The Zimbabwe Model: Radicalisation, Reform and Resistance

Sam Moyo and Paris Yeros

Introduction

The world system has entered a period of prolonged crisis which is already producing a new generation of radicalisms. If we were to judge from previous periods of systemic transition, the current one is likely to evolve through a series of revolutionary situations and eventually yield a handful of revolutionary ruptures, which will unleash tidal waves throughout the system. But every radicalisation and revolution will obtain distinct characteristics, in accordance with local conditions, with some being more innovative than others in confronting universal challenges. This is the case of Zimbabwe's radicalisation.

Although it occurred a decade before the 'Arab Spring', Zimbabwe's radicalisation has not aroused as much intellectual interest. The propaganda war by corporate media has a large share of responsibility for this indifference (see Chari, Chapter 8), but also the larger process of 'intellectual structural adjustment' that has been underway since the 1980s (Moyo and Chambati, Chapter 1). Thus, a genuine confrontation with imperialism has been roundly dismissed as a case of African 'despotism', requiring 'regime change' (Moyo and Yeros 2005b). It is, indeed, an irony that on the eve of systemic transition, 'regime change' is being promoted as the only relevant historical category: not only has Zimbabwe's rebellion been condemned for not meeting historical criteria, North Africa's rebellions must now be made to conform to them, by force. Yet, both are cases of robust revolutionary situations under
contemporary imperialism and comparable to other cases in Latin America and Asia (Moyo and Yeros 2005a, 2011a).

The researchers involved in this book have been engaged in rigorous debate over the last decade and find that a distinct and advanced case of radicalisation, structural reform and resistance to imperialism has been in progress in Zimbabwe. In fact, we may speak of a ‘model’: not a model in the Weberian sense of ‘ideal types’; nor a model which deserves uncritical emulation; nor a model of revolution, for it did not result in one (Moyo and Yeros 2005b, 2007a, 2011b). But it is a model of radicalisation which stubbornly escalated through most of the contradictions of a contemporary revolutionary situation and offered a number of lessons along the way. Zimbabwe has undergone a multi-class, rural-urban political mobilisation; suffered international sanctions, political destabilisation and militarisation; and experimented with a new economic structure with a diversified set of external economic relationships.

This concluding chapter elaborates on six points that make the recent Zimbabwean experience distinct and innovative. They include: (i) the character of the land movement, which has been multi-class, decentralised and anti-bureaucratic, but also united by radical nationalism; (ii) its capacity to articulate grievances across the rural-urban divide; (iii) the radicalisation of its petty-bourgeois components; (iv) the resulting creation of a tri-modal agrarian structure as a matter of state policy; (v) experimentation with state dirigisme, developmentalism and an emerging popular cooperativism; and (vi) a new non-alignment policy termed ‘Look East’.

But before we delve into these issues, it is important briefly to interrogate the historical context of Zimbabwe’s decolonisation, as a counterpoint to a revisionist historiography which has emerged in the course of radicalisation.

The decolonisation of Zimbabwe: why history matters

This is not the first time that Zimbabwe has been seen as a model. In the 1980s, it was actively promoted as a model of political transition in the settler societies of Southern Africa, whereby majority rule was to be conditioned on property guarantees. It also became a pilot project for market-led land reform, which later flowered into general World Bank policy. What is different now is that Zimbabwe has proposed new ways of deepening the transition to majority rule, by means of radical land reform and, as happened elsewhere in Africa after decolonisation, through an ‘indigenisation and empowerment’ programme.

After the stalling of decolonisation in Southern Africa in the 1960s, the process was re-launched by a combination of armed and political struggle, leading to
military victories in Mozambique and Angola against Portugal and negotiated transitions in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. This was an integrated, thirty-year regional conflict, at a time of wider imperialist crisis. Crucially, the post-independence invasion and destabilisation of Angola and Mozambique by the apartheid regime in South Africa was used by imperialism as a lever of negotiation, until the region as a whole succumbed to a generalised pact in the 1990s: peace, independence and majority rule, in return for property guarantees, plus economic opening to monopoly and finance capital. Unlike in the rest of the South, decolonisation and neoliberalism in Southern Africa coincided, the one being conditional on the other. But the pact was unstable from the beginning.

In the case of Zimbabwe (Moyo and Yeros 2011b), the pact included those in the nationalist movement, led by the Patriotic Front parties (ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU), who viewed the pact as a strategic objective, seeking piecemeal reforms and eventually the growth of a black middle class; as well as those in the movement who saw the pact as a tactical move, intended to consolidate political gains and prepare for the next the economic phase of the struggle. For imperialism, it was a tactical retreat, aiming to cut its losses and rely on economic statecraft to maintain its monopoly position. A previous, watered-down plan for ‘independence’, by which white political privileges would have been retained indefinitely, was negotiated with a colonial proxy advocating peace with Rhodesia (Abel Muzorewa’s UANC), but was defeated. Nonetheless, the above ‘trifurcated’ contestation, born of the Lancaster House negotiations in 1979, was never laid to rest, even as, in the closing years of the Cold War, domestic political forces were temporarily co-opted into accepting the pact as final. The adoption of structural adjustment in 1990 and, thereafter, the generalisation of the pact to the region, raised false hopes for a peace and development dividend all around.

To understand the subsequent radicalisation in Zimbabwe, the character of the decolonisation pact must be clarified. This character remains important, given the emergence of a revisionist historiography, which claims to be more peaceful and democratic than the violent ‘patriotic history’ of the nationalist leadership (Ranger 2004: Raftopoulos and Mlambo 2009). This revisionism is essentially the reincarnation of a liberal form of settler-colonial political compromise. Despite the phasing out of white political privileges, Zimbabwe remained a racially divided society, in which the defence of ‘human rights’ served mainly to protect white property and race-based privilege. Neocolonialism in Zimbabwe, not only relegated the majority population to a permanent process of semi-proletarianisation and super-exploitation, it also excluded the possibility of the emergence of a black middle class with roots of its own in the economy.
The structural violence inherent in this ‘post-white settler’ type of neocolonialism (Mandaza 1985) was never to be pacified by piecemeal reforms. As the country entered structural adjustment in the 1990s, even the visible social gains of the prior decade were reversed.

