation for an extended period of time prior to their burial. The coins of Larissa and Chalkis, the latter with a date in the fourth century BC, show synonymous wear and add emphasis to the chronological mixture of the hoard.

\textsuperscript{428} Moreover, the hoard contains an unusually large portion of Rhodian coins which normally do not occur on mainland Greece in large quantities. See Tsangari 2007, 200.
\textsuperscript{429} Tsangari 2007, 221.
\textsuperscript{430} The federal Achaian coins were struck by Patras, Antigoneia and Megalopolis. Thompson assigns the coins a date between 175 – 168 BC, noting that at least the Megalopolitan piece was in a very good state of preservation Thompson 1968, 91 – 92. The Megalopolitan coin belongs to the very first issue of Dengate’s Group I. See Dengate 1967, 61: 106.
\textsuperscript{431} Thompson 1968, 92.
\textsuperscript{432} Mamroth 1928, 6. n. 2.
The Delphi 1907 hoard [IGCH 303] (Appendix 4.10) may in fact simply constitute a collection of bronze coins found during the excavations rather than a legitimate hoard. The coins are chiefly regional and only three were struck outside Central Greece. Several of the coins were in very poor condition when found and 14 of the 34 Aitolian hemiobols are in fact illegible. The Aitolian material represents Tsangari’s Third and Fourth series. Several of the other coins are similarly worn and thus difficult to examine. The editors of the IGCH date the hoard to the second century BC, a broad range that Tsangari readily accepts. Based on the poor condition of the hoard, any effort to tighten its chronology is futile. The worn nature of several Aitolian coins, however, point to an extended period of circulation and a date somewhere in the second century BC does not seem out of place.

These three hoards are the only Central Greek hoards that contain Aitolian coins and have a Late Hellenistic date, and we note that only one of them contains Aitolian silver; Aitolian silver struck in the third, not the second century BC. The bronze coins, on the other hand, are comparatively freshly minted. Furthermore, late Aitolian bronze coins are not uncommon in excavated contexts. We find Aitolian Fifth series hemiobols at various places in Thessaly including Larissa and Medeon, in Volos, Kallion, Amphissa and of course at Delphi. But the circulation of Aitolian bronze into this part of the Greek mainland did not start with Tsangari’s Fifth series issues; on the contrary, it follows a longstanding tradition of regional monetary exchange. In Thessaly, for example, we find material from all five Aitolian series. Over 300 Aitolian bronze coins have

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434 Svoronos 1908. The editors of the IGCH note the lack of proof for the hoard’s genuineness but still choose to include the group in their publication, thereby legitimizing it. Since no contrary evidence exists – except, of course, the lack of a known archaeological context or proper study at the time of its acquisition by the Numismatic Museum – and no other scholar has even questioned its authenticity as a hoard, I have chosen to interpret it as such. The composition of the hoard, chronological and geographical, suggests that the coins were found together.


437 Note e.g. the Kallion 1978? hoard. See Tsangari 2007. For excavated coins at Kallion in general, see Kravartogios 1981: 1982.

been found in the area around Amphissa and Delphi, and they also appear in excavated contexts in
Phokis, Lokris, Boiotia and on Euboia.\textsuperscript{439} The Late Hellenistic tombs at Livanates in Lokris, for
example, contain Aitolian bronzes of Tsangari’s Third and Fourth series.\textsuperscript{440}

Considering the steady presence of Central Greek silver in Aitolian Late Hellenistic hoards,
the absence of Aitolia’s triobol in Central Greece might be considered surprising. Yet, it is important
to recall that a large portion of the Central Greek silver coinages found in Aitolia has a fourth- or
third-century-BC date and is not contemporaneous with the burial of the hoards in which they
occur. Nevertheless, it is clear that Aitolia’s silver normally did not circulate into Central Greece, but
its bronze coins did, with a regularity that is noteworthy.

The economic ties between Central Greece and Aitolia do not appear to change with the
indemnity. Everyday transactions and minor trade was conducted as usual, and Aitolians relied on
the small individual networks that were already in place. The loss of Delphi in this case seems to
have mattered very little.\textsuperscript{441} There is no measurable change in how Aitolian bronze coinage
circulated into the neighbor states to the east and northeast. We may thus conclude with some
certainty that the removal of these regions from Aitolian federal authority did not have an
immediate impact on the manner in which individuals traded their goods and services. In the
second century BC, business was conducted as usual, at least for the duration of Aitolia’s coinage.\textsuperscript{442}

\textbf{8.2. Western Greece.}

\textit{The Vonitsa 1993 hoard [CH VIII, 431]} (Appendix 4.11) consists of an assortment of third- and
second-century-BC silver coins in various states of preservation.\textsuperscript{443} The contents are somewhat
geographically mixed and include foreign coins that are otherwise rare in this part of Greece; the

\textsuperscript{439} Tsangari 2007, 243. To this we can add the late third-century-BC Amphissa hoard \textit{(CH VIII, 351)} and the
Abae hoard \textit{\textit{(IGCH 195)}} which dates to 225-220 BC. Tsangari 2007, 232.
\textsuperscript{440} Onasaglou 1994.
\textsuperscript{441} For Aitolians as residents of Delphi, see e.g. Roussel 1932; Daux 1936. The most relevant treatment of
Aitolia’s involvement at Delphi is still Flacelière 1937. See also relevant parts in Scholten 2000.
\textsuperscript{442} Even the latest bronze issues from the Fifth series are represented in Central Greece.
\textsuperscript{443} Warren 1993a.
tetradrachms from Side, for example. The freshest coin, a tetradrachm of Perseus, is practically f.d.c. This Macedonian coin is on a reduced weight standard, placing it after 172 BC. The single Roman denarius is possibly the earliest known denarius in a Greek hoard. The Corinthian drachms date to the later third century, before the first issues of the federal coinage of the Achaian league. The Athenian tetradrachm is of a type that immediately precedes the New Style coinage, placing it before the 160s BC. Based on the tetradrachm of Perseus, Tsangari places the hoard in the historical context of the Third Macedonian War, associating its burial with Roman legates traveling through Greece in the late 170s BC. Both the date and its attributed historical context are generally accepted.

*The Stratos 1965 hoard [IGCH 251] (Appendix 4.12)* is a small group of silver coins from Aitolia, Achaia and Arcadia. The latest coins in the hoard are those of the Arcadian league struck by Megalopolis which belong to Dengate’s group I, period III. The Achaian triobols are all early issues and struck at the mints of Elis and Antigoneia. The Aitolian issues have parallels in other hoards. Tsangari, having studied the material in some detail, notes that the Aitolian coins in this hoard are in better condition than those of the same issue in the Agrinion 1959 hoard. Thus, *IGCH* 251 is reasonably earlier than *IGCH* 271. Touratsoglou and Tsourti reject the burial date suggested in the *IGCH* and choose to associate the hoard with the Third Macedonian War, thus placing its burial around 169 BC. Indeed, a date in the 160s BC seems to agree with the Arcadian material as well as the Achaian, and there is nothing in the Aitolian material to contradict this.

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444 Tsangari 2007, 216; CH VIII, 83; Mamroth 1928.  
445 *RRC* 207, no. 126.  
446 Tsangari 2007, 216.  
448 Dengate’s (1967, 110) traditional dating for group I, period II is c. 182 – 168 BC. This arrangement relies on the traditional view that the Final Group of the Achaian league was struck between 151 – 146 BC. Note that these three triobols vary less than 0.03g in weight.  
449 Thompson 1968, no. 395.  
450 Tsangari 2007, 220.  
452 The early federal issues of the Achaian league seem to begin in the 180s BC, not the late third century BC as previously believed. Boehringer 2008, 85.
No Western Greek hoard dating to the second half of the second century BC contains Aitolian coins. *The Kephallonia 1934 hoard [IGCH 257]* (Appendix 4.13), most likely dating to the early 90s BC, however, contains a single, very worn Fifth series Aitolian triobol. Dominated by Achaian federal triobols and autonomous issues from Argos, *IGCH 257* is composed of Peloponnesian and Central Greek coinages that commonly circulate together. Several Achaian issues belong to the Final group and thus form the end date of the hoard, suggesting a lower date than the original suggestion of 175 – 145 BC. The Messenian triobol belongs to Grandjean’s large series X, which was struck in the second half of the second century BC through the second third of the first century BC. In light of the presence of Final Achaian issues, especially those of Elis, we must consider a burial date in the first century BC, perhaps in the first decade of the century.

The latest Western Greek hoard in which Aitolian coins occur is *Western Greece 1936 [IGCH 260]* (Appendix 4.14). While very large – the *IGCH* counts some 677 coins – its composition is similar to others; a mixture of Central Greek and Peloponnesian coinages, with Achaia’s federal triobol being the absolutely largest inclusion. The 21 Aitolian triobols chiefly belong to

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453 Lemerle 1935.
454 The Achaian triobols are struck at the mints of Sikyon, Patras, Messene, Elis, Antigoneia, Megara, Epidauro, Megalopolis, Sparta, Aigeira, Pallantion, Tegea and Dyme with the mint at Elis being represented by the greatest number of coins (16).
455 Touratsogolou and Tsourti (1991, 175) place the hoard right before the sack of Corinth around 150 BC – this despite the fact that federal Achaian coins struck at Corinth are missing from the hoard. Tsangari (2007, 222) does not attempt to date the hoard more closely though arranges it chronologically among hoards she has assigned to the first half of the second century BC.
456 Grandjean 2003, 112.
457 The hoard’s origins are as troublesome as its present whereabouts. It first attracted attention in the spring of 1937 at the hands of a dealer in Athens who declared its origin to be an island off the coast of Preveza. Other rumors about its origin had circulated at the time, placing the hoard on the island of Kephallonia and the city of Patras respectively. No other information has been recorded with regards to its find spot and its origins will thus remain unknown. It is however noteworthy that the three different suggestions for the hoard’s origins all point to western Greece and the area connected by the waterways of the Ambrakian gulf, the Ionian Sea and the Corinthian gulf. The hoard was first published by Thompson in 1939 and remained part of the J. P. Shear collection until it was stolen in December 1968. It appears that the hoard was not acquired by the J. P. Shear collection in its entirety since individual coins deriving from the hoard circulated freely on the market as late as 1972. Its whereabouts are currently unknown. See Thompson 1939, 116; *IGCH*, 41. Tsangari (2007, 101) mentions that that a coin from this hoard showed up on a list of New York-based R. J. Myers in September 1972.
458 There is some confusion to the composition of the hoard and the number of coins therein. Dengate (1967, 105) identifies 98 coins of Megalopolis in the hoard, 28 of which were struck for the Achaian league.
Tsangari’s Fifth series with only seven coins being significantly earlier.\textsuperscript{459} The hoard’s burial date is disputed and any suggestion must be carefully weighed against the chronologically very mixed nature of the hoard.\textsuperscript{460} The oldest coin in the hoard and consequently its \textit{terminus post quem} is a Boiotian piece dated 426 – 395 BC.\textsuperscript{461} The discrepancy in age between this group of coins and the other contents of the hoard is surprising but not unusual; we recall the very old Central Greek silver coins appearing in second-century-BC hoards in Aitolia.

To date \textit{IGCH} 260 is to accept or reject the ‘new landscape” in Peloponnesian coinages. Followers of the traditional chronology tend to place the Western Greece 1936 hoard in the years around the destruction of Corinth.\textsuperscript{462} Believers in the lower chronology, however, will point out that Achaia is represented by a number of coins of the Final group, both federal and civic issues which makes such an early date impossible.\textsuperscript{463} Moreover, the hoard contains a triobol of Messene which belongs to Grandjean’s series X.\textsuperscript{464} The Arcadian issues are also important for the burial date of the hoard, as it contains 17 coins of Dengate’s group III which Boehringer conclusively demonstrates were struck in the late second and early first century BC.\textsuperscript{465} Boehringer consequently assigns the hoard a burial date around 50 BC.\textsuperscript{466} Warren chooses to lower the burial date even more and places it at the time of Actium.\textsuperscript{467} While the good condition of the majority of the coins is problematic for accepting such a low chronology, the hoard must have been buried at a time when the striking of

\textsuperscript{459} Tsangari 2007, 227.
\textsuperscript{460} The coins from Central Greece, for example, were immediately singled out by Thompson (1939, 130ff) as belonging to an entirely separate chronological group. She dates the Sikyonian, Phokian and Lokrian coins to the fourth century BC as well as those of Chalkis; even older are the coins of Boiotia, which Thompson date to the fifth century BC.
\textsuperscript{461} Thompson 1939, 117, Pl. I, no. 1.
\textsuperscript{462} So Thompson 1939; Tourasoglou and Tsourti 1991; and the \textit{IGCH}.
\textsuperscript{463} Warren 1999a, 109.
\textsuperscript{465} Dengate 1967, 105. Of these 16 are struck without control marks and only one with the control ΜΕΓ. Boehringer 1991, 166.
\textsuperscript{466} Boehringer 1991, 164.
\textsuperscript{467} Warren 1999a, 109. Warren’s point of departure is the group of Achaian triobols struck by the mint at Elis. She argues that these federal triobols were struck from the time of Sulla into the 30s BC. Cf. Warren 1997.
Peloponnesian silver was drawing to an end. The practice of an older, previously discarded coin type being buried alongside freshly struck new coinage was thus not exclusive to Aitolia.

Aitolian coins do not commonly occur in excavated contexts in Western Greece. A few bronze coins have been found at Stratos, but nowhere else in Akarnania. Based on the very long border between the two regions one would have expected some monetary cross-contamination to occur, but not so. The appearance of Aitolian coins at Stratos and only at Stratos must be viewed in light of the city’s close ties to the Aitolian league. It continued to furnish league officials in the second century BC despite the re-attachment of its chorai to the Akarnanian league. Some Aitolian strays have been found at Kassope, Dodona and in Ambrakia but no meaningful circulation can be detected of Aitolian coinage in Epiros. Aitolia’s coinage is similarly rare on the Ionian islands but Fifth series bronzes have been found on Korfu. Interestingly, the city of Kranion on Kephallonia used Aitolian coins for the production of its own coinage; here, overstruck Aitolian coins are quite common. In general, circulation of Aitolian coinage in Western Greece is small: in hoards, only 28 coins are accounted for.

8.3. Achaia.

The Lechena 1979 hoard [CH VIII, 417] (Appendix 4.15) and the Lechena (?) 1986 hoard [CH VIII, 358] (Appendix 4.16) may in fact form a single unit. Both hoards were immediately dispersed on the market and no information has been recorded of their contents. The two groups have been connected on supposition alone. Indeed, there is no evidence that the two were even found at Lechena. The bronze contents are mixed and represent a wide range of origins; states in Central

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468 In her original assessment of the hoard, Thompson (1939, 116) emphasized their good state of preservation. See Warren 1997, 111, n. 16.
469 Both issue 80 and issues from earlier series have been identified at Stratos: Tsangari 2007.
470 Six strategoi and four hieromnemones in the period 200 – 141 BC. See Grainger 2000, 49ff. See also chapters 4 and 7.
472 E.g. issue 87a: Tsangari 2007, 181.
473 Tsangari 2007, 244-445; Polybius 4.6.2; BMC Peloponnese 82, 62.
Greece including Aitolia, the Peloponnese, Carthage, Asia Minor, Ptolemaic Egypt, Northwestern Greece, the Cyclades and possibly also Rome. The burial date of 175 – 150 BC as assigned in the CH is accepted by Tsangari.474

The Patras 1973 hoard [CH VIII, 454] (Appendix 4.17) contains some 117 Classical and Hellenistic silver coins which were found in a terracotta vase in the center of Patras.475 While chronologically heterogeneous, the contents almost exclusively derive from the Peloponnese and most commonly from Achaia's federal mints.476 Only a handful of triobols represent mints in central Greece which includes two Aitolian issues.477 The Achaian issues, by far the most numerous, were struck at a number of Peloponnesian mints but not at Corinth. The Achaian league is represented by both Early and Late issues but no Final: in this aspect, the hoard is compositionally similar to IGCH 271. Interestingly, the mint at Megalopolis is represented both by its fifteen autonomous triobols and several federal coins struck for the Achaian league. Tsangari believes the hoard to have been buried around 150 BC.478 Yet, the federal Achaian material does not necessarily support that date. A date post the destruction of Corinth is by no means impossible and any date prior to that of the Agrinion 1959 hoard, perhaps in the 140s BC or even 130s BC, is absolutely acceptable.

Reportedly found in a bronze vase in a village in ancient Pellene, Achaia, the Zougra 1859 hoard [IGCH 261] (Appendix 4.18) was first said to contain some 9,000 pieces but only 771 are known today.479 The silver coins were struck by various states in Central Greece and the Peloponnese and span several centuries in date. No attempts have been made to study the hoard

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474 Tsangari 2007, 234.
475 Agallopoulou-Kalliontzi (1981) reports that the vase, a trefoil olpe with a tall vertical handle, was in good condition with no pieces missing and there is thus no need to suspect that portions of the hoard had escaped the vase.
476 The oldest coin in the hoard is a triobol from Hermione which dates to the second quarter of the fourth century BC; Grandjean 1990, group II, issue 4.
477 The latest Aitolian issue is 73b.
478 Tsangari 2007, 223. Agallopoulou-Kalliontzi (1981, 199), too, believes that the hoard was buried around 150 BC and arrives at this date in part because of the absence of Final Group Achaian issues. This conclusion is however problematic as it relies on Thompson's outdated view that the Final Group was struck between 151 and 146 BC.
479 See e.g. entry in Noe 1937.
beyond superficial observation. The 14 known Aitolian coins belong to Tsangari’s Second, Fourth and Fifth series with issue 76c being the latest in the hoard. Based on the traditional view of Peloponnesian coinages, the hoard has been assigned a burial date in or around 146 BC.\(^{480}\) In support of his lower chronology proposed for the coinage of Achaia, Boehringer proposes a date in the late second century BC. He primarily bases this opinion on the fine condition of the Tegea and Pallantion triobols.\(^{481}\) Warren suggests that these issues might in fact belong to the beginning of the first century BC which would have obvious consequences for the burial date of the hoard.\(^{482}\) Her suggestion is supported by Grandjean’s dating of the two triobols of Messene which also points to a lower dating of the hoard.\(^{483}\) Since several of the Aitolian issues in the Zougra hoard appear in later hoards, most notably Agrinion 1959, there is nothing that prevents a lower burial date on their behalf.

\textit{IGCH 262, or the very large Diakofto 1965 hoard} (Appendix 4.19), was dispersed on the market immediately upon its discovery. Some information was recorded by Price in the British Museum but little data has been retained with regards to the individual coins in the hoard.\(^{484}\) The Aitolian issues, for example, remain a mystery, and it is not known which issues or indeed which series are represented here. It is however clear that many, if not all, of the Achaian triobols belong to the Final period of the league’s silver issues.\(^{485}\) It has generally been observed that the composition of \textit{IGCH 262} is similar to that of \textit{IGCH 271} with the important exception that the Diakofto hoard contains Final issues of Achaian silver. Unsurprisingly, the hoard date is contested.

\(^{480}\) Oeconomides 1968; Oeconomides, Lakakis-Marchetti et al 2007; the latter reviewed by Walker 2008. Both the \textit{IGCH} and Touratsoglou and Tsourti (1991, 137) support this date; Tsangari (2007, 224-225), too, believes that the hoard dates to the middle of the second century BC.

\(^{481}\) Boehringer 1991, 172. The Achaian material is crucial in dating this hoard. Among the represented mints are Megara, Aigira, Corinth, Dyme, Patras, Sikyon, Elis, Messene, Sparta, Argos, Kleonai, Epidauros, Antigoneia, Megalopolis, Pallantion and Tegea. See Oeconomides 1968, 136-137.

\(^{482}\) Warren 1997, 110, n. 10.

\(^{483}\) Grandjean 2003, 114 – 116, Pl. V, no. 117. The Messenian triobols belong to Grandjean’s series X.

\(^{484}\) \textit{IGCH}, 42. See Warren 1993b, Pl. XX, nos. 1, 4, 6 – 9, 23 for rare illustrations of some of the coins from the Diakofto hoard.

\(^{485}\) Warren 1999b. The Achaian mints represented in the hoard are Patras, Sparta, Dyme, Aigion, Aigeira, Kleitor, Epidauros, Tegea and Pallantion.
Touratsoglou and Tsourti date the hoard to the historically convenient year of 146 BC.\textsuperscript{486} Warren, however, dates the hoard to the years between the Sullan period and Actium.\textsuperscript{487} She argues that the burial of the hoard should be placed closer to that of the Poggio Picenze hoard (\textit{ICGH} 2056) than the Western Greece 1936 and Caserta 1890 (\textit{IGCH} 2053) hoards. In support of her dating, she emphasizes the fact that the hoard contained all the varieties of the Final Group Achaian triobols issued at Patras.\textsuperscript{488} Since so little information has been retained with regards to the contents of the hoard, it is impossible to assign the hoard a secure burial date, yet the presence of the quinarius in combination with the Achaian evidence lends itself to a date post 83/2 BC. The distinct difference in Achaian issues between this hoard and the Agrinion 1959 hoard demonstrates that the Diakofto hoard must necessarily be placed well after the Agrinion hoard. It is unfortunate that no information has been recorded with regards to the Aitolian triobols, as the Diakofto hoard contains one of the larger assemblages of Aitolian coins found in Greece, and the composition of the Aitolian material could further illuminate the monetary practices of the federation at the very end of its coin striking.

The coinage of the Aitolian \textit{koinon} occurs in four Achaian hoards (or possibly five, if the enigmatic Lechena hoard is indeed two separate burials). The Achaian silver hoards contain the largest amount of Aitolian coins found anywhere outside of Aitolia, and compositionally, they share many similarities. In these hoards, Aitolia’s coins appear alongside coins struck by other states in Central Greece and it is plausible that they crossed the Corinthian gulf in similar ways. The Achaian hoards contain Aitolian triobols of several issues and series, although Tsangari’s Fifth series is by far the most common. Thus, Aitiolia’s coinage made its way to Achaia in the second century BC and, in the case of the Zougra and Diakofto hoards, possibly even later. Whatever the case, the

\textsuperscript{486} Touratsoglou and Tsourti 1991, 172. They choose to consider the Roman quinarius of 83/2 BC as intrusive; \textit{Syd.} 609a. The editors of the \textit{IGCH} also assign the hoard a burial date of 146 BC.
\textsuperscript{487} Warren 1999a.
\textsuperscript{488} Warren 1993b, 98, n. 126. Warren’s suggested date is further supported by Grandjean’s (2003, 112ff, Pl. IV, no. 109; Pl. V, nos. 125, 126) dating of the series X Messenian triobols.
circulation of Aitolian silver into Achaia in the second century BC seems to have been comparatively large; in fact, more Aitolian Late Hellenistic silver has been found in Achaia than in Aitolia itself. No such circulation can be attested for the preceding century.

The numismatic data demonstrates that the Polybius-based conviction of complete Aitolon-Achaian disassociation is at best exaggerated. The consistency, regularity and continuity with which Aitolian silver circulated into Achaia and Achaian triobols into Aitolia cannot be indicative of a long-standing, deliberate sociopolitical distance between the two populations; rather, they signal the opposite. Almost every single issue of Achaia's Early and Late groups occurs in Aitolia. Aitolia's Fifth series is similarly well-represented in Achaia, although not with the same extreme consistency.

Small transactions of everyday commodities were most likely carried out in bronze, and the lack of Aitolian bronze in Achaia indicates the absence of such transactions. In comparison to how common movement of Aitolian silver into Achaia seems to have been, the lack of Aitolian bronze in Achaia may seem surprising. It need not be. The parts of Central Greece where Aitolia's bronze coinage continued to circulate in the second century BC had a long tradition of contacts with Aitolia itself. Many places, including Delphi, had been under Aitolian authority until 190 BC and some places were even inhabited by Aitolians. That small merchants and individuals continued their small-scale trade operations after the indemnity was only natural as the trade network was already in place; moreover, there was no new law that forbade their business. Such a network simply did not exist across the Corinthian gulf.

