CHALLENGING CHANGE: LOCAL POLICIES AND THE NEW GEOGRAPHY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION

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Abstract

Over the past three decades, the US foreign born population spread from a few major cities into smaller cities and towns across the country. This dissertation describes unappreciated implications of this geographic dispersal and tests theories about the way citizens and local governments in these “new immigrant destinations” reacted. I first use a representative survey from a pair of matched North Carolina counties—one with a rapidly growing immigrant population and one without—to test theories of how an influx of immigrants may change natives’ opinions about immigration. Only natives in precarious economic circumstances appeared to feel threatened by local immigration. I also explore the relationship between opinions about immigration and political beliefs, media consumption and parenting.

I then construct a unique dataset showing that 215 local governments considered policies intended to restrict immigration from 2000 to 2009. Greater changes in a jurisdiction’s foreign born population share are associated with a greater probability that an anti-immigration policy will be considered. I find that this association is stronger if that jurisdiction voted Republican in 2004 or was located outside of a traditional immigrant gateway state. Geographic dispersal caused the immigrant population to grow more quickly in areas with these characteristics. As a result, simulations show that geographic dispersal of the foreign born population was a key factor promoting the boom in local anti-immigration policy proposals.

Case studies and media accounts suggest that immigrants and Hispanics left or avoided jurisdictions that implemented anti-immigration policies. I test whether these policies impacted the demographic composition of these communities by examining changes in the ethnic makeup of students attending local schools, while taking economic conditions into account. Implementing a 287(g) immigration enforcement agreement is associated with substantially smaller increases in the percent of students who are Hispanic two years following the agreement. This association appears to result not from the policies alone, but from the interaction of the policies and increasing unemployment. I find no association between other types of local immigration control policies and subsequent changes in the percent of students who are Hispanic.
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Chapter One: The new geography of American immigration

Introduction to the dissertation

This dissertation is inspired by a simple question: does it matter where immigrants settle? Important changes in the size and geographic distribution of the foreign-born population in the United States have made this question relevant. The immigrant population of the early twenty-first century is not only much larger than it was in the middle of the previous century, but also located in very different places. From 1971 to 1995, 78 percent of new immigrants settled in one of five states (New York, California, Florida, Texas, and Illinois) and 48 percent went to one of five metropolitan areas (Parrado and Kandel 2008:26). This geographic concentration meant that immigration existed comfortably in the past for most Americans living outside of the Southwestern states and gateway cities such as New York, Chicago and Los Angeles.

As the immigrant population grew from 7.9 percent of the US population in 1990 to 12.6 percent in 2007, the immigrant population also dispersed geographically. The cities and towns that can be considered “established immigrant destinations” still attract many immigrants, but they have been joined by hundreds of “new immigrant destinations.” By 2005, only half of recently arrived immigrants were in the top five states named above. A steadily increasing share of immigrants settled in Southern and Midwestern states like Georgia, whose foreign-born population quadrupled from 1990 to 2007 (Migration Policy Institute 2008). In total, nineteen states had foreign-born populations that more than doubled between 1990 and 2007.

One of the results of this growth pattern is that a much greater number and larger variety of American communities now host significant immigrant populations. The number of counties whose foreign-born population share was over 10 percent more than doubled, from 119 counties in 1990 to 317 counties in 2007, for example. Immigrants now constitute a major share of the population in rural farming towns, booming suburbs and major urban centers that received little immigration earlier in the twentieth century. This dispersal has thus broadened and changed the contexts of reception under which immigrants adapt to life in the United States.

In many respects, the answer to the question “does it matter where immigrants live?” appears to be a clear “yes.” Social scientists have provided important examples of why life for immigrants is different in the new immigrant destinations than in the established immigrant destinations, producing numerous journal articles and several prominent edited volumes on the subject (Jones 2008; Massey
2008; Singer, Hardwick, and Brettell 2008). The news media has also been attracted to the drama of immigrants infiltrating formerly all-white suburbs or replenishing the declining populations of rural areas.

However, when it comes to the politics and policies surrounding US immigration, it is less clear whether it matters where immigrants live. There are reasons to believe that it does: Many theories of the way that native-born citizens form opinions about immigration and immigrants ascribe an important role to the size and characteristics of the local immigrant population. I review these theories in detail in Chapter Two, but simply put, they postulate that having immigrants nearby changes the opinions of natives either by presenting economic and social threats or by providing opportunities for cooperation and learning.

If local immigrant population characteristics change opinions about immigration, whether favorably or unfavorably, there may be important implications for the way we think about the politics of immigration at the national level and the recent proliferation of state and local laws regarding immigration. After all, this broader engagement between American political systems and immigration occurred at all levels of representative government. For example, in 1990 25 percent of electoral districts for the US House of Representatives had populations that were over 10 percent foreign-born. By 2007, 44 percent of US House districts had populations that were at least 10 percent foreign-born.

Chapter Two of the dissertation addresses this question of whether having a sizeable, newly settled immigrant population changes the way that native residents of a locality think about immigrants and immigration policy. It uses a unique, representative phone survey of natives to compare the opinions about immigration expressed by residents of a North Carolina county that received extensive recent immigration against a nearby, comparable county that did not. Marta Tienda and I demonstrate that the pattern of associations between personal characteristics and opinions about immigration differs between the two counties, but only in limited ways: People who feel economically insecure are more likely to express unfavorable opinions about immigration if they are residents of the county with high levels of immigration, while political liberals in the immigration county expressed more favorable views of immigration than their counterparts in the non-immigration county. Other factors such as educational attainment and being the parent of a school-aged child have extremely strong associations with respondents’ opinions about immigration, but there were not clear differences in these associations between the two counties. There was little sign that natives in general felt more threatened by immigration in the immigration county than the other county. In fact, respondents in the immigration
county expressed more favorable opinions about immigration overall than respondents in the other county, although this was likely due to differences in the composition of the two counties’ native populations.

The opinions that natives express about immigration may or may not relate to actual policies, which are the subject of the third chapter. The first decade of the twenty-first century brought worrisome signs of friction between immigrants and natives. Between 2000 and 2009, at least 215 county and municipal jurisdictions seriously considered local policies intended to restrict immigration or limit its effects on their community. Of these jurisdictions, 156 enacted such a policy. These laws thus provide a convenient, if unfortunate, indicator of jurisdictions where natives are especially concerned about or resistant to immigration in general or illegal immigration in particular. They are also a policy phenomenon worth studying in their own right: The US Constitution reserves control of immigration to the federal government, so any devolution of this power to localities is historically and legally notable.

Hopkins (2010) showed that a growing immigrant population share was associated with a higher probability that a local jurisdiction will consider an anti-immigration policy,¹ but it is unclear whether the popularity of these policies was related to geographic dispersal of the foreign-born population. My analysis shows that where immigrants settle does in fact matter: Geographic dispersal played an important role in promoting these ordinances by causing the immigrant population to grow rapidly in more conservative areas of the country and in states that were not traditional immigrant gateways. In the empirical model I test, these two characteristics are found to make localities more “sensitive” to growth of the immigrant population, increasing the probability that they would consider such measures.

If immigrant settlement patterns affect policy formation at the local level, do local policies then in turn affect where immigrants settle? Chapter Four tests the hypothesis that local anti-immigration policies have affected the demographic makeup of the jurisdictions that considered and passed them. I measure the response of Hispanic student age population growth to these policies, studying this population both for its own sake and as a rough proxy for the Hispanic foreign-born population. I show that most types of policies had no measurable effect on the growth of the Hispanic student population. 287(g) policies—a arrangement in which local police participate in enforcement of federal immigration

¹ It should be noted that, although I use “anti-immigration” as convenient shorthand to describe these diverse policies, some proponents of such ordinances would argue that they are instead intended to support immigrants, especially legal immigrants. For example, a measure intended to prevent the hiring of unauthorized immigrants can be considered a way to improve employment prospects for authorized immigrants; “English-only” laws can be viewed as a way to encourage immigrants to learn English.

Chapter One
laws—were associated with reduced growth of the Hispanic population, but only two years after the policies were implemented and in combination with local increases in unemployment. This finding that restrictive policies and poor economic conditions intersect to make localities less attractive to Hispanics has broad implications. Other studies found major impacts from restrictive local and state policies on foreign-born and Hispanic population sizes, but may have not fully considered the implications of the severe employment loss that occurred in the same years.

These three analytical chapters follow the impact of geographic dispersal of the foreign-born population from its impact on individual natives to its role in policy formation and then complete the feedback loop by considering the impact of these policies on the ongoing process of geographic dispersal. I test theories of how individuals and local governments respond to changes in the demographic make-up of local populations, and how immigrants respond to policies directed at them. Each of these hypotheses proceeds from observations about the way that the foreign-born population of the United States has dispersed as it has grown over the past two decades. In this first chapter, I lay a descriptive foundation for the analyses that follow, by highlighting important aspects of the modern geography of American immigration and showing why theory and existing research suggest that they are shaping the future of immigration policy.

**Describing the new geography of American immigration**

Over the past twenty years, important characteristics of each of the three components of the immigrant integration process have changed: The immigrants themselves, the natives they come into contact with and the social, economic and physical environment in which immigrants and natives interact. The geographic dispersal of the foreign-born population played an important role in changing each of these elements. As the foreign-born population grew from 1990 to 2007, it grew fastest in localities that previously had few immigrants, in smaller cities and in localities with nondurable manufacturing industries (such as meatpacking), shifting the contexts in which immigrants and natives encounter each other. The native side of the equation changed as well: Geographic dispersal led the immigrant population to grow more quickly in areas with where natives had more conservative political preferences and lower levels of education. Finally, the fact that the most recent cohorts of immigrants settled in different locations than their predecessors means that a larger number of localities have immigrant populations with few naturalized citizens and that are disproportionately Latin American. Each of these elements may raise the potential for conflict between natives and immigrants, a hypothesis that I test in Chapters Two and Three.
These trends capture the recent past of American immigration, but there is no guarantee that they will continue into the future. The combination of the recent recession and restrictive policy measures at the federal, state and local levels could halt the growth of immigrant populations in new settlement areas, or even reverse it. However, there is little sign, based on either the descriptive evidence presented here or the analysis in Chapter Four, that this is the case. Despite economic and policy headwinds, growth of the foreign-born population continues to be strongest outside of established immigrant destinations. The issues that this introduction and the dissertation raise will remain relevant for some time.

I highlight these trends in two ways. First, I group US localities by the relevant characteristics, such as their population size, and show how the distribution of the foreign-born population across these grouping changed between 1990 and 2007. Second, I make these changes more concrete by comparing “new immigrant destinations” (localities whose immigrant population share was small as of 1990, but grew substantially afterwards) against “established immigrant destinations” (localities where immigrants were already a sizeable share of the population in 1990). I draw on the existing empirical and theoretical literature to show how these trends and differentials are socially important, and point out how my own research and findings demonstrate the connections between the new geography of immigration and today’s immigration policy.

**Data sources and unit of analysis**

I describe American localities in this chapter primarily using US Census Bureau estimates from the 1990 and 2000 Census and from the 2005 to 2009 combined waves of the American Community Survey (ACS). The use of the pooled ACS data enables the use of estimates for small population groups, such as rural and suburban counties and places. However, it also introduces an element of imprecision—rather than representing a single moment or year, these estimates are based on a sample taken over five years (Schechter 2010). Thus, while in this discussion I will often refer to the midpoint of this sample, “2007,” as if it was a single point in time, I am in fact referring to the 2005 to 2009 period. I supplement these data sources with data on the number of votes cast for each candidate in the 2004 US Presidential elections, unemployment estimates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and industrial employment estimates from the Census’s County Business Patterns data (Bureau of Labor Statistics n.d.; Haines Stewart III n.d.; Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research 2008; Larsen various; US Census Bureau Economic Planning and Coordination Division n.d.).
Selection of a geographic unit of analysis presents a challenge in this descriptive chapter and throughout the dissertation. Other researchers have studied the dispersal of the foreign-born population using states (Liaw and Frey 2007; Massey and Capoferro 2008), regions (Crowley, Lichter, and Qian 2006), metropolitan areas (Singer 2004), counties (Crowley et al. 2006; Donato et al. 2007), and Census places (Parisi and Lichter 2007) as their primary unit of analysis.

My goal here is to capture demographic change as residents perceive it in their daily life, in schools, the workplace and the job market, in a way that is relevant to political decision-making at the sub-state level. This leads me to use the county (or equivalent) as the primary unit of analysis in this description. I restrict my analysis to the 2849 (of 3141) county equivalents from the 50 states and the District of Columbia with populations of 5,000 or more in the 2000 Census. Relative to the chief alternative, the Census place, the county has the advantages of having a clear and stable definition, more closely approximating the geographic extent of local labor markets in many cases and being more extensively used in the existing literature on new immigrant destinations. Further, the county is the smallest geographical unit for which estimates of some economic and political characteristics are available. The key insights generated in this description are robust to using the Census place as the unit of analysis (roughly equivalent to the city, town or municipality). I thus do not present the description separately for the two units of analysis, but provide additional place-level descriptive statistics in Table 2.

Defining new and established immigrant destinations

A comparison of the characteristics of “new” and “established” immigrant destinations provides one useful tool for understanding the changes brought about by geographic redistribution of the immigrant population. I define “established immigrant destinations” as counties that had 7.9 percent of their population foreign-born in 1990. Seven and nine-tenths percent of the US population was foreign-born in 1990. “New immigrant destinations” are those counties that were less than 7.9 percent foreign-born in 1990, but that had at least a 5 percentage point change in the share of their population that was

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2 County-level analysis can obscure place-level variation (and vice-versa). The same general patterns discussed here exist in both place and county-level analysis. Furthermore, there is a high degree of correlation between place and county-level population characteristics. The correlation coefficient between place-level percent foreign-born and the percent foreign-born in the county that contains that place is 0.80 for places of 5000 persons or more. The correlation between place-level change in percent foreign-born between 1990 and 2007 and the same measure at the county level is 0.63.
foreign-born between 1990 and 2007. Under these definitions, 233 counties qualify as new immigrant destinations, while 139 counties qualify as established immigrant destinations. “Non immigration counties” were below 7.9 percent foreign-born in 1990 and had less than a 5 percentage point change in the share of their population that was foreign-born between 1990 and 2007.

These definitions are necessarily arbitrary, and a host of plausible alternative definitions or subcategories could be used instead (e.g., Lichter and Johnson 2006; McConnell 2008; Singer and Suro 2002). However, small changes in these definitions do not change the insights generated here: the goal of defining new and established immigrant destinations is simply to compare the characteristics of communities where the foreign-born population has grown rapidly from a relatively small base against those where there was a substantial existing foreign-born population in 1990.

**Growth, dispersal and the making of the new immigrant destinations**

Two fundamental forces have shaped the geography of American immigration since 1990. The first is the growth of the US foreign-born population. The US immigrant population grew 89 percent between 1990 and 2007. This dwarfed the native-born population growth of 17 percent in the same period. This growth was uneven, however: The foreign-born population grew at much higher rates in counties where the foreign-born composed a small share of the population as of 1990 than in areas with larger immigrant population shares (Figure 1). As a result, the immigrant population distribution shifted and the new immigrant destinations came to hold a greater share of the nation’s foreign-born population. A number of reasons for this geographically uneven growth have been identified, including strong job and population growth in the “Sun Belt” of the Southeast and Southwest, restructuring of food processing industries, legalizations from the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, increased border controls and anti-immigration political activism in California (Durand, Massey, and Capoferro 2005; Kandel and Parrado 2005; Liaw and Frey 2007; Massey and Capoferro 2008; McConnell 2008).

As a summary measure of this dispersal, the index of dissimilarity between the 1990 foreign-born population and the 2007 foreign-born population is 0.20, when calculated at the county level. This

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3 In Table 2, I compare new and established immigrant destinations defined at the Census place of population 5,000 or greater, using the same criteria. These criteria identify 1376 new immigrant destination places and 933 established immigrant destination places.

4 The index of dissimilarity is: \[ .5 \sum_{i} \left| \frac{a_i}{A} - \frac{b_i}{B} \right| \], where \( a_i \) and \( b_i \) are the populations of the two groups in county \( i \) and \( A \) and \( B \) are the total populations of these groups.
means that 20 percent of today’s immigrant residents would need to move to a different county in order to replicate the geographic distribution of immigrants in 1990. As a result of changed settlement patterns, the foreign-born population distribution became more like that of the native population: The index of dissimilarity between native and foreign-born populations dropped from 0.47 in 1990 to 0.40 in 2007, at the county level. However, the magnitude of this dispersal should not be exaggerated: The foreign-born population remained highly concentrated. In 1990, three quarters of all immigrants lived in just 75 counties. By 2008, three quarters of all immigrants still lived in only 111 of 3141 counties.

These two major forces—growth and dispersal of the foreign-born population—made immigration a daily fact of life for the first time in generations in many communities. As of 1990, only 10 percent of counties were more than 5 percent foreign-born. By 2007, 25 percent of counties were above this threshold. The growth of the foreign-born population was at least as important as its dispersal: Even without changes in the distribution of the foreign-born population, growth alone would have raised the proportion of counties that were at least 5 percent foreign-born to 18 percent.

In 1990, nearly 60 percent of the US native population lived in counties whose populations were less than 5 percent foreign-born (Figure 2). By 2007, this figure had dropped by almost half. Immigrants were also living in areas where higher proportions of the population were fellow immigrants. Despite geographic dispersal toward areas that formerly had few immigrants, the overall growth of the foreign-born population meant that the average immigrant in 2007 lived in a county with a higher share of immigrants than did the average immigrant in 1990. Somewhat counter-intuitively, the phenomenon of geographic dispersal destinations does not mean that today’s immigrants are living in communities that have few immigrants.

Dispersed settlement patterns meant that immigration was suddenly an immediate issue for jurisdictions across the country, not just the residents of a few “gateway” cities. Further, growth and dispersal of the foreign-born population meant that immigration became a pressing issue not only in new localities, but also in new states: Only 23 percent of new immigrant destination counties were in the “Big Five” traditional immigration states of California, New York, Illinois, Texas, and Florida, compared with 69 percent of established immigrant destination counties. As Marrow (2005) notes in a review of the literature on the new immigrant destinations, states are the primary level of government responsible for social service provision in the US, although localities have primary responsibility for schooling and law enforcement in most states. The novelty of immigration to both states and localities is
important given that American system of government assigns local, state and federal governments important responsibilities for social policy and, recently, immigration policy.

This novelty—the existence of a sizeable immigrant population where none existed twenty years ago—accounts for much of the interest by social scientists in the “new” immigrant destinations. There are reasons to believe that the process of immigrant integration may proceed differently where the immigrant population is recently settled. First, novelty in itself may play a role in how natives react to immigration. People may be less psychologically equipped to adapt to growth of the foreign-born population locally if they have had little experience with immigrants previously. Similarly, the initial settlement of immigrants may signal a more important change in the nature of a community than any marginal growth of the immigrant population thereafter. There is evidence for the symbolic and psychological power of “new” settlement by minorities from other contexts: Green et al. (1998) find that minority population growth provokes considerably more “defensive” violence in formerly all-white neighborhoods of New York than in mixed neighborhoods.

Second, public programs that aid the integration of immigrants in the new immigrant destinations may be substantially weaker than those in established immigrant destinations and gateway states, because there is no established institutional infrastructure for such services. There may also be a delay in recognizing the needs of immigrants or less political support for providing services to new immigrants in places where immigrant populations are new (Riffe, Turner, and Rojas-Guyler 2008). Third, nonprofit and ethnic organizations have been shown to be important in representing the interests of immigrants in the political process and in serving as an intermediary between immigrants and the government in policy implementation (de Graauw 2008; Hagan and Baker 1993). These may be weaker or nonexistent in communities with a short recent history of immigrant settlement.

However, dispersal and growth have also meant that the immigrant and native populations, as well as the localities themselves, in the new immigrant destinations differ from the established immigrant destinations in ways that are not directly related to novelty. One of the challenges for this dissertation and other work on immigrant-native relations in the new immigrant destinations is to differentiate theoretically and empirically the influence of novelty from these other economic and demographic characteristics, discussed below.

**Growth in suburbs and smaller cities**

As shown above, the number of counties where at least one in twenty residents was an immigrant more than doubled between 1990 and 2007, yet most immigrants in the United States...
continued to live in the same locations as their predecessors. In part, this boom occurred because a small number of populous urban gateways cities continued to draw a significant proportion of new immigrants, but immigrant populations grew more quickly in a much larger number of less populous cities (Figure 3). As of 1990, 55 percent of the foreign-born population was in the 34 counties that had a 2000 population of over one million people. After 1990, the foreign-born population in these large urban counties continued to grow, but more slowly than in other counties. As a result, the proportion of the foreign-born population that was living in less populous counties increased, even as the foreign-born population grew substantially. Consequently, new immigrant destination counties were about a third as large, on mean, as the established immigrant destination counties in terms of population size.

The growth of the foreign-born population in smaller and moderately sized counties brought with it qualitative changes in the localities where immigrants lived. Rather than occupying a single neighborhood in a central city, immigrants in the metropolis now live in both the central city and many of the suburban and exurban surrounding jurisdictions. Traditional models of assimilation presumed that immigrants lived first in specific neighborhoods (often an ethnic enclave), then dispersed to the suburbs over generations as they assimilated (Alba et al. 1999; Alba, Logan, and Stults 2000). Scholars studying the new immigrant destinations have used terms like “heterolocalism” and “edge gateway” to describe a new geographic model of assimilation, in which newly arrived immigrants of the same nationality are geographically dispersed in relatively inconspicuous clusters across suburban landscapes (Hardwick 2008; Price and Singer 2008; Zelinsky and Lee 1998). These researchers argue that despite the absence of a single, dominant ethnic neighborhood, immigrants often form larger and vibrant conational communities that often span several cities or towns within a single metropolis. This expansion across a greater variety of types of communities may carry risks: Fennelly and Orfield (2008) for example, show that skepticism about immigration in Minnesota runs highest in suburban and exurban areas, compared with rural and urban areas. Case studies such as Marrow (2008) or McConnell and Miraftab (2009) also show the potential for conflict as immigrants diversify racially and ethnically homogenous suburban and exurban communities.

The counties we study in Chapter Two of this dissertation are in many ways typical of these suburban and exurban new immigrant destinations. With total populations of around 60,000 and 37,000, the two counties are exurban in nature and located in a booming metropolitan area. Employment conditions in the area were strong through the beginning of the recession and non-durable
manufacturing industries were a major source of employment for immigrants. Each of these economic characteristics is also typical of the new immigrant destinations, as discussed below.

**Strong employment and growth—with exceptions**

In addition to differences in size and the social and physical nature of the communities in question, there are also systematic economic differences between the new and established immigrant destinations. Economic conditions are of special concern in this dissertation because they occupy an important place in theories of relations between natives and immigrants. There is evidence of an association between economic insecurity at the national and individual level and less favorable opinions about immigration (for some of this evidence and a literature review, see Citrin et al. 1995, 1997 or Chapter Two of this dissertation).

Bountiful employment possibilities in the new immigrant destinations played a major role in drawing the immigrant population out of center cities into the new immigrant destinations. The mean monthly unemployment rate between 2000 and 2007 was over one percent lower in the new immigrant destinations than in the established immigrant destination counties (Table 1, Figure 4). These mostly prosperous locales were also attractive to natives—the native population in the new immigrant destination counties grew by 30 percent between 1990 and 2007, compared to 17 percent in the established immigrant destinations.

As of 2007, macroeconomic conditions would seem to point toward easier immigrant/native relations in the new immigrant destinations, relative to the established immigrant destinations. However, the new immigrant destinations were not spared the effects of the recession that began in December of 2007: The mean unemployment rate was 4.4 percent higher in 2009 than in 2007 in these counties, almost as high as the mean increase of 4.6 percent observed in the established immigrant counties (Figure 4). Although the new immigrant destinations retained their employment advantage over the established immigrant destinations, the tight labor markets that had drawn natives and immigrants alike to these communities clearly disappeared. This makes the effects of the recession an essential element to consider when studying demographic and social changes after 2007. In Chapter Four, I explore some of the consequences of changes in employment conditions on Hispanic population growth from 2000 to 2008, with special attention to the effects of employment changes in the context of anti-immigration policymaking.

Even before the recession there were exceptions to the rosy economic picture in the new immigrant destinations. Meatpacking, food processing, textiles, furniture manufacturing, and other...
nondurable manufacturing industries became a major force attracting immigrants to smaller cities and rural areas. The increased attraction of employment in these industries for new immigrants since 1990 has been documented both qualitatively and quantitatively (Alvarez and Butterfield 2000; Griffith 1995a, 1995b; Kandel and Parrado 2005; Liaw and Frey 2007). However, many of the new immigrant destinations where nondurable manufacturing was an important employer had relatively high unemployment rates and slowly growing or even shrinking native populations.

In the case of the meatpacking industry, immigrants followed the movements of jobs as companies strategically moved production out of center cities, often to areas with slack labor markets and no unions, in an effort to drive labor costs down. Industrial meatpacking jobs are relatively dangerous, dirty, and poorly paid and have high employee turnover rates as a result. The search for new employees led to the recruitment of immigrants: Between 1990 and 2000 the proportion of the meatpacking workforce that was Hispanic rose from ten percent to almost 30 percent, with most of these Hispanic workers being immigrants (Kandel and Parrado 2005). In other cases, such as the textiles and furniture industry in the Carolinas, the jobs stayed in the same locations, but immigrant labor helped sustain existing local industries facing intense international competition (Anderson 2000; Anderson, Schulman, and Wood 2001).

The attraction of these nondurable manufacturing industries for immigrants is apparent in summary statistics comparing the two types of immigrant destinations. In the new immigrant destination counties, these immigrant intensive nondurable manufacturing industries\(^5\) accounted for seven percent of all employment on mean, compared to less than four percent in established immigrant destination and other counties (Table 1). One extraordinary aspect of these industries was that they drew immigrants to destinations that held relatively less attraction for natives, a clear exception to the strong positive association between native and foreign-born population growth. In the 79 new immigrant destination counties that had more than five percent of their employment in these industries, the native population grew by a mean of only 16 percent between 1990 and 2007, compared with 36 percent in other new immigrant destination counties. These manufacturing magnets were also less prosperous than other new immigrant destinations: On mean, the new destination counties with high employment in immigrant intensive nondurable manufacturing industries had a median household income of $33,965 per year, versus $43,590 in those with lower employment in these industries. Not all shrinking and struggling new immigrant destinations were hosts to nondurable manufacturing:

\(^5\) Food processing, meatpacking, textiles, apparel, leather and wood products manufacturing.

Chapter One
County, NJ is an example of the handful of localities where jobs in more prosperous suburbs attracted immigrants to cheap housing in a distressed urban core that otherwise lost population.

I consider the role of nondurable manufacturing industries, and their possible importance to the context in which immigrant-native relations occur, in two chapters of this dissertation. The first chapter examines attitudes towards immigration in a new immigrant destination in North Carolina where both poultry processing and textiles are major local employers of immigrants. In the second, high levels of employment in these nondurable manufacturing industries is tested as one of several possible predictors of anti-immigration lawmaking by localities. The role of light manufacturing is of theoretical interest because these jobs bring immigrants into less-prosperous, more slowly growing communities and a very specific type of workplace. In the population-losing counties studied by Donato and coauthors (2007), mean immigrant family incomes had risen to approach the stagnant incomes of native families. Hypothetically, these conditions of slow economic and population growth may make immigrant population more visible and contentious.

The nature of the workplace in these industries may also create special tensions between natives and immigrants, as documented in case studies (e.g., Gouveia and Stull 1995; Griffith 1995b). Light manufacturing jobs are generally clustered in a limited number of large workplaces and are often part of a national or multinational corporation, as opposed to construction and services jobs which are more likely to be dispersed across locally owned firms and workplaces. Thus, it is conceivable that the economic competition posed by immigrants may be more visible in cases where nondurable manufacturing is an important source of employment and that those communities that are host to such plants have not “consented” to immigration in the same way as communities where immigrants have been hired by many different employers. A journalistic account captured how the mere proposal of a new meatpacking plant in Hooker, OK by a national company launched debates about immigration locally, showing how this industry may inspire more controversy than others that employ immigrants in less visible ways, such as services and construction (Juozapavicius 2007).

**Different places, different natives**

As described above, the twin forces of immigrant inflows and geographic dispersal of the foreign-born population brought many more Americans into contact with immigrants. By 2007, nearly two-thirds of the native-born population lived in a county that was at least 5 percent foreign-born. As the number of Americans who lived in close proximity to immigrants increased, their mix of personal characteristics changed as well. Of greatest relevance for this dissertation, greater numbers of
immigrants were living in areas where larger proportions of American citizens had conservative political views and relatively low levels of education.

Both political views and education are associated with attitudes towards immigration and immigrants. More conservative political views, whether measured by party identification, voting behavior, or opinions on other issues, are associated with greater resistance to immigration, although the reasons behind this association are not clearly understood (Alvarez and Butterfield 2000; Campbell, C. Wong, and Citrin 2006; Citrin et al. 1990; Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; Pantoja 2006). Higher levels of education are generally associated with more positive views of immigration, presumably because it increases the potential net benefits a person yields from immigration and enhances a person’s ability to adapt to change and diversity (Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Pantoja 2006; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Given these associations, the shift of immigrant populations towards less well educated and more conservative areas of the country has potentially important implications for immigrant integration and political reactions to immigration.

Political preferences

In this chapter and in Chapter Three, I use votes in the 2004 US Presidential election at the county level as a measure of political preferences. This election was closely contested, but immigration was not a major campaign issue and the candidates had similar positions on immigration, making the results a useful measure of views on other policy issues. As Figure 5 shows, growth of the foreign-born population in counties where the majority of voters supported George Bush in 2004 vastly exceeded that in counties where the majority supported John Kerry. The foreign-born population grew by 147 percent between 1990 and 2007 in counties where less than half of votes were cast for Kerry. Not surprisingly, the new immigrant destination counties were politically conservative, with only about 40 percent of their votes, on mean, going to John Kerry versus about 50 percent in the established immigrant destination counties.

In 1990, counties in which the majority of the votes would be cast for John Kerry in 2004 contained 68.5 percent of the immigrant population (Figure 5). The share of the US foreign-born population located in these counties dropped to 57.8 percent by 2007. In many respects, this shift was an inevitable product of dispersal of the foreign-born population: Support for the Democratic candidate was strongest in a small number of highly populous urban counties that also contained the bulk of the nation’s immigrants in 1990, while the majority of the nation’s counties both supported Bush and had few immigrants as of 1990.
The intersection between the geography of immigration and the geography of politics thus figure prominently in this dissertation. The overarching theory is that people or jurisdictions with more conservative political beliefs will react to local growth of the immigrant population by becoming more skeptical of immigration and/or supporting local efforts to restrict immigration. In Chapter Two, my co-author and I explore differences between a non-immigration county and a new immigrant destination county in terms of the association between individuals’ political affiliations and their opinions about immigration. In the third chapter, I test the hypothesis that the growth of immigrants in more conservative areas of the country explains the popularity of local anti-immigration policies.

Education

The distribution of the foreign-born population also shifted from better educated to less well educated areas of the country from 1990 to 2007, although this shift was far less dramatic than the one involving political preferences. As of 1990, immigrants lived in counties that had extremely well educated populations: 30 percent of the US foreign-born population resided in counties where 30 to 35 percent of blacks and whites had a college degree in 2000. Seventy-four percent of the immigrant population was in counties whose proportion of black and whites with bachelor’s degrees exceeded 25 percent, the national level (Figure 6).

