LEADING (AND READING) BY EXAMPLE:
EXEMPLARITY IN OVID’S METAMORPHOSES

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Abstract

This study identifies and investigates a recurring problem in Ovid’s *Metamorphoses*: the inability or unwillingness of mortal characters to learn from models of behavior (*exempla*), a tendency which has the frequent consequence of transformation or death. We encounter generations of humanity who, though originally based on the world’s most pious man and woman, fall far short of that couple’s promise; we meet sons who prove ill-disposed or ill-suited to follow in the paths of their outstanding fathers; and we find listeners who disregard or deride stories about others’ offenses against the gods, and repeat the mistakes therein.

A full-length critical inquiry into exemplarity in the *Metamorphoses* has not been undertaken before. But exemplarity is a subject which repays sustained attention, not only because it is a prevalent and perplexing theme in the epic itself, but also because of its long-standing significance in Roman thought and practice, as well as its notable utility for Augustus in defining his role and regime. My project, then, seeks to contribute to two distinct and thriving areas of scholarship: exemplarity in Roman culture and Latin literature at large; and the current trend in Ovidian studies which sees the poet entering into conversation with the emperor, each addressing similar issues from a different perspective.

The dissertation’s four chapters explore the mechanics of exemplarity in four contexts: ancestral, monumental, paternal, and literary. My close readings indicate that Ovid’s interest in the many ways in which the discourse of exemplarity can go wrong is, fundamentally, an interest in the controllability of *exempla*. It was a preoccupation which the poet shared with the emperor, who was systematizing and synthesizing models for
imitation in a more conspicuous manner than ever before at Rome. I argue that Ovid dismantles the rhetoric of exemplarity, openly displaying the difficulties endemic to the process of teaching and learning from exceptional precedents. And yet, elsewhere in his works, he engages in his own poetic version of exemplarity and imitation in a strategic bid to cast himself as a “model” poet. The discourse of exemplarity, in fact, offers a culturally specific way of making sense of Ovid’s tireless attempts to secure his literary legacy.
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In a recent and unusually productive fit of procrastination, I discovered that an anagram of “dissertation” is “sinister toad.” Others include, “it aids no rest” and “into disaster.” And while there’s something to be said for Plautus’ observation about nomen atque omen, there’s just as much, if not more, to be said for the many individuals who have made my path to this project’s completion considerably less disastrous, restless, and toad-ridden than it would no doubt otherwise have been. It is a pleasure and a privilege to thank them here.

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Introduction

In Monty Python’s *Life of Brian* (1979), unassuming Brian Cohen has the mixed fortune of being born in the stable next door to Jesus Christ and, in the ultimate case of mistaken identity, is later proclaimed the Messiah. Dismayed at the unwanted attention, Brian attempts to reason with the hoards of devoted but deluded acolytes who gather outside his window. “You don’t *need* to follow me,” he insists. “You don’t *need* to follow anybody. You’ve got to think for yourselves. You’re all individuals!”

“Yes!” the crowd shouts with one voice, “we’re all individuals!”

“You’re all different!” Brian continues desperately.

“Yes!” the mob agrees in unison, “we *are* all different!”

When a lone dissenter pipes up, “I’m not,” he is hurriedly shushed by the rest.

This controversial comedy classic, set in Roman-occupied Judea, pokes fun at those who would unquestioningly and uncritically accept the leadership and instruction of others. Like any good satire, it contains a grain of truth, namely, the human impulse to teach and learn by example. Brian’s misguided disciples, of course, take this tendency to an extreme: despite his assurances to the contrary, they apparently do need to follow him, are not all individuals, and (with one vocal exception) are not all different. But emulating models of conduct which we perceive to be particularly admirable or successful, while eschewing those considered objectionable, is a familiar experience for nearly all of us, whether we do so consciously or not.¹ And the Romans, for their part, certainly did so consciously. The use of the past as a guide for the present and future, and the use of others’ lives as a guide for one’s own, were integral features of Roman culture and

¹ For a comprehensive critical inquiry into exemplarity and imitative learning, which draws on research in the fields of education, philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science, see Warnick (2008).
identity. The *exemplum*, a model of human behavior for imitation or avoidance, was one of the cornerstones on which Rome was built.²

In her study of exemplarity in Livy’s *History of Rome*, Jane Chaplin describes the triumviral and Augustan periods as “an age fascinated by *exempla*.”³ A similar claim could be made of the past two decades of our own time, which have seen a flurry of critical interest in Roman exemplarity, with monographs and articles on the subject spanning the fields of ancient literature, historiography, and art alike.⁴ We are, it seems, deeply curious about the Romans and their *exempla*: why they selected them, when they made use of them, how they lived up to them, where they fell short of them. The scholarly appeal of this topic is understandable: *exempla* were so ubiquitous in Roman culture that there is something here for everyone, specialist in sarcophagi and Silius alike; moreover, the phenomenon of exemplarity lends itself to just the sorts of paradoxes and tensions which are the stock and trade of critics. In the first place, the *exemplum* raises the question of how a deed or individual can be at once singular and universal, that is, so exceptional as to be worthy of attention, and yet so normative as to be potentially imitable by others.⁵ As well as straddling the boundary between specificity and

² Braund (2002) xi terms exemplarity an “essentially Roman habit of mind.” On the peculiar “Roman-ness” of the tradition of exemplarity, see Litchfield (1914), Roller (2004), Roller (2009), and Gowing (2009) 333-34.
³ Chaplin (2000) 170, referring to the collections of *exempla* which emerged at this time, as well as the interest in exemplarity exhibited by Cicero, Livy, Horace, and Vergil, not to mention Augustus himself.
generality in this way, the *exemplum* is characterized by a collapse of time frames, so that a figure from the past may be touted as relevant for the present circumstances, or an event in the present may be held to be significant for the future. Meanwhile, the *exemplum* typically falls somewhere between history and myth, insofar as it often purports to be factual, but in reality may be so fantastical as to strain credulity. Further complications arise in those cases where the *exemplum* is meted out as a source of instruction, or at least observed and accepted as a model for imitation or avoidance by others. On such occasions, it proves authoritative and yet flexible, prescriptive and yet open to interpretation.

It is this last matter in particular, the potential controllability of the *exemplum*, with which the present study is primarily concerned. My project identifies and investigates a recurring problem in Ovid’s *Metamorphoses*: the repeated inability or unwillingness of human characters to learn from models of behavior, a tendency which has the all-too-frequent consequence of transformation or death. The poem showcases a variety of colorful scenarios in which mortals fail in their creation and imitation of *exempla*. We encounter generations of humanity who, though originally based on the world’s most pious man and woman, fall far short of that couple’s promise because of their outrageous conduct; we meet sons who prove ill-disposed or ill-suited to follow in the paths of their outstanding fathers; and we find listeners who disregard or deride stories about others’ offenses against the gods, and repeat the mistakes therein.

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7 Kraus (2005) 186 attributes the characteristic malleability of the *exemplum* to its function in rhetoric: “[a]s part of the ancient tradition of rhetorical persuasion, *exempla* are embedded in a system designed to argue both sides of a given question; so any exemplary story or figure can be itself the grounds of contested interpretation . . .” See also Chaplin (2000) 71-72, Morgan (2007) 127, Langlands (2008) 162 n. 10, and Warnick (2008) 7-9.
This propensity of exemplarity to go awry in the *Metamorphoses* is the starting point for my inquiry. While the topic has previously been touched on, however briefly, in scholarly discussions of individual episodes in the poem, a full-length critical study has not been undertaken before. But exemplarity is a subject which repays careful and sustained attention, not only because it is a prevalent and perplexing theme in the epic itself, but also because of its long-standing significance in Roman thought and practice, as well as its notable utility for Augustus in defining his role and regime. My project, then, seeks to contribute to two distinct and thriving areas of scholarship: exemplarity in Roman culture and Latin literature at large; and the current trend in Ovidian studies which sees the poet entering into conversation with the emperor, each addressing similar issues and grappling with similar problems from a different perspective.

The four chapters of the dissertation explore the mechanics of exemplarity and imitation in four contexts: ancestral, monumental, paternal, and literary. Taken together, my close readings indicate that Ovid’s interest in the many ways in which the discourse of exemplarity can go wrong is, at its core, an interest in the controllability of *exempla* (or rather, the lack thereof). It was a preoccupation which the poet shared with the emperor, who was, at the time, systematizing and synthesizing models for imitation in a more conspicuous manner than ever before at Rome. I argue that, throughout his epic, Ovid dismantles the rhetoric of exemplarity, openly displaying the difficulties endemic to the process of teaching and learning from exceptional precedents. And yet, elsewhere in his works, we find him engaging in his own poetic version of exemplarity and imitation, applying the same keen understanding of the mechanics of *exempla* which we see in the *Metamorphoses,* in a strategic bid to cast himself as a “model” poet. The discourse of

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8 These works are cited in the section, “Exemplarity in the *Metamorphoses,*” below.
exemplarity, in fact, offers a culturally specific way of making sense of Ovid’s tireless attempts to secure his literary legacy, and particularly his well-documented habit of alluding to his earlier poems in subsequent works. But the fissures which he has so rigorously exposed in the edifice of exemplarity are not easily disguised or disregarded, and we may be left wondering whether Ovid is really any more capable of controlling exempla than Augustus himself.

The remainder of this introduction is devoted to an explanation of the “hows” and “whys” behind the current study. I begin with a brief definition of the exemplum, sketching first its broad range of meanings and functions in Roman life, and then my own use of the term throughout the current study. The two subsequent sections focus on the content and cultural context of the Metamorphoses respectively, in an effort to demonstrate why the theme of exemplarity in this poem merits investigation in the first place. Finally, I provide an overview of the dissertation’s chapters and their central arguments.

Defining the Exemplum

Refusing to be constrained by a single definition, the ever flexible exemplum finds a home in a number of different genres and contexts, and has a specialized, though not unrelated, meaning in each case. Derived from the verb eximere, “to take out” or “extract,” it is a part “picked out” from a series, or, in Ernout and Meillet’s definition, an “object distinguished from others and put aside to serve as a model.” In ancient

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9 See van der Blom (2010) 4 on the difficulty of defining the exemplum, and Bell (2008) 4-6 for a range of meanings of the term in modern scholarship.
rhetorical theory, the *exemplum* was a device which, like the simile, drew on historical or mythological material in order to lend color and credibility to an argument. In its mythological guise, the *exemplum* is commonly found in elegiac poetry, where it is used to relate its subject to a character or event known from the world of legend, such as a god or goddess, or a famous battle. Ovid frequently exploits the mythological *exemplum*, one of his favorite rhetorical devices, for humorous effect in his elegiac collections, by selecting points of reference which are markedly incongruous or open to multiple interpretations. His creative use of this figure of speech bears witness to an author who was well aware, even in his earliest works, of the questionable authority wielded by *exempla* and their capacity to be read in different, and at times contradictory, ways.

But the *exemplum* was not simply a device reserved for rhetorical handbooks and elegiac imaginings. It was also associated more generally with moral education: in Roman historical writing, it signified a character or event from the past (or an account of such a character or event), which served as a model of behavior for imitation or

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11 Some ancient definitions are to be found in *Rhet. ad Her.* 4.62, *Cic.*, *Inv. rhet.* 1.49, *Quint.*, *Inst.* 5.11.1-2. On the use of example (both the Greek *paradeigma* and Roman *exemplum*) as a device in the theory of ancient rhetoric, see e.g., McCall (1969) *passim*, Demeon (1997). On the *exemplum* in Roman declamation, see van der Poel (2009).


13 On the particular selection of examples hinges, presumably, on their status as famous love affairs. We may imagine that Hippolytus’ interpretation of these examples, however, might be rather different: the unions named by Phaedra were all doomed to unhappiness, and could easily be regarded as deterrents. The reader, meanwhile, armed with privileged foreknowledge of Euripides’ fifth-century tragedy, *Hippolytus*, brings yet another perspective: these three mythological couples are entirely appropriate models, insofar as the fates of Hippolytus and Phaedra will be similarly miserable. The same *exemplum*, then, may not have the same significance for all who encounter it.
avoidance by others.\textsuperscript{15} As self-contained narrative units which could be detached from their surrounding context, historical *exempla* also lent themselves well to arrangement in the form of collections, where they were grouped by theme or moral type.\textsuperscript{16} The recent efforts of Matthew Roller to capture and classify the peculiarly Roman mode of thought and practice that is exemplarity have proved particularly compelling. His framework, termed “exemplary discourse,” comprises the doing, witnessing, commemorating, and imitating of actions which epitomize (or, conversely, fall far short of) Roman social and moral values.\textsuperscript{17} The discourse plays out in four sequential stages: a deed is performed; it is observed by an audience, who judges it “good” or “bad” for the community; it is memorialized in the form of a monument (such as a statue, narrative, or ritual) which calls it to mind; and it is held up as a model, to be replicated or avoided by those who encounter the monument and learn of the deed which it commemorates.

Though Roller’s exemplary discourse is rooted in historiography, its applications and implications stretch well beyond the confines of the history book.\textsuperscript{18} For the imprint of the *exemplum* is evident everywhere in Roman society and culture, from the models of manhood encountered by youths reading Latin epic in the schoolroom, to the ancestor portraits (*imagines*) paraded at aristocratic funerals, which were intended not only to commemorate outstanding predecessors, but also to inspire younger generations to


\textsuperscript{17} Roller (2004), esp. 4-6; see also Roller (2009), esp. 216-17.

\textsuperscript{18} See Roller (2009) 219-29.
emulate their great deeds. But despite the different cultural contexts in which the exemplum is found, one characteristic which remains consistent is (paradoxically) its malleability in both use and meaning. Chaplin’s analyses of exemplary narratives in Livy’s history offer a particularly clear demonstration of this. Her readings show how the same exemplum can be revived and revised over time, invoked as either a source of inspiration or a stark warning, and can produce different interpretations depending on the speaker and the audience.

My approach to exemplarity in this study, as will be evident from the readings in the chapters which follow, has been colored in various ways by each of the above definitions, with Chaplin’s discussion of the versatility of the exemplum and (in particular) Roller’s cultural-historical framework informing much of my analysis. As a general principle, I primarily use the term “exemplum” to refer to an individual who is an outstanding model of his or her type, exhibiting behavior which has a pragmatic or instructive force, and which may be imitated or avoided by those who encounter it (whether this encounter is through direct observation, or via the medium of a cautionary tale). In the final chapter, I interpret the phenomenon of exemplarity specifically within the context of the Roman literary scene. There, I use the term “exemplum” in reference to an author or text which is a model of its kind, worthy of imitation in the form of both physical copies to be replicated and poetic passages to be cited in the form of allusions.

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20 See Chaplin (2000) 32-49 on the capacity of Livy’s Caudium narrative to be repeated and manipulated.
Exemplarity in the *Metamorphoses*

The *Metamorphoses* may at first glance appear an unlikely candidate for a study of exemplarity. Whereas its predecessor in the Roman epic genre, the *Aeneid*, is centered on a single hero endowed with exemplary qualities, Ovid’s narrative comprises a series of discrete but interconnected tales focused on the experiences of different characters. And yet, this episodic nature is, arguably, one of the very qualities which makes the poem such an appropriate subject for a critical inquiry of this sort. The *Metamorphoses* could perhaps be considered a compendium of exemplary tales, a collection of human acts of violence, irreverence, foolishness, envy, hubris, and (occasionally) piety so extraordinary that they frequently culminate in the most extraordinary act of all: metamorphosis.

The act of metamorphosis, in fact, shares a degree of common ground with the figure of the *exemplum*. In the first place, both are unique and spectacular enough to garner attention from an audience. Just as *exempla* walk the fine line between history and myth, moreover, so too do we find stories of metamorphosis within the poem presented as factual by their narrators, but met with disbelief and scorn by listeners who consider them too preposterous to be believable. And like the exemplary tale, an account of an extraordinary incident or individual which is plucked from its surrounding context and offered as a stand-alone narrative, Ovid’s episodes typically record an

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21 See e.g., Aeneas’ exhortation that his son should be inspired by the *exempla* of both himself and the boy’s uncle, Hector (“tu facito . . . | sis memor et te animo repetentem exempla tuorum | et pater Aeneas et auunculus excitet Hector,” Aen. 12.438-40). A number of more minor characters in the *Aeneid*, such as Camilla or Nisus and Euryalus, could also be described as “exemplary.”

22 Segal (1985) 59; see also Segal (1998) 14.

23 Ovid opens the *Metamorphoses* by declaring that, *in noua fert animus mutatas dicere formas | corpora* (“my mind compels me to tell of forms changed into new bodies,” 1.1-2), with the accompanying implication that tales of transformation are tales worth telling (*dicere*). Both the poet and storytellers within the epic itself frequently introduce or conclude a report of metamorphosis with a claim that it is marvelous or deserves recounting, a convenient shorthand for its narrative value (e.g., Perseus’ account of the snaky transformation of Medusa’s hair is *digna relatu*, “worth relating,” 4.793).

astonishing one-time event excerpted from a character’s longer life, such as an arboreal transformation which affords escape from divine rape. The metamorphosed body, moreover, shares with the exemplary monument the dual qualities of preservation and prescription, in that it both recalls its human subject and often instructs those who encounter it to apply the lessons from that human’s life to their own.

The significance of the theme of exemplarity in the Metamorphoses is also suggested by Ovid’s use of the term “exemplum” at critical moments in the opening and closing books of the poem, discussed in detail in Chapters 1 and 3 of this study. In Book 1, Deucalion classifies himself and his wife, the sole survivors of a world-wide deluge, as “the exempla of mankind” (hominum . . . exempla, 1.366), before the couple cast the stones which are to be transformed into the new generation of men and women. Meanwhile, in Book 15, Jupiter predicts that Augustus “shall guide morality by his own exemplum” (exemplo . . . suo mores reget, 15.834); shortly after, the emperor and Julius Caesar are compared to a series of mythological sons and fathers, including Jupiter and Saturn, who are deemed “exempla equaling them” (exemplis ipsos aequantibus, 15.857). This bookending of the poem by the figure of the exemplum attests to the relevance of exemplarity from early human history (Deucalion and Pyrrha) to Ovid’s own day (Augustus).

Elsewhere in the epic, the term “exemplum” appears in an educational context of warning, consolation, and persuasion. As a tool for instruction, however, the rhetoric of

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25 In quoting from the Metamorphoses throughout this study, I use Tarrant (2004). Translations are my own, unless otherwise stated.
26 The use of the word “exemplum” in reference to Deucalion and Pyrrha captures their singularity as both the most pious members of the human race and its only representatives in the aftermath of the flood; see further Chapter 1 below.
exemplarity proves inadequate time and again. The failure of *exempla* becomes particularly apparent in the tale of Arachne in Book 6, who vies with Minerva in a weaving contest (6.1-145). In the four corners of her tapestry, the goddess adds miniature pictures of humans who dared to challenge the immortals and subsequently suffered the fate of metamorphosis. The reasoning behind Minerva’s creation of these vignettes, the poet explains, is “so that her rival for praise might understand from *exempla* what reward she might expect for such mad audacity” (*ut . . . exemplis intellegat aemula laudis | quod pretium speret pro tam furialibus ausis*, 6.83-4). But Arachne, we may surmise, either fails to notice the images and the parallels between these characters’ acts of hubris and her own, or else simply chooses to ignore them. In any case, no mention is made in the text of her acknowledgement of these *exempla*, and she continues in her willful and reckless competition with the goddess, with the eventual outcome of her transformation into a spider.

The Hippolytus episode in Book 15 is another instance in which the *exemplum* fails to fulfill its stated and desired purpose (15.479-546). Here, the young man seeks to console Numa’s grieving widow, the nymph Egeria, by urging her to reflect on the comparable suffering of others. He cites his own misfortunes as one such precedent: “I wish that the *exempla* which could relieve you in your sorrow were not my own; but mine, too, can do so” (*utinamque exempla dolentem | non mea te possent releuare – sed et mea possunt*, 15.495-96). The next fifty lines are devoted to Hippolytus’ tale of woe:

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27 In this respect, exemplarity is of a piece with the theme of failed rhetoric in Ovid’s work more generally, discussed in Tarrant (1995), Schiesaro (2002) 74.
29 On exemplarity in this episode, see Gildenhard and Zissos (1999b) 179-81, Hardie (2002b) 205. The use of *exempla*, either historical or mythological, is a standard feature of the *consolatio* genre. See Wilcox (2005) on this theme in Cicero’s letters, and Wilcox (2006) on Seneca’s *Consolatio ad Marciam* and *Consolatio ad Helviam*. 

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his step-mother’s treachery, his father’s curse, his fatal chariot-ride, and his rebirth as Diana’s follower, Virbius (15.497-546). No sooner has he finished speaking, however, than we are told that Egeria finds no solace in others’ losses; instead, she dissolves into grief and is transformed into a spring (15.547-51). One character’s attempt to guide another by designating himself as an exemplum has been in vain.

The problematic nature of the rhetoric of exemplarity is also on display in the myth of Byblis in Book 9, in which a young woman falls hopelessly in love with her twin brother (9.454-665). The term “exemplum” features three times, making this the episode in which the word appears most frequently. The story is presented as an exemplary tale in its opening verse: “Byblis serves as an exemplum that girls should love lawfully” (Byblis in exemplo est ut ament concessa puellae, 9.454). And yet, as the narrative proceeds, the discourse of exemplarity is dismantled and undermined almost immediately. In an effort to convince herself and her brother, Caunus, that incest is an acceptable option, Byblis cites a series of divine precedents for sibling marriage: Saturn and Ops, Oceanus and Tethys, Jupiter and Juno. Even as she proffers these examples, however, she recognizes their inapplicability to her own situation, conceding that the gods are a law unto themselves and the customs of humans are different (9.497-501). Byblis has stumbled upon one of the perennial problems of the exemplum: the distance between the two points of reference (in this case, deities and mortals) which cannot be bridged. Nevertheless, this realization does not stop her from trying to force the

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30 See Nugent (2008) 164. This is the only time in the epic that the poet-narrator himself explicitly declares a character to be an exemplum. His statement raises the question of whom, exactly, the case of Byblis is intended to instruct: the audience within the world of the Metamorphoses, or Ovid’s own readers (as the present tense, est, perhaps indicates)?


comparison, and she returns twice more to the subject of divine sibling unions. First, in her monologue, she invokes the case of the sons and daughters of the god Aeolus, before asking herself, “why have I provided these exempla?” (cur haec exempla paraui?, 9.508); soon after, propositioning Caunus in a letter, she claims that “we follow the exempla of the great gods” (sequimur magnorum exempla deorum, 9.555). But if she cannot even make herself believe that a parallel may be drawn between divine and mortal incest, she certainly cannot persuade her brother of it (and it is possible that he does not even reach that point in the letter; we learn that he disgustedly throws the tablets aside without reading to the end, 9.575). Exempla, in this case, are exposed as specious rhetorical devices peddled, despite the speaker’s full awareness of their inadequacy, as a means of casting a legitimate veneer on an act otherwise considered morally reprehensible.

Even in episodes where the word “exemplum” itself does not appear, the theme of inimitable models and unheeded warnings persists. Two of Ovid’s most famous episodes, those of Phaethon (1.747-2.400, discussed in Chapter 3) and Icarus (8.183-235, Conclusion), feature a son who is incapable of following, quite literally, in the path of his extraordinary father. In each case, it is not simply that the child does not live up to his exemplary parent; the attempt to do so in fact proves to be the death of him. Models of behavior related by characters themselves tend to be equally ineffective. The poem is populated by a host of bad listeners, internal audiences who recklessly disregard or disbelieve the stories that they are told, and suffer dire consequences. Pentheus scorns his guest Acoetes’ account of Bacchus’ power, and fatally experiences the full force of that power himself (3.511-733). Niobe pays no attention to the cautionary tale of her

33 See Fabre-Serris (1995) 364-74 on exemplary narratives offered by characters within the epic.
countrywoman, Arachne, commits the same offense by pitting herself against a goddess, and meets a similar fate (6.146-312). The Pierides give a rendition of the Giants’ challenge against the Olympians, even as they themselves vie against the Muses in a singing contest (5.662-78), and are transformed into magpies as a punishment.\footnote{On the complex narrative structure of this episode in particular, see Leach (1974) 113-15, Johnson and Malamud (1988), Hinds (1987a) 128-33, Wheeler (1999) 81-84, Rosati (2002) 299-301, and Johnson (2008) 41-73.}

As is clear from each of these episodes, exemplarity, whereby an action performed by one individual is held to be worthy of imitation or avoidance by others, is an inherently social process. Reception is built into the very concept: a model, after all, never stands alone, but is always (or always has the potential to be) a model for someone else, whether the identity of that person is made explicit, or merely implied. The act of imitation is described by Bryan Warnick, in his philosophical study of the educational value of examples, as “a way of both sending and receiving social feedback.”\footnote{Warnick (2008) 93.}

Replicating a particular deed, he explains, is a means of signaling that one has seen it and admires it, and of forging a connection with others. In Rome, we might add, those “others” comprised not only the agent and imitator of the deed themselves, but also the wider community, who endorsed or denounced it according to their mutual values.\footnote{Roller (2004) 3-5, Roller (2009) 216.} The exemplum, in short, functions as a mode of communication between members of society.

And, like any other mode of communication, the exemplum is prone to failure.\footnote{As Warnick (2008) 44 puts it, “[e]xamples always slip out of a teacher’s hands, usually saying both more and less than what the teacher wants them to say.”} Its creator (whether the individual who performs the extraordinary action, or the observer or narrator who relates it) cannot, despite his or her best efforts, maintain authority over it. Charles Martindale’s frequently quoted observation, “[m]eaning . . . is always realized
at the point of reception,” holds equally true in the case of the exemplum. So while Daedalus may urge Icarus to follow his example by flying in the middle course across the sky, he cannot stop the boy from rejecting him as a role model and cutting his own path. Conversely, a character may select and adopt as a model a deed or individual that is wholly inimitable. Phaethon, for instance, is intent on taking Sol, in his role of both father and extraordinary figure, as a model for imitation, whether he wishes to be one or not - and, as the god’s frequent and futile attempts to dissuade his son from riding in his solar chariot clearly indicate, he does not.

As previous studies of exemplarity such as Chaplin’s work on Livy have demonstrated, however, Ovid is hardly the only ancient author to concern himself with the inability or unwillingness of characters to learn by example. As early as the Iliad, Achilles remained unmoved in the face of the cautionary tale of Meleager, proffered by Phoenix in an attempt to persuade him to rejoin the Trojan War (Il. 9.524-608). It seems, then, that as long as there have been exempla, there have been those who would resist and reject them. So what is it about the failure of the exemplarity in the Metamorphoses in particular which sets it apart from that in the other texts, and makes it worthy of extended analysis? First, and most obviously, the sheer number and variety of ways in which exempla stray from their intended course in this poem, touched on in the preceding discussion, points to a pattern which calls for some explanation. But the subject of exemplarity is afforded additional relevance by the cultural context of the

41 See Alden (2000) 229-41, part of an extended analysis of the paradigm of Meleager in the Iliad, with further bibliography.
Metamorphoses, as well as by Ovid’s own process of poetic production and his conception of his place within the literary tradition.

**Imperial Exempla, Intertextual Exempla**

Ovid’s verses have long been mined by critics in search of evidence for his attitude towards imperial rule and ideology. But earlier scholarly attempts to label him staunchly “Augustan” or “anti-Augustan” have tended to generate readings which, although reassuringly tidy, are frequently one-sided and implicate the emperor too heavily in the poet’s work.42 My project, in approaching exemplarity as a matter of shared interest to Ovid and Augustus alike, aligns itself instead with current research on the Metamorphoses which has produced an altogether more nuanced understanding of the poet’s relationship to the imperial regime. These studies (to venture a generalization about an array of complex discussions) see Ovid engaging with issues of demonstrable concern to Augustus himself, such as succession, time, power, and art.43 It is argued that, by opening these areas up to interpretation, Ovid interrogates and presents alternatives to imperial authority. Exemplarity, I suggest, is another such area in which both poet and emperor have a stake.44 The final part of the dissertation, meanwhile, seeks to contribute to the broader body of scholarship on Roman exemplary discourse by applying the findings of recent studies on exemplarity to this most intertextually inclined of authors,

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42 For a discussion of the difficulties of the “Augustan”/“anti-Augustan” dichotomy, see Galinsky (1975) 210-17, Kennedy (1992), and Barchiesi (1997) 5-8, 84.
44 O’Gorman (1997) discusses Ovid’s and Augustus’ mutual interest in the didactic uses of exempla, though her focus is on the poet’s elegiac works rather than his epic.
and thereby demonstrating the usefulness of the category of the *exemplum* within a poetic and metapoetic context.\(^{45}\)

Always a distinctive feature of Roman culture, the phenomenon of teaching and learning by example acquired a new and notable significance within Ovid’s own lifetime. The advent of the Principate, with its accompanying spotlight trained on a single and singular individual, inevitably heralded a shift in the nature and function of the rhetoric of exemplarity. Christina Kraus, in a discussion of the tendency among Roman imperial historians to focus their narratives on “exemplary figures,” captures the sense of this change. “When history’s gaze,” she writes, “is more or less forcibly directed at the emperor – especially (but not exclusively) to the emperor functioning as positive role model – the prescriptive function of *exempla* becomes dominant. The flexibility inherent in the *exemplum* being thus threatened or even lost, the audience’s independent response to the spectacular suggestiveness of exemplarity is repressed or redirected, and its constructive use profoundly compromised.”\(^{46}\) It is, I suggest, to this increasing control over *exempla* that Ovid is responding in the *Metamorphoses*.

The practice of exemplarity and imitation, like so many other long-established customs at Rome, was transformed at the hands of Augustus, even as he claimed to preserve its traditions.\(^{47}\) It has plausibly been observed, in fact, that the category of the *exemplum*, with its ability to accommodate both past precedents and future prospects, was key to the paradox which lay at the heart of the foundation of the Principate, a new

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\(^{45}\) Regarding the applicability of the rhetoric of exemplarity to literary production, some groundwork has already been laid by Barchiesi (2009a) esp. 46, Fleming (2009) 26-27, and Seo (2013) 10, 64-65, 185-86.

\(^{46}\) Kraus (2005) 188.

\(^{47}\) Barchiesi (2009a) 52 notes that “the function of exemplarity undergoes massive refashioning at the beginning of Imperial culture. It is important to remember that this is both a time of crisis and a time of intense systematization and rationalization in the ‘factory’ of public *exempla*.” See also Chaplin (2000) 169-96, Kraus (2005), Lowrie (2007) 102-12, Peachin (2007), Bell (2008) 11, Lobur (2013), Gunderson (2014), Langlands (2014).
political order purporting to be a continuation of what had come before. The clearest expression of this appears in Augustus’ *Res Gestae*, where he describes how he passed new laws in order to revive “many *exempla* of our ancestors” (*multa exempla maiorum*), while also handing down “*exempla* to be imitated by posterity” (*exempla imitanda posteris*).

Suetonius’ *Life of Augustus*, too, attests to the emperor’s personal and political commitment to excerpting and promoting outstanding models of conduct. He was allegedly given to combing his book collection for choice *exempla* in both Greek and Latin, which he then would copy out and send to any subordinates in need of admonition. Suetonius also recounts how, in response to the knights’ resistance to his marriage legislation, Augustus publicly gathered Germanicus and his family around himself, ostentatiously presenting the young father as an *exemplum* for imitation. Most conspicuously, however, his exemplary habit found a visual outlet in the shape of the statues which took pride of place in his new Forum, and commemorated the ancestors of the Julian clan and the city’s famous Republican leaders. The latter came complete with inscriptions (*elogia*) deliberately selected by Augustus, it has been suggested, to emphasize the men’s accomplishments in the areas which he himself most valued.

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51 *In evoluendis utriusque linguae auctoris nihil aeque sectabatur, quam praecepta et exempla publice uel priuatum salubria, eaque ad uelbnum excerpta aut ad domesticos aut ad exercituum prouinciarumque rectores aut ad urbis magistratus plerumque mittebat, prout quiue monitione indigerent*, Suet., Aug. 89.2.
52 . . . *accitos Germanici liberos receptosque partim ad se partim in patris gremium ostentauit, manu uultuque significans ne grauarentur imitari iuuenis exemplum*, Suet., Aug. 34.2.
domestic peace and religion). An accompanying edict, issued by the emperor, instructed the Roman citizens to measure himself and his successors against the standards set by these great men of the past, *uellut ad exemplar* (“as by a template,” Suet., *Aug.* 31.5).

From this collection of sources, then, emerges a picture of an Augustus who was well aware of the capacity of *exempla* to be interpreted at the point of reception, but who was nevertheless keen to present himself as the one who amassed, ascribed, displayed, revived, and transmitted them. The *princeps’* self-definition, we may infer, existed in a hall of mirrors in which he was himself the *exemplum*, at once the finished product, reflecting the great Romans of the past, and the archetype, projecting a blue-print for imitation into the future.54

Just as importantly for the purposes of the present discussion, several passages in Ovid’s works, too, depict the emperor’s attempts to exert authority over the rhetoric of exemplarity. In the *Fasti*, the poet relates that Augustus razed a luxurious Roman house which had been bequeathed to him, by way of making an example (*exempla*) of his dislike of extravagance (*sic agitur censura et sic exempla parantur*, *Fast.* 6.647). Elsewhere, the emperor’s wife, Livia, is described as serving as a standard (*exemplum*) for Ovid’s own spouse (*te docet exemplum coniugis esse bonae*, *Tr.* 1.6.26).55 Finally, at the end of the *Metamorphoses*, Jupiter himself proclaims that it is written in the fates that Augustus shall “guide morality by his own *exemplum*” (*exemplo . . . suo mores reget*,

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53 See Chaplin (2000) 174-96 on the statues and their *elogia*, which the Elder Pliny alleges were written by the emperor himself (*H.N.* 22.6.13). For further discussion of the sculptural program in Augustus’ Forum (with additional bibliography), see Chapters 1 and 2 below.

54 Kraus (2005) 194-95. On Augustus’ efforts to turn himself into an *exemplum* and control his own exemplary legacy, see Lowrie (2007) 102-12, Langlands (2014).

The emperor’s efforts to control exempla did not, it seems, escape the poet’s notice - or his pen.

It is within this cultural context, then, that the theme of exemplary discourse in the Metamorphoses must be read. Ovid is no less conversant than Augustus in the language of exemplarity; his medium of choice, however, is stories rather than statues, epic rather than edict. And while the models of conduct promulgated by Augustus seem largely to have been positive ones, disseminated with a view to inspiring imitation and emulation (statues of outstanding individuals displayed in his Forum, or the ideal of the family man, Germanicus), Ovid’s poem teems with cautionary tales, dire warnings, and characters who repeatedly fail to learn by example.

But even as he subjects the rhetoric of exemplarity to scrutiny and exposes the flaws in the system, Ovid, no less than Augustus, seeks to create and control standards for imitation, and make an exemplum of himself. He, too, experiments with the practice of selecting, expressing, and communicating exempla, discovering how the models of the past can apply to the present, and how those of the present can affect the future. In his case, however, those models are literary ones: his books and the poems they contain. Again and again, the Metamorphoses has revealed just how easy it is for the message embodied by an exemplum to become lost in translation and transmission, with the audience missing or misunderstanding the point intended by the original actor (or author, if the exemplum is conveyed through narrative), or simply electing to ignore it. When the discourse of exemplarity breaks down, in short, the source of the error invariably turns out to lie in one of the exemplum’s defining qualities: its uncontrollability. Faced with the problem of securing his own literary legacy, Ovid’s solution, I suggest, is to seize
control by making himself both the creator and the imitator of *exempla*. He does so by revisiting passages from his own earlier poems in his subsequent works, in an effort to present himself as a model poet who, like his exemplary predecessors, is worthy of imitation. It appears that as far as Ovid is concerned, the most successful *exempla*, which is to say those with the best chance of securing one’s survival and legacy, belong to the world of books.

**Overview of Chapters**

The opening chapter of this dissertation introduces several of the study’s recurring themes via a close reading of the Deucalion and Pyrrha episode in Book 1. In this tale, which features the epic’s first appearance of the term “*exemplum,*” an exceptionally pious married couple find themselves charged with the regeneration of humanity in the aftermath of Jupiter’s universal flood. Obeying an oracular instruction, the pair cast stones, which are in turn transformed into men and women. Whereas other critics have likened this repopulation of the world to an act of artistic creation, I propose an alternative reading of the story through Matthew Roller’s framework of Roman exemplary discourse, an interpretation which aims to account for both the adamantly non-biological nature of the human race’s reproduction and, conversely, the episode’s curious emphasis on the theme of biological ancestry. I seek to demonstrate, moreover, that details of the poet’s imagery in the episode find important real-world parallels in exemplary thought and practice, namely, the display of *imagines* at aristocratic funerals; the prevalent metaphor of following in the footsteps of one’s predecessors; and the array of marble statues in Augustus’ Forum, commemorating great men. So when the impious
descendants of Deucalion and Pyrrha turn out to be nothing like the reverent couple on whom they were modeled, this undermining of the rhetoric of exemplarity holds significance not only for the world inside the poem, but also for contemporary Rome itself.

In the second chapter, I explore an interpretation of transformed humans - the trees, animals, and rocks which are the end products of metamorphosis - as monuments (monumenta) with the potential both to memorialize the characters that they once were, and to instruct others to avoid those characters’ exemplary fates. I argue that Ovid, even as he presents these bodies as “metamorphic monuments” (as I term them), casts doubt on their capacity to monere, in the word’s dual sense of “call to mind” and “warn.” At a time when Augustus was relying on monuments as a means of embodying and transmitting imperial values, this message strikes a particularly suggestive note. The chapter first offers an analysis of the Lycaon episode in Book 1, in which the cruel Arcadian king serves a banquet of human flesh to Jupiter and subsequently undergoes a lupine metamorphosis. I suggest that a parallel may be drawn between Ovid’s tale of Lycaon and another exemplary wolf narrative in Rome’s mythic history: the miraculous nurture of its founder, Romulus, by a she-wolf (the so-called lupa Romana), whose images populated the early imperial city. But one wolf is virtually indistinguishable from another, and the poet thereby implies that any given monument is always open to multiple readings, with a meaning which can never quite be fixed. In the final part of the chapter, I turn to the tale of Venus and Adonis in Book 10, an episode which heavily features the term “monere” and its cognates, and showcases numerous instances of unheeded warnings. Chief among these is Adonis’ disregard for the goddess’ cautionary
tale of Hippomenes and Atalanta, and its accompanying admonition to avoid hunting
dangerous beasts, which results in the young man’s death and subsequent transformation
into an anemone. I propose that this flower, in both form and name, functions as a
monument which, ironically enough, commemorates the failure of monuments to warn
and instruct.

The subject of the third chapter is the Roman ideal of the son who follows the
exemplum of his father, and resembles him in both physical appearance and character. In
an analysis of the Phaethon episode in Book 2, yet another story in which a warning (this
time, a paternal one) goes unheeded, I suggest that the boy’s journey in his parent’s
chariot is a literalization of the popular Roman metaphor of the younger generation
tracing the path of the older one, which leads the way. My reading takes as its point of
entry the problem of why Phaethon is so insistent upon driving the solar vehicle.
Drawing on Maurizio Bettini’s work on the social significance of family resemblance, I
argue that Phaethon wants not only to be like his father (as critics have previously noted),
but also to be seen to be like his father by others. He endeavors, fatally, to achieve this
by undertaking the most conspicuous act in the entire cosmos, one which will finally
assure him a universal audience: the rising and setting of the Sun. In the final part of the
chapter, I turn to another type of “parent-child” resemblance: that between an author and
his poems. Taking my cue from Ovid’s repeated references to his books as his children
in the elegies from exile, I offer a new reading of the final verses of the Metamorphoses
in Book 15, proposing that the poet presents the epic as his offspring. He thus puts
himself in dialogue with Augustus and his attempts to secure the survival of the imperial
family line. Ovid implies that when it comes to matters of succession, a book can
preserve the life of its creator in a way that a human child, uncontrollable and mortal, cannot.

The fourth chapter further develops this interpretation of the Metamorphoses as the poet’s offspring, and addresses the various means by which Ovid taps into the discourse of exemplarity in his attempt to control his own literary legacy. I begin by discussing the arrangements made by the poet in the Tristia and Epistulae Ex Ponto for his books to be safeguarded in Rome while he, their author and “parent,” languishes on the Black Sea. It is, he realizes, the books’ continued existence in the form of multiple copies (exempla) which holds the key to his own poetic survival. Next, I examine how Roller’s four-stage sequence of exemplary discourse may be translated from its original cultural-historical context into a literary one, in order to shed light on the process of Roman poetic production and reception in general, and Ovid’s penchant for self-reference in particular. So it is that we find Ovid writing poetry (action), passing judgment on it (audience), recording his own name among lists of canonical authors (commemoration), and lastly, alluding to and revisiting his earlier work in later poems (imitation). I explore this final stage in detail in an analysis of Tristia 1.7, the well-known elegy which sees the poet claiming to have cast the Metamorphoses into the fire upon his banishment from Rome. Here, he offers a mythological exemplum in which he compares himself to Althaea who, in a tale previously recounted in his epic, deliberately caused her son Meleager’s death by burning a wooden log representative of his lifespan. I argue that by citing his own earlier version of the myth, Ovid seeks to demonstrate the outstanding and eminently imitable quality of the Metamorphoses, and thereby to validate the exemplary status of both his poem and himself as a poet. But his relentless questioning and
undermining of the rhetoric of exemplarity is not easily forgotten, and it remains unclear whether Ovid, any more than Augustus or the characters in his own epic, has managed to establish real mastery over *exempla*.

Finally, in the conclusion, I revisit the major themes of this project through the lens of the Daedalus and Icarus episode in Book 8, reading the story as a case study of both the futility of warning and the uncontrollability of *exempla*. In this tale, the son not only disregards his father’s advice, but also rejects him as a model for imitation, instead striking out on his own path and dying in the act. While exemplarity and succession may fail at the level of the plot, however, they succeed in a metapoetic sense. For in his depiction of the relationship between parent and child, we find Ovid himself following in the footsteps of his poetic “fathers” by alluding to similar passages in earlier outstanding works, including, essentially, his own.
Chapter 1

Exemplary Ancestors: Deucalion and Pyrrha

Something curious has happened to Deucalion and Pyrrha since Ovid first sent them forth to multiply in Book 1 of the *Metamorphoses*: they have become old before their time. The architects of the new race of mankind in the aftermath of Jupiter’s devastating flood, these spouses have frequently found themselves described in scholarship on the poem as senior citizens. Deucalion is a “pious old man”\(^1\) who, together with his wife, has the dubious privilege of being counted among the epic’s “friendly old people.”\(^2\) Nor is this trend a recent one, or limited to academic criticism on the epic. In Rubens’ seventeenth-century painting, currently housed in Madrid’s Prado, a withered and hunched Deucalion and Pyrrha cast stones from gnarled hands, the newly-formed human race springing up in their wake, smooth-skinned and supple. What is strange about this inclination on the part of Ovid’s readers to consign Deucalion and Pyrrha to their golden years, is that nowhere in the epic does the poet refer to their ages at all.

