CAPETIAN CORPORATE QUALITIES:
THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE AUVERGNE UNDER
COUNT ALPHONSE OF POITIERS, 1241-1270

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Abstract

My thesis analyzes the structure and culture of the thirteenth century Capetian administration, and deals with issues of authority, power and stability in high medieval France, with an emphasis on the dynamics of great feudal agglomerations. The work focuses on the reign of Louis IX of France, 1241 - 1270, a period of transformation during which private organizations gave rise to the early state. It examines the challenges of organizational leadership, in particular the need to find an appropriate equilibrium between uniformity and diversity, stability and innovation, reliability and flexibility. The work emphasizes the role organizational identity and organizational culture played in enabling value-based transformation, as well as the manner in which overlapping organizational identities aided or hindered it.

In 1254, King Louis IX launched an anti-corruption reform, aimed at correcting abuses in the royal administration. An important element of this reform was a change in the culture of the royal administration, mediated by a new pattern of recruitment. Previously, administrators were drawn from the ranks of the warrior aristocracy. Hence, employees were recruited primarily from within church organizations, namely the universities and the monastic and mendicant orders. Organizational values are distinct from the values of the external environment, but influenced by them. This influence is thought to be mediated, in part, by recruitment practices. Value congruence, the degree
to which personal values are consistent with organizational values, is predictive of
employee misbehavior, the reduction of which was the key objective of Louis IX’s
reform.¹

In analyzing the incongruence of values between the Capetian administration and its
knightly employees, I employed cultural dimensions identified in studies of
organizational behavior and leadership, in particular in the 2004 GLOBE study, the
largest of its kind to date. I have adopted several of these dimensions as heuristic devices
for determining the degree of value congruence between knightly culture and the culture
of the Capetian administration in the 13th century. I found that Louis and Alfonse’s
organizational values marked a distinct departure from knightly values, particularly in
assertiveness, power distance and performance orientation

Introduction

This dissertation set out to look at the administration of Alphonse of Poitiers in the context of that of his older brother, King Saint Louis of France. Louis is famous for reforming the royal administration in a manner driven by his personal moral convictions, an effort for which he was canonized. Even if we accept as a given that the king lived up to his legend, the vast majority of administrators and vassals were no saints. To what extent did his beliefs influence them? Count Alphonse of Poitiers seemed like a good test case.

Alphonse of Poitiers was the king’s brother and staunch ally. He was also the king’s greatest vassal, ruling a large part of his realm independently. The count replicated many of his brother’s policies in his own lands. He published his own reform ordinance and sent out enquêteurs to collect complaints about official misconduct. I hoped that by finding out how these measures were carried out in Alphonse’s lands, specifically in the Auvergne, some light may be shed on how the moral fervor of any one individual, even one in the ultimate position of power, is translated into organizational change.
The Auvergne was chosen for two main reasons: first, being remote and of relatively little importance, economic or otherwise, it had few ties to the lands of the royal domain. The second reason, possibly stemming in part from the first, was that the administration of the Auvergne was notoriously corrupt under Alphonse’s rule, both pre- and post- the enactment of the reform.

The first chapter of this dissertation sets the historical background and looks at Alphonse and Louis as individuals. In the second chapter, I suggest a second approach for studying the administration of Alphonse, one borrowed from Organization theory, which offers a more impersonal view of its function. I argue that this modern approach is applicable to thirteenth-century France and that it could provide new insights into medieval polities. This chapter also contains an organization theory description of the Alphonsine administration and its task environment.

The third chapter draws on this breakdown of the Alphonsine administration to provide insights into the role of corruption reform in the Auvergne. The fourth and final chapter continues this argument: after examining modern organization forms, in particular plural form franchises, I suggest the royal apanages of the thirteenth century may have contributed to rather than hindered uniformity in the kingdom of France.


Chapter One

“Tous deux ont eu le même labeur; mais l’un a recueilli la gloire, l’autre a eu l’oubli pour partage. On ne saurait pourtant séparer Alphonse de son frère, car leur oeuvre a été commune.”

Edgard Boutaric, *Saint Louis et Alphonse de Poitiers*

This dissertation takes a look at the administration of Alphonse, count of Poitiers and Toulouse, Marquis of Provence, brother to Louis IX. Alphonse’s administration, like his personality, has been eclipsed by that of his illustrious brother. The brothers have traditionally been studied as a set, despite the fact that ample documentation exists to study Alphonse by himself. Alphonse and Louis were close, and it is tempting to see Alphonse as an obedient younger brother, devoid of his own ambitions or agenda. In this vein, historians have sometimes overlooked Alphonse’s contribution to French administration on account of its close association with the administrative policy of Saint Louis. This is the opinion set forth in the main work on Alphonse, Boutaric’s *Saint Louis and Alphonse of Poitiers*, and it is eloquently stated in the quotation opening this chapter. It is my hope, in this work, to engage with Boutaric’s statement and elaborate

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on it. First, the brothers shared in the same labor only to the extent that both of their administrative legacies lived on in the late Capetian administration. Second, although brothers, and close ones, Alphonse and Louis were separate and dissimilar personalities, and there is much to learn from studying them separately.

Superficially, Alphonse copied the royal administration’s structures. The similarities are obvious. The comital lands and the royal lands were divided into the same administrative units, bailliages and prévôtes. Alphonse, like his brother, ruled by means of a council, which also met as a court three times a year. Both brothers relied on enquêteurs—special royal agents who toured the realm—to monitor the behavior of other officials.

However, these similarities in structure hid a discrepancy in policy, born from a disparity of character. Although both brothers were working with the same tools, Alphonse’s government had a flavor distinct from Louis’. The count came up with separate solutions to the problems of centralization, tax collection and controlling the costs of administration. He was far more concerned with efficiency than he was with protecting the rights of his subjects, and particular types of administrative corruption flourished under his tutelage. Some of Alphonse’s solutions were adopted by future Capetians and applied to the entire realm. The government of later Capetian rulers, especially Philip the Fair, has the same overtone as Alphonse’s, with its combination of greed and distance. From Alphonse’s extensive remaining administrative records
emerges the image of a decisive, realistic man, who showed spectacular attention to detail and a nearly obsessive focus on raising money. This likeness is not very flattering, but at least it is distinctly his own.

It is not my intention to build straw men. Although Boutaric’s view is still the accepted consensus, other historians have noted its limitations. In Auguste Molinier’s introduction to Correspondence Administrative d’Alfonse de Poitiers he charged Boutaric with having a preconceived notion that the brothers’ administration was identical, when in reality “... Alfonse n’a suivi ni en politique, ni en administration, les principes de son illustre frère, et qu’il excerça sur l’administration et la régie des ses domains une action plus directe et plus efficace.”3 J. Richards put things more mildly, in Saint Louis: “Il ne semble pas qu’il [Alphonse] ait jamais donné d’inquiétude à son frère. Au cours des premières années, sa comptabilité révèle combien les intérêts de l’un et de l’autre restaient enchevêtres, et quelle était l’emprise que conservait l’administration royale. Par la suite, le comte de Poitiers continua à appliquer dans ses domaines les methods donc usaien les agents du roi, non sans y ajouter sa touche personelle.”4

However, this course of study is far from exhausted; the Alphonsine archives are large and diverse, allowing us to travel further down the path indicated by Molinier and

3 Molinier, Correspondance administrative d’Alfonse de Poitiers, no. XXVII.

Richard. This work is largely based on documents from the Auvergne, because my interest in the Auvergne predated my interest in Alphonsine administration. However, it seems that documents from Poitou and Languedoc support the same conclusions.

This chapter elucidates the sources of Alphonse’s power and describes the relationship between Louis and his brothers. The princes of the blood enjoyed a great deal of flexibility when it came to administering their *apanages*. Finally, I will demonstrate that Alphonse deviated from the moral path set by Louis practically as soon as he came into the lands of the house of Saint Gilles. The rest of the dissertation will concentrate on Alphonse’s government and on administrative corruption in Auvergne during his rule, and will examine the link the administration of the *apanage* and that of the kingdom as a whole.

Saint Louis has cast a long shadow over French history, and another one, at least as long, over French historiography. Ruling over a strong and prosperous France during the Most Christian Century, Louis embodied the epitome of medieval kingship for contemporaries and medievalists alike. In his person were combined majesty and humility, justice and mercy. It was not merely his earthly power that earned him a place in exempla and chronicles, although he had plenty of it. Thanks to the military endeavors of his recent ancestors Louis ruled over a larger kingdom than any of his predecessors. With the aid of his sage mother Blanche, and in no small part on account
of his own policy, he exercised more control over the high nobility than previous Capetians. Louis was a sought-after arbiter all over Europe, because of his reputation for fairness and peace-seeking. The Mongol court saw him, accurately, as the leader of all of Christendom. In sum, if I may paraphrase the words of Potter Stewart, a good king is hard to define, but Saint Louis was immediately recognizable as a good king.

While sainthood is not a necessary condition for successful kingship, in Louis’s case the two were inextricably linked. Louis saw his responsibilities as a ruler through the prism of Christian devotion. He saw kingship as a moral burden that was his to carry, and accepted responsibility for the spiritual well-being of his subjects. The king revealed this conviction in writing. He believed, for one, that his first crusade failed because of the moral injustices that accompanied the financial and military preparations for the undertaking. Those included extorting monetary gifts from both lay and churchman and the use of conscripted labor to build the new port in Aigues Mortes. Upon his return, there was a marked change in his administration. He had decided to clean his realm of sin, in particular of heresy, usury, and the presence of Jews, Albigensians, and Lombard loan sharks. In December of 1254 Louis translated his moral ideals into the language of administrative reform, issuing the Great ordinance which opens with the words “ex
debito regie potestatis,";\(^5\) out of the duty of the power of kingship. The power of kingship was not a gift, not a personal belonging; it was a divine duty.

The ordinance itself put a major emphasis on justice. The royal judge had to be impartial, and could not accept gifts, for him or his household. The *baillis* and *seneschals* were prohibited from offering gifts to the members of the council, before whom they brought their account books.\(^6\) Louis also addressed the problem of *baillis* and *seneschals* potentially creating local power bases in their provinces; they were not allowed to own lands in their area of government, or marry their sons there. In addition, the king prohibited common abuses of judicial power, such as arbitrary imprisonment and the imposition of arbitrary fines.

\(^{\text{5}}\) Ordonnances des rois de France de la troisième race, 1, 65-75.

pointed out that Louis’ probable inspiration in the creation of the institution were the inquisitors of the Holy See. Accordingly, Louis’s enquêteurs had spiritual and religious overtones. Upon his return from crusade, in addition to the administrative reform heralded by his great ordinance, Louis sent out enquêteurs again, in greater number.

For Louis administration and morality were interconnected: he wished to make his kingdom holy, which meant he needed to assure the behavior of all subjects, not only those working in the royal administration. The second emphasis of the great ordinance was public morality. Taking responsibility of the spiritual well-being of his subjects, much as if they were his flock, the king prohibited blasphemy, prostitution, games of chance, and the patronizing of taverns by all except travelers on the road. He also legislated against trial by battle, private wars and tournaments. The king showed a genuine concern for the monetary and spiritual well-being of his subjects.

Before we grow too attached to the vision of France as it is presented in the great ordinance, we should take a moment to consider that Louis, the paragon of Christian kingship, did not rule France completely by himself. Louis was, when he took the throne, the oldest among six brothers (and one sister, who did not rule any lands). As the eldest, rearing and educating his siblings was his responsibility, until the day they reached their maturity and came into their own lands. The king’s father, Louis VIII, left

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7 Glenisson, “Les Enquêteurs-Reformateurs de 1270 à 1328,” 19
each of his sons an *apanage*; a part of the royal domain that would be his to rule independently. The lands the princes of the blood were invested with were not the least of the crown’s domains: Artois, Anjou, Maine and Poitou. Any of the *aparages* would have made for a kingdom of non-negligible size and strength. At the same time, all those provinces were poorly integrated into the royal domain, so that temporary rule by a prince of the blood was a step on the path of full integration. Since the *aparages* reverted to the crown upon the death of the prince, any administrative decisions made for them would have a chance to effect the royal administration. Administrative personnel who had proven their worth were also likely to stay on, perpetuating the old way of doing things.

Louis did not begrudge his brothers their lands, quite the opposite. The princes who survived to maturity, namely Robert, Alphonse and Charles, were invested with their *aparages* when they reached their majority, at which point they married, the king knighted them and they did homage to him for their lands. Robert was invested with the city of Arras and the county of Artois in 1237, on the occasion of his marriage to the daughter of the duke of Brabant. Later the same year Louis knighted Robert in Compiegne in the presence of thousands of knights.\(^8\) The king gave his brother expensive symbolic gifts, including a horse and the trappings for a chapel. Additionally,

\(^8\) *Vie et Vertus de Saint Louis*, 34.
Louis gave the count of Arras [do you mean viscount of Arras?] a gift of land on Robert’s behalf. In exchange, Robert received Hesdin, Lens and Bapaume.

Alphonse, second oldest, received the lands of Poitou, Auvergne and Albigois in 1241, upon marrying Jean, the daughter of the count of Toulouse.⁹ His dubbing was an ornate and splendid affair, held in Saumur on the 24th of June 1241. Jean de Joinville wrote a vivid first-hand account of the occasion, which was attended by barons, prelates and three thousand knights.¹⁰ Twenty-nine young nobles were knighted on the same day as Alphonse, tying them together in bonds of loyalty. Each new knight received expensive gifts from the king. Among the assembled, in their samite and silk, the young king stood out to Joinville, not in his splendor, but because he was wearing an ill-fitting hat.

The dubbings were important occasions for exhibiting and solidifying the power of the Capetians. The elaborate affairs served multiple purposes. First, they drew the nobility to the king, reaffirming his authority. Second, the dubbings celebrated the warrior aristocracy, underscoring the king’s commitment to the values that united that group, of which he and his brothers were members. Moreover, common celebration was likely to bring the members of the elite closer together. The display of royal power was also meant to bolster the claims of the princes of the blood.

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⁹ Vie et Vertus de Saint Louis, 52.

¹⁰ Jean de Joinville, 169.
Louis offered Alphonse additional support in claiming his homages. Immediately after the knighting the king took his brother with him to Poitiers, likely because he expected his brother to run into trouble with the count of la Marche. The count was a powerful and ambitious man, married to an even more ambitious woman, and had strong ties to king Henry III of England. At one time, Alphonse was engaged to the count’s daughter, and at that time queen Blanche made the count of La Marche a gift of the province of Aunis.  

There are conflicting accounts, but it seems the count of La March refused at first to do homage to Alphonse for his lands in Poitiers, leaving in a huff. In spite of that, Louis insisted that Alphonse receive the full legacy intended by Louis VIII, including the province of Aunis.

As count of Poitou and lord of Auvergne, Alphonse was already a powerful prince, but he was about to augment his power considerably. Alphonse became the count of Toulouse and marquis of Provence in 1249, with the death of count Raymond VII of Toulouse, his father-in-law. He was now the greatest feudatory in the realm.

Alphonse was married to the Raymond VII’s daughter, Jeanne, but he did not come by the county of Toulouse in accordance with the regular rules of inheritance. Alphonse’s claim to the lands of house Saint Gilles was based in the terms of the 1229 treaty of

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11 Boutaric, *Saint Louis et Alphonse de Poitiers*, 49.

12 *Vie et Vertus de Saint Louis*, 52.

Paris, the peace treaty that ended the Albigensian crusade. The main distinction between the manners of inheritance was that if Alphonse died without issue, as he eventually did, Jean would reserve no rights over the county, which would revert to the royal domain. Had the couple been fruitful, a cadet branch of the Capetians likely would have been established in the former lands of the house of Saint Gilles. Louis must have had great faith in his brother, to entrust to him such a potential power base.

Alphonse’s lands were made out of two newly acquired provinces; Auvergne, first conquered in 1212, and the Toulousain, officially not a part of the royal domain until Alphonse’s death. Both those provinces shared a southern culture and language that Alphonse was unfamiliar with. The third province, Poitou, was packed with warlike barons of uncertain loyalty. Regardless of the challenges they posed, together these lands formed a large, if noncontiguous, realm. However, for the purpose of ascertaining Alphonse’s power as a prince, it is not enough to know where his lands lay, how rich they were, how peaceful; the count held his lands from his brother, possibly the most powerful man in Europe. How free was he to do with his lands as he pleased?

Louis reserved the right to get involved in his brothers’ apanages, although he was careful and did not meddle often. In fact, Louis never interfered in Alphonse’s lands, although he acted as arbiter between his brother and other nobles in various court cases. The king did, however, interfere in the inner workings of Charles of Anjou’s apanage on at least three occasions. Those three incidents serve to shed light on the
amount of free rein Louis allowed the princes of the blood within their lands. Guillaume de Saint Pathus, a mendicant who was confessor to Queen Marguerite and to her daughter Isabella, preserved the record of these three court cases in his *Vertus de Saint Louis*.

Guillaume’s description of the first court case is somewhat laconic. A man from Anjou appealed before the king’s court that count Charles coerced him into selling the count property. The king ordered his brother to appear before the court to answer the charge, either in person or via proctor. Convinced of the truth of the allegation, the king returned the property to the nameless complainant, and forbade his brother from hassling him further.¹⁴

The confessor provides a more detailed account of the second appeal from Anjou. This time the petitioner was a knight, an uncle to the count of Vendôme, Burchard V. The knight had lost a case concerning the ownership of a castle in Charles’ court of Anjou. The count was not only the judge in the matter; he was also the knight’s adversary, and the victor. Charles insisted that the judgment was final and refused to entertain an appeal. Moreover, furious that the man had appealed to the royal court, the count imprisoned him under miserable conditions and refused to release him in spite of many offered pledges. Charles’ course of action was preemptive as well as

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¹⁴ *Vie de Saint Louis par Guillaume de Saint-Pathus*, 141.
punitive, since the knight could not very well pursue his appeal from a prison cell. However, the strategy failed. The knight’s appeal was carried to court by his squire, who “vint jusques a la presence du benoiet roi et li senefia toutes les choses desus dites.”

After the king had heard “all those things” from the squire, he summoned Charles to appear before him in person. When the count presented himself the king chastised him sharply in front of the court, telling him, “il devoit etre un roi en france et quil ne creust pas, por ce [que il] etait son frère, qu’il l’espargnast contre droite justice en null chose.” Louis then ordered his brother to release the knight so that he could pursue his appeal himself. Charles, clearly not altogether cowed, continued his campaign of intimidation, sending a host of trained legal specialists and witnesses from Anjou to confront the lesser noble. The knight confided to the king that he was unable to hire proper legal representation, both on account of his lack of funds and because the Angevin lawyers, fearing possible repercussion, would not take on his case. The king provided the knight with his own legal scholars, after swearing them to give the knight

\[\text{\footnotesize 15 Ibid.}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize 16 Ibid.}\]
loyal service. Finally, following a long process in front of the king, the decision of the court of Anjou was overturned.

In the third instance, a coalition of bourgeois merchants from many places launched a complaint against count Charles in Louis’ court. They demanded restitution for loans given to the count and merchandise sold to him, since payments had not been forthcoming. The king ordered his younger brother to settle his debts. When Charles continued to drag his feet, Louis threatened to take away his lands, which as mentioned he held by homage from his brother. Charles finally made restitution.

Guillaume de Saint Pathus included these anecdotes in his account to illustrate the king’s commitment to justice and fairness, which was greater even than his love for his own flesh and blood. The confessor wrote his book with the intention that it be submitted to the papal see as supporting evidence for Louis’ canonization proceedings, and the text should not be taken at face value. However, regardless of the details of particular cases, his account of Louis’ clashes with Charles inadvertently sheds light on the many hurdles a plaintiff could expect to encounter on the way to the king’s justice. First, Louis did not inquire after his brother’s doings. In order to reach the benevolent king, one needed to proactively appeal to him. At a time when the rules of appeal and the order of appeals were not yet determined, one would have had to appear in court and request an audience. It is for that reason, in all likelihood, that Charles insisted on keeping the Angevin knight imprisoned.
Second, the expense and risk of a trip to Paris would have sufficed to put an appeal to the king’s court outside the reach of all but the powerful and the desperate. The lack of immediate access to the court was compounded by the power struggle between the king and his brother on the matter of judicial rights. Louis’ strongly worded chastisement of his brother, to the effect that he would not spare him from justice on account of their tie, was a response to Charles’ expectation that he would receive exactly that kind of special treatment (which doubtless he would have considered only fitting of his station.) In theory, the *apanages* were always a part of the realm, and Louis was its only king. Louis believed that all justice in his kingdom originated in the king and belonged to the king. In addition, the fair universal application of justice was central to his view of a righteous society, as exhibited by the weight he assigned this issue in the great ordinance.

At the same time, the high nobility was not thrilled with the king’s involvement in their judicial rights. Robert, Charles and Alphonse were Louis’ brothers, but in terms of class interests they belonged to the high nobility. The king’s public rebuke of Charles was an action in the same vein as his unexpectedly harsh verdict against Enguerran de Coucy.¹⁷ The very fact that he had to chastise Charles multiple times for the same

¹⁷ Ibid., 137-40.
behavior is proof of the underlying conflict. Louis needed to make such bold statements, in front of his court, because the struggle between the high nobility and the king was still ongoing, as attested to by Charles’ reluctance to come to heel.

Guillaume de Saint Pathus’ account also elucidates the issue of access to representation, an inequality (still) inherent in the adversarial justice system. Thirteenth-century France was overrun with lawyers, so it seems hiring one should not have proven too difficult a task. However, the king’s brothers and other high nobles had access to the great legal minds of their time. Even without the threat of blackballing any Angevin lawyer who backed a legal rival, the weaker (read poorer) party was at a disadvantage.

Finally, under the existing conditions, an appellant had to submit to the hostility of the great lord he was arguing against. It is probably no coincidence that successful appeals launched against Charles of Anjou were brought by a knight with immediate ties to the high nobility, who could trust a squire to travel to Paris in his stead and approach the king directly, and by a coalition of bourgeois, pooling their power and influence to demand restitution. One could not afford to launch an appeal over minor injustices—it would have been an undertaking worthwhile only when all else failed, regardless of the very real moral rectitude and commitment to justice of the man sitting on the throne (or, in Louis’ case, at the base of a tree). In conclusion, it seems that the princes of the
blood enjoyed a great deal of freedom from supervision within their *apanages*, as long as they did not defy Louis too obviously.

In addition, we must accept that Louis loved his brothers very much, and was in fact quite lenient with them, despite protestations to the contrary. In part, Louis had to be lenient with his brothers, since they were his most trusted supporters. Alphonse and Charles’ support permitted the king to stay in *Outremer* following the crusade and rebuild the crusader kingdoms. Following Blanche’s death Louis relied on his brothers to rule France, even asking them to arrange a new truce with England, despite the fact that the official regent was his underage son Louis. The conflicting pressures of his love to his brothers and his love of justice must have weighed on him, since he instructed his son and heir, Philip III, on the matter: “Aime tes frères et leur voiles touzjors bien et aimmes leurs bons avancemenz et leur soies en lieu de pere a enseinier les en tout bien; mes garde, pour amour que tu aies vers aucun, [que] tu ne te desvoies de ferre droit, ne ne fai as autres chose que tu ne doies.”

As I mentioned previously, Guillaume de Saint Pathus did not record any occasion on which the king was at odds with his brother Alphonse, strengthening the impression that Alphonse was the “good,” obedient brother, in contrast with the willful

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18 Ibid., 68, “Love your brothers and always wish them well and want their advancement and be like a father to teach them; but have care not to do what you have no right to do and not to hurt another out of love for anyone.”
and ambitious Charles. This may be the result of the record’s context, as at the time of the canonization process Charles was Saint Louis’ only surviving brother, and one does not speak ill of the dead. Guillaume quotes Charles as saying that he had never known any of his three deceased brothers to commit a mortal sin. The monk, like other hagiographers of Saint Louis, intended to cast the entire family in a beatific light: Blanche, Isabella, Louis, and also, for a while, Alphonse and Robert. For example, rather than condemning Robert of Artois’ foolhardy attack on Mansourah, which cost him his life and may well have cost his brother the crusade, Guillaume de Saint Pathus praises the count for dying a martyr, the fulfillment of a childhood desire instilled in him by his mother’s spiritual teachings.19 The attempted beatification of an entire generation of Capetians was not, of course, devoid of a political agenda.

Even taking this bias into account, it does seem like the king had a special connection with Alphonse, who, for the most part, was his staunch supporter. Alphonse shared Louis’ single-minded commitment to the crusade. He started preparing for a second passage as soon as he returned from the first, as early as 1250. Alphonse intended to rejoin his brother in Outremer immediately, although his plans were derailed by either illness, the needs of France, or a combination of the two (the letter from the chaplain to Louis is proof of that). Guillaume de Pathus needed no further

19 Ibid., 15.
proof of Alphonse’s religious devotion: “et encore pour passer plus prochainement et pour tenir son dit, il avoit en propos de passer tantost aincois que il revenist en France, pour ce que il aidast et secorust a la Sainte Terre. Et einsi eust il fet el tens que il trespassa, se il n’eust este mene par meilleur conseil ace que il eust ordene a reperier un pou de tens en France, pour la volente Dieu greigneur acomplir et por fere plus grant proufit a la Terre Sainte. De quoi il fu mout triste [de ce que] il ne passait, me que] il n’estoit past besoing a la Sainte Terre que il Passat adonc la mer si tost.”

This was no hagiographer’s trope; as we will study in detail in following chapters, financing a second crusade was a major preoccupation of the Count of Poitier’s. Alphonse’s yearning to return to the Holy Land was wholly spiritual in nature, as he stood nothing material to gain and much to lose in this endeavor. His brother must have appreciated this, given that he had a special spot in his heart for all those who followed him on crusade. Louis and Alphonse shared a metaphysical obsession, and that was a powerful bond, even if Louis had other moral aspirations that Alphonse did not share. In contrast, although Charles of Anjou joined his brothers on both crusades, he was not as committed to the crusade as a manner of salvation. Charles had to be persuaded into going on the second

\[20\] Ibid., 15.

\[21\] Ibid., 89.
crusade, and he acquiesced in large part because as king of Sicily he saw a chance to advance his standing in the Mediterranean.

Alphonse’s fervent preparation for a second crusade may have been connected to his childless marriage. Alphonse married Jeanne in order to bring the Toulousain into the French realm, and did not attempt to set her aside when the marriage proved fruitless. Perhaps he loved her, after all the count and the countess went together on both crusades, reluctant to part. Alternatively, Alphonse may not have wanted to put the reintegration of the Toulousain in jeopardy. Either way, by the late 1250s, with both partners in their late thirties, the count must have realized that whatever lands, honors or fortune he amassed would benefit only his brother’s children. In light of that, it is understandable that Alphonse’s ambition was wholly directed at the Holy Land and personal redemption.

Alphonse supported his brother’s international policy, which was geared towards peace making, arbitration, and prevention of wars between Christians. The sister-queens of France and England, Marguerite and Eleanor, tried hard to get Alphonse involved in the baronial rebellion in England. They hoped for his active participation, but he would not yield.

The attempted recruitment is chronicled in a series of letters between the queens and the count. First, Queen Marguerite asked Alphonse to intervene in private war between the count of Comminges, his vassal, and Gaston de Bearn, her cousin.
Gaston de Bearn was an especially bellicose knight, and was willing to come to Henry’s aid, provided he could extract himself from the war he was already embroiled in. Marguerite complained to Alphonse that her cousin was being oppressed by the count of Comminges.\textsuperscript{22} Alphonse declined to intervene in Gaston’s favor, explaining that Gaston was the original aggressor, whose behavior “quod nobis displicet, vestram serenitatem rogantes ut vobis displiceat illud idem.”\textsuperscript{23} The queen’s continued insistence only led to Alphonse taking a harder hand on Gaston.\textsuperscript{24}

Alphonse was lord of La Rochelle, an important port where many mercantile vessels were docked. In August 1263 Queen Marguerite wrote Alphonse again, asking him to put the vessels docked in La Rochelle at the disposal of the English King and queen.\textsuperscript{25} These conscripted ships would form a navy that would attack England. Marguerite mentioned that Louis had convened peace talks between king Henry and his barons in Boulogne-sur-Mer at the end of September, and she wanted the ships until the middle of October, in case the peace talks failed. The queen’s plan would have undermined the peace talks. Alphonse replied laconically that he did not own any of the

\textsuperscript{22} Molinier, \textit{Correspondance administrative d’Alfonse de Poitiers}, 1866.

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 1867.

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., 1988, 2014.

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 2015.
ships docked in La Rochelle.\textsuperscript{26} The sisters were not stopped. At the end of October 1263 Marguerite sent Alphonse another missive, once more requesting the loan of the ships.\textsuperscript{27} Alphonse was polite but firm in his refusal; he would like to aid Henry, but he had no vessels. If any of his subjects who did own ships wanted to lease them to the English party, they could. However, he did not wish to get involved, “quia timeremus ne eis faceremus injuriam et peccatum super hoc incurreremus.”\textsuperscript{28} Eleanor, queen of England, sent a similar request, also during October.\textsuperscript{29} It was denied at the same time as her sister’s.\textsuperscript{30} Given that on other occasions Alphonse did not have any moral qualms about commandeering property, he probably stayed out of the English civil war out of support for his brother, who was hell-bent on preventing inter-Christian bloodshed.

On May \textsuperscript{7}th 1264, Eleanor wrote Alphonse once more. She hoped an army of sympathetic French nobles would come to win England back for Henry. Alphonse had repeatedly maintained that he had no vessels to contribute to this undertaking, so Eleanor came up with an ingenious solution; the count would impound all English

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 2016.
\item \textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 2017.
\item \textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 2019.
\item \textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 2020.
\item \textsuperscript{30} Ibid., 2021.
\end{itemize}
vessels docked in his ports, and use them to transport the army.\textsuperscript{31} Alphonse refused, saying that course of action seems unlawful, “timemus et videtur multis bonis hoc nos non posse seu debere facere absque magna injuria et periculo.”\textsuperscript{32}

Marguerite beseeched Alphonse one additional time, in 1265, requesting that he arrest members of the baronial party traveling from Gascony to England when they passed through his lands.\textsuperscript{33} Alphonse agreed and had the men arrested.\textsuperscript{34} However, when Louis heard of the arrests he commanded Alphonse to send the prisoners to Paris,\textsuperscript{35} where, following an inquest, he released them.\textsuperscript{36} When Alphonse finally acquiesced to one of Marguerite’s requests, Louis got involved and set it aside. This one slip does not strike me as an act of rebellion. It is more likely Alphonse acquiesced to this request because it was smaller, did not require direct international involvement, and he had refused so many before. When Louis asked for the prisoners to be sent to Paris he did it in a neutral tone and without rancor, and Alphonse complied.

