Land Reform and Redistribution in Zimbabwe Since 1980

Sam Moyo

Introduction

Although it is increasingly recognised that Zimbabwe’s Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP), initiated in 2000, was redistributive (Moyo et al. 2009; Scoones et al. 2010), few studies have examined the qualitative character of this outcome and its prospects for progressive social and political transformation in a largely agrarian society. Most critics of the FTLRP (e.g., Cliffe et al. 2011) continue to underplay the significance of the settler-colonial roots of Zimbabwe’s land question and its exacerbation under neoliberal rule after independence, in fomenting the social and political crisis which provoked the popular reclamation of land (see Moyo and Yeros 2005, 2007a) and in shaping the transformational character of the FTLRP (Moyo 2011a, 2011c). Focusing on the narrowly defined ‘human rights transgressions’ that accompanied the FTLRP, using abstracted neoliberal good governance norms, the critics miss the important role that broad-based social mobilisation played in shaping state action towards accommodating a wide array of land demands.

Land reform was meant to redress historical settler-colonial land dispossession and the related racial and foreign domination, as well as the class-based agrarian inequalities which minority rule promoted. Post-independence land reforms sought to alter the resultant repressive social
relations of production and reproduction, through broadening access to land and promoting peasant productivity. Implicitly, land reform would free labour from the exploitative tenancy relationship used by large-scale farmers to compel the landless to work for low wages. Local government reforms were instituted to undo the territorial, administrative and social segregation of Communal Areas from former Large-Scale Commercial Farming areas, free the movement of people, goods and services and consummate local and national sovereignty over alienated territory in a unitary system of government (Mtizwa-Mangiza 1991). By eliminating the enclaves of unequal political power and economic domination, land reform would also promote democratic land administration (Shivji et al 1998).

Land reform policy in Zimbabwe was implemented in three phases characterised by critical shifts in economic policy and performance and by changes in the electoral political circumstances. Between 1980 and 1989, land reform was based on state-led purchases of land on the market and its allocation to selected beneficiaries, in the context of heterodox economic policies, which enabled increased public spending on social services and peasant agriculture. From 1990, neoliberal policies restricted state interventions in markets, in general and restricted social welfare subsidies. Furthermore, land redistribution slowed down, despite the adoption of land expropriation laws. In the third phase, an escalating social crisis, which culminated in extreme political polarisation by 1997, saw the land redistribution programme shift towards land expropriation, leading to extensive land redistribution and increased state interventions in the economy, alongside bitterly contested elections.

Initially the Government of Zimbabwe’s (GoZ) land reform was narrowly conceived to address displacement, landlessness and ‘overcrowding’. From 1985, a wider range of indigenous classes of people agitated for access to land (Moyo 1995) and land reform policy gradually accommodated middle-class demands for land (GoZ 1998). Official land reform programmes were always accompanied by varying degrees of popular (‘illegal’) land occupations throughout the countryside (Moyo 2001; Tshuma 1997). The state repressed these from 1985 (Herbst 1990), despite their being encouraged by some political party and state officials and by war veterans (Moyo 2001). In 2000, however, it condoned the nationally coordinated land occupations led by war veterans. The post-colonial political dynamics of class formation, including the resuscitation of the peasantry and the rise of an aspirant petty-bourgeoisie, in the face of the consolidation of settler and foreign capital, alongside the demise of working classes, animated land reform policy shifts.
Dominant discourses on land reform in Zimbabwe, from 1980, tended to argue against large-scale land redistribution on the grounds that it would disrupt agricultural productivity, while assuming that peasant agriculture was unproductive (Whitesun Foundation 1983), despite the extensive under-utilisation of land among Large-Scale ‘Commercial’ Farmers (LSCF) (Weiner et al 1985). Economic policy emphasised industrial development and urban employment within a minimalist rural development strategy which promoted agricultural productivity through improving peasant markets (World Bank, 1982; GoZ 1986; Moyo 1986). Land redistribution was gradually considered relevant only to competent black farmers, notwithstanding the wider livelihood requirements of smallholder farmers (Moyo 2000). When the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) was adopted in 1990, the land policy was re-oriented to support export led agricultural growth, based mainly on large-scale farming (Moyo 2000), while the building of domestic grain reserves for food security was discouraged (Moyo 2011d).

During the 1990s, however, political demands to de-racialise large-scale commercial farming to achieve equitable capitalist opportunity and political stability increasingly shaped policy (GoZ 1998). The critique against land reform soon turned to the alleged prevalence of elite capture in the programme, contrary to the evidence from official evaluations of the resettlement programme (Cusworth and Walker 1988). Donor- led land reform prescription soon emphasised poverty reduction and sustainable livelihoods approaches which ‘make markets work for the poor’ (DFID 1997 [2000]). Thus, when the FTLRP was initiated, some scholars considered it unwarranted, allegedly because it pursued the partisan political and land interests of ZANU-PF elites, whose ‘nationalism’ and legitimacy needed refuelling (Raftopoulos 2003).

The underlying assumption of this critique is that the FTLRP land occupations and state land expropriations and allocations were centrally controlled by ZANU-PF and state functionaries, who are perceived to be a monolithic political entity representing mainly petty-bourgeois interests. Local social forces and diverse class interests were allegedly not active in the politics and implementation of the FTLRP (see Sadomba and Masuko, Chapters 3 and 4 for alternative views). Instead, the whole land reform was deemed a ‘chaotic and often violent’, ‘racially motivated land seizure’ and ‘politically vindictive land grab’, which violated the legitimate land rights of white farmers (see Willems 2005). Putatively, the FTLRP only benefited President Mugabe’s cronies and destroyed agriculture (Bond 2005), while the statutory land user rights provided to the beneficiaries by the state are allegedly insecure,
leading to ubiquitous land disputes (Vudzijena 2007). Agricultural land has apparently been transformed into ‘dead capital’ (Mhishi 2007: 9; Richardson 2005; Robertson 2011), limiting the supply of credit. Without empirical substantiation, the critics vilified the entire land movement (Johnson 2009).

Consequently, white farmers have demanded that either their land be returned to them or they be compensated for the land at ‘market rates’. It is claimed, furthermore, that the land tenure of FTLRP beneficiaries cannot be secure without such compensation, while the recovery of agricultural investment and re-engagement with and funding from donors can only occur when the ‘contested land’ is resolved (see JAG 2006). This perspective eschews the demands for the restitution of indigenous land rights in relation to colonial loss, contemporary social needs and the direct action to be taken by various classes to repossess land (Hunzvi 2000), despite the state support they received. Not surprisingly, the scope of land redistribution has been understated even if it is now grudgingly recognised (see Cliffe et al 2011).

This chapter explores the social and structural distributional outcomes of the FTLRP based on extensive empirical research (see Chapter 1 on the sources used). It first summarises the evolution of land reform policy before and after the FTLRP, touching briefly on the social forces which mobilised for the radical reform (as elaborated upon by Sadomba and Masuko, Chapters 3 and 4). It then examines the extent to which the programme was redistributive and elaborates on the social transformations it evoked in terms of race, gender and other forms of identity and the recognition this purveys. The chapter finally assesses the class formation processes emerging from the new land ownership structure, briefly noting the changing agrarian land-labour relations (for details on labour relations see Chambati, Chapter 5). This chapter is also intended to set the stage for later assessments of the wider agrarian changes that have ensued.

**Market-based land reform and its contradictions**

The use of the market mechanism to redistribute land from 1980 to 1999 meant that landowners defined the land available for resettlement and central government reactively chose the land to acquire. The UK government contributed matching funds for ‘resettlement’ during the 1980s, within the logic of an ‘aid’ project, rather than as reparations for colonial land losses. This approach limited the amount, quality and location of the land acquired in relation to social needs and organised demand (Moyo 1995). Land prices rose in response to the growth of both private and public demand for land in the markets. Notably, some of
the acquired land had been ‘illegally’ occupied by peasants, in the ‘Accelerated
Land Resettlement Programme’ (see Tshuma 1997), setting a precedence of
‘regularising’ popularly occupied land, although, from 1984, ‘squatters’ were
often violently evicted by the police and white farmers.

Constitutional restrictions on land expropriation were partially removed
in 1990 and the Land Acquisition Act (1992, Chapter 20: 10) enabled the
state to expropriate land for redistribution, although this was sparingly used
between 1993 and 1997, partly due to successful litigation by landowners
(Moyo 1999). While land reform had not fully challenged the legitimacy of
exclusive private freehold property, which was generally regarded as a legally
superior form of land tenure compared to customary land rights (Shivji et al
1998), the state allocated permissory land rights and tradable leasehold rights
to the beneficiaries of land reform.

By 1999, approximately 3.4 million hectares had been redistributed,
reducing the white commercial farming area to 11 million hectares, or
approximately 35 per cent of the total agricultural land, most of which was
‘prime’ land. About 70,000 families were resettled, far short of the official
targeted 162,000 families and others on official ‘waiting lists’ for land (Moyo
1999). The beneficiaries mainly included ‘the landless, poor and overcrowded
rural people’, various ‘disadvantaged groups’ and some ‘competent’ farmers
(Moyo 1995). By 1990, black professionals, entrepreneurs and political elites
had also gained a limited amount of private and state-acquired land through
the Commercial Farm Settlement Scheme (Moyo 1999). The extension of
peasant farming on marginal grazing lands and increased ‘squatting’ stretched
local government regulatory capacities, while rural social differentiation
deepened (Moyo 2000).

Meanwhile, the adoption of the ESAP in 1990 led, not only to the slowing
down of land redistribution, but to the expansion of land markets to foreigners
and aspiring black commercial farmers, leading to increased private land
subdivisions and consolidations (see Rugube et al 2003). Land concentration
and foreign land ownership escalated, including in regions previously regarded
as agro-ecologically marginal (Moyo 2000). The acquisition by blacks of
large-scale farms grew to about 15 per cent of the LSCF areas. Intra-capitalist
competition for land escalated through the ‘indigenisation’ ideology, while
some blacks were co-opted by capital into large-scale farming.

The ESAP also had the effect of increasing the scale and sources of demand
for land. Labour retrenchments led to increased illegal occupations of farming
land (see Yeros 2002). Increased demographic pressure in Communal Areas
fuelled more organised land occupations and natural resource poaching (Moyo 2000). In 1997, war veterans agitated for increased pensions and militantly demanded that President Mugabe and the state ‘get on’ with land expropriation. The state designated 4.1 million hectares for compulsory acquisition in 1997 and, in 1998, land ‘invasions’ by war veterans backed this policy (see Sadomba, Chapter 3). Thus, the structural and social contradictions of the ESAP and limited land redistribution fuelled the mobilisation of radical land reclamation movements, which influenced state expropriation, while most formal civil society organisations stood aside (Moyo 2001).