Another peculiar political dynamic was also in place. Like in Angola, Mozambique and Namibia, where liberation was obtained by armed struggle, the security apparatus of the new state was rapidly taken over by guerrilla commanders. Other branches of the state were ‘Africanised’ in due course. But from early on, control over the security apparatus became a political resource for petty-bourgeois struggles. Since there were diverse elements among the security forces with varying inclinations vis-à-vis the independence ‘pact’, any perceived sign of contestation among the parties over the military apparatus, the electoral dispensation and worse, suspicion of South African involvement, at a time when apartheid destabilisation was rife, tended to seriously unsettle the balance. This political dynamic degenerated into a fratricidal conflict in Matabeleland from 1983 to 1987. In effect, petty accumulation impulses, instead of challenging racial inequalities and defending against de-stabilisation, were channelled into a violent, ‘ethnic’ competition over exclusive control of the state apparatus. But from a longer historical perspective, it is also clear that the accumulation needs of the petty-bourgeoisie could not be realised. Under the different neoliberal conditions of the 1990s, marked by ongoing obstacles to accumulation and social differentiation, the petty-bourgeoisie was forced back into a popular, inter-class black alliance against the status quo dominated by settler and foreign capital.

Various aspects of this history and the subsequent process of radicalisation have been analysed in detail elsewhere (Moyo and Yeros 2005b, 2007a, 2011b; Sadomba 2008). The irony is that, by the time Zimbabwe entered the process of re-radicalisation, intellectual discourse had already suffered a historic reversal, to such a degree that a settler-inspired revisionist history, based on an awkward confluence of liberalism, Weberianism, post-structuralism and pseudo-Gramscianism, could now pass as ‘progressive’ and even dominate publication outlets with a ‘radical’ tradition (Moyo and Yeros 2007b; Moyo and Chambati, Chapter 1).

Radicalisation and its mode of mobilisation

The land movement: decentralised, anti-bureaucratic agency

The land movement was initiated by popular rural and urban mobilisation against the immediate policy of the ruling party and the state, under the leadership of liberation war veterans. This point is affirmed by Wilbert
Sadomba and Luis Masuko (Chapters 3 and 4) and is contrary to the ‘land-grab orchestration’ scenarios (Hammar et al 2003), or to supposedly ‘agnostic’ assessments as to the ‘impossibility of generalisations’ (Scoones et al 2010). The nationalist leadership dragged its feet until 1997, stepping in only when it risked losing its most critical social bases, the peasantry and the war veterans, the latter permeating the security forces of the state apparatus. The purpose of the nationalist leadership was to control and co-opt the land movement, as well as to open a political space for the expression of pent up land demands among layers of the population, some of which were not directly organised by war veterans. Most crucially, it did so to accommodate the interests of the aspiring black bourgeoisie, through a bifurcated land redistribution programme, providing for both peasant and small-scale capitalist farming (see Moyo, Chapter 2). It also spared from redistribution certain farms owned by foreign capital, the state and public trusts, ostensibly to maintain some critical food supplies and agro-industrial capacity.

Streamlining the land movement was critical to the state, by creating Land Committees at district and provincial levels, as well as Committees of Seven on the farms, while diminishing the powers of local war veterans who were the vanguard of the land occupations (see Sadomba, Masuko and Murisa in this volume). In their place, civil servants, chiefs and other war veterans, not connected directly to local struggles, were installed, thereby broadening and diluting the representation and class character of the land movement. Over the following years, gaining firm control over the movement was, however, made difficult by the war veterans’ decentralised and anti-bureaucratic character. This form of agency was enabled by historic and organic roots of social mobilisation developed during the armed struggle, as well as by the pre-existence of localised land movements.

This decentralised and anti-bureaucratic nature of the land movement is its first distinctive characteristic, essential for understanding the success of this mass mobilisation. Formally constituted and bureaucratised organs of political representation, such as political parties, farmers’ unions, trade unions and NGOs lacked either the interest or the organic roots to mobilise a radical land movement (see Moyo 2001; Yeros 2002; Moyo and Yeros 2005b). The formally constituted war veterans’ association, the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA), was also lacking in this regard (Sadomba, Chapter 3). This characteristic may be seen as having parallels with the recent North African mass mobilisations, with the exception that in Zimbabwe this decentralised nature has been based on a unifying principle of radical nationalism.
Bridging the rural-urban divide against occupational corporatism

The second distinctive characteristic of Zimbabwe’s radicalisation was the extensive rural-urban spread of the land movement, in terms of active membership and physical participation in the land occupations. The leadership of the land movement included local peasant leaders, local war veterans, spiritual leaders, some chiefs and various working class activists, intellectuals and political party leaders, in a cross-class alliance. But war veterans and various local leaders played a vanguard role in galvanising the mobilisation of long standing grievances over land and racial inequality.

If political parties, farmers’ unions, trade unions and NGOs have lacked sufficient interest or organic roots in the land question, they have also been structurally incapable of bridging the rural-urban gap in the interest of mass mobilisation. The land movement did manage to bridge this gap, by both incorporating urban elements into rural land reform and promoting land occupations in urban areas for residential purposes. Thus, the land movement overcame the occupational corporatism of trade unions and farmers’ unions and the often divisive strategies of political parties. This form of mobilisation is a rare phenomenon, which has some parallels in the contemporary world, namely in Bolivia and Nepal and, to a lesser degree, in Venezuela, but apparently also in Egypt (see Moyo and Yeros 2011a).

It remains important to emphasise the bureaucratic sclerosis and the sources of political polarisation that have accentuated the rural-urban divide. By the mid-1990s, trade unions, led by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) had completely abandoned land reform as a political project (Yeros 2002). Previously, the labour centre had maintained in its analysis and political discourse, however superficially, an acknowledgement of the importance of the land question. Yet, as the ZCTU pried itself away from the control of the ruling party and the state in the late 1980s and also articulated a critique of structural adjustment in the early 1990s, it gravitated increasingly to a political project of ‘good governance’ and ‘regime change’, promoted by foreign donors and international trade unions. In so doing, it joined forces with a broad array of liberal, urban-based, middle-class, donor-dependent NGOs, including the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA). By the time the ZCTU founded the Movement of Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999, all the ‘pro-democracy’ forces had been completely overwhelmed by white-settler interests and foreign donors (see also Gwisai 2002).

