Changing Agrarian Labour Relations after Land Reform in Zimbabwe

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Introduction

The agrarian labour relations generated after the ‘Fast Track’ Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) tend to be neglected in most literature after 2000. This neglect largely resulted from the dismissal of the redistributive nature of the FTLRP and changing patterns of agricultural production by some studies (see Marongwe 2009; Masiwa and Chipungu 2004; Hellum and Derman 2004; Sachikonye 2004; Davies 2004; Richardson 2005). The distributional outcomes of the FTLRP, which in turn shape a restructured agrarian labour regime, have, however, been acknowledged in a few empirical studies (Moyo et al 2009; Scoones et al 2010).

Most studies analysing agrarian labour relations after 2000 have adopted modernisation perspectives, in which formal wage labour in the capitalist LSCFs is treated as superior to self-employed forms of labour in the ‘backward’ peasant sector (Freund 1984), assuming that returns to wage labour are greater than those of self-employed peasants. The self-employment of peasants is neglected because it also does not fit the formal employment criteria used by neo-classical economists (see Leavy and White 2001). The concern has been on the ‘displacement’ of former farm workers from their LSCF jobs and residency in the farm compounds (see Sachikonye 2003; Hartnack 2005; NRC 2003; Magaramombe 2003; Rutherford 2004).

The former farm workers who lost their jobs, but are still resident in the farm compounds, tend to be addressed as ‘displaced in situ’ (Hartnack 2005; Magaramombe 2010), meaning they are out of ‘work’ regardless of their new
livelihoods in farm and non-farm work. In this respect, the redistribution of LSCFs to peasants is thus equated with the 'end of modernity' (Worby 2003), with unemployment as the sole consequence. On the other hand, the analysis of the physical displacement from the farm compounds does not adequately examine the insecure residential tenure that farm workers faced before 2000. The notion of 'physical displacement' does not acknowledge the extent to which the FTLRP has re-established self-employed peasant jobs that were displaced by colonial land dispossession or investigate whether this change represents losses or gains in the overall scheme of social life.

Moreover, the agency of former farm workers is not examined as they are largely considered as passive victims of violence and/or human rights abuses (narrowly limited to political and civil rights) at the hands of war veterans and peasants during the FTLRP (Hellum and Derman 2004; ZHRF and JAG 2007; JAG/RAU 2008; Ridderboos 2009). The struggles they waged to improve their material conditions, including their alliances with war veterans and peasants in the land occupations (Sadomba 2008), is not assessed. Their mobilisation against land reform by land owners and their trade union, the General Plantation and Agriculture Workers Union of Zimbabwe (GAPWUZ), emphasising job protection rather than a new livelihood after redistribution, is also not considered.

The dynamic process that entailed the FTLRP in terms of the differentiated land acquisitions and allocations over the last decade, alongside changing agrarian (labour) policies, which in turn influenced the agrarian labour relations outcomes, is also not adequately acknowledged in the literature. Indeed, much of the commentaries based on the earlier phases of the land reform did not envisage changes in the outcomes with the continued implementation of the FTLRP and shifting agricultural production conditions (see, for example, Alexander 2003; Sachikonye 2003, 2004; Magaramombe 2003).

The emphasis of most contributions after 2000 on what happened to former farm workers sidelines analysis on what kind of agrarian employment structure is emerging and the social relations of production that this entails.

Agrarian labour relations need to be understood in their historical context and, in former settler colonies such as Zimbabwe, these were based on specific land-labour utilisation relations created by land dispossession. The ownership of land, though not the only decisive factor, is central in the emergence of agrarian labour relations, influencing who sells or hires labour power (see Patnaik 1997; Mafeje 2003; Bernstein 2010; Moyo 2011a). By eschewing the historical evolution of agrarian labour relations, the debate after the FTLRP misses the critical linkage between land and labour relations. Thus the comprehension of the new agrarian
labour relations requires analysis that relates labour utilisation with the new land access patterns, changing land use patterns, land tenure reforms, agricultural resource flows and their effects on different classes and segments of society.

The reversal of the monopoly in land ownership via extensive land redistribution affects agrarian labour relations by generating a new agrarian employment structure in which the political power is diffused amongst a broad base of many smaller capitalist farms and peasants. Furthermore, the state tenures allocated to land beneficiaries through public leases and permits undermine the residential labour tenancy by reducing their authority to compel wage labour in return for residency and, in turn, their control over labour (Moyo 2011a). Land redistribution also provides peasants wider access to means of production for autonomous social reproduction through self-employment.

This chapter examines the transformation of agrarian labour relations after the radical restructuring of agrarian property relations since 2000. It begins with an examination of how colonial land dispossession and policy shifts after 1980 shaped agrarian labour relations in Zimbabwe, which provides the basis for evaluating the changes generated by the FTLRP. It then explores whether a new agrarian labour regime has emerged to replace those that were structured around land alienation, social relations of labour residential tenancy and private property. The different types of farm and non-farm sources of employment that have emerged in relation to the new land use patterns and the social and economic conditions under which this labour is employed are assessed on the basis of detailed empirical studies conducted by the AIAS since 2000 and other secondary sources. The assessments of the struggles being waged by labourers to improve their material conditions precede our conclusions.

Agrarian structure, production and labour relations

The (agrarian) labour relations in Zimbabwe developed from a historical process structured around land alienation and private property during colonial conquest (Arrighi 1970; Clarke 1977). A semi-proletarianised African labour force economically and extra-economically subordinated to labour markets in the European farms, mines and urban industries emerged (Palmer 1977; Maféje 2003). This labour force existed alongside a dispossessed under-employed and unemployed reserve army of labour in Communal Areas governed by customary tenure and reserved for Africans engaging in petty commodity production, mostly via self-employed family labourers (Bush and Cliffe 1984).

In the LSCFs, a master-servant relationship between white farmers and black workers was generated on the basis of a labour residential tenancy and part-time
labour supplies from the Communal Areas (Clarke 1977; Rubert 1997). These exploitative labour relations were institutionalised through various repressive racial legislations such as the *Masters and Servants Act of 1899* that treated black workers as the property of white land owners (Amanor-Wilks 1995). The conditions of agrarian labour prior to 1980 were pathetic, characterised by paltry wages, intimidation of workers, racial abuse, arbitrary dismissals and physical violence (Rubert 1997; Rutherford 2001).

The colonial skewed land redistribution patterns were inherited at independence (see Moyo and Chambati, Chapter 1; Moyo, Chapter 2). However, since the 1950s, farm workers were incorporated into the national labour relations framework that covered the rest of the working class (Kanyenze 2001). This incorporation occurred concurrently with the abolition of the *Masters and Servants Act of 1899*, which governed labour relations in the LSCFs (ibid). The state regulated the labour markets, including the requirement for state consent in worker dismissals and the introduction of minimum wages that increased the real wages of farm workers by over 50 per cent in the early 1980s (Amanor-Wilks 1995). Previously banned trade unionism amongst farm workers and its associated structures such as farm-level workers’ committees also emerged, but their impact on improving the material conditions of workers was limited (Loewenson 1992; Rutherford 2001). In particular, trespass laws restricted trade union access to LSCFs, such that after two decades of independence, only a third of the permanent farm workers were members of the largest farm labour union, GAPWUZ (Kibble and Vanlerberghe 2000).

By 1980, the LSCFs had diversified from the colonial labour-intensive maize/tobacco production systems to include other outputs, utilising high levels of modern technologies (such as hybrid seeds, pesticides and fertilisers) and capital-intensive production systems mainly geared towards exports (Loewenson 1992; Muir 1994). The new outputs included sugar, cotton, wheat, soybeans, coffee, tea, beef and dairy. The diversification of LSCF commodities intensified after ESAP, as they moved away from traditional exports such as cotton to new high-value exports such as horticulture and wildlife ranching, but tobacco was retained as a key export (Amanor-Wilks 1995; Moyo 2000).

The transformation of LSCF agricultural production was also reflected in the growth of agrarian wage employment from 218,817 workers in 1983 to a peak of 334,521 workers in 1996 (CSO 1984; 1997) and by 2000 there were 313,879 workers (CSO 2001). Simultaneously, the structure of the labour force was shifting towards more casualisation of labour, which was less protected by the labour regulations and poorly remunerated, as the share of permanent workers declined from 76 per cent in 1983 to 50 per cent in 1996 (CSO 1998). Women constituted
65 per cent of the total casual LSCF labour force and less than 10 per cent of the permanent employment (Chambati and Moyo 2004). The LSCF labour force was initially dominated by foreign workers brought in from Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia in the 1950s, but over the years their share decreased from over 70 per cent to around 30 per cent by 2000 (Magaramombe 2001), as more locals enlisted in the wage labour market to offset the effects of land alienation.