When did Deucalion and Pyrrha get so old – and why? Perhaps the description of a husband and wife weathering a world-wide flood conjures up a mental image of their well-known Biblical counterparts, the preternaturally aged Mr. and Mrs. Noah. Or, to adduce a parallel from within the world of the poem itself, it may be that Deucalion and Pyrrha’s supposed old age stems from their frequent association in scholarship with another of the poem’s very few cases of happily married couples, the elderly Baucis and Philemon in the

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1 Fantham (2004) 29; cf. 30: “old couple.”
eighth book of the epic. As paragons of piety and the sole survivors of a heaven-sent deluge, Baucis and Philemon are often considered, quite reasonably, to be the doublet of Deucalion and Pyrrha. But have the two couples become so interchangeable in the minds of some of Ovid’s readers that the advanced age of Baucis and Philemon has been imputed to Deucalion and Pyrrha, too? If so, it is worth noting that while Ovid repeatedly describes Baucis and Philemon as elderly, he never once refers to Deucalion and Pyrrha in similar terms. And whereas Baucis and Philemon tremble beneath the weight of their years (8.660-61) and lean on canes as they clamber up a nearby hill (8.693-94), there is no comparable mention of Deucalion and Pyrrha struggling with the physical labor of visiting the mountain oracle, or of throwing the stones which will be transformed into the new race. In fact, the Baucis and Philemon episode makes for a useful case study of old age, Ovidian-style, and as such, helpfully demonstrates exactly what it is that the poet does not do in his treatment of Deucalion and Pyrrha.

But there may be another explanation for readers’ temptation to cast Deucalion and Pyrrha as a couple in their twilight years, rather than as one of child-bearing age: remarkably for the founding myth of worldly repopulation, their story is centered on the theme of barrenness. As such, it is representative of what Philip Hardie has seen as Ovid’s avoidance of the theme of “generational continuity” in the epic, that is, the poet’s commitment to exploring alternatives to biological succession. The sole surviving members of the flood may be a husband and wife pair, but the means by which they produce offspring is anything

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but traditional. Instead, the race is reborn through a strangely sterile, even funereal ritual, with the couple casting stones which change into human beings.

Taking their cue from a simile in which Ovid compares the transforming figures to sculptures carved from blocks of marble (1.405-6), critics have frequently and convincingly read this metamorphosis as an act of artistic creation.\(^6\) And yet this interpretation cannot account for another recurring feature in the episode, which at first seems to be at odds with the poet’s rejection of the traditional mode of reproduction: the theme of ancestry. Deucalion and Pyrrha are blood relatives themselves and, as Ovid tells us in an aetiological coda, their act of giving birth to the new race, while non-biological, results in the creation of our own biological ancestors (1.414-15).

The following reading attempts to reconcile these two, apparently mutually contradictory narrative threads – the non-biological and the biological - by instead interpreting Deucalion and Pyrrha’s act of reproduction within the framework of exemplarity and imitation. Through an analysis of the episode’s imagery and the associations which that imagery evokes, I propose that Ovid presents the couple as exempla, models of piety to be emulated by the members of the new human race who succeed them. My approach is informed by Matthew Roller’s schema of Roman “exemplary discourse,” a sequence composed of the doing, witnessing, commemorating, and imitating of deeds held to represent critical socioethical values.\(^7\) Roller’s work, grounded in Latin historiography, demonstrates how the Romans conceived of the past in relation to themselves, and how they learned from and sought to mirror those who came before them, especially (but not exclusively) within their own families. As such, it offers a useful way of thinking about the status of Deucalion

\(^6\) These works are cited in the discussion below.
\(^7\) Roller (2004), Roller (2009).
and Pyrrha, who are at once the predecessors and creators of the new race, and yet not the biological ancestors.

The story of Deucalion and Pyrrha, I suggest in this chapter, may be examined through the lens of the traditions and innovations in exemplary discourse which were current in Rome at the time of Ovid’s writing. In this episode, references may be detected both to long-established displays of exemplarity (the imagines maiorum, images of office-holding family relatives which were exhibited in aristocratic homes and funeral processions) and more recent ones (the statues of pre-eminent ancestors and statesmen in the Forum Augustum). My discussion also serves to introduce several themes to which I will return in subsequent chapters of this study: the relationship between exemplarity and different types of reproduction; the pragmatic function and didactic value of monuments; and the ultimate failure of human beings to learn from models of past behavior.

**Fertility from Sterility**

Let us begin by examining the unusual nature of Deucalion and Pyrrha’s act of reproduction, an oddly barren and funereal affair. Hearing the oracle’s instructions to throw the bones of her mother (ossa . . . parentis, 1.383), Pyrrha initially interprets the command literally and in mortuary terms, recoiling at the thought of disturbing her biological parent’s ghost (umbras, 1.387). Though she and her husband reject this interpretation outright, the correct, metaphorical meaning of the oracle’s riddle turns out to have equally sepulchral undertones: stones (lapides, 1.393, 399; saxa, 1.400, 411), like bones, belong to the lexicon of death and burial.⁸

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⁸ *OLD s.v. lapis* 4d: “a tomb-stone, funeral stele; also, a stone sepulchre;” *s.v. saxum* 3f: “as a tombstone; also, applied to a sarcophagus.”
In fact, as much as Deucalion and Pyrrha’s act of creation is a birth ritual for the new race, it also serves as a death ritual for the old one, destroyed in Jupiter’s mighty deluge.\(^9\) Despite the wittily incongruous vignettes of storm-tossed men sailing over fields of grain and fishing in the tree-tops (1.293-96), the description of the flood ends on a somber and morbid note: for the few who are not drowned outright, slow starvation awaits (1.311-12). Deucalion and Pyrrha ultimately emerge from the water-logged world as the sole survivors (superesse, 1.325, 326; femina sola superstes, 1.351), and are immediately charged with the task of casting metaphorical “bones” (ossa, 1.383) to the ground, in a ritual not unlike an inhumation.\(^{10}\) Read in the wake of the death of their fellow mortals, then, Deucalion and Pyrrha’s act may be considered a funeral for mankind.\(^{11}\)

In the context of a death ritual, the imagery of this passage is entirely appropriate. Applied to a creation ritual, however – and particularly the ultimate creation of the human race - it becomes far more puzzling. At first, the glaring absence of fecundity which characterizes this episode is presented as a natural consequence of the destruction unleashed by Jupiter upon the earth. When the flood recedes, Deucalion and Pyrrha are left gazing at a landscape filled only with emptiness, desolation, and silence (inanem | . . . desolatas . . . silentia, 1.348-49). The world may be restored (reditus orbis erat, 1.348), but its rebirth is strikingly barren, the earth’s sense of loss etched into the word “orbis” itself, reminiscent as it is of the adjective “orbus” (“bereft” or “deprived”). This adjective, in fact, has already appeared a hundred verses earlier in reference to the universal destruction: upon hearing Jupiter’s plans to wipe out mankind, the Council of the Gods had feared for the future of

\(^9\) Ahl (1985) 113.
\(^{10}\) See Ahl (1985) 108 for puns on the term “humus” in this episode.
\(^{11}\) Ahl (1985) 112-13 suggests that Ovid may be alluding to the Parentalia, the Roman festival for dead ancestors, in this episode. This is one of a number of wordplays which he detects on the base par, some of which I discuss further below.
terrae mortalibus orbae ("a world bereft of mortals," 1.247). When Deucalion and Pyrrha make their way to the shrine of Themis to request instruction from the oracle, they find it, too, to be the picture of sterility, its altars unlit (stabantque sine ignibus aerae, 1.374) and its stone steps chilly (gelido . . . saxo, 1.376), the only sign of life the unsightly moss which discolors its gables (fastigia turpi | pallebant musco, 1.373-74).

That the earth should be left a derelict wasteland in the wake of the universal flood is not surprising. What is more perplexing is that this sense of barrenness not only pervades the landscape, but even extends to the characters of Deucalion and Pyrrha themselves, and to their act of creation. The married couple’s replenishment of the earth is startlingly and counter-intuitively non-sexual. Stones and bones are, after all, hardly the stuff of fertility. Admittedly, as is clear from the epic’s other mythical narratives of propagation on a mass scale, the spawning of an entire race all at the same time requires a mode of reproduction that is altogether faster and more efficient than the nine-month human gestation period allows. There is no question that the god (or poet) faced with the challenge of repopulating the world is forced to be creative in his approach to solving the problem of procreation. Nevertheless, Ovid seems to protest too much, presenting Deucalion and Pyrrha’s act of reproduction not simply as non-biological, but as painstakingly and self-consciously so.

In his study of puns and verbal humor in the Metamorphoses, Frederick Ahl identifies a tension in the Deucalion and Pyrrha episode between Ovid’s use of the similar-sounding words, “parere” (“to give birth”) and “pārēre” (“to obey”). The oracle instructs the couple to throw the bones magnae . . . parentis (“of the great mother,” 1.383), a command which Pyrrha interprets as a reference to her biological mother and is initially loath to pārēre

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12 Cf. Cadmus’ sowing of the warrior race from serpent’s teeth (3.102-30), and the creation of the Myrmidons from ants (7.614-60).
13 For this pun and others in the Deucalion and Pyrrha episode, see Ahl (1985) 104-20.
Deucalion, however, identifies the “parent” in question as Mother Earth (magna parens terra est, 1.393) and her “bones” as stones, which he and wife must cast behind them in order to replenish the empty world. Immediately after this act of repopulation, the earth spontaneously spawns (peperit, 1.417) an assortment of non-human forms of animal life, fecunda . . . semina (“fertile seeds,” 1.419), which are nourished ceu matris in aluo (“just as in a mother’s womb,” 1.420). The reference to the instruments of biological conception, semen and aluus, along with the use of the verb parere (“give birth”), serves to substantiate the epithet which the oracle had earlier applied to the earth, magna parens, and thereby to ratify Deucalion’s interpretation of the riddle. More than that, however, the couching of Terra’s creation of new, non-human species in the language of traditional, biological reproduction has the effect of accentuating the comparative sterility of the married couple’s regeneration of mankind from stones.¹⁴ Like Mother Earth the magna parens, Deucalion and Pyrrha, too, may be regarded as parentes (“parents” or “ancestors”). Unlike Terra, however, the pair’s parental status derives not from an act of giving birth (parere) but rather from one of obedience (pārēre). This characteristically Ovidian wordplay captures the extraordinary nature of Deucalion and Pyrrha’s regeneration: they are parentes, “parents” or “ancestors,” precisely – and only - because they are pārentes, “obedient.”¹⁵

The friction between the verbs parere and pārēre observed by Ahl is, on closer inspection, representative of a broader trend within the episode. It is worth noting that elsewhere in the mythological tradition, Deucalion and Pyrrha are frequently credited as biological parents to children who, together with their own descendants, found and rule a

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¹⁴ A point noted by Ahl (1985) 110.
¹⁵ See Ahl (1985) 109, 112.
number of regions throughout Greece. Ovid’s lack of engagement with this detail of the myth may once again point to a conscious effort on his part to downplay the couple’s capacity for traditional reproduction. His Deucalion and Pyrrha are, in fact, conspicuously chaste in their interactions with one another. While their verbal communication is always tender, any physical intimacy between the couple is virtually non-existent. Though the pair is twice described as sharing a marriage-bed (Deucalion . . . | cum consorte tori, 1.318-19; torus iunxit, 1.353), this detail is repeatedly undermined by the poet’s depiction of their relationship in action. When Deucalion caresses (mulcet, 1.391) his distraught wife, he does so by means of gentle words (placidis . . . dictis, 1.391) rather than physical contact. And though each spouse plants kisses, it is not on the other one: the gesture is instead directed towards the cold stone steps of Themis’ shrine (uterque | . . . gelidoque . . . dedit oscula saxo, 1.375-76). On the orders of the oracle, they loosen their robes (“cinctasque resoluite uestes,” 1.382; tunicasque recingunt, 1.398), but this ungirding serves as a prelude only to the ritual casting of stones. And, in a play on words similar to that on parere (“give birth”) and pārēre (“obey”), new life is finally created not through the married couple’s act of “lying down” (iacēre)\textsuperscript{18} together, but through the decidedly less erotic act of “throwing” (iacere, 1.394; iactu, 1.413) together.

The poet thus appropriates the language and imagery of sexual reproduction and repeatedly subverts it, never letting his audience forget that this is not procreation as we know it. Such a disavowal of the traditional mode of propagation is made all the more

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\textsuperscript{16} E.g., Hes., \textit{Cat.} fr. 2, 3; Pind., \textit{Ol.} 9.42; Apollod., \textit{Bibl. Epit.} 1.7.2-3; Hdt., 1.56.2; Ap. Rhod., \textit{Argon}. 4. 265-66; Strab., 8.7.1, 9.5.6, 9.5.23; Paus., 5.1.3, 5.8.1, 10.38.1. See Barchiesi (2005) 195, who notes that Ovid does not treat the version of the myth in which Deucalion and Pyrrha are the parents of Hellen, founder of the Hellenes.

\textsuperscript{17} Cf. Hardie (1993) 106, who points out that the theme of metamorphosis in this poem “replaces (transforms?) the traditional epic concern with succession in the family and state with another model of the interplay of continuity and discontinuity;” cf. Hardie (1993) 94.

\textsuperscript{18} On the use of “\textit{iaceo}” as a sexual term, see Adams (1982) 177.
striking by the fact that it is coupled with an emphasis, throughout the episode, on biological relationships, particularly those between ancestors and descendants. Deucalion and Pyrrha’s casting of stones is, we recall, the foundational act of human creation, including our own. Ovid concludes the episode with an aetiological postscript in the first person plural, in which he traces the existence of himself and his audience back to this flinty genesis (1.414-15):

   inde genus durum sumus experiensque laborum,  
   et documenta damus qua simus origine nati.

   “Hence we are a hard race and accustomed to toil, and we give proof of the origin from which we are born.”

The terms “genus,” “origo,” “nasci” orient the reader squarely within the realm of genealogy, as the poet reminds us that the non-biological progeny created by Deucalion and Pyrrha are also our own biological progenitors.

   Ovid’s interest in genealogy is, equally, reflected in his representation of Deucalion and Pyrrha’s relationship to one other. The pair are more than just spouses: they are also kin by blood, a detail of the traditional myth which the poet chooses not to disguise in his version of the tale.19 Deucalion’s address to his wife not only acknowledges their joint ancestry, but is even (paradoxically, given the emphasis on the couple’s apparent lack of physical intimacy) laced with incestuous undertones: o soror, o coniunx . . . | quam commune mihi genus et patruelis origo, | deinde torus iunxit (“my sister, my wife . . . whom a common race and family origin, and then a marriage-bed, joined to me,” 351-53). The two are not siblings, in fact, but cousins, the son and daughter of the Titan brothers, Prometheus and Epimetheus, respectively. Deucalion’s description of his wife as his sister, a curious over-determination

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of the couple’s shared bloodline, is in keeping with the episode’s accentuation of the theme of ancestry.

Pyrrha, too, has biological relationships on her mind. Her immediate response to the oracle’s instructions to cast the “bones of the great mother” (ossa . . . magnae . . . parentis, 1.383) is, quite understandably, to think of her own birth parent. Three lines later, the poet refers to her by her patronymic, “the daughter of Epimetheus” (Epimethida, 1.390), and those readers well-versed in mythological genealogy will intuit that the mother whose bones Pyrrha is so unwilling to disturb is none other than Pandora. Deucalion, who glosses the riddle metaphorically, offers a different, and more acceptable, solution: magna parens terra est (“the great mother is the earth,” 1.393). But it is worth noting that Pyrrha’s literal interpretation of the oracle, while summarily dismissed by the pair in favor of Deucalion’s metaphorical and altogether more palatable one, is never explicitly revealed to be wrong. Despite the charges of simple-mindedness leveled against her by one modern commentator,20 there is more than a grain of truth to Pyrrha’s understanding of ossa . . . magnae . . . parentis (“bones of the great mother,” 1.383) as a reference to her own maternal bloodline.21 The “great mother” to which the oracle alludes is, in fact, Pyrrha’s own grandparent, as her mother, Pandora, was created from earth. It is telling that, at the exact moment when Deucalion offers his own identification of the “great mother” as the earth itself, Ovid showcases the couple’s heritage by referring to them by their respective patronymics, Promethides and Epimethides (1.390), and calls Pyrrha by the name Titania (1.395), an allusion to her grandfather, the Titan Iapetus. He thereby reminds his audience of the famous myth of Pyrrha’s mother, Pandora, who was molded from earth by Deucalion’s father,

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21 Brooks (1860) 85. One etymology of Pandora’s name, the “giver of all gifts,” is in fact an epithet of Gaia, the Greek earth goddess and Terra’s counterpart; see Zeitlin (1996) 60.
Prometheus, and presented to Pyrrha’s father, Epimetheus, as a wife. In other words, Deucalion’s interpretation of the riddle as “Mother Earth” - a metaphorical reading which had initially appeared to be an overt rejection of the ancestral element integral to Pyrrha’s literal one - is revealed to be similarly grounded in family affairs after all.

**Artistic Creation**

What Ovid has effectively done, then, is set the world’s most non-traditional, non-biological act of reproduction in a context in which traditional, biological relations are emphasized. Even as we enjoy the clever paradox, however, we find ourselves faced with the challenge of classification: in which terms, and according to which categories, is this unusual evolution of human beings from stones to be understood? Deucalion himself, seeking the advice of the oracle, provides a possible answer: as a form of art (ars). Dismayed at the sight of the empty earth, he asks Themis to tell the couple *qua generis damnnum reparabile nostrí | arte sit* (“by what art the loss of our race may be restored,” 1.379-80). William Anderson reads this plea as indicative of the pair’s “comically naïve problem . . . about how children are made.”22 The humor involved in Ovid’s transformation of what should be an act of sexual reproduction into an insistently non-sexual one is difficult to deny, but the charge of naïveté seems unduly harsh. Perhaps Deucalion’s question is merely the sign of a practical mind. After all, reproducing is one thing, reproducing an entire race quite another. Moreover, the creation of human beings by *ars* has an important precedent: a previous generation of mankind, as Deucalion has pointed out shortly before,

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22 Anderson (1997) 181; see also McAuley (2012) 131. Barkan (1981) 641-42 offers an alternative explanation, noting that Deucalion and Pyrrha “stand in need of special arts, for they are at a moment of transition between a primordial age, in which the gods or godlike figures created human beings, and our own times, in which human beings can procreate.” [emphasis in original]
was originally manufactured by *artibus* (1.364), that is, the “arts” of his father Prometheus, who molded the Golden race out of clay (1.80-83). And ultimately, Deucalion is quite right to phrase the question to the oracle as he does: the creation of new life will indeed be achieved by *ars*, that is to say, by artificial rather than biological means.

But is it art? The scholarly consensus certainly suggests so, and not without justification. Besides Deucalion’s own classification of the world’s repopulation as a form of *ars*, critics have found a number of reasons to include this transformation among the many in which Ovid likens the process of metamorphosis to artistic creation.\(^{23}\) Subsequent episodes in the epic see the distinctions between stone and flesh collapsed, and the two substances revealed, against all odds, to be interchangeable. The transformation of men and women into rocks and statues occurs with alarming frequency in the world of the poem, and is presented as a consequence of emotions such as jealousy, terror, and grief, which freeze or petrify the human spirit.\(^{24}\) The enactment of the reverse metamorphosis – that is, the vivification of inanimate material – is comparatively rare, but appears to be the preserve of the inspired artist. Deucalion and Pyrrha’s creation of human figures from stone is a conceit straight out of the sculptor’s studio, as is clear from the simile through which Ovid mediates the transformation (1.404-6):

\[
\ldots quaedam, sic non manifesta, uideri
forma potest hominis, sed uti de marmore coepta,
non exacta satis rudibusque simillima signis.
\]

“a certain likeness to a human form could be seen, though not clear, but just as if begun in marble, not sufficiently defined and very much like rough images.”


\(^{24}\) E.g., Aglauros (2.819-32), Niobe (6.303-12), Propoetides (10.241-42), Anaxarete (14.754-60). On stone imagery in the *Metamorphoses*, see Bauer (1962).
With a luminescent quality reminiscent of human flesh, marble had long been a material of choice for Greek and Roman sculptors. The genesis of Deucalion and Pyrrha’s new race from stones in fact finds its closest parallel in the quintessential myth of art versus life, the transformation of the ivory maiden, created by the sculptor Pygmalion, into a real woman in Book 10 of the epic (10.243-97). The language of the two metamorphoses is similar, with the poet recounting in each case how the inert material loses its hardness (ponere . . . rigorem, 1.401; positoque rigore, 10.282) and softens (mollirique . . . mollitaque, 1.402; mollescit . . . | . . . remollescit, 10.283-85) into flesh. Finally, an interpretation of the metamorphosis through the lens of artistic activity is lent further verbal support by Deucalion’s description of himself and his wife, as they consider an otherwise empty world, as hominum . . . exempla (“the exempla of mankind,” 1.366). In his discussion of the episode, Joseph Solodow remarks that, “[w]hether exempla means “(sole) copies,” with regard to other, lost originals, or “(artist’s) models,” with regard to the people whom they are to create afresh, this word . . . belongs to the realm of art.”

It should by now be apparent, then, that a reading of this metamorphosis as an act of artistic creation has a great deal to recommend it, from both a visual perspective and a verbal one. In particular, a comparison of Deucalion and Pyrrha to sculptors has the virtue of accounting for their solution to the oracle’s conundrum: lapides, “stones” (1.393). What the

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25 Plin., NH 36.4. Appropriately for a simile describing a transformation, marble is an example of what is known in geology as a “metamorphic rock,” that is, one created when the composition of a pre-existing rock (in this case, limestone) is changed after being subjected to heat or pressure. Sadly, the term is not an ancient one, but was coined in the nineteenth century.


28 One scholarly approach to metamorphosis which has proved particularly productive, in fact, has been to view the phenomenon through the lens of artistic activity. Just like a sculpture or a painting, the finished product of transformation simultaneously functions as a representation of, and a substitute for, the human that it once was. For a selection of discussions, see Solodow (1988) 203-31, Sharrock (1996), Hardie (2002a) 173-93, Feldherr (2010) 243-341.
artistic analogy cannot explain, however, are the riddling terms in which the oracle defines those stones in the first place: “ossa . . . magnae . . . parentis” (“the bones of your great parent,” 1.383). The bones of relatives are imports not from the world of art, but from that of ancestry, a theme which, as we have already seen, receives special emphasis in this episode. In order to reconcile both solutions to the oracle’s conundrum – metaphorical as well as literal, bones as well as stones - I would like to propose an alternative way of conceiving of the couple’s unusual mode of reproduction, and one which would have had particular resonance for Ovid’s contemporary readers: as an act of exemplarity and imitation.

Model Making

My interpretation of the Deucalion and Pyrrha episode is based on what Matthew Roller has termed “exemplary discourse,” the schema which he has developed in order to shed light on the Roman preoccupation with creating and transmitting exempla, models of good or bad behavior. Roller draws persuasive connections between distinct cultural phenomena found in Roman literature and images, assembling them in a sequence which offers valuable insight into how the Romans thought about the past and their relationship to it. His model of exemplary discourse is structured in four sequential stages, outlined here. First, an action with important consequences for the community is performed; next, the action is judged by an audience to be emblematic of social and ethical values, whether positive or negative; then, the action and the judgment passed on it are commemorated in the form of a monument, a device such as a statue or narrative which calls them to mind and brings them to the attention of a wider public; and finally, those who encounter the action, whether first-hand or via the monument which commemorates it, are encouraged to imitate or

avoid it.\textsuperscript{30} In the following discussion, I suggest that Ovid’s Deucalion and Pyrrha episode may be mapped onto each stage of this discourse, to be read as a play on the Roman cultural tradition of exemplarity, a tradition which assumed both a new face and unprecedented importance around the time when the poet was writing the \textit{Metamorphoses}.

Our point of entry into this interpretation is Deucalion’s classification of himself and Pyrrha, in the lonely aftermath of the flood, as \textit{exempla} (1.365-66):

\begin{quote}
\textit{nunc genus in nobis restat mortale duobus} \\
\textit{(sic uisum superis) hominumque exempla manemus.}
\end{quote}

“Now the race of mortals survives in us two (so the gods willed it), and we remain the \textit{exempla} of mankind.”

As mentioned above, the word \textit{“exemplum”} can refer to artists’ models or copies of works of art; as such, its use in this episode has been cited by Joseph Solodow in support of a reading of the stones-to-humans metamorphosis as a type of artistic creation.\textsuperscript{31} This is, however, only one of a host of possible definitions for the term \textit{“exemplum.”} Here, the first appearance of the word in the poem, Ovid evokes several different meanings at once. Ernout and Meillet define the term \textit{“exemplum”} as an “object distinguished from others and put aside to serve as a model;”\textsuperscript{32} in surviving the catastrophe which wipes out the rest of mankind, Deucalion and Pyrrha have essentially been removed from the previous series of humans and put aside to serve as models for the next one. So Deucalion’s observation that he and his wife “remain the \textit{exempla} of mankind” (\textit{hominum . . . exempla manemus}, 1.366) proves both timely and appropriately for the son of Prometheus (\textit{Promethides}, 1.390), whose name was associated

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item \textsuperscript{30} Roller (2004) 4-6.
  \item \textsuperscript{31} Solodow (1988) 204.
  \item \textsuperscript{32} Ernout and Meillet (2001) 205: \textit{“Exemplum est proprement l’objet distingué des autres et mis à part pour servir de modèle.”}
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
with “forethought” - prescient: they are currently the sole samples (*exempla*) of the old human race, and will shortly be the templates (*exempla*) of the new one. The verbs chosen by Deucalion, *restare* (“now the race of mortals survives [*reстат*] in us two,” 1.365) and *manere* (“we remain [*манемус*] the *exempla* of mankind,” 1.366), share this chronological double vision, in that they are equally applicable to present and future circumstances: the pair “remain” not only in the sense that they are the only surviving members of the old race; they will also “remain” in the form of the new race which they will produce by casting the stones.

Deucalion and Pyrrha are, in fact, singular specimens of humanity in terms of both number and character. They are both the sole survivors of the old race and will also be the templates of the new one by casting the stones.

Looking back to the poet’s thumbnail sketch of the couple at the beginning of the episode, we find that it captures each of these two aspects of their exemplarity. Ovid introduces the pair not only as the sole surviving humans, but also as the most pious ones (1.322-27):

> non illo melior quisquam nec amantior aequi
> uiur fuit aut illa metuentior uilla deorum.
> Iuppiter, ut liquidis stagnare paludibus orbem
> et superesse uirum de tot modo milibus unum
> et superesse uident de tot modo milibus unam,
> innocuos ambo, cultores numinis ambo . . .

> “There was no better nor more justice-loving man than him [Deucalion],
> nor any more god-fearing woman than her [Pyrrha]. When Jupiter saw
> that the world was submerged in watery pools, and that only one man was
> left out of so many thousands, and that only one woman was left out of so
> many thousands, both innocent, both worshippers of the gods . . .”

It is clear that Deucalion and Pyrrha are (to cite once more from Ernout and Meillet’s definition of an *exemplum*) “distinguished from others” with regard to their behavior. Exceptional among their fellow humans for their piety, the two are that rare commodity in

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33 Barchiesi (2005) 197 classifies this double meaning as “un famoso esempio di arguzia di Ovidio.”
the *Metamorphoses*: the positive exemplum. To be sure, Deucalion and Pyrrha are not the only pious members of this now-defunct race, as revealed by a seemingly incidental detail in Jupiter’s account of recent events on his visit to Arcadia. At the meeting of the Olympian Council which preceded the flood, he had presented Lycaon’s crimes and subsequent lupine transformation as a case study in justification of his plan to destroy humanity. According to Jupiter, Lycaon’s subjects recognized the god in their midst and reacted appropriately (*uulgus . . . precari | coeperat, “the common people began to worship me,” 1.220-21), unlike their king, who mocked their “pious prayers” (*pia uota*, 1.221). What sets Deucalion and Pyrrha apart from this religious crowd (*uulgus*, 1.220), then, must be the *extent* of their respect for the gods: in all the world, we are told, there is no better (*melior*, 1.322) or more justice-loving (*amantior aequi*, 1.322) man than him, and no more god-fearing (*metuentior . . . deorum*, 1.323) woman than her.

If Deucalion and Pyrrha are the emblem of human piety, the wicked Arcadian king, Lycaon is the emblem of human depravity. The married couple and the king are presented as equal and opposite: Deucalion and Pyrrha’s desire to restore human life (1.364) is matched only by Lycaon’s desire to destroy it (1.226-29), and ultimately, Lycaon’s impiety precipitates the *de*population of the world, while Deucalion and Pyrrha’s piety precipitates the *re*population. Ovid’s application of similar language to each case allows for a close comparison to be drawn between them. The couple’s relationship to the gods stands in marked contrast to that of the Arcadian king: when the storm-tossed pair wash up on Mount

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34 As Wheeler (1999) 178, O’Hara (2007) 116 point out, this mention of the citizens’ reverence somewhat undermines Jupiter’s subsequent claim that the human race is cruel, criminal, and deserving of universal destruction (1.241-43).
35 A touch of humor may be detected here: as Fratantuono (2011) 15 notes, there are quite literally no better people than Deucalion and Pyrrha, because everyone else has perished in the flood.
36 Otis (1966, repr. 1970) 100 juxtaposes the “theodicy” of Deucalion and Pyrrha with the “counter-theodicy” of Lycaon.
Parnassus, they resolve (*placuit*, 1.367) to worship the divine spirit and consult the oracle; Lycaon, on the other hand resolves (*placet*, 1.225) to test the immortality of his divine visitor by attempting to murder him in his sleep. Whereas Lycaon incurs divine wrath (*iras*, 1.166) as a result of his attempt to serve human meat to a god, Deucalion and Pyrrha seek to deflect that same wrath (*ira*, 1.378) by means of their prayers. This is not to say that Deucalion and Pyrrha trust in the gods blindly or unconditionally; they, too, experience their fair share of skepticism on hearing the oracle’s instructions, with Pyrrha even refusing to obey the command to cast (what she believes to be) the bones of her biological mother, until her husband convinces her of an alternative solution to the riddle. But while Lycaon elects to resolve his doubt (*dubitabile*, 1.223) about his visitor’s identity by treating the king of the gods to a feast of human flesh and an assassination attempt, Deucalion and Pyrrha take a leap of faith, venturing, in spite of their personal reservations (*spes . . . in dubio est*, 1.396), to interpret and implement the divine command.

When these two episodes, the first extended stories of human transformation in the poem, are considered side by side in this way, it becomes apparent that their central characters function as *exempla*, paradigms for the race: the model of badness on the one hand, versus the model of goodness on the other. In each case, Jupiter assumes the role of “audience” (to borrow a term used by Roller in his work on exemplary discourse), observing and casting moral judgment on the deeds of the human actors.\(^{37}\) Whereas it was his eyewitness experience at the hands of the murderous Lycaon which had incited the king of the gods to destroy the race in the first place, it is the sight of Deucalion and Pyrrha which at last impels him to call an end to that destruction. Gazing down from heaven at the flooded world, Jupiter spots (*uidet*, 1.326) the couple stranded on Mount Parnassus, praying to the

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local deities.⁴⁸ Perceiving the pair to be the sole survivors of the deluge, “both innocent, both worshippers of the gods” (innocuos ambo, cultores numinis ambo, 1.327), he finally scatters the storm clouds and restores visibility between the earth and the sky (1.328-29).

Jupiter’s decision to end the worldwide devastation, like much of his behavior elsewhere in the epic, feels oddly impromptu and capricious. Deucalion and Pyrrha were not earmarked for survival or actively spared, it seems, but simply happened to have the good fortune to wash up on a mountain-top and catch the god’s eye. But it can be no coincidence that the last remaining members of the race are also the most reverent.⁴⁹ For the restoration of mankind is directly related and largely attributable to the couple’s exemplary piety. The replenishment of the race hinges on, and is the culmination of, a sequence of religious acts: their decision to consult the oracle (1.367-68); their ability to appease the anger of the gods with their prayers (1.377-81); Deucalion’s adoption of the role of augur (augurio, 1.395) in order to interpret the divine command, and conviction in the inherent rightness and righteousness of oracles (1.392); and the pair’s willingness to obey the god’s enigmatic instructions to cast the “bones of the great parent,” even in the face of their own misgivings (1.396-97).

As the world’s most pious couple, then, Deucalion and Pyrrha are ideal candidates both to create and to serve as models (exempla) for a new human race which, Jupiter had promised the Olympian Council, would be unlike (dissimilem, 1.252) the savage and sacrilegious generation destroyed in the flood. And although the couple’s act of reproduction is, as we have seen, an emphatically non-biological one, Deucalion and Pyrrha’s basic

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⁴⁸ Another reference to the role of divine “sight” in the couple’s salvation appears later in the episode, when Deucalion remarks on how “it seemed right to the gods” (uisum superis, 1.366) that the human race should depend on himself and his wife alone.

⁴⁹ Rhorer (1980) 311 n. 49 notes that “[t]he accidental rescue of Deucalion and Pyrrha . . . is an example of how carefully Jupiter lays his plans.”
physical form is nevertheless transmitted to the new generation, presumably as a result of the transformation’s supernatural element (superorum numine, 1.411). The stones cast by these self-proclaimed hominum . . . exempla (“exempla of mankind,” 1.366) themselves assume forma . . . hominis (“the shape of a human,” 1.405), and the pair also lend their respective genders to the figures, with Deucalion’s stones evolving into men and Pyrrha’s becoming women (1.411-13).

Most tellingly of all, however, the poet likens the transforming humans in a simile to statues blocked out from marble (1.405-406). The implication is that the members of the new race are at once monuments produced by Deucalion and Pyrrha, and monuments to Deucalion and Pyrrha, created in the couple’s image and recalling (monēre) them in physical form and gender. The metamorphosis corresponds in approximate terms, then, to the third stage of Roller’s model of exemplary discourse, in which the exceptional action, having been evaluated by an audience, is subsequently immortalized by means of a monument (monumentum), thereby preserving for posterity the memory of the deed and the judgment passed on it. In this case, the outstanding piety of Deucalion and Pyrrha, which had been observed by Jupiter in his capacity as audience of their prayers on Parnassus (1.324-27), is commemorated in the form of the members of the new race, who, in physical shape and gender, resemble and serve as “living memorials” to the couple.40

Critics have typically interpreted the metamorphosis of stones to humans, as I noted earlier, as a form of artistic creation. It could equally be read, however, in the light of the Roman custom of commemorating exemplary individuals via the reproduction of their likenesses in inanimate media. In both public and private, the leading families of Rome

40 Gertz (2003) 106. The idea of metamorphosed bodies as monuments will be explored further in Chapter 2 below.
proudly displayed their ancestors in the form of wax face masks (*imagines*), painted pictures, shield portraits, busts, and statues, as well as images on curule chairs, coins, and gems.\footnote{Flower (1996) 40-46, 71-88.} The most notable of these, for the purposes of the present discussion, are the *imagines*, masks of male ancestors who had held a curule office. While examples of *imagines* themselves have not survived, their function and significance may be at least partially reconstructed from artistic representations and the many passages from ancient literature in which they are cited, including Ovid’s own exhortation to the reader of the *Fasti* to “survey the wax masks arranged around the halls of the high-born.”\footnote{He goes on to claim that none of the titles held by these famous Romans can compare to the name, “Augustus;” *perlege dispositas generous per atria ceras: | contigerunt nulli nomina tanta uiro*, *Fast*. 1.591-92. On the *imagines*, see Flower (1996).} He is referring here to the Roman aristocratic tradition of displaying the *imagines* in the *atrium* of the house. But the masks were also exhibited to the community on the occasion of the funerals of Roman office-holders, when they were paraded ostentatiously before the bier.\footnote{Flower (1996) 91-127.} The value of this spectacle as an act of exemplarity and potential imitation is clear from Polybius’ detailed account of the ritual’s proceedings in his *Histories*. He describes how a family member of the deceased delivered a eulogy which extolled the achievements and successes of each of the ancestors represented by these masks, inspiring ambitious young men in attendance to live up to the deeds of their predecessors.\footnote{Polyb., 6.53.9-54.3. This passage is discussed by Roller (2004) 1-2 in relation to his model of Roman exemplary discourse.}

Polybius’ description of the young men’s reaction to hearing the glorious deeds of their ancestors, moreover, usefully illustrates the fourth and final operation of the model of exemplary discourse: imitation. The next generation, like those who came before them, hopes to win the great reputation that accrues from brave actions. “The imitator,” explains
Roller, “typically seeks to become “the new X” or “another X,” or at least something comparable to X in the socioethical significance of his or her action.” If, as I have suggested, the members of the new race function as monuments which commemorate Deucalion and Pyrrha in physical form, they are also designed to serve as imitations of them in character. Here I depart slightly from Roller, for whom imitation is the aim of an audience who encounters a monument and seeks to “become” the exemplary individual which that monument commemorates. The process of metamorphosis, whereby one entity literally becomes another, enables the commemorative and imitative stages of exemplary discourse to be fused together, so that the stones which commemorate Deucalion and Pyrrha become, as we shall see, the humans intended to imitate them.

At the Olympian Council earlier in Book 1, Jupiter had vowed to replace the current cruel and godless race – the race which lived in the Iron Age when, as the poet had previously told us, “piety lay conquered” (uicta iacet pietas, 1.149) - with one that was unlike (dissimilem, 1.252) it, and to meet his fellow deities’ need for humans to bring incense to their altars (1.248-51). In other words, the king of the gods had claimed that the next age of mortals would be a devout one. And who better to serve as templates for this new, pious generation of men and women, than a couple who are the very paradigm of piety?

Jupiter’s promise appears to be borne out by a detail of Deucalion and Pyrrha’s act of reproduction which at first sight seems incidental, but is in fact, I think, a powerful literalization of a favorite Roman metaphor denoting imitation. Ordered by the oracle to throw stones post tergum (“behind their backs,” 1.383), the couple follow the instructions to the letter, or rather, to the location denoted by the preposition post (“behind”): lapides sua post uestigia mittunt (“they throw the stones behind their footsteps,” 1.399). The stones are

not scattered at random, but cast, very deliberately, behind them. With this gesture, the temporal belatedness of the race relative to Deucalion and Pyrrha themselves is represented spatially: the newly-formed humans literally “come after” their begetters.\(^{46}\) The choreography of the scene thus visually reflects its chronology. But Ovid’s choice of imagery and language suggests that there is more at stake here than a simple matter of time and space. The picture which the poet has conjured is a reification of a metaphor which had long been entrenched in the Roman cultural consciousness: that of the new generation following in the footsteps (\textit{uestigia}, 1.399) of their exemplary ancestors.\(^{47}\)

The array of contexts in which this popular metaphor is used by ancient authors, and the force with which it is invested, are well illustrated by Catherine Baroin in her discussion of familial remembrance and resemblance in the Roman Republic and early Empire.\(^{48}\) Citing passages from a range of literary genres, Baroin demonstrates that the pervasive image of following in the footsteps (\textit{uestigia}) of one’s predecessors is not simply an expression of relative temporality; crucially, it also connotes imitation in a behavioral sense, whether in the sphere of education, oratorical practice, military training, or political affairs. The Romans relied on those exemplary individuals who came before them, particularly those within their own family, to guide them along the right path in various aspects of life. That the metaphor of following in a relative’s footsteps belongs to the discourse of exemplarity and imitation is clear from a letter written by Pliny the Younger to the son of an exceptionally learned man. Pliny commends his correspondent for seeking to follow (\textit{sequi}) and fill the footsteps

\(^{46}\) For a discussion of the Roman representation of time in spatial terms, see Bettini (1991) 113-93, with 115-16 on the term “\textit{post}.”\(^{47}\) Baroin (2010) 32 notes that “[t]here is a particularly felicitous metaphor expressing the imitation of the model and the repetition of conduct, namely “to follow in somebody’s footsteps”, \textit{instare vestigiis, per vestigia vaderi}, \textit{vestigiis ingredi}, or else \textit{vestigia sequi} or \textit{persequi}.”\(^{48}\) The current discussion is indebted to Baroin (2010) 32-36 for all literary passages cited, save Deucalion and Pyrrha. Ovid’s use of the metaphor is explored in further detail in Chapter 3, below.
(implere uestigia) of his father, who serves as a model (exemplar) for his son to imitate (imitandum). Nor is the trope used in reference to blood-relatives alone: in the well-known dream sequence in Cicero’s De Re Publica, Scipio Aemilianus, the conqueror of Carthage, claims to follow in the footsteps (ingressus uestigiis) not only of his biological father, but also of his grandfather by adoption, Scipio Africanus. Behavioral characteristics need not, then, be genetically inherited in order to be imitated, a consideration which has important implications both for the new race which Deucalion and Pyrrha create through non-biological reproduction, and, as we shall discover, for Augustus himself, who in his new Forum sought to define and display his own identity as an extension of those of his adoptive relatives.

Augustus’ exploitation of the rhetoric of exemplarity to establish the new imperial order and his own role within it has already been outlined in the main introduction of this study. As we saw there, the emperor was a proponent of teaching and learning by example, in the habit of selecting and publicly displaying models of behavior for himself and others to follow. His most eye-catching exhibition was the collection of sculptures of illustrious heroes, leaders, and ancestors in his new Forum. It is against this backdrop of Augustus’ commitment to exempla-making that the tale of Deucalion and Pyrrha may be interpreted. In particular, the episode’s final couplet transports the reader from the fictional beginnings of world history to the lived experience of the modern day. Immediately after the

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49 uides quem sequi, cuis debeas implere uestigia. o te beatum, cui contigit unum atque idem optimum et coniunctissimum exemplar, qui denique eum potissimum imitandum habes, cui natura esse te simillimum soluit, Ep. 8.13.1-2. On this passage, see Bernstein (2008b) 216-17.
52 In a note on the verse in which Deucalion and Pyrrha are described as hominum . . . exempla (1.366), Barchiesi (2005) 197 remarks, parenthetically, that the word “exemplum” and the idea of moral exemplarity are characteristic of political terminology under the Augustan principate.
transformation of the stones into living beings, the first-person narrator momentarily intrudes to offer some concluding remarks (1.414-15).  

inde genus durum sumus experiensque laborum, 
et documenta damus qua simus origine nati.

“Hence we are a hard race and accustomed to toil, and we give proof of
the origin from which we are born.”

These two verses together form an etiological coda of the type favored by Ovid elsewhere in the epic, used to explain an enduring physical or behavioral trait of a species created via metamorphosis. In this case, the attribution of the hardness of the human spirit and experience to the race’s flinty origins is an idea found already in the works of the poet’s literary predecessors. It would be understandable, then, if his comment on the correlation between provenance and personality were to be considered standard, even formulaic.

This couplet is not (quite) the platitude it initially seems, however. What Ovid is describing here is not simply the human condition in general, but two key components of the early Italian character in particular, *duritia* (hardness) and *patientia* (endurance). The present tense of the verbs (*sumus, damus, simus*) marks a shift to the present day, while the first-person plural includes both the poet and his audience within its purview, not just as

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54 This is not the first time in the poem that Ovid has described the inheritance of essential characteristics from the raw materials involved in non-sexual reproduction: among the multiple creation stories earlier in Book 1, the reader encountered humans who were fashioned from the blood of the Giants, and as a result, were equally blood-thirsty themselves (1.160-62). On Ovidian aetiologies, see Myers (1994), Tissol (1997) 167-214.


humans, but as Romans. These grammatical cues signal that, in casting the rocks, Deucalion and Pyrrha have produced not only the first of a generation of fictional characters whose exploits will fill the remaining fourteen books of the *Metamorphoses*; they have also produced the reader’s own predecessors. In other words, this Greek mythological couple have created the ancestors of the Romans out of stone. And creating ancestors out of stone was a quintessentially Roman habit which was being systematized and authorized in Ovid’s day as never before.