\footnotesize
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 2022.
\item \textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 2023.
\item \textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 2026.
\item \textsuperscript{34} Ibid., 2027.
\item \textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 2028.
\item \textsuperscript{36} Boutaric, \textit{Saint Louis et Alphonse de Poitiers}, 110.
\end{enumerate}
Although Alphonse followed Louis’ cues and supported his policies, nonetheless, he did not always act in ways consistent with his older brother’s admittedly extreme moral standards. I shall now look into two early examples of Alphonse’s independent, self-interested actions. The following events should make it clear that the two brothers, although close, were two very different people.

Alphonse’s health took a turn for the worse upon his return from the first crusade. In 1252, he became paralyzed. With prayer and the retaking of the crusader vow, his situation improved, but he was not returned to perfect health. As Alphonse’s chaplain saw fit to inform King Louis, his illness still troubled him during his everyday life and in particular while performing his husbandly duties.37

The following year the count contracted a disease of the eyes and lost partial sight. Perhaps on account of the incomplete relief offered by faith, Alphonse’s treatment plan changed. He sent his servant, Philip Salsarius, to find and hire a famous Jewish doctor residing in Aragon. Patronizing a Jewish doctor was unorthodox if not prohibited outright. Alphonse was assisted in this matter by his vassal, Raymond, sire of Lunel.

Boutaric and Ducluzeau have cast the sire of Lunel as the driving force behind Alphonse choice of doctors.\(^{38}\) However, the only primary document, a letter from Raymond to Alphonse, does not support this conclusion.\(^{39}\) It was Phillip Salsarius, the count’s messenger, who told the sire of Lunel which of his Jews to question about the doctor. Only after the arrival of Philip Salsarius did the sire of Lunel conduct an inquiry, and learn that the doctor was called Habrahaym, that he came from the lands of the Saracens and now lived in Aragon, and was a very wealthy merchant. The two Jews from Lunel also told their lord that the physician could cure the count quickly, as long as Alphonse could still tell small objects apart in close quarters and could still discern between green and blue.

True, Raymond of Lunel was eager to be of service. He spoke with the Jews “incontinenti” after receiving the messenger. He sent them to Aragon, accompanied by the count’s messenger, “the Sunday after the arrival of the letter.” The letter arrived the day after Ascension, namely Friday, so they departed in some haste. Raymond also promised that, if needed, he would personally travel to Aragon to convince the doctor, even by appealing to the king of that realm. Lunel, near the southern rim of Languedoc, was an important Jewish center, not far from Aragon. Raymond, a southerner, could be


\(^{39}\) *Layettes du Trésor de chartes*, vol. 3, 4055.
expected to be more familiar and untroubled with dealing with Jews. Alphonse, on the
contrary, while married into southern nobility and ruling southern lands, spent his time
in France mostly in the North. Nonetheless the impetus clearly originated with the
count himself, and he deserves the full weight of moral disapproval.

Raymond of Lunel’s letter raises questions that, sadly, remain unanswered. How
did the count hear about this doctor, whose name he was ignorant of? How did the
count’s messenger know which of the Jews of Lunel to interview? How did the Lunel
Jews come by their knowledge of the efficacy of Habrahaym’s methods? Had they had
previous discussion with him on the matter of the count’s illness, or were they merely
exhibiting familiarity with ophthalmology? I have found no other mentions of Phyllip
Salsarius, the count’s messenger to Lunel. His second name, “saucer” or “salter,” may
mean that he was a member of the count’s household. His first name, with some
probability, suggests that he could have been a convert, which would explain why he
was chosen for this mission.

Be that as it may, the Jewish doctor was reluctant to take the count on as a
patient. Common wisdom is that Habrahaym was afraid to visit France because of Louis’
vehement anti-Jewish policy. Habrahaym stated that he was concerned with being
forced to stay on in the count’s court against his wishes, a diplomatic way of

40 Ibid.
expressing his lack of desire to reside in France. The physician demanded that the count produce letters of safe passage, and send letters asking the king of Aragon’s permission to let him leave the lands of the Crown (presumably so he may return). He also insisted the dealings be kept secret.

The physician had good reason for concern. First, there was widespread anti-Jewish sentiment in northern France, where Alphonse resided, sanctioned by the crown and flourishing in the wake of the crusade. In 1247 a ritual murder accusation in Valréas ended in the judicial torture and murder of several Jews, all of whom gave contradicting testimony, implicating different accomplices, and denied the confessions when asked to repeat them willingly. \(^{41}\) In 1251, rumors that the Saracens were triumphing over the crusader forces gave birth to a spontaneous and chaotic movement, known as the Shepherds’ Crusade or the Pastoureaux. Working at first with royal sanction, they attacked those they considered enemies of the crusade: nobles who did not take the passage, wealthy churchmen and Jews. \(^{42}\)

Moreover, the king’s personal attitude towards Jews was well known to be one of hatred. Louis wanted the Jews of his realm to convert, and encouraged their conversion by making life as Jews as difficult as possible. Financially, the endeavor took

\(^{41}\) Jordan, *Louis IX and the Challenge of the Crusade*, 147.

\(^{42}\) Ibid.
the form of anti-usury legislation, reiterated over and over, beginning in the very earliest days of his rule.\textsuperscript{43} Moneylending was one of the few ways for Jews to make a living in a Christian world. Without usury, there was no profit to be made in moneylending. The king also tried to prevent Jews from practicing their religion. In order for a Jewish community to observe their religion, they required a copy of the Talmud. In 1242 Louis supported the renewed ban and burning of the Talmud in Paris, a burning that the pope himself was ambivalent about.\textsuperscript{44} The king also forbade Jewish-Christian interactions, especially ones where Jews had authority over Christians. Jews could not use the services of prostitutes; they could not visit taverns, and had to dismiss any Christian servants.\textsuperscript{45}

Anti-Jewish legislation and attitudes were the norm in medieval Europe, rather than the exception. It is noteworthy, therefore, that even contemporaries remarked on Louis’ special zeal on the matter; the king was famous for hating Jews. In 1254, responding to a Jewish plea to be allowed to leave England, count Richard of Cornwall opined, “Where would you flee, wretched people? Behold the king of France hates you

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 129.

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., 137.

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid.
and persecutes you, and condemned you to perpetual exile. You wish to avoid Charybdis only to encounter Scylla.”

Guillaume de Chartres, Louis’ chaplain, also observed his strong hatred, “Judaeos autem Deo et hominibus odibiles abominabatur in tantum, quod eos videre non poterat, nec aliquid de bonis eorum in usus suos converti volebat, asserens se nolle eorum retinere venenum.” Louis’ attitude, as described by Guillaume, was irrational and exaggerated. It reflected a fear of corruption so great, it even attached to confiscated property. Louis’ counselors found the king’s viewpoint unreasonable: they warned him that everyday life could not go on without loans. It was better that the Jews provide them, rather than Christians damn themselves by engaging in usury. The king corrected them: Christian moneylenders were the church’s jurisdiction. The Jews belonged to him, so it was his moral responsibility to restrain them: “veneno suo inficiant terram meam.”

In 1253, the same year that Alphonse asked Habrahaym to travel to Northern France, the king sent a missive to France commanding that all Jews of his realm who did

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46 Matthæi Parisiensis, monachi Sancti Albani, Chronica majora, vol. 5, 441.

47 Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France, vol. 20, 34.

48 Ibid.
not live “by honest labor” be exiled. Matthew Paris suggests that the king was provoked into issuing the order because the Saracens taunted him for suffering the enemies of Christ to live in his lands. It has also been suggested that the king had heard rumors that in his absence the Jews were morally corrupting his kingdom. The command fits neatly with Louis’ resurgent concern, following the failure of the crusade, with the moral perfection of France. With Blanche, the king’s official regent, having died the year before, it would have been up to his brothers to comply with his demand, in case Alphonse needed a reminder that his older brother hated Jews.

If the general atmosphere in France was not enough to discourage Habrahaym, there was also a specific concern about a Jewish doctor treating a Christian patient. A preoccupation with poison, common in the thirteenth century, gave rise to fear of doctors and pharmacists, who, in disguise of caring for a patient, could insidiously cause his death. The fear of treachery was even greater when the physician was a Jew. It was accepted that Jews hated Christians, and there was also an association between Jews and poison (as seen in the excerpt from Guillaume de Chartres above.). This thirteenth-century fascination with poison is concurrent with the initial appearance, in this century, of conciliar decisions addressing the question of Jewish doctors. The first synod to

legislate this relationship was the 1227 synod in Trier, which asked lords to make sure Jewish physicians did not treat Christians on their lands. The synod of Albi, 1254, authored a more definitive decision. It decreed that, “all Christians who, when sick, put themselves in the care of Jews, will be excommunicated.”

This Synod was held on Alphonse’s lands.

Although not verbalized until the fourteenth century, the church was concerned less with possible physical malpractice and more with spiritual malpractice. The worst case scenario was one in which a Jewish doctor intentionally interfered with his patient’s salvation by deceiving the invalid about the true state of his health, with the intention of delaying last rites. Granted, the decision of the council of Albi postdated Alphonse’s mission to Aragon. However, the council did not create suspicion and mistrust of Jewish doctors, it merely acknowledged them. Alphonse would have been well aware that he was taking a controversial course of action, if a practical one. This realistic, secular approach to disease sets Alphonse apart from Louis, for whom illness, like so many other things, was spiritual in essence.

The concept of physical suffering carried a great deal of moral and religious importance for Louis, and embracing the infirmities of the flesh was a cornerstone of his religious practice. Accordingly, the king did not fear illness. In fact, he courted the

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50 Shatzmiller, Jews, Medicine and Medieval Society, 91.
company of lepers and relished the opportunity to immerse himself elbow-deep in putrid flesh, living or dead.\textsuperscript{51} The king was fond of caring for the sick, in particular the sick religious of his favorite abbey, Royaumont. He often visited their infirmary, stopping by every invalid’s side to offer consolations. He was followed on these visits by his physicians, and would send for proper medicine.\textsuperscript{52}

Louis relished performing the good works with his own hands. On one occasion the king hand-fed morsels of pear to a monk who was disfigured by sores on his face. While the king fed him morsels of pear, “la porreture ou l’ordure qui couroit des plaies du dit malade qui estoient de chsacune partie du nes, couloit sus la main du roy,” who had to stop and wash his hands twice before the pear was consumed.\textsuperscript{53} When the king visited hospitals, the knights accompanying him were sometimes so disturbed by the odors and appearances of the ill that they had to leave the room.\textsuperscript{54}

Brother Leger, a leprous monk from Royaumont, was a particular favorite of the king’s, who came to see him many times. Brother leger was very ill: “qui estoit di despiz et si abominables que pour la grant maladie ses ieux estoient si degastez que il ne veoit

\textsuperscript{51} Vie de Saint Louis par Guillaume de Saint-Pathus, 100.

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., 93.

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., 98.

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 97.
goute, et avoit perdu le nes et ses levres estoient fendues et grosses et les pertuis des
ieux estoient rouges et hysdeus a veoir.”55 He was so ill that he had been put in
isolation, for fear of contagion. Kneeling before the bed of the leper, Louis practiced
ritual servility. He offered Leger his choice of luxury meats from the royal stores, then
asked him for his preference of sauce. The monk opted for partridge in salt. The king
then hand fed the man with the ruined face, dipping the morsels in salt and carefully
placing them in the monk’s mouth, taking care to avoid getting the grains in the open
sores on Brother Leger’s lips. Throughout this meal, the king advised the monk to suffer
patiently, because his illness was his purgatory in this world: “il valoit miex qu’il soufrist
cel maladie ici que il soufrist autre chose el siècle avenir.”56 Louis frequently asked
Brother Leger to pray for him, presumably because his physical suffering meant that he
was spiritually superior. For others, his leprosy was at best, repulsive, and at worse the
mark of a sinner; as far as Louis was concerned brother Leger’s wound covered body
made him holier, worthier, more likely to be a successful intercessor with God.

Louis brought physicians with him to the infirmary, but he went to see brother
Leger accompanied only by the abbot. It is likely that Brother Leger was beyond help, as
far as contemporary medicine went. Note, however, that Louis, despite the fact that

55 Ibid., 94.
56 Ibid., 95.
scrofula and leprosy were occasionally confused, did not attempt to cure either of these critically ill monks by using the Capetian healing touch, which was miraculous and knew no such limitations. Louis saw the torments of disease, in all their plastic horror, as a short cut to heaven. Such an opportunity was not to be wasted; the king could heal the body, but disease could heal the soul. The king instructed both his son, Philip, and his daughter, Isabelle, on the proper way to conduct themselves should they fall ill. It is, in fact, one of the first topics of his instructions. He wrote his son and heir, “Se Nostre Seigneur t’envoie aucune persecucion ou maladie ou autre chose, tu le dois souffrir de bonne volente et li dois render graces et savoir l’en bon gre; car tu dois penser que tu l’as bien deservi et ce, et plus se il vouloit, pour ce que tu l’as pou ame et pou servi et a fet mout de choses contreres a sa volente.”

The king recommended the same course of action to his daughter, “se vos avez aucune persecucion de maladie ou autre chose en la quele vous ne puissiez mettre conseil en bonne maniere, soufrez la donques de bonne volente et rendez pour ce graces a Nostre Seigneur et l’en sachiez bon gre: car vos devez croire que il fet ce pour nostre bien, et devez croire que vos avez ce deserve, et plus se il voloit, pour ce que vos l’avez pou ame at pou servi et fet mout de choses contreres a sa volonte.”

57 Ibid., 65.

58 Ibid., 61.
Louis practiced the approach he preached. The king suffered from poor health throughout his life, and transformed his physical agony into religious fervor, “il soufri de sa bonne volonté aspers[ces] et gries en entenc[ion] d’avoir l’amour de Nostre Seigneur et en esperance d’avoir salut pardurable.” Louis took the crusader vow for the first time in 1244, during a grave malady. The king’s doctors feared for his life, and they were not the only ones. In all the churches in France subjects prayed for Louis. Pope Innocent IV was aggrieved by the news, afraid of losing the church’s lay protector. As soon as Louis regained consciousness, he took the crusader vow. Complete convalescence was only attained following the celebration of a special feast day dedicated to Saint Denis and his companions. On that day the monks of Saint Denis exhibited the relics of the saints in the church and carried them in a procession. This drew a sufficient amount of prayers and tears of contrition to convince God to cure the young king completely. The king’s recovery was a grand religious drama with a cast of thousands.

Guillaume de Nangis concludes his description of the king’s illness thus, “la maladie de roi était dans les desseins de la Providence; il en resulta beaucoup de bien, comme par example, la secours de la terre d’outre mer, quand il prit la croix, et les

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59 Ibid., 112.

60 *Vie et Vertus de Saint Louis*, 72.
ameliorations qu’il fit en son royaume.” The king likely saw things similarly. The illness was the impetus for the crusade, an undertaking he dedicated his life to. God was present in the fever, in the darkness on the edge of death. Taking up the cross was a watershed moment in Louis’ life, and in French history. Moreover, that was how it was viewed by contemporaries. If this was not the origin of Louis’ religious appreciation of illness, it must have bolstered it considerably. This appreciation explains the patient manner with which the king accepted the health problems that plagued him for the remainder of his life.

In 1250, outside Mansourah, a plague of dysentery decimated the ranks of the crusaders. Louis was among the afflicted. His teeth became loose and he lost so much weight that his vertebrae were apparent under his skin. According to the testimony of Ysembert, the sole servant who was present for the ordeal, the king never complained, but suffered patiently, and prayed constantly. When the weak and hungry crusaders tried to return to Damietta they were ambushed on the way. The afflicted king fought bravely but when he saw the battle was lost, he surrendered. Sick, taken prisoner, weary from a day of fighting, the king still called his chaplain so they could say nones together.

61 Ibid.

62 Vie de Saint Louis par Guillaume de Saint-Pathus, 113.
The defeat turned out to have been the work of Providence; the sultan had his own physicians tend to the king. Without their superior medical knowledge, Guillaume de Nangis assures us, Louis would have perished.\textsuperscript{63} The sultan’s physicians were very probably Muslim or Jewish, but the situation was different from Alphonse’s. Louis did not seek out Muslim or Jewish doctors, but accepted his illness and probable death. As a prisoner, his treatment was out of his control. God rewarded Louis for being the perfect Christian patient by healing him. He was worthy of health because he accepted his disease.

In his later years, the king suffered from bouts of illness several times a year. For the duration of the spell, a few days at a time, the king lost his hearing, could not eat or sleep, and was too weak to leave his bed. His right leg swelled and reddened between the ankle and the leg.\textsuperscript{64} This affliction, too, he bore gratefully. Louis died after a three week long fever while on his second crusade. At first, although grievously ill, the king kept all the canonical hours recumbent in bed. He requested that the cross be brought to his bedside, and he embraced and kissed it. Louis thanked God for his illness, made confession and took communion frequently. When the priest carrying the wafer walked into the room, the king would throw himself to the floor, and would remain kneeling

\textsuperscript{63} Vie et Vertus de Saint Louis, 126.

\textsuperscript{64} Vie de Saint Louis par Guillaume de Saint-Pathus, 117.
and praying before he took communion. Too weak from illness, he would have to be helped back to his bed. Even after he lost the ability to speak, the king continued to pray, lifting his clasped hands to the heavens.65

Given the king’s attitude towards comingling of Christians and Jews, it is unlikely that he would have sanctioned his brother’s choice of medical specialist. In fact, given the penalty of excommunication, it is likely Louis would have preferred his brother to suffer patiently. Alphonse must have known this course of action was controversial. Even Habrahaym, a recent transplant to Aragon from the lands of the Saracens, was not ignorant of the implications of accepting the position.

Alphonse’s willingness to hire a Jewish doctor was not the result of any particular affinity to Jews. In 1249 he expelled the Jews from several cities in Poitiers, in exchange for a monetary gift of four shillings per household.66 In the course of raising funds for his second passage, he ransacked the homes of the Jews the county of Toulouse and imprisoned them along with their women and children.67 Then again, Alphonse was ruthless when raising money regardless of the religion of the despoiled. He did not seem to share Louis’ hatred of Jews, although he was happy to expel them if there was

65 Ibid., 153-155.


67 Boutaric, Saint Louis et Alphonse de Poitiers, 322.
monetary incentive. Alphonse’s letters on the matter of the expulsion of the Jews of Poitou are curiously lacking in moralistic tone. He attributes no adjectives to his Jews. They are not described as morally corrupt, nor is Poitou pronounced cleaner for their absence. Alphonse was not invested in Louis’ moral program, outside the crusade. He made decisions based on practical needs.

This image fits well with Alphonse’s behavior in setting aside the last will and testament of Count Raymond VII of Toulouse. Raymond passed away in 1249, just after Alphonse left France on his first crusade. The count made a generous will, leaving ten thousand marks and all his gold and silver vessels and precious stones in alms. Additionally he commanded his executors to send fifty knights on crusade at his expense. Alphonse was notified of the count’s death and sent a copy of his will by his chaplain, Philip, treasurer of St. Hilaire.  

He had ample time to peruse the document before his return to France, in 1251.

In May 1251 Alphonse summoned twenty one legal scholars to Toulouse to find fault with the will. Alphonse met the scholars in Toulouse so he could show them the document himself, and the implication that this was a personal favor to the count was not missed. From the wording of their decision, the scholars realized what was being

68 Ibid., 69-73.

69 Layettes du Trésor de chartes, vol. 3, 3939.
asked of them. They described the documents as the defunct’s will and codicil “according to what many people say . . . with others saying that these charters ought not to be trusted, not as the testament nor a certain last will of the lord count, although from them hung many and more seals.” The scholars were hinting that they were initially expected to declare the will a forgery, but on account of the seals the plan had to change.

Fortunately, an original copy of Raymond VII’s testament and codicil survived, allowing modern historians to see for themselves that it contained all the proofs of authenticity required at the time. Indeed, Alphonse’s legal team found no fault with the authenticity, “Those lawyers, moreover, having considered the data, and with the said charters carefully examined, granted they did not cancel or abolish them, nor found them faulty in any of their parts.”

However, aware that the count wanted to set the will aside, the lawyers were primed to find fault with the will. They invalidated the will based on a slew of technicalities. Some of the lacunas they found were not even required to be filled by local custom, but only by Roman law. The main problems with the will were that it was not read publically to the witnesses at the time it was given, that it was not signed by the count in the presence of the witnesses, that it had been opened without the presence of the heirs (who were on crusade), and when it was opened that witnesses did not recognize their seals, “in the manner fixed and given in the jure civili.” The
lawyers assembled in Toulouse followed the common legal maxim—since the facts were
against them, they argued the law. They reached the conclusion that the count and
countess were not responsible for the will unless they were “urged by their own
conscience.” His own conscience only urged Alphonse to fulfill one element of the will;
he did send fifty knights to the Holy Land, although likely he did that out of his own
devotion to the crusade.

Could Alphonse have had genuine concerns about the validity of the will? An
inquest into the manner of the count’s death and the drawing up of his will casts
substantial doubts on that. The inquest contained the testimonies of three
trustworthy men who were present when Count Raymond VII made his will, Sicard
l’Alaman, Ponce d’Austaud and J. Auriol. All three agreed that the count dictated his will
to J. Auriol when he was on his deathbed in Milaud. Auriol then read it to the two other
men in a room that lay below the Count’s. When Ponce d’Austaud, the chancellor,
protested that the will had to be signed with great ceremony, Sicard countered that the
count was too ill, and it sufficed according to the custom of the land that the will be
signed by the count and by his barons.

Sicard was a central figure in count Raymond VII’s administration. Among other
responsible positions, he was tasked by the dying count with governing the county of

\[70\] *Layettes du Trésor des chartes*, Vol 3, 3939
Toulouse until the return of Alphonse. He later became a key player in Alphonse’s administration, essentially retaining his position but without an official title.  

In other words, this was a person Alphonse trusted and who was familiar with local custom.

Either Sicard intentionally sabotaged the will, perhaps with an eye towards his future employment, or Alphonse set aside a will he knew perfectly well to be both authentic and acceptable. Pons d’Astoaud also continued on in the new regime, and was trusted with the administration of justice in Languedoc, again, without title. Moreover, the count had started making his will during a previous illness from which he recovered. He kept most of the items from this first will for his second, so it could not be argued that he made it rashly and was not in his right mind.

Although the will was very generous, it was not out of proportion with Raymond’s wealth and with his desire to reconfirm his orthodoxy, frequently called into doubt on account of his father’s affiliation with the Albigensians. (Although it seems clear the older count Raymond was not a heretic, he was excommunicated and the family’s prestige suffered.) By revoking the will Alphonse was risking the eternal soul of his father-in-law. Relying on legal sophistry, Alphonse had the will set aside. His main intent was to stop the gift of alms. His monetary need at the time was great: he had spent a fortune on the crusade, and wanted to attempt another passage. However,

71 Boutaric, *Saint Louis et Alphonse de Poitiers*, 126.
regardless of how he planned to use the money, he had to despoil churches to get it. On account of the two years that elapsed between the count’s death and Alphonse’s return to France, many of the alms had already been distributed.

The churches and monasteries who had been the intended recipients of Raymond’s generosity complained bitterly. Alphonse made arrangements with some, in particular the most powerful houses. Fontevraud, a strong monastery with royal ties, gave him the most trouble. Count Raymond VII was buried there, alongside his royal Plantagenet relatives. Accordingly, he left the monastery the largest gift, five thousand marks of silver and all his precious vessels, stones and jewelry. The precious objects had already been given to the monastery by the time Alphonse returned to France, which did not prevent him from demanding them back. After “multas altercaciones” the abbess of Fontevraud came to an arrangement with Alphonse. The monastery returned the precious items to Alphonse in return for a one-time payment of fifteen hundred pounds tournois and an annual rent of four hundred pounds tournois, to come from the péage of Mermande.

Count Raymond VII made another large gift to the abbey of Cîteaux, namely fifteen hundred marks of silver. (Note that the count had previously, in 1231, made the monastery a gift in the form of rents in the city of Mermande, which he later violently

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72 Layettes du Trésor des chartes, Vol 3, 4059
took back. The monastery considered this a debt that Alphonse was responsible for. It is not clear if the money the count left Cîteaux in his will was in recompense for this. Abbot Boniface fought for the alms very diplomatically. In his letter to count Alphonse he employed the common medieval trope of the evil counselor. Boniface expressed hope that Alphonse is not swayed by “aliquorum consiliiis qui forte vobis placere intendant, vel quia non auderent vovis rectum dare consilium.” He went on to warn him, “si, par sinistrum consilium, rem alienam retineretis, hoc non esset sine detriment anime defuncti et gravi periculo anime vestre.”73 Alphonse agreed to pay Cîteaux all the money they demanded, in payments of 100 marks delivered by the bailli of Mermande. Boutaric had collected proof that weaker monasteries did not do as well. In 1270 Alphonse was still refusing to pay the Cistercian monastery of Alnise the sum of one hundred marks left them in Raymond’s will.

Both of the anecdotes I have discussed took place while Louis was still away on crusade. It is tempting to speculate that Alphonse permitted himself greater flexibility when he felt free from royal supervision, and especially given that after Blanche’s death Alphonse and Charles were the de facto (if not de jure) regents. However, as we will examine in detail in the next chapter, Alphonse did not follow his brother’s cues after Louis’ return.

73 Ibid., vol 3, 3967
As mentioned previously, the king showed a marked change in policy upon his return to France in 1254. Convinced that the failure of the crusade was an indication of God’s displeasure with him, he meant to correct his ways by making France more moral. In particular, he repented of the extortionate practices he had resorted to in order to finance the crusade, and was set on reforming the administration in a way that would prevent abuse of the rights of the weak. Wishing to make amends and to make his presence known, Louis took a meandering tour of his realm, hearing claims.\textsuperscript{74} In a conciliatory mood, he preferred to settle even questionable claims.\textsuperscript{75} His new-found sensitivity to abuses of rights made him relinquish his right of hospitality, at great expense to himself. Almost immediately upon his return the king sent out new pairs of \textit{enquêteurs} to listen for signs of abuse. He then replaced a great many of his highest administrators (\textit{baillis}, seneschals etc.) who were believed to be corrupt.

Both brothers began a reorganization of their administration in the wake of their first crusade, but it was inspired by different ideals and gave rise to different norms of government. The moral flexibility that Alphonse showed before his brother’s return is mirrored in his actions following it. Alphonse was wholly devoted to launching a second crusade. This goal required a great deal of money, and the financial need became the

\textsuperscript{74} Jordan, \textit{Louis IX and the Challenge of the Crusade}, 137.

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., 138.
guiding principal of the Alphonsine administration. All the characteristics of Alphonse’s administration—centralization, the use of *enquêteurs* as tax collectors, personal attention given to the smallest expenses—were created for the purpose of raising money for a second crusade. This same policy, relying on the use of similar agents, was adopted by future Capetians, in preference to Louis’. They used it to raise money for less holy wars with the same single minded doggedness of their great unc
Chapter Two

“The intelligence of the universe is social”

Marcus Aurelius, Meditations

Edgard Boutaric believed that the Alphonsine and royal administrations were similar because the two brothers had similar personal beliefs. Later critics, like Auguste Molinier, noted the administrative differences, but maintained that the personality of the prince was the guiding force of the administration: “Ce gouvernement peut être qualifié de personnel, et offre par suite les défauts et les qualités du prince qui en est l’âme.” Both assumed that to understand the government one must first understand the prince, and given Alphonse’s intense involvement in the workings of his administration this was an understandable assumption.

I embraced the same assumption in the first chapter, hoping to find the origins of administrative diversity in Alphonse and Louis’ personal distinctions. The view that an organization is the lengthened shadow of its leader is still common in managerial fields; its appeal is the reason contemporary Fortune 500 CEOs command huge monetary compensations and enjoy celebrity status. However, the amount of control any one man can exercise over a complex organization is limited, even when that man both owns the

76 Molinier, Correspondance administrative d’Alfonse de Poitiers, LXXVIII.
organization and leads it. For that reason I dedicate this following chapter to an analysis of the Alphonsine administration from an organization theory point of view.

My investigation relies principally on Herbert Simon’s and James March’s work on bounded rationality, and on the theories of contingency and institutions that were developed based on that work. Herbert Simon perceived organizations as decision making machines, whose human components are the “administrative men.” Administrative man, unlike his fellow abstraction, economic man, is incapable of making consistently rational choices. Rather, like his real-life counterpart, administrative man is limited by his knowledge of the relevant variables; he does not necessarily identify all the pertinent variables, and even if he did, he may not know their values. His attention is focused on the most pressing issue. His analytical skills are exhausted by a relatively low level of complexity. Later research bolstered Simon’s assessment of the deficient rationality of man, showing that even under optimal conditions humans tend to make systematic mistakes in rational deduction. For example, humans tend to overestimate rare possibilities, and they choose the option that will minimize their feelings of regret rather than the option that promises the greatest rewards.

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77 March and Simon, Organizations.

78 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow.
Organizations constrain the scope of members’ choices, surrounding them with rules, roles and plans. This allows the administrative man to make better decisions than he would alone and unbounded, although he remains fallible. Bounded rationality is an inherent characteristic of organizations, so Simon’s theory is equally applicable to a political party or to a coffee shop. For that reason, I preferred Simon’s theory of bounded rationality over public administration theory, which is used specifically to explain political organization.

Public administration theory was created to explain democratic societies, and relies on some assumptions incompatible with medieval society. For example, public administration theory supposes that a public administration receives funding from a political body and its goals do not include making a profit. The Alphonsine administration, to the contrary, fulfilled needs we would consider public (protecting public order, maintaining roads and bridges), and at the same time was also intent on producing the greatest revenue possible. I suspect many of the premises of public administration theory could be modified to apply to the medieval period, but that challenge is beyond my powers.

Employing an organization theory approach allows us to study Alphonse’s organization separately from Alphonse’s persona. The historical study of Alphonse’s administration was influenced by the myth of Saint Louis and his noble brothers, sainted mother and sister. The lines between Louis the man and Louis the most Christian king
were blurred as a result of the successful campaign to canonize him that began right after his death.\(^79\) Over the centuries this myth served many political purposes, in France and beyond it, and as a result it never lost its power.

Additionally, this analysis allows us to approach the question of medieval administrative malfeasance without becoming bogged down by the modern definition of corruption. During Alphonse’s rule, the Auvergne gained a reputation for administrative corruption. Of the four constables who served in Auvergne two were accused of serious wrongdoings. The modern definition of corruption is based on a dichotomy between the public and private spheres, a dichotomy which was not in place in the medieval period (and, if I may add, a contrast that is not as sharp as it painted even in this day and age). Organization theory allows us to study these cases as instances of anti-social behavior in organizations, which does not require a previous public/private or administrative/political dichotomy.

If we are to treat Alphonse’s administration as an organization, we had better define the concept. According to Simon and March, “Organizations are systems of coordinated action among individuals and groups whose preferences, information, interests or knowledge differ.”\(^80\) Humans have always lived in a society of organizations,

\(^79\) Gaposchkin, *The Making of Saint Louis*.

\(^80\) March and Simon, *Organizations*, 2.
for no man is an island. A family, a village and a hunting party are organizations, as are a bank, a university or a multinational firm. However, those latter organizations have more members, face greater communication problems and contain manifold levels of interdependence. They are termed complex organizations.