After 1990, less educated areas of the country received a slightly larger proportion of net immigrant population growth. Growth rates of the foreign-born population were highest in counties where less than 20 percent of blacks and non-Hispanic whites had a bachelor’s degree—the foreign-born population of these counties grew by 128 percent between 1990 and 2007. As a result, about 25 percent of blacks and Non-Hispanic white adults in the mean established immigrant destination county had a bachelor’s degree, compared with about 33 percent in the mean established immigrant destination county.

Educational attainment and political views are but two dimensions along which native populations in the new immigrant destinations differ from those living in the established destination, but theory suggests that these two factors may be highly important to immigrant-native relations. As a result, these variables play an important role in the dissertation. Associations between these characteristics and opinions about immigration have been established, but there is only limited evidence as to whether this association depends on the size of the foreign-born population, and none that tests whether it is intensified by growth of the foreign-born population (Scheve and Slaughter 2001). As a result, social science has little to say about the possibility that the incursion of immigrant populations
into areas with less educated and more conservative natives may foster less favorable opinions and policy reactions regarding immigration.

I test whether growth of the immigrant population in areas with less educated natives may be causing resistance to immigration in two ways. In Chapter Two, I examine whether the relationship between educational attainment and an individual’s opinions about immigration is different for residents of a new immigrant destination county, relative to a non-immigration county. In Chapter Three, I test whether localities with low proportions of college graduates are at higher risk of an anti-immigration ordinance for any given change in the proportion of the population that is immigrant.

New immigrants for new destinations

With these shifts in the distribution of characteristics of the natives who live near immigrants, one aspect of the immigrant-native interaction equation has decisively changed. Another aspect has changed as well: Immigrant populations in the new immigrant destinations differ in important ways from those in the established immigrant destinations. Continued growth in immigrant inflows has meant that immigrants from longer-settled, earlier-entry cohorts have been joined by even larger numbers of immigrants from more recent entry cohorts nationwide. In the new immigrant destinations, the representation of the older entry cohorts is even smaller because, by definition, these localities had few immigrants as of 1990. Resettlement from established immigrant destinations (rather than directly from abroad) did contribute to the growth of the immigrant population in new immigrant destinations, adding some immigrants from earlier entry cohorts (Lichter and Johnson 2009). Despite this domestic resettlement, only about 30 percent of immigrants in the mean new immigrant destination county entered the United States before 1990, compared with 47 percent in the mean established immigrant destination county.

There are a number of reasons why entry cohort composition might be important to immigrant-native relations. First, length of time in the United States is associated with greater income, English language abilities and other factors that should reduce the social distance between immigrants and natives, ceteris paribus (Carliner 2000; Lubotsky 2007). Further, according to a number of theories of immigrant integration, longer-established co-nationals or co-ethnics play an important role in assisting newly arrived immigrants in adapting to life in the United States. For example, the “ethnic enclave” has been represented as an important incubator that trains newly arrived immigrants and connects them to jobs (Bailey and Waldinger 1991; Portes 1987). This suggests that new immigrants in places with few longer-resident co-nationals may face a disadvantage relative to their peers in the established

Chapter One
immigrant destinations. However, no empirical evidence is yet available on the association between the economic or social success of new immigrants to a particular locality and the number of longer-established immigrants to that particular locality.

Second, immigrants from earlier entry cohorts are more likely to be naturalized citizens who can provide a direct political voice for newcomers because they can vote in state, national and local elections, while non-citizens are not.\(^6\) The immigrant population in the mean new immigrant destination county was 26 percent naturalized citizens in 2007, compared with 39 percent in the mean established immigrant destination county. Looking beyond the citizen/noncitizen dichotomy, length of time in the United States is associated with higher rates of voting among Latino and white naturalized citizens. Voting rates among citizens are also higher in the second immigrant generation relative to the first, after controlling for other variables (Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001). It is not known, however, whether or not having a large naturalized immigrant population reduces the probability of anti-immigration lawmaking or other signs of immigrant-native tension. Research has shown cases where naturalization and/or voting rates increased in response to anti-immigration lawmaking or varied by the concentration of immigrants or co-ethnics in a district (e.g. Barreto, Segura, and Woods 2004; Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001) but no studies consider whether naturalization or voting rates among immigrants reduce the probability of anti-immigration lawmaking. Further, Dancygier (2010) argues that greater proportions of naturalized citizens can aggravate tensions in European cities, finding that significant numbers of naturalized citizens can pose a threat to natives’ political power and inspire immigrant-native violence.

Third, immigrants in new immigrant destinations are somewhat more likely to hail from Latin American countries. Seventy percent of immigrants in the mean new immigrant destination county were from Latin America, compared with 59 percent in the mean established immigrant destination place. Further, 54 percent of new immigrant destination counties had immigrant populations that drew more than three quarters of their immigrants from Latin America, compared with 45 percent among the established immigrant destinations. To a great degree, this results from the greater representation of Latin America in the most recent immigration cohorts. In 2007, 45 percent of the US immigrant population was from continental Latin America and 31 percent from Mexico. In contrast, in 1990 only 33 percent of the foreign-born population was from Latin America, and 22 percent was from Mexico. The

\[^6\text{In order to naturalize, one must have been a legal permanent resident (green card holder) for at least five years or have served in the US military, among other requirements.}\]

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overrepresentation of Latin Americans in the new immigrant destinations also occurred because geographic dispersal of the foreign-born has been a largely Mexican phenomenon, as Massey and Capoferro (2008), Liaw and Frey (2007) and others document. There is also evidence that immigrants from new source areas within Mexico feed immigration to the new immigrant destinations, while migrants from more traditional sending areas are more likely to go to established destinations (Massey, Rugh, and Pren 2010).

The fact that a single region with a dominant language and overlapping cultural background composes such a large and growing share of the American population has provoked concern about the ability of Latino immigrants to assimilate and the impact of these immigrants on broader American culture (e.g., Huntington 2004). These cultural arguments are joined by concerns about the impact of immigration from the region on the current and future prospects of low-skilled workers, given Latin American immigrants’ levels of educational attainment (e.g., Borjas 2001). Latin American immigrants are indeed more poorly educated than both immigrants as a whole and natives, with about 35 percent of Latin American-born immigrants aged over 25 having less than nine years of education, compared to 21 percent among all immigrants and three percent among natives (Dockterman and Velasco 2010).

Other scholars have argued that continuing immigration has helped maintain social boundaries between Hispanics and non-Hispanic whites by replenishing the supply of recently immigrated co-nationals and co-ethnics (Jiménez 2008). Further, Latino immigrants may be especially visible and provocative because of the unfortunate tendency to conflate “illegal immigrant,” “Mexican,” and “Hispanic” in political discourse and the popular imagination (Jiménez 2008). This conflation emerges from fact: About three quarters of the unauthorized immigrant population was estimated to be Hispanic as of 2008 (Passel and Cohn 2009a). The potential for overlap between Hispanic, immigrant, and unauthorized identities is arguably worse in the new destinations: Unauthorized immigrants are overrepresented in the non-traditional immigrant destination states relative to the traditional immigrant destination states, along with new immigrants and Latino immigrants (Passel, Capps, and Fix 2004).

Some emerging quantitative and qualitative evidence supports a subjective sense that Hispanic immigration may be different from that of other ethnic groups in terms of the reactions it provokes in natives. For example, Brader et al. (2008) found that white respondents who were given a mock newspaper article emphasizing the negative consequences of immigration were more likely to support restrictions on immigration and English-only laws when the article was accompanied by a picture of a Hispanic man identified as a Mexican immigrant, rather than a European man identified as a Russian
immigrant. These respondents were also more likely to sign a letter to their congressman supporting restriction of immigration. The researchers also found evidence suggesting that this result was provoked by emotional anxiety, not differences in respondents’ perceptions of the facts surrounding immigration. Some limited evidence provides reason to hypothesize that the numerical dominance of Latino immigrants in new immigrant destinations, specifically, may exacerbate tensions with local native residents. In case studies in suburban Dallas, Brettell (2008) proposes that one city passed an anti-immigration law in part because its immigrant population was dominated by Mexicans, while other cities with more diverse immigrant populations were more welcoming.

This evidence makes consideration of the special role of the national origin of immigrants within specific localities an important aspect of this dissertation. In the second chapter, the high-immigration county studied had a foreign-born population that was 75 percent Latin American in 2007, providing an excellent example of a new immigrant destination affected by primarily Hispanic immigration. In the third chapter, I make a direct test of the hypothesis that immigrant population growth that is dominated by Latin Americans is more likely to inspire adverse political reactions than immigration from other countries and more diverse sources.

The importance of Latin American immigration in terms of both sheer numbers and its role in public debates about immigration also leads to my focus on Hispanics when measuring the impact of anti-immigration policies on demographic changes in Chapter Four. Although it would have been ideal to measure changes in the size of the entire population of households headed by foreign-born persons at the local level following such policies, nationwide data sources do not allow year-to-year estimates of such populations in most localities. Accordingly, I examine changes in the Hispanic enrolled primary and secondary student population, which can be measured with precision from year-to-year. While limited in some respects, information about school aged-children provides important information about the potential long-term impact on the ethnic makeup of these localities, and allows me to also look at the reaction of native-born Hispanic families, who may sense hostility from policies targeting immigration even if they are not directly affected by them.

**Trajectories of growth**

Beginning during the 1980s and continuing through at least 2007, the steady and rapid growth of the foreign-born population in the new immigrant destinations is one of the defining features of American immigration over the past three decades. Will this trend continue? Either policy changes or economic changes could alter the trajectory of growth of the immigrant population in the new
immigrant destinations, by either reducing the national growth of the foreign-born population or by reducing the attraction of the new immigrant destinations specifically. By addressing the role of growth of the immigrant population in new destinations in provoking public opinion and policy backlashes to immigration, and the demographic effects of such policies, this dissertation directly seeks to evaluate the probability and impacts of future policy changes. I also contribute some information about the relationship between economic changes and immigrant population growth, although the issue is largely beyond the scope of this dissertation.

Between 2007 and 2008, growth of the US immigrant population apparently halted (Figure 7). The unauthorized immigrant population even declined between 2007 and 2008, according to the best estimates (Passel and Cohn 2008). These were rather remarkable events, given the steady, strong growth in both authorized and unauthorized immigrant populations since the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. The primary reason for stalled growth of the foreign-born population was presumably the severe recession that began in December of 2007 and ended in June of 2009. For the Mexican-origin population, this drop in immigrant stock appears to have resulted from a decrease in immigrant inflows while outflows have held steady (Passel and Cohn 2009b).

The recession does not appear to have affected the new and established immigrant destinations in vastly different ways based on unemployment rates. As discussed above and shown in Figure 4, unemployment rates jumped by over four percent from 2007 to 2009 in both new and established immigrant destinations. However, these similar macroeconomic pictures may disguise differences in local economies that may be important to immigrant population growth. Employment in construction was a major force in drawing immigrants to new immigrant destinations (Liaw and Frey 2007) and construction composed a larger mean share of employment in the new immigrant destinations than the established immigrant destinations (Table 1). This raises the possibility that the dramatic collapse of the residential construction sector, in particular, may have affected immigrant population growth in new immigrant destinations.

Policy changes, too, may have affected the growth and geographic distribution of the nation’s foreign-born population. Legal immigrant admissions continued their secular growth trend following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Discussion of comprehensive immigration policy reform, which in many of its variations included provisions for the regularization of unauthorized immigrants, continued in the US Congress through 2007. However, as the decade wore on the federal government also took a number of policy steps intended to discourage illegal immigration. These included a continual build-up
of resources dedicated to migrant interdiction at the US-Mexico border, more aggressive enforcement operations in the interior of the country and increased involvement of local and state authorities in enforcing federal immigration law through the 287(g) and, later, Secure Communities programs.

Federal and state policy changes undertaken during the 1990s, such as heavy enforcement of the most trafficked border crossing points in California and Texas and California’s Proposition 187 may have helped promote the geographic dispersal of the immigrant population (Durand et al. 2005; Massey and Capoferro 2008). Now, however, federal, state and local policy measures could be working against continued geographic dispersal. For example, the data I collect for Chapter Three show that new immigrant destination counties and places were more likely than established immigrant destinations to participate in the 287(g) immigration enforcement program. Subjectively, the growing list of states and cities that are attempting to “opt out” of the Secure Communities immigration enforcement program includes a disproportionate number of established immigrant destinations and traditional immigrant gateway states, such as San Francisco, Boston, Illinois and New York. Although US Immigration and Customs Enforcement does not publish detailed statistics on the location and industry of worksite enforcement actions, many of its highest profile raids have been in nondurable manufacturing plants in new immigrant destinations, such as the May 2008 arrest of 389 workers at a meatpacking plant in Postville, Iowa (Greenhouse 2008).

This possible policy divide is even clearer at the state and local level. New immigration states, led by Arizona, Oklahoma and Georgia, have passed a number of controversial bills taking measures to strengthen immigration enforcement, such as enabling or requiring state and local police to detain suspected unauthorized immigrants (Severson 2011). None of the traditional immigrant gateway states has passed comparable legislation. At the local level, established immigrant destinations are far more heavily represented among the localities declaring themselves “sanctuary cities” or taking other actions to welcome immigrants than they are among those passing immigration enforcement measures or English-Only bills.

Despite these countervailing forces, growth of the foreign-born population in the new immigrant destination counties continues to be stronger than in the established immigrant destination counties (Figure 8). Of the three categories of counties used here, growth of the immigrant population has stalled in only the established immigrant destination counties according to ACS estimates through 2008.

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7 Although the term has no formal meaning, “sanctuary cities” generally have a policy of not taking immigration status into account in law enforcement and the provision of most municipal services.
2009. Measures of the Hispanic student population from school records provide a secondary gauge of population change, with greater year-to-year precision at the local level. The general picture is the same in that data: Although growth of the Hispanic student population slackened marginally after 2006 in both new and established immigrant destination counties, growth remains robust in the new immigrant destination counties.

There are a number of possible explanations why immigrant population growth may be continuing in the new immigrant destinations despite the halt in growth of the national immigrant population. First, as shown above, while unemployment rates jumped in the new immigrant destinations counties, these counties retained their employment advantage over the established immigrant destinations. Second, growth of the immigrant population in new immigrant destinations is likely less dependent on new arrivals from overseas than is growth in the established immigrant destinations: In Johnson and Lichter’s (2009) traditional Hispanic destinations, all net Hispanic population growth from 2004 to 2006 is due to immigrants arriving from overseas within the past year, whereas Hispanic population growth in their “high growth” Hispanic destinations resulted from both direct immigration and the resettlement of foreign-born and native Hispanics living elsewhere in the United States. Thus, the nationwide pause in immigrant population growth could reasonably be expected to affect the traditional immigrant destinations more than the new immigrant destinations.

In Chapters Three and Four, I begin to answer the question of whether policies made at the local level may slow the growth of the immigrant population in the new immigrant destination. One of the primary tasks I take on in Chapter Three is to establish the prevalence of local anti-immigration policies, as well as to test whether they are related to the patterns of immigrant population growth discussed here. In Chapter Four, I test whether such policies are having an impact on Hispanic population growth: Other studies have shown substantial decreases in the foreign-born population or Hispanic population following the implementation of individual instances of local or state laws, but have not always fully considered the role of economic conditions in these decreases (Capps et al. 2011; Guterbock et al. 2010; Lofstrom, Bohn, and Raphael 2011). Both the incidence and impact of such policies could have important impacts on the growth of the immigrant population in the new immigrant destinations in the future.

Next steps

The literature on the geographic dispersal of the foreign-born population and the new immigrant destinations is at a crossroad. In many respects, knowledge in the area is well developed:
Social demographers have produced complex descriptions of changes in the geographic distribution of the foreign-born population, while ethnographers have contributed case studies of the way immigrants and native interact in specific new immigrant destinations. However, many questions remain unexplored. There is still limited research that investigates the larger implications of geographic dispersal for the future of immigration policy and immigrant integration outcomes in the United States.

Many of the open questions surrounding the new immigrant destinations concern the role of natives. As this survey shows, geographic dispersal of the foreign-born has changed the experience of natives as much as, if not more than, that of immigrants. For example, are local and state anti-immigration policies a sign that natives in new immigrant destinations are rejecting immigration? Do these laws signal a long-term change in the politics of migration in the United States when considered in conjunction with the vocal opposition to immigration of individual representatives to the US Congress from new immigrant destination districts, such as Representative Lou Barletta from Pennsylvania or former Representative Tom Tancredo from Colorado? Or are such high profile examples simply transitory symbols of the difficulty of social change, to be followed by broadly positive relationships between immigrants and natives in the new immigrant destinations in the long term?

In the chapters that follow, I begin to answer these and other questions. First, my chapter coauthor and I compare a single new immigrant destination to a closely located area that received little immigration, in order to understand which natives might feel most threatened or welcoming of immigrants under these circumstances, and why. Second, I study one of the possible signs of conflict in the new immigrant destinations, local anti-immigration policies, with the goal of quantifying them, understanding why they occur in some communities and not others and evaluating the role of geographic dispersal in promoting them. Finally, I study one consequence of these policies by evaluating if and how they affect subsequent population changes.
References


Table 1. Characteristics of new and established immigrant destination counties and non-immigration counties, 1990 to 2007.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category totals</th>
<th>New</th>
<th>Established</th>
<th>Non</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of counties</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>2477</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign-born population, 2007 (millions)</td>
<td>5.9</td>
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<td>7.5</td>
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<td>Native population, 2007 (millions)</td>
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<td>Native population, 1990 (millions)</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>136.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Share of counties in Big Five State (%)</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Demographic characteristics (means)                                             |      |             |      |
| Population of county, 2007 (thousands)                                         | 200  | 667         | 65   |
| Foreign-born share, 2007 (% of population)                                      | 11.0 | 21.6        | 2.7  |
| Foreign-born share, 1990 (% of population)                                      | 3.1  | 15.3        | 1.4  |
| Growth of foreign-born population 1990-2007 (%)                                 | 940.0| 90.1        | 220.2|
| Growth of native-born population 1990-2007 (%)                                 | 29.8 | 16.6        | 13.3 |

| Immigrant population characteristics (means)                                    |      |             |      |
| From Latin America, 2007 (% of foreign-born)                                   | 69.7 | 58.9        | 39.3 |
| Naturalized citizens, 2007 (% of foreign-born)                                  | 25.9 | 38.7        | 42.8 |
| Immigrated before 1990, 2007(% of foreign-born)                                | 29.1 | 46.9        | 44.3 |

| Political and economic characteristics (means)                                  |      |             |      |
| Have college degree, 2000 (% of blacks and non-Hispanic whites)                | 24.3 | 32.7        | 17.9 |
| Votes for John Kerry, 2004 (% of total)                                        | 39.5 | 49.6        | 39.4 |
| Employment in immigrant intensive manufacturing industries, 2007 (% of workers)| 7.1  | 3.8         | 3.4  |
| Employment in construction, 2007 (% of workers)                                | 9.0  | 7.3         | 8.3  |
| Mean unemployment rate, 2000 to 2007 (%)                                        | 4.7  | 6.1         | 5.4  |
| Change in unemployment rate, 2007 to 2009 (%)                                  | 4.4  | 4.6         | 4.3  |

### Table 2. Characteristics of new and established immigrant destination Census places and non-immigration census places, 1990 to 2007

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<td>4.3</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
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<td>Native population, 2007 (millions)</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>77.8</td>
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<td>Foreign-born population, 1990 (millions)</td>
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<td>13.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Native population, 1990 (millions)</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>64.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Share of places in Big Five State (%)</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>21.2</td>
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<tr>
<th>Demographic characteristics (means)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Population of place, 2007 (thousands)</td>
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<td>55</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign-born share, 2007 (% of population)</td>
<td>13.0</td>
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<td>Foreign-born share, 1990 (% of population)</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
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<td>Growth of foreign-born population, 1990-2007 (%)</td>
<td>893.7</td>
<td>115.0</td>
<td>205.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth of native-born population, 1990-2007 (%)</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>27.4</td>
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<th>Immigrant and native population characteristics (means)</th>
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<tr>
<td>From Latin America, 2007 (% of foreign-born)</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>29.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Naturalized citizens, 2007 (% of foreign-born)</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>48.6</td>
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<td>Immigrated before 1990, 2007 (% of foreign-born)</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>47.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have college degree, 2000 (% of blacks and non-Hispanic whites)</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>25.0</td>
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</table>

Figure 1. Growth of foreign-born population between 1990 and 2007 for counties by 1990 percent foreign-born. Source: ACS

Figure 2. Distribution of native population by percent foreign-born in county of residence, 1990 versus 2007. Source: ACS
Figure 3. Distribution of foreign-born population by 2000 county population, 1990 and 2007. Source: ACS

Figure 4. Mean unemployment rates in counties by immigrant destination type, 2000-2009. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics (n.d.)
Figure 5. 1990 and 2007 distribution of foreign-born population by percent of votes cast for John Kerry in 2004 in county of residence. Source: Haines Stewart III, Charles. n.d..

Figure 6. 1990 and 2007 distribution of foreign-born population in counties by proportion of blacks and non-Hispanic whites with a bachelor’s degree. Source: ACS
Figure 7. Estimated total foreign-born and unauthorized immigrant population 2000 to 2010, indexed to 2000 level. Source: CPS and Passel and Cohn (2010)

Figure 8. Estimated total foreign-born population 2000 to 2009 for counties of population 65,000 or more for each class of county, indexed to 2000 level. Source: ACS.
Chapter Two: Natives’ opinions toward immigration in a new immigrant destination (with Marta Tienda)*

I. The problem

Through most of the past century, immigration was largely an abstraction for the majority of native-born Americans except residents of a few large cities in five immigrant gateway states: New York, California, Florida, Texas, and Illinois. As the preceding chapter describes, this changed dramatically in the past three decades. Although immigrant settlement remained concentrated, increased inflows combined with geographical dispersal of the foreign-born population transformed many places throughout the United States. For the first time in a century, immigrants began to populate small and midsize communities across the nation, most notably in the South and Midwest. In North Carolina, the site of our study in this chapter, the foreign-born population surged from 115 thousand persons in 1990 to 630 thousand by 2007, rising from 1.7 percent of the population to 7.0 percent. In that year 115 thousand children in North Carolina resided with at least one foreign-born parent. Thus, in less than 20 years the share of North Carolina’s school-age youth living in immigrant households rose from 3.4 percent to 14.2 percent (Migration Policy Institute 2009).

For native residents, the geographic dispersal of immigrants rekindled a familiar love-hate relationship. As the widely publicized controversies in Farmingville NY, Hazelton PA, Danbury CT and elsewhere attest, employers and homemakers delight at immigrants’ willingness to work long, often irregular hours for low wages, but community residents often resent their presence in schools, neighborhoods and public spaces. In many places where social divisions were sharply drawn in black and white, the arrival of Latin American immigrants spawned new racial tensions (Marrow 2008, 2009; Murphy, Blanchard, and Hill 2001). Viglucci’s (2000) interviews with employers, community leaders and parents in Chatham County, North Carolina, one of our study sites, give voice to these tensions:

“I hate to think what would happen if the immigrants left tomorrow. Our industry would disappear.” - Siler City Town Manager Joe Brower

* A version of this chapter was published as Kevin O’Neil and Marta Tienda. 2010. “A Tale of Two Counties: Natives’ Opinions toward Immigration in North Carolina.” International Migration Review 44(3):728-761. The chapter benefited from the helpful comments of three anonymous reviewers from IMR. A version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Population Association of America, Detroit MI April 30 2009. The data collection was supported by a grant from the Russell Sage Foundation. We acknowledge institutional support from the Office of Population Research, and National Institutes of Health (#5 T32 HD007163 and #5 R24 HD047879).
“I heard from other parents, 'My child is the only white child in the classroom.'” - T.C. Yarborough, President of the Siler City Elementary School Parent-Teacher Association

“We (African Americans) were already down, and now we’re even further behind. Latinos have rented and are steadily buying a lot of property. They have cash money, they have good credit, they’re a good liability. People cater to them. But it has made housing skyrocket.” - Rev. Barry Gray, pastor of the First Missionary Baptist Church of Siler City.

These anecdotes not only invite a re-consideration of the integration prospects of recent immigrants settled in nontraditional destinations, but also provide hints about how the geographic dispersal of the foreign-born population shapes attitudes toward immigration. First, geographic dispersal changes the context for interactions between natives and immigrants. In the new immigrant destinations, immigration is neither a relatively familiar process (as it is in the traditional destinations) nor a distant abstraction (as it remains in much of the country), but a dynamic and challenging part of everyday life. Second, public and private institutions in these places are now compelled to serve an ethnically distinct and rapidly growing population segment. This may also disrupt established racial and social hierarchies, particularly if established residents perceive greater competition for coveted resources (jobs, seats in local schools, housing) and a drain on public coffers. Third, the newcomers face thinner social networks and few co-ethnic organizations compared with the traditional destinations, and this has direct implications for their acceptance. Finally, the geographic dispersal is occurring in the context of vitriolic national debates about illegal immigration, which also may influence local attitudes toward immigrants and immigration.

The opinions of natives in the new settlement communities regarding immigration are of interest to social scientists in their own right and because they partly define the contexts of reception for new immigrants. Aspects of these contexts include interpersonal relationships between immigrants and natives, the capacity and willingness of local institutions to serve the needs of newcomers, the character of the local labor market, and the constellation of state and local policies that govern access to social goods—all of which are influenced by the opinions natives hold about immigrants and immigration. (Rumbaut and Portes 2000; Portes and Rumbaut 2006).

The growing residential dispersal of foreign-born populations has not gone unnoticed, but the literature about native residents’ acceptance of immigrants has yet to fully explore the implications of this geographic shift. Researchers have documented the timing, scale and residential contours of the new settlement patterns, establishing the dominance of Mexican and Central American immigrants in Chapter Two
the dispersal (Massey and Capoferro 2008). Other studies observe the great diversity of impacted communities, which range from resurgent urban cores to booming suburbs and small towns across the country (Singer, Hardwick, and Brettell 2008). Passel, Capps and Fix (2004) estimate that the unauthorized share of the foreign-born population is substantially higher in most of the new immigrant destinations compared with the traditional hubs. Each of these factors implies that the geographic dispersal may provoke different reactions among natives in the new immigrant destinations.

This chapter examines the reactions of the native population to the influx of immigrants in nontraditional destinations. Using a representative survey from a pair of matched counties in North Carolina—one that experienced rapid growth in its immigrant population and one that did not—we identify local responses to growth of the foreign-born population. Building on insights from existing case studies of immigrant-native relations in new immigrant destinations and the rich theoretical literature about immigrant integration in traditional hubs, we develop and test several hypotheses about how natives’ characteristics and experiences shape perceptions of and opinions toward immigration, depending on whether native populations are directly exposed to the foreign-born. That the two counties are located in the same metropolitan area, have overlapping media markets and have similar industry structures provides a contrast between opinions about immigration by native residents who witnessed growth in the foreign-born population at close range and those who observed the phenomenon from a distance.

To motivate and provide context for the empirical analysis, the next section presents the available evidence on recent changes in public opinion in the new immigrant destinations and nationwide. The third section provides a framework for theorizing individual natives’ responses to immigrants and formulates several testable propositions. Following a description of the sites, the data, and statistical methods, we present empirical results—both descriptive comparisons between the two target counties and multivariate analyses designed to test specific claims. The concluding section draws both research and policy implications in light of evidence that the dispersal is unlikely to reverse, even if its pace abates in the near term.

**II. Evidence on native reactions in the new immigrant destinations**

Available evidence is ambiguous about whether and how the geographic dispersal of the foreign-born population is associated with variation in opinions about immigrants and immigration. Televised and printed media target high profile cases that showcase anti-immigration legal actions, protests or violence in new immigrant destinations like Hazelton, PA and Farmingville, NY (Barry 2006;
Lambert 2005; Kaplan 2008). Such incidents leave the impression that immigrants foster conflict in new settlement areas. Precisely because they are extreme, however, such anecdotes about place and time-specific incidents are not helpful for gauging the prevalence, intensity or correlates of anti-immigration sentiment.

Beyond individual incidents, nonprofit and advocacy organizations have reported a rise in anti-immigration extremist groups, discrimination and violence have become more common since geographical dispersal of the foreign-born began. For example, the Leadership Council on Civil Rights (2009) reports a 40 percent increase in the annual number of hate crimes committed against Hispanics between 2003 and 2007. The strongest evidence about the reactions of native residents to new immigrant neighbors comes from a body of richly textured case studies that describe the complex dynamics at work in specific places, for national origin groups or in particular industries (see studies collected in Anderson 2000; Stull, Broadway, and Griffith 1995; Massey 2008; Singer, Hardwick, and Brettell 2008; Zuniga and Hernández-León 2005; Gozdziak and Martin 2005). A few of these studies have systematically studied opinions of different groups of natives. For example, Fennelly (2008) finds that residents from lower socioeconomic classes harbor more negative opinions about immigrants than higher status groups, although respondents of all classes expressed concerns about safety and nostalgia for the days before immigration. Community leaders reported benefits to diversity and the local economy, but middle- and working-class respondents expressed concerns about impacts on jobs and schools and use of public benefits by immigrants. Based on interviews with residents in two rural North Carolina communities, Marrow (2008) finds that blacks feel economically, but not politically, threatened by new immigrants, although perceived threat is less intense in the area where blacks comprise the majority of the population.

With no counterfactual to compare findings, case studies cannot answer whether natives’ opinions depend on the level of local immigration. Additionally, qualitative descriptions of place-specific institutional and social dynamics do not permit adjudication of competing explanations about native responses to immigrants. Only a few studies use either indirect measures of opinion change, such as political actions or survey data to systematically evaluate opinions about immigration in new destinations.

Legislative and administrative actions by municipalities and states to limit immigrants’ access to public resources are an indirect indicator of natives’ opinions about immigration, and a potentially important aspect of the local context of reception. Because regulation of immigration is legally
dominion of the federal government, immigrant-specific ordinances indicate that local communities are struggling to deal with immigration. In 2007 alone, state legislatures considered 1,059 immigration-related bills and passed 167 of those (Migration Policy Institute 2008). From 2005 to 2009, 215 localities considered policies intended to limit immigration or its impact, as documented in the next chapter, while others took measures to welcome immigrants. The least welcoming communities require landlords to check the legal status of tenants, allow police to assist federal officials in apprehension and deportation activities or send powerful symbolic messages by declaring English the official language (Rodriguez, Chisti, and Nortman 2007). The most welcoming localities direct local service agencies and police to ignore legal status, issue local identification cards for all residents and/or aggressively promote English and citizenship education.

It is not yet clear whether negative (and/or positive) legislative measures are direct responses to growth of the foreign-born population. In 2007, legislatures in the ten states with the fastest-growing immigrant populations considered over twice the number of bills regulating the employment of immigrants and also passed more bills that reduce the rights of immigrants than the six top traditional immigrant destination states (Lagalaron et al. 2008). Municipalities that considered anti-immigration ordinances were more likely to have experienced significant growth in their immigrant population than a set of matched controls that did not consider such action (Hopkins, 2010). However, Ramakrishnan and Wong (2008) find that the rate of growth of the local Hispanic population does not predict whether municipalities propose or pass an anti-immigration ordinance.