With this parallel in mind, let us turn again to the simile which the poet uses to negotiate the transformation of Deucalion and Pyrrha’s stones. A vague human form could be discerned, Ovid tells us, *uti de marmore coepta, non exacta satis rudibusque simillima signis* (“just as if begun in marble, not sufficiently defined and very much like rough images,” 1.405-6). I suggested earlier that the analogy takes on new significance when considered in light of the Roman custom of commemorating exemplary individuals by means of the plastic arts, but there may be something else to add. In the course of the main narrative, the poet had not named the particular type of mineral thrown by the couple, referring only to *lapides* (“stones,” 1.393, 399) and *saxa* (“rocks,” 1.400, 411). In the context of the simile, however, he is more geologically specific: the transforming humans are likened to half-finished statues hewn *de marmore* (“from marble,” 1.405). With a single word, *marmor*, Ovid transports the reader from the fictional and primitive realm to the real one: marble statues belong not to the antiquated era of Deucalion and Pyrrha, but rather to the modern environs of Ovid’s Rome. Nevertheless, when this simile is marshaled as evidence in support of a reading of the metamorphosis as an act of artistic creation, as it typically has

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57 On the use of the first-person plural verbs here, see Wheeler (1999) 103.
been, the full effect of the mention of marble is liable to be missed. For, from the perspective of art, there is nothing unusual about finding this type of stone named in a description of statues, given that it had long been a preferred medium of ancient sculptors.\textsuperscript{59} If the transformation is interpreted as an act of monument-making in commemoration of exemplary individuals, however, a passing mention of statues hewn from marble becomes freighted with meaning.

Ovid’s Rome – both the Rome constructed by the emperor, and the Rome constructed by the poet himself in his elegiac verse - was a city not only of marvels, but also of marble.\textsuperscript{60} This was an age in which, in his own words, “the mountains diminish as the marble is quarried from them” (\textit{decriscunt effosso marmore montes}, \textit{Ars Am.} 3.125). Rome’s new marble mantle was the product of extensive exploitation of the recently-opened quarries in Luna, the modern Carrara district, on the northwest coast of Italy. No longer reliant on supplies of foreign marble, imported at prohibitively high costs, the Romans were free to use the stone on an unprecedented scale. The poet’s literary life can in fact be plotted along the contours of the refurbished urban landscape. In the early amatory works, Augustus’ marble porticos, theaters, and temples are converted into the gleaming arena in which Ovid’s youthful “games of love” are played out.\textsuperscript{61} Years later, in the banished poet’s musings from the coast of the Black Sea, those same stone monuments are recast as the object of the exile’s longing.\textsuperscript{62} Whereas Rome is covered with marble, Tomis, uncultivated and uncivilized, is

\textsuperscript{59} Cf. Plin. \textit{HN} 36.4, Verg., \textit{Aen.} 6.848. Newlands (1995) 100 observes that, elsewhere in his works, Ovid frequently likens youthful flesh to marble; the comparison of Deucalion and Pyrrha’s brand new humans to statues hewn from this material is thus particularly fitting.


\textsuperscript{61} \textit{Am.} 2.7.3; \textit{Ars Am.} 1.70, 1.81, 1.103, 3.317. For the phrase, “games of love,” see the title of Myerowitz (1985).

covered only with marble-white frost \((\textit{terraque marmoreo est candida facta gelu}, \textit{Tr.} 3.10.10)\).

At a time when Augustus was in the process of outfitting Rome so conspicuously in marble, one has to wonder whether any reference by Ovid to the stone could really have been written, or read, as a purely incidental detail. Its first appearance in the \textit{Metamorphoses} in the description of the Olympian Council in Book 1, as well as critics’ subsequent responses to the scene, suggest not. Called to the emergency assembly by Jupiter, the gods take their seats in the \textit{marmoreo . . . recessu} (“marble inner chamber,” 1.177). In this mention of a marble council-chamber, following as it does the poet’s tongue-in-cheek comparison of the Milky Way to the Palatine Hill in the two preceding verses (1.175-76), scholars have detected an allusion to the marble temple of Apollo Palatinus, in whose adjoining library the elderly Augustus convened the Senate.\(^6^3\)

Turning back now to the epic’s second reference to marble, the simile in which the transforming humans are likened to statues blocked out \textit{de marmore} (1.405), we find that it, too, strikes a distinctly Augustan note. The new race’s creation from stones distinguishes it from the Golden Age one, which the Titan Prometheus, Deucalion’s father, had shaped out of clay, a mixture of earth and rainwater \((\textit{tellus . . . mixtam pluialibus undis}, 1.80-82)\). While Ovid’s mythological account may hold that earth and stones are the stuff of human generations, his contemporary Roman audience was more likely to encounter these substances in the form of building materials. In the poetic conceit that clay represents the old

world order and marble the new, we might just hear an echo of Augustus’ triumphant claim to have “found Rome a city of brick and left it a city of marble [marmoream].”

The new marble face of Rome on which the emperor so prided himself was composed, in no small part, of new marble faces, that is, the faces of the statues of exemplary Roman ancestors and heroes which sprang up in the niches of the porticos and semi-circular bays lining his Forum. One group comprised the Julian clan and the kings of Alba Longa; the other, Romulus and the Republican heroes. The identities of around thirty of these illustrious figures, which were slightly larger than life-sized and crafted from Luna stone, have been established via a combination of literary, archaeological, and epigraphical evidence, with Ovid’s own description of the statues in the fifth book of his Fasti proving instrumental in modern reconstructions of the composition and layout of the Forum Augustum’s sculptural program. According to the poet’s imaginative account, Mars Ultor himself descends to the city from heaven, to inspect and approve the temple which Augustus has built in his honor. Among the tourist attractions, we are told, is the emperor’s Hall of Fame: the divine visitor beholds the statues of Aeneas and the Julian ancestors on one side of the Forum Augustum, and of Romulus on the other.

The supposed completion date of the Metamorphoses in A. D. 8 puts the composition of the epic within a decade of the Forum Augustum’s official dedication in 2 B.C.E., and it is tempting to entertain the possibility that the Deucalion and Pyrrha episode,

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64 urbem ... excoluit adeo, ut iure sit gloriatus marmoream se relinquere, quam latericiam accepisset, Suet., Aug. 28.3. Bricks (lateres), of course, are dried blocks of earth mixed with water; see Plin., NH 35.49.
featuring so early in the poem, may have been written very shortly after the Hall of Fame was finished. Regardless of precise dating, however, it is clear that if Ovid’s contemporary readers wanted to see real and recent marble statues of exemplary Romans for themselves, there was no need to look very far. Here in the Forum Augustum was the city’s heritage writ large, the antecedents of the Roman people on one side facing those of the emperor on the other. Ovid’s use of the word “auos” (“forefathers”) in his description of the Hall of Fame in the Fasti underscores the prominence of the theme of ancestry in the sculptural program (5.12.564). Like the procession of imagines which was a fixture of the aristocratic funeral, Augustus’ picture gallery was a celebration of Roman roots: both the real, military and civil roots of the people, as represented by the statues of the city’s historical heroes, and the emperor’s own reconstructed roots, as embodied by the figures of the Julii, his adoptive relatives. And in the center was a large bronze image of the emperor in a triumphal four-horse chariot, with an inscription proclaiming him, again in the language of genealogy, Pater Patriae (“Father of the Fatherland”), and conveying the promise of roots laid down by Augustus himself.

Augustus was far from the first, of course, to display portraits of ancestors in public spaces around the city. Instead, his innovation lay in the systematization and authorization of them as visual exempla. Whether Ovid intended the statue simile in the Deucalion and Pyrrha episode to be read as a direct allusion to Augustus’ Hall of Fame is, of course, unknowable. A case for such a reading could certainly be attempted, based on the observations discussed above: the mention of marble; the centrality of the theme of origins.

69 On the chariot statue and title Pater Patriae, see Aug., R.G. 35.
and ancestry to both the Deucalion and Pyrrha episode as a whole and the emperor’s portrait gallery; the proximity of the construction and dedication date of the Forum Augustum to the composition date of the Metamorphoses; and the poet’s evident familiarity with the site’s sculptural program, as attested in the fifth book of the Fasti. On the other hand, as the analogies to Augustus (1.204), Caesar (1.201), and the Palatine (1.176) earlier in Book 1 well illustrate, Ovid is not one to shy away from referring to contemporary figures and features openly and by name. That he forgoes such an opportunity in the case of the sculpture simile would undermine any attempt to pin the image down to a specific topographical location in Rome. The aim of the present discussion, then, is not to “prove” that the poet had the emperor’s marble portrait gallery in mind when he composed these two verses. The reason why I have trained my attention on the Hall of Fame is rather that it makes for a convenient “one-stop shop” where several prevailing imperial preoccupations converge, preoccupations to which, I believe, Ovid was keenly attuned, and to which he is responding at this early point in the Metamorphoses. In the emperor’s Forum, as in the poet’s Deucalion and Pyrrha episode, issues of genealogy and succession, exemplarity and imitation, are set in stone and put on display.

If the Hall of Fame sought to answer the question, “where do we come from?”, the public edict issued by the emperor concerning its interpretation addressed the follow-up question, “where are we going?” The reading of the sculptural program which Augustus attempted to impose on his citizens is recorded by Suetonius: the emperor and his successors were to be measured against these exceptional figures of Roman history as if against an exemplar (uelut ad exemplar), that is, an original model or pattern.\footnote{commentum id se, ut ad illorum \ldots \ uelut ad exemplar et ipse, dum uiueret, et insequentium aetatium principes exigerentur a ciuibus, Suet. Aug. 31.5, with Gunderson (2014) 137-38. On the distinction between the
framed in the terms of exemplarity, and in both the portrait gallery and accompanying edict, the emperor makes a great show of learning from the past. As Joseph Geiger has noted in his recent monograph on the Hall of Fame, “Augustus’ Gallery of Heroes was . . . a place of memory, but was meant above all as a place of instruction. It displayed the past, but its message was for the present and for the future.”

The educational value of monuments of predecessors is similarly captured by the aetiological coda of the Deucalion and Pyrrha episode, which, I proposed above, may be read as comment on the Roman (and, as we have now seen, particularly Augustan) custom of creating likenesses of ancestors out of stone. Here, Ovid connects our hardness and hardiness to our genesis from rocks: documenta damus qua simus origine nati (1.415). Translators of the poem typically render the phrase documenta damus as “we give evidence” or “we offer proof,” while William Anderson notes in his commentary that documenta is “a prosaic word [which] captures the didactic manner of the aetiologist.” The only other appearance of the expression documenta dare in Ovid’s literary corpus indicates, however, that the phrase equally finds a home in exemplary discourse. In the third book of the Metamorphoses, the Theban king Pentheus rages against Acoetes, a worshipper of Bacchus, threatening to put him to death so that he will “serve as a model [documenta dature] to others (o periture tuaque aliis documenta dature | morte, 3.579-80). Documenta dare, then, is to function as a precedent from which others can learn, that is, in a more literal translation, “to give lessons” of behavior which may in turn be imitated or avoided. This interpretation terms “exemplum” and “exemplar,” see Festus 72.5 Lindsay (1913): exemplum est, quod sequamur, aut uitemus. exemplar, ex quo simile faciamus. illud animo aestimatur, istud oculis conspicitur.

75 Cf. Livy, praef. 10, on the lessons (documenta) to be learned from the study of history.
is supported by Varro’s definition of the term “documentum” as exempla docendi causa (“examples for the sake of teaching,” Ling. 6.62). So when, at the end of the tale of the human race’s birth from rocks, Ovid concludes that “we give lessons” about our ancestral origins, this could be read as a nod to the cultural preoccupation with teaching and learning from the past. For in a sense, the Romans - and foremost among them, Augustus – did, in a very public and visible way, trace their origins (origine, 1.415) to and give lessons (documenta dare, 1.415) from stones in human form: that is, the marble monuments of those exemplary individuals in Roman history.

**The Failure of Imitation**

Even as he acknowledges the past as a storehouse of lessons, however, the poet questions just how well these lessons can be learned. At this late stage in the discussion, I would like to revisit the fourth and final operation in Roller’s model of Roman exemplarity - the imitation of the deeds of exceptional individuals by those who succeed them – and examine more closely Ovid’s treatment of this all-important “reception” point in the Deucalion and Pyrrha episode and beyond.

From a Roman perspective, learning from the past did not simply entail passive absorption, but active emulation. That one’s children should resemble oneself in behavior was considered the height of good fortune, as is clear from a letter sent by Ovid to a loyal friend during his time in exile, to thank him for his support. Among his correspondent’s blessings, the poet hopes, will be a boy so similar (similis, Tr. 4.5.31) to his parent in character that anyone would be able to recognize him as his father’s son (illum | moribus

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76 Baroin (2010) 30 notes that “[i]t is clear that the memory of ancestors is a memory of action, a pragmatic memory . . . remembering one’s ancestors is indeed imitating them. To follow a model (exemplum) is a dynamic process.” See also Harders (2010) 52.
agnoscit quilibet esse tuum!, *Tr. 4.5.31-32*). This appeal to visibility indicates that what is valued here is not just the child’s inheritance or emulation of his parent’s disposition, but rather the performance of that disposition through his actions, so that others may see and acknowledge it as a family trait. Nor was this process of imitation restricted to biological relatives. So Augustus could claim, in the public edict which accompanied the dedication of his Forum, not simply to admire the great men whose statues he had set up (among whom were the Julii, his adoptive family), but rather to appropriate them as a standard against which his own behavior ought visibly to be measured by his citizens (*Suet., Aug. 31.5*).

The well-known Roman metaphor of following in the footsteps of those who came before is, as I mentioned earlier, similarly predicated on the ideal of moral imitation. I have already suggested above that this figure is literalized by Ovid in his Deucalion and Pyrrha episode, in the image of the couple casting the stones behind their footsteps (*post uестigia*, 1.399) and the freshly-transformed humans emerging in their wake. It is time now to consider just how far these members of the new race succeed in imitating their pious predecessors.

At first, Deucalion and Pyrrha’s repopulation of the world appears, to all intents and purposes, a triumph. The oracular riddle is deciphered, the divine command obeyed, and the human race restored. The future of mankind is secured, with both genders represented in the new generation (1.412-13). After the numerous false starts represented by the now-defunct ages of metal and blood, this is finally the race which survives, and which will endure through the remaining fourteen books of the epic, right up to the poet’s own day. And

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despite the myth of degeneration in successive ages, well-known from Hesiod onwards,\textsuperscript{79} the reader has been primed to expect that this time will be different, thanks to Jupiter’s promise to the Olympian Council that the new race would be unlike (\textit{dissimilem}, 1.252) the one before. Initial signs, at least, are encouraging. The negative paradigm of the previous race, embodied by the exceptionally impious Lycaon, is washed away in disgrace, while the positive paradigm, represented by the exceptionally pious Deucalion and Pyrrha, prevails and is adopted as the foundation of the new generation.

And yet, no sooner are these hopes of a new beginning and an enduring legacy of piety raised, than they are dashed. Whether the generation created from stones can really be described as \textit{dissimilis} from the preceding Iron Age stock, as Jupiter had led his fellow Olympians to believe, is highly questionable.\textsuperscript{80} As story after story in the \textit{Metamorphoses} will demonstrate, the sense of promise exemplified by Deucalion and Pyrrha remains, with a few exceptions, unfulfilled. When it comes to their offspring, the world’s most pious couple has produced an alarmingly mixed moral bag. Contrary to the impression created by the episode’s reified metaphor, the majority of these new humans turn out not to follow in their footsteps (\textit{uestigia}, 1.399) at all. It seems that this best and most righteous of men and this most god-fearing of women (1.322-23), have together generated a race that is, for the most part, the very picture of impiety and savagery.

Most notably, Deucalion and Pyrrha’s respect for the divine is not a trait shared by most of their successors. The couple’s reverent prayers and obedience of the oracle’s instructions, despite their personal doubts, was apparently the exception rather than the rule. Instead, the race produced by Deucalion and Pyrrha seems to have more in common with

Lycaon, the negative paradigm of the previous race, who doubts the identity of his immortal visitor, Jupiter, and hatches a plan to murder him in his sleep. The new generation not only fails to give the gods due worship, but actively questions their divinity, challenges their authority, and threatens their bodily integrity. Pentheus, the “scorer of the divinities” (contemptor superum, 3.514), sneers at prophesies (praesagaque ridet, 3.514) and denies Bacchus’ godhead (3.557-58), modeling himself after the Argive king Acrisius, who similarly refused to recognize the deity as a son of Jupiter (3.559-60, cf. 4.609-10). The Propoetides dare to deny the goddess Venus (10.238-39), and Erysichthon goes a step further, not only rejecting the gods and refusing to burn offerings on their altars, but even destroying Ceres’ sacred grove (8.739-42). Some humans are inhospitable to divine visitors - the Lycian peasants refuse the thirsty and nursing Latona a drink from their lake (6.348, 361-65), and Pyreneus attempts to rape his house-guests, the Muses (5.288) - while others, like the Pierides (5.662-78), Arachne (6.1-145), Niobe (6.146-312), and Chione (11.301-27) insult the gods by claiming superiority to them.

Deucalion and Pyrrha are similarly remarkable in the Metamorphoses for their happy marriage. Elsewhere in the poem, love – or, more frequently, lust - is at best a destabilizing force, and at worst a highly destructive one. Scylla betrays her father and fatherland for the sake of a potential love interest (8.85-89), and Anaxarete’s rejection of Iphis’ romantic advances results in his suicide and her subsequent transformation into stone (14.733-761). Cephalus and Procris’ marriage, beset by jealousy and suspicion, ends in the husband’s accidental murder of his wife (7.840-62), while Tereus and Procne’s marriage disintegrates into rape, infanticide, and cannibalism (6.524-660). The figurative incest implied in Deucalion’s respectful and affectionate description of his wife and cousin as his sister (soror,
1.351) takes a disturbing turn for the literal in later generations, with Byblis harboring forbidden lust for her twin brother (9.454-665) and Myrrha tricking her father into sharing his bed with her (10.463-71).

These blasphemers, criminals, and deviants, then, are the descendants of the god-fearing and pious Deucalion and Pyrrha. This is not to disregard some important and memorable exceptions in the poem: married couples reminiscent of the pair in their devotion to each other and to the gods (Baucis and Philemon, 8.611-724; Ceyx and Alcyone, 11.410-748), or those in dire straits who pray for divine favor and are richly rewarded (Iphis and her mother, 9.666-797; Pygmalion, 10.243-97). But these are rare bright spots in an otherwise dark and disturbing moral universe. As Richard Tarrant has observed, “chaos in Ovid’s *Metamorphoses* is not limited to the poem’s opening episode but has a pervasive presence in the poem, both in the physical world and, more significantly, in the moral lives of human beings.”

For the most part, the exemplary piety of their creators, Deucalion and Pyrrha, does not extend to the central characters who inhabit Ovid’s epic. Both in their relationships with the gods and with each other, the race created by the couple instead appears overwhelmingly to be modeled on the alternative paradigm of human behavior presented in Book 1: that of the godless and savage Lycaon.

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81 Tarrant (2002a) 349.
82 This is by no means to imply that the mortal characters in Ovid’s epic are uniformly irreverent. Some humans who suffer the fate of metamorphosis are neither explicitly “good” nor “bad,” but are simply victims of the gods’ caprice and lust. Moreover, several of Ovid’s tales of impiety feature a passing mention of the contrasting religiosity exhibited by a supporting cast of characters. Unlike the protagonists themselves, these faceless and nameless multitudes pay the deities their due honor, and thereby throw the disrespect shown by the central figure into high relief (e.g., the fellow citizens of Lycaon, 1.220-21; Pentheus, 3.732-33; and Niobe, 6.162-64).
The reader is never told what eventually becomes of Deucalion and Pyrrha. This is a striking omission in a poem in which the fate of the central human character(s) in each episode - a fate which almost invariably comprises metamorphosis or death - is a recurring detail. Having fulfilled their divinely-ordained purpose of regenerating the human race, Deucalion and Pyrrha neither expire quietly nor, like Baucis and Philemon, their fellow pious married couple later in the epic, undergo a transformation in lieu of death as a reward for their reverence (8.703-20): they simply drop out of the text altogether. Metamorphosis typically allows Ovid’s human characters to leave behind some permanent physical remnant in the universe, be it a tree, animal, statue, body of water, or star, which at times retains traces (uestigia) of their former selves. Even those few whose tales end in death rather than transformation, like Phaethon and Icarus, are commemorated by means of a tombstone, a small token which nevertheless testifies to their existence (2.326-28, 8.234-35). But the traces or remnants initially left by Deucalion and Pyrrha upon the earth are temporary: the footsteps (uestigia, 1.399) in which the new human race springs up behind them. It is this race, in fact, which will function as the couple’s permanent form of preservation. Like Aglauros (2.819-32), Niobe (6.303-12), Anaxarete (14.755-58), Lichas (9.219-29) or the victims of Medusa’s petrifying gaze (5.183-249) elsewhere in the poem, who are changed into rocks or statues, Deucalion and Pyrrha live on in the shape of transformed stone embodiments of themselves. Unlike these characters, however, the pair’s embodiments consist not of static objects, but the stone-grown humans to whom they have transmitted their physical form and gender. The combined effect of Deucalion and Pyrrha’s unobtrusive

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83 Gertz (2003) 122 notes the lack of closure in this episode, contrasting the ending of the tale with that of Baucis and Philemon.
84 As a wolf, Lycaon keeps uestigia (1.237) of his human shape; Lichas is transformed into a rock which bears uestigia (9.227) of a human form.
disappearance from the text and the rebirth of mankind is to create the illusion that the couple’s identities have been entirely subsumed and supplanted by the next generation. In other words, it momentarily looks as though the exempla have successfully been, to use Matthew Roller’s terms, witnessed, commemorated, and imitated, and that the members of the new human race have realized the quintessentially Roman aspiration of becoming their ancestors.

The operative word here, of course, is “momentarily.” When the members of the Olympian Council had expressed consternation at the thought of a world devoid of humans and votive offerings, Jupiter had soothingly promised to repopulate the earth with “offspring unlike the previous race, from a miraculous origin” (subolemque priori | dissimilem populo . . . origine mira, 1.251-52). But of these two criteria, dissimilitude from their predecessors and a marvelous genesis, only the second comes to fruition. There is little question that the rebirth of mortals from stones is a wondrous feat of human and superhuman engineering: as the narrator himself interjects in the course of relating the metamorphosis, “who would believe this, unless antiquity bore witness?” (quis hoc credat nisi sit pro teste uetustas?, 1.400). But it is certainly not a race unlike (dissimilem, 1.252) the previous one. Over the course of the epic, every passing tale of human impiety and cruelty will gradually erode the positive exemplum of Deucalion and Pyrrha, like a drop of water hollowing out a stone.85 All that the couple has successfully transmitted to the new generation of humans, it appears, remains strictly on the surface, in their physical form and gender. With respect to character and moral fiber, the pair’s successors will, with a few notable exceptions, turn out to be nothing like their god-fearing and righteous creators.

85 The analogy is borrowed from Pont. 4.10.5: gutta cauat lapidem.
And those successors, as the poet tells us in the episode’s final couplet, are none other than the Romans’ own ancestors (1.414-15). At this point, the fictional world of Deucalion and Pyrrha collides with the real world of Ovid and Augustus. As we move through the episode, the language and imagery of Roman exemplary discourse, in both its traditional and contemporary guises, becomes increasingly difficult to ignore. In a darkly appropriate opening to a poem in which characters repeatedly prove unwilling or unable to learn from the past, Ovid seems to suggest that the entire human race, up to and including the Romans themselves, is founded on a stunning failure of exemplarity.
Chapter 2
Metamorphic Monuments: the Wolf and the Anemone

At one point in the Fasti, Ovid briefly turns his attention to a selection of Roman sacred spaces, namely, the temples of Juno Moneta and Mars, and the shrine dedicated to Tempestas. After sketching the buildings’ respective locations in the city, he adds that, *haec hominum monimenta patent* (“these human monuments are clear to see,” 6.195).\(^1\) There is nothing remarkable about the poet’s wording here: the “human monuments” to which he refers denote, unambiguously, the structures set up by men in honor of the gods.\(^2\) Such structures are a dime a dozen in the Fasti, as they were in Rome itself. Transposed into the context of the Metamorphoses, however, the same phrase, *hominum monimenta*, might well have had a rather different ring to it: not monuments made by humans, but monuments made out of humans.\(^3\) When, in the fifth book of the epic, Perseus fatally brandishes the decapitated head of Medusa at Phineus, the hero exults that he will turn his rival into an “everlasting monument” (*monimenta per aeuum*, 5.227).\(^4\) Nor is it only those humans transformed into stone statues who are labeled *monumenta* by Ovid: animals and plants are defined in the same terms. Juno makes the Theban women monuments (*monimenta*, 4.550) of her cruelty by changing them into birds, and Thisbe proclaims that the blood-red fruit of the mulberry tree will be monuments (*monimenta*, 4.161) of her own and Pyramus’ death.\(^5\)

In the preceding chapter, we encountered a race of stone-grown humans who, in physical form if not in character, commemorated their exemplary creators, Deucalion and

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\(^1\) *Monimentum* is a less common alternative spelling of *monumentum*; see *TLL* 8.1461.

\(^2\) Boyle (2003) 46 notes the pun on *monimenta* in reference to Juno Moneta.

\(^3\) On the *Metamorphoses* as a “landscape with figures,” see Hinds (2002).


\(^5\) On the mulberry memorial in the Pyramis and Thisbe episode, see Gertz (2003) 53-64.
Pyrrha. The current chapter examines the theme of human memorials in Ovid’s epic more closely. My discussion takes root in the idea that the poet presents transformed bodies as monuments, which immortalize the exemplary deeds and stories of the individuals that they once were. In his recent study of exemplarity in Roman culture and historiography, Matthew Roller has proposed that a monument such as a narrative, statue, scar, rite, or toponym, is a principal component of what he terms “exemplary discourse.” The function of the monument, he explains, is to preserve the extraordinary action, its performer, and the judgment passed on it (whether positive or negative), and to make this known to a wider audience, both of contemporaries and of future generations. By provoking interest and curiosity about the exemplary deed, the monument invites retellings of it and affirms the esteem or opprobrium in which it is held, thereby exhorting the audience to imitate or avoid it (or at least, to consider previous evaluations of it to be normative).

**Commemoration and Caution**

Ovid’s use of the word “monumentum” to describe the final product of metamorphosis indicates that a close affinity exists between the traditional monument and the transformed body. The function of a monumentum is to monere, that is, to “make present in the mind,” “remind,” or “warn.” In his definition of the term in *De Lingua Latina*, Varro posits an etymological connection between “monere” and “memoria,” and captures the monument’s dual commemorative and cautionary function in his subsequent example: the monuments on the tombs which line the roadways remind passersby that they, too, are mortal (*monimenta quae in sepulcris . . . admoneant*). Like the tomb monument, the transformed

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7 *Ling.* 6.49. Cf. Serv. *ad Aen.* 3.486, who also associates *monumentum* with *memoria*: *monumenta autem a mentis admonitione sunt dicta.*
body is where commemoration and warning meet and mesh: to those who encounter it, this
“metamorphic monument” (as I term it) simultaneously serves as a reminder of the former
human, and an admonition to avoid that human’s fate. Its dual sense of preservation and
 prescription is what makes the transformed body, like the traditional monument, an integral
part of exemplary discourse. But before looking more closely at the particular place of
monuments and metamorphosed humans in relation to exempla, it may be helpful to remark
on some of the similarities between the two more generally.

The funerary association found in Varro’s definition of the word “monumentum” also
emerges from the very first use of the term in Ovid’s poem, in reference to the very first
metamorphosis. Here, Jupiter destroys the anarchic Giants with his thunderbolt, prompting
Terra (Mother Earth) to transform their blood into a new, human race, which will serve as
monimenta (1.159) of her dead sons. While most bereft parents in the Metamorphoses must
content themselves with an inanimate stone to commemorate their dead child – Phaethon’s
mother, Clymene, sheds tears over her son’s inscribed marble tomb (2.333-39), and Daedalus
raises a sepulcher for Icarus (8.234-35) - Mother Earth has the power to engender living
memorials9 from her sons’ blood, in the form of a race of humans who prove just as wild as
their gigantic forebears. It is instructive to note that, later in the epic, the same word appears
in reference to the ancestral tombs in which Hecuba prepares to bury her daughter Polyxena
(monimentis, 13.524). Ovid’s use of the term “monumentum” to denote both the traditional
tomb monument and the transformed body points to his conception of the synonymity of the

8 The qualification of Varro’s definition offered by Levene (1998) in his review of Jaeger (1997) is worth
restating here: “the fact that some monuments warn (monere) as well as recall . . . (as Varro indicates) does not
mean that all things that were called monumenta necessarily were seen as having an admonitory quality: we
must bear in mind that Varro’s description may be slanted to justify his strained etymology.” Nevertheless, the
vast majority of the metamorphic monuments which feature in Ovid’s epic (and certainly the ones discussed in
this chapter) are presented as having a clear admonitory function.

9 For the term “living memorial,” see Gertz (2003) 55 on the mulberry bush which commemorates Pyramus
and Thisbe (4.164-66).
two. Each serves as a representation of, or substitute for, a former human life, and simultaneously “is” and “is not” that life.10

Ovid is explicit in his account of the reasoning behind Terra’s animation of her Giant sons’ blood: her act of creation is born of a fear “that no monuments of her offspring would remain” (*ne nulla suae stirpis monimenta manerent*, 1.159). The consonance of these last two words is not merely decorative: one of the *monumentum*’s principle reasons for being is precisely to *manere*, to “remain” or “endure.” Again, this connection is anticipated by Varro in his definition of *monumentum*, when he notes a possible etymological thread between *manere* and *monere*, via *memoria* (*Ling*. 6.49). However idiosyncratic Varro’s hypothesis may be, the antiquarian scholar was clearly not alone in making the connection between monuments and permanence: Ovid, too, sets the two words in conjunction several times.11 And Terra has, in theory at least, designed the ultimate everlasting monument: her human memorials are regenerative, thereby ensuring their own longevity.12

Ovid’s metamorphic monuments are built to stand the test of time. It is not difficult to see the durability of the rock that is the end result of Niobe’s metamorphosis, or the spring that is Arethusa’s, or the tree that is Daphne’s (particularly given the special significance of the laurel in Augustan Rome). The staying power of many of the other transformed beings in the *Metamorphoses* is, however, rather more limited. With their average life expectancies of five and two years respectively, a weasel like Galanthis (9.306-23) or a spider like Arachne

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10 For a fuller discussion of the correspondences between transformed bodies and funerary monuments, see Hardie (2002a) 81-91.
11 Besides Met. 1.159, see 5.277 (*mansura . . . monimenta*), 10.725 (*monimenta manebunt*), and Fast. 4.709 (*monimenta manent*).
12 Nevertheless, Jupiter will very nearly thwart Terra’s plan by sweeping away all but two members of the human race (the pious Deucalion and Pyrrha) in a flood.
(6.1-145) makes for a sorry monument indeed. Through reproduction, though, Ovid’s mortal creatures preserve the very characteristic which commemorates their exemplary deed, and thereby become everlasting. Minerva tells Arachne as much in Book 6, after transforming her into a spider for daring to challenge a divinity to a weaving contest. The punishment, warns the goddess, will extend to the girl’s descendants, who will all inherit her new eight-legged physique. So while neither Arachne on her own, nor the ephemeral web she weaves, may qualify as an eternal monument, every spider thereafter, by virtue of its proficiency in spinning, immortalizes both her talent and her offence. In his article on mythological paradigms (exempla) in ancient poetry, H. V. Canter writes that, “as an instrument for illustrating general principle the example makes for vividness of presentation through the specific and the concrete” (emphasis added). Ovid’s metamorphosed bodies share this telescoping of the general by the specific, insofar as they commentate on the universal (the characteristics of every wolf, every spider, every hyacinth) by commemorating the individual (the fates of Lycaon, 1.163-252; Arachne, 6.1-145; Hyacinthus, 10.162-219).

Like every monument, every metamorphosed human contains a tale which needs to be told, and is simultaneously both the end result and the source of that tale. On the one hand, these metamorphic monuments reify and finalize the moment of change, the culmination of a transformation story; on the other, they pique the viewer’s interest and so

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13 Figures are based on the longevity of twenty-first century weasels and spiders. While these creatures are not specifically termed “monumenta” by Ovid, I nevertheless count them (along with the other transformed individuals in the epic) as monuments, by virtue of their preserving and commemorating particular characteristics of the humans that they used to be. It is also worth noting that the fates of both Arachne and Galanthis are described as having a potentially admonitory function (admonita, 6.150; admonitu, 9.324).
15 lexque eadem poenae, ne sis secura futuri, | dicta tuo generi serisque nepotibus esto (“and lest you be carefree for the future, let the same law of punishment be declared upon your race, even to your remote descendants,” 6.137-38).
16 Canter (1933) 202.
17 See Fowler (2000a) 202 on the paradoxical status of the monument as both a “summation of memory” and a “starting-point . . . for desire.” On the story contained within every metamorphic body, see Barkan (1986) 89.
instigate the narration of that story afresh. It is, for instance, Minerva’s fascination with a flock of magpies that elicits the Muses' tale of the exemplary recklessness of the Pierids, who challenged the goddesses of Helicon to a singing contest and were subsequently turned into birds (5.300); and it is Adonis’ curiosity about Venus’ hatred of lions that incites her to tell of the exemplary ingratitude of Hippomenes, which led to the leonine transformation of him and his new wife, Atalanta (10.552).

In the case of the epic’s first extended tale of transformation, the metamorphic monument takes the form of both a changed body and an admonitory narrative. Here, Jupiter summons the Council of Olympians in response to the crisis of mankind’s savagery, as exemplified by the Arcadian king Lycaon, who served him a feast of human flesh and was turned into a wolf. Jupiter has apparently read the first-century rhetorical handbooks recommending the use of *exempla* to lend credibility to the speaker’s argument. His primary aim in presenting the story of Lycaon’s crimes is to offer a case study in support of his contention that the human race is unsalvageable, and in justification of his decision to annihilate it.18 The Arcadian king’s misdeed and subsequent comeuppance is treated by the Jupiter as a teachable moment: “what was the crime and what the punishment, I shall teach you” (*quod . . . admissum, quae sit vindicta, docebo*, 1.210). Lycaon is selected as an *exemplum* of iniquity, simultaneously representative of the savagery of mankind and yet exceptional in the extent of his cruelty.19 Such, as I discussed in this study’s main introduction, is the essence of the *exemplum*. It straddles the realm of both the general and

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18 Fabre-Serris (1995) 60 notes that “[p]our Jupiter, le crime de Lycaon est exemplaire.”
19 Though he never refers explicitly to the phenomenon of exemplarity in the Lycaon episode, Due (1974) 103-4 nevertheless captures the sense of it, when he notes that “the general wickedness of mankind is combined in Jupiter’s mind with the specific outrage of Lycaon” (emphasis added).
the specific, an action or an individual at once so extraordinary as to be remarked upon, and yet so accessible as to invite the hope – or, as here, the fear - of repetition in future.

Lycaon’s status as a monument derives not only from his membership in the race of humans which Terra created as *monimenta* (1.159) to the dead Giants. He is also a *monumentum* insofar as the story of his depravity is used to warn (*monere*) Jupiter’s fellow Olympians of the danger posed by mankind’s continued existence, and to instruct (*monere*) them to assent to his proposed destruction of the human race. It is worth noting at this point that the English word “monument,” despite preserving the root *monere*, has lost the specific sense of “warning” or “instruction” found in cognates such as “monition,” “premonition,” and “admonition.”

The monitory force of the Latin *monumentum* is better encapsulated by the German term, *Mahnmal*, which derives from the verb *mahnen* (“to warn”, “to remind”, “to urge”, “to admonish”) and the noun *Mal* (“mark”, “sign”). In his study of Holocaust memorial sites across Germany, Klaus Neumann explains the particular connotations of the term: “In contrast to a *Denkmal*, which is to function merely as a reminder of a past, or an *Ehrenmal*, which honors somebody or something from the past, a *Mahnmal* is a critical statement about the past. It is to serve as an admonition – lest the past recur in the future.”

It is in precisely this sense of the word that Lycaon functions as a monument.

But it is not only Jupiter’s spoken narrative that serves as a monument to Lycaon’s exemplary wildness: the story is also contained within and commemorated by the figure of the wolf itself. The god’s speech reaches a climax with the extended description of the newly-formed animal, a distinctly unlovable bundle of unkempt fur, flashing eyes, and

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20 See *OED* s.v. 5b: “a thing that gives warning; a portent. *Obs.*”
bloody maw. After his transformation, Lycaon’s savage inner disposition is finally matched by his outer appearance (1.236-40):

> fit lupus et ueteris seruat uestigia formae:
> canities eadem est, eadem uiolentia uultus,
> idem oculi lucent, eadem feritatis imago est.

He becomes a wolf, and retains traces of his former shape: there is the same gray hair, the same savagery of expression, the same glint in his eye, the same picture of wildness.

The king of Arcadia may now have four legs and a tail, but there is a continuity in his essence which receives due emphasis in Ovid’s description (eadem . . . eadem . . . idem . . . eadem, 1.238-39). Lycaon the wolf is a monument to Lycaon the man.22

No matter how similar the shade of his coat or how familiar the glint in his eye, however, there is no escaping the fact that, in reality, a wolf cannot bear any more than the most superficial of resemblances to a human being, in physical terms at least. The poet gracefully sidesteps this interspecies dissonance, managing to preserve both the authenticity of the wolf and the enduring presence of the human, by describing the animal not as hominis imago (“the image of a man”), but rather as feritatis imago (“the image of wildness,” 1.239).

The phrase is scrupulously chosen: Jupiter elsewhere characterizes the human Lycaon as notus feritate (“well-known for his wildness,” 1.198), mankind as the perpetrators of fera . . . Erinys (“wild fury,” 1.241), and their Giant ancestors as a ferus hostis (“wild enemy,” 1.185). As the image of feritas, then, the wolf commemorates not only Lycaon, but also the entire human race, and the Giants from whose blood that race was created.

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22 A non-fantastical analogy to the similarities between the wolf and the human might be the commonplace that dogs often resemble their owners in terms of hairiness, relative size, facial expression, etc., an observation borne out by a scientifically-tested correlation between people’s taste in canine companions and their own appearance; see Coren (1999).
But, as we have seen already, the monument does more than simply preserve the past in a stagnant receptacle of memory. Far from freezing a moment in time, the monument renders that moment fluid. It is, as Mary Jaeger writes in her monograph on monuments in Livy’s history, “Janus-like,” looking to the future as well as to the past. More specifically, the monument in exemplary discourse has a pragmatic as well as a commemorative function, drawing on the past in order to provide instruction for the future, and embodying a guide for the conduct of its audience, whether an exhortation to emulate a great success, or a warning to avoid a great failure. *Monere*, from which the noun *monumentum* derives, is, after all, a transitive verb. So the *monumentum*, by definition, relies on a direct object – its audience - in order to complete its sense. Its purpose, the very reason for its existence, is to affect that audience by serving as a reminder, warning, or instruction, or, in a broader sense, by generating an interpretation or a reaction. Nor is there any limit to the number or nature of interpretations and reactions that it provokes: just as the past is recalled by no two individuals in quite the same way, no single monument holds quite the same significance for everyone who encounters it. This multiplicity of meanings inherent in the monument is perhaps counterintuitive, given the physical fixity and solidity of, say, a bronze statue or marble tomb. But, as Don Fowler has observed in his influential essay on Roman ruins, the monument’s “lack of monumental stability” is in fact its paradox and its essence.

Within Ovid’s lifetime, the power of monuments was exploited more extensively and effectively than ever before at Rome. Augustus’ flair for harnessing the potential of architecture and iconography in the service of his new regime, and the various ways in which the refurbished imperial citiescape could be interpreted, have long been a subject of interest to

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24 Fowler (2000a) 211.
Monuments were essential building blocks in the creation of the *exempla* upon which, as we have seen in the Introduction and Chapter 1 above, Augustus’ self-construction as emperor (and, correspondingly, Augustus’ construction of imperial Rome) so heavily depended. As Ovid’s Jupiter puts it in his prophecy at the end of the *Metamorphoses*, Augustus *exemplo . . . suo mores reget* (“shall guide morality by his own example,” 15.834).

Nor did the emperor guide by his own example alone: his Forum was peopled with inspirational statues of heroes and notable Roman ancestors, *summi uiri* whose achievements were recorded in inscriptions (*tituli* and *elogia*) well placed to catch the eye and imagination of passersby.

Augustus was certainly attuned to the multiplicity of meanings of both *exempla* and monuments, and used it to his advantage. At the same time, however, the selection of authorized imperial meanings was still prescribed within certain limits. According to Suetonius, for instance, the emperor attempted to impose a reading of the statues in his Forum, proclaiming that citizens should consider them models (*uelut ut exemplar*) for himself and his successors. In other words, meeting-places for singletons and intimate nooks for amorous couples, of the sort described by Ovid in his *Ars Amatoria*, were presumably not what Augustus had in mind for his temples, porticos, and theaters. In fact, the plurality of meanings contained within monuments and texts is precisely the defense mustered by the exiled poet in his plea to Augustus in *Tristia* 2, when he attempts to excuse his erotic elegy on the grounds of his audience’s “misreading:” he, as the author of the *Ars*,

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27 Aug. 31.5; cf. 34.2, in which Augustus presents a crowd with the example of Germanicus and his children, holding the family up as role models (*. . . manu vultuque significans ne gravarentur imitari iuvenis exemplum*).
cannot control his readers’ interpretations of it any more than Augustus, as the author of the imperial building program, can control the use and abuse of his monuments.\(^{29}\)

The imprint left by the Augustan building program upon Ovid’s imagination is visible everywhere his amatory, aetiological, and exilic works.\(^{30}\) Parts of his *Ars Amatoria* serve as a guidebook of the best pick-up spots in Rome, his *Fasti* explains the origins of notable civic sites, and his *Tristia* and *Epistulae Ex Ponto* read as extended love-letters to the gleaming and cultured urban landscape he has left behind. Whether he is remarking irreverently on the erotic uses for Augustan buildings, appealing to multiplicity of meanings and audience subjectivity in self-defense, or exposing alternative and competing aetiologies for particular institutions, Ovid repeatedly pushes the boundaries of authorized imperial monumentality.\(^{31}\) The next two sections of this chapter seek to demonstrate that the *Metamorphoses* is no exception, by showing that the transformed body, the so-called “metamorphic monument,” continually questions and undermines its own ability to *monere*, to “call to mind” and “to warn.” To be sure, the vast majority of the monuments in Augustan Rome commemorated *exempla* that were positive and inspirational, rather than negative and cautionary like those in Ovid’s epic (that is, *summi uiri* rather than *pessimi uiri*). Nevertheless, in practical terms, exhortation and warning operate as two sides of the same coin, both evincing the combination of commemoration and prescription so essential to the discourse of exemplarity.

