LOVE, COMPASSION AND OTHER VICES: A HISTORY OF THE
STOIC THEORY OF THE EMOTIONS

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## Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter One: Chrysippus</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Two: Posidonius</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Three: Seneca</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Dissertation Abstract

The Stoics held the surprising, and perhaps even paradoxical, position that all emotions (pathē) are vicious and, consequently, play no role at all in a virtuous and fulfilling human life. In support of this claim, they argued both that emotions depend fundamentally on, and in a sense just are, certain false evaluative beliefs, and that emotions are “excessive and rejecting of reason.” My dissertation focuses especially on the latter claim, which has been largely misrepresented by scholarship on the Stoic theory of the emotions. In elucidating it, I argue for a new interpretation of the classical Stoic theory of the emotions formulated by Chrysippus, the most influential of the early Stoics. I also give an overview of the reception and development of his theory by the later Stoics Posidonius and Seneca, many of whose innovations, I argue, aim to explain why, according to the Stoic account, emotions are altogether “rejecting of reason” despite being based on certain occurrent evaluative beliefs.

Beyond its contribution to the study of Stoic ethics, I take my dissertation to advance our understanding of the classical world chiefly in two ways. First, by devoting much of my dissertation to the sophisticated reception of the classical Stoic theory of the emotions by later Stoics, I challenge the common portrayal of philosophers in the later Hellenistic and the early Imperial period as popularizing reporters of school dogma rather than innovative philosophers in their own right. Second, I take my dissertation to contribute to the broader study of ancient emotions. As I hope to show in future work, the Stoic theory provides the framework for much of the subsequent philosophical discussion of the emotions in antiquity. A detailed and accurate account of the Stoic theory of the emotions
will, therefore, be crucial as a foundation for future research on Hellenistic and Imperial conceptions of the emotions.
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While working on my dissertation, I have been helped by many people. My friends and compatriots in Princeton’s Classics and Classical Philosophy programs listened to earlier drafts of the chapters in both more formal and informal contexts, offered valuable suggestions and constant intellectual stimulation, and contributed to making the last six years terrifically enjoyable. Among many other people, special thanks are due to Yelena Baraz, Emilio Capettini, Chris Caterine, Mallory Monaco Caterine, Adam Crager, Andrew Feldherr, Adam Gitner, Megan Goldman-Petri, Leon Grek, Brooke Holmes, Richard Hutchins, Madeleine Jones, Aaron Kachuck, Dawn Lavalle, Stephanie Lewandowski, Danielle Meinrath, Thomas Miller, Ben Morison, Simon Oswald, Rachel Parsons, Whitney Schwab, Mor Segev, Simon Shogri, Mali Skotheim, Geir Thorarinsson, Dan Tober, Wei Wang, Gina White and Donna Zuckerberg. I should also record my gratitude to the other participants in the conference Seneca Philosophus for their comments on an earlier version of the first three sections of Chapter Three, and to Marcia Colish and Jula Wildberger who are co-editing the volume Seneca Philosophus (De Gruyter, forthcoming), in which a slightly altered version of the first three sections of Chapter Three will appear under the title “Seneca on the Analysis and Therapy of Occurrent Emotions.” I also owe a tremendous debt both to my dissertation advisors, John Cooper, Bob Kaster, and Christian Wildberg who not only improved every aspect of the dissertation, but have also indelibly shaped my own ideal of scholarship, and to my dissertation supervisor, Hendrik Lorenz, who encouraged me to develop this project from its beginnings as a presentation in his seminar on Posidonius and has helped me in every stage of it. I owe a debt of a different kind to my parents, Nan Holmes and Steven
Kaufman, who have supported my academic endeavors long before Princeton and have also read and discussed with me nearly every argument, academic or otherwise, that I’ve developed since then. Finally, my dissertation is dedicated to my son Julian Kaufman for his, at least quasi-emotional, love and enthusiasm and to my wife Anna Thysell, for her constant support and companionship.
Introduction

The Stoics held the surprising position that all emotions (πάθη) are vicious and, consequently, play no role at all in a virtuous and fulfilling human life. Nevertheless, like many other ancient philosophical schools, they also held that forming and experiencing the right emotions at the right times is an important and constitutive part of living a fulfilling and virtuous life. They explained this apparent contradiction by distinguishing between the ordinary, vicious emotions (πάθη) of the non-wise and the good-emotions (ἐὐπάθειαι) of the wise.¹ However, since they took the conditions of becoming a wise person to be extremely demanding (for instance, among other requirements, the wise never form any false beliefs at all, either about theoretical matters or even about particular phenomena such as whether the next bus is scheduled to arrive at 11 or at 11:15), they held that every emotion any of us, or any Stoic for that matter, actually experiences is thoroughly vicious. Therefore, for the Stoics, emotions such as love, compassion, fear and hate are never appropriate to the circumstances the agent finds himself in, but are in every case vicious and misguided. Moreover, this was not simply an oddity in their theory – like, say, their insistence even in the face of anatomical observation that the mind was located in the heart rather than the brain on which nothing else in their theory depended² – but instead reflected central aspects of their theory of mind, theory of action and ethical theory.

The Stoics offered two main arguments in support of their surprising and counter-intuitive position. First, they argued that all ordinary emotions (πάθη) depend

¹ For the Stoic theory of “good emotions” (ἐὐπάθειαι), see the texts collected in SVF 3.431-442; and, for discussion, see Inwood 1985, 173-175; Sorabji 2000, 47-51; and Cooper 2005.
² See especially DL 7.159 = SVF 2.837, Aëtius Plac. 4.5.6 = SVF 2.838, as well as the many verbatim quotations from Chrysippus’ On the Soul, collected in SVF 2.879-911. For discussion, see especially Tieleman 1996.
fundamentally on, and express, *false* beliefs. According to them, emotions, including good-emotions, express the following two beliefs: the belief that something good or bad is present or impending for one, and the belief that it is appropriate for one to experience an affective reaction as a result. Since the Stoics took virtue and virtuous action *alone* to be good and vice and vicious actions *alone* to be bad, they held that both of the evaluative beliefs expressed by emotions are most commonly false. For the objects of emotions are typically not the impassioned person’s own virtue or vice, but instead more conventional and, for the Stoics, *merely apparent* goods or bads, such as health, sickness, pleasure and pain, all of which are, they argue, “indifferent” (ἀδιάφορα) for one’s virtue or vice, and so, too, for the overall quality of one’s life. For example, someone who is frightened at the prospect of going to the dentist’s office to have a cavity filled is frightened, the Stoics would argue, only because he believes that pain is bad for him. If, on the contrary, he believed that pain was not bad but was rather merely worth avoiding, and so, in Stoic terms, “dispreferred” (ἀποπροηγμένον), then although he might still endeavor to avoid or postpone the dentist’s appointment, he would not be afraid of it.

Second, the Stoics argued that emotions are vicious on account of being, in their terms, “excessive” and “rejecting of reason.” Although scholars have often taken the Stoics to hold that emotions are excessive and rejecting of reason only in the rather minimal sense that because they express false beliefs, they are also rejecting of *right* beliefs. According to the Stoics, only the so-called “good emotions” of the wise are correlated with true beliefs. All other emotions are correlated with at least one false belief. Thus, even in cases where a non-wise person is, say, upset over his vice, which really is bad, the Stoics would argue that his further belief that it is appropriate for him to suffer an agitated, strong affective reaction as a result is false. For further discussion of such cases, see Chapter One, n11.

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3 For ancient statements of this view, see, for example, Andronic. Rhod. 1 = SVF 3.391, Cic. Tusc. 4.14 = SVF 3.393 and Stob. 2.7.10b, p. 90 Wachsmuth = SVF 3.394.

4 According to the Stoics, only the so-called “good emotions” of the wise are correlated with true beliefs. All other emotions are correlated with at least one false belief. Thus, even in cases where a non-wise person is, say, upset over his vice, which really is bad, the Stoics would argue that his further belief that it is appropriate for him to suffer an agitated, strong affective reaction as a result is false. For further discussion of such cases, see Chapter One, n11.

5 For the Stoic use of the term “indifferent,” and its role in their theory, see especially the texts collected in SVF 3.117-146. For an accessible and helpful introduction to Stoic axiology, see Brennan 2005, 119-168.
reason, which is the reason that a perfectly rational agent would have exercised,⁶ I argue that the Stoics took emotions to be excessive and rejecting of reason far more robustly. According to Stoic theory, emotions are excessive and rejecting of reason primarily in the sense that, once formed, impassioned people are no longer fully in control of them; and so, even if they form the desire to check or abandon their emotions, they may fail to do so immediately. For example, even if someone recognizes that their anguish over their favorite basketball team’s losing streak is unwarranted, they may nevertheless continue to feel distressed. But in that case, since, as we have seen, emotions express certain beliefs, someone may both feel distressed, and so hold the belief that it is appropriate for them to be distressed over their team’s losing streak, and at the same time believe that their distress is inappropriate and perhaps even form the impulse (that is, the psychological movement to action) to calm down.⁷

Although scholarship on the Stoic theory of emotions has generally taken the Stoics to have rejected the possibility of such *synchronic* mental conflict on account of the Stoic view that the adult human soul consists solely of reason,⁸ I argue that the view that synchronic mental conflict is possible played an important role in the Stoic theory of the emotions. Appreciating the distinctive way in which the Stoics took emotions to be excessive and rejecting of reason thus has significant implications for Stoic moral psychology, as well as for the Stoic theory of the emotions. Moreover, it is also crucial

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⁶ For representative examples from scholarship on the Stoic theory of the emotions, see Gill 1998, 140; Annas 2003, 105; and Graver 2007, 37-38.

⁷ By an “impulse” (ὁρμή) the Stoics mean a psychological movement to action, which is sufficient to produce an action if nothing intervenes and interferes. Thus, someone who forms the impulse to cross the street will do so, unless he is either physically impeded or, I will argue, his impulse is checked by his experiencing a vivid rival impression or impulse. For ancient definitions, see especially Stob. 2.7.9, p. 86 Wachsmuth and 2.7.9b, p. 88 Wachsmuth.

⁸ For representative examples, see Inwood 1985, 131-143; Frede 1986, 97-98; Gosling 1987, 199; and Price 1995, 157-158 and 167.
for understanding the reception and development of the Stoic theory of the emotions by later Stoics, many of whose innovations aim to explain why, according to the Stoic account, emotions are excessive and rejecting of reason despite depending fundamentally on certain occurrent evaluative beliefs.

My dissertation is divided into three chapters, each of which focuses on a different Stoic philosopher. While the first chapter offers a detailed interpretation of the theory of the emotions articulated by Chrysippus, the most influential of the early Stoics, the subsequent two chapters discuss the reception and development of the early Stoic view by the later Stoics Posidonius and Seneca. My first chapter begins by considering Chrysippus’ distinction between errant impulses, which are based on mistaken reasoning but are nevertheless not rejecting of reason, and emotions, which are also correlated with false beliefs but reject reason altogether.9 I argue that proper attention to this Chrysippean distinction indicates that the Stoics do not use the phrase “rejecting of reason” to mean “rejecting of right reason,” as commentators have generally understood it. For both errant impulses and emotions reject right reason, but only emotions are said to be rejecting of reason. Instead, I argue that Chrysippus takes emotions to be “rejecting of reason” primarily in two interrelated ways. First, in order to form an emotion someone must assent without “circumspection” (περίσκεψις)10 to a false impulsive impression portraying a course of action as good or bad for them; and second, after someone has formed an emotion, it is no longer fully under the control of their reason since they may continue to experience it, even if they form a countervailing evaluative belief. Taking

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9 For this distinction, see especially PHP 4.2.12, 4.4.16-17. I use the abbreviation PHP to refer to Galen’s On the Doctrines of Plato and Hippocrates, which is far and away our best source for both Chrysippus’ and Posidonius’ theories of the emotions. Unless otherwise noted, I follow De Lacy’s 1984 edition of this work.

10 I take the term περίσκεψις from PHP 4.3.7; a variant of it is used as well in a verbatim quotation from Chrysippus’ On the Emotions at PHP 4.6.29.
note of the latter way in which emotions are rejecting of reason allows us to see the error in the widespread view in Stoic scholarship that the Stoics, by positing only a rational aspect of the soul, denied the possibility of occurrent mental conflict. I argue that Chrysippus not only allowed occurrent mental conflict but also explained how it is possible by appealing to the Stoic conception of reason as an extended, material thing and arguing that certain parts of reason may contain, or rather simply be, distinct and conflicting evaluative beliefs and impulses.¹¹

The next chapter turns to the reception and development of Chrysippus’ theory of the emotions by the 2nd-1st century BC Stoic Posidonius. I argue that Posidonius accepts the early Stoic account of emotions as impulses that depend fundamentally on, and express, certain beliefs and are also excessive and rejecting of reason, but operates with a far more restrictive conception of reason as incapable of synchronic occurrent conflict. For example, he explains the possibility of synchronic mental conflict, which Chrysippus had taken reason itself to bear, by positing an additional non-rational aspect of the soul, which, he argues, plays a necessary and constitutive role, together with reason, in the formation of emotions. For Posidonius, then, if an impassioned person continues to experience and to act on their emotion despite coming to recognize they ought not to do so, it is not because of any conflict within reason itself, as Chrysippus had argued, but rather results from a conflict between reason and a distinct, non-rational aspect of their soul.

My third and final chapter turns to Seneca’s development and reception of the early Stoic theory of the emotions. I argue that although Seneca introduced several

¹¹ For the Stoic conception of the soul as corporeally extended, see SVF 2.773-800 and the brief discussion in Gourinat 1996, 17-21.
philosophically significant innovations into the Stoic theory of the emotions, he did so, unlike Posidonius, without abandoning any of the central tenets of the Stoic theory. For example, I propose that Seneca’s innovative analysis of the formation of emotions into three successive mental “movements” \textit{(motus)} in \textit{On Anger} provides an elegant explanation of why, as Chrysippus also thought, people experiencing emotions often continue to experience them even if they reject the evaluative beliefs on which their emotions are based (Sen. \textit{De ira} 2.4.1). I also argue that Seneca made a novel contribution to the Stoic therapy of the emotions, which takes fully into account the implications of the early Stoic view that impassioned people are inadequately reason-responsive. He claims that in treating especially violent occurrent emotions, the only available method of therapy is to stimulate a rival emotion in the impassioned person. For example, he recommends treating someone experiencing occurrent anger by, say, frightening him. This method of emotional therapy makes very good sense on the basis of the Stoic view that emotions are rejecting of reason. For it does not directly challenge the beliefs correlated with the emotions it aims to override, but instead stimulates a more vivid, rival impulse that simply proves more effective than the emotion it counters, without challenging the beliefs correlated with it.

This chapter also discusses the affective relationship of the wise to merely apparent goods or bads, for which Seneca is far and away our best source. Although, as we have seen, the Stoics deny that the wise will ever form emotions regarding merely apparent goods or bads, they allow that such things may stimulate psychic and physical responses in the wise, which are very similar to, if not indistinguishable from, those associated with emotions. For example, the wise, as they watch their city burn around
them, may experience a shrinking or contraction of their psychic *pneuma*, and may also become pale and shed tears.\(^{12}\) According to Stoic theory, the non-voluntary affective response of the wise in such cases is neither an emotion nor a good-emotion, but is instead, to use Stoic vocabulary, a “pre-emotion” (προπάθεια).\(^{13}\) While scholarship on the Stoic theory of pre-emotions has focused for the most part on whether they were already part of the early Stoic theory and, if not, on who introduced them into Stoic theory,\(^{14}\) I argue that Seneca addresses a further and philosophically far more interesting question: will the same range of conventionally good and bad things stimulate pre-emotions in the wise and the non-wise? For example, even if the wise will, as our sources attest, naturally and unavoidably experience pre-emotions as they watch their city burn to the ground, we might wonder whether, like the non-wise, they will also commonly experience a pre-emotion if their tax-refund is less than expected or if someone cuts them off in traffic? I argue that careful consideration of Seneca’s discussion of the pre-emotions of the wise strongly suggests that a far more restricted set of objects stimulates pre-emotions in the wise than in the non-wise. In particular, the wise naturally and unavoidably experience pre-emotions *only* in response to merely apparent good or bad things that are, to use Stoic vocabulary, “preferred” (προηγμένα) or “dispreferred” (ἀποπροηγμένα) *intrinsically*, such as health or sickness. By contrast, they will not naturally experience pre-emotions in response to merely apparent goods or bads that are

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12 For the Stoic conception of psychic *pneuma*, and its background in earlier philosophical and medical texts, see Annas 1991.

13 I should note that the term “pre-emotion” (προπάθεια) is not securely attested in a Stoic context until Origen in the 3rd century AD (*Selecta in Psalmos*, 12.1141, 12.1144 Migne), although the concept is clearly present much earlier. Margaret Graver 1998 has argued that a Stoic use of the term προπάθεια may be present already in Philo; for a dissenting view, see Weisser 2012.

“preferred” or “dispreferred” only instrumentally, such as money or reputation.\(^\text{15}\)

Therefore, while the wise will experience pre-emotions if their city is sacked or if their car spins out of control, according to Seneca, they will not typically experience pre-emotions if they unexpectedly lose a great deal of money or if someone insults them.

Beyond its contribution to the study of the Stoic theory of the emotions, my dissertation will advance our understanding of post-Classical philosophy chiefly in two ways. First, by paying close attention to the criticism and development of the classical Stoic theory of the emotions by later Stoics, I challenge the still too common portrayal of philosophers in the later Hellenistic and Early Imperial periods as mere reporters of classical theory rather than sophisticated and creative philosophers in their own right. By doing so, I hope to show that authors such as Posidonius and Seneca merit more philosophical attention than they have been given in recent decades and to stimulate scholarly work on Late Hellenistic and Early Imperial philosophy more broadly. Second, my dissertation also contributes to the wider study of ancient emotions. For the Stoic theory of the emotions deeply influenced both the literature of its day and the contemporary and subsequent philosophical discussion of the emotions in antiquity.\(^\text{16}\) A detailed and accurate history of the Stoic theory of the emotions will, therefore, be essential for the study of post-Classical conceptions of the emotions more broadly.

\(^\text{15}\) For the Stoic distinction between indifferents (ἀδιάφορα) that are preferred and dispreferred intrinsically (δι᾿ αὑτά) and only instrumentally (δι᾿ ἕτερα), see DL 7.107, Cic. De fin. 3.56-57, Stob. Ecl. 2.7.7b, p. 80 Wachsmuth.

\(^\text{16}\) For discussion of Stoic influence on contemporary Greek and Roman literature, as well as its afterlife, see M. Colish 1985. For a discussion of its afterlife in Early Christian thought, see Sorabji 2000, section four.
Chapter One: Chrysippus

In Books Four and Five of his treatise *On the Doctrines of Plato and Hippocrates*,¹ which are far and away our best sources for Chrysippus’ theory of the emotions, Galen endeavors to show that Chrysippus’ theory of the emotions is not only false, but also internally inconsistent. His criticism focuses especially on the following two positions held by Chrysippus:

(i) Chrysippus’ view that there are two distinct kinds of bad and wrong “impulses” (ἡρμαί):² “emotions” (πάθη) and also impulses arising from an error in reasoning, which I will call “errant impulses.”

(ii) Chrysippus’ view that someone may hold the impulse to act in a certain way, but nevertheless fail to act on the basis of it.

In the process of arguing that each of these positions is inconsistent with the central tenets of Chrysippus’ theory of the emotions, Galen quotes quite a few passages from Chrysippus’ *On the Emotions* (Περὶ Παθῶν) that collectively provide strong evidence of Chrysippus’ commitment to them.³ Thus, it might be expected that any reconstruction of Chrysippus’ theory of the emotions would attempt to explain how these positions fit coherently and consistently into his overall theory. In fact, the standard interpretation of the Stoic theory of the emotions, which has recently been described as “the subject of unusual agreement among scholars” (Brennan 1998, 21), takes these

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¹ I will refer to *On the Doctrines of Plato and Hippocrates* as ‘PHP’ in what follows. My citations of this text are from De Lacy 1984.

² By an impulse (ἡρμή) the Stoics mean a psychological movement to action, which is sufficient to produce an action if nothing intervenes and interferes. For ancient definitions, see especially Stob. 2.7.9, p. 86 Wachsmuth and 2.7.9b, p. 88 Wachsmuth. For an excellent modern discussion, see Brennan 2005, 86-87.

³ For Chrysippus’ commitment to (i), see PHP 4.2.12 and 4.4.16-17. For his commitment to (ii), see 4.2.14-18, 4.4.24-32 and 4.7.12-17.
positions to be incompatible with fundamental elements in Chrysippus’ theory of the

emotions.

According to the standard interpretation, the Stoics define an emotion as *any* impulse correlated with the following occurrent beliefs (both of which are most commonly false): the belief that a present or impending object is good or bad for one, and the belief that it is, consequently, appropriate for one to experience an agitated, strong affective reaction. However, as I will argue, Chrysippus’ distinction between errant impulses and emotions implies that there can be impulses that are not emotions — namely, errant impulses — sharing the same pair of occurrent beliefs. For the crucial difference between errant impulses and emotions, as he describes them, is *not* the propositional content of the beliefs correlated with them, but rather the way in which one forms and holds such impulses. Thus, according to Chrysippus, an impulse correlated with the same false evaluative beliefs that are commonly correlated with emotions, but formed through a mere error in reasoning, would be an errant impulse rather than an emotion. Therefore, the standard interpretation is incapable of explaining Chrysippus’ distinction between emotions and errant impulses. The standard interpretation also holds

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4 According to the Stoics, only the emotions of the wise, the so-called “good emotions” (εὐπάθειαι), are correlated with true beliefs. All other emotions are correlated with at least one false belief. For the Stoic theory of good emotions, see especially Cic. *Tusc.* 4.12-14 and DL 7.115. For an excellent recent discussion, see Cooper 2005.

5 The Stoics hold that only virtue and vice and virtuous and vicious actions are either good or bad, everything else is indifferent (ἀδιάφορον) to a person’s leading a fulfilling life. Accordingly, since people are most commonly emotionally moved towards corporeal and external ‘goods’, which the Stoics take to be indifferents, most emotions are correlated with the *false* belief that something present or impending is good or bad for one. For discussion of the Stoic theory of indifferents, see the passages collected with commentary in Long and Sedley 1987, vol. 1, 354-359.

6 For example, Steven Strange expresses the standard interpretation when he writes: “The hormetic reaction of the passion then follows *automatically*, once these requisite judgments have been made […]” (2004, 40, my emphasis). For other representative examples, see Graver 2007, 38-46, esp. 41-45; Brennan 1998, 30; and Inwood 1985, 150-151.

7 Discussions of Stoic psychology very frequently conflate emotions and errant impulses. For example, Christopher Gill, in discussing the distinction between what I have been calling errant impulses and
that on the Stoic theory it is impossible for someone to have the occurrent impulse to act in a certain way but to fail to (at least endeavor to) act on the basis of it,\(^8\) thereby contradicting Chrysippus’ view that someone may hold an occurrent impulse without acting on the basis of it.\(^9\) It follows that the standard interpretation is incapable of explaining Chrysippus’ commitment to either of the positions that Galen criticizes.

In this chapter, I propose an interpretation of Chrysippus’ theory of the emotions that explains his commitment to both of these positions. I argue that someone forms an emotion \textit{only} if he both assents to an impulsive impression (\ orchēτική νοηματική)\(^10\) representing something as good or bad (in most cases falsely),\(^11\) and if he fails to exercise circumspection (περίσκεψις) in assenting to it.\(^12\) By exercising circumspection when evaluating and assenting to an impulsive impression, I mean that the agent does not assent precipitately and without checking to make sure that, according to him, there is

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\(^*\) For instance, in summarizing the standard interpretation of Stoic psychology, Tad Brennan writes: “What we might describe as having, but also checking or restraining, the impulse to eat the cake, would not count in Stoicism as having an impulse. If the impulse is there it results in action, and there can be no checking or restraining of it” (Brennan 1998, 28). See also Gill 1998, 122n50 and Inwood 1985, 52-53.

\(^9\) It is worth noting that for Chrysippus there is no ethically meaningful distinction between a person’s forming the active impulse to do something and actually doing it. Hence, according to Chrysippus, if someone forms the active impulse to walk across the street, but is prevented from doing so by an external impediment, he nevertheless succeeds in walking (in the sense relevant to ethics) in virtue of holding the active impulse to do so. See especially, Sen. 

\(^10\) An “impulsive impression” (orchēτική νοηματική) is an impression of “what is appropriate” (τό καθῆκον) for the agent to do, which, if the agent assents to it, gives rise to an impulse (νοηματική) to do that thing. The term is introduced and defined in Stob. 2.7.9, p. 86 Wachsmuth.

\(^11\) I mean to exempt certain emotions the objects of which really are good or bad for one, but which are also correlated with the false belief that it is appropriate for one to be distressed or elated as a consequence. The classical example of this is Alcibiades’ distress regarding his own vice: although, as he supposes, something bad, namely his vice, really is present to him, the Stoics take his additional belief that it is appropriate for him to be distressed to be false. For ancient discussions of the Alcibiades case, see Posidonius’ objection to Chrysippus in Gal. PHP 4.5.28, and Cic. Tusc. 3.77 and 4.61. For commentary, see Graver 2007, 191-211 and White 1995, 241-245.

\(^12\) I take the term περίσκεψις from PHP 4.3.7.
reason to assent; but instead remains receptive to possible countervailing impressions and reasons and assents only after considering the other salient impressions and reasons of which he becomes aware. Chrysippus is quite clear, however, that it is not a requirement of exercising circumspection that one correctly determines the truth or falsity of the impulsive impressions with which they are faced. Rather, they may assent to a false impulsive impression despite exercising circumspection, in which case, I submit, they form an errant impulse instead of an emotion. Chrysippus, therefore, distinguishes errant impulses and emotions by whether or not one exercises circumspection in forming them. Moreover, he also takes the manner in which someone forms an impulse to characterize the way in which he holds it. Thus, someone who assents with circumspection to a false impulsive impression will also hold the consequent errant impulse in a circumspect way. By contrast, someone who assents to such an impression without circumspection will hold the consequent emotion in an uncircumspect way.

My interpretation of Chrysippus’ theory of the emotions rests in part on a reconsideration of his account of occurrent mental conflict. Chrysippus, like nearly all Stoics, held that the adult human capacity for desire and impulse does not have both a rational and a non-rational aspect, as Plato and Aristotle had argued, but is instead wholly rational. That is, according to him, all desires and impulses of adult humans are acts of reason alone. While scholars have generally taken this position to imply that Chrysippus also denied the possibility of a person’s holding the impulse to act in one way, but believing, at the same time, that he ought to act differently,¹³ I argue that such occurrent

¹³ For representative examples, see Brennan 1998, 23; Price 1995; 157; and Gosling 1987, 179. This view rests largely on the untenable assumption that synchronic mental conflict is incompatible with a monistic theory of soul. For an earlier attempt to show that synchronic mental conflict is compatible with Stoic moral psychology, see Joyce 1995.
mental conflict plays an important role in his theory of the emotions. For example, I argue that he takes emotions to be, in his description, “excessive impulses” (ὁρμαὶ πλεονάζουσαι) in the sense that impassioned people at the apex of their emotion are incapable of abandoning their emotion immediately, even if they form the belief that they ought to do so. An impassioned person may, therefore, continue to experience and to act on an emotion, and so also to hold the beliefs correlated with it, even if he forms the belief that he ought rather to calm down.

This chapter is divided into five sections. In the first section, I discuss Chrysippus’ distinction between errant impulses and emotions, and argue that someone forms an emotion only if he assents to a false impulsive impression without exercising circumspection. In the second section, I consider Chrysippus’ reasons for thinking that people who are faced with false impulsive impressions commonly have countervailing impressions or dispositional beliefs readily available to them. In the third section, I turn to the range of ways in which, according to Chrysippus, impassioned people may fail to exercise circumspection, and argue that he allows the possibility of someone’s continuing to experience an emotion despite forming the belief that they should rather act differently. In the fourth section, I discuss a difficult passage from Chrysippus’ *On the Emotions*, explaining the tendency of people experiencing the emotion of distress to cease to feel distressed over time, even if they continue to hold the impulse to be distressed. In the fifth and final section, I consider Chrysippus’ explanation of the sense in which all emotions are “excessive impulses,” and argue that he takes emotions to be “excessive” in that an impassioned person at the apex of her emotion may continue to act on the basis of
it, even if she comes to believe that her emotion is misguided and that she ought, therefore, to calm down, and so too, perhaps, even if she forms a countervailing impulse.

I

In several quotations preserved in the *PHP*, Chrysippus distinguishes between emotions and errant impulses. For instance, in explaining the first half of Zeno’s definition of emotions as “an irrational and unnatural movement of the soul, and an excessive impulse” (*ἀλογόν τε καὶ παρά φύσιν ψυχῆς [...] καὶ πλεονάζουσαν όρμήν*) (*PHP* 4.2.8), he writes:

> τὸ γὰρ ἀλογόν τούτου ληπτέον ἀπειθὲς λόγῳ καὶ ἀπεστραμμένον τὸν λόγον, καθ’ ἣν φοράν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔθει τινὰς φαμέν ὀδηγεῖσθαι καὶ ἀλόγως φέρεσθαι ἄνευ λόγου <καὶ> χρίσεως <οὐ γὰρ> ὡς εἰ δημαρτημένος φέρεται καὶ παραδών τι κατὰ τὸν λόγον, ταῦτ’ ἐπισημαίνεται, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα καθ’ ἣν ὑπογράφει φοράν, οὐ πεφυκότος τοῦ λογικοῦ Ἲσου κινεῖσθαι οὕτως κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν λόγον. (*PHP* 4.2.12)

For one must understand this irrationality (sc. of emotions) as disobedient to and rejecting of reason. And in reference to this motion, we say colloquially that certain people are pushed and moved irrationally, without reason and judgment. For we do not use these expressions as if someone is moved in error and having overlooked something on the basis of reason. Rather, we use them especially with respect to the motion that they outline; for a rational animal is not naturally moved thus on the basis of his soul, but on the basis of reason.

In this passage, Chrysippus contrasts the behavior of impassioned people who are “pushed and moved irrationally, without reason and judgment” with that of people acting on the basis of merely errant reasoning who are “moved in error and having overlooked something on the basis of reason.”

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14 On the attribution of this definition to Zeno, see also Tieleman 2003, 96-7.
15 Supplying <καὶ>, as first suggested by Petersen 1888, and followed by De Lacy 1984.
16 I follow De Lacy 1984 in supplying <οὐ γὰρ>. While I am not confident in this precise restoration, it is clear that a negative has fallen out of the text. Alternatively, Müller 1874 supplies καὶ οὐ οἴχει εἰ and Pohlenz 1898 supplies καὶ γάρ οἴχει εἰ.
17 It is worth noting that commentators have often taken what I have been calling errant impulses to be merely theoretical rather than practical mistakes. For instance, Teun Tieleman writes that the errors in this passage concern “purely cognitive mistakes (where the relation to action is absent or at least less direct)” (2003, 98). However, Chrysippus’ description of people suffering errors as “moved along in error” (δημαρτημένος φέρεται) speaks strongly against this interpretation. For as Tieleman himself notes in discussing this passage: “the term [sc. φέρεσθαι] indicates the impulse aspect of behavior in particular”
is emphasized by the similarity of the phrases “is moved in error and […] on the basis of reason” (δημαρτημένως φέρεται καὶ [...] κατὰ τὸν λόγον) and “to be moved irrationally” (ἀλόγως φέρεσθαι). Chrysippus’ distinction between emotions and errant impulses thus centers on the way in which each departs from normative rationality: while errant impulses are based on reasoning that has gone astray but are still “on the basis of reason” (κατὰ τὸν λόγον), emotions are not merely based on false beliefs, but are “disobedient to and rejecting of reason” (ἀπειθὲς λόγῳ καὶ ἀπεστραμμένον τὸν λόγον).

Although scholars have often argued that the Stoics take emotions to be “disobedient to and rejecting of reason” only in the rather minimal sense that they are disobedient to and rejecting of right reason, such interpretations do not account for Chrysippus’ distinction between emotions and errant impulses. For since both emotions and errant impulses are correlated with false beliefs, they are both rejecting of right reason. Thus, on the standard interpretation of the Stoic theory, emotions and errant

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(2003, 98n40, my emphasis). The close parallel between the phrases δημαρτημένως φέρεται, in the case of errors, and ἀλόγως φέρεσθαι, in the case of emotions, also suggests that errant impulses are practical and so not purely cognitive errors. For the verb φέρεσθαι is most naturally taken to have the same sense in both cases, thereby supporting taking the errors at issue here to be impulses guiding action, like emotions. This is also suggested by the final sentence of the passage, which substitutes the verb κινεῖσθαι for φέρεσθαι. While κινεῖσθαι could be used to describe purely cognitive change, it is far more easily understood, absent special qualification, to refer to physical movement. Errant impulses in this passage are thus no more “purely cognitive mistakes” than emotions are “purely cognitive mistakes.” Instead, I think that both are practical impulses and so action guiding.

18 For instance, Christopher Gill writes: “The πάθος is unreasonable in the sense that it does not involve the kind of judgment (in accordance with ‘right reason’) that a fully reasonable man would make” (1998, 140, my emphasis). Similarly, Julia Annas argues that emotions are “disobedient to reason” in that they are disobedient to “right reason, the reasoning that should have been followed” (2003, 105). By equating the irrationality of emotions with their not being in accordance with “right reason,” both Gill and Annas obliterate Chrysippus’ distinction between emotions and errant impulses. Cf. Brennan 1998, 31-32 and Graver 2007, 37-38.
impulses would both be “disobedient to and rejecting of reason,” contradicting Chrysippus’ distinction between them.\textsuperscript{19}

By contrast, I propose that a person acting on the basis of an errant impulse is moved “on the basis of reason” \textit{not} in the sense that she acts on the basis of right reason, but in the sense that she remains open and responsive to reasons speaking against her impulse. By contrast, impassioned people are distinctively “disobedient to and rejecting of reason” in virtue of their proneness both to overlook countervailing reasons and to be inadequately responsive to countervailing reasons even if they become aware of them.

This interpretation is also suggested by another passage from \textit{On the Emotions}, focusing on the distinctive way in which emotions are disobedient to and rejecting of reason. As Chrysippus writes:

\textit{διὸ καὶ οὐκ ἀπὸ τρόπου λέγεται ὑπὸ τινον τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθος εἶναι κίνησις παρὰ φύσιν, ὥς ἐπὶ φόβου ἔχει καὶ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων, πάσης γὰρ αἱ τοιαύται κινήσεις τε καὶ καταστάσεις ἀπειθεῖς τε τῷ λόγῳ εἰς καὶ ἀπεστραμμέναι· καθὸ καὶ ἀλόγως φαμὲν φέρεσθαι τοὺς τοιούτους οίχι οἷον κακῶς ἐν τῷ διαλογίζεσθαι, ὡς ἂν τις εἴποι κατὰ τὸ ἔχειν ἐναντίως πρὸς τὸ εὐλόγως, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ λόγου ἀποστροφήν. (\textit{PHP} 4.4.16-17)}

Therefore, it is correctly said by some people that an emotion of the soul is an unnatural motion, as in the case of fear, desire and the like. For all such motions and conditions are disobedient to reason and have rejected it. On the basis of which we say that men of such a sort are moved irrationally, not such as in reasoning badly, as someone would say in respect to their being in a state opposite that of someone reasoning well, but rather in respect to the rejection of reason.

Although the reasoning involved in emotions presumably often involves features characteristic of bad reasoning, such as the overhasty consideration of alternatives and objections, it is \textit{not}, according to the final sentence of this passage, a kind of bad reasoning. Since it is, of course, also neither good nor mediocre reasoning, it follows that, for Chrysippus, the reasoning involved in emotions somehow does not count as reasoning

\textsuperscript{19} For a good discussion of the standard interpretation’s inability to explain Chrysippus’ distinction between errant impulses and emotions, see Sorabji 1998, 151-153 and 2000, 55-57.
at all. Rather, he distinguishes the “thinking,” or whatever we should call it, involved in emotions from reasoning more generally on the grounds that impassioned people are moved irrationally not “in respect to their being in a state opposite that of someone reasoning well, but rather in respect to the rejection of reason.” Chrysippus’ stark distinction between mere bad reasoning and the thinking correlated with emotions raises the following interrelated questions: first, and most pressing, what does he mean by the phrase “rejection of reason” (τὴν τοῦ λόγου ἀποστροφήν), especially since emotions, like all adult human impulses, are based on the agent’s coming to form, and hold, certain occurrent evaluative beliefs? And second, how does he distinguish the “rejection of reason” involved in emotions from mere bad reasoning?

An interpretation of Chrysippus’ claim that emotions are “without reason and judgment” (ἄνευ λόγου καὶ κρίσεως), which Galen imagines a partisan of Chrysippus suggesting, helps to resolve both of these puzzles. Galen, when criticizing Chrysippus’ description of emotions as acts of reasoning that are, nevertheless, “without reason and judgment,” briefly considers and rejects a more sympathetic interpretation of Chrysippus’ account.

εἰ μὴ γῆ Δία βοηθῶν τις αὐτῷ φαίη πλείω σημαίνει τὸ τῆς κρίσεως ὄνομα καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὴν ἐξήγησιν τοῦ ὄρου τὴν οἰον περίσκεψιν εἰρήθαι κρίσιν, ὡς εἶναι τὸ ἄνευ κρίσεως ἴσον <τῷ>20 ἄνευ περίσκεψις. (PHP 4.3.7)

Unless, by Zeus, someone coming to his [Chrysippus’] aid would say that the word judgment (τὸ τῆς κρίσεως ὄνομα) means many things and in his explanation of the definition [of the emotions] he said judgment in the sense of circumspection (περίσκεψιν), so that without judgment is the same as without circumspection.

According to this interpretation, by claiming that emotions are “without judgment” (ἄνευ κρίσεως), Chrysippus means that they are “without circumspection”

20 Supplying <τῷ>, which was proposed already by Bake 1810.
(ἀνεύ περισκέψεως). Although Galen rejects this interpretation on the grounds that Chrysippus should have been more explicit if by “without judgment” he meant “without circumspection” (PHP 4.3.9-10), I think that it suggests a very promising interpretation of Chrysippus’ theory of the emotions, explaining how an emotion may depend fundamentally on the impassioned person’s beliefs, but nevertheless move him “without reason and judgment.” Since Galen does not discuss this interpretation at any length, it is quite unclear from this passage alone how exactly this interpretation should be understood, and even what precisely, according to it, the term circumspection (περίσκεψις) means. There are two other instances of variants of the term circumspection in the PHP, which help to elucidate its use here.

The next use of this term occurs in Chrysippus’ description of the irrational devotion that people expect from their lovers.

Beloveds especially deem it right for their lovers to have inclinations towards them of such a kind, that they be rather uncircumspect (ἀπερισκεπτότερον) and inattentive to reason, and moreover, that they be disposed to transgress any argument advising them [contrary to their inclinations], or rather, that they be not at all disposed to listen patiently to any such argument.

According to this passage, people expect their lovers to be both inattentive to reason and, if they become aware of reasons speaking against their emotion, inclined either to

21 PHP 4.3.6-7. Anthony Price quotes this passage, and comments that it shows that Galen is not “at a loss to make sense” of Chrysippus’ claim that emotions are “without reason and judgment” (2005, 481). Price does not, however, discuss what its implications are for Chrysippus’ theory, or even what in particular περίσκεψις means. Inwood also grants that this interpretation “may be right” (1985, 162n150), but he takes περίσκεψις to refer to cases “when an agent attends to and obeys Right Reason” (162). Since both emotions and errant impulses fail to obey right reason, this can hardly be Chrysippus’ intention in describing emotions as “without reason and judgment.” Moreover, as I discuss below, variants of the term περίσκεψις occur on two other occasions in Galen’s discussion of Chrysippus (once in a direct quotation from Chrysippus), and on neither occasion does the word mean what Inwood proposes.
transgress or to disregard them. This passage closely associates being disposed in a rather uncircumspect way (ἀπερισκεπτότερον) with being “inattentive to reason” (ἀνευ ἐπιστροφῆς λογικῆς). By the term “rather uncircumspect” Chrysippus thus seems to denote a milder failure to pay attention to countervailing reasons than the positive inclination to disregard them. Therefore, according to this passage, being rather uncircumspect means being inattentive to, and so also, presumably, inadequately interested in, reasons speaking against one’s inclination. Accordingly, a person would exercise circumspection by being suitably open to and interested in countervailing reasons.

The next and final instance of the term circumspection (περίσκεψις) in the *PHP* also supports this interpretation. Galen uses this term in his discussion of Chrysippus’ claim that “the origin of the emotions consists in two judgments conflicting with each other.” In criticizing Chrysippus’ account of the origin of emotions, Galen distinguishes cases in which someone has equal credence in both conflicting judgments from cases in which someone holds conflicting judgments but finds one of them far more persuasive, prima facie, than the other (ἡ ἑτέρα φαίνοιτο μακρῷ πιστοτέρα). As an example of the latter case, he imagines someone who finds the view that pleasure is the good very persuasive, but “also has something small drawing him to the opposite,” say, his

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22 One might also translate ἀνευ ἐπιστροφῆς λογικῆς as “without concern for reason.”

23 *PHP* 5.4.10: εἴπερ γὰρ ἐν τῷ μάχεσθαι δύο κρίσεις ἀλλήλαις ἢ τῶν παθῶν ἐστι γένεσις […]. There is good reason to think that this account of the origin of the emotions is a close paraphrase of a line of Chrysippus. In particular, Galen introduces it as “the argument following” (τὰ γοῦν ἐξῆς) Chrysippus’ claim that “the health and sickness, ugliness and beauty of the soul are in its parts and that its parts are conceptions and suppositions,” suggesting that Galen is referring to a particular passage from Chrysippus’ work. Further support that this account paraphrases an argument of Chrysippus is Galen’s reformulation of it a few sentences later, when he claims that Chrysippus contradicted himself “by distinguishing emotion from mistaken judgments, and then saying that sicknesses of soul and emotions are formed in the disagreement of judgments with one another (ἐν τῇ τῶν κρίσεων πρὸς ἀλλήλαις ἀνομολογίᾳ)” (*PHP* 5.4.14).
suspicion that honor, and not pleasure, is the good. In such cases, Galen argues: “it will be necessary for us […] to assent [sc. to the judgment that seems far more persuasive], and to act in accordance with our assent, but not in an uncircumspect way (οὐκ ἀπερισκεπτῶς).”

I take it that someone would assent in an uncircumspect way to a view that he finds very persuasive if, in assenting to it, he were simply to disregard whatever consideration is “drawing him to the opposite.” For example, one would assent “in an uncircumspect way” (ἀπερισκεπτῶς) to the view that pleasure is the good if they assented to it without giving due consideration to their countervailing intuition that, say, honor is the good. Therefore, in Galen’s view, simply being aware of countervailing reasons is insufficient for exercising circumspection. Rather, one must also give the countervailing reasons one is aware of due consideration, even if they speak against an impression one finds far more persuasive at first sight.