Representative telephone surveys provide another perspective on variation in opinions about immigration. If the geographic spread of the foreign-born population provoked a negative change in public opinion during the 1990s and 2000s, it was overwhelmed by other shifts in national opinion. Opinions about immigration among the general American public are conveniently measured based on responses to variants of the question, “Should (legal) immigration be kept at its present level, increased or decreased?” Using this metric, national polls indicate that restrictionist sentiment peaked following the 1992 recession and the controversy over Proposition 187, a 1994 California ballot initiative intended to prevent unauthorized immigrants from accessing social services, health care, and public education. Anti-immigration opinions ebbed during the economic boom of the late 1990s, rose briefly following the terrorist attacks and 2001 recession, then fell somewhat through 2008 (Figure 1). This pattern accords with claims that support for restriction of immigration rises as macroeconomic conditions deteriorate (Citrin et al. 1995). In July of 2008, 39 percent of US residents favored less immigration, 39 percent
preferred current levels and 18 percent preferred increases in legal immigration (CBS News/NY Times 2008). By historical standards, these results show a relatively favorable national disposition toward immigration, which is remarkable given the changes in volume, composition, and settlement patterns of recent immigrants (for histories of opinion polling on immigration, see Simon 1985; Simon and Alexander 1993). Evidence from public opinion polls that specifically gauge native attitudes toward immigration in new destinations, is limited, however. Hopkins (2010) claims that the opinions toward immigration held by native residents in areas with rapidly growing immigrant populations became more negative, relative to their peers elsewhere, but that this occurs when immigration is a politically salient issue nationwide.

In sum, the available evidence does not answer whether increases in the foreign-born population foster negative opinions about immigration in the new destinations, and has even less to say about any such variation in opinion is moderated by individual characteristics and group membership. Although national opinion polls show no growth in the proportion of residents favoring restriction of immigration, specific groups or residents of particular places may have grown more extreme in their opinions. If so, this might explain the rise in anti-immigration sentiment documented through other methods.

Our study measures individuals’ opinions regarding immigration using responses from a representative telephone survey to a variety of questions. By collecting information about respondents’ experiences and personal characteristics, we are able to model statistically the differences in opinion associated with theoretically relevant covariates. We then compare the pattern of associations in two matched counties, one that is a new immigrant destination and another that hosts relatively few immigrants. By doing so, we contribute information about how opinions about immigration may differ in places that have received immigration relative to those that have not and provide a test of the mechanisms theorized to shape the opinions of natives citizens about immigration in the New Immigrant Destinations.

III. Opinions about immigration: Theory and evidence

Our study builds its theoretical framework from an extensive social science literature about how individual and group characteristics, as well as the broader context created by media, politics and the economy, influence perceptions of and attitudes toward minority groups, and recent immigrants in particular. Specifically, we first discuss the implications of prevailing theoretical perspectives for understanding native responses to new immigrants. Given the prominence and politicization of
immigration in the national and local media in recent years, we also consider how publicity and politics influence public opinion about immigration.

**Responses to mass immigration: Competition or cooperation?**

Numerous studies indicate that the size and growth of the foreign-born population is the lynchpin that shapes public attitudes toward immigration and perceptions of the new neighbors, but there is no clear consensus about the underlying mechanisms (for reviews see Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; and Hopkins, 2010). In fact, the dominant theoretical perspectives, dubbed the contact and threat perspectives, make opposite—but not incompatible—predictions about how the size and growth of a minority population influence opinions of the majority, or of more established minorities.

In its benevolent rendition, the contact perspective of inter-group relations implies that a growing foreign-born population is conducive to favorable opinions about immigrants and immigration because more direct exposure to immigrants in multiple social venues fosters acceptance and mutual understanding while also dispelling myths and unfounded fears about the newcomers. An important proviso is that contacts should be cooperative and that the newcomers do not compete with established native residents for power and resources (Lieberson 1961; Alport 1979). Thus, while the contact perspective implies that opinions about immigration should be more favorable as the foreign-born share of the population rises, this presumes that native residents do not perceive immigrants as a threat.

Perceptions are powerful predictors of human behavior. Therefore, if native residents perceive that immigrants are competing for jobs, housing, and social goods, inter-group contact may instead engender hostility. Originally developed to explain black-white relations (Blalock, 1967), the threat version of the contact hypothesis predicts that growth in the relative size of the foreign-born population in a local area fosters hostility among native residents due to perceived competition for power and resources (Blalock 1967; Bobo and Hutchings 1996). The threat perspective implies that natives living in communities that witnessed an increase in their foreign-born population will harbor more negative attitudes toward immigrants, compared with residents not directly impacted by the immigrant dispersal.

Although the inter-group contact and threat perspectives together have ambiguous predictions about native responses to foreign-born residents, mediating circumstances permit more nuanced predictions. Tolbert and Hero (2001), for example, find that support among whites for California’s anti-illegal immigration Proposition 187 was highest in counties with either very small or very large Hispanic populations, and lowest in counties with average size Hispanic populations. One interpretation of these Chapter Two
findings is that moderate size minority populations permitted positive interactions between groups, but large minority populations resulted in threat.

The threat and contact perspectives also suggest hypotheses about how specific groups and individual natives will react to arrival of immigrants in their communities. In particular, the threat perspective raises the possibility that established minorities may perceive that immigrants undermine their precarious economic and political power; the contact perspective holds out the possibility that shared experiences of economic and political marginality can foster solidarity. In North Carolina, a prominent new destination state, the foreign-born and their children may not yet impact electoral politics, but competition likely occurs in other spheres (Marrow 2008, 2009). In many localities, immigrant workers visibly sustain and dominate employment in non-durable manufacturing and personal services industries (Fischer and Tienda 2006), creating potential for competition and conflict with less-skilled native workers and African Americans, even as they contribute to the overall welfare of their new communities. Housing and schools are other potential arenas for conflict, particularly in resource-strapped districts facing new fiscal outlays for special instructional needs, such as bilingual programs.

By focusing on how the costs and benefits of immigration are distributed, the political economy literature contributes a more specific version of the threat hypothesis. For example, native workers whose skills place them in direct economic competition with immigrants are more likely to harbor anti-immigration sentiments compared with potential beneficiaries, such as the affluent, owners of capital, and managers (Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Similarly, native residents who perceive their own economic situation or that of their community to be precarious or deteriorating will likely be less tolerant of immigration in the presence of a substantial foreign-born population.

There is mixed support for the threat perspective in the recent US immigration literature. Studying California’s Proposition 187, Alvarez and Butterfield (2000) find that natives who were pessimistic about the economy or felt threatened economically by immigration were more likely to support the ballot initiative. From national data, Espenshade and Hempstead (1993) and Pantoja (2006) find that the less-educated, as well as respondents who are most pessimistic about the economy and their own economic circumstances, are less supportive of immigration. By contrast, Citrin, et al. (1997) claim that personal economic circumstances have little influence on opinions about immigration, but anxiety over the national economy and taxes is associated with a more skeptical view of immigration.
Empirical consensus also is lacking regarding how exposure to immigrants influences attitudes toward immigration. For example, Dixon and Rosenbaum (2004; Dixon 2006) maintain that whites who directly interact with Hispanics in schools or their community have more positive views of them and that contacts with Hispanics dispel stereotypes, but contacts with blacks do not. Hood and Morris (2000) find that residence in densely-populated counties with substantial Hispanic and Asian populations is associated with lower support for the anti-immigration Proposition 187. Although supportive, these findings are highly tentative because they are based on national data with little contextual information (Dixon and Rosenbaum); because they use indirect measures of contact, namely residence in counties with large minority populations (Hood and Morris); and because they draw inferences about attitudes toward immigration using ethnicity as a proxy.

Other studies indicate the importance of the nature of inter-group contact in moderating opinions, further demonstrating the importance of nuance in predicting whether contact triggers understanding or hostility. Stein, Post, and Rinden (2000) claim that attitudes toward minority groups depend on the level of direct interaction. Specifically, they show that residence in a county with a high proportion Hispanic is associated with a more negative view of Hispanics among respondents who reported infrequent interactions with Hispanics, but a more positive view among those who reported frequent interactions. As expected, cooperative contact is conducive to positive views of the out group, while superficial or adversarial contacts usually foster negative attitudes.

The cooperative and competitive versions of the contact hypothesis have straightforward implications for native residents’ opinions about immigration in new destinations. Specifically, natives whose personal characteristics place them in competition with immigrants, or whose personal economic circumstances are precarious, will harbor more negative views of immigration in the county that has received immigrants compared with similar residents not directly impacted by a surge in the foreign-born population. A further implication is that sustained contact with immigrants will be associated with more positive views of immigration while superficial or sporadic interactions with immigrants will be associated with negative views of immigration.

**Indirect contact: Media exposure**

Recent analyses have put a focus on the role of the news media and national political discourse in shaping individuals’ opinions about immigration (Hopkins 2010). The prominence of immigration as a national policy issue means that even residents whose first-hand experience with foreign-born residents form opinions based on what they hear or read. An especially promising theoretical insight concerns
how media and political events influence local responses to immigration. Hopkins (2010) theorizes that both rapid growth of foreign-born population and prominent media coverage of immigration are necessary to trigger perceptions of threat among native residents. His “politicized change” perspective differs from conventional contact theory by emphasizing two new features—the pace of change in the foreign-born population (that is the intensity of the influx), rather than the size of the foreign-born population per se, combined with national media coverage that frames immigration as a social problem. For Hopkins, both conditions must be present to foster anti-immigration sentiment, which is a testable proposition if nearby localities that did and did not attract foreign-born residents can be compared.

Political orientation

Political beliefs also may influence attitudes toward immigration by defining group membership, social values and policy preferences. Advocates of limited government, for example, may view immigrants as a drain on public budgets, which acquires larger compass in light of immigrants’ geographic dispersal. The new settlement patterns re-distributed the fiscal impacts of immigration, previously concentrated among costal “blue” states, toward southern and midwestern states, and within states away from large metropolitan centers toward smaller urban and suburban places. Furthermore, if immigration activates values about national identity and foments divisions between in- and out-groups (Huntington 2004), reactions to immigration may be independent of actual exposure. This “symbolic politics” thesis, which helps explain why strong reactions to illegal immigration occur in places where few immigrants reside, finds support in recent political responses to immigration. Despite pervasive evidence that immigration poses no threat to the nation’s common language, many states and localities have passed “English-only” ordinances (Rodriguez et al. 2007; Citrin et al. 1990). By showing that humanitarian and egalitarian values predict support for immigrant admissions, Pantoja (2006) finds support for the symbolic politics thesis from the opposite direction.

Some studies reveal that beliefs and values are more powerful predictors of attitudes toward immigration than variables associated with direct contact or threat. For example, Ramakrishnan and Wong (2008) find that political party composition predicts the likelihood that local governments will initiate and pass immigration-related legislation. Studies about identity, political orientation and receptiveness to cultural change influence attitudes toward immigration, but the size and growth of the local immigrant population figures is of secondary importance in these analyses. This research suggests that higher levels of political and social conservatism will be associated with less positive views of
immigration and that the magnitude of the association will not depend on the size of the local foreign-born population.

**Tolerance for diversity**

Evaluating contact hypotheses also requires that we consider how natives’ reactions are mediated by their individual characteristics and prior exposure to information about other groups (Alba, Rumbaut, and Marotz 2005). Building from evidence that *education and exposure to other cultures* raise tolerance for diversity and change, we expect a positive association between levels of education and positive attitudes toward immigrants (Espenshade and Hempstead 2006, Pantoja, 2006). A shared cultural heritage or recent immigrant ancestry also are associated with support for immigration (Espenshade and Hempstead 1993, Espenshade and Calhoun 1993). Haubert and Fussell (2006) find that a college education, a white collar occupation, experience living abroad and rejection of ethnocentrism—all part of what they term a “cosmopolitan worldview”—are associated with more favorable opinions toward immigration. These findings suggest the testable proposition that more highly educated residents, those with an immigrant heritage and those with more cosmopolitan experiences will harbor more positive views of immigration compared with their less educated counterparts, those with no immigrant heritage and limited exposure to communities beyond their own.

**Our contribution**

Building on these myriad insights, we empirically evaluate which mechanisms, direct (contact and competition) vs. indirect (media) exposure to new immigrants best explain native reactions to the growth of foreign-born residents in a specific, but highly relevant case. We test several hypotheses in a community that witnessed a growth in its foreign-born residents and a nearby, loosely matched county that attracted few immigrants. As such, our analysis is among the first to investigate the formation of opinions about immigration in one of the “new immigrant destinations.” The focused nature of the survey analyzed allows us to examine several aspects of inter-group relations between natives and immigrants in ways that general surveys about political and social attitudes cannot. Finally, we explore an aspect of opinion formation that has received limited analysis, namely whether the influence on opinions of selected respondent characteristics depends on residence in a community that has actually witnessed rapid demographic change.
IV. Study sites

We analyze a unique randomized phone survey of US-born adults living either in Chatham County or Person County, North Carolina during summer of 2008. A total of 1,080 US-born adults (574 from Chatham County and 506 from Person County) participated in the phone survey. Response rates of 19.1 percent in Person County and 20.9 percent in Chatham County were not significantly different between the two counties (p = 10.1%). The survey was conducted during the US Presidential election campaign and about a year after a major immigration reform bill failed in the US Congress amid high-profile protests for and against. Stock market indices were well off the highs posted the previous summer and the 2008-09 recession was already underway (although not yet officially acknowledged). Data collection was complete well before widespread acknowledgement of the extent of the financial crisis and the resulting market crash in late September of 2008.

After eliminating cases with incomplete information, the analysis sample includes 998 observations. The survey obtained respondents’ race, occupation, social contact with immigrants, perception of the size of the local immigrant population, awareness of media coverage of immigration, and opinions about various national and local level immigration issues. Respondents who answered “Don’t Know” or refused to answer a question were assigned neutral answers as appropriate.

The two target counties were selected through a process designed to identify appropriate matched pairs of high and low immigration counties nationwide. The foreign-born made up less than one percent of the population of each county in 1980. A simple model based on county characteristics in 1980 and 1990 predicted that both Chatham County and Person County would experience high rates of growth in their foreign-born population over the next decade (Hanson 2007). By 2000, the foreign-born population of Chatham County rose to nearly nine percent of the population, primarily due to

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8 Response rates are calculated according to the American Association for Public Opinion Research’s “RR3”: completed interviews over estimated contacts with eligible units (American Association for Public Opinion Research 2009).

9 Predictor variables in this model include 1980 to 1990 change in foreign-born, black, and Hispanic population shares, 1990 employment shares in nondurable manufacturing and agriculture, share of the population that owns its own home, 1980 to 1990 change in median home value, and 1980 to 1990 change in country population. The universe of the model was counties in the South located within Metropolitan Statistical Areas and having 2000 populations between 25,000 and 75,000 people. This model can account for about 52 percent of variation in 1990 to 2000 percent change in the share of the county population that is foreign-born. Chatham County and Person County were both in the top 20% of these 152 counties in terms of predicted change in foreign-born share of the population according to this model. Chatham County and Person County were selected from among this top fifth because they were geographically proximate to each other.
immigration from Mexico and Central America, while Person County’s foreign-born population share remained unchanged.

Person County and Chatham County share many key attributes that are relevant for immigration. Manufacturing employment in both counties is well above the national average—22 percent in Chatham versus 26 percent in Person—which is important because of the growing representation of foreign workers in manufacturing industries. Nonetheless, both counties witnessed declines in manufacturing employment between 2000 and 2007: 17 percent in Chatham County and 22 percent in Person County. Both counties border Durham County and are part of the Durham Metropolitan Statistical Area; both are served by the Durham Herald-Sun and several other regional newspapers and broadcast television and radio stations based in Raleigh-Durham or Greensboro. Each county also has several small local periodicals and at least one local radio station.

Despite these similarities, Chatham County and Person County differ in important ways. Table 1 shows select demographic information for the research sites based on the American Community Survey (ACS), and Table 2 presents key sample characteristics. Chatham County residents are, compared to Person county natives, better educated and average higher family incomes (Table 1). The proportion of residents who are black in Person County is about twice that of Chatham County, although this difference is smaller when only the native population is considered. In these two counties, the Hispanic population largely corresponds to members of households headed by immigrants, which accounts for Chatham County’s larger Hispanic population based on ACS data compared with our sample of US-born residents. Age structures of both counties are similar, however. Our county samples capture these differences, although blacks are somewhat underrepresented in the Person County sample.

Person County witnessed less population growth than Chatham County (Table 1). This is reflected in the survey data by the higher share of Chatham County natives who reported having been born outside North Carolina (Table 2). Voters in each county are about equally likely to register or identify as Democrats or Republicans, but at every education and income level Chatham County respondents were far more likely than Person County residents to describe themselves as “liberal” (Table 2). This corresponds with voting data from the 2004 Presidential Elections: John Kerry won 50 percent of votes in Chatham County, but only 41 percent in Person County.

Chatham County immigrants are concentrated around Siler City, attracted by job opportunities in its poultry processing plants, but the foreign-born are also dispersed in other areas of the county, where they find employment in construction, agriculture and service industries that hire unskilled
workers. The educational profile of Chatham County’s Hispanics was very low in the 2000 Census: Only 3.7 percent had a bachelor’s degree or more, and 70.5 percent had not graduated from high school.

In 2000, 85.6 percent of Chatham County’s foreign-born population was from Latin America, with 67.3 percent from Mexico and 14.2 percent from Central America. Only 49.6 percent of Person County’s immigrants were from Latin America. Asian-origin immigrants accounted for only 5.2 percent of Chatham County’s foreign-born, but 32.1 percent of the foreign-born in Person County, where 19.6 percent of the foreign-born population was from Vietnam. In 2000, 14.7 percent of Chatham County’s and 28.3 percent of Person County’s foreign-born population were naturalized citizens.

Immigration has been an active political issue in Chatham County since before 1999. In 2000, then Chair of the County Board of Commissioners Rick Givens provoked protests from state Hispanic advocacy organizations and a rebuke from the North Carolina Governor’s office for a letter requesting assistance in removing illegal immigrants, although he later adopted a more conciliatory approach to immigration (Viglucci 2000). In January 2008 Chatham County’s Board of Commissioners voted against participating in the federal 287(g) program, which trains local law enforcement officers to enforce federal immigration laws. As of August 2008, eight North Carolina jurisdictions, none of them in the study counties, participated in the program.

V. Analytic strategy

Our primary goal is to evaluate variants of the contact hypothesis by investigating whether perceived threats, actual contact or indirect exposure to foreign-born populations are associated with anti-immigration sentiments. Additionally, we evaluate the influence of personal characteristics, such as political alignment and tolerance for diversity, on attitudes toward immigration in the presence and absence of a local foreign-born population. After defining key theoretical constructs in operational terms, we compare mean values for the core theoretical constructs in each county. Using multivariate regression techniques, we show how the key constructs are associated with anti-immigration opinions in both counties. Finally, to evaluate which theoretical mechanisms are activated or aggravated by growth of the local immigrant population and/or direct contact with immigrants, we model interactions between Chatham County residence and key variables to test for differences in the association between these covariates and attitudes toward immigration, contingent on recent growth in the foreign-born population.
Our empirical strategy models differences in opinions about immigration among individuals, but cannot explain how variation in opinions about immigration arises at the county level. This is especially important given the differences in the composition of native populations of the two counties and direct exposure to immigrants by Chatham County residents. Therefore, we investigate how the estimated association between opinions about immigration and residence in Chatham County changes as theoretically important controls are introduced.

**Dependent variable: Immigration Problems Index**

In order to capture natives’ general opinions about immigration, we created an index from responses to eight questions, listed below and summarized in Table 3. A numerical score was assigned to the ordinal responses (1 to 5, 1 to 3, or 1 to 10, depending on the number of implicit categories), with higher scores indicating that immigration was a more salient or more problematic issue, or a preference for fewer immigrant admissions. The “Immigration Problems Index” is an unweighted sum of the standardized scores for each question. Crohnbach’s alpha coefficient for the index is 0.79 and the mean inter-item covariance is 0.32. Alternative formulations of the index using different weightings of the scores derived from factor analysis and subsets of the eight variables were used to check the robustness of the multivariate estimates. Substantive results were unchanged. Responses to the following questions were used to develop the index:

1. Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be decreased a lot, decreased a little, left the same as it is now, increased a little or increased a lot?

2. Now consider illegal or undocumented immigration as a national issue. On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is equal to unimportant and 10 is equal to very important, how would you rank the issue of illegal immigration?

3. And using the same scale, how would you rank the issue of illegal or undocumented immigration as a local issue? 1 being unimportant; 10 being very important.

4. Considering legal immigrants, do you think that today's legal immigrants pay their fair share of taxes, or not? (No, Don’t know, or Yes)

5. What about undocumented immigrants -- do you think that they pay their fair share of taxes? (No, Don’t Know, or Yes)

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10 The dependent variable and many of its component items show signs of censoring for respondents with the most negative view of immigration, especially in Person County (Figure 2). Tobit models were used in robustness testing, with no substantive difference relative to Original Least Squares. For ease of interpretation, we present OLS models with Huber-White standard errors generated using STATA’s “robust” option.
6. Consider the statement that more good jobs for immigrants means fewer good jobs for American citizens. Would you say you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly?

7. Consider the statement that having more students from immigrant backgrounds makes it more difficult for schools to teach all children. Would you say you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly?

8. On balance, do you think immigration into the United States is good, bad, or doesn’t make much difference?

On six of the eight items, respondents from Chatham and Person Counties provided significantly different answers (Table 3). Respondents from both counties agree that the presence of larger numbers of immigrants increase instructional challenges for teachers. Further, residents of both counties report that illegal immigration is an equally important local issue, despite the fact that Person County was not impacted by immigration. The composite Immigration Problems Index shows that residents of Person County harbor more negative perceptions of immigration compared with Chatham County respondents (Figure 2, Table 3). At face value, this raw difference lends support to claims that direct exposure dispels myths about immigrants and potentially fosters understanding of immigration, but differences between counties in average education and political orientation indicate that other mechanisms might be responsible for average differences in perceptions. The final stage of the analysis considers this possibility.

**Predictor variables**

The theoretical discussion identified several factors that predict opinions about immigrants. These include threat of competition, the nature of inter-group contact, media exposure, tolerance for diversity and political orientation. Several hypotheses implicate more than one of these social influences, however. Table 2 summarizes the key predictor variables, which we describe below.

**Threat**

Because most direct competition takes place in the labor market via displacement or wages, we use several measures of labor market status to capture perceived threat. As the quotes in the introduction indicate, rapid growth of foreign-born populations may also activate competition in schools (for teacher’s time and other resources), which we represent with an indicator for parents of school-aged children. Self reports of precarious financial circumstances gauge respondents’ vulnerability to competition from foreigners and perceptions of threat. Unadjusted mean differences show considerable similarity between respondents from Chatham and Person County, with several notable exceptions.
There were twice as many respondents out of the labor force but not retired in Person compared with Chatham County. A larger share of Person County respondents holds managerial positions and Chatham County respondents are more likely to be retired. Finally, Person County residents are also significantly more likely than their Chatham County counterparts to report having children enrolled in the public schools.

Education also influences perceived economic competition and threat as well as tolerance for diversity. A political economy perspective predicts that job and resource competition will be greatest among native residents with educational profiles most similar to the foreign-born. Lack of a high school degree or equivalent is thus a key competition indicator.

Inter-group contact

To assess whether intergroup contact is associated with positive perceptions of immigration, we use several measures of actual contact and exposure to immigrants. These include whether respondents socialized with an immigrant outside of the workplace; had contact with an immigrant on the job; and reported hearing non-English languages spoken frequently in their community or at work. Chatham County’s immigrant influx is reflected in the significantly higher shares of residents who report socializing with an immigrant outside of work, as well as more frequent exposure to non-English language in the community (but not in the workplace).

Indirect exposure: Media

We measure respondents’ indirect exposure to immigrants and immigration issues using indicators of media consumption habits and frequency with which immigration appears in the news. Respondents from our comparison counties differ both in their frequency of newspaper reading and their awareness of immigration themes in media. Just over one-quarter of respondents from both counties reported watching “Lou Dobbs Tonight” (a news commentary show on CNN that frequently covered immigration and consistently framed it as a problem). 11

Tolerance for diversity

To capture variation in tolerance for diversity, we use three indicators of a respondent’s breadth of experience: Whether the respondent was born outside of North Carolina; speaks a foreign language; and has a foreign-born grandparent. Education also influences understanding of diversity. Better

11 Lou Dobbs resigned his position in fall, 2009, under pressure from Hispanic and immigrant advocate groups.
educated respondents presumably are more adaptable to social change, including ethnic transformation of their communities. In particular, college-educated residents are likely to be more accepting of immigrants than their less educated counterparts.

Political orientation

Political orientation is measured using a self-characterization as politically liberal, conservative, or moderate or apolitical. Exploratory analysis revealed this measure to better predict immigration attitudes than party preference. About one-third of respondents from each county self-identified as conservative, but Chatham County respondents are over twice as likely as Person County residents to identify as liberal (18 versus 7 percent). Person County respondents are thus significantly more likely to identify as politically moderate or apolitical than Chatham County residents.

VI. Results

Table 4 reports multivariate regression estimates predicting opinions toward immigration, as measured by an index that characterizes immigration as a social problem. High values indicate more problematic opinions about immigration. As expected, a liberal political orientation and measures of tolerance for diversity are associated with more favorable views of immigration. The coefficients on having a college degree, being born outside of North Carolina, speaking a foreign language, and identifying as politically liberal are all negative and statistically significant. Results also support claims that intergroup personal contact fosters acceptance of immigrants. Both socializing and working with an immigrant are associated with more benign views of immigration. Not all inter-group contacts are positive, however. Reporting hearing a foreign language frequently in the community is associated with a more problematic view of immigration (Table 4).

Media consumption also predicts opinions about immigration. Viewing “Lou Dobbs Tonight” is associated with a more problematic view of immigration, while frequently reading a newspaper (perhaps a more nuanced source of information about immigration) is associated with a more benign view. It is unclear, however, whether respondents with less favorable opinions are more likely to watch Lou Dobbs, or vice-versa.

The “threat” hypothesis finds very limited support. Parents of a school-age child are more likely to harbor negative views of immigration than residents whose families are not directly involved in schools. Other predictor variables implicated in intergroup competition, most notably being black, unemployed or having no high-school degree, show no significant association with views of immigration.
**County differences in opinion formation**

Our theoretical arguments posit that opinions about immigration will differ between residents whose communities were directly impacted by immigration and those whose exposure is only indirect, because specific mechanisms of opinion formation will be activated when a large immigrant population is present. Lacking before-and-after data on opinions in these two counties or a true counterfactual, we cannot directly assess how opinions have changed as a result of immigration. Instead, we examine differences in the association between opinions and various characteristics and experiences across the two counties, knowing that the dramatic recent immigration to Chatham County is perhaps the most substantial and relevant, but hardly the only, difference between the two counties. Results reported in Table 5 reveal few significant differences between the two counties in the associations between opinions about immigration and the key predictor variables.

A few noteworthy differences emerge, however. One is the difference in the association between reporting financial insecurity and the Immigration Problems Index. There exists a positive association between financial insecurity and more problematic views of immigration in Chatham County, but not in Person County. Thus, there is some evidence that economically insecure residents feel threatened by local immigration, or partly blame immigrants for their economic plight when immigrants are present locally. Overall, however, we find no evidence that competition and threat better explain opinions about immigration among Chatham compared with Person County residents.

The association between being a parent and a more problematic view of immigration is not stronger in Chatham County than in Person County. Given the overall association between parental status and more problematic immigration attitudes, this is surprising. However, about one-third of Person County parents reported that over 10 percent of their child’s class consisted of immigrant students. Thus, Person County parents may perceive competition in schools despite the small number of county residents who are immigrants or children of immigrants. Whether accurate or not, perceptions shape attitudes.

The hypothesis that the association between media coverage of immigration and attitudes toward immigration depends on the intensity of immigration is not supported. Associations between media consumption and opinions about immigration are essentially similar in both counties, which does not support Hopkins’s (2010) claim that the intersection of media coverage and demographic change produces negative reactions to immigration.
Analyses also produced a few unexpected results. Liberal respondents harbored less problematic views of immigration, relative to residents with a moderate political orientation or who considered themselves apolitical, but only in Chatham County. Two explanations for this association seem plausible. First, local immigration may polarize opinions about immigration, increasing the difference in opinions between liberals and moderates. Second, liberals in Chatham County may be, on average, “more liberal” than liberals in Person County. Not only are there many more liberals in Chatham compared with Person County, but Chatham County liberals, like residents of Chatham County generally, are more likely to have been born outside of North Carolina. Thus, Chatham County liberals may represent a different set of experiences and political attitudes than Person County’s liberals.

Another unexpected result is the weaker association between socializing with an immigrant and a more benign view of immigration for Chatham County compared with Person County. Again, unobserved heterogeneity may be implicated. Natives socializing with immigrants in a county with relatively few foreign-born residents may be predisposed to extremely positive views of immigration. Alternatively, natives in a high-immigration county may have other opportunities to gather information about immigration, lessening the importance of direct social contacts. These conjectures warrant further scrutiny, however.

**Differences in opinions about immigration between Chatham and Person County**

Residents of Person County view immigration more problematically than residents of Chatham County (Table 3, Figure 2). More Person County residents scored a maximum score of “10” on the Immigration Problems Index and fewer had benign views of immigration (Fig. 2). This county-level difference argues against the blunt hypothesis that broad competition and threat are responsible for highly negative views of immigration in new immigrant settlement areas, which predicts the opposite.

In the absence of extensive differences between counties in associations between the social forces theorized to shape views of immigration, we consider two plausible explanations for why residents of the low immigration county articulate more negative views than residents of the county where the foreign-born population surged. The first is that the compositions of the two counties’ native populations differ systematically in ways that predict divergent views. That larger shares of Chatham County residents have college degrees, were born out-of-state and identify as liberals compared with Person County is particularly important. The second explanation revolves around the contact hypothesis. Natives in Chatham County have much greater opportunity to interact with immigrants and a greater proportion report doing so, compared with Person County. Our analysis indicates that some of
these contacts are associated with a more benign view of immigration; hence it is plausible that the larger number of contacts with immigrants in Chatham County partly account for the opinion gap between the two counties.

The estimated association between residence in Chatham County, relative to Person County, and a more benign view of immigration is greatly decreased when controls for political orientation, tolerance for diversity, and education are introduced (In Table 6, Model Two versus Model One). Including controls for contacts with immigrants also attenuates the association between the county of residence and scores on the Immigration Problems Index, (Model Three versus Model One), but to a much smaller degree. Thus, differences in population composition most likely explain the large difference in opinions about immigration in the two counties.

Limitations

Our cross-sectional data do not allow us to claim that the differences we observe between the two counties are exclusively the result of immigration to Chatham County. The two counties differ in many important ways other than their very different immigration experiences and we do not claim that Person County represents a true counterfactual - a Chatham County sans immigration.

Another significant limitation of our analysis is that several operational measures are based on self-reports and are subject to selection bias, which render the direction of causal pathways ambiguous. Native residents with more problematic views of immigration may chose to watch Lou Dobbs Tonight, rather than the program influencing their opinions. Natives may be more sensitive to use of foreign language in public spaces if they disapprove of immigration. Finally, although we argue that these two North Carolina counties are a good testing ground for theories regarding opinion formation in new immigrant destinations, higher external validity requires replication beyond this new immigration state.