It is these qualities of commemoration and prescription - and more specifically, the difficulties and tensions that they raise – which are the subject of the following two sections. The first, a discussion of the Lycaon episode in Book 1, focuses on the monument’s *commemorative* function, showing how the figure of the wolf at Rome is always plural and as

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\(^{31}\) See Boyle (2003) 49.
such, is always problematic. The second examines the monument’s cautionary function via a reading of the Venus and Adonis episode in Book 10, exposing the unremitting futility of the act of warning, which eventually comes to be embodied by the anemone. By addressing each of the two senses of monere in turn – commemoration (“to call to mind”) and prescription (“to instruct” or “to warn”) – I hope to shed light on the ways in which Ovid uses the transformed body to explore the complications and contradictions inherent in monumentality.

A Tale of Two Wolves

In the beginning was the Wolf. That the same species stands in first place, at the head of both the Roman world and the world within Ovid’s epic, can hardly be a coincidence. Whereas the story of Daphne, which appears shortly after in Book 1, has long been subjected to readings centered around the symbolism of the laurel in Augustan Rome, the Lycaon episode has never, to my knowledge, received similar treatment, or at least not extensively.\textsuperscript{32} But it is difficult to imagine a more iconographically-loaded or ideologically-charged animal to which Ovid could have accorded primacy in his poem. The following reading seeks to assess the meaning and significance of this choice. The first part of my discussion focuses on the wolf’s distinct lack of distinguishability, which, I suggest, renders every member of the species a potential monument to Lycaon. Next, I turn to the particular implications of this lupine likeness for Rome itself, a city founded on the exemplary tale of a wolf which, contrary to first impressions, may not be so different from that which opens Ovid’s epic after all.

\textsuperscript{32} See the brief but useful comments of Ginsberg (1989), cited below. Barchiesi (2005) 177 notes that both Ovid’s pre-Roman Arcadians and the Romans themselves are descended from a wolf; Fratantuono (2011) 11-12 draws a parallel between Lycaon (the subject of Jupiter’s opening speech in the \textit{Metamorphoses}) and the she-wolf (who features in Jupiter’s opening speech in the \textit{Aeneid}, 1.275-77).
After his transformation, the wolf formerly known as the man Lycaon bounds, howling, into the fields to attack the flocks. His still-human mind may be terrified (*terrītus*, 1.232), but in his external appearance, characteristics, and behavior, he is lupine through and through. The Arcadian king’s metamorphosis deprives him of the unique name and unique body which serve, as Jean-Pierre Vernant has observed in another context, as definitive markers of human identity.33 His animal transformation renders him indistinguishable from any other member of his species, with the consequence that every wolf now recalls (*monere*) the wild and savage Lycaon.34

A brief survey of the salient characteristics of the wolves who populate the world of the *Metamorphoses* will serve to demonstrate as much. The wolf is considered a danger to gods and humans alike: Venus tells Adonis that she keeps her distance from ravaging wolves (*raptores . . . lupos*, 10.540) and warns him to do the same. The wolf is the embodiment of the carnivore: when Pythagoras exhorts mankind to adopt a vegetarian diet, the wolf is one of the bloodthirsty, meat-eating species (*dapibus cum sanguine gaudent*, 15.87)35 whose example he specifically rejects; and one indication of the severity of a plague is that not even wolves will touch the corpses (*non cani tetigere lupi*, 7.550). In similes, too, the wolf, without exception, represents menace: when the men of Cures launch a night attack on the Romans, they are compared to silent wolves (14.778), and the animal appears frequently in narratives of sexual violation as a figure for the rapist. Apollo, in pursuit of Daphne, vainly tries to convince her that he is not like a wolf chasing a lamb (1.505); Arethusa fears Alpheus

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34 Whether or not Ovid envisions Lycaon as the world’s *first* wolf is unclear, and has been subject to debate. Segal (1998) 14 takes it for granted that Lycaon’s transformation accounts for the origin of the species; but see Schmidt (1991) 21 and O’Hara (2007) 123-28 on the problems of Ovid’s stories of causation, especially with regard to the wolf. Intriguing as this question is, however, its answer is perhaps not of great importance. Irrespective of whether Lycaon is the founder of the species, all wolves acquire a new signification and a new story after him. On Ovidian aetiology in general, see Myers (1994), Loehr (1996), Tissol (1997) 167-216.
35 Cf. *sanguine gaudet* (1.235), used in reference to Lycaon.
as a lamb fears the howls of wolves (5.627); Philomela trembles before Tereus like a wounded lamb attacked by a wolf (6.528); and Hesperia flees Aesacus as a hind flees a wolf (11.772). A wolf that is tame and friendly is an aberration, a sure sign that something sinister is afoot: the wolves who wag their tails and fawn excitedly over visitors to Circe’s palace are not really wolves at all, but men transformed by the witch’s magic (14.255).

Throughout the epic, then, the wolf is consistently represented as a figure of wildness, rapacity, and danger – that is, as a Lycaon.

The wolf is, in fact, an animal which lends itself naturally to replication: it exists in a pack, and, unlike its domestic counterpart, the dog, is not particularly diverse in either breed or color. An Aesop’s fable relates how, in a war between the wolves and the dogs, the dog-council elects a general to lead them, but is frustrated at his failure to enter battle immediately. The rationale behind the dog-general’s hesitation is worth quoting at length:

“Here is the reason why I delay and act with caution! One must always make plans with an eye to the future. All of the enemy whom I have seen are wolves, members of the same breed, whereas some of us are dogs from Crete, some are Molossian hounds, some are Acarnanians, others are Dolopians, while others boast of being from Cyprus or Thrace. Still others come from other places – what need is there to go on at length? We are not even the same colour, as the wolves are: some of us are black, some are grey, some are red with white-spotted chests, and some of us are white all over. How can I lead troops who are so lacking in unity to fight against an enemy who all resemble each other in every possible way [τοὺς ὄμοια πάντ’ ἔχοντας ἄλληλοις]?”

36 The wolf has retained its power and appeal as a rhetorical symbol of danger into the twenty-first century. A television commercial released during George W. Bush’s 2004 presidential campaign for reelection featured a lone wolf stalking through the forest, as a voiceover intoned that budget cuts supported by liberals in Congress threatened to weaken US defenses against terrorism. The advertisement concluded with a warning that “weakness attracts those who are waiting to do America harm,” as the camera panned to an ominous shot of the entire pack springing into action.

37 “ἀκούσατ’ . . . οὗ χάριν διατρίβω, τί δ’ εὐλαβοῦμαι· χρὴ δ’ ἀεὶ προβουλεύειν. τῶν μὲν πολεμίων τὸ γένος ὄν ὀρθὸν πάντων ἐν ἔστων· ἡμῶν δ’ ἤλθον οἱ μὲν ἐκ Κρήτης, οἱ δ’ ἐκ Μολοσσῶν εἰσιν, οἱ δ’ Ἀκαρνάνων, ἄλλοι δὲ Δόλοπες, οἱ δὲ Κύπρον ἢ Θρᾴκην αὐχοῦσιν, άλλοι δ’ ἄλλοθεν—τί μηκύνω; τὸ χρῶμα δ’ ἡμῖν οὐχ ἐν ἔστω ὡς τούτοις, ἄλλ’ οἱ μὲν ἡμῶν μέλανες, οἱ δὲ τερράδες, ἐνιοὶ δὲ πυρροὶ καὶ διάργεμοι στήθη, ἐνιοὶ δὲ πυρροὶ καὶ διάργεμοι στήθη, ἄλλοι δὲ λευκοί. πῶς ἂν οὖν δυνηθεὶν εἰς πόλεμον ἄρχειν” εἶπε “τῶν ἄσυμφωνον πρὸς τοὺς
The canine commander makes an excellent point. Unlike wolves themselves, who are able to identify each other based on a distinctive howl or scent, non-wolves (whether of the dog or human variety) are generally not well-versed in lupine recognition. As readers, we would be hard-pressed to pick Lycaon out of a pack, as becomes apparent from two wolf sightings in the *Metamorphoses* which occur shortly after his transformation. First, in the description of the mighty flood which Jupiter unleashes in response to the savagery of the human race, as exemplified by Lycaon, we catch a glimpse of an unnamed wolf paddling nonchalantly alongside a herd of sheep (*nat lupus inter oues*, 1.304) – an incidental detail, perhaps, but not an unproblematic one. The verse is famously disparaged by Seneca the Younger in his *Naturales Quaestiones*, in an otherwise positive assessment of the poet’s account of the great deluge. The whole passage would have been magnificent, grumbles Seneca, if only Ovid had preserved the grandeur demanded by the subject-matter and “not concerned himself with what the sheep and the wolves were doing.” As it is, such a flight of fancy only reduces a prodigious talent and theme to “childish tomfoolery” (*pueriles ineptias*, *Q Nat*. 3.27.13).

Besides, the philosopher adds, surely the creatures should be drowning rather than swimming? Tomfoolery and proper effects of flooding on animal welfare aside, Ovid’s passing reference to the swimming wolf, read in conjunction with the Lycaon episode which precedes and precipitates the deluge, raises the important issue of the identity loss which metamorphosis entails: as an animal, Lycaon is now identical to every other member of his pack.

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"ομοια πάντ’ ἔχοντας ἀλλήλοις;", Babrius 85 = Perry (1965) 343. Trans. Gibbs (2002) 32. Detienne and Svenbro (1989) 150-51 offer an interesting reading of this fable (citing a slightly different version), in which the uniformity of the wolf pack is likened to the hoplite formation.

38 magnifice haec, si non curauerit quid oues et lupi faciant, *Q Nat*. 3.27.14.

species. So is the nameless swimming wolf in fact Lycaon, or just a lupine lookalike?\

There is no way of knowing.

The second ambiguous wolf reference occurs in Book 2. Callisto, Lycaon’s daughter from before his metamorphosis, has been raped by Jupiter and, as a punishment inflicted by the god’s furious wife Juno, has been transformed into a bear.\(^{41}\) Despite her new animal appearance, however, Callisto has retained a human mind and a human fear of wild beasts, hiding from her fellow bears and forgetting that she is one herself (2.493-94). Ovid cannot resist taking the irony one step further, adding that she is also afraid of the wolves, “although her father was among them” (*pertimuitque lupos, quamuis pater esset in illis*, 2.495).\(^{42}\) In his commentary, William S. Anderson notes that this is the first time in the epic that the familial relationship between Lycaon and Callisto has been mentioned, and regards it as “gratuitous information, cleverly saved for this moment’s paradox.”\(^{43}\) Viewed in light of the complex identity issues which metamorphosis brings to the fore, however, this genealogical tidbit is just as telling as the inability of Io’s father and sisters to recognize their newly bovine family member (1.642-43), or the failure of Actaeon’s hunting companions to grasp the true identity of the stag (3.242-46). It seems that, as a wolf, Lycaon is not recognizable even to his own

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\(^{40}\) This is related to the questions raised by Schmidt (1991) 21 and O’Hara (2007) 126, of whether Lycaon is the world’s first (and, by extension, only) wolf, i.e. whether his transformation is intended to account for the origin of the species, and if so, how it is that, when we encounter him in Book 2, he is accompanied by other wolves (2.495).

\(^{41}\) On Ovid’s inconsistent chronology in Book 2, and the suspension of belief necessitated by Callisto’s continued existence after a deluge that has supposedly wiped out mankind, see Gildenhard and Zissos (1999a), esp. 40—42, Wheeler (1999) 128-30, and O’Hara (2007) 121.

\(^{42}\) It is not immediately clear whether *pertimuitque lupos, quamuis pater esset in illis* (2.495) is a comment on Callisto’s feelings towards wolves in general (a species that now includes her parent), or an indication that she has specifically encountered her four-legged father in the woods. The nuance of the concessive clause is particularly ambiguous: is the acknowledgement of Lycaon’s lupine state intended to represent Callisto’s perspective, or the omniscient narrator’s? If she *has* chanced upon Lycaon in her wanderings, the implication of that clause is either that she does not recognize him in wolf form, or that she recognizes him but is nevertheless afraid of him. The first alternative is probably more likely, given Ovid’s recurring interest in the inability of characters to identify their transformed relatives (e.g., Callisto’s own son, the hunter Arcas, fails to recognize the bear as his mother and has to be prevented by Jupiter from killing her, 2.496-507).

\(^{43}\) Anderson (1997) 291.
daughter, or, if he is, that she makes no distinction in her reaction to him than to any other member of his species: she is terrified of them all. Either way, to Callisto, Lycaon is no longer “father.” He is simply “wolf.”

The indistinguishability of the wolf is an issue with special relevance to Rome. As Warren Ginsberg points out in a discussion of Lycaon, “this wolf, we suppose, must stand as the anti-type of Rome, whose symbol is the wolf . . . But how can the anti-type be distinguished from the type? Can the wolf that is Lycaon really be told apart from the wolf that is Rome?”

Though Ginsberg does not elaborate on this problem, the question which he raises is an important and intriguing one, and deserves further development. In particular, it is worth adding that the tension which he identifies between the she-wolf and Lycaon already lies latent in the origins of the Lupercal and the Lupercalia, two institutions which assumed particular importance in Ovid’s day.

The legendary location of the twins’ nurture by the she-wolf, the Lupercal is named in the Res Gestae as one of the buildings restored by the emperor, and Vergil’s inclusion of it in Aeneas’ tour of the pre-Roman settlement of Pallanteum represents further evidence of the site’s significance in the Augustan period. But as James O’Hara notes, Vergil actually offers two different etymological theories for the origins of the Lupercal, associating it not only with the she-wolf who nurtured the twins (in antro | . . . lupam, “the she-wolf in the cave,” Aen. 8.630-31), but also with the Arcadian deity Pan Lycaeus (Lupercal | Parrhasio dictum Panos de more Lycaei, “the Lupercal, named after Lycaean Pan in the Arcadian

fashion,” *Aen.* 8.343-44). This god originally had his sanctuary on Mount Lycaon (“Wolf Mountain”) in Arcadia – that is, the same Mount Lycaon inhabited by the king and founder who shares its name. In other words, it appears that the Arcadian wolf associated with the Lupercal is none other than Lycaon.

Similarly, in the *Fasti*, Ovid attributes joint Arcadian/Roman origins to the Lupercalia, too, the republican rites which had supposedly fallen into disuse and which were, according to Suetonius, revived by Augustus. The poet initially explains how the rites, celebrated in honor of the Arcadian god Pan, were brought to Italy by Evander (*Fast.* 2.279-80). Shortly after, however, he launches into an extended account of the wolf’s miraculous nurture of the twins in the cave, and ends by adding: *illa loco nomen fecit, locus ipse Lupercis* (“she [the *lupa*] lent her name to the site, and the site lent its name to the Luperci,” *Fast.* 2.421). Ovid thereby associates the etymology of the Lupercalia, the rites in which the Luperci participated, with the she-wolf, via the cave which takes her name. But once again he is quick to turn the tables, returning to the possibility of the festival’s Arcadian origins in the very next couplet: *quid uetat Arcadio dictos a monte Lupercos? | Faunus in Arcadia templa Lycaeus habet* (“what forbids the Luperci from being named after the Arcadian

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47 On Pan’s association with Arcadia, see Nielsen (2002) 76-78; on Lycaon as king and founder in the mythological tradition, see Forbes Irving (1990) 90-95.

48 Aug. 31.4. Quite what Suetonius means when he refers to the lapse and reintroduction of the Lupercalia is unclear, since the rites are reported to have been celebrated in 44 B.C.E. (the occasion on which Caesar was offered, and famously rejected, the diadem symbolizing kingship). In fact, much of what we know, or think we know, about this festival is uncertain. For some interpretations of the ancient evidence, see Wiseman (1995a) 77-88, Wiseman (1995b), North (2008), North and McLynn (2008).

49 Cf. *Fast.* 5.99-102. See Robinson (2011) 214 for a list of additional ancient sources which classify the Lupercalia as an Arcadian import brought by Evander to Rome, including Livy 1.5.1-2.

mountain? Lycaean Faunus has temples in Arcadia,” Fast. 2.423-24).\(^{51}\) These double Arcadian/Roman aetiologies offered by Vergil and Ovid raise the issue of exactly which wolf Augustus was resurrecting (or thought he was resurrecting) when he restored the Lupercal and reintroduced the Lupercalia: the \textit{lupa Romana}, or Lycaon? In a city in which single monuments were frequently held to recall more than one exemplary event or individual,\(^{52}\) this could hardly have been a trivial or irrelevant question.

Far from discreetly papering over Rome’s lupine identity crisis, Ovid chooses to expose and accentuate it. As his passing mention of the unidentified swimming wolf and Callisto’s terror at her father’s new species reminds us, one wolf looks much the same as any other. So while, in theory, the wolf Lycaon could not be more different from the \textit{lupa Romana} - male, not female; Greek, not Italian; murderer, not nurturer - in practice, perhaps the phrase “could not be more different” is something of an overstatement. The truth is that Lycaon \textit{could} be more different from the \textit{lupa Romana}; he could start by not being a wolf. After all, to the non-specialist (and the non-wolf), does a male wolf really look so different from a female wolf? Can a Greek wolf really be distinguished from an Italian wolf? In her day-to-day life, unencumbered by abandoned human infants, is the \textit{lupa Romana} not just as much of a carnivore as Lycaon? Moreover, if Lycaon is indeed the world’s first wolf, and if his transformation does indeed account for the origin of the species, this raises the

\(^{51}\) These two verses are omitted by one of the manuscripts (M), but Robinson (2011) 276 offers a plausible cause for this, suggesting that the omission “could easily be explained by the homoeoteleuton with 421 [Lupercis].” He nevertheless suspects an interpolation, noting the couplet’s resemblance to Aen. 8.343-44, cited above. But if the verses are in fact genuine, perhaps the connection which Ovid draws here between the Luperci and Mt. Lycaon could point to a veiled reference to the wolf priests within the Lycaon episode in \textit{Met.} 1: like the Luperci, who performed a sacrifice and a naked ritual run, the wolfish king kills a victim and roasts its meat (1.226-30), and flees (\textit{fugit}, 1.232; cf. \textit{currant}, Fast. 2.283) without his clothes (\textit{abeant uestes}, 1.236; cf. \textit{posita corpora ueste}, Fast. 2.284).

\(^{52}\) See e.g., Livy’s variant aetiologies of the Lacus Curtius (1.13.5, 7.6.3-5), with Miles (1995) 56-57. See also Wiseman (1986), Jaeger (1997) 58-59.
disconcerting question of whether Ovid intends him to be a distant relative of the *lupa Romana*.

For all her celebrated maternal instincts, in fact, it seems that the Romans already considered the she-wolf to be something of an ambivalent and paradoxical figure, embodying both affection and savagery. She is, after all, the foster-mother of Mars’ children. Propertius attributes Romulus’ brutality in abducting the Sabine women to his nourishment by the “harsh milk of a she-wolf” (*duro . . . lacte lupae*, 2.6.20), and a simile in Ovid’s own version of the mass assault in the *Ars Amatoria* likens the Romans to “hateful wolves” in pursuit of young lambs (*inuisos . . . lupos*, *Ars Am*. 1.118). Presented in this less-than-flattering light, as a rearer of rapists, perhaps the she-wolf is not so different from the savage Lycaon at all.

The poet’s choice of the phrase *imago feritatis* (“the image of wildness,” 1.239) to describe the wolf Lycaon does little to resolve the question one way or another. Does Lycaon’s *feritas* make him the opposite of the maternal and humane she-wolf? Or is the she-wolf, who is widely considered the source of Romulus’ (and the Romans’) fierceness, and whom Ovid elsewhere terms a *fera* (“wild beast,” *Fast*. 2.414), rather Lycaon’s double? It seems unlikely, moreover, that there is anything incidental or innocent about the poet’s use of the word “*imago*” (1.239) in reference to a *lupus* (1.237), writing as he was in a city rich in wolf imagery. Throughout the republican and imperial periods, the she-wolf existed in the Roman imagination not only in the form of a legend, but also, and even primarily, in the form

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53 Another possible point of commonality between the two is worth mentioning. Like the wolf which was formerly the man Lycaon, the she-wolf has a human alter-ego: the *lupa* who nursed Romulus and Remus was also identified, in a rationalized version of the story, as a prostitute; see Livy 1.4.7.


of an *imago*.\textsuperscript{57} Sculpted on altars, carved into sepulchers, painted on walls, stamped on coins, and engraved on gems, she marked both Rome and the provinces as her territory, and was a conspicuous presence in the Roman landscape, presiding over the city’s hills as a free-standing statue. Livy mentions that a monument of the she-wolf was located by the Lupercal cave on the slope of the Palatine, dedicated by Gnaeus and Quintus Ogulnius, a pair of brothers who served as curule aediles in the early third century.\textsuperscript{58} Another free-standing sculpture of the she-wolf, in bronze, stood on the Capitoline,\textsuperscript{59} and suffered a fate not unlike Lycaon’s when it was struck by lightning in 65 B.C.E.\textsuperscript{60}

The *lupa*’s afterlife as an *imago* continued into the Augustan period. Archaeologists have deduced from extant fragments that the wolf-and-twins vignette was the subject of the poorly-preserved left panel of the West façade of the Ara Pacis,\textsuperscript{61} and the she-wolf makes an additional, though unconfirmed, appearance on the breastplate of the Augustus statue from Prima Porta, on which is depicted a male figure accompanied by a canine. The pair cannot be identified with certainty (and the “wolf” may in fact be a dog), but Karl Galinsky

\textsuperscript{57} The scholarship on the *lupa Romana*, in all of her many iconographic manifestations, is vast. Dulière (1979) is a standard and comprehensive work, in two volumes; see also Evans (1992) 59-86 for a concise overview, and Wiseman (1995a) 63-76 on the Etruscan evidence. For the most recent discussions of *lupa* representations and their afterlives, see Mazzoni (2010) and Alföldi et al. (2011).

\textsuperscript{58} Livy 10.23.11, though it is not clear from the historian’s syntax whether the Ogulnii dedicated the entire wolf-and-twins statue group, or simply added figures of Romulus and Remus underneath a pre-existing wolf monument. An image of the wolf-and-twins, believed to depict the Ogulnii statue group, also appears on the reverse of a didrachm (the so-called Hercules or Ogulnii coin) which dates to around the middle of the century and coincides with Quintus’ consulship. On the Ogulnii monument and coin, see Dulière (1979) 43-62, Evans (1992) 59-63, 80-81, Wiseman (1995a) 72-76, and Mazzoni (2010) 30-31. Taken together, the Ogulnii statue group and coin indicate that the she-wolf existed not simply as a monument, but also in the form of what Roller (2009) 221 has elsewhere termed a “meta-monument,” a network of cross-references in which particular representations of an exemplary event or individual (in this case, the Ogulnii statue) were later imitated or cited via other media (the didrachm) – further evidence of the *lupa*’s significance as an *imago*.

\textsuperscript{59} On the *lupa Capitolina*, see e.g., Dulière (1979) 21-43, Mazzoni (2010) 15-88.

\textsuperscript{60} A divine warning, according to Cicero, of the threat posed by Catiline (*Cat.* 3.8; cf. *de Div* 1.12). On the lightning strike, see Dulière (1979) 62-64, Mazzoni (2010) 28-30. This was not the first time that wolf monuments had been associated with portents: Livy records that, when news of the defeat at Trasimene reached Rome in 217 B.C.E., the city’s wolf statues (though nowhere specified as images of the *lupa Romana*) were seen to break into a sweat (22.1.2).

\textsuperscript{61} Dulière (1979) 96-101. The scene subsequently featured on the so-called Arezzo Altar, which dates to the beginning of the first century C.E.
classifies them as Mars and the *lupa Romana*, citing in comparison an Augustan frieze commemorating the Battle of Actium, which features a prow decorated with a wolf’s head.\(^{62}\) Even the she-wolf’s cameo appearance in the *Aeneid* takes the form of an image, the first of the figures featured in relief on the shield of Aeneas.\(^{63}\)

Simply by classifying the wolf Lycaon as an *imago* (1.239), then, Ovid taps into a well-spring of Roman lupine tradition. Like the she-wolf, whose iconographic representations populated the city, Lycaon in his metamorphosed state exists in the form of a monument, an *imago feritatis*: in his appearance, vicious demeanor, and the name of his species (*lupus / λύκος*), he calls to mind (*monere*) the savage man he once was. But no less than that, the figure of the wolf is also a monument to the particular exemplary deed which led to Arcadian king’s metamorphosis in the first place - an exemplary deed which, as we will find, is curiously reminiscent of that performed by the she-wolf.

Food and feeding lie at the heart of the Lycaon episode. Certainly, the Arcadian king is punished for his general savagery, his impiety, and his diabolical plot to kill Jupiter in his sleep, but it is the feast of human flesh which is presented as his primary offence. This much is clear from the first mention of the story: it is referred to as the tale of the *foeda Lycaoniae . . . convivias mensae* (“vile banquets of Lycaon’s table,” 1.165), the memory of which makes Jupiter groan and decide to convene the Olympian Council. The preparation of the feast is, in fact, recounted in more detail than any of Lycaon’s other crimes: he is cast in the role of

\[\text{\^{62}}\text{Galinsky (1996) 158, 346. The frieze, discovered in the Circus Flaminius area, features an array of religious and naval symbols related to Actium.} \]

\[\text{\^{63}}\text{Vergil presents his she-wolf as a type of artist herself: Putnam (1998) 155-56 points out that the verb *fingere* (Aen. 8.634), used to describe how the creature “molds” the infants with her tongue, later appears in reference to Vulcan’s construction of the shield itself (8.726); see also Hardie (1986) 350, Putnam (1998) 162-65, and Mazzoni (2011) 105-12 for a discussion of the she-wolf’s act of creation in relation to the poet’s. On the significance of the wolf-and-twins scene in the *Aeneid*, see Putnam (1998), esp. 119-23, 180-87.} \]
both butcher and chef, even taking the trouble to cook the meat in two different ways. It is also worth noting that Jupiter’s unleashing of his retributive thunderbolt is an immediate (simul, 1.230) response not to his learning of Lycaon’s intended assassination attempt (of which the god apparently has foreknowledge), but to the king’s dinner service.

Given the Lycaon narrative’s prevailing focus on food, it is perhaps surprising to find, on closer inspection, that nowhere in the episode does Ovid mention that the Arcadian king actually eats. While Lycaon may be a schemer, a murderer, and a generally unpleasant human being, there is nothing in the text to suggest that he is anthropophagous, too. His dishing out of the Molossian hostage derives not from his own appetite, but from a desire to test Jupiter’s divinity (experientia ueri, 1.225; cf. 1.122-23). To refer to Lycaon’s “cannibalism,” as some critics do, is therefore slightly misleading; the king is punished not because he consumes his own kind, but because he serves it to a god. Lycaon’s exemplary act is not rooted in eating, but rather in (attempted) feeding.

Lycaon is not alone in committing an exemplary act involving feeding: it is the lupa Romana’s extraordinary nursing of Rome’s future founder which secures his survival. Ovid retells the story in the second book of the Fasti (2.413-20):

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64 obsidis unius iugulum mucrone resoluit | atque ita semineces partim furentibus artus | mollit aquis, partim subiecto torruit igni (“he slit the throat of a hostage, and one portion of the half-dead limbs he tenderized in boiling water, the other he roasted over the fire,” 1.226-29). In his essay on Lycaon’s sacrifice and social order in the Greek sources, Detienne (2002) 120, notes that ancient evidence, both literary and zoological, defines the wolf as the “most skillful of butchers and the best of cooks . . . [who] uses its powerful jaws like a sharp knife, neatly slitting its victim’s throat so that the blood spurts out . . . [and] also knows how to cut the flesh into portions.” For further discussion of sacrificial ritual in the Lycaon episode, see Feldherr (2010) 133-49.

65 quod simul imposuit mensis, ego uindice flamma | . . . euerti tecta (“as soon as he set it [the human flesh] down on the tables, I overturned the house with my avenging flame,” 1.230-31).

66 On Lycaon’s motivating impulse as a search for the truth, see Feldherr (2010) 134, 139.


68 Even after his transformation into a wolf, Lycaon’s killing spree among the flocks is attributed to his satisfaction in slaughter (cupidine caedis, 1.234; sanguine gaudet, 1.235), rather than the satisfaction of his hunger.
uenit ad expositos, mirum, lupa feta gemellos:
   quis credat pueris non nocuisse feram?
non nocuisse parum est, prodest quoque. quos lupa nutrit,
   perdere cognatae sustinuere manus.
constitit et cauda teneris blanditur alumnis,
   et fingit lingua corpora bina sua.
Marte satos scires: timor abfuit.  ubera ducunt
   nec sibi promissi lactis aluntur ope.

A she-wolf, who had recently given birth, came to the abandoned twins – a marvel! Who could believe that the wild beast would not harm the boys? Far from harming them, she even helped them. They, whose relatives could bring themselves to kill them with their own hands, were nurtured by a she-wolf. She stood still and caressed the young nurslings with her tail, and licked the twin bodies into shape with her tongue. You would know that they were sprung from Mars: they had no fear. They drank from her teats, and were fed on supply of milk not intended for them.

The uncomfortable proximity of the animal’s tongue to the infants’ bodies, reflected in the juxtaposition of *lingua corpora* (2.418), reminds the reader that this close encounter between a wolf’s maw and a pair of defenseless babies could have easily produced a rather less happy (though rather more tasty) outcome. As with the tale of Lycaon, the exemplary nature of the legend of the *lupa Romana* derives, in large part, from the unnatural inversion of the expected categories of consumption. In the case of the she-wolf, an animal feeds semi-divine infants, creatures not of her own species, rather than killing and eating them; meanwhile, in the Lycaon episode, a man feeds flesh from his own species, rather than that of an animal, to a god. Whereas the human Lycaon behaves like a wild beast (*notus feritate*, 1.198), the wild she-wolf (*fera*, *Fast*. 2.414) behaves like a human, and is far more benevolent than the boys’ own relatives (*Fast*. 2.416). The two acts are exemplary in opposite ways. While the

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69 Cf. *Hist. an*. 594a30-32, where Aristotle claims that a lone wolf, more than those who run in a pack, tends towards man-eating.

70 Cf. *Fast*. 3.53: *lacte quis infantes nescit creuisse ferino?* (“who does not know that the infants grew up on the milk of a wild beast?”)
nourishment which the lupa Romana offers to the twins is a miracle (mirum, Fast. 2.413), the feast which Lycaon offers to Jupiter is an abomination (foeda . . . conuiuia, Met. 1.165). Again, though, the implications of the parallels and inversions between the two wolves are far from clear-cut. Does the she-wolf’s status as a savior of humans serve to distinguish her once and for all from the slaughterer Lycaon? Or do Ovid’s statements of incredulity (mirum, 2.413; quis credat?, 2.414) and his emphasis on the unnaturalness of the situation (nec sibi promissi lactis aluntur ope, 2.420) rather place the she-wolf’s act squarely beyond the bounds of credibility?

In terms of geographical location, too, Lycaon and the she-wolf are closer than it appears at first glance. Arcadia might seem like a remote setting, but are we really so far from Rome? That an intimate connection existed between the two regions in Roman mythic history is attested by the eighth book of the Aeneid, in which Aeneas is given a guided tour of the future site of Rome, currently inhabited by the Arcadian emigrant, Evander. Perhaps Ovid’s Lycaon episode, which sees an ancestor of Aeneas (Jupiter) visiting an ancestor of Evander (Lycaon), could even be read as a sinister sort of “prequel” to Vergil’s account. As we saw earlier, the lupine link between Rome and Arcadia becomes clear when Evander points out the landmark which will, Vergil tells us, eventually be the Lupercal: et gelida monstrat sub rupe Lupercal | Parrhasio dictum Panos de more Lycaeis

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71 On the relationship between Rome and Arcadia, see Fabre-Serris (2008) 13-168, with 22-24 on Ovid’s account of the Lupercalia in Fast. 2.
72 For Jupiter as the ancestor of Aeneas, see the epic’s penultimate book, in which Venus pleads to the king of the gods for the deification of her son, qui te de sanguine nostro | fecit auum (“who, from my blood, made you a grandfather,” 14.588-89). The family ties between Lycaon and Evander are slightly trickier to reconstruct, owing to differences in the genealogical traditions related in the sources. Vergil writes that Evander’s settlement in Italy, Pallantum, is named after his great-grandfather Pallas (Pallantis proaui, Aen. 8.54); Servius, ad loc., notes that Pallas was actually Evander’s grandfather (auus), a son of Aegeus who was expelled from Athens and settled in Arcadia. According to Pausanias, however, Pallas was a son of Lycaon, and founded the original Pallantum, the Greek city in Arcadia (8.3.1). In the Fasti, meanwhile, Ovid calls Evander “the Pallantian hero” (Pallantius heros, 5.647), an epithet that could variously refer to his ancestor Pallas, his origins in the Arcadian city of Pallantum, or his founding of the settlement of the same name in Italy. Evander’s descent from Pallas, and Pallas’ from Lycaon, would make Evander and Lycaon relatives.
(“and he shows him, beneath a cold rock, the Lupercal, named after Lycaean Pan in the Arcadian fashion,” 8.343-44). Here, Vergil aligns himself with one of several etymologies for the Lupercal that were current at the time: its derivation from Lycaeus. Meanwhile, the “cold rock” under which the future Lupercal sits is, of course, none other than the hill that would later be called the Palatine. If the sub-mountainous region that is the future Lupercal is named “after Lycaean Pan in the Arcadian fashion,” this may indicate that the mountain itself is envisioned as an Italian replica of one in Evander’s native Arcadia: Mount Lycaon. So while Vergil’s Aeneas, on his visit to the home of an Arcadian king, is shown an Italian version of Mount Lycaon (the future Palatine), Ovid’s Jupiter, on his visit to the home of an Arcadian king, travels to the equally cold Greek original where Lycaon resides: *gelidi pineta Lycaei* (“the pine-woods of cold Lycaon,” 1.218).

Another set of wolf tracks leading from Arcadia to the Palatine may be discerned when Lycaon’s story is considered from a narratological perspective. The episode has garnered the attention of scholars for its position not only as the first extended tale of human metamorphosis, but also as the first tale related by a character in the epic, and as such, has frequently been read through the lens of narratological theory. Jupiter’s transparently one-sided account of mankind’s iniquity raises broader questions relating to the authority, objectivity, and credibility of narrators in the *Metamorphoses*, and the impartiality of Ovid’s gods. For the purposes of the current discussion, however, sifting through the narrative layers will produce answers of a more topographical nature.

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73 In other words, this etymology of the Lupercal alludes to a Greek λύκος which will eventually be transformed into a Roman *lupa* – much like Lycaon himself, who, along with his physical change of form, undergoes a bilingual metamorphosis from λύκος to lupus; see Feldherr (2002) 170.

74 Servius, *ad loc*.

75 Whether Jupiter is telling the truth or crying wolf is not quite clear: inconsistencies in his account of his experience as Lycaon’s guest have led critics to wonder whether the god may be guilty of poetic license. See e.g., Due (1974) 106, Anderson (1989), Segal (1999) 404-5, and Wheeler (1999) 171-81.
As Ovid traces the Olympian council members’ route to the emergency meeting called by Jupiter, he inserts the epic’s first analogy, and first explicit reference to contemporary Rome. The poet presents the lay of the celestial land as a reflection of the urban and social structures of Rome itself, complete with household deities (1.174), patrons and clients (1.171-2), and separate suburbs for the “plebeian” lesser gods (1.173). In a final flourish, he describes the residential quarter of Olympus, the dwelling-place of Jupiter and the other distinguished divinities, as the magni . . . Palatia caelī (“Palatine of high heaven,” 1.175). The parallel drawn between the king of the gods and the emperor of Rome, whose own residence was on the Palatine, is unmistakable, and the function and tone of the comparison, as well as the intention behind it, continue to spark debate. As Augustus was not the Palatine’s only famous inhabitant; the hill was also the legendary home of the she-wolf. It was here that she had nursed the twins in the Lupercal, and it was here, according to Dionysus of Halicarnassus, that a monument of her (the Ogulnii statue group, dating to the republican period) still stood. As such, the Palatine makes for a particularly fitting backdrop for Jupiter’s account of the wolf-man, Lycaon.

The significance of this intrusion of contemporary Rome into Ovid’s account becomes even clearer when the episode is disassembled into its narrative layers and respective geographical locations, as follows. Jupiter (the narrator of the tale) encounters Lycaon via first-hand experience, in the setting of Arcadia. The Council of the Gods (the primary audience) encounters Lycaon via Jupiter’s story, in the setting of Olympus. And the readers of the Metamorphoses (the secondary audience) encounter Lycaon via Ovid’s

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76 As Feeney (1991) 199 points out, the connection is strengthened by the fact that the emperor was accustomed to convene the Senate within the same complex, in the library adjoining the temple of Apollo Palatinus (Suet. Aug. 29.3). For further discussion, see Wheeler (1999) 172-77, Hill (2002), Barchiesi (2008), Miller (2009) 334-38.

77 Ant. Rom. 1.79.8, with Dulière (1979) 61-62.
narrative – which orients us in the setting of the Palatine. The overall effect that I am attempting to capture here is similar to that produced by a thaumatrope, a simple scientific toy which enjoyed popularity among the Victorians. This device consisted of a cardboard disc or rectangle suspended on opposite ends by pieces of string, and decorated with a picture on either side (for example, a bird and an empty cage). When the strings were twirled and the card spun quickly, the two pictures seemed to merge, creating the optical illusion of a single image (so that the bird appeared to be perched in the cage). The effect of the thaumatrope can be explained by the eye’s ability to retain an impression of an object for a split second after the object has vanished. In the same way, the mind’s eye of Ovid’s reader retains the memory of the Palatine, even after the poet has moved on from the Roman analogy to a discussion of the events at Lycaon’s home in Greece. The result of this narratological sleight of hand is that Ovid’s audience is presented with an exemplary tale involving a wolf (Lycaon), related in a setting which bears an uncanny resemblance to the Palatine, the site of another exemplary tale involving a wolf (the lupa Romana). By flipping deftly between the narrative levels – describing Palatine-like Olympus one moment, a wolf in Arcadia the next - the poet bridges the conceptual and geographical gaps between the different landscapes, and affords his reader a fleeting, thaumatropic glimpse of a composite

78 The meaning of the word “thaumatrope” – “wonder-turner” – makes the device a particularly apt parallel to the subject of the Metamorphoses. It is worth noting, in fact, that the thaumatrope had a link with classical mythology from its very conception. The British physician John Ayrton Paris, who was the first to document the device in his work of fiction, Philosophy in Sport Made Science in Earnest (1827), and is usually credited as its inventor, has a character observe that, “this amusing toy might be made instrumental in impressing classical subjects upon the memory of young persons,” before adding, “why can we not . . . thus represent the Metamorphoses of Ovid?” (368). Among the mythological scenes specified as especially well-suited to the spinning thaumatrope are Daphne’s metamorphosis into a laurel (“as the figure revolved, the leaves were seen sprouting from her fingers, and her arms lengthening into branches”), and Eurydice’s death and revival, which Dr. Paris accompanies with a paronomastic epigram: “By turning round, ‘tis said, that Orpheus lost his wife; | Let him turn round again, and she’ll return to life” (374, emphasis in original). For a discussion of the thaumatrope and similar optical toys, including color photographs of nineteenth-century examples, see Stafford and Terpak (2001) 354-56.
image which would have had particular resonance for a Roman audience: a wolf on the Palatine.

I mentioned earlier that one of the defining qualities of the *exemplum* is its capacity to walk the fine line between the specific and the general, between exceptional singularity and accessible imitability. This defining quality is also, however, one of the *exemplum*’s defining problems: the “specific” always threatens to collapse back into the “general” from which it distinguished itself in the first place. So while the she-wolf’s exemplary act of humanity might make her an exceptional wolf, an extraordinary wolf, and a thoroughly excellent wolf, she is such precisely *because* she is a wolf, a species better known for its savagery. It is this same oscillation between the specific and the general which the metamorphic monument embodies. The process of metamorphosis occludes individual identity, so that Lycaon’s transformation turns a man with a distinctive name and a distinctive body into a wolf indistinguishable from any other. The result is something of a paradox, in that any and every wolf subsequently becomes a potential *monumentum* to Lycaon, calling to mind (*monere*) his exemplary wildness, and yet no wolf is sufficiently distinctive to call to mind (*monere*) the human Lycaon in particular. As I hope to have shown in the course of this discussion, the question becomes a particularly pressing issue for Rome itself, the city whose foundational exemplum involves a wolf.

But what is the poet’s agenda when he stands a wolf at the head of his universal history, as an *imago* commemorating an exemplary act of feeding in an Arcadia very much tied to Rome, and the Palatine in particular? A characteristic feature of the traditional monument, as Don Fowler and others have noted, is that it continually resists rigid classification, its meaning shifting to reflect the interpretation of its audience. This
observation is equally applicable to the metamorphic monument, the transformed body that is
a product of metamorphosis. Even after no trace of the former human being is perceptible,
and the new form – whether animal, tree, or rock - is seemingly intact, Ovid’s “finished
product” is never quite finished. It is left to the individual viewer or reader to complete its
meaning, and even then, that meaning is only complete until the next viewer or reader
supplies another one. So does the exemplum of Lycaon, who is the stereotype and prototype
of the cruel and bloodthirsty wolf, make that of the lupa Romana all the more extraordinary
by comparison? Or is Ovid setting up an alternative (and altogether more plausible) wolf
symbol, one which, unlike the lupa Romana, is unauthorized by the emperor?79 At the very
least, the poet exposes the multiplicity of the wolf, the exemplum upon which Rome (and, by
extension, Augustus) was built, by emphasizing the animal’s other side: the savagery which
representations such as the tender scene of the nursing lupine foster-mother on the Ara Pacis
sought to elide.

This same resistance to authorial control manifests itself, in a different way, in the
anemone, the metamorphic monument which is the final product of Adonis’ transformation
in Book 10. While the flower does not share the same symbolic significance as the wolf at
Rome, it nevertheless raises important issues concerning the prescriptive function and
didactic value of monuments, and so that is where we turn next.

79 In a brief discussion of exemplarity in Ovid’s Roman history at the end of the epic, Hardie (2002b) 208
makes a similar point about the tension between type and anti-type, with regard to Cipus: “The stories in
Metamorphoses 15 are anticipations of, or exempla for, the one great man Augustus, but the exact relationship
between exemplum and that which is exemplified cannot be too hastily pinned down. . . . Is Cipus a pure
example of a Republican hero, a counter-example to a Julius or an Augustus who takes on the de facto role of
king, or is he a parallel for Julius’ refusal of the royal diadem, and for Augustus’ ostentatious return of powers
to the Republic?”
**The Admonition of Adonis**

In his 1908 essay, “The Ethics of Elfland,” G. K. Chesterton remarks on a recurring feature of the fantasy genre, which he terms the “Doctrine of Conditional Joy.” For fairy-folk, he observes, the key to unbridled happiness frequently rests on a single, non-negotiable condition:

“... according to elfin ethics, all virtue is in an “if.” The note of the fairy utterance always is, “You may live in a palace of gold and sapphire, if you do not say the word ‘cow’”; or “You may live happily with the King’s daughter, if you do not show her an onion.” The vision always hangs upon a veto. All the dizzy and colossal things conceded depend upon one small thing withheld. All the wild and whirling things that are let loose depend upon one thing that is forbidden.”