It is not, however, a condition of exercising circumspection that one correctly determines if the impression at issue is true or false. On the contrary, Galen is quite clear that someone may assent to a false impression despite exercising circumspection. For instance, as we have seen, he writes that someone may assent “with circumspection”

24 PHP 5.4.12: καθάπερ εἰ καὶ τίς τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν οἰόμενος ὑπάρχειν ἔχοι τι βραχὺ περιέλκον εἰς τοῦναντίον.
25 PHP 5.4.12: ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν ισάζοιέν πως ἄλλῆλαις αἱ κρίσεις ὡς πρὸς πίστιν, ἐπέχειν ἀναγραφὸν ἡμᾶς ἦσται περὶ τῆς τοῦ πράγματος ὑπάρξεως, εἰ δ’ ἤ ἐτέρα φαίνεται μακρῷ πιστοτέρα, συγκατατίθεσθαι μὲν καὶ πράττειν γέ τι κατὰ τὴν συγκατάθεσιν, οὐχ ἀπερισκεπτῶς δέ.
26 This interpretation of the word περίσκεψις fits the uses of the word in Galen’s De usu partium 5.4, vol. 3, p. 354-5 Kuhn, = SVF 2.1136. In that passage, Galen complains that we tend to choose what appears to be in some way profitable to us ἀπερισκεπτότερον (“in a rather uncircumspect way”), by choosing it “even if it happens to be, by nature, more harmful in other respects than beneficial in respect to the things that we desire.” Compare also the uses of the word περίσκεψις in Galen’s De motu musculorum II, vol. 4, p. 400, line 11 Kuhn, and in De metodo medendi XIV, vol. 10, p. 856, line 9 Kuhn. The term περίσκεψις and the related verb περισκοπεῖν also appear several times in other Stoic texts. See, for instance, Epictetus’ Diatribai 3.22.12 and 4.11.16 and, if Theiler (1982, fragment 33) is right to take it to be closely modeled on Posidonius, Strabo’s Geography 4.4.2.
(οὐκ ἀπερισκέπτως) to the supposition that “pleasure is the good,” which is false in his view. Thus, according to him, exercising circumspection requires examining the impression at issue in light of the countervailing considerations readily available to one, which is perfectly compatible with mistaking a false for a true impression. Hence, if by the expression “without reason and judgment” (ἄνευ λόγου καὶ κρίσεως) Chrysippus indeed means “without circumspection” (ἄνευ περισκέψεως), then, in his view, impassioned people form emotions without remaining sufficiently open and responsive to the countervailing reasons readily available to them.

This interpretation is confirmed by Chrysippus’ claim that “the origin of the emotions consists in two judgments conflicting with each other” (PHP 5.4.10). As we have seen, Galen examines this view by considering two different kinds of conflicting judgments: conflicting judgments in which one has equal credence and conflicting judgments one of which “seems far more persuasive” (μακρῷ πιστοτέρᾳ) than the other. Galen argues that there is an automatic decision process in both cases.27 In cases where we have conflicting intuitions both of which seem equally persuasive “we must suspend judgment” (ἐπέχειν ἀναγκαῖον ἡμᾶς ἔσται), while in cases where one of our impressions seems far more persuasive than the other “we must give assent and act in accordance with it.”28 Although Galen complains that in such cases we will not form emotions, but will at worst form an errant impulse and so, in Chrysippus’ words, “be moved in error and having overlooked something on the basis of reason” (διημαρτημένως φέρεται καὶ παριδών τι κατὰ τὸν λόγον, PHP 5.4.14 = PHP

27 This assumption is also shared by some other critics of the Stoics: see, for instance, Plu. On Moral Virtue 448b-c.
28 PHP 5.4.12: ἀναγκαῖον ἡμᾶς ἔσται [...] συγκατάθεσθαι μὲν καὶ πράττειν γέ τι κατὰ τὴν συγκατάθεσιν.
4.2.12), I propose that Chrysippus takes the sort of conflict between two judgments that gives rise to an emotion to be resolved in an *uncircumspect* way, without giving the countervailing judgment due consideration. In arguing that “the origin of the emotions is in two judgments conflicting with each other,” Chrysippus thus suggests a theory of the emotions like that obliquely reported and rejected by Galen, according to which people form emotions by assenting without circumspection to an impulsive impression falsely portraying a present or impending state of affairs as good or bad for them.²⁹

II

Now, it might be wondered whether impassioned people are commonly aware of countervailing reasons. For example, are most people aware of reasons speaking against their indulging in such ordinary, culturally sanctioned emotions as, say, grieving if their best friend dies? If not, then it might seem that, according to the interpretation for which I have been arguing, Chrysippus will have to relabel many conventional emotions as errant impulses. For if someone is entirely unaware of reasons speaking against a false impulsive impression, and does not have such reasons readily available to him, then presumably the requirement for his exercising circumspection when assenting to that impression, and so forming an emotion, would be quite low. Indeed, in such cases, it is difficult to see how we would distinguish whether or not one assented with circumspection.

In responding to such an objection, Chrysippus might have appealed to his view that every adult human holds true *dispositional* beliefs that are sufficient for

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²⁹ To be sure, by arguing that emotions arise in the conflict between two judgments, Chrysippus does not mean that whenever one forms an emotion they must *actually* be aware of reasons speaking against their doing so. Rather, as I argue in the following section, he means that the false beliefs expressed by an emotion are *always* in conflict with some other belief held by the impassioned person, whether or not they are in fact aware of this conflicting belief as they form and experience their emotion.
distinguishing goods and bads – such as virtue and vice – from things that are “indifferent” (ἀδιάφορα) for living a fulfilling life – such as health and physical pleasure and pain. Since he thinks that emotions most commonly express the false belief that something that is, in fact, indifferent is good or bad, emotions, according to him, will commonly contradict the impassioned person’s dispositional beliefs distinguishing things that really are good or bad from things that are indifferent for the overall quality of her life.

Chrysippus’ innovations in the Stoic therapy of the emotions suggest another, complementary response to this objection. As Cicero reports, Chrysippus argues that when consoling people experiencing distress one should not challenge their belief that something bad is present to them – as at least Cleanthes, the immediately preceding scholiarch of the Stoics, seems to have advocated (Cic. Tusc. 3.76) – but should instead challenge the other belief correlated with their emotion, namely, that it is appropriate for them to be upset. An important premise of Chrysippus’ method of consoling distress is that it is possible to challenge someone’s belief that it is appropriate for him to experience distress without directly challenging his belief that something bad has happened to him. To borrow an example that Cicero uses to illustrate Chrysippus’ view,

30 See, for example, Cic. Tusc. 3.2, which represents the Stoic theory as holding that all men have spermata virtutum (“the seeds of the virtues”); cf. Cic. De Fin. 3.20-22 and Epict. Diatribai 2.11.2-8. As Gill comments, “this means that…the capacity of virtue remains latent in all of us, in spite of the corrupting effect of our social environment” (1998, 119); cf. Inwood 1985, 162. Of course, giving such beliefs adequate consideration is not simply a matter of bringing them to bear directly on one’s impressions, but may also involve articulating them further and carefully working out their interrelationships: see Dyson 2009 for discussion of this point.

31 I mean to exempt emotions the objects of which really are good or bad for one, but which are also correlated with the false belief that it is appropriate for one to be violently distressed or elated as a consequence. The classical example of this is Alcibiades’ distress regarding his own vice: although, as he supposes, something truly bad, namely his vice, is present to him, the Stoics take his additional belief that it is appropriate for him to be vehemently distressed to be false. For ancient discussions of the Alcibiades case, see Posidonius’ objection to Chrysippus in Gal. PHP 4.5.28 and Cic. Tusc. 3.77 and 4.61. For commentary, see White 1995, 241-245 and Graver 2007, 191-211.

32 For discussion, see Graver 2002, ad loc in her commentary.
it is possible, according to Chrysippus, to persuade someone in mourning over his friend’s death that his grief is indicative of a weak and inconstant soul and, thus, inappropriate, without opposing his more fundamental belief that his friend’s death is bad for him (Cic. *Tusc.* 4.60).

Cicero’s account of Chrysippus’ therapy of distress is confirmed, and explicitly extended to the therapy of any emotion, by a passage from the Fourth Book of *On the Emotions*, preserved by Origen. After warning against attempting to persuade an impassioned person “at the peak of the swelling of their emotions” (ἐν τῷ καιρῷ τῆς φλεγμονῆς τῶν παθῶν) that their belief that something good or bad is present or impending for them is false, Chrysippus argues that “it must be shown that every emotion is inconsistent (ἀνομολογούμενον), even for those positing the good and the end to be pleasure.”

In his view, then, it is possible to persuade impassioned people that their emotions are inconsistent with their other beliefs and commitments, *even on the assumption that something good or bad really is present or impending for them.* Accordingly, if his therapy of the emotions is to be effective, the people he endeavors to console must already hold beliefs speaking against the appropriateness of their emotions. For otherwise it is very difficult to see how he could persuade them that their

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33 Origen, *Contra Celsum* 8.51 = SVF 3.474: οὐδὲν ἦττον αὐτῷ βοηθήτεον καὶ παραδεικτέον, ὅτι καὶ τοῖς ἰδιονὶν τάγαθον καὶ τέλος τιθεμένοις ἀνομολογούμενόν ἐστι πάν πάθος.

34 By contrast, Teun Tieleman takes this passage to advise showing people in mourning that their grief is inconsistent with their own false belief concerning the human good (2003, 169). For example, when treating an Epicurean in mourning, one should argue that her grief is inconsistent with her false belief that pleasure is the good. It is quite difficult to see, however, why *every* false conception of the human good should itself be inconsistent with believing that it is appropriate for one to be distressed. But, if Chrysippus intends his method of emotional consolation to be generally applicable, then it ought to depend on considerations available to anyone. Thus, *pace* Tieleman, I take it that Chrysippus would recommend treating an Epicurean in mourning by arguing that, even granting that pleasure is the good, her grief is inconsistent with some of her other beliefs. This interpretation is also suggested by Cicero’s claim, in discussing Chrysippus’ theory, that irrespective of a person’s conception of the human good, she ought to grant that “movements of the soul that have turned away from right reason are vicious, so that even if those
emotional behavior is inappropriate without challenging their belief that something truly
good or bad is present or impending for them, on which their belief that it is appropriate
for them to be emotionally affected depends. It follows that Chrysippus takes adult
humans quite generally to hold dispositional beliefs speaking against each of the false
beliefs commonly correlated with emotions.

III

The next section turns to Chrysippus’ account of the various ways in which impassioned
people may fail to exercise circumspection both in forming and in acting on the basis of
their emotions. As we will see, at one extreme, impassioned people may be so
“completely blinded” (τελέως ἀποτυφλοῦν) by their emotions that they fail even to
become aware of countervailing reasons that would ordinarily seem perfectly obvious to
them. At the other extreme, they may consider and even endorse countervailing reasons,
but continue nevertheless to experience their emotions. Although scholars have generally
held that the Stoics denied the possibility of an impassioned person’s holding an impulse
to act in a certain way and, at the same time, a conflicting occurrent evaluative belief to
the effect that they ought rather to act differently, I argue that Stoic psychological theory
is perfectly capable of explaining such synchronic psychic conflict.

As an example of the “irrationality” (ἀλογιστία) and “blindness” (τυφλότης) involved in emotions generally, Chrysippus describes the propensity even of people who
ordinarily display exemplary rationality to form utterly irrational emotions (PHP 4.6.44-
46). For instance, he contrasts a person’s enraged attempt to assault an inanimate object,
such as a sponge or a rock, with the rationality they ordinarily evince in conversation.

things that move fear and distress are bad, and those that move desire and pleasure are good, nevertheless
the movement itself is vicious” (Cic. Tusc. 4.61).
Although such people clearly have the conceptual resources to realize that it is insane to punish an inanimate object, say, a rock that they have tripped over, they nevertheless assent rashly to the impression that they ought to punish it “in the hope that they will accomplish something by these actions” (ὡς δὴ τι περαι[ε]ντες δι’ αὐτῶν, PHP 4.6.44). According to Chrysippus, such cases illustrate how “we stand so far outside of ourselves, and come to be so far outside ourselves, and are so fully blinded in the midst of our misfortunes.” I take it that our being “so fully blinded” (τελέως ἀποτυφλούμεθα) when we are in the grip of especially violent emotions means that we fail to pay any attention at all even to countervailing considerations that would ordinarily seem obvious to us.

Chrysippus describes the blindness of impassioned people in more detail in a passage from his On Inconsistency (Περὶ Ἀνομολογίας), preserved by Plutarch:

‘τυφλόν ἐστιν ἡ ὀργή καὶ πολλάκις μὲν οὐχ ἐά ὤραν τὰ ἐκφανῆ πολλάκις δὲ τοῖς καταλαμβανομένοις ἐπιπροσθεῖ, μικρόν προελθὸν ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ἐπιγινόμενοι, βιαῖως προωθούσα ἑπὶ τὰς ἐναντίας πράξεις.’ (Plu. On Moral Virtue 450c2-7)

‘Anger is blind: it often does not allow us to see clear things, and it often covers things that are grasped.’ Then, a little further on, he [Chrysippus] says: ‘For emotions, as they arise, force out lines of reasoning and things that appear differently, and violently push forward to the opposite actions.’

According to this passage, “anger is blind” in that it “often” obscures both things that we would otherwise see clearly and “things that are grasped” (τοῖς καταλαμβανόμενοις) by us. The “things that are grasped” but that anger may “cover” at least include and may even be restricted to the content of true beliefs. Anger, therefore, often prevents people

35 PHP 4.6.44: οὕτω γὰρ ἐξιστάμεθα καὶ ἔξω γινόμεθα ἑαυτῶν καὶ τελέως ἀποτυφλούμεθα ἐν τοῖς σφαλλομένοις […].
36 The phrase τὰ καταλαμβανόμενα (“the things grasped”) seems to pick up the Stoic term of art κατάληψις (“cognitive grasp”). According to Stoic theory, κατάληψις is the cognitive state resulting from one’s assenting to a “katalectic impression” (καταληπτικὴ φαντασία), which is a true impression that
from either forming clear impressions or attending to their own true dispositional beliefs.

The second sentence explains why emotions more generally are often blind in this sense: namely, they “force out (ἐκκρούειν) lines of reasoning and things that appear differently, and violently push forward to the opposite actions.” Hence, anger often blinds enraged people by “forcing out” countervailing impressions and lines of reasoning.

In addition to explaining why anger and other emotions are often “blind,” this passage also suggests that someone may form and hold an emotion without being so blinded. For, according to it, anger only “often” (πολλάκις) prevents enraged people from forming and attending to countervailing impressions and lines of reasoning, thus implying that anger is not always blind in this sense. However, since emotions more generally are said to “force out” countervailing impressions and beliefs and to “violently push forward to the opposite actions,” they ought to do so both when enraged people are so blinded by their anger that they are incapable of appreciating countervailing reasons and also when they are not so blinded but are enraged nevertheless. Therefore, according to Chrysippus, even in cases where impassioned people are not blinded by their emotions, their emotions still somehow “force out” their countervailing impressions and lines of reasoning and “violently push forward to the opposite actions.”

portrays the object causing it with such clarity and detail that it could only have been caused by that object. For example, a kataleptic impression of a particular egg not only portrays that egg accurately, but does so with such clarity and detail that it could only have been caused by that particular egg. By assenting to a kataleptic impression, one thus forms a belief that does not merely happen to be true, but is, as it were, guaranteed to be true by the quality of the impression itself. Although, in standard Stoic usage, the phrase τὰ καταλαμβανόμενα might refer as easily to kataleptic impressions as to the contents of true beliefs formed by assenting to kataleptic impressions, I take it that the distinction in the second sentence of this passage between lines of reasoning (τοὺς λογισμοὺς) and impressions (τὰ ὡς ἱνὸς φαινόμενα) suggests that a similar distinction is intended in the first sentence between the phrases πολλάκις δὲ τοῖς καταλαμβανομένοις ἐπιπροσθεῖ and πολλάκις μὲν οὐκ ἐὰν ὀρθῶς τὰ ἐκφανῆ. If so, τοῖς καταλαμβανομένοις refers to the content of true beliefs and τὰ ἐκφανῆ to the content of true impressions. For the ancient evidence for the Stoic theory of κατάληψις, see the texts gathered with commentary in Long and Sedley 1987, vol. 1, 253-259. For further commentary, see Sandbach 1971, Frede 1983, Reed 2002 and Hankinson 2003.
In his examples of impassioned behavior, Chrysippus describes several ways in which people may form and act on the basis of their emotions despite being aware of considerations speaking against them. The most similar of these to the utter blindness of a person’s angrily assaulting an inanimate object is when someone rashly abandons his present impulse as he forms an emotion. Chrysippus illustrates this sort of case by quoting Euripides’ description of Menelaos’ passionate reunion with Helen after the sack of Troy.

οἷος εἰσῆκται καὶ τῷ Εὐριπίδη ὁ Μενέλαος· ἔπει τὴν μάχαιραν φέρεται ἐπὶ τὴν Ἐλένην ὡς ἀναιρήσων, ἵδων δὲ καὶ καταπλαγεὶς [eἰς] τὸ κάλλος ἐξέβαλε τὴν μάχαιραν, οὐδὲ ταύτης ἐπὶ δυνάμενοις κρατεῖν, καθὰ καὶ ἡ ἐπίπληξις αὐτῇ εἰρηται αὐτῷ:

‘σὺ δ’ ὡς ἔσείδες μαστὸν ἐκείνης ἐκβαλὼν ξίφος φίλημ’ ἐδέξω προδότιν αἰκάλλων κύνα·’ (PHP 4.6.9)

Menelaos has been brought forward as such a person by Euripides. For he drew his sword and rushed at Helen with the intention of killing her, but when he saw her and was strunned by her beauty, he cast down his sword, since he was no longer able even to hold it. And accordingly, he heard this rebuke:

‘When you saw her breast, you threw down your sword
and took her kiss, flattering the treacherous dog.’

As indicated by the aorist participles ἵδων, “when he saw her,” and καταπλαγεὶς, “he was stunned,” in Chrysippus’ gloss, Menelaos does not reconsider his impulse to kill Helen upon seeing her again, but immediately abandons it and forms instead the passionate desire to embrace her. Although when Menelaos looks upon Helen he is presumably still aware of the beliefs correlated with his desire to kill her, he nevertheless assents rashly to an impression portraying embracing her as good for him, and so forms the passionate desire to embrace her. Menelaos, when he forms the

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37 I follow Müller 1879 and De Lacy 1984 in deleting ἐκείνης, which does not make sense metrically and is not attested in the manuscript tradition for the Andromache.

38 The final two lines are from Euripides, Andromache 629-630. For other accounts of this story, see, e.g., Aristoph. Lys. 155-156, Eur. Or. 1287. For the background in the Little Iliad, as well in Ibycus, see M. Noussia-Fantuzzi’s forthcoming article.
passionate desire to embrace Helen, thus fails to take into consideration even his own countervailing occurrent beliefs.

Chrysippus also gives examples of people who act on the basis of their emotions despite remaining attentive to countervailing considerations. For instance, as an example of impassioned behavior, he cites the concluding lines of the famous deliberation scene of Euripides’ Medea, in which Medea debates whether to murder her children as revenge for Jason’s infidelity.

καὶ μανθάνω μὲν οἷα δρᾶν μέλλω κακά,
θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσων τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων.⁴⁹ (PHP 4.6.19 = Euripides, Medea 1078-9)

I understand what sort of evils I am about to do, but anger is stronger than my considered judgments.⁴⁰

Medea contrasts her anger (θυμός), which urges her to kill her children, with her considered judgments (βουλεύματα), urging her not to kill them. Although Galen takes Medea to refer to conflicting rational and non-rational parts of her soul, thereby contradicting the Stoic view that the adult human soul consists solely of reason and not of both a rational and a non-rational part or aspect (PHP 4.6.20-22), Chrysippus chooses to cite these lines, and so surely understands them in a way that is consistent with Stoic moral psychology. Indeed, since he takes emotions to be correlated with certain false

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⁴⁹ Chrysippus omits the final line of Medea’s monologue, ὃς περ μεγίστον αἵτων κακών βοστοῖς, which may be translated as “which [sc. anger] is the cause of the greatest evils for men.”

⁴⁰ The translation of the second sentence, “θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσων τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων,” is controversial. It may mean either, as I translate above, “but anger is stronger than my considered judgments,” or alternatively, “but anger controls my judgments.” The latter reading, which is the more unusual sense of κρείσσων plus the genitive, is supported primarily by the worry that in the broader context of the deliberation speech βουλεύματα ought to refer to Medea’s plan to murder her children. However, in the absence of any direct evidence that Chrysippus or any other later ancient author understood the passage in this way, it seems better to take him to understand the phrase κρείσσων τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων to mean “stronger than my considered judgments.” In support of this interpretation, see Tieleman 2003, 171n113. For an argument in favor of taking Chrysippus to understand κρείσσων as “controls” rather than “stronger than,” see Gill 1983, 138. Mastronarde 2008, 393-397 is a good survey of modern interpretations of these lines.
evaluative beliefs, I propose that he understands Medea to refer not to a conflict between her non-rational emotion and her considered judgments, as Galen argues, but instead to a conflict between, on the one hand, her anger and the set of beliefs correlated with it and, on the other hand, her considered judgments.

Although Medea’s anger proves more effective than her considered judgments and she kills her children soon after deliberating, I take it that she kills them despite continuing to believe that she should not do so. This is suggested both by her claim that “I understand what sort of evils I am about to do” and by the final line of her deliberation (apparently omitted by Chrysippus), in which she describes anger as “the cause of the greatest evils for men.” Therefore, Medea, when she forms the impassioned impulse to murder her children, does not reject her considered judgment that it would be wrong for her to murder them. Rather, she sets out to murder her children despite continuing to be aware that it is wrong to do so. Thus, although Medea’s enraged murder of her children is her choice, it is not her considered choice. For, as we have seen, in killing her children, she simply disregards her conflicting occurrent belief that it is wrong for her to do so, and so fails to exercise circumspection.

That impassioned people may, according to Chrysippus, continue to experience their emotions despite holding and attending to countervailing beliefs is also suggested by

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41 For a similar interpretation, see Tieleman 2003, 171-173. I do not, however, agree with Tieleman’s claim that “as precisely these lines make clear, Medea’s giving in to her anger is a considered choice and in this sense fully rational” (172, my emphasis). In my view, these lines rather show that although Medea’s enraged murder of her children is her choice, it is not her considered choice. Her course of action is nevertheless rational in that it is based on certain of her beliefs and a consequent rational impulse rather than on some non-rational psychic power.

42 Cf. PHP 4.6.38 = Euripides, Alcestis 1080, where Chrysippus cites Euripides’ portrayal of Admetus as believing that endless grief is pointless, but suffering inconsolable grief nevertheless: “I myself also know this [sc. that it is fruitless to grieve endlessly], but a certain love leads me away” (ἔγνωκα κακὴν τοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔρως τις ἐξάγει). Therefore, Medea’s anger in the face of her considered judgments is not an anomaly in Chrysippus’ discussion of the emotions, but describes a phenomenon that he also discusses elsewhere in his On the Emotions.
his description of the inadequate reason-responsiveness of people experiencing especially violent emotions. As he writes:

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dιό καὶ τοιαύτας ἔστιν ἄκούσας φωνὰς ἐπὶ τὸν ἑρώτημα καὶ τὸν ἄλλος σφόδρα ἑπιθυμούντων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὦργιζομένων, ὅτι τῷ θυμῷ θέλουσι χαρίζεσθαι καὶ ἕαν αὐτοῖς, εἵτε ἤμεινον εἵτε μή, καὶ μηθὲν λέγειν αὐτοῖς, καὶ ὡς τότῳ ἐκ παντὸς γε τρόπου ποιητέον, καὶ εἱ διαμαρτάνουσι καὶ εἱ ἀσύμφορον ἔστιν αὐτοῖς. (PHP 4.6.27)
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Therefore, it is also possible to hear comments of such a kind from lovers, people with other violent desires and from angry people: that they want to gratify their anger, and to allow them to do so whether it is better or not, and to say nothing to them, and that this must be done by all means, even if they are mistaken and if it is not advantageous for them.

According to this passage, impassioned people often insist on gratifying their emotions, “whether it is better or not […], even if they are mistaken and if it is not advantageous for them.” Minimally, this means that impassioned people may suspect that the evaluative beliefs correlated with their emotions are false, but continue, nevertheless, to hold their emotions and the beliefs correlated with them.\(^{43}\) This passage may even imply the stronger claim that impassioned people may continue to act on an emotion despite believing that doing so is “not advantageous for them” (ἀσύμφορον ἔστιν αὐτοῖς). Although the latter interpretation may seem rather implausible (for it suggests that one may, at the same time, believe both that they ought to act on the basis of their emotion and that acting on their emotion is not beneficial for them), Posidonius, an important Stoic of the 2nd-1st Century BCE, takes Chrysippus, in this and other such passages, to ascribe an even more extreme sort of cognitive dissonance to impassioned people.\(^{44}\)

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\(^{43}\) As Tieleman comments in his discussion of this passage: “The emphasis is not on the other persons who offer counseling, but on the emotional person’s capacity of recognizing right reason as such, even when rejecting it” (2003, 176).

\(^{44}\) That Posidonius has this passage, or one very similar to it, in mind is suggested by the similarity of the phrase εἱ καὶ μὴ συμφέρον ἔστι, καὶ σύντος ἐξέτεον in his criticism to the phrase καὶ ὡς τούτῳ ἐκ παντὸς γε τρόπου ποιητέον […] καὶ εἱ ἀσύμφορον ἔστιν αὐτοῖς in the Chrysippean passage quoted
But indeed, that men in the grip of appetites not only reject reason, as he [sc. Chrysippus] says, but also suppose in addition that even if it [sc. the object of their appetite] is not beneficial, even so it must be grasped, contains a contradiction […]. For grant that they reject people who say that this [sc. the object of their appetite] is not beneficial and that they consider people who announce that they will show that it is not beneficial to be fools, on the grounds that that which is pursued is of great benefit. But this, at any rate, is unpersuasive, that someone, on account of supposing that something is a great good, supposes he ought to take this thing, even if it is the greatest evil.

Posidonius criticizes Chrysippus for holding that “someone, on account of supposing that something is a great good, supposes that he ought to take this thing, even if it is the greatest evil.” As Posidonius argues, the irrationality involved in this supposition goes far beyond an impassioned person’s rejecting countervailing reasons in an uncircumspect way because she is convinced that the object of her emotion is “of great benefit” (μέγα ὀφέλος). Instead, someone who forms such a belief believes not only that the object of her emotion is both a great good and also, quite possibly, a great evil, but she also entertains these contradictory beliefs in a single line of reasoning. For her belief that she ought to act on the basis of her emotion, even if its object is the greatest evil, depends on her antecedent belief that the object of her emotion is a great good.

Posidonius thus presents Chrysippus as holding that an emotion may not only be inconsistent with some of the impassioned person’s other occurrent beliefs, but may even be correlated with internally inconsistent lines of reasoning.

However, as I argue in more detail in the next chapter, there is little reason to accept Posidonius’ interpretation of the way in which Chrysippus explains how
impassioned people may continue to act on an emotion despite believing that doing so is not, in fact, beneficial for them. Our evidence rather suggests that Chrysippus takes impassioned people in such cases to believe both that the object of their emotion is good for them and also, independently of that belief, that the object of their emotion is not beneficial for them.\textsuperscript{46} This view is suggested, for instance, by a passage from Arius Didymus’ 1\textsuperscript{st} century AD Epitome of Stoic Ethics.\textsuperscript{47} As Arius writes:

\begin{quote}
Πᾶν γὰρ πάθος βιαστικὸν ἔστι, ὡς πολλὰς ὀργῶν τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὀντας ὃτι συμβέβηκε τόδε οὐ ποιεῖν, ὡς τῆς σφοδρότητος ἐχθρεύομένους, καθάπερ ὑπὸ τινος ἀπειθοῦς ἔπει, ανάγει θαυμάζοντο πρὸς τὸ ποιεῖν αὐτὸ […]. (Stob. 2.7.10a, p. 89 Wachsmuth)
\end{quote}

For every emotion is violent, with the result that men who are in the grip of emotions often see that it is not beneficial to act in this way, but are carried away by its vehemence, just as by some disobedient horse, and are led to act in this way.

A few lines later, he adds:

\begin{quote}
oἱ δὲ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὀντες, κἀγα μάθωσι, κἀγα μεταδιδαχθῶσιν ὃτι οὐ δεῖ λυπεῖσθαι ἢ φοβεῖσθαι, ἢ ὅλως ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡμοὶ οὐκ ἀφίστανται τούτων, ἀλλ᾽ ἀγονται ὑπὸ τῶν παθῶν εἰς τὸ ὑπὸ τῆς τούτων χρατεῖσθαι τυφλοτορχοῦ. (Stob. 2.7.10a, p. 90 Wachsmuth)
\end{quote}

But those who are in the grip of emotions, even if they learn or come to realize that they should not be distressed, frightened or, generally, be in the grip of emotions of the soul, nevertheless they do not give these things up, but are led by their emotions to a state of being ruled by their tyranny.

Arius reports that, according to the Stoics, impassioned people often continue to pursue their emotions despite forming the countervailing occurrent evaluative belief that it is not, in fact, beneficial for them to do so. However, unlike Posidonius, Arius does not claim that in such cases the evaluative beliefs correlated with emotions are \emph{themselves} internally inconsistent. Rather, he comments that even if an impassioned person forms the belief that her emotion is not beneficial, she may continue to experience it nevertheless.

\textsuperscript{46} Anthony Price, in a footnote explaining what he thinks the Stoics should have said about conflicting beliefs, writes in a similar vein: “Yet in cases of conflict p may be serving one set of a subject’s inferences while ~p is serving another; this is less incoherent than bringing p and ~p together within one and the same inference. What is problematic is not, in itself, a temporal coincidence of contradictories in a single mind, but their proximity within a single stretch of thinking” (2005, 485n32).

\textsuperscript{47} For Arius as a source for Early Stoic ethics, see the essays collected in Fortenbaugh 1983.
on account of being carried away “by its vehemence” (ὑπὸ τῆς σφοδρότητος) or “ruled by its tyranny” (τὸ ὑπὸ τῆς τούτων χρατείσθαι τυραννίδος). Arius’ account is very similar to Chrysippus’ claim, discussed above, that even emotions that are not “blind” are characterized by their ability to “force out” (ἐκκρούειν) countervailing impressions and beliefs and to “violently push forward to the opposite actions” (βιαίως πρωθοῦντα ἐπὶ τὰς ἐναντίας πράξεις, Plu. On Moral Virtue 450c2-7). Together, these passages strongly suggest that, according to Stoic theory, impassioned people may continue to pursue their emotions even if they form a countervailing evaluative belief. Since the Stoics take forming the evaluative belief that it is appropriate to act in a certain way to be a sufficient condition ordinarily of forming the impulse to act in that way (and indeed, in a sense, even to be that impulse), this passage also suggests that the Stoics may have allowed the possibility of an impassioned person’s simultaneously holding both an emotion and a rival occurrent impulse.

Now, it might be objected to Arius’ account of the Stoic position, and so also to the interpretation of Chrysippus’ view for which I have been arguing, that Stoic moral psychology is incapable of explaining a person’s holding, at the same time, an emotion and a conflicting occurrent evaluative belief. For example, Tad Brennan, in his summary of the standard interpretation of Stoic moral psychology, writes, “our assessment of what is good and what should be pursued can be altered by reflection and argumentation. And because there is no division, this alteration takes place without remainder; the whole soul takes on the new view, unanimously” (Brennan 1998, 28). As Brennan reports, the standard interpretation, which takes the Stoics to deny the possibility of any synchronic psychic division or conflict at all, is based on the premise that because the Stoics take the
adult human soul to consist solely of reason, and not of both a rational and a non-rational part or aspect, they are incapable of explaining a person’s holding both an impulse and, at the same time, a conflicting occurrent evaluative belief. In order to explain a person’s holding such synchronic psychic conflict, the argument goes, the Stoics would need to follow the Platonists or Aristotelians in positing in addition to reason a further non-rational aspect of the soul, such as appetite (ἐπιθυμία) or spirit (θυμός). So, to use a Platonic example, someone who forms a strong appetitive desire for a glass of water may also believe that water would not, in fact, be beneficial for her, say, because she is overhydrated or because she has an upset stomach.

However, despite the wide agreement among ancient philosophy scholars that the Stoics’ monistic theory of soul is incapable of explaining a person’s holding either conflicting occurrent evaluative beliefs or impulses, the Stoics’ conception of the adult human soul as wholly rational does not commit them to denying synchronic psychic conflict. For since they take the human soul to be corporeal and so extended, it was at least open to them to argue that different parts of it might sometimes hold, or even simply be, distinct and conflicting occurrent evaluative beliefs and impulses. Conflicting occurrent evaluative beliefs and even impulses are thus, at least in theory, perfectly compatible with Stoic moral psychology. Of course, that conflicting occurrent evaluative beliefs and impulses might be explained on the basis of Stoic moral psychology does not

48 Representative examples are Price 1995, 157-158, 167; Gosling 1987, 199; Frede 1986, 97-98; and Inwood 1985, 131-143.

49 This position was popular already in antiquity: see, for instance, Galen’s comments in *PHP* 4.2.36-38 and 4.6 *passim*, as well as Plutarch’s statement of it in *On Moral Virtue* 445b3-6. For representative modern exponents of this view, see the preceding note.


51 For the Stoic view on the corporeality of the soul, see *SVF* 2.773-800 and the brief discussion in Gourinat 1996, 17-21. For Chrysippus’ description of beliefs as literal “parts” of the soul, see, e.g., *PHP* 5.2.47-5.3.7.
mean that Chrysippus or any other Stoic actually allowed their possibility. It does show, however, that simply appealing to the Stoics’ view that the adult human soul is wholly rational is insufficient to demonstrate that the Stoics denied the possibility of synchronic psychic conflict.

The primary textual basis for taking the Stoics to have denied the possibility of a person’s holding either conflicting occurrent evaluative beliefs or impulses at the same time is Plutarch’s brief epitome of the Stoic theory of akrasia in his On Moral Virtue. Plutarch reports that the Stoics explain akrasia not as the synchronic conflict between reason and the passionate part of the soul (τὸ πάθος), as he thinks they should, but instead as “a turning of a single reason in both directions, which escapes our notice by the speed and swiftness of its change.” Thus, according to Plutarch, the Stoics explain akrasia as the rapid, diachronic oscillation between conflicting evaluative beliefs and impulses. For example, someone suffering an akratic episode might alternate rapidly between believing that she should be angry with a rock she has tripped over and believing that doing so would be insane. While it may seem to her that she holds these beliefs and the impulses correlated with them simultaneously because of the speed with which she moves between them, their simultaneity is an illusion.

Although a detailed discussion of Plutarch’s account of the Stoic theory of akrasia would require an analysis of his treatment of the Stoics more generally, as well as an interpretation of his On Moral Virtue as a whole, it is worth making a few points here. First, since he does not attribute his account of akrasia to any particular Stoic author, it may be his own summary of Stoic theory rather than a quotation or close paraphrase of a

52 Plu. On Moral Virtue 446f3-447a1: ἀλλ’ ἕνος λόγου τροπὴν ἐπ’ ἀμφότερα, λανθάνουσαν ἡμᾶς ὀξύτητι καὶ τάχει μεταβολῆς.
Stoic work. Accordingly, its value as evidence for reconstructing Chrysippus’ theory is quite limited, especially given Plutarch’s generally polemical treatment of Stoic theory. Moreover, even if it accurately reflects the views of a later Stoic, that Stoic may differ from Chrysippus on this point.

Second, a crucial premise of Plutarch’s epitome of the Stoic theory of akrasia, that Stoic moral psychology is incapable of explaining *synchronic* psychic conflict, is based on his assumption that a single part or aspect of the soul cannot be simultaneously disposed in different ways with respect to the same thing. While Plutarch, like Galen, is committed to this position by his commitment to Platonism, it is difficult to see why Chrysippus should have held it: especially as he, unlike Plutarch and other Platonists, takes reason to be corporeally extended and, indeed, to be literally composed of distinct and often contradictory beliefs (*PHP* 5.2.47-5.3.7).

Of course, these considerations do not rule out the possibility that Chrysippus recognized cases such as Plutarch describes. There is little reason, however, to accept Plutarch’s claim that this is the only explanation of akrasia compatible with Stoic moral psychology. In the final two sections, I will focus on several passages from Chrysippus’ *On the Emotions* that, together with the passages discussed in this section, provide very good evidence that the possibility of a person’s holding conflicting occurrent evaluative

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53 For a survey of Plutarch’s more general stance towards Stoicism, see Babut 1969. For a more recent discussion of Plutarch’s own theory of moral psychology, see Gill 2006, 229-237.

54 The classical statement of the principle that the same part of the soul cannot simultaneously be disposed in different ways in respect to the same thing is Pl. *Resp.* 4.436a8-c2. Plutarch’s commitment to this principle is evinced, for example, by his claim that “continence (*ἐγκράτεια*) would not differ from temperance (*σωφροσύνη*) and akrasia would not differ from intemperance (*ἀκολασίας*) with respect to pleasures and desires, if it was the same part of the soul by which men naturally desire and judge” (*On Moral Virtue* 445b3-6). The claim that continence would be indistinguishable from temperance and akrasia indistinguishable from intemperance on the basis of *any* monistic theory of soul depends on the assumption that it is possible to explain synchronic conflicting beliefs and impulses *only* by reference to distinct rational and non-rational parts or aspects of the soul. Galen’s commitment to the psychic division principle is illustrated, for instance, by *PHP* 4.2.25-44.
beliefs and perhaps even impulses played an important role in Chrysippus’ theory of the emotions.

IV

The next section turns to Chrysippus’ explanation of the tendency of distress to abate over time irrespective of whether one reconsiders the beliefs underlying it. Since Chrysippus takes emotions to depend fundamentally on certain false occurrent evaluative beliefs, this may seem, as both Galen and Posidonius argue, to pose a serious challenge to his theory of the emotions. Chrysippus explains this phenomenon in a difficult passage from his On the Emotions.

ζητήσαι δ’ ἂν τις καὶ περὶ τῆς ἄνεσεως τῆς λύπης, πῶς γίνεται, πότερον δόξης τινὸς μεταξιούμενης ἢ πασῶν διαμενουσῶν, καὶ διὰ τι τούτῳ ἔστη. εἰτ’ ἐπεφέρον φησί, ‘δοξεῖ δὲ μοι ἢ μὲν τοιαύτη δόξα διαμένειν, ὅτι κακόν αὐτὸ ἢ δὴ πάρεστιν, ἐγχρονιζομένης δ’ ἄνεσεθα ἢ συστολὴ καὶ ως οἴμαι ἢ ἐπὶ τὴν συστολὴν ὀρῆ, τυχὸν δὲ καὶ ταύτης διαμενουσῆς οὐκ ὑπακούσεται τὰ ἐξῆς, διὰ ποιῶν ἄλλην ἐπιγινομένην διάθεσιν δυσσυλλόγιστον τούτων γίνομεν. οὕτω γὰρ καὶ κλαίοντες παύονται καὶ μὴ βουλόμενοι κλαίειν κλαίουσιν, ὅταν μὴ ἐνιστῇ τι ἢ μηθέν, ὅταν τρόπον γὰρ ἢ θρῆνοι παύσαται καὶ κλαύσεις εὔλογοι καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτης διαμενούσης ὑποκεύμενα ποιῇ καὶ εἶναι ἐπὶ τὰ τὸν γέλωτα κινοῦντος γίνεσθαι ἐφιν, καὶ τὰ ὀμοία τούτοις. (PHP 4.7.12-17)

‘And someone might ask about the abatement of distress, how it arises, whether when some belief is altered or with all remaining the same, and why this happens.’ Then continuing on, he says: ‘And it seems to me that a belief of such a kind remains, that the thing which is present is bad, but as this belief ages the contraction slackens and, I suppose, the impulse to this contraction. And it may also happen that although the impulse remains, the things following it will not obey; these

55 For Galen’s criticism, much of which he attributes to Posidonius, see PHP 4.7.18-44, as well as my discussion in Section Four of the next chapter.
56 There is some uncertainty over whether the text here should read ὅταν μὴ ὀμοίας τὰς φαντασίας τὰ υποκεύμενα ποιῇ καὶ ἐνιστῇ τι ἢ μηθέν, or ὅταν ὀμοίας τὰς φαντασίας τὰ υποκεύμενα ποιῇ καὶ ἐνιστῇ τι ἢ μηθέν. The manuscripts have the former reading here, but the latter reading in Posidonius’ restatement of the text at PHP 4.7.37. While most recent interpreters have favored the former reading, Margaret Graver has recently argued for the latter, but it seems to me that the former would suit her interpretation of the passage at least as well (2007, 90). In particular, so far as I can tell, she wants the impressions at issue to be “similar” to the non-voluntary reaction of someone who cries or ceases crying despite not wanting to do so, and “dissimilar” to impressions associated with the course of action that the agent in fact wants to do. Accordingly, either reading is compatible with her interpretation. In the absence of pressing textual reasons for preferring one reading to the other, I opt for the former on the grounds that it makes better sense of the passage, and is compatible with all the other interpretations of the passage of which I am aware.
57 The antecedent of ταύτης is controversial, and may be either ἡ ἐπὶ τὴν συστολὴν ὀρῇ or δόξα. While the former seems to me the far more natural construal of the Greek, the latter is at least grammatically possible, and avoids the difficulty as to how, as Posidonius complains, Chrysippus’ theory could explain a
things happen on account of another condition of some kind arising that is difficult to explain. For in this way people both stop crying, and cry despite not wanting to cry, when the underlying condition makes impressions that are unlike, and little or nothing stands in the way. For it is reasonable that in the way in which the cessation of laments and outbreaks of weeping occur, so too such things and things similar to them also happen in the case of those things which cause greater movement in their beginnings, just as I said happens in the case of things causing laughter.'

In this passage, Chrysippus distinguishes the following two ways in which the emotion of distress may abate even if the distressed person does not reconsider her belief that something bad has happened to her. She may either continue to hold this belief, but no longer have the impulse to be distressed, or she may continue to hold this belief and also the impulse to be distressed, but cease nevertheless to be distressed. Both cases pose at least an apparent difficulty for Chrysippus. While the former may seem to challenge his view that emotions depend fundamentally on the beliefs correlated with them, the latter risks contradicting his view that emotions are impulses of a certain kind. I will begin by discussing the former case, about which there is wide agreement among scholars, and will then turn to the more contested latter case.

In the second sentence of the passage, Chrysippus describes the tendency of the emotion of distress to abate over time, even if the people experiencing it continue to believe that “the thing which is present is bad” (κακὸν αὐτὸ ὃ δὴ πάρεστιν). Shortly
before citing this passage, Galen reports Chrysippus’ definition of distress as “the vivid belief that something bad is present to one” (δόξαν γὰρ εἶναι πρόσφατον τοῦ κακὸν αὐτῷ παρεῖναί, PHP 4.7.3; my emphasis). Although this belief has the same propositional content as the belief held by people whose distress has abated over time, Chrysippus adds the further condition that this belief be “vivid” (πρόσφατος). Presumably then, he takes the belief “that the thing which is present is bad,” which remains in cases of the abatement of distress, to no longer be “vivid” in the relevant way.

Arius Didymus reports that the Stoics use the adjective “vivid” (πρόσφατος) in their theory of the emotions to mean “that which is such as to cause an irrational contraction or elation.” Although, as a passage from Cicero confirms, it is not a necessary condition of a belief’s being πρόσφατος that one have formed it recently, the use of the term πρόσφατος, which in Ancient Greek often simply means “recent,” strongly suggests that ceteris paribus more recent beliefs tend to be more vivid than older ones.

The tendency of more recent beliefs to be especially vivid is helpful for understanding Chrysippus’ account of the abatement of grief. For, as we have seen, he argues that the evaluative belief that something bad is present to one commonly ceases to cause distress “when it grows old ([sc. δόξας] ἐγχρονιζομένης).”