VII. Discussion

We present one of the first analyses of the social factors that influence native residents’ opinions about immigration in a new immigrant destination, making a novel comparison between two geographically proximate and loosely matched counties that did and did not receive immigration. There is no sign that widespread hostility towards immigration followed the growth of the foreign-born population. Indeed, native residents in the county that witnessed an increase in its foreign-born population viewed immigration more benignly compared with residents in the county that did not. Differences in the population characteristics of the two counties largely explain this result. There is
suggestive evidence that contacts between natives and immigrants, when they are more sustained than merely passing in the street or grocery store, foster a benign view of immigration. Policies intending to bolster support for immigrants in new destinations would do well to focus on promoting such interactions. As important, the hypothesis that natives would broadly sense competition and threat from immigration is not supported.

Our analysis also reveals points of friction. Native residents in dire economic straits appear especially prone to view their new immigrant neighbors in negative ways. That parents have a more negative view of immigration in both counties compared with nonparents suggests that schools are a site of perceived competition for teacher’s time and for educational resources. These results are worrisome in light of the current recession, which raises the risk for conflict between immigrants and natives as more people feel economically insecure and local resources shrink. Other researchers should take note of our finding that political orientation and the predisposition of natives to tolerate diversity are extremely important in both counties. Finally, our results suggest that differences of opinion about immigration among people of different political orientations may be aggravated by the rapid growth of immigrant population in nontraditional destinations. These results warrant more extensive exploration in light of the extensive political and educational differences between populations in the new and traditional immigrant destinations.
References


Tables and Figures

Figure 1. US Residents Preferring Decrease in Immigration
Polls with Nationally Representative Adult Samples, 1982-2008

Source: Selected polls retrieved May 28, 2009 from the iPOLLO Databank, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.
Table 1. Key demographic characteristics of Person County and Chatham County, North Carolina, 2005-2007.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Person County</th>
<th>Standard Error, Person</th>
<th>Chatham County</th>
<th>Standard Error, Chatham</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population and income</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>37,356</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>59,811</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population growth, 2000-07</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median family income</td>
<td>$48,877</td>
<td>$4,070</td>
<td>$63,410</td>
<td>$5,624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proportion of employment in selected industries</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and mining</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education and healthcare</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profession, scientific, and management services</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Race and ethnicity</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Black (Non-Hispanic)</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White (Non-Hispanic)</td>
<td>67.4%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>70.6%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
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<td>Hispanic (Any Race)</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Non-Hispanic)</td>
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<td>0.3%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Education (age 25 and over)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No HS degree or GED</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
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<td>HS degree, GED, or some College</td>
<td>65.8%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>49.5%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor’s or higher</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>32.4%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Place of birth</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign-born</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in North Carolina</td>
<td>74.0%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>58.1%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in other US state</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>30.3%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Sample characteristics: Key predictor and control variables, Person and Chatham Counties, North Carolina with T-tests for differences between counties.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Person County N=506</th>
<th>Chatham County N=574</th>
<th>P-value, 2-sided T-test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>38.1%</td>
<td>42.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race and ethnicity</td>
<td>Black (Non-Hispanic)</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>White (Non Hispanic)</td>
<td>75.8%</td>
<td>83.5%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other race/ethnicity</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>No high School degree</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High school degree, some college</td>
<td>67.3%</td>
<td>50.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bachelor's degree or Higher</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
<td>43.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Age 18 to &lt; 35</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Age 35 to &lt; 50</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Age 50 to &lt; 65</td>
<td>37.8%</td>
<td>33.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Age 65 and above</td>
<td>29.3%</td>
<td>32.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>55.3%</td>
<td>54.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non managerial</td>
<td>34.3%</td>
<td>36.7%</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Managerial</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>29.1%</td>
<td>34.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not in labor market</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition Indicators</td>
<td>Parent of public school student</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Finances are poor</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct contact</td>
<td>Socialized with an immigrant</td>
<td>28.5%</td>
<td>38.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Worked with an immigrant</td>
<td>31.6%</td>
<td>36.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hears foreign language very often</td>
<td>38.1%</td>
<td>46.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hears foreign language at work very often</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media contact</td>
<td>Reads newspaper frequently</td>
<td>38.7%</td>
<td>45.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Watches &quot;Lou Dobbs Tonight&quot;</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sees or hears immigration in media several times a week</td>
<td>49.2%</td>
<td>55.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance for diversity</td>
<td>Born outside North Carolina</td>
<td>68.7%</td>
<td>50.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Speaks a foreign language</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Has a foreign-born grandparent</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political orientation</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate or apolitical</td>
<td>61.5%</td>
<td>52.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>31.4%</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Perceptions of immigration in Person County and Chatham County: Immigration Problems Index and its components

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Person County mean value (S.D)</th>
<th>Chatham County mean value (S.D)</th>
<th>P-value, two-sided T-test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immigration Problems Index (1 = least problematic, 10 = most problematic)</td>
<td>7.21 (1.98)</td>
<td>6.43 (2.30)</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preferred number of immigrant admissions (1 =Increased Greatly, 5= Decreased Greatly)</td>
<td>3.71 (1.08)</td>
<td>3.40 (1.23)</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good jobs for immigrants means less good jobs for Americans ( 1= disagree strongly, 5 = agree strongly)</td>
<td>3.46 (1.49)</td>
<td>3.14 (1.52)</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More immigrant students make it more difficult for teachers to educate all students ( 1= disagree strongly, 5 = agree strongly)</td>
<td>3.94 (1.35)</td>
<td>2.82 (1.42)</td>
<td>0.123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of illegal immigration as national issue (1 = Not important, 10 = Most important)</td>
<td>8.60 (2.28)</td>
<td>8.13 (2.43)</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of illegal immigration as local issue (1 = Not Important, 10 = Most important)</td>
<td>7.73 (2.76)</td>
<td>7.89 (2.56)</td>
<td>0.326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal immigrants pay fair share of taxes (1 = Yes, 2= Don’t Know, 3 = No)</td>
<td>2.13 (0.89)</td>
<td>1.76 (0.87)</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unauthorized immigrants pay fair share of taxes (1 = Yes, 2= Don’t Know, 3 = No)</td>
<td>2.78 (0.55)</td>
<td>2.59 (0.71)</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration is good (1) bad (3), or neutral (2).</td>
<td>2.17 (0.81)</td>
<td>1.88 (0.87)</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 2. Immigration Problems Scale by County

Chatham

Person

Percent of Responses

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

<==Less Problematic More Problematic==>
Table 4. Regression of Immigration Problems Index (1 = least problematic, 10 = most problematic) on key predictors, with robust standard errors. A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>OLS Coef.</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>County of residence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Person</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chatham</td>
<td>-0.202</td>
<td>-0.128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-0.307*</td>
<td>-0.125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race and ethnicity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White (non-Hispanic)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black (non-Hispanic)</td>
<td>-0.093</td>
<td>-0.177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic and other</td>
<td>-0.754^</td>
<td>-0.406</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No high school degree</td>
<td>0.173</td>
<td>-0.248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School, GED, some college</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor's degree or higher</td>
<td>-0.887**</td>
<td>-0.147</td>
</tr>
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<td>Employment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-managerial worker</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managerial worker</td>
<td>0.218</td>
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<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>0.288</td>
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<td>Retired</td>
<td>-0.301</td>
<td>-0.208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not in labor market</td>
<td>-0.175</td>
<td>-0.248</td>
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<tr>
<td>Competition indicators</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent of public school student</td>
<td>0.466*</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own finances are bad</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td>-0.204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct contact with immigrants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialized with an immigrant</td>
<td>-0.754**</td>
<td>-0.134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worked with an immigrant</td>
<td>-0.498*</td>
<td>-0.217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hears foreign language very often</td>
<td>0.504**</td>
<td>-0.128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hears foreign lang. at work very often</td>
<td>0.358</td>
<td>-0.221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reads newspaper frequently</td>
<td>-0.328*</td>
<td>-0.132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watches &quot;Lou Dobbs Tonight&quot;</td>
<td>0.326*</td>
<td>-0.132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig. in media several times weekly</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>-0.125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance for diversity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born outside North Carolina</td>
<td>-0.472**</td>
<td>-0.144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaks a foreign language</td>
<td>-0.572*</td>
<td>-0.231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has a foreign-born grandparent</td>
<td>-0.094</td>
<td>-0.176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political orientation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>-1.395**</td>
<td>-0.215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>0.396**</td>
<td>-0.134</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| N          | 998 |
| r2         | 0.30 |

A. Model includes dummy variables for age, coefficients not shown.
Table 5. Regression of Immigration Problems Index (1 = least problematic, 10 = most problematic) on key predictors and their interaction with residence in Chatham County.\(^A\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Main Effect</th>
<th>S.E. of Main Effect</th>
<th>Interaction w/ Chatham County</th>
<th>S.E. of Interaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>County of residence</td>
<td>Person</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.127</td>
<td>-0.374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chatham</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.159</td>
<td>-0.186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.294</td>
<td>-0.251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race and ethnicity</td>
<td>White (non-Hispanic)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Black (non-Hispanic)</td>
<td>-0.121</td>
<td>-0.237</td>
<td>0.056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hispanic and other</td>
<td>-0.379</td>
<td>-0.562</td>
<td>-0.603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>No high school degree</td>
<td>-0.042</td>
<td>-0.324</td>
<td>0.441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High school, GED, some college</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bachelor's degree or higher</td>
<td>-0.664**</td>
<td>-0.221</td>
<td>-0.238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>Non-managerial worker</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Managerial worker</td>
<td>0.406</td>
<td>-0.251</td>
<td>-0.382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>0.091</td>
<td>-0.551</td>
<td>0.231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td>-0.277</td>
<td>-0.595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not in labor market</td>
<td>-0.102</td>
<td>-0.346</td>
<td>-0.223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition indicators</td>
<td>Parent of public school student</td>
<td>0.523*</td>
<td>-0.242</td>
<td>-0.135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Own finances are bad</td>
<td>-0.431</td>
<td>-0.304</td>
<td>1.089**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct contact with immigrants</td>
<td>Socialized with an immigrant</td>
<td>-1.104**</td>
<td>-0.212</td>
<td>0.674*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Worked with an immigrant</td>
<td>-0.580^</td>
<td>-0.332</td>
<td>0.057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hears foreign language very</td>
<td>0.266</td>
<td>-0.187</td>
<td>0.375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hears foreign lang. at work very often</td>
<td>0.615^</td>
<td>-0.343</td>
<td>-0.378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>Reads newspaper frequently</td>
<td>-0.368*</td>
<td>-0.185</td>
<td>0.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Watches &quot;Lou Dobbs Tonight&quot;</td>
<td>0.235</td>
<td>-0.195</td>
<td>0.256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Immigration in media several times weekly</td>
<td>0.186</td>
<td>-0.185</td>
<td>-0.225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance for diversity</td>
<td>Born outside North Carolina</td>
<td>-0.547*</td>
<td>-0.214</td>
<td>0.205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Speaks a foreign language</td>
<td>-0.648</td>
<td>-0.397</td>
<td>0.173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Has a foreign-born grandparent</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>-0.307</td>
<td>-0.371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political orientation</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>-0.429</td>
<td>-0.421</td>
<td>-1.382**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>0.277</td>
<td>-0.193</td>
<td>0.156</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 998, \(r^2 = 0.33\)

A. Includes dummy variables for age, coefficients not shown. ** = \(p < .01\), * = \(p < .05\), ^ = \(p < .10\)
Table 6. Estimated difference between responses of Person and Chatham County residents on the Immigration Problems Index (1 = least problematic, 10 = most problematic) when controlling for different sets of variables, using OLS regression.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chatham County coefficient</td>
<td>-0.760**</td>
<td>-0.255*</td>
<td>-0.650**</td>
<td>-0.202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.E.</td>
<td>-0.136</td>
<td>-0.128</td>
<td>-0.132</td>
<td>-0.128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sets of control vectors (x = included)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender and age</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race and ethnicity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct contact with immigrants</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance for diversity</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political orientation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>998</td>
<td>998</td>
<td>998</td>
<td>998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>r2</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** = p < .01, * = p<.05, ^ = p<.10
Chapter Three: Geographic dispersal of the foreign-born population and local anti-immigration policies*

1. Introduction

In July of 2006, the small city of Hazleton, Pennsylvania made national headlines by passing a local law intended to drive unauthorized immigrants out of the town. The town’s “Illegal Immigration Relief Act” created substantial penalties for employing or renting housing to unauthorized immigrants and declared English to be the town’s official language. Hazleton’s action set off a flurry of copycat laws: Newspapers reported imprecisely that “at least 80 town and cities” considered similar laws and that “as many as 100 other towns” had passed them in the months that followed (Preston 2007; Hurdle 2007). The specific policies in question ranged from deputizing local police to enforce federal immigration law, to prohibition of renting housing to or hiring unauthorized immigrants, to largely symbolic measures such as declaring English the official language of local government or restricting the flying of foreign flags.

Prominent journalists and politicians tied these proposals to federal inaction on illegal immigration, noting that Hazleton’s ordinance and its contemporaries followed failed attempts by the US Congress to pass immigration reform legislation in 2005. As The New York Times (2009) put it, “localities have been taking immigration enforcement into their own hands out of frustration over Washington’s failure to enact comprehensive reform, over misguided and ineffective federal enforcement of existing rules and over a sense that America has lost control of its borders.”

Population changes may have contributed to this sense of frustration and loss of control. The proliferation of local policies came just after America’s unauthorized immigrant population reached an estimated 11.1 million people in 2005, or 30 percent of the foreign-born population (Passel 2006). This was a dramatic increase from an estimated 2.5 million unauthorized residents in 1989. The overall immigrant population also grew during this period. The foreign-born population of the United States grew by 18.5 million people from 1990 to 2006, as the foreign-born population share rose from 7.9 percent to 12.5 percent.

_________________________

* I presented research in this chapter at the Notestein Seminar, Office of Population Research, Princeton University, November 9, 2010 and at the New Realities in Mexican Immigration Conference, Princeton University, April 22, 2011.
The nationwide growth of the foreign-born population was only one force changing population compositions at the local level. Beginning well before 1990, the geographic distribution of the foreign-born population of the United States changed in important ways (Massey and Capoferro 2008; Singer 2004; Lichter and Johnson 2006). The proportion of the nation’s immigrants located in traditional central city “gateways” such as New York, Los Angeles, Miami and Chicago declined, while significant immigrant populations sprang up in smaller cities, suburbs and towns across the country. Between 1990 and 2007, the foreign-born population more than doubled in 19 states where few immigrants lived previously, including Georgia, North Carolina and Iowa (Migration Policy Institute 2008). As a result of this dispersal and continued growth of the foreign-born population, a greater number and variety of local communities experienced growth of their immigrant population after 1990.

Some promising social science research posits that the growth of the immigrant population at the local level is a key trigger of these “anti-immigration policy proposals”—broadly defined in this chapter as concrete proposals for local laws or stated policies intended to limit immigration, illegal immigration or the impact either has on the local community.12 Hopkins (2010) found that the change in a locality’s foreign-born share of the population between 1990 and 2000 was associated with higher likelihood of considering an anti-immigration law. The case of Hazleton itself provides compelling anecdotal evidence of this association: The estimated foreign-born share of the town’s population increased over 10 percentage points from 2000 to 2007, from 3.7 percent to 14.0 percent.

I build on this insight by testing whether some types of communities are more sensitive than others to growth in their foreign-born population share. I ask whether a given change in population makeup raises the risk of an anti-immigration policy proposal by the same amount, no matter where that change occurs. The dispersal of the foreign-born population has dramatically changed the nature of the communities receiving immigrants. If the policy and opinion response to immigration depends on the characteristics of the places where foreign-born people settle, then dispersal of the foreign-born population may have promoted these local policy reactions and altered the way Americans think about immigration policy.

12 Appendix A contains a more detailed description of the various types of policies. It should be noted that, although I use “anti-immigration” as convenient shorthand, some proponents of such ordinances would argue that they are instead intended to support immigrants, especially legal immigrants. For example, a measure intended to prevent the hiring of unauthorized immigrants can be considered a way to improve employment prospects for authorized immigrants; “English-only” laws can be viewed as a way to encourage immigrants to learn English.
Geographic dispersal, by bringing immigrant populations into a diverse set of new immigrant destinations, has altered the contexts of reception in which immigrants adapt to natives and vice-versa. In many communities with growing foreign-born populations, immigration is a relatively novel phenomenon and may be a novelty in the state as well. As described in Chapter One, the new immigrant destinations include a larger number of localities with less-educated native populations and where voters support more conservative political candidates, relative to more established immigrant destination communities. Many more of these new immigrant destinations have immigrant populations that are composed predominantly of Latin Americans, contain few naturalized citizens or work primarily in nondurable manufacturing industries, especially meatpacking, food processing and textiles. As a result, the context of reception in which immigrants and natives encounter each other has shifted.

I test whether differences in the context of reception affect the association between changes in the proportion of the local population that is foreign-born and the likelihood that the jurisdiction considers implementing an anti-immigration policy—what I refer to as a locality’s “sensitivity” to changes in its foreign-born population share. Results show that simply being classified as a “new” immigrant destination in itself is not associated with greater sensitivity to changes in population makeup once other controls are introduced. However, a conservative electorate and being located outside of the traditional immigrant gateway states—two characteristics that are more common in the new immigrant destinations—are both associated with greater sensitivity to changes in foreign-born population share.

Having established these associations, I then consider whether the proliferation of anti-immigration policy proposals observed between 2000 and 2009 is related to the geographic distribution of the growth of the foreign-born population. Geographic dispersal implies that a greater number of local communities are exposed to increases in their foreign-born population share. It also means that these places have a different set of characteristics, on average, than would be the case had the foreign-born population remained concentrated in the traditional gateways, making them more sensitive to changes in their population share in my models. I assess the relative importance of these two different results of dispersal—the greater number of places experiencing immigrant population growth and the changes in their distribution of characteristics—in promoting anti-immigration policy proposals by conducting two simulations. The first simulates a case in which the immigrant population never

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13 The context of reception includes but is not limited to the characteristics and resources of the existing immigrant and coethnic population, the capacity and willingness of local institutions to serve the needs of newcomers, the character of the local labor market, and the constellation of state and local policies that govern access to social goods. (Rumbaut and Portes 2000; Portes and Rumbaut 2006)
dispersed geographically after 1990; the second simulates a case in which all localities have the same sensitivity to changes in their foreign-born population share as the established immigrant destinations. Comparing predicted probabilities of anti-immigration policy proposals resulting from these two simulations against those from actual data supports the hypothesis that dispersal of the foreign-born population is indeed a key factor promoting anti-immigration policies. Further, these simulations demonstrate that the shift of the immigrant population into localities with more conservative voters and less educated populations may play an important role in explaining the popularity of these policies.

Following this introduction, Section 2 provides the theoretical and empirical background for the chapter. Section 3 describes the data I use, especially the data collected on local anti-immigration policy proposals. Section 4 discusses the hypotheses and statistical analysis methods for estimating the relationship between characteristics of local communities and the association between changes in foreign-born population share and probability of proposing an anti-immigration ordinance. Section 5 describes the results of that analysis, while Section 6 takes those results and uses them to simulate hypothetical counterfactuals. Section 7 concludes.

2. Theoretical and empirical background

Why does it matter where the immigrant population is growing? What differences between localities might be important to understanding why some localities create policies to deter immigration, while the vast majority does not? How has dispersal of the foreign-born population since 1990 changed the characteristics of the communities where immigrants settle, and how does this impact public opinion and policy reactions to immigration?

The collection of theoretical perspectives that make up group threat theory, discussed more extensively in the previous chapter, is also relevant to understanding how the local immigrant population size might trigger anti-immigration laws. Generally speaking, theories of group threat or competition posit that the larger and geographically closer the minority population is, the greater the perceived competition for scarce resources or sense of threat among the majority group, or sub-groups of the majority group (Allport 1979; Bobo and Hutchings 1996). However, theories of racial threat or competition have not consistently predicted when and where natives will react negatively to immigrants, with some evidence that immigrant population share is associated with more negative opinions on immigration or with electoral support for restricting immigration (Campbell, C. Wong, and Citrin 2006; Marrow 2008; C. J. Tolbert and Hero 2001, 1996) and others studies finding little evidence
that a larger relative size of the local immigrant population generates a sense of threat among natives (Citrin et al. 1990; Dixon 2006; Hjerm 2007).

The flip side of group threat, contact theory, predicts that a larger out-group population can actually reduce hostility under the right conditions by allowing personal interactions and dispelling myths and stereotypes (Allport 1979; Lieberson 1961; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006; Dixon and Rosenbaum 2004; Dixon 2006). The threat and contact hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, with some evidence from California, for example, that whites feel the greatest threat when the immigrant or Hispanic population is either very small or very large—suggesting that positive contacts were most likely when the out-group is moderately sized relative to the in-group. (Stein et al. 2000; C. J. Tolbert and Hero 2001).

**Beyond group threat and contact: The role of change**

The inconsistent theories and evidence on the relationship between the size of the immigrant population and natives’ opinions and behavior makes plausible the hypothesis that the magnitude of change in group sizes is more important for understanding when feelings of threat materialize among natives than the relative group sizes themselves. This argument was materialy advanced by Hopkins (2010), who finds that native residents of communities where the immigrant population share rose rapidly showed a greater negative change in their opinions about immigration when immigration was a salient national issue than did residents of other communities. The same study finds that cities considering anti-immigration policies in the period 2000 to 2006 had greater percent point changes in their foreign-born population share from 1990 to 2000 than did a set of matched controls. However, Hopkins did not extensively examine whether the relationship between change in proportion foreign-born and policy reactions was moderated by other demographic, economic and political factors.

In contrast to Hopkins, Ramakrishnan and Wong (2008) find no relationship between Hispanic population growth from 1990 to 2000 and anti-immigration policy proposals. Due to the correlation between Hispanic and foreign-born growth rates, it is likely that they may have found the same null result had that indicator been used instead. Ramakrishnan and Wong’s result may differ from those of Hopkins due to their use of growth rates (as opposed to changes in population share) to measure changes in population composition. Because the majority of US communities have long had very small or nonexistent immigrant and Hispanic populations, very large growth rates can thus still result in insignificant point changes in percent immigrant or Hispanic. Of the two indicators, the change in foreign-born population share arguably better measures visible changes in relative group size.

Chapter Three
Local context

Hopkins’s take on how demographic change alters intergroup relations offers a much-needed theoretical advance. However, population sizes and changes are not the only local-level factors that shape immigrant-native interactions and the opinions of natives about immigration policy. This section reviews some of the relevant evidence surrounding key elements of the local context of immigrant reception that feature in the analysis.

Novelty of immigration

A number of observers have linked friction between natives and immigrants to the settlement of large numbers of immigrants in American communities that previously had few immigrants. Media accounts of high profile ordinance proposals, such as Hazleton’s, or native-on-immigrant violence have identified both the rapid growth and novelty of Hispanic immigration as possible triggers (Semple 2008). Some advocates link observed increases in abuse and discrimination against immigrants and Hispanics directly to geographic dispersal of immigrant populations into new territory in the Southeast and Midwest (Leadership Council on Civil Rights 2009; Bauer and Reynolds 2009).

Beyond the few extreme incidents that attracted media attention, a body of rich ethnographies and case studies document the complex and often difficult adjustment of natives to immigrants and vice-versa in these places, highlighting frictions that emerge when native communities encounter immigrant neighbors for the first time (Anderson 2000; Gozdziak and Martin 2005; Massey 2008; Singer, Hardwick, and Brettell 2008; Stull, Broadway, and Griffith 1995; Zuniga and Hernández-León 2005). In particular, a number of case studies have documented how immigration to relatively homogenous communities may threaten a psychological sense of place, continuity and community in the new immigrant destinations in a way that it does not in the traditional immigrant destinations (Fennelly 2008; Erwin 2003; Schoenholtz 2005). Further, immigrant-focused services, such as English language classes and translation services, that may aid immigrant integration and smooth intergroup relations may be less developed in areas where immigration is new (Kay 2005; Riffe, Turner, and Rojas-Guyler 2008).
There is little quantitative evidence assessing this possible link between the novelty of immigration and resistance by natives. The closest test yet comes from New York City, where Green, Strolovitch and Wong (1998) found that racially-motivated crimes committed against non-whites were disproportionately common in neighborhoods that had previously been almost entirely white, but where the minority population share was increasing. They interpret this pattern as a sign that all-white neighborhoods were being defended against settlement by non-whites.

There are, of course, multiple geographical levels at which immigration can be “new.” Even if immigration is new to a particular locality, it may be a familiar phenomenon in the state that contains it. Indeed, the five traditional gateway states contained around a quarter of counties and places categorized as new immigrant destinations in Chapter One. States provide an important element of context: Many important social and educational services used by immigrants are provided or funded by state level governments and organizations (Marrow 2005). Thus, the location of a locality inside (or outside of) a traditional gateway state might affect the way immigrants and natives relate to each other at the local level.

Even if the new immigrant destinations are, in fact, at higher (or lower) risk of anti-immigration policy proposals or other forms of resistance to immigrant settlement, the sheer novelty of immigration may not be responsible for this difference. The new and established immigrant destinations, however defined, differ in other important ways that could shape intergroup relations. My analysis thus includes the novelty of immigration as one possible influence on the relationship between policy change and risk of an anti-immigration policy reaction, but also tests whether other characteristics have a similar impact.

*Employment and growth*

The new immigrant destinations, as a group, are magnets for immigrant and native population growth alike. The native-born population grew by 30 percent between 1990 and 2007 in new immigrant destination counties, but only by 17% in established immigrant destination counties. Rapid growth of

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14 Note that while Hopkins (2010) studies the effects of changes in the foreign-born population share, his analysis is not interested in the interaction of this change with the size of the foreign-born population prior to the change, a measure of novelty.

15 New York, California, Florida, Illinois and Texas.

16 In Chapter One I defined the new immigrant destinations as those counties and places whose foreign-born population was below that of the country as a whole in 1990, but where the percent of their population that was foreign-born increased by more than five percentage points by 2007.

17 Established immigrant destination counties were those counties that we more than 7.9% foreign-born in 1990.
the native-born population may make the growth of the foreign-born population less noticeable. Case studies from very rapidly growing, largely suburban metropolitan areas such as Charlotte NC, Atlanta GA, or Dallas TX have commented on the small inconspicuous geographic clusters of immigrants in booming suburban landscapes and the relatively low visibility of the jobs they occupy in landscaping, cleaning and food services (Smith and Furuseth 2008; Odem 2008).

However, not all places that attracted immigrants also attracted natives: A small share of new immigrant destinations lost native population. This shifts the substantive meaning of any given change in the immigrant population share: In places where the native-born population is shrinking, relatively modest growth of the immigrant population could result in substantial shifts in the population makeup. It also may lead to a context of reception in which immigrants are more publicly visible. Donato and coauthors (2008, 2007) study rural counties that have had native population losses offset by immigrant population growth, observing that these places have special potential and risk for immigrant integration outcomes. The incomes of immigrants have grown in such areas, gaining on those of natives, while naturalization rates and rates of English proficiency have declined with ongoing immigration. Immigrant populations in these places are considerably younger than native populations, with higher proportions of families with children than natives. My analysis thus tests the possibility that reactions to immigrant population growth places with declining native populations are different from those with growing native populations.

The communities with growing immigrant populations, but declining native populations, overlap partially with another category of communities singled out in my analysis—those with substantial employment in nondurable manufacturing industries whose workforce has a large immigrant share. These industries include meatpacking, food processing, textiles, apparel, leather goods, furniture and wood production. The relocation of these in these industries away from major cities coupled with recruitment of immigrant labor were major reasons for immigrant population growth in many rural or small city Midwestern and Southeastern communities, including a number whose native-born population was declining (Crowley, Lichter, and Qian 2006; Guzmán and McConnell 2002; Kandel and Parrado 2005). These industries not only attract immigrants, but influence the integration process once they arrive. Immigrants to these places are often drawn by a single, prominent employer, making their influence on the local labor market explicit and adding the potential for workplace tensions to spill over into the wider community. Despite the generally unattractive nature of jobs in nondurable
manufacturing, immigrant labor in these industries represents competition for lesser-skilled natives (Gouveia and Stull 1995; Griffith 1995; Kandel and Parrado 2005; Anderson 2000).

The general state of a locality’s labor market also forms a key part of the context of reception and influences the way that natives perceive immigration. At the individual level, several studies find that natives in financial peril, the unemployed and those with a pessimistic view of the national economy view immigration more negatively (Alvarez and Butterfield 2000; Citrin et al. 1995, 1997; O’Neil and Tienda 2010). At the community level, Hopkins (2010) finds that localities that experienced an increase in unemployment and had a large immigrant population share were at higher risk of considering an anti-immigration policy.

Native population characteristics

Differences in the way that individual natives and subgroups of natives react to immigrants and immigration may also help explain inconsistent support for the group threat and contact theories. Theory and evidence point toward individuals with greater education being more supportive of immigration, either because immigration presents a greater net economic benefit (and less of a threat) to better-educated residents or because education expands tolerance for diversity and change (Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007, 2010; Pantoja 2006; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). This idea is relevant for understanding the consequences of geographic dispersal: Rates of college and high school completion are lower, on average, in the new immigrant destinations than in the established immigrant destinations as shown in the introduction to this dissertation.

The citizens of the established immigrant destinations are more politically liberal, by a large margin, than in new immigrant destinations, as discussed in the introduction. Political beliefs are highly associated with opinions about immigration and immigrants, presumably because immigration provokes questions of national identity and values (Citrin et al. 1990; Newton 2000; Pantoja 2006). Important associations between political preferences of local voters and the proposal and/or passage of immigration-related laws have been found at both state and local levels (Chavez and Provine 2009; Ramakrishnan and T. Wong 2008). In Chapter Two, political identifications are strongly associated with natives’ opinions about immigration and these associations are different in the new immigration county and non-immigration county.
Foreign-born population characteristics

Much of the research on political and opinion reactions to immigration focuses on the characteristics of natives and of native populations, to the relative neglect of immigrant and immigrant population characteristics. My analysis incorporates a couple of key characteristics of the immigrant population that differ across communities in the United States.

Immigrants from Latin America, especially Mexico, have accounted for the majority of growth in the foreign-born population since 1980. The dispersal of the immigrant population, too, has been driven by changes in the geographic distribution of the Mexican-origin population (Massey and Capoferro 2008). The combination of the composition of recent cohorts of immigrants and the geographic redistribution of Latin-American immigrant population means that the foreign-born populations of many new immigrant destinations are dominated by a single, recognizable language and ethnic group. Hispanic immigration has inspired high profile concern about cultural changes (e.g., Huntington 2004) and has been shown in experiments to inspire negative emotional reactions among natives (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008). In case studies in suburban Dallas, Brettell (2008) hypothesizes that the dominance of Hispanic immigrants in one city promoted an anti-immigration policy, while the multi-ethnic mix of immigrants in another city resulted in more welcoming reactions.

Although some of the dispersal of the foreign-born population involves long-settled immigrants relocating within the United States, most of the growth of the immigrant population in the new immigrant destinations involves new arrivals to the country (Lichter and Johnson 2009). This implies that a lower proportion of the immigrant population in these new settlement areas will be naturalized citizens. Naturalized citizens may be especially important in moderating political reactions, as they provide political representation that may help fend off anti-immigration policies. Alternatively, the political power represented by naturalized immigrants may present a special threat to natives, leading to heightened conflict (Dancygier 2010). Accordingly, a low proportion of naturalized immigrants and high proportions of Hispanics among an area’s immigrant populations are two possible risk factors for anti-immigration policy proposals tested in my analysis.