Farmers’ unions representing the peasantry had also, in the 1990s, distanced themselves from the land reform agenda (Skalnes 1995) as petty-
bourgeois interests prevailed among their ranks, to focus mainly on access to state services and subsidies. Although they did not expressly oppose the land reform, they were both uninterested and unable to mobilise a constituency in the interest of repossessing land. On the other hand, the white-settler Commercial Farmers’ Union (CFU), in alliance with GAPWUZ, the farm workers’ trade union, mobilised both its membership and international public opinion against the land occupations.

It has been claimed that such ‘pro-democracy’ alliances have been the vanguard of ‘progressive’ politics in Zimbabwe and the reason why the ruling party opted for a radical position on the land question (Raftopoulos 2009), as if there were no real political or historical basis for such a position. With the mounting evidence of an extensive land redistribution, there has now been a veiled acknowledgment of the vanguard role of the land movement. However, this role is rendered as a mere component, together with the MDC alliance, of a broader ‘passive revolution’, as per Gramsci, that has ‘remained largely under the control of the state’ and that has ‘largely politically marginalised the majority of the population’ (Raftopoulos 2010: 707). Such an interpretation serves only to obscure the distinctive features of a rare mass mobilisation which confronted the white agrarian monopoly and the imperialist alliance as a whole, to the effect of liquidating the settler element and broadening the social base of the economy.

**Petty-bourgeois radicalism: an unexpected factor?**

There are outstanding issues regarding the relationship of the land movement to the nationalist leadership. The difficulty of interpretation lies in the fact that the ruling party, having succumbed to structural adjustment, changed course in the late 1990s to enter a process of radicalisation, even as it sought to streamline and control the land movement. Most analyses have adopted a ‘neopatrimonial’ conceptual framework, for which the only relationship that exists in society is between rapacious black capitalists and their ethnicised client networks. Even the so-called Gramscians have replicated this imagery, seeing in the above ‘passive revolution’ a ‘destructive party accumulation project’ (Raftopoulos 2010: 706), not a radicalisation of an array of forces, which included the semi-proletariat and aspiring black capital, all against monopoly capital. Others, despite their keener interest in class analysis (see Masuko and Sadomba, in this volume), have inclined in a similar direction, arguing that black capital never really broke ranks with monopoly capital, acting solely on the latter’s behalf to control the land movement. We have
argued elsewhere that the process of radicalisation integrated diverse class interests, including the petty-bourgeoisie and the semi-proletariat, against the white agrarian faction of monopoly capital. This radicalisation resulted neither in a revolution, nor in a generic ‘passive revolution’, for the white agrarian establishment was essentially liquidated both economically and politically. The role of the petty-bourgeoisie and the nationalist leadership, their use of the state and their relationship with the movement must be interrogated further.

The character and function of the ‘radicalised state’ underwent a peculiar transformation: it suffered a suspension of its bureaucratic coherence (its ‘bureaucratism’), just as its personnel was being mobilised in the interest of Fast Track Land Reform (Moyo and Yeros 2007a, 2011b). The reconstitution of Land Committees and Committees of Seven overrode local bureaucratic structures – something that the ‘chaos’ theorists have seen as the ‘destruction of the state’ (Hammar et al 2003) – but it also established fast-track procedures and new capacities for the expropriation and redistribution of land, while also reforming laws and amending the constitution to underpin the action and defend land occupiers against eviction. The breaking of ranks with monopoly capital is also exemplified in the fact that the state expropriated nearly 5,000 properties and redistributed them, going far beyond the estimated 1,000 properties that were actually occupied by the land movement. Moreover such acquisitions persisted beyond the immediate election contests.

From a left perspective, one may rightly fault the ruling party for streamlining the land movement and creating space for the petty-bourgeoisie. But it is not the case that it fulfilled a reactionary role, for it did not defend the status quo ante. Empirically, this was not the case and in our view, this formulation does not adequately recognise the existence of real intra-class conflict, between petty-bourgeois and monopoly capital, black and white elites and among black elites.

This conflict suggests that the third distinctive characteristic of Zimbabwe’s radicalisation is the emergence of petty-bourgeois radicalism. This radicalism is another rare phenomenon – although, incidentally, this is also gaining ground in South Africa. he petty-bourgeoisie itself was radicalised, mainly by the land movement, but also by the nature of the external ‘regime change’ interventions. Certainly, it did so largely on its own terms, but there is a problem in attributing radicalisation solely to certain local-level war veterans, against all the rest that vied for land. Instead of one ‘genuine’ category of radicalism, there are different radicalisms, each with its own class project.
That the petty-bourgeoisie also became an agent of change surely presents very difficult political questions, as previous debates among African scholars have shown (Fanon 1967; Cabral 1978; Shivji 1976). Those who have opposed the petty-bourgeoisie outright, in the case of Zimbabwe, to the point of closing ranks with the ‘regime change’ agenda, have taken recourse to racialised discourses of ‘corruption’, ‘patrimonialism’ and ‘orchestration’. This tendency vilified the whole of the land movement on the basis of the attendant use of force and the unfair advantages that some political elites sought.

Others have claimed to stand aloof of the difficult political questions, but have, nonetheless, deployed a liberal-populist ‘people versus state’ dichotomy. This approach renders the whole land reform process solely as a consequence of the agency of the landless against an indifferent state, at best, or a ‘commandist’ and ‘clientelist’ state, at worst (on this view, see Scoones et al 2010). Class analyses that reach similar conclusions can only do so by downplaying the radicalisation of the petty-bourgeoisie and treating it as if it never really broke ranks with monopoly capital (e.g. Sadomba, Chapter 3).

It would be more correct to say that the nationalist leadership in recent years has come to represent mainly un-accommodated bourgeois interests, which indeed have liberation convictions of their own, but which are under the illusion that they can reform monopoly capitalism so as to sustain a ‘patriotic bourgeoisie’ into the future. This situation explains the current pressures for ‘indigenisation’ programmes in strategic industries (to be discussed below), as opposed to more collectivist solutions (Moyo and Yeros 2011b: Moyo 2011b).

This situation also goes a long way to explain the violence that has accompanied land reform, mainly off the farms, as the nationalist leadership has, once again, proven unable to commit ‘class suicide’ and submit itself to the evolving and expanding popular demands on the ground (Moyo and Yeros 2009, 2011b). The bifurcation of the Fast Track Land Reform, the strategy of indigenisation of agro-estates and other industries and the recurrent violence are manifestations, not only of class conflict, but also of intra-class conflict between petty-bourgeois interests and monopoly capital.

