“Building State and Security in Afghanistan and the Region”

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Liechtenstein Colloquium Materials
LISD Colloquium in Istanbul on Afghanistan, July 21-24, 2005

“Building State and Security in Afghanistan and the Region”
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AS THE RESULT OF THE SPECIAL LISD AFGHANISTAN COLLOQUIUM IN PRINCETON
The Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination (LISD) at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs arranged the Colloquium on “Building State and Security in Afghanistan and the Region,” in Istanbul, Turkey July 21 - 24, 2005. This Colloquium is the culminating conference of Phase II of the LISD Project on “Promoting Stability and Viability in Afghanistan and the Region,” hosted by LISD since summer 2001, and has been supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Woodrow Wilson School, and the government of Liechtenstein.

The Project has focused on the conduct of Afghanistan’s 2004 presidential elections and parliamentary elections to be held in 2005; institutional design, which includes culture and education; and as well as the establishment of infrastructure and vital economies. Regarding Afghanistan’s security dimensions, the Colloquium has been concerned with border security, narcotics, and organized crime. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) of former combatants, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), and more generally, the role and impact of the international community on the country have been key areas examined during the course of the Project. Discussions have focused on the pragmatic details of these policy debates and developed larger, more theoretical questions of state-building, legitimacy, and viable institutions.

The goal of this concluding Colloquium is to take the results of the LISD Project’s Phase II work, and based on this consider the future of Afghanistan and the region as the country moves out of immediate post-conflict transition as a secure, politically and economically viable state among its neighbors. We examine these issues from the perspective of infrastructure and economy, energy and natural resources, “hard” and “soft” security, and the range of regional challenges including environmental and health stresses; human trafficking; and the narcotics trade. Of course, regional developments, the current international order, the U.S.-led “global war on terror” and various challenges elsewhere – such as Iraq, the recent catastrophic tsunami, and the July London bombings – can influence the prospects for and parameters of Afghanistan’s development, not the least of which being the international attention and support paid to the country.

This concluding Colloquium brings together senior policy makers, academics, members of the governments of Turkey, Afghanistan, and its regional neighbors, as well as representatives from the European Union, U.S., India, Russia, and other countries, and key multilateral institutions such as NATO, and non-governmental organizations. The Colloquium focuses on partnerships and the post-Bonn role for principal donors – the E.U., US and Japan - as well as the larger regional and bilateral partnerships Afghanistan and her neighbors will need to solidify and build on the developments accomplished during the transition process. The conference further examines the role for public, private, state and corporate actors.
According to its traditional rules, the Colloquium is private, off-the-record, and by invitation-only, in order to facilitate open and meaningful discussion. Invited participants are characterized by outstanding expertise, the willingness to engage in meaningful discussion, as well as substantial *pouvoir* and competency to implement resulting policy propositions. The Project has been conducted under the auspices of The House of Liechtenstein and the LISD at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School. Since 1985 the informal motto of the Liechtenstein Colloquium has been: independent, international, inter-generational, interdisciplinary, and innovative, with equal participation independent of gender, race, and religion. (Please see [www.princeton.edu/~lisd](http://www.princeton.edu/~lisd))

*Wolfgang Danspeckgruber*, Chair, Liechtenstein Colloquium
In this fifth LISD meeting on Afghanistan, international experts – the discussants ultimately contributing to the content of this publication – have analyzed and debated critical issues facing the new Afghan state after the inauguration of the first democratically elected president, Hamid Karzai, in 2004. In terms of state-building, issues include the conduct of the soon to be held parliamentary elections, institutional design, culture and education, as well as the establishment of infrastructure and vital economics. Regarding security issues, areas of concern included narcotics, disarmament and re-integration of former combatants, PRTs, and more generally, the role and impact of the international community. Discussions have focused on the pragmatic details of these policy debates and developed larger, more theoretical questions of state-building, legitimacy, and viable institutions. It has become clear that in the shadow of international attention to the elections in Iraq and now the natural catastrophe of the recent tsunami in Asia, continued international attention paid to Afghanistan has varied—both in terms of actual assistance and financially. The Phase II LISD Vienna meeting has generated a number of recommendations and lessons for Afghanistan and the international community, which are also relevant for building state and security elsewhere.

I. BUILDING THE AFGHAN STATE

i.) Parliamentary Elections

SUMMARY

Great gains have been achieved in political representation, but much remains to be done in improving participation and ensuring that the elected administration is able to actually effect change. The November 2004 presidential election reflected ethnic voting patterns and interests. Upcoming parliamentary elections have the potential to exacerbate these tendencies and reify existing power structures. While the successful conduct of the presidential elections has tested the electoral mechanisms within the country, and the ability of the Afghans and the international community to get constituents to register to vote as well as assess their willingness to get to the polls, the parliamentary elections are expected to test the fragile political consensus and the power and efficiency of the Karzai government and international community to re-engage potential spoilers.
Recommendations

- **Eliminate the Single Non-Transferable Voting (SNTV) electoral system**
  SNTV is an undesirable electoral framework which not only hinders the current administration but may also result in a highly fragmented legislature. A substantial disparity between the popular vote and number of allocated parliamentary seats could easily occur, which would serve as an invitation to spoilers.

- **Provide substantial security measures**
  Security provisions for parliamentary elections will be even more vital than during the recent presidential elections. There have been several incidences of candidates being threatened.

- **Facilitate the development of a party structure**
  While it is crucial that such parties are democratically and representatively forged, the international community has a key role to play in training, providing models and funding the provision of information such entities.

- **Focus also on the ongoing support for local elections**
  The electoral process will not stop with parliamentary elections. District and local elections will very much require electoral machinery and donor support. The democratic experiment in Afghanistan will also be greatly impacted by the legitimacy of local leaders and their support from the central government. Primary concentration on parliamentary elections at the expense of ignoring local elections would miss an important state-building opportunity.

- **Start planning now for the transition of current leadership**
  Present stability is perceived to depend heavily on a strong central leader, currently judged to be due to the dynamism of Hamid Karzai. Post-conflict countries consistently revert to conflict or fail in the democratic experiment when facing an initial handover of power. Keeping this upcoming transition in mind will help frame the creation and building of sustainable institutions.

**ii.) Legal and Constitutional Developments**

**Summary**

The adoption of a constitution is a very important sign of progress. Nonetheless, different interpretations of “constitution” do exist and portend the possibility of future tensions. In Afghanistan, the current state of “constitutional” governance consensus depends heavily on personality, and not yet on institutions. Building the processes needed to institutionalize rule of law has only just begun. The delays in concentrating on justice mechanisms have already threatened the state-building effort, and new, immediate attention is needed to consolidate peace in legal and enforceable rules.
Recommendations

• **Create guidelines for negotiating and settling the contradictory tenets of existing laws**
  The state’s modus vivendi as it negotiates overlapping state, customary, and Islamic law is currently unclear. Most of the judiciary only possesses access to and is trained in Islamic law.