The radicalisation of the official land reform policy was also stoked by disagreements between the GoZ and the UK government over financing land acquisition, with the latter denying any colonial obligation (Short 1997). The Land Donors Conference of 1998 mobilised donors around a poverty-oriented land reform programme which prescribed limited and gradual land redistribution using ‘market-assisted’ approaches, rather than land expropriation (World Bank 1999). Also from 1999, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) ‘suddenly’ created an externally-funded political opposition party (the Movement for Democratic Change), which was allied to various western-funded NGOs and the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) and which exposed radical land reform. Political polarisation spiked over constitutional reform, pitting the ZANU-PF alliance against the MDC alliance over presidential powers and land expropriations, with the CFU playing a critical role in mobilising farm workers against the Draft Constitution.

These events dovetailed into wider political developments, surrounding campaigns for the Referendum on the Draft Constitution in February 2000, the mass occupations of land led by war veterans from March 2000 and the parliamentary election campaign of June 2000. External relations with the West deteriorated as its support for the political opposition grew and economic sanctions were escalated, allegedly in response to state-sponsored violence and abrogation of the rule of law.

The Fast Track Land Redistribution Policy and its implementation

Implementing the FTLRP entailed numerous actions phased over the decade, involving ‘illegal land occupation’ and formal state expropriations in relation to the changing balance of forces, pitting increasing popular demand for land against landowner litigations (see Table 2.1). The first phase of the FTLRP was dominated by extensive popular and ‘illegal’ land occupations and the
mass designation of over 3,000 farm properties for expropriation. In March 2001, a law was enacted to protect ‘illegal occupiers’ on the farms from a barrage of litigations by white farmers and from a Constitutional judgement requiring the restoration of land to farmers. Land occupations initially entailed both violence in the takeover of land and negotiations over its sharing (‘co-existence’) between occupiers and white farmers.

The state gradually gained control over the land reform process from the ‘illegal occupiers’ through creating District Land Committees (DLCs), which involved the government bureaucracy, security agents, ZANU-PF members, war veterans and other social formations (chiefs, farmers associations, etc). The formal FTLRP policy document was issued in April 2001 (GoZ 2001). From late 2000, the FTLRP was increasingly dominated by formal land allocations to the ‘illegal occupiers’ and many others who applied for land through the DLCs (see Moyo 2005). This change entailed adjustments to the numbers of people accommodated and the sizes of their plots allocated, as well as converting some A1 allocations to A2 allocations. In April 2001, the white farmers negotiated the transfer of one million hectares under the proposed Zimbabwe Joint Resettlement Initiative (ZIJRI 2001), but the deal collapsed over various disagreements. By 2004, the bureaucracy had formalised two FTLRP land allocation schemes (A1 and A2),4 initiated various land law reforms and recomposed the judiciary to facilitate expropriations and thwart landowner litigation. Land allocations by 2002 accommodated more of the petty-bourgeoisie. Surges of land allocations were, however, also shaped by the political mobilisation that accompanied the various elections and the related escalation of western sanctions from 2001, as dirigiste economic policies were instituted.
Table 2.1: Periodisation of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme 2000-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land Reform Phase (Period)</th>
<th>Key Political and Economic Events</th>
<th>Key Land Policy Events</th>
<th>Key Land Transfer Processes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 2000 to June 2001</td>
<td>-Feb 2000 Referendum</td>
<td>-Constitutional Judgment</td>
<td>-Popular occupations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary situation</td>
<td>-Mass land occupations</td>
<td>-FTLRP policy paper</td>
<td>-Mass A1 allocations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Parliamentary election</td>
<td>-Land Occupiers Act</td>
<td>-Mass expropriations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Judicial reforms</td>
<td>-DLCs established</td>
<td>-Mass land litigations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-ZIJRI negotiation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2001 to December 2003</td>
<td>-Heterodoxy policy</td>
<td>-Land audits</td>
<td>-A2 allocations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rationalisation of land reform</td>
<td>-Sanctions escalated</td>
<td>-A2 scheme designed</td>
<td>-A1/A2 land disputes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Presidential election</td>
<td>-'Corrections' exercise</td>
<td>-Expanded A1 allocations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2004 to June 2008</td>
<td>Deep economic crisis</td>
<td>-Expropriation laws</td>
<td>-A2 allocations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucratisation of land reform</td>
<td>-Parliamentary elections</td>
<td>-'Re-planning' processes</td>
<td>-A1 allocations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Unified elections (2008)</td>
<td>-Leases designed</td>
<td>-Estates contested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual land redistribution</td>
<td>-Economic liberalisation</td>
<td>-Leases negotiated</td>
<td>-Conservancies indigenised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-New sanctions</td>
<td></td>
<td>-Some land occupiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Indigenisation policy</td>
<td></td>
<td>accommodated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-New foreign investment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by author (see Moyo 2011d, 2007)
From mid-2001 to 2003, the second phase of the FTLRP entailed a re-design of the A2 scheme, which by 2003 had allocated 8,000 plots to beneficiaries (Utete 2003). The District Land Committees increasingly sidelined war veterans in the formal land transfer process (see Sadomba 2008), while illegal land occupations were sporadic and less formally condoned. The GoZ also sought to rationalise the FTLRP process by instituting two land audits and embarking on a ‘correction’ exercise (Buka 2002; Utete 2003). A third phase of the FTLRP saw both A1 and A2 land allocations increase twice above the original target of redistributing 5 million hectares. This increase constituted a response to mobilisations for land around the 2002 presidential election. By 2008, the A2 land allocations had surpassed 16,000 beneficiaries.

By mid-2008, when political accommodation and compromise over economic liberalisation were reached, the land allocations had tapered off. This fourth phase of the FTLRP entailed residual land allocations, including that of more A2 plots.

The FTLRP allocation process was not free of corruption. In particular, the A2 scheme entailed jumping application queues to gain better capitalised plots (e.g., with irrigation facilities) and ‘whole farms’ and unsubstantiated plans to justify access to larger-sized plots, using ‘pseudo-legal’ administrative loopholes. Some individuals corruptly gained access to multiple farms, while others got plots which are above the recommended A2 farm size, although their area represents a relatively small proportion of the overall redistributed lands (Buka 2002; Utete 2003). Some political elites, state officials and private citizens with connections gained temporary, but free, use of underutilised state farms and some of the state acquired, but unallocated, lands (e.g., for seasonal cropping, grazing). Some land beneficiaries ‘grabbed’ the moveable properties of the former farmers using ‘illegal’ means.5

However, below 20 per cent of the A1 land beneficiaries secured land through ‘illegal occupations’ and these were later ‘regularised’ by the GoZ (see Moyo et al 2009). The rest had applied for the land through various formal channels. Beyond the ‘official’ land beneficiaries, many people used ‘informal’ methods to gain access to sub-plots from official beneficiaries, who ‘shared’ their land with relatives, friends and neighbours, or even rented land out to tenants (Moyo et al 2009: 34). Thus, contrary to common assumptions about the FTLRP land beneficiaries, many more than the officially recognised beneficiaries were resettled formally and informally.
FTLRP policy contradictions and adjustments

The FTLRP land acquisition and allocation policy and its implementation procedures often seemed inconsistent. Agro-industrial estates were not subdivided despite persistent demand for their land, while the share of A2 land allocations rose beyond expectation. The pace and regional distribution of land transfers was unevenly spread out over the decade, as a result of provincially differentiated mobilisations of the land occupations and formal expropriation. Provincial land reform managers often weighed local economic imperatives against social pressures for land and protected some white farmers to sustain local supplies (e.g., of milk) and jobs. Moreover, the demand for A2 land grew as the economic crisis escalated and certainty over the veracity of the FTLRP process grew among the middle classes. This demand led to various adjustments to the acquisition and allocation policy to accommodate expansive claims and their belated expression.

Moreover, land acquisition was actively opposed by white farmers in the courts on the ground, often involving some farm workers and at times the bribing of officials to stall land expropriations. Approximately 700 white farmers had successfully negotiated for their land not to be expropriated by 2007, but this was whittled down to 300 by 2010 as demand persisted. Meanwhile, the political opposition and some NGOs consistently vilified the FTLRP process, leading to escalating animosities. High profile media vilification and incessant litigation often sparked emotional and precipitous seizures of some LSCF farms.6

The key dilemma facing the policy elites by 2002 was that over 50,000 people had applied for A2 plots and only 8,000 had been offered land by 2003 (Utere 2003), while some within ZANU-PF and FTLRP critics insisted that the A2 scheme should only allocate land to people ‘with means’. Few A2 applicants could prove they had investible resources. Some applicants felt excluded, alleging this was because they lacked connections to power and indeed such corruption did occur. Many simply lacked the resources and patience to persistently bid for land as officials faced land expropriation bottlenecks (Interviews: Centenary 20057). When the 99-year lease document was first issued in 2006, only some with ‘whole farms’ got leases, ostensibly because these did not require survey and as the FTLRP process faced legal bottlenecks to confirm the state’s ownership of expropriated lands. This disparity caused widespread disaffection and pressures for land allocations.

However, the main FTLRP implementation contradictions and policy ambiguities revolved around the bi-modal land and agrarian reform strategy, which, although formally adopted in 1990, was only implemented more
generally from 2001, when the A2 scheme began. Therefore, class-based differentiation in access to redistributed land arose *a priori* from the deliberate policy design of addressing landlessness and racial imbalances in agrarian capitalist accumulation (i.e., ‘black empowerment’). Initially, the policy had proposed to allocate 20 per cent or one million hectares of the targeted land to A2 farmers on a sliding scale depending on agro-ecological potential, while expecting most wealthy blacks to buy farms on the market (GoZ 1998). This scheme was intended to create medium-scale black ‘commercial’ farmers, who would pay progressive land taxes and lease fees charged according to the farm infrastructures availed with the land, hence the ideal of selecting those ‘with means’. This secondary redistribution mechanism was never fully levied on A2 farmers, who pleaded poverty. By 2010, the A2 farmers had been allocated close to 40 per cent of the redistributed land, with over 20,000 having benefited compared to over 150,000 A1 beneficiaries (GoZ MLRR 2010).

During 2001, the A2 maximum farm size policy was adjusted to cater for three categories of A2 beneficiaries: small-scale (averaging 50 hectares in natural regions 1 and 2), medium-scale (averaging 200 to 600 hectares in natural region 3) and large-scale A2 farms (averaging 1,000 hectares in natural regions 4 and 5) (GoZ 2001). In order to accommodate demand, however, most of the A2 allocations were within the set maximum sizes, with the majority getting less than 100 hectares each. About 3,000 A2 farmers got more than 300 hectares each (see Table 2.1 and Figure 2.2), ostensibly because the terrain, soils and agro-ecological potential were poor (Sukume and Moyo 2003). Influence played a critical role in the selection of the beneficiaries on some of the A2 and A1 farms.

Zimbabwe’s land reform policy was always ambiguous about the redistribution of agro-industrial estates, wildlife conservancies and forest plantations. The FTLRP was silent about creating new privately or publicly owned estates. Since some estates were not located ‘near congested communal areas’, partly because they had been established in remote and previously ‘uninhabitable’ areas and were buffered by white outgrower farms, they were less accessible to ‘illegal’ land occupations. However, most of the estate land acquisitions were more reactive to popular land occupations than state-planned. Until 2002, there was also official prevarication over the expropriation of foreign-owned farms covered by Bilateral Investment Protection and Promotion Agreements (BIPPAs), although many of them were eventually redistributed because they had been extensively occupied illegally. The logic of ‘economies of scale’ was mainly used by policymakers to justify retaining estates, alleging their superior (micro-economic) efficiency
compared to small farms (see Sukume and Moyo 2003; Moyo 2011b). The agro-industrial estates were also considered critical to export, employment and agro-industrial growth by the state (GoZ 1998; Utete 2003).