The programmatic opening of the passage is also helpful for explaining why the distressed person’s belief that something bad is present to her is often no longer sufficient to cause distress after a period of time. Chrysippus, in raising some puzzles to be

59 Galen cites Chrysippus’ definition at second hand, within a passage criticizing Chrysippus from Posidonius’ own On the Emotions.
60 Arius Didymus Ecl. 2.7.10, p. 89 Wachsmuth: τὸ δὲ πρόσφατον ἀντὶ τοῦ κινητικοῦ συστολῆς ἀλόγου ἢ ἐπάρσεως. Cf. Cic. Tusc. 3.25 and 75, as well as Plu. On Moral Virtue 449c. For a good discussion, see Inwood 1985, 146-149.
61 Cicero cites Artemisia’s untiring grief over her husband’s death as evidence that it is not a necessary condition of a belief’s being vivid that one have formed it recently (Cic. Tusc. 3.75).
discussed in the passage, asks whether distress abates “when *some* belief is altered or with *all* remaining the same” (πότερον δόξης τινὸς μετακινομένης ἢ πασῶν διαμενομένων). In the next sentence, he writes that, despite one’s distress abating, “a belief of a such a kind remains (ἡ μὲν τοιαύτη δόξα διαμένειν), that the thing which is present is bad.” As has often been argued, the juxtaposition of these two clauses strongly suggests that only one of the beliefs involved in distress remains.⁶² Thus, according to Chrysippus, as a person’s belief that something present is bad for them ages and grows stale, they may no longer hold the further belief that it is appropriate for them to be distressed, and so may no longer be distressed.⁶³

The other way in which people may cease to be distressed while continuing to believe that something bad has happened to them is more difficult to explain. In such cases, a person holds the impulse to be distressed, and so believes both that something bad is present and that it is appropriate for them to be distressed, but nevertheless is not distressed. As an example, Chrysippus describes the familiar case of people who either cry or stop crying despite wanting to do the opposite. This has seemed to many scholars to be inexplicable on the basis of Stoic theory; indeed, several scholars have even rejected the natural reading of the Greek text in order to avoid ascribing such a view to Chrysippus.⁶⁴ However, despite the scholarly controversy regarding this passage, Chrysippus’ explanation of this phenomenon is, in my view, quite clear. According to him, people who hold the impulse to be distressed may fail to feel distressed if, after their

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⁶² See, for example, Long and Sedley 1987, vol. 2, 413 and Inwood 1985, 151.
⁶³ As was argued above in Section Two, Chrysippus’ method of consoling people in the grip of an emotion focuses on their belief that it is appropriate for them to be distressed rather than on their belief that the state of affairs about which they are distressed is good or bad, and thus relies on the possibility of a person’s holding the latter belief without also holding the former.
⁶⁴ See, for instance, Inwood 1985, 149n94 and Gill 1998, 122n50.
emotion has become relatively stale, they form a vivid countervailing impression that has a greater psychological effect than their emotion. Since my argument for this interpretation is based on a close reading of the final three sentences of the passage, I will reprint the sentences at issue for ease of reference.

And it may also happen that although the impulse remains, the things following it will not obey; these things happen on account of another condition of some kind arising that is difficult to explain. For in this way people both stop crying, and cry despite not wanting to cry, when the underlying situation does not produce like impressions, and little or nothing stands in the way. For it is reasonable that in the way in which the cessation of laments and outbreaks of weeping occur, so too such things and things similar to them also happen in the case of those things which cause greater movement in their beginnings, just as I said happens in the case of things causing laughter.

In the first sentence, Chrysippus writes that someone who holds the impulse to be distressed may fail to act on the basis of it “on account of another disposition of some kind that is difficult to explain.” By describing this disposition as “difficult to explain” (δυσσυλλόγιστον), Chrysippus emphasizes that this is a more pressing puzzle for his theory of the emotions than the former case. His description of this disposition as “difficult to explain” does not, however, imply, as Galen argues (PHP 4.7.18-20), that Chrysippus took himself to be incapable of explaining it. On the contrary, in the immediately following sentences he gives a reasonably clear explanation of this phenomenon.

65 In defense of reading μὴ here, see n56.
66 I should note another possible translation of δυσσυλλόγιστον. One might take this disposition to be δυσσυλλόγιστον for the agent rather than for Chrysippus and other philosophers trying to explain it, and so translate: “another disposition…that is badly reasoned out [by the agent].” However, given the aporetic context of the passage, it seems more likely that Chrysippus is simply acknowledging that this is a pressing aporia for his theory of the emotions. And indeed, even though Chrysippus offers an explanation of such cases, he is right to take it to be, at least prima facie, δυσσυλλόγιστον on the basis of Stoic psychology.
As indicated by the particles οὕτω γάρ, “for in this way,” the next sentence further explicates both the phenomenon Chrysippus means to explain and his claim that it occurs “on account of another condition of some kind” (διὰ ποιὰν ἄλλην ἐπιγινομένην διάθεσιν). Chrysippus considers two related cases in which people fail to act on the basis of their impulse: they may either cry or cease crying despite wanting to do the opposite. As he explains, people cry or cease crying despite wanting to do the opposite “when the present situation does not produce like impressions and little or nothing resists (ἐνιστῆταί τι ἢ μηθέν).” For Chrysippus, then, there are the following conditions of a person’s holding the occurrent impulse to be distressed, but failing nevertheless to be distressed: first, the present situation must not furnish similar impressions, and second, little or nothing must resist the impressions it furnishes.

By the present situation not furnishing similar impressions, Chrysippus presumably means both that it does not present impressions supporting one’s emotion and also, since the present situation can hardly fail to furnish any impressions at all, that it furnishes impressions unlike one’s impulse. For example, someone who is distraught over his friend’s death may, at the same time, be faced with the unlike impulsive impression of his favorite tragedian’s victory as worth being excited over. The second condition clarifies that such countervailing impressions are capable of overriding an impulse only when “little or nothing resists.” I propose, then, that impressions that are

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67 Pace Graver who argues that this sentence begins an independent passage, making no reference to the preceding discussion of the abatement of distress over time (2007, 90). She helps her case by simply omitting the inferential particles οὕτω γάρ from her translation of the passage. The particles seem to me, however, to speak decisively against her interpretation.

68 For the translation of τί ἢ μηθέν as “little or nothing,” see n58 above.

69 The present situation thus furnishes the same sort of impressions that Chrysippus describes in his On Inconsistency by the expression “things that appear differently” (τὰ ὡς ἓτερος φανόμενα), where he clearly refers to impressions unlike one’s emotion (Plu. On Moral Virtue 450c).
unlike one’s emotion are only overriding when one’s emotion is no longer capable of offering resistance and pushing them out.\textsuperscript{70}

While it seems likely both that the present situation will often present impressions unlike one’s impulse, and that such impressions may override an impulse if “little or nothing resists” them, the condition that “little or nothing” resists unlike impressions is not by itself particularly helpful for explaining how people may fail to act on the basis of their occurrent emotional impulse. For what needs to be explained is not how people may be faced with impressions unlike their occurrent impulse, but in what sense an impulse that fails to be action guiding remains occurrent; and so too, in what sense people whose distress is insufficient to push out unlike impressions may, nevertheless, be said to hold the occurrent impulse to be distressed.

In the final sentence of this passage, Chrysippus compares the unwanted “cessation and outbreak of laments” (ἡ θρήνων παῦσις γίνεται καὶ κλαυθμοὶ) of the previous sentence to similar phenomena that also “cause greater movements in their beginnings, just as I said happens in the case of things causing laughter.” Although Chrysippus’ comparison is obscured by the fact that his discussion of laughter, as well as the other cases he has in mind, is no longer extant, all of these cases presumably involve “things that cause greater movement in their beginnings.”\textsuperscript{71} For example, people very commonly laugh when they first hear a joke, but cease laughing soon afterwards without reconsidering their belief that the joke is amusing. Similarly, there is good reason to think

\textsuperscript{70} Chrysippus’ account of the blindness of emotions, discussed above, is relevant here: “For emotions, as they arise, force out lines of reasoning and things that appear differently, and violently push forward to the opposite actions” (Plu. On Moral Virtue 450c).

\textsuperscript{71} This is even clearer if one follows the more generally accepted translation of the phrase ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς μᾶλλον τῶν πραγμάτων κινούμενων as a genitive absolute, in which case the relevant part of the sentence reads (I have put the genitive absolute in italics): “...it is reasonable that such things and things similar to them also happen in the case of those things, since things cause greater movement in their beginnings, just as I said happens in the case of the things causing laughter.”
that Chrysippus takes emotions, as well as the impressions and beliefs correlated with them, to commonly have a greater psychological effect when they first arise than afterwards. For instance, as we have seen, he writes that “emotions as they arise (τὰ γὰρ ἐπιγινόμενα [...] πάθη) force out lines of reasoning and things that appear differently.”


Read in conjunction with his account of the tendency of distress to abate as it ages, this passage strongly suggests that Chrysippus takes emotions as they age to offer less resistance to countervailing impressions. This is suggested as well by his view, as was argued above, that it is not simply the belief that something evil is present to one that causes distress, but the “vivid” (πρόσφατος) belief that something evil is present to one. While a belief may be vivid without being recent, more recent beliefs are, as was argued above, typically more vivid than less recent beliefs. Therefore, for Chrysippus, the beliefs correlated with an impulse, as well as the impulse itself, tend to become less vivid over time.

I propose, then, that Chrysippus explains cases in which people hold the occurrent impulse to be distressed but fail to be distressed, by the growing inability of distress as it becomes less vivid to push out unlike impressions. His explanation of such cases thus depends on his distinguishing between more and less vivid occurrent impulses. Moreover, since, as we have seen, Chrysippus allows that someone who holds a less vivid occurrent impulse may fail to act on the basis of her impulse if she is faced with a fresh unlike impression, his explanation of the abatement of distress seems also to require a further distinction between effective impulses, which someone holds and acts on, and ineffective impulses, which someone holds but fails to act on.

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72 Plutarch, *On Moral Virtue* 450c.
We might wonder, however, whether an ineffective impulse would count as an occurrent impulse at all or if it is rather a dispositional impulse of some kind. In order to answer this, it is helpful to distinguish the following ways in which an unlike impression might prevent someone from acting on his occurrent impulse:

(i) It might prove so distracting that they fail to act on their impulse, even if they do not assent to the distracting impression. For instance, someone might fail to act on the basis of his impulse to study Greek as a result of being distracted by the various sounds emitted by a crowded bathhouse beneath his apartment.

(ii) It might, without their assent, stimulate a violent, non-voluntary affective reaction in them (such as shedding tears, or becoming pale), which the Stoics call a “pre-emotion” (προπάθεια). For example, someone might involuntarily break out in tears at the sight of his friend’s empty library carrel despite not wanting to cry, but wanting rather, say, to laugh at a joke.

In both of these cases, someone who holds the occurrent impulse to act in a certain way fails to act on it because of the psychological force exerted by a vivid unlike impression to which he does not assent. Since he does not assent to the unlike impression in either of these cases, he would not form a belief or impulse speaking against his impulse. Rather, he simply fails for the moment to act on the basis of any impulse at all,

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73 In support of the latter interpretation, one might appeal to the Stoic use of the term ὅρμη to refer to dispositional, as well as occurrent, impulses. See, for instance, Stob. Ecl. 2.7.9, p. 87 Wachsmuth.

74 For a detailed and very amusing account of the difficulty of living or, worse yet, attempting to study above a Roman bathhouse, see Sen. Ep. 56 passim. Along similar lines, Margaret Graver gives as an example the distracting antics of a toddler, which may distract one without, however, presenting them with an impulsive impression to act in any particular way (2007, 90-91).

despite, as Chrysippus’ examples suggest, continuing to endorse the beliefs correlated with his impulse, and even actively trying to act on the basis of his impulse. I propose, then, that in the case under discussion the distressed person’s impulse to be distressed remains occurring despite failing to guide his activity in the sense that he continues to actively endorse the beliefs correlated with it, and so actively, but unsuccessfully, tries to maintain his occurring distress in full force and effect. His impulse thus continues to have psychological force sufficient, if unopposed, to cause him to be distressed, without his first having to assent again to an impulsive impression. By contrast, people who believe that something bad has happened to them, but no longer believe that it is appropriate for them to be distressed, and so, as was argued above, no longer hold the impulse to be distressed, must first assent to an impulsive impression portraying something bad as present to them in order to become distressed again.

V

The next and final section turns to Chrysippus’ explanation of the way in which all emotions are “excessive impulses” (ὄρμαὶ ἀπειλωτῆς ἡμῶν), which, I argue, has significant implications for his theory of psychic conflict, as well as his theory of the emotions more generally. In several passages, Chrysippus compares the sense in which emotions are “excessive impulses” to the “excessive movement” (πλεονάζει [...] ἐκ τῶν ἀρέσεων κίνητας) of runners who are incapable of stopping or changing direction immediately on account of their momentum. He gives a detailed account of this analogy in Book One of On the Emotions:

οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ πορεύεσθαι καθ’ ὀρμὴν οὐ πλεονάζει ἢ τῶν σκελῶν κίνητας ἀλλὰ συναπαρτίζει τῇ ὀρμὴ ὡστε καὶ στήναι, ὅταν ἐθέλῃ, καὶ μεταβάλλειν. ἐπι δὲ τῶν τρεχόντων καθ’ ὀρμὴν οὐκέτι τοιαύτως γίνεται, ἀλλὰ πλεονάζει παρά τὴν ὀρμὴν ἢ τῶν σκελῶν κίνητας ὡστε ἐκφέρεσθαι καὶ μὴ μεταβάλλειν εὐπειθῶς εὔπειθῶς ἐναρξαμένου. αἷς οἴμαι τι παραπλήσιον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὀρμῶν γίνεσθαι διὰ τὸ τὴν κατά
When someone walks in accordance with his impulse, the motion of his legs is not excessive, but corresponds in some way to his impulse with the result that he both stops and changes direction when he wishes. Such a thing no longer happens in the case of those running in accordance with their impulse, rather the movement of their legs is excessive beyond their impulse, with the result that they are carried away and do not obediently change their course straightaway if they endeavor to do so. I suppose that something similar to these movements happens also in the case of impulses, on account of their exceeding the proportion in accordance with reason, so that whenever someone has such an impulse he is not obedient to reason. While in the case of running the excess is said to be beyond the impulse, in the case of impulse the excess is said to be beyond reason. For the proper measure of a natural impulse is that which is in accordance with reason and to such an extent as reason deems right.

The first half of this passage compares the excessive movement of runners to the controlled movement of people walking. While the movement of someone walking “corresponds in some way to his impulse with the result that he both stops and changes direction whenever he wishes,” the movement of runners “is excessive beyond their impulse with the result that they are carried away and do not obediently change their course straightaway if they endeavor to do so.” As my translation indicates, in the Greek text, both of the subordinate clauses are clearly marked as result clauses. For Chrysippus, therefore, the ability of walkers to stop and change direction immediately, as soon as they form the desire to do so, and the inability of runners to do the same results from and is explained by their controlled and uncontrolled movement respectively. The movement of runners is thus “excessive beyond their impulse,” and so out of their control, independently of whether they actually form the impulse to change direction or to stop suddenly.

The second half of the passage turns to “excessive impulses,” or emotions. As Chrysippus explains: “while in the case of running the excess is said to be beyond the

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76 I follow De Lacy 1984 and Müller 1874 in deleting καὶ.
impulse, in the case of impulse the excess is said to be beyond reason.” As we have seen, Chrysippus takes the movement of runners to be “in excess beyond their impulse” because of their inability to immediately alter their movement should they form the impulse to do so. Presumably then, emotions are in excess “beyond reason” in the sense that, like runners, impassioned people at the apex of an emotion are incapable of checking or abandoning it immediately, even if they come to believe that they ought to do so.\textsuperscript{77}

However, while in the case of runners it is only movement of their bodies that is excessive and out of their immediate control, emotions are “in excess beyond reason” (πλεονασμοῦ λεγομένου [...] παρὰ τὸν λόγον) despite being themselves impulses expressing certain evaluative beliefs. Thus, if an impassioned person forms the belief that he should act differently, but continues nevertheless to experience and to act on his emotion, he will not, like runners, move in a way that simply fails to express his occurrent evaluative beliefs and impulse altogether. Instead, he will act on an impulse, namely his emotion, and the beliefs correlated with it, but will fail to act on the basis of his occurrent belief that he ought, say, to calm down. Moreover, since the Stoics take forming the occurrent belief that it is appropriate to act in a certain way to be sufficient, at least absent special circumstance, for forming a corresponding impulse, an impassioned person who forms the belief that he ought to calm down may also, perhaps,\textsuperscript{77} this interpretation is also suggested by the final sentence of the passage, which describes “the proper measure of a natural impulse” (συμμετρία [...] φυσικῆς ὁρμῆς) as that “which is in accordance with reason and to such an extent as reason deems right.” For since emotions are, by contrast, unnatural impulses (see, e.g., Stob. Ecl. 2.7.10, p. 88 Wachsmuth = SVF 3.378, Clemens Strom. 2 p. 460 Pott = SVF 3.377, and PHP 4.2.8), impassioned people presumably will not, like people acting on the basis of a natural impulse, hold their emotions only “to such an extent as reason deems right.” As becomes clear in the parallel passage in Book Four of On the Emotions, which I discuss below, reason here is not only right reason but reason “of whatever kind” (τὰ ὀφθαλμῶν ἣ, PHP 4.4.25). Thus, according to Chrysippus’ analysis, impassioned people may fail to immediately check or restrain their emotion, even if they come to believe that they ought to do so.
form a corresponding impulse. If, then, he continues nevertheless to act on the basis of his emotion, he will hold both an \textit{effective} occurrent impulse, namely his emotion, which he acts on, and also a conflicting \textit{ineffective} occurrent impulse that is somehow overridden by his emotion. Chrysippus’ comparison of emotions to the excessive movement of runners thus strongly supports taking him to have allowed the possibility of a person’s simultaneously holding both an emotion and a conflicting occurrent evaluative belief, as well, perhaps, as a corresponding impulse.

It is worth emphasizing, however, that it is not a condition of an emotion’s being excessive or disobedient to reason that the impassioned person actually forms, but fails to be responsive to, the belief that she ought to act differently. Rather, just as the movement of runners is excessive beyond their impulse whether or not they actually form the desire to stop suddenly, so too, for Chrysippus, emotions are excessive “beyond reason” independently of whether the impassioned agent actually forms the belief that her emotion is unwarranted. For example, even if one routinely gets passionately excited about the prospect of spending a weekend at Baiae and \textit{never} doubts that their excitement is appropriate, their emotion is still excessive according to Chrysippus. Therefore,

\footnote{Our evidence is inconclusive on whether, according to Chrysippus’ theory, someone in such a condition will hold only a countervailing occurrent evaluative belief or also a countervailing impulse. The best evidence that Chrysippus allowed the possibility of a person’s holding conflicting impulses is his view, discussed in the previous section, that people may hold the occurrent impulse to be distressed but fail to act on the basis of it, and his consequent distinction between effective and ineffective impulses. While this provides some reason for taking him to have allowed the possibility of a person’s holding conflicting occurrent impulses, there is an important disanalogy between the two cases. In the former case, where people hold an impulse but fail to act on it because of a more vivid, countervailing impression, their impulse only becomes ineffective after it has already proven effective. By contrast, in the case currently under discussion, the countervailing impulse would be ineffective even when it is first formed. Alternatively, Chrysippus may simply have denied that someone currently acting on an emotion has the psychic resources to form a countervailing impulse. For further discussion of the latter possibility, see Chapter Two, Section Five.}

\footnote{Margaret Graver, in discussing this passage, writes in a similar vein: “For the other impulse, the impulse to cease feeling that way and to stop doing the things the emotion is driving one to do, is a reasoned impulse which cannot take effect. \textit{It is as if the rational mind has lost the ability to execute its own commands}” (2007, 68; my emphasis).}
emotions, according to this passage, are “excessive” primarily in the sense that, once formed, they are out of the impassioned person’s immediate control, \( \textit{whether or not she actually forms a rival evaluative belief.}^{80} \)

This interpretation of Chrysippus’ explanation of the excessiveness of emotions is confirmed and further developed by a similar passage in Book Four of \textit{On the Emotions}, in which Chrysippus again compares emotions to the movement of runners. This passage is also helpful for reconstructing his account of psychic conflict, and indeed, includes the only use in the verbatim fragments of his works of a cognate of the Greek word \( \textit{ἀκρασία}.^{81} \)

80 This interpretation is also suggested by Arius Didymus’ explanation of the sense in which the Stoics take emotions to be “disobedient to reason” (τὸ ἀπειθῶς τῷ λόγῳ). Arius reports that, according to the Stoics, emotions are “disobedient to reason” in the sense that “every emotion is violent, such that those who are in the grip of the emotions often see that it is beneficial not to act in this way, but are carried away by its vehemence” (Stob. 2.7.10a, p. 89 Wachsmuth). Therefore, according to Arius, the Stoics hold that because “every emotion (πᾶν πάθος) is violent,” impassioned people “often” (πολλὰκις), but not always, form countervailing occurrence evaluative beliefs, but are “carried away” by their emotions. Since the violence of their emotions explains why impassioned people may recognize that their emotion is not beneficial but be “carried away” by it anyway, emotions are presumably violent in this sense even if the people experiencing them do not form, but fail to be adequately responsive to, any countervailing evaluative beliefs. According to Arius, then, the Stoics hold both that emotions are “disobedient to reason” in the sense that an impassioned person at the apex of her emotion may fail to check her emotion immediately, even if she recognizes that she ought to do so, \( \textit{and} \) that emotions are disobedient to reason and out of control in this way, whether or not the people experiencing them actually form the belief that their emotion is harmful.

81 I should note that the term \( \textit{ἀκρασία} \) also appears in the Stoic taxonomy of vices, as reported in DL 7.92 = \textit{SVF} 3.265. In contemporary philosophical English, the term akrasia refers to cases where someone recognizes that she should act in a certain way, but nevertheless acts differently. For example, when my alarm goes off in the morning, I may recognize that I should wake up, but akratically turn my alarm off and go back to sleep nevertheless. The use of the term \( \textit{ἀκρασία} \) in philosophical Greek is wider, while it is often used to describe such cases, it also often simply means “out of control.” The \textit{locus classicus} for the philosophical use of the term \( \textit{ἀκρασία} \) is Arist. \textit{EN} 7.1-10. For a helpful collection of recent articles on ancient theories of akrasia, see Bobonich and Destrée 2007. For contemporary discussion, a good place to start are the essay collected in Stroud and Tappolet 2003.
Indeed such conditions [sc. impassioned ones] are of the sort that are uncontrolled (ἀκρατεῖς), as if the men were not in control of themselves but were carried away, just as those running hard are carried away, since they are not in control of themselves. But those moving on the basis of reason as their guide, and who steer their course by it, of whatever sort it may be, are in control over, or do not suffer, such motion and the impulses in accordance with it, so that they obey if reason shows itself, like walkers. On account of which, movements that are irrational in this way are said to be emotions, and to be contrary to nature, because they transgress a rational constitution.

In this passage, Chrysippus contrasts the “uncontrolled conditions” (ἀκρατεῖς καταστάσεις) of impassioned people with the non-emotional (ἀπαθής) state of people “moving on the basis of reason as their guide […] of whatever sort it may be.” While people acting on the basis of reason are in control of themselves, “so that they obey if reason shows itself, like walkers,” impassioned people behave “as if they were not in control of themselves but were carried away.” Thus, according to Chrysippus, people acting on the basis of reason “of whatever sort it may be” (χάν ὁποιοσοῦν ἴη), and not only people acting on the basis of right reason, “obey if reason shows itself.”

Presumably then, by reason showing itself, he also means reason “of whatever sort.” For although people acting on the basis of reason would certainly abandon their impulse if they were to see that right reason speaks against it, they would also abandon their impulse if they were to form the false belief that they should act differently. Therefore,

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82 Gourinat has proposed as an alternative translation of this clause—οἶς καὶ ἀκρατεῖς αἱ τοιαῦται καταστάσεις εἰσίν—“such states are like those which are out of control.” Following De Lacy 1978 and most other recent scholars, I translate the clause as “such conditions [sc. impassioned ones] are of the sort that are uncontrolled” (2007, 244). As both translations are possible construals of the Greek text, it is difficult to arbitrate between them. While there is, in my view, a clear sense in which all emotions are akratic conditions in Chrysippus’ view, it does not matter very much for my interpretation which translation one prefers. If one prefers Gourinat’s translation, the sense in which emotions are similar to akratic conditions remains important for my interpretation.

83 In context, ἀπαθῆς means “not-suffering” the motions and impulses of impassioned people. It is also a term of art in Stoic philosophy to describe someone who does not suffer emotions (πάθη) at all, see, e.g., Epictetus, Diatribai 1.4.27 and Diogenes Laertius 7.117.

84 This picks up Chrysippus’ distinction in the immediately preceding passage in On the Emotions between impassioned people and those who have merely deliberated badly, which I discussed above in section I (PHP 4.4.16-17).
for Chrysippus, non-impassioned people are responsive not only to right reason, but to reason more generally.

By contrast, he writes of impassioned people that “such conditions [sc. impassioned ones] are of the sort that are uncontrolled (ἀκρατεῖς), as if they were not in control of themselves, but were carried away.” As I have been arguing, impassioned people are “carried away” (ἐκφερόμενοι) in the sense that even if they form the belief that their emotion is inappropriate, and so too, perhaps, the impulse to calm down, they may continue, nevertheless, to act on the basis of their emotion. It is not, however, a condition of their being “carried away” that they in fact form conflicting impressions, evaluative beliefs or impulses to which they are inadequately responsive. On the contrary, their being carried away is not explained by their failure to be adequately responsive if they happen to form unlike impressions, beliefs or impulses, but rather explains their inadequate responsiveness. The primary sense of the adjective ἀκρατεῖς in this passage is thus, I propose, the rather literal “out of control” rather than the more technical “going against one's considered judgment,” which is familiar both in philosophical Greek and contemporary philosophy. 

Although, as we have seen, Chrysippus does not take it to be a requirement of someone’s being in an akratic condition that she act against her considered judgment, he describes a variety of ways in which an impassioned person may act against her considered judgment. Indeed, insofar as every impassioned person holds dispositional

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85 Pace Sorabji 2000, 56, who takes ἀκρατεῖς here to mean something like going against one’s better judgment. Gourinat also prefers “out of control” to Sorabji’s “going against one’s better judgment” (2007, 244); however, he takes emotions to be “out of control” in that an impassioned person “may still see what is the best for one, and yet refuse to assent to the impression one has of the best” (245). In my view, however, an impassioned person may see and assent to her impression of what is best for her, but, nevertheless, act on the basis of her emotion.
beliefs speaking against their emotion, there is a sense in which *every* emotion conflicts with the impassioned person’s considered judgment. More robustly, Chrysippus allows that people may rashly abandon their prior impulse when they form an emotion. For example, as we have seen, he cites and comments on a passage from Euripides’ *Andromache*, in which Menelaos, when he first sees Helen’s breasts again, drops his sword and embraces her, rashly abandoning his impulse to kill her for infidelity (Eur. *Andr.* 629-630 = *PHP* 4.6.9). Although Menelaos surely has the evaluative beliefs correlated with his impulse to kill Helen at hand (after all, he is acting on them when he sees her), he assents to the impulsive impression that he should embrace her without giving them a second thought. Menelaos thus acts against his considered judgment without ever holding simultaneously conflicting occurrent evaluative beliefs or conflicting impulses.

However, Chrysippus also allows that impassioned people may continue to experience and act on the basis of an emotion despite believing that it is wrong for them to do so. For example, as he describes, Euripides’ Medea acts on the basis of her anger despite recognizing that doing so is wrong. Chrysippus’ theory of the emotions thus admits a wide variety of ways in which people may act against their considered judgment. Nevertheless, the basic sense in which emotions are akratic is not that they conflict with the impassioned agent’s considered judgment, but instead that they are out of his control, so that he is not adequately responsive even to his own countervailing beliefs and impulses.
VI

In sum, in this chapter, I have argued that Chrysippus takes emotions to depart from normative rationality in the following three ways: first, they are correlated with false occurrent evaluative beliefs; second, both in forming and in holding an emotion impassioned people fail to give the countervailing impressions and considerations readily available to them due consideration, and so fail to exercise circumspection; and finally, emotions are, in Stoic terms, “excessive impulses” in the sense that impassioned people may continue to act on the basis of them, even if they form a countervailing evaluative belief.

I have focused especially on the latter two kinds of irrationality both because other interpretations have focused more on the first and because the latter two kinds of irrationality are more distinctive of emotions than the former, which also holds of errant impulses. In arguing that the latter two kinds of irrationality play a significant role in Chrysippus’ theory of the emotions, I have also challenged several tenets of the standard interpretation of Stoic moral psychology. For instance, I hope to have shown that Chrysippus allows a far wider range of cognitive dissonance than scholars have generally allowed, including conflicting occurrent evaluative beliefs and perhaps even conflicting occurrent impulses.

86 As mentioned also in the opening pages of this chapter, for a subset of emotions which are excessive and wrong responses to a present or impending good or bad, such as Alcibiades’ distress over his vice, only the belief that it is appropriate for one to be emotionally affected is false.
Chapter 2: Posidonius

In his *On the Doctrines of Plato and Hippocrates*, which is our primary evidence for Posidonius’ theory of the emotions, Galen argues that Posidonius, the head of the Stoic school approximately one hundred and fifty years after Chrysippus, made quite radical innovations in the Stoic theory of the emotions.¹ Indeed, according to Galen, Posidonius largely abandoned the Stoic account and, instead, adopted a more or less Platonic position, according to which emotions are impulses not of reason, as earlier Stoics had argued, but of non-rational aspects of the soul. Although, as has often been commented, Galen’s own interpretation of Posidonius’ theory is unconvincing,² the evidence he adduces convincingly shows both that Posidonius strongly criticized Chrysippus’ theory of the emotions and that he proposed his own quite different theory. Nevertheless, as we will see, Posidonius retained the most distinctive features of the standard Stoic account of the emotions, even though he rejected their explanation of these features.³ For example, he held the distinctive Stoic position that *all* the emotions of the non-wise are reason-rejecting and excessive impulses, but explained this by proposing quite significant innovations in Stoic moral psychology, including positing a non-rational, in addition to a rational, aspect of the soul.

This chapter is divided into six sections. The first section discusses Posidonius’ detailed criticism of Chrysippus’ explanation of why impassioned people are, in his

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² For representative examples, see Cooper 1998, 73-74; Fillion-Lahille 1984, 124-127; Gill 1998, 124-125; and Tieleman 2003, 198-201. Galen also seems to have used Posidonius’ theory (as he understood of it) as a significant source for his own ethical works; see, e.g., Walzer 1962 for Galen’s use of Posidonius in his *On Moral Character (De Moribus)*.
³ As noted already by Pohlenz 1965, 146.
words, “rejecting of reason” (ἀποστρέφεσθαι τὸν λόγον), which Galen quotes at length in *PHP* 4.5, and argues that his criticism is based largely on an idiosyncratic interpretation of Chrysippus’ account of the cognitive content of emotions. In particular, in addition to the two beliefs commonly correlated with Chrysippus’ account,⁴ Posidonius includes the otherwise unattested belief that it is not fitting to accept any argument challenging the appropriateness of one’s emotion. As he shows, this additional belief has far-reaching consequences for Chrysippus’ theory of the emotions.

The next section considers the implications of Posidonius’ idiosyncratic interpretation of the cognitive content of Chrysippean emotions for his own theory of moral psychology. While Chrysippus held that reason is capable of holding conflicting occurrent beliefs and perhaps even conflicting impulses, I argue that Posidonius’ interpretation of Chrysippus’ theory is based on his more restrictive conception of reason, according to which reason itself is incapable of occurrent conflict. Posidonius’ interpretation of Chrysippus’ theory of the emotions thus attempts to make the best case possible for Chrysippus’ theory on the basis of his own quite different conception of reason.

The third section turns to Posidonius’ claim that a person’s degree of familiarity with emotionally-salient things partly determines her susceptibility to emotions, independently of her evaluative beliefs and strength of soul (ἰσχὺς ψυχῆς).⁵ One difficulty for this view is distinguishing the salutary kind of familiarity with emotionally-

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⁴ Namely, that something good or bad is present or impending for one, and that it is appropriate for one to be emotionally affected. For the correlation of emotions with these two beliefs, see, for instance, Andronicus *On the Emotions* 1 = SVF 3.391; Cic. *Tusc.* 4.14 = SVF 3.393; Stob. *Ecl.* 2.7.10b, p. 90 Wachsmuth = SVF 3.394.

⁵ By the expression “strength of soul” (ἰσχὺς ψυχῆς), the Stoics mean a person’s ability to retain and to act on the basis of their considered beliefs in the face of vivid countervailing impressions.
salient things that Posidonius recommends from other harmful kinds of familiarity with them such as emotional “sicknesses” (νοσήματα) and “infirmities” (ἀρρωστήματα). I argue that Posidonius’ innovations in Stoic emotional therapy provide a model of the sort of familiarity with merely apparent good and bad things that he takes to be beneficial, thus indicating his solution to this difficulty.

The next section turns to Posidonius’ explanation of why emotions are excessive and rejecting of reason. His account is based on his view that emotions are constituted by two components: the evaluative beliefs correlated with them and “affective movements” (παθητικαὶ κινήσεις) of a non-rational aspect of the soul. While Posidonius, I argue, holds that these are together necessary and sufficient conditions of forming an emotion, he takes the affective movements partly constituting an emotion to be sufficient for continuing to hold and experience it. For example, an enraged person who abandons the beliefs correlated with her anger may continue, nevertheless, to experience and to act on her anger because she continues to experience the affective movements partly constituting it.

The fifth section considers the implications that Posidonius’ account of the excessiveness of emotions has for his conception of the role of the non-rational aspect of the soul in non-emotional impulses. While, like all Stoics, Posidonius takes forming the belief that one ought to act in a certain way to be a necessary condition of forming a non-emotional impulse, I argue that he takes forming and holding this belief to be a sufficient

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6 Emotional “sicknesses” and “infirmities” are dispositional propensities to form more frequent and more intense emotions when faced with merely apparent goods and bads. For the Stoic conception of emotional sicknesses and infirmities, see the passages collected in SVF 3.421-430.

7 By the expression “affective movements” (παθητικαὶ κινήσεις), I take Posidonius to refer to vehement movements of the non-rational aspect of the soul, which, as I will discuss in section four, partly constitute emotions. For an excellent discussion of Posidonius’ use of this expression, see Cooper 1998, 85. The best textual evidence for Posidonius’ use of this expression is PHP 5.5.26-29 together with 4.7.28, 37 and 5.5.21.
condition only if the agent is not at the same time experiencing vehement countervailing non-rational movements.

The sixth and final section discusses further implications that the role of the non-rational aspect of the soul in non-emotional impulses has for the practical life of the wise. In particular, while the wise will form only true beliefs, they may fail, according to Posidonius’ theory, to form impulses on the basis of their practical decisions if they are at the same time experiencing vehement countervailing movements of a non-rational aspect of their soul.

I

In *PHP* 4.5, Galen quotes an extended series of passages from Posidonius’ *On the Emotions* (Περὶ Παθῶν), which he presents as devoted to strongly criticizing Chrysippus’ theory of the emotions (*PHP* 4.5.26–44). Posidonius’ criticism in these passages is based largely on an idiosyncratic interpretation of Chrysippus’ account of the cognitive content of emotions. In addition to the two beliefs that our sources commonly correlate with Chrysippean emotions,⁸ Posidonius interprets Chrysippus as correlating emotions with the further and otherwise unattested belief that “it is fitting and in accordance with the value of the things that are present or impending […] not to accept any argument concerning its being right to be moved differently by these things [sc. the objects of one’s emotion].”¹⁹ Posidonius attributes this additional belief to the cognitive

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⁸ Namely, that something good or bad is present or impending for one, and that it is appropriate for one to be emotionally affected. For the correlation of emotions with these two beliefs, see, for instance, Andronicus *On the Emotions* 1 = SVF 3.391; Cic. *Tusc*. 4.14 = SVF 3.393; Stob. *Ecl*. 2.7.10b, p. 90 Wachsmuth = SVF 3.394.

⁹ *PHP* 4.5.27: εἰ γὰρ τὸ μέγεθος τῶν φαινομένων ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν κινεῖ τὸ νομίζειν καθῆκον καὶ κατ’ αὐξών εἶναι παρόντων αὐτῶν ἢ παραγινομένων <ἐμπαθῶς κινεῖσθαι> καὶ μηδένα λόγον προσίεσθαι περὶ τοῦ ἄλλους δεῖν ὑπ’ αὐτῶν κινεῖσθαι […] For discussion of this text, see below.
content of Chrysippean emotions most clearly in two verbatim passages from his *On the Emotions*.

In the first, he raises an objection to Chrysippus’ claim that people form “emotional infirmities” (ἀρρωστήματα) as a result of forming the dispositional belief that a merely apparent good or bad, such as pleasure or pain, is the greatest good or the greatest bad. By an “emotional infirmity” Chrysippus means a deep-seated disposition to form emotions regarding a merely apparent good or bad object.10 Thus, to use one of Chrysippus’ examples, cited by Posidonius, people who are “woman-mad” (γυναικομανεῖς) believe that sexual intercourse with women is the greatest good, and so worthwhile pursuing even to the detriment of other merely apparent goods such as, say, their health or their property (*PHP* 4.5.22). Moreover, Posidonius takes Chrysippus to have appealed to the emotionally infirm agent’s belief that a merely apparent good or bad is the greatest good or the greatest bad to explain why, in Chrysippus’ words, “emotional infirmities are said to consist not only in judging each of these things to be good, but also in falling in excess to these beyond what is in accordance with nature” (*PHP* 4.5.21).11 Thus, according to Posidonius, Chrysippus explained the excessiveness of emotional infirmities by their gross overvaluation of merely apparent good or bad things.

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10 Several different sources define emotional “infirmities” (ἀρρωστήματα) as emotional “sicknesses with weakness [of soul]” (νοσήματα/νόσημα μετὰ ἀσθενείας). Since the Stoics define emotional “sicknesses” (νοσήματα) as false dispositional beliefs mistaking what is not choiceworthy for something “vehemently choiceworthy” (σφοδρὰ αἱρετὰ, Stob. *Ecl.* 2.7.10c, p. 93 Wachsmuth = *SVF* 3.421), and emotional infirmity is, therefore, a false dispositional evaluative belief taking what is not, in fact, choiceworthy to be vehemently choiceworthy, together with weakness of soul. The emphasis in these definitions on the vehemence (σφοδρότης) of either the belief or its object fits very well with Posidonius’ report. See also, D.L. 7.115 = *SVF* 3.422, Cic. *Tusc.* 4.26 = *SVF* 3.427 and Sen. *Ep.* 75.11 = *SVF* 3.428. For critical discussion, see Graver 2007, 139-141 and Inwood 1985, 128.

11 οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ κρίνειν ἀγαθὰ ἐκπαιδεύσατα τούτων λέγεται ἀρρωστήματα ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἔπι πλέον ἐκπαιδεύσατα πρὸς ταῦτα τού κατὰ φύσιν.
Posidonius also seems to have proposed a similar interpretation of Chrysippus’ account of the excessiveness of emotions. For, a couple of chapters later, Galen reports that Posidonius raised the same objection to Chrysippus’ definition of distress as the belief that “a great or unsurpassable or unendurable bad” (μεγάλου κακοῦ ἢ ἄνυπομονήτου ἢ ἀκαρτερήτου) is present to one that he raises for Chrysippus’ account of emotional infirmities (*PHP* 4.7.5-6). It is likely, then, that, in its original context, Posidonius directed the following objection to Chrysippus’ account of both emotional infirmities and emotions. He objects that, according to Chrysippus’ account of the excessiveness of emotional infirmities, not only the non-wise, but the wise, too, will form emotional infirmities and emotions, contradicting Stoic theory.¹² For since the wise believe correctly that virtue is the greatest good, they will passionately desire (ἐπιθυμοῦντες) it and will be excessively delighted (περιχαρεῖς γινόμενοι) whenever it is present to them (*PHP* 4.5.26). In developing this line of criticism, Posidonius gives a detailed account of the propositional content of Chrysippean emotions.

For if the magnitude of the apparent good or bad things causes one to consider that it is fitting and in accordance with the value of the things that are present or impending for him to be moved in an emotional way, and for him not to accept any argument concerning its being right to be moved differently by these things, then those who consider their possessions to be unsurpassable [sc. the wise] ought to suffer these things, but this is not observed to happen.

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¹² According to the Stoics, the wise will not form any ordinary “emotions” (πάθη) at all. Instead, they will form only the so-called “good emotions” (εὐπάθειαι), which, unlike “emotions”, are correlated only with true beliefs. For ancient evidence, see especially Cic. *Tusc.* 4.12-14 and DL 7.115. For an excellent recent discussion, see Cooper 2005.

¹³ I follow De Lacy 1984 in supplying ἐμπαθῶς κινεῖσθαι from the preceding sentence *PHP* 4.5.26. The other possibility, followed, e.g., by Theiler 1982, is simply to delete κατ’ and thus to take this passage to refer to two rather than three distinct beliefs. For discussion, see Edelstein and Kidd 1988, vol. 2, 590.
According to this passage, the wise will form emotions if they form the following three beliefs: (i) the belief that a great good or bad is present or impending for them, (ii) the belief that it is fitting and in accordance with the value of the things that are present or impending for them that they be moved in an emotional way, and (iii) the belief that it is fitting and in accordance with the value of the things that are present or impending for them that they not accept any argument concerning its being right to be moved differently by these things. Since Posidonius is raising an objection to Chrysippus’ theory in this passage, he presumably takes Chrysippus to agree that forming these three beliefs is a necessary and sufficient condition of forming an ordinary, excessive emotion (πάθος).

For it would otherwise be open to Chrysippus simply to deny that the wise would form an emotion as a result of forming these beliefs. However, while our other sources commonly correlate the first two of these beliefs with Chrysippean emotions, the attribution of the final belief to Chrysippus’ analysis of the emotions has very little textual support.

14 Namely, that something good or bad is present or impending for one, and that it is appropriate for one to be emotionally affected. For the correlation of emotions with these two beliefs, see, for instance, Andronicus On the Emotions 1 = SVF 3.391; Cic. Tusc. 4.14 = SVF 3.393; Stob. Ecl. 2.7.10b, p. 90 Wachsmuth = SVF 3.394.

15 The best evidence for this belief in the extant fragments and reports of Chrysippus’ theory is a fragment from Chrysippus’ On the Emotions quoted by Galen (perhaps at second hand from Posidonius):

διὸ καὶ τοιαύτας ἐστὶν ἀκοῦσαι φωνάς ἐπὶ τῶν ἐρώντων καὶ τῶν ἄλλως σφόδρα ἐπιθυμοῦντων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὀργιζομένων, ὅτι τὸ θυμόν θέλουσα χαρίζεσθαι καὶ ἐὰν αὐτούς, εἴτε ἄμενον εἴτε μή, καὶ μηθὲν λέγειν αὐτοῖς, καὶ ὡς τούτο ἐκ παντός γε τρόπου ποιητέον, καὶ εἰ διαμαρτάνουσα καὶ εἰ ἀσύμφορον ἔστιν αὐτοῖς. (PHP 4.6.27)

And therefore, it is possible to hear statements of such a kind from lovers and people with other strong appetites and the enraged, that they want to gratify their anger and to allow them to do so, whether it is better or not, and to say nothing to them, and that this must be done in any event, even if they are making a mistake and if it is not beneficial to them.

The impassioned people described in this passage come very close to stating the belief that Posidonius takes Chrysippus to ascribe to all emotions; however, it is far from clear that even these people should be understood as, in fact, endorsing that belief. As Chrysippus explicitly comments, he is reporting the common expressions of people suffering emotions, and so not committing himself to taking these expressions at face value. Rather, as I argued in Chapter One, I take this passage simply to call attention to the propensity of impassioned people to continue to experience their emotion even if they recognize that doing so is not beneficial to them.
To be sure, there is good reason to think that Chrysippus held that impassioned people are not at all inclined to accept arguments speaking against their emotion; but there is very little evidence that Chrysippus took impassioned people to believe that they should not accept countervailing arguments. On the contrary, our evidence suggests that Chrysippus explained the inadequate reason-responsiveness of impassioned people by the vehemence of their emotions, which may both blind them to the force of countervailing arguments and may even cause them to continue acting on the basis of their emotion even if they recognize that they should not do so. By correlating this belief with the cognitive content of emotions, Posidonius thus offers on Chrysippus’ behalf an intellectualist explanation of why impassioned people are disinclined to consider and accept considerations speaking against their emotions. As he goes on to show, this explanation has significant implications for Chrysippus’ account of the excessiveness of emotions.