8.4. The Peloponnese

*The Arcadia 1929 hoard [IGCH 242] (Appendix 4.20)* is one of four Late Hellenistic hoards found in the Peloponnese that contain Aitolian silver coinage. Its find spot is unknown and there is merit in

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489 Delphi is the best documented place, but others exist; manumitters from Amphissa and Kallion, among others, identified themselves as Aitolians. On manumissions, see chapter 8.
490 This includes the entire peninsula except Achaia.
suspecting that the hoard had been adulterated while being marketed. Consisting primarily of Peloponnesian issues, both federal Achaian and autonomous city issues, it includes seven Aitolian triobols, five of which belong to Tsangari’s Fifth series. The latest Aitolian coin is 67f. The Achaian coins belong to the Early group. Crosby and Grace assigned the hoard a burial date of 185 – 182 BC based on the occurrence in the hoard of very fresh Achaian league coins struck at Elis. Since Elis entered the Achaian league in 191 BC, they saw this as the terminus post quem for the burial of the hoard. This date has however been seriously challenged. Touratsoglou and Tsourti prefer a later date around 160 – 150 BC based on what they believe to be the last issues of the Achaian league and Megalopolis in the hoard. Boehringer places the burial of the hoard in 146 BC, the final year in which Corinth was able to issue coins.

On account of the Aitolian issues, nothing prevents a later burial date. The composition of the hoard seems to indicate a concentration of issues in the first half of the second century BC with worn outliers in the second half of the fourth century BC (the drachms of Chalkis) in addition to some material from the last third of the third century BC. Consequently, it is not difficult to accept Boehringer’s date of 146 BC with the caveat that the hoard may, in fact, be neither intact nor unadulterated.

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491 Thompson 1968, 91 – 92. A small bronze figurine of the god Hermes, only 0.045m tall, was supposedly found with the hoard but no other data is recorded. See Crosby and Grace 1936. The IGCH too doubts the hoard; for example, the bronze coin of Elis is interpreted as a possible intrusion.
492 Thompson 1968, 91. Several Achaian mints are represented, including Corinth, Sikyon, Patras, Argos, Koronai, Messene, Elis, Megara, Antigoneia, Megalopolis, Sparta and Aegira.
493 Antigoneia is the best represented mint with a total number of 45 coins while Patras is the second most common mint with 27 coins. The least represented are Sparta (one coin), Aegira (two coins) and Corinth (two coins). Several Achaian mints are not represented at all. See Thompson 1968, 110-115.
494 Thompson (1968, 91) argues that it would be impossible that all the Elis issues in the Arcadia hoard were struck prior to 182 BC as it would imply that Elis alone of all the league’s members struck a regular sequence of issues on an annual basis immediately upon its entrance into the league. She elects to push Crosby and Grace’s initial burial date forward 20 – 25 years. In indirect support of her view, Boehringer (2008, 85) has demonstrated that the majority of Peloponnesian mints struck posthumous Alexanders in the 190s BC, not federal Achaian issues, and more importantly, that there is no connection whatsoever between the date for a city’s entrance into the Achaian league and its first federal issues.
496 Boehringer 1991, 164.
497 E.g. Aitolian issues 21a and 34d. Tsangari 2007, 223.
Because of the mixed contents of bronze and silver in the *Messene before 1937 hoard* [IGCH 301] (Appendix 4.21), Tsangari believes it to be a circulation hoard.\(^{498}\) There is some confusion to the contents of the hoard which has been permeated by a distinct lack of study, and the editors of the *IGCH* are content with a burial date in the second century BC. Comprised of an assortment of Peloponnesian federal and autonomous coinages the hoard includes a single Aitolian Fifth series triobol, issue 76c.\(^{499}\) Little is known of the other coins in the hoard. The Achaian mints of Tegea and Pallantion – especially active mints during the Final Group period – are represented among the issues of the Achaian league which forms an interesting contrast to the Arcadia 1929 hoard, in which both mints were notably absent.\(^{500}\) The Arcadian triobols carry the monogram ΜΕΓ on the reverse, indicating Megalopolis as their mint.

The broad burial date given in the *IGCH* is of course unacceptable. Based on their estimation of the date of the latest issue of the Achaian league and Megalopolis, Touratsoglou and Tsourti date the hoard to 150 BC.\(^{501}\) For the sake of this inquiry, we must however take into consideration the fact that Aitolian issue 76c occurs in two other Greek hoards that are positively later than 146 BC.\(^{502}\) Consequently, if we accept a burial date of 146 BC for the Messene hoard, we must also accept the fact that issue 76c remained in circulation at least until the burial of the other hoards. Moreover, the Messenian silver triobol is of Grandjean’s series X which points to a later date.\(^{503}\) This coin appears to be if not *the* latest, one of the latest coins in the hoard and we can thus discard a date in the mid-second century BC and tentatively place the hoard some 50 years later, perhaps around 100 BC.

\(^{498}\) Tsangari 2007, 224.

\(^{499}\) Tsangari 2007, 165, Pl. LXXXI, no. 1373.

\(^{500}\) Thompson 1968, 115; Tsangari 2007, 224. Two of the six triobols from Patras are of the type SNG Cop. 154 which presumably dates to shortly before 146 BC.

\(^{501}\) Touratsoglou and Tsourti 1991, 184, Fig. 1. Tsangari (2007, 224) assigns the hoard a somewhat later burial date in 146 BC.

\(^{502}\) Zougra 1859 (*IGCH* 261) and Agrinion 1959 (*IGCH* 271).

The worn Epidauros 1934 hoard \([IGCH\ 258]\) (Appendix 4.22) was found during the excavations of Epidauros Limera.\(^{504}\) Consisting of worn Peloponnesian issues and a single Aitolian triobol, its wear demonstrates prolonged circulation at the time of burial.\(^{505}\) A number of mints are represented among the Achaian coins.\(^{506}\) The Achaian contents are relevant for the discussion of Achaia’s Final group, since several of the federal mints striking these issues are represented in this hoard, as are those mints striking civic issues of the same period.\(^{507}\) Unsurprisingly, the hoard’s burial date is contested.\(^{508}\) Tsangari places the hoard in her chronological hoard group of “146 BC or shortly thereafter” but without further comment.\(^{509}\) Considering the poor condition of all coins in the hoard, this date is inadequate. In view of the “new landscape” in Peloponnesian coinages, the hoard must have a burial date in the first century BC. The poor condition of all the coins, the presence of the final issues of Tegea and Pallantion and Grandjean’s date for the Messenian triobols all support Boehringer’s lower chronology and I would consequently suggest a burial date in the early first century BC. This would however require the single Aitolian triobol to have remained in circulation for more than a century, but the worn condition of the coin reveals that it has been in circulation well beyond its expected life time.

The latest Peloponnesian hoard to contain Aitolian material is the Vellies-Monemvasia 1984 hoard (Appendix 4.23). This hoard of fractional silver was found at Vellies in 1952 but was not purchased by the Numismatic Museum until 1984. It is highly likely that the 72 coins are only one part of a larger hoard which was dispersed on the market prior to its relocation to Athens.\(^{510}\) All Aitolian coins belong to Tsangari’s Fifth series; the latest in the hoard is issue 76c. Chronologically,

\(^{504}\) AA 1935, 177; Lemerle 1935, 243.
\(^{505}\) The Aitolian triobol, issue 34a of the Third series, is noted to be exceedingly worn; Tsangari 2007, 225.
\(^{506}\) Messene, Elis, Antigoneia, Corinth, Dyme and Tegea are all represented by one coin each, Patras and Elis by two, Megalopolis by three, and Pallation and Sparta by four.
\(^{507}\) Warren 1993b, esp. 89.
\(^{508}\) In the \(IGCH\), Thompson assigned the hoard a burial date between 175 – 145 BC. Touratsoglou and Tsourtis (1991, 183) elect to view the hoard’s burial in the context of the upheavals of 146 BC and consequently assign it a burial date in this year.
\(^{509}\) Tsangari 2007, 225.
\(^{510}\) ADelt 34 (1984) B1; Pl. 1, nos. 5-11.
the hoard is very mixed.\footnote{The drachm of Chalkis, for example, dates to the last third of the fourth century BC; Picard 1979, group 1, issue 2. The single triobol of Hermione is similarly early, dating to the second quarter of the fourth century BC; Grandjean 1990, group 2, issue 8. The Rhodian didrachm is in very good condition and dates to c. 190 BC; Tsangari 2007, 227.} The latest coins in the hoard are Final Achaian and its burial date must consequently suit the controversial group.\footnote{The drachm of Chalkis, for example, dates to the last third of the fourth century BC; Picard 1979, group 1, issue 2. The single triobol of Hermione is similarly early, dating to the second quarter of the fourth century BC; Grandjean 1990, group 2, issue 8. The Rhodian didrachm is in very good condition and dates to c. 190 BC; Tsangari 2007, 227.} Despite the evidence in support of the lower chronology, the hoard has been assigned a traditional burial date of 146 BC.\footnote{The drachm of Chalkis, for example, dates to the last third of the fourth century BC; Picard 1979, group 1, issue 2. The single triobol of Hermione is similarly early, dating to the second quarter of the fourth century BC; Grandjean 1990, group 2, issue 8. The Rhodian didrachm is in very good condition and dates to c. 190 BC; Tsangari 2007, 227.} Tsangari draws attention to the fact that the composition of this hoard is highly similar to that of the Agrinion 1959 hoard yet the Agrinion hoard contains no Achaian coins of the Final Group whatsoever, and the mints of Pallantium and Tegea are not represented therein.\footnote{The drachm of Chalkis, for example, dates to the last third of the fourth century BC; Picard 1979, group 1, issue 2. The single triobol of Hermione is similarly early, dating to the second quarter of the fourth century BC; Grandjean 1990, group 2, issue 8. The Rhodian didrachm is in very good condition and dates to c. 190 BC; Tsangari 2007, 227.} Thus, Boehringer’s suggestion of 80 – 50 BC as repeated by Tsangari is perfectly acceptable.

Except for at Corinth and Olympia in whose records most coin-striking states are represented, Aitolian Late Hellenistic coins do not frequently occur in excavated contexts in the Peloponnese. A few Aitolian bronze coins have however been found at Megalopolis.\footnote{The mints of Patras, Antigoneia, Tegea, Corinth and Pallantion are represented; Tsangari 2007, 226. The Corinthian issue must have been struck before 146 BC but this is not true for the Final Group issues. Boehringer has argued that the final federal issues struck at Tegea and Pallantion should be associated with the Mithridatic war; Boehringer 1991, 165.} Earlier issues have been found at Corinth where Aitolian tetradrachms are part of a third-century-BC hoard.\footnote{The mints of Patras, Antigoneia, Tegea, Corinth and Pallantion are represented; Tsangari 2007, 226. The Corinthian issue must have been struck before 146 BC but this is not true for the Final Group issues. Boehringer has argued that the final federal issues struck at Tegea and Pallantion should be associated with the Mithridatic war; Boehringer 1991, 165.} Circulation of Aitolian bronze coins is essentially invisible outside larger sanctuaries, and Aitolian silver is similarly rare in Peloponnesian hoards. To interpret the presence of such a small number of Aitolian coins as meaningful circulation is insensible. Moreover, we note that several of the Aitolian coins recorded in Peloponnesian hoards have been in circulation for an extended period of time. In comparison to Achaia itself which appears to have received Aitolian currency rather regularly and in comparatively large quantities, the rest of the Peloponnese does not seem to have accepted or used the Aitolian triobol in the same manner. The Aitolian triobol seems to have

\footnote{The mints of Patras, Antigoneia, Tegea, Corinth and Pallantion are represented; Tsangari 2007, 226. The Corinthian issue must have been struck before 146 BC but this is not true for the Final Group issues. Boehringer has argued that the final federal issues struck at Tegea and Pallantion should be associated with the Mithridatic war; Boehringer 1991, 165.}
managed some movement simply because of its similarity to the Achaian triobol; in the Peloponnese, the Aitolian triobol never appears without its Achaian counterpart.

8.5. Italy.

Aitolian coins appear in two Italian hoards. The first, the Canose before 1995 hoard (Appendix 4.24), was briefly mentioned by Tsangari but it has not yet been published.\(^{517}\) Tsangari notes that the Aitolian bronze coins belong to the Fifth series but cannot further specify their issue. The coins of Lucanian Herakleia date to 278 – 250 BC and the Apulian coins of Caelia and Arpi date to the last quarter of the third century BC. Tsangari believes the hoard to have been interred in the first quarter of the second century and assigns it a burial date of 190 – 175 BC. It is noteworthy that no other Central Greek coinages are represented in the hoard.

The Caserta 1890 hoard [IGCH 2053] (Appendix 4.25) was first published in 1908 and is one of the largest collections of Greek coins found in Italy.\(^{518}\) Three of the four Aitolian triobols belong to Tsangari’s Fifth series with 76b being the latest issue. The hoard contents are chronologically mixed but exclusively consist of Peloponnesian and Central Greek coinages, the federal Achaian triobol being the most commonly represented.\(^{519}\) IGCH 2053 plays an important role in the down-dating of Achaian coin chronology and those in support of the traditional chronology of Hellenistic coinage prefer a mid-second-century-BC burial date.\(^{520}\) Still, the hoard contains the latest issues of both federal and civic triobols belonging to the Final group of Achaian silver which makes it difficult to accept the traditional dating.\(^{521}\) Moreover, the Final group of federal triobols of Elis occur fully

\(^{517}\) Tsangari 2007, 233.

\(^{518}\) Löbbecke 1908.

\(^{519}\) The drachms of Chalkis, for example, are significantly older than the Achaian silver. They belong to Picard’s issue 26 which dates to 290 – 273/1 BC. Even older according to Löbbecke’s observations in 1908 is the Theban coin dated to c. 400 BC. This kind of hoard composition with a small group of much older coin being added to a larger group of younger coins is not unique to the Caserta hoard; we have already observed the same phenomenon in a number of Greek coin hoards, e.g. IGCH 271, IGCH 260 and IGCH 232.

\(^{520}\) Löbbecke 1908, 278; Touratsoglou and Tsourti 1991, 184.

\(^{521}\) Warren 1993b, 89. Represented within the hoard are the mints of both Tegea and Pallantion whose issues Boehringer associates with the Mithridatic war.
f.d.c: this group of Elean issues dating to the period between Sulla and Actium leads Warren to suggest a burial date roughly contemporary with that of the Western Greece 1936 hoard.\(^\text{522}\)

Boehringer also favors a later date in the first century BC and tentatively assigns the hoard a burial date in 40/30 BC.\(^\text{523}\) While generally not persuaded by Boehringer and Warren’s lower chronology for the coinages of the Peloponnese, Tsangari does not present any further suggestions of her own. The worn second-century-BC Aitolian coins, one of which is so worn that it is in fact illegible, point to an extended period of circulation and in that aspect, Warren and Boehringer’s suggestion of a mid/late first-century-BC date is not out of place.

Late Hellenistic Aitolian coins do not appear in Italy outside these two hoards. If the 13,000 kilos of silver sent to Rome as payment for the war indemnity were indeed coined money, chances are that they were immediately melted down and re-issued as Roman coinage. There is certainly no indication that Aitolian coins ever circulated into Italy in any purposeful or significant numbers.\(^\text{524}\)

8.6. Other places.

The Greece 1986 or earlier hoard \([CH \text{ VIII, 338}]\) (Appendix 4.26) lacks a precise find location and was dispersed on the market without further investigation.\(^\text{525}\) Little is known of its contents. The two Aitolian triobols are both Late Hellenistic, the latest being issue 73a. The contents are otherwise chronologically mixed; the coin of Philip II, for example, is believed to have been struck at Pella in 323/2 – 315 BC.\(^\text{526}\) The Achaian coins belong to the mints at Megara, Aigina, Antigoneia, Argos, Corinth, Megalopolis, Patras, Sicyon and Sparta, and there is some confusion to whether the Messenian triobol is an autonomous issue or a federal one belonging to the Achaian league:

\(^{522}\) Warren 1993b, 90. Löbbecke himself observed that the Elean issues were among the freshest coins in the hoard: Löbbecke 1908, 277; Warren 1997, 111; Warren 1999a, 109.
\(^{523}\) Boehringer 1991, 164. Grandjean’s (2003, 112 – 122, Pl. IV, no. 110; Pl. VI, no. 182) dating of the issue X Messenian triobols does in no way conflict with a late date. Not all Caserta issues are illustrated.
\(^{524}\) The Enna 1966 hoard \((IGCH \text{ 2232})\), dating to the third century BC, contains a single Aitolian Third series tetradrachm.
\(^{525}\) Tsangari 2007, 221. See \(CH \text{ VIII, Pl. XLII, nos. 4 – 38 and XLIII, nos. 1 – 6 for illustrations.}\)
\(^{526}\) Le Rider 1977, no. 539.
Tsangari and Grandjean believe the coin to be autonomous but the original publication in CH lists it as an Achaian issue.\textsuperscript{527}

The date of CH VIII, 338 is disputed. The editors of CH suggest a burial date in the early years of the second century BC without closer examination. Dengate’s study of the coinage of the Megalopolis sheds no real light on the hoard’s date. Grandjean’s dating of the Messenian triobol to the late second or even into the first century BC is not accepted by Tsangari, who finds a historically convenient date around 168 BC to be reasonable.\textsuperscript{528} It certainly seems handy to group the Greece 1986 hoard with others belonging to the period of the Third Macedonian War, and the condition of the coin of issue 73a suggests that the coin had not been in circulation for an extended period of time. Still, the Messenian triobol points to a date well past the 160s BC. Moreover, it should be noted that Aitolian issues 67f and 73a occur in the much later Agrinion 1959 hoard. Consequently, the hoard was likely buried in the late second century BC rather than the earlier years of the century.

Aitolian coins are rare in contexts beyond those discussed above. A few coins have been found at Knossos but none dating to the second century BC.\textsuperscript{529} Excavations in the Athenian Agora have unearthed a few Late Hellenistic Aitolian specimens including issue 65c but the numbers are not meaningful.\textsuperscript{530}


The evidence presented above emphasizes the limited circulation of Aitolia’s triobol beyond its native land. Overall circulation is small and in the few hoards that Aitolian coins occur, they are always in the minority. Circulation of a coinage, I have argued, mirrors its relevant monetary

\textsuperscript{527} Grandjean 2003, 121, no. 209d.
\textsuperscript{528} Tsangari 2007, 222.
\textsuperscript{529} Tsangari issues 24a, 36i.
\textsuperscript{530} Tsangari 2007.
system and can closely correspond to the area with which the coin-striking agent (and its population) traded. Moreover, the geographic distribution of a coinage indicates where it was accepted as legal tender. By abandoning the dual weight standard preferred in the later third century BC, Aitolia focused accessibility of its coinage to a monetary sphere occupied by coinages struck on the reduced Aiginetan weight standard. Yet, few Aitolian coins survive in preserved hoards, indicating that broad external circulation of Aitolian silver was only marginally successful.

In Aitolia’s case, there is a visible geographic difference in how bronze and silver circulate. First of all, outward circulation of bronze coins is not much changed. Bronze still appears in former Aitolian territories in Central Greece, continuing a tradition of circulation begun long before the indemnity. The unbroken circulation pattern attests to the sustained movement of Aitolians conducting smaller business transactions on a local level, outside their own region. In fact, the reorganization of Central Greece after the Antiochene and Macedonian Wars seems to have had little impact on small-scale trade and transactions between individuals. Chances are that the Aitolian merchants trading with the former federal holdings in Lokris and around Delphi simply retained their existing trading networks when Delphi was officially removed from the koinon’s control. The frequency with which Aitolian bronze occurs affirms the continued presence of Aitolians in this area at a time when Aitologia’s own territory had been much reduced; in that aspect, external monetary circulation – and thus, trade – was unchanged and unharmed by the Roman treaty.

While circulation of Aitolian bronze did not change geographically after the indemnity, Aitolian silver did. This, however, is a natural consequence of the weight standard chosen by the

\[531\] See discussion in Psoma and Tsangari 2003. The federation’s abandonment of the dual weight standard used in the third century BC and reversal to a single silver coin type may simply be a rational response to the transactional dynamic inherent in smaller silver coins. Whatever the reason, Aitolia did not simply choose the triobol for its ability to circulate into a specific region.
The third-century-BC tetradrachm had circulated in the monetary sphere – and thus, geographic region – best suited to it, and the Fifth series triobol similarly circulated within the appropriate weight standard system. Coins struck on the Corcyrean weight standard moved in a sphere dominated by Achaia’s very large federal coinage and circulation of Aitolia’s triobol thus followed the geographic limitations of that system. Overall external circulation of Aitolian silver is quantitatively small but geographically broad. In hoards the triobol is always in the minority and is sometimes present in only a single specimen, yet it appears everywhere within that system. Nevertheless, only on the north coast of Achaia do we find evidence for meaningful circulation of Aitolian silver. There, Aitolian silver occurs in larger quantities than in Aitolia itself, and both its regularity and the quantities with which it occurs emphatically demonstrate successful transmission of one coinage into another region. In fact, even the very last Aitolian issue circulated into Achaia, establishing that this specific circulation pattern remained unbroken until the end of Aitolia’s coinage. The preceding century had seen essentially no cross-circulation of coins in the two regions. It is here, then, that we observe the greatest visible change in the circulation of Aitolian Late Hellenistic silver.

What is the nature of Aitolo-Achaian monetary exchange in the second century BC? The evidence for physical Achaian presence in Aitolia as noted above hints to the means by which Achaian coins entered Aitolia but the regularity of regional cross-circulation cannot solely be explained against the background of military occupation of a specific city. The Achaian federation most likely exacted taxes from the annexed Aitolian cities but the quantity of Aitolian coins on the south shore of the Corinthian gulf is simply too large to be pinpointed to Pleuron and Herakleia alone. Moreover, Achaian presence in Aitolia was neither permanent nor particularly long, if we are to trust our ancient authors, and thus does not correspond to the length of the monetary exchange as evidenced by the numismatic data. Unfortunately, this is where the trail ends. Polybius’ arch

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532 The fact that Aitolia’s coinage only occurs in a handful of third-century-BC hoards makes any comparison difficult.
enemy and his native Achaia clearly engaged in a monetary exchange that was both regular and large-scale, but whatever the reason for its inception and the manner of its existence – trade, gifts, federal grants, individual transactions –, it essentially came to an end before Achaia began production of its Final group.\textsuperscript{533}

\textbf{10. Economic adaptation and decline.}

Over the course of the second century BC Aitolia experienced a visible economic decline. At some point in the 130s the federation lost the ability to strike new coins and Aitolian coin production came to an end, never to be resuscitated again. But archaeological evidence demonstrates that the decline was gradual and moreover, not everywhere present. In conjunction with the archaeological and epigraphic data, the numismatic evidence suggests that the population was not only aware of this economic decline, but it in fact attempted to adapt to it.

\textbf{10.1. Adaptation and economic response.}

Our first agent, the individual, was initially able to maintain his everyday affairs and business transactions as the circulation of Aitolian bronze coins in Lokris and around Delphi illuminates the presence of unbroken trade networks. Naturally, not every Aitolian traded with Delphi nor should we assume that every individual member of the federation used coined money on a daily basis. Still, outward circulation of Aitolian bronze was not affected by the Roman peace treaty but importantly, Aitolia’s own production of bronze coins appears to have been unsatisfactory. If indeed too little bronze was in circulation to enable daily, private transactions to be carried out, the population had to make use of what little silver it had. The fractional triobol was small enough to enable comparatively small transactions, and consequently facilitated a wider range of transactions than

\textsuperscript{533} Again, Kalydon is a local exception.
the tetradrachm. But without sufficient quantities of coinage in circulation, the size and weight of the federal coins did not matter. Individuals may eventually have had to resort to selling stored goods in order to obtain the physical coins needed for their own purchases. Epigraphic records indicate that this response is precisely what happened.

As the quantity of coins in circulation dwindled, Aitolia’s population responded by infusing the economy with old, formerly discarded coins which until that moment had not been acceptable as legal tender. More importantly, hoard composition demonstrates that the population accepted essentially any kind of silver currency, including freshly minted coinages struck on a wholly different weight standard than their own. The Achaian triobol, however, virtually identical to Aitolia’s own, seems to have been the most readily available and possibly also most easily acceptable coin type, but silver was silver and in a declining economy the Aitolians could not afford to be picky. For roughly 50 years, the Achaian triobol was the most commonly occurring coin type in Aitolia parallel to the federation’s own silver and it remained regular until the early 120s BC, when the Aitolio-Achaian monetary exchange came to an abrupt end.