• **Delimit Supreme Court independence in applying religious law**
  A fundamental challenge for legal reform is the establishment of an independent Supreme Court. Through the combination of Article 3 (no law can be contrary to the provisions and beliefs of Islamic law) and Article 121 (granting the explicit power of judicial review), the current Supreme Court possesses dangerously broad and independent powers.

• **Reinvigorate and prioritise judicial reform and improve donor coordination**
  The lack of donor coordination in general and delays by the lead donor nation in particular has been directly responsible for the poor judicial reform. The donor community should forge a single unified vision of judicial reform and prioritize the rule of law as a primary goal of institutional development. Without judicial reform, and immediate attention to courts and prisons, the millions being poured into police training will be ineffective. These projects must occur together.

• **Identify and build key pockets of judicial competence**
  Choose key dispute areas in which to funnel international resources. At a minimum, establish a limited competency in critical urban areas for the adjudication of property disputes, which form the bulk of Afghanistan’s judicial caseload.

• **Identify or create a resolution mechanism for key categories of disputes in the short-run, with an eye to long-term institution building**
  Land ownership and family relationship disputes possess the ever-present potential to snowball into larger political disputes, particularly if such disputes occur along ethnic cleavages.

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iii.) Governance Structure

**Summary**

Full centralization of power needs to precede decentralization, but not to the detriment of developing local government capacity. Lessons learned from South Asian neighbors demonstrate that, given the will and administrative capacity to implement decentralization, some constitutional protection along with a concrete timetable, tremendous improvements in social welfare are possible through local organization. To be viable, a decentralization program needs to be detailed enough to ensure adequate capacity to distribute resources, and as well as possess strong channels of communication with the central authority.
Recommendations

- Organize fiscal and political decentralization around pre-existing local governance structures
  Fiscal and political decentralization efforts should build on pre-existing structures. However, a decentralization program should also seize the opportunity to democratize such structures.

iv.) The Economy and Infrastructure

- Security and Economics
  The lack of security in Afghanistan is largely linked to the lack of economic opportunities. Many who fight for regional warlords do so for economic reasons. In the short-run, the reconstruction of destroyed and damaged infrastructure and the building of new infrastructure is seen as the more viable way of generating employment opportunities. This will require the continued support from the international community.

- Security and Infrastructure
  The lack of transport infrastructure – a lack good roads as well as a lack of any railroads does not negatively impact the economic development and the security of Afghanistan. But besides offering new and rapid ways to connect between the regional capitals – hence to finally establish national cohesion and enhancing the influence of the nation’s capital – it is also important to link the various regions of Afghanistan with neighboring states, and to eventually offer economically advantageous transit capabilities through the country in East-West- and North-South-directions.

- Special infrastructure project: railroad
  The construction of a working rail road system – one within the country as a Circular rail line and other – connecting subparts/regions of Afghanistan to the neighboring states:
  From the north linking Mazar-e-Sharif via Baghlan to Kabul.
  From the west coming in to Herat and linking it with Kandahar and then further northeast to Kabul. And with spokes out connecting Afghanistan with Iran (via Mashhad), Pakistan, Tadzikistan will afford the state with excellent connections to the neighbors. The railroad can be connected from Kandahar to the South-East to Quetta (Pakistan) and further on to Shikarpur and Sukkur.
  Within Afghanistan a cross sectioning through the country, for instance from Kabul to Herat – may become a major contribution to the future of Afghanistan.
  The construction of a railroad would addresses three important dimensions:
  - the enhancement of economic interaction and the contribution to regional stability and national cohesion;
- the positive impact on the regional trans-national contact and interaction;
- the offer of major, extensive labor intensive projects, i.e. high amounts of employment; thus a major contribution to take thousands of young unemployed “off the road,” and provide them with a serious source of income.

This would also provide – not to be underestimated – a source of national pride, namely to participate in a project which may enhance national prestige and really change the future of the country.

A functioning railway system will encourage extensive, direct foreign investment also with heavy industries, permit the export of heavy raw materials and natural products such as minerals, petroleum, natural gas, and timber, etc, and finally, offer the state to become a throughway from Europe via Asia Minor over to South Asia.

Simply stated, it should become possible to travel by train from Vienna via Istanbul to Tehran, and further on to Herat and Kandahar and Kabul, and from there to Islamabad and into India, New Delhi. Such a rail connection would clearly have a lasting effect on the structure and economic as well as strategic situation of the subcontinent, not to speak about the entire region.

Furthermore it may also add positively to DDR and employ thousands of demobilized and unemployed young Afghans; to offer new ways for direct foreign investment and international financial and economic interests.

v.) The Role of NGOs

Summary

Non-governmental organizations are a diverse and loosely defined category of players in the current state and security-building project. While some are more legitimate than others, NGOs tend to have excellent access to and understanding of the local reality at the grassroots. Despite some criticism of the NGO role, foreign governments have also heavily relied on the existing capacity of NGOs to deliver services.

Recommendations

- Speed up the provision of a just and viable NGO policy in Afghanistan
  The NGO community itself is eager to have a defining policy and registration process in Afghanistan to improve donor coordination and access as well as to ensure quality of ser-
vices and advocacy. The international community should play a role in pushing for a policy that sets a free and respectful relationship with NGOs and the central government.

- **Create a lessons learned mechanism from the NGO community with a process for sharing with outside partners**
  Not only do NGOs need a more complete monitoring and evaluation mechanism that allows for the identification and publicizing of lessons learned, but government, donor and military actors in Afghanistan could benefit from the local view of NGOs.

### II. Building Security in and around the Afghan State

#### i.) Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)

**Summary**

Initially, the U.S. Department of Defense set about creating PRTs in several cities in Afghanistan, each with a complement of 50 to 100 U.S. military personnel, plus civilian aid and political advisors. The PRTs main objectives are security, reconstruction, strengthening the influence of the central government, and monitoring and assessing the local/regional situations. In addition to the PRTs, military/civilian civil operations teams are operate around Afghanistan, performing some of the same functions as the PRTs on a reduced scale.

Though much has been done to improve the security of Afghanistan, PRTs will continue to provide the *de jure* response to a lack of security in many parts of Afghanistan. Because each PRT has been constituted in a different way, there is need to take account of the various existing PRT models and examine whether such models can be more efficiently organized or resourced. Participants differed on how one should optimally leverage the PRT capacity beyond the strict security realm. Two options emerged: the first being that PRTs should concentrate exclusively on their core competencies, the second argument called for extending the PRT mandate to build on larger reconstruction efforts that have showed some success.

**Recommendations**

- **Develop an understanding of PRT best practices**
  Because of differing orientations and priorities within the donor community, a wide diversity of local needs and changing security requirements from one province to another, the PRTs around the country have different organizations, resources and mandates. However, there has been no common accounting of best practices, or wider participation in assessing what strategies have worked.