Posidonius attributes this belief to the cognitive content of Chrysippean emotions again a few paragraphs later. He challenges Chrysippus to explain a scene from Book Ten of the *Iliad*, in which Agamemnon, frightened by the Trojans’ rout of the Greek army, seeks advice from Nestor on how best to ward off the Trojans’ attack (*Il.* 10.17-20, 91-95; *PHP* 4.5.36-41). The difficulty that this passage poses for Chrysippus’ theory, at least according to Posidonius’ interpretation of that theory, is that Agamemnon seeks

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16 For the failure of impassioned people, according to Chrysippus, to be adequately reason-responsive, see especially his comparison of impassioned people to runners who, on account of their vehement movement, are unable to stop, or change direction, as soon as it seems best to them to do so (Gal. *PHP* 4.2.15-18 = *SVF* 3.462 and 4.4.24-25 = *SVF* 3.476); cf. Plu. *On Moral Virtue* 450c2-7 = *SVF* 3.390 and Stob. *Ec.* 2.7.10a, p. 89 Wachsmuth = *SVF* 3.389. The best discussion of the sense in which Chrysippus takes impassioned people to be inadequately reason-responsive is Cooper 1998, 79-81; cf. Gill 1998, 115-123, esp. 117-123 and Graver 2007, 66-70. See too, the discussion in Chapter One, Section Four.

17 I find Tieleman’s 2003, 256 suggestion that Chrysippus may have cited this quotation in his own treatise very attractive. Indeed, it is even possible that Chrysippus posed the very same dilemma for his theory that Posidonius raises here: although, in that case, he would certainly also have suggested a solution for it. For a comparable case, see *PHP* 4.7.12-17 with Posidonius’ criticism in 4.7.36-44. For a detailed discussion of *PHP* 4.7.12-17, see Chapter One, Section Four.
advice despite still exhibiting the physical symptoms of fear, thus contradicting the additional belief that Posidonius takes to be correlated with Chrysippean emotions.

Now, if he [sc. Agamemnon] is present seeking counsel, as he is shaking through fear in his heart, then people in the grip of an emotion who do not consider it fitting on account of the value of what has happened not to accept any argument are moved emotionally. But if he is no longer afraid, but says these things, while recalling his fear, then someone might reasonably ask why it is that although the same supposition and weakness are present, some people reject reason but others accept it.

Posidonius takes this passage to pose a dilemma for Chrysippus, turning on whether or not Agamemnon is still frightened when he seeks advice. If he is still frightened, then, Posidonius argues, even people “who do not consider it fitting on the basis of their evaluation of what has happened not to accept any argument” may be in the grip of an emotion. This poses a serious difficulty for Chrysippus’ theory of the emotions, at least as Posidonius understands it. For if Agamemnon is frightened when he goes to Nestor’s tent for advice, then impassioned people may accept, and even seek out, arguments speaking against their emotion. Worse yet, Agamemnon’s fear not only does

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18 As my translation indicates, I follow the previous translators of this passage in taking both the initial οὐ and the following μηδένα to express distinct negatives: see, e.g., De Lacy 1984, Theiler 1982, Edelstein and Kidd 1972-1989 and Vimercati 2004. Alternatively, one might expect the negative compound μηδένα simply to reinforce the initial simple negative οὐ, and not to express a distinct negative: for this rule, see, e.g., Smyth 1956, #2761. I do not think this rule applies here for three reasons: First and most importantly, while, for instance, Smyth phrases the salient rule about compound negatives as follows (#2761, my emphasis): “If in the same clause one or more compound negatives follows a negative with the same verb, the compound negative simply confirms the first negative,” οὐ and μηδένα are not governed by the same verb in this passage. Second, the verb προσίεσθαι when it has negative force very regularly has μηδένα or οὐδένα in the accusative case rather than οὐ or μή modifying the verb and a positive object: see, e.g., Polyb. 15.22.5; Plut. De Sollertia 970d8; Dio Halicarnassus 9.27.5; and Aristophanes Frag. 431, line 2. Therefore, Posidonius could not idiomatically write, say, oi εν τοις πάθεσιν οντες ου κατ’ αξίαν τον λόγον μη προσίεσθαι, in which each negative would clearly and unambiguously have independent force. Finally, since this passage seems to have followed the passage discussed beforehand in Posidonius’ account, and as we will see below even seems to abbreviate the earlier passage’s formulation of this belief, the phrase μηδένα λόγον προσίεσθαι may have the force of a quotation here.
not prevent him from seeking advice, but, as he tells Nestor, it even motivates him to seek out Nestor’s counsel (II. 10.91-95 = PHP 4.5.39).\(^{19}\) Thus, if Agamemnon is still frightened, then he considers it fitting to seek advice because of his gross overvaluation of what has happened to him, which is the opposite of what we would expect on the basis of Posidonius’ interpretation of the cognitive content of Chrysippean emotions.

Conversely, if he is no longer frightened, but merely recollects the physical symptoms of fear, then, Posidonius says, one might ask: why are false beliefs and weakness of soul sometimes sufficient to cause one to “reject reason,” but sometimes insufficient?\(^{20}\) That is, if Agamemnon continues to believe that something bad is impending and has the same weakness of soul, then why is he no longer frightened?

Since this dilemma is effective only if Chrysippus cannot accept either of its horns, it implies that, in Posidonius’ view, Chrysippus holds both that it is a necessary condition of a person’s being moved emotionally that they “consider it fitting on account of the value of what has happened not to accept any argument,” and that a person’s having the relevant occurrent false beliefs and weakness of soul are sufficient conditions of their holding a corresponding emotion.\(^{21}\) Therefore, in this passage, like in PHP 4.5.27, Posidonius presents Chrysippus as holding that emotions are correlated with the belief

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\(^{19}\) I am grateful to Christian Wildberg for calling this aspect of the dilemma to my attention, as well as for discussion of the rest of the interpretation and translation of this passage.

\(^{20}\) It is worth noting that Posidonius, in posing this dilemma, seems to use the expressions “are moved emotionally” (κινοῦνται κατὰ τὰ πάθη) and “are rejecting of reason” (οἱ μὲν ἀποκλίνουσι τὸν λόγον) interchangeably. This reflects Posidonius’ view, reported a few lines before in Galen’s account, that all emotions, whether motivated by the belief that a great, moderate, or small good or bad is present or impending for one are excessive and rejecting of reason (PHP 5.5.32).

\(^{21}\) I will postpone discussion of Posidonius’ claim that, according to Chrysippus, holding certain occurrent evaluative beliefs and being weak of soul are sufficient conditions of a person’s forming and continuing to hold an emotion, until Section Three below.
that “it is fitting on account of the value of what has happened not to accept any argument.”

It is worth noting that Posidonius’ formulation of this belief differs slightly in these two passages. While the former reports that emotions are correlated with the belief that “it is fitting and in accordance with the value of the things that are present or impending that one not accept any argument concerning its being right to be moved differently by these things,” the latter represents impassioned people as believing that “it is fitting for them, on account of the value of what has happened, not to accept any argument,” full stop. The latter passage thus appears to suggest a more comprehensive rejection of other arguments and considerations than the former; however, in context, it is unclear how broadly Posidonius intends it. For the phrase “any argument” might indicate the impassioned person’s commitment not to accept any argument at all, irrespective of its relationship to their emotion, or it might indicate their commitment not to accept any argument speaking against their emotion, in which case it would simply be an abbreviated expression of the former formulation.

While the broader interpretation has some support in our evidence, the latter interpretation is far more likely. It is strongly suggested, for instance, by the passage from

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22 I have underlined the relevant part of the passage: οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες οὐ κατ’ ἀξίαν τῶν συμβεβηκότων καθήκειν νομίζοντες μηδένα λόγον προσίεσθαι κινοῦνται κατὰ τὰ πάθη (PHP 4.5.40).

23 PHP 4.5.27: τὸ νομίζειν καθῆκον καὶ κατ’ ἀξίαν εἶναι παρόντων αὐτῶν ἢ παραγινομένων […] μηδένα λόγον προσίεσθαι περὶ τοῦ ἄλλους δειν ὑπ’ αὐτῶν κανεῖσθαι.

24 PHP 4.5.40: οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες οὐ κατ’ ἀξίαν τῶν συμβεβηκότων καθήκειν νομίζοντες μηδένα λόγον προσίεσθαι κινοῦνται κατὰ τὰ πάθη.

25 For instance, in support of it one might appeal to Chrysippus’ emphasis on the “blindness” (τυφλότης) of emotions, which can obscure not only countervailing impressions and reasons that would otherwise be clear to one, but may also impede one’s ability to attend to wholly unrelated impressions and arguments: see, for instance, Plutarch On Moral Virtue 450c2-c7, PHP 4.6.44-46. Cf. Arist. EN 10.5, 1175b1-24, which describes how pleasures stemming from an activity may hinder one’s ability to attend to, and perform, even wholly unrelated activities.
the *Iliad* motivating this dilemma. Agamemnon goes to Nestor’s tent to ask “if he might devise a blameless plan, / which would ward off evil from all the Greeks” (*PHP* 4.5.38 = Hom. *II*. 10.19-20). Since Agamemnon is frightened by the prospect of the Greek army’s destruction, if he is still afraid when he asks Nestor to develop a plan to save the Greeks from destruction, then he actively seeks out considerations directly challenging his occurrent emotion. In light, too, of Posidonius’ earlier formulation, which explicitly endorses the more minimal interpretation, I propose that the latter formulation should be understood as an abbreviation of the fuller, but more cumbersome, expression that “it is fitting for them, on account of the value of what has happened, not to accept any argument [concerning its being right for them to be moved differently by the things that have happened to them]” (κατ᾽ ἄξιαν τῶν συμβεβηρώτων καθήκειν νομίζοντες μηδένα λόγον προσίεσθαι [περὶ τοῦ ἄλλως δεῖν ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν κινεῖσθαι]).

Immediately after challenging Chrysippus’ ability to account for Agamemnon’s behavior in *Iliad* 10, Posidonius turns to Chrysippus’ explanation of the sense in which impassioned people are “rejecting of reason.” As we will see, Posidonius’ criticism of Chrysippus’ explanation both confirms the far-reaching significance of his interpretation of the cognitive content of Chrysippean emotions for Chrysippus’ account of the

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26 εἰ τινά οἱ σὺν μὴν ἁμέμονα τεκτήναιτο, ἧτος ἀλεξίκακος πάσιν Δαναοῖσι γένοιτο.
27 This interpretation is also supported by the striking lexical similarity between his two formulations of this additional belief. For ease of reference, I will cite them again in Greek:
The former formulation: τὸ νομίζειν καθήκον [...] μηδένα λόγον προσίεσθαι περὶ τοῦ ἄλλως δεῖν ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν κινεῖσθαι (*PHP* 4.5.27).
The latter formulation: κατ᾽ ἄξιαν τῶν συμβεβηρώτων καθήκειν νομίζοντες μηδένα λόγον προσίεσθαι (*PHP* 4.5.40).
The expression τὸ νομίζειν καθήκον [...] μηδένα λόγον προσίεσθαι περὶ τοῦ ἄλλως δεῖν ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν κινεῖσθαι of the former formulation is nearly identical to the expression καθήκειν νομίζοντες μηδένα λόγον προσίεσθαι of the latter. They differ significantly only in that the former formulation qualifies the phrase μηδένα λόγον προσίεσθαι with the expression περὶ τοῦ ἄλλως δεῖν ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν κινεῖσθαι. As Posidonius seems to have used both formulations in the course of a single line of argument, it thus seems very likely that he intended the latter formulation as an abbreviation of the expression μηδένα λόγον προσίεσθαι περὶ τοῦ ἄλλως δεῖν ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν κινεῖσθαι.
But indeed, that men in the grip of appetites not only reject reason, as he [sc. Chrysippus] says, but also suppose in addition that even if it [sc. the object of their appetite] is not beneficial, even so it must be grasped, contains a contradiction: namely that they are moved as if to a great good and, on account of its greatness, consider it fitting to hold on to it in this way, even if it is not beneficial and even if it has nothing beneficial but rather the opposite. Grant that they reject people who say that this [sc. the object of their appetite] is not beneficial and that they consider people who announce that they will show that it is not beneficial to be fools, on the grounds that that which is pursued is of great benefit. But this, at any rate, is unpersuasive, that someone, on account of supposing that something is a great good, supposes he ought to take this thing even if it is the greatest evil [...]

In this passage, Posidonius contrasts two possible explanations of why impassioned people are “rejecting of reason.” According to the explanation that he presents in the first sentence, and in fact ascribes to Chrysippus, impassioned people are rejecting of reason because they believe that “even if [the object of their appetite] is not beneficial, even so it must be grasped.” As Posidonius argues, this view “contains a contradiction,” for it implies that someone in the grip of an appetite may believe that because the object of her appetite is a great good, she ought to pursue it even if it is not good at all. The difficulty here is not simply that someone in such a condition would hold conflicting occurrent beliefs (namely, the belief that the object of her appetite is a

28 Deleted already by Willamowitz, as reported in Pohlenz 1898, and also by Edelstein and Kidd 1989, ad loc. For a discussion of the text, see Edelstein and Kidd 1989, vol. 2, 596-598.
29 Deleted also by Müller 1874.
30 This is confirmed as well by the final sentence of the above quotation, in which Posidonius writes: “But this, at any rate, is unpersuasive, that someone, on account of supposing that something is a great good (διὰ τὸ μέγα αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν ὑπολαμβάνειν), supposes he ought to take this thing even if it is the greatest evil (κἂν ἂν μέγιστον κακὸν).”
great good, and the belief that it may not be good), but that she would hold them in a
single line of reasoning. Thus, according to Posidonius, Chrysippus explained the
impassioned rejection of reason by arguing that impassioned people, at the apex of their
emotions, believe that the thing they are pursuing is so great a good that they should
pursue it even if it is “the greatest bad” (κἂν ἢ μέγιστον κακόν).

In the second sentence, Posidonius proposes what he rightly takes to be a more
plausible explanation of why impassioned people at the apex of their emotions are
rejecting of reason. On this alternative, their gross overvaluation of the objects of their
emotions and the consequent vehemence of their emotions themselves simply blind them
to the force of countervailing considerations. This explanation has considerable support
in the extant fragments of Chrysippus as what Chrysippus himself proposed. For instance,
it makes very good sense of his description of people who are “so fully blinded” (τελέως
ἀποτυφλούσθαι) by their emotions that they even assault inanimate objects, such as
rocks or doors, without giving any consideration at all to their dispositional belief that
doing so is insane (PHP 4.644–46). Moreover, in addition to accounting for important
aspects of Chrysippus’ description of impassioned behavior, this explanation is also
consistent with his psychological monism, and so may seem to be a promising
interpretation of his explanation of the impassioned rejection of reason. Nevertheless,

31 As A.W. Price, in discussing this passage, writes: “Yet in cases of conflict p may be serving one set of a
subject’s inferences while ~p is serving another; this is less incoherent than bringing p and ~p together
within one and the same inference. What is problematic is not, in itself, a temporal coincidence of
contradictories in a single mind, but their proximity within a single stretch of thinking” (2005, 485n32).
32 For further discussion of such cases, see Chapter One, Section Two. It is worth noting that the standard
doxographical lists of Stoic emotions actually mark out certain emotions as ‘fully blind’ in this sense. For
instance, σύγχυσις, which might be translated as “emotional confusion,” is defined as “irrational distress,
which vexes one and hinders one from seeing present affairs” (σύγχυσιν λύπην ἄλογον, ἀποκναίουσαν
καὶ κωλύουσαν τὰ παρόντα συνορᾶν, DL 7.112 = SVF 3.412; cf. Andronicus On the Emotions 2 = SVF
3.414). Note also Aristotle’s description of some occurrent emotions as altogether disabling a person’s
rational capacity, see especially EN 3.12 1119b8-10, with comments and further citations in Lorenz 2006,
197n27.
although Posidonius takes this explanation to be more plausible than the alternative he presents, he does not ascribe it to Chrysippus.\(^{33}\) Instead, he claims that Chrysippus endorsed the self-contradictory and, in his words, implausible (\(\text{ἀπίθανον}\), \(\text{PHP} 4.5.43\)) explanation described in the first sentence of the passage.

But why would Posidonius, a leading Stoic, ascribe such a philosophically unattractive interpretation to Chrysippus, especially given that this interpretation is supported by very little evidence in the fragments and reports of Chrysippus’ theory?\(^{34}\) To answer this it is important to see that Posidonius’ “implausible” interpretation of Chrysippus’ account of the impassioned rejection of reason is based on his interpretation of the cognitive content of Chrysippean emotions.\(^{35}\)

As we have seen, Posidonius takes Chrysippus to have correlated emotions with the otherwise unattested belief that “it is fitting and in accordance with the value of the things that are present or impending that one not accept any argument concerning its being right to be moved differently by them” (\(\text{PHP} 4.5.27, 4.5.40\)).\(^{36}\) Posidonius is quite emphatic that, on Chrysippus’ account of the emotions, impassioned people form this belief on the basis of their antecedent belief that a great good or bad is present or impending for them.\(^{37}\) Now, someone who forms the belief that, say, the object of her

\(^{33}\) For a reconstruction of Chrysippus’ own explanation, see Chapter One, Section Four.

\(^{34}\) The best evidence for it, as for the additional belief Posidonius correlates with Chrysippean emotions, is again \(\text{PHP} 4.6.27\), discussed above in n16.

\(^{35}\) As seen already by Pohlenz 1965, 154-155; however, Pohlenz takes the additional belief, as well as the account of the rejection of reason that Posidonius criticizes, to accurately reflect Chrysippus’ theory.

\(^{36}\) ‘[…] καθῆκον καὶ κατ’ ἀξίαν εἶναι παρόντων αὐτῶν ἢ παραγινομένων ἀξιολογεῖται]\(^{36}\) καὶ μηδένα λόγον προσέφθαι περὶ τοῦ ἄλλου ἢτείν ὑπ’ αὐτῶν χινεῖται.’

\(^{37}\) For example, Posidonius, when first introducing this belief, writes that “the magnitude of the apparent good or bad things \(\text{καθῆκον}\) one to consider that it is fitting and \textit{in accordance with the value of the things that are present or impending for him} (κατ’ ἀξίαν εἶναι παρόντων αὐτῶν ἢ παραγινομένων) […] to accept no argument concerning its being right for him to be moved differently by these things” (\(\text{PHP} 4.5.26-27\)). Again, in \(\text{PHP} 4.5.40\), the first horn of the dilemma is that people “who do not consider it fitting \textit{on account of the value of what has happened} (κατ’ ἀξίαν τῶν συμβεβηκότων) not to accept any argument are moved emotionally.”
appetite is so great a good that she should not take into practical consideration, let alone endorse, any argument speaking against it, in effect believes that she should maintain her belief about the goodness of the object no matter what countervailing arguments are offered or present themselves, even ones that she accepts as conclusive. Thus, according to Posidonius’ account, impassioned people believe that because a great good is present or impending for them, they should not accept any argument (μηδένα λόγον προσίεσθαι) speaking against their emotion, even if they are faced with considerations showing convincingly in their view that, in fact, “the greatest bad” is present or impending for them. But this just is the self-contradictory line of reasoning by which, according to Posidonius’ account, Chrysippus explained the impassioned rejection of reason. Posidonius’ interpretation and criticism of Chrysippus’ account of the impassioned rejection of reason thus reveals the full implications of his idiosyncratic interpretation of the cognitive content of Chrysippean emotions.

II

The next section turns to Posidonius’ reasons for proposing such an unsympathetic and philosophically unattractive interpretation of Chrysippus’ theory of the emotions.

Although polemical interpretations are hardly uncommon in ancient Greek and Roman philosophy, Posidonius’ interpretation does not simply misrepresent Chrysippus’ theory, but is instead, I argue, his best effort to make philosophical sense of Chrysippus’ theory.

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38 It is worth noting that the verb προσίεσθαι, which I have been translating by “accept,” may also mean “to submit oneself to,” see, e.g., Arist. *HA* 574a33 and, in a more extended sense, Xen. *Cyr.* 3.3.45 and Hdt. 1.135, or even “to pursue.” For instance, the only use of this verb in von Armin’s collection of Stoic fragments means something like “to pursue” (οὕτω γὰρ τὰ βλάπτοντα διωθεῖται καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα προσίεται, DL 7.85 = SVF 3.178). Presumably then, someone who forms the belief “that he should μηδένα λόγον προσίεσθαι concerning its being right to be moved differently” is committing himself, first and foremost, to not taking any countervailing argument into practical consideration. Thus, even if he grasps intellectually that a countervailing argument is persuasive, or even compelling, he may nevertheless refuse to alter his behavior on the basis of it.
on the basis of his own quite different conception of reason. While Chrysippus allowed
that reason may hold conflicting occurrent evaluative beliefs and perhaps even impulses,39
Posidonius, following the Platonic and Aristotelian tradition, takes reason to be incapable
of occurrent conflict.40 His commitment to this view is suggested both by his criticism of
Chrysippus’ account of the excessiveness of emotions and by his own innovations in
Stoic moral psychology.

Galен, when first introducing Posidonius in the PHP, comments on Posidonius’
puzzlement over Chrysippus’ explanation of the excessiveness of emotions.

καὶ πυνθάνεται γε τῶν περὶ τὸν Χρύσιππον οὐκ ἀληθαῖς ἐν τῇ περὶ παθῶν ἑαυτοῦ
πράγματεία, τίς ἢ τῆς πλεοναζούσης ὀρμῆς ἐστιν αἰτία. ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος οὐκ ἂν δύναιτό γε
πλεονάζειν παρὰ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράγματα τε καὶ μέτρα. πρόδηλον οὖν ἡς ἐπέρ τις ἀλογὸς
ἐστι δύναμις αἰτία τοῦ πλεονάζεσθαι τὴν ὀρμήν ὑπὲρ τὰ μέτρα τοῦ λόγου, καθάπερ τοῦ
πλεονάζεσθαι τὸν δρόμον ὑπὲρ τὰ μέτρα τῆς προαιρέσεως ἀλογὸς ἢ αἰτία, τὸ βάρος τοῦ
σώματος. (PHP 4.3.4-5)

He [sc. Posidonius] often inquires of Chrysippus, in his own treatise On the Emotions, what the
cause of excessive impulse is. For reason would not be able to exceed its own deeds and measures.
Therefore, it is clear that some other non-rational power is the cause of the impulse exceeding the
measures of reason, just as there is a non-rational cause of a runner exceeding the measures of his
decision, the weight of his body.”

According to this passage, Posidonius often challenged Chrysippus to explain “the cause
of excessive impulse” (ἡ τῆς πλεοναζούσης ὀρμῆς […] αἰτία) on the grounds that
“reason would not be able to exceed (πλεονάζειν) its own deeds and measures.” As the
final sentence makes explicit, Posidonius’ objection alludes to Chrysippus’ comparison
of the excessiveness of emotions to the movement of runners, which “exceeds”
(πλεονάζει) their impulse in the sense that they are unable to stop or change direction as
soon as they decide to do so (PHP 4.2.14-18).

39 For a detailed reconstruction of Chrysippus’ more complicated conception of reason, see Chapter One.
40 The locus classicus for this is Plato Rep. 436b8-9. For discussion, see especially Lorenz 2006, ch. 2.
As I argued in Chapter One, Chrysippus intends the runner analogy to suggest that just as runners are incapable of stopping their movement straight away should they decide to do so, so too impassioned people at the apex of an emotion may fail to abandon their emotion immediately, even if they come to believe that they ought to do so.\(^{41}\) Since Chrysippus ascribes all beliefs and emotions to reason itself, his explanation of the excessiveness of emotions implies that reason itself may, at the same time, hold an emotion, together with the beliefs correlated with it, and a conflicting occurrent belief. For example, even if someone in the grip of anger recognizes that her anger is inappropriate, she may nevertheless continue to feel enraged, and so continue to be moved by that rage to act accordingly. But in that case she would hold both her emotion and, at the same time, the occurrent evaluative belief that she ought to act differently, which her emotion overrides.

Against this line of explanation, Posidonius objects that “reason would not be able to exceed its own deeds and measures.”\(^{42}\) He seems to have the following difficulty in mind: if, as Chrysippus held, emotions are impulses that express certain evaluative beliefs and are based wholly on a faulty and erroneous reason, then how is it possible for an impassioned person to reconsider the beliefs correlated with her emotion, but to continue nevertheless to act on her emotion? An implicit premise of this objection is that reason itself is incapable of occurrent internal conflict. For if Posidonius granted that reason were capable of holding an impulse and a conflicting occurrent evaluative belief, then it

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\(^{41}\) For a detailed account of Chrysippus’ use of the runner analogy, see Chapter One, Section Four.

\(^{42}\) It is worth noting that Posidonius’ formulation here alludes to, and implicitly denies, Chrysippus’ account of the excessiveness of emotions. In particular, Posidonius’ expression ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος οὐκ ἦν δύνατό γε πλεονάζειν παρὰ τὰ ἐαυτοῦ πράγματα τε καὶ μέτρα is quite similar to Chrysippus’ αἷς οἴμαι τι παραπλήσιον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὀρμῶν γίνεσθαι διὰ τὸ τὴν κατὰ λόγον ύπερβαίνειν συμμετρίαν (\textit{PHP} 4.2.17).
is difficult to see why he would object to the possibility of someone’s continuing to experience an emotion, conceived of as an excessive rational impulse, while, at the same time, also holding a countervailing evaluative belief. In urging this difficulty, Posidonius therefore presupposes a conception of reason according to which the rational aspect of the soul is incapable of occurring internal conflict.\footnote{In fact, most scholars understand Chrysippus’ conception of reason in just these terms. See, for instance, Brennan 1998, 25, Price 1995, 157-158, 167; Gosling 1987, 199; Frede 1986, 97-98; and Inwood 1985, 131-143.}

This interpretation is also suggested by Posidonius’ own explanation of the runner analogy, which Galen reports in the final sentence of this passage. Posidonius emphasizes that the inability of runners to stop or change direction immediately, as soon as it seems best to them, is the result of the weight and momentum of their bodies, and not of their holding conflicting beliefs or impulses. Thus, if an impassioned person forms the belief that she should no longer be emotionally affected, but continues nevertheless to experience and to act upon her emotion, that is because emotions involve, in addition to reason, “some other non-rational power” (ἐτέρα τις ἄλογός [...] δύναμις), similar to the weight and momentum of the runner’s body.\footnote{To be sure, since this is a paraphrase rather than a verbatim quotation of Posidonius’ interpretation of the runner analogy, there is no reason to think that the expression ἐτέρα τις ἄλογός ἐστι δύναμις is his own. Nevertheless, as I will argue, the evidence Galen presents overwhelmingly suggests that Posidonius posited a non-rational, in addition to a rational, aspect of the soul.} Therefore, according to Posidonius, even extreme cases of the excessiveness of emotions are not explained by any conflict within reason itself, as Chrysippus had thought, but by a conflict between the rational power of the impassioned person’s soul, which is responsible for her countervailing belief, and “some other non-rational power,” which is responsible for her continuing to experience and to act upon her emotion.\footnote{See Section Four below, for a more detailed analysis of Posidonius’ explanation of the impassioned rejection of reason.} Posidonius’ criticism of Chrysippus and his own
interpretation of the runner analogy thus suggest that he takes reason itself to be incapable of holding an impulse to act in a certain way and, at the same time, a conflicting occurrent evaluative belief.

Posidonius’ interpretation of the runner analogy is based on his chief innovation in Stoic moral psychology: his introduction of a non-rational aspect of the adult human soul, in addition to reason. While, Posidonius, like all Stoics, takes assenting to an impulsive impression portraying a course of action as the thing to do, and thereby forming certain occurrent evaluative beliefs, to be a necessary condition of an adult human’s forming any impulse, he also takes a non-rational aspect of the soul to play a significant role in the impulses of adult humans. For example, as we have seen, his own explanation of the cause of the excessiveness of emotions is based on his distinction between rational and non-rational aspects of the soul. Indeed, as his interpretation of the runner analogy evinces, Posidonius explains occurrent mental conflict by the different aspects of the soul coming into conflict rather than by either aspect of the soul itself being conflicted.

46 While this has long been the communis opinio, it has been contested recently by Teun Tieleman 2003, who argues that Posidonius’ moral psychology is, in fact, fundamentally in agreement with Chrysippus’, and so does not introduce a non-rational, in addition to a rational, aspect of the soul. Beyond the verbatim quotations and close paraphrases of Posidonius that Galen provides, Posidonius’ interpretation and corresponding criticism of Chrysippus’ theory of the emotions speak strongly against Tieleman’s interpretation. For it is difficult to see why Posidonius would have proposed an interpretation of Chrysippus that fundamentally misrepresents his theory, if, as Tieleman thinks, he in fact agreed with Chrysippus on nearly every significant issue concerning the emotions, theory of action, and moral psychology.

47 In outline, my interpretation of Posidonius’ innovations in moral psychology follows that first proposed by Fillion-Lahille 1984, and further developed by Cooper 1998. For other views, see Kidd 1971 and Sorabji 2000 who argue that Posidonius introduces non-rational parts of the soul that are perfectly capable of giving rise to impulses and emotions without any contribution of the rational part, and also Tieleman 2003 who rejects altogether Galen’s claim that Posidonius recognized a non-rational, in addition to a rational, aspect of the soul.

48 In addition to PHP 4.3.4-5, see especially 4.7.35-37 with my discussion in Section Four.

49 I should note that Galen, in presenting Posidonius’ theory of moral psychology, often represents him as following Plato and Aristotle in subdividing the non-rational aspect of the soul into distinct appetitive and spirited parts (see, for instance, PHP 5.6.33-40). The evidence Galen presents in favor of taking Posidonius
moral psychology underlying it, are compelling evidence that he takes reason to be incapable of occurrent internal conflict. This interpretation is confirmed by his claim, reported later in the *PHP*, that “it is impossible for an impulse to be present, but the activity on the basis of it to be prevented by some other cause” (*PHP* 4.7.36), which rules out the possibility of a person’s holding, at the same time, either conflicting occurrent impulses within reason itself or conflicting rational and non-rational occurrent impulses.50

Posidonius’ more restrictive conception of reason helps to explain his peculiar interpretation of Chrysippus’ theory of the emotions. For, as we have seen, Posidonius takes Chrysippus to hold that in cases where, for example, people in the grip of appetitive desire continue to pursue their appetite despite recognizing that it is wrong or inappropriate to do so, they act on the basis of the *single* self-contradictory line of reasoning that because the object of their appetite is a *great* good, they ought to pursue it even if it is not good. Thus, according to Posidonius’ interpretation of Chrysippus, people in such a condition do not hold *distinct* conflicting evaluative beliefs and impulses, but rather form a *single*, albeit self-contradictory, line of reasoning and a *single* impulse. Therefore, Posidonius takes Chrysippus to explain even cases where impassioned people act on their emotions despite recognizing that they should not do so without attributing full-blown occurrent psychic conflict to them.

By contrast, as I argued in Chapter One, Chrysippus takes reason to be perfectly capable of holding both an impulse, together with the beliefs correlated with it, and a

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50 ἀμήχανον γὰρ εἶναι φήσι παρεῖναι μὲν τὴν ὁρμήν, ὑπ’ ἄλλης δέ τινος αἰτίας κωλύεσθαι τὴν κατ’ αὐτὴν ἐνέργειαν. For further discussion, see Section Four below.
conflicting occurring evaluative belief.\textsuperscript{51} To be sure, it is not, in his view, possible for someone to assent simultaneously to conflicting impressions. But he allows that reason is capable of producing impulses that, once formed through assent to an impulsive impression, are no longer fully under its control. For instance, he takes emotions to be “excessive” and “out of control” in the sense that, at their apex, they are not under the immediate control of the impassioned person’s faculty of assent (\textit{PHP} 4.2.14-18, 4.4.24-25, 31-32).\textsuperscript{52} Therefore, according to his theory, an impassioned person who forms the belief that she should act differently may continue nevertheless to act on the basis of her emotion because her emotion, as well as the evaluative beliefs correlated with it, is not fully in her control.

To sum up, I have argued so far that Posidonius’ idiosyncratic interpretation of Chrysippus’ explanation of the excessiveness of emotions reflects his attempt to understand Chrysippus’ theory on the basis of his own more restrictive conception of reason. Therefore, although Posidonius’ interpretation of Chrysippus’ theory of the emotions is not very helpful for reconstructing Chrysippus’ theory, it is, I hope to have shown, quite revealing of his own views, and helps to suggest the basis of his own innovations in Stoic moral psychology and theory of the emotions.

\section*{III}

The next section turns to Posidonius’ other chief line of criticism in the passages from his \textit{On the Emotions} quoted in \textit{PHP} 4.5. His claim that a person’s degree of familiarity with emotionally-salient things partly determines her proneness to emotions, as well as the

\textsuperscript{51} Chrysippus’ conception of reason makes very good sense on the basis of his view that reason is an extended, corporeal thing, of which impressions, beliefs and impulses are certain parts and movements. For the Stoic view of the corporeality of the soul, see \textit{SVF} 2.773-800 and the discussion in Gourinat 1996, 17-21 and Frede 1994. For the description of beliefs as literal “parts” of the soul, see, e.g., \textit{PHP} 5.2.47-5.3.7.

\textsuperscript{52} For discussion, see Chapter One, Section Four.
intensity of the emotions she forms, independently of her evaluative beliefs and strength of soul. By “strength of soul” (ἰσχὺς ψυχῆς), Posidonius means the ability to maintain one’s considered beliefs in the face of persuasive countervailing impressions. As he argues, this seems to indicate a significant difference between his and Chrysippus’ theory of the emotions. For since Chrysippus takes the adult human soul to be wholly rational, he would presumably explain someone’s susceptibility to emotions by her salient evaluative beliefs and her strength of soul. At any rate, if he allowed other factors independent of a person’s evaluative beliefs and strength of soul, such as, say, her physical constitution (see, e.g., Gal. PHP 5.5.22-29 and De ira 2.19-20), it has not left any record in any our evidence. Thus, although Chrysippus would agree that a person’s degree of familiarity with merely apparent good and bad things might affect her emotional susceptibility to them, he would likely explain this wholly by the salutary effect of her familiarity on her salient evaluative beliefs and strength of soul.

By contrast, Posidonius takes a person’s degree of familiarity with emotionally-salient things to be an independent factor in determining her proneness to emotions.

Thus, according to him, someone who has become accustomed to living in extreme

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53 The best evidence for Chrysippus’ understanding of the expressions “strength of soul” (ἰσχὺς ψυχῆς) and, especially, “weakness of soul” (ἀσθένεια ψυχῆς) is a passage from his On the Emotions quoted and discussed by Galen. In Galen’s paraphrase, someone who suffers from “lack of psychic tension” (ἀτονία) and “weakness of soul” (ἀσθένεια ψυχῆς) is prone to rashly abandon her countervailing dispositional and occurrent beliefs when faced with a persuasive hormetic impression “because the tone of her soul betrays [her] and does not endure through everything nor carry out fully the commands of reason” (PHP 4.6.3). Chrysippus, in explaining this phenomenon, quotes a passage from Euripides’ Andromache that describes Menelaos rushing at Helen in rage with his sword drawn after the fall of Troy, but forming the appetite to embrace her and dropping his sword as soon as he sees her breasts (Andr. 629-630, PHP 4.6.7-9). There is no question here of Menelaos reconsidering the case for anger after seeing Helen. Rather, his occurrent anger is simply overridden by his lust for her. As this example makes clear, someone who is weak of soul may rashly abandon even his occurrent beliefs under the influence of a vivid impulsive impression. Cf. Clemens Al. Stom. 7.17 = SVF 3.490.

54 This is implied, for instance, by Cic. Tusc. 3.52, which reports that Chrysippus held that “what has not been foreseen, strikes more vehemently.”

55 For further discussion, see Lorenz 2011, 203-204.
poverty may become emotionally inured to the difficulties associated with poverty, even if she continues both to have the same weakness of soul and to hold the same evaluative beliefs. However, we might wonder what sort of familiarity Posidonius has in mind, and how he would distinguish it from less-salutary kinds of familiarity, like emotional “sicknesses” (νοσήματα) and “infirmities” (ἀρρωστήματα), which make people more rather than less prone to form emotions. While our evidence for how exactly a person’s familiarity with emotionally-salient things might reduce her proneness to emotions is not as clear as one might like, I argue that Posidonius’ distinctive method of emotional therapy helps to specify the sort of familiarity he has in mind.

In PHP 4.5.33-34, Posidonius is reported by Galen as presenting several cases in which a person’s proneness to emotions is partly determined by whether, and to what extent, she is familiar with the merely apparent good or bad things at issue, independently of her evaluative beliefs and weakness of soul.

Although two people have the same weakness of soul and receive a similar impression of the good or bad, one of them comes to be in the grip of an emotion, but the other does not; and one comes to be more so, and the other less so; and sometimes the weaker one, supposing that what has befallen him is greater, is not moved. And with respect to the same things, the same person sometimes comes to be in the grip of an emotion and sometimes does not, and sometimes to a greater degree and sometimes to a lesser degree. At any rate, people who are unaccustomed suffer more in fear, distress, desire and pleasure; and people who are baser are snatched quickly by their emotions.

In the cases Posidonius describes, a person’s occurrent evaluative beliefs and weakness of soul do not explain either whether she forms an emotion or, if she does, the

56 For the Stoic theory of emotional “sicknesses” and “infirmities,” see n10 below.
intensity of the emotion that she forms. For example, he posits a case where two people are faced with a similar emotionally-salient situation, but only the person who is stronger of soul and who supposes that something of less significance has happened to her experiences an emotion, which is exactly the opposite of what we would expect on the basis of Chrysippus’ theory. The final sentence of this passage suggests that Posidonius explains such cases by the degree of familiarity of the people under consideration with the apparently good or bad things at issue. Thus, he writes, generalizing from the previous two sentences, “at any rate, people who are unaccustomed (οἱ ἄηθεις) suffer more in fear, distress, desire and pleasure […]”. The implication is that people who are less familiar with emotionally-salient things form more vehement emotions than those who are more familiar with them, ceteris paribus. Therefore, if two people who have the same evaluative beliefs and strength of soul are faced with a persuasive false impulsive impression, whichever of them is more familiar with the apparently, but not really, good or bad thing at issue will be less strongly affected by it.

This interpretation is confirmed by the next verbatim passage quoted by Galen:

τὸ μὲν ἄρα κακὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἄσυνηθους ταχὺ συναρπάζεται, τὸ δ’ ἐναντίως ἠγμένον χρόνῳ μετασυνεθιζόμενον· ἐν οἷς αἱ μὲν ὑπολήψεις ἰσαί πολλάκις καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀσθενείας, τὰ πάθη δ’ οὔτ’ ἐπίσης οὔτε ἰσα γέγενται. (PHP 4.5.35)

Therefore, base character is snatched quickly by the unfamiliar; but what has been led in the opposite way is snatched [only] in time, since it is changed by habituation. In these cases, the

57 The first sentence also describes two other cases: (i) those in which two people with the same weakness of soul and false beliefs are presented with a similar impulsive impression, but only one of them forms an emotion and (ii) those in which two people with the same weakness of soul and false beliefs are presented with similar impulsive impressions, but one of them forms a more intense emotion than the other. Collectively, (i) and (ii) attest that, in Posidonius’ view, one’s degree of habituation to emotionally-salient things affects both one’s propensity to form emotions and also the intensity of the emotions one forms. 58 That this sentence draws a more general maxim from the cases presented in the preceding sentences is also suggested by the particle γοῦν, which is often inferential in post-classical Greek: for discussion and other examples, see Denniston 1934 (reprinted 1981), 456-458, esp. 458. 59 Galen writes that in its original context these passages were separated by quotations from various poets and prose-authors (PHP 4.5.34).
suppositions and weakness [of soul] are often equal, but their emotions neither arise equally nor are equal.\(^{60}\)

Posidonius writes that while base character is “snatched quickly by the unfamiliar” (ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀσυνήθους ταχὺ συναρπάζεται), less base character is not snatched quickly “since it is changed by habituation” (μετασυνεθιζόμενον).\(^{61}\) As he explains in the second sentence, the ethically significant difference between the base and less base states of character at issue in this passage consists solely in their relative familiarity with emotionally-salient things.\(^{62}\) Therefore, according to him, a person’s familiarity with merely apparent goods and bads partly determines her ethical virtue, by affecting her propensity to form emotions.\(^{63}\)

\(^{60}\) For instance, De Lacy takes χρόνῳ with μετασυνεθιζόμενον, and so translates the second clause: “but what is given the opposite evaluation is seized only when its habituation is changed in the course of time” (De Lacy 1984, ad loc). Edelstein and Kidd also read χρόνῳ with μετασυνεθιζόμενον, but rejecting the sense of De Lacy’s translation, posit a lacuna at the end of the sentence, which Edelstein proposes filling in with the phrase ἢ οὐδὲ ὀλοκλήρως ἐξώςταται ἢ ἐπὶ μικρόν (Edelstein and Kidd 1972-1989, vol. 2, 594). By contrast, following a suggestion of Edelstein and Kidd in their commentary, I take the main verb of the second clause to be, again, συναρπάζεται and take χρόνῳ to modify it. For further discussion, see Edelstein and Kidd 1972-1989, vol. 2, 594-595.

\(^{61}\) I take the contrast to be between bad and less bad character, rather than, say, between bad and good character. For someone who is habituated in the relevant way to preferred and dispreferred indifferents, but believes that they are, in fact, good and bad, is still vicious, according to Stoic theory, even if she is in a better condition than someone who holds the same beliefs, but is inadequately habituated to such things and so is more prone to emotions.

\(^{62}\) Note, as well, the striking lexical similarity between the first clause of this passage and the final sentence of the immediately preceding passage. In particular, both describe the base as “snatched quickly” (συναρπάζεσθαι ταχέως/ταχὺ). However, while the earlier passage, distinguishes “the unaccustomed” (οἱ ἀήθεις) and the “baser” (οἱ κακώτεροι) – “at any rate, the unaccustomed suffer more in fear, distress, desire and pleasure; and the baser are snatched quickly by their emotions” – the passage under consideration identifies the two. Thus, according to it, the base are not simply snatched quickly by their emotions, but are snatched quickly because they are the unaccustomed, at least in the right way, to emotionally-salient things. In context, this revision emphasizes that the base and less base character under consideration differ only in their degree of familiarity with emotionally-salient things.

\(^{63}\) To be sure, in Posidonius’ view, everyone who is ethically base holds false evaluative beliefs and is weak of soul. However, while holding false evaluative beliefs and being weak of soul are necessary conditions of a person’s being ethically base, her degree of familiarity with emotionally-salient things also affects the quality of her character. For instance, someone whose evaluative beliefs and strength of soul are in a better state than those of someone else may nevertheless be more prone to emotions, and so (at least in that sense) baser than her, on account of being unaccustomed to emotionally-salient things.
Posidonius’ distinctive method of preventative emotional therapy is based on and helps to further explain the significance that he takes a person’s familiarity with emotionally-salient things to have for her susceptibility to emotions. He recommends that people “dwell in advance” (προενδημεῖν) on merely apparent good and bad things, so that they may gradually become familiar with them, and thus be less strongly affected by them should they encounter them on future occasions (PHP 4.7.7). Since the surrounding context is crucial for reconstructing the details of this method of emotional therapy, I will quote Galen’s report in full.

Against the first [sc. definition], he asks the reason why the belief of the presence of the bad does not cause distress, but only the fresh belief [of the presence of the bad] causes it. And he [Posidonius] says it is because everything that it is unpracticed and strange, falling on one all at once, startles and causes him to stand outside of his prior judgments. But what has been practiced and is accustomed and has been prolonged either does not cause him to stand outside [of his prior judgments] at all, so as to move him emotionally, or only to a small degree. And, for that reason, he says to dwell in advance in affairs and to use things that are not yet present as if they are present. And, for Posidonius, the term “dwell in advance” means to, as it were, fashion and model in advance that the thing will be present to one, and to accomplish little by little habituation of a sort as if to something that has already happened.

According to this passage, Posidonius both challenged Chrysippus’ explanation of why only the “vivid” (πρόσφατος) belief that something bad is present to one causes distress, and also offered his own explanation of this phenomenon. Posidonius’
explanation appeals to the propensity of things that are “unpracticed and strange” (τὸ ἀμελετητὸν καὶ ξένον) to have a greater emotional effect than what “has been practiced and has become familiar and has been prolonged” (ἀσκηθὲν δὲ καὶ συνεθισθὲν καὶ χρονίσαν). Thus, according to him, things that have been prolonged or that have been practiced or that have become familiar are not vivid in the relevant way.