Our second agent, the federation or state itself, was forced to accept the economic responses of its population. If not, tax collection would have been impossible. The federation may or may not have played part in the rapid and regular interchange of coinage with Achaia, but it had no choice but to accept any silver coinage that was available to its population – or collect no taxes. Nevertheless, the federation maintained tight control of its own monetary production and despite the influx of foreign silver into its economy, never deviated from its own standards. Moreover, the koinon never resorted to the two most common approaches to circumventing an economic problem.

534 Aitolia’s tetradrachm weighs on average c. 17.2g; roughly seven times as much as its 2.5g triobol. Tsangari (2007, 254) argues that the koinon chose the triobol simply for financial reasons as it lacked the monetary means to produce a larger coinage. See chapter 5.
535 See chapter 8.
536 From a chronological perspective, a connection between the influx of Achaian silver and the rapidly escalating debt-problems in the 170s BC seems attractive although tenuous.
in the short term; it did not devaluate its own currency, nor did it debase it.\textsuperscript{537} Thus, Aitolia seems to have avoided inflation.\textsuperscript{538} The Roman peace treaty had stripped Aitolia of most of its annexed territories, areas that traditionally paid tax to the \textit{koinon}. Consequently, the \textit{koinon} collected less money in tax than prior to the indemnity. Further territories were removed in 167 BC and the situation escalated.\textsuperscript{539} Decline was followed by collapse.

10.2. Decline and the Aitolian economy.

Without sufficient quantities of coins in circulation, Aitolia’s economy suffered. Eventually, when bullion was no longer available, coin production became impossible. Roughly at the same time foreign coinages stopped circulating into Aitolia in any noteworthy quantities. Silver became unavailable. The federation could no longer meet the needs of its population in terms of monetary production and conversely, the population could not meet the demands of its federation in terms of taxation. Ancient populations often solved economic problems by annexing new territories, an economic response with which Aitolia was very familiar.\textsuperscript{540} But the peace treaty forcibly prevented Aitolia from engaging in such activities and thus, the \textit{koinon}’s hands were tied.

\textit{Over the course of the second century BC, Aitolia’s economy became increasingly demonetized. Less coinage in circulation led to diminished economic activity. The population had less purchasing power and taxation became problematic. The government became poorer and may have had to raise taxes; if it did, the population was not able to meet the demands of taxation and tax evasion may have become an issue.}\textsuperscript{541} It is clear from literary and epigraphic sources that economic decline was a tangible problem which not only caused turmoil within the federal

\textsuperscript{537} On debased coinages in antiquity, see e.g. Howgego 1992; Harl 1996. On debt and debasement, see brief notes in Fredriksen 1966.
\textsuperscript{538} The negative effects of inflation in the ancient world remain poorly understood, and especially in the pre-Roman world. For an explanatory overview from a wider historical perspective, see Cagan and Lipsey 1978. For a Rome-specific treatment, see Wassink 1991.
\textsuperscript{539} Diodorus 31.8.6; Grainger 1999, ch. 23.
\textsuperscript{540} Tainter 1988.
\textsuperscript{541} There is no hard evidence to that effect. On the effects of tax evasion on a small economic system, see Tainter 1988; Parkinson 1960.
government but in fact lead to drastic social upheavals and ultimately to a political revolution. Already in the 170s BC, Aitolia witnessed a dramatic debt crisis among its elite whose members suddenly lacked the means to repay their loans.\textsuperscript{542} The financial crisis had serious sociopolitical consequences as the members of the elite traditionally served as magistrates within the federation, but with the debt problem unsolved, the situation escalated into civil war. For the non-elite, lack of coin was also detrimental as it impeded commercial activity, which in turn had a negative impact on social, political and legal infrastructure. Moreover, the financial problems of the elite deeply affected the functionality of the federal government which ultimately ceased to exist, and both economy and polity collapsed. With the end of the federation, the region lost its monetary functionality entirely.

We are ill informed of what happened next. In the wake of economic collapse, a barter system may have resurged. The lack of evidence for regional monetary circulation in the first century BC suggests that the population may have resorted to a non-monetized method of exchange. But despite the complete demonetization of the regional economy, archaeological evidence suggests that parts of the population remained in comparatively good financial standing. Some individuals indeed seem to have been wealthy. The economy thus cannot have collapsed completely. Large building projects would not have been possible in a state of complete anarchy for a population existing in financial vacuum. The Heroon at Kalydon, for example, built in c. 100 BC, was built with much reused material, but the workers still had to be paid, and some of the sculpture is original work.\textsuperscript{543} The loss of a functional coinage contributed to the collapse of the Aitolian economy but not all smaller local city economies or indeed individuals were equally affected.

\textsuperscript{542} See chapter 8.  
\textsuperscript{543} See chapter 4.
CHAPTER 7.

Economic institutions and state interference: the fate of the Aitolian koinon.

1. Introduction.

Since its emergence in fourth century BC, the federation had furnished the population of Aitolia with an economic framework that allowed greater connectivity – and thereby easier access – to the Mediterranean world. By striking coins, making policy, negotiating treaties, awarding various grants, voting on war and carrying out military campaigns the federation provided the Aitolians with the infrastructure necessary for economic activity, and through that infrastructure, with the possibility for obtaining improved marginal return on an individual basis. Not synonymous with the economy itself, the federation was nevertheless the engine that drove the socioeconomic machinery forward, individually and collectively. Consequently, the fate of the koinon is of utmost importance for a contextual reading of the region's decline.

2. Timeline.

Epigraphic records confirm that the federation remained fully functional through the first half of the second century BC. The last full list of magistrates dates to 141/0 BC, demonstrating that the league was not dissolved in 146 BC, and both coin production and the dating of documents by the annually elected strategos continue beyond that list.\textsuperscript{544} Even the very last Aitolian manumission is dated by that year's strategos, although we do not know the exact year.\textsuperscript{545} Unfortunately, the last strategiai cannot be dated more closely than to the late second century BC, and after 141/0 BC, the

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{544} {\textit{IG} IX 1}\textsuperscript{2} 1:34d. No serious study of Late Hellenistic Greece will now take Pausanias 7.16.10 at face value; see e.g. Warren 1999b.
\textsuperscript{545} {\textit{IG} IX 1}\textsuperscript{2} 1:137f. This document \textit{might} date to 119/8 BC, although it is not clear whether this was the year when Satyros from Arsinoe was strategos.
\end{footnotesize}
evidence is sporadic. No grammateis or hipparchoi are known after that year, and the centuries-long sequence of strategoi is broken in the mid-130s BC. The latest epigraphic mentioning of the koinon itself, but without the strategia dating formula, is IG IX 1² 1:139 which consisting of a dedication to Sulla, can be dated to 84 BC. This document, found at Kalydon, must be considered the terminus for the Aitolian league. A single inscription from the imperial period makes use of the traditional phrase “κατὰ τοὺς Αἴτωλῶν νόμους” but the document is fragmentary and cannot be dated; in fact, the only reason for its supposed imperial date is its inclusion of a Roman name.

The epigraphic record does not provide us with a definitive end and this is likely a realistic portrayal of the federation’s timeline. Its end came about gradually as its power diminished and its territories shrank. It is clear that in the early first century BC, it no longer existed in any form. Importantly, no other agency attempted to fill the vacuum created by its disappearance, either locally or regionally. There is indeed no evidence for local authorities assuming the responsibilities formerly held by the federation.

3. Composition: strategoi, territory and party factions.

A crucial factor for the federation’s success was the democratic process by which it integrated newly annexed territories into its political apparatus. This is best exemplified by the office of strategos. In the third century BC, strategoi were regularly recruited from cities in territories that had recently joined the federation. This openness to new members made federal membership attractive and facilitated both negotiation of foreign policy and use of economic institutions. After 189 BC, however, that openness drastically changed. In two decades between 189 and the 169 BC, six men held the office of strategos no less than fifteen times (Appendix 3A). In that same time

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546 IG IX 1² 1:72 and 1:36a.
547 IG IX 1² 1:82.
period, only four men held the office a single time. Repeated *strategia* was not unheard of in Aitolia but this dramatic change is noteworthy. These *strategoi* came from Trichonion, Pholas, Pleuron, Stratos, Hypata, Kalydon and Kallipolis. Most of these were large *poleis* in the heartland of Aitolia and had been members of the federation since its creation.

This new climate has been explained as the rise of an oligarchic elite which ran the federal government to best suit its own narrow interests. This oligarchic elite, Grainger argues, was deeply invested in the late third-century-BC debt problem – we assume as creditors – and had successfully prevented the passing of any legislation that would solve that crisis.\(^549\) This hostile political climate gave rise to dissatisfaction and conflict. Livy-based scholarship maintains that the Aitolian citizenry was split into two political factions, one pro-, the other anti-Roman, but the reality was more complex than that, and more importantly, the strife was between *individuals* and not between two formulated political parties.\(^550\) The political discord culminated in 167 BC when 550 Aitolian *principes* were slaughtered at the instigation of Lykiskos.\(^551\) What happened to the oligarchic regime is unclear, but after 167 BC, the highest magistracy was rarely repeated, signaling that the balance of power within the league had been restored.\(^552\) In fact, until the end of the league only two people were *strategoi* more than once.\(^553\) Nevertheless, the *strategoi* came almost exclusively from the heartland of Aitolia, a similar situation as in the previous two decades. Kalydon furnished no less than nine strategoi after 167 BC, Arsinoe eight, and Trichonion six. The remaining *strategoi* came from cities that only provided a single individual (Phytaion, Sosthenes, Oaxos, Agrinion).

Consequently, while certain towns (Pholas, Hypata) no longer controlled the important office, thereby indicating a shift in power distribution within the region, the highest office was still very

\(^{549}\) Grainger 1999.

\(^{550}\) Livy 41.25, 42.2; Polybius 30.11.

\(^{551}\) Livy 45.28.6-7.

\(^{552}\) Grainger (1999, 538) argues for a combination of “new men” and members of old Aitolian families but just because an individual is unknown prior to holding office, one cannot necessarily consider him a political outsider.

\(^{553}\) Dorimachos II from Trichonion in 147/6 and 140/39 BC, and Satyros from Arsinoe in 143/2, 136/5 and 129/8 BC.
much monopolized by a small group of towns. The difference between the recruitment of *strategoi* pre- and post-indemnity demonstrates quite clearly both the success and the failure of the *koinon*. As an inclusive, pseudo-democratic body, it had been attractive, powerful and dynamic, but when dominated by an oligarchic regime, it lost both attraction and functionality. While our records are too few to ascertain whether this pattern applies to *grammateis* and *hipparchoi* as well, the monopolization of the federal *strategia* invariably demonstrates how sensitive the federal framework was to corruption.

Constant re-election of league officials was detrimental to both the internal democratic process and the outward perception of the league. Whether the oligarchy successfully managed to drive public policy in its own best interest we cannot tell, but chances are that the debt crisis in the 170s BC was exacerbated by political discord.\(^{554}\) Moreover, the inclusiveness traditionally associated with the federation was seriously challenged which damaged its reputation in the long term. Active members ceased to be active when federal policy became the provenance of a small group of individuals, and indeed stopped wanting to be active. The composition of the league was thus irrevocably altered. The only cities interested in active membership were those located close to Thermon, in the heartland of Old Aitolia.

But not only party politics and an uneven distribution of power within the league affected its composition. Territorial losses also had bearing for the radically changed patterns of political recruitment. In the third century BC, magistrates had been recruited from newly annexed territories, sometimes in obscure areas far from the federation’s meeting place at Thermon. Only two of these cities continued to furnish magistrates after having been separated from the federation in 189 BC; Kallion (once) and Stratos (six times). In all other cases, former members no longer participated in league politics – even when still dating their own records by Aitolian strategic year. Consequently, the sudden emergence of a small group of men controlling the supreme magistracy

\(^{554}\) See chapter 8.
in the federation must be viewed in the greater context of the Roman indemnity. By removing formerly annexed territories from the federation, Rome damaged the distributary mechanism which had both maintained the balance of power within the federation and made federal membership so attractive.

4. Economic institutions, friendships and foreign policy.

In the third century BC the federation made use of Panhellenic economic institutions to advance economic connectivity at the regional and international level. Unsurprisingly, it continued to rely on the same institutions in the decades following the indemnity (Appendix 3B). Several proxenies were granted in the 180s BC. The recipients came from Thebes, Corinth, Patras, Rhodes and Alexandria; to Grainger, these were “important commercial cities”. Notably, the grants included proxenia only and none of the other privileges whose functions were distinctly economic in nature – not a single case includes ateleia, for example. Most grants were given to individuals but the very first proxenia after the indemnity was awarded collectively to the population of Athens. Athens had been instrumental in negotiating the conditions for the indemnity on Aitolia’s behalf and was probably considered an unusually good friend at that point in time. Only one other grant was bestowed collectively rather than individually, and in that case, asylia given to the sanctuary of Athena Nikephoros at Pergamon, the federation appears to have responded to Pergamon’s request for recognition. No known grants date to the 170s which is unsurprising in light of the regional discord occurring in that decade. A few grants date to the 160s BC but oddly, one of them was given to a man from Hypata, a city that had furnished the league with two strategoi in the period 189 – 169 BC. This suggests that Hypata had been removed from the league, and in conjunction,

555 Grainger 1999, 506.
556 Polyb. 21.1, 21.9, 30.7, 31.5-16. Ferrary (1988) finds it remarkable that Polybius mentions no other agents but Athens and Rhodes negotiating with Rome on Aitolia’s behalf. The evidence for Aitolo-Athenian relations does not warrant the suggestions made by Losada 1965.
557 Roussel 1932.
emphasizes the way the federation used *proxenia*; to best make use of important individuals who could not otherwise be integrated into the regional framework. The other *proxeniai* dating to this period were given to men whose origins are so obscure, they cannot be placed on a map even very generally. In the late 140s, some contact was established with Naxos and Dyme in Achaia. In at least two cases the federation reverted to its old habit of combining *proxenia* with *asylia* and the economic privilege of *asphaleia*. The very last grants date to 129/8 BC and an unknown year in the late second century BC.

In the second century BC, the federation made use of distinctly fewer grants than in the previous century. This suggests a change in the broad connectivity earlier provided by these economic institutions; moreover, it brings up the important question of whether overall economic strategies had changed, deliberately or accidentally. Here we note that Aitolia relied almost exclusively on *proxenia* grants, and moreover, that their process was unchanged. *Proxenoi* were still sponsored by leading Aitolians who presumably put their names forward to the assembly. The granting formula remained unaltered, and records were still displayed at the sanctuaries of Thermon and Delphi. Clearly, individual connectivity and the market access it provided remained central to how the federation sought to negotiate its place in the Hellenistic economy. These economic institutions had proved useful in the past; to cancel that practice would have been unwise. On a side note, the mere fact that *proxenia* was still awarded suggests a continued movement of people into and out of Aitolia which in turn emphasizes a sustained tradition of trade, euergetism and ordinary economic activity. The indemnity did consequently not immediately prohibit the federation from utilizing its preexisting socioeconomic infrastructure.

Grainger argues that Aitolia relied on *proxenia* for commercial purposes, actively looking for “new friends” to replace its former allies Rome and Antiochus III.\textsuperscript{558} Yet, the grants were

\textsuperscript{558} Grainger 1999.
significantly fewer after the indemnity, and their geographic distribution is distinctly narrower.\textsuperscript{559} The institution itself was unchanged, as was the federation's means of using it, but the sudden drop in both asylia and those privileges that had purely economic purposes merits attention. In the third century BC, the federation had actively entered agreements which enhanced its own odds of improved marginal returns by increasing overall connectivity, but after the indemnity, federal behavior appeared significantly more passive, which raises an important question: who were Aitolia's "friends"? With which regions did Aitolia successfully connect when its former territories had been removed? Unfortunately, the grants are too few, and foreign circulation of Aitolian coinage not large enough to demonstrate a deeper, more strongly pronounced connection between the federation and another community. Only two collective grants were issued in the second century; a stark contrast to the previous century.

Nevertheless, two major dedications at Delphi in the 180s BC demonstrate that the federation understood the importance of state-sponsored connectivity for survival. Dedicated in 182 BC, the Aitolian monument to Eumenes II is testimony to the inherent adaptability of the koinon.\textsuperscript{560} Eumenes II was the arch-enemy of Antiochos III, Aitolia's former ally, and his support of Rome not a decade earlier had been greatly rewarded.\textsuperscript{561} The federation had eagerly responded to a recent Pergamene request for asylia and by erecting a monument at Delphi, they displayed to the world their new friendship with a powerful ruler – the same ruler who had profited from their own defeat. That very year the federation had completed its indemnity payments to Rome, and may in Eumenes II have looked for a powerful ally to help improve its tarnished reputation after the Greco-Roman conflict. The monument to Prusias II of Bithynia is also believed to have been dedicated in this year.\textsuperscript{562} This is the only known connection between the federation and Bithynia in this century and the dedication is best viewed as an intelligent design for the federation to gain the friendship of

\textsuperscript{559} Delphic grants of proxenia to Aitolians were also fewer in this century (Appendix 3C).
\textsuperscript{560} IG IX 1\textsuperscript{2} 1:183. The document is discussed in Daux 1836; Pollitt 1986.
\textsuperscript{562} IG IX 1\textsuperscript{2} 1:184 = FdD III 4.1, no 76.
the newly crowned king. Both monuments were displayed at Delphi, a strategic location that announced Aitolia's good intentions and through its visibility as a Panhellenic sanctuary could facilitate greater connectivity.

The federation and its members had a long history of Delphic dedications, some to itself and its own members, others to foreign rulers.\textsuperscript{563} Naturally, a similar tradition was upheld at Thermon, where numerous monuments announced Aitolian friendship with powerful rulers and states.\textsuperscript{564} That tradition came to an abrupt end at the conclusion of the war, clearly an effect of the gradual loss of federal power. The federation's choice of Delphi for the display of its “friendship” with Eumenes II and Prusias II signals the importance of visibility in order to achieve wider integration in the Panhellenic framework – and integration was paramount for survival.

But whether such displays of friendship had any real effects on Aitolian affairs, the federation certainly did not rely on the two eastern kings. In the 170s BC, the federation appealed to other states to help solve its debt crisis.\textsuperscript{565} First it approached Macedon, then Rome.\textsuperscript{566} Third party mediation was a common feature of the Hellenistic world and was readily used when two parties could not solve a problem, yet to find the \textit{koinon} first soliciting the help of its major opponent in the previous century, then that of the very state that had robbed it of important territories has been found noteworthy. It has been argued that Aitolia's relationship to Macedon became friendlier after the Roman war, but the string of appeals to Pergamon, Bithynia, Macedon and Rome in combination with \textit{proxenia} grants to individuals from various polities rather suggests that the federation could not afford to discriminate.\textsuperscript{567} Internal problems dictated that the federation maintained an outward state of positive neutrality and thus it cultivated relationships

\textsuperscript{563} Scholten 2000. The examples are numerous. See e.g. \textit{IG} IX 1\textsuperscript{2} 1:181; 1:200, 1:202, 1:203; \textit{Syll.}\textsuperscript{3} 514.
\textsuperscript{564} Perhaps most noteworthy is the large exedra hosting a statue group of the Ptolemies; \textit{IG} IX 1\textsuperscript{2} 1:56. On its date, see Bennett 2002.
\textsuperscript{565} Two \textit{doreai} voted to the federation by the Delians in the late 180s or early 170s BC may have some relationship to the tumultuous debt crisis. \textit{ID} 442 – 443. On the Delian epigraphic corpus and its economic implications in general, see Reger 1994. Cf. Baslez and Vial 1987.
\textsuperscript{566} Appian \textit{Mac.} 1.7; Livy 41.25, 42.2, 42.4.
with foreign states when it could. In fact, the position of neutrality was of paramount importance from a standpoint of recovery. Further marginal decline caused by exogenous factors could be disastrous. Unfortunately, the altered composition of the federation prevented it from using those relationships to improve odds of marginal return.

5. Territorial loss, occupation and warfare.

The Roman treaty removed large tracts of land from the *koinon*, thereby altering the composition of the *koinon*. That territorial loss came to gradually impact the federation as territorially-induced civil unrest among the population had a negative impact on the reliability and the very functionality of the league. In fact, that shift in internal balance damaged overall federal management of the territory it still controlled, accidentally providing other agents access to Aitolian resources. Decline was inevitable.

That loss of reliability is most visible in Aitolian manumission records. These documents were always private and may consequently provide indirect evidence for how the population viewed the federation. After the first quarter of the second century BC, manumissions at Naupaktos and Bouttos were no longer only dated by the eponymous federal *strategos*, but more often by local *grammateis thearois* and the *agonothetes*.\textsuperscript{568} These two towns were not necessarily detached from the league but the changed dating formula indicates a general lack of confidence in the federation.\textsuperscript{569} Moreover, the documents bring up the important question of foreign agency and indeed of occupation. Literary sources indicate that at least two Aitolian cities were held by the Achaian league, although the timeframe for that occupation is unknown. Herakleia which controlled Thermopylaei and thus was essential for the movement of people through central Greece had been

\textsuperscript{568} An example of dating by local *grammteus*: IG IX 1\textsuperscript{2} 3:639,6; of *agonothetes* IG IX 1\textsuperscript{2} 3:638,9. On this practice in general, see Sherk 1990.

\textsuperscript{569} Papageorgiadou-Bani (1996) believes that Naupaktos was occupied by Achaia between the Third Macedonian War and the destruction of Corinth but there is no firm evidence to that effect.
an important member of the Aitolian koinon but had been removed from the federation by the time of the Achaian War in 147/6 BC. It appears to have been made a member of the Achaian league against its will. It rebelled, clearly dissatisfied with its new “owners”, but was made a member anew.\footnote{Pausanias 7.14.1; Grainger 1999, 532.} Similarly, membership in the Achaian league was forced upon Pleuron in the heartland of Aitolia. When visiting Aitolia in the 160s BC, the Roman ambassador Gallus was approached by a group of Pleuronians who begged to be removed from the Achaian league. Gallus appears to have granted that wish.\footnote{Pausanias 7.11-14; Grainger 1999, 532; Gruen 1976a.} The occupation of Pleuron is visible in the recruitment patterns for federal strategoi; between 189 and 174 BC, it provided no less than three magistrates, but none thereafter (Appendix 3A). Unattested beyond these references, occupation of the Aitolian heartland is poorly understood but if real, its consequences for regional decline may have been significant. Resources would have been removed from Aitolian control, the basis for taxation and military recruitment disturbed, and the potential for marginal improvement further decreased. Foreign agents are likely to have treated occupied territories harshly, perhaps exacting far more taxes than the Aitolian population could manage. Such occupation would have had dire consequences for the survival of the league. The loss, temporary or permanent, of two majorly active cities further destabilized the already unstable federation, and chances are that other cities suffered the same fate although the literary and epigraphic records are silent to that end.

Warfare, too, played its part in the gradual loss of federal power and control. After the indemnity, the koinon fought no wars of its own, but it did support Rome against Perseus – perhaps because it had no other choice. Grainger considers the Aitolian assembly “anti-Roman” yet its stance seems primarily have been “anti-war”.\footnote{Grainger 1999, 526; Livy 43.17-22; Polybius 28.4.} Most Greek states, in fact, sought a stance of neutrality and attempted to stay out of the conflict, convinced that whatever the outcome, it would

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571 Pausanias 7.11-14; Grainger 1999, 532; Gruen 1976a.
572 Grainger 1999, 526; Livy 43.17-22; Polybius 28.4.
be bad for the Greeks. Eventually, the Aitolian federation sent its cavalry to Rome’s aid, consisting of 500 men. In comparison, Achaia sent three times as many. If this was indeed the federation’s entire cavalry, and Livy explicitly says it was, the basis for military recruitment had shrunk dramatically in only some thirty years. Moreover, the koinon was clearly not enthusiastic about renewed Roman involvement in Greece as it allowed its own citizens to enlist with Perseus.

The federation was not rewarded for supporting Rome; in fact, it was blamed for the minor defeat at Kallikinos and the Aitolian cavalry commanders were sent off to Rome as prisoners. These men were all former strategoi – important political figures intimately connected to the machinery of the federation. Additionally, the federation was dealt further territorial losses after Pydna when most notably, Amphilochia was detached from the league. Thereby the federation lost physical contact with the Ionian Sea. Roman involvement in Greece had no positive effects on the federation, and it is unsurprising that the Aitolians diligently stayed out of the Greco-Roman conflicts culminating in the destruction of Corinth in 146 BC. Warfare was too costly and too uncertain an enterprise for the crumbling koinon, and moreover, the Roman treaty prevented it from using warfare to best suit its own territorially-driven interests.