Most of this LSCF wage farm labour (65 per cent) was concentrated in the Mashonaland Provinces (Central, East and West) located in the high potential agro-ecological regions, whilst Matabeleland North and South and Midlands in the drier regions had the least share and the predominant plantation estates in Manicaland and Masvingo employed 16 per cent and 10 per cent of the workers (CSO 2001).

The ESAP, which encompassed new flexible labour arrangements that largely favoured employers, eroded the earlier gains that accumulated to workers via minimum wages and job protection (UNDP 1999), such that, by 1999, farm wages were only 24 per cent of the rural PDL (Kanyenze 2001). Even the high-income export oriented land use patterns did not result in improved social reproduction of agricultural workers, as the profits benefitted mostly the LSCF land owners (UNDP 1999; Davies 2000). Farm workers supplemented their wages with other income generating activities (e.g., petty trading and gold panning) and petty commodity production on small gardens provided by 20 per cent of LSCFs and in Communal Areas (Vhurumuku et al 1998).

Although social policy shifts after 1980 improved the lot of farm workers, they did not significantly alter agrarian labour relations. The LSCF agricultural workers, who constituted the largest share of formal employment (26 per cent) (CSO 2001), were the least paid amongst the working class (MPSSW 2001; Tandon 2001). The colonial farm compound or labour reserve on the LSCFs persisted as an institution tying residency to employment. Many studies done before the FTLRP have exposed the appalling living conditions (housing, health, education, malnutrition, poverty) of farm workers (see Loewenson 1992; Amanor-Wilks 1995; Tandon 2001; Rutherford 2001). Many white farmers continued to institute some of the elements of the master-servant relationship to repress labour. This approach has been termed ‘domestic government’ (Rutherford 2001). The social and economic conditions of farm workers were out of the public view, as trespass laws restricted access to them, whilst spatial dispersion of the LSCFs made it difficult for trade union organisation (Chambati and Magaramombe 2008). The spatial dispersion of the LSCFs also limited the reach of state labour officials (Loewenson 1992). Moreover, government provided minimal social services to farm workers as they largely considered them the responsibility of farmers (ibid).
In the Communal Areas, agriculture production on small land sizes was the basis of social reproduction, utilising labour-intensive technologies of mainly cheap food crops (dominated by maize) for subsistence and surplus for sale in domestic markets (Muir 1994; Moyo 1995; Mehretu 1994). Agrarian labour in the Communal Areas was mostly provided by self-employed family workers, though hiring wage labour was limited to a few rich households (Adams 1991). These self-employed workers, who were mostly women (Potts 2000; Muchena 1994), accounted for 84 per cent (or 2,018,808 workers) of the total agricultural labour force in Zimbabwe, with the remainder on LSCF employment (CSO 2000). Despite the growth in agricultural production and productivity (maize and cotton) in the Communal Areas after 1980, the declining farm sizes and land quality caused by demographic growth meant that many could not meet their social reproduction needs (Moyo 1995). Agricultural productivity declined from the 1990s as the state reduced input subsidies, forcing many households into cheap wage labour (Oni 1997). By 1999, migrants constituted around 30 per cent of the LSCF workers (Sachikonye 2003). Deepening poverty, growing landlessness and the massive retrenchment of urban workers after ESAP fuelled demands for land redistribution by 1997 (Moyo 2000; Moyo and Yeros 2005).

The Communal Areas were, in fact, socially differentiated. There were households that commanded more land, superior land quality in prime agro-ecological regions and/or better access to economic and social resources than others. These households hired wage labour and performed better in agricultural production (see Adams 1991; Cousins 1992; Moyo 1995). However, the social reproduction of most self-employed and LSCF agrarian wage labour was fragile and these households could not meet their basic food and social requirements.

**New agrarian labour relations after land reform**

*Restructuring of agrarian labour relations*

The transformation of agrarian labour relations during the FTLRP was not a one-off event, but a dynamic process that was shaped, since 2000, by differentiated land acquisition and redistribution and by changing agrarian policies. Moyo periodised the FTLRP into four distinct phases (see Table 2.1, Periodisation of the FTLRP 2000-2012, Chapter 2). These four phases of land reform also entailed various changes in agrarian (labour) policies (Table 5.1). The land reform policy did not initially adequately address what would happen to the former farm workers who were employed and resident on the LSCF private properties under insecure tenure. Numerous policy measures were, however, instituted...
to address their needs over the course of the last decade. These included the retrenchment and re-employment policy; land access and residential tenancy reforms; amendments of the citizenship laws; repatriation; social services; and wage rates determination policy (Table 5.1). Alongside these, macro-economic conditions and various agricultural and economic policies that shaped the conditions for agricultural production and utilisation of labour also underwent dynamic changes (Table 5.1; see also Moyo and Nyoni, Chapter 6).

**Table 5.1: Changing agrarian (labour) policy regime, 2000-2011**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land Reform Phase (Period)</th>
<th>Key Agrarian Labour Policy Events</th>
<th>Key Agrarian Labour Processes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| March 2000 to June 2001 Revolutionary situation | - Citizenship laws amended | - Migrant citizenship in doubt  
- Land occupiers/LSCFs/farm workers disputes  
- Mass worker evictions  
- Formal job losses  
- Expanded self-employment |
| July 2001 to December 2003 Rationalisation of land reform | - Land access and temporary residence  
- Retrenchment policy  
- Migrant repatriation | - Land allocations to workers  
- Severance packages paid  
- Farm wage disputes/LSCFs monopoly in collective bargaining  
- Wage jobs in A2, more self-employment on A1  
- Non-farm livelihoods  
- Low land utilisation on new farms |
| January 2004 to June 2008 Bureaucratisation of land reform | - Migrant citizenship rights restored  
- Land tenure reforms  
- Inclusion of new farmers in collective bargaining  
- Subsidised farm mechanisation  
- Input and output market price controls  
- State input subsidies  
- Contract farming | - More land allocations to workers  
- Depressed farm wages  
- Shortages of key inputs  
- Food production dominant  
- Limited wage employment capacity  
- Expansion of non-farm livelihoods  
- Labour shortages |
| July 2008 to December 2011 Residual land redistribution | - Multiple foreign currencies introduced  
- Liberalisation of agricultural markets  
- Reduction in state input subsidies - Expansion of contract farming | - Dollarised wage payments  
- Expanded land utilisation  
- Increased availability of inputs  
- Expanded wage employment capacity  
- Diversification of commodities  
- Concentration of labour in contract commodities |

Source: Moyo, Chapter 2 for land reform phases; key labour policy events compiled by author from Chambati and Moyo 2004; Moyo et al 2009; Moyo and Nyoni, Chapter 6.
The transformation of agrarian labour relations after 2000 entailed the expansion of the peasantry and creation of many new smaller capitalist farms that in turn generated various forms of self-employment on farm and non-farm activities and full and part-time farm wage jobs as discussed below. The restructuring also involved the loss of an estimated 200,000 formal farm worker jobs in the acquired LSCFs. These job losses were phased throughout the last decade, but most occurred in the earlier phases of land reform characterised by mass expropriations of LSCFs. An estimated 100,000 farm jobs (of which 50 per cent were part-time) were, however, retained in the LSCFs and plantation estates that were not acquired (also discussed below). Amongst those who lost their jobs, some have been completely displaced from the former LSCFs and others are still resident in the farm compounds. Between 30,000 and 45,000 workers are estimated to have been displaced from the former LSCFs to Communal Areas, towns and informal settlements (Chambati and Moyo 2004; Chambati and Magaramombe 2008). Most of these physical displacements occurred during the early phase of land reform that was characterised by confrontation between land occupiers and farm workers. Some former farm workers have also been reported to have migrated to neighbouring countries to work in their LSCFs, especially in South Africa (Rutherford and Addison 2007) and Mozambique (Hammar et al 2010). However, the extent of former farm worker migration to neighbouring countries is not known in the absence of systematic data collection on this question.

Nationally, it is estimated that over two-thirds of the former farm workers remained on the former LSCF land (Chambati and Moyo 2004; Moyo et al 2009; Magaramombe 2010). Nearly 69 per cent of the former farm workers indicated that the majority of their colleagues were still resident in the compounds (AIAS Farm Worker Survey 2005/06). There were variations in the displacement: For example, in Chiredzi, Chipinge, and Zvimba Districts over 60 per cent of the former farm workers reported that most of their colleagues had stayed put, compared to 29 per cent and 9 per cent in Kwekwe and Mangwe respectively (AIAS Farm Worker Survey 2005/06). Overall, there has been a net gain in livelihoods, as 45,000 farm workers and 4,000 physically displaced farmers have been replaced by 170,000 farm households (see Moyo 2011a) plus new types of employment.