While this is reasonably straightforward in the case of what “has been prolonged in time” (χρονίσαν),65 Posidonius’ explanation implies that by becoming familiar with a merely apparent good or bad people come to stand in a similar relationship to it as to an emotionally-salient event that has been prolonged in time. And so, just as emotionally-salient events have a greater emotional effect when one first becomes aware of them than afterwards, so too emotionally-salient events that are “strange and unpracticed” have a greater emotional effect than those with which one is familiar. Posidonius’ comparison of things that have been prolonged in time to those with which one is familiar suggests that in both of these cases the difference for him lies not in the propositional content of the beliefs one forms, but in an emotional efficacy independent from the content of one beliefs. Presumably then, he takes apparently good or bad things that are “strange and unpracticed” to have a greater emotional effect than those with which one is familiar, even if one judges them to be equally good or equally bad.

In the final two sentences of this passage, Galen turns to Posidonius’ preventative therapy of the emotions. According to Galen, Posidonius recommends that people “dwell in advance among affairs (προενδημεῖν τοῖς πράγμασι) and use things that are not yet present as if they were present” in order to reduce their susceptibility to emotions. Galen

65 I take it that Posidonius’ inclusion of “that which has been prolonged” (τὸ χρονίσαν) anticipates his discussion of Chrysippus’ explanation of the tendency of distress to abate when the belief correlated with it, that something bad is present to one, “has been prolonged” ([sc. δόξας] ἐγχρονίζομεν, 4.7.14).
reports that by the term “dwelling in advance” (προενδημεῖν) Posidonius means “to fashion and model in advance (προαναπλάττειν τε καὶ προτυποῦν) that the thing will be present to one [...]”. The verbs προαναπλάττειν τε καὶ προτυποῦν suggest that by “dwelling in advance” Posidonius means that people should imagine merely apparent good or bad events in vivid detail, “as if they were present” (οἷον παροῦσι), rather than, say, merely grasping the possibility that such things might someday be present to them. By fashioning and modeling an emotionally-salient event in advance, someone using Posidonius’ method of emotional therapy will ideally accomplish “a certain habituation as if to something that has already happened,” and so will become less prone to form emotions if actually faced with that event.

One challenge for Posidonius’ theory is to explain why people who use his therapy of the emotions become habituated to emotionally-salient things in an ameliorative way, while those who often form a certain emotion are not so habituated, but instead form emotional “sicknesses” or “infirmities,” and so become prone to even more frequent and more vehement instances of that emotion. For if the frequent experience of merely apparent good and bad things were itself sufficient to produce the sort of habituation that he has in mind, this disanalogy would be inexplicable. A further difficulty for Posidonian pre-meditation is that, even granting that it ultimately makes people less prone to form emotions, it risks being as harmful as the emotions it prevents. After all, if people are habituated to merely apparent good or bad things by often forming emotions concerning them, then this method of emotional therapy would prevent or

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66 For an overview, see LSJ ad verba. For salient uses of ἀναπλάττειν, see Aristophanes Nubes 996 and Plato Alcibiades 121d6-7; for τυποῦν, see Plato Protagoras 320d2-3. The significance of grasping apparently good or bad things in vivid detail is confirmed by a passage of Posidonius quoted later in PHP 5.6.24-26, which I will discuss below.
minimize later instances of an emotion only at the cost of stimulating earlier instances of it. Together, these objections target both the coherence and desirability of Posidonius’ preventative therapy of the emotions.

However, as we will see, both objections can be resolved by taking a closer look at Posidonius’ method of preventative emotional therapy in light of his more general theory of the emotions. In particular, a passage from his *On the Emotions* reported later in the *PHP* helps to explain why the preventative therapy of the emotions he proposes is well suited for familiarizing people with emotionally-salient things without causing full-blown emotions in them.

For I suppose that you all have long since observed how those who have been persuaded through argument that something bad is present or impending to them are not frightened or distressed, but those receiving impressions of these very things are. For how would someone move the non-rational unless he presents some representation similar to a perceptible one? Some people thus fall into appetite through a narrative, and when one vividly urges them to flee an impending lion they are frightened, even though they do not see it.

In this passage, Posidonius contrasts the emotional effect of merely grasping that something bad is present or impending with that of forming the vivid impression that something bad is present or impending. While people who “have been persuaded through argument” (διὰ λόγου μὲν πεισθέντες) alone that something bad is present or impending for them are not thereby emotionally affected, those “who receive impressions of these very things” (φαντασίας δ’ ἐκείνων αὐτῶν λαμβάνοντες) often become frightened or distressed. Posidonius explains the different psychological effects of these two ways of grasping apparent goods and bads by arguing that in order to move “the non-
rational” (τὸ ἄλογον), one must present it with a “representation similar to a perceptible one (τινὰ ἄναξωγράφησιν […] αἰσθητῇ παραπλησίαν).” Thus, according to him, in order to form an emotion one must both form certain false evaluative beliefs – to use his example, that being killed and devoured by a lion would be bad for them – and also experience vehement movements of the non-rational aspect of their soul.

Posidonius’ distinction between the psychological effect of these two ways of grasping emotionally-salient things helps to explain the emphasis in his preventative therapy of the emotions on forming vivid impressions. For a person who vividly imagines that apparently good or bad things are present to her may suffer an emotional response, but will hardly assent to the impression formed by her imagination, and so form the belief that the things she is imagining are actually present to her. Therefore, people will not form emotions by “dwelling in advance” (προενδημεῖν) among apparently good and bad things. They may, however, to use a Stoic term of art, experience pre-emotions (προπάθειαι), by which the Stoics mean physical and psychic movements that arise without the agent’s assent, often in response to an impulsive impression. I propose, then, that by “dwelling in advance” among emotionally-salient things people experience pre-emotions without, however, forming corresponding emotions.

67 As Hendrik Lorenz has shown, Posidonius likely has Plato’s account of the appetitive part of the soul in mind here (Lorenz 2011, 207-208). See, for example, Ti. 71a-c and Phlb. 38-39; cf. Alcinoos Intr. 155.13-17. For an earlier Stoic use of the noun ἄναξωγράφησις, see DL 7.201 = SVF 2.17.

68 For Posidonius’ view that the emotions of adult humans require their forming beliefs, see especially, Plut. Lib. Aegr. 6. This is, of course, the standard Stoic position, and it would mark a decisive break with Stoic tradition if Posidonius abandoned it.

69 Our best ancient sources for the Stoic theory of pre-emotions are Sen., De Ira 2.2.1-2, 2.3.2; 2.4.1; Ep. 11.1-7, Ep. 57.3-6; and Gell. NA 19.1. For critical discussion, see especially Abel 1983; Graver 1999 and 2007, ch. 4; and Sorabji 2000, 70-73. I give a detailed account of the Stoic theory of the pre-emotions in Chapter Three. Although there is a fair amount of scholarly controversy over when pre-emotions were first introduced into Stoic theory, PHP 4.7.15-16 suggests that they may already have played a role in Chrysippus’ theory; cf. Cic. Tusc. 3.82-83 and Gell. NA 19.1. Nevertheless, our evidence is far too scanty to determine when the Stoic theory of pre-emotions took the form it has in Seneca’s works. For the view that Posidonius introduced pre-emotions into Stoic theory, see, e.g., Cooper 1998, 99.
This interpretation is supported by the strikingly similar method of preventative emotional therapy proposed by the Cyrenaics, which Posidonius, as has often been commented, likely used as a model in developing his own method of emotional therapy.\footnote{In addition to the striking similarity of the two methods of emotional therapy, Posidonius and the Cyrenaics also seem to have used the same quotations in illustrating their view. For discussion of Posidonius’ indebtedness to the Cyrenaics, see Graver 2003, 218-219 and Lorenz 2011, 205-207.}

In his *Tusculan Disputations*, Cicero reports that, according to the Cyrenaics, “distress is not caused by every bad thing, but by a bad thing that is unexpected and unforeseen” \(\textit{insperato et necopinato malo} \): Cic. *Tusc.* 3.28).\footnote{Cyrenaici non omni malo aegritudinem effici censent, sed insperato et necopinato malo.} Accordingly, the Cyrenaics recommended “the pre-rehearsal of future bad things” \(\textit{praemeditatio futurorum malorum} \) as a way of mitigating the emotional effect of the actual presence of bad things \(\textit{Tusc. 3.29}\).\footnote{My translation of \textit{praemeditatio} as “pre-rehearsal” follows Margaret Graver 2003, \textit{ad loc}. Other possibilities are “anticipation” or “previous consideration.”} A few paragraphs later, Cicero endorses the Cyrenaic method of “the long pre-rehearsal” \(\textit{diuturna praemeditatione} \) of bad things, but adds that \textit{he} thinks “that this evil [\textit{viz.} distress] is a matter of belief, not of nature” \(\textit{malum illud opinionis esse, non naturae, Tusc. 3.31}\). The implication is that, unlike Cicero, the Cyrenaics take distress to follow \textit{naturally} from the unexpected presence of something bad.\footnote{See DL 2.91-92, which reports that, according to the Cyrenaics, people naturally form both distress and fear, as opposed to envy, erotic love and fear of the Gods.} Therefore, according to their theory, distress does not, as the Stoics held, depend on the distressed agent’s forming \textit{false} beliefs about the value of what is present to her. Rather, distress is naturally and unavoidably caused by the unexpected presence of something that really is bad.

Thus, for the Cyrenaics, people will not alter their evaluative beliefs by rehearsing bad things in advance, but will, at best, habituate themselves so that the actual presence of such things will not strike them unexpectedly, causing them to be distressed.
In the following paragraph, Cicero reports Epicurus’ criticism of the Cyrenaic therapy of distress. Epicurus, he writes, rejected the therapeutic value of the pre-rehearsal of bad things because “he thinks that it is necessary that everyone who judges that he is in the midst of something bad, whether it has been foreseen and expected or if it is of long standing, is in distress.” (Cic. *Tusc.* 3.32). Thus, for Epicurus, at least according to Cicero’s portrayal of him, good and bad things which have been anticipated are just as emotionally vivid as those that are unexpected. Worse yet, in Epicurus’ view, the anticipation of good and bad things is as emotionally vivid as the present experience of them, and so is not only useless as emotional therapy, but is even harmful (Cic. *Tusc.* 3.32). By contrast, as Epicurus’ criticism implies, the Cyrenaics held *both* that the unexpected and unforeseen (*insperatum et necopinatum*) presence of good or bad things has an especially strong emotional effect, and that the experience of present good or bad things is far more emotionally vivid than the memory or anticipation of them.

Diogenes Laertius, in his précis of Cyrenaic ethics, describes the latter position in more detail (DL 2.89-90): “But they [sc. the Cyrenaics] say that pleasure is not accomplished through the memory or anticipation of goods, which Epicurus believed. For the movement of the soul dissipates in time.”

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74 Qui censet necesse esse omnis in aegritudine esse, qui se in malis esse arbitrentur, sive illa ante provisa et expectata sint sive inveteraverint.
75 For discussion, see Graver 2003, 196-199. While scholarship on Epicurus has generally taken this aspect of Cicero’s report at face value, it cannot, at the very least, reflect later Epicurean doctrine. For, in his *De Morte*, Philodemus, an Epicurean of the 1st Century BC, explicitly recommends vividly imagining one’s own death (*De Morte*, 37.18-39.25 Henry). Nevertheless, however one should interpret Epicurus on this point, the contrast Cicero draws remains useful for understanding Cyrenaic therapy.
76 ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κατὰ μνήμην τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἢ προοδοκίαν ἢδονήν φασίν ἀποτελείσθαι· ὅπερ ἠμέρου Ἐπικούρῳ. ἐκλύεται γὰρ τὸ χρόνον τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κίνημα. I should note an alternative translation proposed by Laks 1993, 37n82 who argues that χρόνον here should be understood as an instrumental rather than temporal dative, and so translated as “by time” rather than “in time.” This is, of course, a possible construal of the Greek, but it seems to me to assign too specific a role to time. For, as I will argue in the main text, I do not think that time alone (whatever that would mean) is responsible for the inability of the anticipation or memory of good things to produce full-blown pleasure.
Cyrenaics take the memory and anticipation of goods to be insufficient to “accomplish” (ἀποτελεῖν) pleasure. In the following sentence, Diogenes reports that the Cyrenaics held a similar view about the emotional effect of bare sights and sounds:

латονοι δὲ μηδὲ κατὰ ψυλὴν τὴν ὄρασιν ἢ τὴν ἁκοῆν γίνεσθαι ἥδονας, τῶν γούν μμουμένων θρήνους ἡδέως ἁκούομεν, τῶν δὲ κατ’ ἀλήθειαν ἁπόδος. (D.L. 2.90)

And they say that pleasures do not arise through bare seeing and hearing. For, at any rate, we listen with pleasure to those imitating mourning, but without pleasure to those who are actually mourning.

According to Diogenes, the Cyrenaics defended their view that “pleasures do not arise through bare seeing and hearing” (κατὰ ψυλὴν τὴν ὄρασιν ἢ τὴν ἁκοῆν) by contrasting the pleasure we take in observing actors imitating people in mourning with our lack of pleasure in observing people who are actually in mourning. Plutarch, in his more detailed account of this aspect of Cyrenaic theory, adds as a further example the squawking of hens and of crows (Plu. Quaest. Conv. 5.1.2, 674b15-17): “For a hen and a crow who squawks continuously is painful and without pleasure to hear (λυπηρὸν ἁκοῦσμα καὶ ἁηδές ἔστιν), but someone imitating a hen and crow squawking is pleasing.” While the examples adduced by Diogenes and Plutarch show only that the way in which we conceive of a bare sight or a bare sound may influence whether or not we find it pleasant, the context implies the view that it is a necessary condition of

77 I translate ἁηδός by “without pleasure” rather than by “unpleasantly,” as, for instance, Hicks 1925, ad loc translates it. This translation is strongly suggested by the immediate context of this passage, which explicitly distinguishes the neutral state of ἁδονία from either pain or pleasure. Thus, while in ordinary Greek ἁηδός often means “unpleasantly,” in context it ought rather to mean “without pleasure”; cf. Bollack 1975, 199-200 and Laks 1993, 38n86.

78 This example seems to stem ultimately from Aristotle’s Poetics 1448b9-12. However, unlike the Cyrenaics, Aristotle does not take this phenomenon to bear on the question of whether bare sights are themselves pleasant or painful. Rather, he takes it to illustrate that there is a distinct pleasure proper to observing the imitation of something. Thus, he distinguishes the pleasure caused by an imitation qua imitation from the pleasure one takes in an imitation “through workmanship or color or some other cause” (ἐπεὶ ἐὰν μὴ τύχῃ προεωρακώς, οὐ̄χ ἢ μίμημα ποιησεί τὴν ἥδονην ἄλλα διὰ τὴν ἀπεργασίαν ἢ τὴν χροιάν ἢ διὰ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἄλλην αἰτίαν, Arist. Poetics, 1448b18-19).

79 ἀλεκτορὶς γὰρ βοῶσα συνεχῶς καὶ κορώνη λυπηρόν ἁκοῦσμα καὶ ἁηδές ἔστιν, ὁ δὲ μιμούμενος ἀλεκτορίδα βοῶσαν καὶ κορώνην εὐφραίνει.
experiencing full-fledged pleasure through seeing or hearing that one also conceives of what one sees or hears in a certain way.\footnote{This is confirmed by Plutarch’s summary of the Cyrenaic position: “And this is strong evidence for the Cyrenaics against you [sc. the Epicureans], that what is pleasant in sights and sounds in not in our sight nor in our hearing, but in our thought” (καὶ τεκμήριον ἐστι μέγα τοῖς Κυρηναϊκοῖς πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοῦ μὴ περί τὴν ὄψιν εἶναι μηδὲ περί τὴν ἀκοὴν ἀλλὰ περί τὴν διάνοιαν ἡμῶν τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀκούσμασι καὶ θεάμαιςν, Plu. Quaest. Conv. 5.1.2, 674a-b).}

The significance of how one conceives of potentially pleasant or painful things helps to explain why, according to the Cyrenaics, neither the memory nor anticipation of good and bad things, but only present goods or bads “accomplish” (ἀποτελεῖν) full-fledged pleasure or pain. For it suggests that if future and past goods and bads do not cause full-blown pleasure or pain, it is because, however vividly they may appear, we do not conceive of them in the right way. This interpretation finds support in the founder of the Cyrenaic school Aristippus’ explanation of why the good and bad consist solely in present pleasures and pains. According to Athenaeus, Aristippus rejected the present significance of anticipated and past pleasures on the grounds that “the one no longer is, the other is not yet and is unclear” (Ath. 12, 544a-b).\footnote{τὸ μὲν ὡς οὐκέτ’ ὄν, τὸ δὲ οὔπω καὶ ἄδηλον.} In very similar language, Aelian reports that Aristippus explained this phenomenon by arguing that “the present alone is ours, and neither what has happened nor what is expected [is ours]: for the one has perished and it is unclear if the other will be” (Ael. VH 14.6).\footnote{μόνον γὰρ ἔφασκεν ἡμεῖς ἡμῶν εἶναι τὸ παρόν, μήτε δὲ τὸ φθάνον μήτε τὸ προσδοκώμενον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπολογότατον, τὸ δὲ ἄδηλον εἶναι εἴπερ ἔσται.} Both passages explain the present insignificance of anticipated pleasures on the grounds that the future is “unclear” (ἄδηλον). Aelian’s report attests, however, that this unclarity is a feature not (at least primarily) of the impressions one forms of future goods and bads, but of one’s conception of them. Thus, since even people who imagine future goods and bads in vivid detail take
the actual occurrence of the events they imagine to be uncertain, they will not form pleasures or pains as a result of anticipating them.

Although the passages we have examined may seem to imply that, according to the Cyrenaics, neither the memory and anticipation of goods nor bare sights and sounds as such are pleasant at all, our evidence is, at least, compatible with the view that all of these are often pleasant, but are insufficiently so to cause full-fledged pleasure; and likewise, that bare sights and sounds and the anticipation and memory of bad things as such are often painful, but are insufficiently so to cause full-fledged pain. In particular, as we have seen, the Cyrenaics seem to have distinguished two distinct components of full-fledged pleasure or pain: a present experience of some kind and the appropriate conception of it. For example, in order to experience full-blown pleasure when one is listening to a concert, a person must both have a physical experience of a certain sort and must conceive of it in the right way, say, as entertainment and not as a signal to an invading army. Therefore, although Diogenes reports that the Cyrenaics denied that pleasure arises “through bare seeing and hearing” (κατὰ ψιλὴν τὴν ὅρασιν ἢ τὴν ἀκοὴν), it is at least possible that they allowed that, say, harmonious sounds are intrinsically pleasant, but held that the pleasant sensation produced by such sounds is insufficient for producing full-fledged pleasure, which requires, in addition, that one also conceive of one’s experience in the right way. This interpretation is also suggested by the parallel case of potentially painful bare sights and sounds. For instance, while a sharp ringing sound or the appearance of a sudden, very bright light is surely painful, however

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83 Although Graver 2002, 198 does not explain how her interpretation is compatible with this (and other similar) passages, she also argues that the “pre-rehearsal of future evils” is somewhat painful, and so apparently takes the memory and anticipation of pleasures and pains to be pleasurable and painful to some degree.
the agent conceives of it, if she takes it to indicate a great good, say, that a prayer of hers has been accepted, then it may fail to produce full-fledged pain in her.\textsuperscript{84}

Perhaps, then, the Cyrenaics denied only that bare sounds or sights as such are sufficient to cause full-fledged pleasure or pain, and not that they may be pleasant or painful at all. Similarly, although the vivid impression of future good or bad things will not, according to the Cyrenaics, cause full-fledged pleasure or pain, they may have granted that, like bare hearing or seeing, the experience of such impressions may still be pleasant or painful to some degree.\textsuperscript{85}

However that may be, the evidence is quite clear that, according to the Cyrenaics, the anticipation of future goods or bads is insufficient to cause full-blown pleasure or pain. Accordingly, someone who uses the Cyrenaic therapy of distress, and so habituates herself to potentially distressing events by vividly anticipating them, will become familiar with them without ever suffering full-fledged distress.\textsuperscript{86} Thus, both Cyrenaic and Posidonian emotional therapy endeavor to make people familiar with potentially distressing things without, however, causing them to be distressed.

\textsuperscript{84} This is suggested as well by the Cyrenaics’ view that, as Cicero reports, it is not simply the presence of bad things, but the presence of “an unexpected and unforeseen bad thing” (\textit{insperatum et necopinatum malum}) that causes full-fledged distress (\textit{aegritudo} = \textit{λύπη}, Cic. \textit{Tusc.} 3.28). Thus, someone who rehearses being tortured in advance, and so expects it in the relevant way, will not experience full-fledged distress, even though she will, of course, still find being tortured very painful.

\textsuperscript{85} It should be noted that Aelian, in reporting Aristippus’ view, comments that Aristippus “promises to men that they will neither toil afterwards over past events nor toil in advance over future evils,” thereby implying that his teaching will contribute to their not toiling over their past and future evils (Ael. \textit{var. hist.} 14.6). However, given the well-attested Cyrenaic view that the anticipation of past and future goods is insufficient to accomplish full-blown pleasure, it seems likely that Aristippus is not claiming that he will prevent people from forming full-blown pain over past and future evils, which they would not do in any case, but rather that he will focus their attention more completely on their present pleasures.

\textsuperscript{86} It is worth noting that the Cyrenaics do not suggest a similar line of therapy vis-à-vis impending goods. For someone who rehearsed future goods in advance would not be struck unexpectedly by them, and so would not form full-blown pleasure at their presence, thus depriving him of a good. For further discussion, see Graver 2002, 169-170 and Graver 2003, 198.
The similarity between Cyrenaic and Posidonian preventative emotional therapy is reinforced by the fact that Cicero’s account of the Cyrenaics uses the same poetic quotations to illustrate their method as Posidonius is reported as using in illustrating his method (Cic. *Tusc.* 3.29-30, 3.67 = *PHP* 4.7.8-10).\(^87\) This coincidence of quotations suggests that Posidonius and Cicero were referring to a common source.\(^88\) In developing his own method of preventative emotional therapy, Posidonius may well, then, be drawing self-consciously on Cyrenaic theory,\(^89\) thus indicating both his indebtedness to their method of emotional therapy and his well-attested openness to other philosophical influences.\(^90\)

To sum up, it is worth turning once again to Posidonius’ explanation of how people may become less emotionally susceptible to merely apparent good or bad things by “dwelling in advance” among them. As I have been arguing, Posidonius’ method of therapy draws on the Stoic distinction between pre-emotions and emotions, both of which involve many of the same psychic movements and feelings.\(^91\) While, according to his theory, both emotions and pre-emotions involve vehement movements of a non-rational

\(^{87}\) The quotations are Anaxagoras fr. A.33 Diels-Kranz and Euripides fr. 821 and fr. 964 Nauck.

\(^{88}\) The complete lack of any reference in Cicero either to Posidonius’ innovations in Stoic emotional theory or to his criticism of Chrysippus’ theory of the emotions (with the possible exception of the so-called Alcibiades problem at 3.77-78, cf. Galen, *PHP* 4.5.23) speaks strongly against Posidonius’ *On the Emotions* being Cicero’s source for these quotations; cf. Graver 2003, 215-217. It should be noted that these same quotations also appear in later Greek and Latin consolation literature: see, for instance, Sen. *Ep.* 91.3-12, esp. 8; *Cons. Polyb.* 11; Plu. *Cons. Ap.* 112d; and Gal. *Indol.* 52 and 77 B-M.

\(^{89}\) For an argument in support of taking a Cyrenaic text, or possibly a précis of Cyrenaic theory, to be Posidonius and Cicero’s common source, see Lorenz 2011, 206. Further support for this interpretation is found in Athenaeus, who quotes a verbatim passage of Posidonius attesting to his familiarity with Cyrenaic ethics: see Athenaeus 7.279d-e = F289 in Edelstein and Kidd 1972-1989. It may also be relevant that Posidonius’ teacher, Panaetius, is reported to have discussed Cyrenaic ethics in his work “On the Schools” (*Περὶ τῶν αἱρέσεων*, DL 2.87).

\(^{90}\) For Posidonius’ openness to other philosophical schools, see, for instance, Strabo, 2.3.8 = T85 in Edelstein and Kidd 1972-1989 and Simplicius, *In Aristotelis de Caelo* 4.3.310b1 = T100 in Edelstein and Kidd 1972-1989.

\(^{91}\) Indeed, according to Seneca, *all* emotions are preceded by pre-emotions: see especially, *De ira* 2.4.1 together with my discussion in Chapter Three, Section Two.
aspect of the soul and are stimulated by the vivid impression of a merely apparent good or bad, pre-emotions occur without the agent’s giving assent, and so, unlike emotions, will not reinforce her false evaluative beliefs and weakness of soul. Therefore, by dwelling in advance on a merely apparent good or bad (for instance, the prospect of being exiled to a Mediterranean island), people will ideally acquire an affective familiarity with it, without, however, reinforcing either their salient false evaluative beliefs or their weakness of soul, and will thus become less prone to be emotionally affected if they are actually faced with it.

IV

So far I have argued that Posidonius’ innovations in Stoic moral psychology have significant implications both for his interpretation of Chrysippus’ theory of the emotions and for his own therapy of the emotions. This section turns more directly to Posidonius’ account of why emotions are excessive and reason-rejecting impulses. As we have seen, Posidonius’ criticism of Chrysippus’ theory of the emotions seems to have focused especially on this aspect of his theory. Yet, despite reporting Posidonius criticism of Chrysippus’ account in some detail, Galen says relatively little about Posidonius’ own explanation of why emotions are excessive and reason-rejecting. Nevertheless, Posidonius’ account has significant implications both for his theory of the emotions and for his theory of action more broadly.

Our best evidence for this aspect of Posidonius’ theory is his criticism of Chrysippus’ explanation of the tendency of distress to abate over time, even if the distressed person continues to believe that something bad has happened to her. As we

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92 See, for instance, *PHP* 4.3.4, 4.5.27, 32 and 40-44 with the discussion in section one above.
have seen, Chrysippus, in explaining this phenomenon, distinguishes two sorts of cases: those in which people continue to believe that something bad has happened to them, but no longer hold the impulse to be distressed; and, more surprisingly, those in which they continue to hold even the impulse to be distressed, but, nevertheless, are not distressed (PHP 4.7.12-17). Galen reports Posidonius’ criticism of the more surprising, latter case in some detail:


gαρ εἶναι φὴσι παρεῖναι μὲν τὴν ὀρμὴν, ὑπ’ ἄλλης δὲ τινος αἰτίας κολύεσθαι τὴν κατ’ αὐτὴν ἐνέργειαν. ὅθεν κάπειδαν λέγη, “οὕτω γὰρ καὶ κλαίωντες παύονται καὶ μὴ βουλόμενοι κλαίειν κλαίουσιν, ὅταν <μὴ> ὁμοίαις τὰ ὑποκείμενα φαντασίας ποιῆ,” τὴν αἰτίαν ἐρωτᾷ κἀνταῦθα ὁ Ποσειδώνιος δι’ ἣν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ μὴ βουλόμενοι πολλάζως κλαίουσιν ἐπισχεῖν μὴ δυνάμενοι τὰ δάκρυα καὶ ἄλλοι κλαίειν ἕτε βουλόμενοι φθάνουσιν παυόμενοι, <δηλονότερο> διὰ τὰς παθητικὰς κινήσεις αὐτος ἐγκειμένας ὡς μὴ χρατεῖσθαι πρὸς τῆς βουλήσεως, ἢ παντελῶς πεπαυμένας ὡς μηκέτ’ ἐπεγείρεσθαι δύνασθαι πρὸς αὐτῆς. (4.7.35-37)

For he [sc. Posidonius] says that it is impossible for the impulse to be present, but the action on the basis of it to be hindered by some other cause. Hence, when he [sc. Chrysippus] says “for thus, people both stop crying and cry despite not wanting to cry, whenever the underlying circumstances do not make similar impressions,” Posidonius asks at this point the reason why many men, even if they do not want to, often cry and are unable to check their tears, and why others stop, despite still wanting to cry: it is clear that it is on account of their affective movements either being especially vehement, so that they are not controlled by their rational desire, or having stopped entirely, so that they are no longer able to be roused by it.

According to Galen, Posidonius rejected altogether the possibility that someone might hold the impulse to be distressed but fail to be distressed on the grounds that “it is impossible (ἀμήχανον) for the impulse to be present, but the action on the basis of it to be hindered by some other cause.” In the following sentence, Galen reports Posidonius’ criticism of the examples that Chrysippus provides of people failing to act on the basis of

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93 Following the manuscript reading of the passage quoted from Chrysippus’ On the Emotions in PHP 4.7.15, which Posidonius is quoting here. For discussion, see Chapter One, Section Three. While there is no compelling textual reason for preferring either reading over the other, Chrysippus’ explanation makes far better sense philosophically if we read μὴ here. For further discussion, see n54 in Chapter One.

94 I follow Theiler 1982, De Lacy 1984, and Edelstein and Kidd 1972-1989 in reading δηλονότερο. While I have very little confidence in this precise restoration, it seems that something like it, marking a transition between Posidonius’ objection to Chrysippus and his own explanation of the phenomenon under discussion, must have dropped out of the text.
their occurrent impulse: namely, people who do not want to cry but cry anyway; and people who cease crying, despite wanting to cry.\textsuperscript{95} Although Chrysippus presents these as examples of people who hold an impulse to act in a certain way but fail to do so, for Posidonius, neither of these cases can describe people failing to act on the basis of their impulse. For, as we have seen, he takes it to be “impossible” for someone to hold the impulse to act in a certain way, but not to act on the basis of it. Instead, the final sentence of the passage reports that Posidonius explained these cases by appealing to a conflict between the impassioned person’s “rational desire” (βούλησις) and her “affective movements” (παθητικαὶ κινήσεις).

According to Galen, Posidonius commonly used (ὅ Ποσειδώνιος ὄνομάζειν εἴωθεν, \textit{PHP} 5.5.24) the expression “affective movements” to refer to the different emotional dispositions caused by different mixtures of the basic physical qualities composing the human body, such as warmth and coldness (\textit{PHP} 5.5.26). For example, Galen comments that, according to Posidonius, “men differ to no small degree with respect to cowardice and daring and love of pleasure and love of toil on account of the places [sc. they inhabit] because affective movements (παθητικῶν κινήσεων) of the soul always (ἀεί) follow the condition of the body, which is altered to no small degree by the mixture in the surrounding environment.”\textsuperscript{96} Since the condition of the body (διάθεσις

\textsuperscript{95} It is controversial among scholars whether Chrysippus introduces these as examples of someone’s failing to act on the basis of her impulse: for the view that it does not, see most recently Graver 2007, 90-91. However, although, as I argued in Chapter One, I think Chrysippus does take these to be examples of someone’s failing to act on the basis of her impulse, what matters for present purposes is that Posidonius clearly interprets Chrysippus in this way. This is indicated especially by Posidonius’ use of the particle ὅθεν (“hence,” “from whence”) to connect these examples to his criticism of Chrysippus’ thesis that someone might hold an impulse, but fail to act on the basis of it.

\textsuperscript{96} \textit{PHP} 5.5.23: καὶ κατὰ τὰς χώρας δὲ ὡς σμικρῷ τινὶ διενηνοχέναι τοῖς ἱδέας τοὺς ἀνθρώπους εἰς δειλάν καὶ τόλμαν ἢ τὸ φιλόδονον τε καὶ φιλόσοφον, ὡς τῶν παθητικῶν κινήσεων τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπομένον ἀεὶ τῇ διαθέσει τοῦ σώματος, ἢν ἐκ τῆς κατὰ τὸ περιέχον κράσεως ὡς κατ’ ὀλίγον ἀλλοιωθήσθαι.
τοῦ σώματος) is hardly sufficient, according to Stoic theory, to cause full-blown emotions (πάθη), which require the agent’s assent, the expression “affective movements” cannot mean emotions here. Otherwise, affective movements would not always follow the condition of the body, as Posidonius seems to have held. Instead, I propose, following the ground-breaking account of John Cooper, that by the expression “affective movements” Posidonius means vehement movements of a non-rational aspect of the soul, which are correlated with and partly constitute emotions.97

As we have seen, according to Galen, Posidonius explains potential conflicts between a person’s emotion and her evaluative beliefs by appealing to a conflict between her “rational desire” (βούλησις) and her non-rational “affective movements” (παθητικαὶ κινήσεις). Thus, according to this model, even if someone in mourning recognizes that her grief is excessive, and so forms the “rational desire” to calm down, she may, nevertheless, continue to experience grief, if the “affective movements” correlated with her distress remain “vehement” (σφόδρα). If, conversely, the affective movements correlated with her grief become weak, or cease altogether, then even if she continues to believe that it is appropriate for her to be upset, she will no longer feel distressed. Thus, according to Galen’s report, Posidonius explains cases where someone’s emotion and her

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97 See John Cooper 1998, esp. 85-90; cf. J. Fillion-Lahille 1984, 153-162. The best textual evidence for this interpretation is PHP 5.5.26-29 together with 4.7.28, 37 and 5.5.21. In addition to the evidence in the PHP, it is worth noting that Post-Hellenistic Platonists and Aristotelian seem to have used the expression παθητικαὶ κινήσεις to indicate both emotions specifically, which they take to be activities of the non-rational aspect of the soul, and movements of the non-rational aspect of the soul more generally: for the first sense, see, Plu. De mor. virt. 444b-c and, for the more extended use, see Asp. 44.29 Heylbut and Nemesius De Natura Hominis 16.75 Morani. It seems likely, then, that Posidonius simply adopted contemporary Platonic and Peripatetic terminology, but redescribed it in Stoic terms. For Posidonius’ familiarity with Platonism and Aristotelianism, see, e.g., Strabo, 2.3.8 = T85 in Edelstein and Kidd 1972-1989; Gal. PHP 4.7.23; and Simplicius, In Aristotelis de Caelo 4.3.310b1 = T100 in Edelstein and Kidd 1972-1989.
evaluative beliefs come apart, by appealing to the inability of reason to control affective movements, which partly constitute emotions.

Although Galen, in reporting Posidonius’ explanation of such cases, writes of a person’s failing to act on the basis of her “rational desire” (βούλησις), I think this reflects his own philosophical assumptions rather than Posidonius’ theory. For if this were Posidonius’ view, then on his theory someone might hold the “rational” impulse to act in a certain way but fail to act on the basis of it, contradicting his claim that it is impossible (ἀμήχανον) to hold an impulse but to fail to act on the basis of it. Instead, I think that Posidonius takes the salient conflict in such cases to consist neither in the agent’s holding conflicting rational and non-rational impulses, as Galen thinks, nor in any dissonance between the agent’s impulse and behavior, as Chrysippus argued, but rather in the conflict between the agent’s emotion and her occurrent evaluative beliefs, which, according to Posidonius, do not issue in an impulse in such cases.

We might wonder, however, what Posidonius takes the status of an emotion to be that one continues to experience after abandoning the beliefs correlated with it. While no extant fragment or report of Posidonius’ theory explicitly addresses this question, his endorsement of the standard Stoic definition of emotions as “excessive” impulses suggests that he would take the remaining “affective movements” to constitute a full-

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98 Galen explicitly endorses the possibility that the different parts of one’s soul might form conflicting occurrent impulses in PHP 5.7 passim, esp. 21-25. For discussion of Galen’s philosophical psychology, see P. Donini 2008.

99 Also speaking against Galen’s use of βούλησις here is that, in Stoic philosophy, the term refers specifically to the eupathic equivalent of the ordinary emotion ἐπιθυμία, appetite (DL 7.115 = SVF 3.431, Andronicus On the Emotions 6 = SVF 3.432), but it is very difficult to see why good emotions (εὐπάθειαι) would be particularly relevant to Posidonius’ discussion of the impassioned rejection of reason. Worse yet, in context, the implication is that someone who fails to cry despite wanting to do so may have a βούλησις to be distressed, directly contradicting the Stoic view that there is no correlate among the good emotions to distress (Cic. Tusc. 4.14 = SVF 3.437, Lactantius div. instit. 6.15 = SVF 3.438).

100 For discussion of why, in Posidonius’ view, evaluative beliefs fail in such cases fail to produce an impulse, see Section Five below.
fledged impulse, and so allows cases where people experience and act on an emotion without believing at the time that it is appropriate for them to do so. For if someone who continues to act on her emotion despite no longer believing that it is appropriate for her to do so does not still hold that emotion, then although her behavior may be excessive, it is difficult to see in what sense her emotion itself would be excessive. It is likely, then, that Posidonius posited quite different conditions of forming an emotion and of subsequently holding and acting on an emotion one has formed. While to form an emotion people must both form certain evaluative beliefs and also suffer corresponding non-rational affective movements, to continue to hold and act on an emotion they need only continue to experience the affective movements partly constituting it. Posidonius’ theory of the emotions thus allows that people may hold and act on impulses that are not, at that time, correlated with any of their occurrent evaluative beliefs.

V

Posidonius’ account of the impassioned rejection of reason also has significant implications for the role of the non-rational aspect of the soul in the non-emotional impulses of adult humans. As we have seen, he allows that people in the grip of a vehement emotion may continue to act on the basis of it, despite believing that it is inappropriate for them to do so. Therefore, if, in his view, forming the belief that it is appropriate to act in a certain way were always a sufficient condition of forming an impulse, then on his theory someone who continues to act on her emotion despite believing that she should rather calm down would simultaneously hold both the non-emotional impulse to calm down and an emotion. But this would contradict his claim that it is impossible (ἀμήχανον) for someone to hold an occurrent impulse, but to fail to act
on the basis of it (*PHP* 4.7.36). Presumably then, Posidonius does not take forming the belief that it is appropriate to act in a certain way to be a sufficient condition in every case of forming even a non-emotional impulse. But in that case we might wonder what he takes the conditions of forming a non-emotional impulse to be.

The clearest example of a case in which someone forms the belief that it is appropriate to act in a certain way, but fails to form a corresponding impulse is when someone in the grip of a vehement emotion recognizes that she should not be emotionally affected, but continues nevertheless to act on her emotion because of the vehement affective movements correlated with it. I can think of two ways that Posidonius might have accounted for this: he might have argued either (i) that corresponding movements of the non-rational aspect of the soul play a necessary and constitutive role in *every* adult human impulse, whether emotional or non-emotional; or (ii) that forming the belief that it is appropriate to act in a certain way is a sufficient condition of forming an impulse unless the agent is at the same time experiencing vehement affective movements that conflict with her belief about how she ought to act. Thus, to borrow a distinction from contemporary metaphysics, Posidonius might have argued that non-emotional impulses are *grounded* in the agent’s belief that it is appropriate to act in a certain way, but are only *conditionally grounded* in the agent’s not experiencing vehement countervailing affective movements. By something’s being grounded in something else, I mean that it is explained by and dependent on that thing. For example, the fragility of glass is

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101 As I argued in Chapter One, I think Chrysippus, in fact, allowed for the possibility of such cases, and so also allowed for the possibility of someone’s holding an impulse but failing to act on the basis of it. See, for instance, *PHP* 4.2.14-18, 4.4.24-25 and 31-32, with my discussion in Chapter One, Section Four.

102 For recent discussion of metaphysical grounding, see especially Rosen 2010 and the essays collected in Correia and Schneider 2012. I owe the notion of conditional grounding to Ralf Bader’s accessible and stimulating talk, entitled “Conditional Grounding,” at the Princeton Workshop on Metaphysical Structure, April 7, 2013.
grounded in its atomic structure. By contrast, by something’s being conditionally grounded in something else, I mean that it is the case partly in virtue of that thing’s not being present. For example, the existence of a particular window pane is grounded in its physical properties, but is only conditionally grounded in, say, a hammer not having struck it.

Although the evidence for this aspect of Posidonius’ theory is mostly indirect, the latter interpretation seems far more plausible. For it is very difficult to see why, as the former interpretation holds, the non-rational aspect of the soul should be involved in every non-emotional or eupathic impulse, especially since Posidonius, apparently following Plato, seems to have taken the non-rational aspect of the soul to be concerned primarily with pleasure and pain, and honor and dishonor.\(^\text{103}\) Thus, while the non-rational aspect of the soul will presumably be involved in and contribute to non-emotional impulses that are directed at objects to which it has a natural affinity or aversion (for instance, to the non-emotional desire to purchase a chocolate-chip cookie), it seems unlikely that it will be involved at all, let alone necessarily, either in the non-emotional impulse to, say, pay one’s rent or in eupathic emotions such as pride in one’s own virtue. Therefore, since the latter interpretation allows that the non-rational aspect of the soul will not be involved in many non-emotional and eupathic impulses, it has far more modest and plausible consequences for Posidonius’ theory of action.

We might wonder, however, why a person’s experiencing vehement countervailing affective movements should prevent her from forming a non-rational

\(^{103}\) For Galen’s discussion, in reporting Posidonius’ views, of the objects, and development, of the non-rational aspect of the soul (which he presents, following Plato, as being subdivided into an appetitive and a spirited part), see especially, *PHP* 5.5.3-8. Although Galen represents Posidonius as subdividing the non-rational aspect into distinct appetitive and spirited parts, the evidence he adduces for this further distinction is hardly compelling.
impulse if she forms the belief that she ought to act in a certain way. According to Posidonius’ theory, vehement movements of the non-rational aspect of the soul might prevent someone from forming a non-emotional impulse in either of the following ways.

First, in cases where affective movements partly constitute an occurrent emotion they may occupy the impassioned agent’s faculty of impulse so completely that she is temporarily incapable of forming a rival impulse. This is suggested by Posidonius’ view that it is impossible to hold an impulse but to fail to act on the basis of it, which implies that he takes the faculty of impulse, like reason more generally, to be incapable of occurrent conflict. It thus seems likely that, according to Posidonius, someone who continues to be enraged despite recognizing that she should calm down may simply not have the psychic resources required to form a corresponding non-emotional impulse.

Second, since movements of the non-rational aspect of the soul will presumably direct the agent’s attention toward objects that are naturally preferred or dispreferred, such as health and sickness, they may, by doing so, also direct the agent’s attention away from her belief that it is appropriate to act in a certain way, and so may, perhaps, distract her to such an extent that her occurrent belief is no longer practically efficacious. For example, even if someone in a state of distress forms the belief that she should calm down, she may not form a corresponding impulse partly because the affective movements correlated with her distress simply prevent her from attending in a focused and undivided way to her evaluative belief.

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104 Compare Seneca’s detailed account in his 56th Moral Epistle of the difficulties in studying amid the disturbance of the crowded street and bathhouse beneath his apartment. Especially relevant is his account of the sorts of the sounds that distract him from his work, without presumably stimulating an opposing impulse in him (Ep. 56.4-5).
I propose, then, that, Posidonius takes forming and holding the belief that it is appropriate to act in a certain way to be sufficient for forming an impulse unless one is, at the same time, experiencing vehement countervailing affective movements.

VI

The next section turns to a difficulty that the role of the non-rational aspect of the soul in non-emotional impulses poses for Posidonius’ conception of the practical life of the wise. If, as I have been arguing, all human impulses are conditionally grounded in the agent’s not experiencing vehement countervailing movements of the non-rational aspect of her soul, then we might wonder whether the wise will also sometimes prove incapable of forming impulses on the basis of their practical reasoning. For although, according to Stoic theory, the wise form and hold only true beliefs, the condition of the non-rational aspect of their soul is determined by many factors that are not fully in their control, such as the surrounding environment, their physical predisposition and their age. Thus, even if a wise person takes the utmost care to keep the non-rational aspect of her soul in a good condition, by, say, eating well, living in the best possible physical environment and practicing Posidonian pre-rehearsal, she will still not have full control over it.