But if we were to fault a radicalised nationalist leadership for an illusory petty-bourgeois project, a similar fault, albeit of a different order, may be attributed to the war veteran movement. Sadomba, for example, agrees that the war veteran movement became ‘tactically sterile’ and paid for this sterility dearly in the Murambatsvina assault on urban settlements in 2005. But, could a decentralised movement, even the one responsible for bringing radical land reform to fruition, overcome such tactical limitations? The uninterrupted
escalation of the revolutionary situation would have required that the land movement undergo organisational and ideological innovation, one founded in proletarian consciousness and equipped with more sophisticated tactical and strategic thinking – which ultimately did not occur.

Masuko argues (in this volume) that, in this respect, the land movement did undergo innovation, beyond the single-issue platform of land reclamation, evident in the plethora of associational forms that have sprouted in the resettlement areas. Such associational forms are certainly the kernel of future progressive politics in the countryside, as Murisa (Chapter 7) also suggests. But their new issue-focus on service provision by the state (agricultural inputs, social infrastructure, markets, credit and subsidies) is far from articulating a new, radical mass movement; for now, this opportunity has dissipated. On the other hand, the liberal ‘pro-democracy’ movement, comprising the donor-funded MDC, NGOs and settler elements, continue to have no interest in the radical potential of such associations on the ground. Instead they persist with a limited ‘pro-democracy’ and market led agenda.

**Structural reform and its new contradictions**

*Trajectories of accumulation: internal, from below and from above*

The re-grouping of popular forces is all the more necessary given the new tendencies of class formation at the top. The land reform radically restructured land ownership, but it did not ‘oust capital’, which itself is now re-grouping (Moyo 2011b). This outcome leads us to the fourth distinctive characteristic of the radicalisation process: the deliberate design of competing trajectories of accumulation. A new tri-modal agrarian structure has been instituted through state policy, consisting of peasant, small-scale capitalist and large-scale estate farms, based on differential landownership regimes (state-sanctioned usufruct permits, non-tradable leases and freehold or state property, respectively), which in turn gives rise to different types of producers vying for different types of labour mobilisation and accumulation strategies (Moyo 2011b, 2011c). The evidence shows that Zimbabwe has unravelled the settler-dominated ‘labour reserve’ economy of the past, by amplifying the smallholder sector and incorporating a significant ‘merchant’ path, while retaining elements (albeit downsized) of the ‘junker’ and ‘state’ paths (for the general characteristics of these paths, see Moyo and Yeros 2005a.).

It is important to note that the diverse elements of this structure are not entirely unique to the continent, but their clear demarcation in state policy
and the dynamic by which they have been established, do make this case unique. It has been argued before that, during the 1990s, in Africa as a whole, a new land concentration process was set off by neoliberal land reforms, a process led by domestic capital in association with foreign interests (Moyo 2008). This process installed a ‘merchant’ path generally, although it never became clearly articulated in state policy. Recently, there are signs of policy interest in this path, as noted in Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Ghana, for example.

From 2000 onwards, under the degenerating world-systemic conditions, this path has been overtaken by a larger process of large-scale land alienation by foreign capital itself, often with domestic allies. This alienation is now installing a new ‘junker’ path on the continent, most notably in the historical macro-regions of the colonial trade and concessionary economies, which had never shared the settler labour-reserve traits of Southern Africa (Amin 1972). What is unique in the case of Zimbabwe is that it has rowed against the current to meet the rest of Africa halfway, by breaking up the large-scale farming established in the course of the nineteenth-century scramble, broadening the small-scale capitalist sector, which had also been introduced by the colonial regime and preserving some agro-industrial estates (Moyo 2011b).

Any genuine class analysis of the new Zimbabwe must come to grips with the tendencies and contradictions of this tri-modal structure and avoid regime-change theories of ‘rentier economy’ (Davies 2005) or ‘crony capitalism’ (Bond 2009), or notions of ‘passive revolution’, which are based on nebulous assessments of the new class relations (e.g., Raftopoulos 2010). The fundamental question is whether Zimbabwe will be able to sustain, via this tri-model structure, an introverted process of accumulation ‘from below’.

The details with regards to the socio-economic characteristics of the new land beneficiaries have been reported already (see Moyo et al 2009; Scoones et al 2010; Moyo, Chapter 2). What is important is to outline the tendencies and contradictions of the new agrarian structure. Three issues should concern us: the new type of labour reserve that has emerged, its attendant processes of class formation and the contest over accumulation strategies.

**The structure of the new labour reserve**

Re-peasantisation and the break-up of the settler agrarian monopoly has diminished the labour reserve of the past and undermined the functioning of the colonial cheap-labour system. As Walter Chambati argues in this volume (see also Chambati 2011), land reform has absorbed surplus labour into petty-
commodity production for own consumption and for the domestic market and pried open access to natural resources and use values that previously were enclosed in the properties monopolised by white farmers. The immediate manifestation of this has been a shortage of labour, which has deprived especially the small-scale capitalist sector of the prior abundant workforce willing to work for wages below the cost of social reproduction.

Previously, the Large-Scale Commercial Farming sector (LSCF) owed much of its productivity to its reliance on the super-exploitation of semi-proletarianised labour. Indeed, by the late 1990s, 50 per cent of its workforce had come to consist of non-permanent, casual labour, which in turn reproduced itself precariously between the LSCF and the Communal Areas. Meanwhile, real wages on the farms had, under the weight of structural adjustment, collapsed to 24 per cent of the Poverty Datum Line, alongside sharp reductions of yields and incomes in the adjacent Communal Areas (see Chambati, Chapter 5). The intensification of super-exploitation all around was further facilitated by a racialised, quasi-feudal labour-tenancy system, together with a patriarchal system of customary authority, which continued to undermine the bargaining power of the semi-proletariat as a whole.

That the labour reserve diminished and the bargaining power of labour altered does not, of course, mean that the labour reserve economy has been extinguished. The persistence of simple reproduction among smallholders and the reconstitution of the small- and large-scale capitalist sectors, under the weight of Western sanctions, continue to re-create the structural conditions of super-exploitation, even among the new self-exploited peasantry. Super-exploitation is further abetted by residual labour-tenancy on the new farms, as well as intra-family and gender-based labour relations. Yet, the unravelling of racialised relations of personal dependence and the expansion of the smallholder sector have altered the balance of power among the three modes of farming. It is here that the new political struggle is now being fought.