The competing demands for land access during the FTLRP by different classes, including landless peasants, the urban working class, farm workers, semi-proletariats and an emerging middle class bourgeoisie interested in commercial farming, meant that many former farm workers’ preferences for land resettlement
could not be met. Various discourses have been mobilised on whether farm workers were supposed to benefit from the FTLRP land allocations. Some argued for the preferential treatment of farm workers since the redistributed lands were tied to their livelihoods as agrarian labourers (Magaramombe 2003). Others wrongly perceived farm workers as foreigners who could not claim land in Zimbabwe (see Moyo et al 2000). The potential of farm workers as independent producers has also been questioned, as some advocated for their continued role as suppliers of wage labour to the new farms. The perceived political allegiance of farm workers to the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and white farmers (who are viewed as anti-land reform) was also considered as a justification for their exclusion in land allocation (see Chambati 2011a).

The possibilities for farm workers to benefit from land allocation was also limited by their exclusion from the list of targeted land beneficiaries in the FTLRP policy document, which emphasised landless peasants as targeted land beneficiaries, followed by other groups in need of land and offered a 20 per cent quota of all land allocations to liberation war veterans (GoZ 2001).

Former farm workers were thus largely marginalised in allocation of land in the initial phases of the FTLRP, but their position received more attention during the GoZ land audits (Utete 2003) and the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Lands and Agriculture enquiries, as well as in advocacy by NGOs such as the Farm Community Trust of Zimbabwe (FCTZ) and in various academic studies (see Magaramombe 2003; Chambati and Moyo 2003; Sachikonye 2003). Since mid 2002 and in 2003, District Land Committees were enjoined by GoZ officials to increase their allocations of land to former farm workers, including the setting aside of some farms for their resettlement.

In this situation, former farm workers were not completely excluded from land access as some studies suggest (see Alexander 2003; ZHRF and JAG 2007); a few of them were accommodated. Former farm workers constituted only 8.1 per cent of the land beneficiaries (Moyo et al 2009: 22). They explored multiple avenues to gain access to land, including through registration with traditional leaders in Communal Areas, participation in land occupations and official applications with District Land Committees (without revealing their status as former farm workers) (Chambati and Moyo 2004). This form of application was done to evade victimisation and being left out of the resettlement exercise as perceived “anti-land reform” reactionaries and MDC supporters (ibid), as some of their constituencies were mobilised to oppose land reform and land occupations as discussed below. Only 38 of the 70 former farm workers who got land disclosed their status when they registered for land (AIAS Farm Worker Survey 2005/06).
There was variation in the distribution of land to former farm workers during the FTLRP. Chipinge had the highest proportion of former farm workers among land beneficiaries (17.7%), followed by Mangwe (12.4%), whilst they were only 6 per cent and 7 per cent in Kwekwe and Zvimba respectively (Moyo et al 2009). In Chiredzi, they constituted less than one per cent of the land beneficiaries (ibid). Some former farm workers also informally accessed small land pieces (between 0.04 and 2.0 hectares) as detailed below, while others (26.8%) got Communal Area plots (AIAS Farm Workers Survey 2005/06).

The former farm workers remaining in the newly redistributed lands who did not benefit from land allocations continued to sell their labour to farm and non-farm activities, as part of the new agrarian labour regime, alongside some landless people from the Communal Areas. This new agrarian labour regime is centred on the diverse sources of employment in the reformed agrarian structure, comprising the peasantry, small-to-medium capitalists, large capitalists and plantation estates and conservancies.

There exists competition for labour resources amongst a set of activities that include self-employed farming, other petty commodity production (e.g. natural resources exploitation) and hiring out labour to farm jobs. The competition for labour resources is also amongst the different classes in the new agrarian structure. This competition has resulted in shortages of farm labour across all the different farm classes. These shortages were faced by 38.4 per cent of the new land beneficiaries (Figure 5.1), as well as the remaining LSCFs and plantation estates (USAID 2010). The farm labour shortages arise because of the expansion of self-employment amongst the potential agrarian labour force from the Communal Areas, who gained access to land, poor wages and new non-farm job opportunities. Farm labour mobilisation strategies have been transformed as they now often involve more sources beyond the Communal Areas as discussed below.

Extrapolating the district surveys’ farm labour utilisation rates and other secondary information nationally, we estimate that, by 2010, permanent jobs had grown to over 478,013 in comparison to 167,459 jobs in 2000 (Table 5.2).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Farm sector</th>
<th>No. of employers/farms</th>
<th>Average farm size</th>
<th>Average no. of employees per farm</th>
<th>Total number of employees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Permanent</td>
<td>Casual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasantry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communal Areas</td>
<td>1,050,000.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Old resettlement</td>
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<td>49.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>1,125,000.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSSF</td>
<td>8,500.0</td>
<td>165.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSCFs</td>
<td>4,956.0</td>
<td>1,754.0</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>29.7</td>
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<td>Estates</td>
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<td>8.6/2.0</td>
<td>94.0</td>
<td>94.0</td>
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<td>Subtotal</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,138,752.0</td>
<td>165.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasantry</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communal Areas</td>
<td>1,100,000.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old resettlement</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>A1</td>
<td>145,800.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Medium capitalist</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSSF</td>
<td>8,500.0</td>
<td>165.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>na</td>
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<tr>
<td>Small-medium A2</td>
<td>22,700.0</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>17.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>31,200.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large capitalist</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large A2</td>
<td>217.0</td>
<td>508.9</td>
<td>15.0</td>
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<td>LSCFs</td>
<td>577.0</td>
<td>574.0</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>29.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate estates</td>
<td>247.0</td>
<td>605.0</td>
<td>138.5</td>
<td>268.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,353,618.0</td>
<td>6,051.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>17,199.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New jobs created</td>
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</table>

The newly redistributed areas had generated an estimated 679,203 new self-employed farm jobs, representing a ninety-fold growth from the situation in LSCFs in 2000 (Table 5.2). Despite the shortages of labour currently being experienced, the new agrarian labour structure represents an overall growth in agricultural employment (Table 5.2). The structural changes in agrarian labour relations in the four agrarian classes are detailed below.

**Agrarian labour relations in the peasantry**

The expansion of the peasantry after land redistribution has entailed the broadening of self-employed family labour in the agrarian labour structure. Increased land access after the FTLRP to the formerly land short and landless peasants has allowed them to engage in petty commodity production through self-employment of family. On the basis of field and secondary data, an estimated 524,880 new self-employed farm jobs have been added via the A1 resettlement scheme (Table 5.1). New self-employed jobs have also been added to the Communal Areas on lands vacated by FTLRP beneficiaries. Out of 1,158 land beneficiary households from the Communal Areas, 864 of them had given up their landholdings to their extended family relatives (AIAS Household Baseline Survey 2005/06). Cumulatively, the peasantry now accounts for over 2,824,380 self-employed farm jobs, equating to 96.5 per cent of the self-employed farm jobs nationally (Table 5.2).

The use of family labour is most important for the peasantry in the Communal Areas, where up to 90 per cent of the labour for the major field operations is provided by the family (Langyuito 2005). Even in the A1 sector, most of the labour force is composed of self-employed family labour, but provides all the farm labour in only in 26.1 per cent of the households (Moyo et al 2009). Overall, self-employed labour deployed to farming averaged 3.6 persons per household in newly redistributed areas (Table 5.2).

Self-employment also entails the reciprocal exchange of labour amongst farm households. This exchange entails the grouping of family labour from several households to carry out time-sensitive tasks such as weeding on a single plot over an agreed amount of time, which is then reciprocated to all the households participating in the group. Reciprocal labour exchanges were utilised by 20 per cent and 23 per cent of the A1 and A2 households respectively (Moyo et al 2009). This practice is also common in the Communal Areas (see Adams 1991; Muchena 1994).

Based on patriarchal gender relations, women and children continue to provide the bulk of self-employed family labour in the Communal Areas (Paradza 2010;
Mutopo 2011; see also Muchena 1994). However, in the newly redistributed areas, men accounted for 55.0 per cent of the family labour, reflecting the slightly male dominated population in these areas (Moyo et al 2009).