Since the wise form only good-emotions (εὐπάθειαι), they will clearly never suffer the runaway “affective movements” partly constituting ordinary emotions

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105 See especially PHP 5.5.22-25, which reports Posidonius’ physiognomic views. As Galen reports, according to Posidonius, the physical build and chemical composition of people influence their dispositions to certain emotions. For example, he claims that “as many of men and animals that are broader-chested and warmer are all more inclined to anger.” Of course, the wise, like everyone else, will have very little, if any, control over their skeletal build and chemical composition. Also relevant is Seneca’s strikingly similar discussion in De ira 2.19-20, which argues that, in addition to internal factors such as one’s chemical composition, accidental and external causes such as sickness or physical injury may also affect one’s proneness to certain emotions. Since emotions require the agent’s assent, the pre-disposition that both Posidonius and Seneca have in mind must be to more or less vehement non-voluntary movements, which may incline one to give assent to impulsive impressions. For ancient physiognomy more generally, see the texts collected in Förster 1893.
According to Stoic theory, they may, however, experience violent pre-emotions, which Posidonius would explain as movements of the non-rational aspect of the soul. Moreover, as we have seen, the non-rational aspect of the soul may also direct one’s attention to naturally preferred and dispreferred objects without, however, stimulating either an emotion or a non-emotional impulse in them. We might wonder, however, whether the movements of the non-rational aspect of the soul in either of these cases are ever sufficiently vehement to prevent the wise from forming a countervailing impulse?

Perhaps the most plausible example of a case in which they will experience such vehement movements of the non-rational aspect of their soul that they will be incapable of forming an opposing impulse is if they experience a vehement pre-emotion. As Aulus Gellius writes, allegedly reporting the views of the early Stoics, if a wise person is a passenger on a ship that is caught in a violent storm and seems to be sinking, she may, like the other, non-wise passengers, be faced with the impression that something terrible is imminent, and may suffer a pre-emotion as a result. For example, she may blanch and tremble, without, however, assenting to the impression that drowning is worth being distressed over, and so without ever becoming afraid (Aulus Gellius, AN 19.1.4-10).

Now, it seems likely that a wise person in the grip of such intense pre-emotions will be incapable of forming certain impulses. For example, if as the waves spill over the prow of

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106 According to Stoic theory, good-emotions are available to the wise alone. There are three basic classes of good emotions: joy (χαρά = gaudium), rational desire (βούλησις = voluntas) and caution (εὑλάβεια = cautio). These correspond to three of the four generic emotions: pleasure (ἡδονή = voluptas), desire (ἐπιθυμία = cupiditas) and fear (φόβος = metus). There is no equivalent among the good-emotion to the fourth generic emotion, distress (λύπη = aegritudo). Unlike ordinary emotions, good-emotions are correlated only with true beliefs, and are perfectly reason-responsive. For the Stoic theory of “good-emotions,” see especially Cic. Tusc. 4.12-14 and DL 7.115. For an excellent recent discussion, see Cooper 2005.

107 For the pre-emotions of the wise, see especially Sen., De Ira 2.2.1-2, 2.3.2, 2.4.1-2; Ep. 11.1-7, 57.3-6; and Gell., NA 19.1, with my discussion in Chapter Three, Sections Five and Six.
her ship she forms the belief that she ought to rejoice over her fellow passengers’ steadfast courage, she may fail to form a corresponding impulse.

Another case in which a wise person’s vehement non-rational movements may prevent her from forming an impulse is if she has too much to drink or if she is under the influence of a narcotic. As Seneca writes, in a chapter that has often been thought to have been influenced by Posidonius, “wine kindles anger, because it increases the heat [sc. of the person]” (Sen. de Ira 2.19.5). In context, Seneca is referring to the effect of wine on the chemical composition of the body; according to him, wine increases the quantity of fire in one, and so causes one to have a greater propensity to suffer vehement, anger-salient pre-emotions. For Posidonius too, then, alcohol might prove intoxicating partly by stimulating especially vehement pre-emotions. It was thus open to him to suggest a middle path between the opposing positions attributed to Cleanthes and Chrysippus concerning the effects of intoxication on the wise. Rather than arguing that the wise will continue to display their virtue, just as when sober, no matter how much they have to drink, as Cleanthes seems to have held, or that they may lose their virtue under the influence of alcohol, and so fail to give assent only to kataleptic impressions, as Chrysippus is reported to have argued (DL 7.127), Posidonius might have held that although the wise will continue to exercise assent responsibly, irrespective of how much

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108 Vinum incendit iras, quia calorem auget. For suggestions of Posidonian influence, see, e.g., Pohlenz 1894, 594ff; Reinhardt 1921, 320; Fillion-Lahille 1984, 180-185; and, more recently, Cooper and Procopé 1991, 58n31. Whether or not Seneca had Posidonius’ discussion in mind when composing these sections, the ideas expressed in it are, at any rate, strikingly similar to those presented in Gal. PHP 5.5.22-25.

109 This idea seems to have been quite popular in antiquity: see, for instance, Plato. Laws 666a-c (also cited by Seneca in De ira 2.20.2); Gal. Temp. 1.658-61 Kuhn; Caus. Morb. 7.12-13 Kuhn.
they have to drink, they may lose their ability to reliably form impulses on the basis of their practical decisions.\(^\text{10}\)

For Posidonius, therefore, the wise too may sometimes experience vehement movements of the non-rational part of the soul, and may thus become temporarily incapable of forming impulses on the basis of their practical judgments. Nevertheless, even in such cases, they will presumably continue to give assent only to katalēptikē impressions. Posidonius’ theory thus may have the rather striking consequence of limiting what is fully and always in the control of the wise to their use of impressions rather than to the impulses they form.\(^\text{11}\)

\(^{10}\) Our only direct evidence for this disagreement between Cleanthes and Chrysippus is DL 7.127. Posidonius’ interest in the effects of drunkenness and especially of its effects on the wise is attested by Seneca in *Moral Epistle* 83.10-11. For discussion of Cleanthes and Chrysippus’ reported disagreement, see Bénatouïl 2006.

\(^{11}\) Posidonius may, therefore, be understood as anticipating Epictetus’ claim that “the correct use of impressions” (τὴν ὀρθὴν ταῖς φαντάσιαις) alone is, strictly speaking, “up to us” (ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, Epict. 1.1.7).
Chapter Three: Seneca

This chapter focuses on the following two aspects of Seneca’s theory of the emotions: his novel contribution to Stoic emotional therapy, and his account of the “pre-emotions” (προπάθειαι) of the wise. Our knowledge of earlier Stoic sources differs dramatically regarding these two topics; while we have a fairly detailed knowledge of earlier Stoic methods of consolation, Seneca is by far our best source for the Stoic theory of the pre-emotions of the wise. I argue that Seneca proposes an otherwise unattested method of consoling people in the grip of especially violent emotions, which differs significantly from the methods proposed by Chrysippus and other earlier Stoics, but is perfectly consistent with the tenets of the early Stoic theory of the emotions. I, then, turn to Seneca’s account of the pre-emotions of the wise, which I argue is both more detailed and of broader significance for the psychology of the wise than has generally been recognized.

This chapter is divided into eight sections. In the first, I discuss Seneca’s therapy of violent emotions and its basis in the classical Stoic theory of the emotions. In the second, I give an interpretation of Seneca’s philosophically sophisticated analysis of anger in On Anger 2.4. This analysis, I argue, explains why emotions are not reason-responsive, and does so in a way that further explains the philosophical basis of his therapy of violent emotions. In the third, I argue that Seneca’s therapy of violent emotions should be understood as a Stoic interpretation of Epicurus’ method of treating distress. In the fourth, I consider the role in Senecan emotional therapy of a subclass of emotions that may contribute to moral education and are only available to less vicious, relatively decent people. In the fifth, I turn to the Stoic theory of pre-emotions, and argue
that both the wise and the non-wise will experience pre-emotions when faced with a vivid impulsive impression falsely portraying a merely apparent good or bad as good or bad. In the sixth, I consider whether the same range of merely apparent goods and bads will stimulate false impulsive impressions, and so, too, pre-emotions, in the wise as in the non-wise, and argue that the evidence from Seneca shows that only a subset of merely apparent goods and bads will naturally and unavoidably stimulate pre-emotions in the wise. In the seventh, I consider why the wise continue to form impressions falsely portraying preferred and dispreferred indifferents as good or bad, despite understanding perfectly well that, in fact, they are neither good nor bad, and so never actually assenting to them. In the eighth and final section, I discuss the propensity of certain wise people to experience pre-emotions regarding things that will not naturally and unavoidably stimulate pre-emotions in the wise, such as the unexpected loss of money or insults, which may seem to militate against my argument.

I

In the *Tusculan Disputations*, Cicero distinguishes two Stoic methods of consoling people experiencing grief, one favored by Cleanthes and the other favored by Chrysippus, both of which treat occurrent grief by arguing against one of the false beliefs correlated with it (*Cic. Tusc.* 3.76-79). While Cleanthes recommends arguing against the mourner’s belief that something bad has happened to her, Chrysippus favors focusing not on that belief, but rather on her further belief that she ought, consequently, to be distressed. Although Cicero introduces these methods in his discussion of how best to treat people experiencing distress, these methods could be applied as easily to the treatment of any

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emotion at all, by overthrowing one or the other of the occurrent beliefs correlated with it. Cleanthes and Chrysippus thus recommend belief-based methods of emotional therapy that console people experiencing occurrent emotions by challenging the beliefs correlated with their emotions.

In *On Anger*, as well as in other works, Seneca proposes a quite different method of treating people experiencing especially violent emotions. He argues that the *only* effective remedy for treating people in the grip of such emotions is to stimulate a rival emotion in them. For example, he recommends treating someone in a fit of rage by frightening him. His method of consoling people experiencing violent emotions thus differs from the belief-based approaches of Cleanthes and Chrysippus. For rather than arguing against either of the beliefs correlated with an emotion, Seneca’s method simply overrides violent emotions by means of rival emotions.

One advantage of this method of therapy over those attributed to Cleanthes and Chrysippus is that it addresses the propensity of impassioned people, according to Stoic theory, to be inadequately responsive should they become aware of considerations speaking against their emotions. To be sure, Seneca did not invent this method of therapy, which is well attested in earlier Greek and Roman literature as well as in other philosophical works – for example, as I will discuss, in the Epicurean method of treating occurrent distress; however, he is the earliest Stoic for whom this method of therapy is attested. It is therefore possible (and, for reasons I will come to at the end of Section

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2 Cleanthes explicitly extends his method of therapy to any emotion in a passage from the Fourth Book of his *On the Emotions* (Περὶ Παθῶν) that is preserved by Origenes, *Cels.* 8.51 = *SVF* 3.474.

3 I want to be clear that Seneca restricts the use of this method of therapy to the treatment of more vehement occurrent emotions that are prone to be especially harmful to oneself or those around one. For a survey of the various strategies proposed in *On Anger* both for preventing people from forming emotions at all and for treating occurrent emotions, see especially Wildberger 2007, 313-316.

4 See, for example, Sen. *De ira* 1.10.1, 3.39.4 and 3.40.5. My citations from Seneca all refer to Reynolds 1965 and 1977.
Three, in my view quite likely) that Seneca was responsible for introducing this method of therapy into Stoic theory.

In several passages, Seneca argues that the only effective method for treating someone suffering a violent emotion is to stimulate a rival emotion in him. For example, when describing the harmful effects of fear in *Moral Epistle* 13, he writes:

Nulla autem causa vitae est, nullus miseriarum modus, si timetur quantum potest. Hic prudentia prosit, hic robore animi evidentem quoque metum respue; si minus, vitio vitium repelle, spe metum tempera.

But there is no reason for life and no limit of miseries if one fears to the degree that is possible. Here, let prudence benefit you; here, reject even a clear occasion for fear by your strength of soul. If you are unable to do this, drive away vice by vice; temper your fear by means of hope. (Sen. *Ep.* 13.12)

Again, when explaining why all emotions are bad auxiliaries to reason in *On Anger*, he writes:

Ideo numquam adsumet ratio in adiutorium inprovidos et violentos impetus apud quos nihil ipsa auctoritatis habeat, quos numquam comprimere possit nisi pares illis similisque opposuerit, ut irae metum, inertiae iram, timori cupiditatem.

Therefore, reason will never take for assistance thoughtless and violent impulses, among which it would have no authority and which it would never be able to check unless it were to oppose them with impulses equal and similar to them, such as fear against anger, anger against sluggishness, and appetite against fear. (Sen. *De ira* 1.10.1)

Finally, later in *On Anger*, in distinguishing the therapy of more and less violent emotions, he writes:

Omni arte requiem furori [sc. remedium] dabit: si vehementior erit, aut pudorem illi cui non resistat incutiet aut metum; si infirmior, sermones inferet vel gratos vel novos et cupiditate cognoscendi avocabit.

[My remedy] will give rest to rage by every means: if the rage is rather violent, it will strike it with shame or fear, which it may not resist; if it is calmer, it will apply speeches that are either pleasing or novel and will call the enraged person away by his appetite for knowledge. (Sen. *De ira* 3.39.4)

In these passages, Seneca argues that violent emotions can only be checked by rival emotions. As he explains in the second passage: “thoughtless and violent impulses” (*inprovidos et violentos impetus*) may only be checked by similarly “thoughtless and
violent” impulses. Accordingly, he recommends treating fear by appetite, and anger by fear.

As we have seen, unlike the methods of emotional therapy advocated by Cleanthes and Chrysippus, Seneca’s method of treating violent emotions does not directly challenge the beliefs correlated with the emotions it overrides. Indeed, the set of beliefs correlated with the emotion that someone applying this method of emotional therapy stimulates in an impassioned person most commonly conflicts incidentally rather than intrinsically with the set of beliefs correlated with the emotion it overrides: that is, in itself neither set of beliefs commonly gives the impassioned person reason to reconsider, let alone to abandon, the other set. For example, if one overrides someone’s grief over his best friend’s untimely death by stimulating an appetite in him to go to another friend’s wedding reception, the set of beliefs correlated with his appetite to go to the wedding reception does not directly challenge the set of beliefs correlated with his grief. For the beliefs correlated with his appetite – namely, that attending the reception would be good for him, and that it is fitting for him to eagerly anticipate attending it – are, in themselves, altogether silent with respect to the beliefs correlated with his grief – that his best friend’s

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5 By incidentally conflicting beliefs, I mean beliefs that conflict only on account of contingent factors, external to the beliefs themselves. For example, the belief that one should live within walking distance of a café would conflict incidentally with the belief that one should live within walking distance of a library if it happens that there are no available apartments nearby both a café and a library. For it is, of course, possible that both a library and a café might be within walking distance of an available apartment, in which case these beliefs would not conflict at all. By intrinsically conflicting beliefs, on the other hand, I mean beliefs that are internally inconsistent, and so conflict with one another independently of the attendant circumstances. For example, the belief that exercise is good conflicts intrinsically with the belief that exercise is harmful. For an ancient example of this distinction, see Arist. *EN* 7.3, 1146a35–1147a3. For a related contemporary discussion of the distinction between “essentially” and “accidentally” conflicting attitudes, see Arpaly 2002, 89–91, especially 89 n.10 and Marino 2008.

6 The major exception to this rule is the therapeutic use of a sub-class of emotions, such as shame (*pudor*), circumspection (*verecundia*) and regret (*paenitentia*), which both play a positive role in moral education and are, in general, only available for the treatment of relatively decent people. As I discuss in more detail in Section Four, in their therapeutic use these emotions are commonly correlated with the belief that one’s emotional behavior is itself inappropriate, and so often conflict intrinsically, rather than incidentally, with the emotions they override.
death is bad for him, and that it is fitting for him to be distressed. Accordingly, these emotions, and the beliefs correlated with them, conflict only incidentally.

More difficult are cases where in order to override an emotion one stimulates a countervailing emotion regarding the same object in the impassioned person. For example, if one treats someone who passionately desires a cup of peppermint tea by making him afraid of that cup of tea, one has, it may seem, challenged his appetite by an emotion conflicting intrinsically with it. Even in this sort of case, however, these emotions will often conflict only incidentally. For someone who passionately desires a cup of tea presumably desires it as something pleasant or thirst-quenching. By contrast, his countervailing fear is unlikely to be either of the tea’s pleasant flavor or of its quenching his thirst, but rather, say, of its scalding him. Accordingly, if the tea were to cool down, the sets of beliefs correlated with these emotions, and so the two emotions themselves, would no longer conflict at all. His appetite for, and fear of, the same cup of tea, therefore, conflict incidentally, and not intrinsically.

That the emotions involved in Seneca’s therapy of violent emotions most commonly conflict only incidentally is a serious limitation of his method. For even if one succeeds in treating someone experiencing a violent emotion by stimulating a rival emotion in him, one will often not cause him to abandon the beliefs on which his violent emotion depends. Rather, the rival emotion one stimulates in an impassioned person has

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7 This shares some affinities with Chrysippus’ method of emotional therapy, which explicitly counsels against challenging the impassioned person’s more fundamental belief that the object of his emotions is, in fact, good or bad. However, unlike Seneca’s method of treating violent emotions, Chrysippean emotional therapy argues against the impassioned person’s belief that it is appropriate for him to be emotionally affected. By contrast, as I have been arguing, Seneca’s method of therapy endeavors to override an emotion without directly challenging either of the beliefs correlated with it. For Chrysippus’ theory, see Cic. *Tusc.* 3.76, 79 and Origenes, *Cels.* 8.51 = SVF 3.474.
the effect simply of distracting him from feeling the other emotion, judged to be a worse one.

Seneca confronts a similar difficulty in his *To My Mother, Helvia: On Consolation*, where he considers the consolatory technique of distracting someone experiencing distress by taking him to a show or gladiatorial contest.

> Ludis interim aut gladiatoribus animum occupamus; at illum inter ipsa quibus avocatur spectacula levis aliqua desiderii nota subruit. Ideo melius est vincere illum [sc. dolorem] quam fallere; nam qui delusus et voluptatibus aut occupationibus abductus est resurgit et ipsa quiete impetum ad saeviendum colligit.

> Sometimes we occupy the mind [of the mourner] with games or gladiatorial contests; but some slight reminder of its loss among the very spectacles by which it is distracted overwhelms it. Therefore, it is better to overcome grief than to deceive it; for grief which has been beguiled and has been diverted by pleasures or activities rises again, and by this very rest gathers its impulse for raging. (Sen. *Helv.* 17.1–2)

In this passage, Seneca comments that someone whose attention has merely been diverted from his grief is very likely to resume grieving if he is faced with an impression recalling his loss. As he writes a few sentences later: “All these things are beneficial for a short time, and are not remedies but impediments of distress” (Sen. *Helv.* 17.2).

On the other hand, the failure of Seneca’s therapy of violent emotions to directly challenge the beliefs correlated with the emotions it endeavors to console helps to explain its therapeutic utility. For, as he argues in a number of texts, emotions are by nature inadequately reason-responsive, and thus unresponsive to countervailing argument. For instance, in *On Anger* he writes:

> Nam si exaudit rationem sequiturqua ducitur, iam non est ira, cuius proprium est contumacia; si vero repugnat et non ubi iussa est quiescit sed libido ferociaque provehitur, tam inutilis animi minister est quam miles qui signum receptui neglegit. Itaque si modum adhiberi sibi patitur, alio nomine appellanda est, desit ira esse, quam effrenatam indomitamque intellego.

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8 Sen. *Helv.* 17.2: “omnia ista ad exiguum momentum prosunt nec remedia doloris sed impedimenta sunt.” See too Seneca’s description of the unsuccessful efforts of Caligula to “divert” (*sevocare*) his grief over his sister’s death by gambling and harming other people rather than addressing the beliefs correlated with it (Polyb. 17.4–6).

9 In addition to the passages cited in the main text, see, for example, Sen. *De ira* 1.7.4 and *Helv.* 17.1.
For if anger listens to reason and follows where reason leads, then it is already not anger, of which obstinacy is a proper quality; if, however, it fights back and does not become quiet when it has been ordered, but is carried forward by its desire and ferocity, then it is as useless a servant of the soul as a soldier who disregards the signal for falling back. And thus, if it suffers a measure to be applied to itself, then it must be called by a different name, and it ceases to be anger, which I understand to be unrestrained and untamable. (Sen. De ira 1.9.2–3)

According to this passage, it is “a proper quality” (*proprium*) of anger to be unresponsive to reason. Indeed, for Seneca, if someone who is pursuing vengeance restrains himself on the basis of reason, then he is no longer angry, even if he continues to display other characteristic symptoms of anger. Moreover, by comparing an enraged person’s relationship to reason with a soldier who disregards the signal for retreat, Seneca implies that an enraged person may act on the basis of his anger despite recognizing that he has reason to act differently. That enraged people may fail to alter their behavior even if they recognize that they have reason to do so is confirmed and further explained by Seneca’s tripartite analysis of the formation of anger, which I will discuss in detail in the next section (Sen. De ira 2.4.1).

This lack of reason-responsiveness is not peculiar to people in the grip of anger, but is characteristic of impassioned people more generally. As Seneca writes in *Moral Epistle* 85:

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Deinde nihil interest quam magnus sit affectus: quantuscumque est, parere nescit, consilium non accipit. Quemadmodum rationi nullum animal optemperat, non ferum, non domesticum et mite (natura enim illorum est surda suadenti), sic non sequuntur, non audiunt affectus, quantulcumque sunt.
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It makes no difference how great an emotion is: however small it is, it does not know how to obey, it does not accept advice. Just as no animal, whether wild or tame and gentle, obeys reason (for their nature is deaf to persuasion), so too emotions, however small they are, do not follow or listen to reason. (Sen. Ep. 85.8)
Seneca is here fully in agreement with Chrysippus, who also held that it is constitutive of emotions to be inadequately reason-responsive.\textsuperscript{10}

The belief-based methods of emotional therapy advocated by Cleanthes and Chrysippus therefore face a difficult task. For if emotions are partly defined by their failure to be adequately reason-responsive, then it is difficult to see what good it would do to treat them by arguing against the beliefs with which they are correlated. In the case of more violent emotions, at any rate, belief-based therapy will be ineffective and, in some instances, even harmful.\textsuperscript{11} Seneca’s method of consoling people experiencing violent emotions by a rival emotion therefore makes a great deal of sense on the basis of orthodox Stoic theory.

A significant drawback of this method of emotional therapy, however, is that it would benefit impassioned people in a far more restricted set of cases than Chrysippus’ or Cleanthes’ methods of emotional therapy. Indeed, since it endeavors simply to replace a harmful emotion with another harmful emotion – in Seneca’s phrase, it treats “vice by vice” (\textit{Ep. 13.12, vitio vitium}) – it would benefit an impassioned person only when the emotion being treated is more harmful than the rival emotion introduced to counter it.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{10} For the failure of emotions, according to Chrysippus, to be adequately reason-responsive, see especially his comparison of impassioned people to runners who, on account of their vehement movement, are unable to stop, or change direction, as soon as it seems best to them to do so (\textit{Gal. P.H.P.} 4.2.15–18 = \textit{SVF 3.462} and 4.4.24–25 = \textit{SVF 3.476}); see also \textit{Plu. vir. mor.} 450c = \textit{SVF 3.390} and \textit{Stob.} 2.7.10a, p. 89 Wachsmuth = \textit{SVF 3.389}. The best discussion of the sense in which Chrysippus takes emotions to be inadequately reason-responsive is \textit{Cooper 1998, 79–81}; see also \textit{Gill 1998, 115–123}, especially 117–123 and \textit{Graver 2007, 66–70}.

\textsuperscript{11} For instance, in explaining his delay in writing a letter of consolation to his mother regarding his own exile, Seneca writes: “I knew that your distress should not be challenged while it was raging freshly, lest these very consolations stir it up and inflame it” (\textit{Sen. Helv.} 1.2). See too Chrysippus’ very similar comment in the fourth book of his \textit{On the Emotions}, preserved in \textit{Origenes, Cels.} 8.51 = \textit{SVF 3.474}.

\textsuperscript{12} Jula Wildberger has suggested to me that this method of emotional therapy might also cause impassioned people to compare the grounds for their current emotion with that of the rival emotion one stimulates in them, and so to hold both emotions in a more circumspect, non-emotional way. This is an intriguing suggestion, but I do not think it can be Seneca’s primary explanation of the efficacy of this method of emotional therapy. For, as this suggestion implies, it is, in Seneca’s view, constitutive of emotions that one
While all emotions are vicious according to Stoic theory, one emotion is presumably more harmful than another by having worse consequences either for the impassioned person or for those affected by him. Thus, if an enraged person were on the verge of assaulting someone, it would probably be worth stimulating a rival emotion in him to prevent him from doing so. Seneca explicitly acknowledges this limitation of this method of emotional therapy by restricting it to the treatment of “more violent” (vehementior) emotions (Sen. De ira 3.39.4).

This limitation also explains Seneca’s restricted use of this method of emotional therapy in his consolatory works. For unless someone’s grief prevents him from carrying out important public or private business, it is not worthwhile, according to Seneca’s theory, to console him by a rival emotion. Moreover, since grief tends to be relatively long-lasting, confronting someone in mourning with a rival emotion that does not challenge his credence in the beliefs correlated with his grief – like merely distracting someone in mourning by taking him to the theater – is not an especially effective, long-term method of consolation. Seneca’s reluctance to use this method in his consolatory works is, therefore, perfectly consistent with his more general endorsement of it.

comes to form, and hold, them without exercising circumspection – on this point, see also Inwood 2005, 154–155. Thus, in forming a rival emotion, an impassioned person will not carefully consider the reasons supporting and opposing it, but will form it, like any emotion, rashly and without circumspection. It may, however, be an additional virtue of this method of therapy that someone whose emotion has been overridden by a rival emotion will be more likely, when the overriding emotion is no longer vehement, to compare his grounds for the two competing emotions and thereby to think of them both in relative rather than absolute terms.

As, for instance, Augustus is said to have countered Vedius Pollio’s enraged desire to cast a slave, who had accidentally broken one of his crystal glasses, into his fish pond as prey for his lampreys, by ordering all of his crystal glasses to be broken and his fish pond to be filled up (Sen. De ira 3.40.2–4). In summarizing this passage, Seneca comments that Augustus’ method of harshly checking Vedius’ anger by fear is only commendable in treating anger that is “wild, harsh, and blood-thirsty, which is now incurable, unless it has feared something greater” (De ira 3.40.5). For Vedius Pollio’s proverbial cruelty towards his slaves, see also Pliny the Elder, Nat. 9.77.
II

Seneca’s analysis of anger in *On Anger* 2.4 further explains the philosophical basis of his method of treating violent emotions. This analysis distinguishes three movements, or stages, of the formation of anger, while only the third movement is full-blown anger, the other two are necessary preliminaries to the third movement. I will argue that Seneca’s subtle distinction between the second and the third movement helps to explain why, in his view, emotions are inadequately reason-responsive despite depending fundamentally on the impassioned person’s forming certain beliefs. I will begin by quoting the passage in full.

Et ut scias quemadmodum incipient affectus aut crescant aut efferantur, est primus motus non voluntarius, quasi praeparatio affectus et quaedam comminatio; alter cum voluntate non contumaci, tamquam oporteat me vindicari cum laesus sim, aut oporteat hunc poenas dare cum seclus fecerit; tertius motus est iam inpotens, qui non si oportet ulcisci vult sed utique, qui rationem evicit.

And that you may now know in what way emotions begin, grow and are carried away: the first motion is not voluntary, but is a sort of preparation for, and threat of, an emotion. The next motion is accompanied by a non-obstinate desire to the effect that it is right for me to be avenged since I have been harmed, or it is right for this man to be punished since he has committed a crime. The third motion is now out of control, and it wants to take vengeance not if it is right, but in any case – this motion has conquered reason altogether. (Sen. *De ira* 2.4.1)

The first movement in the formation of anger is a non-voluntary and largely ineliminable response to the impression of oneself or someone close to one having been unjustly

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14 While these movements mark distinct, diachronic stages of the genesis of an emotion, the transition from the first movement to the third need not involve any perceivable interval of time. Indeed, the formation of an emotion presumably often occurs without any perceivable gap between the emotionally-salient impression and the full-blown emotional impulse. This is supported by Seneca’s frequent description of emotions as overhasty, rash assents: see, for example, *De ira* 1.18.1 and 3.2.6.

15 Some scholars have argued that the second movement is anger, and that the third movement is rather “cruelty” (*feritas*), which is described in *On Anger* 2.5: see, for instance, Fillion-Lahille 1984, 181 and, more recently, Graver 2007, 125–130. However, this interpretation is directly contradicted by Seneca’s earlier claim in *On Anger* 1.9.2 that “obstinacy is a proper quality of anger” (*cuius sc. irae proprium est contumacia*); see also *On Anger* 2.3.4. For the second movement is, Seneca writes, “accompanied by a non-obstinate desire” (*cum voluntate non contumaci*), and thus cannot be full-blown anger.
injured. In the second movement, one assents to the proposition that “it is right for me to be avenged since I have been harmed,” or to the similar proposition that “it is right for this man to be punished since he has committed a crime.” The third and final movement differs from the second in that “it is out of control” (impotens), and so wants “to take vengeance not if it is right, but in any case.”

An important difference between the second and the third movement is that the third movement is no longer responsive to the countervailing belief that it is not right for one to be so moved. As Seneca writes, while the second movement is correlated with the belief that “it is right for me to be avenged,” the third movement “wants to take vengeance not if it is right, but in any case.” Minimally, then, the belief that it is right to take vengeance is not correlated with the third movement.

Scholars differ, however, over the precise propositional content of the belief correlated with the third movement. For instance, Katja Vogt has argued that, in forming the third movement of anger, “the agent will assent to something like ‘I have to take revenge because I have been offended’” (Vogt 2006, 71). Vogt reports that she arrives at

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16 As several texts in De ira tell us, the initial impression causing the first movement of anger is “the impression of injury” (species iniuriae). See, for instance, De ira 2.1.3, 2.2.2 and 2.3.5. That first movements follow unavoidably from the impression of one’s having been injured is suggested by De ira 2.2, in which Seneca distinguishes non-voluntary movements in response to the impression that one has been injured from full-blown anger, which one only forms by giving assent to that impression. Unlike anger, Seneca places the “first blow of the soul, which moves us after the impression of injury,” among those things “which happen by a certain condition of the human lot, and so happen even to the wisest” (De ira 2.2.2). The strong implication is that “the first blow of the soul” (primus ictus animi) not only occurs without assent, but also occurs in all humans. For further support, see De ira 2.4.2.

17 As has often been noted, the latter phrase is very similar to Chrysippus’ characterization of people suffering anger as insisting that “this [action on the basis of their emotion] is to be done in any case, even if they are mistaken, and if it is not to their advantage” (Gal. P.H.P. 4.6.27 = SVF 3.475 καὶ ὡς τοῦτο ἐκ παντός γε τρόπον ποιητέον, καὶ εἰ διαμαρτάνουσι καὶ εἰ ἀσυμφοροῦν ἑστὶν αὐτοῖς). See, for example, Sorabji 2000, 61–62, with 62 n. 33.

18 This is confirmed by Seneca’s distinction a couple of lines previously between someone who “has thought that he has been harmed, has wanted vengeance, but has settled down immediately when some consideration speaks against it” and anger “which leaps over reason, which drags reason with it” (De ira 2.3.4).
this account by simply subtracting the notion of rightness from the beliefs correlated with
the second movement (Vogt 2006, 71).

One difficulty with Vogt’s interpretation is that it fails to explain why enraged
people pursue vengeance “not if it is right, but in any case.” For the belief that “I have to
take revenge because I have been offended,” while resistant to the objection that it is not
right to take revenge, is open to the objection that I have not, in fact, been offended, or
that I have not been offended by this person. Thus, according to Vogt’s interpretation,
while emotions are insensitive to concerns of rightness, they remain sensitive to other
countervailing considerations.

Seneca is quite clear, however, that impassioned people at the apex of their
emotion are inadequately responsive not only to considerations of rightness, but to
countervailing considerations of whatever kind. For instance, he writes:

Sibi enim [sc. ira] indulget et ex libidine iudicat et audire non vult et patrocinio non relinquit
locum et ea tenet quae invasit et eripi sibi iudicium suum, etiam si pravum est, non sinit.

For [anger] indulges itself and judges according to its desire and does not wish to listen and does
not leave room for someone pleading on behalf of the defendant and holds those views which it
has entered into and, even if it is wrong, does not allow its judgment to be snatched from it. (Sen.
*De ira* 1.17.7)

In this passage, Seneca argues that anger is wholly unresponsive to arguments showing
that it is wrong to take vengeance, irrespective of their grounds. He expresses a similar
view shortly afterwards:

Etiam si ingeritur oculis veritas, [sc. ira] amat et tuetur errorem; coargui non vult, et in male
coeptis honestior illi pertinacia videtur quam paenitentia.

Even if truth is brought before its eyes, [anger] loves and favors its error; it is not willing to be
refuted, and when it has undertaken a base course of action, obstinacy seems more upright to it
than regret. (Sen. *De ira* 1.18.2)

Presumably then, if someone in a fit of rage were faced with evidence challenging *any* of
his grounds for anger – for instance, evidence showing that the person he is angry with
did not in fact injure him – he would continue to be angry, and so to pursue vengeance, regardless.\(^{19}\) Vogt’s interpretation of the belief correlated with the third movement does not, therefore, explain why people acting on the basis of the third movement, that is of full-blown anger, do so “not if it is right, but in any case,” irrespective of countervailing reasons.

Richard Sorabji, on the other hand, has proposed taking the third movement to be correlated with “something like ‘I must be avenged, come what may’” (Sorabji 2000, 62). His interpretation explains anger’s unresponsiveness to countervailing considerations of whatever kind. However, by including the rider “come what may” in the belief correlated with the third movement, he strips the transition from the second to the third movement of much of its explanatory force. For since nothing in the second movement corresponds to the rider “come what may,” it is difficult to see how, in his view, the third movement follows from the second. Sorabji’s interpretation of the belief correlated with the third movement, therefore, fails to explain why enraged people form the belief correlated with the third movement. Rather, by adding “come what may” to the belief correlated with the third movement, it simply asserts that impassioned people are inadequately reason-responsive.

By contrast, I think that Seneca’s tripartite analysis of the formation of anger gives an elegant explanation of why, according to Stoic theory, enraged people, as well as impassioned people more generally, are inadequately reason-responsive. In my view, the third movement is correlated with the conclusion of the beliefs involved in the second movement, stripped of any reference to the impassioned person’s reasons for holding it.

\(^{19}\) See also *De ira* 1.19.1 and 3.29.2.
That is, the belief correlated with the third movement includes neither the notion of it being “right” to take vengeance, nor one’s reasons for thinking it is right to take vengeance. Rather, the belief correlated with the third movement is simply ‘I must be avenged’.

An advantage of this interpretation is that it explains why someone who holds such a belief would continue to hold it “in any case” (*utique*), irrespective of whatever countervailing reasons might be urged against it. For, in arguing against someone’s belief that it is right for him to take vengeance, one presumably challenges his reasons for holding this belief; but according to the interpretation of the third movement that I have proposed, the belief correlated with someone’s rage does not in fact refer to his reasons for becoming angry. That is, the occurrent belief correlated with his anger is simply ‘I must be avenged’, and not ‘I must be avenged because I have been harmed’ or ‘I must be avenged because it is right for me to be avenged’. To be sure, there is a causal story involving one’s forming the belief in the appropriate reasons at an earlier stage of the emotion’s genesis, namely in the second movement; but the only belief correlated with the emotion itself is the conclusion of the beliefs involved in the second movement, stripped of any reference to one’s reasons for holding it. There is no need, then, to take the belief correlated with the third movement to include the rider that one should continue to hold it “come what may,” irrespective of countervailing reasons. For, as I have been arguing, the occurrent belief in question, “I must be avenged,” is already resistant to countervailing reasons in virtue of its not being coupled with the impassioned agent’s reasons for holding it.
Against the background of his analysis of anger in *On Anger* 2.4, Seneca’s method of treating violent occurrent emotions by opposing them with countervailing emotions, therefore, makes better sense than the standard Stoic method of treating occurrent emotions by arguing against one or the other of the beliefs correlated with them. For if the only belief correlated with anger is ‘I must be avenged’, then it is very difficult to see how someone would persuade an enraged person to abandon his anger by arguing against it. Rather, it would make far better sense to treat his anger by causing him to believe that he must act in a different way. Since emotions are characterized, according to the Stoics, by their ability to occupy the impassioned person’s attention, thereby blinding him to countervailing considerations, a rival emotion would presumably be especially well suited for overriding a violent emotion.\(^{20}\)

It remains to consider why the second movement, if unopposed, leads to the third movement. Although Seneca’s discussion leaves the explanation for this transition underdetermined, it seems to me that we can make good sense of it. First, it is important to appreciate that, according to Stoic theory, the beliefs correlated with the second movement are false.\(^{21}\) More particularly, the belief that “it is right for me to be avenged because I have been harmed” depends on two false beliefs:

(i) The belief that I have been harmed.

(ii) The belief that because someone has committed a crime, he ought to be punished.

\(^{20}\) For the propensity of emotions “as they arise” to “push out” (ἐκκρούειν) even countervailing considerations that would otherwise be clear to them, see Chrysippus’ explanation of the blindness of emotions, preserved in Plu. *On Moral Virtue* 450c = SVF 3.390. Tieleman 2003, 180–181 is a good, detailed discussion of this passage.

The former belief, that one has been harmed, plays an important role in Seneca’s account of the genesis of anger. Indeed, Seneca takes it to be non-controversial to Stoics and non-Stoics alike that in order to become angry one must have the impression of injury (species iniuriae).\(^{22}\)

For Seneca’s criticism of this belief, it is useful to turn to his more extended discussion of injury (iniuria) in On the Constancy of the Wise Man.

Injury has this as its aim, to affect someone with something bad. However, wisdom leaves no place for what is bad (for the only thing that is bad for it is baseness, which is not able to enter where virtue and uprightness already exist); therefore, if there is no injury without something bad […] no injury pertains to the wise man. (Sen. Const. 5.3)

In this passage, Seneca argues that for people to suffer injury they must suffer something that is, in fact, bad for them. But, as he comments, according to Stoic axiology, baseness alone is bad for one; things that are conventionally taken to be bad such as death, sickness, poverty and pain are, for the Stoics, merely “dispreferred indifferents” (ἀποπροηγμένα, or incommoda in Seneca’s terminology).\(^{23}\) Thus, someone only suffers an injury, and so is only harmed in the sense relevant to anger, by becoming more vicious. By contrast, the non-wise most commonly form the belief that they have been injured in response to their being ‘harmed’ in a more colloquial sense, by, for example, someone hitting or insulting them. It follows that, in Seneca’s view, both the impression

\(^{22}\) De ira 2.1.3; see also 2.2.2 and 2.3.5.

\(^{23}\) For an eloquent description of the Stoic distinction between preferred and dispreferred indifferents and virtue and vice, see Sen. Ep. 66.19–20. For the Stoic theory of indifferents, see also the passages collected with commentary in Long and Sedley 1987, 1.354–359 and, for a fuller collection of passages, see SVF 3.117–168.
of injury underlying anger and, if one assents to that impression, the consequent belief that one has been injured are nearly always false.  

The other belief correlated with the second movement of anger – namely, that because someone has committed a crime, he ought to be punished – directly contradicts Seneca’s view that all punishment should be exclusively forward-looking. For, as Seneca writes: “He [the wise man] will always in every punishment observe this: that he may know that one punishment is applied so that it may cure evil men, another so that it may destroy them; and in both he will look not to the past, but to the future […]”. Thus, in Seneca’s view, it is right to punish someone only if doing so will improve either him or the larger community. That someone has harmed one, or otherwise committed a crime, is, therefore, an insufficient reason for one’s punishing him.

Cumulatively, these beliefs greatly exaggerate both the injury one has suffered and the value of taking revenge for it. Thus, it seems likely that someone’s overvaluation of the injury he has suffered, together with his false belief that the people who have harmed him ought to be punished because they harmed him (and not because punishment would benefit either them or the larger community), may lead him to form the further

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24 The only exception would be cases in which someone forms the belief that he has been harmed by being made less virtuous. However, while other people may contribute in an indirect way to someone’s virtue or vice, each person is, in every case, responsible for assenting to false impressions, and so for forming the false beliefs and vicious impulses on which his vice depends. Each person is, therefore, responsible for his own virtue or vice. Thus, the only impression that one has been harmed that may be true is the impression that one has harmed oneself by acting basely; but in such cases the additional belief that it is appropriate to be excited at the prospect of taking revenge on oneself is clearly false. For ancient discussions of this sort of case, see Posidonius’ objection to Chrysippus in Gal. P.H.P. 4.5.28, and Cic. Tusc. 3.77 and 4.61. For commentary, see Graver 2007, 191–211 and White 1995, 241–245.

25 Sen. De ira 1.19.7: “Hoc semper in omni animadversione servabit, ut sciat alteram adhiberi ut emendet malos, alteram ut tollat; in utroque non praeterita sed futura intuebitur […]”. See also De ira 1.6.2–4 and 1.16.2–4.

26 It is worth noting that, according to Seneca, although a person cannot, strictly speaking, be harmed by anyone else, another person may, nevertheless, harm him – by which Seneca means that someone may act with the intention of harming him. Therefore, the belief that someone has harmed one, unlike the belief that one has been harmed, may often be true. For Seneca’s discussion of this point, see especially Const. 7.3–8.
belief that being avenged would be good for him. As has often been noted, this further belief plays a fundamental role in the formation of anger.\textsuperscript{27} For, according to the Stoics, anger is not distress that one has been harmed, but rather the passionate desire for vengeance falsely conceived of as something good.\textsuperscript{28}

Someone who forms the false beliefs correlated with the second movement of anger may, then, come to focus so excessively on taking vengeance that he no longer pays attention to his reasons for doing so or, indeed, to anything else at all, for example anything that might happen to him as a consequence. Seneca seems to have something like this in mind when he comments on the irrationality of enraged people who on account of their belief that they have been harmed act in ways that (at least according to their conception of what being harmed entails) harm themselves far worse.

For instance, in describing the self-destructive anger of barbarians, he writes:

\begin{quote}
Cum mobiles animos species iniuriae perculit, aguntur statim et qua dolor traxit ruinae modo legionibus incidunt, incompositi interriti incauti, pericula adpetentes sua; gaudent feriri et instare ferro et tela corpore urgere et per suum vulnus exire.
\end{quote}

When the impression of injury has struck their excitable minds, they are led away at once, and where their pain has dragged them, disorganized, fearless and incautious they fall on our legions in the manner of a landslide, seeking their own peril; they rejoice to be struck, urge themselves onto the sword, challenge weapons with their body and die through a wound of their own creation. \textit{(De ira 3.2.6)}

According to this passage, enraged people, urged on by their belief that they have been harmed unjustly, often expose themselves to, and even take pleasure in, being harmed far more severely than they were harmed by the injury they are bent on avenging.\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{27} Kaster 2010, 7–8 and Vogt 2006, 66.
\textsuperscript{28} For Stoic definitions of anger, see Sen. \textit{De ira} 1.2.3\textsuperscript{b} = Lact. \textit{Ira} 17.13, Sen. \textit{De ira} 2.1.4, Stob. 2.10c, p. 91Wachsmuth = \textit{SVF} 3.395 and D.L. 7.113 = \textit{SVF} 3.396.
\textsuperscript{29} Along similar lines, in the very beginning of the \textit{De ira}, Seneca describes anger as “raging with the most inhuman desire for arms, blood and torture; it is neglectful of itself provided that it may harm another, rushing onto the very weapons [of those on whom it aims to take vengeance], and is hungry for a vengeance that will draw the avenger with it” (1.1.1).
In my view, the non-voluntary first movement of anger also contributes to the transition from the second movement to the third movement. Following standard Stoic theory, Seneca is emphatic that the first movement caused by the impression of injury occurs without one’s assenting to this impression and is insufficient to compel one to assent to it.\textsuperscript{30} Thus, even the wise, who never assent to false impressions, will suffer non-voluntary first movements in response to the impression of injury.\textsuperscript{31} If, however, a person assents to this impression, then the non-voluntary psychic and physical movements constituting the first movement – say, a quickened heart-beat and an expansion of his psychic \textit{pneuma} – are presumably reinforced by his assent, and so contribute to the phenomenological intensity of his anger, thereby focusing his attention on taking revenge instead of his reasons for doing so. For instance, when comparing the hideous external features of enraged people to their even uglier internal state, Seneca writes:

Qualem intus putas esse animum cuius extra imago tam foeda est? Quanto illi intra pectus terribilior vultus est, acrior spiritus, intentior impetus, rupturus se nisi eruperit!