Integral to Chesterton’s schema is the act of warning: the character must be made fully aware of the stipulated condition before breaking it (as he or she inevitably will). Nor is this principle restricted to fairy tales; the Doctrine of Conditional Joy, it seems, exists not only in Elfland, but also somewhere closer to home: the Mediterranean. Chesterton’s subsequent examples are drawn from the world of Classical mythology, unmistakably alluding to the conditions broken by Pandora (“a box is opened, and all evils fly out”) and Psyche (“a lamp is lit, and love flies away”). The Doctrine of Conditional Joy is also applicable to Ovid’s account of Venus and Adonis, the last of the tales in the tenth book of the *Metamorphoses*. Here, one character after another experiences a great loss as a direct result of his or her failure to heed a warning.

In the aftermath of his wife’s double death, Orpheus regales an audience of trees, birds, and beasts with a series of stories involving love, loss, or some combination of the two.

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80 Chesterton (1908) 99.
81 Chesterton (1908) 100.
The final tale in the sequence describes how Venus, enamored with the hunter Adonis and seeking to protect him from danger, cautions him not to pursue dangerous beasts. Lions in particular, she adds, are abhorrent to her. When Adonis asks the reason for her hatred, the goddess responds by relating, in some detail, the tale of Hippomenes and Atalanta. Warned by an oracle never to wed, the fleet-footed huntress Atalanta set her persistent suitors the challenge of participating against her in a race, in which the reward for victory was her hand in marriage, and the penalty for loss was their death. Hippomenes, entranced by the girl’s beauty and undeterred by the failure of many before him, prayed for assistance to Venus, who presented him with golden apples to cast during the course of the race. Atalanta slowed down to retrieve the precious objects, forfeiting her accustomed victory, and the pair were married. But Hippomenes neglected to make the proper thank-offerings to Venus, with the result that the affronted goddess filled him with an uncontrollable passion for his new wife, to which he succumbed in the spectacularly ill-advised location of Cybele’s temple. The furious Magna Mater responded by transforming the couple into fearsome lions and employing them as her chariot-bearers.

After concluding her story and repeating her warning to Adonis to avoid savage beasts, Venus sets off for Cyprus. But the young hunter ignores the goddess’ advice and pursues a wild boar, which promptly gores him to death. At the sound of her lover’s cries, Venus returns, and commemorates the boy by establishing an annual festival in his honor, and by transforming his spilled blood into an anemone flower.

Although this final section of Orpheus’ song-cycle has never suffered from a lack of scholarly interest or interpretations, the central role which Ovid accords to the act of warning warrants further attention. Three-quarters of the episode is devoted to the embedded
narrative of Hippomenes and Atalanta, the monitory tale which Venus delivers to Adonis in the hope of discouraging him from hunting wild beasts. The prominence of the theme filters down to a linguistic level, with *monere* and its cognates appearing seven times in total, more frequently than in any other episode in the *Metamorphoses*. But the act of warning is repeatedly presented as problematic, and not once does an admonition bring about the desired outcome.

Venus herself frames the story of the metamorphosis of Hippomenes and Atalanta as an exemplary tale. She recounts how, insulted by the suitor’s failure to acknowledge the pivotal role she played in his success, she set out to make an *exemplum* of him and his new wife: *ne sim spernenda futuris | exemplo caueo* (“so that I would not be scorned by anyone in the future, I warn by example,” 10.684-85). Here, the goddess captures the oscillation between present and future, specific and general, which is so typical of the *exemplum*. Her warning operates at two different narrative levels. Within the setting of the tale itself, it serves as a caution directed at unspecified future offenders against Venus’ honor; within the broader context of the episode, meanwhile, it may be read as an (unsuccessful) instruction to Adonis himself not to spurn the goddess by disregarding her advice about hunting wild beasts. Though Venus herself is not the agent of the leonine metamorphosis, she is directly responsible for the event which precipitates it, that is, the all-consuming lust which leads Hippomenes to defile Cybele’s temple. Venus thereby imprints herself in the figures of the lions, so that they become monuments which not only commemorate the story of the lovers and their crime against Cybele, but actively warn (*caueo*, 10.685) against disdaining Venus herself in future (*futuris*, 10.685).

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82 10.542, 543, 553, 625, 708, 709, 725.
As with Lycaon above, the monument which preserves Hippomenes’ exemplary recklessness is double, existing not only in the form of the metamorphosed bodies of himself and his wife (the lions), but also in the form of the cautionary narrative. In fact, the word “monere” recurs several times at both the beginning and end of Venus’ embedded tale (monendo . . . monet, 10.542-43; monuit . . . monitis, 10.708-9). From the outset, moreover, Venus promises Adonis that, upon hearing the story, he will marvel at the monstrum of the crime against her (10.553). This term, according to one ancient etymology, derives from the verb monere, and is typically found in reference to a supernatural event, a portent, or a divine warning. In the case of the couple’s metamorphosis into lions, the monstrum is quite literally a divine warning, in that it issues from the goddess Venus herself.

In one of the most curious and frequently noted features of this episode, however, the contents of the goddess’ cautionary tale bear only a passing relation to its apparent purpose as a warning to Adonis to keep his distance from wild beasts. Its emphasis is not so much on danger as on desire, not so much on lions as on lust. Most of the narrative is devoted to Hippomenes’ burgeoning love for Atalanta, his manly courage in pursuing her, and the footrace in which he wins a victory and her hand in marriage. The couple’s transformation into lions, by contrast, is addressed only briefly at the end of the story, with the effect that it seems almost like an afterthought.

From this, the inclination might be to draw the conclusion that Venus is simply constitutionally incapable of telling a story that does not involve passion. But additional clues indicate that something more than the goddess’ adherence to her personal area of

85 As Coleman (1971) 469 puts it, “the ostensible moral of the tale, that Adonis should avoid lions when he is out hunting (705-6), cannot on any interpretation bear the weight of the preceding narrative of Atalanta.” For similar views, see Anderson (1972) 517, Nagle (1988) 116-17, and Simpson (2001) 381.
expertise may be at stake here. Venus’ cautionary tale seems deliberately set up for failure on all fronts. While she maintains that the lions are angry (*iram uultus habet*, 10.702) and fearsome (*timendi*, 10.703), their ferocious credentials diminish considerably when she adds that Cybele has employed them, tamed and bridled, as her chariot bearers (*dente premunt domito Cybeleia frena leones*, 10.704). The image of the lions with which Venus leaves Adonis, then, is not one of savage predators lying in wait to attack a young hunter in a blaze of furry fury, but rather of domesticated beasts of burden, placidly yoked in the service of a goddess.86 And when Venus ends her speech by instructing her lover one final time to shun wild beasts, her diction is, oddly, better-suited to epic warfare: she tells him to avoid any creature which “does not turn tail in flight, but offers its breast to battle” (*non terga fugae, sed pugnae pectora praebet*, 10.706). These are fighting words, all the better with which to inflame the heart of a young man set on heroism. This parting remark, and the goddess’ story as a whole - with its emphasis on determination, courage, and the thrill of the chase - appears less like a caution and more like a challenge, and Venus sounds less like a wise counselor and more like a motivational speaker.

Having inadvertently whetted Adonis’ appetite for danger, the goddess ends her speech with a wish that the youth should avoid hunting wild beasts, “so that your manly vigor [*uirtus*] may not prove ruinous to the both of us” (*ne uirtus tua sit damnosa duobus*, 10.707). “Thus,” concludes Orpheus the narrator, “she warned him” (*illa quidem monuit*, 10.708). Just one verse later, however, we learn that the goddess’ admonition will go unheeded, as Adonis’ sense of manly vigor (*uirtus*) resists the warnings (*stat monitis contraria uirtus*, 10.709). The very quality which leads Adonis to disregard the goddess’ warning to restrain his *uirtus*, then, is none other than his *uirtus*. The effect of the repetition

is not simply ironic, or indicative of Venus’ outstanding powers of prediction, but starkly reveals the inadequacy of warning.

Admonition proves equally futile within the narrative of Venus’ cautionary tale itself. The oracle which cautions Atalanta to avoid marriage is a detail not found in any other version of the myth, and appears to be Ovid’s own innovation. As Anderson points out, it provides motivation for the contest that the girl devises for her suitors, and divests her of some of the responsibility for imposing such a deadly obstacle. More than that, however, it serves as yet another opportunity to showcase the inefficacy of warning. As in other scenes of prophecy in the epic, the god delivers an instruction (fuge coniugis usum, “flee from intercourse with a husband,” 10.565); but he also predicts, in the very next verse, that this instruction will prove fruitless (nec tamen effugies teque ipsa uiua carebis, “but you will not flee, and, though living, will lose yourself,” 10.566). In a startling display of cynical self-awareness, the oracle appears openly to articulate what anyone familiar with ancient prophecies already knows: that its prediction is powerless to change the course of events.

Visual caveats are exposed as just as fruitless as aural, oracular ones. When the lovestruck Atalanta grieves over Hippomenes’ decision to take part in the fatal race, she laments that, despite watching one suitor after another suffer the bloody punishment for defeat in the footrace, he fails to be warned (admonitus, 10.625) by their misfortune. Although he, unlike them, initially wins the challenge and the bride, the outcome of his involvement with Atalanta turns out to be equally disastrous, if not more so: according to

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88 Anderson (1972) 522.
89 Simpson (2001) 381 detects a connection between the oracle’s warning that Atalanta should “run” (fuge . . . effugies, 10.565-66) from a husband, and Venus’ warning that Adonis should “run” (effuge, 10.707) from wild beasts. Both admonitions go unheeded.
Cybele, who devises his punishment, transformation into a lion is a fate worse than death (10.696-98).

Throughout the episode, then, a pattern emerges in which the efficacy of warnings is continually subjected to scrutiny and undermined, with an insistence that points to design rather than accident. The theme of failed admonition penetrates through the narrative layers, spanning both the embedded tale of Atalanta’s marriage and the broader context of Venus’ interaction with Adonis. To reach a fuller understanding of its significance, however, we must turn to the primary, outermost narrative frame of Book Ten and its narrator: Orpheus himself.

In their discussions of the Song of Orpheus, critics frequently posit thematic links between the recent, traumatic events of the bard’s life and the substance of his art. Besides the two topics named by Orpheus himself at the outset – boys adored by the gods, and the deviant passions of women (10.152-54) – Robert Coleman notes that the loss of a loved one, the punishment of impiety, and the relationship between life and death are additional themes in the song which Orpheus has lately experienced for himself.90 Philip Hardie, meanwhile, suggests that the bard’s attempt to bring his wife back from the dead finds a parallel in those of his tales in which life is (re)created: Pygmalion’s lifeless ivory maiden is animated through divine intervention, while Hyacinthus and Adonis, the deceased lovers of Apollo and Venus respectively, are eternally memorialized through their subsequent metamorphosis into flowers and their commemoration in annual festivals.91 Orpheus thereby seeks to

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90 Coleman (1971) 470.
compensate for the death of his beloved Eurydice by means of the perpetuation of what
Hardie terms “textual substitutes,”⁹² that is, stories of desire and loss.

Though every attempt to trace any common thread other than the most prosaic (for
instance, “love”) throughout the seven stories of Orpheus’ song seems invariably to involve a
touch of creative accounting or the provision of one or two exceptions,⁹³ on a case-by-case
(or rather, tale-by-tale) basis, at least, the imitation of the bard’s life in his art is
unmistakable.⁹⁴ In the Venus and Adonis episode, the recurring use of the term “monere,”
the innovative addition of Atalanta’s oracle, and the glaring dissonance between the goddess’
apparent purpose (to expound the dangers of hunting wild beasts) and the substance of her
narrative (a romantic hero myth with a pair of bridled big cats tacked on the end), are all
features which may be attributed to the bard’s own recent failure to heed a warning, and his
ensuing sense of disillusionment and cynicism. After all, who knows the futility of
admonition better than Orpheus, who suffered the second, and irreversible, loss of Eurydice
due to his inability to abide by the instruction not to turn around on their return journey from
the Underworld?

Several textual sign-posts orient the reader towards approaching the theme of warning
in the Venus and Adonis episode via the Orpheus and Eurydice story. When the goddess
cautions her young lover to fear and avoid wild beasts, Orpheus himself inserts an aside: “if,”
he adds, “there could be any benefit in warning” (si quid prodesse monendo | possit, 10.542-
43). This remark, which seems at first to be little more than a platitude about the rashness of

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⁹² Hardie (2002a) 68.
⁹³ See e.g., Leach (1974) 122: “In all the tales save that of Pygmalion, love is presented as a fatal impulse
verging on death” (emphasis added); Hardie (2002a) 65: “Each story is a counter-example to Orpheus’ first,
b briefly told, tale of the rape of Ganymede . . .” (emphasis added).
⁹⁴ As Galinsky (1975) 90 points out, while none of the tales corresponds exactly to Orpheus’ situation, each
reflects certain aspects of it.
youth or a portent of the tale’s unhappy outcome, takes on a new significance when we consider the personal history of the story’s narrator. Similarly charged is the use of the word “lex” in reference to the condition imposed by Atalanta, when she sets her suitors the challenge of the footrace (lex, 10.572; legem, 10.574). The term had initially appeared in the context of Eurydice’s return to the upper world (hanc simul et legem Rhodopeius accipit heros, “the Thracian hero received her, together with the condition,” 10.50). Finally, Orpheus’ own disillusionment with divine warnings could also account for two additional features of the episode, which critics have traditionally sought to explain: Ovid’s invention and inclusion of Atalanta’s oracle, and the deeply problematic nature of Venus’ cautionary tale to Adonis. In all these ways, Orpheus makes it quite clear that Adonis’ decision to hunt wild beasts is not to be understood as a simple case of a reckless youth ignoring or misunderstanding a cautionary tale; rather, it seems that he has received a defective model.

Nevertheless, as ever in the Metamorphoses, the price for failing to learn from a warning must be paid, and that price is to become a warning oneself. Mourning over her lover’s body, Venus pledges to establish an enduring monument (monimenta, 10.725) of her grief, an annual reenactment of his death and her lamentation. Here, the goddess is alluding to the Adonia, the yearly festival in honor of Adonis. Given that one purpose of a monument is to monere, to “call to mind,” there would, ordinarily, be nothing unusual about the use of the term “monumentum” to denote a celebration which recalls the life and death of its subject. Particularly disturbing, however, is the appearance of the word “monumentum” in reference to the Adonia, a festival which commemorates the demise of a young man whose resistance

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95 As noted by Nagle (1988) 114 n. 27.
96 Pace Simpson (2001) 382, who maintains that Adonis deliberately rejects Venus’ explicit warning to avoid wild beasts in favor of an implicit warning embedded within the goddess’ tale (the oracle’s instruction to Atalanta to shun marriage), which has particular resonance for him as a would-be hero: “Adonis would rather die hunting, exercising his virtus, than, like Atalanta, lose his “self” through love.”
to warnings (*stat monitis contraria uirtus*, 10.709) was the direct cause of his death. In an episode in which the term “*monere*” has been so devalued, and the lessons of the past have been shown to have such little bearing on the present, the promise of a *monumentum* inevitably rings hollow.

But the festival is not the only monument which Venus sets up for her lover. The term “*monumentum*” is additionally found, as we have seen above, in reference to transformed bodies. Venus’ monument for Adonis, then, may be regarded not as the Adonia alone, but also the anemone born of his blood, a perennial plant whose flower returns year after year. The “annually-recurring image of death” (*repetita . . . mortis imago* | *annua*, 10.726-27) predicted by Venus would then refer not only to the reenactment of her lover’s demise and subsequent rebirth in the Adonia festival, but also to the yearly-flowering anemone’s destruction by the winds.

On announcing her intention to create a flower from the blood of her beloved, Venus invokes as a precedent a botanical metamorphosis wrought by a fellow goddess: “or was it once permitted to you, Persephone, to turn female limbs into fragrant mint [*mentas*], and shall the transformation of the hero descended from Cinyras be begrudged to me?” The allusion is to Pluto’s mistress, the nymph Menta, whom Persephone transformed in a fit of rage (and in one version of the myth, then proceeded to trample underfoot). As we have seen already in this episode, Venus is a goddess motivated by *exempla*. The driving force behind her punishment of Hippomenes was not only her fury at his ingratitude (*subitam conuertor in iram*, 10.683), but also a desire to “warn by example,” so as not to be similarly

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97 Hardie (2002a) 69.
98 *an tibi quondam | femineos artus in olentes uertere mentas, | Persephone, licuit, nobis Cinyreius heros | inuidiae mutatus erit?*, 10.728-31.
spurned in future (dolens ne sim spernenda futuris | exemplo caueo, 10.684-85). Now, in her speech over Adonis’ body, we find her once again invoking an exemplum in order to get what she wants, in this case, a flower for her lover.\textsuperscript{100}

The relevance of Persephone in this context is clear enough: her association with the Underworld makes her an appropriate choice for an invocation over a corpse.\textsuperscript{101} But how are we to account for this (apparently obscure) exemplum in particular? After all, the parallel between the two goddess’ situations is not especially close: the transformation enacted by Persephone was not, unlike Venus’, of a dead male lover, but rather of a living female lover-rival. One possible explanation for the choice might lie in the name of the object of Persephone’s metamorphosis, Menta. Venus’ reference to mentas (“mint”, 10.729) echoes the description of the Adonia festival as monumenta four verses earlier, and reminds the reader that the term “monumentum” may equally well be applied to the product of the metamorphosis, the transformed body. In the context of a speech about monumenta, objects whose purpose is to “call to mind,” it is entirely fitting that Venus’ mens should be admonita of Menta.

But this is not the only significant feature of the word “menta.” The nymph turns out to be the owner of a “speaking name;” she was mint all along.\textsuperscript{102} Ovid thereby primes the reader for the onomastic wordplay which concludes the Venus and Adonis episode, when he reveals the word “anemone,” too, to be something of a “speaking name” – but with a twist.

\textsuperscript{100} Pavlock (2009) 100 regards the reference to Persephone as evidence of Venus’ “obsession with power” and “self-interest in her transformation of Adonis.”

\textsuperscript{101} This Underworld association is reinforced by the comparison, shortly after, of the anemone’s blood-red hue to the color of the pomegranate (10.735-37). Venus’ invocation to Persephone may also allude to another myth, in which the two goddesses vie for possession of the infant Adonis (Apollod. Bibl. 3.14.4, with Detienne (1977) 64 and Pavlock (2009) 170-71 n. 34).

\textsuperscript{102} On the relationship between names and bodies in Ovid’s epic, see Hardie (2002a) 239-57.
In the description of the plant which concludes the episode, the word “anemone” is conspicuously absent, though the etymology offered by the poet – *excutient idem, qui praestant nomina, uenti* (“the same winds which shake the flower give it its name,” 10.739) - makes it clear that the omission is not through any lack of botanical knowledge on his part. On the contrary, the suppression of a Greek name (here, *anemone*, from ἄνεμοι, “winds”) whose etymology is then expressed in Latin (*uenti*, “winds”) is characteristic of the sort of wordplay which Ovid relishes. In this case, the absence of the word “anemone” is particularly suggestive, as if the winds have already borne away the flower’s name together with its petals. Philip Hardie remarks that “we hear its sound in the Latin *nomina*. The echo hints that a windy fickleness may be the quality of all names when it comes to guaranteeing the presence of their bearers.” The anemone is a short-lived flower for a short-lived boy, and Hardie’s observation can be taken a step further if we note that this sense of absence is already inscribed within the name *anemone* itself, which contains the word “nemo,” “no one.”

But there may be something more to add. In his monograph on stylistic features of the *Metamorphoses*, Garth Tissol demonstrates that etymological wordplay and the suppression of species’ names, far from being symptomatic of Ovidian frivolity, operate as deliberate strategies through which the poet demands and achieves the reader’s active

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103 On the naming of the anemone, see Michalopoulos (2001) 26-27. In the epic’s aetiological passages, the appearance of the word “*nomen*” frequently serves as marker of an etymology. See Myers (1994) 37-39 for a discussion of the “etymological intent” of Ovid’s stories, and 65 n. 19 for a list of citations where the terms “*nomen*,” “*nomina*,” “*nominat*,” and the related expressions “dicere,” “appellare,” and “uocare,” are used in the context of aetiologies; see also Michalopoulos (2001) 4-5.

104 Nor is Ovid at all atypical among Latin authors in this respect. As McCartney (1919) 346 puts it, “the Romans loved the clashing of word on word as well of sword on sword.”

105 Segal (1989) 89 notes the correspondence between the scattering of the flower by the winds (*uenti*, 10.739), and Orpheus’ failed attempt to grasp Eurydice, which leaves him snatching only at the breezes (*auras*, 10.49).

106 Hardie (2002a) 69.
engagement with the text. This observation is no less true of Adonis’ metamorphosis into a flower in the final verse of Orpheus’ song. Here, Ovid asks us to supplement the boy’s physical transformation by enacting a philological one of our own, a bilingual metamorphosis from Latin uenti to Greek ἄνεμοι, with the result that it is not only the winds which furnish the anemone with its name (qui præstant nomina, uenti, 10.736), but the reader, too. And as we triumphantly declare, in Greek, the answer to the poet’s etymological riddle – anemone! – in the same breath we hear ourselves declaring, in Latin, the futility of warnings: a! ne mone! (“ah, do not warn!”). The flower’s name is revealed to be a bilingual oronym, a word which, when sliced up into its component sounds, produces an entirely different meaning. In a world where warnings – don’t look back, don’t hunt dangerous beasts, don’t marry – are invariably ignored, perhaps the only worthwhile warning is the warning not to warn at all.

In supplying the missing name of flower (anemone) and thereby exposing the prohibition concealed within it (a! ne mone!), we are made complicit in Ovid’s narrative, hearing ourselves echo the disillusionment of the narrator Orpheus, who, reflecting on Venus’ instructions to Adonis, had earlier questioned the value of admonition: “if there could be any benefit in warning” (si quid prodesse monendo | possit, 10.542-43). After all, whom, in this sorry sequence of nested tales, have warnings ultimately benefited? Chesterton’s Doctrine of Conditional Joy, in which “all virtue is in an if,” is as applicable here as it is in Elfland: Orpheus would have reclaimed Eurydice, if he had not turned around; Hippomenes would have remained safe, if he had learned from the unhappy fate of his fellow suitors;

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108 Pinker (1994) 160 defines “oronyms” as “strings of sound that can be carved into words in two different ways,” e.g., “I scream” and “ice cream.”
Atalanta would have retained her identity, if she had remained unmarried; and Adonis would have been safe in his hunting, if he had pursued deer and rabbits rather than lions and wild boars.

While Ovid did not invent Adonis’ association with the anemone,\textsuperscript{109} he invests it with new meaning by setting it in the context of a web of futile warnings. For a second-time reader alert to the poet’s etymological wordplay, \textit{anemone} is a \textit{nomen} which is not only \textit{omen} (as the proverb goes), but also \textit{monens}. In Ovid’s hands, the word becomes something of a reverse “speaking name,” preserving the fate of Adonis, who resisted Venus’ warnings and failed to learn from the monuments (that is, the lions and the cautionary narrative) which commemorated the \textit{exemplum} (10.685) of Hippomenes’ recklessness. As a monument itself, the anemone is at once permanent (in the perpetual re-growth of the flower) and ephemeral (in that flower’s transience).\textsuperscript{110} In both name and substance, then, it is an eternal warning against the ineffectuality of warnings, a \textit{monumentum} which, paradoxically, calls to mind \textit{(monere)} and cautions against \textit{(monere)} the failure of \textit{monumenta}, “things by which one is warned.”

Reading back through the episode, we discover that Ovid has planted the seeds of the final verse’s onomastic twist from the beginning. The clues to the \textit{anemone}’s name and its hidden prohibition were there all along, both in the poet’s recurrent use of \textit{monere} and its cognates (\textit{monendo}, 10.542; \textit{monet}, 10.543; \textit{monstrum}, 10.553; \textit{admonitus}, 10.625; \textit{monuit}, 10.708; \textit{monitis}, 10.709; \textit{monimenta}, 10.725), and in his depiction of the tragic results of one ineffectual caution after another. Did we, the audience, heed the many warnings of Adonis’ transformation? And if not, are we any better than the characters in the story?

\textsuperscript{109} Forbes Irving (1990) 279-80.
\textsuperscript{110} Janan (1988) 132.
By aligning the process of metamorphosis with monument-making, Ovid inserts himself into a rich and relevant contemporary discourse, projecting onto the transformed body the contradictions and incongruities of monumentality. To this end, the wolf and the anemone each expose a different, but related, tension within the monument and, by extension, within the exemplum. The case of Lycaon starkly reveals that the meaning of the monument which reifies and commemorates the exemplary deed or individual – in this case, the wolf - is impossible to control. The loss of identity which the process of metamorphosis involves (or, in exemplary terms, the collapsing of the specific into the general) means that any and every wolf becomes a monument which calls to mind (monere) the savage Lycaon – including, crucially, the lupa Romana, the wolf upon whose exemplum Rome is founded. Meanwhile, the Venus and Adonis episode attests to the alarming capacity of the monument to fail to instruct (monere), that is, to fall short of its goal of transmitting a prescribed message to its audience. Nor does the negative imperative contained within the name of the flower (a! ne mone!) necessarily have to pertain to warning in particular; it can simply denote instruction more generally.\footnote{Mone is used in this broader sense in the Fasti, when the narrator asks various interlocutors for instruction (1.467, 3.261, 5.447).}

The lessons learned from the cases of both the wolf and the anemone have broader implications for Augustan Rome, a city in which, thanks to the emperor’s spectacular building program, monuments had assumed unprecedented significance. Here, as elsewhere in his works, we find Ovid challenging and resisting the authority of monuments, laying bare their failure to do their job. If the monument’s whole reason for being is to preserve an exemplary deed, and to inspire others to emulate great success or eschew great catastrophe (or at least to consider the judgments already passed on those successes and catastrophes
normative), the discourse breaks down entirely when the audience cannot, or does not, draw the intended lesson from it.

We saw at the beginning of this chapter that the metamorphosed body shares with the traditional monument not only multiplicity and instability of meaning, but also a characteristic sense of permanence. I noted there that, several times in Ovid’s description of the transformed body, the terms “monumenta” and “manere” are found in conjunction. It is precisely this permanent quality of the metamorphic monument – manifested by the eternal reproduction of the wolf, and the eternal re-growth of the anemone – which ensures that the problems it embodies always remain, and always remain unresolved. In Augustan Rome, a city built on exempla and monumenta, the issues raised and tensions exposed by Ovid could be neither incidental nor irrelevant – and nor were they transient. That the poet intends for his audience to keep these issues and tensions in mind as they read the Metamorphoses is clear from his choice of Lycaon - whom he presents as a lupine monument resembling Rome’s own iconographic symbol - as the epic’s first extended narrative of transformation. And while it would probably be an exaggeration to suggest that Ovid’s wolf threatens to blow the emperor’s house of exempla down altogether, perhaps we could concede that he chips away, quite spiritedly, at its foundations.

Chapter 3

Family Resemblances: the Sun-Child and the Book-Child

The process of creating and imitating exempla is, as we have seen several times now, disquietingly prone to error. But for Phaethon, the boy who tries and fails to drive the solar chariot of his father, the term “error” applies quite literally, in the Latin sense of a straying from the right path. This tale, which extends over the first two books of Ovid’s epic, is predicated on the unsuccessful attempt of a parent to educate and guide his child. The language of warning and instruction abounds, but as a source of admonition, Phaethon’s father Sol turns out to be little more effective than the monuments discussed in the previous chapter. He cautions (caue, 2.89; monitus, 2.103; monitis, 2.126), counsels (consiliis, 2.146), and seeks to dissuade (dissuadere, 2.53) Phaethon from his dangerous quest to ride in the chariot. But for all the teaching on the part of the parent, there is remarkably little learning on the part of the child, and the son falls short of the cultural standard of being like and looking like his father.

My discussion begins with an overview of the role of the Roman father as an exemplary figure on which the son is to model himself. Turning next to Ovid’s tale of Phaethon, I suggest that the story dramatizes a long-established metaphor in the rhetoric of ancestral and paternal exemplarity, namely, the image of the younger generation following in the path of the older one, which leads the way. Such an analysis through the lens of exemplary discourse helps to shed light on a puzzling interpretative issue concerning the motivation behind Phaethon’s dogged pursuit of the chariot-ride. In the second half of the chapter, I argue that, as an alternative to the traditional ideal of family resemblance and emulation which he has exposed as so problematic, Ovid presents a considerably more
promising form of parent-child exemplarity and imitation: the bond between a poet and his poems. There, I address modes of survival and succession, a matter of fundamental significance to poet and emperor alike.

**Following the Father**

Paternity and exemplarity were always closely intertwined in Roman culture, as passages in every literary genre attest.¹ Demea, one of the fathers in Terence’s *Adelphoe*, explains how he educates his son by directing the boy’s attention towards positive and negative role models: “I order him to look into everyone’s lives, as if into a mirror, and to take from others an example [exemplum] for himself: ‘do this!’ . . . ‘avoid that!’ . . . ‘this is praiseworthy!’ . . . ‘this is blameworthy!’”² Horace, too, recalls in one of his *Satires* how his father was accustomed to point out *exempla* of notorious spendthrifts and philanderers, with a view to steering him down a more wholesome moral path.³

But the Roman father was not only a source of *exempla*, transmitted in the form of cautionary tales; he also, together with his relatives and ancestors, served as an *exemplum* himself, to be emulated by his son. Cicero notes as much in the *Fourteenth Philippic*, when he commends those who fought and died in the civil war against Antony. The greatest consolation for the children of these excellent citizens, he tells the Senate, is that they will now have “domestic *exempla* of courage” (*domestica exempla uirtutis*).⁴ Elsewhere, in one of his letters, he advises Lentulus Spinther on the matter of his son’s schooling, and declares

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¹ See Bonner (1977) 18, Chaplin (2000) 11-13, Bernstein (2008b), and Bloomer (2011) *passim*, from whose work several of the literary passages cited in the current discussion are drawn.
³ *insueuit pater optimus hoc me, | ut fugerem exemplis uitorum quaeque notando, Ser. 1.4.105-6.* See Gowers (2012) 175-76 for the passage’s comic models, most notably Demea in Terence’s *Adelphoe*.
that the finest education of all will be for the young man to be trained in the imitation (imitatione) of his father.\textsuperscript{5} Meanwhile, in the last book of the \textit{Aeneid}, Aeneas bids his son Ascanius to recall the models (exempla) of his relatives, and be inspired by his father and uncle, Hector.\textsuperscript{6} In each of these cases, the parent-child dynamics conform to a long-standing tradition in Latin literature whereby a boy’s father is considered to be his best teacher and, as Neil Bernstein writes in a discussion of the Younger Pliny’s idealized account of education in times gone by, “filial emulation of a good father represents the best means of forming another good man.”\textsuperscript{7} These principles are evinced in particular by Cato the Elder, Cicero, and Seneca the Elder, all of whom composed didactic works for the edification of their sons.\textsuperscript{8}

If the task of the Roman father was to serve as a positive role model, then that of the Roman son was both to be like him and to be seen to be like him by others. The ideal of the child as the \textit{imago} (“image”) of his parent, in both physical appearance and disposition, was a prevalent one in Roman culture.\textsuperscript{9} Latin literature teems with parents who delight in the sight of themselves reflected in their progeny, children who take pride in their resemblance to their relatives, and well-wishers who remark approvingly on, or express hopes for, their friends’ lookalike and like-minded offspring.\textsuperscript{10} In a nod to the Augustan restoration of moral

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\item\textit{Lentulum nostrum, eximia spe, summa uirtute adulescentem, cum ceteris artibus quibus studuisti semper ipse tum in primis imitatione tui fac erudias; nulla enim erit hac praestantior disciplina, Fam. 1.7.11.}
\item\textit{sis memor et te animo repetentem exempla tuorum | et pater Aeneas et auunculus excitet Hector, Verg., Aen. 12.439-40.}
\item Bernstein (2008b) 209, on \textit{Ep.} 8.14.4-6, an account of sons receiving instruction in the military and political spheres.
\item Quintilian, too, had planned to leave his book to his son, but the youth died too soon (\textit{Inst.} 6 praef. 1). See Bernstein (2008b) 208-16, who notes that, contrary to the impression created by the didactic trope of the father-as-educator, it was in reality highly unusual for an aristocratic parent to assume personal responsibility for his child’s schooling (209-10).
\item Baroin (2010) 46 suggests that the description of the son as an \textit{imago} may point back to the \textit{imagines maiorum}, the portraits of distinguished ancestors displayed in \textit{atria} and at funerals.
\item See e.g., Cic., \textit{Q. fr.} 1.3.3 (his daughter Tullia is “the image of my face and speech and mind,” \textit{effigiem oris, sermonis, animi mei}), and \textit{Fam.} 6.6.13 (Caecina is praised for having a son who is “the image of his father in mind and body,” \textit{imagini animi et corporis tui}); Catull., 61.209-18 (a wish for the future child of L. Manlius
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laws, Horace describes how child-bearing women are praised for producing “similar offspring” (*simili prole*), a convenient shorthand for the newborns’ visible resemblance to their fathers and, by implication, the fidelity of their mothers.\(^{11}\) Dio Cassius’ Augustus, meanwhile, delivers a laudatory speech to the married knights, in which he reflects on the joy engendered by a child who looks like both parents, and who is “at once the physical and spiritual image [εἰκόνα] of yourself.”\(^{12}\)

As the *Pater Patriae* (“Father of the Fatherland,” the title conferred on him in 2 B.C.E.),\(^{13}\) Augustus both participated in and orchestrated this discourse of paternal exemplarity, his marriage legislation being designed to facilitate the production of one new generation of Romans after another. To reinforce the message when the laws met with resistance, he made a show of publicly displaying an *exemplum* from within his own family, Germanicus and his children.\(^{14}\) Meanwhile, he asserts in the *Res Gestae* that, “by new laws passed on my proposal I brought back (*reduxi*) into use many exemplary practices of our ancestors which were disappearing in our time, and in many ways I myself (*ipse*) transmitted

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\(^{11}\) Carm. 4.5.23, with Bettini (1999) 192-93.

\(^{12}\) εἰκόνα μὲν τοῦ σώματος εἰκόνα δὲ καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, 56.3.4. This passage will be discussed in further detail below.

\(^{13}\) See Severy (2003) 158-86.

\(^{14}\) Suet. Aug. 34.2.
(tradidi) exemplary practices to posterity for their imitation.” While the use of first-person verbs (reduxi, “I brought back;” tradidi, “I transmitted”), and intensive pronouns (ipse, “I myself”) is to be expected in a personal narrative of this kind, it also speaks to the emperor’s concerted effort to position himself firmly in the driver’s seat as far as exempla are concerned. A similar impression is created by Augustus’ edict that he and his successors were to be judged against the great men commemorated in his Forum, uelut ad exemplar (“as by a template,” Suet. Aug. 31.5). Among these statues were counted representations of his own Julian ancestors, yet another manifestation of the theme of family relations.

In a passage at the end of the Metamorphoses, Ovid, too, frames the emperor’s relationship to exemplarity in terms of paternal authority, both inside and outside his own family. Recounting the future of the imperial family to Venus, Jupiter predicts that Augustus exemplo . . . suo mores reget (“shall guide morality by his own example,” 15.834), the reference to mores (“customs” or “morality”) pointing to the emperor’s marriage laws, with their objective of producing legitimate heirs. To lead by example is to attempt to control the future, and we find the emperor doing just that in the verses immediately following. Here, Jupiter describes how Augustus, “looking ahead to an age of future time and of coming generations, will command his offspring [Tiberius], born of his chaste wife, to bear both his

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18 The ideal of the ruler as a model for others to follow was a standard feature of panegyric, both before and after Ovid; see Woodman (1977) 245 for further instances of this topos in Greek and Latin literature. But something more than adherence to generic convention may be at work here: it has long been recognized that the poet’s language comes tantalizingly close to the words used by the emperor himself in R.G. 8.5. See Bömer (1969-86) 477, Schmitzer (1990) 286-87, Hardie (1997) 192, Hardie (2002b) 202-3, Feldherr (2010) 73-74; see also the related discussion of Fairweather (1987) 193-94.
name and his cares.”

Nor was his heirs’ adoptive rather than biological status an obstacle to the emperor’s participation in the tradition of familial exemplarity, since likeness between relatives comprised not only physical resemblance but also shared character and behavior.

**Phaethon and the Paternal Path**

The following reading proposes that it is within and against this cultural tradition of paternal exemplarity that Ovid’s tale of Phaethon may be read. For a start, the poet takes care to convey the exemplary nature of the boy’s father. As the sun-god, Sol is a naturally extraordinary and conspicuous presence, but his splendid singularity is emphasized by the temporal attendants who flank him in multiples on either side: the four personified units of time, Day, Month, Year, and the Ages (2.25-26); the twelve Hours (2.26); and the four Seasons (2.27-30). Engraved on the doors of the palace, too, are numerous sea gods and goddesses, as well as the twelve signs of the Zodiac (2.8-18). But in the midst (medius, 2.31) of all these multitudes, there is only one Sun. Surrounded by glittering jewels and clad in royal purple raiment (2.23-24), he is visually arresting in a most literal sense: the very sight of him and his radiance stops Phaethon in his tracks (consistitque procul, 2.22), and the boy must keep his distance (2.22-23) until the god removes his blinding crown of rays (2.40-41).

But his depiction of Sol’s singular nature is not the only way in which Ovid engages with the rhetoric of exemplarity in this narrative. In my discussion of the Deucalion and

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19 *temporis aetatem uenturorumque nepotum | prospiciens prolem sancta de coniuge natam | ferre simul nomenque suum curasque iubebit*, 15.837.


21 This episode has engendered a number of more overt political analyses, with parallels typically drawn between Sol and Augustus, or between Phaethon and either Augustus or one of the emperor’s doomed successors. See e.g., Schmitzer (1990) 89-107, Videau (2010) 527-35, Fratantuono (2011) 32-36; see also Wheeler (2000) 37 n. 105 for further bibliography, and Barchiesi (2009b) 170 n. 13.

Pyrrha episode in Chapter 1, I suggested that his account of the new, stone-grown human race springing up behind the couple’s *uestigia* (“footsteps,” 1.399) in Book 1 is a reification of the well-known ideal of following in the footsteps of one’s venerable ancestors. This figure of thought, in fact, belongs to a broader set of images denoting exemplarity and imitation which is centered on the idea of the *uia* or *iter*, the “path” or “journey.”23 So it is that we find Lysiteles, in Plautus’ *Trinummus*, berating the profligate Lesbonicus for ruining his family’s illustrious reputation, and reminding him that “your father and ancestors made an easy and level path (*uiam*) for you to procure honor.”24 Cicero uses the same metaphor in the *Brutus*, when he urges his friend, Publius Crassus, “to consider as the straightest path (*uiam*) to renown, that which his ancestors had left well-trodden for him.”25

Throughout Roman literature, in fact, the notion of resembling one’s father (and one’s ancestors more generally) finds expression in this collection of metaphors relating to progressive motion in space and time, that is, the younger generation being led by the older one. Immediately before admonishing Ascanius to recall the models (*exempla*) of his kinsmen, Aeneas promises that his own right hand will lead (*ducet*) his son into great prizes.26 Meanwhile, the Younger Pliny, reflecting on his literary career and a correspondent’s suggestion that he pen historical works, cites his uncle and adoptive father as a familial example (*domesticum . . . exemplum*) of a writer in this genre, and records the

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26 *nunc te mea dextera bello | defensum dabit et magna inter praemia ducet. | tu facito, mox cum matura adoleverit actas. | sis memor et te animo repetentem exempla tuorum | et pater Aeneas et auunculus excitet Hector, Aen. 12.436-40.*
saying among wise men that, “it is most honorable to follow in the footsteps of one’s ancestors (maiorum uestigia sequi), as long as they have proceeded along the right path (itinere).” Elsewhere in his letters, he approves of a son for training in eloquence alongside his father, a learned man whom Pliny deems an excellent model (exemplar) for the youth to follow (sequi) and imitate (imitandum), and in whose footsteps (uestigia) to tread. The metaphor even appears to have worked itself into Augustus’ own lexical imagination, as attested by his claim in the Res Gestae to have “brought back” (reduxi) ancestral exempla (R.G. 8.5). The emperor’s use of the verb reducere casts him in the role of guide, dux, ushering in exempla for others to follow.

This image of the descendant proceeding down his ancestors’ path is consistent with Maurizio Bettini’s study of the spatial metaphors used to represent the passage of time in Latin literature. Bettini cites several excerpts from the works of Seneca the Younger, in which life is envisaged as a forward march. In this journey (iter) undertaken by all, the older generations advance towards death in front of the younger ones, and the deceased are described as having “gone before” (antecedere) or having been “sent ahead” (praemittere). This concept also takes form, famously, in Vergil’s parade of heroes in the sixth book of the

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27 *me uero ad hoc studium impellit domesticum quoque exemplum. auunculus meus idemque per adoptionem pater historias et quidem religiosissime scripsit. inuenio autem apud sapientes honestissimum esse maiorum uestigia sequi, si modo recto itinere praeesserint, Ep. 5.8.4-5*, cited in Baroin (2010) 27 n. 31. On this passage, see also Gibson and Morello (2012) 115-16.


30 *quem putas perisse praemissus est. quid autem dementius quam, cum idem tibi iter emetiendum sit, flere eum qui antecessit? Ep. 99.7; cf. quem putamus perisse praemissus est, Ep. 63.16; dimisimus illos, immo consecuturi praemisimus, Ad Marc. 19.1; omnes ergo nostros, et quos superstites lege nascendi optamus et quos praecedere iustissimum ipsorum uotum est, sic amare debemus, Ad Marc. 10.3; omnibus illo nobis commune est iter: quid fata deflemus? non reliquit ille nos sed antecessit, Ad Pol. 9.9.* See Bettini (1991) 142-43, 289 n. 1.
It was given real-life expression, meanwhile, in the choreography of the aristocratic Roman funeral procession, in which the *imagines maiorum*, portraits of the ancestors, were carried before the body of the deceased, and were perceived to be leading (*ducre*) the way.\textsuperscript{32}

It is this long-established metaphor of the older generation leading (*ducre*) the way (*uia*), and the younger one following (*sequi*) which, I propose, we find Ovid dramatizing in the Phaethon episode. *Sol deducit iuuenem* (“escorts the young man,” 2.106) to the celestial chariot, and though the laws of nature, by which there can only ever be one Sun, preclude the possibility of the god physically guiding his son through the sky (or so we may infer), he nevertheless shows him the way verbally. That is, he reviews the solar itinerary in two detailed speeches prior to the boy’s departure (2.63-87, 126-40), tracing the route from the steep initial climb to the precipitous final descent, and all the associated occupational hazards in between.\textsuperscript{33} And Sol’s celestial passage is repeatedly termed a path, a *uia* and an *iter*, both by the god himself in his warning to his son, and by the narrator in the description of Phaethon’s ride.\textsuperscript{34} Since Sol’s daily journey is undertaken by chariot, however, the *uestigia* to which he directs his son’s attention in his pre-flight instructions are not footsteps, as they were in the Deucalion and Pyrrha episode discussed in Chapter 1, but rather wheel-tracks

\textsuperscript{31} On the parade of heroes as an actualization of the metaphor of “the way,” see Bettini (1991) 144-47.
\textsuperscript{32} See Bettini (1991) 176-82, and Flower (1996) 99, who notes that “the usual verbs used to describe the procession of the *imagines* are *ducre* or *duci* and *comitari*,” citing Hor., *Epod.* 8.11-12 and Cic., *De Or.* 2.225.
\textsuperscript{33} Hardie (2002a) 66 has noted in another context that Ovid’s taste for structural repetitions, not to mention the recurrent theme of metamorphosis, often leaves the reader with the distinct impression of having “heard this one before.” In the case of the Phaethon episode, this sense of narrative déjà vu is even more pronounced than usual: the boy’s breakneck tour of the heavens plays out just as (and worse than) his father had predicted, down to the leering Zodiac landmarks and unruly horses.
\textsuperscript{34} *ardua prima uia est* (2.63); *ultima prona uia est* (2.67); *utque uiam teneas* (2.79); *nec tibi derectos placeat uia quinque per arcus* (2.129); *corripue re uiam* (2.158); *uiasque praecipites . . . feruntur* (2.206-7); *per insidias iter est formaque feraum* (2.78); *hac sit iter* (2.13); *sectus in obliquum est lato curuamine limes* (2.130). Like the path left by the ancestors of Publius Crassus in the excerpt from Cicero’s *Brutas*, cited above, Sol’s track is well-worn (*tritumque . . . spatium*, 2.167-68).
(manifesta rotae uestigia cernes, 2.133). When Phaethon takes flight, however, he cannot discern where the way lies (nec scit qua sit iter, 2.170), and is at the mercy of the rampaging horses, who drag him through pathless territories (per auia, 2.205). Phaethon’s experience, in short, is characterized by numerous and violent departures from his father’s customary route, in the form of wandering, spinning, and scattering. And when he himself leaves behind traces (uestigia, 2.318) of his celestial journey, they are not footsteps or even wheel-tracks along the paternal path, as in the traditional metaphor of familial imitation, but rather fragments of his father’s shattered chariot.