Both small- and large-scale capitalist farmers have a structural interest in policy measures that will oblige small producers to work for wages below the cost of social reproduction. This structural interest would be reinforced should an export-oriented accumulation strategy come to pass (see Moyo and Nyoni, Chapter 6). But these two types of farmers are not identical, given that small-scale capitalist farmers, many with significant resource vulnerabilities, may also be co-opted by the state into production for domestic markets and industries. In fact, this objective has largely been their principal orientation to date. At the same time, smallholder farmers will themselves undergo differentiation,
thereby adding to the labour pool. Yet, this may also be mitigated by inward-looking policy measures that both reinforce the conditions of smallholder production and induce the growth of cooperativism and rural industries capable of re-organising the labour process. The political struggle between the three modes of farming and the attendant disputes over labour, remains unequal and will be determined by a number of factors.

**State interventionism and new ‘developmentalism’**

The dominant factor in shaping the accumulation trajectory is, of course, the structural power of monopoly capital, which has opposed the radicalisation process and undermined progressive agrarian change by imposing severe limits on Zimbabwe’s economic recovery. From the beginning of the Fast Track, financial isolation and a capital strike had led to a severe shortage economy, leading the state towards an interventionist economic strategy. This interventionism under contemporary neoliberalism is the fifth distinctive characteristic of the Zimbabwe model.

We have argued elsewhere that the state initially had no comprehensive plan to defend against sanctions (Moyo and Yeros 2007a). A plan emerged as the internal and external contradictions escalated, taking the form of controls over prices, trade, capital and agricultural markets, the monopolisation of grain purchases by the Grain Marketing Board and the setting of food production targets. The plan also targeted subsidies to agriculture and industries, including for the production of ethanol, thereby reviving an erstwhile Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) that had been undermined by structural adjustment. State-owned agro-estates, together with state interests in mining, banking and other firms, are in the forefront of this strategy, especially for the production of local agro-fuels against a rising fuel-import bill. Furthermore, the plan includes an agricultural mechanisation policy to enhance motorised draught power, the bulk of which have been allocated to small- and large-scale capitalist farmers to compensate for the labour shortages produced by Fast Track Land Reform (Moyo 2011a; Moyo and Nyoni, Chapter 6). Other broad-based state investments include irrigation, electricity and transport facilities, although these have remained low given the fiscal constraints. This plan reflects both the class bias of the state and its reaction to the generalised strike by private banks and bilateral and multilateral donors.

Eventually, hyperinflation, political confrontations and informalisation of economic activity compelled the state back to an attempted normalisation with international capital. It is through this process that the state ‘interrupted’
the momentum of the revolutionary situation, culminating in the assault on urban land movements in 2005 (Moyo and Yeros 2007a, 2009, 2011b). Indeed, the heterodox plan lacked the foresight to defend against the ensuing capital strike, which could have been better resisted by a policy of immediate nationalisation of banks and strategic industries. Thus, the state became susceptible to carrot-and-stick strategies by foreign capital, including its refusal to fully default on debt.

Normalisation has led to cooptation back towards an extroverted strategy through various mechanisms (Moyo 2011a, 2011b). One has been the eventual shift of the land redistribution policy on agro-estates towards an essentially comprador ‘indigenisation’ strategy, by which black capitalists are to become majority shareholders in agro-estates, thereby succumbing to the logic of plantation agriculture and its associated financial circuit. Another has been the expansion of contract farming, linked to a similar external financial circuit, locking small-scale capitalists into agro-estates for the production of sugarcane for the European market (under the ACP-EU Lomé Convention), as well as for tobacco and cotton for the Chinese market. But the cooptation has been most evident in the adoption, in 2008, in the midst of peak hyperinflation, of a neoliberal policy on currency, capital, trade and agricultural markets. Thus, dependence on external finance, inputs and markets has exercised overriding power in tilting, once again, the internal balance between social classes, while Western sanctions against Zimbabwe, including those against the parastatals spearheading the economic recovery, have been retained.

Yet, the countertendencies are also notable. For the above policy of normalisation has not totally extinguished the dirigisme of the state: the new black bourgeoisie, still acutely vulnerable to a monopolistic world market, remains in conflict with international capital, as do, most obviously, the popular classes from which the nationalist leadership must still claim legitimacy. Despite the neoliberal turn, the state has not abandoned the policy of ISI, or its intention to mediate pro-actively in favour of black capital and, secondarily, smallholder farmers. The class character of state power, the strategies of the black bourgeoisie and the re-grouping of social forces are the three further factors that will co-determine the balance of forces.

Contrary to the trends on the rest of the continent, marked by a new wave of externally-driven land alienation for the production and export of foods and bio-fuels, the Zimbabwean state has persisted with its policy of seeking to build national food self-sufficiency and to substitute for imported petrol by expanding the cultivation of sugarcane on agro-estates owned by the
state and public trusts. Producing ethanol for domestic transport and other industrial requirements has various local industrial spin-offs (Moyo 2011b). Such investments are being made via joint ventures with foreign capital, from the East, West and South, under the “Look East Policy” inaugurated in 2004 (see more below).

The indigenisation strategy has also re-escalated, going beyond agriculture to secondary industries, banking and especially mining. Generally, indigenisation has been a multi-class strategy, whose class character has oscillated in accordance with the correlation of forces. In the 1980s, it shifted from a popular land reform policy to one geared towards the creation of a black bourgeoisie via affirmative action with respect to land. The latter continued throughout the 1990s, under structural adjustment, without much success, until its radicalisation in the Fast Track Land Reform Programme. Then, under the subsequent normalisation, the strategy shifted back to a bourgeois strategy, geared towards creating majority shareholding amongst black capitalists. Yet, a further elaboration of the policy has envisioned joint ventures between state-owned enterprises and foreign firms. This policy is reflected not only in the support for state-owned agro-estates; it has also turned on the mining sector, which has now become the principal target and which has enormous potential to fill the foreign-exchange gap.