What makes an organization complex? There are multiple propositions, each based in a different theory of the organization. According to Thompson, a proponent of organic contingency theory, the complexity of the organization corresponds to its employment of multiple levels of interdependence and coordination. Another contingency theorist, Hage, determines the complexity of an organization based on the amount of knowledge available within it. In his view, complexity is high when an organization hires highly educated men who work in specialized fields. According to bureaucratic contingency theory an organization’s complexity is primarily a function of its size.\(^\text{81}\) Regardless of the definition, most scholars agree that complex organizations are either a novel modern phenomenon, or at the very least a primarily modern phenomenon. Modern society is dominated by complex organizations, and it is implied or stated than this was not the way of things in its pre-modern counterparts: “social,

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political and economic institutions have become larger, considerably more complex and resourceful, and prima facie more important to collective life.”

Thompson argues that modernity is a prerequisite for complex organizations because of their reliance on trained professionals. Complex organizations depend on their members being capable of rational decision making, and, according to Thompson, only modern societies produce men who have these skills, “the homogenizing influences of culture are most clearly seen in societies in transition to modernization, where the contrasts between those factors which are conductive to complex organizations and the inherited aspirations or beliefs, the perceptions and interpretations of reality, are sharp and the entrenched homogeneity thus highly visible. Indeed, the norms of rationality which accompany complex organizations may be at odds with the basic values and orientations of such cultures.”

Thompson hints that religion and belief in the supernatural, both prevalent in medieval society (and in modern western society), are incompatible with rational thinking. However, that is not his main argument against the existence of pre-modern complex organizations.

One of the most important elements of cultural preparedness, according to Thompson, is the existence of the concept of career: "social systems are always

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83 Thompson, *Organizations in Action*, 103.
structured, and in the society geared towards complex organizations, economic activities are clustered into occupations. Individuals are sorted and prepared for them and are taught to fashion careers, either within an occupation or in some combination of them . . . much of the difficulty of incorporating complex organizations into traditional societies lies in the absence of this “infrastructure”—the notion of career, aspirations defined in career terms, and the preparatory socializing agents.”

Thompson accepts Simon’s bounded rationality, and agrees that organizations are decision-making machines. Placement of the proper individuals in decision-making positions is therefore crucial, which poses another difficulty for traditional societies: “organizations in traditional societies may have less success in matching discretionary abilities with needs for discretion, for in such societies the educational institutions may not attach primacy to the preparation of decision makers, and only a minority may receive the appropriate education. Shortages of those equipped to exercise discretion result in a tendency in traditional societies to be centralized, bureaucratic and inflexible.”

When Thompson and March refer to pre-modern societies, they lump together the temporally pre-modern with the culturally pre-modern, that is contemporary

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84Ibid., 104.

85Ibid., 118.
traditional societies. They embrace, I suspect unknowingly, the idea that civilization progresses in a linear manner, so that the epitome of human achievement is found in contemporary western societies. Many of the contributors to organization theory come from modern science backgrounds, which I suspect is the source of this mistake. Modern science is unique because it advances in a gradual and cumulative way.

The notions these scholars express regarding medieval administration tend towards the simplistic and the cursory. Generally, they invoke the specter of medieval government only to criticize or justify contemporary administration. Here, for example, is Charles Perrow’s description of medieval tax collection: “during the late middle ages, the king who wanted revenues from the land and from the people he controlled would sell a tax franchise to someone, generally a nobleman. This official would agree to pay the king a set fee; he was then free to collect as much money as he could from the people and keep anything beyond the set fee. The king benefited because he did not have to organize and maintain a large bureaucracy to collect taxes. However, the collector might exact such a heavy toll that the subjects would revolt. Or the basis of the economy might be ruined so that fewer and fewer taxes could be collected. Or the collector might become so rich that he challenged the power of the king. Eventually, the king or the state took control of taxation, centralized it, hired personnel on a salaried
basis to run the system, and used the army to back up the collectors. This paragraph presents medieval tax collection as a protection racket by another name. The king has no more legitimacy than his tax collector, as both rely on brute force.

There is no denying that some cultures excel in providing support for complex organizations more than others. However, I argue that thirteenth-century European society was a society dominated by and supportive of complex organizations. A thirteenth-century Auvergnat man paid taxes to the government, went to the bailli’s court to lodge a lawsuit, was a member of a parish, gave alms to representatives of the mendicant orders, shopped at the town’s fair, and had his will prepared by a university-educated notary. The presence of complex organizations in medieval life was rendered possible by the existence of a pool of skilled, university trained administrators, extremely suited to life as organization men, because they were trained in appropriate decision making.

Organizations help harness our abilities, by limiting the number of inputs we must weigh when arriving at a decision, and providing rules of thumb to follow in making our choice. Bounded rationality allows organization members to function, “because they treat the world as rather empty and ignore the interrelatedness of all things (so stupefying to thought and action), they can make their decisions with

86 Perrow, Complex Organizations, 15.
relatively simple rules of thumb that do not make impossible demands upon their
capacity for thought. Simplification may lead to error, but there is no realistic alternative
in the face of the limits on human knowledge and reasoning.”

Organizations rely on two forms of logic; logic of consequences, in which actions
are weighed by their expected consequences, and logic of appropriateness, in which
actions are evaluated based on the recognition of similar past situations. Much of the
decision making behavior in organizations relies on recognition and categorization,
more than on analytical knowledge.88

Organizations have an advantage over individuals because a logic of
appropriateness requires experience and practice to develop. Organizations can call on
the combined experience of the body of members, past and present, through the
formulation of rules and by maintaining archives; “organizations are collections of roles
and identities. Assemblages of rules by which appropriate behavior is paired with
recognized situations.”89 The existence of many rules does not reduce the human
administrator to an automaton. Rather, it gives him sufficient slack to allow for new
challenges to be met in terms of familiar challenges, which requires innovative thinking.
The crucial logical step is to find the correct rule to apply to the situation, “an exercise

87 Simon, Administrative Behavior, 119.
88 March and Simon, Organizations, 13.
89 Ibid., 12.
more analogous to legal reasoning than to economic reasoning," and one uniquely suited to the skills of the thirteenth century medieval university graduate.

Europe’s universities in the thirteenth century consciously aimed to prepare graduates for careers in administration. This shift was brought on by the growing demand for qualified men in the papal court, in the courts of lay princes and in the growing cities. Many medieval scholars decried the utilitarian teaching philosophy that overtook their institutions, but students continued to flock to the more profitable faculties. Since their creation in the twelfth century medieval universities taught the liberal arts, theology, law and medicine. In the thirteenth century theology became the least popular faculty, and law the most popular; all medieval universities taught law in the thirteenth century, but only about half had a theology faculty.91

In part, the new-found interest in law is attributable to the re-discovery of Roman law in northern Europe. The decline in popularity of theology was also related to a perception that a university education could prepare you for a well-paid career, as indicated by the story of “an ambitious student at Orleans who asks for money to buy a

90 March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions, 25.

91 Paetow, The Arts Course at Medieval Universities.
Bible and begin theology, but is advised by his father to turn rather to some lucrative profession."  

The study of law, theology and medicine was generally preceded by a course of study in the liberal arts. Medieval universities owed much of their curriculum to the Roman system of higher education, which was utilitarian and aimed at the preparation of young men for administrative and political life in the empire. The liberal arts were divided into the trivium: grammar, rhetoric and logic, and the quadrivium: arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy. The emphasis in medieval universities had always been on the trivium, and in the thirteenth century even the study of the trivium was edited so that grammar took a distant third place to logic and rhetoric. The study of rhetoric maintained popularity by adapting to current need. In Roman times political life consisted of public speaking and students of rhetoric focused on oral presentation. In the middle ages the course on rhetoric came to focus on writing, and was sometimes called the ars dictaminis.  

Professors of ars dictaminis taught the technique of composing letters and official documents. The objective was for graduates to find positions in secular or religious courts, or as notaries in the Italian city-states. With time, the ars dictaminis

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93 Paetow, *The Arts Course at Medieval Universities*, 70.
came to concentrate on legal documents, so that students were taught the charter
hand, distinct from conventional book hand, and ars dictaminis books came to include
chapters on legal theory. Lecturers in ars dictaminis also taught the proper phrasing of
the most important missive the students would ever write: the letter home requesting
additional funds.\(^9^4\)

Scholasticism contributed equally to training good organization men by honing
the logic of appropriateness. Scholasticism was at its peak in the thirteenth century, and
its method permeated all medieval universities. It was akin to a kind of legal
argumentation, suited to an age fascinated by law, “law, even more than philosophy,
was the favorite pursuit of the medieval scholar. Knowledge of canon and civil law was
the surest avenue to preferment and wealth. Hence arose a tendency to treat
philosophy like law. Aristotle was cut up into texts, which were quoted like texts from
the pandects. A like use was made of the fathers and holy scripture, and, as time went
by, of the great schoolmen who had been before.”\(^9^5\) However, rather than identifying
scholasticism as a philosophy tainted by law, I tend to agree with Haskins that “law is a
form of scholasticism.”\(^9^6\)

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\(^9^5\) Rickaby, *Scholasticism*, 49.

The scholastic method of disputation involved proposing a question, bringing supporting and contrasting arguments from a limited list of authoritative texts, and then explaining the chosen answer. This method embodied bounded rationality; the arguments pro and con had to be logical, relevant, and originate in a limited corpus of texts. The candidate for a bachelor’s degree spent the forty days of lent putting forth propositions and arguing them against others.97 Many of the propositions scholastics debated seem like nonsense to a modern reader, and this led educated men to reject the entire approach as a waste of intellectual effort. However, the contents of the specific propositions were irrelevant, the significance of the method was in honing logical skills, which were applicable to any situation.

Scholasticism has been ridiculed in our time, and did not lack for medieval critics, either. One such critic, Juan Luis Vives, described the scholastic dispute in mocking tones, “I deny it. Prove it. I will defend it appropriately.” For he who “defends appropriately” (in their own words), no matter by what incongruous admissions and concessions, is held to be a learned man and best adapted to disputation, that is, to the apex of knowledge.”98 Roger Bacon, a scholastic as well as a critic of scholastic thought, explained the method and its limitations in the following manner, “there are two ways

97 Rickaby, Scholasticism, 11.

98 Norton, Medieval Universities, 121.
of knowing—by argument and by experience: argument concludes and makes us grant
the conclusion, but does not produce certainty and remove doubt, unless it is by way of experience.”

Bacon and Vives lamented the inadequacies of the scholastic method when it
came to science, but also highlighted how fitting it was to other fields, namely ones
where the usefulness of reaching a conclusion outweighed that of removing all doubts.
Bacon’s distinction between knowing by argument and knowing by experience is
reminiscent of Simon’s demarcation between the logic of appropriateness and the logic
of consequence: “in establishing appropriateness, rules and situations are related by
criteria of similarity or difference and through reasoning by analogy and metaphor. The
process is mediated heavily by language, by the ways in which participants come to be
able to talk about a situation as similar to or different from another.”

It has been suggested that the members of traditional societies may find it hard
to acclimate to working within a complex organization because they are unfamiliar with
this environment. Medieval graduates would have suffered no such alienation. Students
typically took six years to graduate, during which years their lives were subsumed by the
university. It is true that they lived in rented houses, and not dorms, and the university


rarely had a physical campus. However, medieval university students were still 
intensively incorporated into the organization.

Medieval universities boasted an international student body. Most students 
were far from home at a time when communication speed was slow. They were younger 
than modern students, and did not necessarily speak the local language. Their legal 
standing derived directly from their status as students, including which courts could 
judge them and also what taxes they would pay. They relied on the bargaining power of 
the university to assure rent caps. Their form of dress, manner of behavior and topics of 
conversation were circumscribed by university statutes. Moreover, the only sanctioned 
language in medieval universities was Latin—within and without the classroom. This rule 
was enforced by penalties and snitches—known as “wolves.” Since few men in 
medieval Europe were native Latin speakers, this requirement went a long way to 
undermine any previous socialization. Young men from diverse backgrounds attended 
university and emerged as a relatively homogeneous group, ready to join the 
administrative workforce.

A medieval university graduate would have also had a taste of the informal 
aspects of life in a complex organization. Rivalry between factions based on country of 
origin or philosophical ideas was common, and sometimes led to bloodshed.

Additionally, squabbles between professors competing for students were common. While occasionally disruptive of their studies, these spats prepared the students for their future jobs. Louis John Paetow made the argument that the contentious atmosphere contributed to the study of the ars dictaminis: “brisk competition disclosed the real essentials of the art, and rendered it more practical. In this atmosphere charged with spite and envy, incrimination and discrimination, the ars dictaminis reached its full growth.”102 The same argument can easily be made for other topics of instruction, especially legalistic ones.

Merit was the official standard for graduation or promotion, but lavish gifts and bribes were common backdoors. A large gift could facilitate the graduation of a mediocre student, and even a good student knew he needed to provide his examiners with a lavish feast in order to matriculate. This was information acquired in the university, and not available to everyone: “Thus a student at Paris asks a friend to explain to his father, “since the simplicity of the lay mind does not understand such things,” how at length after much study nothing but lack of money for the inception banquet stands in the way of his graduation.”103 The graduates also gained first-hand experience about the dependencies that bind organizations together; they witnessed

102 Paetow, *The Arts Course at Medieval Universities*, 77.

the university negotiating with the church, with the mendicant orders, with the city and sometimes even with the king. A thirteenth-century alumnus could be expected to come into his first administrative position with few illusions about organization life.

I hope I have convinced the reader that thirteenth-century Europe satisfied the pre-conditions for existence of complex organizations demanded by organization theory. The theory is therefore applicable to medieval complex organizations. In my work I rely on the body of research that originated in Simon’s theory of bounded rationality. If we accept bounded rationality we also accept that decision makers try to satisfy, and not to maximize, since the question of maximization is too complex.\textsuperscript{104} We let go of the notion that there are universal maximization principles for management, one structure that is optimal. Every organization has its own ideal structure, based on its specific conditions.

In this chapter I look at the formal structure of Alphonse’s administration in the Auvergne. The formal structure is the official hierarchy familiar to us from organization charts, and is a logical starting point to this analysis. However, the formal organization is not capable of fully accounting for organizational behavior. In future work, I hope to

\textsuperscript{104} March and Simon, \textit{Organizations}.
study the informal structure of the same organization, the one created by interpersonal relationships.

The research in this chapter is informed by the propositions of the contingency theory of organizations. Contingency theory argues that an organization’s structure adapts to the demands of the environment, that is, to its contingencies. There exists a fit between those two factors, and the fit is specific to each structure-environment pair. In other words, according to contingency theory there is no one optimal organization structure. When the environment changes, the structure will change as well, following an undetermined time lag. Contingency theory has substantial empirical data supporting it, and I have found that it aptly accounts for the structure of Alphonse’s administration.

The contingency theory of the organization joins two theories; organic theory and bureaucratic theory. The two theories have been shown to be mutually consistent, with the former working at the lower levels of the complex organization and the latter at the higher levels. The main difference between the two theories is the contingency they focus on. Organic theory sees environmental uncertainty as the main contingency affecting structure, usually divided into the aspects of task uncertainty and task interdependence. Task uncertainty refers to technology change, environmental change, innovation, etc. Bureaucratic theory, on the other hand, considers the size of the

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organization, a calculation based on the number of members, to be the main 
contingency, although it acknowledges uncertainty as a secondary factor.

Organic theory assumes a continuum of structures, on one end of which is the 
“mechanistic organization,” which is centralized in decision making, specialized in roles 
and formal. At the other end of this continuum we find the organic structure, which is 
decentralized (lower level employees can make autonomous decisions), low on 
functional specialization and formalization. Organizations can fall anywhere on the 
continuum, but note that the three factors—specialization, centralization, and 
formalization—travel together along this line. The mechanistic structure fits low task 
uncertainty, and the organic structure fits high task uncertainty. “Where task 
uncertainty is low, the knowledge and information possessed by senior managers 
enables them to exercise high control over all operations and employees so that the 
organization is effective. However, where task uncertainty is high, much expertise and 
information is distributed among employees, so that they have to be empowered to use 
their initiative and make decisions in a participatory manner, in order for the 
organization to be effective.”\textsuperscript{106}

Bureaucratic theory perceives a different continuum, extending from the simple 
organization to the complex bureaucratic organization. On this continuum 

\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., 23.
centralization, specialization and formalization do not travel together, and one can imagine a bureaucratic organization high on specialization and formalization but low on centralization. In an organization of that sort top managers control the employees not through direct orders (since centralization is low) but through tight job definition (specialization) and through rules (formalization). In bureaucratic theory centralization is inversely related to specialization and formalization, whereas according to organic theory those three variables are directly proportional.

These two theories seem to suggest rival predictions, but they can be amalgamated by combining the task and size contingencies. Lex Donaldson provided the following summary of the synthesis: “as organizations grow in size they increase specialization-formalization, structural differentiation and decentralization. As task interdependence decreases because of diversification, this causes divisionalization, so that decentralization increases, as does specialization-formalization (e. g., the creation of profit reporting) and structural differentiation (e. g., the number of levels), beyond that which would exist for its size alone . . . as task uncertainty increases, for example, through increased innovation in products or services, there is a reduction in formalization and an increase in decentralization. The reduction in formalization from
increasing task uncertainty offsets to a degree the increase in formalization coming from size increase.”

No organization is autonomous, and Alphonse’s administration was no exception. Alphonse’s administration was part of a larger organization—the kingdom of France. I mentioned in the first chapter that Alphonse and his brothers were granted _apanages_ in their father’s will. It is a matter of historical consensus that a precondition for the creation of the _apanages_ was the great increase in size of the Capetian kingdom during the twelfth and early thirteenth century. Bureaucracy theory suggests that the increase of size was not only a precondition but the driving force for this change. It predicts that growth in size leads to both divisionalization and de-centralization, and Louis VIII’s decision to create the _apanages_ fulfilled both structural changes.

Louis VIII introduced a new level into the French administration, the level of the _apanages_, creating a kingdom with three additional administrative divisions. He put the princes of the blood at the heads of those divisions, and gave them nearly complete autonomy within their lands, effectively de-centralizing the kingdom. In accordance with bureaucratic theory, de-centralization meant that the princes were not controlled by direct orders from the king, but they were under different forms of control, namely

107 Ibid., 29.
specialization (each was concerned only with a particular region) and formalization, that is abiding by organizational rules.

Louis VIII could pick agents to run the divisions from within his immediate family because he was blessed with many sons. Aristocratic families were organizations, some simpler and some more complex, with their own rules of appropriate conduct. The children encountered those rules from infancy, and likely internalized them. In the Capetian family (although not in every royal family), this indoctrination created trustworthy agents, and de-centralization did not lead to the loss of control: “the trust associated with the delegation in political institutions is, like the division of labor itself, not an explicit contract but a rule of appropriate behavior. It is sustained by socialization into the structure of rules, and rarely considered as a deliberate willful action.”\textsuperscript{108} It may seem curious that no special vow or contract was demanded of the princes, beyond the feudal oath. In fact, this should not be surprising, since, “trust can be undermined by persistent untrustworthiness, but it is probably more likely to be undermined by coming to see the granting of trust as part of a voluntary contractual arrangement.”\textsuperscript{109}

Below the level of the apanages the size contingency became less important, primarily because the size of the apanages was a set variable. It was here that the

\textsuperscript{108} March and Olsen, \textit{Rediscovering Institutions}, 27.

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid., 28.
contingencies of task uncertainty came into play. Let us recall that the key notion in organic contingency theory is that conditions of low task uncertainty promote a mechanistic organization, whereas conditions of high task uncertainty call for an organic structure, with less formalization.

Task uncertainty can be parsed into several components, the most ubiquitous being technology uncertainty, domain uncertainty and task interdependence. The word technology refers here not to the equipment at the organization’s disposal, but to the cognitive processing required to achieve a task. Perrow created a categorization of technologies with regard to tasks. He distinguished four types of tasks based on two factors, analyzability and the number of exceptions. If a task is analyzable and has few exceptions, it requires routine technology. Analyzable tasks with many exceptions call for engineering technology. If a task is un-analyzable and has few exceptions, it uses a craft technology. A task that is both un-analyzable and has many exceptions calls for a non-routine technology. Analyzable tasks demand centralized structures, and un-analyzable tasks require decentralization. The more exceptions to a task, the more flexibility is required. Complex organizations rely on multiple types of technology since they contend with multiple tasks. For example, a car manufacturer applies routine technology on the assembly line, but the sales division employs craft technology.

Alphonse’s administration had many varied responsibilities towards its clientele, including auctioning rents, judging between litigants, collecting taxes, keeping the peace and maintaining public roads. The tasks became more analyzable and predictable the lower down the hierarchical pyramid one travelled, but since most of the tasks involved people, none were even as routine as manufacturing a car. For the prévôts most tasks were analyzable, but they could expect exceptions. For example, tax collection was analyzable as to the amount of tax the bailli need to collect from farmer A, but his response to the tax collector could not be predicted fully. The constable’s tasks included some tasks that were analyzable and not predictable, and some that were not analyzable, so he needed more discretion. Alphonse’s council was positioned at the top of the hierarchical pyramid; the council carried out some routine tasks (keeping accounts, for example) but was also frequently entrusted with tasks that were un-analyzable and unpredictable, because they were novel, such as selling off the comital forests.

The second contributing factor to task contingency is domain uncertainty. An organization’s domain “identifies the points at which the organization is dependent on inputs from the environment. The composition of that environment, the location within it of capacities, in turn determines upon whom the organization is dependent.”¹¹¹

¹¹¹ Thompson, Organizations in Action, 27.
Because “environment” is a general term, which threatens to draw the entire cosmos into every analysis, it was reframed as “task environment,” that is, “those parts of the environment relevant or potentially relevant to goal setting and goal attainment.”¹¹²

An organization cannot survive unless its claim for a domain is recognized by the domain. This is because the organization is dependent on its domain for inputs. If a local coffee shop has no clientele or coffee supplier, it will not survive. An organization’s first priority is to ensure its survival, and that requires domain consensus: a mutual recognition between the domain and the organization. A noble title, even a royal one, did not ensure domain consensus.

A prince could fail to win domain consensus, and he could lose the consensus. Alphonse’s brother Charles of Anjou lost his domain consensus in Sicily and that led to a rebellion against him. One can imagine less dramatic non-compliance expressing itself in Italian strikes and cheating on taxes. Some organizations can search for new domains, but Alphonse’s administration of the Auvergne was constrained geographically. It was a “captive organization” of its domain.

Alphonse was aware of the precarious nature of legitimacy, and stated it in his 1254 ordinance, “Item, quod senescallus, judices et ballivi regant terram secundum jura, et consuetudines et usus patriae ut condemnations fiant in maleficiis per sententiam,

¹¹² Ibid.
The final element contributing to task uncertainty is task interdependence. In pooled interdependence, two organizational units have no direct connection, so that they are only dependent to the extent that they both contribute to and receive inputs from the same organization. Sequential interdependency means that the output of one unit of the organization serves as the input for another unit. Mutual interdependency means that feedback from other units is required to finish a task. Thompson, who put special emphasis on the contingency of task interdependence, argues that a complex organization would incorporate all three types of interdependency, and that each would correspond to a different form of organizational control.114

Thompson predicts that units with pooled interdependency are controlled by rules. The Auvergne, Poitou and the Toulousain were linked through pooled interdependency. These administrative units had no direct ties; they were only

113 Histoire générale du Languedoc, vol. 6, 502.

interdependent to the extent that they belonged to the same *apanage*. Officers in all three provinces took the same oath and read the same ordinance.

Units with sequential interdependence are controlled by a plan. For example, the council is sequentially dependent on the constable, because they use his accounts as input for their financial calculations. The dates of the great feast days served as the basis of a plan that ensured the councilors would receive the records on time. Reciprocal interdependence between units requires direct feedback. On matters of great importance Alphonse would receive and provide frequent feedback to his seneschals and special agents. Now that we have defined the main elements of task uncertainty, we can look in detail at how these factors affected Alphonse’s administration in Auvergne.

One way for an organization to deal with contingencies is by regulating the interactions of its elements: “Under norms of rationality organizations seek to buffer environmental influences by surrounding their technical cores with output and input components.”¹¹⁵ The technological core of a car manufacturer is the assembly line. The factory ensures the assembly line keeps working by providing the necessary components and removing completed cars. On the input front buffering is accomplished by stockpiling parts, and on the output side by contractually obligating car dealerships

¹¹⁵ Thompson, *Organizations in Action*, 20.
to buy less popular models along with models for which there is more demand (output buffering is usually only seen in manufacturing enterprises.)

For Alphonse’s organization, buffering on the input front meant proper recruitment and training, with additional safeguards for positions that call for the highest discretion. The concern was that officers would create bonds with the task environment that would compete with their loyalty to the organization and sway their understanding of appropriateness.

The constable (equivalent to seneschals in Alphonse’s other estates)

The constable stood at the head of the local administrative pyramid in Auvergne. His responsibilities included choosing and supervising the lower administrators, putting the prévôts up for auction, and acting as judge. Additional duties consisted of assuring the fulfillment of the count’s orders, conducting special inquiries into matters that interested the count, maintaining record of the count’s local rights and possessions, and leading the local nobles in battle if the need arose. Three times a year either the constable or his representative traveled to the count’s court and presented their accounts and records to the council.

Alphonse’s seneschals, including the constable of Auvergne, were always selected from the ranks of the lower nobility. However, they were never chosen from within the local nobility of the province they were to lead. The seneschals were not allowed to stay in one post for longer than a few years, because faith in their ability to
retain loyalty to the organization was limited. However, successful seneschals were
sometimes awarded with a second term in another province. Eustache de
Beaumarchais, for example, served as seneschal of Poitou after proving himself as bailli
of the mountains of Auvergne.\(^\text{116}\)

The seneschals and constable were salaried officials. Despite the large salary (25
sous a day, according to the 1256 records),\(^\text{117}\) they sometimes finished their term in
debt because of the great expenses the job entailed.\(^\text{118}\) Seneschals had little job
security; their position was revocable at will, and the terms were never long to begin
with. Four constables served in the Auvergne under Alphonse; In 1251 Messire
Nivardus, after him Herbert de Plainly, and then from 1255 to 1267 Geoffrey Thomas,
who was replaced by Evrard de Millechamps. It bears mentioning (although this will be
treated in detail in chapter four) that the first and the third of this list were officially
accused of grave malfeasance.

Before assuming his duties the seneschal swore an oath to fulfill his
responsibilities and to abide by the rules contained in Alphonse’s 1254 ordinance.\(^\text{119}\)

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\(^{116}\) *Layettes du Trésor des chartes, VOLUME and document number????? not this*
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\Rightarrow (Paris : H. Plon, 1863-1909), J317, no. 61
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\(^{117}\) Boutaric, *Saint Louis et Alphonse de Poitiers*, 153.

\(^{118}\) Molinier, *Correspondance administrative d’Alfonse de Poitiers*, LVVVI.

\(^{119}\) *Histoire générale du Languedoc*, vol. 6, 502.
This was no standard oath of fealty, but a list of specific administrative instruction, which should be seen as an important training device. Alphonse’s 1254 ordinance is usually discussed in relation to the similar but more famous ordinance published by Louis IX at roughly the same time. I will engage in a detailed comparison of the two in the chapter dedicated to the institutional elements of the two governments. For our purpose suffice it to say that both ordinances were concerned with reforming the administration, but Alphonse’s was much briefer than Louis’—barely two pages long compared with Louis’ seven. Surprisingly, Alphonse’s ordinance is also more detailed and more specific than Louis’, and its general character resembles that of an administrative manual, whereas Louis’ is more general, moralistic and spiritual in nature, emphasizing the values dear to the organization.

The seneschals swore to give justice to everyone according to the best of their knowledge and possibility, and to receive no gifts from anyone subject to them, except for small amounts of food and drink. Their families could also not accept gifts in their name. Most importantly, they could neither marry nor contract a marriage for their children within the sénéchaussée. This set of rules was concerned with creating a buffer between the local power base and the seneschal.

The seneschals were to determine legal matters with the help of a judge, but were forbidden from selecting the judges, who were to be chosen by either Alphonse or
his agent. The seneschals vowed not to interfere with claims that were up for appeal. They were forbidden from converting physical punishments into monetary ones. They were responsible to investigate and punish excesses committed by the lower officials, and were instructed to punish them publicly and make an example of them, rather than let them make quiet restitution. They were warned not to subject people to judicial torture unless necessary, and to permit men to post bail if they could afford to do so, and their crime was not great. The seneschals also swore not to molest people who intended to appeal directly to the count. These rules were specific enough to bind the seneschals and the constable, yet flexible enough to allow them to deal with unexpected situations.¹²⁰

In addition to formulating his expectations from the constable in rules, Alphonse carried on a lively correspondence with the men who held the position, sometimes writing them multiple times on the same week and demanding speedy replies. That is, the count employed rules, plans and reciprocal interdependence with the constable of Auvergne. The constable enjoyed a great deal of autonomy, but this was not the unhappy result of distance and poor communication. To carry out his duties the constable needed to have a great deal of autonomy, since the environment he worked in was constantly changing.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 502.
The constable faced multiple problems every day and had to divide his attention among them. Alphonse’s letters to the constable usually directed his attention to a difficulty that had become a priority for Alphonse. Often the letters were summary orders regarding simple cases. In one such letter Alphonse told the constable not to enforce collection of a particular debt, in another he corrected a punishment he considered too mild. Sometimes, however, the count entrusted difficult problems to the constable, leading to a lengthy exchange of letters. Under those circumstances the constable’s discretion was frequently curtailed, and he would collaborate closely with either Alphonse himself or one of his trusted council members.

As the departure date for the 1270 crusade neared the Alphonsine organization increasingly devoted itself to financing the costly endeavor. The constable of Auvergne was ordered time and again to secure substantial cash gifts from the cities of Auvergne, in particular from Riom and Montferrand. Alphonse’s claim for these crusading gifts was based on dubious legal ground; in the north of France custom supported the right, but the consulates denied the existence of an equivalent local custom. The count, familiar with the northern custom, maintained it must be general, “a qua consuetudine homines

121 Molinier, Correspondance administrative d’Alfonse de Poitiers, 762.

122 Ibid., 764.
de Alvernia exemptos non credimus.” Legally savvy, the consuls of Montferrand and Riom declined to make the required gifts.

Alphonse, however, was set on procuring the gifts, and aware of the fluidity of the law. In a letter from August of 1268 Alphonse told his constable, “tam propter brevitatem temporis quam ob urgentem qualitatem negotii, necessarium sit nobis providere pecuniam quantamcumque poterimus bono modo . . . confidimus enim nos expertis premii tam eos qui gratiam ipsam fecerint quam alios qui eam fieri procurarint.” The count directed the constable to inquire into legal precedent as well as into the local custom. The constable was not to draw his own conclusions, but rather to send the information he gathered to the count, “quam citius commode poteritis . . . significare nullatenus omittatis.” The count made inquiries of his own and discovered that although no record existed, Riom had previously granted him four thousand pounds for crusade. He wrote the men of Riom and demanded the same contribution.