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573 Polybius 28.7.4; Gruen 1975; 1976a; 1984. On Perseus’ involvement in Greece and how it was portrayed, see Mendels 1978; Champion 2007; Eckstein 1988.
574 Livy 42.55.9.
575 Some 6,500 Aitolian mercenaries had been in service to the Ptolemies in the late third century: Livy 31.43. See Chapter 2.
576 Polybius 27.15.14; Livy 42.60.8-9; Appian Mac. 12. See Gruen 1984.
577 Livy 42.60.8-10.
578 Diodorus 31.86.
579 On Greece after the destruction of Corinth, see Morstein Kallet-Marx 1995. The important question is whether Rome formally converted Greece into a province in 146 BC. Accame (1946), Badian (1968) and Ferrary (1988) think so, but Gruen (1976, 1984) dissents. For criticism on Gruen, see Baronowski 1988. Whatever the case – and the evidence is not conclusive either way – it is clear that the Greek leagues were not dissolved in 146 BC, contra Pausanias 7.16.12.
6. The end of the *koinon*.

The *koinon* remained fully functional through the 130s BC, that much is clear from epigraphic and numismatic records. Its end, however, was not a distinct event at a certain point in time. Rather, it petered out, gradually losing its attraction, functionality, reliability, and use. An inscription dated to 165 BC emphasizes the way in which that decline manifested itself.\(^{580}\) The document is a list of citizenships awarded to a single individual and includes Aitolia, Doris, Eastern Lokris, Oitia and Ainianes, all counted separately. Some fifty years earlier, the grant of Aitolian citizenship would have covered all these. Oitia and Ainianes had never been formally detached from the league yet one by one, members abandoned their affiliation with the no longer attractive *koinon*.

The evidence for that gradual decline as outlined above shows that the process was as complex as it was unfortunate.\(^{581}\) Internal conflicts prevented economic recovery, and social unrest made for poor adaptation to Aitolia’s new order post-189 BC. While clearly not intending to eradicate the Aitolian *koinon*, the indemnity, it seems, was an instrumental factor for the federation’s end. Had the Romans not insisted on detaching important territories from the *koinon*’s control, financially induced civic strife may not have persisted. The territorial clause was seriously detrimental to the federation and its population as it not only reduced its chances of improved marginal return, but also changed the very ways in which the Aitolians operated. The *koinon* was no longer able and indeed not allowed to solve socioeconomic problems by capturing a new energy subsidy, nor could it extend its power territorially by offering membership to small polities. Seriously reduced, Aitolia would have needed a "big friend" to recover in the same manner that the federation itself had been the voice for small, annexed polities in the third century BC. Perhaps such royal sponsorship was sought in Eumenes and Prusias. Yet, its attempts failed, and the structural

\(^{580}\) *Syll.* 3 653 = *FdD* III 1,218; Grainger 1999, 534.

\(^{581}\) Oddly, Grainger (1999, 535) blames a single individual, Lykiskos (who died in c. 157 BC; Polyb. 32.4.1-3), for the decline and eventual end of the league.
damage was too great for the federation to adapt to the new conditions set upon it by the indemnity and civic unrest. Its ultimate end was inevitable.

The federal machinery was intimately connected to the population and the loss or weakening of one was detrimental to the other. Without the federation, the population of Aitolia had little chance of continued connectivity with the outside world; indeed even of continued connectivity within Aitolia. Without the economic infrastructure provided by the *koinon*, the Aitolians were doomed to an existence without their own coinage, without a monetized economy, without any means of negotiating economic strategies beyond their own household. While Aitolia never lost all economic activity – the archaeological record attests that much – its population had almost no options for that vital connectivity after the collapse of the federation.
CHAPTER 8.
Economic activity and the Aitolian people.

1. Introduction.

After 189 BC, Aitolia faced a new order in which its problem-solving mechanisms were severely restricted. Important territories had been removed from the federation's control, and the peace treaty prevented it from the territorial expansion necessary to avoid marginal decline. While the socioeconomic infrastructure was still in place – the federation and its institutions as well as local governments and networks – the Aitolian population faced problems that it was unable to solve. Over the course of the second and first centuries BC, the Aitolians witnessed their landscape contract, their monetary circulation weaken, and their international connectivity decline; all signs of significant loss of sociopolitical complexity. Unsurprisingly, focused examination of the Aitolian people generates a similar image in which population decline and site abandonment indicate a gradual system collapse. Naturally, the population responded in different ways to this “downward slope” and a detailed reading of select socioeconomic features provides the context necessary for Cicero's *Aetolia amissa*. This chapter evaluates the relevant evidence.

2. The debt crisis in the 170s BC.

After accepting the clauses for the Roman indemnity, the Aitolians disappeared temporarily from the historical narrative. Despite the lack of written information, the 180s and early 170s BC appear to have been relatively stable years for the federation and its people. There seems to have been no immediate change for day-to-day conditions. Federal meetings were attended as usual; economic institutions remained unchanged; coins were struck and circulated. In fact, the Aitolians seem to

582 Tainter 1988.
have experienced several peaceful, seemingly stable years until the late 170s BC when a violent, disruptive debt crisis suddenly arose. The crisis is interpreted either as a political or an economic problem when in fact it was neither; it was financial in nature. At the heart of the problem lay debt but the indebted were not the poor, like Grainger thinks, but rather men of property and influence. Disputes among privileged citizens often arose when large sums were borrowed against the security of land, and this was clearly the case in Aitolia. In Thessaly, a similar conflict emerged when illegal interest made debt payments impossible, a possible explanation for the mechanisms of the Aitolian conflict.

Civil unrest and growing violence characterized the crisis. While simply fiscal in origin, the debt problem quickly became a political issue as involved parties used their influence in the federation to manipulate the situation to their own advantage – an approach not foreign to the Aitolians, who in the late third century BC saw Alexander the Isian thwart Skopas’ proposed debt legislation by similar manipulation. Jealous monopolization of federal offices at this time is emblematic of the severity of the situation. The indebted clearly could not pay their loans, but were not willing to give up the property on which their elite status was based. Violent reactions ensued, causing the federation to reach out to third parties for mediation; first to Perseus, who sent a garrison; then twice to the Roman senate, who sent two embassies. Neither external agent

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583 Naturally, its emergence is only sudden because Livy and Polybius have nothing to say about Aitolia prior to its breakout. Livy 41.25, 41.47, 42.2, 42.5, 42.12, 42.38, 42.40, 42.42, 43.17, 45.28; Polybius 28.4, 30.11, 30.13, 32.4-5, 39.11; Appian Mac. 11.1, 11.7; Diodorus 29.33.
584 Habicht 1989; Gruen 1976a: 1984; Walsh 2000. Oddly, the event has received little attention among economic historians.
587 Habicht 1989. The Aitolian crisis was thus not simply a local phenomenon; Thessaly and Perrhaebia, too, suffered debt crises at this time. Diodorus (29.33) indicates that the problem in Thessaly was that debts had been cancelled, thus causing an outrage among the lending parties whose loans were never repaid.
588 Polybius 13.1.
589 See chapter 4.
590 Rome appears to have become the “to-go” state for third party mediation at this time. In the 160s BC, the inhabitants of Pleuron approached the Roman ambassador Gallus with a request for third party mediation: they wanted their city to be removed from the Achaian league. Paus. 7.11-14. See e.g. Champion 2007. On Perseus in this situation, see Eckstein 1988.
could solve the problem as the issue had escalated beyond repair. In fact, the Roman ambassadors reported that the Aitolian madness was incorrigible.\footnote{Livy 41.27.} Some form of internal agreement was met but civil unrest arose anew, culminating in the murder of 550 Aitolian principes at a meeting in 167 BC.\footnote{Livy 45.28.7; Polybius 30.11.5.} Properties were confiscated and proscriptions enforced as other citizens were driven into exile, thus ending the conflict.\footnote{Hollander 2005.}

All complex societies are problem-solving organizations which settle issues of growth and decline by adapting and adjusting to immediate constraints. The Aitolian debt crisis is best understood in these terms. In the third century BC, socioeconomic instabilities were corrected through territorial expansion. By capturing a new energy subsidy, the federation prevented its population from the “downward slope” leading to marginal decline. The population, too, avoided marginal decline by engaging in a variety of activities synonymous with energy capture; paid mercenary service, piracy, and freebooting while on military campaigns. Such problem-solving mechanisms had tangible and immediate effects both collectively and individually. Yet, the incessant wars in the late third and early second centuries BC had upset the regional credit structure which depended on the value of land, which in turn drove up interest rates.\footnote{Some disenfranchised Aitolians approached Aemilius Paullus in 167 BC, asking for redress after the slaughter, but were not given the legal help they requested. Livy 45.28 – 31; Polybius 30.13.} In addition, the Romans had not only removed vital territories from Aitolian control and prevented further expansion, but the monetary component of their requested indemnity drove large quantities of bullion and coined money out of Aitia, leading to less coinage in active circulation. Consequently, the people who had borrowed money against the security of their land were physically unable to pay back their loans. Moreover, the region had not had time to restore its exhausted agricultural countryside. Farmlands could simply not produce large enough a profit for their indebted owners. Their hands tied by the indemnity, the Aitolians could no longer rely on their traditional problem-
solving methods, and the crisis was unavoidable. The violent reactions illustrate how sensitive Aitolia’s economy was to shifts in its structure and moreover, demonstrate the severe outcome of exogenous shock on a small, agrarian-based economy. Its manifestations of violence were, in effect, a problem-solving mechanism emerging in a situation when traditional solutions were no longer possible. Naturally, any problem-solving mechanism that is self-predatory in nature will harm the equilibrium of the collective and thereby cause further damage to socioeconomic frameworks, and in less dire circumstances such mechanisms rarely occur. In its appearance we thus identify a combination of the “new world order” in which Aitolia’s old strategies were rendered nonoperational, and the “inheritance” of the unresolved financial problems of the late third century BC.

While neither Polybius nor Livy show interest in its outcome, the disruptive debt crisis could have had no positive effects on the population. Proscription of property left fields untilled which caused an escalating agrarian loss and advanced landscape contraction. The federation was similarly negatively impacted as it failed to prevent problems escalating into civil war, thus losing vital reliability and power. Taxation may have been halted, leading to shrinking federal coffers which in turn had a negative effect on subsequent coin production. Property rights had previously been regulated by federal law, but failure to maintain that legal framework may have seriously challenged the legislative apparatus.\textsuperscript{595} Local governments were also affected when prominent citizens were removed, either through forced exile or through murder. For the regional economy, there is no doubt that the debt crisis was seriously detrimental. Embedded socioeconomic structures need to be reliable in order not to injure the very activities that constitute economic life, but the kind of unconstitutional problem-solving characterized by the debt crisis damaged those structures and had a negative effect on their reliability. Consequently, a problem of debt restricted

\textsuperscript{595} For ἐνκτησις γῆς καὶ οἰκίας in Aitolia, see e.g. \textit{IG IX 1} 1:3A; 1:6, 1:8, 1:10b. Regulations for property rights are also visible in some grants of politeia or isopoliteia that include “right to land and house”. See Mackil and van Alfen 2006, 222f. \textit{Enktesis} is generally poorly understood in Hellenistic \textit{koina}; for the better investigated Athens, see Pečírka 1966.
to the elite had a profound, negative impact on all levels of society, and its harmful effects were irreversible.

3. Distribution of wealth and the Aitolian elite.

Fiscal problems in the highest stratum of society could have long-lasting, unfavorable effects on the entire population, and a closer look at Aitolia's elite is necessary. In 189 BC, this group was visibly wealthy. Alexander the Isian had a reported personal fortune of some 200 talents, and funerary material signals the existence of a profoundly rich, small elite. Unsurprisingly, the remainder of Aitolia's population seems to have been comparatively poor; engaged primarily in agrarian activities aiming at subsistence, they may not even have regularly used coined money. While a natural feature of many agrarian economies, this division of wealth hinders the distribution of resources, prevents growth, and moreover, neither stimulates socioeconomic activity nor forces advances in technology.

While there is no explicit evidence, it is exceedingly likely that social stratification was based on wealth. At the basis for this plutocratic stratification lay property, in particular ownership of land. In the late third and early second century BC, some citizens evidently borrowed money against the security of their property, a loan that took the form of crude credit. The property was needed as a guarantee against risk. For the lending party, that security was an important concern in formulating economic strategies as it safeguarded against permanent loss of capital. It is thus likely that these loans were chiefly available to persons with substantially large, important properties. For the borrower, the loan was risky as losing property entailed a permanent loss of

597 On agriculture and *oikos* models for subsistence farming, see Burford Cooper 1978. On the primitivist/substantivist debate in relation to *oikos*-farms, see Cartledge 2002.
598 See e.g. Scheidel 2007.
599 Cf. the plutocratic division of society in archaic Athens or Republican Rome.
600 Gabrielsen 2005.
status, yet the loan was clearly important enough to warrant the risk. Why did the wealthy Aitolians see fit to borrow money against the security of their important lands?

Funerary evidence suggests that Aitolía’s elite was seriously engaged in an internal competition for visibility. Deeply embedded in elite identity throughout the Greek world, this visibility was important in several ways; politically, socially, but also financially. A better known person had a better chance of holding public office, perhaps thereby qualifying for consideration for federal office and in extent, vastly improving the odds for personal gain. Consequently, elite families striving for improved visibility in their local communities invested in what can only be labeled conspicuous consumption.\(^{602}\) Naturally, fine dedications in sanctuaries and elaborate funerary monuments were costly, but the social standing obtained through enhanced visibility justified such financial investments. Conspicuous consumption consequently reflects a conscious socioeconomic strategy that while seriously dangerous, had a distinct, long-term goal in mind. Unfortunately, that specific strategy could have disastrous effects on society as a whole, which the Aitolian debt crisis so clearly illustrated.\(^ {603}\)

Nevertheless, the elite competition for visibility may have to some extent stimulated important connectivity. The physical manifestations of their consumption required manpower, skilled labor, and resources, all of which mandated the movement of people and encouraged skill specialization. Such investments were important for a centralized economy and encouraged market exchange.\(^ {604}\) Yet, there is no evidence that elite competition had a measurable positive impact on the regional economy, and their self-serving competition for visibility did not stop the population on the “downward slope”.

But elite activities did not solely serve elite interests, even though personal aggrandizement was certainly their aim. Through acts of euergetism, elite members participated in the Panhellenic

\(^{602}\) On elite families, see O’Neil 1984-1986.

\(^{603}\) Carney 1973.

\(^{604}\) Renfrew 1979.
ideal of generosity and thereby influenced the socioeconomic activities of others.\textsuperscript{605} In Aitolia, a preserved inscription documenting a local benefaction unsurprisingly deals with debt. The Kalydonian Lykos personally absolved the city of Pleuron from its public debt and received an honorific statue at Thermon in return.\textsuperscript{606} The example is indicative both of the sharp division of wealth within Aitolia and the purchasing power available to the elite. An example from Kalydon simply labels the honorand \textit{euergetes} but it is clear that the man is from the same city whose population collectively honors him.\textsuperscript{607} Two other Aitolians were honored with statues at Delphi for their services to the temple and to the city, although the nature of that service is unknown.\textsuperscript{608} Several Aitolian citizens were granted various honors at Delphi, including \textit{proxenia}, presumably for services of benefaction rendered to the sanctuary (Appendix 3C). In several cases, the honorand come from well-known Aitolian families who had actively participated in federal affairs which suggests an elite status.\textsuperscript{609} Clearly, the Aitolian elite partook in a well-known Hellenistic institution that when directed toward a community – like in the case of Pleuron – could have an immediate, positive effect on the personal finances of the local population.

Yet, random acts of euergetism meant little for the Aitolian population as a whole. In fact, elite focus on self-aggrandizing consumption intensified the inequalities within society. By monopolizing federal offices for the sake of their own visibility, elite families barred less wealthy members of the population from important opportunities for marginal improvement, thereby reinforcing the plutocratic structure of Aitolian society. Consequently, elite behavior only served to accelerate the “downward slope”.

\textsuperscript{605} See e.g. Bresson 2000; Davies 2005. On money and benefactions, see von Reden 2010.\textsuperscript{606} IG IX 1\textsuperscript{2} 1:70, late third century BC.\textsuperscript{607} IG IX 1\textsuperscript{2} 1:140, second century BC.\textsuperscript{608} Syll.\textsuperscript{3} 621 to Pantaleon from Pleuron, 180s or 170s BC; \textit{FdD} III 1,576 to a man from Naupaktos, c. 150 BC.\textsuperscript{609} E.g. Aristonymos from Naupaktos in \textit{FdD} III 1,151 – see Grainger 2000.
4. Mercenary service.

In the ancient world, the masses routinely lacked economic power.\(^{610}\) Individuals consequently had little influence over collective problem-solving mechanisms within the local or regional economy. That does not mean that none were available to them. Piracy and brigandage had always been part of the Aitolian way of life, an opportunistic approach toward personal gain which was absolutely essential for any individual situated in an economic system that was otherwise incapable to improve marginal returns. Mercenary service was another such problem-solving mechanism. At the end of the third century BC, a massive exodus of Aitolian mercenaries coincided with a regional debt crisis, suggesting that mercenary service was utilized to alleviate financial and socioeconomic pressure on an individual basis.\(^{611}\) Importantly, several of the late third-century-BC Aitolians embarking on a new career were deeply enmeshed in private debt.\(^{612}\) Undeniably, the Aitolians viewed mercenary service as a personal problem-solving mechanism in the same manner as piracy or freebooting. Curiously, there is no evidence for such service in the period following the indemnity, not even during the deeply troubling debt crisis in the late 170s BC, and we must ask why.\(^{613}\)

After the battle of Apamea, the Roman general Acilius barred the Aitolians from crossing into Asia.\(^{614}\) This was not a clause in the indemnity yet oddly, the Aitolians seem to have obeyed. On the other hand, there were few employers in the 180s and early 170s BC. To seek service with Antiochus III was out of the question as the Roman peace treaty explicitly forbade him from continuing previous engagements.\(^{615}\) Ptolemaic Egypt succumbed to civil war in the mid-180s BC.

\(^{610}\) Carney 1973.
\(^{611}\) See chapter 2; Griffith 1968.
\(^{612}\) Skopas and Dorimachos are the two most notable examples. Polybius 13.1.
\(^{613}\) The lack of evidence for Aitolian piracy in the second century BC is not a factor of Polybius losing interest in the region but rather, suggests that piracy was no longer considered a reliable problem-solving mechanism. See e.g. Ormerod 1997; Perrier 2008.
\(^{614}\) Polybius 20.10.4; Livy 36.38.3; Eckstein 1995a.
\(^{615}\) Burstein 1980.
Neither Pergamon nor Bithynia was in need of additional troops. In fact, the two decades following the clash between Rome and the Seleucids were largely peaceful, a stark contrast to the constant warfare in the late third century BC. In the ancient world, mercenary service seems to have resulted from a combination of local conditions and external incentives. In the early second century BC, the external incentives were visibly lacking. Nevertheless, the federation not only seems to have complied with the indemnity clauses, but also actively sought to improve its image in the Panhellenic world. It may have strongly suggested that no Aitolians seek employment abroad, passed legislation against the recruitment of mercenaries in its territory, gone to great measures to prevent piracy, or penalized anyone whose behavior threatened to irritate Rome.

Consequently, Aitolian mercenaries were noticeably fewer in the Late Hellenistic period. A Ptolemaios served Antiocchos IV in Palestine in the late 170s BC. In 171 BC, Perseus held a census of his army which at that time included a band of 500 Aitolian and Boiotian mercenaries commanded by the Achaian Lykon. The mixed company is strongly indicative of the participants' mercenary status. The Aitolian general Archidamos from Pholas fled with Perseus after Pydna, but his fate is unknown. Interestingly, Archidamos had been the Aitolian strategos no less than four times in the period 191 – 175 BC, and had commanded the Aitolian army both at Thaumakoi and Kynoskephalai; moreover, he had served as an official envoy to the Achaian league and to Glabrio. Archidamos was undoubtedly a member of the Aitolian elite and his choice of mercenary service at the end of his career suggests his involvement in the escalating debt crisis. Slingbolts at

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616 See Launey 1949. The early second century BC stands in stark contrast to the early third century BC, the heyday of Greek mercenary activity. See Griffith 1968. On mercenaries in earlier times, see Parke 1933; McKechnie 1989.
617 Archibald 2011.
618 See chapter 7.
620 Livy 42.12.51.
621 Livy 44.43; Plutarch Aem. 23.3; Grainger 2000, 109.
622 Livy 32.4.2, 39.1.4; Polybius 18.21, 20.9, 28.4; IG IX 12 1.97, 1.310, 3.629; SGDI II 1786, 1795, 1843, 1986, 1987, 2036, 2037, 2047, 2132, 2134; SEG XII 295.
Numantia inscribed ΑΙΤΩΛΩΝ indicate Aitolian participation in a Roman campaign. Since no Aitolian federal army ever served outside Greece, the Aitolians at Numantia must have been mercenaries. In the case of Ptolemaic service, we hear of a Melankomas who was governor of Kition on Cyprus and his son – also named Melankomas – who was hipparchos, hegemon and governor of Kition in 145 – 116 BC. A third Aitolian, Andramachos, was strategos for the whole island. Bagnall suggests that this Andramachos was the same individual as the ambassador to Rome for Ptolemaios Philometor in 154 BC.

The first century BC is similarly meager. Sulla held a small recruiting campaign in Thessaly and Aitolia. The Kalydonian Ladames, presumably a Sullan mercenary, dedicated a statue in his honor. Ladames came from an old local family which can be traced at least into the third century BC, and his father was one of the last documented federal strategoi. Decades later, Caesar’s general Cn. Domitius Calvinus used Aitolian and Epirote mercenaries in an attack on Thessaly. Pompeius Magnus recruited heavily in Western Greece; in fact, Petropoulous argues that he occupied Kalydon in 49 BC. Caesar used light-armed Aitolian troops at Pharsalos at which point the Aitolian mercenary leaves the historical narrative.

In contrast to his third-century-BC predecessor, the second-century-BC Aitolian mercenary was a professional. The sparse evidence indicates that service extended well beyond a series of campaigns. The Aitolians at Kition held a permanent position – which in fact was inherited from father to son – and Perseus’ company of Aitolo-Boiotian mercenaries was an integrated part of his standing army. The first-century-BC evidence is less informative but it is likely that the locally recruited bands of Aitolians did not consist of professionally trained soldiers; after all, the koinon

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623 González 1996.
624 OGIS 134; Launey 1949, 1136; O’Neil 2006.
625 CIG 2626; Launey 1949, 1133; Bagnall 1976.
626 IG IX 1 2 1:137; SGDI II 1418; Appian Bell. Mith. 30.
627 IG IX 1 2 1:36j; Grainger 2000, 15.
628 Cassius Dio 41.51.3.
629 Caesar BC 3.61; Petropoulos 1991.
630 Appian BC 3.70.
no longer existed and Aitolia had not gone to war for several generations. Archibald argues that
Hellenistic mercenaries were selectively recruited in areas that combined large populations with
well-established traditions of professional warfare but in the first century BC, Aitolia’s population
appears to have been neither large nor maintained such traditions; moreover, Roman generals
simply seem to have recruited mercenaries locally, wherever the Roman army happened to be.631

Rural Greece had always exported young men and Aitolians had regularly left their
homeland for paid service abroad since the Classical period.632 By the second century BC,
mercenary service had become a deeply integrated problem-solving mechanism for the Aitolian
population, a mechanism that alleviated socioeconomic problems through the temporary
dislocation of involved parties. This temporary removal helped restore regional equilibrium, at
least on the surface. That equilibrium was structurally essential for the federation and consequently
formed an intrinsic part of the socioeconomic framework for Aitolia’s population.

Private debt appears to have been a major factor for discord in Late Hellenistic Aitolia.
When the external incentive for mercenary service was no longer available and piracy was no
longer deemed a viable choice, local conditions forced the involved parties had to resort to other
forms of problem-solving. Unfortunately, these included political manipulation, revolts, and
violence – options that only caused further harm to the region, the federation, the population and
their economy.