- **Develop and publicize a clear but flexible PRT operational mandate**
  While each PRT needs some flexibility in adapting a specified mandate to local and re-
regional conditions, a clear mandate will be important in clarifying responsibilities and forming appropriate expectations of the PRT role. Some participants stated the desire to emphasize ‘positive’ security developments has created a gap between public perceptions and the security reality on the ground. Key to managing expectations is publicizing the planned role for each PRT. While individual PRT donors may perceive their roles differently, some participants noted that local Afghan often do not differentiate between them in their expectations of security provision.

- Clarify the PRT role in security provision for upcoming parliamentary elections
  A contentious lead up to the parliamentary elections is expected to test the ability of the international community to ensure basic security.

ii.) Combating the Narco-Economy

**Summary**

Proliferating opium production and on-sight processing is a new and dangerous development which poses a grave danger to the central government’s monopoly on the use of force, as it provides significant economic resources to local leaders, regional challengers, and increases the power of organized crime. Increasingly, it is not only opium production but the processing of opium in mobile and modern Afghan laboratories that should concern the international community, as well as increased linkages with international crime and with international drug networks.

**Recommendations**

- *Prioritize and resource a comprehensive alternative livelihood and development program to provide a viable “out” from opium harvesting*
  The narco-economy will continue to thrive as long as it provides economic security. It is important to maximize on the current donor commitment and move beyond short-term, limited impact eradication programs to implement a long-term development strategy in place that assists communities to end poppy production. The counter-narcotic plan must address growing internal demand, and regional demand as well as Afghanistan’s “supply” problem.

  International attention should focus on the nexus between production, processing and international organized crime, resisting the criminalization of local farmers. Improved training for police and border services capable to stopping organized crime will be essential. However, the political interface of organized crime with regional political powers will continue to threaten the integrity of the state if a solution cannot be found.
iii.) The DDR Process

**SUMMARY**

Though the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration has gotten underway in many parts of the country, there is continued concern that the approach is not holistic. The process has focused on disarmament and demobilization, while little has been done to address the reintegration part of the process, even though the reintegration of people is the key to the success of the whole process. Moreover, DDR has not focused on Kabul and other areas more difficult to disarm.

iv.) Regional Relations

**SUMMARY**

Regional relations have long been problematic from the perspective of domestic Afghan capacity, politics, and interests.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- **Clarify the responsibility for border security and ensure capacity to fulfill the necessary roles**
  The provision of border security has been problematic from the perspective of domestic Afghan capacity because six groups currently share this responsibility, with their various goals, capacities and backers potentially coming into conflict. Key to this will be clear policies and enforcement of revenue collection as border fees represent a major income for regional leaders. Assisting the central state in capturing this revenue will be key to its stability.

- **Continue encouraging dialogue between regional neighbors**
  Particularly India and Pakistan, who have key stakes in Afghanistan’s economic development because of the pipeline potential, should be encouraged to cooperate in the provision of border security.
III. The Role of the International Community

Summary

The International community will need to continue to play a critical role in providing stability and encouraging the growth in government capacity. As we know from recent World Bank research, a majority of current post-conflict states are likely to return to conflict within five years. If the international community does not want to watch significant conflict re-erupt in Afghanistan in the coming years, they need to demonstrate long-term, committed financial and political involvement. The international community will continue to grapple with the dilemmas and contradictions involved in forging organically-created and sustainable institutions in the country, while undertaking immediate post-conflict stabilization measures and fulfilling a security role that the Afghan government cannot yet ensure.

Recommendations

- **Forge a post-Bonn compact**
  As parliamentary elections mark the conclusion of the Bonn Agreement, members of the international community and the new Afghan government should forge the next compact to establish benchmarks for mission success. A radical disconnect in definitions of mission success could undermine and potentially de-legitimize the intervention effort. The international community and the Government of Afghanistan should establish reasonable benchmarks in five arenas: 1) political and civic development, 2) security and rule of law, 3) public finance and administration, 4) social recovery, and 5) economic recovery. Financial assistance should be conditioned upon these discrete indicators.

- **Provide for improved donor coordination and management**
  Ideally, a mechanism for managing coordination (both an external component for the donor level and an internal component at the host country level) should be worked out prior to intervention, despite the considerable time pressure. Advance coordination and consultation will preview inconsistencies between ambitions and political will and help forge a better match of mandate and resources.

- **Aggressively recruit and train the next generation of civil servants**
  The entire project of the new government of Afghanistan will rest on the quality of its civil servants and their ability to carry out its orders. While attention is being paid to police and army training, the issue of effective civil service training and reform has been sidelined. Not only does this effort need to be adequately funded by the international community, but long-term trainers and advisors should be made available to ministries to assist in policy development, training, and identification of new managers. Given the reality of a two-decade war, special attention will have to go to recruitment and training to replace the ageing population of former civil servants.

- **Focus on assistance to the Government of Afghanistan to implement its Constitution**
  The constitution has legitimacy as a road map. The international community, whether through a Post-Bonn compact or through bilateral agreement must develop concrete steps to assist the GoA to implement the provisions of the Constitution.
But the constitution’s dictates aren’t broad enough for all that needs to happen. Constitution- support must be integrated with support for the expected Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan and other national development planning. This support must include an honest and transparent examination of donor political will and likely timetables of aid drawdown.

- **Transparency in evaluation of lead country responsibilities**
  1. **Religion, Human Rights and the State:** The final wording of the role of Islam in Afghanistan’s constitution is more strongly worded than was widely expected, leaving the door open for more conservative interpretations of the country’s laws. This and the concern about human rights should be reviewed in the future, perhaps in conjunction with a constitutional review.
  2. **Civil Service Reform:**
     A competent civil service will be the key to political administration and the delivery of basic services and security. In order to increase competence and decrease corruption, a livable salary must be paid to the police and civilian administrators and their training needs to be improved. Civil service reform should also include improved revenue collection efforts, since this would provide the basis for paying improved and regular salaries.
APPENDIX I

LISD COLLOQUIUM ON STATE BUILDING IN AFGHANISTAN,
Triesenberg, Principality of Liechtenstein

The Liechtenstein Colloquium on European and International Affairs
Stability and Viability in Afghanistan:
Building a Viable and Effective Afghan State

As post-Taliban Afghanistan struggles to build a viable and secure state under President Hamid Karzai, a clear and urgent need exists for the international community to assist Karzai’s government in building enduring domestic institutions that support the promotion of democracy, while improving the stability and security of this Asian country.

In March 2003, Princeton University’s Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination (LISD) sponsored a colloquium entitled, “Stability and Viability in Afghanistan: Building A Viable And Effective Afghan State,” held in Triesenberg, Liechtenstein, which brought together diplomats, government officials, academics, policy experts, and field practitioners to examine international and local best practices relevant for state and security building in Afghanistan—to be considered policy recommendations by Afghans themselves.