Upon the discovery of massive diamond deposits, a struggle ensued, especially from 2007 onwards, for the control of the industry, against both small miners who entered the fray, as well as corporate capital of South African and Western origin. The strategy on diamonds and the possibility of circumventing sanctions, led to a confrontation with foreign capital and small miners, which has entailed the repression of the latter. In the event, the West, ostensibly in solidarity with the repressed small miners, resolved to broaden its sanctions tactics by invoking the ‘Kimberly Certification Process’ with regard to ‘blood diamonds’. Then, as Zimbabwe won the certification battle, the United States proceeded unilaterally to impose new sanctions on two mining firms in partnership with the mining parastatals. Nonetheless, state policy on minerals now seems to be stabilising and is positioning the state to reap future profits, via joint ventures looking both East and West. The accommodation of Chinese capital has been central to this strategy, which has already begun exploration and production. Similarly, the expansion in the production of platinum by Western multinationals was compelled by the threat of losing concessions to the East. Meanwhile, high-ranking state personnel have positioned themselves in the state-owned Zimbabwe Mining
Development Corporation driving the joint ventures, which has undermined the legitimacy and transparency of the strategy. For some ‘pro-democracy’ forces (e.g., Cross 2011), this critique has become opportunistic, calling for the nationalisation of black capital but not Western capital!

It is important to add that a further elaboration of the indigenisation policy, beyond the re-distribution of majority shareholding and joint ventures, towards a higher degree of social access, has recently been emerging in the wake of popular agitation. This transformation involves the imposition of conditions on foreign firms to undertake investments in physical and social infrastructure, such as roads, schools and clinics, as well as the allocation of shares to ‘community and employee trusts’. This strategy may soon be complemented by evolving plans to create institutional markets among smallholders, so as to strengthen local markets. The strategy reflects a renewed attempt, in response to more general criticisms of class bias, to broaden the benefits of indigenisation, especially of mining, to the rural areas. It also reflects the continued need of political elites (combining both ZANU-PF and MDC leaders) to respond to the reaction by capital and to meet popular demands for state support in the light of forthcoming elections.

Overall, these policies reflect the persistence of a specifically nationalist accumulation strategy promoted by black capitalists with connections to the state. For, despite having sunk roots of their own in the means of production, they remain vulnerable to both monopolistic forces and the need to maintain legitimacy vis-à-vis popular forces. In other words, black capital continues to seek to consolidate its position by recourse to a pro-active state, against what it considers to be its main obstacle, Western monopoly capital.

Yet, there are other tendencies at play among the black bourgeoisie, which could undermine its nationalist economic posture. For instance, the Fast Track Land Reform obtained a significant ethno-regional structure (Moyo 2011a), as aspiring capitalists, lacking other means to bid for land, mobilised sub-national, ethno-regional claims to land ‘rights’ to exclude non-local competitors. This tendency continues and could escalate as land bidding is re-focused on the enlargement of existing landholdings, at the expense of smallholders and as bidding spreads to the retained private and public agro-estates. These are essentially the ongoing petty-bourgeois tendencies of a class which remains profoundly insecure. Should the main ‘enemy’ come to be seen once again as ‘internal’ (and ‘ethno-regional’), there would certainly be regression to a neocolonial type of politics and this would ultimately be more malleable to foreign interests. The immediate manifestation of such a tendency
would be the escalation of factional politics, both within the ruling party and within the MDC (see Moyo and Yeros 2007b). Yet, this should not be seen as a foregone conclusion – or a perennial and de-contextualised ‘ethnic’ possibility in African politics – but as shifting strategies of accumulation, subject to pressures from above and from below.

**Rural cooperativism and democratisation**

This analysis takes us to a consideration of the economics and politics of the popular classes after land reform. While the larger farmers have been gravitating towards production for export markets (albeit still in minority numbers), the basic pillar of food sovereignty will remain the smallholder farmers, together with a significant portion of small-scale capitalists. There has been a clear shift in the orientation of production towards food grains, to which the new land beneficiaries have dedicated 78 per cent of their cropped land. And while national maize yields per hectare have suffered severe setbacks under conditions of drought and sanctions, beneficiaries in wetter agro-ecological regions have performed much better (Moyo 2011c; Moyo and Nyoni, Chapter 6). But the economic potential remains enormous, considering that land utilisation rates are already at 40 per cent – that is, the land utilisation level of the extroverted LSCF sector prior to Fast Track. But notable in this regard is that, on average, the A2 farmers with larger landholdings crop below 20 per cent of their land, while a few surpass the 50 per cent mark. In the absence of broad-based investments in infrastructure, fertilizer and machinery, fulfilment of the agricultural potential will be delayed and differentiation across regions will deepen, with adverse consequences for national cohesion.

One of the immediate consequences of Fast Track is the re-emergence of informal land rental markets between the better performers and the weaker ones, often between A2 and A1 farmers, respectively (Moyo, Chapter 2). Both macro-economic conditions and labour shortages, on both A1 and A2 farms, have contributed to this tendency. Land sharing is also common, although this often occurs among A1 farmers and kinship networks, as well as between all resettled farmers and farm workers, gold-panners and ‘squatters’ who have yet to be settled formally (Moyo et al 2000). Such tendencies represent local class differentiation across all agro-ecological regions and herald future conflicts over access to land and natural resources.

Although land tenure is generally seen to be secure, boundary and access disputes could intensify (Moyo, Chapter 2). One of the terrains of struggle that could intensify is the status of leasehold on A2 farms, which is being challenged
by domestic and foreign elements which advocate the conversion of the current leasehold land rights into freehold tenures. In this case, small-scale capitalist farmers would find allies in private banks, which typically justify their refusal to finance resettlement farmers on the supposed absence of ‘collateral’. Another terrain of struggle is the land tenure status of the remaining farm workers, who have been re-inserted into labour-tenancy relations (Chambati, Chapter 5). Yet, state policy still remains committed to both leasehold tenure and the protection of farm workers against eviction from A2 lands.

These struggles over production, land access, tenure and labour, as well as over the much-needed social services in general, require organised social forces capable of tilting the balance towards smallholders and farm workers. The most promising development is the local emergence of new cooperative movements to pool labour, savings and infrastructure, procure seeds and fertilizers, channel extension services, bid for producer prices and negotiate labour contracts (Murisa, Chapter 7). Some of these groups are orchestrated by state extension agents and by private contract farming firms, while others are led by the war veteran groups which grew out of the previous Committees of Seven in the land occupations. Yet others draw on kinship relations and existing former farming associations in the Communal Areas (see Murisa, Chapter 7; Moyo 2011c). Thus, among resettled farmers, approximately 40 per cent now belong to farmers’ groups. Among the farm workers, there are cases of group negotiations for access to land and conditions of work, in the absence of a national agricultural labour union representation, whose credentials have not been in favour of agrarian reform (Chambati, Chapter 5).