5. Manumissions.

A group of inscribed documents records the process of manumission and thereby attests to tangible
economic transactions. They chiefly date to the first half of the second century BC and verify that

631 Archibald 2011, 50.
the legal structure necessary for such economic transactions was still in place. In addition to constituting the only available evidence for price setting in Late Hellenistic Aitolia, this group of documents provides important demographic information that serves to further contextualize the “downward slope”.

The data is straightforward. In the Late Hellenistic period, Aitolians manumitted some 166 slaves. 71 were men, 69 women, 15 boys and 11 girls. While the majority was manumitted in the sanctuaries at Delphi and Skala/Naupaktos, inscriptions at Phistyon, Kalydon and Arsinoe demonstrate that these towns, too, were used for manumission. Most slaves were “homeborn”. Foreign-born slaves did exist and in addition to various Greek peoples, included Thracians, Gauls, and an Arab. Roughly 21% of these slaves were manumitted conditionally. The conditions were always in favor of the former owner and illuminate a crude economic strategy aimed at maximizing profit. Most commonly, the manumitted slave had to remain in service to his former owner – for a specified time, for an unspecified time, of for the remainder of the former owner’s life – but other conditions involve performing commemorative rites as well as the slave’s property being inherited by the former master. In some cases, the freedman could break the conditions of his contract in exchange for a certain sum of money.

The average price of manumission by an Aitolian owner was just below 4 minae which was slightly lower than at Delphi (Fig. 44). It has been argued both that market prices for slaves were

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633 Several manumission records demonstrate that Aitolian law regulated a slave’s status in his polis. In IG IX 12 1:96a, a manumitted woman is said to be eleuthera, anephtapos and aphorologetos which gives her a legal status equal of citizen rights. IG IX 12 1:82c holds the freed slave to be isoteles and entimos according to Aitolian law. SGDI II 2133 gives a slave right to politeuein, ie, to be a citizen (!). Clearly, a sophisticated legal system allowed for the integration of former slaves into Aitolian society. See Zelnick-Abramovitz 2005. Consequently, while manumission per se is a private act, in Aitolia, it was also an integrated socioeconomic institution. Cf. Morris and Papadopoulos 2005.

634 A slave manumitted at Phistyon is said to be το γένος εκ τας χώρας – of local origin. IG IX 12 1:96b. Presumably, that indicated being born in a nearby town but not at Phistyon.


636 SGDI II 1811; Samuel 1965.

close to release prices, and conversely, that the release price was substantially higher.\textsuperscript{638} Price is the most important factor in determining profit yet the price point must match what the buyer – in this case, the slave – psychologically finds reasonable; otherwise, incentive for purchase is lost.\textsuperscript{639} Consequently, the price setting visible in Aitolian manumissions indicate that on average, 4 minae were considered reasonable both for the seller and the buyer, which in turn suggests that release prices was higher than market prices but only marginally so. Yet, from a subsistence point of view, the difference is irrelevant. Comparing the cost of manumission to the cost of wheat, Hopkins demonstrates that 4 minae, roughly the equivalent of 3 ½ tons of wheat, could feed a poor family engaged in subsistence farming for three years.\textsuperscript{640} A majority of the Aitolian population probably lived off small, rural farming operations run by an extended family unit; under such living conditions, 3 ½ tons of wheat would make a substantial difference toward survival.

Yet, there is definite reason to believe that subsistence farmers did not engage in manumission. The occupation of slaves was often defined by the livelihood of their owners.\textsuperscript{641} Consequently, their ability to accumulate and store wealth was dependent on the owners’ status, income, and profession. This suggests that manumitting slave owners were not engaged in subsistence farming; indeed, the institution was probably restricted to individuals of a certain economic status.\textsuperscript{642} Female slaves manumitted at the sanctuary of Syrian Aphrodite at Phistyon had several male owners each, suggesting that they may have been \textit{hetairai}.\textsuperscript{643} Unfortunately, few other documents indicate what the professions of owners were, and although we hear of the

\textsuperscript{638} Hopkins 1978 contra Westerman 1955.
\textsuperscript{639} See e.g. Parkinson 1960.
\textsuperscript{640} Hopkins 1978. While the comparison is illuminating, it is clear that coined money was involved at the time of transaction: \textit{SGDI} II 1953; Westermann 1948, 10.
\textsuperscript{641} Zeyrek 2006.
\textsuperscript{642} Blavatskaja (1972) believes all Aitolian manumittors to be members of noble and distinguished families.
\textsuperscript{643} \textit{IG IX} 1\textsuperscript{2} 1:96a, 1:97 – 1:99, 1:106, 1:108. See Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005).
manumission of a "skilled baker", in most cases it is impossible to more closely determine how slaves accrued and stored the wealth needed to purchase their own freedom.\textsuperscript{644}

Unsurprisingly, manumission follows the now well-known Aitolian trend of intense activity followed by rapidly escalating decline. Over 80\% of Aitolian manumission documents date to the first half of the second century BC, thus coinciding with the debt crisis. It seems likely that at this time, slaves were manumitted at least in part to free up cash. The phenomenon did not lose its cultural significance thereafter but rather, the sharp shift in manumission practices reflects familiar socioeconomic changes.\textsuperscript{645} First, numismatic data has demonstrated that significantly less coinage was in circulation in the latter half of the second century BC. The loss of monetary circulation thus physically hindered slaves from accumulating and storing the wealth necessary for manumission. Second, fewer people possessed the accrued wealth necessary to meet the risk involved in parting with the income-generating labor of a trained slave. Most manumitted slaves were homeborn which suggests that fewer slaves were purchased on the market or obtained – for free – through piracy and warfare; in turn, this indicates an overall declining economy.\textsuperscript{646} Connectivity dwindled. Finally, the sharp drop points to a fact also emphasized by Polybius: population decline.

\textbf{6. The relationship between demographic effects and socioeconomic change.}

Several scholars have cautioned against misreading Polybius 36.17, a passage whose objective is at least partially moral: to demonstrate \textit{why} the depopulation of Greek states was taking place.\textsuperscript{647}

Population decline in the ancient world has been explained as a literary \textit{topos} that utilized oversimplified, impressionistic generalizations to advance a specific rhetoric, and this, too, applies

\textsuperscript{644} IG IX 1\textsuperscript{2} 3:630a.
\textsuperscript{645} Cf. the situation at Delphi where the tradition continued unbroken into the imperial period. See Zelnick-Abramovitz 2005; Hopkins 1978; Bloch 1914.
\textsuperscript{646} Blavatskaja 1972.
\textsuperscript{647} Reger 2007; Tarn and Griffith 1952; Rostovtzeff 1941; Austin 2006, 148-149; Walbank 1957. On moralism in Polybius, see Eckstein 1995b.
Nevertheless, landscape contraction and site loss combined with a lack of settlement nucleation strongly indicate a smaller population; moreover, the decline in site activity—observed, for example, through the distinct drop in manumissions and the gradual abandonment of formerly important socioeconomic institutions—is highly suggestive of a shrinking population. At the time of Augustus’ arrival, the population of Aitolia was undeniably smaller than 150 years earlier. Corresponding evidence from Boiotia supports this conclusion.649

Naturally, population numbers are rarely static, and Roman census figures demonstrate a decline in capitæ civium between 164 and 136 BC by no less than 6%.650 In the following period, however, the Roman population bounced back. Such fluctuations are a natural demographic feature as populations tend to increase when small and decrease when large.651 They may depend on epidemics, war and food shortage.652 Yet, Late Hellenistic Boiotia did not experience the same response but rather, its population decline was continuous. This depopulation has been explained as a consequence of agricultural over-exploitation.653 Population growth in the fourth and third centuries BC exerted too much pressure on subsistence and the biotope could simply not sustain such a large population. In Boiotia’s case, then, population numbers were regulated by ecological constraints.654

Despite noteworthy parallels, the depopulation of Aitolia cannot simply be explained in terms of ecology and landscape constraints. The Aitolian countryside was never easily farmed like Boiotia; therefore, its population relied on outside energy subsidies so greatly that their raid mentality eventually became structurally essential for their survival. Rather than ecologically

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648 Alcock 1993.
650 Nicolet 1994; Brunt 1971.
651 Hixon, Pacala et al 2002; Engels 1984. The ancient world was embedded with numerous restraints on population growth; warfare and migration were but two of them. See Chaniotis 2011: 2005.
induced, the depopulation of Aitolia results from a complex process involving a multitude of socioeconomic factors, all components of the “downward slope”.

The very complexity of the process is what made it so powerful. The mass exodus of Aitolian mercenaries in the late third century BC had temporarily alleviated financially induced social problems, but that same problem-solving mechanism deprived the exhausted landscape of the manpower essential for agricultural restoration. Even if the majority of mercenaries eventually did return home, their temporary dislocation had initiated landscape contraction. The conditions of the Roman peace treaty hindered traditional problem-solving mechanisms from counteracting escalating agro-economic problems, effectually causing a domino effect. Once in motion, negative change was rapid. Ancient societies were ill-equipped for counteracting marginal decline since they were structurally lacking in incentives toward technological invention and advancement in agriculture.\textsuperscript{655} Thus, when traditional methods were no longer available to the Aitolians, they were forced to replace them with less structurally suitable mechanisms. Yet, despite outside energy subsidies no longer being available, the population could not disengage from their age-old raid mentality which when turned inward, had disastrous effects. Debt crisis manifesting itself in civil war was one such result. In this structurally imbalanced economy, new problem-solving mechanisms emerged which were unsuitable both for the region and the population, population decline being at the same time the most logical and the most impactful. Since demographic conditions are major determinants of economic performance, sustained population decline can have lasting negative effects on a society; so also Aitolia.\textsuperscript{656}

If only two children reach adult age instead of four, the population is cut in half in a single generation.\textsuperscript{657} If only one child reaches adult age, population decline occurs at a staggering 75% within one generation. While astounding at first glance, such variations are not unreasonable in the

\textsuperscript{655} Tainter 1988; Burford 1993; Weber 1976.
\textsuperscript{656} Scheidel 2007.
\textsuperscript{657} This precludes that a rise in immigration or other population-regulating mechanisms take place.
short-term as stability in population rates tends to correct itself over two or three generations.\textsuperscript{658} In Aitolia's case, however, recovery was impossible and although there is no numerical data whatsoever, the general effects are apparent. When the population shrank, the farmed landscape lost vital manpower. This lead to a smaller area in agricultural production which resulted in a contracted energy subsidy; consequently, the only way for the population to remain within the vital margin was to shrink. In this way, Aitolia adapted to the new conditions and constraints placed upon it. Of course, the Aitolian population is unlikely to have possessed collective insight into demographic checks and controls, but as a natural response it was perfectly logical. As a problem-solving mechanism, however, it was poorly suited to the Aitolian landscape.

The effects of a smaller population were disastrous, especially in terms of sociopolitical complexity.\textsuperscript{659} Economic institutions became difficult to manage and eventually ceased to exist, depriving the region of vital socioeconomic connectivity. The agricultural base for economic life became challenging to maintain. Eventually, the population had to transition to a lower level of sociopolitical integration, abandoning the very structures that had previously characterized and formalized their society.\textsuperscript{660} This is the background for Cicero's \textit{Aetolia amissa}; a population demonstrating vital signs of system collapse.

\section*{7. Occupation and exhaustion: Rome and the Aitolian population in the first century BC.}

The Aitolian people were not strangers to foreign occupation of their territory. Already in the fourth century BC, Achaians had occupied Kalydon and Naupaktos.\textsuperscript{661} In more recent years, Pleuron

\textsuperscript{658} Engels 1984. The best studied example besides the city of Rome is Roman Egypt whose data verifies that fluctuations overall corrected themselves: Bagnall and Frier 2006.

\textsuperscript{659} Tainter 1988.

\textsuperscript{660} Renfrew 1979.

\textsuperscript{661} Merker 1989.
had been attached to Achaia; Herakleia had been occupied and then lost to the same koinon. Such occupation was unlikely permanent albeit undoubtedly injurious to the socioeconomic framework of individual town. In the second century BC, the Aitolians diligently stayed out of trouble, avoiding participation in the Achaian War and only supporting Rome with a small contingent against Perseus. The population and the federation appear to have maintained a policy of active neutrality. Consequently, the Aitolians were spared such atrocities as the plundering of Epiros in 167 BC or the destruction of Corinth in 146 BC. Yet, between Khaironeia in 84 BC and the battle of Actium in 30 BC, Greece was the scene for all decisive Roman campaigns, campaigns that can only be described as lengthy, and even non-involved states were affected. As the setting for these major Roman conflicts, the Greek states and their populations experienced the usual negative effects of prolonged warfare without a chance of marginal improvement. Indeed, Greece became a battlefield, and Aitolia too felt the effects, for example when Pompeius Magnus placed large garrisons at Kalydon and Naupaktos. While the Roman army technically fed itself, food convoys were brought in from afar, yet local resources could quickly become exhausted when an army remained stationary. There are no detailed accounts for the events at Kalydon and Naupaktos beyond the fact that Caesar's general Calvisus threw out the enemy garrisons and then "possessed himself of the whole country", but numismatic evidence at Kalydon demonstrates the length and intensity of Roman presence in the region. Some Aitolians were recruited into the large Roman armies; we have already observed them in the armies of Sulla, Pompeius and Caesar. Such service may have been forced rather than voluntary, a strong indication of the hardship of Roman military

662 See chapter 7; Grainger 1999, 534. Aymard (1938, 37.9 n. 3) believes that Pleuron was annexed by Achaia in 168 BC but there is no direct evidence to this date.
663 See e.g. Grainger 1999, chapters 22 and 23. The literature on the Achaian war is extensive; see e.g. Gruen 1976b; Fuks 1970.
664 On the enslavement of the 150,000 inhabitants of Epiros, see Ziolkowski 1986; Oost 1954; Scullard 1945. See also Gruen 1984.
666 Caesar BC 3.35.
667 See section 4 above.
presence. For example, recently levied Aitolian troops deserted Pompeius for Caesar.\textsuperscript{668} It is clear that the Aitolian people at large did not benefit from the lengthy presence of Rome's troops. We are ill informed of how Roman armies behaved during this time but the exhaustion of taxes, supplies, forced labor and in some cases plunder can only have led to further decline.\textsuperscript{669} Cicero repeatedly remarked on the desolate state of the Corinthian gulf in the 50s BC, arguing that Roman generals in many ways were responsible for that desolation.\textsuperscript{670} Both Caesar and Pompey installed veteran colonies on the north coast of the Peloponnese; after his successful campaigns in Cicilia, for example, Pompeius settled a colony of pirates (!) at Dyme west of Patras.\textsuperscript{671} No such colonies were officially established in Aitolia yet the introduction of a new permanent population suggests that the local populations had become too small to successfully farm all available farmland; colonies were rarely, if ever, established in the middle of active, productive centers.

Other Roman generals also injured Greece. Sulla, for example, is said to have extorted money and equipment in Aitolia and Thessaly.\textsuperscript{672} Yet, other foreign, non-Roman groups also caused harm to Central Greece. In c. 84 BC, a large contingent of raiding Thracians sacked the sanctuary at Delphi and marauded their way through Greece.\textsuperscript{673} Moreover, the battle of Pharsalos was not the end of Roman military presence. In the late 30s BC, Marcus Antonius stationed his armies and navy along the west coast of the Peloponnese and Western Greece.\textsuperscript{674} Octavian's general Agrippa successfully harassed Antonius' food convoys in a prolonged sequence that in many aspects resembled guerilla warfare.\textsuperscript{675} While it is not clear whether Aitolia was part of these events, the greater area of Western Greece was undoubtedly affected. Antonius' army comprised nineteen legions, perhaps totaling some 75,000 foot. His headquarters were at Patras, but when Agrippa took

\textsuperscript{668} Caesar BC 3.61. \\
\textsuperscript{669} Grainger 1999, 542. \\
\textsuperscript{670} in Pisonem 91, 96. \\
\textsuperscript{671} Plutarch Pompey 1.28.4. \\
\textsuperscript{672} Diodorus 38.9.7; Plutarch Sull. 12.3-6, 19.6; Appian Mith. 30.54. See also Shatzman 1975. \\
\textsuperscript{673} Appian BC 2.70; Grainger 1999, 542. \\
\textsuperscript{674} Plutarch Ant. 57.1, 58.1; Cassius Dio 50.9.2-3; Murray and Petsas 1989. \\
\textsuperscript{675} Cassius Dio 50.11.3; Vellius 2.84.2; Orosius 6.19.6; Murray and Petsas (1989).
Patras and Corinth, thus cutting off Antonius from the Peloponnese, he was forced to move his
armies north toward the gulf of Ambrakia.\textsuperscript{676} The road to Actium went through Aitolia.

\textsuperscript{676} For the composition and size of Antonius' troops, see Tarn 1932. On the campaign in general, see Tarn and Charlesworth 1989.
CHAPTER 9.
From indemnity to integration.

1. Features of decline.

The most illuminating features of Aitolian decline are the landscape itself, the structure of the regional economy, and the series of exogenous shocks. While not powerful enough individually to cause economic decline, their combination resulted in what I have labeled “the downward slope”.

1.1. Mountain and shore: the Aitolian landscape.

Aitolia’s landscape was an intrinsic feature of the region’s development in the Hellenistic period. As the setting for civilization, the mountains and rocky shores were both constraining and enabling; constraining, since the landscape was generally not suitable for farming; enabling, since it forced a certain modus operandi upon the population which over the centuries enabled the formation of the koinon and contributed to its success. The basis for economic activity was always agrarian, yet at the time of the indemnity, the regional agriculture was exhausted. Constant warfare and loss of manpower had led to a serious disruption of farming activities, a disruption of a type that causes settlement contraction and thus demands time for recovery.

The indemnity happened at a most inopportune time. The inability to capture a new energy subsidy forced reactivation of the exhausted countryside, depriving it of its necessary recovery time. Importantly, the Aitolian landscape had never been able to fully sustain the needs of its population, and the contracting countryside had long-term negative effects for all who dwelled in it. For a population structurally dependent on expansion, population decline was the only long-term solution to the new constraints. By compressing the shrinking population into areas best suitable agriculturally and pastorally, the Aitolians resorted to the most natural form of problem-solving: subsistence survival. In fact, in the Late Hellenistic period, the Aitolians may have had to rest on
pastoralism to a greater extent than before. Due to settlement contraction, formerly farmed uplands were now available for grazing again, a fact that may have facilitated survival for the best connected sites.

1.2. The problem-solving koinon.

In this dissertation I have argued that the Aitolian federation was an important economic agent which in fact formed the framework for most economic activity in the region. As a problem-solving socioeconomic organization, the koinon was structurally formatted toward territorial expansion and energy capture. This essential feature of its economy had grown out of the population’s traditional way of life and constituted a coping mechanism that worked to reduce risk in the face of preexisting ecological and geographical constraints. In fact, its expansionistic tendency was an intrinsic part of its success. By integrating foreign territories into its organization, the federation provided small, unimportant communities with both an international voice and a network that offered improved connectivity and thereby, a socioeconomic upswing. For its own population, it offered the opportunity for organized energy capture whenever agricultural constraints made wealth accumulation impossible and survival difficult.

The failure of the Aitolian koinon almost exclusively depends on its expansionistic characteristics; more so than on its stresses. The indemnity restricted its growth mechanism and moreover, removed already captured subsidies that had been integrated into the economy. While sufficiently sophisticated to negotiate relationships with the outside world, the federation lacked the self-awareness to adjust structurally to internal problems. Consequently, the federation ceased to be a problem-solving organization and as an obsolete, dysfunctional institution, its structural collapse was inevitable.

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677 Gallant 1991.
678 Renfrew 1979, 488.
The loss of federal socioeconomic institutions held clear disadvantages for the population. Aitolia could not sustain its population size and wealth when problem-solving mechanisms were restricted and eventually lost. Without the koinon, Aitolia was transformed into a region of relatively isolated towns – not even city-states. These local communities relied on each other for resources and managed to sustain status quo, yet certain integral aspects of their economy could no longer be maintained. Without the federation that had brought the people of the mountains to the forefront of Greek affairs and offered access to international networks of exchange, the Aitolians had to revert to a local system. No other organization could negotiate their relationship with the outside world; no local polity was large and strong enough to assume the problem-solving role of the collapsed federation.

1.3. Exogenous shock.

Persson has demonstrated that the smaller the economy, the more vulnerable it is to exogenous shock.679 Never large, Aitolia’s agrarian-based economy was particularly sensitive to changes in its structure. Reliant on expansion, it took a great deal of investment to maintain a delicate balance between marginal improvement and full-fledged decline. All forms of external trauma had the potential to affect such a system in the long-term; consequently, the federation sought to eliminate the sources for such traumas, for example by incorporating large territories as shock-absorbers against outside threats. Still, when rattled by exogenous shock, the system had to compensate for the loss of energy – most often, through capture of a new energy subsidy. Yet, Aitolia had not had time to compensate for the extended warfare in the late third century BC. Taking the form of physical damage of buildings, removal of goods, agrarian decline, population removal and landscape contraction, the wars can only be considered monumentally disruptive, and it would

have taken a serious investment of energy to restore the equilibrium.\textsuperscript{680} The federation was structurally equipped with the mechanisms to achieve that end, and had done so before. Unfortunately, a second major exogenous shock – the indemnity of 189 BC – pushed the region further into disrepair. This economic trauma was less straightforward in nature and it is not clear whether the Aitolians completely comprehended the consequences. Not only were annexed energy subsidies removed and bullion vital for a functional monetary economy driven out, but the indemnity changed the very structure of federal coping mechanisms.

I have made the argument that the indemnity of 189 BC was not intended to cause the “downward slope” evaluated in this dissertation. The conditions of the peace were not unbearably harsh; in fact, in comparison to other polities, Rome asked very little of the Aitolian koinon. Yet, this exogenous shock set in motion a complex chain-reaction from which the Late Hellenistic Aitolians could not escape. Generally, exogenous shock had a physical effect – damaged goods, destroyed farmlands, stolen booty – but the indemnity changed the very mechanisms of Aitolian problem-solving; thus, its effects were structural. Such trauma could only be met with serious reorganization of socioeconomic structures, but as an ancient state, Aitolia did not possess the sophistication or complexity to meet that challenge.

2. Synthesizing the evidence: system collapse?

With a seriously restricted federation, socioeconomic institutions ultimately became obsolete. Connectivity dwindled although was never entirely lost. Loss of local coin production restricted monetary exchange which in return limited trade. The economy was never entirely demonetized but the evidence suggests that significantly fewer people were integrated into the monetary economy than in the late third century BC. Nevertheless, for a minor part of the population, the

\textsuperscript{680} There is plenty of comparative evidence for the serious disruptions of warfare; see Chaniotis 2005:137.
monetized feature of exchange was evidently important enough to maintain at any cost. They responded to the new monetary constraints by adopting foreign currencies. This signals a surprisingly high level of monetary reliance for small pockets of the population and emphasizes the range of integration within the population. Importantly, we find these monetarily engaged individuals in the same towns that show the strongest signs of sustained connectivity.

In many aspects, Late Hellenistic Aitolia displays serious signs of loss of sociopolitical complexity, the hallmark of system collapse. The most important feature of that collapse was the fall of the federation at the end of the second century BC. Yet in its wake, a new system arose. Significantly less complex, it consisted of individual towns and local communities who shared in no larger, communal socioeconomic structures, yet they retained sufficient site-to-site connectivity to survive. These communities predominantly relied on barter although pockets of the population retained monetary integration. Importantly, any foreign coinage seems to have been acceptable legal tender. While locally self-sufficient in terms of socioeconomic infrastructures, they seem to have lacked the larger features necessary for greater integration; common legal structures being the most essential. Thus, these communities lacked the ability to negotiate relationships with other polities who maintained a higher level of socioeconomic complexity. Moreover, as less complex societies, they were ill equipped to defend themselves against exogenous shock; thus, the disastrous effects of Roman presence on the smaller Greek states in the first century BC.

A collapsed federation consequently did not equate a collapsed region – only a changed one. From a broader chronological perspective, the Aitolian population quite successfully adapted to the new constraints. The poor landscape had never been able to successfully sustain a large population in the long-term, but could more easily support a small population partially engaged in pastoral activities. By returning to a less complex form of society, smaller amounts of energy had to be

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invested in managing socioeconomic infrastructures. In fact, low levels of complexity are the norm; seriously complex societies are recent in human history and thus unusual.\footnote{\textit{Tainter 1988, 198.}}

What we observe in first-century-BC Aitolia is not a lost civilization but a natural and logical response to new conditions: problem solving at its most organic. It is a rational economizing process that seems to have evolved spontaneously. It is only in our modern eyes that a less complex society is "bad". Invariably, such bias is unhelpful and I invite caution when assessing negative concepts such as "collapse" and "decline" in the ancient world. In Aitolia's case, perhaps we should no longer talk about "decline" but rather, about "change".