From 2001, the GoZ was discouraging ‘illegal settlements’ in the estates and conservancies which it had not already expropriated, despite such lands being recommended for expropriation by provincial authorities. At the beginning of 2003, government officials and ‘stakeholders’ proposed FTLRP policies for forest estates and wildlife conservancies (GoZ 2004). These policies sought to redistribute shareholdings to black investors (‘indigenisation’), rather than subdividing the lands and thereby to ‘save’ employment-intensive and specialised farms which produced ‘strategic’ needs (e.g., seed, citrus, dairy and timber). This step formalised the 1998 decision to limit the expropriation of estates (Moyo 1999). Thus, many estates which had been listed for expropriation during the FTLRP, including those ‘illegally’ occupied, were not appropriated by the state until 2008. While 39 middle-class people got shares in the seven conservancies during 2010, the equity share-holdings of agro-industrial estates were being negotiated by 2011. Following social pressures for such shares to be more broadly distributed, ‘Community Equity Share Trusts’ were being negotiated in 2011, as was being done for large mines.

Another contentious aspect of the FTLRP policy concerned the limited allocations of land to farm workers. By 2010, they comprised below 10 per cent of the official beneficiaries (see Chambati, Chapter 5). In fact, many farm workers were not merely victims of the FTLRP but active agents who sought land through land occupations (Sadomba 2008), applying for land in local official channels, refusing to vacate farm compounds and ‘squatting’ on redistributed lands (AIAS 2007). Moreover, many farm workers were also mobilised against the land acquisitions by white farmers. However, by 2001 the GoZ policy was only able to prevent A2 farmers from evicting them from farm compounds and compelling such residents to provide labour, partially undermining the erstwhile farm labour-tenancy relationship. This was too late for about 45,000 former farm workers who had been physically displaced (Chambati and Magaramombe 2008). By 2004, however, the GoZ was encouraging A1 and A2 farmers to provide former farm workers with small ‘subsistence plots’ of about one acre per family (ibid), while in A1 areas this had happened, oblivious of official policy.

This policy contradiction essentially reflected the evolving class contest between farm workers and the new A2 capitalist employers. However, farm workers were also being mobilised by the competing political parties for votes. This constituency had tended to be influenced by the white farmers
during the constitutional referendum and elections until 2002, as many farm workers were isolated in the LSCF compounds and did not have adequate social networks and political connections to the Communal Areas.

Persistent landlessness, however, also led to popular challenges of the official attempts to stabilise the FTLRP process and to normalise relations with capital. The retention of large-scale farms and agro-estates was met with active resistance by poor rural people, former farm workers, provincial elites and some land allocation officials (see Moyo 2011b). Land concentration was seen as continuing to exclude landless people and elites who aspired to gain land, while the economic crisis led various social forces in different localities to lobby for more land redistribution, leading to belated sub-divisions of parts of the estates which were ‘illegally settled’. Some local authorities ‘formally allocated’ estate land to ‘beneficiaries’, contradicting the central government’s evolving investment policy, while mobilising local grievances over foreign land ownership and exclusion (Moyo 2011b). The Development Trust of Zimbabwe (DTZ), whose 386,000 hectares were spared from expropriation because it is owned by indigenous people, remained ‘illegally occupied’ for a while, until the central government ‘mediated’ the dispute, leading the DTZ to cede over 60,000 hectares to settlers (GoZ 2009).

The Forest-Based Land Reform Policy of 2004, however, sustained its moratorium on ‘illegal’ land occupations of the state-owned Forest Commission of Zimbabwe (FCZ) and actually evicted occupiers. Similarly, most of the conservancies were still occupied by peasants by 2009 and they resisted government evictions, as also occurred in public parks such as Gonarezhou Park in southeast Zimbabwe (GoZ 2009). Local and central government officials were soon at loggerheads over plans to redistribute shareholdings under the Indigenisation Policy. Another dispute also arose between the GoZ and some former landowners over the ownership of wildlife itself, with the latter claiming compensation for them as private property (if their land was expropriated), while state officials considered them and other natural resources on LSCFs as public property (GoZ 2004).

By 2011, the policy conflict over agro-estates and conservancies reflected an intra-elite class struggle for access to shares coloured by ethno-regional sentiment (see Moyo 2011b), while the landless people who occupied them illegally were often pawns in such struggles. Moreover, the scale of publicly-owned agro-industrial estates which was retained was extensive enough to deprive many landless people of access to land and autonomous ‘livelihoods’. The distributive value of retaining parastatal estates only began to materialise
in 2011, when the foreign and domestic partnership over the ARDA estates started producing ethanol in Chisumbanje (Moyo 2011b), while promoting irrigated outgrower plots among neighbouring Communal Area families.

Much of the critique of the FTLRP land allocation process correctly identifies the government’s failure to eradicate some multiple farm holdings and to sufficiently include former farmer workers, but it has failed to comprehend the complexities of its implementation. Few protested the limited redistribution of remaining estates and conservancies, although more recently there has arisen a correct query over the allocation of conservancy shareholdings, mainly to a few elites. However, the dominant narrative on the FTLRP has not been adequately informed by empirical data to comment substantively on its varied redistributive qualities.

Land redistribution and the reformation of property rights

An extensive land redistribution outcome

Of the 15 million hectares of land which in 1980 were controlled by about 6,000 white farmers, over 13 million had by 2009 been formally transferred to over 240,000 families of largely rural origin with widely differentiated landholding sizes within the A1 and A2 land redistribution schemes in various agro-ecological regions and provinces (Moyo et al 2009; Sukume and Moyo 2003). The FTLRP phase alone officially benefited 168,671 families on 9.2 million hectares, while we estimate that at least 20 per cent more families out of the official beneficiary families also have access to the redistributed land (Moyo 2011a).

Those families which acquired land through the A1 scheme hold an average 20 hectares of land each, including access to common grazing areas, while the peasantry now holds 70 per cent of all the agricultural land. The A1 allocations averaged 5 hectares of arable land in the wetter regions and 10 arable hectares in the drier regions, while access to grazing land per beneficiary varies between 7 and 60 hectares in wetter regions and 20 to 200 hectares in the drier areas. By 2010, the FTLRP had benefited over 22,000 new small-scale, medium-scale and large-scale capitalists with relatively larger plots averaging about 100 hectares under the A2 scheme and these beneficiaries grew in number from about 8,000 and 16,000 families in 2003 and 2008 respectively. While the white outgrowers around the sugar, coffee, tea and forestry agro-industrial areas were eliminated, redistribution substantially increased the number of smaller black outgrowers.
Table 2.2: Structure of agricultural landholdings and farms, 1980 to 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Farm categories</th>
<th>Farms/households (000's)</th>
<th>Area held (000 ha)</th>
<th>Average Farm size (ha)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasantry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communal</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>1,050</td>
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<tr>
<td>Old resettlement</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A1</td>
<td>145.8</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>1,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle farms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old SSCF</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small A2</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large farms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large A2</td>
<td>0.217</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black LSCF</td>
<td>0.956</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White LSCF</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
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<td>0.8</td>
<td>4.956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agro-Estates</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.049</td>
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<tr>
<td>Parastatal</td>
<td>0.126</td>
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<td>0.126</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conservancy</td>
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<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Institution</td>
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<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>0.296</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>714.2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,138.8</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Sources: Compiled by S. Moyo and N. Nyoni from Moyo and Yeros (2005), GoZ MLRR (2009), GoZ 2009 data. Total hectarages do not tally due to rounding off, while some agricultural land is now urban residential and there is some missing data.
Over 18 per cent of Zimbabwe’s 39 million hectares of land (including parks and forests) remained as state land. There was a decrease in agricultural land area owned by the state farming agency (ARDA) from 121,964 hectares to 115,601 hectares, despite the increase in its farms from 19 in 1999 to 24 in 2010. The area of large agro-industrial estates also declined marginally (Table 2.2). This persistent land concentration means control of water, wildlife and woodlands resources is also concentrated, ostensibly to preserve large-scale, specialised and integrated enterprises, to meet the state’s agro-industrial development agenda (Moyo 2011b).

Nonetheless, about 13 per cent of Zimbabwe’s entire agricultural land is now held by a range of middle-scale farmers (on A2 and Small-Scale Commercial Farms [SSCF]), while over 82 per cent is held by small farm producers (in the Communal Areas, in A1 areas and in informal settlements) and below 5 per cent is held by large farms and estates. This state of affairs stands in stark contrast to the pre-1980 and pre-1999 situations, when agricultural lands were predominantly held by the LSCFs and large agro-industrial estates, leading to the formation of a new tri-modal agrarian structure (see Chapter 6).

The FTLRP’s redistribution process has led to a ‘net transfer of wealth and power’ from a racial minority of landed persons to various classes of black people, including mostly the previously landless and land-poor classes and a substantial number of low-income wage-earning and unemployed workers, as well as various categories of the petty-bourgeoisie. Most of the beneficiaries of FTLRP came from rural areas, being largely peasants from the Communal Areas, with a few coming from the farm worker populations in LSCF areas (Moyo et al 2009), while about 25 per cent of them were from urban areas (Moyo et al 2009). The latter settled mainly in peri-urban areas, reflecting the social pressure for land among lower-income working peoples and the organised demands of the petty-bourgeoisie. Fewer than 25 per cent of beneficiaries continued to be formally employed, largely in urban areas, while over 70 per cent of the land beneficiaries were unemployed people mainly from rural areas. These findings confirm the shift towards increased urban demand for land in the context of declining formal employment and wages under structural adjustment in the 1990s (Moyo 2000; Yeros 2002), as well as in response to the deepening economic crises during the 2000s.

Since the FTLRP did not redistribute most private and public estate lands, popular demand for such land has been widespread, with the GoZ reporting that over 100,000 people were still on its waiting lists for land redistribution (GoZ MLRR 2010). In addition to this pressure, unfulfilled demand for
residential land in urban and rural areas, including among agricultural workers, is extensive. Persistent land concentration and class-based differentiation in access to land has generated a variety of new land struggles (as elaborated upon below and in Chapter 6).

Reformation of agricultural property rights and land tenure relations

The land tenure system was reformed by extinguishing most private property rights in agricultural land and broadening the effective occupation and use or ownership of the redistributed land through socially differentiated forms of land tenure provided to the A1 and A2 land beneficiaries. The latter get 99-year lease contracts providing land use rights to individual landholders. The A1 beneficiaries, on the other hand, receive statutory permits to occupy and use land in perpetuity as a family land right, which includes sub-plots to establish a homestead and for cropping and access to grazing woodlands used communally by a number of families.