Some of this self-employed family labour is mobile and straddles the newly redistributed areas and the Communal Areas. Over 20 per cent of the beneficiaries that originated from the Communal Areas still practice petty commodity production in these areas (Moyo et al 2009). Family labour is exchanged between the newly redistributed and Communal Areas by these land beneficiaries.

The self-employed workers in the peasantry also hire farm wage labour. The A1 sector employed most of the farm wage jobs amongst the peasantry, amounting to an estimated 145,800 and 860,220 full and part-time wage workers (Table 5.2). In the small A1 farms, 21.3 per cent and 57.1 per cent hired permanent and casual workers respectively (Moyo et al 2009). Overall, 71.6 per cent of the A1 households hired farm wage labour (ibid). Agrarian wage labour markets also continue to exist in Communal Areas. Recent research in Svosve Communal Areas (Goromonzi District) showed that up to a third of the households surveyed by Chimhowu and Woodhouse (2008) were participating in casual agricultural labour markets (see also Paradza 2010).

It is in this context of labour hiring that some peasants also experienced shortages of farm wage labour. In the A1 farms, 38.6 per cent of the land beneficiaries reported facing them (Moyo et al 2009). These shortages were highest in Kwekwe District (36.5%), in the context of competition with gold panning activities, followed by the districts located in the higher potential agro-ecological regions (Zvimba and Goromonzi – around 30%) that hired more wage labour (ibid).

In the Communal Areas, farm labour shortages were experienced as a result of the movement of 10 per cent of the households into the newly redistributed areas and via the economic crisis context that resulted in the outmigration of mostly young people to urban and other areas and even across borders in search of wage employment. Some scholars (Kinsey 2010) have reported declines in average household sizes by as much as 42 per cent between 2001 and 2008 in selected Communal Areas in Mashonaland Central and East and in Manicaland. In a similar vein, field surveys in Mangwe Communal Areas revealed that 20 per cent of the 150 households interviewed had a member who had left for South Africa between 2001 and 2003 (Maphosa 2009). Paradza (2010) also found that non-farm job opportunities created in the former LSCFs such as gold panning were resulting in labour shortages as unemployed school leavers from Goromonzi Communal Areas were flocking to these areas.
Agrarian labour relations in the small-to-medium and large capitalist farms

The small-to-medium and large capitalist farms, dominated by the new A2 land beneficiaries, are defined by the reliance on hired wage labour for their agricultural production activities. Specifically, this sector has diversified the sources of farm wage employment by increasing the potential number of employers from around 4,500 to over 31,000 (Table 5.2). Cumulatively, they employ a total of 211,253 and 424,656 full and part-time farm jobs respectively (Table 5.1). The family labour in the middle and large capitalist farms accounted for only 3.5 per cent of the total self-employment nationally. In contrast, permanent farm wage labour constituted 44.2 per cent of the total, yet they constitute less than 4 per cent of the farm units.

Figure 5.1: Levels of agrarian wage labour hiring

Most of the middle- to- large A2 farms (82.9%) hired in farm wage labour (Moyo et al 2009). Part-time farm workers were hired more often (63.6%) than full-time workers (50.5%) (ibid). Agricultural wage labour was being mobilised in small batches in the downsized farms, as few hired more than 10 workers (Moyo et al 2009), compared to an average of 50 workers engaged in the LSCFs prior to 2000 (CSO 2001). The capitalist A2 farms tended to hire larger amounts of labour in comparison to the small A1 farms (Figure 5.1). Farm wage labour use tended to be higher in the high agro-ecological potential districts of Chipinge, Goromonzi and Zvimba, where over 75 per cent used it, compared to around 60 per cent in the drier Mangwe and Kwekwe Districts (Moyo et al 2009).
The reliance of the new capitalist farms exposes them to shortages of farm labour, which are characteristic of the new agrarian structure. These were faced by 37.4 per cent of the capitalist farms in the newly redistributed areas (Figure 5.2). The capitalist farms located in the higher agro-ecological potential districts that require more labour (such as Goromonzi) had the highest proportion of households (47.6%) that reported facing labour shortages, followed by Kwekwe district (42.5%), which is endowed with high-wage alluvial gold that has been attracting labour. In Chiredzi, Mangwe and Zvimba Districts, farm labour shortages were reported by 31 per cent, 16.7 per cent and 27.8 per cent of capitalist farms surveyed, respectively.

Figure 5.2: Land beneficiaries experiencing farm labour shortages

Thus, the new agrarian employers increasingly have to search for farm labour, unlike in the past when landless people from the Communal Areas would actively seek employment in the LSCFs. Field surveys in Mazowe and Zvimba districts, for instance, showed that some new capitalist farms were trucking unemployed youths from Bindura and Banket towns to work as day casual labourers (Chambati 2009). The recruitment of unemployed urban youths from the nearby high-density suburbs of Epworth and Mabvuku was also observed in Goromonzi District. Former farm workers were employed by 36 per cent of the land beneficiaries (Moyo et al 2009). The employment of former farm workers was higher in Chipinge, Goromonzi and Zvimba districts, which also had a higher concentration of former farm workers before 2000 (ibid). The majority of the former farm workers (76%) who have been re-absorbed into farm employment have been engaged in A2 capitalist farms (AIAS Farm Worker Survey 2005/06), whilst 79 per cent of the A1 farms that hired wage labour engaged new farm workers from communal and urban areas (ibid). Overall, 42 per cent of the land beneficiaries recruited wage labour from the Communal Areas (AIAS Household Baseline Survey 2005/06).
Land and Agrarian Reform in Zimbabwe: Beyond White-Settler Capitalism

Landless relatives from the extended family were also being incorporated into the wage agrarian labour force. This development introduced new forms of social patronage in which work relations are defined by kinship ties between the employer and the employee (Chambati and Moyo 2004). These social patronage labour relations entail qualitatively different social relations than the remnants of the master-servant relationship in LSCFs, as discussed later. The social patronage labour relations were existent in 11.5 per cent and 16 per cent of the A1 and A2 farms respectively (AIAS Household Baseline Survey 2005/06). Children are also being exploited as underpaid farm labourers to reduce the costs of labour and alleviate shortages.10

The gender composition of the labour forces recruited by the new land beneficiaries imitates that of the LSCF, as men still dominate the permanent forms of employment, comprising 70 per cent of the full-time work force, but women’s share has increased significantly to 30 per cent (Moyo et al 2009) from the 10 per cent they occupied in the LSCF sector before 2000 (CSO 2001).

Agrarian labour relations in the plantation estates

As has been noted above (Moyo 2011b; Moyo, Chapter 2), foreign-owned large agro-industrial plantation estates involved in sugar, tea, coffee and timber in the Eastern Highlands and Lowveld were not acquired under the FTLRP. On their expansive land sizes, they still employ large batches of farm labour, estimated at 34,209 and 66,319 full and part-time workers, respectively (Table 5.1). The hired permanent labour in the agro-industrial plantation estates constitutes 7.2 per cent of the total full-time agricultural wage employment nationally. The plantation estates are exclusively reliant on wage labour, some of which still operates under the labour residential tenancy. They command the largest concentration of wage labour per farm unit, averaging in excess of 200 workers per estate (Table 5.1).

A key development in the agrarian labour relations in the plantation estates during the FTLRP has been the shortages of farm labour. Since the plantation estates relied to a large extent on part-time labour from the Communal Areas, particularly during harvesting periods (Mtisi 2003), they also face labour shortages as some of the potential labour force were allocated land during the FTLRP. For instance, Tanganda Tea Company (the largest tea producer in the country) attributed reduced output in 2006 to harvesting labour shortages (USAID 2010). Similar labour shortages were also encountered by sugar plantation estates in the Lowveld (Parliament of Zimbabwe 2006; Scoones et al 2010). The poor wages eroded by inflation after 2000 also forced some
farm labourers in the plantation estates to seek farm work in nearby South African and Mozambican LSCFs (Hammar et al 2010; Rutherford and Addison 2007).

**Non-farm sources of rural employment**

Land redistribution and tenure reforms after 2000 have also opened up self-employment opportunities in natural resources exploitation to land beneficiaries, to those in nearby Communal Areas and to former farm workers. The LSCF freehold property rights excluded other population segments from accessing natural resources through their security protection systems in the form of farm guards and other security people (see Moyo 1995). Land beneficiaries with state tenures are less equipped to exclude others from natural resources on their lands. In Kwekwe District, for example, over 20 per cent of the land beneficiaries confirmed the presence of informal gold miners on their lands (Moyo et al 2009). Land beneficiaries blame former farm workers for the “destruction” of natural resources (Chambati and Moyo 2004). Many former farm workers (81 per cent) confirmed accessing natural resources in new farms (AIAS Farm Worker Survey 2005/06).