This dynamic social development may shape the future of rural and national politics, depending on the ability of rural cooperativism to deepen its scope and branch out to form wider political alliances. The resurrection of mass politics requires building up the new producer associations into an advanced, united and autonomous cooperative movement of rural workers, capable, not only of obtaining ad hoc services, but also of dislocating the new black bourgeoisie from its political pedestal (Moyo and Yeros 2007a).

Rural cooperativism also holds the unique potential to transform gender relations and customary authority. These are the social and political pillars of historic super-exploitation, particularly that of women. Fast Track Land Reform tripled the proportion of rural women holding land in their own right, yet women remain greatly under-represented, with less than 20 per cent of the total farm units. The land movement also opened political space for women, which was filled in mass numbers, yet women seldom held leadership
positions in land committees and local farmer associations (see Murisa, Chapter 7). The new cooperativism is the best possible vehicle for broadening the participation of women with respect to land rights, agrarian change and political leadership.

Moreover, cooperativism is the only realistic vehicle for withering away the retrogressive patriarchal aspects of customary authority. Contradictory tendencies have been evident here as well. It is true that the state extended customary authority to resettlement areas, both as a cooptation tactic and a low-cost dispute-resolution mechanism. The state also co-opted chiefs through their inclusion into the A2 farming scheme and mechanisation. Yet, the state has excluded chiefs from exercising authority over A1 land permits and A2 leases and has also maintained their subordination (in some power relations) to elected authorities in local government. Meanwhile, their cooptation into a new class position, where this has occurred, raised new questions regarding the trajectory of this institution. Furthermore, while the ethno-regional structure of Fast Track has also extended the kinship basis of customary authority, it has nonetheless been observed that beneficiaries from non-contiguous areas have not always embraced their new chiefs (Murisa, Chapter 7). Finally, the state has also been active in supporting farmers’ groups via agricultural extension officers, contrary to suggestions that new farmers have not received state support (e.g. Scoones et al 2010; Cliff et al 2011) or that they have been re-tribalised (Worby 2003).

Overall, it is clear that intervention into this fluid field by a new social agent based on cooperative and democratic principles can further erode customary authority, empower women, integrate farm workers and smallholders in agro-industrial production units and expand the potential for the formation of alliances among cooperative producers nationwide. This type of social agent may fulfil the aspirations for popular agrarian change which are necessary after Fast Track. But this transformation should go much further than welfarism would permit, by creating efficient worker-controlled cooperatives to sustain the struggle against monopoly capitalism and retain pressure on the reconfigured state.

Resistance through non-alignment

The changing security context

Internal dynamics, including the class character of the indigenisation strategy and the ongoing social struggles, will determine the ability of the state to sustain an inward-looking accumulation process and its legitimacy. However,
the foreign policy of the state will also be crucial in circumventing Western sanctions, towards creating the external conditions for sustaining an inward-looking strategy, as well as in defending Zimbabwe from external intervention, ostensibly on ‘humanitarian’ grounds. In this regard, the sixth and final distinctive characteristic of Zimbabwe’s radicalisation is its ‘Look East’ policy, which, despite its name, amounts to a vanguard redefinition of ‘positive non-alignment’ in the post-Cold War period.

The strategic context on the continent has been changing since the 1990s (Yeros forthcoming). As such, the current scramble for Africa has definite antecedents in the recent past. A new phase of land alienation was already underway under structural adjustment (Moyo 2008). To this situation was added a renewed interest in oil, gas and minerals at the turn of the century, until the most recent surge in land alienation for the production of food and bio-fuels. The determinants of the new scramble are to be found, not only in system-level changes, but also in the evolving geo-strategic facts on the ground in Africa.

In relation to energy resources, the 9/11 attacks on US targets was a turning point. The attacks raised the prospect of prolonged instability in Western Asia, setting off a policy debate on the possibility of expanding oil production in Africa, as proposed by the Cheney Report on energy (NEPDG 2001). In turn, this raised obvious concerns in China as to its possible exclusion from key sources of oil and shipping lanes, thereby compelling Beijing to fine-tune and upgrade its own Africa strategy over the following years (GoC 2006). The re-militarisation of US strategy has been most closely associated with this dynamic.

But the less acknowledged source of the scramble has been the changing security context on the continent. And here, several inter-related events shook the foundations of the US geo-strategy. The first event was the political transition in South Africa. A controlled transition though it may have been, it nonetheless deprived the Western alliance of a staunch ally in Southern Africa. The second was the state fracture and war in the DRC, by which the United States lost its main pillar in Central Africa. Thus, the two Cold War pillars of US strategy in these regions (the apartheid state and the Mobutu regime) collapsed in the space of a few years. The third event has been precisely the re-radicalisation of the liberation movement in Zimbabwe, which challenged outright the controlled character of the transitions to majority rule.

These events have been compounded by escalating disputes over the control of Somalia and Sudan in the East, over Ivory Coast in the West and over
North Africa, which again have threatened the control over critical sources of energy. All these have thrust collective imperialism back into crisis and raised the stakes of the scramble. It is in this light that the establishment of AFRICOM – which was deemed unnecessary even in the height of the Cold War – must be seen. AFRICOM’s most immediate target may be China, but it is the loss of firm control over large swathes of the continent that has made it necessary.

In the wake of the Libya intervention and the ‘Arab Spring’ in general, external intervention has taken more complex forms, although it is clear that Zimbabwe has been a critical laboratory for the combined use of ‘soft power’ (via NGOs and supporting opposition parties) and direct economic pressure through sanctions. In this regard, Mahmood Mamdani (2011) has argued that internal democratic reforms, against the privileges of internal elites, are essential to prevent future Libya-style interventions. But we know that interventions are selective, typically to support extroverted economic interests and to conserve client and corrupt political systems. The North African revolts have themselves led to ‘popular’ elections which have propelled to power economically and socially conservative forces.