123 Ibid., 746.
124 Ibid., 739.
125 Ibid., 746.
126 Ibid., 747.
In case the donation was still not forthcoming, the count told the constable to carry on a secret inquiry into the personal finances of the thirty or forty greatest men in Riom, “quantum possunt habere per estimationem et famam vicinorum, tam in mobilibus quam in imobilibus, de quolibet sigillatim.” This was information the bourgeois wanted very much to keep hidden, and Alphonse used it as a bargaining chip.

Intimidation techniques were also used against Montferrand; in order to compel payment the constable imprisoned many of the bourgeois and their servants, and also stationed armed men in their houses. The consuls sent a proctor to complain in front of the count, and in response Alphonse wrote the following missive to the constable: “procedet cum ea qua decet maturitate et cautela, providentes ne de obmissione se negligentia aut etiam de injustitia possitis merito reprehendi.” He ordered the constable to grant temporary release to all the men except the oath-helpers. Besides shifting responsibility to the constable, however, the count did not suggest any peaceful resolution. Instead, he reiterated there would be no negotiating a change in the sum of the gift. This left the constable no negotiating tool except force.

In July of 1269 the consuls of Montferrand were still in prison, and had sent another proctor to appeal their incarceration in front of the count. The count told the

127 Ibid., 749.

128 Ibid., 1154.
constable to release the men conditionally for three weeks, at the end of which period they were to present to him in writing their reasons for failing to pay. The constable would put his arguments in writing as well, but the count did not leave the composition of this document up to him. Rather, he instructed him to obtain the help of Guillelmus Ruffi (Guillaume le Roux), one of Alphonse’s household clerks: “quas receptas una cum rationibus et deffensionibus vestris, communicato consilio magistri Guillelmi Ruffi, quem si presens non fuerit per litteras consulatis.” The consuls were finally released from jail in December of 1269, after agreeing to make a two thousand pounds donation.

Use of force against bourgeois was not directly ordered by the count, and not because he objected to it. Rather, use of force was the appropriate routine behavior for the constable under the circumstances, and was carried out without need for feedback. The legality of the constable’s behavior was distinct from its appropriateness under the rules of the organization. The role of the constable was given to men familiar with violence because willingness to resort to violence was a job requirement. Physical coercion of subjects was not necessarily abuse of authority. The constable acted, in this matter, in ways that seem to belie the oath he took; he imprisoned the bourgeois for a lengthy period despite their ability to post bail, and the fact that they had an appeal standing. The constable’s oath functioned as a general rule, standard for all Alphonse’s

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129 Ibid., 1153.
lands. However, the task of the constable was too uncertain to be controlled through rules alone. It required reciprocal interdependence, and direct feedback from the count had primacy over any rule based decree.

The baillis (or prévôts)

The baillis or bayles, if one wants to distinguish them from royal baillis, were the lower local officials, tax farmers endowed with judicial power. Tax farming was a buffering strategy used by many administrations in the Middle Ages; it protected the organization from fluctuations in the task environment, guaranteeing revenue by re-dividing the risk of a bad harvest so that it fell on the renter and not on the lord. Alphonse had a motley assortment of rights in the prévôtés, hidden in many customary fees and obligations. Turning those rights into cash was a complicated, time consuming job, which he was happy to contract out. Alphonse did not interact directly with his baillis, they did not travel to see him and he did not write them. Their behavior was controlled by the constable and by the rules included in the 1254 ordinance, which specified their responsibilities and how they were to be chosen. Like the seneschals, they took an oath to keep the rules of the ordinance, swore to give fair justice to all and vowed not to accept gifts. Unlike the seneschals or royal baillis, who were prohibited from marrying within the sénéchaussée, the Auvergnat baillis were by nature deeply entangled with the local inhabitants.
The Auvergne was comprised of twenty-three baillies (administrative offices of the baillis), which were put up for public auction annually. In his 1254 ordinance Alphonse advocated competition, urging the constable to work out the sale in whatever way yielded the highest revenue. Even after a winning bid was accepted and the winner entrusted with the farm, the auction would remain open for a pre-determined period of time to allow a higher bid. The higher offer had to be above a set value, a determination based on the traditional valuation of the prévôte. The ousted winner, if he had already taken charge, would get a part of the new offer as recompense—a quarter, sometimes a third. This system held everywhere in the apanage.130

The only positive principal of recruitment for the bailli positions was wealth: a standard that further served to buffer the constable from local influence. Alphonse insisted that the auction of the baillies would be conducted in public, preventing the constable from picking favorites. On one occasion Alphonse set aside the baillis named by the constable, and put their positions up for auction again.131 Wealth was a relatively neutral standard of selection.

However, there were several traits that rendered one ineligible for a prévôt position. First, prévôts could not be related to the seneschal. The prévôtés could also not

130 Boutaric, *Saint Louis et Alphonse de Poitiers*, 256.

131 *Layettes du Trésor des chartes*, vol 3, 504
be farmed out to clerks, and if it became clear that a clerk had bought a farm, the sale was voided. The official reason for this restriction was that clerks could not be called in front of a lay court to answer for accusations of abuse of power. A secondary reason was likely the desire to keep the two organizations—the church and the Alphonsine administration—as separate as possible.

The baillis were allowed to use coercion in order to collect the taxes, for which purpose they hired, at their own expense, local men to serve as sergeants. Recognizing the potential for abuse of power residing in these sergeants, Alphonse addressed them in his 1254 ordinance. A prévôt could only hire three or four sergeants, and he had to inform the seneschal of their identities. This was in order to prevent him from creating a private army. The prévôt and his sergeants were forbidden to collect a fine without a judgment by a seneschal or judge. If any of the sergeants was found acting without orders, the presumption of illegality was heavy and he was tried publicly. Like the constable, the prévôts were also required to stay in place for a month after their commission ended in order to allow their former subjects to lodge complaints. If a prévôt was found guilty of a crime, he was punished publicly.

The council:

Alphonse’s council was his main organ of government. It was made up of knights and clerks who belonged to the count’s household and had a close personal relationship with the count. During the great feast days, when his feudatories came to give homage
and his seneschals came to submit their accounts, the council met as an official court. At those events the members of the council would review the account books from the provinces, and also sit as a judicial court of last recourse. Even when the council met as a court, it was not itself endowed with any judicial power. All decisions were made by the count, and the council was only there to give advice. During the rest of the year the council served as a reservoir of trustworthy agents who could be called on for any number of special missions, including serving as enquêteurs.

These men were Alphonse’s confidants, and his relationship with them was almost friendly. In a letter to his councilor, Jean de Nanteuil, the count inquired after the knight’s health before turning to business: "De ce que vouz este ferment dehestie, si cum vos nos avez fet assa voir par voz lestres, nos en avons pitie en nostre cuer; et de ce que vos estes tornez a guerison, nos en loons Nostre Segneur et en somes liez." The count trusted his councilors above any of his other officers, and seems to have had faith in their abilities as well as in their loyalty.

There was some specialization among the members of the council, not when they met as a court, but in the ad hoc missions entrusted to them. The specialization was on either a geographic or functional basis, and it was never complete. The extraordinary assignments delegated to the councilors called for the highest level of

administrative logic. The agents corresponded directly with the count informing him of their progress, but were usually given a fair bit of autonomy.

The treasurer of Saint Hilaire (a title carried by three consecutive councilors) was often sent to take care of ecclesiastical issues, including Alphonse’s dealings with both the French church and the papal court in Rome. The treasurer was also the de facto head of the household clerks. Sicard l’Alaman, a knight, had had years of experience in Languedoc as the head of administration for the defunct count Raymond. Accordingly he was dispatched to deal with problems arising in meridional sénéchaussées. Jean de Nanteuil carried out a similar role in Poitou and Saintonge. Ponce d’Astaud, a lawyer who had also served count Raymond, took care of judicial issues that arose in the Midi. Jacques Dubois, a clerk, was responsible for insuring Alphonse’s rights for the confiscated property of heretics, a role that made him a liaison to the Roman inquisition. Gilles Camellin, Thomas de Neuville and Guillaume le Roux (all three clerks) formed a finance office of sorts; Gilles was in charge of recovering comital rights that had been acquired by churches and monasteries over the previous thirty years, a complicated and sensitive task. Together with Gilles, Thomas de Neuville was sent to liquidate Alphonse’s rights in the forests of Languedoc when the preparations for the crusade called for an immediate inflow of cash. Guillaume le Roux was dispatched to render the silver mines in Orzals functional; first, he negotiated a
settlement with other claimants to the mines. Later he was called to coordinate the repair efforts after the mines had been flooded.

The extraordinary missions required innovative thinking and searching for solutions. Alphonse’s letters to his agents emphasized this need for mental acuity. Take, for example, the following letter to Gilles Camellin, concerning the sale of the count’s forests: “Mandamus vobis quatinus super tradicione forestarum nostrarum et aliis nostris negociis vobis comissis, pro denariis in magna quantitate, meliori modo et legaliori quo poteritis, pro nobis perquirendis, viso scripto vobis super hoc tradito, sitis curiosus, diligens et intentus, nam instantis passagii prefixus terminus appropinquat, ubi nos opos[r]tebit quasi importabilia expensarum onera sustinere.” Alphonse left the specifics of the mission up to Gilles. The only rigid requirement was to produce a large amount of money.

The councilors were also sent to assist the seneschals in difficult matters. We have already seen one such example; the constable of Auvergne was ordered to consult with Guillaume le Roux on the matter of the crusading gift. Another example is contained in the following letter from Alphonse to Jean de Nanteuil, in which the count asked the knight to help a seneschal who had been derelict in his duties: “et vous

133 Molinier, Correspondance administrative d’Alfonse de Poitiers, 1323.
meesmes l’en aidiez et conseilliez selon ce que vous verrez qui sera a fere.”¹³⁴ In both cases it seems the councilors were dispatched because the seneschals were incapable of solving complicated administrative problems by themselves. This use of councilors was not uncommon.

One will note that the councilors named so far were secular clerks and knights, which was representative of the makeup of the council. We know from the household accounts of 1258 that the council included twenty six knights and fifteen clerks. A 1268 list of clerks working in the household gives twenty six names, all of them secular clerks. Before embarking for Outremer in 1270 Alphonse left the administration of his estates in the hands of a regency council and the protection of his rights to a group of “general proctors.” Both governing bodies were comprised, with one exception, only of secular clergy. Similarly, the executors of the count’s will numbered eight regular clerks, one knights, and three monks. As stated above, I believe that secular clerks would have had the optimal training for administrative roles, and no competing socialization into a monastic order or a powerful family.¹³⁵

The knights who served on the council were also selected based on their proven administrative skills. Sicard l’Alaman and Pons d’Astaud, for example, were the top two

¹³⁴ Ibid, vol 1, 1037

administrators of the late Count Raymond. Sicard was general administrator of the Toulousain during Alphonse’s first crusade, and Pons, served Raymond as chancellor. When the Alphonsine administration was just coming into being, these two men were already experienced professionals. Another knight, Thomas de Neuville, was also promoted from within the Alphonsine administration. Thomas was clerk to Pierre de Landreville, seneschal of Rouergue 1253-1262 and later seneschal of the Toulousain from 1262 until his death in 1268. In this faculty, he traveled to the count’s court to present the seneschal’s accounts and became known to Alphonse.

Secular clerks were sometimes also recruited based on their previous administrative record. Guy Foucois, the future Pope Clement IV, practiced law under count Raymond and was hired by the Alphonsine administration after the count’s death. Guy was among the lawyers who signed their name to the annulment of count Raymond’s will. Granted, Guy’s career path was far from typical, but it does reveal the high esteem in which skilled administrators were held. Gilles Camellin, another member of the secular clergy, was hired after serving as clerk to count Thibaut V of Champagne. For a young clerk the Alphonsine administration offered not only employment but the potential for career advancement.

In contrast with short termed positions of seneschal and bailli, Alphonse’s councilors enjoyed stable employment. Many of the same names appear in the 1258 and the 1268 household accounts. It is likely some clerks had even longer careers, but
we cannot be certain since household records earlier than 1258 are very rare. We know of six clerks who served Alphonse until their deaths. The count reprimanded his clerks freely, but did not dismiss them. The council members were Alphonse’s household knights and clerks, meaning they lived under the count’s roof and ate at his table, and were given livery on feast days. Despite having few expenses, they received a nice salary, and were additionally compensated for good service with lucrative rents and pensions.

The majority of clerks serving Alphonse were of northern French origin, which is not surprising given that the count spent most of his life in the Ile de France. There were however noted exceptions, and capable men were hired from Languedoc and even Auvergne.

The constable, the prévôts and the council were the three main groups of employees Alphonse’s government of the Auvergne relied on. These groups were buffered from environmental influences to differing degrees. The most intensely regulated group was the council. It was controlled through recruiting and physical incorporation. Councilors were recruited based on administrative background. As a result, despite including clerks and knights, the council was a homogenous group, likely to communicate well and work together. The councilors were also physically buffered

\[136\] Ibid., 362.
from general society, since they travelled with the count’s court. This physical incorporation into the organization also gave them common experiences to draw on, strengthening their role identification. They were not, however, controlled by rules.

The seneschals stood in second place in terms of buffering intensity. They were recruited from the lower nobility and were also a homogeneous group. They did not interact much with each other, but maintained close contact with the count, who was also a knight. Again, this common background likely made communications easier. In addition to receiving direct feedback from Alphonse, they were also educated about their role by means of the oath they took.

At the third level we find the *baillis*, who had no direct contact with the count. They received training by means of the oath, and could not be recruited from within competing organizations (the family of the seneschal and the church). Nonetheless, there was relatively little buffering through recruiting for this position, and the group was heterogeneous. They were primarily controlled by the training the seneschal received, and by the rules of the 1254 ordinance.

This ordering of groups with regard to buffering corresponds directly to the amount of discretion and innovation the positions entailed (which is not to say that the amount of training they received was optimal for their jobs). If we accept that “the components of an organization which are most protected from environmental
influences [are its] technical core,“137 then the council was Alphonse’s organization’s technical core.

Interdependencies are one of the principles of organization structure, and as a result “organizations group positions to minimize coordination costs.”138 This structuring principal explains why the council, the main group engaging in reciprocal interdependence with the count, lived with him. The seneschals, however, could not stay close to the count in order to minimize coordination costs, because a higher level constraint existed, namely, distance. “When higher-priority coordination requirements prevent the clustering of similar positions of groups, organizations seek to blanket homogeneous positions under rules which cut across group boundaries, and to blanket similar groups under rules that cross divisional lines.”139 Indeed, the seneschals were recruited so they formed a homogeneous group and were blanketeted by a set of rules that applied to every division of the apanage.

A related proposition is that “when organizations employ standardization which cuts across multiple groupings, they also develop liaison positions linking the several groups and the rule-making agency.”140 It is expected that “staff specialist” positions

137 Thompson, Organizations in Action, 51.

138 Ibid., 57.

139 Ibid., 60.

140 Ibid., 61.
will emerge, such as accountants who advise middle managers on matters related to accounting. Alphonse’s administration also developed such liaison positions in the form of the judges mentioned in the 1254 ordinance. Those men, if one recalls, were selected by an agent of the count’s, representing the rule making agency, and not by the seneschal. Organizations use such positions to deal with the remaining interdependence that cannot be controlled by rules. The intricacies of medieval law were just such a remaining interdependence, because of the great legal diversity in Alphonse’s lands.

It was also common for seneschals to solicit expert advice on thorny issues from whichever of Alphonse’s councilors happened to be traveling in their area, consistent with the fact that “Organizations with reciprocal interdependence not contained by departmentalization rely on task-force or project groupings to accomplish the remaining coordination”\(^\text{141}\)

In addition to buffering, organizations can protect their technological core through preventative maintenance. In a car manufacturer this takes the form of scheduled upkeep of machines. Curiously, Alphonse’s organization did not schedule maintenance of its technological core. The corruption scandals of the fourteenth century reveal that such upkeep was sometimes necessary, but Alphonse’s faith in his

\(^{141}\) Ibid.
councilors seems to have been well founded. However, Alphonse’s administration did conduct preventative maintenance of the main divisions of the apanage, and the men charged with this task were the enquêteurs. Alphonse chose his enquêteurs primarily from the ranks of his household clerks and knights,¹⁴² and it is fair to say conducting an enquête was one subtype of the task force missions the councilors were frequently charged with.

The enquêteurs were named in a letter of commission that limited the geographic and temporal span of the mission. Missions could be and were prolonged, but every extension required a new letter of commission. The constable or seneschal was informed of the arrival of the enquêteurs, and was expected to give them whatever aid he could. The standard responsibilities of the enquêteurs were to take note of the state of the count’s properties and rights and to collect local complaints against the count or his officers. Their main purpose was to collect information for the count, and, after 1263, they had very little judicial discretion. The enquêteurs did not have a mandate to order restitution except in cases where the sum was too small to involve a judge. In all other cases they brought their data in front of the council, for the count to make the decisions. Then, carrying out their new commands, they returned to the province to ensure the judgments were carried out.

On occasion Alphonse sent *enquêteurs* to investigate a specific official and not to conduct true preventative maintenance. In 1263 Alphonse sent Gui d’Etampes and Eustache de Mezi to investigate the constable of Auvergne.\(^{143}\) Rather than traveling the Auvergnat countryside to collect information, the *enquêteurs* settled in Riom, the seat of the constable. They published their mission in order to attract plaintiffs. When none were forthcoming, the *enquêteurs* conducted their inquiry by posing the set of questions about the baili’s performance to multiple local witnesses. This was an important turning point for the institution; the *enquêteurs* transformed from an institution intended to ensure the compliance of the task environment to one ensuring the compliance of the organization members.

The boundary between the council’s other ad hoc missions and the *enquête* missions was already fluid, and became more so, since the count often charged his *enquêteurs* with additional jobs. In 1269 Pons d’Astaud and Eudes de la Montonière conducted an *enquête* in the Venaissin, the Toulousain and Rouerge. The count gave annual alms to religious establishments in his lands. The division of alms was carried out in the following manner: a list of sums and recipients in their province was entrusted to the seneschals, along with the responsibility for dividing the money. Upon receipt the religious establishment gave the seneschal a receipt proving the transaction. Alphonse

\(^{143}\) *Enquêtes administratives d’Alfonse de Poitiers*, 44-45.
was concerned that the seneschals would forge receipts and embezzle the money. Therefore, he charged the two *enquêteurs* with an additional mission. While traveling the countryside on *enquête* business, they were to visit the intended recipients and verify they were in possession of the alms.\(^{144}\)

The 1267 *enquêteurs* in Auvergne, besides hearing complaints, also fined Alphonse’s Auvergnat vassals for a variety of offenses, contrary to their custom.\(^{145}\) This departure from tradition can be attributed to the organization’s pressing financial needs, since at the same time their colleagues in the Toulousain had their letters of commission re-issued to add that they would also be collecting the subsidy for the crusade.\(^{146}\)

There can be little doubt that Alphonse was inspired to create his own *enquêteurs* after seeing the institution function in his brother’s organization. Louis sent out his first *enquêteurs* in 1247, whereas Alphonse did not begin to employ the institution until 1258.\(^{147}\) The process whereby organizations adopt administrative solutions from other organizations, known as “benchmarking,” is common in

\(^{144}\) Molinier, *Correspondance administrative d’Alfonse de Poitiers*, 1324.

\(^{145}\) Ibid., 727.

\(^{146}\) Ibid., 324, 1216.

\(^{147}\) Glenisson, “*Les Enquêteurs-Reformateurs de 1270 à 1328*,” 8.
organizational learning. The origin of Louis’ *enquêteurs*, on the other hand, is a question that sparked a lively historical debate. Louis’ *enquêteurs* appear remarkably similar to Charlemagne’s *missi dominici* as well to the itinerant judges of Henry II’s England, although a more immediate inspiration could have been the inquisitors of the Roman Church. However, given that creating a supervisory maintenance unit is a widespread solution for the problem of buffering, the case cannot be made for divergent evolution over convergent evolution taking place.

We find more mendicants among the ranks of Alphonse’s *enquêteurs* than in the rest of his organization. The *enquêteurs* included seven lay men (four knights and three bourgeois), thirteen secular clerks and fifteen mendicants, divided almost equally between Franciscans and Dominicans.\(^{148}\) Since Alphonse usually preferred secular clergy to regular clergy, this seeming departure from habit was attributed to his brother’s inspiration. Louis IX preference for mendicants, in turn, was ascribed to his trust in their high moral standards and their shared spiritual worldview.

However, Yves Dossat showed that the impression that mendicants dominated Alphonse’s *enquêteurs* is false. In contrast with the seculars, who often had their mission charters extended multiple times, the mendicant charters were rarely renewed, so that their part of the total work was smaller than their number suggests. Moreover,

\(^{148}\) Dossat, ”Alfonse de Poitiers et les clercs,” 362.
the use of mendicant *enquêteurs* varied based on the province. Dominicans worked more in Poitou and Franciscans in the Auvergne, but few mendicants were used as *enquêteurs* in the *sénéschaussées* of the Midi.\(^{149}\)

So far we have discussed the ways organizations adapt to the environment by controlling their members and making internal changes. Organizations also react to contingencies by interacting with their task environment. Unlike the average coffee shop or car manufacturer, Alphonse’s administration faced little direct competition from other organizations in most of its spheres of activity (the exception being the existence of competing court systems, which will not be addressed here). Nonetheless, the administration still needed to attain power relative to its task environment, because even barring competition support was not guaranteed.

Prestige is a form of power that can be gained for free, that is without exchange of power taking place. Therefore, “organizations . . . competing for support seek prestige.”\(^ {150}\) The creation and maintenance of a favorable view of the organization allows the organization to attract clients and donors and influence the community informally. Alphonse’s administration enjoyed some a priori prestige, due to Alphonse’s high status and close relationship with the king. Alphonse also frequently invoked the

\(^{149}\) Ibid.

\(^{150}\) Thompson, *Organizations in Action*, 33.
crusade while negotiating within the domain, not only because it occupied his mind, but in order to increase, by association, his own administration’s prestige.

In addition to the personal and familial reputation of the organization’ leader, Alphonse’s administration gained esteem based on past performance. This claim for goodwill was central to Alphonse’s negotiations with Montferrand and Riom. In a letter from May second, 1258 the count voiced his great disappointment with Riom, “cum longo tempore quieta et pacifice vixerint sub nostro regimine, nec per nos extorta fuerit peccunia ab eisdem.”151 In another letter he warned, “presertim cum longo tempore sub nostro regimine vixeritis pacifice at quieta, nec per nos a vobis extorta fuerit pecunia in taliis vel exactionibus vel alio quoquo modo . . . talim videlicet que nobis esse grata debeat.”152

Alphonse’s organization also relied on prestige in the rebuilding of the *bastides* in Languedoc. The Albigensian crusade left many ruined towns in Alphonse’s meridional *sénéchaussées*. The inhabitants, having fled and settled elsewhere in Languedoc, became subjects of Alphonse’s vassals; yet, they maintained a desire to return to their old homes. In return for his permission to rebuild, they granted the count the rights of justice in their new towns as well as the bans of the mill and the butchery. Boutaric

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151 Molinier, *Correspondance administrative d’Alfonse de Poitiers*, 725.

152 Ibid., 749.
ascribed their willingness to rebuild under those conditions to the prestige of Alphonse’s administration. "Quelle était donc la cause de cet empressement? La justice et le bon gouvernement du comte Alphonse."\(^{153}\)

Once permission was granted, these towns were rebuilt remarkably quickly. The former inhabitants took apart their houses and transported the materials to rebuild the old homesteads. Alphonse’s vassals were unhappy with the lost revenues that resulted from the exodus. The bishop of Rodez even excommunicated the men who left his lands.\(^{154}\) Alphonse gave the “old-new” towns lands and rights in his forests and (politically restrictive) charters, but he did not contribute financially to their renovation. The promise of rights attracted the inhabitants, a promise that had value only to the extent that the organization was known to keep its word.

The Auvergnat task environment was heterogeneous and its elements had varied capacity for financial support. This became especially critical during the preparations for the crusade, which required cash money. A thriving city or a rich monastery could make Alphonse large monetary gifts, but most of the Auvergnat nobility had no such capacity. In fact, many were indebted to the count already. Contingency theory proposes that, “when support capacity is concentrated in one or a few elements of the task

\(^{153}\) Boutaric, *Saint Louis et Alphonse de Poitiers*, 514.

\(^{154}\) Ibid., 515.
environment, organizations . . . seek power relative to those on whom they are dependent.”¹⁵⁵ In this case we would have expected Alphonse’s organization to concentrate its power acquisition strategies on the church and the cities, the wealthiest elements of the task environment.

One way organizations gain power is by relying on other organizations active within the same task environment whose dependencies can be exploited for this purpose. This category of cooperative strategies is comprised of contracting, coopting and coalescing. The power gained is the result of lowered uncertainty, and serves both organizations in the relationship.

Contracting between organizations refers to an agreement for exchange of performance in the future.¹⁵⁶ Many contracting behaviors are informal and rely on faith rather than on an official agreement, written or oral. Alphonse believed such an informal arrangement existed between the consulate of Riom and himself. His organization did not act against the consulate’s pretensions to a charter, and in return the consuls were expected to acquiesce to extraordinary gift demands. In a letter from May second 1268 Alphonse threatened the informal contract, “ceterum cum, sicut nobis subjectum est, in villa Riomi habitants utuntur quibusdam privatis legibus,

¹⁵⁵ Thompson, Organizations in Action, 34.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 35.
When contracting with the consulates did not yield the intended results, an alternative strategy, coopting, was used. Coopting is defined as “the process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-determining structure of an organization as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence.” Alphonse’s organization embraced the consulates and used them as boundary spanning elements that negotiated with the general urban population on the Alphonsine administration’s behalf. The organization accomplished this by offering the consular government protection from the two main threats to their stability—their local lords and other urban factions. Coopting, unlike relying on prestige, involves relinquishing some power to the

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157 Molinier, Correspondance administrative d’Alfonse de Poitiers, 725.

158 Thompson, Organizations in Action, 35.
absorbed organization. Alphonse’s administration was willing to give the consuls of Montferrand and Riom a modicum of political power in return for the consulates becoming subordinate to the organization.

The consuls of the Riom and Montferrand were elected internally, but not in a democratic fashion. The members of the consulates represented the most powerful (that is, richest) families in town.159 Although the consuls were not compensated for their service, there was sufficient financial incentive to serve. Consular power allowed one to further his financial interests within the city and beyond it. The settled oligarchy needed to protect its own domain consensus against other wealthy bourgeois families who wanted to claim this power. It complied with the Alphonsine government to ensure its own authority.

In 1225 the consuls of Montferrand enlisted the aid of King Louis VIII against their local lord, gaining the prestige of direct submission to the king in return for an oath of fidelity and an annual gift of a mark of gold on the feast of the Purification of the Virgin. The mark was always carried by a consul, and not by a common messenger, presumably since participating in its delivery was a prestigious duty. When the Auvergne became part of Alphonse’s apanage the oath and gift transferred to Alphonse. The old arrangement between the king and the consulate was not an example of coopting,

159 Lodge, “La vie quotidienne à Montferrand au XIIIe siècle,” 81.
because the consulates were not incorporated into the royal government, but it did set a precedent for treating directly with the overlord.

Despite their appeal to the king, the consulate of Montferrand continued to have strained relations with their local lord, Guichard de Beaujeu. Guichard, a knight from an impoverished family, borrowed large sums of money from the bourgeois and neglected to pay them back. He also neglected to send one of his men to help the consuls collect the communal tax, despite repeated requests.\(^{160}\)

Additionally, the consuls believed Guichard was supporting an urban confraternity in opposition to the consuls and to the count. In a letter from 1251 the consuls presented themselves as loyal representatives of the count, contrasted with the unnamed men of the confraternity, who plotted to transfer the town’s loyalty to Guichard: “And also let us notify you, lord, that many men of Montferrand are in accord and have made an agreement and became a confraternity, which the lord agreed to, as we think, which fraternity is against our freedom and against being faithful to you . . . , because in the city of Montferrand there ought to be no oath, except for those to the city and to you, lord.”\(^{161}\) The men of the confraternity must have also identified the consuls with the count, given that they tried to prevent the payment of the mark of

\(^{160}\) *Recueil d’anciens textes bas-latins, provençaux et français*, 171-73.

\(^{161}\) Ibid.
gold, the count’s annual tribute. The consuls staged the political developments in Montferrand as a threat to both themselves and the count. However, it is more likely that the “confraternity” was a competing political organization, capitalizing on the power struggle between the local lord and the consulate in order to gain clout.

The Alphonsine administration used charters to coopt the consulates. It is worth clarifying a common misapprehension; the donation of a charter did not signify the creation of a consular organization, but merely acknowledged its existence. The consular organization was generally already old and stable when a charter was approved. However, gaining formal approval helped the consulate achieve domain consensus.

Above, we discussed the legal battle between Alphonse’s government and the cities of Riom and Montferrand regarding the crusading gift. We can now address the resolution of that conflict. In 1270, in return for the gift, Alphonse gave the men of Riom a new charter. Riom had enjoyed a charter (given under almost the same exact circumstances) since 1249, but that charter had originated in Lorris in the Gâtinais, and did not fit the needs of the city.  

The 1270’s charter came to be known as the Alphonsine, and was given to many Auvergnat towns, including Montferrand, and it

162 Boutaric, Saint Louis et Alphonse de Poitiers, 506.

163 Ibid., 507.
was by means of the Alphonsine that these consulates were coopted into the Alphonsine administration.

One of the innovations of the Alphonsine system was an addition to the oath of the baili. The baili now also swore to keep the privileges of the city. The Alphonsine change also slightly limited the constable’s span of control; he was compelled to arrive in Riom to judge the men of Riom, and if he could not arrive at the city he was still bound to judge them as close to it as possible, so as not to trouble them. The consuls, on their end, were to swear an oath of fealty, and their election schedule was now set by the count’s government. They were given limited rights of low justice within the city, to be exercised in collaboration with the baili. The chart also specified a set of offenses for which the count was entitled to a fine. On all non-specified offenses the consuls would judge according to their own discretion, with the council of the baili and six councilors, and according to the customs of the city.164 The Alphonsine charter gave the consulate power over the city, allowing the ruling faction to defend itself against other urban groups. The exchange of power in this transaction was such that the Alphonsine organization gained power over the cities by sharing power with the consulates.