3. Data, hypotheses and methods

In this analysis, I measure the association between changes in jurisdictions’ foreign-born population share and anti-immigration policy proposals and test whether specific other characteristics of the localities moderate this relationship. I am interested in whether a local political jurisdiction
seriously considered a policy intended to restrict immigration or its impact on the community between 2000 and 2009. I thus first define the relevant geographic units of analysis, then discuss how the outcome variable of interest—proposal of an anti-immigration policy—is defined and measured. Subsequently, I explain the predictor variables that measure demographic change and the other characteristics of localities. Table 1 presents mean values of the variables used in the regression as well as the continuous variables they are derived from, when relevant, for counties and places that did and did not consider an anti-immigration policy.

Units of analysis

In the dataset of anti-immigration policies I construct, there are 215 unique government jurisdictions that considered policies, 77 of which are at the county level and 138 in towns, cities or municipal jurisdictions. I thus conduct my analysis separately for counties and Census places (which correspond closely to city, town, village and other sub-county political jurisdictions). In order to exclude very sparsely populated counties and very small places with very little local government activity, I restrict the analysis to counties and Census places of 5,000 persons or more population in the 2005-9 American Community Survey (ACS) estimates, leaving analytic populations of 2,832 counties and 5,895 Census places.

Dependent variable

The dependent variable indicates whether the government of a county or Census place seriously considered a concrete proposal for a policy intended to either enforce federal immigration law locally or to curtail the services or privileges accessible to authorized or unauthorized immigrants. The specific natures of these policies are discussed further in Appendix A.

The primary source for proposed policies was a full-text search of the Dow Jones Factiva database of US newspapers for a set of keywords commonly associated with local immigration-related policies, during the period from January 1, 2000 to December 1, 2009. The Factiva database contains articles from 605 major and minor US newspapers, located in all 50 states, as well as Reuters and Associated Press newswires.

I also obtained lists of proposed policies from the Fair Immigration Reform Movement (FIRM) and the Latino Justice PRLDEF, as well as the websites of organizations representing different political perspectives on immigration: The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), the Immigration Reform Law Institute, US English, and
ProEnglish (LatinoJustice PRLDEF n.d.; Fair Immigration Reform Movement n.d.). A list of jurisdictions that signed “287(g)” local immigration enforcement agreements with the federal government was obtained from the Immigration and Customs Enforcement website (US Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2008).

I confirmed each policy proposal and its outcome through either the minutes of public meetings or newspaper accounts. A jurisdiction was considered to have “proposed” a policy when specific language for an ordinance or a formal motion was successfully introduced and formally discussed by the governing body, where the relevant executive body considered a stated, formal change in policy, or where a voter-led initiative was successfully placed on the ballot by petition. Instances where a proposal failed at introduction for lack of a seconding motion, where policies were proposed by members of the general public but not acted upon by elected or appointed officials, where policies were discussed non-specifically or informally or where ballot initiatives failed to gather the required number of signatures were not designated as proposed policies.

The decision to use proposed policies, as opposed to only those that passed, deserves explanation. Considering a policy is arguably as valid an indicator of political support for immigration restriction as passing an ordinance. In many of the jurisdictions where political support for local immigration restriction efforts was strongest, or at least loudest, the policies were never enacted. The legal timeline of the issue explains this result: Many of the jurisdictions that considered very aggressive policies based their proposals on the Hazleton, PA law. A court injunction prevented that city from enforcing its law and involved it in an expensive series of lawsuits and appeals that continue to the present day, leading many other jurisdictions to suspend discussion of their policies to await the outcome. Other more moderate policies were more easily passed in many cases because they carried a less obvious risk of legal trouble. I choose to use proposed, rather than passed, policies as the outcome because of this ambiguity surrounding the substantive meaning of proposal passage in terms of political support.

18 Latino Justice PRLDEF, ACLU and MALDEF litigate against local anti-immigration immigration ordinances, while FIRM is an umbrella organization of immigration advocacy organizations. The Immigration Reform Law Institute (a branch of the Fair Immigration Reform Movement) advocates and litigates in favor of legislation to reduce immigration, while US English and ProEnglish advocate on behalf of official English legislation.

19 This relatively restrictive definition of a “proposed ordinance” may explain why I find a higher rate of passage than Ramakrishnan and Wong (2008)
In order to identify only those places where policies carried credible mainstream political support, I included only explicit, formal policy proposals. For example, a pattern of arrests of immigrants by local police that did not result from a stated policy does not qualify as a “policy proposal,” no matter how sustained, discriminatory or even illegal. I also excluded policies where it was not clear that the political intention was to control immigration or the impact of immigration through restrictive means. Changes in zoning, parking or occupancy laws were not counted, for example, because it is difficult to assess whether this type of policy changes are related to immigration. Further, the characterization of these changes as being related to immigration or not in the media likely depends to a large degree on the size and characteristics of the local immigrant population, introducing an unacceptable level of bias given my method of counting policies. Similarly, policies that were enacted in order to comply with state laws, day labor regulations passed in support of public hiring halls, and the repeal of pro-immigrant “sanctuary city” declarations were excluded because of the ambiguous intent of these policies.

I do count jurisdictions that considered applying or did apply to US Immigration and Custom Enforcement’s “287(g)” program as having an anti-immigration policy proposal. The 287(g) agreements, which allow local police to be deputized to enforce federal immigration laws, involve localities directly in immigration enforcement. As a hybrid federal-local program, they are not included as “local” policies by Hopkins (2010) and Ramakrishnan and Wong (2007), but I include them because 287(g) agreements share the same goals as other local anti-immigration policies and must be initiated by the locality. Although they often arise from the same political climates and types of public campaigns as other types of anti-immigration policies, 287(g) agreements differ from other local policies in that they can be initiated through administrative channels in most jurisdictions (Capps et al. 2011). Thus, while my data includes all jurisdictions that successfully signed 287(g) agreements, it likely undercounts cases where officials considered the program, but did not complete the application process or receive approval.

**Characteristics of proposed anti-immigration immigration policies**

This search yielded 259 policies considered by localities from January 2000 to December 2009. Of these, 180 (69.5 percent) passed into law or were otherwise approved by the local government. I do not, however, know the extent to which most of these policies were actually enforced. Many localities considered multiple policy proposals. Two hundred fifteen distinct jurisdictions considered a policy and 156 (72.6 percent) of these approved at least one policy. These jurisdictions were located in 150 distinct counties. Seventy-seven county-level jurisdictions considered at least one policy, 66 of these passed at least one policy. One hundred thirty eight sub-county (municipal) jurisdictions considered policies, 90
passed or implemented them. Eight of the sub-county level policy proposals occurred in political jurisdictions with no closely equivalent Census place and were not used in empirical analysis.

Although it is impossible to directly assess the extent to which this search captured all anti-immigration policies considered by US localities during this time period, my results compare favorably with those used in other studies. Using a slightly different definition of “proposal,” Hopkins (2010) finds 108 sub-county localities considered anti-immigration policies from 2000 to 2006, compared with 98 sub-county proposals in the same period in my data. Ramakrishnan and Wong (2008) found 78 jurisdictions had considered anti-immigration policies through July 2007, compared with 121 equivalent jurisdictions in the same time period in my data.

Policies intended to regulate employment were considered in the most jurisdictions (Figure 1), followed by 287(g) provisions, English-as-official-language policies and housing prohibitions. Among those policies actually approved, 287(g) agreements were the most common, followed by employment restrictions, housing prohibitions and English-as-official language declarations (Figure 1).

As Figure 2 shows, a burst of proposals followed the introduction of Hazleton’s “Illegal Immigration Relief Act” in the summer of 2006. Relatively few jurisdictions considered immigration-related policies prior to 2006. Many policies were considered in late 2006 and early 2007, but relatively few of these passed. This likely reflects the fact that Hazleton was quickly forced to defend its law in an expensive lawsuit, leading other localities to table similar proposals until the Hazleton policy’s legal fate was decided in court. After 2006, 287(g) agreements grew as a proportion of the proposed policies, possibly because this program had clear Constitutional support.

**Predictor variables**

The goal of this exercise is to test whether anti-immigration policy proposals are related to changes in the immigrant share of a locality’s population and whether this relationship is moderated by other local characteristics. Accordingly, I describe counties and Census places using several different measures and create a number of indicator variables signaling their membership in theoretically important categories. Indicator variables are used primarily because they result in regression

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20 Hopkins apparently included occupancy and zoning ordinances and probably included a number of policies that did not meet my paper’s more restrictive definition of a formal proposal. However, Hopkins did not include 287(g) agreements, although these were relatively uncommon in the time period in question.

21 Ramakrishnan and Wong’s dataset of policies was primarily from a list provided by the Fair Immigration Reform Movement, which was one of the data sources I used. They did not conduct a periodical search.
coefficients that have a clear, interpretable substantive meaning when interacted in my models with a continuous variable (change in proportions foreign-born).

Demographic change and context

The key explanatory variable is the point change in percent foreign-born of a locality’s population between 1990 and 2007. Estimates of immigrant population shares are from the 1990 Census summary files and the pooled 2005 to 2009 waves of the ACS. Estimates from the 2005-9 ACS data thus represent a five-year period, not a single year. For convenience, I refer to this span of time by its midpoint, “2007,” in the text and tables.

Population size, population density and a locality’s position on an urban-to-rural continuum have been shown to be important predictors of anti-immigration policy proposals (Hopkins 2010; Ramakrishnan and T. Wong 2008). These variables, while not of substantive interest, are included as control variables because they are also associated with key predictor variables. Population size and density are from the 2005-2009 ACS estimates. In order to place localities on an urban-to-rural continuum, I created indicator variables for suburban and rural status. “Rural” localities are those located outside of a 2000 Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) and “suburban” localities are those located in a MSA, but not classified as or overlapping with a central city of an MSA. The omitted “urban” category consists of localities that either were central cities of MSAs or intersected a central city.

Novelty of immigration

At the local level, I measured the novelty of immigration to a place with an indicator variable coded 1 for jurisdictions with less than 7.9 percent of their population foreign-born in 1990, (the foreign-born share for the country as a whole in that year) and zero otherwise. At the state level, an indicator variable identifies the commonly cited immigrant gateway states: The “Big Five” of New York, Florida, Illinois, California and Texas.”

Native population characteristics

As reviewed above, previous literature has found that levels of education and political preferences are strongly associated at the individual level with preferences on immigration policy. I thus look at these characteristics at the local level in order to test how they might affect reactions to

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Many researchers also include New Jersey among the traditional gateway states. In robustness testing, I use an alternative version of this variable that includes New Jersey.
demographic change. Measures of the proportion of blacks and whites aged 25 or over (used here as a proxy for the native-born population) that have high school degrees and bachelor’s degrees were obtained from the 2000 Census. I coded the indicator variable identifying a jurisdiction with low levels of native education as one if the proportion of the black and non-Hispanic white population with at least a high school degree was less than 76.5 percent and the proportion with a bachelor’s degree was 17.1 percent or less. (These cutoffs were the 25th percentile for counties for each variable).

I measure political preferences using county-level vote totals from the 2004 Presidential election (Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research 2008; Haines Stewart III n.d.). Because sub-county level estimates for these variables are not available, Census places were assigned the values of their containing county or the county containing the largest proportion of that place’s population in 2000. I coded each jurisdiction as conservative if less than 46.6 percent of voters in a jurisdiction or its containing county voted for the Democratic Presidential candidate in 2004. Nationally, 48.3 percent of voters voted for the Democrat. Very populous urban counties voted more heavily Democratic, while the larger number of less populous counties supported the Republican county more heavily, meaning that in 75 percent of counties less than 46.6 percent of votes were for the Democratic candidate.

Immigrant population characteristics

Estimates for the proportion of the foreign-born that were naturalized citizens and the proportion of the foreign-born from Latin America were from the 2005-2009 ACS estimates. An indicator for a “Latin-dominated” immigrant population identifies jurisdictions where 68.5 percent or greater of a jurisdiction’s foreign-born population was from Latin America in 2007 (68.5 percent was the 75th percentile for counties). “Low naturalization” jurisdictions were those where the foreign-born population was estimated to consist of 27.2 percent or less naturalized citizens (this was the 25th percentile for counties).

Employment and growth

I identified jurisdictions whose native-born population was unchanged or decreased between the 1990 Census and 2007 with an indicator variable. Another variable identifies jurisdictions that experienced economic distress during the period in question. This variable is coded one if a jurisdiction or its containing county experienced a year-to-year rise in the annual average unemployment rate of two percent or more between 2002 and 2008. Finally, places with high employment in immigrant dependent manufacturing industries were also identified with an indicator variable. This variable was
coded one if employment in a selected group of non-durable manufacturing industries—meatpacking, food processing, textiles, apparel, and leather and wood goods—was more than 3.9 percent of the over-16 employed population in that jurisdiction or its containing county (3.9 percent was the 75th percentile for counties).

**Hypotheses**

I test three specific hypotheses about the relationship between foreign-born population growth and anti-immigration ordinances using three different statistical models. The first hypothesis is that growth in the foreign-born share of a locality increases the probability of a local anti-immigration policy proposal. This hypothesis has been tested and supported by Hopkins (2010), who found that greater increases in foreign-born population share from 1990 to 2000 were associated with a greater probability of Census-place level policy proposals. In order to provide a comparable benchmark, I first retest this hypothesis using both county and place-level analysis, my own list of anti-immigration policy proposals, a different statistical model and updated data on demographic change.

Second, I test the hypothesis that changes in the local foreign-born population share are more likely to provoke anti-immigration policy proposals in new immigrant destinations than in established immigrant destinations—defined here as jurisdictions that were below and above the national proportion foreign-born in 1990, respectively. That is, I hypothesize that for any given percent point change in foreign-born population share, a community that already had a substantial immigrant population will be at a lower risk of considering an anti-immigration policy.

The third hypothesis, like the second, builds on the proposition that not all communities are equally “sensitive” to changes in their population compositions. I hypothesize that, for any given change in the foreign-born share of the population, communities with specific characteristics discussed above are at higher risk of an anti-immigration policy proposal. This is important for three reasons. First, the new and established immigrant destinations differ from each other in important ways other than the novelty of immigration. If the second hypothesis is supported, the influence of potentially confounding variables must be considered. Second, the dichotomous new immigrant destination/established immigrant destination category is overly simplistic. Even within the categories of new and established immigrant destinations, there are important differences in the way growth of the immigrant population was distributed. For example, even among the established immigrant destinations, communities with more conservative political vote shares experienced more growth of their foreign-born population than their more liberal counterparts. Third, the way each of these specific attributes of a geographic and

Chapter Three
political place does—or does not—influence reactions to population change is substantively important to an understanding of policy reactions to immigration.

**Estimation (I)**

In order to test the first hypothesis, I estimate the association between the changes in the foreign-born share of a jurisdiction’s population and the probability that the jurisdiction considered an anti-immigration policy proposal. I use a linear probability model for ease of exposition, despite the binary outcome. Although a non-linear model such as a logit offers certain advantages (and was used in robustness testing and the simulations that follow), the substantive meaning of logit interactions are less intuitive and logit coefficients cannot be compared across nested models without additional calculations and interpretation (Ai and Norton 2003; Karlson, Holm, and Breen 2010). I estimate this equation separately on data at the county and Census-place level for counties and places of 5,000 persons or more.

The first regression model estimates the association between point change in percent foreign-born and probability of considering an anti-immigration policy, statistically controlling for certain other variables:

\[ Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 \Delta Fb_i + \gamma X_i + \rho Z_i + \varepsilon_i \quad [\text{Model 1}] \]

\( Y_i \) is an indicator variable, coded one if the jurisdiction considered an anti-immigration policy and zero otherwise. \( \Delta Fb_i \) is the jurisdiction’s point change in percent foreign-born between the 1990 Census and the 2005-9 ACS estimates. The coefficient \( \beta_1 \) represents the change in probability of considering an anti-immigration policy associated with a one percent increase in percent foreign-born between 1990 and 2007.

\( X_i \) is a vector of control indicator variables and is included in all three models. These controls are grouped separately from other control variables (\( Z_i \)) because each of them will be interacted with the point change in percent foreign-born in Models 2 and 3. These variables, described above, include indicators for:
Novelty

- Low immigrant population share in 1990
- In a “Big Five” state

Native population characteristics

- Low native education
- Conservative

Immigrant population characteristics

- Latin dominated immigrant population
- Low naturalization immigrant population

Growth and Employment

- Lost native population between 1990 and 2007
- Immigrant-dominated manufacturing
- High unemployment increase

Continuing, \( Z_i \) is a vector containing additional control variables also present in all three models: Percent foreign-born in 2007, logged population size, logged population density, and indicators for suburban or rural status, with urban being the omitted category. \( \varepsilon_i \) is an individual error term.

Estimation (II)

My second hypothesis proposes that the communities that did not already have a substantial foreign-born population are more sensitive to growth of their foreign-born population; that is, given the same change in population composition, a new immigrant destination community will have a greater risk of considering an anti-immigration policy.

I test this proposition by estimating the following model, which allows the association between policy proposals and change in foreign-born population share to vary across new and established immigrant destinations:

\[
Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 \Delta Fbi + \beta_2 L_i \Delta Fbi + \gamma X_i + \rho Z_i + \varepsilon_i \quad [\text{Model 2}]
\]

\( Y_i, \Delta Fbi, X_i, Z_i, \) and \( \varepsilon_i \) are all as defined above. Variable \( L_i \) is an indicator variable which is coded 1 for jurisdictions that were less than 7.9 percent foreign-born in 1990. This variable is included in the
vector $X_i$ in all three equations. In this model, however, the indicator $L_i$ is also interacted with the jurisdiction’s change in percent foreign-born in the term $L_i \Delta Fb_i$. The regression coefficient $\beta_2$ thus represents the increase (or decrease) in probability of considering an anti-immigration policy associated with a one percent change in percent foreign-born in jurisdictions that were not established immigrant destinations in addition to the “base” association $\beta_1$, which now represents the association between risk of an anti-immigration policy proposal and change in proportion foreign-born in an established immigrant destination.

This model thus provides an easily interpreted framework for testing whether the “sensitivity” to foreign-born population growth differs between established and non-established immigrant destinations. If I find an association between growth of the foreign-born population and risk of considering an anti-immigration policy, but this association does not depend on a jurisdiction’s past experience with immigration, I would expect $\beta_1$ to be positive, but the coefficient $\beta_2$ to be zero. If places that are new immigrant destinations react more strongly to changes in their population makeup than established immigrant destinations, I would expect $\beta_2$ to be positive.

**Estimation (III)**

Whether or not growth of the foreign-born population provokes greater reaction in new immigrant destinations than in established immigrant destinations, elements other than simple novelty may moderate the relationship between population change and anti-immigration lawmaking. The third model thus tests whether jurisdictions with specific characteristics—including measures of immigrant population composition, native population composition, and economic and population growth—are predisposed to react to growth of the immigrant population.

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 \Delta Fb_i + \gamma X_i + \beta_2 X_i^* \Delta Fb_i + \rho Z_i + \epsilon_i$$  

[Model 3]

The terms $Y_i$, $\Delta Fb_i$, $Z_i$, $X_i$, and $\epsilon_i$ are all unchanged from above. However, the full vector of variables $X_i$ is now interacted with $\Delta Fb_i$, the point change in percent foreign-born between 1990 and 2007. This model thus allows the relationship between changes in foreign-born population share and risk of an anti-immigration policy proposal to vary with different values of the indicator variables contained in vector $X_i$. If any of these characteristics indeed moderate the relationship between changes in immigrant population share and risk of an anti-immigration proposal, I would expect the
corresponding coefficient contained in vector \( \beta_x \) to be significantly different from zero. The coefficient \( \beta_1 \) now has a very specific and not especially important substantive meaning: It now represents the association between change in proportion-foreign-born and probability of an anti-immigrant policy proposal in jurisdictions in the small set of jurisdictions for which all variables in vector \( X_i \) are zero.

6. Results

Growth of immigrant population share and risk of policy proposal

Columns 1 and 2 in Table 2 (for counties) and Table 3 (for Census places) present the results of Model 1, estimating the relationship between percent point changes in immigrant share between 1990 and 2007 and probability of an anti-immigration policy proposal between 2000 and 2009 with a set of other variables statistically controlled for. In both the county and place-level analysis, there is a statistically significant positive relationship between change in proportion foreign-born and the probability of a proposal. At the county level, each point increase in percent foreign-born is associated with a 0.9 percentage point increase in the probability that the jurisdiction considers an anti-immigration policy. At the place level, the association is weaker: Each point increase in percent foreign-born is associated with about a 0.02 percentage point increase in the probability that the jurisdiction considers an anti-immigration policy.

These seemingly small, but statistically significant, associations are important in context. The 90\textsuperscript{th} percentile for change in percent foreign-born for counties is 5.3 percentage points, for places the same figure is 11.4 percentage points. These population changes would imply a risk of an anti-immigration policy 4.8 percentage points and 2.2 percentage points higher than an otherwise similar county or place, respectively, that experienced no change in proportion foreign-born. Only 2.7 percent of counties with more than 5,000 people and 1.8 percent of Census places with more than 5,000 persons considered an anti-immigration policy. Thus, the association between the risk of an anti-immigration policy proposal and the change in foreign-born population share is small, but nonetheless important compared to the baseline risk.

For comparison, Hopkins (2010: 55) predicts that a Census place with an eight point (90\textsuperscript{th} percentile) change in percent foreign-born between 1990 and 2000 has a 1.4 percent higher probability of considering an anti-immigration policy than an otherwise similar place with no change in foreign-born population share. This figure is only loosely comparable to the one I present above, given the different modeling approaches and datasets. Still, the associations I find are clearly of a similar order of
magnitude and my model also supports the hypothesis that anti-immigration policies at both the county
and place level are related to changes in the jurisdiction’s foreign-born population share.

**Sensitivity to population change in new and established immigrant destinations**

Columns 3 and 4 in Tables 2 and 3 present the results of Model 2, which tests whether new
immigrant destinations are more sensitive to changes in their foreign-born population share than
established destinations. It tests this proposition by including an interaction between point change in
percent foreign-born and the indicators for having a foreign-born population share of less than 7.9
percent in 1990.

In counties, there is a marked difference between new and established immigrant destinations.
A one point increase in percent foreign-born in a county that was less than 7.9 percent foreign-born in
1990 is associated with a 1.3 percent increase in probability of an anti-immigration proposal. In contrast,
the association between point change in percent foreign-born and policy proposals in established
immigrant destination counties is not significantly different from zero. Thus, the model finds no
association between changes in population makeup and policy proposals in counties that already had
substantial immigrant populations in 1990, but a relatively large one in the new immigrant destinations.

For places, the results are different: The coefficient on the interaction between the indicator for
a low proportion foreign-born in 1990 and change in foreign-born population share is not significantly
different from zero. For places the association between changes in population makeup and probability
of a policy proposal is the same in new and established immigrant destinations.

These different results at the county and place level could be explained in several ways. The
political process of municipalities and counties may differ in systematic ways that influence my analysis:
For example, the county may simply happen to be a less politically active unit in areas that had large
numbers of immigrants in 1990. Another possibility is that the novelty of immigration to a community
itself does not affect political reactions to immigration, but that other confounding attributes of a
jurisdiction do influence this reaction. The next model investigates the role of many of these potentially
confounding variables.

**Other attributes and sensitivity to population change**

Columns 5 and 6 in Tables 2 and 3 report results from Model 3, which introduces interactions
between point change in percent foreign-born between 1990 and 2000 and a set of indicator variables
identifying several classes of jurisdictions. In the county-level analysis, two of these interaction terms
have associations with the probability of an anti-immigration policy proposal that are significantly different from zero: The interaction with the indicator for being in a Big Five traditional immigration state and the interaction with the indicator for being politically conservative. These coefficients imply that counties outside of Big Five states and conservative counties are more sensitive to changes in their population makeup than their non-Big Five and non-conservative counterparts. Every one point increase in percent foreign-born in counties outside of a Big Five state is associated with a 1.4 percentage point greater risk of an anti-immigration policy proposal, relative to the same increase if it occurred in an otherwise similar jurisdiction inside a Big Five State. A one point increase in percent foreign-born in a conservative county is associated with a 1.7 percentage point greater risk of an anti-immigration policy proposal relative to the same change in an otherwise similar liberal county, assuming all other variables are the same.

To give a more specific example, Loudon County, Virginia had a 14.2 point increase in percent foreign-born between 1990 and 2007, was located outside of the Big Five states and voted solidly Republican in the 2004 election. The model predicts that the county has a 40 percent probability of an anti-immigration proposal (Loudon County did, in fact, enact an anti-immigration policy). If that county had instead experienced no change in its foreign-born population share, the model would predict only a 5.3 percent probability of a policy proposal. An otherwise identical county, with the same 14.2 point change in percent foreign-born, but located in a Big Five State and with a liberal political constituency, would have a predicted probability of 16.4 percent.

The place-level analysis reveals a similar pattern of associations between anti-immigration policy proposals and the interactions between the various indicators and change in foreign-born population share. As with the county-level analysis, the associations between probability of an anti-immigration policy proposal and the interactions of change of foreign-born population share with being in a Big Five state and with being politically conservative are significantly different from zero. Every one point increase in percent foreign-born is associated with a 0.19 percentage point greater probability of an anti-immigration policy proposal if it occurs in a place outside a Big Five State, relative to the same change in an otherwise similar place in a Big Five state. Each one point increase in percent foreign-born is associated with a 0.24 percentage point greater probability of a policy proposal if it occurs in conservative jurisdiction, relative to the same change in an otherwise similar place with liberal voting habits.
To give a concrete example at the place level, Morristown, Tennessee witnessed a 14.5 point increase in percent foreign-born between 1990 and 2007, was not in a Big Five state and voted heavily Republican in 2004. The model predicts an 8.9 percent probability of an anti-immigration policy proposal (The town did not, in fact, consider any such policy). If the town instead had no change in its foreign-born share, the model would have predicted a three percent probability of an anti-immigration policy proposal. If it had the same 14.5 point change in foreign-born population share, but instead had been in a Big Five state and had liberal voting patterns, the model would have predicted a two percent probability of an anti-immigration proposal.

The association between changes in foreign-born population share in a low education place and the probability of an anti-immigration policy proposal is also negative and significantly different from zero. Given prior research showing associations between lower levels of education and less favorable opinions about immigration, this association is unexpected. One plausible substantive explanation is that communities with more well-educated people are better equipped to organize a policy response to immigration.

To summarize, in the county-level and place-level analysis, the association between the probability of an anti-immigration policy and the interaction with the indicator for a low foreign-born population in 1990 is not statistically significant from zero when the other interaction terms are controlled. The novelty per se of immigration to a jurisdiction appears to be less important in moderating reactions to foreign-born population growth than other differences among jurisdictions, namely political orientation and location inside or outside of a traditional immigrant gateway state. Further, the patterns of associations for counties and places are much more similar in this model than in Model 2. At both levels of analysis, losing native population, immigrant-heavy manufacturing industries, increases in the unemployment rate, Latin-dominated immigration populations and low proportions of naturalized immigrants among the foreign-born also do not appear to moderate the relationship between the change in foreign-born population share and the likelihood of anti-immigration policy proposals.

**Limitations of the analysis and robustness testing**

A few limitations of the analysis deserve mention. The models developed here are intended to identify demographic risk factors and model possible associations between demographic change and policy decisions, but cannot directly confirm causal mechanisms. The stylized models rely extensively on indicator variables in order to make the theoretical arguments clearer and the results easy to interpret,
but lose information in the process. The possibility that the results are sensitive to the choice of threshold used in converting continuous variables into indicator variables was tested by repeating the analysis using alternative specifications of the indicator variables. Substantive results remained unchanged. Of course, there may be confounding variables that I have not included in my models or discussed here. In particular, there are a host of differences between the “Big Five” immigrant gateway states and the other states that may be meaningful to this analysis; I have not explored what underlying mechanism creates the difference I observe between these two groups of states.

The counties and Census places observed were at risk of making these proposals from 2000 to 2009, yet the key predictor variable is change in proportion foreign-born between 1990 and an estimate constructed from 2005 to 2009 data. The need to use county level estimates for two core variables in the place-level analysis also adds an element of imprecision. As discussed before, there is no way of knowing precisely how well my data has captured all anti-immigration policy proposals made in the study period.

7. Implications of the results

These results provide evidence in support of the hypothesis that counties and places with specific attributes react differently to changes in their population structure. Specifically, political preferences of the local electorate and location in a traditional immigrant gateway state appear to moderate the association between population change and local policy reactions. How should this information shape our understanding of the role that geographic dispersal of the foreign-born played in promoting anti-immigration policy proposals?

In the theoretical model advanced here, which focuses on changes in local foreign-born population shares, geographic dispersal of the foreign-born promotes anti-immigration policies in two ways. First, as the immigrant population spread geographically after 1990, a greater number of localities experienced increases in their foreign-born population share relative to previous decades, resulting in a larger number of communities at risk of an anti-immigration policy proposal. Second, geographic dispersal changed the characteristics of the communities where the immigrant population share grew substantially, relative to previous decades. For example, the immigrant population grew by 69 percent and 63 percent between 1990 and 2007 in counties and places, respectively, in Big Five states, but by 131 percent and 122 percent in counties and places in other states. Similarly, the immigrant population grew by 69 and 63 percent between 1990 and 2007 in non-conservative counties and places, but by 150 percent and 141 percent in conservative counties and places, respectively. These differentials in growth...
rates have resulted in large shifts in the population makeup of communities with conservative voting habits and that are located outside of the Big Five states. Because these localities are more sensitive to changes in their population make-up in my model, this mechanism should also increase the number of localities with significant risk of an anti-immigration policy proposal as the foreign-born population disperses.

Simulating the impact of geographic dispersal of the foreign-born population

In this section, I conduct two simulations to measure the relative importance of these two results of geographic dispersal—the greater number of localities exposed to foreign-born population share growth and the greater sensitivity to growing immigrant populations among those localities exposed. I compare predicted probabilities from Model 3 against two sets of predictions generated using the same model applied to simulated data. The first set simulates the anti-immigration policy proposals that would have happened had the immigrant population dispersed, but all jurisdictions had the same “sensitivity” to changes in their population makeup as the established immigrant destinations. The second set of predictions simulates what would have happened had the foreign-born population of the United States continued to grow, but without geographic dispersal (that is, if the distribution of the foreign-born population across places and counties was the same in 2007 as in 1990). Comparing the predictions based on actual data to the first simulation thus approximates the possible influence of increased sensitivity to changes in population makeup resulting in promoting anti-immigration policy proposals. A comparison between the predictions obtained from the actual data with those from the second simulation conveys an understanding the impact of both implications of geographic dispersal: Wider exposure and increased sensitivity to changes in population makeup.

For the base “real” scenario, I generate predicted probabilities using Model 3, estimated using a logit model, for counties and Census places respectively.23 This model, with \( Y_i \) now representing the logit transformation of the probability of an anti-immigration policy proposal, is:

\[
Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 \Delta Fb_i + \gamma X_i + \beta_2 X_i^* \Delta Fb_i + \rho Z_i + \epsilon_i
\]

23 A logit model is used because it does not result in out-of-range predictions, as does the linear model, and interpretation of coefficients is not important here. The substantive insights from this exercise are unchanged if the linear probability model is used instead to generate the predictions.
For the “equal sensitivity” simulation, I generate predictions generated using the same regression coefficients generated above, but substitute new values, referred to as vector $S_i$, into the interaction term $\beta \times X_i \times \Delta F_{bi}$, resulting in the equation:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 \Delta F_{bi} + \gamma X_i + \beta S_i \times \Delta F_{bi} + \rho Z_i + \epsilon_i$$

The values of the variables in $S_i$ for each jurisdiction are randomly assigned, but drawn from binomial distributions with the same proportions as in those jurisdictions that had more than 7.9 percent of their population foreign-born in 1990. This has the effect of giving all jurisdictions nationwide the same approximate overall sensitivity to changes in the foreign-born population share as the established immigrant jurisdictions. The uninteracted vector of indicator variables in term $\gamma X_i$ and all other terms remain as they were in the real data. Because only the interacted vector $S_i$ is changed, the predicted probability that any given jurisdiction will consider an anti-immigration policy *in the absence of a change in percent foreign-born* is exactly the same in the real and simulated scenarios.