The A1 permit provides similar forms of land rights to those provided under the ‘customary tenure’ system in Zimbabwe’s Communal Areas, but their legal status differs as the state directly owns such land and controls the land allocation process using criteria which transcend those defined by memberships to given ‘communities’, despite the involvement of traditional leaders in nominating some of the land beneficiaries. The A1 land tenure relationship is thus a vertical legal and social relationship between the state and the families, which is complemented by elements of customary land administration practise, including empowering traditional leaders to enforce compliance with recommended land use and the management of natural resources and adjudication over land disputes, such as inheritance. However, the land permit tenure provided to resettlement beneficiaries before 2000 tended to have limited legal enforceability with regard to intra-family land rights at succession and, in particular, women’s land rights were considered weak and open to abuse (Shivji et al 1998; Tshuma 1997).

It has recently been argued that the A1 land tenure conditions are insecure because they can easily be evicted by the state and they face numerous land disputes (World Bank 2009). In practise, around 20 per cent of the A1 and A2 farmers reported facing tenure insecurities, especially during the early years of the FTLRP when the GoZ was ‘re-planning’ the land allocations and evicting or relocating some ‘unlawful occupiers’, including converting some A1 landholdings into A2 schemes. Existent land conflicts were focused on disputes over boundaries, competing claims to land allocations, the rights
to use common natural resources and over access to ‘inherited’ on-farm infrastructures. Competing claims over allocation were more common in the peri-urban and higher potential agro-ecological districts. Neighbours, local authorities and former land owners were the key sources of such conflicts (Moyo et al 2009). These conflicts reflect the GoZ’s land administration deficiencies, rather than the form of land tenure per se.

By 2006, about 16 per cent of the beneficiaries had been threatened with eviction once or more, particularly among the A1 families in better agro-ecological potential regions and peri-urban districts such as Goromonzi, where 31 per cent of the beneficiaries had faced eviction (Moyo et al 2009). Most eviction threats were, however, successfully resisted. But about 9 per cent of the land beneficiaries said they kept Communal Area homes because they feared eviction at some future point (Moyo et al 2009; Scoones et al 2010). Altogether, a minority (17 per cent) of the beneficiaries felt that their current forms of land tenure were too vague and that they needed formal documents to secure their rights. About 21 per cent of the beneficiaries reported encountering problems with access to credit because they did not have adequate land tenure documents and the majority of these were A2 landholders (Moyo et al 2009).

Permissory and customary tenures in A1 and Communal Areas, respectively, continue to be contested by some formal civil society actors (see Zimbabwe Institute 2007) and international agencies (UNDP 2008), who advocate for the greater individuation and tradability of land rights, ostensibly to enable their use as collateral for credit. About 30 per cent of the A1 beneficiaries represent a new generation of farmers. These farmers have, on average, higher levels of education, formal work experience and urban connections when compared to the rest of the peasantry. They demand more formal land rights, a limited role for traditional leaders in land administration and specified land inheritance procedures (Mhondoro Field discussions°). The extension of traditional leadership into newly redistributed areas has heightened such concerns, despite the fact that these new land user rights are derived from the state and not through custom. The GoZ argues against land tradability for fear of renewed land concentration, while the administrative requirements of registering the permit tenure is considered beyond its current capacity (Midzi and Jowa 2007).

The A2 scheme land beneficiaries received land ‘offer letters’, mostly as individuals rather than as married couples and these are expected to receive leasehold contracts (Utete 2003) which are legally recognised as a record of their ‘real land use right’. By 2010, hardly 1,000 A2 farmers had received the lease
contracts (Midzi and Jowa 2007). The lease covenants require beneficiaries to institute basic farm developments, minimum land utilisation and recommended natural resource management practices, as was the case with pre-2000 leases. Until 2009, the lease had required the beneficiaries to allocate 20 per cent of their land to growing food grains or to sell 20 per cent of their cattle to a parastatal agency (the Cold Storage Commission), but this was resisted by new landholders and eventually abandoned. The lessees are expected to pay rental fees, but the state has not been collecting these because beneficiaries resisted it, claiming that it is not affordable, while many refused to ‘pay for repossessed land’. Failure to enforce this redistribution mechanism represents an inequity which is only recently being addressed through the introduction of a land tax (GoZ, MoF 2009 Finance Bill).

Some have argued that the main source of land tenure insecurity concerning the A2 leasehold is the limited land administration capacity to sustain effective land records, land registration and to survey subdivisions, as this weak capacity limits the enforceability of A2 land rights (Midzi and Jowa 2007). Some consider the slow issuance of leases to reflect the reluctance of the GoZ to secure lease tenure so as to retain political influence over the beneficiaries in line with prevalent neopatrimonialist perspectives (see Zimbabwe Institute 2007). Others perceive the Minister’s powers to repossess and/or cancel the lease within only 90 days of notice to reflect ‘autocracy’ (Vudzijena 2007). This perspective is substantiated by an alleged limited scope to appeal against such decisions because of lack of an ‘independent appeal system’. Yet the lease is subject to Zimbabwe’s contract law and appellate courts. These courts have heard some cases in favour of landholders, although the appeal process is cumbersome and costly to the complainants.

Formal debates on the A2 lease mainly involve the elites, including farmers, bankers, government officials, consultants, donors and cabinet ministers. The primary disagreement has concerned whether the lease should be ‘tradable’ and land markets reintroduced, leaving the state with the residual role of regulating land markets and the judiciary to adjudicate disputes (see Mhishi 2007; UNDP 2008). This perspective on land ‘tenure security’ is informed by the belief that land collateral is the only instrument that can be used or is required to borrow from private banks, since banks putatively only recognise tradable land rights as ‘security’. Thus an open land market is considered necessary to manage loan defaults (Mhishi 2007). Others favour tradability because it allows farmers who want to ‘exit’ to sell their fixed investments (Hungwe 20069), or that land markets will remove the unproductive and speculative
lease holders and promote investment and productivity (e.g. Sukume 2007; Vudzijena 2007). Others have proposed a gradual movement towards land markets through providing tradable lease holdings with an option to buy the land after some years (Zimbabwe Institute 2007). The UNDP had also proposed that the permisssory and customary tenures be converted to tradable lease holdings with an option to buy (UNDP 2008).

The social and economic cost-benefits of these proposals have hardly been studied in light of contrary international evidence (see Migot-Adholla 1994). The GoZ leans towards a regulated land lease market which prohibits the sales of leases to multiple landholders and foreigners, rather than an open land market (GoZ 2009). Moreover, retention of existing land laws which provide government the right of first refusal in all agricultural land sales enables the GoZ to restrict the scope of 'buyers' and prevent land concentration, if it so wishes.

But the agricultural land tenure policy remains inconsistent because some freehold agricultural land tenures continue to exist in Zimbabwe on a few large-scale farms and agro-industrial estates which were not acquired by the state. It is estimated that about 1,000 black and white landowners still held such titles as of 2010 (GoZ, Ministry of Land, Land Reform and Resettlement 2010). Conservancies have been converted into 25-year leases, now involving new black beneficiaries as shareholders. The remaining white-owned farms continue to be subjected to state acquisitions for redistribution. More recently, most of the agro-estates were acquired by the state and leased back to the existing operators, who are required to off-load shares to indigenous persons. The operators are required to cede 51 per cent of their shareholding equity to indigenous persons.

Private, but informal, land rental markets, which involve about 25 per cent of the land beneficiaries, also shape the existing agricultural landed property rights as the practise has not been vigorously policed. Meanwhile, some public estates are being leased on unclear terms to tenant graziers, including to displaced corporate farming entities, former white farmers and some elite black cattle owners (GoZ, MLRR 2010).

Thus, Zimbabwe's land reform programme, following the Fast Track Land Reform process, has led to land redistribution to twice as many beneficiary families as had been planned in the early 1980s. This increase has substantially reduced the overall scale of land concentration and expanded the numbers of those involved in farming, despite the retention of agro-industrial estates and conservancies. This outcome has reconfigured the fundamental basis of settler-colonial agrarian relations, including racial discrimination and foreign
domination in the control of land and consequently of labour relations. Private property rights and markets in agricultural land were substantially extinguished in favour of state-allocated land user rights, although advocacy for the commodification of land through freehold tenure, tradable leases and land rental markets has been growing, especially among the middle class farmers and capital. Whereas class-based struggles over land ownership and labour remain central to on-going agrarian change, racial relations of land ownership were largely redressed, as were a wider range of socio-political and cultural relations in society, as we discuss next.

Identity and nationality issues emerging from the FTLRP process

The FTLRP redistribution also restructured a wide range of social relations of agrarian production and social reproduction, which had been constructed over 120 years of colonial and post-independence rule. Restructuring was accomplished by broadening social access to land and socialising the land tenure system, through expanding the public property regime, while retaining customary land tenures. Redistribution reversed racial patterns of land ownership, broadened the ethno-regional distribution of land and marginally altered gender relations of access to land, as we elaborate on below (Moyo 2011a). Redistribution also unravelled the unequal political and racial power relations and the related labour agrarian relations associated with inequitable control over the labour of landless people, while reversing the territorial segregation which had resulted from monopolistic control over large tracts of land and natural resources by a few landowners. This process has broadened access to various natural resources connected to land control such as water, indigenous forest and wildlife, which, for many people, has reinforced their spiritual connections to nature and their history, as embedded in the indigenous land tenure.

These changes represent social, cultural and symbolic progress on the steep and long road to social and structural transformation. However, the land redistribution process did not reverse all the regressive social and agrarian relations, especially those evoked by patriarchal hierarchy and unequal power relations, such that land access biases against women, youth and perceived immigrants persist. There are also notable degrees of exclusion from access to land based on ethno-regional and nationality difference, although we contend that new forms of class difference in land ownership pervade most of the inequalities in land ownership and labour relations which obtain today and struggle over the unequal distribution of agrarian surpluses continues on a qualitatively altered plane (see Chambati 2011, Chapter 5).
Race dimensions of the land redistribution

The racial and foreign nationality dimensions of land ownership animated most of the social struggles embedded in the informal and formal politics of the land redistribution process, given the settler-colonial legacy of dispossession. The mobilisation of demands for access to land were often structured on the basis of indigeneity and, within provinces, struggles for access to land were often mobilised around ethno-regional identity and ‘belonging’. Consequently, the relatively limited amount of land allocated to former white farmers has raised questions concerning whether the land reform was racially discriminating against white citizens, as some former white farmers have argued in courts and at the SADC tribunal. Indeed, it appears that the state recognises ‘indigeneity’ to Zimbabwe in a narrow sense, with some ‘coloureds’ arguing that they did not benefit sufficiently from the FTLRP. Some critics of the FTLRP even suggest that this outcome has limited the citizenship rights of white farmers (Hammar and Raftopolous 2003).

By 2007, about 725 white farmers were still holding over one million hectares throughout the eight provinces (GoZ, MLRR statistics). Many of these white farmers held relatively large landholdings in the drier southern provinces (Midlands, Matabeleland and Masvingo), as well as in one high rainfall province (Mashonaland East). More than 12 per cent of these farms were over 2,000 hectares in size, with only 295 of them holding below 500 hectares each. At the end of 2007, white farmers comprised about 4 per cent of the new large ‘commercial’ farming sector. Following the former farmers litigation at the SADC tribunal in 2007, in a context of the election campaigns of 2008, many of these farms, including those of the litigants, were expropriated. By the end of 2011, around 300 white farmers were still on some farms.