We touched upon the subject of the new cities of Languedoc earlier, relative to the need for prestige to ensure domain consensus. It was mentioned that Alphonse

164 Ibid.
gave those cities charters. Those charters were also used as part of a coopting strategy, but they were not as liberal as the Alphonsine. The new cities did not elect their consuls; the baili selected them with the help of the local elders.\textsuperscript{165} The consuls’ role was hollowed of meaning and but they maintained two of their prior roles; maintenance of the city’s roads and water sources, and dividing the demanded tax sums between the city’s inhabitants, according to their wealth. However, the consuls were not allowed to collect a tax unless it was ordered by the seneschal, and they were to submit their accounts to him\textsuperscript{166}. The particular location of a bridge or the internal division of tax sums were of little import to Alphonse’s organization. They were of great significance to the inhabitants, however, and gave the consulate power over them.

The creation of the new towns in Languedoc was a coopting triumph; first, it brought inhabitants and their tax revenues back into the count’s lands, shifting the power balance with his vassals in his favor. Second, it incorporated into the administration the specific knowledge the consuls had about the town and the wealth of their neighbors without sharing any political power.

The church was the second element of the task environment with easy access to money. In its dealings with the church, Alphonse’s organization relied on a combination

\textsuperscript{165} Ibid., 517.

\textsuperscript{166} Ibid.
of contracting and coalescing. The main sanctions church leaders had at their disposal were excommunication and the interdict. The main dependencies of local church leaders were their submission to the papal see and their reliance on lay power for enforcing church verdicts. Alphonse’s organization exploited both those dependencies.

When a prince was excommunicated all the oaths of fealty his vassals and subjects owed him were nullified. This was the greatest weapon church leaders had against lay interference. Alphonse contracted with the pope to reduce the effectiveness of this weapon. At the count’s request, Pope Clement IV (formerly Gui Foucois, a member of the count’s council) provided Alphonse with a written privilege that protected him from excommunication.\(^{167}\)

Having procured a shield for himself, the count continued to weaken the power of excommunication. Excommunications were issued by church courts, but it was up to lay judges to execute the judgment. Although lay authority was forbidden from interfering in religious decisions, the Alphonsine administration refused to carry out verdicts of excommunication if they were motivated by financial reasons or seemed unjust. This, in fact, meant that the secular judges supervised the decisions of church courts. The administration’ battle against excommunication was supported by the king. In 1264 the bishop of Clermont minted new money and threatened the men who

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\(^{167}\) Ibid., 429.
refused to use it with excommunication. Alphonse informed Louis, who threatened the bishop with seizing his temporal assets\textsuperscript{168}. The king went so far as to order the \textit{bailli} of Bourges to follow through with the threat, if the bishop would not relent.

When Alphonse announced his intention to return to \textit{Outremer} in 1253, the pope awarded him extraordinary financial privileges that would allow him to finance another crusade. Alphonse was accorded three thousand marks of silver from the proceeds of usury, not only from within his \textit{apanage}, but from the entirety of France, and was also permitted to free his vassals from the crusader vows they took for a payment, and to use all the pious donations that were made in the interest of the holy land or without a specified purpose. Many of those privileges were given at the expense of local French religious establishments, who objected but were forced to submit to the papal authority. Alphonse was not accorded the right to collect the tenth from the religious establishments of his \textit{apanage}, but only because the pope had already bestowed that privilege on King Louis IX.\textsuperscript{169}

The former lands of house saint Gilles were still, in Alphonse’s day, a putative hotbed of heresy. The inquisition was responsible for identifying potential heretics, determining their level of heresy, and rendering a fitting punishment. Contrary to

\textsuperscript{168} Ibid., 428.

\textsuperscript{169} Ibid., 316.
popular imagination, most punishments were relatively mild. As with all church courts, the inquisition depended on lay power to carry out the verdicts. The property of the condemned heretics was confiscated by the seigneur. This property presumably paid for his expenses in supporting the inquisition. This was a common arrangement and not unique to Alphonse’s lands.

At the beginning of Alphonse’s rule every seneschal was responsible for coordinating with the inquisition in his sénéchaussée. After 1255 the relationship between the inquisition and the Alphonsine administration was streamlined and concentrated in the hands of a dedicated clerk, Jacques Dubois. Jacques was in charge of confiscated revenues from all three meridional sénéchaussées: Rouerge, the Agenais and the Toulousain. He was responsible for collecting the property, selling it, and for representing the count’s interests in case of litigation. Jacques sent regular reports to the council every term.

In addition, Jacques created and maintained inventories of all the confiscations since the time of count Raymond VII. He ascertained the status of the property in every location, gathering information from the local consulates. He was successful enough at his job to remain in it for sixteen years, until 1271. His efforts were rewarded with two farms in the Lauragais that gave him an annual income of ten pounds a year.\footnote{Dossat, “Alfonse de Poitiers et les clerks,” 362.}
The interaction between the inquisition and the Alphonsine administration took the form of a coalition because the Alphonsine administration underwrote the inquisition. Jacques Dubois’ responsibilities included paying the inquisitors’ expenses, which gave the Alphonsine administration, and not the papacy, direct power over the inquisition. Alphonse’s organization saw the inquisition as a potential source of revenue, one that was falling far short of its potential. During the two financial terms from Ascension 1256 to Purification 1257, the inquisition raised only eight hundred and twenty pounds in revenue, but spent eight hundred and thirty two pounds on expenses. Alphonse notified Jacques of his displeasure, and asked the clerk to move the inquisitors from Toulouse to a less central, cheaper location. Alphonse suggested they operate out of one of his castles.

Accordingly, confiscations of heretics’ property, rare under count Raymond, increased in frequency. Both the inquisitors and Alphonse’s officers accepted administrative authority over the inquisition. Once both organizations committed to evaluate the inquisition in monetary terms, abuses of power soon followed. In 1255 Renaud de Chartres, a Dominican, arrived at Toulouse as a newly appointed inquisitor. He was disturbed by the way the inquisition operated and decried the abuses he

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171 Molinier, Correspondance administrative d’Alfonse de Poitiers, XLIX.

172 Ibid., 948.
encountered in a letter to Alphonse. His description of the operating procedures indicated that the inquisitors were informed participants in the coalition.¹⁷³

In his letter Renaud informed the count of a pattern of abuse; when the previous inquisitors condemned a heretic to life imprisonment, the secular judge burned the man in order that his property could be confiscated on behalf of the count. The previous inquisitors knew of this cruelty but did not protest it. Renaud’s letter takes stock of their reasons for allowing the miscarriage of justice, and from his phrasing it is clear that Renaud was personally exposed to these arguments and that they were prevalent. The first argument against intervening was that it was not a part of the inquisitors’ duties; it was not a decision they needed to make, and, since it was a difficult decision, they chose not to make it.

Moreover, Renaud writes, “some people claim that if we do not follow the path of our predecessors, our work would be in vain, and the land could not be purged from the disgrace of heresy . . . the zealots of the faith will perhaps say that we are destroying the inquisition by acting with more gentleness than the inquisitors about whom we just spoke.”¹⁷⁴ Renaud did not dismiss these justifications out of hand. He took counsel before deciding he would address his doubts to the pope.

¹⁷³ Boutaric, *Saint Louis et Alphonse de Poitiers*, 452-54.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.
The inquisitorial arguments in favor of maintaining the coalition with Alphonse’s administration were valid according to the logic of appropriateness. First, the decision Renaud was so conflicted about did not fall within the bounds of his organizational role. Second, the miscarriage of justice supported the achievement of the inquisition’s organizational goals. Renaud countered with a moral argument, calling on logic external to his role as an inquisitor but compatible with his role as a Dominican, “our conscience doubts that we can keep quiet about such acts without danger to our souls or the danger of irregularity.”

An additional testament to the effects of the coalition is found in a 1253 letter to Alphonse from the seneschal of Rouerge. The seneschal complained that the bishop of Rodez sentenced six heretics to penitence, denying the count his rights, “the bishop . . . summoned to Rodez six inhabitants of Najac . . . since these six men were publicly known as heretics, I travelled to Rodez to aid with the judgment and to make sure you will not be the victim of any fraud. The lord bishop told me all the men were heretics and you will gain one hundred thousand sous from their goods, but the bishop and his assessors begged me to leave . . . a part of the goods to these men and their children, which I refused, the next day the bishop . . . condemned the six men to penitence,

175 Ibid.
This letter refers to a heresy tribunal not led by the Dominicans but by the bishop of Rodez. Nonetheless it reveals that both bishop and seneschals agreed that the count’s administration should have influence over the verdict.

A final prediction with regard to domain maintenance is that captive organizations, like Alphonse’s, will seek to enlarge the task environment if they are unable to achieve enough power over it. We see this prediction come true for Alphonse’s organization in the years leading up to the 1270 crusade. Unable to command sufficient funds by traditional means, the organization turned to other sources of revenue within the same domain. From 1261 to 1270 Guillaume de Plessis and Salomon collected fouage in the sénéchausées of the Midi. The collection of fouage for a crusade was a novelty in the Midi, although it was presented by the Alphonsine administration as an ancient right. Another example for the search for new sources of revenue was Gilles Camellin’s 1269 mission to the Rouerge, the Venaissin and the Toulousain.

Alphonse sent Gilles Camellin to the Midi in 1269 to search for extraordinary sources of revenue. One such untapped resource was the count’s forest rights, which

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176 Ibid., 456-57.
177 Thompson, Organizations in Action, 37.
Gilles utilized ingeniously; he had the area partially deforested, converting some of the cleared land to pasture and building new towns on the rest. He also sold parts of the deforested land, putting the parcels up for auction to insure the highest sale price. However, Gilles did not lose sight of other opportunities; he collected money from the Jews of Toulouse, looked into unapproved amortissements, and fined bourgeois who held noble fiefs. It was common and customary for non-nobles to own noble fiefs in Languedoc, although theoretically those fiefs could only belong to men who could supply knight’s service. The mission to fine the owners of those fiefs made Gilles quite unpopular in the Midi.

In addition to the interactive strategies discussed so far, an organization can also mitigate contingencies through organizational design. Organizations attempt to “place boundaries around those activities which if left to the task environment would be crucial contingencies.” The manner in which this happens differs based on the interdependence involved in the task. Units relying on long-linked technology are expected to achieve boundary formation through vertical integration. In Alphonse’s organization the mint was such a unit.

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178 Molinier, Correspondance administrative d’Alfonse de Poitiers, XLXX.

179 Thompson, Organizations in Action, 39.
Minting is a long-linked technology, dependent on an input of precious metals, which the organization had to buy. In an attempt to buffer the minting activity from external dependency the organization attempted to acquire and run a silver mine in Orzals in Rouergue. The land the mines were situated on belonged in part to Alphonse and in part to a vassal of the count of Rodez. Working the mines required negotiating an agreement with the count, a process that took three years to complete. Finally, Alphonse bought the property rights from the vassal and agreed that the count of Rodez would receive three sous for every mark of silver the mine produced.180

This classic instance of vertical integration exposed the dangers of this strategy: the organization had no previous experience in mining, the process of integration cost a lot of money and effort, and the amount of mined ore was disappointing. Alphonse charged the seneschal of Rouergue with operating the mine, “we ask you, as we have before, that, if you have not yet done this, you make sure to purvey two mills, or three, or more, with water or of horses, or of wind, or of manual power, to work the mine in Orzals.”181 In 1267 the seneschal sent the count two hundred and five marks of silver from the mine, and received a cold response: “you should know that we are very surprised that you have sent us such a small sum of new silver from our mines in Orzals.

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181 Molinier, Correspondance administrative d’Alfonse de Poitiers, 130.
. . we command you add a sufficient number of other workers to the workers that you have there, and if you do not have water mills, to make horse mills and hand mills.”182

By the end of 1268 the mine had only supplied a thousand pounds worth of silver. After the count of Rodez complained that Alphonse’s officers demanded his participation in the extraction costs, the mine was closed.183

The units of Alphonse’s organization that relied on reciprocal interdependence were expected to seek to expand their domains by “incorporating the object worked on.”184 A contemporary example for this strategy is the modern American university, where the “object” worked on is the student. Undergraduate students sit in lecture halls owned by the university, eat on the meal plan and sleep in dorms. Their social environment is comprised of other students, chosen by the university. This allows constant reciprocal connection and isolates them from undesired influences. Alphonse’s council members were incorporated into the organization in almost the same way. They lived where the count lived, ate at his table and wore his livery. They interacted socially with other members of Alphonse’s court.

No organization is an island, and in every organization there exist elements that are interdependent with other organizations, and are “not subject to authoritative

182 Ibid., 136.

183 Boutaric, Saint Louis et Alphonse de Poitiers, 208-210.

184 Thompson, Organizations in Action, 43.
specification of permissible action.”\textsuperscript{185} While the most buffered element, the council, made up the technical core of the organization, the individual province governments were the organization’s boundary spanning elements. The technological core is responsible for problems of coordination, while boundary spanning elements deal with adjustment to exogenous variables. The potential exogenous constraints are usually the result of either geographic restrictions or the social composition of the task environment.

Alphonse’s organization dealt with a serious geographic constraint. The three main divisions were fairly distant from each other, where distance is measured by the costs of communication and transportation. However, since they were only connected through pooled interdependence, the relevant distance was between the three divisions and Paris. The Alphonsine accounts recorded transportation and communication expenses: wages for messengers, purchase of sacks used to transport money, payments for horses and armed escorts. The sums added up: the recorded expenditure on messengers for one of the terms of 1260 reached a hundred and fifty-four pounds.\textsuperscript{186} Steps were taken to limit these expenses.

\textsuperscript{185} Ibid., 66.

\textsuperscript{186} Molinier, \textit{Correspondance administrative d’Alfonse de Poitiers}, XXXIII.
On less than urgent matters Alphonse instructed the seneschals to answer “quamcitius commode poteritis,” that is to send their replies with the next scheduled messenger. On routine matters the seneschal either sent his response with his clerk, when the latter went to court to present his accounts, or carried it himself on his next visit. The seneschals were quite creative in saving on communication expenses: one used a visiting bishop’s messenger, and another gave his missive to the men who transported the count’s money. Alphonse was equally committed to cutting these expenses, and had enquêteurs carry letters to the seneschals for him.

The social composition of a task environment is estimated in gross terms as homogeneous or heterogeneous, stable or rapidly changing. The social composition of the population the Alphonsine administration dealt with was heterogeneous. The three geographic divisions spoke different languages, and each followed distinct local customs. The social composition within each sénéchaussée was also heterogeneous, being comprised of groups that were not equal before the law and whose economic and communal interests were varied. During Alphonse’s reign the social milieu in lands of his apanage was not changing rapidly, although some changes certainly took place.

“The organization component facing a stable task environment will rely on rules to achieve adaptation to environment.”187 Below the level of the sénéchaussée the

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units of Alphonse’s administration faced a stable task environment, and accordingly relied on the rules set forth in the 1254 ordinance to manage it. However, when Alphonse began to raise capital for the 1270 crusade, his actions de-stabilized the task environment by changing the customary demands, and as a result the domain consensus was put in jeopardy.

Often, Alphonse’s organization dealt with large or unpredictable variations. Some nobles were allies, others had offended the count, and one could rapidly move between these two groups. Thompson proposes that “when the range of task-environment variations is large or unpredictable, the responsible organization component must achieve the necessary adaptation by monitoring that environment and planning responses, and this calls for localized units.”188 This proposition explains why the organization relied on prévôts who were geographically dispersed, rather than stationing tax collectors in a central location, such as Riom or even Paris, and dispersing them on an ad hoc basis.

This form of organization emerges under conditions where the social component is heterogeneous and the environment is dynamic: “organizations designed to handle unique or customary tasks . . . base specialists in homogeneous groups for

188 Ibid., 72.
‘housekeeping’ purposes, but deploy them into task forces for operational purposes.”\(^{189}\)

Alphonse’s council members, usually based in the homogeneous council, were sent to the provinces as overseers (for example, Sicard l’Alaman to the Toulousain) or used in task forces faced with operational projects like the sale of the meridional forests or the preparation of the mines in Orzals.

Organizations tend to satisfy rather than to optimize efficiency. In keeping score of their performance, different units are measured by different yardsticks. Units controlled through rules are assessed in terms of adherence to the rules.\(^{190}\) In Alphonse’s administration the seneschals assessed the baillis based on this standard. The seneschals, despite their oath, were primarily controlled through reciprocal interdependence, and were not evaluated based on observance of the rules.

Units controlled through mutual adjustment, like the seneschals, are measured in terms of the confidence expressed in them by coordinate units, “evaluations of this sort are typically made by maintenance or trouble shooting crews.”\(^{191}\) The seneschals were sometimes directly evaluated by enquêteurs, as the constable of Auvergne was.

\(^{189}\) Ibid., 80.

\(^{190}\) Ibid., 95.

\(^{191}\) Ibid., 95-96.
However, when the *enquêteurs* were on a routine mission, the seneschal had no duty to appear before them, unlike the *prévôts* and their sergeants.192

Both *prévôts* and seneschals acted as boundary spanning units, and those “are judged in part by evidence of the disappointments they cause for elements of the task environment.”193 In a standard *enquête* the *enquêteurs* solicited testimony from the task environment about disappointments caused by the count’s officers, and generally that category did not include the seneschal. However, rumors heard during a routine *enquête* could launch a special investigation into the behavior of the seneschal. Such investigations, judging by the 1263 *enquête* against the constable of Auvergne, were concerned not only with the disappointment of the task environment, but equally, if not primarily, with the damage the constable inflicted on the organization.

In summary, the structure, buffering techniques and coordinating strategies employed by Alphonse’s administration are in line with the predictions of contingency theory relative to the contingencies it faced. The organization was complex judging by all common definitions: it employed highly educated men, was large in size and dealt with multiple levels of interdependency. Good administration did not follow the same evolutionary path as modern science; modern organizations achieved greater efficiency

192 Boutaric, *Saint Louis et Alphonse de Poitiers*, 441.

193 Thompson, *Organizations in Action*, 96.
than their medieval counterparts because they stood on the shoulders of the giants of modern science, not on account of modern (Western) man’s unparalleled genius for management.

This is an important distinction to make, because it suggests that the study of pre-modern organizations could be a beneficial strategy for organization theory. The oldest surviving modern organizations are less than two centuries old, and their histories still shed light on the ways organizations adapt to survive. Given that organizations accumulate knowledge and learning in quantities far beyond the scope of the individual, imagine how much more we could learn from organizations that survived for centuries or even millennia. It would be particularly tempting to apply this analysis to the Catholic Church, a thriving contemporary organization with nearly two millennia worth of experience.
Chapter Three

“Objects mistakenly made subject to legislation result only in the limitation, if not the complete annulment, of that which is attempted to be safeguarded.”

Metternich

Any organization, once it becomes large enough, faces a principal-agent problem. It is necessary for decisions in the organization to be made by the people who have access to the proper information, and so beyond a certain size vertical differentiation is required. This differentiation allows humans to collaborate and transcend their limitations in acquiring and analyzing information, and is therefore one of the main advantages of hierarchical organizations. At the same time, the fact that an agent has access to information that the principal is excluded from creates potential problems for the principal; the agent can take actions deleterious to the principal, or he may have hidden knowledge about the actual value of his position. In organizations, authority is in the hands of the person whose decisions guide behavior. If left unaddressed, hidden action and hidden knowledge by agents usurp the authority of the
principal. This happens in both private and public organizations; in private organizations the problem is studied in terms of organizational misbehavior and in public organizations as corruption.

One difference between the two approaches is the span of behavior they find relevant. Whereas corruption studies look at the misuse of public resources for private gain, organizational misbehavior is concerned with all behavior that can compromise the organization, including employee theft (which, conceptually, much corrupt behavior falls under), harassment, free-loading and whistle blowing. Whistle blowing falls under the same category as theft, in this view, because although it may be beneficial for the public it is harmful for the organization. The organizational framework recognizes that misbehavior can be motivated by multiple factors, including self-interest; desire to cause damage and concern for the organization. In contrast, corruption studies more commonly concentrate on the rational incentives that motivate public employees to go astray.

Both approaches agree that organizations must actively seek to influence the employees in order to prevent the breakdown of authority, and in both views employee behavior can be controlled through the application of adequate incentives and sanctions, among them salaries, bonuses, and termination. However, the organizational view puts a greater emphasis on affecting behavior through the inculcation of organizational values and habits, leading to the creation of an organizational identity
that will promote desirable behavior without constant supervision. This form of control can be achieved by in-house training and by relying on professional identities.

The difference in emphasis stems from the divergent definitions of rationality prevalent in neoclassical economics and in behavioral economics. Neoclassical microeconomics assumes subjective expected utility, whereas behavioral approaches assume bounded rationality. Subjective expected utility means that an actor can assign values to possible scenarios, is faced with a well-defined set of alternatives to choose from, can predict the future outcomes of his choice to a reasonable degree, and will select the alternative that would maximize his utility value. Bounded rationality, on the contrary, supposes that the actor has limited knowledge, limited ability to predict the future and limited attention. Choices are made based on the elements of the problem to which attention is called, and maximizing is replaced by satisfying.194

The correction of agents’ conduct was a key element in Capetian administrative reform. In this chapter I set out to understand the reform efforts undertaken by Alphonse in light of modern research about corruption and misbehavior. Alphonse’s reform cannot be studied separately from Louis’ reform, which inspired and instructed it. The brothers launched their efforts in 1254, after returning from crusade. Louis believed the crusade’s failure was a divine rebuke of his past acts as king, in particular

194 Simon, Reason in Human Affairs.
allowing mistreatment of the common subjects by royal officials. His reform ordinance of 1254 set the tone of the enterprise, and his brother echoed it, albeit with some changes.

I have found that the Capetian reform measures were mostly consistent with the program enunciated by a leading scholar of corruption, Susanne Rose-Ackermann, in her 1999 *Corruption and Government*. However, in addition to introducing structural and legal changes, the Capetian efforts were directed at nurturing organizational loyalty and fostering organizational values. Interestingly, those efforts targeted not only the employees, but also the clients, and in particular the common people. This choice signaled the expansion of membership to include the general populace, and was related to a major shift in the nature of the organization.

It may seem surprising to find that thirteenth-century reform efforts closely correspond to the solutions advocated by contemporary research. The current definition of corruption assumes a sharp distinction between the private and public sectors, a separation that was just coming into being during the high medieval period. Moreover, because that separation did not yet exist as an ideal, the lines between the legitimate and the illegitimate were fuzzy. However, the degree of actual separation varies widely even among modern states, and complete separation is an ideal more than it is reality. Privatization, the effects of corporate lobbies, and even the existence of financial organizations as powerful as any state, belie the existence of a firm boundary.
Although much research in the field concentrates on bringing corruption reform to developing countries, and takes into account the culturally fluid nature of the definition, proper caution should still be taken. Scholars of corruption concern themselves primarily with modern state officials who face corrupt incentives quite unlike those tackled by their medieval counterparts. First, the modern state is involved in many more aspects of everyday life than its medieval counterpart. Second, the dependence of politicians on constituents creates novel motivations and curbs on political corruption. It is to be expected that some arguments made by scholars of corruption would be inapplicable to a dynastic monarchy. Nonetheless, Capetian reform followed modern prescriptions fairly closely, at least as understood by Rose-Ackerman.

Corruption in the Auvergne

Between 1248 and 1251, Messire Nivardus was constable of the Auvergne. In 1251 an enquête found him involved in many cases of abuse. To mention a few of the most notable offenses, Nivardus had let a gang of outlaws, led by Uldinus Cholet, run wild in the countryside, abusing the subjects of the count and of the local lords. On several occasions he accepted gifts in exchange for his promise to restrain the gang, but after receiving payment remained idle. Nivardus alienated the count’s possessions in a certain forest exchange for payments, and allowed Robert of Auvergne to take over the
count’s pastures at Vort and Draco de Castro Novo to seize control of the villages of Busseroles and Chasanoles.195

The complaints paint an image of collapsed central authority, due in part to the constable’s inaction; Willelmus de Castronovo, a knight, created a new village on the count’s lands and usurped his ban of the oven. The abbot of Bellaqua sold his rights of justice, which belonged to the count, to the son of the duke of Burgundy. The forest of Pincat, formerly peaceful, became a refuge for outlaws. The count’s revenues from Taleine were usurped by men of the count of Burgundy (Franche-Comté), who beat the Alphonse’s collectors, kept them in chains for thirteen weeks and extorted forty-six pounds from them in return for their freedom. As a result, no collectors were willing to risk a return trip.196

The constable also accepted monetary gifts in return for showing leniency to violent criminals. For example, he accepted eight pounds and twelve pounds respectively from Chaumat and Giraud de Sancto Dominico, fugitive murderers who wished to return from outlawry. On the occasion of his daughter’s marriage members of


196 Ibid., 44.
the local elite, including Robert of Auvergne and two abbots, gave the constable gifts to the sum of 300 pounds. Esclarlata Guardela, a local widow, reported being asked for a wedding gift and declining. This may indicate the gifts were, in fact, payments elicited to gain the constable’s good will. Local landholders paid the constable for defense, for justice, and in order “to be his friend.”

Nivardus’ time in office coincided with Alphonse’s stay in Outremer, before the count launched his administrative reform. The 1254 ordinance expressly forbade many of Nivardus’ transgressions; it banned officials from accepting gifts, converting physical punishment for payment of a fine, and accepting money from litigants. Henceforth officials took an oath to abide by the ordinance, which spelled out their proper behavior. In 1255 a new constable, Geoffroi Thomas, was appointed, who was to administer the Auvergne for the next ten years. In spite of the reform, he proved to be equally as corrupt as his predecessor, and more enterprising.

Persistent rumors about Geoffroi’s behavior prompted a 1263 enquête directed personally at the constable, and not, as was more common, at the province. The records

197 Ibid., 51: “Willelmus Bontos et Morlat et alii consules Pontis Castri j. et r., dixerunt quod dominus Nivardus, eo anno quo primo fuit conestabulus, vocavit eos et alios probos homines dicte ville, ut servirent ei, tali modo quod esset amicus eorum. Et ipsi tunc dederunt sibi 10 l. vienn.”

198 Histoire générale du Languedoc, vol. 6, 502.
of this *enquête* show the constable had created a criminal network in the Auvergne, a sophisticated enterprise aimed at usurping the count’s authority. His network remained hidden for almost ten years because of the terror he inspired in the population, which was so great that no witnesses would openly testify against him and his associates. Their reluctance to complain meant the *enquêteurs* had to accept testimonies anonymously.  

The clarification of administrative norms provided by the ordinance gave Geoffroi a blueprint for keeping abuses secret.

Geoffroi’s organization excelled at avoiding detection and maintaining the semblance of legitimacy. At the core of his network we find Radulphus de Roeris, an impoverished knight from a local noble family, who was the constable’s close friend. The relationship proved beneficial to both parties; Radulphus was facing financial difficulties and was reportedly indebted to the city of Riom to the tune of one thousand pounds, and Geoffroi needed a local ally. By 1263 Radulphus was not only wealthy, but had also, with the support of the constable, appropriated the lordship of half of the city of Marsac, which belonged rightfully to the count.

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200. Ibid., 147, 145.
As for Geoffroi, he profited by making Radulphus his agent in corrupt deals, eliminating the constable’s direct involvement. Radulphus was Geoffroi’s partner in governance, despite having no formal affiliation with the comital administration; he was present in all assizes, accepting bribes meant for Geoffroi. The records of the consulate of Montferrand document several such payments, with a greater sum dedicated to the constable and a smaller sum which was presumably Radulphus’ fee. The sale of justice was the central source of ill-gotten revenues, which resulted in the systematic exclusion of the poor from the assizes; they could not afford the bribes. Witnesses reported that the constable refused to hear poor claimants, but on the contrary, would happily hang them. Geoffroi was also said to have insulted and chased away petitioners who could not afford to bribe him.

Bribes were also required for bidding on bailiwick farms, so that the winner was not the highest bidder but the man who offered the largest bribe. The constable systematically distanced himself from those transactions; he left the Auvergne for two or three months every year, authorizing Radulphus to act in his place. During those

201 Ibid., 147.


203 “Requisites utrum conestabulus faciat libenter justitiam conquerantibus, dicit quod libenter punit et suspendit malefactors, sed conquerantibus . . . repellit eos ab auditia sua.” *Enquêtes administratives d’Alphonse de Poitiers*, 144.

204 Ibid.
months Radulphus would conduct the auctions and collect bribes from the participants.\textsuperscript{205} Although the witnesses believed the bribes were shared, none could recall seeing Geoffroi accept bribes in person. The practice of using subordinates to handle money is still a popular (and successful) strategy for avoiding conviction among corrupt officials.

The testimonies revealed the formation of a criminal organization, with a characteristic network structure in which the central member is most isolated from contact with other participants: “criminal network structures often protect some participants when their illegal activities are no longer secret and participants become the target of investigation by external forces. Increasing protection after detection can take a variety of forms: limited physical interaction between network participants . . . , the creation of internal organizational buffers to detach participants from one another, and the decentralization of management to shelter leaders.”\textsuperscript{206}

The network created in Auvergne was centralized around the constable’s court. Corrupt deals linked many of the provincial officials, including the prévôts, their clerks, and many important bourgeois. The stability of this arrangement was secured by sharing ill-gotten gains with local administrators, insuring their silence with money and shared

\textsuperscript{205} Ibid., 145, 147.

\textsuperscript{206} Morselli, Inside Criminal Networks, 9.
culpability. A centralized criminal network can usually not emerge unless it can act with impunity, the impunity being offered in this case by the constable. This structure provided protection against random discovery, but not against a concerted effort at exposure.

The 1254 ordinance prohibited the farming of rents to men of ill repute and instructed the use of auction to avoid preferential treatment in their allotment. By apportioning the positions based on bribes, and allowing the prêvôts to make up for the additional expenses by extorting the subjects, Geoffroi transformed their bribes into an investment in his criminal organization. The constable did not have the baillis swear the oath, and never punished them for bad behavior. One witness reported that the constable “supports his servants and baillis more than he should, and will hardly believe anything against them.” Following the enquête, the baillis of Riom, Sebazac, Nonette, Issoire, Oson, Mottonio and Castronovo were made to pay restitutions, as were some of their clerks.

Both the constable’s family and his household shared in the bounty; His wife was given many gifts and his clerk accepted bribes. A witness who had served as bailli for

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207 Histoire générale du Languedoc, vol. 6, 502.

208 “Requisitus sustineat servientes suos, ballivos et alios plus debito, dcit quod sic: vix autem aliquid vult credere contra eos.” Enquêtes administratives d’Alphonse de Poitiers, 145.

209 Ibid., 148.
seven years testified that, “all the servants of the constable accepted bribes, some more and some less. At each term they get gifts from the baillis, three times a year, some get 20 pounds from each bailli, some 10.”210 The witness had paid the servants sixty pounds in less than seven years. As mentioned above, clerks and servants of the baillis also participated in the criminal acts. Geoffroi’s network replaced the comital administration as the object of organizational identification.