About 21 per cent of the former farm workers were involved in the commoditisation of natural resources on a full time basis (AIAS Farm Worker Survey 2005/06). Alluvial mining (especially gold and diamonds) has created an alternative source of income for farm workers and others in various provinces. In Goromonzi and Kwekwe districts, 30.7 per cent and 21 per cent were self-employed in gold panning, while 27 per cent in Chipinge panned for diamonds (ibid). In some instances, these activities have led to the abandonment of FTLRP plots by, for example, 300 former farm workers in Zvimba North (Magaramombe 2003). Firewood sales also represent one of the major sources of non-farm employment as firewood is in high demand, being the major source of energy for 81.3 per cent of the land beneficiaries, as well as for urban dwellers in the context of nation-wide electricity shortages (Moyo et al 2009). Other natural resource extraction livelihoods include fish and thatching grass sales (Chambati 2009), as well as wildlife hunting for meat consumption in the former LSCFs in districts such as Mwenezi (Scoones et al 2010).

New rural jobs also arose out of the demand for housing and other productive infrastructures by land beneficiaries. A wide array of construction jobs and material supplies (bricks, thatching grass and poles) were created as over 73 per cent of the land beneficiaries had constructed homesteads by 2007, whilst other sources of rural construction jobs included storage
facilities (7.3 per cent) and worker housing (8.9%) (Moyo et al 2009). Over 5 per cent of the small A1 land beneficiaries were involved in supplying bricklaying services, whilst 2.1 per cent provided carpentry services (Moyo et al 2009). Farm equipment repairs and services also provided non-farm employment. In Goromonzi District, one A2 farmer who previously worked for an engineering firm prior to 2000 was operating a workshop at his homestead for water pumps and tractor repairs for other land beneficiaries. Such new economic opportunities were also observed in the other districts surveyed (Moyo et al 2009).

Petty trading activities such as the vending of clothes and value-added farm products have also grown as result of the unrestricted movement of people and goods with over 5 per cent of the land beneficiaries involved (ibid). Within the newly redistributed areas surveyed, we found some land beneficiaries involved in the pressing of oil from oilseeds (soybeans and sunflower seeds) and the grinding of groundnuts into peanut butter using hand-operated machines in preparation for sales in the local markets. Others have also taken advantage of the absence of facilities such as retail shops through the operation of small informal shops at their homesteads: they buy daily consumer goods and services such as foodstuffs (salt, cooking oil, sugar, flour, etc.) from nearby urban centres for resale to others. About 5 per cent of the land beneficiaries were found to be involved in these types of activities (AIAS Household Baseline Survey 2005/06).

**Changing agricultural production relations and labour utilisation**

The utilisation of the different forms of labour is differentiated according to the land sizes redistributed, input usage, asset ownership, cropping and livestock production patterns, value of crops produced and farm machinery and equipment resources distribution (Moyo et al 2009; Chambati 2011a; Scoones et al 2010). Agrarian labour utilisation is one of the critical factors in explaining broader social differentiation in newly redistributed areas (Moyo et al 2009). Amongst the peasantry in the A1 sector, 68.7 per cent were low-level labour users who relied mostly on family labour with occasional hiring of part-time workers, while 23 per cent were high-level labour users, hiring over seven full-time workers (Table 5.3). More middle- to-large capitalist A2 farms (38%) were high-level labour users compared to A1 peasantry (23%) (Table 5.3).
Table 5.3: Emergent Structure of Rural Labour in New Resettlement Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of labour use</th>
<th>A1</th>
<th>A2</th>
<th>% Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of HH</td>
<td>of HH</td>
<td>Average labour use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FT&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>PT&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1134</td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td>4.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>5.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1651</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Small farms had higher labour/land ratios (or labour employed per unit of farm area) than the middle- to -large capitalist farmers. As expected, there was a direct relationship between the number of workers hired and the areas cropped (Moyo et al 2009; Chambati 2009). The average labour/land ratios decreased as the farm size increased (Table 5.4). This relationship arises from the existence of labour substituting farm machinery in the larger farms. For instance, among the land beneficiaries owning tractors, 48.3 per cent had farm sizes over 50 hectares, in comparison to 17.0 per cent of the non-tractor owners (AIAS Household Baseline Survey 2005/06). We also saw that tractor owners had a lower number of permanent workers per cropped area of 0.4 in comparison to 0.6 amongst non-tractor owners (AIAS Household Baseline Survey 2005/06). As a result, small farms generate more employment in comparison to the larger farms, which is critical given Zimbabwe's current unemployment problem.

Table 5.4: Labour Intensities by Farm Sizes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Labour type</th>
<th>Farm sizes</th>
<th>1-19</th>
<th>20-49</th>
<th>50-99</th>
<th>100+</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of workers per unit area</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent workers</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casual workers</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family labour</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family + permanent</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>962</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AIAS Household Baseline Survey (2005/06)
Prior to the FTLRP, the LSCFs were the lowest employers of labour per unit of cropped area, which averaged 0.7 workers per cropped hectare, compared to an average of 3.5 and 5 in the old resettlement and SSCF sectors respectively during the 1990s (GoZ 2001). The labour utilisation per unit of cropped area (0.62 workers per cropped area), excluding casual workers, in the newly redistributed areas is slightly less than the combined rates that prevailed in the former LSCF sector (Moyo et al 2009), implying greater capacity for labour absorption in a situation when land utilisation reaches optimal levels.

The socio-economic context during the last decade was also largely influential in determining the trajectory of agricultural production and labour relations. The wider economic crisis, especially between 2004 and 2008, induced production constraints, but land beneficiaries managed to establish farming activities to varying degrees (see Moyo and Nyoni, Chapter 6).

The FTLRP transformed the export-oriented LSCF land use patterns towards food crops such as maize and small grains. However, from around 2008, the re-integration of the country into international capital markets and economic stabilisation through dollarisation has drawn a few larger land beneficiaries who have been able to accumulate capital into production of high value export and cash crops such as tobacco, oilseeds and horticulture (Moyo et al 2009; Scoones et al 2010; Moyo 2011c). Investments into productivity enhancement inputs, irrigation and mechanical equipment such as tractors are relatively higher amongst this group (ibid).

Most of the beneficiaries who had diversified their agricultural production to include other cash/export crops such as tobacco, oilseeds and horticulture tend to have higher proportions of representation in the medium and high level labour users than those focused on food production. For instance, amongst tobacco, oilseed and horticultural producers, over 40 per cent were medium and high-level farm labour employers in comparison to 33.9 per cent of maize-focused producers (AIAS Household Baseline Survey 2005/06). The farm wage labour employed was significantly higher in land beneficiaries involved in tobacco and oilseed production who hired an average of 3.85 and 3.60 permanent workers respectively in comparison to 1.74 workers by food crop producers (AIAS Household Baseline Survey 2005/06).

These farm labour use patterns were also reflected in input usage. The average amount of fertiliser applied to maize production, for example, was highest amongst high level farm labour employers (1,257 kilogrammes per hectare), compared to low level farm labour employers (100.2 kilogrammes per hectare) (AIAS Household Baseline Survey 2005/06). Overall, the expensive
inorganic fertiliser was more commonly used by the medium and high-level farm labour employers than the low-level farm labour employers (ibid).

Access to scarce and/or expensive inputs through contract farming has also been introducing new shifts to agrarian labour relations. Since 2009, there has been an increased promotion of contract farming by merchant capital and agro-industrial processing companies that derive their inputs from agriculture in export crops (cotton and tobacco), oilseeds (soybean) and food crops (sugar beans) (Moyo and Nyoni, Chapter 6; Moyo 2011a). Contract farming, which provides inputs and technical advice on credit in return forcrop sales, lessens farmers’ difficulties in mobilising financial resources in a tight external financing environment.

The tobacco sector specifically registered the largest growth in contract farming (Moyo and Nyoni, Chapter 6; Moyo 2011b). This growth resulted in the concentration of agrarian labour in tobacco production. It is estimated to have employed 112,000 people or 20 per cent of the current formal employment nationally in the 2009/10 season, whereas in 1998 it employed 172,000 people (Price Waterhouse Coopers [PWC] 2010) or 12.7 per cent of the formal employment (CSO 2000). Nevertheless contract farming has entailed the super-exploitation of self-employed agrarian labour through low output prices and overpriced inputs provided by contractors, as well as via poor wages paid to labour hired by the small capitalist farms (Moyo 2011b; Moyo and Nyoni Chapter 4). Moreover, in contract farming, the bulk of the production risks (harvest failure, labour shortages and product quality) were also borne by the peasants and small capitalists (see Oya 2011).