What sort of soul do you think is within, the external appearance of which is so foul? How much more terrible is the countenance within the enraged person’s chest, how much sharper the breathing, how much more violent the impulse, which will burst through itself, if it does not burst forth! (\textit{De ira} 2.35.4)

Although in this passage Seneca is describing the internal state of someone in a full-blown fit of rage, the features he describes could constitute the first movement of anger as well.\textsuperscript{32}

Seneca thus explains the transition from the second to the third movement of anger by both the non-voluntary movements constituting the first movement and the

\textsuperscript{30} See, for example, \textit{Sen. De ira} 2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.3.5 and 2.4.2. For discussion of the Stoic theory of pre-emotions (\textit{προπάθειαι}), see Abel 1983 and Graver 1999 and 2007, 85–108.

\textsuperscript{31} In addition to the preceding note, see \textit{Sen. Ep.} 99.18, \textit{Const.} 10.3–4 and \textit{Gel.} 19.1.

\textsuperscript{32} See too \textit{De ira} 2.3.2: “For if anyone thinks that pallor and falling tears and the stirring up of obscene liquid, or deep breathing and the sudden brightening of eyes, or anything else similar to these is a sign of an emotion and a sign of the soul, he is deceived and does not understand that these are blows of the body.”
second movement’s overvaluation of actually taking vengeance. Together, these may lead someone to focus excessively on taking vengeance at the expense of remaining attentive to his reasons for wanting to do so, thereby giving rise to the third movement, occurrent anger.

III

So far, I have argued that Seneca’s works introduce a method of emotional therapy into Stoic theory that is otherwise unattested in earlier or contemporary Stoic authors, but which makes very good sense on the basis of the early Stoic theory of the emotions. In particular, it gives due weight to the failure of impassioned people to be adequately reason-responsive. I now want to consider the likely origin of this method of emotional therapy. I will argue that it is best understood as a Stoic interpretation of the standard Epicurean method of treating people experiencing distress, thereby suggesting that it may be Seneca’s own contribution to Stoic theory.

In the Tusculan Disputations, Cicero gives a brief summary of Epicurus’ therapy of distress: “[Epicurus] puts the relief of distress in two things: distraction (avovatione) from thinking of one’s misfortune, and redirection (revocatione) to the contemplation of...

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33 The next source ascribing this method of emotional therapy to the Stoics is the sixth-century Platonist Olympiodorus in Alc. p. 37 Westerink = vol. II p. 54 Creuzer = SVF 3.489.
34 In fact, this method of emotional therapy is indirectly anticipated by a passage from Chrysippus’ On the Emotions, describing the propensity of people who suffer from “lack of psychic tension” (ἀτονία) and “weakness of soul” (ἀσθένεια ψυχῆς) to rashly abandon their countervailing dispositional and occurrent beliefs when faced with a persuasive impulsive impression (PHP 4.6.7–9). Chrysippus, in explaining this phenomenon, quotes a passage from Euripides’ Andromache that describes Menelaos, after the fall of Troy, rushing at Helen in rage with his sword drawn, but forming the passionate desire to embrace her and dropping his sword as soon as he sees her breasts (Andr. 629–630). As in the method of emotional therapy I have been discussing, there is no question here of Menelaos reconsidering the case for anger when he sees Helen. Rather, his occurrent anger is simply overridden by his lust for her. While this passage does not suggest that rival emotions should ever be used to override an emotion, it clearly allows that they are capable of doing so. I want to thank Jula Wildberger for pointing out the relevance of this passage to me.
pleasures.” As the similarity of the terms *avocatio* and *revocatio* suggests, these methods are closely related. While *avocatio* turns a distressed person’s attention away from his distress and from the reasons he has for feeling it, *revocatio* redirects his attention to the contemplation of pleasure. According to Cicero, these methods are really two stages of a single process of consolation, in which *avocatio* from one’s distress precedes *revocatio* to the “memory of past pleasures and the anticipation of future pleasures” (*Tusc*. 3.33 “praeteritarum [sc. voluptatum] memoria et spe consequentium”).

Since *avocatio* and *revocatio* represent distinct steps of the treatment of someone in distress, they must be different in kind. *Revocatio* is not, therefore, a special kind of *avocatio*, but is rather a distinct, though complementary, stage of consolation.

A few lines later, however, Cicero, in rejecting Epicurean therapy, writes in a way that suggests *revocatio* is, in fact, the culmination of a single process of *avocatio*: “For this *revocatio*, which he [Epicurus] recommends, when he calls us away (*avocat*) from dwelling on our evils, is nothing.” Despite this apparent inconsistency, I believe that Cicero’s account is perfectly coherent. For even if there is an essential difference in theory between *avocatio* and *revocatio*, there need not be any such difference in practice: that is, *avocatio* and *revocatio* may often be two aspects, rather than diachronic stages, of a single activity, separable only in account. Presumably then, someone in mourning may

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36 The corresponding Greek terms are uncertain; Graver, following the work of Asmis and Kassel, suggests that *revocatio* translates ἐπιβολή (2001, 171). See too Kassel 1958, 31 and, especially, Asmis 1984, 124–125.

37 Cic. *Tusc*. 3.35: “Nam revocatio illa, quam adfert, cum a contundis nos malis avocat, nulla est.”

38 I want to thank Geir Thorarinsson for urging this point on me in discussion.
turn his attention away from the object of his grief by redirecting his attention to the contemplation of pleasure. Of course, in other cases, *avocatio* and *revocatio* will be distinct diachronic stages of the therapy of distress. For example, someone in mourning may, first, turn his attention away from the object of his grief, without, however, focusing on anything in particular, and only afterwards redirect his attention to the contemplation of pleasure.

Both *avocatio* and *revocatio* also play a role in Senecan emotional therapy. For example, in summarizing his strategies for treating more and less violent episodes of rage, he writes:

Omni arte requiem furori [sc. remedium] dabit: si vehementior erit, aut pudorem illi cui non resistat incutiet aut metum; si infirmior, sermones inferet vel gratos vel novos et cupiditate cognoscendi avocabit.

[My remedy] will give rest to rage by every means: if the rage is rather violent, it will strike it with shame or fear, which it may not resist; if it is calmer, it will apply speeches that are either pleasing or novel and will call the enraged person away by his appetite for knowledge. (*De ira* 3.39.4)

So far, I have focused especially on Seneca’s method for treating people in the grip of violent emotions; however, in this passage, he distinguishes the proper method for treating more and less violent emotions. More particularly, he recommends treating people experiencing more violent emotions by stimulating a rival emotion in them, and treating those experiencing less violent emotions by distracting them (*avocabit*) with “pleasing or novel” speeches. 39 These two methods of emotional therapy are quite similar to Epicurus’ distinction between *avocatio* and *revocatio* – although it is worth noting that for Seneca, unlike Epicurus, they are *alternative* methods of therapy, rather than distinct

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39 I take it that “the appetite for knowledge” (*cupiditas cognoscendi*) that is stimulated by pleasing or novel speeches is not especially vivid, and so is better characterized as a diversion than as a full-blown emotion. At any rate, the passage strongly implies that it would be insufficient for overriding “more vehement” instances of anger. This is also supported by Sen. *Helv.* 17.1–2, which, as we saw in Section I, argues that someone in mourning whose distress “is called away” (*avocatur*) by mere “spectacles” (*spectacula*) is easily called back to mourning by “some slight reminder of his loss” (*levis aliqua desiderii nota*). For another consolatory use of the term *avocare*, see *Polyb.* 8.3–4.
aspects of a single therapeutic method. In particular, I propose that Seneca’s method of
treating more violent emotions should be understood as a Stoic adaptation of Epicurean
revocatio.

Although, for Epicurus, the redirection from distress to the contemplation of
pleasure replaces a harmful psychological state with an objectively better one, if this
redirection causes one to rejoice vehemently, then, from a Stoic perspective, it simply
replaces one vicious emotion, distress, with another vicious emotion, pleasure (hēdonē).
Thus, from a Stoic perspective, Epicurean revocatio is worthwhile only if it causes less
harm than the distress it overrides. Indeed, in some cases it may be worthwhile overriding
someone’s intense pleasure with fear or pain. Seneca’s method of treating people
experiencing violent emotions by stimulating a rival emotion in them may, therefore, be
understood as a Stoic interpretation of Epicurean revocatio.

That Seneca, in fact, had Epicurean emotional therapy in mind in developing his
therapy of violent emotions is suggested by both his well-attested familiarity with
Epicureanism and specific references in his works to Epicurean emotional therapy.40 For
instance, as has been widely recognized, in his consolatory works Seneca often draws on
Epicurean emotional therapy, by counseling his addressees to redirect their attention from
the death or exile of the person they are mourning to their pleasant memories of him.41 A
good example of this is a passage from To Polybius: On Consolation, in which Seneca
endeavors to console Polybius over his brother’s untimely death.

40 In addition to the passages mentioned below, a particularly clear reference to Epicurus’ therapy of
distress is Ep. 78.18.
41 For representative examples in the scholarly literature, see Abel 1967, 26–27, Grollios 1956, 52–54,
Manning 1974, 79–81 and 1981, 46–48, all of whom take this feature of Senecan consolation to be
indebted to Epicurean revocatio. For further examples from Seneca’s consolatory works, see Sen. Marc.
3.4 and 12.1–3, Polyb. 10.6 and Ep. 99.3–5.
Nimis angustat gaudia sua, qui eis tantummodo, quae habet ac videt, frui se putat et habuisse eadem pro nihilo ducit; cito enim nos omnis voluptas relinquit, quae fluit et transit et paene ante quam veniat aufferetur. Itaque in praeteritum tempus animus mittendus est et quicquid nos umquam delectavit reducendum ac frequenti cogitatione pertractandum est: longior fideliorque est memoria voluptatum quam praesentia. Quod habuisti ergo optimum fratrem, in summis bonis pone!

He makes his pleasures excessively narrow, who thinks he enjoys only those things that he has and sees, and considers having had these things to be of no value; for all pleasure leaves us quickly, and flows out and passes by and is nearly gone before it arrives. And thus, the soul must be sent into the past and whatever has delighted us must be led back and must be handled with frequent thought; the memory of pleasures is more lasting and more faithful than present pleasures. Therefore, count among your greatest goods that you had an excellent brother! (Sen. Polyb. 10.3)

Seneca argues that Polybius should not mourn his brother’s death, but should instead be grateful for his pleasant memories of his brother’s life, through which his brother will continue to benefit him. In support of this claim, Seneca argues that the memory of past pleasures is in certain respects even more satisfying than the experience of present pleasures, insofar as it is “more lasting and more faithful than present pleasures.” Thus, according to this passage, so long as Polybius frequently recalls his pleasant memory of his brother, his brother will remain among his “greatest goods” (*in summis bonis*). In addition to its structural similarity to Epicurean emotional therapy, Seneca’s debt to Epicurus in this passage is suggested both by its uncharacteristic emphasis on pleasure and by a passage in the *De Beneficiis* that, in very similar language, ascribes to Epicurus the view that the memory of past pleasures is in certain respects superior to the fleeting pleasures of the present (*Ben. 3.4.1–2; cf. Brev. vit. 10.2–4*).

In light of Seneca’s familiarity with Epicurean *revocatio*, as well as his more general sympathetic interest in Epicureanism, it seems likely that the therapy of violent

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42 Indeed, Seneca’s claim that Polybius should count having had an excellent brother “among his greatest goods” (*in summis bonis*) suggests that pleasure, and not virtue, is the greatest good (*summum bonum*), which is, of course, the Epicurean, and not the Stoic, position. For, according to this passage, the fact that Polybius had an excellent brother is among his greatest goods only because of the pleasure that Polybius may take in his memory of him.

43 For the Epicurean view that the memory of past pleasures are, in certain respects, superior to the experience of present pleasures, see too Plu. *contra Epicuri beatitud. 1099d* = Usener 436 and Cic. *Fin.* 2.106.
emotions he advocates is his own contribution to Stoic theory. Alternatively, it is also possible that an earlier Stoic developed this method of emotional therapy, but that Seneca was attracted to it because of its affinity to the Epicurean method of consolation. At any rate, the similarity of this method to Epicurus’ therapy of distress suggests that whoever first introduced it into Stoicism was self-consciously indebted to Epicurean theory.

Seneca’s therapy of more violent emotions thus shows how a Stoic might integrate the views of other philosophical schools into Stoic theory without abandoning the basic framework of Stoicism.

IV

The next section turns to the role in Senecan emotional therapy of the sub-class of emotions that are useful for moral education, such as shame (pudor), circumspection (verecundia) and regret (paenitentia). Since these emotions are especially characteristic of people who have made ethical progress (προκόπτοντες = proficientes) but are not yet virtuous, I will refer to them by the neologism “prokoptic emotions.” Like other emotions, prokoptic emotions are correlated with false beliefs and are inadequately reason-responsive at their apex. However, they may also play a positive role in one’s becoming virtuous, and so are important for the Stoic theory of moral education.

44 Seneca’s interest in Epicurus is evident throughout his Epistulae Morales and Dialogi. For discussion of his use of Epicurus, see Cooper 2004 and I. Hadot 1969, 47-71.

45 For a detailed discussion of these emotions in Roman society more generally, see Kaster 2005, ch. 1-3.

46 It is unclear who first introduced an analysis of prokoptic emotions into Stoic moral education. The first mention of emotions of this kind in extant Stoic texts is in a fragment from Posidonius’ On the Emotions, in which he raises a paradigmatic case of such emotions as a challenge for Chrysippus’ theory of the emotions. More particularly, against the view that emotions depend on the false belief that a great evil or good is present for one, Posidonius remarks that “people making progress (προκόπτοντος) also suppose that great harms are present to them on account of their vice” (PHP 4.5.26). Prokoptic emotions thus certainly played some role in Stoic ethics by Posidonius’ time, if not earlier. While there is no direct evidence showing that Chrysippus had considered such emotions, a verbatim quotation preserved in Stobaeus, Florilegium 103, 22 = SVF 3.510 shows that he had already distinguished “people making progress” (προκόπτοντες) as a special class.
example, the prokoptic emotion shame (*pudor* = *aισχύνη*), which the Stoics define as ‘the fear of a bad reputation’ (*φόβος ἀδοξίας*), may contribute to moral education by directing one’s attention to other people’s evaluation of one’s character, and so indirectly to the quality of one’s character itself.\(^\text{47}\)

As we have seen, Seneca argues in favor of consoling people suffering violent emotions by stimulating a rival emotion in them. However, it matters a great deal for the explanation of such cases whether one overrides their emotions by an ordinary emotion or by a prokoptic emotion. So far, I have discussed cases where a violent emotion is overridden by an ordinary emotion, but a violent emotion may also be overridden by a rival prokoptic emotion. For instance, as we have seen, in *On Anger* 3.39 Seneca recommends confronting violent rage with either fear (*metus*) or the prokoptic emotion shame (*pudor*). Again, in *On Anger* 3.1, when distinguishing methods of treatment proper to different sorts of people, Seneca writes:

Consilium pro moribus cuiusque capiendum erit; quosdam enim preces uincunt, quidam insul tantque instantque summissis, quosdam terrendo placabimus; alios obiurgatio, alios confessio, alios pudor coepto deiecit, alios mora, lentum praecipitis mali remedium, ad quod nouissime descendendum est. (*De ira* 3.1.2)

Judgment [of what remedy to apply] will have to be taken according to the character of each person: for pleas overcome some people, while others trample over and attack those who give way, whom we will calm by terrifying; others have been cast out of their anger, after it has begun, by rebuke, confession, shame (*pudor*) and delay, a slow remedy for a swift evil, to which one must descend as a last resort.

In this passage, Seneca assigns different methods of emotional therapy to different sorts of people: for more vicious people he recommends terror, for less vicious people he recommends rebuke, confession, shame or delay. Both this passage and *On Anger* 3.39

\(^{47}\) Andronicus, *On the Emotions* 3 = *SVF* 3.409; cf. Diogenes Laertius, 7.112 = *SVF* 3.407. For the most part, our Greek sources use different terms for emotional and eupathic shame: namely, the emotional version is *αἰσχύνη*, and the eupathic version is *αἰδώς*. For further discussion of the role of shame in Stoic moral education, see Kamtekar 1998 and Graver 2007.
recommend confronting an emotion with shame in certain circumstances. However, while in *On Anger* 3.39 Seneca limits the use of shame or fear to the treatment of “rather violent” emotions, in this passage he assigns different methods of emotional therapy to more or less vicious people, rather than to more or less violent instances of anger. Shame, rebuke, confession and, if the other methods fail, delay are only appropriate for treating less vicious people. Despite the apparent conflict between these two passages, I propose that, when read in conjunction, they give Seneca’s criteria for when to use shame as a means of emotional therapy. In particular, one should use shame in order to console less vicious people in the grip of a violent instance of rage.

By contrast, when treating more vicious people suffering violent rage, one should override their rage by fear.

The limitation of the therapeutic use of shame and other prokoptic emotions to the treatment of the more violent emotions of less vicious people is supported by the close connection Seneca draws between relative ethical decency and a developed sense of either shame (*pudor*) or circumspection (*verecundia*). For example, in describing the general immorality of his age, he writes:

> Certatur ingenti quidem nequitiae certamine. Maior cotidie peccandi cupiditas, minor uerecundia est. (*De Ira* 2.9.1)

> Men compete in a huge competition of wickedness. The appetite for sinning becomes greater daily, the circumspect fear of sinning becomes smaller.

According to this passage, “the appetite for sinning” (*cupiditas peccandi*) and “the circumspect fear of sinning” (*verecundia peccandi*) conflict *intrinsically*. Thus, as the one emotion becomes more prevalent, the other diminishes for that reason. Presumably, this

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48 Seneca can only have less vicious, relatively decent people in mind because, according to Stoic theory, virtuous people form only good emotions (*εὐπάθειαι*). Indeed, strictly speaking, all non-wise people are vicious, even if some are closer to virtue than others.

49 As reflected in my translation, I take the term *peccandi* to modify both *cupiditas* and *uerecundia*. This is supported by the use of the phrase *verecundia peccandi* in Brev. *Vit.* 12.5, which I discuss in the following footnote.
is true both of society at large and of individual people as well. For instance, someone who is prone to both emotions will become less prone to one if his disposition to the other becomes stronger.50 Again, later in On Anger, Seneca writes:

Vitare uulgares conuictus memento; solutior est post uinum licentia, quia ne sobriis quidem pudor est. (De ira 3.37.1)

Remember to avoid the common sort of gatherings (vulgares convictus); the license (licentia) of such people is more unrestrained after wine, because they do not even have shame (pudor) when they are sober.

For Seneca, people who frequent vulgar gatherings lack a developed sense of shame altogether. Consequently, such people are characterized by licentia, the propensity to act and speak in unrestrained ways. By emphasizing the rarity of circumspection and shame, and associating both with relative ethical decency, these passages help to explain why Seneca limits the therapeutic use of shame to the treatment of the violent emotions of relatively decent people.51

Seneca’s limitation of the therapeutic use of circumspection and shame also makes a great deal of sense against the background of his analysis of the formation of emotions in On Anger 2.4. As I argued above, in treating someone experiencing a violent occurrent emotion by provoking a countervailing ordinary emotion in him, one challenges neither the belief correlated with the emotion that is being treated nor even the beliefs correlated with the second movement of the formation of that emotion. Thus, even

50 Compare the use of the phrase verecundia peccandi in Brev. Vit. 12.5, in which Seneca argues that vicious people who become Epicureans based on a motivated and grossly inaccurate interpretation of Epicurus’ conception of pleasure, thereby lose their sole remaining good: “the circumspect fear of sinning” (verecundia peccandi).

51 In his comments on the proper ends and kinds of punishment in De Ira I, Seneca also limits the use of prokoptic emotions to the treatment of less vicious people. For instance, in listing the remedies suited to each person’s particular “illness,” he writes: “Let his circumspect fear (verecundia) cure this man, travel this one, pain this one, poverty this one, the sword this one” (I.16.4). Circumspect fear is among the least severe of the remedies in his list, and so is only fitting for treating less severe criminal illnesses; cf. De ira. 1.16.2-3 and 1.19.5 concerning the related prokoptic emotion, regret (paenitentia).
if one succeeds in overriding an emotion by a countervailing ordinary emotion, one does not challenge the impassioned person’s reasons for forming it. Accordingly, the impassioned person is likely to resume her prior emotion if a fresh impression redirects her attention to it or if the emotion overriding it becomes less vivid.

Matters are quite different with shame and circumspection. For if someone ceases to act on the basis of an emotion on account of becoming ashamed of doing so, she also forms the belief that her emotional behavior is open to criticism, and so inappropriate. Her shame thus conflicts intrinsically, and not merely incidentally, with at least one of the beliefs involved in the formation of the emotion it overrides: namely, the belief that it is appropriate for her to be so affected. Thus, unlike ordinary emotions which override other emotions without challenging the beliefs on which their formation depends, shame and circumspection not only override other emotions, but, in doing so, give the impassioned person reason to reconsider her belief that it is appropriate for her to experience the emotion they override.

On the other hand, Seneca is quite emphatic that causing an impassioned person to reconsider the beliefs correlated with the second movement of the formation of her emotion—in the case of anger, the belief that she has been unjustly harmed by someone, and that it is right for her to be avenged for it—is insufficient to override her emotion. Rather, even if an impassioned person at the apex of her emotion were to form the belief that her emotion was inappropriate, she would continue to pursue it regardless. Thus, shame, like ordinary emotions, overrides other emotions only by proving more vivid than they. However, if an impassioned person abandons her emotion on account of becoming ashamed of her emotional behavior, she thereby also comes to hold the belief that it is
inappropriate for her to act on the basis of her prior emotion, which conflicts intrinsically with the belief that it is right for her to be so affected, on which the formation of her prior emotion depended. As such, if she subsequently forms an impression reminding her of her prior emotion, she is less likely to resume her emotion than if it was overridden by an ordinary emotion.

The role of prokoptic emotions in Senecan emotional therapy is confirmed by their role in his consolatory works. For instance, in the beginning of his consolation letter to Marullus, he writes:


Are you expecting consolations? Receive criticism (convicia accipe)! Do you bear the death of your son so effeminately? What would you do if you had lost a friend? A son, an infant, of unsure hope has died; a tiny bit of time has perished. We hunt out causes of pain and we even want to complain unjustly about fortune, as if fortune will not furnish us legitimate causes of complaint. But, by Heracles, you seemed to me already to have enough soul to stand up against solid evils, let alone for these mere shadows of evil, over which men groan for the sake of habit.

In this passage, Seneca strongly criticizes Marullus’ excessive grief over his infant son’s death, which he contrasts with his previous appraisal of Marullus’ character. He complains that Marullus displays an uncharacteristic weakness of soul by mourning his son’s death “so softly” (tam molliter). As such, Seneca’s letter will provide “criticism” (convicia) of Marullus’ excessive grief rather than the more customary

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52 As his addressees are all friends or relatives of his, it is reasonable to expect that his letters of consolation are addressed to people who are (or, at any rate, whom he believes to be) sufficiently decent to be receptive of prokoptic emotions. And indeed, Seneca gives reasons in most of his consolatory works for taking his addressee to be suitably refined so as to be responsive to appeals to shame or circumspection: see, for instance, Ep. 99.3; Marc. 1, 1 and 5; Polyb. 6.2-3; 18.1; Helv. 17.4-5.
“solace” (*solacia*) for his loss. Since Seneca closely associates shame and circumspection with the sensitivity to criticism (*convicia*), it is reasonable to take his unconventional approach in this letter as intended to make Marullus ashamed of his excessive grief. This is supported by Seneca’s tone throughout the letter: for instance, Marullus’ grief “is not only useless, but ungrateful” (*non supervacuus tantum sed ingratus est*); it is “madness” (*furor*); it is “unjust” (*iniquum*) and “stupid” (*stulta*); nothing is “more insane” (*dementius*); nothing is “more foolish” (*stultius*) than it. In addition to arguing against Marullus’ grief, Seneca thus also endeavors to make him ashamed of it.

Similarly, in *To Polybius: On Consolation*, Seneca endeavors to shame Polybius into bearing the death of his brother more lightly.

Nihil te plebeium decet, nihil humile. Quid autem tam humile ac muliebre est quam consumendum se dolori committere? Non idem tibi in luctu pari quod tuis fratribus licet; multa tibi non permittit opinio de studiis ac moribus tuis recepta, multum a te homines exigunt, multum expectant. Si volebas tibi omnia licere, non convertisses in te ora omnium: nunc tantum tibi praestandum est, quantum promisisti. […] Nihil umquam ita potes dignum facere perfecti et eruditi viri professione, ut non multos admirationis de te suae paeniteat. (Sen. Polyb. 6, 2-3)

Nothing common, nothing vulgar is fitting for you. However, what is so vulgar and so womanly (*tam humile ac muliebre*) as to give yourself over to be consumed by distress? When faced with an equal reason for grief, the same thing is not permitted to you as to your brothers; there are many things that the accepted opinion of your studies and character does not permit to you, men demand and expect much from you. If you wanted all things to be allowed to you, you should not have

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53 Indeed, as Seneca writes at the very end of his letter to Marullus, his letter of consolation is intended to encourage Marullus to return to his usual, true character. So, in *Ep.* 99.32, he writes: “I have written this to you, not as if you were waiting for so late a remedy from me (for it is clear to me that you have said to yourself what you will read [from me]), but so that I may criticize this slight delay in which you have withdrawn from yourself, and so that I may encourage you in the future to raise your soul against fortune…” *Haec tibi scripsi, non tamquam expectaturus esses remedium a me tam serum (liquet enim mihi te locutum tecum quidquid lecturus es) sed ut castigarem exiguam illam moram qua a te recessisti, et in reliquam adhortarer contra fortunam tolleres animos….*

54 See, for instance, *De Consolatione ad Marcia* 19.6, in which Seneca in describing the advantages of death for Marcia’s son, Metilius, includes among these advantages that “nor are his circumspect ears (*verecundae aures*) even harassed by any criticism,” *ne conuciis quidem ullis verecundae aures uerberantur*. The close association of shame and the sensitivity to criticism is confirmed by the Stoic definition of shame (*ἀίσχυνη*) as “fear of a bad reputation” (*φόβος ἀδοξίας*); for this definition, see Diogenes Laertius 7.112; Arius Didymus *Ecl.* 2.7.10c, p. 92 Wachsmuth; Andronicus *On the Emotions* 3 = *SVF* 3.409.

55 The citations are from Sen. *Ep.* 99.4, 5, 6, 7 and 18 respectively.
According to Seneca, Polybius’ excessive grief threatens to undermine his reputation both as a scholar and as a virtuous person (*perfecti et eruditi viri*). Indeed, Polybius’ grief is so serious a failing that if he continues to respond to his brother’s death in “so vulgar and womanly” a way, people will not simply cease to admire him, but will even regret having admired him in the past.

Although Seneca’s description of immoderate grief as “so vulgar and so womanly” (*tam humile ac muliebre*) portrays it as intrinsically undesirable, this passage does not insist on the intrinsic badness of Polybius’ grief, but rather on its inconsistency with his reputation and public position. For example, despite portraying immoderate grief as intrinsically undesirable, Seneca contrasts the reaction that it would be appropriate for Polybius to have to his brother’s death with the reaction that would be appropriate for his other brothers. By grieving excessively for his brother’s death, Polybius, *unlike his brothers*, would do something “unworthy of [his] claim to being a perfect and learned man.” So far as this passage is concerned, then, Polybius’ grief is excessive because of his reputation and political station, and not because of its intrinsic baseness. Seneca thus challenges Polybius’ belief that it is appropriate for him to be distressed over his brother’s death, rather than his more fundamental belief that his brother’s death is bad for him.₅⁶ Moreover, by describing the cost that Polybius’ grief will have for his reputation

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₅⁶ In this respect, overriding a violent emotion by stimulating a prokoptic emotion in the impassioned person is similar to Chrysippus’ method of emotional therapy, which also focuses on the impassioned person’s belief that it is appropriate for her to be so affected rather than her more fundamental belief that something good or bad is present to her. Indeed, Cicero, in giving an example of Chrysippus’ method, notes the efficacy of confronting mourners with “the weakness of an effeminate soul” (*imbecillitatem animi effeminate*, *Tusc. 4.60*), which is echoed in Seneca’s characterization of excessive grief as “so vulgar and so
both as a scholar and as a virtuous man, Seneca endeavors to shame Polybius into abandoning his grief.

While I have been arguing that prokoptic emotions play an important role in Seneca’s consolation letters, as well as in his more general theory of emotional therapy, I do not mean to imply that his consolation letters are primarily concerned with stimulating prokoptic emotions in their addressees. Rather, as has been frequently noted, his consolation letters appeal to diverse forms of consolation. Nevertheless, it is striking that while prokoptic emotions play an important role in his consolation letters, Seneca nowhere endeavors to console his addressees by ordinary emotions such as fear or anger. As I have been arguing, this makes excellent sense given both the (at least, presumptive) ethical decency of his addressees and the drawbacks of overriding grief with an ordinary, rather than prokoptic, emotion.

V

The next several sections turn to Seneca’s account of “pre-emotions” (προπάθειαι) and their role in the affective life of the wise. By “pre-emotions” the Stoics mean movements of mind and body that both feel like emotions and involve many of the same physical symptoms associated with them, but, unlike emotions, arise without the agent’s assent and are, thus, non-voluntary. For example, the wise, although they understand perfectly well that their impending death is not bad for them, will, nevertheless, like the non-wise, have a pre-emotional reaction as their ship sinks beneath the surface of the sea (Gell. NA 19.1). However, even if both the wise and non-wise will, as our sources attest, naturally

womanly” (tam humile ac muliebre) in the letter above. However, unlike Chrysippean emotional therapy, prokoptic emotions, according to Seneca’s analysis of the emotions, override occurrent emotions by proving more vivid than them, rather than by overriding one of the beliefs correlated with them.

57 See, for instance, Grollios 1956, 63-64; Manning 1974, 73-81 and 1981, 19-20.
and unavoidably experience pre-emotions as they watch their city burn to the ground or as their ship sinks beneath the sea, we might wonder whether the same range of objects will commonly stimulate pre-emotions in the wise as in the non-wise.\footnote{To my knowledge no secondary work has investigated, let alone suggested an answer to, this question. For discussion of the Stoic theory of pre-emotions, see Abel 1983; Inwood 1985, 175-181 and 1993, 164-183; Graver 1998 and 2007, 85-108; and Sorabji 2000, 66-70.} For example, will the wise also commonly experience a pre-emotion if their tax-refund is less than expected or if someone cuts them off in traffic? I argue that Seneca takes a far more restricted set of objects to stimulate pre-emotions in the wise than in the non-wise. In particular, according to him, the wise naturally and unavoidably experience pre-emotions only in response to merely apparent good or bad things that are, to use Stoic vocabulary, “preferred” (προηγμένα) or “dispreferred” (ἀποπροηγμένα) intrinsically, such as health or sickness; but they do not naturally experience pre-emotions in response to merely apparent goods or bads that are “preferred” or “dispreferred” only instrumentally, such as money or reputation.\footnote{I will give a brief overview of the Stoic theory of value in Section Two below. The main evidence is collected in SVF 3.68-168. For the Stoic distinction between indifferents that are preferred and dispreferred intrinsically (δι᾿ αὑτά) and only instrumentally (δι᾿ ἕτερα), see DL 7.107, Cic. De fin. 3.56-57, Stob. Ecl. 2.7.7b, p. 44 Wachsmuth. For an accessible and helpful introduction, see Brennan 2005, 119-168.} Therefore, while the wise will experience pre-emotions if their city is sacked or if their car spins out of control, they will not experience pre-emotions if they unexpectedly lose a great deal of money or if someone insults them.

The first few chapters of Book Two of Seneca’s On Anger provide our most sustained account of the Stoic theory of pre-emotions. Seneca, in distinguishing emotions from other superficially similar phenomena, describes a wide variety of non-voluntary movements and feelings, ranging from the merely physical, for example, shivering when splashed with cold water, to cases involving the mind in a more robust way, for example,
one’s hair standing on end in response to bad news (De ira 2.2.1).\(^{60}\) The most salient case for the Stoic theory of pre-emotions are Seneca’s examples of non-voluntary movements that are stimulated by false impulsive impressions to which if one assents one will form an emotion. The example of such an impression that Seneca uses most frequently, fitting the argumentative context of his On Anger, is “the impression of injury” (species iniuriae).\(^{61}\) For instance, in On Anger 2.2, he writes:

\[
\text{Ira praeceptis fugatur; est enim voluntarium animi uitium, non ex his quae condicione quadam humanae sortis eueniunt ideoque etiam sapientissimis accidunt, inter quae et primus ille ictus animi ponendus est qui nos post opinionem iniuriae mouet. (De Ira 2.2.1-2)}
\]

Anger is expelled by instruction; for it is a voluntary vice of the soul, and is not among those things that happen by a certain condition of the human lot, and so also occur in the perfectly wise, among which things the initial blow of the soul must be placed, which moves us after the impression of injury.

According to Seneca, someone who is faced with “the impression of injury” (opinio iniuriae) will suffer an “initial blow of the soul” (primum ictum animi),\(^{62}\) and may as a result become red in the face and have an increased heart rate, even if she does not subsequently assent to this impression (De ira 2.3.1-4).\(^{63}\) Therefore, although the wise will never assent to the impression that they have been injured, and so will never actually become angry, if someone strikes them they may experience many of the common symptoms of anger. Thus, unlike merely physical non-voluntary movements, such as blinking when someone extends his finger towards one’s eye, the movements stimulated

\(^{60}\) In distinguishing these two sorts of cases I follow De ira 2.4.2, in which Seneca distinguishes the non-voluntary “first blow of the soul” produced, for instance, by the report of bad news or the impression of injury from merely physical reactions, such as blinking when someone extends a finger towards one’s eye.

\(^{61}\) In addition to this passage, see also De ira 2.3.5, 2.4.

\(^{62}\) For the rather unusual use of opinio to mean impression, cf. Sen. NQ 7.10.3 which seems to use opinio and the more normal species as synonyms: redamus ignem circumacto turbinis accendi et hinc expulsam in sublime praebere nobis opinionem speciemque sideris longi.

\(^{63}\) For a detailed portrayal of the physical phenomena associated with anger, see De ira 1.1.3-4.
by the impression of injury really do constitute a pre-emotion. For if one subsequently assents to this impression, they will form the emotion of anger.64

Seneca’s 99th Moral Epistle helps to explain how the “impression of injury” may cause one to become red in the face and short of breath even without their assent. In particular, he argues that the wise and non-wise alike, when they first hear of the death of a close friend, will cry by “natural necessity” (naturalis necessitas) because the impression of their friend’s death causes a non-voluntary expansion of their soul, which applies pressure to their tear-glands and “pushes” (exprimit) tears out from their eyes (Ep. 99.18).65 According to this model, people experience a pre-emotion when, as a result of being faced with an impulsive impression, they suffer a non-voluntary psychic contraction or expansion, which may in turn have further physical effects, such as tears or an acceleration of their heart rate.

A fragment from Epictetus’ Discourses, which is preserved in Latin translation by Aulus Gellius, helps to fill in the details of the Stoic theory of pre-emotions.66

Propterea cum sonus aliquis formidabilis aut caelo aut ex ruina aut repentinus nescio cuius periculi nuntius vel quid alius est eiusmodi factum, sapientis quoque animum paulisper moveri et contrahi et pallescere necessum est non opinione alicuius mali praeccepta, sed quibusdam motibus rapidis et inconsultis officiun mentis atque rationis praeventibus. Mox tamen ille sapiens ibidem τὰς τοιαύτας φαντασίας, id est visa istaec animi sui terrifica, non adprobat, hoc est όυ συγκατατίθεται όυδε προσεπιδοξάζει, sed abicit respuitque, nec ei metuendum esse in his quicquam videtur. (Fragment from Epictetus Bk. V, preserved in Aulus Gellius’ translation in his Attic Nights 19.1)

Therefore, when there is some frightening sound from the sky or from a falling building, or the sudden report of some danger of whatever kind, or something else of this kind has happened, it is necessary (necessum est) that even the soul of the wise man is moved and contracted a little and [that he] grows pale, not on account of forming the belief that there is something evil, but by certain rapid and unauthorized movements, preceding the work of the mind and of reason.

Nevertheless, soon the wise man does not approve such impressions (τὰς τοιαύτας φαντασίας),

64 See, for instance, De ira 2.1.3, 2.2.2, 2.3.5 and 2.4.1.
65 See, too, the very similar account of eupathic tears of joy in Philo, De Migratione Abrah. 156-57, Vol. 2, p. 299, 3 Wendl = SVF 3.436. According to Philo, as the joyful person’s soul expands, it “presses and squeezes” (θήριόμενον δὲ κατὰ πεζόμενον) the eyes, causing tears.
66 For a survey of Aulus Gellius’ background in and use of the different philosophical schools, see Holford-Strevens 2003, 260-285.
that is to say he neither assents nor gives credence to (οὐ συγκατατίθεται οὐδὲ προσεπιδοξάζει) such terrifying impressions of his soul, but rejects and scorns them, nor does anything in them seem to him of such a kind that it ought to be feared.

According to Epictetus, “it is necessary” (necessum est) that even the soul of the wise is “moved and contracted a little” (paulisper moveri et contrahī) when they are faced with “terrifying impressions” (visa terrifica), such as those portraying a loud sound or the sudden report of danger as something “that ought to be feared” (metuendum). Since the wise do not, of course, believe that any of these things ought to be feared, but rather subsequently “reject and scorn” (abicit respuitque) such impressions, they are presumably “moved and contracted” irrespective of their beliefs. Along similar lines, Seneca, as we saw above, argues that the wise will necessarily experience “an initial blow of the soul” when they are faced with the “impression of injury,” even though they will never assent to this impression (De ira 2.2.2). Together, these passages suggest that emotionally-salient impulsive impressions more generally are a sufficient cause of pre-emotions.

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67 A few lines afterwards, Aulus Gellius comments that the Stoics frequently used the verb together with συγκατατίθεσθαι to describe someone’s assenting to false impressions. It is a stark reminder of how little Stoic writing has survived that Gellius’ uses of the term προσεπιδοξάζειν are its only surviving instances in ancient Greek.

68 As Seneca writes, such first movements are “among those things which happen by a certain condition of the human lot” (ex his quae condicione quadam humanae sortis eveniunt), and which are, therefore, ineliminable.

69 While I have focused on false impulsive impressions, I do not mean to imply that people only experience pre-emotions in response to false impulsive impressions. On the contrary, it is certainly possible that either true impulsive impressions, say an impression correctly portraying one’s virtuous action as something which one ought to rejoice, or impulsive impressions accurately portraying preferred or dispreferred indifferenters as such might also stimulate pre-emotions. However, so far as I am aware, there is no evidence at all bearing on whether impressions of either kind will stimulate pre-emotions in the wise. Accordingly, since it is not at all clear to me what the Stoics would have said about such cases, this essay will deal only with the pre-emotional effect of false, emotionally-salient impressions.
VI

While, as we have seen, there is very good evidence attesting that both the wise and the non-wise will experience pre-emotions, it is less clear whether the same range of things will commonly stimulate pre-emotions in both of them. For while the wise and non-wise alike will have a pre-emotional response as their car spins over the edge of a cliff, we might doubt that the wise will commonly suffer a pre-emotion if they win a game of poker or if their favorite charioteer wins a contest. While a number of texts bear indirectly on this question, our best evidence for this aspect of the Stoic theory of pre-emotions is Seneca’s distinction, in his On the Constancy of the Wise Man, between the merely apparent bads that the wise feel but conquer, and those that they will not even feel, but that commonly stimulate both pre-emotions and emotions in the non-wise.

Sapiens autem a nullo contemnitur, magnitudinem suam nouit nullique tantum de se licere renuntiat sibi et omnis has, quas non miserias animorum sed molestias dixerim, non uincit sed ne sentit quidem. Alia sunt quae sapientem feriunt, etiam si non peruerunt, ut dolor corporis et debilitas aut amicorum liberorumque amissio et patriae bello flagrantis calamitas: haec non nego sentire sapientem; nec enim lapidis illi duritiam ferriue adserimus. Nulla uirtus est quae non sentiat perpeti. Quid ergo est? quosdam ictus recipit, sed receptos euincit et sanat et comprimit, haec uero minora ne sentit quidem nec adversus ea solita illa uirtute utitur dura tolerandi, sed aut non adnotat aut digna risu putat. (Sen. Const. 10.3-4)

The wise man, however, is insulted by no one, for he knows his own greatness and he assures himself that so much power over him is allowed to no one, and all these things that I said are not disturbances of the soul, but rather annoyances (miserias animorum sed molestias) he does not conquer, but rather does not even feel (sed ne sentit quidem). There are other things which strike the wise man, even if they do not overthrow him, like physical pain and weakness, the death of friends and children, the destruction of his country burning in war. I do not deny that the wise man feels (sentire) these things; for we do not attach the hardness of stone or iron to him. There is no virtue which does not perceive that it itself suffers. What, then, is the case? The wise man receives certain blows, but he conquers, cures and checks them, and those lesser things he does not even feel, nor does he use his accustomed virtue of enduring difficult things against them, but either he does not notice them or he thinks them worthy of laughter.

While the wise man “feels” (sentire) but “conquers” (evincit) more serious potentially distressing “troubles” (miserias), “he does not even feel” (ne sentit quidem) mere “annoyances” (molestias). For example, Seneca writes, when a wise person is faced
with the death of a friend, “he receives certain blows (quosdam ictus recipit), but he
conquers, cures and checks them.” By contrast, when someone insults him, “he does not
even feel” it, let alone form an emotion in response. On the other hand, the non-wise will
commonly form emotions when faced either with more serious “troubles,” such as the
prospect of being tortured, or even, as Seneca argues in the immediately preceding
sentences, with mere “annoyances,” such as false accusations or the loss of a long-sought
inheritance (Sen. Const. 10.1-3).

Seneca’s claim that the wise will receive quosdam ictus, “certain blows,” when
faced with more serious potentially distressing events, such as the death of their spouse,
strongly suggests that they will experience pre-emotions in such circumstances.70 For he
commonly uses the term ictus, “blow,” to describe the pre-emotional response to an
emotionally-salient impression.71 For example, in On Anger 2.2 he writes, as we have
seen, that the wise and non-wise alike will experience a non-voluntary, “initial blow of
the soul” (primus ictus animi) in response to the impression of injury. Again, in his 57th
Moral Epistle, when explaining his own propathic response to the darkness (obscuritas)
of an especially dusty carriage trip from Baiae to Naples, he comments:72 “I felt a certain
blow of the soul (sensi quendam ictum animi) and an alteration without fear, which the
novelty of the unusual affair and its unpleasantness caused” (Sen. Ep. 57.3).73 Presumably

70 This is also suggested by Seneca’s claim that the wise “feel” (sentit) such things. As the surrounding
context makes clear, he does not mean that the wise are merely aware of such things, but are not even
aware of, for instance, insults (contumeliae), which they “do not even feel.” For, as he writes, the wise will
often be aware that someone has intended to insult them; but they will simply not be bothered, voluntarily
or otherwise, by that fact (Sen. Const. 12.1-3).
71 For the use of the term ictus to describe pre-emotional movements, see, in addition to the passages cited
in the main text, De ira 2.4.2; 2.25.4; and Ep. 99.18.
72 For Baiae as one of the Roman world’s preeminent vacation towns, see Prop. 1.11, Cic. Cael. 35 and,
73 Moral Epistle 57, 3: sensi quendam ictum animi et sine metu mutationem quam insolitae rei novitas simul
ac foeditas fecerat. In the following sentence, Seneca explicitly extends his experience to the wise as well.
then, when Seneca remarks that the wise will “receive certain blows” (*quosdam ictus recipit*) if they are faced with more serious potentially distressing events, such as the death of a friend, he means that they will experience pre-emotions in such circumstances. Thus, if a wise person’s friend dies, he will suffer a psychic contraction and cry, without, however, assenting to the impression that something bad has happened to him.