Participants included Ambassador Robert Finn, U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan; Ambassador David Johnson, Afghanistan Coordinator, U.S. Department of State; Afghanistan’s Minister of Reconstruction, Dr. Amin Farhang; Hans-Ulrich Seidt, director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Berlin; the European Union’s special representative in Afghanistan Francesc Vendrell; Professor Amin Saikal, Australian National University; Wolfgang Danspeckgruber, director of the LISD and colloquium organizer; Princeton University faculty, and others. A special feature of the Liechtenstein Colloquium was its video conference link—via satellite—with Kabul, made possible by the World Bank’s Global Distance Learning Network. Hedayat Amin Arsala, Vice President of Afghanistan, and Anne Tully, the World Bank’s country director in Afghanistan, participated via the video conference link. The colloquium was funded by LISD, the Carnegie Corporation, and the government of Liechtenstein.

The three-day colloquium focused on the political history of Afghanistan, the main issues and lessons in building viable, democratic state systems, and lessons from international case studies on decentralization and nation-building, and their applicability to Afghanistan. In particular, the discussions focused on best practices in designing effective electoral systems and dealing with Afghanistan’s unique regional power centers, warlords, ethnic groups, and traditional Afghan society.
This Liechtenstein colloquium was the first in a series of meetings as part of the LISD’s project “Promoting Viability and Stability in Afghanistan and the Region,” which runs through 2005. The participation of Afghan policymakers at this and other meetings is enabled through the World Bank’s videoconferencing facilities and the LISD’s working relationships with government officials, international organizations, and institutes in Kabul.

In Afghanistan and the region, the most pressing need for the country’s future stability and viability is the creation of enduring state structures, which are accepted by the people. On the other hand, stability and security within Afghanistan and among its neighbors, and the capability to establish viable institutions is the prerequisite for the state’s viability. Through a series of analyses, the project will cull consensus advice of the best policy direction for strengthening Afghanistan and the region’s future.

KEY FINDINGS

Findings presented in this brief represent policy recommendations expressed as a whole by participants, even where consensus on key issues was not reached. However, unanimous consensus was achieved on such issues as the international community’s continued security presence in the country, as well as the importance of conducting voter awareness campaigns before national elections.

DECENTRALISATION VERSUS CENTRALIZATION

Key issues discussed over the consolidating of power in Afghanistan’s center focused on the priority and timing of such consolidation, namely which options are most viable in the current circumstances. Some participants stated that Afghanistan will not be stable unless a central government is strengthened and prioritized. Other experts argued that decentralization is the only option that would ensure stability, given the existence of a number of influential stakeholders outside the central government.

Sub-national units: Is it necessary to redraw boundaries?
If new boundaries do need to be drawn, careful consideration must be given to the number and composition of sub-national units. On the one hand, participants stated that existing research reveals that greater numbers (up to 50) of sub-national units tend to stabilize ethnically and socially fragmented societies. On the other hand, participants expressed concern that 32 provinces are administratively difficult to manage, and units would benefit from consolidation.

Some experts suggested that 12-15 sub-national units would be most viable in the current context. Participants expressed wide agreement, though not consensus, that sub-national units, if redrawn, should not correspond solely to the country’s ethnic composition. Doing so would tend to reinforce multiethnicity and enhance interethnic cooperation. The political culture of the district system could be designed to facilitate social alliances.
Institutions

Experts at the Liechtenstein Colloquium also considered what the most important considerations for the structure of government should be. Discussions centered on two general models of governance – majority representation, or proportional representation. Participants in favour of proportional representation argued that a majority system might lock out minorities and prompt dissatisfied stakeholders to subvert the formal system of government. A minority of participants felt that a majority-based system would facilitate social alliances in the local political arena.

Some experts supported a Swiss-style rotating head of state. Most, however, felt a rotating executive would both undermine consensus-building and render it difficult to institutionalize the regular transfer of power, such as occurs in the democratic election of a head of state.

Several participants emphasized the need to consider the role of traditional/religious leadership in the design of domestic political institutions. Several experts also urged the consideration and development of a strategy, vis-à-vis armed groups: in particular, some participants suggested a demilitarization program.

How quickly should political parties be formulated?

Participants disagreed, however, on the possibility for effective political parties to be created in time for Afghanistan’s 2004 elections. Those experts stressing the need to establish parties immediately argued that parties could enhance both discipline and participation, thereby avoiding the personalization of politics. Those participants opposing the premature creation of parties argued that personalization is only potentially destabilizing in the absence of institutional constraints. Personalization of politics within functioning institutions however, can even be beneficial. These experts felt that stable political parties would naturally evolve and that establishing weak parties now could jeopardize their long-term legitimacy.

Some participants suggested the June 2004 deadline leaves insufficient time to register and educate voters, train Afghans to run their own elections, and to guarantee security at the polls. Other experts emphasized that because no election is perfect, a postponement of elections could do more harm than good, insofar as the overall environment might not get better over time, and postponement may send the wrong signals.

The role of the international community

Certain potentially destabilizing issues such as the opium trade cannot be addressed without the assistance of powerful international actors such as the European Union. However, experts disagreed over the appropriate level of U.N. involvement. Some participants advocated a so-called “light footprint” approach, while other participants suggested the need for a greater international presence. The international community can play an instrumental role in minimizing any potentially destabilizing influence on or by Afghanistan’s neighbors, such as Pakistan and Iran.

Moreover, deliberations included what the nature of international and local community involvement should be. For example, experts agreed upon the need to strike a necessary balance between foreign recommendations and indigenous Afghan proposals.
They also agreed that it is crucial that Afghans themselves assume full responsibility for their constitution’s design. The primary role of the international community, participants noted, should be a supportive one. Both international and local NGOs are conducting important humanitarian work, but all participants strongly agreed that non-governmental actors cannot be a substitute for coherent and legitimate state structures.

**Ethnicity**

Does ethnicity matter in Afghanistan? Experts agreed that a strong national Afghan identity exists. However, participants disagreed on the extent to which ethnicity plays a role defining Afghanistan’s political and social landscape. Experts did agree on the need to create institutions which bridge rather than reinforce ethnic cleavages. Participants also agreed that the constitution should be designed to ensure the rights of minorities, women, and children.

**Security**

On the role of the international community with regard to security, participants unanimously agreed on the need for a continued international security presence in Afghanistan, with a need for immediate expansion to the country’s provinces, several of which are dominated by local leaders. Experts agreed that a strong international security presence is critical in preparing for and conducting national and regional elections. Increased security is essential for political and economic progress in Afghanistan. It is therefore important that the constitutional provisions and the role of international actors not work at cross-purposes. Security should be provided at the time of the elections, but participants urged that general insecurity should not be used as an excuse to cancel elections.

**Summary**

Participants concluded that neither decentralization nor centralization has to be prioritized one over the other, as they are not mutually exclusive options. A mixed system of asymmetric power-sharing may thus represent the best option.

Experts voiced concern that redrawing administrative boundaries at such a critical stage could have deleterious effects on stability. In addition, redrawing boundaries could undermine the existing capacity of local government to provide services.

All participants determined the necessity of a strong judiciary for implementation and legitimatization of any future constitution. Experts also agreed upon the need to build upon existing institutional capacity, especially those institutions which enjoy already popular recognition, and are still functioning.