The areas cropped and commodity choices are also influenced by the farm machinery and equipment endowments possessed by households, which in turn affect the demand for farm labour. The farm machinery and equipment endowments such as tractors that allow households to crop more land areas were not accessible to most households. For instance, only 36 per cent of large A2 land beneficiaries had access to a tractor, whilst in the small A1 farms, 52 per cent and 6.2 per cent had access to animal-drawn ploughs and tractors respectively (Moyo et al 2009). Moreover cattle, which provide low cost draught power, were owned by 42.8 per cent of the new land beneficiaries (Moyo et al 2009). The farm mechanisation programme launched by the government in 2003 to address this problem and labour shortages (GoZ 2007) was limited in its reach, as it mostly benefited a few large farmers (World Bank 2006; Chambati 2009).

There was a direct relationship between capital intensity and scale of labour establishment in the newly redistributed areas (Table 5.4). The land
beneficiaries with high capital intensity also tended to be high-level farm labour employers (Table 5.5). The high-level labour users constituted the majority of the households with high capital intensity. These high capital intensity land beneficiaries also tended to have high cropped areas, as 43 per cent of them cropped over 10 hectares in comparison to 11 per cent of the low and medium capital intensity land beneficiaries (AIAS Household Baseline Survey 2005/06). Access to irrigation, which was limited to 16 per cent of the land beneficiaries, was available to more high-level farm employers (19.5 per cent) in comparison to 16.2 per cent and 14.2 per cent of the low-level and medium- level farm labour employers (ibid).

**Table 5.5: Level of labour use vs. capital intensity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Labour Use</th>
<th>Capital Intensity (No. and % of households)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low&quot;</td>
<td>822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium***</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High****</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1202</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AIAS Household Baseline Survey (2005/06).

* Farm machinery and equipment endowments are used as a proxy of capital intensity in newly redistributed areas; ** Low capital intensity do not own any power driven implements and mostly rely on animal drawn implements and hiring in services; *** Medium capital intensity-own at least one of the power driven implements, not including a tractor; **** High capital intensity -own at least three items from a set of power driven equipment that includes tractor.

The agricultural production processes and labour relations are also largely shaped by access to finance by land beneficiaries, which in turn influences the commodity choices, farm machinery and equipment employed and areas cropped. Thus medium to large capitalist farms with access to more finance through personal savings and salaried jobs in the metropolis also tended to be medium and high level employers. Most resources invested in agricultural production were from land beneficiaries’ own finances as credit facilities were limited for most of the last decade (Moyo et al 2009). The low level farm labour employers had the least percentage of land beneficiaries (24%) who had access to income from professional employment, compared to medium level (27.3%) and high level farm employers (37.4%) (AIAS Household Baseline Survey 2005/06).
Even the quality of formal jobs of the land beneficiaries were also differentiated, as the high level farm labour employers (32.1%) had the highest proportion of those in high-paying managerial jobs in the civil and private sectors, followed by the medium-level farm labour employers (26%) (ibid). Of the low-level farm labour employers, 23.6 per cent were employed in managerial jobs (ibid). Furthermore, high-level farm employers had the highest percentage of land beneficiaries (12.7%) who had access to savings and pensions from recent professional employment, compared to 9.5 per cent and 8.6 per cent amongst low and medium-level farm employers respectively (ibid).

The agricultural production processes and labour relations in the retained export oriented plantation estates and the peasantry in the Communal Areas also underwent transformation after 2000. Some agro-industrial estates such as Tanganda Tea Company, invested in mechanical harvesters to supplement hand plucking by human labour (Tanganda Tea Company 2006) and expanded outgrower schemes (The Herald 2006), which entailed the transfer of production risks and/or labour shortages to small producers. Labour exploitation of small tea and sugar producers is also rife through under-grading of output and low prices (Mtisi 2003; Parliament of Zimbabwe 2006). These problems arise from the monopoly control of value chain of plantation crops by the agro-industrial estates (Moyo 2011b).

Alongside labour shortages, after 2000, low international prices for plantation crops such as coffee (USAID 2010; Moyo 2011b) also resulted in the shift to other lucrative crops. An example is that of Tanganda Tea Company, which reduced its coffee hectarage from 5,000 hectares to 3,000 hectares and replaced it with macadamia nuts, which is less labour intensive, yet commanding better international prices (The Daily Mirror 2006). New land beneficiaries in some of the sugar plantation estates acquired during the FTLRP have also been reported to be shifting land use to the less labour-intensive food crops (Scoones et al 2010; Moyo 2011b).

In the Communal Areas, the shortage of critical farming inputs (fertiliser, seeds, agro-chemicals) and the recurrent droughts resulted in the decline in land areas under cultivation (see Moyo and Nyoni, Chapter 6; Paradza 2010). Research conducted in Svosve Communal Areas showed that the land areas under cultivation declined from an average of 1.7 hectares in 1998 to 1.08 hectares in 2005 (Chimhowu and Woodhouse 2008), resulting in under-employment of family labour.
Economic and social conditions of agrarian labour

Land redistribution has altered the ways in which agrarian labourers realise their social reproduction. The diversified farming structure provides the agrarian labour force with broader choices for wage work than before, when the farm wage labour markets were monopolised by a few LSCFs. Agrarian political power has been diffused among many smaller employers. Quite crucially, the new dispensation delinks the employment rights of former farm workers from their land rights.

Nonetheless, the economic crisis during the FTLRP negatively affected farming and its associated returns (Moyo and Nyoni, Chapter 6) and the social reproduction of agrarian labourers. The wages of those in both rural and urban employment were eroded by inflation as the average real earnings index (1990 as the base year) declined from 90.7 in 2000 to 10.0 by 2004 (Kanyenze 2007). New A2 land beneficiaries have been pressing for low farm wages through their respective farming unions in the collective bargaining process. Agrarian wages have been repressed at below 10 per cent of the rural Poverty Datum Line (PDL) (Sachikonye 2003; Magaramombe 2010; Chambati 2011a) during the hyperinflationary period (between 2005 and 2008), such that part of the wages were paid in kind (maize grain, salt, cooking oil and soap). Even after the relative stabilisation of the economy, prevailing farm wages at $30 to $50 still remain way below the monthly rural PDL, estimated at over $300 (ZIMSTAT 2011). Beyond wage payments, other statutory benefits such as leave days and protective clothing are being received by a few farm workers (Parliament of Zimbabwe 2003; Utete 2003). There were, however, cases of non-super-exploitative wage payments, especially among export crop producers such as tobacco, which require specialised skills (Moyo et al 2009; Moyo 2011). The overall result has been under-consumption of basic food and social requirements by landless labourers.

Even with the opening up of diverse sources of farm and non-farm employment opportunities during the FTLRP, the social reproduction of many agrarian labourers was precarious. About 53 per cent of the farm worker households were managing to consume three meals per day (breakfast, lunch and supper) around 2006, whilst 4.3 per cent and 42.6 per cent had one and two meals per day respectively (AIAS Farm Worker Survey 2005/06). This rate of consumption was in contrast to that of land beneficiary households in which over 75 per cent were able to consume three meals per day during the same period (AIAS Household Baseline Survey 2005/06). Moreover, proteins were glaringly missing in farm worker diets dominated by the staple sadza. 

sadza
and vegetables (AIAS Farm Worker Survey 2005/06). Similar to the situation before 2000, malnutrition and food insecurity remain major challenges for farm workers, as noted by 31 per cent of them in the survey. Many farm worker households were not able to send their children to school, as only 22.2 per cent of the school-age children (6 to 18 years) were in school (AIAS Former Farm Worker Survey 2005/06). Most of the youths were employed in the new farms, with 30.9 per cent and 15.8 per cent of them as permanent and casual labour respectively. Land beneficiary households presented a different picture as 77 per cent of the school-age children were in school (AIAS Household Baseline Survey 2005/06).

There were, however, some differences in the social reproduction of agrarian labour between kinship and non-kinship work relations. Although the wages paid in kinship work relations were not significantly different from those paid to non-relatives, in the former case more workers received additional benefits than in the latter (Moyo et al 2009). For instance, 84 per cent of related employees received food rations in comparison with 54 per cent of non-related employees (AIAS Farm Worker Survey 2005/06). This was also reflected in the number of meals consumed in related employee households; 67.3 per cent of these households consumed three meals per day in comparison with 46.4 per cent of non-related employee households. Annual leave was also enjoyed by more kin employees (58.9%) compared to non-related employees (48.9%).