By contrast, according to Seneca, a wise person “does not even feel” (*ne quidem sentit*) mere “annoyances” (*molestias*), and so does not experience pre-emotions in response to them. Throughout *On the Constancy of the Wise Man*, “insults” (*contumeliae*) are Seneca’s chief example of a mere “annoyance” that the wise will not even feel, but which will commonly stimulate pre-emotions and emotions in the non-wise. For example, in the first sentence of the passage cited above, he writes that, unlike other people, “the wise man…is insulted by no one” (*sapiens…a nullo contemnitur*), by which he does not mean that no one endeavors to insult the wise, but rather that the wise will never assent to the impression that they have been insulted.74 The impression that one has been insulted is a species of the impression of injury, portraying one’s being treated disrespectfully as harmful. While, according to Stoic theory, as we have seen, all impressions portraying an indifferent as harmful are false, Seneca argues that insults are especially trivial. For instance, earlier in the work, he writes:

> Diuidamus, si tibi uidetur, Serene, iniuriam a contumelia. Prior illa natura grauior est, haec leuior et tantum delicatis grauis, qua non laeduntur homines sed offenduntur. […] Ad tantas ineptias peruentum est ut non dolore tantum sed doloris opinione uexemur. (*Const. 5.1-2*)

For instance, he writes “his [sc. the wise person’s] soul will also be struck, his color will change,” *huius quoque ferietur animus, mutabitur color*.

74 See also Sen. *Const.* 5.1-2 and 16.3. Seneca makes the same distinction between doing and receiving injury. According to him, the wise person never receives injury, but people may nevertheless do him injury in the sense that they may treat him in ways that they (falsely) believe will cause him injury. See, for instance, *Const.* 7, 6: “Here, we ought to understand that it may happen that someone does injury to me, and that I do not receive it […].” *Hoc loco intellegere nos oportet posse euenire ut faciat aliquis iniuriam mihi et ego non accipiam […].*
Let us distinguish, if it seems all right to you, Serenus, injury (iniuria) from insult (contumelia). Injury is by nature more serious, insult, by which men are not harmed but offended, is more trivial and serious only for the delicate. […] We have arrived at such a degree of foolishness that we are vexed not only by pain, but by the opinion of pain.

Seneca’s distinction in this passage between “injury” (iniuria) and mere “insult” (contumelia) corresponds very closely to, and helps to explain, his later distinction between “troubles” (miserias) that stimulate pre-emotions in the wise and mere “annoyances” (molestias) that the wise will not even feel.\(^\text{75}\) For Seneca, more serious potentially distressing events, or “troubles,” such as extreme physical pain or the death of one’s friends, by which people are not merely annoyed but are harmed (at least in a colloquial sense), are more serious than insults.\(^\text{76}\) By contrast, people who are vexed by insult are vexed “not only by pain, but by the opinion of pain” (non dolore tantum sed doloris opinione). Since on Seneca’s theory, as has been argued, the impression of injury necessarily causes an “initial blow of the soul” (De ira 2.2.2), his claim that the wise will not even feel insults implies that the wise will not only withhold assent from impulsive impressions portraying insults as worth being upset over, but that they will not even be faced with any such impressions.\(^\text{77}\) Presumably then, someone has to hold the false belief that his being insulted is harmful in order to form the impression of injury when someone insults him. By contrast, irrespective of their beliefs, people naturally form impulsive impressions, but not emotions, in response to things that are “by nature more serious,” like physical pain, the death of their loved ones and the destruction of their city. Thus, the

\(^{75}\) For instance, contumeliae are Seneca’s primary example of a mere molestia in Const. 10.3.

\(^{76}\) To be sure, according to Stoic theory, since neither of the items Seneca describes are capable of compelling someone to act viciously, neither of them are capable, strictly speaking, of actually harming someone. See, for instance, Const. 5.3-5.

\(^{77}\) For instance, according to Seneca, Cato the Younger, when he was struck in the face while in the public bath, did not become angry, but when the aggressor began to apologize, replied, “I do not recall having been struck” (Sen. De ira 2.31.2, cf. Const. 14.3)
wise, who do not hold any false beliefs, will form false impulsive impressions, and so, too, pre-emotions, only concerning things that are “by nature more serious,” (*natura grauior*), and not concerning mere annoyances, like insults, which are only *conventionally* disturbing.78

Although Seneca does not explain why people commonly form false impulsive impressions portraying insults and other mere “annoyances” as harmful only if they, in fact, believe that being insulted is harmful for them, but they form false impulsive impressions concerning more serious “troubles” irrespective of their beliefs, this makes very good sense on the basis of Stoic axiology. As is well known, the Stoics sharply distinguished between things that *really* are good or bad, such as virtue and vice and virtuous and vicious actions, and things that are only *apparently* good or bad, including life, pleasure and material success, all of which are altogether “indifferent” (*ἀδιάφορα*) for the overall quality of one’s life (DL 7.102, Cic. *De fin.* 3.50-51).79 Among such “indifferents” (*ἀδιάφορα*) the Stoics distinguished between those that have “value” (*ἄξια*) or “disvalue” (*ἀπάξια*) and so are commonly worth pursuing or avoiding, which they called “preferred” (*προηγμένα*) or “dispreferred” (*ἀποπροηγμένα*), and those that are “wholly indifferent” (*καθάπαξ ἀδιάφορα*), such as, to use a Stoic example, whether the number of stars is even or odd (Stob. 2.7.7, p. 79 Wachsmuth, DL 7.104, *ES M.* 11.59). Among preferred and dispreferred indifferents, they made yet a further distinction between those that are preferred or dispreferred “*in themselves*” (*δι᾿ αὑτά*) and those that

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78 As we will see in Section Four below, there are some exceptions to this: namely, a wise person’s affective history and idiosyncratic physical constitution may also cause him to form such impulsive impressions irrespective of his beliefs. However, *qua* wise, he will only form impulsive impressions, and pre-emotions, concerning things that are “more serious by nature” (*gravior natura*).

are preferred or dispreferred only “for the sake of other things” (δι᾿ ἑτερα, DL 7.107, Cic. De fin. 3.56-57, Stob. Ecl. 2.7.7b, p. 44 Wachsmuth). For example, while the Stoics took health to be intrinsically preferred, and thus to be worth pursuing even if nothing else comes from it, money is preferred only for its utility in acquiring intrinsically preferred indifferents, such as health, and in avoiding intrinsically dispreferred indifferents, such as sickness.

Seneca’s distinction in his On the Constancy of the Wise Man between “troubles” (miseriae) and “annoyances” (molestiae) makes very good sense on the basis of the Stoic distinction between things that are preferred and dispreferred intrinsically and those that are preferred or dispreferred only instrumentally. For example, while insults, which are Seneca’s primary example of a mere “annoyance,” are worth avoiding only insofar as they harm one’s reputation, which the Stoics take to be dispreferred only instrumentally, the more serious injuries that the wise feel but conquer, notably physical pain and the death of their friends, are all intrinsically dispreferred. Similarly, Epictetus’ examples of impressions that naturally and unavoidably stimulate pre-emotions in both the non-wise and the wise are also of intrinsically preferred and dispreferred indifferents. For instance, he describes as terrifying the intense pre-emotional effect of an impression portraying the imminent threat of death either at sea or in a collapsing building, which is, of course, intrinsically dispreferred (Gell. NA 19.1).

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80 For the distinction between indifferents preferred and dispreferred in themselves and merely productive preferred and dispreferred indifferents, see, Stob. 2.7.14 Wachsmuth = SVF 3.133; Cic. De Fin. 3.56-57 = SVF 3.134 and 159; and DL 7.107 = SVF III 135.

81 For the standard Stoic view that good reputation (δόξα, εὐδοξία) is preferred only instrumentally, see, e.g., Cic. De fin. 3.57 and Stob. Ecl. 2.7.7e, p. 83 Wachsmuth.

82 Both of these examples reflect common dangers in the Roman world. For an entertaining and vivid account of the risk of one’s apartment building collapsing, see Juv. 3, 190-211.
This interpretation gains further support from Seneca’s claim in several works that the wise will not suffer any emotional reaction at all, whether voluntary or non-voluntary, if they unexpectedly acquire or lose a great deal of money or if they suffer a slight to their reputation.\(^{83}\) For example, in his 87\(^{th}\) Moral Epistle, Seneca, after describing the positive effect of his rather frugal camping trip with his friend Maximus on his moral well-being,\(^{84}\) comments on his own residual attachment to his wealth and reputation:

Durat adhuc perversa recti verecundia, et quotiens in aliquem comitatum lautiorem incidimus invitus erubesco, quod argumentum est ista quae probo, quae laudo, nondum habere certam sedem et immobilem. (Ep. 87.4)

My perverse embarrassment regarding the right still endures and as often as we encounter some more luxurious group, I blush unwillingly (invitus erubesco), which is proof that these things that I approve and that I praise do not yet have a firm and immobile seat.

According to Seneca, the fact that he feels embarrassed and blushes “unwillingly” (invitus) when he passes more luxurious traveling parties is “proof” (argumentum) that he is not yet wise. As his use of invitus shows, his reaction does not express an emotion, which are voluntary according to the Stoics, but rather a pre-emotion. However, as we have seen, for Seneca, the destruction of one’s city or the death of one’s friend do naturally and unavoidably stimulate pre-emotions in both the wise and non-wise alike, whatever their beliefs (Const. 10.4; Ep. 99.16-19; cf. De ira 2.2-3). Thus, if Seneca’s non-voluntary feeling of embarrassment and blushing really are proof that he is not yet wise, then he experiences a pre-emotion when his reputation is threatened only because

\(^{83}\) In addition to the passage cited in the main text, see, e.g., Tranq. 1.4-9, 14.3; Vit. Beat. 21-22; Ep. 36.6. For the indifference of the wise to money, see too Plu., De Stoicorum Repugnantiis 1043e = SVF 3.153.

\(^{84}\) Seneca claims that by living with relatively little property for a few days, he has recognized how insignificant for his well-being material possessions are and has, thus, become less fearful of financial losses and of poverty (Ep. 87.3). His camping trip thus functions as a method of ethical training or emotional therapy, reminiscent of Posidonius’ recommendation that one imaginatively “dwell in advance” (προενδημεῖν, PHP 4.7.8) among conventionally distressing things. For a more detailed account of this practice, and its popularity in various forms among Seneca’s contemporaries, see his 28\(^{th}\) Moral Epistle, as well as the discussion in Newman 1989.
of his continuing and unwarranted concern for both his wealth and his reputation among other members of the Roman elite.\footnote{In the opening pages of \textit{De tranquilitate animi}, one of Seneca’s closest friends, Annaeus Serenus, reports his own very similar experience of, first, feeling morally uplifted by his exercise in voluntary poverty and, then, his non-voluntary embarrassment when he encounters, for instance, the luxurious set-up of some teacher or the gilded outfits of another person’s slaves. Although, as he comments, he is not made worse by these experiences, he takes them to illustrate that he not yet wise (\textit{Tranq}. 1.4-17, esp., 1.4-9).}

Our evidence suggests, therefore, that Seneca takes the wise to naturally and unavoidably form false impulsive impressions, and so also to experience pre-emotions, \textit{only} concerning indifferents that are preferred and dispreferred intrinsically. By contrast, the non-wise will commonly experience both pre-emotions and emotions regarding indifferents that are preferred and dispreferred merely instrumentally, as well as those that are preferred and dispreferred intrinsically.

\textbf{VII}

It remains to consider why the wise, who understand perfectly well that preferred and dispreferred indifferents are not, in fact, good or bad, would continue to form impressions falsely portraying them as such. I argue that the Stoic account of human development helps to explain this. According to the Stoics, children under the age of fourteen are not yet rational animals, and thus, like non-rational animals more generally, do not act on the basis of reason, but instead act directly and immediately on the basis of persuasive impressions depicting objects either as things to be pursued or as things to be avoided.\footnote{As Clement describes, for the Stoics, animals are incapable of judging and, as a result of their judgment, resisting or accepting persuasive impressions; instead, they “are carried away with” (\textit{συναποφέρεσθαι}) their impressions (Clement \textit{Stromat}. 2 p. 487 Pott = \textit{SVF} 2.714, cf. Cic. \textit{De off}. 2.11). For the Stoic account of animal action, see especially Inwood 1985, 18-26, 66-91.}

For example, as soon as a child is born, it is immediately and naturally attracted to things that will preserve it and is averse to things that will destroy it.\footnote{For the Stoic account of childhood development, see especially DL 7.85 = \textit{SVF} 3.178, Gell. \textit{NA} 12.5 = \textit{SVF} 3.181 and Cic. \textit{De fin}. 3.16 = \textit{SVF} 3.182. For discussion, see Brunschwig 1986.} As children mature, they
come to recognize a broader class both of things that are commonly conducive to their well-being, such as food and the proper-functioning of their limbs, and of things that are commonly inimical to their well-being, such as illness or burning stove-tops. Of course, the first objects to which children are attracted and averse are preferred and dispreferred intrinsically. For a person’s affective relationship to indifferents that are preferred and dispreferred intrinsically is the basis for his attraction and aversion to indifferents that are preferred and dispreferred only instrumentally. Children will, therefore, naturally and instinctively pursue intrinsically preferred and dispreferred indifferents as worth pursuing or avoiding.

Indeed, even after a human reaches the age of reason at around fourteen, she will continue to avidly pursue and avoid preferred and dispreferred indifferents. For instance, the 3rd-2nd century BC Stoic Diogenes of Babylon defined the human end as “to choose well in the selection of and rejection of things according to nature” (εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν τῇ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἐκλογῇ καὶ ἀπεκλογῇ, Stob. Ecl. 2.7.6a, p. 76 Wachsmuth = SVF 3 Diogenes 44-46), by which he means to choose well in the selection and rejection

88 As Diogenes Laertius writes: “Nature, in constituting the animal, orients the animal to itself. For thus it pushes away harmful things and embraces what is beneficial.” (νυστησαμένην αὐτὸ οἰκεῖωσαι πρὸς ἐαυτό, οὕτω γὰρ τὰ ἐκλάποντα διοικεῖται καὶ τὰ οἰκεία προσέχεται, DL 7.85)
89 Recall that for the Stoics all human vice is explained by either the persuasiveness of things or the influence of those around one (DL 7.89 = SVF 3.228, Gal. PHP 5.5.14 De Lacy = SVF 3.229a). For an account of how newborn children in particular may be corrupted, see, e.g., Chalcidius ad Timaeum 165 = SVF 3.229.
90 Of course, since children have not yet reached the age of reason, their impressions will not, at least most commonly, be propositional, but will instead simply portray such objects in an attractive or unattractive way. The impressions of children are complicated by the fact that, although they are not rational animals, in the Stoic sense, until age fourteen, they, of course, begin using and comprehending language much earlier. Presumably then, the impressions of children may involve propositions in a way in which the impressions of a dog will not. Nevertheless, children, like all non-rational animals, will act directly on the basis of their impulsive impressions. For discussion of the impressions of non-rational animals, see Brittain 2002, 256-274.
91 For the age of reason according to the Stoics, see the passages collected in SVF 1.149 and 2.83, with the discussion of Inwood 1985, 72-75.
of preferred and dispreferred indifferents. While their impulses as children were previously stimulated directly by their impressions of certain things as worth pursuing or avoiding, adult humans will form impulses only if they assent to an impulsive impression portraying something as worth pursuing or avoiding, and so form the belief that it really is worth pursuing or avoiding. However, while adults are responsible for and have control over giving and withholding assent from impressions, they are not similarly responsible for the impressions with which they are faced. For example, a wise person who is being tortured cannot simply decide not to form an impression portraying her intense physical pain as terrible for her, even if she may refuse to give assent to it. Nevertheless, we might wonder why the wise are faced with impressions that do not correspond to any of their beliefs and to which they will never assent?

As we have seen, for the first fourteen years of their lives, the impulses of the wise, like all other humans, were primarily directed at or away from intrinsically preferred and dispreferred indifferents. Moreover, even after they reach the age of reason,

92 Similarly, Antipater of Tarsus is reported to have defined the human end as “to live continuously selecting the things in accordance with nature and rejecting the things contrary to nature (ζῆν ἐκλεγομένους μὲν τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ἀπεκλεγομένους δὲ τὰ παρὰ φύσιν διηνεκῶς, Stob. Ecl. 2.7.6a, p. 76 Wachsmuth = SVF 3 Antipater 57-58). Even the wise will, therefore, continue to pay attention and, in ordinary circumstances, to select and reject preferred and dispreferred indifferents, respectively. Seneca discusses this point at length in De vit. beat., see especially, 22-23. For ancient criticism of this position, see already Posidonius’ remarks, as reported by Galen, in PHP 5.6.10-11. For discussion of Diogenes and Antipater’s definitions of the τέλος, see A.A. Long 1967 and G. Striker 1986.

93 To be sure, there is a fair amount of evidence suggesting that the Stoics allowed animals as well as humans a faculty of assent: see especially Alexander of Aphrodisias De Fato 13, p. 181 Bruns = SVF 2.979 and Nemesius De Natura Hominis 35, p. 258 = SVF 2.991. However, by attributing assent to non-rational animals, the Stoic clearly do not mean that animals are in a position to consider and evaluate their impressions — indeed, this is explicitly denied by several texts (e.g., Origen De principibis 3.1.2-3, p. 108 Delarue = SVF 2.988; Clemens Stromat. 2.20.110-111, p. 487 Pott = SVF 2.714). Instead, by non-rational assent I take it that they wish to account for the role that an animal’s habituation and memory may play in the impulses it forms. For example, the Stoics might explain a well-trained dog’s resisting an attractive impulsive impression portraying the steak on its master’s table as worth pursuing, by its memory either of past punishments or of past rewards for good behavior. In either case, the dog does not choose to forego the steak; rather its countervailing impressions are simply more effective than the impression portraying the steak as attractive. For discussion of non-rational assent, see especially Inwood 1985, 75-91 and Long 1996, 244-246.
they continue, for the most part, to pursue preferred indifferents and to avoid dispreferred indifferents. Presumably then, the wise continue to be faced with false impulsive impressions portraying intrinsically preferred and dispreferred indifferents as good or bad because their attraction and aversion to such things is, in Seneca’s phrase, “an unconquerable and inevitable” (\textit{inuictum et ineuitabile}, \textit{De ira} 2.2.1) aspect of human nature, stemming from their deep childhood, and even adult, attachment to them.\textsuperscript{94}

By contrast, their affective attachment and aversion to indifferents that are preferred and dispreferred only instrumentally is presumably less deep for the following reasons. First, since their attachment to instrumentally preferred and dispreferred indifferents, such as money and reputation, arises only several years after birth, when they have developed sufficiently to care about such things, it is presumably less deeply ingrained than their attachment to intrinsically preferred indifferents such as their own health, which they care about as soon as they are born and throughout infancy. Second, the Stoics may also have held that children first become attracted and averse to indifferents that are preferred and dispreferred merely instrumentally on the basis of their more fundamental attraction and aversion to intrinsically preferred and dispreferred indifferents. For instance, it seems plausible that the attraction that a seven year old feels for money arises largely from his underlying attraction to the things which he can acquire with it, such as candy or admission to an amusement park. If he did not think that he could use it for \textit{anything}, then he would be no more attracted to it than to other pieces of paper.

\textsuperscript{94} For an account of how such pre-emotions might prove beneficial for the wise, see H. Lorenz 2011, 209-211.
Matters are more complicated with the childhood concern with reputation. For while a good reputation may have significant external benefits, such as facilitating their interaction with their peers, the concern that children feel for it is not, I think, plausibly understood as directed solely at acquiring external goods. Rather, children presumably value a good reputation at least in part for what it indicates about themselves. For example, even if a child does not anticipate any other advantages from having a good reputation, she might value a good reputation as a sign of her own good character or natural ability. But in that case, she will still value her reputation not for its own sake, but on account of what it indicates about herself. Thus, while the stance that children have to their reputation may be more complicated than their attraction to money, the Stoics might reasonably have argued that children first develop their interest in developing a good reputation because of its contribution to other, antecedent concerns of theirs.

As we have seen, the Stoics took the attraction and aversion of children to merely instrumentally preferred and dispreferred indifferents to be less deeply ingrained than their attraction and aversion to indifferents that are preferred and dispreferred intrinsically. Moreover, since the wise do not believe that even intrinsically preferred and dispreferred indifferents are good or bad, their ineradicable affective attachment to them will not commonly extend to indifferents that are preferred or dispreferred only instrumentally. The Stoic theory of childhood development thus offers a straightforward explanation of why intrinsically preferred and dispreferred indifferents alone naturally and unavoidably stimulate pre-emotions in the wise.
So far I have argued that, according to the Stoics, the wise commonly experience pre-emotions only when faced with the presence or imminent prospect of intrinsically preferred or dispreferred indifferents. By contrast, several Stoic texts present examples of wise people experiencing pre-emotions when faced with indifferents that are preferred or dispreferred only instrumentally, which may seem to contradict this interpretation. For example, Seneca, in discussing the fear of public speaking, notes that this fear is ineliminable for people who are predisposed to it, even if they become wise (Ep. 11.1-7). But in that case, since the fear of public speaking presumably expresses the speaker’s concern with the quality of his reputation, which, as we have seen, the Stoics commonly took to be preferred only instrumentally (Cic. De fin. 3.57 and Stob. Ecl. 2.7.7e, p. 83 Wachsmuth), it follows that the wise may also suffer pre-emotions regarding indifferents that are preferred or dispreferred only instrumentally.

Although such cases may seem to militate against the interpretation for which I have been arguing, our sources are quite clear that such non-standard pre-emotions reflect idiosyncratic aspects of the affective histories and physical constitutions of the wise people experiencing them, and so will not naturally and unavoidably occur in the wise more generally. This is suggested by several passages in which Seneca describes the significant and ineliminable effect that a person’s congenital physical constitution has on her proneness both to pre-emotions and emotions. For example, in On Anger 2.19,

95 Seneca discussion of this concludes with the following line, describing such non-voluntary and congenital propensities (Ep. 11.7): “Wisdom promises nothing against these things. It does not accomplish anything: they arise of their own accord, they come unbidden, they leave unbidden,” Nihil adversus haec sapientia promittit, nihil proficit: sui iuris sunt, iniussa veniunt, iniussa discedunt.
96 Sen. De ira 2.19-20. As Seneca argues, one’s initial nature is not the only determining factor in the relative proportion of elements constituting one’s soul: age, gender, diet and other factors are also
Seneca, following a popular line of Hellenistic physiognomic theory, ascribes different emotional propensities to people whose souls have a preponderance of different elements. As he writes, people with a “fiery soul” (feruida animi natura) are especially prone to anger (iracundos), and those with an airy or “cold mixture” of soul (frigidi [sc. animi] mixtura) are prone to timidity (timidos). Moreover, since “it is not possible to change once and for all the elements that were mixed at our birth,” such physical propensities are ineliminable. However, as we have seen, the Stoics held that in order to form an emotion one must first assent to a false impulsive impression, and so form certain false beliefs, which the wise will never do. Therefore, the ineliminable propensity of someone whose soul has a preponderance of fire cannot be to the emotion of anger, which the wise will never experience, but to anger-salient pre-emotions. It also seems likely that people with fiery souls will experience comparatively more intense pre-emotions when faced with the impression of injury. Accordingly, a person’s idiosyncratic physical constitution may make her especially disposed both to experience certain pre-emotions and to experience particularly intense episodes of them.

Again, in his 11th Moral Epistle, Seneca comments on the effect that the physical constitution of the wise may have on their affective life.

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significant. For the ineliminability of such propensities, see De ira 2.20.2: “Indeed, it is difficult to change nature, and it is not possible to change once and for all the elements that were mixed at our birth,” Naturam quidem mutare difficile est, nec licet semel mixta nascentium elementa convertere.

97 Compare the very similar accounts of Lucretius 3.282-322; Posidonius, as reported in Gal. PHP 5.5.22-29; and Galen himself in, e.g., Gal. QAM 4.821 Kuhn. For ancient physiognomy more generally, see the texts collected in Förster 1893.

98 Sen. De ira 2.19.2: Iracundos feruida animi natura faciet; est enim actuosus et pertinax ignis: frigidi mixtura timidos facit; pigrum est enim contractumque frigus.

99 Sen. De ira 2.20.2: “[...] nec licet semel mixta nascentium elementa convertere.”

100 This is implied by Seneca’s claim that the amount of fire available to someone affects not only how prone to anger he is, but also on how quickly and for how long he becomes angry (De ira 2.19.4-5).
Hic illum, quantum suspicor, etiam cum se confirmaverit et omnibus vitiis exuerit, sapientem quoque sequetur. Nulla enim sapientia naturalia corporis aut animi vitia ponuntur: quidquid infixum et ingenitum est lenitur arte, non vincitur. (Ep. 11.1)

I suspect that this [propensity to blush] will follow him even when he has strengthened himself, has stripped himself of all vices and become a wise man. For the natural vices of the body or the soul are not set aside by wisdom: whatever is implanted and inborn is lightened, not conquered, by art.

Seneca is quite emphatic that “natural vices of the body or the soul” (naturalia corporis aut animi vitia) affecting one’s propensity to pre-emotions may belong to the wise, as well as to the non-wise. Thus, even if Lucilius’ friend, whom Seneca is describing in this passage, achieves wisdom, his wisdom will not remove his propensity to blush entirely, but will, at best, alleviate it. In the immediately following sections of the letter, Seneca gives several examples of people with an ineliminable and congenital propensity to blush when speaking to a large audience. He distinguishes between people such as Pompei and Sulla, who, Seneca claims, blushed and stammered when speaking before a crowd irrespective of their extensive experience of public speaking (Ep. 11.4), and people such as the philosopher Papirius Fabianus, Seneca’s teacher and friend, with a less severe predisposition, who blush on account of both their natural propensity and their inexperience. Seneca, in discussing Fabianus’ stage fright when testifying before the Senate, comments:

Non accidit hoc ab infirmitate mentis sed a novitate rei, quae inexercitatos, etiam si non concutit, movet naturali in hoc facilitate corporis pronos. (Sen. Ep. 11.5)

This did not happen from the weakness of his mind, but from the novelty of the circumstance, which moves, even if it does not disturb, inexperienced people (inexercitatos) who are prone to this by a natural propensity of their body.

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101 Shortly before, Seneca writes: “neither training nor practice ever expels these things, rather nature exercises her force and reminds even the strongest of herself by this fault,” haec nec disciplina nec usus umquam execuit, sed natura vim suam exeret et illo vitio sui etiam robustissimos admonet (Ep. 11.2).

102 For discussion of Papirius Fabianus and his relationship with Seneca, see Griffin 1976, 39-41.
Although Fabianus blushes partly because of his ineliminable natural propensity \((\textit{naturalis facilitas})\) to become nervous when speaking in front of a large audience, Seneca implies that had he been a more experienced public speaker he would either not have blushed at all or he would, at least, have blushed far less deeply. Thus, in Seneca’s view, habituation may also play an important role in determining the pre-emotions to which one is liable.\(^{103}\) By contrast, people with a more extreme natural propensity \((\textit{naturalis facilitas})\) to become nervous and to blush as a result, like Pompei or Lucilius’ friend, will continue to blush and to tremble when speaking before a large audience, irrespective of their experience with public speaking.

A passage from \textit{On Anger} 1.16 suggests that a wise person’s previous affective history may also affect her susceptibility to pre-emotions. In particular, Seneca, in explaining the propensity of the wise to experience pre-emotions of anger when they observe vicious people enjoying material prosperity or acting basely, writes:

\begin{quote}
Sed tam commoda illorum [sc. improborum] sine inuidia uidebit quam scelera sine ira; bonus iudex damnat inprobanda, non odit. ‘Quid ergo? non, cum eiusmodi aliquid sapiens habebit in manibus, tangetur animus eius eritque solito commotor?’ Fateor: sentiet leuem quendam tenuemque motum; nam, ut dicit Zenon, in sapientis quoque animo, etiam cum uulnus sanatum est, cicatrix manet. Sentiet itaque suspiciones quasdam et umbras adfectuum, ipsis quidem carebit. (\textit{De ira} 1.16.7)
\end{quote}

But as he [the wise man] will view the prosperity of vicious men without envy, so he will view their crimes without anger; a good judge condemns deeds that ought to be blamed, he does not hate them. ‘What then? When the wise man has something of this kind at hand, will his soul not be affected, will he not be moved more than ordinary?’ I confess: he will feel some slight and delicate movement. For, as Zeno says, a scar also remains in the soul of the wise man even when the wound has healed. And thus, he will feel certain hints and shades of the emotions, but he will lack the emotions themselves.

Although the wise will not become envious or angry, they may feel “some slight and delicate movement” \((\textit{leuem quendam tenuemque motum})\) when they observe a

\(^{103}\) Cf. \textit{De Ira} 2.20.2 in which Seneca, in the context of explaining various “beginnings and causes” \((\textit{initia causaerque})\) of the proclivity to anger, writes: “habit has the greatest force,” \((\textit{plurimum potest consuetudine})\).
vicious person enjoying prosperity or acting basely. Seneca explains this “slight movement” by citing an otherwise unattested quotation of Zeno of Citium, the founder of the Stoic school, according to which “a scar (cicatrix) also remains in the soul of the wise man even when the wound (vulnus) has been healed.”

Although scholars have often taken this quotation to explain the ability of preferred or dispreferred indifferentes more generally to stimulate pre-emotions in the wise, it is unclear how the pre-emotions commonly experienced by the wise could have their origin in the “scars” left behind by “wounds” formed earlier in their lives. For the wounds and their resulting scars are, at least in theory, avoidable, and so are not natural in the normative Stoic sense, even if most wise people will have suffered them. Therefore, if this passage is consistent with Seneca’s own comments later in On Anger, and elsewhere, it cannot give his explanation of why pre-emotions are a natural and ineliminable part of human nature. For if Seneca had quoted Zeno in order to explain why the wise ever suffer any pre-emotions at all, then a wise person who becomes wise according to nature would not, in his view, be susceptible to pre-emotions, directly contradicting his view, as has been argued, that such pre-emotions are a natural and ineliminable part of human nature.

Instead, I submit that, like the other passages we have seen, Seneca cites Zeno in order to explain certain non-standard pre-emotions that only some wise people will

104 For the use of the term “scar” (cicatrix) to refer to the residual psychological effects of a past emotion, see also Sen. Marc. 1.5 and Cic. Tusc. 3.54.
105 For representative examples, see I. Hadot 1969, 132n38; Abel 1983, 89; Inwood 1985, 177; and Sorabji 2000, 70n30. For criticism of this line of interpretation, see Cooper 1998, 99n50; Griffin 1976, 180n4; and Kaster 2010, 28n105.
106 Similarly, the Stoics define emotions as certain “unnatural movements of the soul” (κίνησις ψυχῆς παρὰ φύσιν, Stob. Ecl. 2.7.6 p. 88 Wachsmuth = SVF 3.378, Clemens Strom. 2 p. 460 Pott = SVF 3.377), even though very nearly everyone forms them most of the time. For the Stoics, then, something’s being natural or unnatural is often simply unrelated to the frequency with which it actually occurs.
107 See, e.g., De Ira 2.2.1-2; 2.3.1-3; Moral Epistle 57.3-6; and 99.18.
experience in virtue of idiosyncratic features of their psychology.\textsuperscript{108} (Of course, as often with the Stoic theory of nature, it is perfectly consistent with such pre-emotions being “unnatural” that nearly all wise people suffer them.) This interpretation is supported by the cases that Seneca uses Zeno’s quotation to explain: namely, the propathic reaction of the wise when they observe vicious people either enjoying material prosperity or acting basely. For it is not at all clear why the wise would commonly suffer pre-emotions in either of these cases. To take the former case first, since, as we have seen, a wise person would not commonly experience a pre-emotion, let alone an emotion, even if \textit{she} were unexpectedly to lose or acquire a great deal of money himself, why would she commonly experience a pre-emotion if \textit{she} were to observe another person, vicious or otherwise, enjoying material prosperity?

It is less clear what the natural response of the wise would be to the base actions of vicious people. For since, according to Stoic theory, vicious deeds really are base, they may seem to be appropriate objects for the pre-emotions of the wise. Yet, if it were natural for a wise judge to experience pre-emotions when he contemplates the crimes of a vicious defendant, then we would expect him also to experience pre-emotions \textit{whenever} he observes base people performing vicious deeds. But in that case, given the Stoics’ remarkably exacting standards for non-vicious behavior (recall that on the Stoic account \textit{all} of the impulses of the non-wise are thoroughly vicious), the wise would form pre-

\textsuperscript{108} To be sure, I intend this an interpretation of Seneca’s use of this passage and not of Zeno’s intention in writing it. We know far too little about Zeno’s own theory of the emotions, let alone about the authenticity or context of this quotation, to hazard an interpretation of its significance within his own philosophy. For recent discussion of Zeno’s philosophy of the emotions, see R. Sorabji 2002, 221-238 and T. Tieleman 2002, 185-220.
emotions whenever they contemplated the behavior of the non-wise, which is absurd.\textsuperscript{109} It thus seems likely that the vicious deeds of other people are too ubiquitous to stimulate pre-emotions in the wise, at least absent special reason.\textsuperscript{110} Presumably then, if a wise person experiences “some slight and delicate movement” (\emph{leuem quendam tenuemque motum}) when she observes vicious people either enjoying material prosperity or acting unjustly, it is only because of some idiosyncratic feature of her physical constitution, habituation or emotional history.

Therefore, according to Stoic theory, at least as Seneca understands it, a person’s physical constitution and past experiences influence both the range of objects that will stimulate pre-emotions in her and also the intensity of the pre-emotions she experiences. Thus, in addition to things that will naturally and unavoidably stimulate pre-emotions in the wise and non-wise alike, some wise people may experience pre-emotions regarding an unusually wide range of things, including things that are preferred and dispreferred only instrumentally, on account of their idiosyncratic natural disposition and experiences. Nevertheless, although different wise people may be prone to pre-emotions concerning different ranges of objects, I hope to have shown that the wise and non-wise alike will \textit{naturally} and \textit{unavoidably} experience pre-emotions \textit{only} when faced with indifferents that are intrinsically preferred or dispreferred.

\textsuperscript{109} Along similar lines, Seneca argues against Theophrastus’ alleged claim that a good man will necessarily be angry with evil men, by pointing out that “in this way, each man will be more inclined to anger the better he is” (\textit{isto modo quo melior quisque, hoc iracundior erit}), which, Seneca claims, is absurd (\textit{De Ira} I 14, 1).

\textsuperscript{110} We might expect that just as the wise shed propathic tears in response to the death of their family members but not in response to the death of strangers, so too, they may perhaps naturally and unavoidably experience pre-emotions when they witness especially base actions of their children or spouse. However, so far as I am aware there is no textual evidence directly supporting this line of interpretation.
IX

In sum, this chapter has focused on aspects of Seneca’s theory of the emotions that are otherwise unattested in extant Stoic sources. The first four sections argued that Seneca introduces a novel method of emotional therapy into Stoic philosophy that, despite deriving ultimately from his reading of Epicurus, makes very good sense on the basis of the early Stoic theory. I also argued that this method of emotional therapy is supported by Seneca’s innovative analysis of the formation of anger, which gives a novel and philosophically sophisticated explanation of how, according to Stoic theory, emotions may fail to be adequately reason-responsive despite being based entirely on the impassioned person’s coming to form, and hold, certain beliefs.

The second half of the chapter turned to Seneca’s account of the pre-emotions of the wise. I argued that while intrinsically preferred and dispreferred indifferents will naturally and unavoidably stimulate pre-emotions in the wise and non-wise alike, absent special explanation, the wise will not experience pre-emotions when faced with indifferents that are preferred or dispreferred merely instrumentally. Nevertheless, even though the wise will not naturally experience pre-emotions regarding merely instrumentally preferred or dispreferred indifferents, such as wealth or insults, such things may, nevertheless, stimulate pre-emotions in certain wise people on account of idiosyncratic features of their physical constitutions and affective histories.

While this chapter is not, of course, a comprehensive study of Seneca’s theory of the emotions, I hope to have shown both that he makes significant and philosophically sophisticated innovations in the Stoic theory of the emotions, and, at the same time, that his innovations are based on, and perfectly consistent with, the fundamental tenets of
Stoic moral psychology. Seneca’s innovations in Stoic emotional therapy thus provide a model of how a later Stoic might develop Stoic theory without any hint of heterodoxy.
Conclusion

My study has focused largely on the Stoics’ explanation of why emotions are, in their terms, “excessive” and “rejecting of reason” despite depending fundamentally on certain occurrent evaluative beliefs. According to the Stoics, emotions are “excessive” and “rejecting of reason” primarily in the sense that once formed they are no longer fully under the control of the people experiencing them, so that even if an impassioned person recognizes that their emotion is inappropriate they may nevertheless continue to experience it and to be moved by it to act voluntarily in an emotional way. Although scholarship on the Stoic theory of the emotions has for the most part given more attention to the Stoic view that emotions depend fundamentally on, and express, certain false occurrent evaluative beliefs, the reception and development of Stoic theory, at least through Seneca, focuses not on this aspect of the Stoic theory, but instead on their view that emotions are “excessive” and “rejecting of reason.” For example, while Chrysippus, Posidonius and Seneca all agreed that emotions express false evaluative beliefs, they each offered distinct and innovative explanations of how it is possible for someone to act on an emotion despite recognizing that it is wrong or inappropriate to do so.

As Chapter One argued, Chrysippus explained the propensity of impassioned people to continue to experience and to act on their emotions even if they form the desire to calm down, by appealing to the Stoic conception of reason as an extended, material thing and arguing that certain parts of reason may contain, or rather simply be, distinct and conflicting evaluative beliefs and perhaps even impulses. His conception of reason thus directly contradicts Plato’s view, followed by Aristotle, that a single part or aspect of the soul cannot at the same time be disposed in different ways with respect to the same
Therefore, within the context of ancient philosophy, the most radical aspect of early Stoic moral psychology was not, as scholarship has generally held, their proposing an explanation of human activity and virtue on the hypothesis that all of any adult human’s desires and beliefs belong to reason alone, which Socratic dialogues such as the Protagoras and the Laches had perhaps already attempted; but instead their conception of reason as itself capable of explaining the full-range of psychic phenomena recognized by the Greek philosophical tradition, crucially including synchronic conflict between practical beliefs and perhaps even between occurrent impulses to act.

By contrast, Posidonius had a far more restrictive conception of reason, according to which reason itself is incapable of occurrent internal conflict. For example, as was argued in Chapter Two, his idiosyncratic interpretation of Chrysippus’ account of the cognitive content of the emotions reflects his endeavor to explain Chrysippus’ theory on the basis of his own quite different conception of reason. Nevertheless, despite abandoning the early Stoic conception of reason, Posidonius’ own innovations in the Stoic theory of the emotions preserved the Stoic insight that emotions depend fundamentally on certain false evaluative beliefs. Thus, like all of the Stoics, Posidonius took assenting to an impulsive impression, and so forming certain false evaluative beliefs, to be a necessary condition of forming an emotion. However, unlike other Stoics, he explained the excessiveness of emotions by positing a distinct, non-rational aspect of the

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1 The classical statement of the principle that the same part of the soul cannot simultaneously be disposed in different ways in respect to the same thing is Pl. Resp. 4.436a8-c2. For Aristotle’s commitment to this view, see, e.g., EN 1102b13-1103a10, especially 1102b13-25.

2 For an influential account of “Socratic Intellectualism,” see, e.g., Segvic 2000. For criticism of the standard account, see Devereux 1995 and Brickhouse and Smith 2012. For my present purposes, this scholarly debate is not especially important. For however we ought to read the Socratic dialogues, it is very likely that the early Stoics read the early Socratic dialogues as background for their own monistic moral psychology. For discussion of the early Stoic use of the Socratic dialogues, see Cooper 1999, especially 96-107; Long 1988; and Striker 1994.
soul, which, he argued, plays an essential and constitutive role in the formation of emotions. For Posidonius, then, if someone continues to act on their emotion despite abandoning the beliefs correlated with it, it is not because of any conflict within reason itself, as Chrysippus had argued, but because the non-rational aspect of their soul is not fully under the control of reason.

Like Posidonius, Seneca also introduces a novel account of the excessiveness of emotions. As I argued in Chapter Three, his innovative analysis of the formation of anger into three “movements” (*motus*), or stages, offers an explanation of why, according to Stoic theory, emotions are inadequately reason-responsive despite depending fundamentally on the impassioned person’s forming, and holding, certain occurrent beliefs. While only the third movement is full-blown anger, the other two are necessary preliminaries to the third movement. Although the second movement is correlated with the beliefs more commonly correlated with anger (namely, that one has been unjustly harmed by someone and that it would, therefore, be right for one to take vengeance), the third movement, which is the emotion itself, is correlated *only* with the conclusion of the beliefs involved in the second movement, stripped of any reference to the impassioned person’s reasons for holding it. That is, the belief correlated with the third movement includes neither the notion of it being “right” to take vengeance, nor one’s reasons for thinking it is right to take vengeance. Rather, the belief correlated with the third movement is simply “I must be avenged.” Thus, on Seneca’s account, even if an enraged person were to recognize that, say, taking vengeance would *not*, in fact, be good for them, say, because of the devastating retaliation that is likely to follow, they may nevertheless continue to experience and to act on their anger *because* their emotion is correlated solely
with their belief that “they must be avenged,” and not with their antecedent belief that being avenged would be good for them, which their recognition contradicts.

While Posidonius and Seneca developed the Stoic theory of the emotions in novel and philosophically interesting ways, they are also crucial sources for the early Stoic theory itself. For instance, as was argued in Chapter Three, Seneca is far and away our best source for the Stoic theory of pre-emotions (προπάθειαι), which may already have been significant in Chrysippus’ theory.⁴ Again, Posidonius’ method of preventative emotional therapy, which recommends that people vividly imagine that merely apparent goods or evils are present to them in order to develop an affective familiarity with such things, may also develop themes that were already present in early Stoicism.⁴ Indeed, given the paucity of early Stoic sources, it is often impossible to be certain whether an apparently novel element of a later Stoic’s discussion of the emotions is an addition to the early Stoic theory or simply an aspect of the early theory of which we are simply otherwise unaware. Nevertheless, despite the limits of our evidence, I hope to have shown that the Stoic theory of the emotions, from Chrysippus through the later Stoics Posidonius and Seneca, was more complex and philosophically interesting than has generally been appreciated in scholarly work on the topic.

After Seneca, the next significant moments in the history of the Stoic theory of the emotions are the innovations introduced by Epictetus and, following him, Marcus Aurelius. While a comprehensive history of the Stoic theory of the emotions would have

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³ For discussion of when the Stoic account of pre-emotions, if not yet the terminology, were first introduced into Stoic theory, see especially, Abel 1983; Graver 1998; Sorabji 2000, 66-70; and Weisser 2012.
⁴ See, for example, Teun Tieleman’s discussion of the affinities between Posidonian emotional therapy and early Stoic theory (2003, 311-314). While, in my view, he exaggerates the extent of the similarity between the two views, he convincingly shows that Posidonius’ method of preventative emotional therapy does not mark as strong a break between Posidonius and the early Stoics as, for instance, Galen’s presentation of Posidonius’ theory suggests.
to discuss them as well, there is, in my view, a natural break between the reception and development of the early Stoic theory by Posidonius and Seneca and its reception and development by Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. For, unlike Posidonius and Seneca, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius were largely uninterested in the early Stoic description of emotions as “excessive” and “reason-rejecting” impulses. Instead, their account of the emotions focused on the dispositional states and beliefs that make people prone to emotions, as well as on developing practical strategies for moral education. For example, Epictetus is our best source for the Stoic account of the positive role that certain emotions – particularly shame, agony, and the passionate desire to become virtuous – may play in moral education despite being correlated with false beliefs. Thus, although my dissertation does not provide a comprehensive history of the Stoic theory of the emotions, it gives a detailed overview of a thematically cohesive and especially philosophically innovative period of that history.

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5 For discussion, see especially Kamtekar 1998.
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