I have so far suggested that in his depiction of a son following the lead of his father along a path or way, Ovid appropriates and literalizes an important metaphor of exemplarity. At this point, I will turn to the question of what such a perspective might bring to bear on our understanding of this story, by considering a feature of the Phaethon narrative which has been seen as illogical by some readers, concerning the boy’s unwavering insistence on driving the solar chariot. By taking into account the central role played by an audience in the discourse of exemplarity, this reading will supplement previous scholarly interpretations that Phaethon wants to be like his father, by proposing that he also wants to be seen to be like his father. He endeavors to achieve this by engaging in the most spectacular and conspicuous act imaginable: being the Sun.

The Spectacular Sun-Child

The Phaethon episode begins with a dispute between a pair of boys over their respective divine parentage. When Phaethon boasts that he is the child of the Sun-god, his

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35 expatiantur equi (2.202); sparsaque sunt laceri uestigia currus (2.318); uoluitur in praeceps (2.320).
friend Epaphus accuses him of being “puffed up with the image of a false father” (*tumidus genitoris imagine falsi*, 1.754). His faith in his solar heritage shaken, Phaethon hurries to his mother, Clymene, and demands “evidence of [his] true father” (*ueri . . . signa parentis*, 1.764). She verifies his lineage by swearing on the light of day, but suggests that the boy seek out the truth for himself by visiting the palace of the Sun, a quest on which Phaethon eagerly embarks. On reaching the god’s dwelling-place, he appeals for “pledges of birth, through which I may be believed to be your true progeny” (*pignora . . . generis per quae tua uera propago | credar*, 2.38-39), and receives a warm welcome from Sol, who confirms his paternity at once and proceeds to offer his son a gift of his own choosing. Phaethon immediately and insistently requests to drive the solar chariot for a day. Knowing the venture will prove too dangerous for the boy, Sol reacts with horror and regret. Far from exhorting his son to aspire to be just like himself (in accordance with the traditional Roman ideal of father-son resemblance), he tries desperately to persuade the boy not to follow in his path. But no amount of paternal pleading or warning can deter Phaethon, and Sol’s fears prove well-founded when the panicked child loses control of the horse-drawn vehicle, careening through the cosmos and setting the earth aflame. Jupiter eventually puts the world out of its fiery misery by striking Phaethon down from the sky with a fatal lightning bolt, and the boy is buried by nymphs on the banks of the river Po.

The current discussion takes as its point of inquiry Phaethon’s all-consuming ambition to be the Sun for a day. For the reader, the boy’s request to drive the solar chariot seems to come out of nowhere. Certainly his fateful journey through the sky had long been

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an integral feature of the mythological tradition, but within the context of Ovid’s own narrative, this plot development is somewhat unexpected. Phaethon’s desire to assume his father’s daily duty has not been mentioned before, in either his earlier exchange with Epaphus or with his mother, Clymene. But it is clear that he wants to do so very badly indeed: the god has scarcely finished offering the boy his choice of gift (uix bene desierat, 2.47) when Phaethon makes his request. He is single-minded in his pursuit of his goal, remaining unmoved by Sol’s attempt to substitute any other bounty on earth, sea, or sky (2.95-97), or by the god’s insistence that a chariot-ride is neither safe nor age-appropriate, nor suitable for Phaethon’s degree of strength and mortal constitution (2.53-56). Sol’s claims that even he himself is not immune to terror at the vertiginous nature of the journey (2.66) fall on equally deaf ears. Instead, Phaethon’s response to the tales of celestial traps, wild beasts of the Zodiac, and uncontrollable, fire-breathing horses (2.78-87) is to coax his father all the more with embraces (2.100). He “fights back” (repugnat, 2.103) against Sol’s dire warnings of the gift’s deadly nature (2.88), “presses” (premit, 2.104) his initial request and appropriately for the sun-child - “burns with desire” (flagrat . . . cupidine, 2.104) for a ride in the chariot. But why?

Phaethon’s self-confessed reason for journeying to the Palace of the Sun had been to attain proof of Sol’s paternity. On meeting the god, he had asked him to “give pledges of my birth, through which I might be believed to be your true progeny” (pignora da generis per quae tua uera propago | credar, 2.38-39). But father and son have very different ideas of

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38 Diggle (1970) 186 notes that “[t]his is the first we have heard of such ambitions.” Nonnus’ version of the myth, in which a ride in the solar chariot is the lifelong aspiration of the boy Phaethon (who even constructs an imitation version of the solar vehicle, complete with a morning star fashioned from white flowers, Dion. 38.171-83), provides an interesting point of contrast.
what exactly such “pledges” (pignora) might be. Horrified at Phaethon’s request to drive the chariot, Sol invites the boy to behold his frightened face, and wishes that he could even cast his gaze into his anxious heart (2.92-94). That Sol himself considers the sight of his terrified countenance to be ample evidence of his paternity is clear from his choice of words, which respond directly to those spoken earlier by his son. “Pignora da” (“give pledges,” 2.38), Phaethon had requested, and the god now echoes the boy’s language: pignora certa petis? do pignora certa timendo (“is it sure pledges that you seek? I offer sure pledges by being afraid,” 2.91). He adds that he is “proved to be a father by a father’s fear” (“patrio pater esse metu probor,” 2.92), but what suffices as proof for the father does not satisfy his son, who doggedly persists in his quest to drive the chariot. Nevertheless, in having Sol appropriate Phaethon’s own phrase, pignora dare, the poet raises an interesting point: Phaethon has asked for pignora, pledges of his lineage, and received them, simply by virtue of Sol fearing for his life. The question arises, then, of why this is not enough for him.

One possible answer is that Phaethon is simply suspicious of Sol’s word, and desires “concrete phenomenal proof” of his paternity.39 The reasoning behind the god’s proffering of a gift in the first place had been so that Phaethon would not be in any doubt of his claim to be his father (quoque minus dubites, 2.44). Unlike the boy himself, however, who seizes upon the prize without a moment’s hesitation, Ovid’s critics have not always been convinced of the need for this supplementary paternity test. Reflecting on the episode in his monograph of 1929, Alfred Rohde deemed it “nearly insupportable” that Phaethon should distrust the god to the point of requiring an additional warranty of his parentage.40

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39 Wise (1977) 45.
40 Rohde (1929) 15: “et paene intolerabile est, quod fingit ne Soli quidem Phaenthontem prius credere quam pignus dedit.” Cf. Csaki (1995) 85, who considers the god’s promise of a gift to be “totally unnecessary.”
Other readers have been more forgiving, typically attributing Phaethon’s yearning to drive the chariot and subsequent demise to “his desire to be like his father.”41 Approaching the episode from a psychological perspective, Karl Galinsky has suggested that Phaethon’s insistence on this particular gift stems from a need to live up to the inflated image of his father which, growing up as the child of an absentee parent, he has constructed in his fantasies. The solar chariot has become, for Phaethon, “a tangible symbol of the power and greatness which he associated with his father and because of which he wanted to be like him.”42 While scholars are right to attribute Phaethon’s motivation for driving the chariot to an ambition to emulate his father, this is, I think, only half the story. When the episode is considered within the framework of Roman customs of father-son exemplarity, the boy’s particular choice of gift, and the urgency with which he demands it, becomes altogether more comprehensible. The present reading proposes that Phaethon desires not only to be like his father; he also desires to be seen to be like his father.

Diggle (1970) ascribes the difficulty to Ovid’s ungainly attempt to transplant certain details of Euripides’ tragedy, Phaethon, into his own version of the myth, even as he discarded other narrative threads less convenient for his purposes. In the fifth-century playwright’s account, known to have been among Ovid’s sources, Phaethon is the product of Clymene’s affair with Helios during her marriage to her mortal husband, Merops. At the beginning of the tragedy, the youth has recently learned that he is not, as he has always believed himself to be, Merops’ child after all. An extant fragment sees Clymene advising Phaethon to visit Helios for himself and remind the god of a promise he made to her during their coupling, when he swore to grant their future offspring any one request (see Phae. lines 45-48, in Diggle (1970) 35; cf. also Diggle (1970) 57, 87-89. Diggle concedes (1970) 87 that these lines are very difficult to make out in the manuscript). The proof of Helios’ paternity, Clymene tells Phaethon, will be in his fulfillment of his earlier pledge. In the Euripidean chain of events, then, Helios’ gift of the chariot serves as the ultimate token of recognition of his son. The Phaethon of the Metamorphoses, by contrast, has grown up in the knowledge that Merops is his step-father and Sol his biological parent, and appears to have had no doubts about his divine origins until they are called into question by Epaphus. Ovid’s Sun-god is bound by no covenant to Clymene, and offers the gift of his own accord, having already claimed Phaethon as his son upon meeting him in the palace. Diggle (1970) 186 concludes that “[a]ll that is unsatisfactory in Ovid’s account stems from his omission of the Euripidean domestic complications,” and that “the logic of the situation can be fully appreciated only by reference to Euripides.”

42 Galinsky (1975) 51.
Matthew Roller’s work on the discourse of exemplarity has demonstrated that, in order for an action or individual to attain the status of an *exemplum*, those who encounter it (either first-hand, or via a commemorative monument) must judge it good or bad in some way, with the potential to instill social values. That is to say, exemplarity, both the creation and the imitation (or avoidance) of models, is dependent upon display and communication. The Roman funeral, with its images of ancestors carried in procession for all to see, attests as much, as does the conspicuous array of statues of great men in Augustus’ Forum, against whom the emperor demanded that he and his successors be judged by the citizens, *uelut ad exemplar* (“as by a template”). The phenomenon of exemplarity thus presents an interesting variation on the thought experiment involving the sound of a falling tree in an empty forest: if an exemplary deed occurs and no one is around to see it, is it an exemplary deed? By Roman standards, it appears that it is not. An *exemplum* – and, by the same token, the imitation of an *exemplum* - cannot exist without an audience.

This presence of observers, and the evaluative judgment which they pass, proves to be similarly important in the matter of father-son exemplarity. Ovid himself, in one of his poems from exile, thanks his correspondent for his loyalty and adds his hope that the man’s son bear such a striking resemblance to his father in character that *anyone* (*quilibet*) would be able to discern the boy’s parentage. Maurizio Bettini provides a useful gloss on this phenomenon: “It is the others, the strangers, who recognize the child as a member of the family, and thus acknowledge his identity. This act of recognition is central to the cultural

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44 Suet., *Aug.* 31.5.
45 *sic iuuenis similisque tibi sit natus, et illum | moribus agnoscat quilibet esse tuum!* (“and may your son be like you, and may anyone recognize him as yours from his character!”, *Tr.* 4.5.31-2). In a discussion of ancestral character and familial exemplarity in the works of Cicero, Treggiari (2003) 150 observes that “[t]o say that a child is worthy of his father is part of the normal courtesy of letter-writing to the father.”
code, and it is the community – the “others” – who serve as its trustees (whether or not they are conscious of this role). Resemblance is a display, a demonstration of genuineness that is directed toward an onlooker, whose very presence constitutes a sanctioning judgment.”

Bettini ascribes this preoccupation with familial likeness to the fear of contamination of the bloodline through female adultery: a child who is the “image” of his father is a visual proclamation of the chastity of his mother.

For an Ovidian case in point, one need look no further than the ecphrasis which features in the Phaethon episode, in the opening of Book 2. On the engraved doors of Sol’s palace is depicted, among other images, the sea nymph Doris surrounded by her daughters, all of whom are of varied yet similar appearance, as is “seemly” (decet) for sisters. The passing mention of “seemliness” is telling: the children’s shared physical characteristics attest to the fidelity of their mother. This is an issue of central importance to Phaethon, too, as his parentage has just been questioned by Epaphus, an audience who casts doubt on whether he truly is the son of his exemplary father.

The figure of Epaphus is believed by scholars to be an Ovidian innovation, whose primary role has been considered by some to connect the preceding tale of his mother Io to

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46 Bettini (1999) 191. The role of onlookers in the discourse of exemplarity, as explained by Roller (2004) 5, is remarkably similar: “An audience of eyewitnesses . . . observe this action, place it in a suitable ethical category (e.g., virtus or pietas or gratia), and judge it “good” or “bad” in that category; I call this the “primary” audience. In most cases this audience is a subset of the Roman community, the group for whom the action is most consequential . . . These audiences, by their very spectatorship and evaluation, constitute the action as consequential for the community, and thereby transform it into a socially and ethically significant “deed,” a res gesta.” [emphasis in original]

47 Bettini (1999) 189-95, with Hor., Carm. 4.5.23, Mart., 6.27.3, and Catull., 61.209-23 in particular. On the wish for family resemblance as a hallmark of the marriage hymn genre, see Feeney (2010) 216 (Catullus’ epithalamium for L. Manlius Torquatus), with n. 51 for related bibliography.

48 facies non omnibus una, | non diuersa tamen, qualem decet esse sororum, 2.14-15.

49 Epaphus’ insult to Phaethon is also an affront to Clymene (1.766).
that of Phaethon. As other critics have pointed out, however, Epaphus is in fact the driving force behind Phaethon’s quest to establish his true parentage and as such, is integral to Ovid’s version of the myth. An interpretation of the Phaethon episode as a case study of ancestral exemplarity helps to determine exactly why Epaphus serves as that driving force. Applying Bettini’s observation about the importance of recognizable family resemblance, we find that the “sanctioning judgment” of an onlooker, which he describes as so essential, is precisely what Epaphus fails to provide, and what Phaethon sorely lacks. Unable to tolerate his peer’s boasts about his solar origins, Epaphus mocks him for being tumidus genitoris imagine falsi (“swelled up with the image of a false father,” 1.754). To the casual observer - the quilibet, or “anyone,” of Ovid’s exile poem (Tr. 4.5.32) - there is nothing, we may surmise, which identifies Phaethon as his father’s son.

Phaethon’s reaction to Epaphus’ taunt – he blushes, and curbs his anger with pudor (“shame”) – provides further evidence that social perception is the engine behind his journey to the Palace of the Sun. The boy articulates this same feeling in his subsequent exchange with his mother, describing the “shame” caused (pudet) by his inability to refute the charge that he is not his father’s son (2.758-59). Pudor is the emotion which arises when one sees

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53 Phaethon’s credibility as the offspring of a god is presented in stark contrast to that of his friend. From the moment of his introduction into the narrative, we are told that Epaphus is believed (creditur, 1.749) to be the son of Jupiter, and occupies temples throughout the cities (1.749-50), a status which presumably affords him the external recognition of his identity that Phaethon requires for himself. See Wheeler (2000) 67.
54 Even when the god offers his face as proof of his paternity (2.92-93), it is not the physical resemblance of his own features to Phaethon’s which serves as a warranty, but his visible fear for his son’s safety.
55 erubuit Phaethon iramque pudore repressit, 2.755.
oneself degraded in the eyes of another. Phaethon’s prior boasting (magna loquentem, 1.750), pride in his parentage (Phoeboque parente superbum, 1.752), and refusal to give way to his peer (nec . . . cedentem, 1.752) leave little doubt that, up until the moment when his claim to divine lineage was challenged by Epaphus, he had clearly regarded himself as, and firmly believed himself to be, the child of the Sun. Now, however, he sees himself through the eyes of an observer, an external audience who fails to endorse his self-proclaimed status as the son of an exemplary father, and his self-image suddenly begins to look very different.

Images and their veracity, in fact, turn out to be integral to the episode as a whole. Epaphus’ taunt that Phaethon is tumidus genitoris imagine falsi (“swelled up with the image of a false father,” 1.754) speaks to the imaginary picture (imago) dreamed up by the boy of the parent whom he has never met. Epaphus’ language is carefully calculated to puncture Phaethon’s ego, by suggesting that the lineage in which he exults is nothing more than an illusion (imago). But there may be an additional significance to the choice of the word “imago.” Even when placed in the mouth of a Greek mythological character, this term is invested with a specialized Roman meaning relating to ancestry and descent, a meaning which, in the context of a narrative so centered on genealogy, is difficult to ignore. Epaphus’ insult is a cutting reminder that for a child like Phaethon, whose paternal heritage is uncertain, the imagines maiorum (“images of the ancestors”) in which the Romans took such pride must necessarily be imaginary ones.

But the term “imago” did double duty in a Roman genealogical context, in the sense that it could pertain not only to ancestors, but also to descendants. The prevalence of the

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56 Kaster (2005) 28-65, with references to Phaethon (an example of pudor in response to an inuria, an “insult” or “injury”) at 163 n. 19 and 173 n. 112.
57 Galinsky (1975) 50.
58 Elsewhere in the epic, the term “imago” is associated with deception; see Solodow (1988) 208-9.
ideal of the son as the “image” of his father has been discussed in the first part of this chapter. In what is perhaps a nod to this duality, Phaethon, in his meeting with Sol, appropriates the language of Epaphus’ taunt and applies it to himself. After addressing the god as “father,” the boy adds the qualification that this appellation is suitable only if “Clymene is not concealing her shame under a false *imago*” (*nec falsa Clymene culpam sub imagine celat*, 2.37). Modern translations give an English rendering of *imago* as “pretence,” “story,” or “guise.” In light of the term’s centrality to Roman genealogical discourse, however, there may be a more culturally specific layer of meaning in play here. Having been accused by Epaphus of reveling in “the image of a false father” (*genitoris imagine falsi*, 1.754), Phaethon is now afraid that the “false image” (*falsa . . . imagine*, 2.37) under which his mother is hiding her shame is none other than himself.

“Being seen” is as fundamental to the identity of the father, Sol, as it is to that of the son, Phaethon. We find a marked emphasis in the episode on the Sun’s overwhelming conspicuousness, and the visual power which he exerts on his viewers. References to eyes and sight pervade the story. The reader is invited to observe Sol and his surroundings via the boy’s line of vision, from the barely tolerable brightness which stops him from drawing nearer (*consistitque procul; neque enim propriora ferebat | lumina*, 2.22-23), to the finely-wrought chariot upon which he gazes in wonder (*opusque | perspicit*, 2.111-12). Certainly, Phaethon is in the unique position of witnessing the god at close quarters within his own dwelling place, but the visual spectacle of this celestial body is arresting from afar, too. The earthly view of the Sun had been given particular weight at the tale’s opening in Book 1, when Clymene, looking (*spectans*, 1.767) towards it herself and invoking Phaethon’s sight of

it (*hoc . . . quem spectas*, 1.770), had sworn on both the all-seeing orb and her own life that
the god was indeed the father of her son. While the staking of one’s life on the truth of an
utterance is a standard feature of oath-taking, Clymene’s formulation expressly calls attention
to the Sun’s visibility: she twice invites him to deny her the sight (*uidendum*, 1.771) of
himself if she is lying. Sol’s conspicuousness is a quality which also features in the god’s
final words to his son, a futile, last-ditch attempt to dissuade him from embarking on the
fateful journey. He tells Phaethon that he ought to let his father give light to the world
instead, light which the boy may then safely look upon (*spectes*, 2.149).

It is, I suggest, in this spectacular visual presence that the primary appeal of driving
the solar chariot lies for Phaethon. His very first words to Sol, the only time in the episode
that he addresses his father in direct speech, lend support to this interpretation. Prior to
making his request for proof of his parentage, the boy hails the Sun as the “communal light
of the vast universe” (*lux immensi publica mundi*, 2.35). His epithet of choice is respectful,
even formulaic, but nevertheless reveals the solar characteristic which stands at the forefront
of his mind: of the many notable qualities that feature in the poet’s preceding description of
the Sun, such as his celestial divinity (*caelesti*, 1.760), altitude (*regia Solis erat . . . alta*, 2.1;
*arce*, 2.31), and all-encompassing sight (*oculis . . . quibus aspicit omnia*, 2.32), the first and
only one on which Phaethon remarks is his universal visibility. The operative word here is
*publica* (2.35). On any given day, the Sun is assured a captive audience consisting of the
entire worldly population. From the outset of the *Metamorphoses*, in fact, sunlight is tied to
the notion of worldwide visibility. Like the ground and the air, it belongs to everyone

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60 *si ficta loquor, neget ipse uidendum | se mihi, sitque oculus lux ista nouissima nostris*, 1.771-72.
61 The poet’s extended description of the vast geographical expanse affected by Phaethon’s fire (which destroys
regions in Ethiopia, Libya, India, Greece, Egypt, and Italy, among other places, 2.217-59), graphically attests to
the sweeping nature of Sol’s path. References to the god’s extensive view of the earth (2.32, 65, 95-97), too,
serve as a reminder that the Sun’s ability to see everything is reciprocated by his ability to be seen by everyone.
Even before the Sun and Earth exist, as in the description of Chaos which opens the epic, the poet considers these two celestial bodies in combination and in relation to one another: “no Sun as yet offered light to the world” (*nullus adhuc mundo praebebat lumina Titan*, 1.10). And when human beings are eventually created, the physical characteristic which distinguishes them from other, prone animals is their ability to “see the sky” (*caelumque uidere*, 1.85) and “raise their upturned faces to the stars” (*erectos ad sidera tollere uultus*, 1.86).

Assuming his father’s role as the “communal light of the vast universe” (*lux immensi publica mundi*, 2.35), then, will afford Phaethon an audience with the whole world. As he discovered in his altercation with Epaphus, verbal claims to greatness tend to be dismissed by an audience unless corroborated by visible evidence. A detail which he relays in his earlier complaint to his mother proves particularly telling here: in the face of his friend’s taunts, he fell silent (*tacui*, 1.758). The implication is that mere words are not a sufficient rejoinder against skeptics. There is nothing left to say: Phaethon needs visual proof of his paternity. And a single circuit of the heavens in the solar chariot will, theoretically, grant him the public recognition of his paternity which he so lacks. Returning now to his original request to Sol, we find that he did not ask for proof so that he would believe *himself* to be the son of the god, but so that he would *be* believed to be such (*credar*, 2.39). This is why his mother’s oath, his father’s immediate affirmation of parentage and frightened face, and the sworn promise

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62 Cf. 2.385, where Sol’s refusal to rise in the aftermath of his son’s death is specifically framed as a dereliction of duty to the earth (*officiumque negat mundo*).
63 It is worth recalling that when Sol initially sought to convince Phaethon of his paternity, the pledges (*pignora*, 2.91) which he offered were *visual* ones. There, he invited his son to behold (*aspice*, 2.92) his frightened face, and wished that the boy could even cast his gaze (*oculos . . . inserere*, 2.93-94) into his anxious heart.
64 On silence as a typical expression of *pudor*, see Kaster (2005) 32.
of any gift on land, sea, or sky, were insufficient evidence. They were all witnessed by an audience of one: Phaethon himself. But if seeing is believing, then being believed to be the son of a god is dependent on being seen to be one.

The boy whose sense of self was diminished by the public overcompensates with the ultimate public display of his parentage, proclaiming his celestial origins before the eyes of the world by becoming the Sun. The Roman ideal of descendants modeling themselves after exemplary ancestors hinges on both physical resemblance and behavior, and for Phaethon, driving the solar chariot means fulfilling each of these twin criteria of “looking like” and “being like” his parent. But not even Sol’s shiniest paraphernalia – the solar vehicle, the crown of rays, and the team of fire-breathing horses - can disguise the fact that Phaethon is little more than a pale imitation of his brilliant father. He is simply a child playing dress-up, and both the god’s pre-flight warning about Phaethon’s deficiencies (2.54-56), not to mention the disastrous chariot-ride itself, prove as much: compared to his exemplary parent, he is too young, too weak, too light, too inexperienced, and above all, too mortal. The rising and setting of the Sun (along with that of the Moon) may be the most repeated act in the entire cosmos, occurring every day by definition, but Phaethon is mistaken in his belief that he, too, will be able to repeat the Sun’s journey. For there remains one crucial, unrepeatable determinant which dooms the boy’s mission from the very start: the fundamental fact of nature that there can only ever be one Sun. Even the god’s accoutrements are one of a kind: there is only one chariot of light, only one team of horses, and only one crown of rays. Phaethon, in short, has chosen to model himself on an exemplum that is truly inimitable. And as the offspring of such a singular parent, Phaethon can never simply be like his father; he

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66 As Ginsberg (1989) 223 puts it, “despite the Sun’s acknowledgment that Phaethon is his son, in his bones and in his soul, Phaethon equally is not his father’s son.”
can only ever be his father, a logical impossibility and an affront against nature, which literally causes the destruction of the world.  

Even in death, Phaethon cannot escape the status which he so feared himself to hold in life, that of a false image. As the boy tumbles through the heavens, his hair aflame, the poet compares him to a shooting star: *ut interdum de caelo stella sereno, etsi non cecidit, potuit cecidisse uideri* (“just as a star can sometimes seem to have fallen from the clear heavens, although it did not fall,” 2.321-22). This is exactly the place in the narrative where most readers of this epic would, not unreasonably, expect the protagonist to undergo a metamorphosis. By replacing the anticipated physical transformation with a simile, Ovid condemns Phaethon to visual falseness even on a linguistic level, in that he *looks like* a star but *is* not one. And that falseness filters down to the figurative plane, too: the type of star which Phaethon most resembles, the meteor, also appears to be something other than what it is, seeming to fall when in reality it does not.

Nevertheless, it seems at first that, in death, Phaethon finally attains the external and public recognition of his parentage which he so craved and which, I have suggested, was the motivation behind his request to drive the solar chariot. The Naiads bury his scorched body in a tomb bearing an epitaph which proclaims him, by name, to be the “charioteer of the paternal vehicle” (*currus auriga paterni*, 2.327). By acknowledging Phaethon as his father’s son, they do for the boy what Epaphus had not. With the mention of the nymphs’ act of engraving (*signant*, 2.326), Phaethon’s story comes full circle: it is, in a final stroke of irony,
the markings (signa) on his headstone that serve as the ueri . . . signa parentis (“signs of his true parent,” 1.764) for which he had begged his mother at the end of Book 1. And yet, nowhere on the tomb is the Sun-god mentioned by name, nor is the so-called “paternal vehicle” specified as the solar chariot. Far from being celebrated as the sun-child, Phaethon is, in the end, destined simply to be commemorated like any other boy who went on a fatal joy-ride.

That Phaethon’s disastrous journey ends not in his metamorphosis, but in his death, is in fact a notable feature of the episode. Sol turns out to be all too prescient in his warnings to his son about his mortal lot (mortalis, 2.56) and the deadly nature of the gift (funesti, 2.88). As an agent of destruction, Jupiter – whose thunderbolts Sol describes as “destined to bereave fathers” (orbatura patres . . . fulmina, 2.391) - proves brutally efficient, and any hopes which the reader may harbor of the boy rising from the ashes of defeat in furry or feathered form, as characters in the Metamorphoses are prone to do, remain unfulfilled. It is worth noting that there does, in fact, exist a mythological tradition in which Phaethon undergoes a transformation into the constellation Auriga, the Charioteer. Scholars disagree

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70 Lowrie (2009) 209. This is not the only time that Phaethon gets more than he bargained for by way of signa: in the beginning of Book 2, he encounters the “signs of his parent” in the form of the twelve images of Zodiac (signa, 2.18) which are engraved on the doors of the Palace of the Sun, signs that he will soon confront in their true and terrifying manifestation as he hurtles through the sky in his father’s chariot. On Phaethon and the Zodiac, see Barchiesi (2009b).

71 It is ironic that a plot so heavily focused on matters of birth should end with death. Feldherr (2002) 177 notes that Phaethon is “quite literally replaced by an inscribed tombstone.” The boy’s personal quest to establish his parentage also brings about sterility on a universal scale, and in the poet’s long description of the effects of the chariot-ride upon the earth, the language of drying and dying predominates (2.208-310). It is, finally, the visit of a mother, the goddess Terra, which prompts Jupiter to take action against the boy and put an end to the chaos. Her lament is specifically framed in terms of a loss of fertility when she asks whether her singed hair and ash-smothered face are the rewards, or “fruits” (fructus, 2.285), which Jupiter now pays for her bounty and service. Wheeler (2000) 68 also observes the “failure of genealogical continuity” precipitated by the transformation of Phaethon’s sisters into trees, with the loss of their capacity for reproduction.

72 The tale’s transformation quota is filled instead by minor characters, members of Phaethon’s family who literally lose themselves to grief in the aftermath of his demise: his sisters, the Heliades, are in the midst of lamentation when they are turned into trees (2.340-66); his friend and relation, Cyncus, mourns to the point of becoming a swan (2.367-80).
about whether there was a literary authority for the boy’s metamorphosis at the time of Ovid’s writing, and whether the poet was familiar with this alternative ending or not.\textsuperscript{73} There are, however, two clues in the text which suggest that Ovid was not only aware of the tradition of Phaethon’s catasterism, but that he was intent on making a show of rejecting it, in order to call attention to the fact that the outcome of this episode is to be death rather than transformation.

The first intimation is the poet’s use of the word “\textit{auriga},” “charioteer,” which occurs just twice in this entire lengthy episode, once when Jupiter hurls the fatal bolt against the boy (\textit{in aurigam}, 2.312), and again shortly afterwards, in the citation of his epitaph (\textit{Phaethon currus auriga paterni}, 2.327). It may not be a coincidence that the term appears for the first time only at this late point in the narrative, in the description of the boy’s demise; this is exactly when Phaethon should, according to the alternative mythological tradition, be transformed into the Auriga (Charioteer) constellation.\textsuperscript{74} The second hint that the poet is signaling his familiarity with and deliberate disavowal of the catasterism is, likewise, found at the moment of Phaethon’s death, as he tumbles out of the sky. In place of the transformation which the reader has likely been expecting (and not unreasonably, given the title and recurring subject matter of this poem), Ovid presents a simile in which Phaethon is compared to a star (\textit{ut interdum de caelo stella sereno, etsi non cecid, potuit cecidisse uideri}, 2.321-22). This looks suspiciously like a bait-and-switch. Ovid, in other words,

\textsuperscript{73} Phaethon’s transformation into the constellation first appears in Claud., \textit{Cons. Hon.} 172; Nonnus, \textit{Dion.} 38.424-28. Diggle (1970) 195 n. 1 maintains that it is impossible to tell whether Ovid knew about this detail of the myth, adding that \textit{Am.} 3.12.37 (where Phaethon is addressed as an \textit{auriga}, or perhaps as \textit{Auriga}) “proves nothing.” See \textit{contra} Bömer (1969-86) 320 and Galinsky (1975) 49, who regard this earlier elegiac reference to Phaethon as evidence that Ovid’s omission of the transformation in the epic is intentional.

\textsuperscript{74} Bömer (1969-86) 320.
seems keen to impress the absence of the protagonist’s metamorphosis upon his audience, thereby throwing Phaethon’s loss of life into higher relief.

**Reproduction and Book Production**

In the opening books of his epic, then, Ovid presents a son who not only fails before a world audience to resemble his father, but who also perishes spectacularly in the attempt to do so. In the closing book, conversely, we find the poet introducing another type of heir, one whose fate sounds altogether more promising. Unlike Phaethon, who succumbed to the fiery Jovian thunderbolt, the successor described at the end of Book 15 will be vulnerable to destruction by neither the anger of Jupiter nor fire (*nec Iouis ira nec ignis| . . . poterit . . . abolere*, 15.871-72). And unlike Phaethon, who fell out of the sky to his death, this successor will be everlasting, soaring with its creator above the stars (*super alta perennis | astra*, 15.875-76). I am referring, of course, to the *Metamorphoses* itself, the triumphant future of which Ovid predicts in the epic’s finale.

The current chapter has so far suggested that, via the tale of Phaethon, the poet explores and questions the Roman ideal of the father as an *exemplum* to be imitated by his son. But this is, in fact, only half the story. Ovid not only dismantles the traditional model of paternal exemplarity, but also, as I will argue here, offers an alternative to it by representing his books as his offspring. We will find that while bookish successors share with human children the capacity to resemble their creator in both appearance and character, they are superior to their mortal counterparts in the sense that they have the potential to exist.

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75 For a brief comment on the significance of Phaethon in the final verses of the *Metamorphoses* and the first poem of the *Tristia*, see Graf (2002) 114.
76 This passage will be discussed in further detail below.
forever, and thereby eternally preserve the life of their author. My discussion begins by sketching how Ovid, in the *Tristia* and *Epistulae ex Ponto*, appropriates the biological language and imagery of child-bearing and child-rearing, and applies it to his poetic project. Next, turning from the poet’s exilic works to his epic, I read the book-as-offspring conceit back into the final verses of the *Metamorphoses* itself. The analysis developed here lends support to and expands on existing interpretations of the epic’s ending, which see the poet putting his mission to secure his own legacy firmly in conversation with that of Augustus.

The representation of poems as children has a long tradition in ancient literature.\(^{77}\) Plato compares the works of Homer, Hesiod, and other bards to offspring who will secure eternal fame for their creators; Aristotle, too, likens poets to parents.\(^{78}\) Catullus describes his poetic utterances as the “sweet progeny of the Muses,” Propertius refers to the “birth” of poems and Muses, and Horace famously mocks the puffed-up poet who labors like a mountain, only to deliver a mouse.\(^{79}\) It is, however, in Ovid’s hands that the metaphor is developed most fully and imaginatively.\(^{80}\)

At various points in his letters from exile (and especially in the prologues of *Tristia* 1 and 3, and the epilogues of *Tristia* 3 and *Epistulae ex Ponto* 3), Ovid plays on the parallel between poetic production and parenthood. The creation of his verses is described in terms of childbirth: *quicquid genui* (“whatever I have borne,” *Pont.* 3.9.12). He envisions his role as that of a father (*pater*, *Tr.* 3.1.66) to a band of brothers (*fratres*, *Tr.* 1.1.107, 3.1.65),

\(^{79}\) *dulcis Musarum . . . fetus*, Catull., 65.3; *nescio quid maius nascitur Iliade*, Prop., 2.34.66, *a me | nata . . . Musa*, 3.1.9-10; *parturient montes, nascetur ridiculus mus*, Hor., *Ars P.* 1.139.
referring to himself as their “parent” (*paren*, *Tr*. 1.1.115, 1.7.35, 3.1.57; *Pont*. 4.5.29), and, in a nod to the correspondence between biological and bookish genesis, their “creator” (*auctor*, *Tr*. 3.1.73, 5.1.68; *Pont*. 1.1.6, 3.9.9). His works are his offspring (*genus*, *Tr*. 3.1.73; *ortos | exule*, *Pont*. 1.1.21-22), his children (*natis*, *Tr*. 3.14.12), his descendants (*stirps*, *Tr*. 3.14.14), and his progeny (*progenies*, *Tr*. 3.14.14), born by parthenogenesis from his head in the manner of Pallas sprung from Jupiter (*Tr*. 3.14.13-14). Nor is this the only family-related mythological *exemplum* through which Ovid reflects on his relationship to his poems. In the opening elegy of the *Tristia*, he figures his book as Icarus (*Tr*. 1.1.87-90), and later equates the *Ars Amatoria*, the work which has accidentally destroyed its creator, with two unwitting legendary parricides, Oedipus and Telegonus (*Tr*. 1.1.114). Meanwhile, claiming in *Tristia* 1.7 to have burned the manuscript of the *Metamorphoses* upon his banishment from Rome, the poet identifies himself with Althaea, a parent who committed an act of filicide by destroying a log which was representative of her son Meleager’s life (*Tr*. 1.7.17-20). Elsewhere, professing the shabbiness of his exile poetry, he maintains that unlike the father of the hideous Homeric warrior Thersites, *he* is not blind to the defects of his offspring (*Pont*. 3.9.9-12). And when Ovid tenderly addresses his personified little book as his *liber*, as he does frequently in the opening elegy of the first book of the *Tristia*, we might just hear an echo of the term “*liberi*,” “children.”

There is also, moreover, a distinctive family resemblance between the poet and his book-children. It is an illusion which Ovid takes great care to construct, maintaining the

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81 For further discussion of this analogy, see the Conclusion to this study below.
83 See Chapter 4 below for further discussion of this elegy, and the comparison to Althaea and Meleager in particular.
existence of similarities in individual character, circumstances, and even physical appearance. The volumes of the *Tristia* are, like the exiled poet himself, tear-stained and tattered, reliant on the kindness of others (*Tr. 1.1.1-3*). The three rolls of the *Ars Amatoria*, meanwhile, have inherited not only their author’s licentious pollution (*Tr. 3.14.17*), but also his new-found sense of remorse, shamefacedly shrinking into the dark corners of their bookshelf (*Tr. 1.1.111-12*). And with regard to the *Metamorphoses*, Ovid’s own life has sadly come to imitate his art: the sudden reversal of fortune heralded by his exile has caused him to count himself among the “changed forms” which were the subject of his epic (*Tr. 1.1.119-22*). Several elegies later, he describes the verses of the epic as his *imago* (“image,” *Tr. 1.7.11*), a term which, as we have seen earlier in the chapter, was frequently used in reference to a child’s resemblance to his or her parent.

It is with this poetic conceit in mind that we turn back to the ending of the *Metamorphoses*. In Book 15, the final and most “historical” section of the poem, the issue of succession rises to the fore repeatedly and insistently, beginning with the question of who is to be king in the wake of Romulus’ demise, and concluding with the imperial affairs of present-day Rome. At the conclusion of the book, Ovid trains his attention on the future, both the emperor’s and his own. Here, as critics have noted, he engages with (and rivals) imperial preoccupations with legacy, immortality, and an everlasting name. The current reading seeks to draw on and extend these interpretations, by proposing that one way in which Ovid lays claim to the future is by constructing the book as his own offspring, a theme that (as we have seen above) he will later develop to great effect in his works from exile. In

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85 On the similarities between Ovid and his personified books, see Hinds (1985), Williams (1992), Newlands (1997) 60-63, Mordine (2010); on the relationship of *Tr. 1.1* to the *Metamorphoses*, see Huskey (2006).
particular, my analysis expands upon Philip Hardie’s remark that “[t]he matchless poet at the very end, with no anxiety about his succession, stands in pointed contrast to the difficulties of finding an imperial successor.”88 Whereas Hardie is referring, broadly, to Ovid’s survival in the form of his name and his text, I suggest that there is an even more specific and literal connection to be made between the emperor’s and poet’s respective “succession policy;” the book is able to preserve its author’s legacy precisely because it is fashioned as his child. Ovid, like the Caesars, is in the business of making heirs; only his are bookish ones.89

The notion that an element of each generation lives on through the next is one which Cassius Dio, writing his Roman History around two hundred years after Ovid, would put directly in the mouth of Augustus himself. Dio imagines an occasion in 9 C.E., when the Roman knights were protesting the Lex Iulia de Maritandis Ordinibus (passed in 18 B.C.E.), with its strict penalties on celibacy. Augustus, having gathered the men in the Forum, divides them into two groups, husbands and bachelors, and delivers a speech to each crowd in which he advocates marriage and procreation.90 While such a meeting between the emperor and the knights in 9 C.E. is not attested in any other source, Dio may have had in mind Augustus’ recitation of Q. Caecilius Metellus’ oration “on increasing offspring” (de prole augenda) before the Senate at the time of the Lex Iulia’s passage years earlier.91 In any case, the speech which Dio composes for Augustus sheds light on a possible reasoning

89 See also Claassen (2008) 48 who, in a discussion of Ovid’s representation of his books as his children in the works from exile, briefly but aptly notes the contrast with the emperor’s own situation: “Augustus had no son to follow him and had banished his daughter and lost his grandsons. He had no true progenies, in the basic sense of the word. Against this the poet affirms his own cyclic continuity after death, his immortality through poetry.”
90 Cass. Dio, 56.1.2-10.3.
behind the emperor’s promotion of reproduction, and that is as a way to transcend the ephemerality of human life (56.2.3-3.5):

“. . . we must console the mortal side of our nature with an endless succession of generations that shall be like the torch-bearers in a race, so that through one another we may render immortal the one side of our nature in which we fall short of divine bliss. . . . And is it not a delight to acknowledge a child who shows the endowments of both parents, to nurture and educate it, at once the physical and spiritual image [εἰκόνα] of yourself, so that in its growth another self lives again? Is it not blessed, on departing from life, to leave behind as successor and heir to your blood and substance one that is your own, sprung from your own loins, and to have only the mortal part of you waste away, while you live on in the child as your successor, so that you need not fall into the hands of aliens, as in war, nor perish utterly, as in a pestilence?”

We find in this passage, as in those cited at the beginning of this chapter, the Roman ideal of the child as the “image” (the imago or, as here, the εἰκόνα) of the parent, the imitation which preserves the essence of past generations and transmits it to future ones. Read less optimistically, however, Augustus’ celebration of the triumph of reproduction over physical vulnerability merely calls attention to the fragile nature of humanity itself. The secret to eternal life may be procreation, but the fatal (and unspoken) flaw in the plan is that children are, of course, no less mortal than their parents. The emperor’s speech implicitly raises, and leaves unanswered, an uncomfortable question: what is to become of the family line when the one who perishes is not the father, but the son?

92 χρῆ . . . τὸ θνητὸν τῆς φύσεως ἡμῶν ἀιδίῳ διαδοχῆ γενέων ὀσπέρ τινὸν λαμπαδίων παραμοθεῖσθαι, ἵν’ ἐν ὧν ὦ μόνῳ τῆς θείας εὐδαιμονίας ἠττώμεθα, τοῦτ’ ἐξ ἀλλήλων ἀθάνατον καθιστώμεθα. . . . πῶς δ’ οὐχ ἢδυ ἀνελέσθαι τέκνον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν συμπεφυκὸς καὶ θρέψαι καὶ παιδεῦσαι, εἰκόνα μὲν τοῦ σώματος εἰκόνα δὲ καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπερ ἐν ἐκείνῳ αὐξηθέντι ἔτερον αὐτὸν γενέσθαι; πῶς δ’ οὐ μακαριστὸν, ἀπαλλαττόμενον ἐκ τοῦ βίου, διάδοχον καὶ κληρονόμον οἰκείον ἐξ ἐαυτοῦ γεγονότα καὶ τοῦ γένους καὶ τῆς οὐσίας καταλιπεῖν, καὶ τῇ μὲν φύσει τῇ ἀνθρώπῃ διαλυθήσεται τῇ δὲ ἐκείνῳ διαδοχῆ ἔχεσθαι, καὶ μὴ τῇ ἄλλοτρίοις ὀσπέρ ἐν πολέμῳ γενέσθαι μὴν ἄρδην ὅπερ ἐν πολέμῳ γε ἀπολέσθαι; Trans. Cary (1914-27).