The white population is today (2011) below 75,000 or below half a per cent of the total population. The remaining white farmers constitute about 6 per cent of the new 3,000 large-scale farms, or 0.9 per cent of the 22,000 A2 farmers. This figure excludes the mainly foreign white-owned large agro-industrial corporations which hold large areas. As such, white representation is, in crude terms, proportionate, although more white farmers could have been retained on the basis of their farming skills and experience. It can hardly be argued that land ownership is racially inequitable. The FTLRP has led, instead, to a ‘de-racialisation’ of ‘commercial farming’ in general, as over 80 per cent of the new middle-scale and large-scale capitalist farms are owned by blacks (see Table 2.2).
Many would agree that more of the truly productive former white landowners could have been retained on smaller land subdivisions like those of most A2 farmers, based on the principle of right (following the ‘one person one farm, within the maximum farm size range’ policy), rather than as a matter of historical course derived from racial privilege. In the event, the negotiated land transfer process failed and the number of the former white landholders who would want to remain farming on downsized farms is not publicly known. Nor is the GoZ’s intention on this specified, largely because litigations by former landowners over land persist. Some in government favour accommodating former white landholders on downsized leasehold farms, while others do not.

However, a number of black large-scale or A2 farmers have hired white farm managers, who were either former landowners or farm managers and they are paid salaries and/or in shares of the farm produce. This arrangement occurs especially in high value enterprises (e.g., tobacco, dairy, export beef, horticulture, bananas, etc) that require large financial commitments, specialised imported inputs and established export markets. It has been suggested that some former white farmers control A2 farms through a subletting system in which black owners operate as ‘fronts’, although the evidence on this is difficult to verify. Once established, some new black agrarian capitalists are forging alliances with white farmers and agro-industry and financial capital in business partnerships and these increasingly demand the re-introduction of private property in agricultural land and advocate for neoliberal economic and agricultural policies.

More commonly, some former white farmers have moved up or downstream of the farming ‘value chain’ by acting as contract financiers and marketers or supervisors of the farming operations of contracted new farmers. As such, they have retained financial interest and market influence in areas such as poultry, tobacco, export beef and horticulture. But currently, such businesses are also required to sell 51 per cent of their shares to indigenous persons under the law enacted in 2009.

Overall, the racial redistribution outcome is seen by some proponents of land reform to be a historical necessity to resolve national questions of development and democratisation (see Moyo and Yeros 2005; Nkomo 2001). But since the racial balancing of capitalist farming attained by the FTLRP involves a component of intra-class transfer of land between races, it might be argued (as Borras 2005 generally does) that this aspect does not qualify to be considered redistributive. In our view, this is true with regard to the large-scale A2 farms.
Ethno-regional outcomes of the land redistribution

Agrarian relations are still coloured by power relations derived from ethno-regional identity. Land redistribution re-linked people with their original ‘homes and ancestral spirits’, providing scope to re-mobilise lineage based on ethnic ties and territoriality (Mazoe focus group discussion 2005; Mkodzongi 2011). Often, these affinities were used to exclude those defined as not belonging, although the evidence suggests that this exclusion operates unevenly among the provinces and peri-urban areas (Moyo 2011a). There are claims that the FTLRP generally excluded some people from accessing A2 plots on ethno-regional grounds within the provinces, especially in the A2 schemes, although the available data required confirming this assertion is limited. More research on this question is required.

There are varying degrees of either under-representation or over-representation of some ethnic groups in land access in some provinces. One alleged case of over-representation relates to people from ‘Mashonaland’ within the ‘Matabeleland provinces’, particularly in the conservancies and peri-urban farms. There were also a few high-profile cases of individual A2 farmers who were evicted from A2 or their own commercial farms in some provinces on ethno-regional grounds. At the local level, it is sometimes argued that certain clans and lineage family groups considered ‘founders of those communities’ and their extended families gained more access to A1 land than others did. Some multiple A2 farm holders are said to use relatives as ‘front’ owners. More micro-studies are required to clarify such processes.

Since the mobilisation of land occupations was not even among the provinces, some groups of families of given ethno-regional backgrounds actually gained more than others. In Matabeleland South, for instance, families of land occupiers from the Midlands province were more actively engaged in occupying large swathes of the Debshan farms owned by the Oppenheimer family, to the chagrin of the landless peoples around Shangani and Fort Rixon (interviews in Bulawayo 2004). War veterans from Matabeleland blamed this disparity on the ‘passivity’ of some ‘communities’ in the Matabeleland provinces during the land occupations, allegedly because of their allegiance to the opposition party (MDC), which allegedly opposed the land occupations.

Mashonaland West was reportedly a notable ethno-regional ‘hotspot’ on land allocations by 2004. A radical war veterans group in an association called Mwati alleged that some of the provincial ZANU-PF leaders at the time were targeting over 50 of the A2 beneficiaries for eviction, including
senior ZANU-PF and state security leaders, putatively because they did not originate from that province. In the process, about 20 farms there were being ‘hoarded’ to avoid their going into the ‘wrong hands’ (AIAS Dialogue 2004). One of the chiefs in Mazowe district was, until 2008, involved in recurrent confrontations with the provincial land officials over their demarcation of a sizeable amount of land for A2 farms, protesting that too much land was being allocated to ‘outsiders’ through this scheme at the expense of locals in both the A2 and A1 schemes.

It is also common to hear people say that when they had applied for A2 land and presented their National Identity Card (the serial numbers of which indicate provinces of birth), if they came from the wrong provinces they did not get land. The A2 application process became ethno-regionally structured. Some elites, during the 2000 to 2002 period, sought land near the more ethnically cosmopolitan towns where they lived (particularly Harare and Bulawayo), while others sought land near their Communal Area ‘home’ (kumusha) districts. Eventually most applicants resorted to bidding for land where they ‘belong’, as conflicts increasingly arose between A2 beneficiaries who ‘belong’ to given districts and those deemed not to. Indeed, some local elites were at the forefront in advocating for the exclusion of ‘strangers’ and, during the height of land bidding (2000-03), there were many ‘evictions’ or unfair rejections of applicants on ethno-regional grounds. Consequently, access to land, particularly in the A2 scheme, tended to be partly shaped by ethno-regional affinities throughout all the provinces, although the policy was that the A2 scheme was ‘national’. This process reflects simmering ethnicised intra-class competition for land, replicating incipient tendencies found during the 1990s (Moyo 1995, 1999). Some policy elites, however, believed that this approach was necessary to avoid the kind of ethnic clashes over land that Kenya has experienced (personal communication).

Ethno-regional and national identity in Zimbabwe (as elsewhere) tend, however, to be dynamic or malleable social constructs, having been shaped by colonial displacements and regional administrative fiat, including gerrymandered ethno-regional chieftaincies. This malleability has subsequently been mobilised by the provincialisation of political party mobilisation structures and demands on the state, vis-à-vis others. It can be expected that future land struggles may evolve around the reconstruction of ethno-regional identities, as land hunger increases again due to demographic growth (if unemployment persists), especially where the FTLRP beneficiaries have large landholdings.
Nationality, citizenship and migrant labour after land distribution

Foreign land holdings in Zimbabwe were relatively large in proportion compared to the scale of land grabbing that is underway elsewhere in Africa, but still less than is the case in South Africa and Namibia (see Moyo 2011b). As discussed above, the FTLRP slightly altered the pattern of foreign land ownership in Zimbabwe, most of which comprised private agro-industrial estates largely owned by transnational firms (TNCs) and some large-scale farms owned by declared foreigners, who were protected by Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (BIPPAs).

Before the FTLRP, there were about 267 (on 500,000 hectares) foreign owned farms differentiated in terms of size. These 267 farms were owned by individual persons from 13 countries, 65 per cent of whom were from nine European nations (mostly German, Dutch, Swiss and Italian); Americans owned 2 and 3.9 per cent of these 267 farms in terms of count and area, respectively. Foreigners from three countries in the South (South Africa, Mauritius and Indonesia) held 32.6 and 26.8 per cent in terms of number of farms and area, respectively. About 20 per cent of the foreign-owned farms ranged in size from 2,000 to over 50,000 hectares. Foreign land ownership was even more substantial in area terms when the agro-industrial estates and conservancies with over 450,000 hectares are included.

A commonplace, related, but not legally robust, view is that, since most of the former white landowners were British citizens (despite also holding Zimbabwean citizenship), their ownership of land in Zimbabwe also represented foreign land ownership. This argument suggests that land ownership inequality based on nationality was even more widespread. This has often been referred to as the ‘kith and kinship’ problem, which underlies the conflict between the Zimbabwean and UK governments regarding compensation for redistributed land (see AAPPG 2009).

After the FTLRP, the persistence of extremely large and under-used foreign-owned estates has tended to contradict the redistributive objective of land reform. It was the local grievances and agitation which drove their redistribution after 2006. Over 20 per cent of the foreign BIPPA-protected farms and substantial parts of most of the agro-industrial estates were settled by ‘illegal’ land occupiers after 2005. The FTLRP gradually whittled down the large-scale ‘foreign-owned’ estates, mostly in the Mashonaland provinces and Matabeleland. Smaller amounts of the core estate lands, such as the highly-capitalised agro-industrial sugar and tea estates in Masvingo and Manicaland, were also expropriated. The majority of these TNCs’ agro-industrial estates
are now owned by transnational firms of South African origin (e.g., Tongaat Hullett Limited) involved in sugar production conglomerates. Others, involving mainly white Zimbabwean and British capital such as Tanganda Tea Company and Ariston Holdings Limited, involved in tea and coffee, were only marginally expropriated (Moyo 2011b). White family-owned estates that were expropriated were involved in tobacco, livestock, wheat and grain (e.g., the Charter Estates, Ariston Holdings, Nicolle Brothers farms and the Oppenheimer’s estate). Even smaller sections of the foreign-owned forest plantations in Manicaland were expropriated during the FTLRP (Moyo 2011b). It is notable, however, that over 20,000 ‘illegal settlers’ were still occupying the agro-industrial estates and conservancies as of 2010.

Another dimension of the nationality question and land reform is the limited degree to which potential land reform beneficiaries among the former farm workers on the LSCF farms gained land. About 30 per cent of these are of foreign parentage, but de facto citizens of Zimbabwe who qualified to benefit from the redistribution. About 10 per cent of the land beneficiaries were former farm workers, who were allocated A1 or A2 plots, some as farm workers. A few of these joined the ‘land occupations’ (Sadomba 2008; Moyo et al 2009), while others benefited as members of Communal Area structures, rather than as farm workers (for details, see Chambati 2009; Chapter 5). Some of them could not resettle in Communal Areas as they have limited kinship ties there and avenues for gaining land to settle there. Thus, many former farm workers still live within the redistributed farming areas and provide casual and permanent labour to A2 and A1 farmers, or were retained by the large farms and estates. Some new farmers tended to treat farm workers as thieves, given high levels of stock theft. Some labelled them foreigners and/or ‘reactionaries’ who had opposed the land reform. Moreover, farm workers’ residential land rights and access to small food security plots continue, as before 2000, to be informal and tied to their provision of specific labour services to landowners. Around 13 per cent of the farm workers had experienced violent confrontations with the new landholders as a result of these land and employment conflicts as of 2007 (see Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum 2007).