The Zimbabwe case shows us that progressive internal reforms themselves invite aggressive external interventions, which polarise politics towards regime change. That Western sabre-rattling against Zimbabwe has not resulted in a Libya-style intervention, or the external interventions that have been so common since the early 1990s in West and East Africa, has to do, in large measure, with the new SADC security framework which, despite all its prevarications, is now anchored in a mutual defence pact, which has been uniquely effective in preventing the further militarisation of the Zimbabwe question (Moyo and Yeros 2011b). Indeed, the SADC mutual defence pact, which grew out of the 1998 intervention in the DRC by Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia against the US-sponsored invasion by Rwanda and Uganda (and then broadened to the rest of SADC in 2003), can be seen as a pioneering security structure not only in Africa, but also in the rest of the South.

Finally, the defence against Western aggression has also to do with Zimbabwe’s deft foreign policy which has quite effectively used the emerging East against the West.

**Zimbabwe’s ‘Look East’ policy**

Zimbabwe’s current Look East policy (LEP), launched in 2004, is not as new as it appears. Since independence, Zimbabwe has abided consistently by most
of its five founding foreign policy principles, which can be summarised as (a) national sovereignty and equality among nations, (b) attainment of a socialist, egalitarian and democratic society, (c) right of all peoples to self-determination and independence, (d) non-racialism at home and abroad and (e) positive non-alignment and peaceful co-existence among nations (Patel 1985; Patel and Chan 2006). The last principle is what concerns us here.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, non-alignment fell into disuse, often discarded, as by the British academic establishment, as ‘antique’ (Chan 2006: 180). Yet, African scholars have recognised an urgent need to reclaim this principle under the new world-systemic conditions. Thus, Issa Shivji has argued that Africa must ‘define its solidarity with the oppressed people against both established and developing imperial hegemonies’ (2009: 9). In so doing, the positing of an equivalence between Western imperialism and the emerging semi-peripheries must be avoided.

‘Positive’ non-alignment is precisely the principle at stake, which should not be confused with ‘neutrality’ or ‘isolationism’, but with (a) non-participation in the military projects of the great powers, which de facto means NATO, given that the emerging semi-peripheries have not embarked on militarisation; and (b) the freedom to judge each foreign policy issue on its own merits, based on national sovereignty and interests, which de facto means preserving the right and capacity to impose conditions on foreign economic interests regardless of their origins.

As Patel and Chan have argued, Zimbabwe’s LEP must be seen as ‘complementary, rather than as an alternative, to engaging with the West’ (2006: 182). Indeed, Zimbabwe has neither turned its back on Western capital, nor has it accepted investment from China and the rest of the East or South without conditions. Nor, indeed, has it rejected military assistance from any single source, including the West, even though it has stubbornly confronted NATO strategy and, consequently, suffered an arms embargo since the DRC intervention in 1998.

Zimbabwe’s LEP, in effect, has been pursued as a method of circumventing Western sanctions and, by engaging with China, as an instrument to force the West back into investing in Zimbabwe on conditions consistent with its indigenisation and empowerment policy. This strategy is now beginning to bear fruit. On the other hand, its arms procurement policy has not had the same effect. In the period 1980–1999, China accounted for 35 per cent of Zimbabwean imports of major conventional weapons, followed by the UK (26%), Brazil (11%), Italy (9%) and Spain (8%). In 2000–2009, China
accounted for 39 per cent, followed by the Ukraine (35%) and Libya (27%) (see SIPRI 2011). Thus, while the West previously had participated in arms sales to Zimbabwe, together with China, from 2000 onwards, Zimbabwe has purchased arms only from non-Western countries, mainly China, but also the Ukraine and Libya.

Zimbabwe’s LEP thus appears as a vanguard way of re-defining positive non-alignment in the post-Cold War world. Evidently, the only other African states that have effectively upheld a similar policy, although without the radical restructuring of their internal relations, have been Angola and Sudan.

**Conclusion: lessons from Zimbabwe**

There are several lessons to learn from Zimbabwe. The first and most obvious, is the need to rebuild autonomous research and intellectual capacity in Africa and the South more generally, a capacity which would be organic to local political struggles. One cannot fail to notice how markedly different the debates in this book are from those led by researchers in Northern institutions, which continue to deploy concepts that reproduce a colonial mindset, not least via the ubiquitous organising concept of ‘neopatrimonialism’. This concept only serves to obscure the structural power of monopoly-finance capital and reduces all social relations to localised and ethnicised categories of domination and resistance. It also disables our understanding of the economic geography of Africa, which is now evolving rapidly beyond the structures inherited at independence (Amin 1972). Especially, the new tendencies towards ‘tri-modalism’ in Africa require urgent research. Clearly, no autonomous development is possible, unless we continue to produce adequate concepts and undertake systematic empirical research.

The second lesson is that radical change is possible. Zimbabwe may have particularities of its own, but the historical-structural and social sources of radical change are firmly rooted in the societies of the South everywhere (see Moyo and Yeros 2005a, 2011a). This is not to say that radical change depends on mere ‘will’. Political resignation should not be answered by naïve voluntarism. It is necessary that the correlation of forces in every situation be assessed properly, with the intention of changing it, not preserving it. This also means that a clear understanding of the state apparatus and state power must be developed, not towards a blanket anti-statist policy of ‘changing the world without taking power’, which remains so hegemonic among social movements, but towards a strategy and tactics which seek to alter state power and unravel the state apparatus in the interest of the oppressed.
The third lesson is that mass mobilisations, in order to endure the countervailing forces that will inevitably align against them, must take seriously the agrarian component of society. This objective should not be merely to accumulate forces for change, but also to initiate a longer-term process of structural change and national resistance, of which the agrarian question is a fundamental component. All societies in recent years that have entered a process of radicalisation have discovered that their food dependence and their domestic disjunctures between agriculture, industry and energy are crucial sources of vulnerability. This potential weakness means that mass mobilisation must also take seriously the project of ‘re-peasantisation’ as an explicitly modern project and as the only alternative in conquering autonomous development in the South (Amin 2012; Patnaik 2012).

Finally, it is crucial that a multi-disciplinary approach is encouraged systematically, as the challenges that are presented by radical change go beyond narrowly-focused disciplines and sub-disciplines which are incapable of seeing the whole. In the case of Zimbabwe, it is clear, for example, that radical change in the countryside became part and parcel of a regional security question, which went largely unnoticed by the dominant analyses. And in this case, a pioneering regional security framework succeeded in confirming the land reform, which otherwise would probably have been reversed by Western military intervention. Radical change and autonomous development require regional strategic autonomy and this also needs to be properly understood.

References