\section*{3. The desolation of Late Hellenistic Greece: rhetoric, concept, reality.}

The concept of desolation has determined how scholars view Greco-Roman interaction in the Late Hellenistic and Early Roman periods. It has therefore influenced not only our interpretation of interstate interaction but also generated a skewed image of the history of less researched Greek states. Moreover, it has reinforced the idea of Roman hegemony in the East and thereby had a profound effect on the eternal question of Greek freedom.\footnote{\textit{See e.g. Larsen 1935.}} In short, it is a singularly powerful concept yet we can no longer support such broad generalizations resting on too narrow a reading of \textit{eremia}.

Desolation has been an intrinsic characteristic of the traditional narrative on Roman involvement in Greece since the moment Romans first set foot on Greek soil, but only in more recent years have scholars begun to reevaluate it as a literary \textit{topos}. Often part of a victor's vocabulary, it is not a singularly Roman concept. Generally, \textit{eremia} – desolation – and the closely connected concept of \textit{oliganthropia} are advanced as negative features of a location in opposition to
the positive polyandria. As a rhetorical tool, desolation explains why something is done to a place and outlines the moral justification for why the place does not attempt to defend itself against that action. Strabo jokingly refers to Megalopolis as a desert but Polybius tells us that the city was difficult to defend because of its eremia, thus offering a morally acceptable explanation for its capture. Desolation is similarly a negative comment on the person causing it to happen. This is part of Cicero’s ferocious attack on Piso in which he adds Aetolia amissa to a long list of regions on which Piso has supposedly inflicted eremia. Naturally, Cicero’s statement cannot be taken at face value as it is his aim to destroy his enemy, thus presenting Piso with great fictionality. Yet, the Romans believed that they had the right to exploit their provinces but should do so with restraint; clearly, there was an acute awareness that overexploitation could lead to eremia. At large, this is how a morally charged concept achieved its rhetorical use.

It is difficult to ascertain what Strabo envisions when commenting on the eremia of Western Greece or indeed the extent to which his use is rhetorical. Yet, Gallo has successfully demonstrated that Strabo chiefly connects desolation with the absence of cities. Moreover, to Strabo, the turn to pastoral activity, away from farming, constitutes a regression in the social and economic development expected in a historical region. As such, Strabo’s rhetoric extrapolates economic tendencies from superficial observation and assigns a lesser moral value to a region that has allowed this “desolation” to happen. It is in this light that we must view the rhetorical use of eremia. A landscape devoid of cities and thus of people is assumed to be poorly connected and thus possess a lower level of socioeconomic complexity. Yet, this inquiry has demonstrated that despite settlement nucleation and a visibly altered landscape, all features of civilization are still in place in

685 Strabo 8.38.8; Polybius 2.55.2, 5.93.5.
687 Nusbet 1961; Shatzman 1975.
“desolate” Aitolia. *Aetolia amissa* may consequently serve to reshape the concept of desolation and thereby offer a reformed attitude toward Greco-Roman interaction in the first century BC.

The Aitolian landscape was undeniably less active at the time of Strabo than in the third century BC, and the traces of that change were visible. Ruins of smaller sites could probably still be seen among untilled fields, and the significantly smaller population appears to have concentrated to a select few towns. These towns, I have demonstrated above, display overwhelming signs of successful connectivity, but also signs of Late Hellenistic change. This, I believe, is the context for Strabo’s interpretative *eremía*: it is the visible change that enables the rhetoric, not the supposed failure of the surviving towns.

The desolation and emptiness of Aitolia can no longer be taken as historical fact. It is rhetorical, conceptual and interpretative, but not an accurate reflection of the situation. Fluctuations in settlement density are natural features of any landscape, as are fluctuations in the level of sociopolitical and socioeconomic complexity of any civilization. In *Graecia Capta*, Alcock poses the important question: how often is genuine depopulation actually intended in literary sources? In the case of Aitolia, the answer is simultaneously positive and negative; negative, because in the time of Strabo, the region was significantly different from two centuries earlier; but also positive, because despite the depopulation of its countryside, Aitolia was not *eremos*. Neither was it *amissa*.

4. Integration: Aitolia and Augustus.

The archaeology of Aitolia – especially at Kalydon – demonstrates that the region is unlikely to have been part of a large-scale population resettlement in the early 20s BC. We may therefore begin to re-examine the complicated process of Augustus’ reorganization of Western Greece in a more

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690 See discussion in Petropoulos 2007.
691 Alcock 1993.
nuanced manner. The Aitolian data indicates that the process aimed at improving sociopolitical complexity through enhanced socioeconomic connectivity, not at simply moving people in an overt display of power.\textsuperscript{692} By placing economic incentives at the forefront of the debate, we may now appreciate the reorganization of Western Greece as an elaborate but poorly understood form of problem solving. This dissertation has showed that Aitolia’s part in that problem solving is both less involved and more complicated than has previously been assumed.

Not part of the synoicism, Aitolia must consequently have been considered adequately complex to fit Augustus’ scheme, and perhaps also sufficiently populous. In fact, not depriving an entire region of its population was distinctly advantageous. The erasure of whole territories was terrible sociopolitical strategy: it made governmental control impossible and provided brigands, pirates and outlaws with an unreachable base for operation.\textsuperscript{693} The region that held the important road from Patras to Nikopolis had to maintain a satisfactory level of population density and thus connectivity.\textsuperscript{694} Moreover, in the same way that Aitolia itself had used annexed territories as shock-absorbers and energy sources, Augustus used Aitolia and other surrounding territories as protection against potential damage, internal and external, of his newly founded settlements.

Despite our focus on Aitolia, it is vital to view no aspects of the synoicism of Nikopolis in isolation. The roughly concomitant foundation of Nikopolis and the colony at Patras required a complex reorganization of large tracts of land, the negotiation of urban and rural space, and the detailed arrangement of administrative infrastructures.\textsuperscript{695} Such a multifaceted process had to account for local features, assets and constraints, or it would invariably fail. It is in this light that we must view the Aitolian integration into Augustus’ “New Greece”. The process was pragmatic, careful

\textsuperscript{692} On synoikistic resettlement in view of the foundation of victory cities, see Jones 1987.
\textsuperscript{693} Historically, Western Greece had been a notorious energy drain for the Romans; Illyrian and Epirote pirates, quarrelsome Aitolians inviting Seleucid kings into their territory, incorrigible federal states – the list is long. To leave Aitolia empty – and thus open to pirates – would have made little sense from a historical perspective.
\textsuperscript{694} Petropoulous 2007.
\textsuperscript{695} There is some evidence that \textit{colonia Aroe Augusta Patrae} was officially founded in 16 BC, at the time of Agrippa’s travels in the East, although the veteran settlement may have arrived earlier. Castrén 1974; Frei-Stolba 1978-79; Grant 1946; Keppie 1983. For the name of the colony, see Agallapoulou 1991; Rizakis 1989.
and evaluative; each involved polity was treated differently, and to assume a similar approach to populations and cities that varied tremendously in size, composition and complexity is to underestimate the sophistication of the Roman apparatus.

Yet, despite its lack of involvement in the Nikopolitean synoicism and function as a territorial shock-absorber, Aitolia was not excluded from the Augustan plan. In comparison to Aitolia's size as an energy subsidy, the Aitolian population was deemed small enough that the Roman government saw fit to inject the region with the manpower needed to make use of untapped resources. Consequently, part of Kalydon’s chora was handed over to the Roman colonists at Patras, probably soon after the arrival of the new settlers.696 This was a logical decision. Having identified an easily maintained energy source for the new settlers across the gulf, Augustus safeguarded against marginal decline in the new colony, and simultaneously improved connectivity for the Aitolian coastal cities. In view of the unbroken, unaltered activity at Kalydon, this phenomenon can only mean that the resource was large enough to share, and simultaneously, confirms what the landscape contraction has already indicated: that local populations were substantially smaller than in the third century BC. Such injection of “labor” sought to stimulate trade and make use of easily obtainable resources. It is likely to have happened elsewhere, although Kalydon and Naupaktos are our only known examples.697

This new reading invites reconsideration of Pausanias’ account of Patras, an account that has been used in the traditional interpretation of the Augustan reorganization of Western Greece. There, the traveler saw the cult statues of Artemis and Dionysos originally housed in the sanctuary at Kalydon, leading modern scholars to conflate Strabo's and Pausanias’ accounts of the Roman integration into a single Augustan narrative.698 Against the background of sustained activity at Kalydon, I posit that the cult statues were not moved at the time of the foundation of Nikopolis, but

696 Strabo 10.2.21. There is no physical evidence of this “large lake full of fish”. For geological investigations in the area, see Strand Pedersen 2000: 2004.
697 For Naupaktos, see the funerary inscription AD 28 (1973) B2 395.
698 Pausanias 7.18.8-9; Osanna 1996; Imhoof-Blumer and Gardner 1984; Arafat 1996.
rather, at some point in the first century AD, perhaps the middle of the century when activity at Kalydon came to a halt – indeed, after the Augustan period. At that time, it was only natural that the sculpture be taken to Patras rather than to Nikopolis, since the colonists across the water had been present in Kalydon’s *chora* for at least a generation. This may have coincided with the last remnants of Kalydon’s population moving to Amphissa.\(^{699}\)

5. Where now? Suggestions for further study.

In this dissertation, Aitolia has been the case study for a detailed appreciation of the applicability of New Institutional Economics. This method can no longer be considered inappropriate for ancient material; in fact, to successfully study the ancient economy and thus ancient society we *must* include regions and time periods that are not represented by canonical economic data. The road ahead is clear. In chapter 3, I outlined the extreme similarities between Aitolian landscape contraction and the concomitant loss of settlement density in other Greek regions in the Late Hellenistic period. Not all regions had the same level of involvement with Rome as Aitolia, and history tells us that they suffered different forms of endogenous and exogenous shock. Yet, considering the similarities in settlement nucleation, a formal inquiry into the mechanisms of their decline according to the same parameters as the present study is very much worthwhile as this would generate a litmus test for the effects of Roman involvement in Late Hellenistic Greece. In Aitolia, the exogenous shock of 189 BC caused a structural collapse of the socioeconomic framework, but other regions may have responded differently. A closer study of Achaia may be especially meaningful considering the violent destruction of Corinth in 146 BC and the first-century-BC Roman colonies at Corinth, Dyme and Patras, but closer examination of Akarnania, too,

\(^{699}\) Pausanias 7.18.8-9, 10.38.4.
is vital. Here, Hoepfner identifies physical destruction in connection with the synoicism.\textsuperscript{700} Detailed analysis of Akarnanian sites can shed invaluable light on the economic features of the Nikopolitean synoicism and at the same time, improve our understanding of the rhetorical or interpretative use of \textit{eremia}. Collapse, I have argued, is generally dependent on the characteristics of a society rather than on its stresses. A close examination of the reaction to decline invites a more nuanced understanding of the problem-solving mechanisms of these non-royal Hellenistic states, their institutions and socioeconomic framework. Consequently, the formal reading of decline presented in this dissertation can both shed light on poorly understood Hellenistic states as well as further contextualize the historical narrative of Late Hellenistic Greece and the arrival of Rome.

Beyond the focus on Late Hellenistic Greece, this study has illuminated the importance of giving proper attention to conflicts, especially in the Braudelian medium-term.\textsuperscript{701} When studying war in the ancient world we often lose interest after its conclusions. The historical narrative tends to follow the army and the victor, not the defeated, and so, too, scholarly attention. Yet, it is the defeated who may inform us of the social, political, economic, demographic and ecological effects of warfare – precisely the kind of information necessary for a deeper understanding of the ancient world at large, which this study has illustrated. Moreover, the present study invites careful reconsideration of the long-term mechanisms of war indemnities from an economic point of view. Between 201 and 188 BC, Rome subjected foreign polities to no less than six large indemnities; ancient literature is studded with countless more examples.\textsuperscript{702} Their short-term and long-term effects are still poorly understood, as are their socioeconomic functions and sociopolitical uses. Considering the disastrous effect the indemnity of 189 BC had on the Aitolian federation, omitting indemnities from the discussion on ancient economies can no longer be accepted.

\textsuperscript{700} Hoepfner 1987.
Aitolia itself still needs closer examination. There is some evidence that the reorganization of Western Greece was incomplete – that is, not fully developed politically. In the first century AD, the Naupaktian Gaius Aristodamos was honored with a statue at Delphi. The inscription fails to use the ethnic of Patras, which would be expected for a Roman in the area.\textsuperscript{703} Kirsten and Kraiker interpret this as conclusive evidence that Naupaktos did not belong to the Roman population in Achaia and thus invite caution in assessing the “Roman” status of Central Greece in the Early Roman period.\textsuperscript{704}

By applying the same formal inquiry to the region after the Augustan integration of Western Greece, we may develop the microscopic approach necessary to fully elucidate the complicated scenario in which Kalydon was finally abandoned. Detailed evaluation of Early Roman remains will invariably help illuminate the Aitolian tabula rasa, both specifically, for example, the time frame for when the cult objects from Kalydon were moved to Patras, and generally, for example the manner in which the region responded to the reorganization of surrounding territories and the infusion of settlers across the gulf. Thereby, we may evaluate Kirsten and Kraiker’s suggestions on the incomplete political reorganization of Greece against physical evidence. Moreover, deeper appreciation of Early Roman Aitolia may help contextualize the network of communication between Nikopolis and Patras, a not insignificant factor for the greater appreciation of Graecia Capta (1993).

Yet, certain aspects of Late Hellenistic Aitolia are still poorly understood, leaving this inquiry partially inconclusive. Further excavation of Aitolian towns is essential to fully contextualize the complicated issue of its second- and first-century-BC history. I have argued against the blanket statement of complete desolation and instead interpreted the evidence as the emergence of a new, less sociopolitically complex system, yet further excavation is vital to truly determine whether this phenomenon was region-wide, or simply restricted to the few sites that

\textsuperscript{703} FdD III 1,1929 = SEG 26 (1976-77) no. 626; BCH 100 (1976) 759; Petropoulos 1991. \textsuperscript{704} Kirsten and Kraiker 1967.
have received the most excavation. Only then can we fully appreciate the complicated path Aitolia
took on its "downward slope" from indemnity to integration.
APPENDIX 1

A. Site gazetteer 1.

Sites with physical Late Hellenistic remains. [Brackets] indicate the site number assigned by Bommeljé et al 1987. Site number corresponds to those in Figure 5.

1. **Agios Ilias** [511-157]
   Located near the Acheloos river, identified with ancient Ithoria. The fortified settlement is located on a hilltop; remains of Hellenistic buildings are preserved. The Mycenaean tholos tombs in the cemetery have received the most attention but Hellenistic graves exist. The only datable Late Hellenistic material is the funerary stele *IG* IX 12 1:134 – first century BC.
   Site function: habitation, cemetery.2

2. **Agia Sofia** [225-86]
   Located NW of Thermon. *IG* IX 12 1:33 – 184/3 BC; *IG* IX 12 1:35 – 142/1 BC; *IG* IX 12 1:92 – second century BC. Blocks from Hellenistic temple to Artemis Hegemone built into Byzantine churches of Agios Nikolaos and Agios Taxiarchis. Excavations have revealed a small monumental tomb containing Late Hellenistic pottery.
   Site function: sanctuary, cemetery.3

3. **Agios Symeon/Chilia Spitia** [371-125]
   Identified with ancient Halikyrna. Located between Kalydon and Pleuron. Excavation and survey have revealed mostly Hellenistic material, some seemingly Late Hellenistic.
   Site function: habitation.4

4. **Agios Thomas** [428-132]
   Located on plain near Mesolongi. Richly built Macedonian tomb containing second century BC Sikyonian coins. Survey noted nearby scatter of Hellenistic pottery and architectural remains.
   Site function: cemetery, [habitation?].5

5. **Agrinion** [X]
   Coin hoards: *CH* I, 76 – early second century BC; *IGCH* 271 – c. 120 BC.
   Site function: ?6

6. **Angelokastro** [509-156B]
   Identified with ancient Konope/Arsinoe, located centrally on the Lake Lysimachia plain. Excavations have revealed a built tomb dating to the second century BC, finds including leaves from a golden wreath and an inscribed lead vessel. Inscribed stele possibly contemporary. Associated with this site is Kakkavaria [515-159B] which appears to have served as the local

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1 AD and related bibliography is only given when *not* cited in Petropoulos 1991, Bommeljé et al 1987, or Bommeljé and Vroom 1995.
4 Bommeljé et al 1991, 74; Bommeljé and Vroom 1995, 86; Woodhouse 1897, 114.
6 Thompson 1968.
necropolis. Excavation and survey have revealed Hellenistic and Roman remains, plus the inscription \textit{IG IX 1}^2 1:131 – 184/3 BC.

\textit{Arsinoe strategoi}: Straton 166/5 BC, Straton 159/8 BC, Ladikos 158/7 BC, Ladikos 151/0 BC, [...]as 144/3 BC, Satyros 143/2 BC, Satyros 136/5 BC, Satyros 129/8 BC.

\textit{Arsinoe hipparchoi}: Ladikos 166/5 BC, Philoxenos 143/2 BC, Menelaos 142/1 BC.

\textit{Arsinoe proxenia} sponsorship: 185/4 BC – \textit{IG IX 1}^2 1:32, 185/4 BC – \textit{IG IX 1}^2 1:71b.

Site function: habitation, cemetery.\(^7\)

7. \textbf{Aspropyrgos} [582-194]

Located in southern section of modern prefecture of Evrytania in Panaitoliko mountains. Dutch team noted a single fragment of Late Hellenistic/Early Roman terra sigillata among Hellenistic and Roman surface pottery.

Site function: habitation.\(^8\)

8. \textbf{Dafnias} [471-141]

Located on south bank of Lake Trichonion. Reported buildings unverified; Dutch survey team noted Western terra sigillata among Hellenistic surface pottery on a terrace near scattered tooled Hellenistic blocks.

Site function: habitation.\(^9\)

9. \textbf{Gavalou} [463-137]

Identified with ancient Trichonion. Located south of Lake Trichonion. \textit{IG IX 1}^2 1:121 – mid-second century BC. Elaborate tomb dating to very early second century BC. Excavation of cemetery has revealed rich Late Hellenistic finds including stelai and gold wreaths. The nearby sanctuary site must be the temple of Asklepios, where recent excavation has revealed several buildings and votive offerings including clay limbs. Ruins of ancient city were detected during work on temple.


\textit{Trichonion hipparchoi}: Alexomenos 185/4 BC, Kritolaos 165/4 BC, [name unknown] 141/0 BC.

\textit{Trichonion grammateis}: Alexandros 142/1 BC.

\textit{Trichonion proxenia} sponsorship: 185/4 BC – \textit{IG IX 1}^2 1:32, 184/3 BC – \textit{IG IX 1}^2 1:33, 141/0 BC – \textit{IG IX 1}^2 1:34d.

Site function: habitation, cemetery, sanctuary.\(^{10}\)


\(^{8}\)Bommeljé et al 1987, 78; Petropoulos 1991, 100; Bommeljé and Vroom 1995, 93.

\(^{9}\)Bommeljé et al 1987, 79; Bommeljé and Vroom 1995, 93.

10. **Kalydon** [411-127]

Identified with ancient Kalydon. Located on the west bank of the Evinos. Excavation has revealed extensiveLate Hellenistic structures including an inner town sanctuary, a Heroon, a subterranean barrel-vaulted tomb and domestic complexes. Datable Late Hellenistic finds consist of statuary, coins, inscriptions, pottery, architectural terracottas and votive offerings dating through the first century BC into the first century AD. *IG IX* 1\(^2\) 1:137 – 130/120 BC, *IG IX* 1\(^2\) 1:140 – mid-second century BC, *IG IX* 1\(^2\) 1:145 – second century BC; *IG IX* 1\(^2\) 1:139 – 84 BC, *IG IX* 1\(^2\) 1:147 – first century BC.


Kalydon *proxenia* sponsorship: 185/4 BC – *IG IX* 1\(^2\) 1:32, 129/8 BC – *IG IX* 1\(^2\) 1:137b.

Site function: habitation, urban sanctuary, cemetery.\(^{11}\)

11. **Kato Khrysovitsa** [240-90A]

Located SE of Thermon. Hellenistic and Roman finds reported; site now largely destroyed.

Site function: ?\(^{12}\)

12. **Kato Mammako** [22-4A]

Possibly ancient Makyneia, located on a hilltop overlooking the plain West of Naupaktos. Dutch survey team noted Hellenistic and Roman surface pottery among earlier buildings, including Late Hellenistic/Early Roman terra sigillata.

Site function: habitation.\(^{13}\)

13. **Kato Vasiliki** [10-2B]

Located on a hilltop in the narrow valley east of Mount Varasova, identified with ancient Chalkis. Excavation and survey have revealed an active Hellenistic site with pottery dating to the second and first centuries BC and some coins dating to the second century BC. Some Early Hellenistic graves have no Late Hellenistic counterparts.

Site function: habitation.\(^{14}\)

14. **Koniska** [X]

Northeast of Thermon. Coin hoard: *IGCH* 266 – early first century BC. The small modern village has received no autopsy.

Site function: ?\(^{15}\)

15. **Kryonneron** [219-84]

Possibly identified with temple of Syrian Aphrodite *en Hieridais* of Phistydon, located north of Lake Trichonion. *IG IX* 1\(^2\) 1:96b – c. 150 BC; *IG IX* 1\(^2\) 1:97 - *IG IX* 1\(^2\) 1:109, *IG IX* 1\(^2\) 1:111 – first century BC.

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\(^{12}\) Woodhouse 1897, 247-8; Petropoulos 1991, 111; Bommeljé et al 1987, 89; Bommeljé and Vroom 1995, 94.

\(^{13}\) Petropoulos 1991, 111; Bommeljé et al 1987, 93; Bommeljé and Vroom 1995, 94; Stiros, Psimoulis et al 2005.


\(^{15}\) *ADelt* 19 (1964) Chron. 9–10.
half of second century BC; \textit{IG IX} \textsuperscript{1} 1:110 – first century BC. Dutch team noted Hellenistic surface pottery. The town of Phistyon, whose Late Hellenistic activity is known through the aforementioned inscriptions, must be located nearby, possibly at Neromanna [220-84A]. Phistyon had its own local archon \textit{(e.g. IG IX} \textsuperscript{1} 1:99 – 103).

Site function: sanctuary, [habitation].

\textbf{15. Kyparissos [161-72]}

Located on the North side of Mount Panaitoliko. Reports of Hellenistic graves and of funerary inscriptions dating to second and first centuries BC.

Site function: cemetery.

\textbf{16. Lysimacheia [515-159A]}

Identified with ancient Lysimacheia. \textit{IG IX} \textsuperscript{1} 1:130 – possibly Late Hellenistic. The walled settlement is in desperate need of excavation.

Site function: habitation.

\textbf{17. Megali Chora [325-118A]}

Identified as ancient Agrinio by Early Hellenistic inscriptions. Remains of Roman building; mix of Late Hellenistic pottery with terra sigillata.

\textit{Agrinio strategoi}: Hybistas 165/4 BC.

Site function: habitation.

\textbf{18. Naupaktos [1-1A]}

Identified as ancient Naupaktos. Rescue excavation has yielded plenty of Hellenistic and Early Roman remains including graves located in two cemeteries, the [Classical] sanctuary of Athena, portions of the ancient city wall and numerous domestic structures, but no systematic investigation of the town has been carried out. A large Macedonian tomb dates to the second century BC. Coin hoards: \textit{IGCH} 244 – c. 175-150 BC, \textit{IGCH} 317 – c. 110 BC. \textit{IG IX} \textsuperscript{1} 3:631 – 643, \textit{IG IX} \textsuperscript{1} 3:645 – second century BC, \textit{ADelt} 28 (1973) Chron. 1975 – post 23/21 BC. Naupaktos had at least two known local magistrates; \textit{grammateus} and \textit{agonothetes}.

\textit{Naupaktos hipparchoi}: Lykos 181/0 BC.