**Land access, local politics and recognition**

A number of the critics of the FTLRP have been pre-occupied with the operation of political patronage (and corruption) during the process, citing anecdotal evidence or using a limited number of redistributed forms to argue that land allocation policy decisions were shaped by allegedly ZANU-
PF allegiances. Indeed, neopatrimonial relations are considered *ipso facto* to define Zimbabwean state-societal relations, particularly as directed by the ruling party, ZANU-PF (see Raftopolous 2009). Whether the distribution was predominantly related to the political affiliation or ‘connection’ of the beneficiaries is an issue which most of the critics have not substantiated. To do so would require that access is systematically examined in terms of the correlation of farm size distribution with immutable political party ‘affiliation’ and rank within these and this would need to be tested against the influences of class status on the nature of beneficiaries across the provinces.

Nonetheless, navigating the sensitive political dynamics associated with land occupations and government land allocation processes and facing organised opposition by white land owners and the hyper-attentive ‘independent’ media, was a crucial aspect of bidding for land. There are different dimensions of political connectivity which operated, locally and nationally, including to party leaders and officials and the bureaucracy in charge of land reform. A variety of other social affiliations, such as professional networks, familial or clan memberships and membership in social associations (including churches, etc.) were also important dimensions of land bidding (see also Scoones et al 2010). Access to A2 land allocations was more often shaped by the brokering of connections to the bureaucracy rather than the party hierarchy, while participation in the land occupations and negotiations with local leadership structures was a more broadly based networking process during the A1 allocations.

While most the leadership of the opposition party (the MDC) distanced themselves from the land reform process, many people who were not necessarily ZANU-PF voters sought land allocations. Among the A1 beneficiaries, many belonged to provinces and local areas that voted against ZANU-PF in 2005 and 2008. Moreover, the membership of political parties has been malleable over the last decade. Furthermore, it is a highly elusive variable to measure, given its political sensitivities. Multiple and tactical political allegiances were found to operate in reality (Mkodzongi 2011), with party allegiances ‘instrumentalised’ (e.g., Mhondoro District). The principal-agent dilemma, which makes for uncertainty in the pay-offs expected of patronage relations, as has been noted elsewhere (de Grassi 2008), generally applied during the FTLRP process. Moreover, it is not uncommon in Zimbabwean electoral campaigns for voters to follow the advice, ‘eat or drink the offerings and vote wherever you want’.

There is a belief that the liberation war veterans, who led the land occupations, gained a substantial amount of the transferred land. To the
contrary, many war veterans did not get land and those who did comprised less than 8 per cent of the land beneficiaries (Moyo et al 2009). Moreover, some members of the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) who did get land complained that they were being dispossessed of the land that they had occupied, largely because they were opposed to some elites getting larger plots (Sadomba 2008). Many of the war veterans who got land were peasants of limited means and education (AIAS 2007).

Contrary to the media-driven assumption that only cronies of the ruling party benefited from land redistribution, empirical data demonstrate that more ‘ordinary’ people (poor peasants, workers and the unemployed) benefited from land redistribution (see AIAS 2007; Scoones et al 2010; Matondi 2011). Over 75 per cent of the beneficiaries in A1 farms and/or the small-scale family A2 farm units were peasants with rather limited formal connections to political parties.

Party political mobilisation and fragmentation over land has largely been a petty-bourgeois accumulation contest over A2 land allocations, more so since the leadership of the ruling party had reigned in its radical elements, particularly among the lower-echelons of the war veterans association from 2004 (Moyo and Yeros 2007). Power struggles within the ruling party shifted from the radical nationalist political unity associated with the Fast Track period towards factionalism associated with the succession contest. Currently, ideological differences across political parties are focused on the privatisation of redistributed land, with ZANU-PF being focused on maintaining the peasantry’s support, through providing access to farming inputs (see Chapter 6). But political mobilisation and fragmentation over access to land between ZANU-PF and the MDC and within the former have been less visible than other divisions. Factionalism has not fully degenerated along the Shona-Ndebele ethnic line, although this partly obtains around electoral tactics (Moyo and Yeros 2007), while the rural-urban divide continues to shape ZANU-PF vs. MDC political mobilisation. Despite this divide, party politics and ethno-chauvinism are more centred on differences over the regional distribution of state support to farming and class differences over the role of the state, although the fact of having promoted land redistribution still benefits ZANU-PF electorally.

Instead, local politics are being re-shaped by the changing local administrative and political power relations that resulted from replacing white farmers’ control over land, territory and labour. Local influence is now more broadly diffused, but the landless are the most vulnerable. Territorial reconfiguration
has enabled freer flows of people, goods and services, particularly in labour mobility, popular petty trading and non-farm activities. Their regulation is beyond the reach of under-resourced local administrative structures. Local power struggles mainly involve lineage-clan leaders, chieftaincies, farmer and social associations and local bureaucracies. The powers wielded by war veteran leaders of the land occupations have been displaced. Sparse local government authorities are ill-equipped to regulate the expanded land administration regime and ubiquitous natural resources and mineral extraction. The hereditary chiefs demand more powers to fill these regulation gaps (Charumbira 2010).

The FTLRP land redistribution partly addressed outstanding national questions, which the decolonisation process evaded. Many beneficiaries say land reform helped achieve what the liberation war was meant to bring (Sadomba 2008). The scope of sovereignty and self-determination in such areas is considered to have been enlarged for some, who refer to the reforms in terms of regaining territorial autonomy. Accompanying the transfer of land as an object is also the transmission of a range of intrinsic social values, such as the symbolic and spiritual value attached to land by many people in Zimbabwe. The colonial land grab had only recently undermined their social basis. Many beneficiaries interviewed claim that the land redistribution restored their identity (e.g., in relation to ancestral graves, etc) and has re-established their ‘belonging’ within the given territories.

Other social benefits are realised from the more equitable political control over the rural territory, including the freer movement of people, goods and services. Small-scale mining (especially of gold) has also proliferated, reflecting the ‘liberation of mineral resources, which had been hidden under the monopolistic LSCF farms’ (Kwekwe interview 2006). Unfortunately the state has tried (albeit unsuccessfully) to evict gold panners at the behest of elites facing farm labour shortages. While land disputes emerged in the newly-resettled areas over the competing interests of the new miners and farmers, social reproduction can nonetheless be based on broader access to natural resources and minerals. Larger sections of the rural population now seek autonomous self-employment in farming, natural resources extraction, mining and commerce in the hitherto secluded private properties (see Moyo et al 2009).

Increased access to these varied resources and more autonomous social reproduction indicate that much more has been gained from the land reform than the pre-occupation only with the material gains of access to farming land reveals. The land reform has also altered wider social relations in society by enhancing the recognition of the socio-political aspirations of various
classes and social groupings in both material and symbolic terms, through the reconfiguration of the national and local political landscape and diversifying access to a wider rural economy. However, such gains were differentiated and contested along various identity- based cleavages such as ethnicity and gender and Zimbabwe’s land reform process generated much external opposition, particularly from European actors whose land was repossessed.

**Gender dimensions of the land redistribution programme**

The FTLRP increased women’s access to land ownership. This change occurred because women’s advocacy groups (such as the Women’s Land Lobby Group) were among the few NGOs who openly supported the land reform by demanding access to the expropriated land. This relatively redistributive gender outcome has endured despite the open and clandestine resistance it faces from some dominant patriarchs within the state apparatus, among some customary leaders and within some lineage household leaderships.

A larger proportion of black women, between 12 and 18 per cent, now own land in their own right (Buka 2002; Utete 2003; GoZ 2007), compared to the 4 per cent of white women who owned LSCF lands (Rugube et al 2003; Moyo 1999) and the 5 per cent of black women who controlled land in previous resettlement areas and communal lands. Other studies suggest that women ‘beneficiaries in their own right’ range between 10 and 28 per cent of the total (WLZ 2007). Women also benefited from access to land as spouses, implying a subordinate level of control over such land. Research is yet to quantify the quality of such access in newly redistributed areas under the prevailing patriarchal system (see Jirira and Halimana 2008).

Gendered land access inequities mostly originated at the point when women who were applying for land faced bureaucratic bottlenecks in a male-dominated beneficiary selection process and because women lacked adequate information on selection procedures (Midzi and Jowa 2007). Nonetheless, the increased access to land by women in both A1 and A2 areas suggests a new dynamic in the gender relations in land access and use. Indeed, more women have been offered land in their individual right under the Fast Track Programme than in the past. Such women landholders do not seem to predominantly come from the ‘vulnerable’ groups, such as widows and divorcees, as obtains in communal and older resettlement areas.

Redistributive land reform did not, however, reverse the fundamental inequities evoked by patriarchal power relations. Land access biases against women, youth and immigrants and the exploitation of female labour through
male control of products are common (see also Makura-Paradza 2010). While more women secured their own land than in previous reforms, husbands still dominate agrarian transactions (WLZ 2007; Moyo 2011a).

Gender relations of land tenure generally entail repressive customary and policy-based patriarchal relations within communal and permissory tenure areas, in relation to inheritance rights, rights on divorce, control of income and so forth (see Chingarande 2008). Unlike the earlier resettlement permit, the draft A1 land permit proposes to strengthen women’s land tenure rights and security, although less is proposed on the wider gender front. It provides for joint ‘spouse ownership’ registration on the permit. This means, in theory, that men can no longer legally dispose of the land use rights or exclude women (for whatever reason: separation, divorce, widows), without the consent of their wife. The official selection system for the A2 scheme scores women higher at the starting line, although this has not adequately increased their access. Reportedly (WLZ 2007), women tended to use their husbands’ name in applying for land, with the expected or implied danger that the men in this process had ‘gifted’ control over land by women without an ‘independent’ physical address.

The majority of the ‘offer letters’ (in A2 schemes) and A1 permits have been issued in the names of the male spouses. There are also reports that some women, who had been given these tenure documents as individuals, had gone back to reverse this by getting government officials to re-issue them in their husbands’ name, contrary to the policy of joint tenure (Ministry of Land officials personal communication). GoZ officials argue that the policy does not allow them to ‘force’ applicants applying individually or jointly to register jointly and/or to refuse the reversal of joint land offers, as this would be regarded as an intrusion into matrimonial affairs and because their powers to insist on joint registration are not enforceable in law. Thus, while officials are expected to encourage joint registration, gender-biased officials may not do so and the practise varies among provinces. Nonetheless, some women claim that land reform liberated them from the customary tenure rules typical of the Communal Areas and they are more optimistic about waging their land struggles vis-à-vis the state (WFLA 2009).