The need to integrate gender considerations into governmental structure was also stressed. Some participants went on to suggest specific gender quotas, such as those featured in India’s governmental system.
Participants emphasized the long-term importance of creating strong political parties in promoting discipline within institutions and reducing the importance of individual leaders; bridging ethnic/social differences; and encouraging political participation in the country more generally. Some participants also suggested enhancing incentives for diaspora to return.

The need to guarantee the security of the voting public before—and, more importantly, during—elections, even for the immediate election period was also determined to be an urgent need. Participants generally agreed that scheduling national elections before regional elections would facilitate the development of a broader national electorate, rather than cause regional or ethnically divided polities.

A fundamental question asked during the colloquium was what should be the level of involvement in Afghanistan by the international community? Participants agreed that continued multilateral international involvement and financial support is crucial to the reconstruction of Afghanistan, even after the elections. United Nations and other international involvement are crucial to preventing further deterioration of both the national and regional security situations.

Future colloquia as part of this project will include, in 2003, a conference in Bonn on security, as well as a meeting on state-building in Kabul. In addition, there will be a meeting on the regional aspects of building a secure and viable Afghan state at at the Australian National University in Canberra, and a EU-sponsored meeting in Brussels in 2004. A concluding meeting will be held at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs in 2005.

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**The website for the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs:**
http://www.wws.princeton.edu

**The website for the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination:**
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In May 2003, Princeton University's Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination (LISD) convened a major international colloquium entitled, “State Building and Security in Afghanistan and the Region,” held in Bonn and Petersberg, Germany, which brought together diplomats, government officials, academics, policy experts, and field practitioners to examine international and local best practices relevant for state and security building in Afghanistan.

Participants included Ambassador Reinhard Schlagintweit, former State Secretary, German Foreign Ministry, and Liechtenstein Ambassador Joseph Wolf; senior Afghan participants included Afghan Prince Mirwais Zaher; Afghan Ambassador Homayoun Tandar; Dr. Farouq Azam; and Professor Quadir Amiyar and Dr. Enayat Qasimi, advisers to Afghanistan's Judicial Reform Commission.

Other experts included Dirk Salomons, Columbia University, Nazif Shahrani, Indiana University, and Kent Eaton of the Woodrow Wilson School. In addition, WWS Ph.D. candidates Rani Mullen and Maya Tudor, Amy Paro (‘M.P.A. ‘04), and department of Politics Ph.D. candidate Prerna Singh, participated in the Colloquium, along with WWS undergraduates Yana Lantsberg (‘04), Steffen Simon (‘05), and Yusufi Vali (‘05). The ZEF was represented by Dr. Conrad Schetter, Prof. Tobias Debiel and Malte Kassner. Wolfgang Danspeckgruber chaired the Colloquium.

The three-day colloquium focused on the current deteriorating security environment and the unacceptable pace of reconstruction in Afghanistan. Underscoring their reciprocal nature, colloquium participants urged a reassessment of the country’s security and reconstruction policies. The experts focused on the particular need to generate additional financial and material resources, strengthen central authority, and renew international commitment to Afghanistan’s physical and economic security. The Bonn sessions also stressed the indispensability of judicial reform and civilian disarmament to enhancing the country's stability.

This colloquium was the second in a series of meetings as part of the LISD’s project “Promoting Viability and Stability in Afghanistan and the Region,” which runs through 2005. The LISD Project is sponsored by Carnegie Corporation in New York, and the SiBiL Foundation in Vaduz. The participation of some Afghan policymakers at this and other meetings is enabled through the World Bank Institute’s videoconferencing facilities and the LISD’s working relationships with government officials, international organizations, and institutes in Kabul.
In Afghanistan and the region, the most pressing need for the country’s future stability and viability is the creation of enduring state structures, which are accepted by the people. On the other hand, stability and security within Afghanistan and among its neighbors is the prerequisite for the state’s viability. Through a series of analyses, the series will cull consensus advice of the best policy direction for strengthening Afghanistan and the region’s future.

**KEY FINDINGS**

Findings presented in this brief represent the policy solutions expressed as a whole by participants, even where consensus on key issues was not reached. However, unanimous consensus on such issues as

**Centralization versus Decentralization**

Participants’ discussions focused on the relative merits of centralization versus decentralization, and federalism. Some experts argued that federalism is not popularly supported in Afghanistan, since it is seen as fragmenting the country and that there is a perceived need for a strong central authority. On the other hand, the current government’s centralizing tendencies could exacerbate deterioration of Afghanistan’s internal security and could be destabilizing in the long term.

Moreover, some participants stated that discussions of decentralization are premature since prerequisites for decentralization, such as support for state-formation and democracy, are still absent in Afghanistan. Discussions concluded that these need not be two mutually exclusive options, but that a mixed system might best suit the current situation in Afghanistan.

**The Security Situation in Afghanistan—Internal Security**

Today Afghanistan faces a grave internal security situation which requires immediate attention and action. Participants agreed that the three main threats to internal security in Afghanistan are:

- Factional rivalries and related fighting;
- Crimes associated with robbery, drug trafficking etc.;
- Continued terrorism in some parts of the country (especially in the south and southeast regions).

Experts unanimously agreed that Afghanistan’s internal security situation is precarious and will deteriorate further unless immediate action is taken by the international community to address this serious problem. Given the current budgetary constraints facing the country and the urgent need to address this issue, participants recommended that resources for a national police force should be prioritised over the development of a large-scale national army.

**External Security**

While addressing Afghanistan’s internal security situation is the most pressing need at this time, external security, such as the roles played by Iran and Pakistan in Afghanistan’s international relations, needs to be monitored. For example, in order to diminish illegal movement of people and goods and to lessen involvement of nearby countries in Afghanistan’s internal affairs, experts
noted that greater domestic and international attention and resources should be focused on securing Afghanistan’s borders. There was, however, debate among the participants over whether the border issue was one that demanded immediate attention or could be tabled to be discussed at future LISD colloquia. There was concern voiced by a majority of experts that opening up the border issue under the present circumstances was beyond the scope of the current session.

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and NATO in Afghanistan
As NATO assumes ISAF responsibility, experts recommended that force enlargement and geographical expansion should be exploited as the best and most appropriate option for improving Afghanistan’s security. The parties should consider approaching the U.N. Security Council for longer ISAF mandates (on the order of six to twelve months) for the sake of continuity of operations.

Discussions on ISAF also focused on ISAF’s short-term and longer-term role in Afghanistan. The ISAF was originally established by the United Nations to assist the Afghan Transitional Authority in maintaining security within the ISAF Area of Responsibility, so that the Transitional Authority, as well as the personnel of the U.N., can operate in a secure environment. Under its United Nations mandate, the security force is responsible only for the capital and its surrounding area. ISAF has roughly 5,000 soldiers from 31 countries, but most of these troops already come from NATO member states.

Some participants argued that it is important to see ISAF as that of an assistant and not a substitute for the police. Moreover, more efforts could be made to build the trust of the local populations in ISAF and the newly formed Afghan Police by, for example, encouraging joint patrols by ISAF and the police. It was also pointed out that if the police took over the provision of security in Kabul, it would free up ISAF staff and enable their expansion to the provinces.