93 On the sense of posterity bestowed by children upon parents, see Dixon (1992) 111.
The Roman practice of adoption for political purposes could, and did, go some way towards alleviating the problem, by providing a ready supply of “spares” to replace prematurely deceased heirs. But the fact remains that the two hazards named by Dio’s Augustus, disease and warfare, are as unforgiving to adopted sons as to biological ones. And the real-life Augustus lost heirs to both, with Lucius succumbing to illness in 2 C.E. and Gaius dying in 4 C.E. of an enemy stab-wound inflicted several months earlier, when he was campaigning in Armenia.\(^{94}\)

It is with these fragile and frustrated hopes of succession in mind that we turn to Jupiter’s prediction, at the end of the Metamorphoses, that Augustus “shall guide morality by his own example” (exemploque suo mores reget, 15.834). The phenomenon of Roman exemplarity was, as this chapter has sought to demonstrate, closely bound up with the ideal of the perpetuation of the family line (that is, descendants emulating the models of their ancestors). This mention of Augustus guiding by his own exemplum is no exception, immediately followed as it is by a reference to “coming generations” (uentorumque nepotum, 15.835) and to the emperor’s heir, Tiberius, described as the “offspring” whom “he will command to bear both his name and his cares” (prolem . . . | ferre simul nomenque suum curasque iubebit, 15.836-37).\(^{95}\) But what does it even mean for Ovid to evoke the image of Augustus guiding by his own exemplum here? By this late point in his epic, it has been determined many times over that leading by example is not quite the simple task that Jupiter makes it out to be in this understated prediction. The god, in fact, tells only half the story:


\(^{95}\) Hill (2002) 149-50 detects a “jarring note” in the description of Tiberius as the prolem sancta de coniuge natam (15.836), with its emphasis on his biological relationship to Livia rather than Augustus.
Augustus may guide, but the question is, will others follow? And will “commanding” (iubebit, 15.837) his successor, Tiberius, to take up the family name and the burden of imperial rule prove effective? As another father, Sol, discovered when he begged Phaethon not to drive the solar chariot, willing one’s offspring to behave in a particular way is no guarantor of either the child’s success or his survival.

The reader does not have long to wait before being presented with a final case in point, which simultaneously showcases both the uncontrollability of exempla and the mortality of children. Here, in the last appearance of the term “exemplum” in the epic, Ovid recounts how the deeds of Augustus have exceeded those of Julius Caesar, and compares the pair to a selection of mythological fathers whose distinction was outdone by their sons (15.855-58):

sic magnus cedit titulis Agamemnonis Atreus, 
Aegea sic Theseus, sic Pelea uicit Achilles; 
denique, ut exemplis ipsos aequantibus utar, 
sic et Saturnus minor est Ioue.

“In this way, great Atreus yields to the honors of Agamemnon; in this way, Theseus conquers Aegeus, and Achilles conquers Peleus; and finally, that I may use exempla equaling them [i.e., Caesar and Augustus], in this way Saturn, too, is less than Jove.”

One particularly intriguing feature of this passage is the conscious effort made by the poet to articulate exactly what he is doing: ut exemplis . . . utar (“that I may use exempla,” 15.857). Ovid is not simply using exemplary parallels to describe Augustus and Caesar; rather, he is announcing, quite deliberately, that he is using them. He thereby signals that the act of defining the emperor and the imperial family via exempla is by no means the preserve or

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96 On Augustus’ difficulties in controlling his exemplary legacy, as depicted by Suetonius, see Langlands (2014).
privilege of Augustus alone.\textsuperscript{97} In the narrator’s first-person intrusion, \textit{ut exemplis . . . utar}, in fact, we may detect a possible echo of the emperor’s first-person claims in the \textit{Res Gestae} that, “I brought back \textit{exempla}” (\textit{exempla . . . reduxi}) and “I myself handed down \textit{exempla}” (\textit{ipse . . . exempla . . . tradidi}, \textit{R.G.} 8.5). It may be no accident, too, that the emperor’s emphatic \textit{ipse} (“I myself”) finds an equivalent in the poet’s \textit{ipsos} (“them”), used in reference to Augustus and Caesar in the phrase, \textit{ut exemplis ipsos aequantibus utar} (15.857). The grammatical subject, \textit{ipse}, has become the grammatical object, \textit{ipsos}. It is, in other words, no longer Augustus who is in charge of selecting and assigning \textit{exempla}, but Ovid.

Another lesson in the uncontrollability of \textit{exempla} is provided by the contents of the mythological father-son comparison itself.\textsuperscript{98} The intended tone of this passage, which sees Caesar and Augustus likened to famous Greek heroes and gods, has proved difficult to pin down.\textsuperscript{99} On the one hand, there is no doubt that the figures to whom the emperor is likened - Agamemnon, Theseus, Achilles, and Jupiter – are powerful leaders, capable of greatness. On the other, however, the mere act of citing them in combination with their fathers has the effect less of conjuring up the memory of their glorious deeds, and more of reminding the reader of the highly dysfunctional families from which they spring.\textsuperscript{100} That the very same individuals can be read as \textit{either} positive or negative models for Augustus and Caesar, depending on which of their personal qualities and actions one chooses to excerpt and

\textsuperscript{97} Feldherr (2010) 77-78 sees Ovid’s use of the term “\textit{exempla}” here as a borrowing of Augustus’ own language in his Forum-related edict (\textit{uelut ad exemplar}, Suet., \textit{Aug.} 31.5).
\textsuperscript{98} See Lowrie (2009) 380.
\textsuperscript{99} As a whole, the epic’s final description of the emperor (15.850-70) has lent itself to both “Augustan” and “anti-Augustan” interpretations; on the usefulness of such terms, see Kennedy (1992), as well as the discussions of Galinsky (1975) 210-17 and Barchiesi (1997) 5-8, 84. Coleman (1971) 476 describes the closing eulogy as characterized by “absurd exaggeration,” a view with which Little (1976) takes issue, arguing that a reading of this passage as ironic is substantiated by neither the genre of Roman eulogy, nor the text of the \textit{Metamorphoses} itself. On Ovidian panegyric, see Galinsky (1975) 254-61, Hinds (1987b) 23-29, Feeney (1991) 210-24, Williams (1994) 155-58, Hill (2002), Tissot (2002) 319-21, and Volk (2010) 104-9.
emphasize, is itself confirmation of the instability of *exempla*, and the multiplicity of interpretations that they spawn.

Indeed, as anyone familiar with Ovid’s works is well aware, there is often more to his mythological *exempla* than initially meets the eye. The poet has been known to rely on the learned reader to supply the finer details which he has left unspoken, but which, once noted, make for an even tighter fit between two points of reference.101 To this end, it is worth considering what exactly these famed characters were famous for. Each of the families, we may recall, is associated with the death or near death of a child, beginning with Atreus, who killed and cooked his nephews, and Agamemnon, who sacrificed his daughter Iphigenia on the eve of the Trojan War. The next father-son pair named by the poet does not fare much better: earlier in the *Metamorphoses*, we have learned both of Theseus’ brush with death at the poison-bearing hands of Aegeus (7.420), and his fatal curse on his own offspring, Hippolytus (15.504-5). Meanwhile, in one of several myths surrounding Achilles’ birth (and a version with which Ovid would have been familiar through Apollonius’ *Argonautica*), Peleus interferes with his wife’s attempted immortalization of their son and thereby dooms him to a certain death.102 Finally, although the gods’ deathless condition renders filicide an impossibility, Saturn tries to do the next best thing by swallowing the infant Jupiter, in a legend which Ovid will address in the *Fasti*.103

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101 See e.g., *Tr.* 1.1.114, with Davisson (1984) 112 and Hinds (1985) 18-20. Here, the poet laments that the risqué *Ars Amatoria* has destroyed him, its creator, and compares the books to two legendary Greek parricides, Oedipus and Telegonus. Further consideration of the original myths, however, reveals that the point of comparison is even closer than it appears at first glance: both of these sons did not just kill their fathers; rather, they killed their fathers inadventently. Ovid thereby subtly lends support to the case which he will assemble throughout the collections from exile, that any offense caused by his writing of the *Ars* was unintentional.

102 *Argon.* 4.860-79.

103 *Fast.* 4.197-205.
Admittedly, one would be hard-pressed to find a single family in Greek mythology whose history didn’t feature the death (or near fatality, or attempted murder) of a child. And yet this is, in a sense, precisely the point: the death of children is a universal liability for everyone but the gods. Having established only a hundred verses earlier that Caesar and Augustus, too, are deities (15.746-50, 760-61), Ovid now declares Saturn and Jupiter to be their closest equivalent in the fourth and final mythological parallel: “exempla equaling them” (exemplis ipsos aequantibus, 15.857). But the rhetoric of exemplarity has, by this late stage in the epic, been exposed as so unstable, so susceptible to failure, that any attempt to compare two points of reference must surely be as much about the differences between them as it is about the similarities.104 And Ovid’s ostensible attempt to level out the terms of comparison (aequantibus, 15.857) instead serves only to unsettle the balance, by drawing attention to the fact that Augustus and Caesar are mortals, and as such, are not really like gods at all.105

What emerges from the poet’s selection of mythological allusions, then, is just how easy it is for (human) children to die. None of the heroic Greek sons to whom Ovid compares to Augustus – Agamemnon, Theseus, and Achilles - survive in bodily form. Instead, they achieve immortality in another way, via literature, living on in the incarnation of the texts which tell their stories.106

104 On Ovid’s use of wittily incongruous exempla in his works of elegiac poetry, see Davisson (1993). Cf. Feeney (1992) 37, in a discussion of similes in Catull. 68b: “The slippage between tenor and vehicle is . . . often more to the point than the match.”

105 On the comparison between Jupiter and Augustus, see Feeney (1991) 219-24. Feldherr (2010) 78 notes that the panegyric tone is further undermined by the fact that Jupiter and Saturn’s immortal status precludes the possibility of a peaceful succession, and necessitates a violent overthrow.

106 Ovid drives home the point by using a term loaded with literary connotations, when he describes how Atreus, in common with the other fathers named here, “yields to the titles” (cedit titulis, 15.855) of his son. The word “titulus” signifies “honor” or glory,” but can also denote the title of a book. Hardie (1997) 193 n. 38 calls this a “moment of textuality;” see also Martelli (2013) 162. It is in this sense, in fact, that Ovid will frequently use the word in reference to his own works in the Tristia, as noted by Martelli (2013) 157-60.
This lasting nature of literature is the thought with which Ovid famously leaves his reader in the final verses of the *Metamorphoses*, the poem’s so-called *sphragis*, or “seal” (15.871-79):

> iamque opus exegi, quod nec Iouis ira nec ignis nec poterit ferrum nec edax abolere uetustas. cum uolet, illa dies, quae nil nisi corporis huius ius habet, incerti spatium mihi finiat aeui; parte tamen meliore mei super alta perennis astra ferar, nomenque erit indelebile nostrum; quaque patet domitis Romana potentia terris ore legar populi, perque omnia saecula fama (si quid habent ueri uatum praesagia) uiuam.

And now I have completed my work, which neither the anger of Jupiter, nor fire, nor iron, nor devouring old age shall be able to destroy. When it pleases, let that day, which has jurisdiction over nothing but this mortal body, end the duration of my uncertain years. But I, with the better part of myself, shall be borne forever beyond the lofty stars, and my name shall be indelible. Wherever Roman power extends over conquered lands, I will be gathered up [or: read] by people’s lips and, with fame through all the ages (if there is any truth to the prophecies of bards), I shall live.

Here, as has been observed in scholarship on this passage, the poet’s bid for eternal life is made in direct response to that of the Caesars, whose deification and respective apotheoses he has remarked on only shortly before (15.746-50, 760-61, 818-19, 845-50, 869-70). It is worth recalling, however, that “immortality” for the imperial family depends not only on the official act of divinization, but also on the production of heirs. So too do we find that Ovid’s attempt to match and surpass the Caesars on their own terms pivots on his designation of his book as his offspring and successor.

Ovid anticipates his journey above the stars in “the better part of myself” (*parte . . . meliore mei*, 15.875). The precise nature of the *melior pars* has proved to be a long-standing

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enigma in scholarship on the *Metamorphoses*. In critics’ attempts to shed light on the meaning of this verse, two comparisons are frequently made: Ovid’s use, earlier in the epic, of similar phrases in his accounts of the apotheoses of the great legendary heroes Hercules (*parte sui meliore viget,* “he gained strength in his better part,” 9.269) and Aeneas (*pars optima restitit illi,* “his best part remained,” 14.604); and Horace’s description of his poetry as *multa pars mei* (“a great part of myself,” *Carm.* 3.30.6), which appears in the context of his famous proclamation of his work as a monument. The better part of Ovid’s self is, then, usually interpreted as either his immortal soul (which will live on in the manner of those of the mythological heroes, long after his corporeal demise) or his book (which will secure his everlasting fame).

In his discussion of this question, Hardie prefers the latter explanation, remarking that, “the living presence of the poet is the text, the poem as a whole, into which the mortal person of the poet has been transformed. . . . His ‘better part’ is . . . his book and the favourable reception of that book.” As an interpretation, this is both attractive and plausible. But there may be something more to add. The use of *pars* with the genitive of a personal pronoun, as here (*parte . . . mei,* 15.875), appears elsewhere in Ovid’s works in a familial context, indicating a particularly strong attachment, both biological and emotional, between relatives. In his autobiographical poem in the fourth book of the *Tristia*, the poet recounts how his brother’s premature death deprived him of *pars mei* (“part of myself,” *Tr.* 4.10.32). Even more telling, for the purposes of this discussion, is Ovid’s use of the

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110 The trope is also found in the context of close friendships; see Nisbet and Hubbard (1970) 48, on Hor., *Carm.* 1.3.8.
expression in the seventh letter of the *Heroides*. Here, Dido, railing furiously against Aeneas for abandoning her, confronts him with the possibility that she may be pregnant, and refers to the imagined child as *pars . . . tui* (“part of yourself;” *Her.* 7.134).

So it is clear, from Dido’s expression, that the child can be defined as “part” of the father; in what sense, though, could the child be considered to be the *melior pars*, the “better part”? For this idea, we need look no further than the father-son vignette located just twenty lines prior to the *Metamorphoses*’ epilogue, where Ovid imagines the soul of Julius Caesar exulting that the deeds of his adopted son, Augustus, are greater and more famous than his own (15.850-54).\(^{111}\) It seems that the better part of the father - which is to say, the fame-winning part - is the son. When Ovid imagines himself achieving *fama* as he soars beyond the stars in the *melior pars mei*, then, he is essentially bestowing on his book the status of a child and heir.\(^{112}\)

The poet’s use of the word “*opus*” (“work,” 15.871) in reference to his epic may lend additional support to an interpretation of the *Metamorphoses* as Ovid’s offspring and successor. While *opus* is a standard term for a work of literature, scholars have also suggested that an architectural metaphor is also in play here. Allusions have variously been detected to the description of the bronze and iron tablets in the House of the Fates (15.809-14); Horace’s famous account of his poem as a monument at the end of the *Odes* (*Carm.* 3.30.1); and Augustus’ own extensive building program.\(^{113}\) It is, however, worth noting that in its previous appearance in the poem only shortly before, *opus* was not used in a literary or

\(^{111}\) On the ironic effect of Ovid’s language here, see Hill (2002) 149-50; on the hint that rivalry may exist between the two Caesars, see Feldherr (2010) 77.

\(^{112}\) This analysis of the *Metamorphoses* as the poet’s offspring will be developed further in the following chapter.

architectural context, but in a familial one. There, after reflecting on Caesar’s military and civic deeds, the poet concluded that there was “no greater work (opus) among the acts of Caesar, than that he became the father of this man [Augustus]” (*neque . . . de Caesaris actis | ullum maius opus quam quod pater exstitit huius*, 15.750-51).\(^{114}\) Caesar’s wide-ranging conquests abroad (15.752-57), Ovid elaborates in the verses immediately following, pale in comparison to his achievement in “begetting such a great man” (*tantum genuisse uirum*, 15.758).\(^{115}\) As has been noted in criticism on this description of Caesar’s feats, the phrase *maius opus* carries associations with epic poetry.\(^{116}\) Turning back to the *sphragis*, though, we find that the reverse of this observation is equally applicable. That is to say, in the poet’s concluding designation of his epic as an *opus*, we may hear an echo of Caesar’s earlier act of paternity. If Caesar’s greatest work is that he became the (non-biological) father of Augustus, then Ovid’s is that he has become the (non-biological) father of the *Metamorphoses*. And just as Caesar’s *opus*-making – in the sense of creating an heir - ensures the preservation of his name (*natusque suus . . . nominis heres*, 15.819),\(^{117}\) so too does Ovid’s (*nomenque erit indelebile nostrum*, 15.876).\(^{118}\) 

Read along these lines, the ending of the epic implies that while the production of a child and the production of a book both qualify as a means of securing one’s legacy, the latter is the surer way of attaining some form of immortality.\(^{119}\) The myths associated with the
exemplary father and son pairs to whom Caesar and Augustus were compared just shortly before showcased a disturbing array of scenarios in which children can die, from murder, to accidents, to deaths in battle. The theme of mortality is reprised in the sphragis, when the poet anticipates his own day of death (15.873-74). His poem, by contrast, can be destroyed by neither Jupiter’s anger, nor fire, iron, nor old age (15.871-72). And Ovid, like any proud parent, has high hopes for his book-child. As it soars above the stars (15.875-76), it achieves what human children, as the Phaethon episode has so clearly demonstrated, cannot: flying, without dying.

Roman tradition held that it was the role of the father to guide (ducere) his son, in life (by providing instruction) as in death (by predeceasing him). In the Phaethon episode, neither ideal comes to pass. This narrative, I have proposed, sees Ovid literalizing a dominant metaphor of exemplary discourse, that of the older generation leading the way and the younger generation following. But exemplarity and imitation is neither a straightforward enterprise nor a foolproof one. Here we find an exceptional parent who has spawned an unexceptional child: Phaethon is so different from Sol that his claim to divine paternity gives rise to disbelief, self-doubt, and eventually tragedy. Warren Ginsberg has remarked that, in the Phaethon episode, “Ovid explodes the idea that paternity determines continuity of identity; for him, “like father, like son” is a myth.” Far from being the product of biological heredity or upbringing, in fact, any resemblance between father and son in this episode is strictly artificial, as the Sun-god adorns Phaethon with his habitual crown of rays (2.124) and leads him to a solar chariot in which he does not belong (2.106). In the end, the

120 Ginsberg (1989) 224.
promise of family resemblance and inherited identity not only remains unfulfilled; it also proves to be the death of the son.

Ovid thereby dramatizes the problems which the phenomenon of ancestral imitation poses for the Romans. First and foremost is the difficulty presented by a mechanism of control, the *exemplum*, which is itself uncontrollable. Sol’s inability to govern his son serves as a reminder of the essentially ungovernable nature of exemplarity more generally; meanwhile, the failure of paternal instructions to hit their mark is symptomatic of the instability of ancestral models. Equally problematic is the tension between singularity and imitability which the *exemplum* embodies, and which is exposed by this story. For how can one possibly succeed a truly exceptional father like Sol?

The son’s inability to follow in the path of his father has very real implications for the succession of one generation by the next, particularly in the case of the imperial family. While the creation of offspring, whether via biological reproduction or strategic adoption, does in and of itself provide a means to escape the impermanence of humanity by preserving part of the parent in the form of the child, it is a fragile and fallible one at best. Augustus himself, with his personal history of lost heirs, could attest as much. Human children - frustratingly headstrong, alarmingly uncontrollable, and above all, ineluctably mortal – are no sure guardians of their parents’ eternal life. Ovid’s book-children, however, appear to be quite a different story. Like traditional offspring, they originate from their creator and bear a resemblance to him, but they are also, essentially, endowed with the potential to live on as a testament to him. The precise means by which they are able to do so is the subject of the following chapter.
In *Tristia* 1.7, the exiled poet reflects, from the unhappy vantage point of the Black Sea, on the life and afterlife of his *Metamorphoses*. The elegy opens with an address to anyone back home who possesses an artistic representation of Ovid, an *imago* or an *effigies* such as a sculptural bust or a cameo ring (*Tr.* 1.7.1-11). While he is thankful to them for remembering him in this way, it is really the verses of his *Metamorphoses* which are his “greater image” (*carmina maior imago | sunt mea*, *Tr.* 1.7.11-2), and which he prays will survive and remind the reader of him (*precor ut uiuant . . . | . . . admoneantque mei*, *Tr.* 1.7.25-6). Ovid’s closest likeness, in other words, is not literal, but literary.

This description of his work as an *imago* speaks to the close connection between art and poetry, as well as to the superior mimetic power of Ovid’s verse. As we saw in the preceding chapter, however, the Roman concept of the *imago* is bound up as much with ancestry as with aesthetics, referring both to progenitors (the *imagines maiorum*, portraits of deceased relatives) and progeny (the ideal of the son as the *imago* of his father). In fact, the poet’s subsequent comparison of himself and his manuscript to the mythological mother/son pair Althaea and Meleager elsewhere in the elegy (*Tr.* 1.7.17-20), as well as his characterization of the books of the epic as orphans in need of protection (*orba parente . . . uolumina*, *Tr.* 1.7.35), suggests that the primary focus of *Tristia* 1.7 does not lie in the world of visual arts, but rather in the family domain. The classification of the *Metamorphoses* as a *maior imago* must not, then, belong solely to the realm of artistic representation. By

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1 Tissol (2005) 99-102 notes that this identification of poet and poem picks up on Ovid’s claim, in *Tr.* 1.1 and 3.1, that he and his personified book share a marred physical appearance.

describing his epic as a “greater image” of himself than a painting or sculpture, and one which is capable of recalling its creator (*admoneant . . . mei, Tr. 1.7.26*), Ovid seems once again to be claiming for his book the status of a child.

Support for this interpretation may be adduced from passages elsewhere in Latin literature, where offspring are proclaimed superior to artistic representations in their ability to capture likeness. For the child, in Roman thought, is not simply considered to be *an* image of the parent; rather, the child is the *best* image. When, in his ninth *Philippic*, Cicero exalts the bravery and self-sacrifice of the consul Servius Sulpicius Rufus, and recommends that the Senate officially commemorate him with a statue and state funeral, he adds that such posthumous memorials would nevertheless pale in comparison to the one which the consul had already secured for himself during his own lifetime: “no clearer monument could Servius Sulpicius have left behind than the image of his own character, virtue, steadfastness, dutifulness, and talent: his son.”

A man’s most authentic *monumentum*, then, and the representation which recalls (*monere*) him more faithfully than any artistic rendering, is his own offspring. A similar sentiment is expressed by Tacitus in the *Annals*, though in reference to grandparents and grandchildren. Here, Agrippina the Elder indignantly declares that Augustus’ spirit has not been transfused into “mute statues” (*effigies mutas*); instead, it is she herself who is his “true image” (*imaginem ueram, Ann. 4.52*).

As a means of self-preservation, children may be better than statues; but for Ovid, books are the best of all. Elsewhere in *Tristia* 1.7, he recalls how he decided to burn the manuscript of the poem upon his enforced departure from Rome. Recreating the moment when he placed his books upon the flames, Ovid likens himself to Althaea, the mythological

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mother who condemned her son Meleager to death by consigning a fateful log, representative of his lifespan, to the fire (Tr. 1.7.15-26).\(^4\)

As I was leaving, I myself sorrowfully placed these [verses], like so much that was mine, in the fire with my own hand. Just as the daughter of Thestius is said to have burned her own son in burning the log, and to have been a better sister than she was a mother, so did I place the undeserving little books, my own vital organs destined to perish along with me, upon the quickening pyre, either because I detested the Muses (as sources of the charges against me) or because the poem was still growing and rough. Since these verses were not completely destroyed, but survive – a number of copies were made, I think – now I pray that they may live, and delight the productive leisure of my reader, and remind him of me.

I suggested earlier that Ovid’s use of the expression *melior pars mei* (“better part of myself,” 15.875) at the very end of the *Metamorphoses* might point to a characterization of the epic as his offspring. This representation of the poem as “part” of the poet, just as a child is “part” of its parent, finds particularly graphic expression in the verses of *Tristia* 1.7 cited above. Ovid’s description of how he placed *rapidis uiscera nostra rogis* (“my own vital organs on the quickening pyre,” *Tr*. 1.7.20) is a direct echo of the words composed for Althaea in his account of Meleager’s death in the *Metamorphoses* (‘rogus iste cremet mea uiscera’ dixit,

“may that pyre consume my vital organs,’ she said,” *Met. 8.478*). But there is an essential difference between the two victims. Any reader familiar with the myth of Meleager would recall that the young man went down in flames, burned alive by an internal, invisible fire (8.515-25). The fate of Ovid’s epic, however, is not nearly so dire: the poet tells us that he believes multiple copies of the poem to have been in existence besides the one he destroyed, and so it was not entirely wiped out (Tr. 1.7.23-4). So while his act of “filicide” in *Tristia* 1.7 may be comparable to Althaea’s, the outcome is entirely different: Meleager perishes, but the *Metamorphoses* lives on (extant, Tr. 1.7.23).7

Earlier Ovidian scholarship, with its tendency to mine the poems from exile primarily as historical evidence, saw the book burning episode frequently extracted as a valuable biographical nugget. More recently, however, critics have subjected the veracity of the anecdote to closer scrutiny, reading it within the broader context of the narrative fiction of artistic decline cultivated by the poet as he languished on the periphery of the Roman empire. The question of whether or not the incident actually occurred is, as we will discover, less important than the question of what Ovid’s account of it, real or imagined, can tell us about his own conception of how the *Metamorphoses* would survive through the ages and achieve the status of a classic work of literature.

5 Meleager’s end is not unlike Phaethon’s, another boy whose parent was responsible for his fiery demise, albeit unwillingly and unintentionally. For a comparison of the deaths of these two characters, see Vial (2010) 45.

6 There is a note of humorous detachment in his expression of uncertainty (reor, “I think,” Tr. 1.7.24) over whether or not other copies of the epic remained in circulation at the time; see Hinds (1985) 23, Tissol (2005) 111, and Krevans (2010) 207.

7 The epic’s continued existence bears out Ovid’s claim at the end of the *Metamorphoses* that the poem cannot be destroyed by fire (15.871-72); see Hinds (1985) 24, Tissol (2005) 103.


9 Williams (1994) 80-83.
The current chapter takes this topic as its point of inquiry, examining the ways in which the poet sets out to establish the *Metamorphoses*, and himself as its author, as an *exemplum*. Via an extended analysis of *Tristia* 1.7, and drawing on evidence from elsewhere in the collections from exile, I argue that Ovid, in an attempt to secure his literary legacy, presents his epic as a model worthy of reproduction, in the form of both physical copies to be replicated and poetic passages to be imitated. But, as I go on to explain in the chapter’s final section, making an *exemplum* of oneself is no simple or straightforward endeavor. In the end, the fortunes of Ovid’s works may turn out to be as mutable as those of the exiled poet himself.

Over the course of the chapter, I develop a brief but promising analogy made by Paul Fleming in his recent study of exemplarity and mediocrity in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century German literature. In a historical overview of shifting Western aesthetics from Aristotle to Kant, Fleming takes the innovative step of applying Matthew Roller’s four-stage sequence of Roman exemplary discourse – comprising action, audience, commemoration, and imitation - to the mechanics of poetic production and reception more generally: “the action is the writing itself; the audience consists in critics who deem a text excellent; its commemoration occurs through its repeated recommendation and citation; and imitation is the goal of such exemplary works.” While Fleming’s project is mainly concerned with literature of a more modern period, the parallels which he draws between cultural and artistic exemplarity are compelling ones with broader significance, and will benefit from further consideration. His four-fold model of literary production and reception, rooted as it is in a

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10 In a discussion of the final lines of the *Metamorphoses*, Fowler (2000a) 196 remarks that “Ovid’s name will be indelible . . . because of the empire-wide book trade which ensures his victory over Augustus’ attempts at suppression. Ovid’s name will last because . . . his works will continue to exist through constant recopying and reinterpretation by readers.” The first part of the current chapter draws on and develops this observation.

schema originally devised to account for a cornerstone of Roman culture and historiography, has the potential to offer particularly valuable insights when mapped back onto another Roman context, namely, a poetic one.

The cue for the application of the rhetoric of exemplarity to the world of books and literature, such as I propose here, is provided by Ovid himself in Tristia 1.7. Here, he attributes the survival of the Metamorphoses after his exile to its existence in the form of pluribus exemplis, “multiple copies” (Tr. 1.7.24). While undoubtedly correct as a translation – this verse is, in fact, one of the citations provided by the Oxford Latin Dictionary under the definition, “a copy (of a document, etc.), transcript”12 - the word “copy” nevertheless cannot do full justice to the shades of meaning encapsulated by the Latin term exemplum, nor bear the weight of the cultural tradition behind it. Implicit in the word is a value judgment, whether positive or negative. An exemplum is a model of its kind, setting a standard by which others can be measured.13

It is instructive to note that, in the two preceding poems in this collection, the word “exemplum” is invested with a distinctly positive force. Tristia 1.5, dedicated to a loyal friend who supported and comforted him at the time of his exile, sees Ovid drawing a comparison to the mythological character Pylades, who proved himself the exemplum . . . ueri amoris (“model of true love,” Tr. 1.5.21) to Orestes in the throes of his madness.14 In Tristia 1.6, meanwhile, he commends his wife, who looked out for his interests in his darkest

12 s.v. 9b.
13 See Habinek (1998) 46 and 185 n. 44, who cites Festus 72 Lindsay (1913) on the connection between exemplum and aestimatio.
14 Cf. Martelli (2013) 210-22 on Ovid’s use of the rhetoric of exemplarity to commemorate loyal addressees in the Epistulae ex Ponto.
hour, as the *exemplum coniugis . . . bonae* (“model of a good wife,” *Tr.* 1.6.26). Taking into account the markedly favorable spirit of the term “*exemplum*” in these two poems, then, where the word is used to denote an outstanding specimen of its kind, perhaps it would not be too much of a leap to ascribe equally positive overtones to Ovid’s use of *exemplis* in *Tristia* 1.7, too, with respect to the *Metamorphoses*. It is tempting, in fact, to trace through these three elegies a thematic pattern of “good *exempla* which have survived the bad circumstances of Ovid’s exile:” an extraordinary friend (*Tr.* 1.5), an extraordinary wife (*Tr.* 1.6), and ultimately, an extraordinary epic (*Tr.* 1.7).

Elsewhere in Latin literature, we find that to describe an author or work as an *exemplum* is to comment on its quality and value. Quintilian’s *Institutio Oratoria* offers a particularly effective demonstration of this application of the term. Though intended for a highly specialized audience (the young student of oratory), this rhetorical handbook provides important insight into the meaning and function of exemplarity within a broader literary context. In the prologue of the tenth book, Quintilian asserts that, in addition to receiving a theoretical training in the rules of rhetoric, the young orator should be raised on a balanced diet of writing, reading, and speaking (10.1.2). These three exercises, he adds, are distinct but interdependent: skill in speaking requires practice in writing, which in turn demands the model (*exemplum*, 10.1.2) provided by reading. This is the first of a series of appearances of the term “*exemplum*” in the sense of a mold in which the orator-in-training should endeavor to cast himself and his speeches. As Quintilian goes on to explain, an even more powerful teaching device than the rules imparted by rhetorical manuals are the *exempla* to be

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16 *nam neque solida atque robusta fuerit unquam eloquentia nisi multo stilo uires acceperit, et citra lectionis exemplum labor ille carens rectore fluitabit*, *Inst.* 10.1.2; see Fleming (2009) 27.
found in literary texts. He commends Homer for providing the *exemplum* in every aspect of eloquence, and advises that Cicero be regarded as the ultimate *exemplum* of an orator.

Returning now to *Tristia* 1.7, we can see that Ovid’s assertion of his epic’s survival in the form of multiple *exempla* (*Tr*. 1.7.24) is not simply a straightforward reference to physical copies of the text. Rather, it is also an implicit affirmation of the poem’s worth as a work of literature. For it is not by chance that the *Metamorphoses* remains in existence; it is in fact because it has already commanded such popular interest that there is sufficient demand for it to be circulated and replicated.

Despite achieving this success, however, the banished poet can hardly afford to rest on his laurels. His challenge now, as we will see in the following section, is to ensure that his books do not suffer the same fate as their author, and disappear from Rome altogether.

**Conservation in Action**

The Roman book – both Ovid’s conception of it and the physical entity which circulated in the first century – was simultaneously creative and procreative, at once a product of the poet himself and a reproductive organism in its own right. In declaring that multiple copies of his *Metamorphoses* remain extant even in the face of his attempt to destroy it (*Tr*. 1.7.23-4), Ovid articulates a key principle of evolution, one which translates easily from the field of animal conservation to the ancient book trade. Just as the survival of a species depends on the existence of individual members which can reproduce, the survival

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17 *nam omnium quaecumque docemus hinc sunt exempla, potentiora etiam ipsae quae traduntur artibus*, *Inst*. 10.1.15.
18 On Homer: *hic . . . omnibus eloquentiæ partibus exemplum et ortum dedit*, *Inst*. 10.1.46; on Cicero: *hunc igitur spectemus, hoc propositum nobis sit exemplum, ille se profecisse sciat cui Cicero valde placebit*, *Inst*. 10.1.112. Later, Quintilian reiterates that the ideal orator should select a master of eloquence as his own model for imitation (*exemplum . . . ad imitantum*, 12.2.27).
of a book in first-century Rome depended on the existence of individual copies (*exempla*) which could be reproduced. The essence of the *exemplum*, after all, lies in its ability to be replicated. As Raymond Starr, in a discussion of the Roman book trade, explains, “since books were copied by hand, the supply of a particular title was not restricted to a specific number of copies in a publisher’s printing run. If one wanted a copy of a book, one had a copy made, provided, of course, that a text was available to copy.” In other words, ancient book production followed the same principle of exponential growth as animate populations: each copy released into the world could, in theory, spawn more copies of itself, like Fibonacci’s rabbits. So while Ovid, in *Tristia* 1.7, might play the passionate poet who casts his manuscripts into the fire with reckless abandon, he in fact displays all the levelheaded rationality of an evolutionary biologist. By ensuring that additional copies of the *Metamorphoses* are in existence besides those which he has (allegedly) committed to the flames, he saves his *nati*, his book-children, from possible extinction, and takes an essential step towards ensuring the survival of his species.

A number of Greek myths may be cited, moreover, in which fire, far from being a source of child destruction, actually serves as an immortalizing agent. That this motif was well-known to Ovid is clear from elsewhere in his works. In the *Fasti*, Demeter, playing nurse to a human infant, surreptitiously submerges her charge in the live embers of the hearth “so that the fire might purge the burden of mortality” (*humanum purget ut ignis onus*, Fast. 4.554), only to be interrupted by the boy’s distraught mother, who mistakenly believes his life to be in danger. The theme of a son’s immortalization by fire also features in the myth of Hercules’ apotheosis in the *Metamorphoses*, when Jupiter grants that his demi-god

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offspring’s mortality be burned away on the funeral pyre (9.252-72). Just like Hercules, then, whose death paradoxically secures his everlasting life and enables him to flourish in his “better part” (parte sui meliore, Met. 9.269), Ovid’s book rolls perish in the fire but miraculously survive (extant, Tr. 1.7.23), ensuring that their author lives on in his melior pars (Met. 15.587). The poet’s destruction of his book-children is, by implication, their ticket into a club of mythological offspring who are immersed in fire as a means to immortality.

Despite its physical fragility and flammable properties, in fact, the Roman book was a resilient creature with the potential, as Pliny the Younger writes in one of his letters, to “survive and be read forever” (liber . . . manebit legeturque semper, Ep. 9.27).21 With careful conservation and under the right circumstances, a book would outlive its author by many years. Tacitus’ account of Cremutius Cordus, the historian whose controversial annals were burned on the recommendation of the Senate, demonstrates as much. While Cordus himself committed suicide, copies of his books “survived, having been hidden and published” (manserunt, occultati et editi, Ann. 4.35).22

For all the imperial wrath that Ovid incurred, his works were not physically destroyed like Cordus’, though they were, he tells us, banned from Rome’s public libraries (Tr. 3.1.79). The specific terms of the prohibition are hazy. Ovid’s creative reenactment, from the point of view of the personified Tristia, sees the book itself dejectedly recounting how it approached one imperial library after another, vainly seeking its “brothers” (Ovid’s earlier works, with the exception of the disreputable Ars), only to be turned away in disgrace (Tr.

21 See Parker (2009) for a discussion of the significance of the permanent written text at Rome, over and above oral recitations.
22 See Martin and Woodman (1989) 184 for further details.
Later, the Pontic poems are imagined as refusing to enter the public libraries, and “think it safer to lie hidden in a private household” (*latere | sub Lare priuato tutius esse putant*, Pont. 1.1.9-10), necessitating Ovid’s request to his friend Brutus to harbor and hide them in his home (*excipe . . . abde*, Pont. 1.1.4).

Regardless of whether the ban on his works in public libraries applied to his entire *corpus* (as he indicates in *Tr.* 3.1) or to the *Ars* only, the qualms expressed by his personified Pontic poems about entering such buildings (Pont. 1.1.5) are unlikely to be entirely fanciful or unfounded, given Ovid’s fraught relationship with the emperor. The key to the survival of Ovid’s books, then, like Cordus’, will be concealment. But how are we to square Ovid’s aspiration for a global audience and public renown with his instructions to Brutus to squirrel his books away in secret? His fervent and frequently expressed wish is to be *read*, not only in Rome itself but all over the city’s conquered lands, and thereby to win fame and immortality. How can Ovid continue to be, as he claims he is, “the most widely-read poet in the whole world” (*in toto plurimus orbe legor*, Tr. 4.10.128), if his works sit entombed in his friend’s private bookcase?

This apparent contradiction can be explained with recourse to Roller’s model of exemplary discourse – comprising action, audience, commemoration, and imitation - newly adapted to a literary context as Fleming suggests. If those back home agree to Ovid’s

23 Contrary to the picture presented in *Tr.* 3.1 (on which see Newlands (1997), Miller (2002) 138-39), the evidence offered by *Tr.* 2.8 (in which Ovid explicitly states that Augustus has prohibited the *Ars*, but makes no mention of his other works) and *Pont.* 1.1.7-8 (which sees Ovid himself urging the *Epistulae ex Ponto* to enter public libraries) might indicate that the ban applied only to the *Ars*. Phillips (1981) 123 points out that a ban on an author’s entire body of literature is otherwise unattested in the Augustan period, citing the counterexample of Gallus, whose works were not suppressed by public edict following his fall from imperial grace. Luck (1977) 170 suggests that the removal or restoration of Ovid’s books may have been left to the discretion of the individual librarian.

24 Cf. the similar instructions to the unnamed addressee of *Tr.* 3.14.


request to safeguard his books, this is an expression not only of loyalty to their exiled companion, but also, we may surmise, of their faith in the poems’ artistic merit. In other words, they constitute an audience who pass positive judgment on Ovid’s act of writing.\(^{27}\) They commemorate the poet by keeping him in both their thoughts and their libraries, perhaps recommending his books and lending them to friends,\(^{28}\) who could in turn commission copies (imitations) of their own. From Brutus’ hidden volumes, then, might eventually spring a new generation of texts, to be adopted by an acquaintance seeking an addition to his personal collection or by a bookseller intending to produce a number of sale copies.\(^{29}\) So the ultimate destiny of Ovid’s book-children (libri/liberi) is not to be cooped up in private houses, but rather to be free (liberi) to be read and reproduced.\(^{30}\) It would then be only a matter of time before there were scores of little Ovids, running rampant through Rome and beyond, into the civilized world at large.\(^{31}\)

**Exemplarity and Intertextuality**

So far, I have proposed that Ovid endeavors to secure his literary legacy by making arrangements for the continued survival of multiple copies (pluribus exemplis, Tr. 1.7.24) of his work, to be replicated in the future. But physical imitation, in the sense of reproduction

\(^{27}\) On the importance of social judgment in Roman literary production and circulation, see Johnson (2010) 52-63, a discussion focused on the Younger Pliny and the institution of recitation.


\(^{30}\) See Hinds (1985) 13-14, who detects a pun on liber in Ovid’s address to his book in Tr. 1.1.1: unlike the exiled poet, the liber (book) is liber (free) to enter Rome. See also Ahl (1985) 56-57, Barchiesi (1997) 89, Hardie (2002a) 298, Smith (2006), and Mordine (2010) 534-55.

\(^{31}\) The number of copies actually produced and in circulation is impossible to calculate. In his study of the Roman booktrade, Starr (1987) 220 explains that questions relating to quantity are “close to meaningless in a world of individually made copies, since the number of copies would increase directly in proportion to the number of readers who wanted one and was not related to the number made at any particular time.”
of material editions of his books, is not the only way in which Ovid seeks to make an exemplum of himself and his poetry. I will suggest in this section and the one following that he also establishes the *Metamorphoses* as a model deserving of literary imitation in later works, starting with his own.

As I mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, the term “exemplum” could refer to a model writer or text considered worthy of emulation by others. In Book 10 of his *Institutio Oratoria*, Quintilian stresses the importance of drawing on suitable authors for oratorical training, and of “forming the mind in accordance with the exemplum of all their virtues” (*ad exemplum uirtutum omnium mens derigenda*, 10.2.1). He cites what he perceives to be the basic human impulse to “wish to do for ourselves what we approve in others” (*quae probamus in aliis facere ipsi uelimus*, 10.2.2), in art as in agriculture, but recognizes that progress in all areas of life, including oratory and literature, requires the judicious combination of imitation with innovation (10.2.4-14). To this we might add that such a combination of imitation and innovation essentially underlies the marked tendency of ancient authors (and especially Augustan poets) towards allusion, including allusion to their own previous works. The abiding presence of his poetic predecessors throughout Ovid’s works, as well as his constant self-positioning in relation to them, make his oeuvre a particularly fertile testing ground in which each of the four core components of the exemplary cycle noted by Roller, once again transferred to a literary framework, may be observed.

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32 Fleming (2009) 27 notes that “[h]is list of such authors— Homer, Virgil, Horace, and so forth— serves as their commemoration, and the end result should be their imitation.”

33 Barchiesi (2009a) 56 suggests that “[i]t would be interesting to compare . . . the practice of exempla-making with the intertextual activity of Roman poets.” See also Seo (2013) 10, 64-65, 185-86, a study of “allusive characterization” in Roman imperial poetry which applies Roller’s schema of exemplary discourse to a literary context.

There is additional justification, besides the use of the term “exemplum” in reference to artistic production, for mapping the schema of exemplary discourse from its original cultural-historical context onto a literary one. Various elements of the traditional rhetoric of exemplarity which have been discussed earlier in this study – monuments, the father as a model for the son, and the metaphor of the path along which which later generations follow earlier ones – find counterparts in the world of books and authors. I will briefly address each in turn. Just as statues, such as those in Augustus’ Forum, commemorated the outstanding military or political accomplishments of their subjects, so too did poems commemorate the outstanding literary accomplishments of their authors. In Latin literature, the locus classicus for the idea of the text as a monument is the finale of Horace’s third book of Odes, a poem to which Ovid alludes in the concluding verses of the Metamorphoses, when he declares that he has completed an indestructible and enduring work (15.871-79).