The changing agrarian structure and class dynamics after the FTLRP

Fast Track Land Reform also undermined the underlying class logic of settler-colonial agrarian relations founded on monopoly control over land which deprived peasants of land based social reproduction and compelled cheap
agrarian labour supplies. While the close association of class differentiation with race in terms of the development of capitalist farming and the labour process had been substantially altered, new less racially-defined agrarian classes have emerged.

Zimbabwe’s agrarian structure now comprises four relatively distinct farm categories, constructed historically by land dispossession and the racially discriminatory state allocation of varied landholding sizes through different forms of land tenure to different farmers (Table 2.2). The FTLRP has diluted this racial criterion, but access to varied sizes of landholdings is now differentiated mostly according to the social status of landholders, conceived in terms of their declared and perceived differentiated capacities to ‘invest’ in farming vis-à-vis actual and the official perceived perceptions of the need for land to enhance basic social reproduction. In practice, the agrarian structure and class content of land ownership is differentiated according to various processes of agrarian class formation and struggles, being based particularly on the varied intensities of wage-labour utilisation in relation to the persistence of landlessness (mainly among permanent agricultural labourers) and the limited access to inputs by the poorer peasants.

Historically, colonial land policies had led to the demise of the peasantry (also called small producers here), but from 1980 their fortunes rose somewhat. The FTLRP beneficiaries have expanded their numbers and land base, but the increase has also created conditions for the construction of more and widely differentiated classes of capitalist farmers in terms of land size and capital intensification. These changes have come at the expense of large-scale capitalist farmers. Furthermore, the FTLRP has retained the presence and influences of large agro-industrial capital, involved directly in production on estates or plantations (and conservancies). The scale of state farming lands also decreased, but remains influential, while landlessness among agricultural workers and aspiring peasants was slightly reduced, although it persists at a relatively lower level. This suggests that state policy deliberately promoted the emergence of a tri-modal agrarian structure, comprising the peasantry, capitalist farmers and plantation capital.

The emerging agrarian classes

Agrarian relations among the peasantry continue to be defined mainly by self-employment of family labour towards producing foods for auto-consumption and selling some surpluses. They have differentiated capacities to hire limited labour and some provide labour services to others. Most of the families hold
customary rights to arable and homestead plots and common grazing areas in Communal Areas, while their A1 beneficiary counterparts hold state permits for similar family and common land rights. About 30 per cent of the A1 beneficiaries are made up of urban workers and a few former farm workers (Moyo et al 2009). Eighteen per cent of the land beneficiaries retain homes and plots in Communal Areas to diversify their reproduction and production using extended family resources (ibid). Sharing land with extended family members and sub-letting to others is commonly practiced.

In general, the new peasantry has smaller farm sizes than their A2 counterparts. Since the large majority of the beneficiaries had their origin directly in the Communal Areas, the pre-existing peasantry expanded its landholdings (Moyo and Yeros 2005; Moyo et al 2009). Re-peasantisation has therefore been a significant phenomenon of agrarian change under the Fast Track Land Reform, with the entry of urban working class elements into the A1 and resettlement schemes leading to the growth of a class of new petty commodity producers, which now account for 93.7 per cent of total new farming establishments since 2005 (Moyo and Yeros 2005).

There is substantial class differentiation within the peasantry, some of which is concealed inter alia by agro-ecological variation in sizes of land entitlements, off-farm incomes and other local processes of economic and political power-building reflected in inequalities in assets and influences over access to agricultural resources. The ‘better-off peasantry’, which historically comprised less than 10 per cent of the peasantry in Communal Areas (Moyo 1995; Maast 1996), has expanded. Under both adverse and positive economic conditions, peasant differentiation is expected to continue, as is the operation of informal land markets, within communal and newly-redistributed areas, due to differentiated access to labour, remittances and land (Moyo and Yeros 2005).

The range of capitalist farmers also tripled in numbers, but their landholdings were down-sized by over 60 per cent. Over 31,000 middle-scale and large-scale capitalist farmers, most of whom are blacks, now exist. Two thirds of them got land as A2 beneficiaries in all provinces on varied land sizes (Figure 2.2) and with varied farm assets. These rely on relatively larger amounts of hired labour than on family labour (see Chambati 2011). They hold land through tenures amenable to market transactions, including mainly leases, while a few retain freehold title. The majority of them originate from the middle class, including currently or formerly employed professionals, small non-farm capitalists and rural ‘elites’, including chiefs and some better-
off peasants, as well as some working class people (AIAS 2007). Those with larger-scale farms tend to be better educated and linked to employment and business (Moyo 2011a) and are better placed to negotiate political power and mobilise resources. A few hire farm managers, while some rent land (AIAS 2007), claiming their land sizes are too small to be ‘viable’. Some hold multiple farms (Moyo 2011a).

Figure 2.1 Farm size allocations by model

![Figure 2.1 Farm size allocations by model](image)

Source: AIAS Baseline Survey (2007)

A renewed ‘merchant path’ of agrarian social relations has emerged. This development can be seen in the increased number of urban professionals, the petty-bourgeoisie, bureaucrats and private sector managers occupying about 20 per cent of the acquired land. These small- and middle-sized capitalist farmers are, however, blurred by their differentiated levels of capital intensification and use of hired labour compared to own family labour. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, only a few of the new middle-scale farmland beneficiaries have access to the farming infrastructure and machinery necessary to intensify production, as this is partly influenced by the pace and direction of ongoing changes in the wider agrarian markets. Nonetheless, agrarian structural change has opened up diverse, ‘productive’ and ‘non-racial’ paths to rural social transformation.
There is an ongoing reconfiguration of the competing categories of the medium-sized and larger capitalist farmers, given that some of the middle farmers gained more access to state-subsidised means of production such as inputs, credit and machinery, largely because of their better contacts in the state and influence over the policy-making process (Moyo and Yeros 2005; Moyo 2011c). These small-scale and medium-sized farmers are broadly spread out among the provinces, with Mashonaland having created larger numbers of small farmers compared to Matabeleland, which had larger maximum farm size prescriptions associated with lower ‘agro-ecological potential’.

At the same time, the land reform downsized, but retained, Large-Scale Commercial Farms by reducing their overall numbers, particularly among whites and by reducing their average landholding sizes. Prior to 2000, the large-scale capitalist farmers were highly mechanised, used agro-chemicals and fertilizers intensively and hired labour extensively. Post FTLRP, large capitalist farms now range in land size from between 300 and 500 hectares in the higher potential regions to 1,500 hectares in the drier areas, while corporate farms range in land size from 1,500 to over 5,000 hectares. Altogether, there are now a total of about 1,500 large scale capitalist farmers with average landholdings hovering around 1,000 hectares. These comprise black and white large-scale individual farmers, most of whom acquired land through the FTLRP or retained this through the Indigenous Farm Settlement Scheme before 2000. If we include those with
over 300 hectares, around which point the number of farmers and size of area converge, we find that there are close to 3,000 mostly black farmers who can today be considered large-scale farmers (see Figure 2.2).

In addition to the redistribution of land, a range of on-farm infrastructures or ‘immovables’ such as farm houses, barns, bore holes, workshops, sheds, irrigation piping and off-farm infrastructures (dams, roads, electricity lines, etc.) left on the farms have provided additional assets to the beneficiaries. This infrastructure has broadened the horizon of physical infrastructures used by a wider range of smaller landholders, compared to the Communal Areas’ conditions. One third of the A2 plots gained some of these infrastructures on an individual basis, as the rest got under-developed parts of farms, called ‘plain’ land. In A1 areas, most of this infrastructure is shared among the beneficiaries, including their being used as social amenities and as other public service facilities. The idea of irrigation using boreholes with motorised pumps and other mechanical handling structures has gained wider use among small landholders. But since access to these was highly skewed, this has sharpened class relations and other social differences.

The agro-industrial estates were reduced to 240 establishments, mostly owned by large-scale capital covering over one million hectares or 3 per cent of all the farming land (Moyo 2011b). They still hold freehold property in vertically integrated enclaves, including tourism conservancies and state estates. They hire large amounts of permanent and seasonal labour (Chambati 2011) and contract an expanding number of outgrowers. The latter comprise small and medium-sized land beneficiaries, relying on family and hired labour. The state has retained its plantations and expanded production through partnerships with capital. The indigenisation policy intends to redistribute the estates’ shareholdings to locals. The estates owned by public trusts were largely spared, although some of them sublet their land out to ‘elites’.

State farms have remained central to Zimbabwe’s agrarian structure since the 1960s and about 10 of these were in place by 1980. Most of the state land was alienated by the colonial state from indigenous populations and some of the agricultural lands and forests were converted into freehold titles owned by the state, while some communal lands were converted into leasehold properties managed (and/or owned) by the state. Before the FTLRP, the state’s ARDA farmed on 19 large-scale estates as a wholly state-owned private corporation. The ARDA estates were intended to promote agricultural ‘development’, but have tended to be run on a ‘commercial’ basis. Most of them were highly capitalised, especially with irrigation resources and were
mandated to produce ‘strategic’ commodities, including those which were being imported (see Moyo 2011a, 2011b). By 2009, ARDA had increased its farms to 24, covering over 115,601 hectares (GoZ 2009) and had entered into estate investment partnerships with domestic and foreign partners. A number of Communal Area families who had occupied this land were deemed to be ‘illegal’ and evicted in 2010.14

Other state parastatals, such as the Cold Storage Commission (CSC), National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ), local authorities and security forces still own some of the large tracts of land, which they had before 1999, whose utilisation and investment arrangements are discussed elsewhere (Moyo 2011b). The land owned by these parastatals, however, decreased from 256,435 hectares in 1999 to 179,944 hectares in 2010, as some of the farms, particularly those owned by the NRZ (57 per cent), CSC (37 per cent) and local authorities (28 per cent) were acquired and redistributed during the FTLRP.

Landlessness and agrarian labour relations

The persistence of large-scale landholdings has meant the exclusion of potential land reform beneficiaries (Moyo 2011a) and fuels the ‘illegal’ occupation of lands (GoZ 2009). The policy of limiting access by former farm workers to redistributed land was partially motivated by the desire for cheap labour supplies. Landless people and poorer peasants still provide some farm labour services at low wage rates (Chambati 2011; Chapter 6). Many landless farm labourers reside precariously on new landholdings, perpetuating exploitation practices via tenancy. Since the pre-2000 relations of agrarian labour were undermined, agrarian labour shortages on capitalist farms have become common as the number of fulltime labourers has declined.

The current process of intensive labour exploitation, based on the existing manipulative labour recruitment system, is largely associated with the insecure labour tenancy among farm workers who are only allowed to live in the inherited or newly-built farm compounds, but are not provided with their own land, at least for housing. This potentially sustains the practice of labour ‘bonding’ and patronage, which enabled ‘semi-forced’ and ‘unfree’ labour conditions in a situation where the state provides limited rural labour protection, apparently due to capacity limitations and given that the agricultural labour unions seem to be off-compass.

Thus, despite the progressive outcomes of land redistribution, agrarian relations are imbued with salient struggles over access to land and labour. The inter-class imbalances in land redistribution (i.e., between A1 and A2
schemes), has to a significant degree, diluted the redistributive character of the FTLRP, as exploitative labour relations persist. Nonetheless, FTLRP redistribution has, in general, reversed the widespread subordination of labour which land dispossession had enabled. While the unequal control over labour power between the peasant (land-short, landless and poor) and the new farmer (landed and capitalist) remains, some of its exploitative features have been altered.