**Relationship between Security and Decentralization**
A critical question participants debated was whether decentralization strengthens or weakens internal security? The debate on whether political decentralization in Afghanistan would strengthen or weaken internal security centered on two opposing views: some experts felt that in Afghanistan, effective security and decentralization are generally incompatible, since the provision of security is predicated on a strong central structure capable of providing security.

**Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)**
Discussions on DDR pointed to the wide range on opinions regarding the goals, scope and duration of the DDR process. Participants widely agreed that DDR will proceed effectively only when the central government has devised a clear vision of comprehensive local, regional and national governance and security structures. Without law and order and a sense that internal security is being provided by the government, regional armed groups and others will be unwilling to disarm. Colloquium experts agreed that security and governance are complementary: the discussions on DDR concluded that there is a need for a comprehensive rather than a narrow vision of security, one which includes development as well as governance.
Participants pointed out that security is linked to unemployment – for example, those who fought for the Taliban and warlords often did so for economic reasons. Thus, there is a need to recognise the importance of creating employment for securing peace. Colloquium experts asserted that in the near term, the reconstruction of destroyed and damaged infrastructure, and building of new infrastructure (roads, highways, railroads, dams, etc.), are the most viable ways to generate employment opportunities. However, this requires the credible and tangible long-term commitment of the international community.

Experts recommended that the DDR programs should be designed to ensure individual appropriate incentives in the context of a broader recovery program. Because DDR programming will be most effective if individual aspirations, socio-economic profiles, and skill sets of various target groups in Afghanistan are better understood, a survey of militia members is desirable. Reintegration, and in particular job creation, should receive as much attention as disarmament and demobilization components.

**Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)**
The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) set about creating PRTs in several cities in Afghanistan, each with a complement of 50 to 100 U.S. military personnel, plus civilian aid and political advisors. The PRTs main objectives are security, reconstruction, strengthening the influence of the central government, and monitoring and assessing the local/regional situations. In addition to the PRTs, military/civilian civil operations teams are perform some of the same functions as the PRTs on a reduced scale.

Colloquium experts recommended that the PRTs should broaden and integrate their current mandates. PRTs should be given sufficient resources and jurisdiction to cope with potential challenges to such a mandate. The PRT mandate should also include police training and support at the provincial level, training and support for the Afghan National Army, and support for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants.

Some participants also voiced concern that the reconstruction element of the PRTs’ mission was problematic, since it overlapped with work being done by the NGO community, noting that PRT staff are not trained in reconstruction work. Several experts recommended that those aspects of the PRTs’ mandate which overlap with those of the assistance community should be eliminated, though some suggested this would not be possible in the near future. Importantly, in order to strengthen the central government’s presence in the provinces and in order to foster civil service training programs, participants agreed that Afghanistan’s central government should be encouraged to assign representatives to the PRTs.

**Regional Commanders (A.K.A. “Warlords”)**
Colloquium participants debated the usage of the term “warlords,” questioning whether this is the most appropriate term to use to describe Afghanistan’s regional hegemons or commanders. Some experts stressed that calling certain regional leaders anything but warlords would be obfuscating issues like human rights abuses and the use of coercion by these regional commanders.
Participants agreed, however, that varying degrees of “warlordism” exist, and distinctions should be made. This problem was seen as particularly urgent in the northern, central and western regions of Afghanistan.

One participant observed that “warlordism” should be seen in the context of an economy of violence – using income from illegal trade and other illegal activities. This economy of violence is based on economic as well as cultural pillars. Militias in Afghanistan operate upon a basis of kinship, with kinship serving as a kind of “social glue.” Efforts to improve the security environment in Afghanistan thus need to take this into account, and particularly, changing the war economy into a peace economy should be combined with efforts to reduce the powers of regional commanders.

**Strategy Towards “Warlords”**

Colloquium participants agreed that Afghanistan’s regional commanders must be brought to recognize their national obligations and responsibilities, thereby assuring loyalty to the central government. Grappling with the country’s regional security challenges requires a more nuanced approach, and thus should account for differences in strategies toward various commanders, keeping in mind that it is critical that local populations have a voice in their security and governance. While some regional commanders may cooperate given appropriate incentives, most commanders will require some deterrent. Few, if any, will require military confrontation. However, any warlord directly challenging the authority of the central government should be dealt with firmly. Noting that this issue will require continued attention and discussion at future LISD colloquia, participants agreed that Afghanistan’s peace process can not be successful if warlords do not honor their obligations towards the government.

**Afghanistan’s 2004 Elections**

While the United Nations plans to proceed with June 2004 elections as outlined in the Bonn Agreement regardless of Afghanistan’s security situation, some participants argued that it is wise to question that plan. The lack of an adequate security environment, together with the absence of other election prerequisites such as an accurate national census, active political organizations, eligible voter registration, and open deliberations of a draft constitution may preclude free and fair elections. Some experts observed that questioning the timeline might also create additional leverage for focusing the international community’s attention on aiding with Afghanistan’s internal security. Participants agreed that due consideration needs to be given to the ramifications of holding flawed national elections.

Though the US government considers the Bonn Agreement non-negotiable (renegotiating some aspects of elections entails the risk of opening up renegotiation of other aspects of the Agreement), colloquium participants from non-U.S. countries stressed the need for flexibility for interpreting Bonn Agreement clauses as necessary. One expert noted the successful example of Mozambique, where elections were postponed for one year due to inadequate security, thereby providing additional time to improve security and provide more democratic elections. One alternative to nationwide elections in June 2004 proposed was sequential elections, with elections being held in urban areas concurrent with candidates being selected in rural areas - with an extension of elections to rural areas at a later, established date.
JUDICIAL REFORM

Some colloquium participants pointed to the difference between capacity of the police to imprison those in Afghanistan accused of various criminal charges, and the limited judicial capacity to deal with those accused and detained. In light of limited judicial capacity, police and court capacity should be harmonized and judicial reform expedited. Experts agreed the focus should be on a centralised, impartial and independent judiciary. Moreover, in order to support the efforts initiated by Afghanistan’s Ministry of the Interior, some participants suggested that the Judicial Reform Commission should create a Code of Criminal Procedure, clearly delineating the fundamental rules of due process.

Participants agreed that since judicial sector reform is an important element in maintaining the country’s security and is exceedingly complex, the need for a second donor in the judicial sector, supplementing Italy’s efforts, is needed. Discussions noted that while budgetary costs for training and jurists’ salaries are crucial, such funding is not easily secured. Major donor support for these expenditures, including the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOFTA), is critical for judicial sector reform to occur.

ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Debate on the need for continued international assistance for Afghanistan included whether there exists a credible commitment from international donors, or whether “donor fatigue” was setting in. Some participants questioned the strength of the U.S. commitment to Afghanistan and whether the U.S. would continue to maintain a sustained presence in the region over the long term. Experts agreed on the importance of continued support for Afghanistan from international community for the ability of Afghanistan to transition to a peaceful and democratic country – and to help maintain the stability of the region.