The social reproduction of farm workers is also being affected by the perpetuation of labour tenancy, as the larger-scale land beneficiaries still seek to link residential tenure to employment. On the contrary, government policy allows landless labourers to reside on redistributed lands irrespective of their employment status (Chambati and Moyo 2004). The implementation of this policy was varied across the districts and, in some areas, conflicts have emerged as land beneficiaries seek to evict those workers refusing to work for them. About a third of the former farm workers indicated that insecure access to residency and related land conflicts had been problems for them during the FTLRP (AIAS Farm Worker Survey 2005/06). Some A2 land beneficiaries complain that they incur electricity and water charges on behalf of former farm workers who they do not employ (Utete 2003). While the residential rights of some former farm workers are as insecure as they were before 2000, the state’s user land rights offer land beneficiaries significantly less authority to compel labour to work for low wages, often leading to labour shortages. Moreover, most of the new smaller capitalist farms that were allocated land with the farm compounds cannot absorb all the labour from there. This lack...
of absorption capacity makes it inevitable for some former farm workers to sell their labour elsewhere, de-linked from residency.

Struggles for labour access have, however, ensued among larger land beneficiaries as they seek to compel landless labourers resident in redistributed lands to work for them through the institution of labour tenancy. Some farm workers view the FLTRP as an opportunity to dismantle labour tenancy, even in the face of eviction threats, which 15.8 per cent face (Moyo et al 2009). Other former farm workers also argue that, even if they are not working on the new farms, their residency is justified since they are yet to receive retrenchment packages; only 56 per cent had received part or the full amount promised (AIAS Farm Worker Survey 2005/06).17

The labour tenancy is being prolonged by the recruitment of landless relatives and other new workers. Eighty-four per cent (or 292) of the new farm workers surveyed were resident in the homes provided by their employers (AIAS Farm Worker Survey 2005/06). Of these, 277 new farm workers (including relative-employees) indicated that they stayed there because of their employment. This labour tenancy arrangement is qualitatively different from the overcrowded compound which was located far away from the white farmer’s luxurious mansion,18 as we observed that new farm workers, in most cases, were housed at the land beneficiaries’ homestead and shared several amenities with them, including water, sanitation and energy. Labour tenancy also continues in the remaining plantations and LSCFs, where a range of self-employed family farmers and the remaining landless continue to provide precarious farm labour, with some continuing to reside on such farms under insecure tenure (Moyo 2011b).

Although the data presented above suggests the entrenchment of functional dualism, whereby farm workers continue to subsidise farming for the emergent mid-sized and large capitalist farms through under-consumption of necessary social requirements that cannot be met by the wage incomes (Moyo and Yeros 2007), after 2000 it persists in a different form. The working class or semi-proletariat have increased their bargaining power or ability to withdraw labour from agriculture and sell it elsewhere.

Furthermore, land redistribution, by extending landholdings to the landless and/or land-short peasantry and working classes released them from the economic compulsion to engage in the wage labour markets in the LSCFs, mines and urban industries. However, in the context of the economic crisis during the FTLRP, some small producers who could not mobilise adequate resources to fully utilise their lands also engaged in farm wage labour (see
Table 5.2). This suggests that the semi-proletarianisation process that existed before 2000 with limited access to land (Moyo and Yeros 2005) has been altered as paid work is sought with autonomy of land access.

Land redistribution has also paved the way for non-racial labour relations systems in the new farms. The inhumane treatment that farm workers suffered at the hands of ‘superior’ white farmers (see Amanor-Wilks 1995; Rutherford 2001) declined significantly after 2000. Only 0.8 per cent of the farm workers reported the use of physical beatings by employers in the accomplishment of tasks (AIAS Farm Worker Survey, 2005/06), indicating a shift in some of the struggles farm workers face in improving their material conditions.

**Politics of rural labour after the FTLRP**

In a bid to improve their material conditions, farm labourers are involved in various organised and unorganised struggles. The self-organisation of farm labourers outside of farm-level worker committees prior to the FTLRP was restricted by the labour tenancy system. The former LSCFs maintained a tight grip on workers through their involvement in issues that transcended the employment contract to include resolving marriage and other social disputes in the farm compound (Rutherford 2001). These peculiar relationships in the LSCF were broken down by the FTLRP. Land redistribution and tenure reforms have opened up opportunities for farm workers to organise themselves independently of external agents such as political parties and NGOs, as well as their lead trade unions.

They are involved in the struggle to access land for residency, farming plots and natural resources. During the land occupations around 2000, some former farm workers viewed their future as independent producers and formed alliances with liberation war veterans and peasants in occupying LSCFs (Sadomba 2008). Indeed, 18 of the 70 former farm workers (25.7%) who got access to land participated in the land occupations and got their occupied lands regularised under the FTLRP (AIAS Farm Worker Survey 2005/06). They also asserted their autonomy in the struggle for land through independent land occupations (Musungwa 2001; Sadomba 2008).

Some former farm workers were also mobilised by white farmers and GAPWUZ to defend existing freehold land rights and their jobs and to oppose the new constitution that contained a clause on compulsory LSCF acquisition (Chambati 2009; Sadomba 2008). The alliances forged during the land occupations also tend to define the current relationships between former farm workers and land beneficiaries. Overall, about 18 per cent of the former farm workers reported
being involved in violent confrontations with A1 land beneficiaries over farm compound land rights and natural resource access. These violent confrontations were reported by over 20 per cent in Chiredzi, Goromonzi and Zvimba, where GAPWUZ had a strong membership base and fewer farm workers participated in land occupations, in comparison to less than 7 per cent in the other districts. In Mangwe District, which had the highest proportion of former farm worker participation in the land occupations, only 3.7 per cent reported these violent confrontations (AIAS Farm Worker Survey 2005/06).

Land struggles by farm workers have continued after the land occupations and formal land allocations during the FTLRP. Some landless former farm workers are deploying their agency to informally occupy unutilised lands in the newly redistributed areas. In the areas surveyed, 9.7 per cent of the former farm workers reported that they were practising their own agricultural production in the self-provided lands in the former LSCFs where they resided (AIAS Farm Worker Survey, 2005/06). This is indeed a source of conflict between former farm workers and land beneficiaries. In general, 68 per cent of the farm workers reported that land conflicts in terms of access to residency, farming plots and natural resources for their basic needs were major problems in the newly redistributed areas (ibid). Over 13 per cent of the farm workers interviewed had experienced violence between themselves and the new land beneficiaries, owing to conflicts emanating from the farm workers’ ‘encroachment’ into the boundaries of land beneficiaries by accessing farming plots and natural resources (Moyo et al. 2009).

Former farm workers’ struggles also relate to them being wrongly perceived as ‘foreign’ migrants (Moyo et al. 2000). In fact 26.5 per cent of the former farm workers are descendants of migrant workers who were born in Zimbabwe, while 90.5 per cent were born in Zimbabwe to immigrant parents (AIAS Farm Worker Survey 2005/06). This birth citizenship is recognised by the Citizenship Amendment Act of 2004 that entitles people born in Zimbabwe of Southern African Development Community (SADC) parents to citizenship, although state administrative capacities are weak in offering registration services (Chambati and Moyo 2004). Most of the former farm workers of foreign origin consider themselves de facto citizens of Zimbabwe as only 0.5 per cent stated a preference to return to their countries of origin after the FTLRP (Chambati and Moyo, forthcoming). As of late 2004, the Repatriation Unit of the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare and the International Organisation of Migration (IOM) had not handled any requests from former farm workers for repatriation (Chambati and Moyo 2004).
The organisation of farm workers through external agents such as trade unions and NGOs weakened after 2000. Land redistribution and tenure reforms created opportunities for trade unions to mobilise workers. The state tenures allow farm worker trade unions freer access to wage workers, access that was previously constrained by trespass laws. Their mobilisation base has also been expanded by the growth of farm wage employment after the FTLRP. However, the creation of a multiple range of smaller farms which hire labour in smaller batches has increased the costs of trade unions in mobilising agrarian wage labour. Farm worker trade unions have not taken advantage of these changes as they have been actively involved in MDC opposition politics (see Chambati and Magaramombe 2008; Chambati 2011a). In fact, most of the leadership of the trade unions, including the farm workers’ union, have taken up leadership positions within the MDC structures. The union’s alignment with the MDC hampers its mobilisation efforts as it is treated with suspicion by land beneficiaries.\(^{19}\) The GAPWUZ organising secretary for Kadoma, Chegutu, Mhondoro and Selous was reported in the press complaining that their efforts to represent agrarian labourers were being hampered by accusations of being ‘MDC activists’ (\textit{The Standard} 2011).