Land redistribution has allowed a large section of rural peasant society to use their own family labour for their own social reproduction in newly-gained farming lands, giving them wider (‘livelihoods’) options, including selling their labour within a differentiated farming set-up and in local non-farm activities. Although many of the former LSCF farm workers, half of whom were part-time peasants (semi-proletarian), did not gain access to land, even they have become relatively freer to sell their labour to many new small-to medium-sized farmers. This income is in addition to their access to small plots to cultivate ‘subsistence’ crops, albeit under poorly-defined or ‘squatting’ tenures.

Land redistribution has also opened new avenues for rural labour as workers or self-employed operators in small mining (especially that of gold), wildlife exploitation and fuel-wood and timber extraction. These activities have arisen as a result of the exposure of previously privately controlled natural resources to more people and the loosening of private property protection security systems. The dynamics of competing access to these resources is one of the main sources of land conflicts, as is their related effect of reducing farm labour supplies.

**Emerging land marketisation and related class dynamics**

Notwithstanding the formally declared absence of freehold lands in newly-distributed areas, a degree of land sales, sub-plot letting and plot rentals or informal land markets has been brewing (Sukume and Moyo 2003), despite the restrictions imposed by the current A1 and A2 tenures. Unequal land and labour relations are thus also being fuelled by tendencies towards land concentration through informal land rentals. About 25 per cent of the land beneficiaries sub-let or share their land (Moyo et al 2009) without official sanction. Some of these lessors lack production inputs or face social calamities such as illness or death (Mhondoro field interviews 2008). Others sublet land for speculative reasons or seek to maximise incomes from farming partnerships (ibid). Large-scale re-concentration of agricultural lands is, however, restricted
by state ownership of redistributed lands and natural resources. Moreover, A2 farmers have no legal right to evict informally-settled farm workers.

Admittedly, few of the interviewed A2 farmers would openly declare that they were engaged in land rentals. Some of the A2 farmers declared themselves short of either arable or grazing land in relation to their current scale of production, claiming higher capacities to utilise rented land (Sukume and Moyo 2003, Moyo et al 2009). At times, such informal land rental arrangements were sanctioned by the local land authorities, especially where land is underused and/or on unallocated lands. About 26 per cent of the A1 land beneficiaries shared land, while only 15 per cent of the A2 households did so (Moyo et al 2009). Land sharing was extremely high in Kwekwe District (90 per cent) and Goromonzi District (27 per cent); while elsewhere, land sharing was on average below 15 per cent.

Two-thirds of such land sharing was with relatives and friends, as well as with adult family relatives. The rest of the land was shared with former and current farm workers, squatters, gold miners and millers. A few of the households even shared land with the former commercial farmers. Land sharing varied among the districts, with 8 per cent of the Kwekwe District beneficiaries reporting sharing land with former commercial farmers (Moyo et al 2009). At that time, the negotiated ‘co-existence’ between land beneficiaries and LSCF farmers was more common there. Furthermore, just over 20 per cent of the Kwekwe District beneficiary households reported sharing land with gold miners and millers, reflecting the ‘gold rush’ experienced there since the FTLRP. Further research is required to unravel the exchange relationships underlying such land ‘sharing’.

Demands for the conversion of agricultural land to marketable tenures are thus a salient feature of the intra-elite and inter-class struggles over the control of land since the FTLRP. Some elites hold on to multiple and over-sized farms which they believe freehold tenure can protect, while other black and white elites rent land informally from some smaller landholders in Communal Areas, A1 areas and among A2 farmers and lease some state lands at little cost. Some even seek to evict economically and politically weaker landholders.

The privatisation of land tenure would also reinforce unequal access to natural resources such as water, woodlands and wildlife. Moreover, given continued landlessness, privatising property rights could enable new landholders to evict agricultural workers and prevent many land bidders from gaining access to the remaining Large-Scale Farms. This sequence of events would only reinforce the persistent super-exploitation of labour, which is
the key motor of class formation. Thus, class relations continue to shape the politics of land, as the new capitalist farmers and the agro-industrial estates retain their advantage in the control of land and bidding for labour and lead the accumulation processes by virtue of their better access to other means of production (credit and technology) and influence over the policy-making process itself (see Chapter 6).

But demands for freehold land tenure among some A2 land holders do not only represent their desire for collaterable land tenure and a belief in the legal superiority of freehold tenure. They also reflect fears of a real threat to their relatively larger landholdings from the demands of the landless people who were emboldened by the radicalised FTLRP process to contest the social legitimacy of larger-scale landholdings. There is also a perception among the ‘excluded’ that many elites received more land than they can use at their expense, such that large-scale landholders are fighting on the back foot as popular (‘illegal’) land occupations persist.

However, the politics of land at the local level are being mobilised through experiences of struggles for land and agrarian production, despite cultural and ethno-regional differences, towards defending the new land rights, as well as access to farming inputs. As argued elsewhere (Moyo 2011c), various forms of local association, including churches, women’s groups, farmer’s clubs, local liberation war veterans’ and collaborators’ and other development associations, farm workers’ associations, as well as kinship networks, shape such struggles (see also Chapters 4, 5 and 7). The formal politics of land is otherwise preoccupied with intra-elite struggles for inclusion in the state’s redistribution of land and input subsidies and over the distribution of the shareholdings of remaining conservancies and agro-industries under the indigenisation mantra, to the chagrin of landless people. Some politically influential and wealthier classes use administrative fiat, ethno-regional sentiments and sometimes force, to expand their landholdings. Many landless people continue to ‘illegally’ occupy land and poach resources, as local authorities, provincial politicians, chiefs and land movement leaders compete to mediate persistent land struggles. A few civil society organisations call for more land to be redistributed to farm workers, women and youths. As a result, the government is working on a land audit framework which, among other things, seeks to broaden the inclusion of these groups and of other politically excluded persons.
Concluding remarks

The cumulative outcome of three decades of land reform in Zimbabwe has been redistributive in scale and breadth, as popular access to agricultural land expanded despite the inequalities which remain. This outcome contradicts dominant narratives which allege that the FTLRP mainly benefited black ‘elites’ and cronies of the ruling ZANU-PF. State-derived land user rights are now dominant and (for now) they have contained the growth of inequitable land markets, while limiting the powers of the new capitalist farmers to re-establish exploitative farm-labour-tenancy, despite the continued exploitation of landless labourers. The unequal political power relations shaped by the erstwhile racially-monopolistic landholding structure have also been undermined, reversing the loss of local territorial sovereignty and spatial segregation. Broader access to natural resources, such as woodlands, wildlife and water, has enhanced the ‘recognition’ of wider societal rights and values.

However, substantial areas of large-scale foreign and state-owned agricultural estates were retained, ostensibly on the grounds of promoting agro-industrial and wider development, although their shareholdings are gradually being ‘indigenised’. This anomaly circumscribes the scope for even more extensive land redistribution. Not surprisingly, such lands continue to be ‘illegally’ occupied by peasants. Second generation land questions include struggles for the redistribution of multiple and oversized landholdings held by the new capitalist farmers, to redress the exclusion of some former farm workers, landless peasants and various classes of women. Although land concentration exists on the margins of land ownership and the current redistribution promises more equitable agrarian change, it highlights the potential polarisation of agrarian reform policy. The tri-modal landholding structure has obtained substantial social legitimacy within the cross-class alliance that defends the land redistribution, although the failure of the state to ameliorate the gains realised by large-scale farmers is opposed at the popular level and among sections of the petty-bourgeoisie.

The Zimbabwe experience illustrates that, despite the hegemony of neoliberalism, radical land reform can be mobilised nationally and involve various classes, while transcending other divides such as rural-urban, worker-peasant and ethno-regional differences. Implementing radical land reform required decentralised structures and coherent leadership, which the liberation war veterans stimulated (see Moyo and Yeros 2007; Sadomba 2008). Both direct popular action through land occupations and state expropriations, led by the petty-bourgeoisie within and outside the state, shaped the actual redistribution
process by balancing the demands of popular and other classes. This process arose from the long-drawn mobilisation of various socio-political forces around the historically specific national questions raised by settler colonialism and the post-independence constraints to social transformation imposed by neoliberalism. This experience differs from the standard formulations regarding the class basis of revolutionary transformations since the 1950s (see Borras 2005). In Zimbabwe’s case, radicalism also provoked intensive external sanctions and support for a political democracy movement, aimed at effecting regime change, while mobilising against the radicalisation of neighbouring former settler-colonial-countries. This in turn provoked greater authoritarian rule and repression of the opposition, leading to a deeper democratic deficit.

The class struggles encountered also query over-generalisations about the neopatrimonial nature of African political and agricultural policy regimes (see de Grassi 2008), including claims that patronage dominated Zimbabwe’s land reform. Instead, there was a deliberate balancing of class-based and ethno-regional demands by the decentralised land movements and bureaucracies involved in land allocations, which the ‘central command’ structures of the state and land movements monitored. Even the opposition’s critique fomented such balancing. Ethno-regional pressures from some central and local elites to exclude ‘outsiders’ obtained, but they were not universally accepted. While urbanites influenced land allocations, this influence operated within limits, debunking the alleged ‘urban bias’ of the FTLRP process. Moreover, since capital was not totally ousted from Zimbabwe’s agrarian political economy, internal class contradictions have enabled international capital to influence agrarian change as discussed in Chapter 6. In historical perspective and despite its many contradictions, the FTLRP placed brakes on foreign land grabbing and offered scope for progressive agrarian struggles in the former settler-colony.
Notes

1. Some reworked sections of this chapter have been published in S. Moyo, JPS 1, S. Moyo, JPS 2 and ROAPE.
2. This is called ‘de-congestion’ in Zimbabwe’s policy, although the concept and targets are vague.
4. A1 targeted landless and poor families, providing land use permits on small plots for residence, cropping and common grazing. A2 targeted new ‘commercial’ farmers, providing larger individual plots on long lease to beneficiaries with skills and/or resources.
5. In 2002, the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) enacted a law to expropriate ‘movable’ farm properties (tractors, irrigation pumps, etc.) which were being warehoused by former farmers or exported to neighbouring countries, to prevent this and their “grabbing” by some new farmers (and criminals).
6. For instance, when 77 farmers took the GoZ to the SADC tribunal in 2007 (before the 2008 election), more farms were expropriated. Some land occupations around 2003 were considered to involve opportunists taking advantage of the political conflict and labelled a third force by some ZANU-PF leaders.
10. S. Moyo, 2005, Mazoe focus group discussion.
14. It is reported that Garahwa (Chipinge) Communal Area residents had occupied this land and were essentially reclaiming it from ARDA, but that ARDA and some local chiefs and leaders had agreed for ARDA to develop land.
References


Zimbabwe Institute, 2007, Understanding the impact of the Fast Track Land Reform Resettlement Programme, Cape Town: Zimbabwe Institute.