In pursuit of this goal Geoffroi employed a second strategy, tailored to the cultural norms of his day. He assumed the posture of a feudal lord, the owner of rights rather than their custodian. Geoffroi’s knighthood made the charade credible, and his engagement in symbolic gestures lent it an air of legitimacy. Witness accounts indicated he succeeded in obfuscating the distinction between principal and agent. One witness said that although he did not know if the constable accepted bribes, Geoffroi had newly begun to stay and eat with his baillis twice or three times a year, at their expense.211 This habit echoed the lordly right of gîte. Other witnesses testified that although they never saw the constable receive monetary bribes, he openly accepted falcons and birds

210 Ibid., 147: “Omnes recipient indifferenter secundum plus et minus; et quolibet termino solutionis recipient donna a ballivis, et hoc ter in anno, aliquando ab uno ballivo 20l., aliquando 10l.”

211 Ibid., 145: “Nisi in hoc videlicet quod de novo consuevit hospitari et manducare cum ballivis suis, bis vel ter per annum cum uno ballivorum et ita cum aliis, ad expensas eorumdem.”
of prey from knights and great men.\textsuperscript{212} Thus, the constable publicly received gifts that were consistent with his lordly aspirations.

Under Geoffroi, usurpations of the count’s rights were permitted provided one had the constable’s cooperation. The knight Petrus de Blot sold his holdings in the city of Menat, which he held as fief from the count (and so could not sell), to the monastery of Menat. Following the sale the abbot intended to exercise the dominium until the constable informed him that the case had to be adjudicated before the count. After debate, the abbot gave the constable a palfrey in return for his silence. A witness saw the horse delivered.\textsuperscript{213}

The reigns of the two corrupt constables were distinct. Nivardus had made Auvergne dangerous due to his failure to establish a monopoly on coercive force, which left the subjects at the mercy of outlaws and private armies. He accepted bribes, but neglected to provide the promised services. In contrast, Geoffroi’s period was characterized by misappropriation of a ‘force monopoly’ and its use for illegitimate reasons. The great robbers of his term in office were not outlaws but members of his corrupt organization, and the effective silencing of witnesses through intimidation suggests greater control over the population. The fact that Geoffroi systematically

\textsuperscript{212} Ibid., 147.

\textsuperscript{213} Ibid.
exclude poor people from court implies a deliberate plan to maximize profits from justice. Was a badly planned reform the cause of this continued corruption? Could modern scholarship elucidate the Capetian error?

In her 1999 Corruption and Government Susan Rose-Ackerman suggested a two part reform program for corrupt governments, consisting of an overhaul of the civil service and an amendment of organization structure. Her plan centers on the reduction of corrupt incentives and an upsurge of the costs of corruption. The structural reform she envisions involves elimination of some programs and simplification of others, in order to reduce incentives to engage in corruption. Although Rose-Ackerman acknowledges that “some applicants may be especially committed to government service,” she believes such men to be rare. Rose-Ackermann does not address inculcating organizational values in administration, but instead recommends increasing salaries to attract better applicants, recruiting with an eye towards preventing conflict of interests, and providing rewards for good performance. Nonetheless, the notion of a professional civil service implies that employees have a professional identification, and that the values of their profession would guide their decisions.

Rose-Ackermann also recommends streamlining the organization structure, especially through elimination of programs that are overwhelmingly corrupt. In the

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214 Rose-Ackerman, Corruption in Government, 73.
Capetian administration hereditary seneschals were a major source of disruption. Their high status combined with the heritability of the position led to permanent confusion between their position as principals in their lands and as agents outside of them. The abolition of the hereditary positions and their replacement by short-term salaried officials began under Philip Augustus, and was consistent with Rose-Ackerman’s recommendation.

Alphonse continued this policy by refusing to return the sénéchaussée of Poitou to the viscount of Thouars, the dynastic claimant. The Auvergne was ruled by a constable, a military title that became an administrative rank equivalent to seneschal. From 1212 until 1230 the title of constable of Auvergne belonged to the count of Bourbon. This meant that of all Alphonse’s lands it had the most recent history of a great feudal lord serving in an administrative role. In fact, Alphonse expended some time and effort before the heir to the Bourbon lands and offices relinquished his hereditary claim to the title, along with Alphonse’s fiefs. This history may have primed the constables under Alphonse to believe they had more discretion than other agents of the same rank.215

Alphonse took additional steps to simplify the structure of his organization, increasing observability and reducing corrupt incentives. When he came into his

215 Boutaric, Saint Louis et Alphonse de Poitiers, 138.
inheritance, Poitou was a sénéchaussée, subdivided into bailiwicks which were in turn composed of prévôtés. Alphonse simplified the hierarchy by eliminating the bailiwicks, and divided the sénéchaussée in two; Poitou and Saintonge. This decreased the power and discretion of the seneschals of Poitou and made detection of malfeasance easier. Alphonse similarly consolidated the six baillies that had existed in the Toulousain into four. 216

The greatest amount of discretion, and therefore the greatest opportunity for abuse, existed in the sale of farms and in matters associated with the constable’s role as judge. From the enquêtes of 1251 and 1263 in Auvergne it seems clear that corruption was common in this auction, in two particular forms; the sale of the farm to a lower bidder (who presumably paid higher bribes) and the extortion of monetary “gifts” from winning bidders. The Capetian reform of tax farming, as expressed in the ordinance, was consistent with Rose-Ackermann’s advice on privatization: “the process should assure the widest level of participation rather than favoring consortia with strong ties to local elites and must be transparent and well publicized, especially in the evaluation of assets.”217

216 Ibid., 134-42.

217 Rose-Ackerman, Corruption in Government, 42.
The ordinance of 1254 decreed that farms were to be sold in public auction to the highest bidder, provided that he was not a clerk, a man of ill repute, or related to the constable. The constable was forbidden to keep any of the money or receive any gifts from those subject to him, except for food and drink of an amount no larger than could be consumed within two days (this was probably permitted because of the difficulty in proving such gifts had taken place.) The new regulations also stipulated that tax farmers swear to uphold the ordinance, that they could not collect fines without order from the constable, could employ only four sergeants at most, and would be held publicly responsible for extortion or other crimes committed while in office. The discretion left to the sergeants was also reduced; if they were found acting without orders, they would be incarcerated. Nonetheless, since the terms of the auction (open, closed) were not defined in the ordinance, it would have been easy to pervert.

Rose-Ackerman mentions that if privatized firms have a monopoly, they should be monitored by regulatory institutions that are not subject to improper influence. Under Louis and Alphonse tax farmers enjoyed a monopoly in the lands of their farm, and were subject to regulation by the enquêteurs, who were buffered from improper influences by their selection. To a significant extent both Alphonse and Louis relied for

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218 Histoire générale du Languedoc, vol. 6, 502.

219 Rose-Ackerman, Corruption in Government, 43.
this purpose on mendicants, who were considered incorruptible, as well as on trusted
members of their inner circles.

In matters of justice, the constable’s freedom was also curtailed; assizes were to
be set as close as possible to the location of harm; justice to evildoers was to be done
“according to law and local custom”, not “according to the constable’s good will”,
addressing the concern that criminals would escape punishment by dealing corruptly
with the constable. This interpretation is corroborated by another newly created
limitation, namely that monetary fines were not to be substituted for corporal
punishment. The constable was forbidden from imprisoning an accused who could offer
bail and from submitting suspects to judicial torture without cause.220 Louis’ ordinance
allowed for even less discretion than Alphonse’s; he specified in which cases bail could
be denied (in cases of heresy or grave crimes for which there were multiple witnesses),
and forbade the use of torture based on the testimony of a sole witness.221

Alphonse and Louis also reformed the administration’s work force, hiring more
university-trained clerks and relatively fewer knights. Clerks could not marry and they
were not land holders, which decreased but did not eliminate the potential for
economic conflict of interest. According to neo-classical microeconomics, employees’

220 Histoire générale du Languedoc, vol. 6, 502.

221 Ordonnances des rois de France de la troisième race, vol. 1, 65-75.
relationships with their employers are a simple financial contract. It is assumed that employees know the range of salaries in their field, and if their compensation is too low they have an incentive to raise it by engaging in corruption.

Behavioral economics acknowledges that employees have limited data about average compensation, and evaluate their wages by comparing them with their aspiration levels. If wages are higher than the aspiration level, aspiration will slowly increase. The aspiration level does not apply only to monetary compensation, but to the multiple inducements a worker receives from his employer. Aspiration levels with regard to monetary compensation, status and power were likely lower among clerks than among the warrior nobility. The nobles aspired, for the most part, to rule their own fiefs. This ambition had more to do with a desire for power and independence than with riches.

Alphonse did raise the salaries in his organization, although some seneschals still found themselves in debt at the end of their terms, in part because their social status required great expense to maintain. Promotion of new administrators was based on merit rather than status, and successful employees stayed with the organization for years, sometimes past the death of the count and king. The change in the nature of the workforce may have been more emphatic in Alphonse’s organization; Louis’ counsel was

\[222\] Douma and Schreuder, Economic Approaches to Organizations, 87.
comprised of both great feudatories and clerks, whereas Alphonse’s council, his major organ of government, was devoid of vassals. Rose-Ackerman endorses a similar reform of the civil service: ”Traditionally, a professional civil service . . . has the security of tenure, is paid a decent salary, is recruited and promoted on merit, and does not have property or business interests that conflict with the fair performance of its duties.”

As mentioned earlier, all of Alphonse’s seneschals and constables came from the ranks of the lower nobility. As knights, they were members of a profession. However, their professional training created warriors, not administrators. The professional values of knighthood may have actually undermined organizational values, a point which I will discuss in detail later. Seneschals and constables frequently did not have long tenure in the organization, and even those who did were rotated between posts in order to prevent conflicts of interest. Although Ackerman recommends secure tenure, she notes that other reformers have endorsed alternating employees for much the same reasons as the Capetians, namely, in order to hinder the formation of coalitions with local elites. She describes a case in India where this strategy failed because it made it difficult to

223 Boutaric, Saint Louis et Alphonse de Poitiers, 123-138.

224 Rose-Ackerman, Corruption in Government, 69.

225 Enquêtes administratives d’Alphonse de Poitiers, introduction.
complain about officials following their move.\textsuperscript{226} Note that both 1254 ordinances took this problem into consideration, directing officials to remain in the area for thirty days after the end of their term in order to allow locals to lodge complaints.\textsuperscript{227}

Alphonse’s organization was in the midst of a transformation. The constables and seneschals were still recruited from the warrior profession, and although they were well paid, were vulnerable to corrupt incentives. The ordinance of 1254 attempted to restrict conflict of interest by forbidding them ownership of land and marriage within their jurisdiction, but it could not address the conflict of interest inherent in their social status. Additionally, the fact that the seneschals and constables carried out their duties far from court made them more difficult to control, a difficulty noted by Louis in a caution to his son, “take special care to have good prévôts and good baillis, and enquire often of them and of those in your household concerning their conduct and whether they are guilty of excessive greed, dishonesty or trickery. Work to rid your lands of all base sins.”\textsuperscript{228}

The second steps in Ackermann’s blueprint for corruption control are implementing measures that increase the cost of corruption, improving detection, specifically through creation of credible regulatory bodies and increasing penalties. A

\textsuperscript{226} Rose-Ackerman, \textit{Corruption in Government}, 84.

\textsuperscript{227} \textit{Ordonnances de rois des France de la troisième race}, vol. 1, 65-75.

\textsuperscript{228} Jean de Joinville, 332.
credible regulatory body is independent, and she suggests achieving this independence by relying on transparent nomination and tenure. Because the Capetian organization did not ‘operate’ in a democratic society, the manner in which it ensured the independence and credibility of the regulators was different, although the end goals were the same. Capetian regulators were independent of any influence except the king’s and were used in ad hoc missions that prevented subversion by local elites. Their credibility was bolstered by association with high prestige organizations, namely the king’s council and the mendicant orders.

By using friars Louis and Alphonse allowed some of the regulators an even greater level of independence. The friars were directly accountable to the Holy See, and thus free from local prelate authority, which was important given the feudal responsibilities of French prelates. They were also, to an extent, detached from the sovereign. Their organizational identification was primarily with their order, which made them likelier whistle-blowers (as seen in the case of Renaud de Chartres, mentioned in the previous chapter).

Ackerman adds that regulatory bodies should, “give consumers a stake in an effective regulatory system.” Rose-Ackerman, Corruption in Government, 44.
process. Until Louis IX’s era the king and his court were peripatetic, and their tours served to bolster loyalty to a distant monarch by allowing subjects to lodge their complaints directly to him. Louis maintained this tradition, although to a lesser extent than previous monarchs. However, Alphonse, perhaps on account of his health, rarely ventured outside of Paris. Regardless of personal preference, the growing size of the realm made this form of direct contact untenable.

Enter the enquêteurs, direct representatives of the ruler who could give personal attention to the complaints of the subjects. Their manner of nomination put them in the ranks of special commissioners, separate from regular office holders, as indicated by the use of the verb commitamus rather than mandamus in their letters of commission. They were personally selected by the prince and delegated a measure of his own judicial power. In this manner, the enquêteurs served not only to combat corruption but also to solve the problem of de-personalization of rule that accompanies the elaboration of bureaucracy. For that reason, they were given wide discretionary berth and could settle cases immediately as long as they did not involve very large sums. In the same interest, enquêteur hearings were informal and did not require a lawyer. The limit on restitution and the ease of approach suggest that common people formed the main intended audience.

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The role of *enquêteurs* in fostering loyalty is further demonstrated by the hiring pool from which they were drawn. The first *enquêteurs* were often recruited from the ranks of the new mendicant orders, which, it is worth noting, were arbiters of church reform. They specialized in preaching to urban publics, and understood their audience well. 231 The new vigor they introduced into European religious life won them many fans, including King Louis, who was even rumored to have been a Franciscan. The king and the mendicants also shared an organizational strategy, offering the laity, until then relegated to a passive role, a chance for active participation. The friars were already encouraging common people in their religious life, and were just as useful in encouraging personal commitment to the kingdom. Careful not to alienate the public he was courting, Alphonse avoided sending Dominicans to Languedoc, where they enjoyed a poor reputation following the Albigensian crusade.232 This was not the case for the Franciscans. Apart from mendicants, Alphonse and Louis relied on the knights and clerks of their councils, many of whom had legal degrees, to fill the ranks of regulators. While not quite as humble and unassuming as friars, these men were also not among the great and powerful.

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232 *Enquêtes administratives d’Alphonse de Poitiers*, xxxi-xxxii.
The main point in which Alphonse and Louis’ reforms departed from Rose-Ackerman’s advice was the matter of penalties. Although the ordinances stipulated public punishment for malfeasance, in addition to restitution, that part seems not to have been enforced. Out of a total of 38 constables and seneschals who worked for Alphonse, seventeen officials continued working for either the comital or the royal administration following the end of their terms as constable. Twelve high officials were found by enquêteurs to have engaged in corruption. Remarkably, three men belonged to both groups. Geoffroi Thomas, constable of the Auvergne, took part in a diplomatic mission for Alphonse in 1269. Pierre de Voisins, a knight who was seneschal of the Toulousain from 1254 to 1256, acted as royal seneschal of Carcassonne from the summer of 1254 until December of that year, and later joined the administration of Charles of Anjou. The complaints about his behavior were made public in September of 1254, which did not impede his career. Finally, Jean d’Arcis, knight, was accused of corruption while seneschal of the Agenais and Quercy, which did not prevent Alphonse from naming him seneschal of the Toulousain. He retained both titles until 1255, when he became exclusively seneschal of the Toulousain, a position he held until 1256.

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233 Ibid., lxxvii.

234 Ibid., lxxviii.
Even if we set aside the case of Geoffroi Thomas, whose career trajectory was certainly stunted, we are left with two corrupt officials who were promoted to positions of power. Jean d’Arcis began his career in the royal administration and worked with Queen Blanche to take possession of the county of Toulouse for Alphonse. He aroused accusations of malfeasance only in his second term as seneschal of Toulouse, and may have gained the count’s good will when, as seneschal of the Agenais and Quercy, he worked to cover the debts left behind by his predecessor, Simon Claret. However, he left his position in the Toulousain in debt to Alphonse and had to sell some of his belongings to cover it. Pierre Voisin, seneschal of the Toulousain 1251-1254, never incurred debts against Alphonse.

Only three of Alphonse’s high officials received pensions rewarding their exceptional service: Adam le Panetier and Thibaut de Neuvy, former seneschals of Poitou, and Raymond Gaucelmi, former seneschal of the Venaissin. None of the three had faced accusations of impropriety or left their position in debt. In summary, Alphonse rewarded competence; men who left their territory in financial disorder were rarely hired again, nor were men with a history of corruption. If they were, it was usually not a promotion; Geoffroi Thomas’ only other known administrative role was a far cry from seneschal. Nonetheless, a much reduced chance of another high position was hardly a harsh punishment.
Neither Nivardus nor Geoffroi Thomas suffered any greater penalty, as far as I have been able to ascertain, than being removed from office. While lower officials were fined, they too were only subject to monetary sanctions, which were by necessity low since, as mentioned before, the *enquêteurs* did not have a mandate to order restitution except in cases where the sum was too small to involve a judge. This meant any large monetary punishment had to go through the count’s court and involve both a delay and additional expenses for the aggrieved party. Modern scholars of corruption recommend that credible reform go to the top, punishing the rich and the powerful for flouting the law, otherwise the legitimacy of the system will suffer. The fact that Nivardus was not punished in 1251 may have contributed to the corruption of Geoffroi Thomas in the 1260’s, although a sample size of two is insufficient to arrive at strong conclusions.

Although the royal ordinance of 1254 stipulated that corrupt officials could be made to pay with their lives, the *enquêteurs* of Saint Louis’ age relied mostly on forcing offending officials, as well as subjects who enjoyed their corruption, to make restitutions to their victims. No official lost his life or his social status over malfeasance during this time. The Capetian organization took note of this issue, as punishments did grow more severe with time. Beginning in 1267 Alphonse’s *enquêteurs* could impose large fines, revenues from which went to his treasury. Glenisson saw this development, which was later adopted by the royal administration, as a cynical move that turned the *enquêteurs* into a taxing agency. For that reason he holds Alphonse responsible for the
perversion of Louis’ charitable endeavor. However, when one recalls how small the fines usually were, it becomes clear they were not sufficient to deter abuse. Not every victim would complain, and subsequently, corrupt deals could be profitable even taking a certain amount of restitutions into account. Moreover, making a ruler party to disputes between individuals is the basis of criminal law, and not an inherently immoral choice.

Under the later Capetians penalties became far more daunting. In 1301 the enquêteurs removed Guichard de Marzy, seneschal of Toulouse, from office. They also ordered the seizure of all his family’s belongings, which was carried out by the bailli of Mâcon. In 1319 enquêteurs condemned a judge in Languedoc and the prévôt of Paris to death. The punishments were carried out in public. Although later enquêteurs could send men to prison, they did not use those sanctions frequently. They could also give administrators letters of recommendation indicating they were found to be good and loyal. The existence of demand for such letters indicated a growing awareness that corrupt behaviors were objectionable, but not necessarily a decrease in the level of corruption.

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235 Glenisson, “Les Enquêteurs- Reformateurs de 1270 à 1328,” 20-23

236 Ibid., 119.

237 Ibid., 130.

238 Ibid.,132-3
Gradually, Alphonse came to rely on his *enquêteurs* for general administration, including judging local nobles and collecting taxes. This broadening of duties, which was adopted by later Capetian monarchs, has been identified as his greatest lasting contribution to the Capetian administration. Glenisson was quite critical of these “financial” missions, which he contrasted with Louis’ “spiritual” use of the *enquêteurs.*\(^{239}\) The growing span of *enquêteur* responsibilities under Alphonse was doubtless due to the ease with which these agents could be used and to the need to raise more money in preparation for the 1270 crusade. However, it also reveals a growing understanding that the misbehavior of organization members could take many forms, and that officials learn to hide their crimes. Usurpations of comital property and rapacious behavior towards the common populace on the part of local nobles were two sides of the same coin, both dependent on the behavior of local officials.

Lands or rights entrusted to officials were not passively lost, but actively usurped by other parties without the official’s intervention. If local nobles ran wild it was because officials were not applying justice properly. Even the close propinquity between taxation and the *enquêtes* was not necessarily a ham-fisted attempt at manipulating public opinion, but a symbolic affirmation that the ruler’s care for his

\(^{239}\) there, *Ibid.*, 20-23
subjects was at the root of his right to tax them. Extending the *enquêteurs'* juridical mandate to high crimes that came to their attention made similar administrative sense. The negligence or corruption of officers permitted local criminals to act; if that was the form corruption took, should it have gone free of punishment? Was it orphaned? If the constable had let murderers and rapists go free, should they have been allowed to profit from his corruption? Moreover, although later circuits by the *enquêteurs* led to many and larger payments for the treasury, in reality it is not clear whether the majority of these fines were ever collected, and many cases ended in settlement for a lower amount.\(^240\)

Following the 1254 ordinance, corruption in the Auvergne was systematic and entrenched, if not necessarily more prevalent. Was this proof of the reform’s failure? Not necessarily. First, it is nearly impossible to accurately evaluate the degree of corruption in an organization, since corrupt deals by their very nature are secretive. Furthermore, as demonstrated by Geoffroi Thomas, officials learn to work around new rules, so that reform may only shift the flow of corruption, and not dam it. As a result, it is very difficult to assess the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures. Moreover, no system of governance, political or economic, ancient or modern, is ever completely free

\(^{240}\) Ibid., 210-230
of corruption. Total elimination of corruption is not a feasible goal, and may not even be desirable.\textsuperscript{241}

In addition, stemming corruption in the Auvergne may have been more difficult than in the royal domain, or in Alphonse’s other territories. The mountainous landscape, welcoming to local outlaws, contributed to the isolation of an area that was already remote. Prior to the thirteenth century, the Auvergne was under the over-lordship of the king of England, who was both distant and uninterested. In 1189 Henry II relinquished the area to Philip Augustus, but the extent of the French king’s authority over the area was debatable. The Auvergnat fiefs were divided between the main and the cadet branches of the same family, holding the counties of Auvergne and of Clermont respectively. The presence of a royal constable was insufficient to deter the senior and cadet branches from waging war on each other, to the detriment of their subjects. These acts of war prompted Philip Augustus to intervene more forcefully.\textsuperscript{242}

In 1208 Gui, count of Auvergne, imprisoned his brother, Robert, bishop of Clermont, and plundered the royal abbey of Mozac. In response, Philip Augustus sent an army, led by the mercenary captain Cadoc and by Guy de Dampierre, lord of Bourbon, to return order to the province. The count of Auvergne’s fiefs were seized and given to the

\textsuperscript{241} Anechiarico and Jacobs, \textit{The Pursuit of Absolute Integrity}.

lord of Bourbon, who adopted the title of constable of Auvergne. Following the French occupation, the feudal composition of the Auvergne was further complicated. It was now composed of four main partitions—the county of Auvergne, the Dauphiné of Auvergne, the temporality of the bishop of Clermont and the Land (Terre) of Auvergne.

There was still no central authority, and the area was notorious for brigandage and outlawry.

Although not a failed state in the formal sense, on account of the absence of a prior state authority, the Auvergne did resemble failed states, in which, “the failure to maintain basic order not only makes fear a constant of daily life but also provides a breeding ground for a small minority to perpetuate criminality and terror.”243 The problem of outlawry was so great that it led to the creation of a separate administrative unit, the constabulary of the mountains of Auvergne, which was dedicated to the extirpation of brigandage in the mountains, where outlaws found shelter. The head of that unit was a military leader and was allowed considerable leeway in (violent) suppression of brigands. Nonetheless, as revealed by the 1251 enquête records, public order had not been established. Under such circumstances instability was likely a more pressing concern than corruption, and Geoffroi’s near-monopoly on violence could be seen as a positive development. In order to make more definite claims it would be

necessary to compare corruption in the Auvergne with the conditions in the rest of Alphonse’s lands.

However, the reform’s failure to eradicate corruption within the span of ten years does not mean that it had no effect. Anti-corruption campaigns serve a double purpose of treating the problem and of announcing and defining the problem. In that sense they resemble morality plays, extolling the legitimacy of the ruling elite and broadcasting its values.\(^{244}\) The morals extolled, in the case of the Capetian reform project, were the king’s own. The target audience was the general populace, not just the employees. In its phrasing and its choice of regulators and remedies Louis’ and Alphonse’s reforms reaffirmed the ties between ruler and subjects. In the case of the Auvergne, it may have created those ties.

In failed states, “vicious networks of criminality, violence . . . feed on disenfranchised populations and uncontrolled territory . . . [P]eople . . . are locked into lives of misery, without a stake in their countries or any certainty about or control over their own futures.”\(^{245}\) The reform gave the populace a stake in combatting corruption by allowing the *enquêteurs* to order small restitutions on the spot. Common people were more likely to require small restitutions, and less likely to have been able to attend the

\(^{244}\) Anechiarico and Jacobs *The Pursuit of Absolute Integrity*.

\(^{245}\) Ghani and Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States*, 4.
count’s court to complain. The ability to address one’s grievances plainly and immediately to a direct representative of the king or count gave subjects a measure of control, and their stake in the process hastened the absorption of the standards of legitimate behavior as devised by Louis and Alphonse. In this light, the greater sophistication exhibited by Geoffroi in hiding his misbehavior was an indication of the reform’s success, not its failure.
Corruption reform and Corporate Governance

“Our postulation of a ‘we’—of the boundary of our concern for others—is a basic assumption about what is good and what is evil.”246 (Herbert Simon, *Rationality in Action*)

“A leader who gets too far ahead of his society will become irrelevant. A great leader must be an educator, bridging the gap between his visions and the familiar. But he must also be willing to walk alone to enable his society to follow.”247—Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*

The Capetian reform was value-based rather than rule-based, and in that sense it departed from the political economics paradigm and resembled organizational approaches to misbehavior. This distinction contributes in no small amount to modern perceptions of medieval organizations as poorly governed. To quote Harold James:

“modern writers tend to shift in favor of rules rather than discretion, and elaborate models of behavior in which binding oneself by rules produces better outcomes.”248

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247 Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 382.

248 James, *The Roman Predicament*, 27.
Rules draw their legitimacy from agreements or generally accepted values, in modern society generally from the prior. In contrast, the legitimacy of values is inherent and maintained regardless of social support.

One ought not let this difference between modern and medieval administration obscure a major similarity; Louis abided, much like modern liberal governments, by the conviction that, “the coercive powers of government must serve general and timeless purposes, and not specific ends.” ²⁴⁹ It was only the purposes that were different. Some of the actions that followed from this conviction, most notably the reform of the administration, arouse sympathy in a modern reader. At other times his devotion to the general good revealed itself in acts that, to modern eyes, seem incredibly cruel. There is no doubt, however, that Louis acted in the best interests of his subjects, as he understood them. He represented not the interests of his class but the general interest.

Louis sacrificed personal profit in order to protect peace, challenged his great vassals and even his own siblings in the interest of justice, and risked life and limb (and a great amount of money) in defense of the church. Not only did he decline to use his power for personal ends, he also refused to allow it to be used to further the personal ends of his family members, preventing (at least for a while) the transformation of the royal administration into the instrument of an oligarchy.

²⁴⁹ Ibid., 37.
The contention between governance based on rules and one based on values culminated when Louis, renowned as a fair arbiter, was asked to adjudicate between the King of England and his rebellious barons. The barons had coerced Henry III to agree to the Provisions of Oxford, according to which the king required baronial assent for his choice of agents and councilors. The barons expected Louis to find a compromise amenable to both sides. However, the king surprised them by striking the Provisions down completely, declaring them to be detrimental for the people of the realm.

The Provisions of Oxford have historically been considered a stepping stone on the path towards the creation of a constitutional monarchy, despite extending formal participation in government only to the most powerful magnates of the realm. The basis for the baronial right of involvement was their ancestors’ role in the conquest of England, and was thus limited to the high nobility. The danger this posed to public order was real; one needed only to look back to the reign of Stephen to see that devolution of central authority could be detrimental to the general population.

The Provisions were intended to prevent the king from oppressing the baronial members of his organization. Louis, on the contrary, was concerned with the safety of the clients of the organization, and so identified the baronial motivation as self-interested. The baronial party demanded governance through consensus. Decision making by consensus requires compromise, and assumes each participant looks after his or her own interests. It takes place in a paradigm of rules that holds legitimacy to come
from the assent of participants, not from the morality of the rule. Jean Richard put it most eloquently, the barons “luttaient précisément contre le type de gouvernement que saint Louis, en vue de réaliser un idéal de paix et de justice, essayait de mettre en œuvre dans son royaume.”

Louis’ reform efforts expressed his ideal of peace and justice, and this emphasis on values distinguished his plan from the one suggested by Rose-Ackerman. Rose-Ackerman assumes rational motivations, whereas Louis believed it was possible to mold not only better officials, but better men. This attitude towards civil service reform is consistent with Herbert Simon’s recommendation that organizations inculcate organizational values in their employees so that their decision making corresponds with organizational ends. Some modern corruption scholars share Simon’s opinion that carrot and stick motivations are insufficient to curtail misbehavior. In their *Pursuit of Absolute Integrity* Frank Anechiarico and James B. Jacobs write: “laws, rules and threats will never result in a public administration to be proud of; to the contrary, the danger is that such an approach will create a self-fulfilling prophecy: having been placed continuously under suspicion, treated like quasi-criminals or probationers, public employees will behave accordingly.”

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251 Anechiarico and Jacobs, *The Pursuit of Absolute Integrity*, 207.
However, Louis’ ambition was even more far-reaching: he aimed at influencing the values of the entire populace, not just the members of his organization. By including general moral decrees in his ordinance he signaled, yet again, that the organization was coming to concentrate on its clients (the entire populace that used the services it provided) and not on its members (feudal lords of all different ranks and employees). Alphonse’s ordinance followed Louis’ lead, but attenuated the emphasis on values in favor of procedural changes. This is noticeable in a direct comparison of the two documents.

The royal ordinance opened with an introduction explaining the motivation for the reform, “ex debito regiae potestatis, pacem et quietem subjectorum nostrorum, in quorum quieta quiescimus, percordaliter affectantes et adversus injuriosos et improbos, qui tranquillitati eorum invident et quieti, zelum indignationis habentes, ad hujusmodi propulsundas injurias, et statum regni, reformandum in melius ad presens tempus subscripta duximus ordinanda. 252 The king did not distinguish between his officials and other wicked men in the introduction, but he did ally himself explicitly with the weak against the wicked, defining his “in-group” on the basis of morality and not social status or joint interests.

252 “Owing to the royal power, deeply desiring the peace and quiet of our subjects, in whose peace we find peace, and having the zeal of anger against the insulting and the wicked, who envy their peace and quiet, we order the underwritten ordinance at this time in order to reform the state of the realm and in this way avert injustices.”
The first element of the official’s oath in the royal ordinance was a vow to do right by the men who came before their court: “tam majoribus quam mediocribus, tam minoribus quam advenis, tam indignis quam subditis, sine personarum et nationum acceptione, jus redent.” According to Alphonse’s ordinance, in contrast, the first promise officials made was to be faithful to the count, and the second promise a more general “jus unicum pro sua scientia et possibilitate reddendo.” Later in his ordinance Alphonse offered two more instructions on justice: “Item, quod seneschallus, judices et ballivi regant terram secundum jura, et consuetudines et usus patriae ut condemnationes fiant in maleficiis per sententiam, non ex sola voluntate,” and “item ut omnibus sint communes in redditione justitiae, et non dehonestent milites et alios bonos viros verbis contumeliosi.”