\textit{Naupaktos proxenia} sponsorship: 185/4 BC – \textit{IG IX} \textsuperscript{1} 1:32.

Site type: habitation, urban sanctuary, cemetery.

\textbf{19. Paralova [294-111]}

A large fortified settlement located on the north shore of Lake Trichonion, identified as ancient Boukation. Graves noted during Dutch survey. No datable Late Hellenistic material except for \textit{IG IX} \textsuperscript{1} 1:114 – second century BC which is funerary in nature.

Site type: cemetery, [habitation].

\footnotesize
\[16 \text{ Bommeljé et al 1987, 91.}
\[17 \text{ Antonetti 1987, 106ff; Bommeljé et al 1987, 91; Bommeljé and Vroom 1995, 94.}
\[18 \text{ Bommeljé et al 1987, 94; Pritchett 1989, 131; Cohen 1995, 114–115; Pritchett 1989, 136.}
\[19 \text{ \textit{ADelt} 31 (1976) Chron. 166 – 169; Bommeljé and Vroom 1995, 91; Wodhouse 1897, 169.}
20. **Pleuron [406-126A]**  
Located on tall outcrop above Mesolongi plain. Very well preserved remains of a fortified Hellenistic settlement with a theater, cistern, lengthy walls with towers, stoas and other buildings, all presumably built after the destruction of “Old Pleuron.” Datable Late Hellenistic material is exclusively funerary and includes a large Macedonian type tomb.  
Pleuron *strategoi*: Pantaleon 186/5 BC, Pantaleon 180/79 BC, Pantaleon 174/3 BC.  
Site type: cemetery, habitation.²³

21. **Sitaralona [224-85C]**  
Located at the East end of Lake Trichonion. Reports of an early Roman brick building atop Hellenistic foundations.  
Site type: habitation.²⁴

22. **Skala [59-18A]**  
Site function: sanctuary.²⁵

23. **Thermon [190-78]**  
Site function: federal sanctuary; changed to cemetery in first century BC.²⁶

24. **Velvina [33-7A]**  
Located on hillock overlooking western end of Naupaktos plain, identified with ancient Molykreion. *IG IX 1² 3:607 – early second century BC. Hellenistic surface pottery. The Doric temple and structures are earlier in date.*  
Molykreion *hipparchoi*: Phrikon 168/7 BC.  
Molykreion *proxenia* sponsorship: 142/1 BC - *IG IX 1² 1:35.*  
Site function: habitation, sanctuary.²⁷

25. **Vlachomandra [30-6]**  
Site function: habitation.²⁸

²¹ Bommeljé et al 1987, 101; Bommeljé and Vroom 1995, 94; Woodhouse 1897, 190ff.  
²² Strabo 10.2.4.  
²⁵ Bommeljé et al 1987, 106; Woodhouse 1897, 331ff.  
²⁷ Bommeljé et al 1987, 112; Bommeljé and Vroom 1995, 93; Woodhouse 1897, 324ff.  
²⁸ *AD* (1889), E; Bommeljé et al 1987, 112.
26. Vomvokou [34-8B]
   Located northwest of Naupaktos. Dutch team noted Late Hellenistic/Early Roman pottery. Site function: habitation?\(^{20}\)

\(^{20}\) Petropoulos 1991, 106; Bommeljé et al 1987, 113; Bommeljé and Vroom 1995, 41; Woodhouse 1897, 337.
B. Site gazetteer 2.

Sites mentioned in Late Hellenistic sources but without a known physical location. All sites, being used as toponyms, are considered habitation sites.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Epigraphy: mentioned as place of origin, for example for a witness in manumission or sponsor of federal <em>proxenia</em> [P] (origin of inscription)⁴⁰</th>
<th>Epigraphy: place of origin for manumitting owner³¹</th>
<th>League official</th>
<th>Latest datable mentioning of site</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aithaneia</td>
<td>SGDI II 1949 (Delphi)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>185 BC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akotion</td>
<td>SGDI II 1810 (Delphi)</td>
<td>3:634a (Naupaktos)</td>
<td></td>
<td>141 BC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambrysion</td>
<td>SGDI II 1810 (Delphi)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>170 BC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apeirikos</td>
<td>SGDI II 1949 (Delphi)</td>
<td>S – 1: Nikidas 141/0 BC G – 1: Alexandros 168/7 BC</td>
<td></td>
<td>141/0 BC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Axios</td>
<td>SGDI II 1951 (Delphi)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>184 BC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boukation</td>
<td>1:101, 1:103 (both Phistyon)</td>
<td>1:97, 1:99, 1:106 (all Phistyon)</td>
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<td>163 BC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chaleius/Chaleius</td>
<td>SGDI II 2037, SGDI II 1743, SGDI II 1726, SGDI II 1729 (all Delphi)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>167 BC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Daianon</td>
<td>1:100 (Phistyon)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>170 BC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dardeon</td>
<td>1:99 (Phistyon)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>170 BC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dexieus</td>
<td>SGDI II 1818 (Delphi)</td>
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<td>170-156 BC</td>
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<td>Dryopaio</td>
<td>SGDI II 1863 (Delphi)</td>
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<td>176 BC</td>
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<td>Erinaios</td>
<td>SGDI II 1949, SGDI II 1722</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>167 BC</td>
</tr>
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</table>

⁴⁰ IG IX ¹² unless otherwise noted.
³¹ IG IX ¹² unless otherwise noted.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>II 1786, <em>SGDI</em> II 1783, <em>SGDI</em> II 1888 (all Delphi),</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Erythrai</td>
<td>1:32 [P] (Thermon)</td>
<td>G – 1: Agathon 185/4 BC 185/4 BC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Euantheia</td>
<td><em>SGDI</em> II 1951 (Delphi)</td>
<td>184 BC</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>Eupalion</td>
<td>3:640a (Naupaktos)</td>
<td>148/7 BC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Herakleia</td>
<td><em>SGDI</em> II 1959 (Delphi)</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>Hermattsos</td>
<td><em>SGDI</em> II 1843 (Delphi)</td>
<td>174 BC</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>Histiaia</td>
<td>3:638,5 (Naupaktos)</td>
<td>Mid-2nd cent. BC</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>Hypata/Hypataion</td>
<td>1:4b [P] (Thermon)</td>
<td>S – 2: Eupolemos 189/8 BC, Eupolemos 176/5 BC 176/5 BC</td>
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<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Isos</td>
<td><em>SGDI</em> II 1949 (Delphi)</td>
<td>185 BC</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>Istorion</td>
<td>3:638,5, 3:634b (both Naupaktos)</td>
<td>3:638,3 (Naupaktos) 141 BC</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>Kaphreia/eis</td>
<td>3:633 (Naupaktos)</td>
<td>3:632, 3:639,12 (both Naupaktos) 150 BC</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>Kyteinia?</td>
<td><em>FdD</em> III 6,13 (Delphi)</td>
<td>Late 2nd cent. BC</td>
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<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Lamia</td>
<td><em>SGDI</em> II 2234 (Delphi)</td>
<td>184 BC</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>Lechoion</td>
<td>1:102 (Phistyon)</td>
<td>166 BC</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>Lilaia</td>
<td><em>SGDI</em> II 2234 (Delphi)</td>
<td><em>SGDI</em> II 1747 (Delphi) 170-156 BC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Machatos/Machetion</td>
<td></td>
<td>G – 1: Stomios 168/7 BC 168/7 BC</td>
</tr>
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<td>29</td>
<td>Medeonion</td>
<td><em>SGDI</em> II 2057 (Delphi)</td>
<td>182 BC</td>
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<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Myaneus/eis?</td>
<td><em>SGDI</em> II 2076 (Delphi)</td>
<td>180 BC</td>
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<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Oaxos</td>
<td></td>
<td>S – 1: A[n]tochos 164/3 BC 164/3 BC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Oiantheia</td>
<td><em>SGDI</em> II 1997, <em>SGDI</em> II 1908 (all Delphi) 156-151 BC</td>
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<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Oikyleia</td>
<td>3:618 (Naupaktos)</td>
<td>200-180 BC</td>
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<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Oinastion</td>
<td>3:640a (Naupaktos)</td>
<td>148/7 BC</td>
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<td>35</td>
<td>Oinoaia</td>
<td><em>FdD</em> III 3,54</td>
<td>160 BC</td>
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<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Orizabon</td>
<td>1:137a (Kalydon)</td>
<td>130-120 BC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Panphion</td>
<td>1:105 (Phistyon)</td>
<td>162 BC</td>
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<td>38</td>
<td>Peleos</td>
<td><em>SGDI</em> II 2135 (Delphi)</td>
<td>177 BC</td>
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<td>39</td>
<td>Pelene</td>
<td>1:97 (Phistyon)</td>
<td>184 BC</td>
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<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Phalikaia</td>
<td><em>SGDI</em> II 2134, <em>SGDI</em> II 2136 (both Delphi)</td>
<td>140-100 BC</td>
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<td>41</td>
<td>Philotaion</td>
<td>1:97, 1:100, 1:108 (Phistyon)</td>
<td>1:96b (Phistyon)</td>
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<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Pholas</td>
<td>S – 4: Archedamos 188/7 BC, Archedamos 182/1 BC, Archedamos 175/4 BC, Proandros 171/0 BC</td>
<td>171/0 BC</td>
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<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Phyllaion</td>
<td>3:634a (Naupaktos)</td>
<td>3:639, 3:633, 3:639,2 (Naupaktos)</td>
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<td>44</td>
<td>Phytaion</td>
<td>S – 1: Panaitolos 167/6 BC</td>
<td>167/6 BC</td>
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<td>45</td>
<td>Phytraion</td>
<td>SGDI II 1949 (Delphi)</td>
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<td>46</td>
<td>Potaneia/Potanaion</td>
<td>SGDI II 2137 (Delphi)</td>
<td>SGDI II 2058 (Delphi)</td>
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<td>47</td>
<td>Potidania</td>
<td>3:632 (Naupaktos)</td>
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<td>48</td>
<td>Porion</td>
<td>3:638,13, 3:640b, 3:639,1 (Naupaktos)</td>
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<td>49</td>
<td>Proennion</td>
<td>1:109 (Phistyon)</td>
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<td>50</td>
<td>Proscheion</td>
<td>1:101, 1:108 (Phistyon)</td>
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<td>51</td>
<td>Rhadeon</td>
<td>1:96b (Phistyon)</td>
<td>1:108 (Phistyon)</td>
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<td>52</td>
<td>Skarphis</td>
<td>SGDI II 1996, SGDI II 1756 (Delphi)</td>
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<td>53</td>
<td>Sosthenes</td>
<td>1:71c [P] (Thermon)</td>
<td>S – 1: Polemarchos 168/7 BC</td>
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<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Spattos</td>
<td>3:638,11 (Naupaktos)</td>
<td></td>
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<td>55</td>
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<td>56</td>
<td>Tnimaion</td>
<td>1:105 (Phistyon)</td>
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<td>57</td>
<td>Tragantion</td>
<td>1:109 (Phistyon)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>Triteus</td>
<td>SGDI II 1730, SGDI II 1818, SGDI II 1734 (Delphi)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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32 Strabo (10.2) notes that the Homeric Pylene was renamed Proscheion by the Aitolians.
APPENDIX 2

Activity before 189 BC.

A. Aitolian federal grants of isopoliteia, politeia, proxenia, asylia etc. until 189 BC.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inscription</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Origin of recipient</th>
<th>Isopoliteia</th>
<th>Politeia</th>
<th>Proxenia</th>
<th>Asylia</th>
<th>Other&lt;sup&gt;35&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1:3</td>
<td>262 BC</td>
<td>Akarnania</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Symmachia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:4c-d</td>
<td>224/3 BC</td>
<td>Magnesia</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:5</td>
<td>290/89 BC</td>
<td>Chaleis, Korinth</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:6</td>
<td>300-250 BC</td>
<td>Achaiia</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>Asphaleia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:7</td>
<td>263/2 BC</td>
<td>Phokis</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:8</td>
<td>300-250 BC</td>
<td>Pronnion on Kephallonia</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Asphaleia</td>
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<tr>
<td>1:9</td>
<td>300-250 BC</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:10a</td>
<td>273/2 BC</td>
<td>?</td>
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<td>?</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1:11a</td>
<td>245 BC</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>245 BC</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>1:11d</td>
<td>245 BC</td>
<td>[I]</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Asphaleia</td>
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<td>1:11f</td>
<td>245 BC</td>
<td>[I]</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>1:11g</td>
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<td>Phokis</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>1:12a</td>
<td>272 BC</td>
<td>Amphissa, Lysimacheia</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>1:12b</td>
<td>272 BC</td>
<td>[I]</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1:12c</td>
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<td>[I]</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>1:12d</td>
<td>272-60 BC</td>
<td>Aigion (Achaia)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>1:12e</td>
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<td>Bouras (Achaia)</td>
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<td>1:12f</td>
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<td>1:12h</td>
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<td>1:12i</td>
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<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<sup>33</sup> *IG IX*<sup>1</sup> if not otherwise noted.

<sup>34</sup> Bold denotes that grant was awarded to an entire city or population, not simply to an individual. [I] indicates that grant appears to have been awarded to an individual although his or her place of origin, and name, are unknown.

<sup>35</sup> Asterisk denotes honor not preserved.
<p>| | | | | |</p>
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<td>271/0 BC</td>
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<td><strong>1:13 II</strong></td>
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<td>Athens</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td><strong>1:13 III</strong></td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1:13 IV</strong></td>
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<td>Megalopolis</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1:13 V</strong></td>
<td>271/0 BC</td>
<td>Glauka?</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1:13 VI</strong></td>
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<td>Phiale</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1:13 VII</strong></td>
<td>271/0 BC</td>
<td>Knidos</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1:13 VIII</strong></td>
<td>271/0 BC</td>
<td>Gergethieus</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1:13 IX</strong></td>
<td>271/0 BC</td>
<td>Thessaly?</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1:13 X</strong></td>
<td>271/0 BC</td>
<td>Dyme</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1:13 XI</strong></td>
<td>271/0 BC</td>
<td>Histiaia</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1:13 XII</strong></td>
<td>271/0 BC</td>
<td>Histiaia</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1:14</strong></td>
<td>287-262 BC</td>
<td>Adaneis</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1:16a</strong></td>
<td>300-250 BC</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1:16c</strong></td>
<td>300-250 BC</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1:16 b.b</strong></td>
<td>300-250 BC</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1:17a I</strong></td>
<td>260 – 230 BC</td>
<td>Athens, Eresia, Melitaion, Messene, Larisa (several), Megalopolis, Sikyon, Karystion, Amphipolis, Mitylene, Macedonia (several), Pellene, Echina, Peparethion (several), Eretria, Rhodes (several), Thorhynus?, Chalkis (several), Kalkadonia, Ambrakia, Athens, Sikyon, Olkaion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1:17a II</strong></td>
<td>260 – 230</td>
<td>Rome,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page</td>
<td>BC</td>
<td>Places</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>1:17b</td>
<td>260 – 230 BC</td>
<td>Pellene, Achaia, Kalchadonion, Thasos, Elaita, Kyzikinos, Messene, Epiros, Syracuseae, Pella (several), Chalkis, Metaponto, Sparta, Sikyon (several), Akarnia, Korinth, Athens (several), Eleutherena on Crete, Akragas</td>
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<tr>
<td>1:17c</td>
<td>260 – 230 BC</td>
<td>Orchomenos (several), Ephesos, Magnesia, Anthedonion?</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:18a</td>
<td>262-260 BC</td>
<td>Peparethion?, Patras</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:18b</td>
<td>262-260 BC</td>
<td>Histiaia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:18c</td>
<td>262-260 BC</td>
<td>Megara</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:18d</td>
<td>262-260 BC</td>
<td>Kassandreia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:18e</td>
<td>262-260 BC</td>
<td>Messene</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:18f</td>
<td>262-260 BC</td>
<td>Messene</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:19</td>
<td>300-250 BC</td>
<td>Byzantium, Boiotia</td>
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* indicates a blank entry.
### Table 1.1: Details of the Inscriptions

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<tr>
<td>1:22</td>
<td>Mid-3rd cent. BC</td>
<td>Phoenicia?</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Asphaleia</td>
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<tr>
<td>1:24a</td>
<td>Mid-3rd cent. BC</td>
<td>Arsinoe, Korinth, Sikyon</td>
<td>*</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1:24b</td>
<td>Mid-3rd cent. BC</td>
<td>Sidon, Pholas, Tarent, Athens, Kyzikinos</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:24c</td>
<td>245 – 236 BC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:25a</td>
<td>245 – 235 BC</td>
<td>Agreion, Eretria (several), Mitylene, Orchomenos, Megara (several), Athens (several)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>1:25b</td>
<td>245-236 BC</td>
<td>Agreion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:25c</td>
<td>245-236 BC</td>
<td>Aigion</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:25d</td>
<td>245-236 BC</td>
<td>Hermione, Zakynthos, Athens (several)</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:27</td>
<td>Late 3rd cent. BC</td>
<td>Anthedonio</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1:28</td>
<td>207-205 BC</td>
<td>Sparta</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X[?]</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:29</td>
<td>210/9 BC</td>
<td>Agina, Koronai, Athens, Molossos, Syracuseae, Thessaly, Aigion, Athens(^{36})</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>1:30a</td>
<td>196/5 BC</td>
<td>Bouteaion, Naupaktos, Pleuron, Dyme</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:30b</td>
<td>196/5 BC</td>
<td>Agreion</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

\(^{36}\) This Athenian is the sculptor Polykles.
| 1:31 Aa | Late 3rd cent. BC | Delphi | * |
| 1:41 Ab | 204/3 BC | Larisa | X |
| 1:31 Ac | Late 3rd cent. BC | Thourion | * |
| 1:31 Ad | 192/1 BC | Messene | X | X |
| 1:31 Ae | Late 3rd cent. BC | Kalydon, Proschion | * |
| 1:31 Af | 223/2 BC | Messene (several), Bouttos | X |
| 1:31 Ag | [mentions Skopas, not as strategos] | Stratos, Herakleia on the Pontus, Thesprota, Eleutherna on Crete, Koronai | * |
| 1:31 Ah | Late 3rd cent. BC | Koronai, Thespiai | * |
| 1:31 Ai | 209/8 BC | Chalkis | X |
| 1:31 Ak | 207/6 BC | Megalopolis, Paleus, Tarentum, Delphi, Polyrene, Thelousios? | X |
| 1:31 Al | | Sostinos, Pronos? |
| 1:31 Am | 223/2 BC | Argouri?, Eleutherna on Crete | X |
| 1:31 An | 205/4 BC | Boiotia, .....? | X |
| 1:31 Ap/q | 205/4 BC | | |
| 1:31 Bs | 214/3 BC | Chalkis, Chios, Corcyra, Meaichmos, Gontrynioi?, Antioch, Aigion, Histiaia, Athens, Rhodes | X |
| 1:31 Bt | 244/3 BC | [I] | X |
| 1:31n | 205/4 BC | Herakleia on Pontus, Pyrgita? | X |   |   |
| 1:31b | 196/5 BC | Larissa | X | X |   |
| 1:31d | 192/1 BC | Messene | X | X |   |
| 1:37 | 300-250 BC | X | X | X | Asphaleia |
| 1:38 | 263-255 BC | X |   |   |
| 1:39 | Mid-3rd cent. BC | ? |   | X |   |
| 1:135 | 220 BC | Lousoi | X |   |   |
| 1:136 | After 206 BC | Trikka | X | X | Asphaleia, ateleia |
| 1:173 | 250s BC | Herakleia | X |   |   |
| 1:176 | 228 BC? | Athens | X | X | Symmachia, asphaleia |
| 1:185 | 250 BC | Delos | [x] |   | Asphaleia |
| 1:186 | 206/5 BC | Magnesia on the Maeander | X | [x] |   |
| 1:190 | 209/8 BC | Mytilene | X |   |   |
| 1:191 | Mid-3rd cent. BC | Tenos | X | X | Asphaleia |
| 1:192 | 204/3 BC | Teos | X | X | Asphaleia |
| 1:193 | Late 3rd cent. BC? | Axos | X |   |   |
| 1:195a | 255 BC | Chios |   |   | ? |
| 1:201 | Late 3rd cent. BC | Athens | X |   |   |
| FdD III 3:218 | 235 BC | Chios |   |   |   |
| FdD III 3:214 | 247/6 BC | Chios | X |   | Ateleia |
| IG XII, 5 526–527, 532 | 220s BC | Keos | X |   |   |
| Miletos 35 | 240/39 BC | Miletos | X |   | Symbola, asphaleia |

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37 This date is contested; see Rigsby 1996. Cf. discussion in Bugin 2010.
38 Referred to in 1:187 (194/3 BC).
B. Delphic grants of *proxenia* to Aitolians, fourth and third centuries BC.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Person/town</th>
<th>Source (FdD III)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>356/5 BC</td>
<td>Xenippos</td>
<td>1, 146</td>
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<tr>
<td>334/3 BC</td>
<td>Leontomenes fr. Strombochios</td>
<td>1,147; 148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>329/8 BC</td>
<td>“Aitolian from Makyneia”</td>
<td>BCH 1899, 254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>320-10 BC</td>
<td>Alexander + brothers Leon &amp;</td>
<td>4,387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nikostratos</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Lykidos</td>
<td>1,142</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Klearchoes</td>
<td>3,90</td>
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<td>1,145</td>
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<td>SEG XVIII 175</td>
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<tr>
<td>Late 4(^{th}) cent. BC</td>
<td>“Aitolian from Kallion”</td>
<td>1,422</td>
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<td>BCH 1944/5, 99</td>
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<td>4,407</td>
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<tr>
<td>? 4(^{th}) cent. BC</td>
<td>Agathion</td>
<td><em>Klio</em> XV 48, n 67</td>
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<td>290-80 BC</td>
<td>Pittias</td>
<td>1,149; 150</td>
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<td>Dikaios (or Lykaios)</td>
<td>1,143; 144</td>
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<td>BCH 1944.3 p 101</td>
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<td>Buterhas from Iritrai (Erythrai?)</td>
<td>3,199</td>
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<td>3,84</td>
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<td>276/5 BC</td>
<td>Kleoesthenes</td>
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<td>273/2 BC</td>
<td>Teisandros</td>
<td>3,203</td>
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<td>SGDI 2515</td>
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<tr>
<td>269/8 BC</td>
<td>Stratolaos + Satyros</td>
<td>4,415</td>
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<td>269/8 BC</td>
<td>Pleisteinos</td>
<td>SGDI 2595</td>
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<td>3,201</td>
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<td>Mid-3(^{rd}) cent. BC</td>
<td>Teleson</td>
<td>SGDI 2589, 2590</td>
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<td>Apollonios + Menekles from Erythrai</td>
<td>SEG I 207</td>
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<td>Late 3(^{rd}) cent. BC</td>
<td>Pantaleon from Arsinoe</td>
<td>SGDI 1926, 126</td>
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<td>Aristarchos from Kyphaira</td>
<td>Syll(^{3}) 534</td>
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<td>SGDI 2672</td>
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### C. Aitolian plunder in Polybius, 231 – 200 BC.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Booty/nature of event</th>
<th>Loss/gain (other victor)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>231 BC</td>
<td>Medion</td>
<td>Men, arms, baggage</td>
<td>Loss (Illyria)</td>
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<tr>
<td>221 BC</td>
<td>Off coast of Kephallonia</td>
<td>Macedonian ship + crew</td>
<td>Gain (sold in Aitolia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>221 BC</td>
<td>Megalopolis</td>
<td>Sale of booty</td>
<td>Gain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>220 BC</td>
<td>Sikyonia</td>
<td>Pillaging</td>
<td>Gain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>220 BC</td>
<td><em>Illyro-Aitolian treaty to divide booty</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>220 BC</td>
<td>Kynaitha</td>
<td>Property, cash, pottery, people, herds</td>
<td>Gain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>220 BC</td>
<td>Lousoi</td>
<td>Sacred furniture, cattle</td>
<td>Gain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>220 BC</td>
<td>Aitolia</td>
<td>Plunder of coast</td>
<td>Loss (Achaia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>220 BC</td>
<td><em>Achaions authorized laphyron on Aitolians</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>220 BC</td>
<td>Achaia (three towns)</td>
<td>Considerable booty</td>
<td>Gain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>219 BC</td>
<td>Pieria</td>
<td>Considerable booty</td>
<td>Gain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>219 BC</td>
<td>Dodona</td>
<td>Destruction</td>
<td>Gain?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>219 BC</td>
<td>Typaneai</td>
<td>Plundered houses</td>
<td>Gain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>218 BC</td>
<td>Thermon</td>
<td>Enormous booty; destruction</td>
<td>Loss (Philip V)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>217 BC</td>
<td>Aitolia</td>
<td>100 men, crews of three ships</td>
<td>Loss (Achaia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>217 BC</td>
<td>Aitolia</td>
<td>Raids on coast</td>
<td>Loss (Achaia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>217 BC</td>
<td>Akarnania, Epiros</td>
<td>Pillaging without opposition</td>
<td>Gain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>212/11 BC</td>
<td><em>Roman-Aitolian alliance</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>211 BC</td>
<td>Antikyra</td>
<td>Sold inhabitants into slavery</td>
<td>Gain (Rome and Aitolia)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