The second manipulated dataset simulates a hypothetical “no dispersion” case in which the immigrant population of the United States retained its geographic distribution as it grew after 1990. I calculated simulated values for each jurisdiction’s point change in percent foreign-born between 1990 and 2007, assuming that each jurisdiction received the same proportion of growth in the national foreign-born population as its share of the existing foreign-born population in 1990. Put another way, this dataset simulates a case in which the foreign-born population growth rates of all jurisdictions were uniform from 1990 onward. When these simulated variables $\Delta F_{bsim}$ are substituted into the equation used for predictions, it becomes:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 \Delta F_{bsim} + \gamma X_i + \beta S_i \times \Delta F_{bsim} + \rho Z_i + \epsilon_i$$

I then generated predicted probabilities, using the same logit regression coefficients as before, and with all other variables in the data unchanged.

---

24 This random simulation process requires a distribution of simulated values. The results in Columns 2 and 5 of Table 4 are medians from repeated trials using 101 randomly generated datasets.
Simulation results

Table 4 describes predicted probabilities of an anti-immigration policy proposal for counties and Census places based on real data, the “equal sensitivity” simulated data, and the “no dispersal” simulated data. All estimates use the same regression coefficients to generate the predictions. Based on these simulations, approximately what proportion of anti-immigration policy proposals might be attributed to geographic dispersal? To give a concrete example, I designate that a policy proposal occurs in every place with a predicted probability of 13.1 percent or greater and in every county with a predicted probability of 22.0 percent or greater. These thresholds would result in the same predicted number of proposals as actually occurred, based on the real data.

With these thresholds, the equal sensitivity scenario predicts 16 percent fewer place-level proposals and 32 percent fewer county-level proposals, relative to the real data. The no dispersal scenario predicts 56 percent fewer place-level proposals and 54 percent fewer county-level proposals, relative to the predictions generated from the real data. Thus, in this simulated case, dispersal of the immigrant population is implicated in about half of place and county-level anti-immigration proposals. Of the subset of proposals resulting from dispersal of the foreign-born population in this simulation, about 28 percent of those in Census places and 60 percent of those in counties could be tied to differences in the sensitivity of communities to immigration rather than to the quantity of communities whose population makeup changed as a result of the foreign-born population scattering.

These are hypothetical counterfactuals and must be interpreted as such. However, geographic dispersal does appear to have played a major role in raising the risk of anti-immigration policy proposals. The changing nature, in terms of political alignment and location in traditional gateway states, of the places where the immigrant population appears to be a major driver of this increased risk.

8. Conclusion

The results in this chapter support the theoretical argument that changes in the foreign-born population share—rather than the relatives size of the foreign-born and native populations—are a key factor in provoking anti-immigration policy reactions. More importantly, my findings provide a more nuanced view of the relationship between population change and policy by showing that whether a locality is located in a traditional immigrant gateway state and the political preferences of its electorate moderate the association between the growth of the immigrant population share and anti-immigration
policy proposals. Simulations suggest that were it not for this moderating effect of community characteristics, a significant number of anti-immigration policies may never have been proposed.

By itself, the novelty of immigration to the new immigrant destinations does not appear to increase the probability that a locality will consider an anti-immigration policy in reaction to growth of the foreign-born population share. This finding warrants looking beyond a crude “new versus established” view of immigrant destinations to identify other ways in which the US immigrant experience and American experience has changed as a result of geographic dispersal.

My results raise additional questions that deserve further research. Although being located in a traditional immigrant gateway state appears to dampen policy reactions to population change, it is not clear whether state-level policies or politics, experience with nearby immigrant populations or some other factor is responsible for the observed association. Similarly, the mechanisms tying conservative voting preferences to greater sensitivity to population change warrant exploration. Further, while this paper looks exclusively at local policies, geographic dispersal and the resulting changes in the local contexts of immigrant settlement could both easily be an important element in the now-numerous state-level policy debates on immigration and in the politics of immigration at the federal level. Geographic dispersal of the foreign-born population deserves to be considered as a force that may be fundamentally altering the way Americans approach immigration policy.
References


Chapter Three Tables and Figures

Figure 1. Local anti-immigration policy proposals 2000-2009, by type and outcome.

Figure 2. Anti-immigration policy proposals by quarter introduced and type of proposal, 2000-2009.
Figure 3. Location of anti-immigration policies, considered and passed, 2000-2009
Table 1. Mean characteristics of Counties and Census places of 5000 persons or more considering or not considering anti-immigration policy proposals 2000-2009.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low immigrant share in 1990</td>
<td>90.9</td>
<td>95.1</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>76.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Big Five State&quot;</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lost native population, 1990-2007</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>34.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>High Latin-American share of foreign-born</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>17.5</td>
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<td>Low naturalization</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>49.8</td>
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<td>Conservative</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant-heavy manufacturing</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>11.2</td>
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<td>Increase in unemployment</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>14.5</td>
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<td><strong>Population growth and urbanity</strong></td>
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<td>Change in percent foreign-born, 1990-2007</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>4.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent foreign-born, 1990</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>6.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent foreign-born, 2007</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>10.4</td>
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<td>Total Population, 2007 (1000s)</td>
<td>573.0</td>
<td>93.0</td>
<td>124.5</td>
<td>30.4</td>
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<td>740.6</td>
<td>269.0</td>
<td>3,289.8</td>
<td>2,868.2</td>
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<td>Native population growth (%), 1990-2007</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central city (% of jurisdictions)</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>8.2</td>
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<td>Suburban (% of jurisdictions)</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>68.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rural (% of jurisdictions)</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>23.5</td>
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<td><strong>Foreign-born Population Characteristics</strong></td>
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<td>Percent naturalized, ACS</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>46.1</td>
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<td>Percent from Latin America</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>35.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent arrived after 2000, ACS</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>27.9</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Population and Economic Characteristics</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent voting for Kerry, 2004b</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>46.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of adults without high school degree, 2000</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>15.6</td>
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<td>Percent with bachelor’s degree, 2000</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% employed in high immigr. manufacturing</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Largest yr-to-yr unemployment increase (%)</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mean unemployment (%) 2001-2004</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mean unemployment (%) 2005-2008</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median household income, 2007 ($1000s)</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>56.2</td>
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</table>

Sources: 1990 US Census. 2007 values are from American Community Survey 2005-9 pooled estimates.

Table 2. Regressions of indicator for anti-immigration policy proposal on county characteristics and their interaction with point change in percent foreign-born for counties of 5000 persons or more. Coefficients and (standard errors).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coef. (S.E)¹</td>
<td>Coef. (S.E)</td>
<td>Coef. (S.E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Point change in % foreign-born, 1990 to 2007</td>
<td>0.009* (0.004)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.003)</td>
<td>0.008 (0.006)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Point change in % foreign-born interacted with indicators for:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low immigrant share in 1990</td>
<td>0.013* (0.005)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.006)</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;Big Five State&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.014*** (0.004)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lost native pop., 1990-2007</td>
<td>-0.007 (0.004)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Latin-American</td>
<td>-0.003 (0.005)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low naturalization</td>
<td>-0.007 (0.004)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>0.017*** (0.004)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low native education</td>
<td>-0.005 (0.004)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>High immigrant manufacturing</td>
<td>0.002 (0.005)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in unemployment</td>
<td>0.004 (0.004)</td>
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<td>Classes of counties</td>
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<tr>
<td>(indicators):</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low Immigrant In 1990</td>
<td>0.074 (0.039)</td>
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<td>0.037 (0.037)</td>
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<td>&quot;Big Five State&quot;</td>
<td>-0.030* (0.012)</td>
<td>-0.030* (0.012)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lost native population 1990-2007</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.005)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.005)</td>
<td>0.011 (0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Latin-American</td>
<td>-0.011 (0.008)</td>
<td>-0.017 (0.009)</td>
<td>-0.013 (0.010)</td>
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<td>Low naturalization</td>
<td>-0.006 (0.005)</td>
<td>-0.008 (0.006)</td>
<td>0.009 (0.007)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>0.029** (0.009)</td>
<td>0.029** (0.009)</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.007)</td>
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<td>Low native education</td>
<td>0.003 (0.006)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.006)</td>
<td>0.010 (0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High immigrant manufacturing</td>
<td>0.004 (0.007)</td>
<td>0.004 (0.007)</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in unemployment</td>
<td>0.002 (0.007)</td>
<td>0.002 (0.007)</td>
<td>-0.007 (0.006)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Controls:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Log population, 2007</td>
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<td>0.026** (0.009)</td>
<td>0.025** (0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log population density</td>
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<td>-0.004 (0.004)</td>
<td>-0.005 (0.004)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent foreign-born, 2007</td>
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<td>0.000 (0.002)</td>
<td>0.002 (0.003)</td>
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<td>Suburb</td>
<td>-0.031 (0.027)</td>
<td>-0.031 (0.027)</td>
<td>-0.036 (0.025)</td>
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<td>Rural</td>
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<td>-0.031 (0.022)</td>
<td>-0.030 (0.021)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>-0.288* (0.130)</td>
<td>-0.324* (0.142)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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<td>2,832</td>
<td>2,832</td>
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<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>0.127</td>
</tr>
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</table>

¹ Standard errors are robust to clustering at the state level.
Table 3. Regressions of indicator for anti-immigration policy proposal on place characteristics and their interaction with point change in percent foreign-born for Census places of 5000 persons or more. Coefficients and (standard errors).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coef.</td>
<td>(S.E)</td>
<td>Coef.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Point change in % foreign-born, 1990-2007</td>
<td>0.0019***</td>
<td>(0.0005)</td>
<td>0.0016**</td>
</tr>
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<td>Point change in % foreign-born interacted with indicators for:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low immigrant share in 1990</td>
<td>0.0006</td>
<td>(0.0009)</td>
<td>-0.0008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Big Five State&quot;</td>
<td>-0.0019*</td>
<td>(0.0008)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Lost native pop., 1990-2007</td>
<td>-0.0005</td>
<td>(0.0011)</td>
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<td>High Latin-American</td>
<td>-0.0004</td>
<td>(0.0017)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low naturalization</td>
<td>0.0019</td>
<td>(0.0014)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>0.0024**</td>
<td>(0.0009)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low native education</td>
<td>-0.0026**</td>
<td>(0.0009)</td>
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<tr>
<td>High immigrant manufacturing</td>
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<td>Increase in unemployment</td>
<td>0.0022</td>
<td>(0.0013)</td>
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<td>Classes of counties (indicators):</td>
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<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>(0.0068)</td>
<td>-0.0039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Big Five State&quot;</td>
<td>-0.0113*</td>
<td>(0.0043)</td>
<td>-0.0114*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lost native pop. 1990-2007</td>
<td>-0.0016</td>
<td>(0.0052)</td>
<td>-0.0011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Latin-American</td>
<td>0.0038</td>
<td>(0.0067)</td>
<td>0.0031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low naturalization</td>
<td>0.0084</td>
<td>(0.0061)</td>
<td>0.0081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>0.0143**</td>
<td>(0.0045)</td>
<td>0.0144**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low native education</td>
<td>-0.0085</td>
<td>(0.0051)</td>
<td>-0.0085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High immigrant manufacturing</td>
<td>0.0048</td>
<td>(0.0093)</td>
<td>0.0046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in unemployment</td>
<td>0.0080</td>
<td>(0.0044)</td>
<td>0.0079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Controls:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log population, 2007</td>
<td>0.0200***</td>
<td>(0.0053)</td>
<td>0.0200***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log population density</td>
<td>-0.0055</td>
<td>(0.0028)</td>
<td>-0.0056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent foreign-born, 2007</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td>(0.0002)</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburb</td>
<td>-0.0139</td>
<td>(0.0135)</td>
<td>-0.0139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>-0.0205</td>
<td>(0.0144)</td>
<td>-0.0202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>5,895</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.0401</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0402</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05  1. Standard errors are robust to clustering at the state level.
Table 4. Predicted probabilities of an anti-immigration policy proposal resulting from real data and equal sensitivity and no dispersal simulated datasets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Places</th>
<th></th>
<th>Counties</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Real Data</td>
<td>Equal Sensitivity^1</td>
<td>No Dispersal</td>
<td>Real Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predicted probabilities</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>75^th percentile</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of jurisdictions with predicted probabilities above:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5%</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10%</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20%</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30%</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predicted number of anti-immigration policy proposals^2</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Results for the equal sensitivity simulation are medians from 101 randomly generated datasets.
2. Assumes that proposals occur in places with predicted probabilities above 13.1% and counties with predicted probabilities above 22.0%.
Chapter Four: Do local anti-immigration policies slow demographic change?

1. Introduction

In the first decade of this century, a number of counties, cities and towns in the United States passed laws or implemented policies intended to insulate their communities from the effects of immigration. In most cases these policies had the explicit goal of reducing the number of unauthorized immigrants settling or living in their community. The law passed in Hazleton, Pennsylvania that provided much of the inspiration for such efforts declared that its goal was to allow residents “to be free of the debilitating effects on their economic and social well-being imposed by the influx of illegal aliens” (City of Hazleton 2006).

Some of these laws sought to punish employers for hiring unauthorized workers or landlords for renting housing to unauthorized immigrants. Other policies involved local police in enforcing immigration law. Still others limited the use of foreign languages in civic services and governance or made symbolic declarations about the use of English in public life. This broad collection of policies, which I refer to in the dissertation as anti-immigration policies, embroiled many of these localities in furious political and legal debates over whether it is wise, or even Constitutional, to make immigration policy at the local level.

In Chapter Three, I provide details on the numbers and types of anti-immigration policies proposed by localities between 2000 and 2009 and show that their popularity may be related to the growth and dispersal of the foreign-born population in the United States. In this chapter, I test whether these policies are, in turn, influencing the distribution of the US Hispanic population by making these localities less attractive to Latino immigrants and other Hispanics. I conduct this assessment in order to contribute to knowledge about whether these policies may in fact be slowing the growth of immigrant population locally. Within the context of this dissertation, my findings also contribute information about how local policies may be shaping the ongoing process of geographic dispersal of the Hispanic and foreign-born populations in the United States by deterring the settlement of members of these groups in the “new immigrant destinations.”

* I presented this chapter at the Population Association of America annual meeting, Washington DC, April 16, 2010. I also presented parts of this chapter at the Notestein Seminar, Office of Population Research, Princeton University, November 9, 2010 and at the New Realities in Mexican Immigration Conference, Princeton University, April 22, 2011.
Media accounts and statements from advocates on either side of the issue give the impression that these laws and policies indeed caused unauthorized immigrants to flee these localities, and perhaps legal immigrants and Hispanic US citizens as well. “Since the law went into effect, we had thousands of illegal aliens leaving the community” boasted one of the architects of a local immigration enforcement policy in Prince William County, VA (McCarren 2010). An immigrant resident in that county agreed that immigrants of all legal statuses were leaving: “A lot of people left their houses; they left their homes with most of their stuff in it. And it came to a point where, in my neighborhood, I only had about two neighbors on the block” (Tarabay 2010).

Similar reports emerged from other jurisdictions. A headline in The New York Times referring to Riverside, NJ stated succinctly: “Town Battling Illegal Immigration is Emptier Now” (Capuzzo 2006). The article went on to imply that regrets over the exodus of immigrants were partially responsible for the repeal of Riverside’s policy, which had not even been enforced by the time of repeal.

If validated, these anecdotes provide a rare example of public policy having a major impact on foreign-born population growth. There is some quantitative evidence that supports these anecdotes in context. Studies of specific localities found that estimates of local immigrant and Hispanic populations dropped after anti-immigration policies were implemented. However, these studies rely on a small number of cases and did not attempt to rigorously separate the effects of economic conditions from those of the anti-immigration policies in question.

Without a more comprehensive assessment of these policies, the changes in any locality could be produced by particular economic and social conditions unrelated to the local immigration policy. The economic recession that began in December of 2007 and the associated slowdown in immigration, in particular, complicate the analysis of the effects of these policies. A study that assessed the 2007 immigration law in Prince William County, Virginia concluded that while “less than 5000 (not hundreds and not tens of thousands) immigrants” had indeed left that county from 2007 through the end of 2008, it was impossible to disaggregate the effect of the policy and that of economic conditions (Guterbock et al. 2010).

These questions are significant to public policy and also to social scientists’ understanding of what factors make a specific place attractive to immigrants and Hispanics. The power of job growth and social networks in determining where people settle is well documented, but the immigration literature has little to say about any role of local policies and political and social conditions. Even if secondary to or
moderated by economic conditions, these factors may make certain places more or less attractive for new residents.

This study assesses the impact of local anti-immigration policies on Hispanic population growth using a nationwide perspective and taking into account the effects of local employment conditions. It does so using a proxy outcome: Growth of the Hispanic student population as a proportion of school enrollment. School enrollment data provides a way to precisely measure year-to-year changes in population makeup. It does not allow measurement of the immigrant population, or even of the full Hispanic population. However, because a large proportion of new immigrants (and especially unauthorized immigrants) are Hispanic and have children, this measure provides a useful, albeit indirect, indicator of the effects local anti-immigration policies are having on the immigrant population, as well as the broader Hispanic population. By dividing policies into three categories, I am able to estimate separately the effect of anti-immigration policies that received serious support but were never enacted, those that were passed into law (but may or may not have been enforced in practice) and a very popular type of local immigration enforcement program, the 287(g) agreement, whose implementation can be confirmed. It is thus possible to distinguish the possible effects on Hispanic student population growth of the political environment and hostility surrounding these policies from the effects of a policy actually being enforced.

My results show that 287(g) agreements may have reduced net growth of the Hispanic share of the student population. The 287(g) program, which I describe in detail below, is a program in which local police agencies enter into an agreement with the federal government to deputize their officers to enforce federal immigration law. However, this effect occurred beginning two years after these agreements were implemented and only in conjunction with rising unemployment. Passing other types of anti-immigration policies does not appear to reduce the growth of Hispanics as a share of all students. Considering anti-immigration policies, but not passing them, was also not associated with smaller increases in the Hispanic share of the student population.

These results fail to support the hypothesis that, in general, anti-immigration policies other than 287(g) agreements slow Hispanic population growth. 287(g) policies, on the other hand, appear to have some impact on Hispanic population growth, but this effect is moderated by local employment markets. Rather, 287(g) policies apparently combine with deteriorating economic conditions to slow the growth of the Hispanic student population.
Following this introduction, Section 2 discusses the anti-immigration policies under consideration, reviews existing evidence on their demographic impacts and places this analysis in a national demographic and economic context. Section 3 describes the data, discusses the problem of geographic unit of analysis and proposes the key hypothesis. Section 4 presents descriptive results comparing mean changes in population makeup in school districts that were affected by anti-immigration policies with a set of matched controls that were not. Section 5 builds on these descriptive results to elaborate formal models for hypothesis testing. Section 6 presents the results and Section 7 concludes with thoughts on the policy implications of the results.

2. Context and existing research

History and types of local policies seeking to control immigration

Until early 2006, few localities had ever attempted to regulate immigration. In the spring of that year, the Riverside, California city council considered a proposal for an aggressive anti-immigration policy. The initiative would have declared English to be the town’s official language, required landlords to verify the immigration status of their tenants and created penalties for hiring unauthorized workers, among other actions.

The Riverside initiative failed, but much of the proposal’s language was taken up and passed into law in July of 2006, in Hazleton Pennsylvania. The passage of that law—unprecedented in its scope and severity—provoked extensive national media attention. It also set off an apparent flurry of copycat laws: Newspapers reported imprecisely that “at least 80 town and cities” considered similar laws and that “as many as 100 other towns” had passed them in the months that followed (Preston 2007; Hurdle 2007).

An injunction stopped implementation of most parts of Hazleton’s policy while the federal district court debated its legality. Many of the other towns and counties that had been considering passing similar laws tabled or abandoned their efforts to await the results of the Hazleton lawsuit. Others did pass similar ordinances, and some of these jurisdictions found themselves embroiled in lawsuits as well.

Most aspects of Hazleton’s lawsuit were indeed found unconstitutional in July of 2007, a decision that has thus far been successfully upheld. Successful proposals for local laws based on the Riverside/Hazleton format became less common after the 2007 court ruling, but several examples exist. In June of 2010, voters in Fremont, Nebraska approved a proposal for a policy that would require
residents to obtain a permit to rent housing and mandate that the town’s employers use the federal “e-Verify” database to verify employment eligibility. Other localities targeted only the employment of unauthorized workers, often by requiring businesses or subsets of business to take additional steps to verify that their employees were work-eligible. A number of localities sought to prohibit day laborers from soliciting work in public places.

Other than employment and housing, the other major approach to controlling immigration at the local level involved the enforcement of federal immigration laws by local police. Most, but not all, communities that took this route did so under “287(g),” a federal program that trains and deputizes state and local law enforcement agencies to enforce immigration laws. Originally authorized by Congress in 1996, the program did not begin enrolling participating agencies until 2002. Local and state law enforcement agencies sign an agreement with US immigrations and Enforcement (ICE). ICE provides training for local officers in conducting screenings for immigration violations. These officers are then empowered to file immigration charges, initiate deportation procedures and detain suspects for up to 48 hours on immigration charges until they can be transferred to federal custody. In the absence of a 287(g) agreement, local agencies have limited power to detain persons solely on suspected immigration violations and are dependent on ICE to assist them on an ad-hoc basis.25

There are two versions of the 287(g) program: A “jailhouse” model in which police conduct screenings only on prisoners already in custody for other charges; and “task force” or “hybrid” models in which officers may also conduct screenings in the field and may screen persons who have not been detained for other reasons.26 The program has provoked concerns about racial profiling, overly aggressive implementation by local agencies, loose federal oversight and negative effects on relations between police and the community from critics inside and outside the government (Capps et al. 2011; Government Accountability Office 2009; Office of the Inspector General 2010). In addition, while the program’s stated goals focus on the apprehension and removal of persons with criminal charges or repeated immigration law violations, a large proportion of the immigrants removed by the program were simply in the country without authorization, a civil offense.

25 The Secure Communities program, initiated in 2008, is in some respects a successor to 287(g)’s jailhouse program and also expands the capabilities of local police to screen and detain suspected immigration law violators. I do not consider this program here because participation had only just begun in the time period I cover, because participation is not initiated by the local government and because the program attracted less public attention and concern from immigrant communities than the 287(g) program.

26 Task force officers are required to notify ICE immediately when detaining a suspect solely for immigration violations, without any other charge.
Finally, a number of localities took actions whose effects were largely symbolic. “Official language” or “English only” laws prohibiting the use of other languages in certain government functions were popular, but often had little demonstrated practical effect on immigrants: In part, this was because many critical bilingual services were either protected by federal law or exempted from the local laws. A number of localities also prohibited providing government services to unauthorized immigrants. These measures, too, seemed to have little practical impact: Federal law already prohibits unauthorized immigrants from receiving federal and state benefits welfare, and access to the locally controlled services that immigrants make most use of—primary education and emergency health care—are protected by federal law or jurisprudence.

It is difficult to assess to what degree many of these policies were actually enforced. Some, like Hazleton’s, were partially blocked by court injunction. It appears that an unknown number of others once passed were never implemented by local executives who were fearful of lawsuits or simply uninterested in strongly enforcing the laws once the political fury surrounding the law’s passage had calmed. The notable exception is the 287(g) agreements: Although different local agencies may be more or less aggressive in enforcing immigration law once enrolled, this federal program requires an extensive application process and a baseline of participation by the local enforcement agency in training and reporting (Capps et al. 2011).

**Characteristics of communities with anti-immigration policies**

Two prior studies have investigated what characteristics may predispose localities to consider, pass and/or implement anti-immigration policies. Hopkins (2010) finds that Census places (a geographic entity usually corresponding to a municipality) that considered anti-immigration ordinances are more populous, and faster growing than Census places in general. They also had higher proportions foreign-born in 2000 and faster growth of the foreign-born population from 1990 to 2000. In multivariate analysis, the change in proportion foreign-born from 1990 to 2000 positively predicts an anti-immigration policy proposal, as does growth of the unemployment rate in those places with higher proportions foreign-born.

Ramakrishnan and Wong (2008), in multivariate analysis of Census places, also find associations between the risk of an anti-immigration policy proposal on one hand and the proportion of votes cast for the Republican Presidential candidate and the black poverty rate relative to that of Latinos on the other. They find that once an anti-immigration policy is proposed, its passage is positively associated with Republican electoral support and the growth rate of the Latino population.
In Chapter Three, I find that increases in the foreign-born share of a jurisdiction’s population positively predicted anti-immigration policy proposals. However, this association was stronger among jurisdictions that were more politically conservative and located outside of a traditional immigrant gateway state than among their more liberal and gateway state counterparts. Immigrant population growth was fastest in these jurisdictions. This pattern implies that, if they do indeed slow immigrant and Hispanic population growth, anti-immigrant ordinances may be slowing or reshaping the ongoing process of geographic dispersal of these populations.

**Impact**

Relatively little social science scholarship addresses the impacts of sub-national anti-immigration policies. Pham and Van (2010) study effects of local anti-immigration policies (at both the town and county level) on county-level employment. Their study estimates that passing an anti-immigration law between 2005 and 2007 was associated with 1 percent to 2 percent lower employment in that county in the same year. Some immigrant-dominated industries appeared to be especially hard hit, while others appeared to benefit. Anti-immigration policies were associated with a 5.3 percent decline in employment in the food services and restaurant business, but with gains of around one percent in other immigrant-dominated industries. The authors interpreted this last observation as a sign that some immigrants in these counties might be switching sectors of employment in response to the policies, while others were leaving.

Pham and Van provide important evidence to support the hypothesis that anti-immigration policies have an effect on the employment of immigrants. However, their analysis warrants some qualifications that are relevant to this paper. First and most importantly, national macroeconomic changes might not impact the various sets of comparison counties used in the analysis in the same way as the counties where policies were implemented. If the counties passing anti-immigration laws suffered disproportionately large declines employment for other reasons, for example, these results could overstate the effects of the policies. Declining employment growth could even be a cause of, rather than a result of, anti-immigration policies. Second, the outcome is measured at the county level, while many of the policies were enacted at the sub-county level. Third, the analysis looks at the employment effects of policies only in the year the policy was enacted, without considering effects in

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27 The three sets of controls used by Pham and Van are the full sample of counties, large-population counties, and counties bordering counties with an anti-immigration policy.
later years. Fourth, the analysis in Pham and Van looks at employment and does not attempt to assess changes in population.

Guterbock, et al. (2010) study a package of local policies, including a 287(g) agreement, implemented by Prince William County, Virginia in 2007. They conclude that the number of unauthorized immigrant residents declined “probably by no more than 5,000 persons overall, but certainly by more than a thousand” between 2006 and 2008. This conclusion was based primarily on estimates from the American Community Survey (ACS) showing that the number of Hispanic non-citizens had dropped by 7,700 persons—about 22 percent of the estimated 2006 Hispanic non-citizen population—between 2006 and 2008. Further, a disproportionate share of this decrease was in the single male Hispanic population. This led to the authors’ assertion that the county’s Hispanic population composition had shifted as a result of the policy, away from young, male, limited English proficiency (and presumably unauthorized immigrant) noncitizens toward more established Hispanic immigrants and natives.

The overall Hispanic population in Prince William County grew by 3.8 percent between 2006 and 2009, while the Hispanic population of the Washington, DC metropolitan area grew by 18.8 percent in the same period, according to ACS estimates. The proportion of non-citizens and Limited English Proficient immigrants among Hispanics also dropped between 2006 and 2008 in the ACS estimates for Prince William County, but not in estimates for other counties in the region (Guterbock et al. 2010). The evaluation also noted that the percent of enrolled schoolchildren in Prince William counties who were Hispanic declined between the school year beginning in fall 2007 and that beginning in fall 2008, after years of steady increase. However, Hispanic school enrollments partially recovered in 2009. Assessments of the county’s desirability as a place to live fell among Hispanics, but remained stable for other groups.

Two limitations are inherent to any study of a single case and to estimates from survey data. First, the possibility that the policy in question distorted responses to the ACS in Prince William County, by discouraging respondents from responding at all or from reporting non-citizen status or limited English proficiency deserves consideration. Second, the authors note that it is impossible to fully disentangle the effects of the policy on immigrant and Hispanic populations from that of economic conditions within a single case (Guterbock et al. 2010).

A multi-site evaluation of the 287(g) program in counties in Virginia (including Prince William County), Georgia, and Maryland by the Migration Policy Institute cautiously supported the hypothesis...
that 287(g) programs led immigrants to leave communities that implemented them (Capps et al. 2011). That study noted that counties that implemented 287(g) in 2007 and 2008 had lost of up to 61 percent of their Hispanic non-citizen populations between the 2007 and 2009 ACS estimates, while that population continued to grow in the ACS estimates for most neighboring counties that did not start 287(g) agreements. That study also found that the growth of Hispanic school enrollments slowed and in some cases declined slightly in the two years following implementation of 287(g) agreements, before rebounding in 2009. The school districts of counties that did not implement 287(g) agreements, by comparison, saw more steady growth of their enrolled Hispanic student populations.

Analysis at the state level has also provided evidence of important effects from immigration-related policies on population composition. Lofstrom, Bohn, and Raphael (2011) estimate that Arizona’s 2007 state employer sanctions law reduced the proportion of persons who were foreign-born Hispanics by about 2.7 percentage points between 2007 and 2009, relative to a weighted set of control states matched on the changes in proportion foreign-born in previous years. They estimate a 1.4 point decline in the percent of children under age 16 who are foreign-born Hispanics as a result of the law.

Looking beyond these very recent state and local policies, there is in general little evidence about whether policy, political or social conditions can deter immigrants or Hispanics from settling in a once-attractive area, or induce them to leave. A much larger body of research shows the importance of job growth and social networks in making an area attractive to immigrants in the first place (e.g., Liaw and Frey 2007). Other work has quantified the effects of national-level control policies on national-level immigrant population flows and stocks (e.g., White, Bean, and Espenshade 1990; Woodrow 1992; Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002). Some observers have argued that California’s Proposition 187 and the political fervor surrounding its passage in 1994 deterred Hispanic immigrants from settling in California and accelerating the process of geographic dispersal of the foreign-born population, but this effect has not been quantified (Massey and Capoferro 2008; Durand, Massey, and Capoferro 2005). Other studies have tested the effects of changes in social welfare benefit policy on state level immigrant population growth, with mixed results (Borjas 1999; Kaushal 2005).

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28 Note that this reference does not investigate Arizona’s more widely known immigration enforcement law, signed in 2010.