As a result, in 2006, few farm workers (4.4 per cent) were aware of the existence of a labour union in their area and only 3 per cent were paid up members of a labour union (AIAS Farm Worker Survey 2005/06). Trade unionism amongst farm workers was more common in Goromonzi (9.6\%) and Chipinge (4\%), compared to less than one per cent in the other districts (ibid). Workers’ committees that handle worker grievances exist on only a few farms, as only 12 per cent of the workers had such structures at their places of employment (AIAS Farm Worker Survey 2005/06). The small-sized labour forces existing in the new farms seem to have also reduced the necessity of such trade union structures.

Although GAPWUZ began up-scaling worker mobilisation from around 2007 (Chambati and Magaramombe 2008), some former farm workers have been expressing reservations about its absence for the most part of the last decade. Indeed, former farm workers at one A2 farm in Zvimba District chased away GAPWUZ officers canvassing for membership as the union had ‘abandoned them in their time of need’ (Chambati 2011b).\(^{20}\)

The absence of trade unions weakens the voice of farm workers seeking the enforcement of their labour rights. Indeed, wage bargaining of farm workers is weak at the National Employment Council for the Agricultural Industry (NECAIZ) level, as land beneficiaries have refused to endorse some collective
bargaining agreements (e.g., July 2003) arguing lack of affordability, with a weak response from GAPWUZ (Chambati and Moyo 2004). At the local level, farm workers have, however, deployed their bargaining power to sell their labour in non-farm jobs. The realisation of farm worker labour and social rights is also negatively affected by the limited presence of state labour officials in the newly redistributed areas (Chambati and Moyo 2004).

Furthermore, a few NGOs still remain working in new farms (e.g., FCTZ, Kunzwana Women’s Association and Farm Orphan Support Trust [FOST]). This number has been reduced from a peak of about twelve in the late 1990s (Chambati and Magaramombe 2008) due to funding constraints (Moyo et al 2009) and state perceptions of them being MDC supporters who utilise welfare projects for political campaigning (Helliker 2008).

Farm workers are increasingly organised independently at the local level in different ways to provide labour services to a range of farmers and others, with the power to withdraw labour. Some formed groups of skilled former farm workers or specialised labour to provide consultancy services to new land beneficiaries as a resistance to the low wages, as they tend to demand higher payment rates than permanent and casual workers. The specialist services being provided by these groups include overall farm planning activities, machinery operations, tobacco operations and livestock disease management and were utilised by 11.2 per cent of the land beneficiaries (AIAS Household Baseline Survey 2005/06). Unskilled former farm workers’ groups also perform general tasks such as weeding, harvesting and stumping and were used by 24.4 per cent of the land beneficiaries (AIAS Household Baseline Survey 2005/06). Beyond farm labour consultancy groups, former farm workers in districts such as Zvimba have also formed groups that harvest thatching grass and firewood for sale.

They are resisting poor conditions of wage employment in the new capitalist farms by diverting their labour resources to non-farm employment, which offers higher wage rates as noted earlier. Rural labour struggles also entail ‘the often invisible day-to-day acts of resistance’ (Scott 1985, cited in Jha 1996: 132), such as frequent absenteeism from work by farm labourers. Some A2 farmers in Zvimba District complained that former farm workers had the habit of missing work on the pretext of being sick, yet in reality they would be using that time to do non-farm employment activities such as fishing in the nearby Darwendale Dam (Chambati 2011b). Former farm workers are thus engaged in wider autonomous struggles to improve their material conditions and social reproduction.
Conclusion

The FTLRP introduced a new broad agrarian labour regime characterised by expanded self-employment in farm and non-farm jobs amongst small land owners, but farm wage labour is hired in a differentiated pattern in the middle to- large capitalist farms. This system replaced the predominantly wage labour system monopolised by a few LSCFs. The land allocations received under the FTLRP provide autonomy in social reproduction for the peasantry and have relieved their pressure to engage in cheap farm labour markets.

The state’s user land rights have undermined the control agrarian employers have over workers and the degree to which they can compel them to work in return for residential rights as was the case in LSCF private properties. The exploitation of farm workers via labour residential tenancy, however, persists in the plantation estates and LSCFs that were not acquired. The political power conferred by land ownership is now diffused amongst many smaller farmers who compete for labour, while de-racialisation of the agrarian labour relations has diluted remnants of the master-servant relationship of the past. This transformation has opened up the opportunities for farm labourers to engage in a variety of struggles to improve their material conditions.

Although functional dualism persists in the new agrarian structure, the semi-proletarianisation process resulting from landlessness and land shortages before the FTLRP has been altered. The freeing of labour from residential tenancy tied to provision of farm labour means that farm workers can sell their labour in competing non-farm jobs. Farm workers resist poor working conditions in the farms through self-organisation in autonomous groups to provide high-wage demand-driven consultancy services to land beneficiaries.

Nevertheless, many agrarian labourers remain unable to meet the costs of social reproduction. For the social relations of agrarian labour to be fully equitable, there is a need to further redistribute land to former farm workers and clarify their tenure security, as well as for the state and NGOs to step up the provision of social services, the enforcement of labour rights and the implementation of agrarian labour quality and skills development programmes.
Notes

1. The analysis of job losses tends to be treated in an undifferentiated manner, i.e., whether they were full or part time.
2. The form of labour tenancy existing in Southern Africa does not entail rental payments, but the residential rights of “labour tenants” in the farm compounds were tied to the labour supply (see Neocosmos 1993).
3. The white farmers resolved disputes internally and transcended the employment contract by resolving marriage and other social disputes in the farm compound (Rutherford 2001). Many used violence in labour management (Kanyenze 2001).
4. By 1995, 62 per cent of the national population were poor, the majority of whom resided in the communal areas, where 80 per cent of the people were poor in comparison to 46% in urban areas (GoZ 1998).
5. Most former farm workers (73%) preferred land resettlement under the FTLRP to re-employment, repatriation and relocation (GoZ/IOM 2004).
6. Peter Gambara, then Director in the Vice President’s Office, as quoted in the Daily Mirror, 4 May 2006 (Magaramombe 2010).
7. In Masvingo Province, they were 7 per cent of the land beneficiaries (Scoones et al 2010). The farm worker land allocations are also presented as a proportion of former farm workers as group. The GoZ/IOM (2004) estimates that 15 per cent of the former farm workers got land.
8. Similar findings were also reported in Masvingo Province, which had about 14.8 per cent of the land beneficiaries as former farm workers (Scoones et al 2010).
9. Land preparation, planting, weeding, fertilisation, harvesting and threshing.
10. A tragedy in 2004 in Bindura exposed the growth of child labour when a lorry carrying farm workers from work overturned, killing 22 people. The survivors included children aged between 13 and 18 years old (Independent Catholic News 2004).
11. Less than a third of the original LSCFs that were surveyed had a farm store (Moyo et al 2009).
12. By 2006, less than 10 per cent of the new land beneficiaries had accessed external finance through mostly the resource-constrained state input programmes (Moyo et al 2009; see also Moyo and Nyoni, Chapter 6).
13. The expansion of outgrower schemes was also influenced by government calls to un acquired large plantation estates to promote new land beneficiaries allocated land in some of the acquired plantation estates (Moyo 2011b).
14. The monthly rural PDL in Zimbabwe is overestimated in comparison to
the World Bank international poverty line of $1.25 per person per day
which translates to $225 per month for a family of six.
15. Thick porridge made from maize meal.
16. The High Court of Zimbabwe has heard several eviction cases of former
farm workers (Chambati and Magaramombe 2008).
17. Permanent workers losing their jobs were entitled to retrenchment packages
deducted from the LSCF compensation for land improvements (Statutory
Instrument No. 6 of 2002). However, disagreements on the compensation
process and delays in the legal aspects of land acquisition meant that few
LSCFs had been valued (Moyo et al 2009).
18. Between 1996 and 2000, 30 per cent of the funds invested in housing in
the LSCFs were for farmers when they constituted only 0.2% per cent of the
population and 70 per cent was devoted to the 2,000,000 people that
included farm workers and their families (CSO 2001).
19. Various senior MDC officials (including its president, Morgan Tsvangirai)
have threatened to reverse the land redistribution programme on
assumption of power (Moyo and Yeros 2009).
20. Field interview with farm worker, Zvimba District, 23 November 2011.

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