39 Polybius 2.37.
40 Polybius 4.6.1.
41 Polybius 4.6.3.
42 Polybius 4.13.5.
43 Polybius 4.16.9; 29.5.
44 Polybius 4.18.8.
45 Polybius 4.18.11.
46 Polybius 4.19.9.
48 Polybius 4.59.1.
49 Polybius 4.62.1.
50 Polybius 4.67.2.
51 Polybius 4.79.2.
52 Polybius 4.8.4-9; 13.1.
53 Polybius 5.94.7-9.
54 Polybius 5.95.11-12.
55 Polybius 5.96.1.
56 Polybius 9.39.2.
D. Aitolian mercenary service, fifth through third centuries BC.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Monarch.</th>
<th>Specified service (if known)</th>
<th>Name of individual (if known)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5th cent. BC</td>
<td>Sicily</td>
<td>Sicilian expedition/Athens⁵⁷</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th cent. BC</td>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>Alexander the Great⁵⁸</td>
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<td>331 BC</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Lykidas⁵⁹</td>
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<td>280 BC</td>
<td>Asculum</td>
<td>Pyrrhus⁶⁰</td>
<td>Cavalry, infantry</td>
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<td>277 BC</td>
<td>Kassandraia</td>
<td>Antigonus Gonatas⁶¹</td>
<td>“10 pirates”</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Camp against</td>
<td>Demetrios Poliorketes⁶²</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Seleukos</td>
<td>Peltasts</td>
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<tr>
<td>? [no date]</td>
<td>Tralles</td>
<td></td>
<td>Names attested in lists of soldiers⁶³</td>
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<tr>
<td>? [no date]</td>
<td>Chios/Erythrai</td>
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<td>Names attested in lists of soldiers⁶⁴</td>
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<td>260 BC</td>
<td>Miletos</td>
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<td>Tyrant, possibly in Ptolemaic service⁶⁵</td>
<td>Timarchos</td>
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<tr>
<td>235 BC</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Ptolemies⁶⁶</td>
<td>Pentekosioarchos</td>
<td>[...], son of Lichas</td>
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<td>Mid–230s BC</td>
<td>Eleusis</td>
<td>Lysimachos [??]⁶⁷</td>
<td>Garrison member</td>
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<td>230s BC</td>
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<td>227/226 BC</td>
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<td>Ptolemies⁶⁹</td>
<td>Chiliarchos</td>
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<td>225 BC</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Ptolemies⁷⁰</td>
<td>Epilochagos</td>
<td>Polemon</td>
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<tr>
<td>219 BC</td>
<td>Coele-Syria</td>
<td>Ptolemies⁷¹</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>Theodotos from Kalydon</td>
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<tr>
<td>219 BC</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Ptolemaios IV⁷²</td>
<td>General</td>
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<tr>
<td>219 BC</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Ptolemies⁷³</td>
<td>Hipparchos</td>
<td>Neandros</td>
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⁵⁷ Thukydides 7.57.9.
⁵⁸ Launey 1949.
⁵⁹ Arrian 3.53.
⁶⁰ Dion. Hal. 20.1.
⁶¹ Polyainos 4.6.18.
⁶² Polyainos 4.9.2.
⁶³ Launey 1949, 188.
⁶⁴ Ibid.
⁶⁵ Polyainos 4.25; Frontinus 3.2.11; Appian Syr. 65.
⁶⁶ Launey 1949, 1133.
⁶⁷ IG II² 1299, line 112.
⁶⁸ Launey 1949, 1134.
⁶⁹ Ibid.
⁷⁰ Launey 1949, 1131.
⁷¹ Polybius 5.46.3; FdD III 1,519; Launey 1949, 184.
⁷² Polybius 5.61.8-10.
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<tr>
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<th>Place</th>
<th>Person/Role</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<td>Tyre, Syria</td>
<td>Ptolemaios IV, Hipparchos, Dorymenes</td>
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<td>217 BC</td>
<td>Raphia, Syria</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Syria</td>
<td>Ptolemaios IV, Commander, Nikolaos</td>
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<tr>
<td>215/14 BC</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Ptolemais, Pentekosioarchos, Theogonos</td>
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<tr>
<td>214 BC</td>
<td>Sardis</td>
<td>Antioch, Antiochos III, Contingent of Aitolians, Cretans and Euboians</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>? [no date]</td>
<td>Samos</td>
<td>Nikias, Pheidias</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Ptolemais, Ilarchos, hipparchos</td>
<td>Sosandros</td>
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<td>212 BC</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Ptolemais, Epigonus</td>
<td>Sosibos</td>
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<tr>
<td>210 BC</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Antiochos III, Commander of light troops</td>
<td>Nikolaos</td>
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<tr>
<td>209 BC</td>
<td>“the East”</td>
<td>Antiochos III, Commander</td>
<td>Panaitolos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>208 BC</td>
<td>Phokis</td>
<td>Attalos I, Garrison member</td>
<td>? from Pleuron</td>
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<tr>
<td>Late 3rd cent. BC</td>
<td>Hellespont</td>
<td>Philip V, Mercenary pirate given 20 ships</td>
<td>Dikaiarchos</td>
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<tr>
<td>Late 3rd cent. B.C into 2nd cent. BC</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Ptolemais, General, recruiter or troops</td>
<td>Skopas of Trichonon</td>
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<tr>
<td>Late 3rd cent. BC into 2nd cent. BC</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Ptolemais, Tax collecting</td>
<td>Dikaiarchos</td>
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<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Ptolemais</td>
<td>Hipparchos, Lamos</td>
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<td>200 BC</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Ptolemais, Charimortos</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

73 Launey 1949, 1133. 74 SEG VII 326 75 Polybius 5.61.9 76 Ibid. 77 Polybius 5.62.2 78 Polybius 5.61.8; 66.1; 68.2-6. 79 Launey 1949, 1134. 80 Polybius 7.16.7 81 Liban, O. XI 119; Launey 1949, 196. 82 Launey 1949, 193. 83 Launey 1949, 1136. 84 Launey 1949, 1134. 85 Polybius 10.29.6. 86 Grainger (1999) believes this is the same Nikolaos who served Ptolemaios IV in Syria in 219 BC. 87 Polybius 10.49.11-12. 88 This is the same Panaitolos who first served the Ptolemais in Syria. He lived a long life and became strategos of the koinon in 167/166 BC: SGDI 1729; 1783; 1854. 89 Launey 1949, 193. 90 Polybius 18.54.8-10; Diodorus 28.1. 91 Polybius 15.25.16: 16.18.2: 18.93.1; Livy 31.43.5; Launey 1949, 1135. 92 This is the same individual who caused havoc in Messenia during the Social War and subsequently served Philip V as some kind of naval captain/mercenary pirate on the Hellespont. For his tenure in Egypt, see Westermann 1929, 22-25. 93 IG IX 1.202. 94 OGIS 86; Strabo 16.4.15.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Opponent</th>
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<tr>
<td>200 BC</td>
<td>Xanthos</td>
<td>Ptolemaios V(^{96})</td>
<td>Hegemon</td>
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<tr>
<td>200 BC</td>
<td>Panion</td>
<td>Ptolemaios V(^{97})</td>
<td>Commander of Aitolians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200 BC</td>
<td>Ptolemies(^{99})</td>
<td>6,500 Aitolians</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

\(^{95}\) At a later date, Charimortos occurs in Polybius’ (18.55.2) accounts of Skopas in Alexandria. See also Launey 1949, 1136-1137.

\(^{96}\) OGIS 91; Launey 1949, 1135.

\(^{97}\) Polybius 16.18.8.

\(^{98}\) Not necessarily an Aitolian himself, as pointed out by Grainger 2000, 290.

\(^{99}\) Livy 31.43.
APPENDIX 3

Late Hellenistic activity (189 BC onward).

A. Origins of Aitolian *strategoi* in the second century BC.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Name</th>
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<th>Source IG IX 1(^2)</th>
<th>Source SGDI / Other</th>
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<td>189/188</td>
<td>Eupolemos</td>
<td>Hypata</td>
<td>1:4b</td>
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<tr>
<td>188/187</td>
<td>Archedamos</td>
<td>Pholas</td>
<td></td>
<td>2132</td>
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<td>187/186</td>
<td>Dikaiaarchos</td>
<td>Trichonion</td>
<td>[assumed]</td>
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<tr>
<td>186/185</td>
<td>Pantaleon</td>
<td>Pleuron</td>
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<td>1844, 1949</td>
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<tr>
<td>184/183</td>
<td>Nikandros</td>
<td>Trichonion</td>
<td>1:33, 1:131</td>
<td>1869, 2053</td>
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<tr>
<td>183/182</td>
<td>Proxenos</td>
<td>Trichonion</td>
<td>1:179</td>
<td>2133</td>
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<tr>
<td>182/181</td>
<td>Archedamos</td>
<td>Pholas</td>
<td>1:310, 3:629</td>
<td>2036, 2037, 2047, 2134</td>
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<tr>
<td>181/180</td>
<td>Thoas</td>
<td>Trichonion</td>
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<td>Pleuron</td>
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<td>179/8</td>
<td>Lochagos</td>
<td>Kallipolis</td>
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<td>178/7</td>
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<td>Stratos</td>
<td></td>
<td>2051, 2135</td>
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<td>1855, 1869, 2927, 2058</td>
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<td>Hypata</td>
<td>3:672</td>
<td>1745, 1864, 1863</td>
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<td>1:31r</td>
<td>1786, 1843, 1987</td>
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<td>1730, 1853</td>
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<td>Livy 42.38.3</td>
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<td>1739, 1740, 1756, 1810</td>
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<td>1729, 1783, 1854</td>
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<td>Trichonion</td>
<td>1:101, 1:102, 1:103, 3:361</td>
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<td>1:105, 1:106</td>
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<td>3:638-9</td>
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<td>3:634a</td>
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*SEG XII 299*

*SEG XII 300*

*SEG XII 303*
**B. Aitolian federal grants of isopoliteia, politeia, asylia etc. from 189 BC onward.**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Inscription</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Origin of recipient</th>
<th>Origin of Aitolian witnesses</th>
<th>Origin of strategos</th>
<th>Isopoliteia</th>
<th>Politeia</th>
<th>Proxeniaiae</th>
<th>Asylia</th>
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<td>Arsinoe, Erythrai (several), Trichonion (several), Kalydon, Stratos, Naupaktos</td>
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<td>185/4 - 182 BC</td>
<td>Pergamon, (Athena Nikephoros)</td>
<td><em>None are Aitolian, all are international</em></td>
<td>Kalydon – Trichonion – Pholas</td>
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<td>185/4 BC</td>
<td>Thebes</td>
<td>Arsinoe</td>
<td>Kalydon</td>
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<td>184/3 BC</td>
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<td>1:31 Ar</td>
<td>182/1 BC</td>
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<td>Stratos</td>
<td>Pholas</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>182/1 BC</td>
<td>Naupaktos</td>
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<td>Sosthenes</td>
<td>Stratos Sosthenes Phytaios</td>
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<td>Macheutieus?</td>
<td>Stratos</td>
<td>Stratos</td>
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<td>Aiklymios?</td>
<td>Stratos</td>
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<td>?</td>
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<td>AS</td>
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100 IG IX 1² if not otherwise noted. All inscriptions come from Thermon unless otherwise noted.
101 Bold denotes that grant was awarded to an entire city or population, not simply to an individual.
102 [Brackets] denote that grant is inferred but text is corrupted.
103 AS = asphaleia, AT = ateleia.
C. Second-century-BC Delphic *proxenia* grants awarded to Aitolians.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Person/town</th>
<th>Source <em>(FdD III)</em></th>
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<tr>
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<td>Stratios fr. Naupaktos</td>
<td>Syll. 583</td>
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<tr>
<td>187/6 BC</td>
<td>Philon fr. Trichonion</td>
<td>n 69, IG IX 1 1:32 line 18</td>
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<td>171/0 BC</td>
<td>? fr. Proscheion</td>
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<td>158/7 BC</td>
<td>Aristonymos fr. Naupaktos</td>
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<td>153-143 BC</td>
<td>Pyrrhos fr. Naupaktos</td>
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<td>150/49 BC</td>
<td>Biaios fr. Naupaktos</td>
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<tr>
<td>139-121 BC</td>
<td>Antileon fr. Arsinoe</td>
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104 Inscription located directly above on inscribed block is dated to this year.

105 Ascertained as a *proxenia* decree through the formula ἔδοξε τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς; no other information is preserved.
APPENDIX 4

Coin hoard composition.

1. Agrinion 1968 hoard (CH I, 76)
100+ AR.
   - Aitolian league: 10+ didrachms, 2 drachms, 100+ triobols
   - Chalkis: undetermined number of drachms
   - Lokris Opuntii: undetermined number of triobols
   - Boiotia: undetermined number of hemidrachms
   - Sikyon: undetermined number of hemidrachms

2. Naupaktos 1967 (IGCH 244)
71 AE.
   - Aitolian league: 64
   - Oitaia: 7

3. Kalydon 1973 (CH IV, 54)
52 AR.
   - Sikyon: 17 drachms
   - Lokris Opuntii: 1
   - Achaian league: 16 triobols
   - Argos: 16
   - Megalopolis

4. Vlachomandra 1886 (AD1889, E)
30+ AR?, 4 AE.
   - Chalkis
   - Sikyon
   - Elis
   - Lysimachos
   - Roman Republic: 1 bronze
   - Uncertain: 3 worn bronzes
5. Agrinion 1959 (*IGCH* 271) 1348 AR.

- Aitolian league: 97 triobols
- Ainianes: 2 triobols
- Lamia: 4 triobols
- Oitaia: 1 triobol
- Thessalian league: 1 triobol
- Lokris Opuntii: 17 triobols
- Phokis: 1 triobol
- Boiotia: 11 triobols, 4 drachms
- Chalkis: 72 drachms
- Histiaia: 6 drachms
- Athens: 39 tetradrachms
- Aigina: 1 drachm
- Achaian league: 838 triobols
- Sikyon: 50 triobols
- Messene: 2 triobols
- Argos: 10 triobols
- Megalopolis: 151 triobols
- Cyme: 2 tetradrachms
- Roman Republic: 39 denarii


- Athens: 1 New Style tetradrachm
- Roman republic: 3 denarii

7. Koniska 1962 (*IGCH* 266) 16+ AR.

- Ainianes: 1 triobol
- Phokis: 1 triobol
- Lokris Opuntii: 1 triobol
- Chalkis: 2 drachms
- Aigina: 1 drachm
- Sikyon: 1 drachm, 3 triobols
- Achaian league: 2 triobols
- Aigai: 1 triobol
- Elis: 1 triobol
- Ptolemy I: 2 tetradrachms
8. Makrakomi 1932 (IGCH 214) 13 AE.
- Aitolia: 4 hemiobols
- Antigonos Gonatas: 2
- Macedonia: 1
- Euphron: 1
- Argos Amphiphilochion: 1
- Lokris: 1
- Corinth: 1
- Sikyon: 1
- Roman Republic: 1

9. Oreus 1902 (IGCH 232) 1300 AR.
- Aitolian league: 2 triobols
- Alexander III: 1 tetradrachm
- Philip V: 13 didrachms, 11 drachms
- Perseus: 9 tetradrachms, 1 didrachm
- Macedon: 1 tetrobol
- Lysimachos: 1 drachm
- Larissa: 1 triobol
- Chalkis: 2 drachms
- Histiaia: 1 drachm, 5 tetrobols
- Achaian league: 3 drachms
- Rhodes: 595 drachms

10. Delphi 1907 (IGCH 303) 42 AE.
- Aitolian league: 34 hemiobols
- Phokis: 3
- Lokris Opuntii: 2
- Sikyon: 1
- Aigeira: 1
- Phlious: 1
11. Vonitsa 1993 (*CH VIII, 431*)
C. 148 AR.
- Aitolian league: 1 tetradrachm, 1 triobol
- Alexander III: 5 tetradrachms
- Perseus: 1 tetradrachm
- Argos Amphilochnikon: 1 tetradrachm
- Magnetia: 1 drachm
- Boiotia: 1 triobol
- Histiaia: 58 triobols
- Athens: 1 tetradrachm
- Corinth: 12 drachms
- Achaian league: 61 triobols
- Arcadia: 1 triobol
- Side: 4 tetradrachms
- Rome: 1 denarius

12. Stratos 1965 (*IGCH 251*)
12 AR.
- Aitolian league: 5 triobols
- Achaian league: 4 triobols
- Arcadia: 3 triobols

13. Kephallonia 1934 (*IGCH 257*)
146 AR.
- Aitolian league: 1 triobol
- Lokris Opuntii: 1 triobol
- Boiotia: 1 triobol
- Sikyon: 7 triobols
- Achaian league: 75 triobols
- Messene: 1 triobol
- Sparta: 3 triobols
- Argos: 41 triobols
- Arcadia: 16 triobol
14. Western Greece 1936 (IGCH 260)

677 AR.

- Aitolian league: 21 triobols
- Lokris Opuntii: 13 triobols
- Phokis: 5 triobols
- Boiotia: 6 triobols
- Chalkis: 31 drachms
- Achaian league: 429 triobols
- Sikyon: 53 triobols
- Patras: 1 triobol
- Messene: 1 triobol
- Sparta: 2 triobols
- Argos: 35 triobols
- Arcadia: 80 triobols

15. Lechena 1979 (CH VIII, 417)

80? AE

- Aitolian league: 1
- Antigonos Gonatas: 2
- Philip V: 3
- Macedonia?: 2
- Epirus, Athamanes: 8
- Ptolemies: 7
- Carthage: 1
- Elis?: 1
- Miletos: 1
- Phokis: 1
- Corinth: 5
- Uncertain: 7

16. Lechena 1986 (CH VIII, 358)

550+ AE.

- Mainland Greece: many
- Macedonia: many
- Seleucids: many
- Ptolemies: many
- Cyclades
- Asia Minor
- Carthage: 3
- Tarentum: 1
- Roman Republic: 1

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106 There is some confusion to the composition of the hoard and the number of coins therein. Dengate (1967, 105) identifies 98 coins of Megalopolis in the hoard, 28 of which were struck for the Achaian league.
17. Patras 1973 (CH VIII, 454) 117 AR.
- Aitolian league: 2 triobols
- Lokris Opuntii: 1 triobol
- Boiotia: 3 triobols
- Sikyon: 4 triobols
- Argos: 3 triobols
- Achaian league: 88 triobols
- Hermione: 1 triobol
- Megalopolis: 15 triobols

\[CH VIII, 454\]

18. Zougra 1859 (IGCH 261) 985 AR.\(^{107}\)
- Aitolian league: 14 triobols
- Lamia: 1 triobol
- Lokris Opuntii: 11 triobols
- Boiotia: 10 triobols, 21 drachms
- Aigina: 3 drachms
- Corinth: 1 triobol
- Sikyon: 11 triobols
- Achaian league: 654 triobols
- Messene: 2 triobols
- Argos: 96 triobols
- Megalopolis: 47 triobols

\[IGCH 261\]

\(^{107}\) These numbers given in this list are those provided by Tsangari 2007, 224. They do correspond to those given in the IGCH. Original numbers as given by de Witte are Aitolia: 421 triobols, Epirus: 1 diobol, Thessaly: 13 triobols, Lokris: 146 triobols, Boiotia: 289 triobols and drachms, Aigina: 14 drachms, Achaia: 5,689 triobols and tetrobols, Elis: 1 triobol, Messene: 3 triobols, Argolis: 1,409 triobols, Arcadia: 1,185 triobols.
19. Diakofto 1965 (*IGCH* 262)
3000+ AR.

- Aitolian league: 63 triobols
- Lamia: 1 triobol
- Lokris Opuntii: 12 triobols
- Phokis: 4 triobols
- Boiotia: 28 triobols
- Thebes: 7 triobols
- Chalkis: 92 drachms
- Histiaia: 6 tetrobols
- Sikyon: 459 triobols
- Aiga: 1 triobol
- Achaian league: 1601 triobols
- Messene: 6 triobols
- Koronai: 2 triobols
- Argos: 391 triobols
- Megalopolis: 226 triobols
- Roman republic: 1 quinarius

20. Arcadia 1929 (*IGCH* 242)
230 AR, 1 AE.

- Aitolian league: 7 triobols
- Lokris Opuntii: 5 triobols
- Phokis: 1 triobol
- Boiotia: 2 drachms, 6 triobols
- Chalkis: 2 drachms
- Aegina: 1 drachm
- Achaian league: 152 triobols
- Sikyon: 1 drachm, 10 triobols
- Elis: 1 bronze
- Argos: 4 triobols
- Kleonai: 2 triobol
- Arcadia/Megalopolis: 37 triobols
- Rhodes: 1 didrachm
21. Messene before 1937 (IGCH 301) c. 168 AR, 12 AE.\textsuperscript{108}
- Aitolian league: 1 triobol
- Chalkis: 2 triobols
- Sikyon: 13 triobols, 1 bronze
- Patras: 6 triobols
- Achaian league: 133 triobols, 1 bronze
- Arcadia: 8 triobols
- Messene: 1 triobol, 7 bronze
- Sparta: 2 triobols
- Argos: 2 triobols
- Methana: 1 bronze
- Kleitor: 1 bronze
- Tegea: 1 bronze

22. Epidauros 1934 (IGCH 288) 33 AR.
- Aitolian league: 1 triobol
- Boiotia: 1 drachm
- Sikyon: 1 triobol
- Achaian league: 21 triobols
- Sparta: 1 triobol
- Argos: 1 triobol
- Hermione: 1 triobol
- Arcadia/Megalopolis: 6 triobols

23. Vellies-Monemvasia 1984 (AD 39) 72 AR.
- Aitolian league: 7 triobols
- Lokris: 2 triobols
- Phokis: 1 triobol
- Boiotia: 1 triobol, 1 drachm
- Chalkis: 1 drachm
- Sikyon: 2 triobols
- Argos: 1 triobol
- Achaian league: 51 triobols
- Hermione: 1 triobol
- Arcadia: 2 triobols
- Rhodes: 1 didrachm

\textsuperscript{108} IGCH reports the total number to be 167 AR, 13 AE. Tsangari (2007) on the other hand gives 159 AR, 12 AE. The numbers given here are the sums of the coins reported to belong to the hoard, as I have not been able to access the coins themselves. There is some additional confusion with regards to the acquisition of the hoard.
11 AE.
- Aitolian league: 2 bronzes
- Herakleia: 2
- Arpi: 1
- Caelia: 1
- Ballaios: 2
- Apulia (uncertain): 1

![Canose 1995 Graph]

25. Caserta 1890 (IGCH 2053)
499 AR.
- Aitolian league: 4 triobols
- Ainianes: 2 triobols
- Oltaieti: 1 triobol
- Lokris: 1 triobol
- Boiotia: 2 triobols
- Thebes: 2 triobols
- Chalkis: 3 drachms
- Achaian league: 322 triobols
- Patras: 18 triobols
- Sikyon: 38 triobols
- Messene: 13 triobols
- Sparta: 23 triobols
- Argos: 49 triobols
- Arcadia: 26 triobols

![IGCH 2053 Graph]

26. Greece 1986 or earlier (CH VIII, 338)
45 AR.
- Aitolian league: 2 triobols
- Philip II: 1 hemidrachm
- Lokris Opuntii: 1 hemidrachm
- Achaian league: 35 triobols
- Arcadia: 5 triobols
- Messene: 1 triobol

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Only includes issues where $n > 3d$. 
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Only includes issues where n > 3d.

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Only includes issues where n > 3d.
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