29 Proposition 187 would have banned unauthorized immigrants from state benefits and public education in the mid-nineties and involved police in immigration enforcement, but implementation was blocked by legal challenges.
In this study, I thus seek to bolster the slim amount of empirical work that examines the effects of policy on the intra-national distribution of immigrant and Hispanic population growth. Unlike previous work on the effects of anti-immigration policy on population growth and composition, my study takes a nationwide perspective and compares a large number of jurisdictions that had such policies against those that did not. This gives me the ability to consider the role of economic conditions in any response in Hispanic population, a weakness of the existing studies of these policies. It looks only at the Hispanic student population however, making it conservative relative to the existing literature that considers impacts on other population groups, such as single male foreign-born Hispanics. By focusing on a more stable population, my study thus says less about the immediate impact of these policies as illegal immigration control measures, but more about what they mean for long-term changes in the ethnic makeup of these communities.

**National economic and immigration context**

A few important demographic and economic changes preceded and accompanied the burst of anti-immigration ordinances in the past decade. One was the robust growth of the foreign-born population of the United States, boosting it from 7.9 percent of the population in 1990 to 12.5 percent of the population in 2006 according to ACS estimates. A second was the extraordinary dispersal of the foreign-born population and especially the Hispanic foreign-born population, towards suburbs, smaller cities and the states of the South and Midwest accompanied this growth, creating new immigrant destinations (Parrado and Kandel 2008).

The growth of the foreign-born population began to slow beginning in 2005, largely due to a slowdown in growth of the unauthorized immigrant population (Passel and Cohn 2009b). In fact, the estimated Mexican-origin unauthorized immigrant population actually began to decline slightly after 2007 (Passel and Cohn 2008). This apparently resulted from a reduction in the number of Mexicans entering the United States, while departures continued at a relatively steady rate.

Changes in immigration were driven in large part by changes in macroeconomic conditions. A minor recession at the beginning of the decade was followed by a major national recession officially beginning in December of 2007. As in other downturns, the Hispanic unemployment rate rose further and showed notable increases earlier than did the overall employment rate (see Figure 1). Hispanic unemployment rates began a secular growth trend in 2007, after declining and drawing close to the overall national unemployment rate in 2006. Modest declines in the size of the Hispanic workforce and
more precipitous declines in construction-sector employment—a major source of employment for unskilled Hispanic immigrants—began shortly thereafter (see Figure 2).

3. Hypotheses and data

Hypotheses

This analysis tests two hypotheses. The first, primary hypothesis is that jurisdictions considering or passing anti-immigration ordinances experienced slower growth (or declines) in their Hispanic populations than would have been the case without such a policy. There are a number of reasons to expect this demographic response and they vary according to the type of policy proposal, and whether it was enforced, passed or merely considered.

Even in cases where a policy was considered, but never passed or enforced, the controversy surrounding the policy proposal may make immigrants and/or Hispanics feel unwelcome or anticipate discrimination, causing them to leave the area or refrain from settling there in the first place. In cases where policies are passed and/or enforced, unauthorized immigrants may credibly fear apprehension, deportation or difficulty in finding a job as a direct result. Authorized immigrants and Hispanic natives, too, may fear being mistakenly affected by the policy or feel the impact indirectly through unauthorized friends and family. The media accounts cited at the beginning of this chapter make the potential for such an indirect effect clear.

The existing evidence supporting this hypothesis comes largely from media accounts (e.g. Capuzzo 2006), an assessment of a subset of 287(g) agreements and the assessment of the Prince William County ordinance, which involved both a local law and a 287(g) agreement. Capps et al. (2011) reported that immigrants in 287(g) sites avoided public places, including local businesses. Guterbock et al. (2010) find that Hispanic survey respondents’ assessment of Prince William County as a place to live and their satisfaction with the police both dropped following implementation of that county’s anti-immigration policy.

However, there are also reasons to expect that population movements would not respond to local policies. Immigration flows have been shown to follow employment and other economic opportunities, as well as social networks, while resisting many efforts to stop or control them (Massey et al. 1998; Massey, Durand, et al. 2002; Donato, Durand, and Massey 1992). Unauthorized immigrants are already at risk of apprehension and forbidden from employment under federal law—it could easily be the case that local policies, too, have little effect. Despite the signs of intimidation and “spillover” cited
at the beginning of the chapter, native-born and authorized immigrant Hispanics might find that such policies are inconsequential relative to the draw of employment.

This leads to my second hypothesis: Hispanic population growth slows (or even declines) as a result of anti-immigration policies, but only when local economic conditions are deteriorating. In places where there are ample and attractive employment opportunities, immigrants (and their employers) may be willing to overlook legal risks and/or discrimination. When economic conditions deteriorate, however, immigrants (or Hispanics) may be less willing to move into or stay in a hostile local environment. This hypothesis is motivated, too, by the need to include in the analysis the impact of the historic deterioration of the US economy in the years immediately following most of the local policies.

I consider all proposals that entered official debate before a local government body, whether they passed or not, for two reasons. First, even the threat of an anti-immigration ordinance and the campaign to pass it may have an intimidating effect on Hispanic and immigrant residents, as discussed above. Secondly, in many jurisdictions where there was strong support for the most aggressive policies, legislative bodies tabled the proposal awaiting the outcomes of litigation in Hazleton and elsewhere. In other places, policies were passed but it cannot be readily confirmed whether they were actually enforced. The substantive difference between an unpassed and passed proposal is thus not clear ex ante.

In hypothesis testing, I distinguish between three types of policy proposals, while referring in the text to all three types as “policies”: Those that passed (excluding 287(g) programs), those that did not, and 287(g) programs. The analysis using the policy proposals tests the possibility that the political campaign surrounding a credible policy proposal or the threat of one being enacted may in itself discourage Hispanics from residing in the jurisdiction. The analysis of the passed policies provides a test of the effect of actually enacting one of these diverse policies into law. However, I know little about whether such laws were actually enforced. Some, such as Hazleton’s, were partially blocked by courts, while others may have been only halfheartedly enforced.

The 287(g) programs provide the strongest test of an anti-immigration policy actually being enforced. Because they involve an agreement with and monitoring by the federal government, I can assume that local police had certain baseline level of participation in the program and at least the
capacity to screen arrestees (and others) for immigration law violations. Unlike the other types of anti-immigration policies, 287(g) agreements can be implemented through administrative decision by local authorities, usually without legislation. Nonetheless, they generally attract public controversy and in many cases were implemented after very public political campaigns by supporters of immigration restrictions (Capps et al. 2011). I consider only those 287(g) agreements involving local law enforcement and only the “hybrid” and “task force” models where the agreement allows the local agency to investigate immigration status prior to arrest for other reason—a more controversial aspect of the program, and the one that opens up the greatest possibilities for racial profiling. 287(g) agreements with state police and “jailhouse enforcement only” arrangements are thus not considered here.

**Key predictor variable: Laws and policies**

The primary source information on local immigration ordinances was a full-text search of the Dow Jones Factiva database of US newspapers for a set of keywords commonly associated with local efforts to control immigration, during the period from January 1, 2000 to December 1, 2009. The Factiva database contains articles from 605 major and minor US newspapers, as well as Reuters and Associated Press newswires.

In addition, lists of proposed policies were also obtained from the Fair Immigration Reform Movement (FIRM) and the Latino Justice PRLDEF, as well as the websites of organizations representing different political perspectives on immigration: The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), the Immigration Reform Law Institute, US English, and ProEnglish (LatinoJustice PRLDEF n.d.; Fair Immigration Reform Movement n.d.). A list of successful applications to the federal government’s 287(g) program was obtained from the Immigration and Customs Enforcement website (US Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2008).

Importantly, only policy proposals that received serious, formal, consideration by a public government body were included in this analysis. Policies that were suggested by citizens but not

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30 From 2006 to 2009, 287(g) agreements nationwide resulted in the removal of 143,185 individuals, but the distribution of these removals across jurisdictions is not known (Office of the Inspector General 2010).

31 Latino Justice PRLDEF, ACLU and MALDEF litigate against local anti-immigration policies, while FIRM is an umbrella organization of immigrant advocacy organizations. The Immigration Reform Law Institute (a branch of the Fair Immigration Reform Movement) advocates and litigates in favor of legislation to reduce immigration, while US English and ProEnglish advocate on behalf of official English legislation.

32 Note that I tabulate each jurisdiction with an agency participating in a 287(g) agreement as a separate policy. More than one agency can participate in a single agreement, thus the number of 287(g) policies counted here is not equal to the number of 287(g) agreements actually signed.
introduced into formal debate as concrete, actionable proposals were not included. Each proposal and its outcome (whether it was passed into law or not) was then confirmed through newspaper accounts or public records and the month it was first formally proposed was recorded.

Each proposal was then tied to the county (for county-level jurisdictions), Census place or county subdivision (for sub-county jurisdictions) containing the jurisdiction and coded for the year in which they passed. The search yielded 259 proposed polices considered by localities from 2000 to late 2009, representing 215 distinct jurisdictions.

Additional predictor variables

One critical objective of this exercise is to separate the effects of changing local employment conditions from those anti-immigration policies. County-level unemployment data was obtained from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. Additional county and school district-level demographic data, presented to provide context and in creating matched control groups but not used in hypothesis testing, are from the 2000 and 1990 Census summary file estimates. School districts that were affected by anti-immigration policies were located in counties with lower mean unemployment rates than those containing general population of school districts, but also affected by the rise in unemployment rates from 2007 to 2008 (Table 1).

Dependent variable: Hispanic and overall student population

Estimating year-to-year changes in population composition for counties and sub-county jurisdictions presents a challenge. The sampling design of the Current Population Survey does not allow for sub-state estimates. The most commonly used source of year-to-year demographic estimates for localities, the ACS, is only available for geographic areas with population of 65,000 persons or more. Even at this level, precise estimates are not possible. The 90 percent confidence bounds for single-year estimates of the foreign-born population at the county level average more than 30 percent of the estimated local foreign-born population. To produce yearly population estimates from the ACS, the Census Bureau also uses information other than responses to that year’s survey, including survey responses from previous years, new housing starts and housing vacancy rates, among other variables (Schechter 2010:11-10). These factors limit the ACS’s utility for evaluating short-term changes in population composition at the local level. Additionally, there exists the possibility that anti-immigration laws, or the clamor surrounding them, may lead immigrants to fail to respond to the ACS at higher rates or to selectively change their answers.
Administrative data from local schools provide an alternative data source. Each year, the US Department of Education collects data on school districts and schools from the states. While this data does not include the place of birth of either students or their parents, it does include the Hispanic ethnicity status of students as reported by the school district. This data comes close to a census of the US primary and secondary school student population, allowing more precise statistical tests and estimates for smaller geographical units. Unlike the American Community Survey and other population surveys, there is less possibility for bias from additional survey nonresponse that might be introduced when Hispanics or immigrants are intimidated by a local anti-immigration policy.

The Department of Education does not specify a method for establishing whether a student is Hispanic or not, leaving states and school districts to report based on their own methods. School districts are required to report their student populations as of October of each year. For the purposes of this analysis, unified school districts that were included in the Census’s School District Demographics System were used. This limits the sampled universe to school districts that had a specific geographic coverage area, excluding most private schools, specialized education agencies focusing on specific populations such as the blind or disabled, and a small number of school districts that were created after the 2000 Census.

Although certainly not a perfect proxy, changes in the size of the Hispanic student population provide useful information about the Hispanic, foreign-born and unauthorized immigrant populations. In the 2000 US Census, 45.5 percent of the foreign-born were Hispanic, while 40.2 percent of Hispanics were foreign-born. In 2000, the correlation coefficient between the proportion of people who were foreign-born in a county subdivision, for example, and proportion of students who were Hispanic in that subdivision was 0.58. Approximately half of unauthorized immigrants are estimated to be couples with children. About 6.8 percent of the country’s K-12 students were estimated to have at least one unauthorized parent (Passel and Cohn 2009a). My choice of the Hispanic student population as the outcome of interest does make my analysis conservative in identifying short-term population reactions to these policies: In the cases they study, Guterbock et al. (2010) and Capps et al. (2011) found that the largest effects of 287(g) policies were on the population of unaccompanied foreign-born males, with smaller though important declines in the growth of Hispanic student-age populations.

I use year-to-year point change in the percent of students who are Hispanic as my key dependent variable. The growth rate of the Hispanic student population, expressed as a percent change, would provide an arguably more intuitive and familiar measure. However, growth rates depend on the
base population: School districts with only a few Hispanic children can thus have huge percent changes resulting from very small changes in the population composition itself. As a result, linear statistical models do a poor job predicting untransformed year-to-year growth rates in applications such as this one. The year-to-year percent point change in percent Hispanic thus provides a more substantively meaningful and easily modeled outcome.

**Unit of analysis**

The unit of analysis used here is the school district, the smallest unit of analysis for which yearly ethnicity data for the enrolled student population is available. School districts are thus coded as having been affected by an anti-immigration policy proposal if they intersect or are contained by a county or municipality that proposed such a policy. Analyzing population change at the school district level thus allows for some study of sub-county variation. This has two advantages. First, it allows the study of the impact of municipal (sub-county) level policies and county-level policies simultaneously. Second, because the foreign-born (and Hispanic) population tends to be clustered, choosing a sub-county unit of analysis provides a more sensitive measure of changes in population makeup. Some school districts are county-wide—in these cases, the school district offers no additional information about sub-county variations in population makeup.

At the same time, this unit of analysis presents some difficulties. School districts vary greatly in geographic and population size across the country and counties contain a widely varying number of school districts. Thus, a naïve analysis using the school district as the unit analysis could be disproportionately influenced by large counties containing many school districts (Los Angeles County, California, for example), relative to an analysis using the county as the unit of analysis. In general, county-level policies will also generally have more influence on the results than sub-county level ordinances simply because counties contain more school districts on average. Accordingly, in robustness testing I repeat my analysis excluding individual counties with multiple school districts.

**4. Descriptive analysis**

I begin by comparing the mean year-to-year change in percent Hispanic in school districts affected by anti-immigration policies against that in districts that were not affected by such a policy.

**Creating matched comparison groups**

In order to make a meaningful comparison between the school districts that were affected by anti-immigration policies, and those that were not, I first construct a set of matched school districts with
comparable characteristics. This matching process is necessary because localities within the United States are extremely heterogeneous with respect to the ethnicity and place of birth of their populations. Many areas of the country have large and/or quickly growing Hispanic or foreign-born populations, while the majority of counties and municipalities have almost no immigrants or Hispanics. Prior research (Hopkins 2010; Ramakrishnan and Wong 2008) shows that places with no foreign-born population and a slowly growing foreign-born population are at extremely low risk of proposing an anti-immigration ordinance. These places constitute a large proportion of US school districts and are largely irrelevant to the analysis.

The comparison population was created by matching the localities that were not affected by any anti-immigration policies (controls) with those that were affected by the relevant type of anti-immigration policy (cases) using three variables: Percent of population foreign-born in 2000, percent Hispanic of the student population in 2000 and change in the percent Hispanic of the student population between 1999 and 2000. Observations were grouped according to values of each variable, with cutpoints at the highest fifth percentile, tenth percentile, twenty-fifth percentile, and median of each variable. This division of three variables into five distinct categories created 125 distinct cells.

Observations in cells containing no cases were dropped from the analysis sample. Control observations in cells that contained cases were retained, and assigned a weight equal to the ratio of cases to controls within that cell. Cases, on the other hand, have a weight of one. Thus, for the purposes of generating weighted estimates of means or weighted regressions, the controls in each cell have a total weight equal to that of the total number of cases in that cell.

This matching and weighting process was performed separately for school districts affected by each of the three categories of anti-immigration policy proposals (all proposed policies, those that did not pass, those that did pass, and 287(g) policies) using the “coarsened exact matching” package for STATA (Blackwell et al. 2009) It produces control populations whose weighted characteristics closely resemble their case populations on the three variables used for matching, as well as other variables. (See Table 2). Most importantly, the weighted control groups show no statistically significant difference in terms of mean changes in percent Hispanic between 2000 and 2004 from their respective case groups, indicating that they had similar growth trajectories even after the time period used for matching. There were statistically significant differences, however, in unemployment rates and changes in unemployment rates between the control and case groups, although the groups were still quite similar relative to the entire population of school districts unaffected by such policies (Table 2.)
**Results: Comparing means**

Figure 3 presents the mean change from the previous year in the percent of students who are Hispanic for the years 2000 to 2008, for districts that were affected by an anti-immigration policy proposal that was not passed into law and a set of matched, weighted control school districts. Separate charts are presented for districts whose policies were proposed in each of the years 2005 to 2008, although the comparison group in each chart is the full set of control counties, matched to districts affected by unpassed policies in all years. Figures 4 and 5 do the same, but for districts affected by anti-immigrant policies that were actually passed and for 287(g) programs, respectively.

As Figure 3 shows, the mean proportion of students who were Hispanic grew steadily from 2000 to 2006 in districts affected by unpassed anti-immigration policies and their control group. For districts with policies proposed in 2006, 2007, and 2008 and the control group, the Hispanic student share rose between around 0.5 and 1.0 percentage points each year in that period. The exception was where an unpassed policy was proposed in 2005—in that group of districts, the Hispanic student share remained essentially unchanged across the 2000 to 2008 period.

The mean year-to-year change in the proportion Hispanic remains positive, but does decline from 2005 to 2008 in the districts where policies were proposed but not passed in 2006, 2007, and 2008 (Figure 3). However, there is no clear indication that these unpassed policies are responsible for the slowdown: the control group of districts also saw smaller annual increases in the Hispanic share of student after 2005. Further, the relationship between the timing of the proposal and the beginning of the slowdown in gains in Hispanic population share varies.

Figure 4 presents the mean year-to-year change in percent Hispanic for districts affected by policies that passed, as well as the matched control group. In this case, the subjective pattern lends some support to the claim that changes in student population makeup are related to anti-immigration policies. For policies passed in 2005, 2006, and 2007, there are decreases in the mean year-to-year change in percent Hispanic, beginning in the same year, or the year before, the policy was passed. These decreases are sizeable—half a percentage point or more—and not observed in the matched control school districts.

The districts affected by 287(g) agreements, presented in Figure 6, show still more dramatic drops in the mean year-to-year increase in percent of students who are Hispanic. In the case of 287(g) agreements signed in 2005, 2006 and 2007, the mean annual increase in percent Hispanic drops peaks at above one percent per year before the 287(g) agreement. After the 287(g) agreements, the mean
change in percent Hispanic then drops to near or below zero percent per year by 2008. Although the control group also sees a decline in the mean year-to-year increase in the Hispanic share of their student bodies after 2003, the decline is smaller and more gradual.

However, while the districts affected by 287(g) agreements undergo dramatic swings in their annual change in Hispanic share, the relationship between the timing of those drops and the 287(g) agreements is unclear. For agreements made in 2005, the decrease in year-to-year changes in the Hispanic share does not begin until a year later. For those made in 2007 and 2008, the decrease begins a year and two years (respectively) before the 287(g) agreements.

The expected relationship between the enacting an anti-immigration policy and any impact it has on population changes is unclear—a policy might take time to take effect, or immigrants might anticipate a policy or be affected by the controversy preceding it. Further, another aspect of timing complicates this analysis. The two year long periods ending in October of 2007 and October of 2008 are a critical part of the evidence that 287(g) agreements had an impact on the growth of the Hispanic student population. However, in employment conditions began to weaken for Hispanics beginning in 2007. In October of 2006, nationwide Hispanic unemployment reached a low of 4.4 percent. It increased to 5.3 percent by October of 2007 and to 8.4 percent in October of 2008.

A subjective look at changes in the student populations in districts that were affected by the three types of anti-immigration policies thus provides some evidence that passed anti-immigration policies might be associated with modest slowdowns in the growth of the Hispanic population as a proportion of the overall student population. 287(g) agreements may be associated with even greater decreases. However, in both cases I cannot distinguish between the impact of the law and those of the economy or other factors with only descriptive results.

5. Regression analysis

The descriptive results suggest that certain types of anti-immigration policies may slow Hispanic population growth, but fail to rule out the possibility that economic changes (or another factor) are responsible. Employment conditions are a possible confounding variable: It is possible that poor employment conditions both promote anti-immigration policies and discourage settlement by Hispanic families.\footnote{In exploratory analysis this does not appear to be the case: Higher (and rising) unemployment rates were negatively associated with the probability of an anti-immigration policy, reflecting the fact that employment} The first task in this section is thus to develop a model that accounts for the impact of local...
economic conditions, in order to rule out a competing explanation. The model I develop thus includes both the unemployment rate in the previous year and the year-to-year change from the previous year in unemployment rates as controls.

There is also the possibility that changes in economic conditions may be similar across the different types of districts, but that employment changes may have a much larger impact on growth of the Hispanic population in the districts affected by anti-immigration policies than in other districts. This hypothesis suggests that anti-immigration policies may make immigrants less likely to settle or stay in an area, but only when the draw of employment opportunities is weak. I thus also elaborate a second model that adds a term for the interaction between policy and changes in the unemployment rates, allowing the effect of changes in the unemployment rate to differ between districts affected by policies and the matched controls.

**Estimating effects of anti-immigration policies**

To test my primary hypothesis—that an anti-immigration ordinance slows the growth of Hispanics as a percent of the enrolled student population—I estimate the following equation 5.1.

\[ Y_{t,i} - Y_{t-1,i} = \alpha_i + \beta_{POLICIES}POLICIES_{t,i} + \gamma \text{YEAR}_{t} + \delta X_{t,i} + \epsilon_{t,i} \]  

[5.1]

Where \( Y_{t,i} - Y_{t-1,i} \) is the point change in percent Hispanic for district \( i \)’s student population from the previous year to the year \( t \), measured in October of each year. \( \alpha_i \) is a district-specific fixed effect parameter. This term’s role in the model can be thought of as measuring the influence of time-invariant characteristics of district \( i \) on \( Y_{t,i} - Y_{t-1,i} \).

The term POLICIES\(_{t,i}\) is a vector of four dummy variables POLICY\(_{t,i}\), POLICY\(_{t-1,i}\), POLICY\(_{t-2,i}\), POLICY\(_{t-3,i}\) coded one if a school district had been affected by the relevant type of policy in the year of the observation (year \( t \)), the previous year (\( t-1 \)), two or more years previous (\( <t-2 \)), respectively and coded zero otherwise. These variables are changed to match the relevant type of policy being tested.

\( X_{t,i} \) is a vector of time-varying control variables for each school district. These include the Hispanic share of students in year \( t-1 \), the growth rate, in percent, of the non-Hispanic student population between year \( t-1 \) and year \( t \), the county-level unemployment rate in year \( t-1 \), and the percent point change in the county-level unemployment rate between year \( t-1 \) and year \( t \). \( \text{YEAR}_t \) is a growth attracts immigrants, and a growing foreign-born population share in turn positively predicts proposal of an anti-immigration policy.

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vector of dummy variables indicating which year the observation was taken in. Year 2001 is the excluded category.

As described above, the equation is repeated separately for the three categories of anti-immigration policies being tested—policies that did not pass, passed policies and 287(g) policies. The equation is estimated for district-year observations taken yearly from 2001 to 2008.

In each case, I estimate the regression on an analytic sample that consists only of districts affected by the relevant type of policies and their matched controls, using weights created as described in section 4.1. The goal is not to use matching to directly calculate a causal impact for hypothesis testing, but simply to limit the analysis sample to a more homogenous population for the regression analysis. Matching is thus used as a preprocessing technique in order to limit model dependence, following Ho, Imai, King and Stewart (2006).

**Estimating joint effects of policies and economic change**

To test the second hypothesis—that the combination of an anti-immigration policy and poor economic conditions slows the growth of Hispanics as a percent of a district’s student population—I estimate the following equation, again repeating it for the relevant categories of policies and units of analysis.

\[
Y_{t,i} - Y_{t-1,i} = \alpha_i + \beta_{POLICIES_{t,i}} + POLICIESX\Delta UNEMP_{t,i} + \gamma_{YEAR_t} + \delta_{X_{t,i}} + \epsilon_{t,i} \quad [5.2]
\]

Where \(Y_{t,i} - Y_{t-1,i}, \alpha_i, \beta_{POLICIES_{t,i}}, \gamma_{YEAR_t}, \delta_{X_{t,i}}, \) and \(\epsilon_{t,i}\) are all unchanged from the equation presented above in section 5.1.

POLICIESX\Delta UNEMP_{t,i} consists of four interaction variables generated by multiplying the vector POLICIES_{t,i} (which contains indicators for being affected by the relevant anti-immigration policies in each of the previous years) by the county-level change in unemployment from the previous year (time t-1) to the year of the observation (time t). These interaction variables thus allow the effects of the relevant anti-immigration policies within the model to vary according to current, local employment conditions. \(^{34}\)

More specifically, this vector contains the following variables:

34 I chose to introduce an interaction on the variable measuring year-to-year change in the unemployment rate, but not on the unemployment rate itself because school districts that were affected by anti-immigration policies were generally located in counties with strong employment conditions, reflecting the fact that they were magnets for immigrants and Hispanics; I thus argue that changes are more theoretically significant than levels. Additionally, the results from equation 5.1 show that change in the unemployment rate is a stronger predictor of Hispanic student population growth than is the rate itself.
\[
\text{POLICYX}\Delta\text{UNEMP}_{t,i} = \text{POLICY}_{t,i} \times (\text{UNEMPLOYMENT}_{t,i} - \text{UNEMPLOYMENT}_{t-1,i})
\]

\[
\text{POLICYX}\Delta\text{UNEMP}_{t-1,i} = \text{POLICY}_{t-1,i} \times (\text{UNEMPLOYMENT}_{t,i} - \text{UNEMPLOYMENT}_{t-1,i})
\]

\[
\text{POLICYX}\Delta\text{UNEMP}_{t-2,i} = \text{POLICY}_{t-2,i} \times (\text{UNEMPLOYMENT}_{t,i} - \text{UNEMPLOYMENT}_{t-1,i})
\]

These interaction variables allow the effects of anti-immigration policies within the model to vary according to changes in local employment conditions in the year of the observation (not the year in which the policy was considered or enacted). The regressions are estimated separately for each policy type using the weighted analytic samples created by matching.

6. Results

Regression analysis results

Columns 1, 3 and 5 of Table 3 present the results of regressions of the year-to-year change in percent Hispanic of the district’s student body on indicator variables for passing each of the three types of anti-immigration policy in the years preceding the observation (Equation 5.1). The regressions include controls for employment rates at the time of the observation, changes in employment rate from the previous year and other controls.

The pattern of associations for the unpassed policies and passed (non 287(g)) policies is similar (Columns 1 and 3 of Table 3). In both instances, there is a small but meaningful and significant positive association between a policy occurring in the year of the observation and the change from the previous year in a district’s Hispanic share of students. The association between changes in the Hispanic share of a district’s student population and policies proposed a year prior to the observation or two years prior to the observation is not significantly different from zero, however. This is the case whether the policy passed (Column 3) or did not pass (Column 1).

These results are clearly inconsistent with the hypothesis that either unpassed or passed (non 287(g)) policies slow the growth of the Hispanic student population once economic conditions are controlled for. In fact, these policies are associated with greater growth of the Hispanic student population share in the year that these policies take place. A plausible substantive explanation is that causality might run the other way: These types of anti-immigration policies have no effect on Hispanic settlement, but that they are proposed in places and years in which Hispanic population growth is especially high.
The regression featuring 287(g) agreements (Column 5 of Table 3) presents a different pattern. There is no significant association between the change in percent Hispanic and 287(g) agreements signed in the year of the observation or the year before the observation. A 287(g) agreement signed two or more years prior to the observation is associated with a point change in percent Hispanic of -0.787 percent in that year. This is a substantively important association given that the mean district affected by a 287(g) agreement saw an increase of 0.99 percentage points in the Hispanic student share in 2004, for example. In the mean district signing a 287(g) agreement, then, the annual increase of Hispanics as a proportion of the student population would be expected to drop by almost four-fifths two years later, if other conditions did not change. Importantly, this association is estimated in a model in which county-level employment rates and changes in employment rates are statistically controlled for.

These three models also yield insights about the relationship between other variables and the change in district Hispanic student share. As expected, the unemployment rate and change unemployment rate have significant and meaningful positive associations with Hispanic enrollment. For example, the mean district affected by a 287(g) agreement was in a county whose unemployment rate increased by 1.57 percent between 2007 and 2008. The model predicts an annual increase in percent Hispanic 0.157 percent lower than would be the case had unemployment remained steady. The growth of the non-Hispanic student population and the Hispanic student share in the prior year are also associated with decreases in the Hispanic share of the student population.

Results with interactions between policies and changes in unemployment

Unemployment and changes in unemployment rates, by themselves, do not appear to explain the association observed between 287(g) agreements and the change in the Hispanic share of a district’s student population. However, this does not eliminate the possibility that anti-immigration policies passed in earlier years could deter Hispanics from settling or cause them to leave only when current economic conditions are poor. This hypothesis is investigated in columns 2, 4, and 6 of Table 3, which add to the previous models the interactions between the policy indicator variables and the change in the local unemployment rate from the year preceding the observation (Equation 5.2).

Estimates of model 5.2 for 287(g) policies (Column 6) is of most interest, given the results above. When the effect of changes in unemployment rate is allowed to vary in response to policy passage, the coefficient measuring the association between a policy proposal two years or more before the observation and the outcome is attenuated to -0.149 and becomes non-significant. A one percent increase in the unemployment rate is associated with a 0.409 percent lower change in percent Hispanic
when it occurs in a district affected by a previous 287(g) agreement, relative to a district with no agreement. As Figure 7 shows, the model predicts that 287(g) policies have a statistically significant impact on the change in proportion Hispanic only when they occur in a county whose unemployment rate increased by at least 0.4 percent two years or more after the policy was enacted.

To put this in context, the mean district affected by a 287(g) agreement was located in a county where unemployment decreased by 0.39 percent from 2005 to 2006, increased by less than 0.02 percent from 2006 to 2007, and then jumped by 1.57 percent from 2007 to 2008. These counties had 2007 to 2008 changes in their annual mean unemployment rates ranging from a decrease of 0.61 percent to an increase of 2.5 percent. In a district with a 287(g) agreement and a 1.57 percent increase in unemployment (the mean for 2007 to 2008 in a district where a 287(g) policy was enacted), the model predicts that year-to-year change in percent Hispanic would be reduced by 0.945 percentage points, relative to a district with steady unemployment and no anti-immigration policy. For a district with the same change in unemployment, but no 287(g) agreement, the model would predict change in percent Hispanic only 0.154 percentage points smaller than a district with steady unemployment and no anti-immigration policy.

These models support the hypothesis that 287(g) anti-immigration policies are associated with a slowdown in growth of the Hispanic student population, but their effect is activated and enhanced by employment losses. Alternatively, 287(g) agreements may strengthen the existing response of Hispanic student population growth to increases in the unemployment rate. The evidence does not allow me to distinguish between these two subtly different theoretical formulations of this interaction, but the 287(g) agreements have no estimated effect independent of economic conditions in my model. The coefficients on the policy indicator variables are not statistically different from zero once the interactions with changes in unemployment are introduced. The coefficient representing the association between changes in the unemployment rate and changes in the Hispanic student population remains unchanged after the introduction of the interaction term, indicating that the interaction between the policies and employment conditions does not appear to account for a significant share of the estimated negative effect of increases in unemployment on Hispanic student population growth observed in Model 1.

Robustness checks and limitations

One of the chief weaknesses of my analysis is the limited number of years in which I observe population change following the policies in question. I am able to observe only five 287(g) agreements
for two or more years (Table 1). Although they contain many school districts, I am not able to exclude the possibility that these five districts are not representative of the full set of districts implementing 287(g) policies and that results would change with more years of observation. Further, a single large jurisdiction (in practice, a county) containing a large number of school districts could disproportionately influence the results. To exclude this possibility, I ran the regression models described above multiple times, each time excluding one of the jurisdictions affected by a 287(g) policy that had multiple districts and each of its districts. The key coefficients were substantively unchanged.