Louis demanded all officials take the oath in public, in front of clerks and lay people, even if they had previously sworn the oath in his presence, in order that they keep it, ”non solum metu divine idignationis et nostre, sed etiam confusionis et

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253 “[G]ive justice to both the powerful and the middling, to both the least and the migrant, the unworthy and the subordinate, regardless of nationality or condition.”

254 “Give justice to each person according to their knowledge and possibility.”

255 “The seneschal, judges and baillis will rule the land according to the laws, customs and usages of the land, and will sentence crimes with reason and not based on their will.”

256 “So that everyone is neutral in handing out justice, and they do not dishonor knights and other good men with insulting words.”
erubescentie apud homines perjuriam manifestum incurrere vereantur.”

Alphonse made a similar prescription regarding the punishment of officials: “Item, excessus senescalli, judicum, ballivorum, et omnium officialium, juxta qualitatem culpae, veritate comperta, puniantur publice, ut exemplo illorum alii corrigantur: non enim sufficit sola restitution illicite receptorum.”

Louis’ ordinance protected all subjects from seizure of body and property, with the poor singled out for additional security. It proclaimed private property as a general principle: “Quia vero nemo sine culpa, vel causa privandus est juro suo.” For that reason officials could not seize anyone’s property without just cause. They were also banned from interfering with exportation of merchandise except in cases of emergency. Realizing that banning exports provided a corrupt incentive to sell special dispensations, the king specified that in the case where such a ban was necessary, no exceptions were to be granted.

In the same vein, officials were prohibited from seizing horses against the owner’s wishes, unless it was necessary for the king’s own purposes, and there were

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257 “Let them fear not only God’s anger and ours, but also the shame and embarrassment that a false oath incurs among men.”

258 “Indeed, the excesses of the seneschal, judges, baillis and all officials, according to the degree of guilt, with the truth having been verified, should be punished publicly, so that their example corrects others: it does not suffice to make a restitution for that which they received illicitly.”

259 “That no one ought to be deprived of his right without guilt or cause.”
restrictions on the renting of horses. Even under such emergency conditions,” seneschali, 
el alii inferiores officiales non capiant equos mercatorum transeuntium, vel pauperum, 

sed divitum tantum, si sufficere possint ad nostrum proprium servitium faciendum.”260

Alphonse made many of the same protections available, although they are not stated 
quite as strongly. He prohibited the collection of fines without a court decision, and 
specified that court decisions had to be based in law and custom. Although there is no 
discussion of appropriation of personal property, when the count was asked to 
confiscate merchant ships docked in La Rochelle on behalf of the queen he refused, 
making a pronounced distinction between his property and the property residing on his 
property: “quod nos non habemus apud Rupellam naves nec batellos qui sint nostri.”261

Alphonse did not extend special protection to any class, but he did mention the 
knights by name. Following on the heels of mandating public punishment of corrupt 
officials, he added, “ut omnibus sint communes in redditione justitiae, et non 
dehonestent milites et alios bonos viros verbis contumeliosis, et quod benigne audient 
omnes conquerentes.”262 Later in the ordinance he warned the seneschal not to

260 “Seneschals and all other lower officials should not take the horses of travelling 
merchants, whether of the poor, but also of the rich, if there are enough they can use for 
doing our own business.”

261 “We do not have at La Rochelle ships that are ours.”

262 “So that all are the same in the rendering of justice, and that they do not insult knights 
and other good men with insolent words, and that they listen favorably to all who 
complain.”
encroach on others’ jurisdiction, that is, the jurisdiction of churchmen and nobles. In the thirteenth century knighthood was common to the greatest barons and to the lowest ranks of the warrior aristocracy. There is reason to believe, however, that this clause referred in particular to the local knighthood. Great lords and direct vassals did not need such protection. They could address themselves directly to the count. Local knights were not necessarily among the rich and powerful of the province, and for that reason cherished their honor that much more. Finally, the clauses in both ordinances reiterating the Capetian policy against Jewish usury also protected primarily the poor, who were, at that point in time, the main clientele of Jewish moneylenders.

Louis’s ordinance introduced rigorous standards of moral behavior for officials, forbidding blasphemy, playing dice or chess, fornicating and visiting taverns. He expressly made higher officials responsible for the behavior of their subordinates, on the job and off it: “baillivos infideles, injuriosos, aut improbos, exactores vel de usura suspectos, aut turpam vitam apperte ducens, in suo non sustinebunt errore; imo eorum excessis corrigit bona fide.”263 Alphonse did not address the moral behavior of his officials in the ordinance. However, it appears that such rules were sometimes

263 “Baillis who are disloyal, commit wrongs or are wicked, who commit exactions or are suspected of usury, or who opens live a shameful life, they will not sustain in their error but correct their excesses.” This standard of administrative responsibility held for the king’s vassals as well his hired officials, as in the case of Enguerran de Coucy.
enforced; in 1264 an Auvergnat sergeant was permanently barred from holding office after being found guilty of adultery.\textsuperscript{264}

The royal ordinance also took steps to improve the moral standing of the king’s subjects, criminalizing prostitution and gambling and curbing attendance at taverns. Prostitutes were to be expelled from towns and their rural hinterland, and leasing one’s house to a brothel was forbidden on pain of forfeiting the property. Visiting a brothel was also decreed a finable offense. Dice playing, dice making and other games of chance were forbidden. Except for travelers, none were to stay in taverns, seen as promoting gambling and prostitution as well as violence and drunkenness.

Chapter Four

“Stockholders toil not, neither do they spin, to earn [dividends and share price increases]. They are beneficiaries by position only. Justification for their inheritance . . . can be founded only upon social grounds.”

Adolf Berle

\textsuperscript{264} Enquêtes administratives d’Alphonse de Poitiers, 177.
Our (admittedly limited) data set suggests that among members of the organization, knights were more likely to misbehave. The organization focused its detection mechanisms on that subgroup, which indicates knights were also perceived as problematic employees. This focus may have been the result of difficulties posed by the distance between the constables and seneschals and the administrative center in Paris. It could also have been the result of incompatibility between knightly culture and the culture of the organization. Value congruence, the degree to which personal values are consistent with organizational values, is predictive of employee misbehavior.265 This goes back to the notion of bounded rationality; organizations simplify human decision making by providing rules and incentives, but individual adaptation to those rules depends on the internal environment of the employee. Some employees, for a variety of reasons, have trouble adapting.266 Organizational values are distinct from the values of the external environment, but influenced by them. This influence is thought to be transmitted in part by recruitment practices. If we accept this premise, the shift to hiring clerks would have sufficed to change the organizational culture even without Louis’ value-based reform.

265 Vardi and Weitz, Misbehavior in Organizations.

266 Jones, Politics and the Architecture of Choice, 30-40.
In order to ascertain the possible incongruence of values between the Capetian administration and its knightly employees, I employed cultural dimensions identified in studies of organizational behavior and leadership, and in particular in the 2004 GLOBE study, the largest of its kind to date. GLOBE researchers isolated cultural value dimensions by running clustering algorithms on a large set of statistical data, collected from organizations in fifty-six countries. The dimensions identified by GLOBE are similar to those noted by Hofstede in an earlier study of international organization culture, one which employed data collected from IBM offices around the world. The cultural dimensions identified by GLOBE researchers are performance orientation, future-orientation, assertiveness and power distance, gender egalitarianism, humane orientation and individualism and collectivism. I have adopted several of these dimensions as heuristic devices for determining the degree of value congruence between knightly culture and the culture of the Capetian administration in the thirteenth century. Despite the modern focus of the studies which gave rise to these heuristics, I believe the results of this analysis attest to their applicability for older organizations. I found that Louis and Alphonse’s organizational values marked a distinct departure from knightly values. I must add that the dimensions I have neglected here are well worth looking into in future work.

Performance orientation
Performance orientation is a reflection of the degree to which a culture rewards high standards, innovation and performance improvement. GLOBE researchers argue that performance orientation is a modern phenomenon, and did not exist during the Middle Ages, “Weber thus chronicled a historical evolution of religious and social views toward work, from the medieval notion that work in this world is a distraction from the godly life to the protestant ethic.” However, one perceives a vocational attitude towards work in Louis’ organization, as well as in the mendicant orders he recruited from. Louis existed within a sacral paradigm of monarchy, one in which good performance of duties was a religious prescription. The novelty of the mendicant orders of the thirteenth century was their devotion to working within the world. Weber was not wrong, but he was using a generalization; medieval society contained subcultures that differed with regard to performance orientation.

Performance orientation is a component of the division between achievement and ascription oriented societies, “achievement oriented societies tend to accord status on the basis of accomplishment. People are usually evaluated on the basis of how they perform their current duties and produce results. Ascribing cultures confer status mostly on the basis of who the individual is. In these cultures, status is generally bestowed

267 House and Hanges, Culture, Leadership and Organizations, 239.
268 Ibid., 240.
upon the individual, not upon the task or the individual’s accomplishment.” As we have seen, the Ludovician and Alphonsine administrations were rational organizations in which promotion was based on previous work accomplishment. Earlier forms of the royal administration relied on the king’s vassals rather than on a professional workforce. During that time, the royal organization had more of an ascribing culture, and men holding important titles expected to be granted particular organizational positions. This was especially true for the seneschalship.

This ascribing mentality was extant during Louis’ period, at least among the nobility. One such example was the viscount of Thouars’ demand to become seneschal of Poitou based on his title, a demand rebuffed by Alphonse. Ascribing and achievement cultures differ in terms of perspective on evaluations; ascribing cultures tend to reject evaluation because it is perceived as passing judgment on the individual. On the other hand, in achievement oriented societies feedback is welcomed because it lets employees know how well they are doing. Evaluation mechanisms, such as those used by both administrations to combat corruption, would be expected to be less efficient when used on men who, as a group, were ascription-oriented.

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269 Ibid., 243.

270 Boutaric, Saint Louis et Alphonse de Poitiers, 135.

271 House and Hanges, Culture, Leadership and Organizations, 404.
Highly performance-oriented societies (including organizations) evaluate groups and individuals on the basis of the results they produce. They therefore ascribe more importance to tasks than to social relationships. In Alphonse’s organization professionals replaced nobility in the highest level of administration, the court. Performance-oriented societies tend to use low-context language, to educate in values, to reward performance, and to expect demanding targets. Those were all hallmarks of the Alphonsine administration; letters to employees were direct and even blunt, value training was introduced via regulatory mechanisms, oaths and recruiting practices and the demands on employees were high. Low performance-oriented cultures, like knightly culture, regard monetary motivations as inappropriate and emphasize tradition and loyalty.

The correspondence between Alphonse and Queen Marguerite during the baronial wars in England reveals this incongruence of values. In her letters to Alphonse Marguerite evokes emotions, kinship and honor. She asks Alphonse to aid Gaston because of his kinship with her and with his wife, “Pro karissimo consaguineo nostro Gastone de Biarno vobis preces porrigimus, ex affectu, ut eidem in negociis suis, amore nostri, necnon cotemplatione uxoris vestre, que sibi in linea consaguinitatis
conjungitur.” Later, she invokes an honor based on aiding members of the kin group, “prout ad honorem vestrum pertinent, ne possit dici merito vel obieci vobis quod per vos vel vestros idem Gasto violenter opprimi videatur.” The one thing Marguerite neglected to discuss is why Gaston needs aid and why she wanted him aided; he was involved in a private war and the queen wanted him disentangled so he could fight alongside Henry III. Alphonse’s reply, beyond the salutation, makes no mention of kin, emotions or honor. Rather, Alphonse answers drily and based on law, “Super litteris quas nobis misisit pro negotio domini Gastonis de Biarno, vestre excellentie notificamus de facto ipsius, quod idem G. intravit cum armis in terra fidelis nostri comitis Cvenarum, quam tenet a nobis, et in eadem multa gravamina et dampna perpetravit, que adhuc non emendavit, quamvis super hoc a nobis fuerit requisitus.” Although both were nobles, Alphonse was replying as an organization man. The two were not, conceptually, speaking the same language.

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272 “For our dearest kin Gaston de Bearn we extend our prayer, with emotion, that you shall in his business, for our love, if not for thinking about your wife, who is related to him in lines of kinship.” Molinier, Correspondance administrative d’Alfonse de Poitiers, 1866.

273 Ibid., 1988, 2014: “Concerning the letter which you have sent us regarding the business of lord Gaston de Bearn, we notify your excellence that the same G. entered with arms into the lands of our vassal the count of Cuens, which he holds from us, and in the same place perpetrated many serious and harmful deeds, which he has not yet corrected, despite the fact that we have asked him to.”
Future-orientation

GLOBE researchers define future-orientation as, “the degree to which a collectivity encourages and rewards future-oriented behaviors such as planning and delaying gratification.” Future-orientation, like other cultural dimensions, can occur on the level of an entire society, an organization or the individual, although organizations tend to score higher on future-orientation than the society they reside in (understandably, since individuals are mortal whereas organizations, in theory, are immortal). Louis’ organization and its Alphonsine subdivision showed considerable future-orientation. It is difficult, given our data, to make a distinction between Louis’ and Alphonse’s individual proclivity to long-term planning and the organizational proclivity to the same. However, through the “founder effect,” the siblings’ individual values likely influenced their organizations.

The influence of social future-orientation on the individual is impossible to predict. However, it is well attested that an individual’s orientation can have a great effect on the organization he leads, especially if he founded it. This founder effect is especially noteworthy in family firms, a category comprising, organizationally, all

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274 House and Hanges, *Culture, Leadership and Organizations*, 282.
medieval dynasties (this will be discussed in detail below). Although Louis was not the founder of the Capetian dynasty, he was the founder of the royal administration in its new form. The Alphonsine administration was a completely new organization, with Alphonse as the true founder.

The planning and execution of both crusades demonstrated future-orientation, which was not always shared by other nobles who embarked on this adventure. The king’s organization began purchasing and storing supplies in Cyprus two years before the crusade reached the island, arranging grain in piles that kept them fresh until the fleet embarked to Egypt. Jean de Joinville, on the contrary, was left in a lurch when his pockets ran dry even before the crusade arrived in Egypt, “I, who had not a thousand livres-worth of rents, had taken responsibility, when I left to go overseas for ten knights, myself included, two of whom were bannerets. It just transpired that when I arrived at Cyprus, after having paid for my ship, I had only 240 livres left; and some of my knights informed me that if I didn’t secure funds for myself then they would leave me. God, who has never failed me, provided for me in this way: the King, who was at Nicosia, sent for me and retained me in his service and put 800 livres into my coffers. Then I had more money than I needed.”275 The king preferred to act after careful planning and consideration, and this preference did not always translate into military victory.

275 Jean de Joinville, 179.
Following the capture of Damietta, for example, the king opted to regroup and reorganize before launching another attack. This cost the crusaders their strategic advantage, leaving them vulnerable to guerilla attacks, disease and privation.²⁷⁶

The large architectural projects undertaken at the king’s behest, most notably the Sainte Chapelle, and Alphonse’s investment in the silver mines of Orzal—these too are revealing. Both brothers relied on archival information, the keeping of which demonstrated future-orientation, as did Louis’ list of men of good character, which he kept in preparation of future hiring. Louis’ European foreign policy, preferring diplomacy to warfare, also indicated future-orientation. Louis barely increased the size of the kingdom, and was not tempted to create an “empire” by backing his brother’s political ambitions.

He acted to reconcile warring princes, which may have weakened his position in the short term: “As for the foreigners whom the kings brought to peace, certain of his councilors said that he did wrong not to leave them to their wars; if he had allowed them to impoverish themselves they would not have been able to attack him as easily as they would if they were plentifully rich. The king answered these councilors and said they were wrong, ‘for if neighboring princes see me leaving them to their wars, they

²⁷⁶ Richard, Saint Louis: roi d’une France féodale, soutien de la Terre sainte, 205.
might discuss this together and say, “the king, in his malice, allows us to keep fighting.”
If their hatred for me on this account should lead them to attack me, I might very well lose, not to mention that I would have won the hatred of God, who says, “Blessed are the peacemakers.”

The same attitude prompted Louis to relinquish lands to the king of England in order to create a more favorable environment for his future heirs. He made the choice that maximized the options available to future kings of France, foregoing immediate rewards against the advice of his council: “the king’s councilors were very much opposed for to this peace agreement, and they said to him, “Sir, we are very surprised that you want to give the king of England such a large part of the lands taken from him by yourself and your ancestors through your conquests and his forfeit. It seems to us that if you think you hold this land wrongfully, you are not being fair to the king of England because you are not returning to him all the conquests made by yourself and your ancestors, while if you think you hold it rightfully, it seems to us you are simply abandoning whatever land you return to him.” The saintly king responded in this way: “My lords, I am sure the king of England’s ancestors were justly deprived of the territories I hold; the lands I am handing over to him are not being given because I have any obligation to him or to his heirs, but in order to foster love between his children and

277 Jean de Joinville, 317.
mine, who are first cousins. And it seems to me that I am putting the land I give to good use, since before this he was not my vassal, but now he will do homage to me." 

Louis' devotional practices also revealed immediate self-denial in favor of a distant reward. He wore simple clothes, ate little, and shunned hunting, gambling and profane poetry, rejecting those pleasures most associated with noble status.

The royal administration attempted to spread this time perception to the general population of the kingdom. Societies with high present-orientation and low future-orientation enjoy the moment and spend time on actions that hold no future advantages, such as drinking, brawling, gambling, swearing and patronizing brothels. Louis took steps to restrain these activities among his subjects, activities that, one may note, he assiduously avoided himself: the king wore simple clothes, watered his wine and habitually left banquets before the minstrels began to perform.

Medieval culture is frequently described as past-oriented; concerned with preserving traditions and customs, suspicious of novelties to the point where even new ideas were presented as ancient discoveries. However, new ideas were introduced constantly, suggesting that the values and practices with regard to time perception were distinct. Medieval European culture was certainly more past-oriented than its modern counterpart, but on the whole, when compared with other world cultures, it was

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278 Ibid., 316.
probably only moderately past-oriented. Moreover, past-orientation and future-orientation are not necessarily mutually exclusive, quite the opposite. Societies which score high on past-orientation, while more likely to legitimate innovations based on past experience, tend to be willing to change current behavior in order to achieve better future results. This is a tendency that also characterizes future-oriented societies. A present-oriented society, for example, would not invest in building projects that take a long time to complete and are meant to last for centuries. In the high Middle Ages, on the contrary, even small medieval towns sponsored the erection of cathedrals.

In addition to the contribution of the founder effect, Louis’ and Alphonse’s organizations were likely to score higher than the general society in future-orientation for several reasons. First, organizations tend to be more future-oriented than general society, likely because organizations have a farther time-horizon. Second, the organization’s future-orientation would have been higher because it employed highly educated men. The structure of the Alphonsine administration supports the premise of higher future-orientation. It has been suggested that organizations with a more future-oriented culture “are likely to have an organic structure . . . rather flexible and fluid, and is capable of dealing with unstable conditions through a network of

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279 House and Hanges, *Culture, Leadership and Organizations*, 333.

280 Ibid., 295.
relationships and a shared perception of goals. In comparison, less future-oriented cultures are likely to have a mechanistic structure.” 281 As discussed in chapter two, the structure of the Alphonsine administration was not rigidly bureaucratic but organic and flexible, and I suspect a study of Louis’ administration would reveal the same form.

Finally, the long tenure of clerical councilors would have bolstered the organization’s future-orientation. In contrast with managers in modern corporations, the clerical agents did not benefit from short-term successes. Future-orientation values have been found to correlate with embeddedness versus autonomy, that is, with the preference for long term interactions over one-off contractual relationships. 282 As a result, it may be that organization values were more in line with the nature of employment of the clerks serving in council, who often served for life, and less with those of the constables, baillis and seneschals, whose jobs were short term and contractually defined.

Organizations with high future-orientation values were found to be more likely to support a visionary leadership style. A visionary leader inspires the values and beliefs of others and motivates them to work harder. He anticipates future events, has a vision of the future and a plan to achieve it. He is also intellectually stimulating, challenging

281 Ibid., 296.

282 Ibid., 313.
the beliefs of others. Louis’s leadership style is consistent with this description. This leadership style has also been endorsed in societies, like Israel and Ireland, who “live by a strong vision of promoting a unique identity for their nations.” This remains interesting in the French case, given the contemporary emergence of a unique French national identity, evoking administrative consistency in dealing with hitherto non-French groups.

**Assertiveness**

“Broadly speaking, cultural assertiveness reflects beliefs as to whether people are or should be encouraged to be assertive, aggressive and tough, or nonassertive, nonaggressive and tender in social relationships.” On this cultural dimension knights were very distinct from clerks, in particular mendicants. Some groups in French medieval society were encouraged to be aggressive and tough, and others were urged to act meekly. The noble subculture valued aggression in the in-group, but meekness in the out-group. In addition, within this culture men were expected to be assertive and tough and women were supposed to be meek.

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283 Ibid., 334.

284 Ibid., 395.
Values do not always translate into practices, and social values do not translate into individual values. Individuals shape their values in relation to the society they live in, but the results of that influence are unpredictable. Clerks could be aggressive and violent, as exemplified by an episode described by Joinville; a clerk who was robbed by three sergeants of the Provost of Paris armed himself and killed the perpetrators, chasing one into a house he was sheltering in. The clerk was brought before the king who, rather than punishing him, made him relinquish the clergy and join the crusaders, saying, “My lord clerk . . . your bravery has lost you your chance of priesthood, but because of it I will retain you in my pay and you will come with me overseas. I would have you know that this is because I strongly desire my people to see that I will not uphold them in any of their wrongdoing.” Similarly, few would have described Isabelle of Angoulême, former queen of England and wife of the Count of La Marche, as meek.

The assertiveness dimension has been linked to how cultures view competition and cooperation. A 1997 study found differences in the use of rituals between competition and cooperation oriented societies. Whereas in western societies competitive activities such as sports events and elections “promote social cohesion and civic pride in the virtues of competition, ‘manliness’ and aggressiveness,” peaceful

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285 Jean de Joinville, 175.
societies, such as the Amish, perform ritual chanting and healing which “help integrate the society, protect them from hostile outside forces and focus people of worldviews of opposition to competition, a need for harmony and the virtue of non-violence.” In medieval society we find both types of rituals. However, the pastimes most associated with the nobility—hunting and tournaments—fell into the first category. Louis viewed both with distaste.

Competitiveness in highly assertive cultures is also expressed by clothes and status symbols, which were of high importance to the French aristocracy. Already during the time of Philip Augustus, the vassals dressed better than the king. The importance of expensive dress and lavish entertainment as status markers did not diminish in the time of his grandson. Joinville, a noble narrator, dedicated much attention to the dress of the king and the key figures in his court. When describing the knighting of Alphonse, which was held in the market halls of Saumur, Joinville informs the reader that, “the great king Henry II of England had built it in order to hold important celebrations.” He then recounts in detail what the guests, knights and sergeants wore, and sends a jibe in


288 Jean de Joinville, 169.
the direction of his beloved king, who wore “a cotton cap on his head. The cap did not suit him at all.”

Joinville’s quarrel with Robert of Sorbon also revolved around dress as a mark of position; Robert chastised Jean for being “more nobly dressed than the king.”

comparing the offense to seating one’s self above the king, that is, pretending to a higher status. Joinville replied with a biting remark, insulting the master’s own social standing: “it is you who are in the wrong, for you are the son of commoners but have abandoned your father ad mother’s style of dress and are wearing better quality camelin than the king is.”

The king’s personal repudiation of fine clothes, rich delicacies and other luxuries was remarkable precisely because of how it contrasted with expected practices.

Organizations tend to reflect the assertiveness values of the society in which they were formed. Until Louis’ time the administrative organization employed mostly nobles, so it would be reasonable to expect a shift in organization assertiveness as the organization came to be dominated by clerks. We may predict that when the organization was primarily noble, we would find more internal competition, more

289 Ibid.

290 Ibid., 151.

291 Ibid.
rewarding of risk-taking behaviors and more striving to prove one’s individual worth. Cultural assertiveness influences the degree of opportunism, so in order to avoid corruption it would be better to hire from within the less assertive culture.\textsuperscript{292} There are some indications for such a change, especially when one focuses on the early years of Philip Augustus’ reign, prior to his reorganization of the royal administration.

At Philip Augustus’ coronation, the count of Flanders, the archbishop of Reims (representing the house of Champagne) and the young king Henry were in attendance and participated in the ceremony. Despite the fact that all three were the new king’s vassals, “the splendor of their presence overshadowed the king even at his own coronation.”\textsuperscript{293} This was an augur for the coming competition between the houses of Flanders and Champagne for power over Philip. Philippe of Flanders arranged a marriage between his niece and the king, giving the house of Flanders a place of influence in court. The queen’s coronation was held at Sens and not, as was traditional, in Reims, a likely intentional insult for the archbishop of Reims and the Champenois. They did not attend the ceremony.

Philip Augustus’ mother, Adele, was Champenois, and the king, now allied with Flanders, seized her dowry lands. The queen mother fled to her brother, Thibaut of Blois, and called upon the king of England for help against her son. The Champenois

\textsuperscript{292} House and Hanges, \textit{Culture, Leadership and Organizations}, 404.

\textsuperscript{293} Baldwin, \textit{The Government of Phillip Augustus}, 7.
returned to favor, and with that began a period of turbulence and internal strife which saw barons fighting each other and the king. Enmities were suspended only when the kings of England and France, along with their barons, embarked on the third crusade. Fortunately for Philip, many of his rebellious vassals never made it back.294

Power distance

“This dimension reflects the extent to which a community accepts and endorses authority, power differences, and status privileges.”295 In general, medieval society accepted that power, status and wealth should be shared unequally. However, the Capetian administration of the thirteenth century allotted power on a different basis than its earlier counterparts. In discussing power distance I find it useful to employ French and Raven’s classification of sources of power. French and Raven define five sources of power most commonly encountered; Coercive, reward, legitimate, expert and referent.296 Coercive power is based on fear. The royal administration relied on coercive power, naturally, but to a lesser degree than Geoffroi Thomas or local lords. It could afford to let go some of its coercive power because, unlike local lords, it had other power sources to rely on, in particular reward power, since thirteenth-century Capetians

294 Ibid.

295 House and Hanges, Culture, Leadership and Organizations, 513.

were extremely wealthy. This wealth was a relatively new phenomenon, dating back to Philip Augustus’s reign.

The Capetians also enjoyed a great deal of legitimate power, vested in them as a result of the dynasty’s long lasting tenure at the head of the accepted hierarchy. Their ties with the church increased both their legitimacy and the rewards they could contribute, via access to prebends. Although these sources of power were strengthened during Louis IX’s rule, the main distinction between Louis’ and Alphonse’s organizations, when compared with the administration of their grandfather, was in reliance on expert power.

Expert power is defined as influence derived from technical expertise, special skills or access to knowledge. In the Capetian organization the men who had the king’s ear had the greatest amount of influence. At the beginning of Philip Augustus’ reign the king’s close councilors belonged to the ranks of the greatest barons and prelates. Philip Augustus also inherited dynastic household officers from his father; a seneschal, a chancellor, a constable and a chamberlain. These positions were grounded in Carolingian practices and belonged to great noble families.

Many of the king’s baronial counselors died on the Third Crusade, giving him an opportunity to weaken the hold their families had over the royal court. Philip kept the seneschalship and chancellorship vacant, and recruited the constable and chamberlain from the ranks of the lesser nobility of the royal domain. The barons continued to be
present at important events, but their control over routine business was weakened. In their stead the king relied on a small group of knights and clerks. Although these “new men” had expertise related to their positions, military or administrative, they seem to have been primarily selected for loyalty. Their lesser status made them more dependent on the king. Power is relative, and the king’s power of reward and coercion was greater over lesser men than over the great barons.

Authority based on expertise, in particular legal expertise, grew in importance during Louis’ reign. This was the result of the formalization and growing complexity of administration and legal procedure. Although the great vassals were still entitled to seats on the council, they had less influence on the king, whose relative position was strengthened in the wake of Philip Augustus’ conquests. Louis’ close councilors, who were frequently in his presence, were clerks and knights with legal expertise. These lesser men’s ascendant authority was most clearly demonstrated when they sat in justice of great barons, such as Enguerran de Coucy or the archbishop of Reims. When Louis prohibited the judicial duel in 1260, he made formalized a reduction in the coercive power of the warrior class. Trial by battle, a system which favored military proficiency, was being replaced by legal procedures that gave the advantage to experts of a different sort.

The barons articulated their resentment in a 1246 document in which they rejected the allocation of influence based on legal knowledge rather than status and
military prowess: “ils empiètent tellement sur la juridiction des princes séculiers qu’aujourd’hui les fils des serfs, dès qu’ils sont clercs, jugent selon leur lois les hommes libres.”

Their resentment was not, however, a simple rejection of social mobility, but denied the legitimacy of power based on knowledge rather than force: “le pays n’est point été acquis par le droit écrit ni par l’arrogance des clercs, mais par le sangue de guerriers.”

A poem from that period, written from a knightly perspective, voiced the antipathy of the displaced: “Je dis a tous ceux qui sont nes des fiefs: Qu’ainsi Dieu m’aide! Vous n’êtes plus de Francs. L’on vous a bien de franchise eloignes, puisque vous etes par enquête juges.”

The poet explicitly attributed the diminished power of the nobility to their growing distance from the king: “vous auriez force, et pouvoir et assurance, car vous etes a notre roi amie; Mais les vôtres sont trop clairsemes autour de lui. Je n’en connais qu’un seul aupres de lui, et celui-là est si épris de clergie, qu’il ne peut pas vous apporter l’aide.”

Recruitment based on knowledge meant that power distance was shifted, conceptually, in the entire realm. It was now possible for the lowest status groups to


298 Ibid., 313.

299 Ibid., 310-311.

300 Ibid.
achieve, however rarely, a position far beyond what had been possible before. Power
distance has been found to be correlated to levels of corruption, leading researchers to
posit that, “under conditions in which power distance is highly valued, corrupt behavior
is legitimated as a privilege of position.”301 This conjecture is consistent with the
growing intolerance towards corruption which accompanied the reduction in power
distance within the royal organization.