FUTURE LISD PROJECT COLLOQUIA

Future colloquia as part of this project will include meetings on security and state-building in Instanbul, and at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School, 2003; a meeting on regional security at the Australian National University in Canberra, and an EU-sponsored meeting in Brussels in 2004. The concluding meeting is planned at Princeton University in 2005.

THE WEBSITE FOR THE WOODROW WILSON SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS:
http://www.wws.princeton.edu

THE WEBSITE FOR THE LIECHTENSTEIN INSTITUTE ON SELF DETERMINATION:
http://www.princeton.edu/~lisd

THE POLICY BRIEF FROM THE FIRST LISD PROJECT MEETING CAN BE FOUND AT HTTP://WWW.WWS.PRINCETON.EDU/POLICYBRIEFS/LISD-COLLOQUIUM.PDF

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Appendix III
as the result of the Special LISD Afghanistan Colloquium
at the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University

General Assembly
Fifty-eighth session
Agenda items 28 and 40 (f)

The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for
international peace and security

Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarians and
disaster relief assistance of the United Nations, including
special economic assistance: emergency international
assistance for peace, normalcy and reconstruction of
war-stricken Afghanistan

Letter dated 16 December 2003 from the Permanent
Representative of Liechtenstein to the United Nations addressed
to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit the report of an international meeting of experts
on the theme of “Building security and state in Afghanistan — a critical
assessment”, held at the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, from 17 to
19 October 2003, organized by the Liechtenstein Institute for Self-Determination
(see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a
document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 28 and 40 (f), and of the
Security Council.

(Signed) Christian Wenaweser
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
Annex to the letter dated 16 December 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Liechtenstein to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Special seminar of the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination at Princeton University

Building security and state in Afghanistan — a critical assessment

Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, 17-19 October 2003

Chair’s summary

Introduction

A conference on “Building Security and the State in Afghanistan – A Critical Assessment” was held at the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, on October 17-19, 2003. At this conference, leading experts on Afghanistan and Afghan government officials presented their assessment of the current status of state-building and pressing security concerns in Afghanistan and the region. The meeting strictly followed Chatham House rules and statements in this summary are therefore not attributable to individual conference participants.

Summary

Participants agreed that in Afghanistan the needs for establishing security and building of state and society are urgent, closely interconnected, and that solutions have to be holistic. Underlining the intertwined nature of security- and state-building, participants urged delivery of immediate and effective international financial assistance to both security and state-building endeavors. In particular, participants called on the international community to deliver the promised assistance and to devote greater resources now to building Afghanistan’s policing and military capacity in order to be able to meet the needs for fair and free elections in June 2004, such as voter registration and civil education campaigns. Also, the seminar insisted that Afghanistan is a sovereign state, and the international community can only offer its assistance to Afghanistan becoming a fully viable member of the international community. It was underlined that in the end policy implementation has to be “by Afghans, for Afghans, and for Afghanistan.”

The following summary outlines the major concerns of conference participants.

SECURITY

General Security

Summary: Although much has been done to improve the security and stability of Afghanistan, Afghans continue to stress security as their chief concern. Participants agreed that warlords/ regional commanders are now potentially a greater threat due to the diffusion of non-democratic power. Participants highlighted that while greater Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) activity is needed and welcomed, PRTs possess limited ability to provide security in the short term.

- Different types of PRTs for different needs: One size does not fit all in PRT planning, as different regions of Afghanistan present distinct needs, as seen in the German concept of PRTs. Some also pointed out that the
concept behind PRTs goes beyond the mere presence of soldiers providing security and also entails assistance to building civil society and government institutions.

- **Coordination mechanism needed among different security structures:** Several participants stressed that some coordination mechanism should be established to increase cooperation among the different security mechanisms (an expanded ISAF, DDR, and PRTs) and respective Afghan institutions. The Afghan National Security Council (NSC), which the G8 strategy recognizes as the focal point for all security sector reform activities, should provide such a mechanism.

- **Continued training of civil servants needed:** Some participants stressed that training of diplomatic personnel and civil servants must continue since it is essential to building capacity, security, and cooperation.

- **De-warlordizing regional commanders:** Some participants suggested that security forces should focus on “dewarlordizing” the warlords/regional commanders. In this process, the security forces should differentiate between warlords and power-holders with a legitimate popular power-base, and support the latter against the former.

- **Increased security concerns in southeastern Afghanistan:** Participants discussed the security situation in the southeastern areas of Afghanistan and the increased dangers faced by NGOs working in this region at length. While NGOs recognize that they are working in an insecure environment, the Afghan government and international community recognize that the work the NGOs do in these areas and the programs they deliver are essential to provide some measure of social welfare and a positive presence of the central government and international community, thereby providing hope for livelihood alternatives that do not include working with the Taliban. However, several participants stressed that security in this region is likely to further deteriorate before it can be more effectively tackled by Afghan and international forces.

**Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration**

**Summary:**

- **Reform of security institutions needed for successful DDR:** It is important to recognize the link between a successful DDR process and establishing and reforming the security institutions.

- **Reintegration most important part of DDR:** Great recognition is needed of the fact that the reintegration part of DDR is the most important, because successful disarmament and demobilization cannot be achieved in its absence. The DDR focus should therefore be on reintegration programs.

- **Reintegration should also consider providing options for regional commanders:** When not fighting, many regional commanders find their troops a burden rather than an asset. If mechanisms could be found to integrate regional commanders into the economy, then they could better provide jobs for their supporters.

- **DDR also needed for Kabul:** The DDR process also needs to focus on Kabul. The Bonn Agreements called for disarming militia groups in Kabul right away — yet this has still not taken place, with many militia groups still present in the capital, including militia groups loyal to prominent members of the current government.

**Drug Production and Trafficking**

**Summary:** Efforts to control drug trafficking need to be prioritized, as poppy production has the potential to impede the establishment of political stability in Afghanistan. Solutions to this problem lie in building a stronger
Afghan state and economy, addressing the international demand side, and creating a regional mechanism/apparatus to create oversight.

- **Need to create economic alternatives to poppy cultivation:** Afghanistan’s opium production is a function of a poor economy in addition to demand dynamics. Creating viable economic alternatives to poppy production is an important component of eliminating drug production.

- **Establish a regional anti-narcotics coordination office:** Some participants suggested that a regional coordination office for anti-narcotic programs should be established. Current programming lacks funds to effectively combat large-scale drug trafficking.

- **Raise awareness of consequences of drug use within Afghanistan:** It is important to publicize the effect of increasing drug use on Afghans and use this understanding to build a public movement against drugs within the country.

- **Multilateral effort needed to tackle narco-mafia:** A number of participants remarked that a concerted multilateral effort is required to tackle the growing, mutually reinforcing relationship between the “narco-mafia” and existing terrorist networks. This cannot be solved by a single country - a sustained effort involving key governments is desirable.

### Border Controls

**Summary:** Participants agreed that a mechanism to coordinate regional border control efforts among Afghanistan and its neighbors is needed. The Islamic Republic of Iran recently developed 25 border centers with well-paid counter-narcotic police to control the drug trade, which might serve as an example.