Another prominent challenge to the validity of these results is that the models described in Section 5 omit any measure of the composition of the Hispanic population. The pattern of associations described here might unrelated to 287(g) policies if, for example, Hispanic residents of jurisdictions that sign 287(g) agreements are more likely to be immigrants (or unauthorized immigrants) than Hispanic residents. If Hispanic immigrant population growth also responds more strongly to economic conditions than Hispanic native population growth, the results above could then be unrelated to the 287(g) agreements. Accordingly, I ran the base model including terms for the percent of the district’s overall Hispanic population that was foreign-born in 2000 and its interaction with the change in unemployment. Again, the key coefficients were substantively unchanged.

Of course, there are other limits to this analysis. Even regression analysis with panel data is always limited in its ability to establish causality; the school districts passing anti-immigration policies may differ from others in unobserved ways that amplify the effects of changes in economic conditions. Although my analysis strategy is resistant to bias from time-invariant unobserved endogenous variables, my control variables cannot fully capture variation across time. For example, sectoral and subsectoral weaknesses in employment might not be captured in the overall unemployment rate, yet be related to both the proposal of anti-immigration policies and Hispanic population growth. Although I cannot exclude such possibilities, they seem unlikely.

7. Conclusion

The current state of evidence on the reaction of Hispanic population growth to local anti-immigration lawmaking is largely based on useful studies that are nonetheless based only a few cases. This paper seeks to analyze this question in a nationwide context while taking into account changes in economic conditions and other potentially confounding factors. I also seek to separate the effects of the social and political controversy surrounding local efforts to implement anti-immigration policies from
the effects of the policies themselves by analyzing unpassed policies, passed policies and confirmed implemented (287(g)) policies separately.

To some extent, my results tell a clear story. When economic and other conditions are controlled for, school districts that were in jurisdictions that considered but did not pass anti-immigration policies witnessed subsequent changes in the percent of their students that were Hispanic that were not statistically different from those in a set of matched controls. The controversy and threat created by an anti-immigration policy proposal are apparently not sufficient to discourage Hispanic families from settling in an area. The same null result was true for anti-immigration policies (other than 287(g) agreements) that were passed into law, although not necessarily enforced.  

287(g) agreements present a more complicated empirical pattern. School districts in jurisdictions that passed 287(g) agreements saw much smaller increases in the percent of students who were Hispanic relative to the control group, beginning two years after the agreements were signed. Economic conditions in the districts affected by 287(g) agreements alone do not explain this slowdown in Hispanic student population growth. Instead, this modeled effect appears to be generated by the combination of the policies and poor economic conditions (primarily after the recession had begun in the year 2008) rather than the policies by themselves.

Keeping in mind the limitations of the analysis, I can draw some preliminary conclusions: There is no empirical evidence from my analysis that, on average, local anti-immigration policies other than 287(g) agreements reduce the growth of the Hispanic student population when economic conditions are stable or improving. There is preliminary evidence, however, that growth of the Hispanic student population may slow in places that implemented a 287(g) agreement, but only when unemployment is rising and only two years or more after the policy was implemented.

There are theoretical and substantive arguments that fit these results. Although they often arise in similar environments of local political controversy about immigration as the other policies studied here, 287(g) agreements require a sustained level of institutional commitment by local police and the local government in order to successfully enter this federal program. They are also the only category of anti-immigration policy for which implementation can be broadly confirmed. Further, while English-only

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35 Arguably, the actual effect of these policies as passed is actually more relevant for policymakers considering such policies than the hypothetical effect if they were enforced—just as medical trials properly measure the effect of a treatment by including all patients who were assigned to the “treatment” group, even if they did not actually complete the treatment in question.
declarations or employer sanctions policies might affect only recent or unauthorized immigrants, a much larger proportion of the Hispanic population may be impacted by more adversarial police-community relationships and real or perceived racial profiling by police, which some advocates say accompany 287(g) agreements. The empirical results of the model, suggesting that 287(g) agreements impact the growth of the Hispanic population, while other types of anti-immigration policies do not, are thus not surprising.

The indication that this effect of 287(g) agreements occurs through interaction with local economic conditions, on the other hand, is unexpected but can be easily explained. Hispanic and immigrant families may be less likely to take the legal risk or endure the real or perceived hostility presented by 287(g) agreements when employment is drying up. This finding is a sign that while economic concerns are apparently still the primary engine of immigrant and Hispanic settlement, the political and policy environment may be an important secondary factor.

These results provide some national statistical context to cases like that of Prince William County and others discussed by Guterbock, et al. (2010) and Capps, et al. (2011), where some advocates of greater restrictions on authorization immigration hailed the indications of a reduction in the Hispanic and foreign-born population as evidence of the success of a 287(g) agreement in reducing the unauthorized immigrant population. The evidence presented here, although it considers only the Hispanic student-age population, nonetheless suggests that any such population changes may be unlikely to continue and could reverse once employment conditions improve. This finding that Hispanic families are largely undeterred from settling in communities that implemented anti-immigration policies also suggests that these policies are unlikely to stop or even slow the continued growth of the immigrant and Hispanic population in the “new immigrant destinations.”
References


Chapter Four Tables and Figures

Table 1. Number of anti-immigration policy proposals, by type and year of proposal.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<th>Passed*</th>
<th>287(g)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Does not include 287(g) policies.
Figure 1. Monthly unemployment rates for the overall and Hispanic population (16+), 2000-2009. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

![Graph of unemployment rates](image1)

Figure 2. Monthly size of the Hispanic workforce and seasonally adjusted employment in construction industry, 2001-2009. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

![Graph of workforce and employment](image2)
Figure 3. Mean change from previous year in percent of students Hispanic 2000-8, districts affected by *unpassed* anti-immigration policy proposals and their matched controls, by year of policy.

Figure 4. Mean change from previous year in percent of students Hispanic 2000-8, districts affected by *passed* anti-immigration policy proposals and their matched controls, by year of policy.
Figure 6. Mean change from previous year in percent of students Hispanic 2000-8, districts affected by 287(g) agreements and their matched controls, by year of policy.
Table 2. School districts affected by *county or place*-level anti-immigration policies and control groups, by category of policy. Means and (standard deviations) of characteristics of the student and general population. ¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
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<th>Passed</th>
<th>287(g)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cases</td>
<td>Controls</td>
<td>Cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student Population</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Hispanic, 2000</td>
<td>10.21</td>
<td>10.96</td>
<td>9.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[15.04]</td>
<td>[17.14]</td>
<td>[14.96]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Hispanic, 2005</td>
<td>13.83</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>13.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[17.63]</td>
<td>[19.57]</td>
<td>[17.01]</td>
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<tr>
<td>% Hispanic, 2008</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>15.98</td>
<td>14.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[18.95]</td>
<td>[20.46]</td>
<td>[17.79]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student Population, Change in % Hispanic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999 to 2004</td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td>3.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[4.12]</td>
<td>[4.23]</td>
<td>[3.94]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004 to 2005</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[1.18]</td>
<td>[1.27]</td>
<td>[1.22]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 to 2006</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[1.18]</td>
<td>[1.25]</td>
<td>[1.17]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006 to 2007</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[1.2]</td>
<td>[1.19]</td>
<td>[1.47]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 to 2008</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Population Characteristics</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% foreign-born,</td>
<td>8.19</td>
<td>8.16</td>
<td>8.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[7.76]</td>
<td>[8.49]</td>
<td>[8.69]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate, 2004²</td>
<td>5.22</td>
<td>5.65</td>
<td>5.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[.95]</td>
<td>[1.69]</td>
<td>[.99]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate, 2008²</td>
<td>5.37</td>
<td>5.85</td>
<td>5.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in unemp. rate, 2007 to 2008</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>1.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Hispanics foreign-born, 2000</td>
<td>33.67</td>
<td>32.93</td>
<td>32.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[18.3]</td>
<td>[20.37]</td>
<td>[20.04]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of workers in construction, 2000</td>
<td>7.24</td>
<td>6.83</td>
<td>6.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[1.28]</td>
<td>[1.93]</td>
<td>[1.61]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (number of districts)</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>9654</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹. Means and standard deviations for control groups are calculated using weights generated in the matching process. ². Unemployment is measured at the county level. All other variables are measured at the school district level.
## Table 3. Regression of change from previous year in percent of students Hispanic on indicators for policies at the county or municipal level and controls, for the years 2001-2008, with fixed effects at the school district level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposal occurring in:</th>
<th>Not passed</th>
<th>Passed</th>
<th>287(g)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposal occurring in:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Year</td>
<td>0.293**</td>
<td>0.285**</td>
<td>0.233**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.076)</td>
<td>(0.078)</td>
<td>(0.076)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Previous Year</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>0.228*</td>
<td>0.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.086)</td>
<td>(0.110)</td>
<td>(0.078)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two or More Years Prior</td>
<td>0.114</td>
<td>0.351</td>
<td>0.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.143)</td>
<td>(0.261)</td>
<td>(0.082)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interaction of change in unemployment rate and proposal in:

| Current Year           | -0.313*    | -0.212 | 0.003  |
|                        | (0.147)    | (0.158)| (0.076)|
| Previous Year          | 0.100      | -0.209*| -0.164 |
|                        | (0.155)    | (0.103)| (0.101)|
| Two or More Years Prior| -0.194     | -0.093 | -0.409**|
|                        | (0.196)    | (0.096)| (0.102)|

Controls

| Unemployment rate, prior year | -0.085**  | -0.085**| -0.078**| -0.078**| -0.028**| -0.027**|
|                              | (0.008)   | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.008) |
| Change in unemployment from prior year | -0.111**  | -0.110**| -0.101**| -0.100**| -0.100**| -0.098**|
|                              | (0.008)   | (0.008) | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.009) |
| Growth in non-Hispanic student pop. from prior year | -0.005**  | -0.005**| -0.005**| -0.005**| -0.006**| -0.006**|
|                              | (0.000)   | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Percent of students Hispanic, prior year | -0.202**  | -0.202**| -0.208**| -0.208**| -0.217**| -0.217**|
|                              | (0.002)   | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) |

Year of observation:

| 2005                  | 0.528**    | 0.529**| 0.552**| 0.552**| 0.712**| 0.713**|
|                       | (0.020)    | (0.020)| (0.021)| (0.021)| (0.024)| (0.024)|
| 2006                  | 0.631**    | 0.631**| 0.627**| 0.627**| 0.852**| 0.852**|
|                       | (0.020)    | (0.020)| (0.020)| (0.020)| (0.023)| (0.023)|
| 2007                  | 0.692**    | 0.691**| 0.710**| 0.710**| 0.981**| 0.978**|
|                       | (0.019)    | (0.019)| (0.019)| (0.019)| (0.022)| (0.022)|
| 2008                  | 0.686**    | 0.687**| 0.725**| 0.727**| 0.903**| 0.904**|
|                       | (0.020)    | (0.020)| (0.020)| (0.020)| (0.023)| (0.023)|

Constant: 3.331** 3.330** 3.116** 3.115** 7.507** 7.495**

Observations: 78,960 78,960 80,856 80,856 81,504 81,504

R-squared: 0.193 0.193 0.232 0.232 0.199 0.199

Number of districts: 9,870 9,870 10,107 10,107 10,188 10,188

1.2000 is reference category. Coefficients for 2002, 2003, 2004 not reported. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01

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Figure 7. Interaction effect: Association between 287(g) policy and change in proportion of students who are Hispanic two or more years after policy implementation, by change in unemployment rate. Confidence intervals were generated following Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006).
Conclusion

Former Speaker of the US House of Representatives Tip O’Neill famously pronounced that “all politics is local.” The spirit of this maxim motivates the questions I ask in this dissertation. Over the past twenty years, the growth and geographic dispersal of America’s immigrant population has changed life in local communities across the country. How have the politics and policies of immigration changed as result? And what do reactions at the local level mean for the lives of immigrants and for future immigrant settlement patterns?

A historical perspective on immigration policy adds import to these questions. Some of the “new” immigrant destinations were in fact immigrant destinations a century before, when the foreign-born population share of the United States reached 15 percent at the end of the nineteenth century (Singer 2004; Migration Policy Institute 2008). Not long after, Congress substantially curtailed immigrant admissions in the Emergency Quota Act of 1921 and the Immigration Act of 1924, causing the foreign-born share of the US population to drop to 4.7 percent by 1970. In that case, rapid growth of the immigrant population was followed by a policy backlash that shaped the size and composition of the nation’s foreign-born population for the next forty years. Is the rapid growth of the immigrant population, combined with changes in its geographic distribution, now provoking a similar policy reaction in localities, and what might its effects be?

This historical comparison is not pure hyperbole. Local anti-immigration policies are in a sense radical: Other than a handful of English-only laws occurring in the 1980s, I could find no record of efforts to regulate immigration at the local level prior to 1990, dating back to the nineteenth century. This historical inactivity at the local level is largely because of the difficult Constitutional problems such policies present and the consequences for localities that enact them: Hazleton, PA and Farmer’s Branch TX reportedly face bills of over $5 million and $3.2 million, respectively, for the primarily unsuccessful legal defense of their anti-immigration laws (City of Fremont 2010). Despite these examples, voters and officials in localities where immigrants had recently settled continued to approve such laws through 2010. Social scientists are only beginning to study the scope, causes and consequences of these powerful symbols of discontent with immigration.

Findings

I open the dissertation, in Chapter 1, with a description of the ways that the geographic dispersal of the foreign-born population has changed the contexts of reception for immigrants, focusing
on aspects that may provoke or resolve friction between immigrants and natives. As a group, the new immigrant destinations have smaller but more rapidly growing populations and tighter labor markets than the established immigrant destinations. There are exceptions: Many of the new destinations that attracted immigrants with meatpacking and other nondurable manufacturing jobs experienced little, if any, population and employment growth. Hypothetically, these low-growth communities could be at higher risk of conflict between natives and immigrants. Natives in the new immigrant destinations are far more politically conservative and slightly less well educated than their peers in established destinations. A body of theory and evidence characteristics has linked conservative political alignments and lower levels of education to skepticism about immigration. Because they are drawn disproportionately from the most recent entry cohorts, immigrant populations in the new immigrant destinations have higher proportions of Latin Americans and lower proportions of naturalized citizens, relative to those in established immigrant destinations. These characteristics, too, may raise the potential for friction with natives. Geographic dispersal has altered diverse elements of the immigrant-native encounter, with implications that are explored in the following chapters.

In the second chapter, my coauthor and I examine individuals’ opinions about immigration, comparing a new immigrant destination (Chatham County, NC) with a community that did not receive immigration (Person County, NC). Our goal in comparing these two communities was to generate insights about how and why individual residents of the new immigrant destinations might have changed their opinions about immigration as the local immigrant population grows. Respondents in Chatham County expressed more favorable opinions about immigration than respondents in Person County. There was thus no sign that the growth of the foreign-born population in Chatham County had caused residents there to broadly view immigration more skeptically. More sustained contacts with immigrants in social life and the workplace were associated with more favorable opinions of immigration, but these contacts do not seem to explain why Chatham County residents had more favorable opinions than their peers in Person County. Instead, this gap in opinions was mostly explained by the Chatham County respondents’ higher levels of educational attainment and more liberal political attitudes.

There were some signs that the growth of the local immigrant population may have altered the opinions natives hold about immigration. Identifying as politically liberal (as opposed to moderate) was more strongly associated with favorable views of immigration for Chatham County respondents than for Person County respondents. Similarly, anxiety about one’s economic situation was much more strongly associated with unfavorable views of immigration among respondents in the new immigrant destination
than among residents of the non-immigration county. We cautiously interpret this cross-sectional comparison of the two counties as suggesting that growth of the local immigrant population may have distanced liberals and moderates in terms of their opinions about immigrants and may have led residents who were feeling economically threatened to grow more skeptical of immigration.

In the third chapter I asked whether geographic dispersal of the foreign-born population had promoted policy actions by localities to deter immigration. I found that about 215 localities considered and 156 localities passed policies intended to control immigration between 2000 and 2009. The growth of the local foreign-born population between 1990 and 2007 was a strong predictor of whether a locality considered an anti-immigration policy, but I also found that this association was moderated by other variables. The association between changes in foreign-born population share and risk of an anti-immigration policy proposal was stronger in localities where the electorate was more conservative and that were located outside of a traditional immigrant gateway state, relative to more liberal communities and those located in the traditional states. In simulations, geographic dispersal of the foreign-born population explains about half of these policy proposals, because it both increased the number of localities that had growing foreign-born populations and caused foreign-born populations to grow faster in more conservative communities and communities located outside of the traditional immigrant gateway states.

Having established a likely link between foreign-born population dispersal and local anti-immigration policies, I then examine whether these policies are in turn shaping the future distribution of the immigrant and Hispanic populations. In the final chapter, I test whether local anti-immigration policies slow Hispanic population growth, taking into account the effects of local employment conditions. Case studies have suggested that these policies have resulted in substantial decreases in the local foreign-born and Hispanic populations, but have been unable to disentangle the effects of the policies from those of economic conditions. I find that the year-to-year change in the proportion of primary and secondary school students who were Hispanic was not affected after local governments considered an anti-immigration policy, or after they enacted laws other than 287(g) agreements. Immigration enforcement agreements under the federal-local 287(g) immigration enforcement program did appear to slow the growth of the Hispanic student population, but only two years after the policies were implemented, and only when the local unemployment rate had recently increased.
Implications and directions for future research

Some findings of this dissertation contradict the hypothesis that the growth of the foreign-born population in new immigrant destinations has provoked a powerful policy backlash. Residents of one such locale expressed more favorable opinions about immigration than their peers in a non-immigration community, hardly a sign that immigrant population growth provoked broad feelings of threat or competition. Local anti-immigration policies appear to have been promoted by both growth and dispersal of the foreign-born population, but they remain uncommon even in the new immigrant destinations: Between 2000 and 2009, 11 percent of new immigrant destination counties and 3.5 percent of new immigrant destination Census places with populations over 5,000 persons considered some type of anti-immigration policy. Finally, these policies do not appear to have a powerful effect on population change: Most local anti-immigration policies did not slow Hispanic student population growth and even 287(g) policies did so only under specific circumstances.

Nonetheless, there are signs that geographic dispersal has changed the dynamics of policymaking related to immigration in important ways. Many of these result from the intersection of foreign-born population growth and political beliefs. In two different types of analysis, I find evidence consistent with the general hypothesis that growth of local immigrant populations widens the gap between people of different political orientations in terms of the opinions they hold about immigration. In our study of Chatham and Person County, we found that the difference in opinions about immigration between liberals and moderates was much larger in the county with a substantial, new immigrant population. In Chapter Two, localities with larger shares of Republican votes were far more likely to react to growth of the immigrant population with an anti-immigration policy proposal than were less conservative localities. The hypothesis that growth of the local immigrant population mobilizes support for immigration among liberals or antagonism among conservatives thus finds support in both of these chapters.

The central role of political orientation in my findings provokes additional questions. The mechanisms behind the association between political beliefs and opinions on immigration have not been extensively explored (Pantoja 2006). Is the gulf between Chatham County liberals and conservatives based on differences in individuals’ relative valuations of the principles of law and order or fiscal prudence versus equality, feelings about cultural change and diversity, or other factors? Answering

36 About 2.6 percent of all counties and 1.5 percent of all Census places with populations of more than 5,000 persons considered an anti-immigration policy.
such questions might yield insights about the consequences for localities of regularizing unauthorized immigrants: A regularization program might calm tensions in new immigrant destinations by removing the element of illegality and validating the newcomers’ path toward full participation in the community, but it could also exacerbate friction by encouraging further immigrant settlement in these places or by confirming that immigrants are “here to stay.” Experimental methods such as those used by Brader et al. (2008) provide a promising way to answer questions about the relationship between political beliefs and the way people react to growth of the foreign-born population.

The finding that communities located outside of the traditional gateway states are more likely to react to growth of their foreign-born population with an anti-immigration policy proposal likewise suggests paths for further inquiry. My results say little about why foreign-born population growth might provoke more controversy outside of the gateway states. Are new immigrant destination communities in the traditional gateway states able to draw upon greater social service resources from the state, are their residents and governments simply more familiar with immigration based on the experiences of nearby communities, or are other factors at work?

The connection between the local and state level also raises the point that counties and municipalities are but one level of government where foreign-born population dispersal may be shaping politics and policy. Further research might look at the relationship between foreign-born population growth and state-level policies or voting behavior in the US Congress. In this dissertation, I conduct one of the few analyses of the impact of local anti-immigration policies on subsequent changes in population makeup, but even less is known about the demographic impact of state policies. States such as Arizona, Alabama, and Oklahoma passed laws that were just as aggressive as any of the local policies (Lofstrom, Bohn, and Raphael 2011).

My analyses covered an unusual period in the history of the American economy, including a major recession that began in December of 2007. This context should be kept in mind when considering the implications of my results. As noted above, in Chapter One we found that respondents who both expressed anxiety about their economic situation and lived in the new immigrant destination county had especially unfavorable opinions about immigration. At the time of the survey (before the recent recession), only about 11 percent of respondents in the new immigrant destination county we studied expressed concern about their financial situation. As a result, this strong association had little overall impact on the differential in opinions across the two counties. With the recession, the number of people in Chatham County and many other new immigrant destinations who worry about their financial
situation has undoubtedly increased considerably, possibly making this intersection between economic anxiety and local immigrant population growth much more important in shaping public opinion now and in the future.

The impact of the recession was already discernible in my analysis of the effect of anti-immigration policies on Hispanic student population growth. I found that 287(g) policies had slowed growth of the Hispanic student population, but only in places suffering from increases in unemployment that accompanied the recession. These results demonstrate the importance of considering economic conditions as both a confounding and a moderating variable when evaluating the impact of policy on population changes. This insight adds important context to previous studies that found large impacts of local anti-immigration policies on foreign-born population size and suggests that policymakers should expect the future impacts of such policies to vary with economic conditions (Capps et al. 2011; Guterbock et al. 2010).

The limits of the available demographic data shaped my analyses. The American Community Survey (ACS) provides a unique and powerful tool for exploring local population characteristics. The estimates generated from the ACS are widely used by scholars, policymakers and the media, often uncritically. Like any data source, the ACS has limitations. The precision of ACS estimates in small areas for short time intervals is necessarily limited. Further, the ACS uses mail, phone and in-person surveys. It is conceivable that immigrants, especially unauthorized immigrants, might chose not to participate or selectively change their responses in areas that have implemented an anti-immigration policy. This potential bias in the data is a challenge for studies of state level policies as well (Lofstrom et al. 2011). I dealt with both of these possible limitations in the ACS data by using school records to measure population change, but a study that tests whether immigrants and Hispanics are systematically undercounted in areas affected by an anti-immigration policy would provide a valuable validation of the ACS data for future studies of the impact of immigration-related policies on local populations.

Looking forward

The issues that motivate this dissertation are likely to remain important, irrespective of economic conditions. Despite the slowdown in growth of the national foreign-born population, there is every indication that immigrants continue to settle in the new immigrant destinations and make their way to the new destinations of the future. As the economic conditions improve, the growth rate of the foreign-born population in these areas is likely to increase toward pre-recession levels.
My research implies that as the growth of the foreign-born population in new immigrant destinations recovers, pressure to enact local anti-immigration policies could also resume. Local anti-immigration policies often provoke legal problems, expense, controversy and tensions within the local community. This makes resurgence in their popularity undesirable to most parties: Even proponents of these policies generally argue that they are a last resort local solution to a national problem.

At least three policy measures might address the issues that I find may promote local anti-immigration policies. The first such measure is federal immigration reform. A combination of local foreign-born population growth and political factors appears to promote local anti-immigration policies, as shown by my research and that of others (e.g., Hopkins 2010). The perception that the federal government has lost either the ability or the will to enforce current immigration laws may explain, at least in part, the power of this combination of demography and conservative political orientations highlighted in my research. A realistic and sustainable federal immigration policy might make immigration a less explosive issue locally, for people of all political orientations but perhaps especially for conservatives.

Federal and state support for immigration-related social services such as language learning and translation services in public schools provide a second policy tool that might help relieve tensions in new immigrant destinations. I found that places experiencing growth of their immigrant populations were more likely to consider an anti-immigration policy if they were located outside of a traditional immigrant gateway state. There are numerous differences between the traditional gateway states and the new destination states that could explain this result, but one likely reason is that the gateway states already had relatively well-developed social programs oriented toward the needs of immigrants and their children. In contrast, many of the new immigrant destination states were unprepared to accommodate newcomers. North Carolina’s director of Limited English Proficiency education summed up that state’s process of adjustment: “It took awhile for people to really understand that these children were here to stay, that it was in the best interest of the state to have them educated” (Maguire 2007). Resources to support schools where the population of children from immigrant families is growing might be natural place to start in light of our finding that respondents who were parents of school aged children had especially skeptical opinions about immigration in both of the North Carolina counties we studied. By supporting these and other services, state and federal governments may be able to show citizens of the new immigrant destinations that localities have not been left alone to manage immigration and its

Conclude
consequences. This, in turn, may prevent natives from feeling that immigration will degrade the services that schools and other local public institutions provide to all residents.

A third, more problematic, policy response to local anti-immigration policies is to normalize and regulate local involvement in enforcement of federal immigration law. To some degree, this has already happened: The federal government’s 287(g) program deputizes local police as federal immigration agents, allowing localities to enforce immigration laws. The program thereby avoids Constitutional conflicts and provides some measure of federal oversight. As 287(g) agreements increased in number over the past decade, other types of anti-immigration policies became less common, although I have not established a causal link between the two trends (Chapter 3, Figure 2).

The federal government’s newer Secure Communities program continues this process of involving local police in enforcing federal immigration law. In that program, local agencies submit the fingerprints of all arrestees for screening against federal databases. Immigration and Customs Enforcement can then initiate the detention and removal of unauthorized immigrants and other immigration law violators (US Immigration and Customs Enforcement n.d.). Unlike the 287(g) program, there is no possibility that local police can conduct immigration screenings in the field under Secure Communities. While 287(g) agreements must be initiated by the local agency and covers only a small proportion of local jurisdictions, Secure Communities is meant to include all police agencies nationwide.

Secure Communities is creating a much broader link between federal immigration law and local law enforcement while the benefits and consequences of it predecessor, 287(g), are still not well understood. Studies of a limited number of 287(g) sites have found large subsequent decreases in some foreign-born population groups, but the role of the economy in these decreases is not known. My study of 287(g) sites nationwide found that growth of the Hispanic school-age population slowed only slightly following these policies, and then only when unemployment was increasing. These different results are not necessarily contradictory, but highlight that the impact of 287(g) policies on the size and growth of unauthorized immigrant, authorized immigrant and Hispanic native populations is not conclusively established, and that the role of economic conditions in any such impact on demographic makeup is not fully understood. It is premature to say that involving local law enforcement in immigration enforcement deters the settlement of unauthorized immigrants under all economic conditions. My results cannot exclude the possibility that growth of the authorized immigrant and native Hispanic populations has been modestly decreased by 287(g) agreements, leaving space for charges that such programs have important intimidating effects on legal residents. Localities thus have reason to be

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concerned about Secure Communities, and indeed the leaders of the states of Illinois and Massachusetts and cities such as Boston and San Francisco have unsuccessfully resisted participation in the program (Perez-Brennan 2011).

More broadly, my results in each of these chapters point to the need to incorporate an understanding of the way that growth of the foreign-born populations affects localities (and vice versa) into analyses of immigration policy. Local context appears to play an important role in the way opinions about immigration and policies towards immigrants are formed. It may also affect the way that policies affect immigrant populations. The changing domestic geography of immigrant settlement thus deserves to be regarded as an essential piece of the immigration policy puzzle, for scholars and policymakers alike.
References


Maguire, Marti. 2007. “Schools Bear the Burden of Immigration.” Raleigh News and Observer, February 27.


Appendix A

Types of Anti-immigration Immigration Policies in the US, 2000-2009

US localities pursued a variety of different policies related to immigration between 2000 and 2009. This collection of ordinances and policies can be classified into the following rough categories. In some cases, localities passed ordinances with multiple mandates, placing them in several of these categories.

Official English Ordinances

A number of localities proposed or passed ordinances declaring English to be the official language of government. In some cases, these laws were accompanied by a specific prohibition against providing translations or foreign-language materials. In others, exceptions were made for specific critical services. In most cases, no matter the specific wording, such ordinances have little practical effect: translations are mandated by federal law in many situations. Decisions restricting the use of bilingual education programs in primary schools were not included in this analysis—in some jurisdictions, these bans found extensive support among immigrants and their advocates.

287(g) Agreements

In 2002, the US federal government began implementing a program, authorized by Congress in 1996, to train and deputize state and local police to enforce federal immigration law. The program requires an approval process and a memorandum of understanding between the federal government and the local law enforcement agency. These agreements allow participating local police to independently determine a detainee’s immigration status and, if warranted, initiate the removal process. In some cases, local legislative bodies passed resolutions requesting that their police forces apply for the program; in others, agencies applied on their own initiative.

Other Enforcement Policies

Although a 287(g) agreement allows local police to enforce immigration law independently of US Immigration and customs Enforcement (ICE), local police can work with ICE to enforce immigration law. Thus, a number of localities considered or enacted policies other than 287(g) encouraging the enforcement of immigration law at the local level. A common enforcement tactic is to direct local police to check the immigration status of all of their detainees and report them to ICE.
Employment

Hazleton and a number of other localities considered ordinances that would fine local employers for hiring unauthorized workers, essentially duplicating federal law. In some cases, the ordinance would also give legal workers the right to sue employers. After Hazleton’s ordinance and others were blocked by the courts, localities pursued other strategies. In several cases, localities require business license holders or government contractors to attest that their workers are legal or to participate in the federal e-Verify employee verification program.

Rental Housing

One especially aggressive tactic for restricting the residence of illegal immigrants employed by localities was banning the rental of housing to illegal immigrations. In Hazleton, for example, landlords could be fined up to $500 per day per illegal immigrant resident. Other versions of this tactic required landlords to attest that none of their residents were unauthorized immigrants or to use the federal e-Verify system to verify the status of their tenants. This type of ordinance faced some of the most serious legal challenges.

Services and Benefits

A number of localities considered ordinances restricting county benefits and services from unauthorized immigrants. These ordinances rarely had much impact, as unauthorized immigrants were already largely excluded from federal and state-funded programs administered by localities, and the two services that unauthorized immigrants arguably make the most use of—public primary education and emergency health care—are protected by federal law. This did not stop one locality from attempting to require schoolchildren to provide a social security number to register, in what was viewed as an attempt to intimidate unauthorized immigrants and their children.

Day Laborer Regulations

The gathering of immigrants looking for day labor work at informal or formal hiring sites is a highly visible and often incendiary reminder of immigration in many American communities. A number of communities considered or passed laws prohibiting solicitation of employment on public roadways or otherwise attempted to restrict day laborers.

Other Types
The tactics used by some communities to limit the impacts of immigration defy classification. Pahrump, Nevada passed a law that, among other things, prohibited the flying of any nation’s flag other than that of the United States. In Bogota, New Jersey, the mayor requested the removal of a Spanish-language billboard.

Zoning and Occupancy Laws

Overcrowded housing and large numbers of cars parked on residential streets are complaints frequently voiced about immigrants. Some jurisdictions have responded to this by imposing or strengthening zoning and maximum occupancy laws. These ordinances are not considered in this analysis for methodological reasons described in Chapter 3.