In his personal behavior, Louis seemed to embody the conflicting views of
power. He wore simple clothes, ate simple food and held court sitting on the ground or
at the foot of his bed. In his management style, the king revealed he was sensitive to the
transformation and handled it delicately, diffusing the tension it threatened to
introduce into his administration. During Joinville’s argument with Robert of Sorbon, the
king intervened strongly in the master’s defense. Shortly after, however, he summoned
Jean de Joinville to his side, along with his son (and eventual heir) Philip and Thibaut,
king of Navarre. Thibaut was to marry Louis’ daughter, and was being raised in the royal
court and treated as a son.302 The following paragraph, describing the king’s speech to
the three young men, is so demonstrative of the use Louis made of power distance in his
leadership that I believe it is worth transcribing in its entirety:

301 House and Hanges, *Culture, Leadership and Organizations*, 564.

“Afterwards, my lord the king called for my lord Philip, his son (father of the current king) and for King Thibaut. He was sitting at the entrance of the oratory and placed his hand on the ground and said to them, ‘Sit yourselves down here, right next to me, so that no one can overhear us.’ ‘Oh! My lord,’ they said, ‘we would not dare sit so close to you.’ And he said to me, ‘Seneschal, you come and sit here.’ And so I sat, so close to him that my clothes were touching his. He had the young men sit next to me . . . He then told me that had called to us so that he could admit to me that he had been wrong to defend master Robert against me. ‘But’, he said, ‘I saw that he was so taken aback by what you said that he really needed my help. In any case you should not heed too closely what I said in Master Robert’s defence for, just as the seneschal said, you should dress neatly and well, so that your wives will love you the better for it and your people value you more highly. For the wise man says: “you should provide yourself with clothes and arms in such a way that the prudhommes of this world might not say that you are making too much of yourself, while young men might nor say you are making too little.”303

Louis delivered this little sermon, complete with a reference to proverbial wisdom, in the oratory. In that space he was acting as spiritual authority, using the altercation between Master Robert and Jean de Joinville as a teaching opportunity. The

303 Jean de Joinville, 151-152.
leadership lessons in this short story are many; first, Louis demonstrated the importance of this talk by asking his children to sit on the floor near him, something they were clearly not accustomed to doing. This breaching of customary distance was sure to imprint the occasion in their memories and smooth any ruffled feathers that arose from the favor he showed the lower-status clergyman.

Then, Louis apologized to Jean, explaining his behavior was motivated by an instinct to help the weaker party. Having his sons present while he delivered this apology demonstrated to them the need to keep both sides placated. He then turned to the main part of the lesson; despite his apology to the seneschal, the reasons he offered in support of dressing in finery were different from Jean’s. Jean maintained that he was correct to wear rich clothes because of his inherited social status, but Louis’ explanation revolves around management of a leaders’ image. He knew the values of noble society, and even if he did not share them, he knew respecting them was crucial for successful leadership. His final sentence is more an endorsement of moderation than a sartorial recommendation.

Uncertainty Avoidance
“The extent to which members of collectives seek orderliness, consistency, structure, formalized procedures and law to cover situations in their daily lives.”

Medieval French society was far less avoidant of uncertainty than modern western societies, but it appears to have been gaining in this dimension. Fixed comprehensive archives, not used by the royal administration until the end of the twelfth century, were becoming more elaborate. Better track was kept of the exact extent of royal and baronial rights, and even consular records were becoming more comprehensive. At the same time, the process had not advanced that much: French still had no definite spelling, and laws and customs varied by locale.

The term uncertainty avoidance was originally created to apply to organizations, which, being unable to predict the future, create rules that minimize the need for prediction. Organizations tend to rank higher on uncertainty avoidance than general society, because they are more formalized. We have already seen that the Capetian administration of Louis’ period was more rigid and strict, and for that reason employed a highly skilled workforce. Alphonse’s frequent reliance on short-term feedback is also consistent with growing uncertainty avoidance. The count wanted to be kept informed of changes in the external environment of his organization so he could react to them.

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304 House and Hanges, *Culture, Leadership and Organizations*, 564.
“Technology, rules, policies and rituals are all means used by organizations to cope with uncertainty.”

The primary technology employed by the thirteenth-century Capetians was legal. Ordinances expressed the rules of the organization. Organizational rituals, including meetings, keeping of written records, and seeking expert advice, governed member identities. Thrice-yearly accounting sessions, maintenance of archives and dependence on a highly skilled workforce represented the tools the Capetian administration used to avoid uncertainty. Recruitment from within, common in Louis’ and Alphonse’s organizations, is also correlated with uncertainty avoidance, because it is low risk.

The ordinances disambiguated both organizational roles and the lives of the subjects by supplying a measure of legal uniformity that was lacking until then. Notably, it has been postulated that uncertainty avoidance is related to power distance: “groups and individuals derive power and status partly from the uncertainty inherent in the environment. The greater the uncertainties faced by society, the greater the need to reduce them. Under such circumstances, the greater is the power of those who control that environment and the greater the public’s acceptance of their authority. However, the actual reduction of uncertainties in society is rarely achieved by any single individual, but through an organization of forces and the creation of structure and

\[\text{Ibid., 566.}\]
systems. Once these are in place, the perceived need for leadership may be diminished.” This suggests that acceptance of high power distance may be the result of a lack of consistency and order. For a while, the uncertainties facing the common people of medieval France were sufficiently great as to legitimate the authority of the warrior class. However, individual lords could do little to remove those uncertainties. The emergence of the new Capetian order may therefore have weakened the authority of other lords in their lands. Where force failed to bring order, law succeeded.

To summarize, the Capetian administration under Saint Louis shifted away from an affiliation with the great barons and toward an affiliation with the common subjects. It afforded greater legal protection to the subjects and gave them a modicum of control. The cultural values of the Capetian organization were inconsistent with those of the warrior aristocracy at the time. Although knights still served on the council, it was not their status or military profession that made them valuable, but administrative and legal expertise.

This realignment of affiliations, in organizational terms, was equivalent to a shift from championing shareholder’s rights to stakeholder rights. This shift, in modern corporate governance, is considered related to the separation of ownership from control. It seems the same may have been true in the thirteenth-century. To clarify this

\[306\] Ibid.
statement, one must be willing to look at Louis’ kingdom as a closed corporation related to other closed corporations by a pyramid group structure. In a pyramid group, one family directly controls a firm, and that firm controls other firms. In our case, the Capetian family controlled the monarchy, and through that, other family corporations, namely those of the great fiefs. Although the great fiefs were held of the king, they were not held of one particular king. In their turn, the great fief holders were the heads of their family firms, which were also of a pyramidal structure.

The structure of the Capetian kingdom under Louis IX was reminiscent of the form of corporate governance used by modern-day franchise corporations. The franchise corporation is a relatively new phenomenon in today’s business world. This new form of organization has transformed many industries, so that in 1996 40% of retail sales passed through chains that were organized as a franchise. Most chains that engage in franchising are set up as a “plural organization.” In a plural organization, the chain manages some of the units directly, and others through franchisers. This form is similar to the form feudal government took in thirteenth-century France; the royal domain was ruled directly by the monarchy, and other areas were controlled by long tenured agents, who had some proprietary rights to the land.

307 Bradach, Franchise Organizations, 1.
In his book *Franchise Organizations* Jeffery L. Bradach argued that the plural form offered several advantages over either pure form. It facilitated unit growth and allowed the firm to achieve uniformity and adaptability, control and innovation. As translated to the thirteenth-century French kingdom, this suggests that a feudal kingdom, could, under certain conditions, have been a more stable and successful form of governance than a more centralized monarchy.

The main challenge faced by plural form organizations is the blending of a network format with a traditional hierarchy. The relationship between a CEO and a franchisee is different from the one between a CEO and the employees of the company units, and as a result a successful CEO must employ two distinct management styles. Whereas the subordinates in the company organization can be commanded, franchisees think of themselves as partners and must be persuaded to follow the CEO’s leadership. In most franchise contracts the franchisee invests his own capital to participate and also gives a certain percentage of the unit’s revenues to the organization. He has the ultimate control over his own units, and a great degree of freedom.

The organization has the legal right to unilaterally end a contract if the franchisee acts against company policy, just as the king had the theoretical right to end the feudal bond if a vassal disobeyed him. In both cases, this sanction existed, but was rarely used. While the written contract typically slants in the direction of the franchiser, it does not reflect the real condition of this relationship. As Dave Gordon, assistant
director of legal affairs for Hardee’s, told Bradach: “Usually a useful response is elicited before anything gets that far. Not only is it not in the interest of the franchisee to get kicked out, but we [the corporation] can end up without a royalty from that unit if we kick them out. On top of that, it is by no means clear who would win in litigation. The big company picking on the small entrepreneur does not usually play well in front of juries.”

Most cases that end in litigation revolve around non-payment of royalties, not uniformity. The need to treat franchisees with kid gloves is more pronounced when dealing with multi-unit franchisees, as is often the case. “The largest franchisees at KFC, Pizza Hut, and Hardee’s had 270, 339 and 432 units, respectively. Each of these franchisees generates revenue of over $100 million.” Having multi-unit franchisees is beneficial for the organization. First, because the relationship between the chain operator and franchisees is personal and time consuming, and secondly because finding reliable franchisees is difficult, and there is an advantage in selling a new unit to a franchisee who is already known to be capable. However, multi-unit franchisees are less dependent on the company, because they have their own infrastructure. Moreover, there exists a mutual interdependence between the chain operator and the large

308 Ibid., 34.

309 Ibid., 51.
franchisees, because his organization is very dependent on their revenues. Finally, the large franchisees are by and large men with ample prior business experience, so that they are similar socially to the chain operator.

The challenge facing the CEO is to maintain a level of uniformity without frequent recourse to the contract, which may or may not be enforceable, and whose enforcement may prove detrimental to the organization by adversely affecting personal relationships with other franchisees. Relationships with franchisees depend on trust. The franchisee and the franchiser have potentially incompatible interests; since the franchiser is paid royalty based on the revenue, and not the profit, the franchiser may be interested in increasing revenue at the expense of profit. For example, the franchiser may demand that the franchisee sell a product that sells at high volumes but provides low profit margin. The plural form helps circumvent this potential conflict of interest; when the franchiser owns a large enough number of units, his interests coincide with the interests of the franchisees.

Note that in a financial, but not legal, sense, a franchisee is indeed similar to a partner—he benefits from the value of the corporation in its entirety, since, contingent on the approval of the chain operator, he can sell the franchise. At the same time, the firm’s reputation depends on uniformity, so franchisees cannot be left completely to their own devices. Influencing their behavior is crucial, but it cannot be achieved by direct command. It is therefore “important to figure out what is important to control
versus what is not when it comes to franchisees. Otherwise everything becomes a crisis.”

The structure of plural franchise organizations shares several similarities with that of the thirteenth-century Capetian kingdom. Under Louis IX the royal administration controlled a large part of France directly, and the rest of the kingdom through feudal ties with great barons. The barons’ organizational position was roughly equivalent to that of multi-unit franchisees. They owed relief and other feudal dues instead of royalties and controlled their territory through their own plural organization. Attempts to decrease the number of direct royal vassals, which began under Philip Augustus, reflected not an attempt to remove the franchisees from the organization, but to rely preferentially on large franchise holders. After the French conquered Normandy, they forced the local nobles who were vassals of the king of England to choose their allegiance. This is also in line with franchise organizations, which prefer that franchisees do not invest in another chain.

While it is true that the Capetians also had direct vassals who held small fiefs from them, the vast majority of fiefs were held either directly or through a small group of barons. Those barons were of the same social strata as the royal family, and were in fact often their relatives. Under Louis IX the counts of Anjou and Poitiers were the king’s

310 Ibid, 100.
siblings, the king of Navarre was his son-in-law, the county of Nevers belonged to his son Jean-Tristan, and the Count of Brittany was married to his wife’s niece. This made the task of management more viable, but also more delicate.

Louis IX began a system-wide adaptation that profoundly altered the culture of the royal organization. Specifically, he wanted his organization to become the purveyor of justice, and not just of legal recourse. The chain operator typically takes the lead in such transformations, because “the chain operator’s motivation to engage in system-wide adaptation overcomes what otherwise might be a classic collective-action problem: no individual franchisee would invest in these resources despite the net benefits they yielded to the system as a whole. The economics of the franchise contract solve this problem by providing the chain operator with the royalty stream, which motivates it to make such an investment.”

We have already looked at some of the policies the king introduced to affect this transformation in the units under his direct control: issuing the 1254 ordinance and creating the enquêteurs. These reforms relied on coercive power, consistent with the review process in company units, which tends to prioritize uniformity and control over revenues or profit. The strategy adopted with the great vassals was different, but increasing the uniformity of crown lands was a necessary component for that part of the plan, as well.

\[311\] Ibid., 135.
Bradach found that the dynamics of the plural form allow a chain operator to leverage the greater uniformity of the company units to nudge the franchisees into adopting the same practices. The interaction between the two forms of organization contributes to uniformity through two main processes: the fact that large franchisees model their internal organizations on the company’s hierarchy, and the process of ratcheting. In addition, system-wide adaptation is promoted by the existence of mutual learning between the two organizational forms. Although the royal administration had some measure of supervision over fief lands, it did not receive records from and did not send regulators to fiefs outside of the royal domain, nor were these fiefs constrained by the 1254 ordinance. Royal administrators only entered the large fiefs to transmit commands or protect men who were under the king’s law (specifically denizens of royal cities).

However, the long tenure of the barons and the king’s personal rapport with them reduced the need for close supervision. This was particularly true of Louis’ time, when many of the barons purchased palaces in Paris and maintained a presence in court despite not being involved in the daily business of administration. The king received little operating data from his barons, but if a problem reached his attention he could order an investigation. These cases were usually brought before the king by the aggrieved parties.
When problems with baronial behavior reached the king’s attention, he adopted a proportional response strategy, much like the one successful chain operators use with multi-unit franchisees. Proportional response’s effectiveness in promoting uniformity is due to the internalization of the costs of bad behavior. Louis limited direct interference with the great vassals to cases of flagrant insubordination, conspiracy and injustice. The first two were customary and necessary for maintaining the organization, but the third was chosen to advance Louis’ system-wide reform. In the third instance, the king restricted his involvement to particularly grievous violations of justice that also encroached on his sense of fairness. These were usually cases where the weak were abused by the strong.

In one case, the count of Joigny denied a bourgeois access to the king’s court, and the bourgeois died in the count’s jail. Louis was spurred to action only after the bourgeois’ death, which transformed the case from a routine issue of jurisdiction to a gross violation of justice. The king summoned the count to answer for his actions, had his sergeants arrest him in front of the entire assembly, and imprisoned him in the Châtelet.\footnote{Vie de saint Louis par Guillaume de Saint-Pathus, 148.} On another occasion the king made the duke of Burgundy confiscate the lands of one of his vassals following complaints of the vassal’s behavior. Again, Louis
intervened only when the accusations were very serious. The knight was accused of many acts of violence against the weak, including the slow torture of a priest who was exposed to bee stings.

The most celebrated example of this sort of royal intervention involved the trial of the Enguerran de Coucy. The baron’s forester caught three young boys playing in the lord’s forest, and executed them for trespassing without bothering with a hearing. The boys’ mothers appealed to Louis, who had Enguerran first jailed by royal sergeants. Imprisoned, the baron was summoned in front of Parlement to respond to the accusation. The barons were present for the trial but did not sit in justice. Enguerran claimed he had the right to be judged by his peers, and in a show of power left the room to consult with his baronial kin, which because of the bonds of marriage comprised the majority of the king’s great vassals. The lord of Coucy was attempting to intimidate the king into backing down, using the implied threat that treating him harshly would adversely influence the king’s relationship with the other vassals.

This sign of subordination angered the king, who was further enraged when Enguerran demanded trial by battle to prove his innocence. The king replied that when dealing with “des povres, des eglises ne des persones (dont en doit avoir pitie), l’en ne devoit pas ainsi aler avant par loy de bataille; car l’en ne troveroit pas de legier aucun qui se vousissent combater pour teles manieres de persones contre les barons du
Enguerran lost the woods in question, was fined six thousand pounds, and vowed to go on pilgrimage to the holy land for three years.

It is important to note that Louis did not play favorites among his barons, and chastised his brother Charles of Anjou in two cases (related in chapter one) of abuse of power against weaker parties. Maintaining the perception of impartiality was crucial to the legitimacy of the king’s power to intervene as the defender of justice. Louis’ version of justice did not correspond to formal law but rather followed a sense of fairness that allowed the weak, rather than the strong, to enjoy the benefit of the doubt. On occasion, they proved undeserving of this benefit, as in the case of the complaint of Pierre de Bois against Jehan Britaut. Pierre accused Jehan of killing his son, and the king arrested Jehan and imprisoned him for more than a year while an investigation into the charge was launched. During that year several important men attempted to intervene on Jehan’s behalf, but the king refused to release him before the investigation was complete. Guillaume de Saint Pathus attributed this recalcitrance, among other things, to the fact that Jehan was stronger and more well connected than his accuser, and was thus assumed by the king to have been at fault: “et pour ce que il estoit de

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313 Ibid., 136.

314 Ibid., 149.
tro loing plus gentill home et plus puissant de lui.” The pleas of Jehan’s advocates only served to further convince the king of Jehan’s privileged position.

Another way in which the plural structure assisted in affecting a kingdom-wide transformation was through ratcheting, a process that takes place between company and franchise units, or, in this case, between the royal domain and the large fiefdoms. Ratcheting takes place “because the chain operator’s ability to legally or informally impose the standards on franchisees was in part based on the level of uniformity in company units. Conversely, the higher the level of performance in company units the higher the standards that could be set for franchisees.” The princes of the apanages fulfilled a crucial role in this process, by modeling their administrations and laws on their brother’s. Alphonse issued a 1255 ordinance that was very similar to Louis’ 1254 announcement. Following the king’s 1262 ordinance on communes, which placed the towns’ internal administration under royal supervision, we find Alphonse and Charles demanding the same oversight from the towns in their domains.

Alphonse also frequently treated the customs of the royal administration as legal precedents when confronted with problems in his lands. When instructing the seneschal of Toulouse and Albi to seize the property of excommunicates, the prince wrote, “you should compel those of our jurisdiction . . . according to what is observed in similar

315 Ibid.
cases by our dearest lord and brother the king of France.” On the matter of granting a crusader a three-year extension on his debts, the count similarly noted that his decision was taken, “according to what the people of the king of France do in those parts in similar cases.” These are examples of modeling, a special case of the ratcheting process whereby large franchisees tend to copy the practices of the company hierarchy without much research, especially if they see those practices as effective. Modeling is useful for franchisees because it saves them the time and inevitable errors that are involved in developing a new administrative strategy.

Other barons adopted Louis’ claim for sovereignty, but did not copy his specific measures; for example, the duke of Burgundy opened his court to appeals from the jurisdiction of his vassals, and summoned legal scholars to his court. This extension of sovereignty was, of course, at the expense of the rights of the local nobility. The ratcheting process can also operate in the opposite direction, when franchisee units outperform company units, compelling the company to adopt their successful measures. Indeed, Philip Augustus was deeply inspired by the procedures of Normandy in his own reform of the royal administrative and accounting measures.

Consumers can also be a motivating force for uniformity. Once they expect a certain level of service, they come to demand it, either by lodging complaints or by withdrawing. In thirteenth-century France the latter strategy took the form of moving to

a more desirable jurisdiction, as some residents of the land of Auvergne did during Geoffroi Thomas’s constableship. Louis’ foresight regarding the clients’ possible role was remarkable. In order to coopt the common people, the king first had to create a standard of expectation corresponding to his vision. The reform process was instrumental in fostering this expectation, as is attested by the lasting popularity of *enquêteurs*. During the rest of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries people demanded, and were granted, the launch of multiple *enquêtes*. This demand was voiced by the provincial leagues of 1314. When Louis X ascended the throne he sent out new *enquêteurs* to increase his legitimacy. It became customary to send out *enquêteurs* in order to mollify the subjects before new taxes were raised.

In addition to seeking greater uniformity of values, Louis also sought a system-wide reform of the coinage. Monetary stability promoted commerce, made counterfeiting more difficult and contributed to the international reputation of the kingdom. An additional advantage was that uniformly accepted specie facilitated contact between residents of different regions of the kingdom. In 1263 Louis decreed that the coins minted by the king, known as *parisis*, would be accepted everywhere in his realm. Although common practice was to ascertain the value of coinage by melting it, the *parisis’* value was to be accepted on faith, vouched for by the king.

The *parisis* were the only tender accepted in the royal domain and in fiefs lacking the right of mint. However, the king did not forbid such barons as did possess this right
from issuing their own coins, provided they did not resemble the royal money and could not freeloard on its stellar reputation. The king enforced this law on his siblings as he did on other vassals; Louis warned Alphonse that his poitevins were too similar to the parisis, and when his brother failed to act swiftly, shut down his mints for two years. When Alphonse’s mints resumed production, they were turning out coins that could not be confused with the parisis.

Louis did not regulate the value of baronial coins or the quantity they minted. Not only would such an attempt have alienated the barons, it would also have been very costly. Louis could not afford to directly finance the administration of the entire realm. He did not aspire to do that, and he did not need to. He relied on the general public’s internalization of the new standards; the existence of “good” money made debased baron coinage harder to pass on. Merchants, moving between feudal jurisdictions, naturally preferred to use the royal coin, which was stable and accepted everywhere. Moreover, because the barons accepted the parisis as legal tender, they were discouraged from issuing weak coins that might be rejected by their own populace. The reform called the barons’ attention to the effects weak local currency could have on the economy of the realm as a whole. As a result, we find barons appealing the king when neighboring lords debased their currency. In one such case, Alphonse of Poitiers

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protested that the bishop of Clermont debased his coin by twenty percent. As the bishops’ coin was accepted in the Auvergne, the effects of the debasement spread into Alphonse’s lands. The king had the bishop fined and his currency declared illegal.

Again, the princes of the apanages hastened the path of reform by adopting the practices of the royal administration. Alphonse, like the king, established uniformity of coinage in his lands. The count adopted the royal standard as to the weight of his coinage, and exercised the same tight control over minting that allowed his brother to maintain the stability of the parisis. All the mints in his jurisdiction minted tournois type coins. This promoted the formation of commercial ties within Alphonse’s lands and between them and the royal domain. The barons were welcome to copy the system, create stable strong money and thereby express their sovereignty. By setting the exchange rate between seignorial and royal coins, the king could easily demonstrate the value of local coinage to the subjects. As with the enquêteurs, the royal coinage of the time of Saint Louis made an indelible impression on the French. It became the symbol for good money, and was frequently invoked (“Let us return to the good coinage of Saint Louis!”) in protests throughout the fourteenth century.

318 Boutaric, Saint Louis et Alphonse de Poitiers, 216-217.

319 Ibid., 188.

320 Bradach, Franchise Organizations, 36.
Louis’ program of reform had to be respectful of baronial independence to work. Controlling the magnates, like franchisee control, depended on persuasion and relied on the personal relationships between the barons and the king. In modern franchise organizations problems between the chain operator and franchisees are discussed face to face, with the objective of reaching a compromise. When franchisees have problems, they usually contact the company decision makers directly. Their investment in the company can suffer from poor company performance, and so although they are not shareholders in a legal sense they feel they need to have a say. For that reason, most decisions involving franchisees are made through personal negotiations.

For that reason, chains provide ample opportunities for direct contact and building trust. They hold annual or semi-annual meetings for their franchisees, attended by the top chain executives. Some chains have a “franchisee advisory committee,” which has no legal authority over company decisions but meets with the chain operator regularly. Sometimes the advisory committee is comprised of both franchisees and company personnel. Such advisory committees are similar to Louis’ council in both makeup and in their advisory capacity. As in feudal organizations, the level of control advisory committees actually exercise over the chain operator’s decisions is variable. The key aspect of these advisory bodies is the opportunity they give the franchisees to be heard: “if they are not part of the process, you get only half-hearted commitment or
no commitment . . . as long as people have been heard and feel they affected the process, then they usually come along.”

In order to foster trust and loyalty to the organization, chains often plan informal activities that bring franchisees together with executives; in modern organizations these take the shape of fly-fishing trips, ski retreats and fancy dinner parties. The franchisees and executives are placed on an equal footing and their high status position in the organization is validated. For Louis, the crusade fulfilled much the same role. I am not suggesting that the crusade was conceived of as a cynical attempt to bond the warrior aristocracy to the king. Louis was certainly sincere in his faith, and the high expense of launching a crusade would not have been undertaken unless it was motivated by religious devotion. However, the crusade, which took on a uniquely French character, brought the nobility and the king together in a mission that combined religious values, military expertise and French identity.

The close proximity shared by the king and his knights on crusade reinforced the bonds of the in-group in a context that affirmed its status and cultural norms, in particular with regard to aggression and the importance of the kin group. It was no coincidence that Louis, Alphonse and Charles brought their wives with them on crusade. The perils of sea travel, warfare and plague were known, but disregarded in deference

321 Ibid., 148.
to the central position kin relations held in noble culture. Aggression, status and kinship were intertwined in noble culture, as revealed by Joinville’s laudatory description of the bravery of the troops of Guy Malvoisin, “But I will not hold back when it comes to my lord Guy Malvoisin, for he came out of Mansurah honorably . . . and it was no wonder that he and his men acquitted themselves well that day, for I was told by someone who knew his affairs well that his entire battalion, with hardy an exception, were knights of his own lineage or knights who were his liegemen.”

During the crusade, the king, who preferred diplomacy to war and did not hunt, played the role of the consummate knight. He showed daring in battle, rushing to his brother’s aid: “Someone came and told the king about his brother’s perilous situation. Hearing this, the king spurred into the midst of his brother’ battalions, sword in hand, and rushed so far in among the enemy that they set light to his horse’s crupper with Greek fire. By making this charge the king rescued the king of Sicily and his men, and drove the Turks from their camp.” He led the Christians to bury their dead, burying rotten corpses with his own hands. The time spent together in captivity certainly also fostered a sense of loyalty to Louis.

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322 Jean de Joinville, 207.

323 Ibid., 212.
The barons willingly submitted to Louis IX’s arbitration, and accepted his proposed compromises. Louis did not try to weaken the great fiefs, and did not see their existence as destabilizing for the realm. Indeed, plural organizations have many advantages; beyond saving money on direct administration, they allow the organization to respond better to local changes and provide a more efficient system of testing innovations. One must not read the absolutism of the later French monarchy back to Louis IX’s period. The main losers from the Ludovician reform were the small fief holders and lesser nobility. Not only were they excluded from the royal administration, the process of modeling meant they also lost their place in local baronial administration, and the adaptation of the idea of sovereignty to the great fiefs encroached on their rights. This development brought on a separation between ownership and control, similar to the one resulting from the managerial revolution in modern corporations.

The term “managerial revolution” was coined by Berle and Means in their classic *The Modern Corporation and Private Property*. Berle and Means drew attention to the effects of corporate government on society as a whole, focusing on the exclusion of stockholders from decision making that resulted from the gradual transmission of daily control to professional managers. The book is most often cited in relation to problems of agency and control, because it highlighted the fact that professional managers have different interests from stockholders, and may run the business in a manner that harms the owners.
Another point made in the book is sometimes overlooked. Berle and Means also addressed the way large stockholders rely on managers to exclude small owners from decision making. This happens because the stock in modern corporations is widely dispersed, so that individual small owners lose sight of the process. Berle and Means voiced concern over the social implications of this development; they noted that modern corporations are too large and powerful to exist without a sense of social responsibility. Their stock is dispersed enough that the social makeup of their small owners would approximate society as a whole, so that if all stockholders exercised control, the corporation would have de facto social responsibility. However, as a result of the managerial revolution, these corporations are protected from public opinion and serve the needs of the few. They become oligarchies.

Berle and Means’ view on this matter was pessimistic, and they believed external pressures must be applied to correct it, “the extensive separation of ownership and control, and the strengthening of the powers of control, raise a new situation calling for decision whether social and legal pressure should be applied in an effort to insure corporate operation primarily in the interests of the ‘owners’ or whether such pressure shall be applied in the interests of some other or wider group.”324 However, later scholars of corporate governance were more hopeful, suggesting corporations may

324 Berle and Means, *The Modern Corporation and Private Property*, 293.
spontaneously develop a sense of public responsibility because their size forces them
out of the purely private sphere.

The Capetian organization under Saint Louis reached such a point of decision.
The basis of the feudal system was private, although it fulfilled some of the roles
commonly ascribed to the public sphere. The royal administration stood the risk of
turning into an oligarchy profiting the royal family and its favorites, instead, Louis relied
on the plural nature of his organization in order to begin a transformation of the feudal
kingdom into a state. Most remarkably, Louis managed to trigger this change with little
violence and avoided civil war. This success was built on the conquests of Philip
Augustus, who vastly increased the size of the area under direct Capetian control. The
number of company units has to be greater than the number of units controlled by
individual franchisees in order for ratcheting to take place, because, “a hidden but
crucial aspect of the plural form . . . is that it largely resolves this potential conflict of
interest between the chain operator and the franchisee. When the chain operator owns
enough units, the economic incentives of the chain operator and the franchise
arrangement become aligned.”325

However, this condition was necessary, but not sufficient. The king’s success also
required the cooperation of the princes of the apanages, cooperation that blood ties do

325 Bradach, Franchise Organizations, 36.
not sufficiently account for. Sibling rivalry was the norm, rather than the exception, among medieval noble houses. Henry II’s sons, for example, fought each other (and their father) for years, despite the fact that their father had endowed each of them with a large legacy. The inner dynamics of the Capetian family, which permitted Louis to trust his brothers, contributed in no small way to the stable successions that characterized the dynasty.

The *apanages* played an important role in the transformation of the essentially private feudal order into the proto-state, and their ambivalent character, as members of both the royal family and the feudal hierarchy, was the reason they could have played such a role. This provides a better understanding of the early *apanages*, which, having seldom been studied separately from their successors, have remained somewhat of a riddle. The *apanages* of later centuries were torn out of the established royal domain, not created in newly conquered provinces, and they had a destabilizing effect on the realm. This was not the case during Louis IX’s reign, and in this case the common name proved misleading. Charles T. Wood, in his book *The French Apanages and the Capetian Monarchy*, asserted that the *apanages* were a deviation from apparently feudal forms, explained by the need to keep cadet princes from becoming disgruntled and disrupting the stability of the kingdom. Arguing against Fawtier, who saw the legal framework of the *apanages* as proof that the Capetian kings were not consciously anti-feudal, Wood observed the *apanages* in a symbolic context; he saw them as special high-status fiefs
whose prestige was tied to the increasing prestige of the king. Wood maintained that, “the circumstances that led to the creation of the *apanages* were such that feudal considerations had but little part to play,” and that, “none of the pressures that led . . . Louis VIII to grant lands in *apanage* can be considered feudal at all.” 326

A testament to his theory, Woods argued, was the existence of good relations between the crown and the *apanage* princes: “Yet the result of the *apanages*, ‘great fiefs ruled over by royal cadets who cheerfully served the king more or less as provincial viceroy’s’, as Fawtier puts it, was a situation that does not much resemble classic feudalism.” 327 In other words, the final proof that the *apanages* were not feudal in nature was how well they functioned within the so-called Capetian feudal hierarchy. Woods was too taken with the royal/feudal dichotomy; he perceived a Saint Louis who aspired to absolute power, striving to supersede feudal government, and could not imagine a stable feudal organization. Nonetheless, such an organization existed in France during Louis’ time.


327 Ibid., 150.
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