- **Increased efforts needed to resolve Afghanistan-Pakistan border issues:** While several participants pointed out that signs of increasing cooperation with Pakistan on border security are emerging, in particular through the Tripartite Commission, some felt that more needs to be done. The main concerns focus on Al-Qaida and Taliban operatives crossing the highly porous border.

### Civil Service and Police Reform

**Summary:** It was agreed that the civil service salary structure must be reformed. A liveable salary must be paid in a timely fashion to the police and civilian administrators. Avoiding corruption, the delivery of basic services, and security hinge on appropriate incentives provided for competent administration. General reform of civil service, which has started, should be strengthened and supported by the international community. A competent civil service is fundamental to a stable and independent Afghanistan.

- **Establish a public administration academy:** Some participants suggested establishing a public administration academy to provide basic training to civil servants of all levels, particularly for fiscal administration capacity with incentives and merit-based exams.

- **Provide basic services in all districts:** The administration must provide, and be seen to provide, basic services in the districts. Basic infrastructure must be provided quickly with communications and technological support in order for the government to be able to communicate to the local levels effectively.
- **Improve revenue collection efforts:** In order to guarantee liveable and regular salaries, a consistent revenue base must be established. There is revenue available, especially in border trade, and this revenue should be secured.

- **Increase police training centers:** Police training centers in PRTs are an important development and need to be expedited. Germany is willing to provide the necessary funds immediately for provincial training centers to start. In general, more funds are needed now to accelerate training of police and civil servants. The more police officials are trained now, the quicker the Afghans can take control of policing and managing governance and administration of their country.

## STATE-BUILDING

### Framework of Government and Drafting the Constitution

**Summary:** Ethnic participation in the future framework, guaranteed by the constitution, must be diverse. A new image of Afghan politics must be fostered to emerge with significant Pashtun and non-Pashtun involvement. Some participants suggested that a proportional representation system is the best way to achieve this goal.

- **Dangers of a strong presidential system:** Several participants suggested that Afghanistan needs consociational democracy: a system with a set of institutional devices designed to ensure the sharing of power among different social groups (such as proportionality, grand coalition, mutual veto), as well as deliberative and participatory politics. They argued that a centralized presidential system does not take historical realities into account and is a recipe for long-term instability.

- **Some tensions between increasing stability and democracy:** Stability and democracy sometimes work against each other. There needs to be a clearer policy in Afghanistan and by donors that reflects the challenges that Afghans face in doing both. This tension must be reflected and provided for in the Constitution.

- **Expedite ministerial consolidation:** The planned ministerial consolidation should be expedited. There are several ministries that are performing the same functions and are operating without a clear mandate or work program. The creation of a Ministry of Economy is essential and needed immediately.

- **Develop post-Bonn agenda:** Some participants suggested that a new framework for international cooperation and government structure is needed, perhaps through another Bonn-type process. The participants recommended that the new framework have a formal process to ensure transparency, provide better information to the people, and promote consultation with the public. An international conference should be organized to develop a post-Bonn agenda for the next five years. Such planning should ensure that ISAF expansion is harmonized with the political agenda outlined in Bonn. Immediate establishment of an achievable calendar for coordinating security benchmarks with the reconstruction efforts (Bonn with Tokyo) is encouraged.

## Election Process and Timetable

**Summary:** Concerns regarding the ramifications of postponement of any elections, need to be worked out with the Afghan government and international partners. In doing so, the risks of failure to meet election expectations and the political benchmarks set out in Bonn need to be weighed against factors of security, political developments that may prohibit a free and fair process, and the ramifications of an election that is unfair and/or does not yield the desired outcomes.
Ensuring that benchmarks for free and fair June 2004 elections are met: Several participants expressed concern that the benchmarks set out in the SG report of July 2003, which need to be fulfilled so the free and fair elections can be held are in danger of not being met.

June elections might reinforce current power constellations: Some participants expressed concern that the June 2004 timeline does not allow enough time to ensure diversity among political players and participation of marginalized groups such as women and certain ethnicities. The new political parties’ law needs time and support to be implemented. Many Afghans currently understand political parties as synonymous with warlordism. If new political elements do not develop, the current power base will likely win, thereby reinforcing current power constellations.

Postponing elections might lead to public disenchantment with the process: Other participants argued that ordinary Afghans are expecting elections, and postponement will lead to further loss of trust in the current government. In addition, these participants emphasized that the upcoming election is merely one of many future elections, and the process is expected to improve over time.

Enhanced public information efforts needed on the electoral process: A more robust public information campaign is needed to increase understanding of democracy and the electoral process, as well as to emphasize that the international community is here to support the peace process.

Role of different security forces during elections needs clarification: The role of various security forces during preparation and holding of elections needs to be clarified to preclude corruption in the process.

Urgent financing of elections preparation needed: Adequate financing of elections preparation is also urgent. Elections are scheduled for June 2004, but the financing shortfall in programs such as voter registration is nearly 80 percent as of October 2003. If the international community is really committed to having anything close to free and fair elections in Afghanistan, they need to immediately fund these programs.

Economy

Summary: Effective reconstruction of Afghanistan requires a more coherent economic plan and a change in the business environment. A poor business climate combined with governance problems has prevented foreign investment, even by those inclined to invest.

Devise an economic development plan: A comprehensive plan for economic development must be developed. Some participants suggested that a Ministry of the Economy/Commerce is needed to guide and implement this process.

Focus on improving business environment: Since investment is a key component to development, some participants suggested that the government must prioritize promotion of a favorable business climate. The focus should be on better infrastructure, intellectual property security, and controls on corruption and red tape. Moreover, the government should take steps to limit government control of the economy.

Better utilization of private sector, also as a means for attracting diaspora: International organizations must make better use of the private sector as a development engine. This approach could also be used to attract great participation by the Afghan diaspora.

Monitor possible unequal development: Some participants cautioned that bringing in international markets could create uneven development and distribution problems, and this situation would need to be monitored carefully.
• **Strengthen psychological reconstruction**: Others argued that psychological reconstruction should be strengthened through employment for people, addressing issues of income and standard of living, and stimulating the move to labor intensive economy.

### Regional Interests and the International Community

**Summary**: Participants agreed on the need to keep the international community’s attention focused on rebuilding Afghanistan, since much remains to be done.

- **Iraq detracting from Afghanistan?** Some participants expressed concern that Iraq has become the main concern in some capitals whose active involvement in crucial and that Afghanistan is in danger of falling off the radar. However, other participants suggested that not only are the two very different cases receiving different attention, but that in fact the US experience in Iraq has brought the attention back to Afghanistan.

- **Are Afghanistan’s neighbors interested in a stable Afghanistan?** While a number of participants expressed concern about the influence of Afghanistan’s neighboring countries, others suggested that a stable Afghanistan is in the interest of these neighbors. Yet others pointed out that this does not mean that these governments or elements within the countries are not doing things that have destabilizing effects.