The book is a monument to the poet in the sense that it preserves his life after his death; it is a substitute child for the same reason. We have already seen Ovid’s adroit and extensive treatment of this metaphor in the works from exile, but the prevalent ideal of the father as an exemplum and the son as his imitation found its way into a literary context in other formulations, too. The relationship of earlier authors to later ones was often envisioned as a form of parental kinship, with Homer and Ennius, in particular, fulfilling the role of pater. The Younger Seneca uses the same analogy in a discussion of how to draw on one’s source texts with a view to generating fresh ideas. He suggests that an author should not

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36 Ovid’s conception of his books as monuments to himself is discussed further below.

37 See the discussions of Hardie (1993) 98-99, O’Sullivan (2009), and Trinacty (2009).
resemble his model in the way that a lifeless picture recalls its subject, but rather as a son looks like his father.\textsuperscript{38}

A related metaphor, common to both the rhetoric of exemplarity and literary production, is that of the well-trodden path, where outstanding predecessors have gone before.\textsuperscript{39} In the opening of the third book of \textit{De Rerum Natura}, Lucretius famously announces that he follows (\textit{sequor}) Epicurus, planting his footsteps (\textit{uestigia}) on the traces left by the philosopher and yearning to imitate (\textit{imitari}) him.\textsuperscript{40} Meanwhile, Horace speaks of “following the footsteps of the bards” (\textit{sequi uestigia uatum}, \textit{Ep.} 2.2.80), and of Roman poets who “dared to abandon the footsteps of the Greeks” (\textit{uestigia Graeca | ausi deserere}, \textit{Ars P.} 286-87) by experimenting with the genre of historical drama.\textsuperscript{41} Nor was it only the author who traveled along the path of his predecessors; the work itself, too, could be figured as a personified successor of earlier ones. Statius, addressing his \textit{Thebaid} directly in the epic’s

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{38} \textit{Etiam si cuius in te comparebit similitudo quem admiratio tibi altius fixerit, similere esse te uolo quomodo filium, non quomodo imaginem: imago res mortua est}, \textit{Ep.} 84.8; on this passage, see Trinacty (2009) 263-65.
\item \textsuperscript{39} See Baroin (2010) 34-35. In their discussion of the Phaethon episode in \textit{Met.} 1-2, Gildenhard and Zissos (1999a) 35 n. 17 identify meta poetic touches in Ovid’s description of the boy’s chariot-ride (\textit{tritumque . . . spatium}, 2.167-68, and \textit{rotae uestigia}, 2.133), and cite relevant literary precedents, including Callim., \textit{Aet.} 1.26; see also Schiesaro (2014). The use of the trope is not restricted to poets: see Sen., \textit{Ep.} 33.11, 79.16, Quint., \textit{Inst.} 1 pref. 3. Even the physical act of learning to write is associated with modeling and imitation, leading and following. Suetonius tells us that Augustus expended particular effort on training his grandsons to copy (\textit{imitarentur}) his own handwriting (\textit{Aug.} 64.3); meanwhile, Quintilian describes how children in the school room formed their letters by following traces (\textit{sequendo . . . uestigia}) which had been inscribed onto wooden tablets so that their stylus would be guided (\textit{ducatur}) by the outlines (\textit{Inst.} 1.1.27); cf. Sen., \textit{Ep.} 94.51, who also uses the verbs \textit{ducere} and \textit{imitari} of boys learning to write.
\item \textsuperscript{40} \textit{te sequor, o Graiae gentis decus, inque tuis nunc | ficta pedum pono pressis uestigia signis, | non ita certandi cupidus quam propter amorem | quod te imitari aueo}, Lucr. 3.3-6; cf. 5.55-56; see Fowler (2000b) 208-11, Schiesaro (2007) 64-67. For a comparison of Lucretian journeys to that of Phaethon in \textit{Met.} 1-2, see Schiesaro (2014).
\item \textsuperscript{41} Literary originality could also be represented by the image of footsteps (\textit{uestigia}) imprinted on virgin territory rather than along a beaten track, as in Hor., \textit{Ep.} 1.19.21-22; see Baroin (2010) 34-35 on the use of this metaphor to refer to both innovation and imitation.
\end{itemize}
final verses, urges it not to compete with the *Aeneid*, but rather to “follow it from afar and always adore its footsteps” (*longe sequere et uestigia semper adora*, *Theb.* 8.817).  

In his works from exile, Ovid draws on a similar idea of successive generations and literary heritage to articulate his own relationship to his poetic predecessors, placing himself next in line after the elegists Gallus, Tibullus, and Propertius. Each of the three poets, he maintains, is the “successor” (*successor fuit*, Tr. 4.10.53) of the one before, and he himself is the “fourth after these in the sequence of time” (*quartus ab his serie temporis*, Tr. 4.10.54). It is with this relationship in mind that we may begin dismantling Ovid’s treatment of his predecessors more generally, in order to gain a better understanding into his reception of their work.

If, following Fleming’s adjustment of the schema to suit a literary framework, we already take the first stage of exemplary discourse (that is, an outstanding deed) to refer to the act of writing, our point of entry will be the second operation, that of “audience.” In *Tristia* 4.10, his so-called “autobiographical” elegy, Ovid reflects on the iconic poets whom he admired in his youth (*Tr*. 4.10.41-55). He recalls how he “revered and cherished the poets of that time,” considering them equal to gods (*temporis illius colui fouique poëtas | quotque aderant uates, rebar adesse deos*, *Tr*. 4.10.41-42) and observing them visually (in the case of Vergil) and aurally (by attending the readings of Macer, Propertius, and...
Horace). The poet’s life cannot, it seems, be written without reference to and reverence of those authors who preceded him, and here we find Ovid witnessing and passing positive judgment on their exceptional deeds – in this case, literary ones.

This judgment takes concrete form in several poems, from Ovid’s earliest elegiac works onwards, which feature lists of his most pre-eminent predecessors. For example, in the epilogue of the first book of the *Amores*, he contemplates, in turn, the legacies of a series of renowned poets, both Greek (Homer, Hesiod, Callimachus, Sophocles, Aratus, and Menander, *Am.* 1.15.9-18) and Roman (Ennius, Accius, Varro of Atax, Lucretius, Vergil, Tibullus, and Gallus, *Am.* 1.15.19-30), each of whom has attained the enduring name and eternal fame to which he himself aspires. Tibullus receives additional personal acclaim later in the same collection, in Ovid’s lament for his death (*Am.* 3.9). Meanwhile, in *Tristia* 2, the *apologia* addressed to Augustus, Ovid pointedly invokes a host of past authors whose texts were not, unlike his own, interpreted as a true reflection of their personal character and regarded as grounds for punishment (*Tr.* 2.359-468). While each of these passages enacts a specific purpose in its own context – as a detail in the poet’s autobiography (*Tr.* 4.10), or a tribute to a late, great literary idol (*Am.* 3.9), or an argument marshaled in his own self-defense (*Tr.* 2) – in the long term, they all essentially serve the same ends as *Amores* 1.15, that is, as a form of commemoration, or, to use another term familiar from discussions of exemplary discourse, “monumentalization.” As a vehicle of memory, the monument is, as we saw in Chapter 2, temporally fluid, projecting a past event or individual before the eyes of the present audience, and extending the “life” of that event or individual for years to come.

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46 *Vergilium uidi tantum*, *Tr.* 4.10.51; *legit mihi . . . | Macer*, *Tr.* 4.10.43-44; *solitus recitare Propertius*, *Tr.* 4.10.45; *tenuit . . . Horatius aures*, *Tr.* 4.10.49.
49 On *Tr.* 2, see Nugent (1990), Gibson (1999), and Barchiesi (2001) 79-103.
Ovid’s panoramas of poets share this sense of endurance and timelessness, at once acknowledging the authors’ existing fame, and contributing to their future renown by preserving their names in a record intended for public consumption and for posterity.

But Ovid’s rosters of illustrious poets, while certainly an expression of his reverence for his forerunners’ talents and his own ambition for equivalent renown, do not turn on the qualities of admiration and aspiration alone. He also makes active use of their works as intertexts, frequently and to great effect.\(^{50}\) Translating into the language of exemplary discourse, we might say that each of these poetic predecessors serves as an object of “imitation.” The present discussion is not the place for a review or even an overview of these allusions, which are legion; that ground has already been, and will continue to be, well covered by the many critics whose monographs and articles are better able to give the individual flights of Ovid’s “intertextual imagination”\(^{51}\) the space and sensitivity that they deserve. Nor is the observation, in and of itself, of the highly allusive nature of his art anything unusual: an entire subfield of criticism on Latin literature has, after all, grown up around the echo chamber of intertextual voices that is so characteristic of Augustan poetry, and especially around Ovidian verse, whose echoes are considered particularly sonorous.\(^{52}\) But if it is even possible to strike out in somewhat of a new direction along this very well-traveled road of allusions and intertexts, an appreciation of poetic production in terms of exemplary discourse may offer a promising route. Considered in combination and as

\(^{50}\) Barchiesi and Hardie (2010) 70 note that “Ovid is especially sensitive to the career of his predecessors: he imitates predecessors not only through textual memories, but by constructing a mix of poetic utterances and (auto)biography.” For an introduction to Ovidian intertextuality, with related bibliography, see Casali (2009); Knox (2009a) Part III (“Intertexts”) also features a number of relevant pieces.

\(^{51}\) For this term, see Barchiesi (2001) 25-28.

\(^{52}\) The bibliography on intertextuality in Roman poetry is substantial; select studies include Thomas (1986), Conte (1986), Fowler (1997), and Hinds (1998). On intratextuality in Classical literature, see the chapters in Sharrock and Morales (2000).
extensions as one another, Ovid’s tendency to pass positive judgment on canonical authors, to memorialize their names in his verse, and to cite from their works in the form of allusions, looks remarkably similar to the exemplary sequence of audience, commemoration, and imitation respectively.

More specifically, it looks remarkably similar to Augustus’ efforts to define both himself and the imperial city through the channels of exemplarity. Ovid’s process of selecting, extracting, and reviving passages from the works of literary predecessors is reminiscent of the way in which Augustus drew on *exempla* in his personal correspondence, public edicts, and propaganda program with a view to communicating Roman values and virtues in a discourse which his public would find comprehensible. The emperor’s claim in the *Res Gestae* to have both resurrected the *exempla* of his ancestors and transmitted his own for imitation by his descendants tells us that, when it came to exemplarity, he considered himself to be something of a Janus type, simultaneously casting his gaze backwards and forwards. Ovid appears to have regarded himself and his works in similar terms, at once drawing allusions to poets of the past and (as we will see) hoping to be the object of allusion by poets of the future. In his use of *exempla*, then, no less than in his treatment of monuments or reflections on his everlasting fame (addressed in Chapters 2 and 3 respectively), Ovid actively invites comparison and competition between himself and Augustus.

Beyond the parallel which it sets up between the poet’s and the emperor’s respective projects, mapping the model of exemplary discourse onto a literary framework in the way

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53 See the main introduction to this study.
54 *Legibus nostris me auctore latis multa exempla maiorum exolescentia iam ex nostro saeculo reduxi et ipse multarum rerum exempla imitanda posteris tradidi*, R.G. 8.5. Cf. Hardie (1997) 192 n. 36 on this passage: “[t]he last words could equally apply to a poetic tradition!”
that I have suggested above has interesting implications for our understanding of Ovid’s
notable inclination towards self-imitation (that is, those passages in which he cites or recycles
material found elsewhere in his works).\textsuperscript{55} While by no means a phenomenon unique to this
poet, self-imitation is a particularly rich and rewarding area of study in his case, due both to
his well-known habit of alluding to his earlier poems in later ones, and to the sheer number of
those poems which are extant.\textsuperscript{56} Once regarded as a symptom of frivolity or a dearth of
original ideas, Ovid’s predilection for revisiting myths treated in his previous works is now
recognized as a deliberate literary strategy. For the poet, the creative challenge involved in
breathing new life into old material, and in investing well-rehearsed themes with fresh
meaning, must have brought its own rewards.\textsuperscript{57} At times, we find Ovid changing particular
details or emphasizing certain features in order to adapt a myth to a different context or
generic convention, or taking advantage the reader’s assumed knowledge of his previous
version of the story to introduce a complication or a touch of irony.\textsuperscript{58}

The modern interpretations generated by such passages have formed part of a broader
trend in scholarship on Roman poetry, in which allusions within the works of a single author
are approached as a variation of the phenomenon of allusions between multiple authors, and
analyzed along similar lines.\textsuperscript{59} In much the same way, we will see that Ovid’s treatment of

\textsuperscript{55} Barchiesi (2009a) 50-52 has observed that the increasing use of \textit{exempla} in an official capacity which
marked Augustus’ rule coincided with the development of \textit{exempla} as self-referential devices in the works of
Livy and Ovid. He notes that when Acontius, the male author of the last of the double \textit{Heroides}, considers the
idea of bearing his beloved away using force, he cites the \textit{exemplum} of Paris - who happens to be the male
author of the first letter of the same collection (\textit{Her.} 20.47-50).

\textsuperscript{56} On Ovidian self-imitation, see Cairns (1979), Boyd (1997) 46-47, 203-23; for a book-length study of this
topic, see Frings (2005), esp. 163-201 on the poet’s allusions to his elegiac works in the \textit{Metamorphoses}.

\textsuperscript{57} See Cairns (1979) 136, Miller (1993) 156 n. 8, and Tarrant (2002b) 28. Galinsky (1975) 4-5 goes so far as to
suggest that the very appeal of mythology as the subject for Ovid’s epic lay in the opportunities it offered for
putting a new spin on traditional stories.

\textsuperscript{58} For two well-known analyses of myths treated by Ovid more than once, see Hinds (1987a) on Demeter and

\textsuperscript{59} Frings (2005) 21.
canonical poets as *exempla* worthy of imitation, as described above, can serve as a window onto his taste for self-imitation. His self-positioning in relation to his poetic predecessors – as an audience of their texts, a commemorator of their renown, and an imitator of their artistry – reveals Ovid’s brilliant insight into the nuts and bolts of exemplary discourse, leaving no doubt that he had an eye for the components which made up a classic - and crucially, what it took to become one. At this point in the discussion, I will once again track Ovid through the stages of exemplary discourse; this time, however, the object of his observation, commemoration, and imitation will not be his predecessors’ outstanding works, but rather his own.

In the discussion of the autobiographical elegy *Tristia* 4.10 above, I cited as evidence for Ovid’s assumption of the role of audience - observer and judge of those who came before him - his claim that he “revered and cherished the poets” of his youth (*colui fouique poëtas*, *Tr*. 4.10.41). It must at this point be admitted that this excerpted recollection is, in fact, something of an incomplete turn in the literary circle of life. Several verses later, Ovid finishes the thought, adding that, “as I revered the older [poets], so did younger ones revere me” (*utque ego maiores, sic me coluere minores*, *Tr*. 4.10.55). In a similar vein, to the picture of the juvenile Ovid avidly attending the readings of Macer, Propertius, and Horace (*Tr*. 4.10.44-50), can now be added the corresponding detail which follows shortly afterwards, that is, the description of his own public recitations as a young poet, and the renown won by his Muse (*notaque non tarde facta Thalia mea est. | carmina . . . populo iuuenalia legi*, *Tr*. 4.10.56-57). Within the space of a few short verses, then, Ovid enacts an important shift from being an audience to others, to having an audience himself. More than that, however, he even slips into the role of audience of his own works, albeit a rather
inconsistent one, on the one hand, playing the enthusiastic talent scout who announces his
discovery of the Next Big Thing (in elegiac terms, the successor to Gallus, Tibullus, and
Propertius, *Tr.* 4.10.51-54). On the other, the harsh critic who destroys any poem which fails
to meet his exacting standards (*Tr.* 4.10.61-62).

If Ovid poses as the audience of his own art, he also styles himself as chief
monument-maker. His fondness for commemorating his literary forebears in the form of
catalogues in the amatory and exile collections has already been remarked upon above. It is
equally important to note, however, that Ovid’s poetic honor rolls also provide an
opportunity for him to train the spotlight on himself, celebrating his own anticipated renown
along with that of canonical authors, and inscribing his own name on the literary-historical
monument which he has constructed for his predecessors. The last poet to be promised
eternal fame in the roster which occupies *Amores* 1.15 is, after all, none other than himself
(*Am.* 1.15.41-42). Similarly, Ovid’s survey of poets in *Tristia* 2 functions as an attempt not
only to exculpate himself in the eyes of the emperor by appealing to precedent, but also to
assimilate himself with these authors and stake a claim to the literary immortality which they
have attained (*Tr.* 2.359-468).

Later in the *Tristia*, we find the connection between literary texts and everlasting
monuments made even more explicit. Stranded in the wintry hinterlands of the empire, his
thoughts turning towards his own mortality and the legacy that he would leave behind, Ovid
sends a letter to his wife with instructions for his burial, including an epitaph to be inscribed
on his tomb. But it is really his books, he goes on to claim, which are “my greater and

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60 On Ovid’s claims to be the heir to preeminent poets in the *Tristia*, see Ingleheart (2010).
63 See further Martelli (2013) 149-60, 174-87; on echoes of the conventional language of funerary epitaphs in
*Tr.* 1.1, see Mordine (2010) 536-37.
longer-lasting monuments” (maiora libelli | et diuturna magis sunt monimenta mihi, Tr. 3.3.77-78). 64 These, more than any stone sepulcher, are what will preserve his name and his life (Tr. 3.3.80). Nor will he be the only one to reap the benefits of immortality from his verses: in the Tristia’s final letter, Ovid promises his wife that his frequent praise for her virtue has rendered his books monumenta to her (Tr. 5.14.1), too, which will furnish her with timeless fame.

Having suggested some ways in which Ovid assumes the role of both audience and commemorator of his own works, I turn now to the final, and perhaps most interesting, operation in the four-stage process of exemplary discourse: imitation, specifically, those passages in which he engages in self-imitation by alluding to particular moments in his earlier poetry. 65 As criticism on intertextuality has shown, one consequence of the act of imitation is that it preserves, in some modified form, the original text and directs the alert reader back to it, either mentally (by recalling it as a source) or physically (by retrieving a copy for review). 66 Ovid’s allusions to his own works will turn out to be no exception. As we will see in the following section, Tristia 1.7 affords us a glimmer of insight into the poet’s attempt to turn his Metamorphoses into an exemplum, that is, a model text worthy of imitation and immortality, once and for all.

64 Cf. Pont. 4.14.25, where Ovid’s letters are described as nostri monimenta laboris.
65 Burrow (2002) 301, noting that Ovid revisits the theme of Pythagorean discourse (Met. 15) in Tr. 3.3, aptly describes the poet as “his own first imitator.”
66 Thomas (1986) 172 n. 8.
Meleager and the *Metamorphoses*

In *Tristia* 1.7, as I discussed above, Ovid recalls how he chose to burn his copy of the *Metamorphoses* upon leaving Rome, and likens himself to the murderous mythological mother, Althaea (*Tr. 1.7.17-20*):

> utque cremasse suum fertur sub stipite natum
> Thestias et melior matre fuisse soror,
> sic ego non meritos mecum peritura libellos
> imposui rapidis uiscera nostra rogis.

Just as the daughter of Thestius is said to have burned her own son in burning the log, and to have been a better sister than she was a mother, so did I place the undeserving little books, my own vital organs destined to perish along with me, upon the quickening pyre.

According to the version of the story told by the poet in Book 8 of the epic, Althaea, outraged that her son Meleager has slain her two brothers, kills him by setting ablaze a talismanic wooden log which the Fates had decreed, at his birth, to be representative of his lifespan. Garth Tissol, who proposes that the details of Ovid’s life contained in *Tristia* 1.7 are not autobiographical but rather symbolic, has observed that the various facets of the poet’s self-presentation in the elegy are carefully designed to imply that the *Metamorphoses* is worthy of canonical status. My own reading approaches *Tristia* 1.7 from a related but narrower angle, examining how Ovid uses the Althaea/Meleager comparison in particular to make an *exemplum* of himself and his epic.

As has long been acknowledged in scholarship on *Tristia* 1.7, Ovid’s description of how he burned his epic before leaving Rome draws heavily on biographical tradition concerning Vergil’s unsuccessful efforts to ensure that the *Aeneid*, in its unfinished state,

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would be destroyed after his death. Here, Ovid seeks to associate the *Metamorphoses* with the already highly acclaimed *Aeneid*, and, as Tissol has rightly observed, does so in a witty paradox, as if pitching one’s epic into the fire were the best way to guarantee its future canonical status. But it is equally worth noting that soon after, Ovid pulls the interpretative rug out from under our feet. Rather than likening himself explicitly to Vergil and his masterpiece, as expected, he in fact equates himself with Althaea, a character drawn directly from the world of his own masterpiece. The epic on which the point of comparison hinges, then, is not the *Aeneid* after all (or at least, not only the *Aeneid*), but the *Metamorphoses*. The gesture, which initially appeared to be classic Vergil, turns out to be vintage Ovid.

The term “*fertur*” (“it is said,” *Tr.* 1.7.17), used to introduce the analogy, has long been counted by scholars of Latin literature (and of Augustan verse in particular) among the so-called “vocabulary of memory,” that is, a collection of expressions invoking rumor, renown, or recollection, by means of which the poet flags an allusion to an earlier text. In this case, the earlier text is the eighth book of Ovid’s own *Metamorphoses*, where he related in detail the story of Meleager’s unusual death at the hands of his parent. So when he writes, in *Tristia* 1.7, that Althaea “is said . . . to have been a better sister than she was a mother” (*fertur . . . | melior matre fuisse soror, Tr.* 1.7.17-18), it is precisely because he has said so himself: this is a close paraphrase of a verse in the epic (*incipit esse . . . melior germana*

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69 Tissol (2005) 104, 110. And Vergil may not be the only great epic poet whom Ovid is channeling in this passage: Homer, too, may be present in these verses. Meleager and Althaea are first found in the *Iliad*, in the context of an exemplary tale related by Phoenix to Achilles (*Il.* 9.553-55). Although the Homeric and Ovidian versions of the myth differ considerably (the story of the talismanic firebrand does not appear in the former; see Alden (2000) 238-39, nn. 148-49), perhaps the Roman poet deliberately chose to invoke Meleager here because of the character’s status as the paradigmatic paradigm.

"parente, “she began to be a better sister than she was a mother,” Met. 8.475). Similarly, Ovid’s account of how he destroyed his books before leaving Rome (imposui rapidis uiscera nostra rogis, “I placed my own vital organs on the quickening pyre,” Tr. 1.7.20) recalls Althaea’s words in the Metamorphoses, as she casts the talismanic log into the fire (‘rogus iste cremet mea uiscera’ dixit, “may that pyre consume my vital organs,” she said,” Met. 8.478).71

These verbal echoes, which have long been noted by critics, make it clear that the appearance of the term “fertur” in Tristia 1.7 is intended to remind the reader of Ovid’s own version of the myth in the Metamorphoses.72 More than that, however, fertur, as I will go on to explain, is a harbinger of Ovid’s master plan for his masterpiece. As such, it serves a similar function to the poet’s prayer in Tristia 1.7 that the Metamorphoses should “live on” (uivuant, Tr. 1.7.25), which, as Stephen Hinds has noted, picks up on his triumphant proclamation in the final verse of the epic itself, where he predicted that he would “live on” (uivam, Met. 15.879) through his poetry.73 To Hinds’ observation, it is worth adding that the shift from the first-person form of the verb uivere (“I shall live on”) in reference to the poet, to the third-person (“they should live on”) in reference to his verses, has the effect of bearing out Ovid’s prediction at the end of the epic that it is his literary corpus, rather than his physical one, which will be indestructible and carry the torch of his immortality (15.871-79).74 This prediction has been rendered all the more pertinent by his metaphorical “death”

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74 On Ovid’s play with the double meaning of the term “corpus,” see Farrell (1999), esp. 129-30 on Met. 15.871-79.
in exile. The *uiuant* of *Tristia* 1.7.25 signals that the *Metamorphoses* is, as promised, now in the process of taking on a life of its own, a life which transcends even its author’s attempts to destroy it, and which, unlike that of the poet himself, can be suppressed by neither emperor nor exile.

A similar strategy, I think, is at work with Ovid’s use of the term “*fertur*” (“it is said”) to introduce the Althaea and Meleager comparison in *Tristia* 1.7. At the close of the *Metamorphoses*, Ovid had grandly announced that, while death was welcome to claim his mortal body, “I, with the better part of myself, shall be borne forever beyond the lofty stars” (*parte . . . meliore mei super alta perennis | astra ferar, Met. 15.875-76*). As discussed in the previous chapter, a number of critics have interpreted this so-called *melior pars* as a by-word for Ovid’s own book, and the personal fame that will accrue from it.\(^{75}\) It would appear, then, that the choice of the verb *fertur* in *Tristia* 1.7, used in reference to Althaea, a character whose myth featured prominently in the *Metamorphoses*, is a direct reply (correspondingly in the passive voice) to *ferar* in the epic’s final verses. As in the case of *uiuam* (*Met. 15.879*) / *uiuant* (*Tr. 1.7.25*) above, there is a shift from the first-person form of the verb at the end of the *Metamorphoses* (*ferar*) to the third-person form in the *Tristia* (*fertur*), with the accompanying implication that it is not the poet himself who is being “borne” or “spoken of,” but rather Althaea, a character in his poem.\(^{76}\) This nod to Althaea’s fame is not at all at odds with the claim advanced by Ovid in the epic’s finale, that he himself would scale the heights of literary celebrity: the poet’s legacy and that of the characters in the world of his poem are not independent of one other. On the contrary, the renown of one of his literary creations

\(^{75}\) See Feeney (1991) 249, Hardie (2002a) 94.

\(^{76}\) Cf. the point made by Tissol (2005) 109 in a discussion of the poet’s allusion to his own earlier version of the myth: “the very terms Ovid uses to narrate his attempt to destroy the *Metamorphoses* assert its own preeminence, and indeed, its canonicity.”
serves only to fulfill Ovid’s earlier prediction that it is his *melior pars* - his book (and, by extension, all those who inhabit it) - which will be the guarantor of his *fama*.77

This metapoetic current is similarly sparked by the choice of Althaea as the subject of the mythological parallel in the book burning anecdote, as opposed to one of the many other notorious infanticides who populate the world of the *Metamorphoses*. Why Althaea and not, say, Procne, who carves up her son and serves him in a feast to her husband (*Met.* 6.641-46), or the murderous Medea (*Met.* 7.396), a character to whom the poet frequently likens himself elsewhere in his works from exile? Perhaps the most obvious answer lies in the means of destruction that Ovid claims to have chosen for his literary offspring: burning a collection of book rolls in the manner of Althaea is obviously more practicable than stabbing or stewing them, the preferred methods of Medea and Procne respectively.78 But there are additional points of contact, too, between the demise of Meleager and that of the poet’s volumes. The term “*libelli*” (“little books”), used of the *Metamorphoses* as Ovid recounts how he laid it in the fire (*Tr.* 1.7.19), is the diminutive form of “*liber,*” a noun with the meaning of both “book” and, fittingly for a comparison to Meleager’s wooden billet, “the inner bark of a tree.”79

In fact, the Roman book - constructed as it was from the woody fibers of the papyrus plant, steeped in cedar oil to protect it from decay and insects, fastened to a wooden rod (the *umbilicus*, around which it was rolled), and stored in beech-wood boxes (*capsae* or *scrinia*) -

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77 As Hinds (1985) 24 puts it in his discussion of *uiuam/uiuunt*, “Ovid’s future existence in the final myth of the *Metamorphoses* is . . . an existence through the survival of his poetry: the subjects of the verbs *uiuunt* in *Trist.* 1.7.25 and *uiuam* in *Met.* 15.879 are, ultimately, one and the same.” [emphasis in original]

78 Another reason why Althaea makes for a particularly suitable analogue is noted by Hinds (1985) 22: since this myth is found at the center of the *Metamorphoses* (the middle of Book 8), Ovid’s citation of it at the moment of the epic’s (attempted) destruction conveys the threat posed to the poem’s very existence.

79 *OLD* s.v. 2 and 1, respectively. Ovid plays on this double meaning elsewhere, e.g., *Met.* 1.549 (Daphne), with Farrell (1999) 133-34, Hardie (2002a) 46, 63. On the metapoetic connotations of terms for wood (e.g., “*silua,*” “*materies*”), see Hinds (1998) 11-14, Roman (2006).
was as much a product of the ligneous landscape as the billet which Althaea casts into the fire.\textsuperscript{80} The cylindrically-shaped book roll, moreover, may have borne some resemblance to a firebrand, especially when the ornamental bosses (\textit{cornua}) which crowned it on either end were carved from painted wood rather than ivory (an alternative material). Critics of this passage in \textit{Tristia} 1.7 have noted that Ovid identifies, via the medium of the mythological analogy, not only with Althaea but also with her son, an apt comparison since the poet’s life, like Meleager’s, is represented by the inanimate object laid on the fire.\textsuperscript{81} When the physical material of the books is taken into account, however, the correspondence between Meleager’s billet and the poet’s epic becomes an even closer one than has previously been envisaged. Ovid’s \textit{uolumina} (\textit{Tr.} 1.7.35) are Althaea and Meleager, the poet and his masterpiece, all rolled into one.

Several features of the Althaea and Meleager story, then, can be seen to recommend the mother and son as appropriate candidates for a comparison to the poet and his volumes. But as is frequently the case with Ovid’s mythological allusions, there is more to this reference than it would at first appear. Closer attention to the details of the Meleager myth (and of the version relayed in the \textit{Metamorphoses} in particular), reveals a further possible correspondence, altogether more subtle than those discussed above, but nevertheless offering a telltale glimpse into Ovid’s vision for the future of his epic. This additional flicker of meaning is not kindled until the final moments of the elegy, when we discover that the poet’s earlier, nonchalant claim that his epic verses “survive” (\textit{extant}, \textit{Tr.} 1.7.23) may in fact have been only half the story.

\textsuperscript{80} On the physical characteristics of the ancient book roll, see Ovid’s own description at \textit{Tr.} 1.1.5-14, with Luck (1977) 12-13, Williams (1992), and Mordine (2010) 526-33; see also van Sickle (1980) 5-12, Kenney (1982) 15-22, Ishy (2006), and Johnson (2009).

At the end of *Tristia* 1.7, Ovid begs his reader’s pardon for the unpolished state of the *Metamorphoses*, and offers six conciliatory verses to be added to the front of its first book as a new preface (Tr. 1.7.33-40). Here, as so often in the works from exile, we find him adopting what has been termed the “pose of poetic decline,” pleading for his critics’ indulgence on the grounds that the epic was not issued by its author himself; instead, he claims, the book rolls were “snatched as if from their master’s funeral” (*quasi de domini funere rapta sui*, Tr. 1.7.38). In any other poem, this figure of speech might be dismissed as little more than a recycling of a favorite Ovidian trope - banishment as a form of death - primarily designed to add a touch of color and pathos (or bathos) to the book’s new preface. Read through the lens of the Meleager comparison earlier in the poem, however, the image of a dramatic, eleventh-hour deliverance of an inanimate object on which a man’s destiny depends assumes a new and powerful significance.

Such a reading is in fact justified by the language of the phrase, *quasi de domini funere rapta sui* (Tr. 1.7.38), itself. The term “*quasi*” (“as if”) signals a shift away from the contemporary world of readers and revisions, and a return to the figurative plane, such as that where we encountered Althaea and Meleager (a parallel introduced by an *ut . . . sic* correlative clause, Tr. 1.7.17-19) earlier in the elegy. There is a return, too, to the language of parents and children: in Ovid’s proposed new epic preface, as in the Althaea and Meleager comparison, the book rolls are envisaged as the poet’s offspring, whom his metaphorical death in exile has left “bereft of their parent” (*orba parente*, Tr. 1.7.35). But the most

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83 Williams (1994) 50.
84 The use of the word “*dominus*” evokes the metaphor of the poet as master. The mixed imagery of the book-as-child and the book-as-slave, such as we find in this elegy, also appears in Tr. 1.1 (see Hinds (1985) 13-14, Mordine (2010) 534-35), Tr. 3.1, and Tr. 3.14, where the poet refers to the continued survival of the *Metamorphoses* in almost identical terms as he does in Tr. 1.7.38: *carmina de domini funere rapta sui*, Tr. 3.14.20.
compelling motivation for associating the story of Ovid’s book rolls’ miraculous survival with the myth of Meleager, as we shall see, lies in the appearance of the word “rapta” (“snatched”).

From the above discussion of the verses in which the poet likened himself to the murderous Althaea, two interrelated features of Ovid’s allusive technique in *Tristia* 1.7 emerged: firstly, his predilection for citing his own epic version of the myth of Meleager as a source text for the elegy; and secondly, his sign-posting of these citations via verbal echoes. Turning now to *quasi de domini funere rapta sui* (*Tr.* 1.7.38), we find that the phrase fulfills each of these criteria. While Meleager’s fatal firebrand is known from elsewhere in the mythic tradition, the additional detail of the new mother retrieving it from the flames (essentially, the infant’s funeral pyre) does not feature in any other extant account of the tale and may have been invented by the poet himself. This telltale sign of a self-citation is bolstered by Ovid’s word-choice. In the narrative relayed in the eighth book of the *Metamorphoses*, Althaea, poised to cast the log representative of her son’s lifespan into the fire, demands that he return the life bestowed on him when she initially rescued the piece of wood at his birth, and uses the phrase *stipite rapto* (“when I snatched the brand,” *Met.* 8.504). Here, she is referring to a detail of the myth recounted by the poet earlier in the episode, in the form of a flashback. Upon learning from the Fates that her newborn son’s lifespan would not exceed that of a particular wooden billet in the fire, Althaea had hurriedly whisked the log away from the flames (*ab igne | eripuit ramum, Met.* 8.456-57), saving the child from a certain death.

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85 Segal (1999a) 325-26 suggests that Ovid may have wished to emphasize the distinction between Althaea’s initial life-giving act immediately after her son’s birth and her subsequent destructive one during his adulthood. On the various versions of this myth, see March (1987) 29-46, Bremmer (1988), Segal (1999a), Alden (2000) 179-290 (esp. 238-39, nn. 148-49), and Grossardt (2001).
A case can be made, then, that in composing *Tristia* 1.7, Ovid had in mind and was alluding to both of Althaea’s encounters with Meleager’s wooden billet, that is to say, not only her act of casting it into the flames in order to kill her adult son (*rogus iste cremet mea uiscera*, *Met.* 8.478; cf. *imposui rapidis uiscera nostra rogis*, *Tr.* 1.7.20), but also her initial rescue of it from fiery ruin at the time his birth (*stipite rapto*, *Met.* 8.504; cf. *quasi de domini funere rapta sui*, *Tr.* 1.7.38), a detail of the myth which the poet appears to have invented himself. Discussions of the first of these allusions (the log’s destruction) have long been a fixture of commentaries and scholarly analyses of the elegy; it is now time to consider what the second (the log’s deliverance from danger), which has so far remained undetected in criticism on the poem, can tell us about Ovid’s aspirations for the *Metamorphoses*, and his vision of how those aspirations could be realized.

Had the firebrand commensurate with his lifespan remained unharmed, Meleager would, we can only assume, have lived forever. Once she had retrieved the wooden talisman from the fire at her son’s birth, all that Althaea had to do to ensure his immortality was to keep it *penetralibus abditus imis* (“hidden away in the depths of the household,” *Met.* 8.458). Strikingly, as we saw earlier in this chapter, the same terms, “*penetrale*” and “*abdere*,” also appear in the prologues of each of the two collections from exile, when the poet reflects on the future of his bookish offspring. In the opening poem of the *Tristia*, the volume is sent forth to Rome by its “parent” (*parentis*, *Tr.* 1.1.115), its final destination the author’s own *penetrale* (“household,” *Tr.* 1.1.105); meanwhile, the prologue of the *Epistulae ex Ponto* sees the poet entrusting his volumes, described as “an exile’s offspring,” (*ortos | exule*, *Pont.* 1.1.21-22), to a guardian, with the instruction to “hide them away” (*abde*, *Pont.* 1.1.4) in his private household. Ovid’s books, it emerges, are children whose survival and prospects for
everlasting life, like those of Meleager and his firebrand, depend on their being stored away in a safe place.

In Tristia 1.7, as we have seen, Ovid sets up a paradox, claiming that the *Metamorphoses* both perished in the fire upon his departure from Rome and yet survived, plucked from the jaws of its author’s metaphorical death. How is this possible? The poet provides the solution to this riddle himself, and it is a solution that applies equally to the parallel realms of reality and myth: *exempla*. In real-world terms, of course, the survival of the *Metamorphoses* is attributable to its existence in the form of “several copies” (*pluribus exemplis*, Tr. 1.7.24). On the imaginative plane, meanwhile, the epic’s simultaneous destruction and deliverance correspond to each of the two “halves” of the story of Meleager’s firebrand, as represented by *pluribus exemplis* in the rhetorical sense, that is, two parallels from the mythological world of the *Metamorphoses*. In the first of these *exempla*, the description of Althaea casting the billet into the fire (*utque . . . Thestias . . . sic ego*, Tr. 1.7.17-20), the book rolls are likened to the adult Meleager, who wasted away along with his wooden talisman; via the addition of the second *exemplum*, detailing the retrieval of the epic “as if from the funeral of its master” (*quasi de domini funere rapta sui Tr.* 1.7.38), Ovid identifies his volumes with the infant Meleager, who was rescued from destruction and granted the possibility of everlasting life. And where Meleager’s mother failed to protect and preserve her child for all time, the poet is determined to succeed. Like the firebrand, Ovid’s books are his life-token; unlike the firebrand, however, the books will remain safe in storage and, it is hoped, eventually emerge unscathed, to ensure their author’s immortality.

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86 Ovid’s selection of and emphasis on particular details of the myth at particular points in his poem once again testifies to the mutable and subjective nature of *exempla*; cf. Chaplin (2000) on Livy, esp. 32-49.
The Uncontrollable Exemplum

One of the perennial problems of the exemplum, as we have seen in the preceding chapters, is its tendency to veer off course. The original message is liable to be lost in translation, with the recipient ignoring or missing the point intended by the author of the exemplary narrative. Using Tristia 1.7 as a case study, I have suggested in the previous section that Ovid attempts to sidestep this challenge by exercising mastery over both sides of the process of exemplarity: transmission and reception. He seeks to achieve this by drawing on passages from his own earlier poems (in this case, the Metamorphoses) as literary models (exempla) in his later compositions. By casting himself in the role not only of author, but also of audience, commemorator, and imitator of his own work, the poet endorses the exceptional nature of his literary achievements, establishes a standard against which others can be measured, and sets a triumphant precedent for future imitators to follow. In gesturing towards his own volumes via self-citation in this way, he implicitly adds them to the repository (whether mental or physical) of canonical works habitually mined by intertextually inclined poets in search of an allusion. The effect of this on the audience is clear. The reader who notes that a particular verse or image has a familiar ring to it and attempts to recall its provenance will find that the usual suspects, such as Homer or Vergil, no longer suffice. A new source of literary allusions now demands consideration, too: Ovid himself.

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87 Cf. Cairns (1979) 137 who, in a discussion of self-imitation in the Amores, observes that the poet’s use of both the works of his predecessors and his own Am. 2.9 as sources for Am. 3.11 is a way in which he “asserted his equality with Catullus, Propertius and Tibullus as an established author within the genre.”

88 On the relationship between author and audience, see Conte (1986) 35, who notes that “[t]he reader’s collaboration is indispensable to the poet if the active phase of allusion is to take effect. Thus allusion will occur as a literary act if a sympathetic vibration can be set up between the poet’s and the reader’s memories when these are directed to a source already stored in both.”
And yet, as we will discover, the art of making an *exemplum* of oneself is not quite as easy as that.\textsuperscript{89} It would be naïve, if not nonsensical, to think that the simple act of performing an exceptional deed and subsequently repeating it would automatically confer exemplary status on that deed. In much the same way, the act of writing a book and then alluding to it in one’s own later work hardly makes that book a classic. The difficulty lies in the fact that the operation of exemplary discourse does not hinge on the roles of the *exemplum*'s creator and imitator alone. Rather, the presence of a third party is also required, an external audience who can pass judgment on the outstanding deed (or book) and ratify its value as a positive or negative model for the community.\textsuperscript{90} As a parallel, we might point to the important part played by an outside observer in confirming the family resemblance, in both physical appearance and character, borne by a son to his father.\textsuperscript{91} As we saw in the discussion of the Phaethon episode in the previous chapter, the boy’s declaration of his own parentage is not in and of itself a sufficient warrant of legitimate paternity. That verification must instead be issued by an external bystander who is not a member of the family, in this case, Phaethon’s peer, Epaphus. It is, I argued, precisely Epaphus’ failure to provide this authorization which galvanizes Phaethon’s quest to drive his father’s solar chariot, an act that will win him a world-wide audience to bear witness to and sanction his paternity.

Such third-party endorsement was not lacking in Ovid’s case. Already during his own lifetime, he received external acknowledgement of his talents. He reports that his early elegiac works inspired an imitator (*Am. 2.18.27-34*), and that his poems were often staged and danced before crowds (*Tr. 2.519-20, 5.7.25*). His frequent claims to world-wide

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\textsuperscript{89} See the remarks of Lowrie (2007) 102-3 and van der Blom (2010) 324 on Cicero’s (not entirely successful) efforts to promote himself as an *exemplum*.


\textsuperscript{91} Bettini (1999) 189-93.
readership and his anticipated life after death, moreover, imply that his renown knows neither geographical nor chronological bounds.\textsuperscript{92} And his confidence was not misplaced: in generations to follow, scores of authors and artists would regard this highly influential poet as the \textit{exemplum} which he foresaw he would be.

Modern scholars are fond of pointing out, especially at the beginning and end of monographs and articles, that Ovid was quite right to predict his future fame and success: he did indeed attain literary immortality, just as he anticipated in the \textit{Metamorphoses’} triumphant finale.\textsuperscript{93} But it is worth bearing in mind that this favorable outcome was perhaps not as comfortably predetermined as we sometimes like to think. Ovid’s powerful influence on art and literature, as well as the surge in academic interest in his poems over the past quarter century or so,\textsuperscript{94} make it easy to forget that the reception history of his works is in fact a somewhat checkered one. His texts did not feature in the Roman school curriculum in classical antiquity, and no ancient commentary on them survives; that such a scholarly work ever existed is uncertain.\textsuperscript{95} Meanwhile, the periods of immense popularity which the poet enjoyed over the centuries were punctuated by spells of intense criticism and, if the number of surviving manuscripts is anything to go by, limited circulation of his books.\textsuperscript{96} Two distinct strains emerge in the history of Ovidian reception, perceptible from antiquity

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{92} \textit{Am.} 1.3.25, 15.7-8, 41-42; \textit{Ars Am.} 2.740; \textit{Rem. Am.} 363; \textit{Tr.} 3.7.51-52, 2.118, 3.3.78-79, 3.7.50, 4.9.19-22, 4.10.128-30, 5.14.5-6.
\item \textsuperscript{94} See Myers (1999) and Schmitzer (2002) for bibliographical surveys.
\item \textsuperscript{95} See Knox (2009b) 238-39. In St. Jerome’s list of Roman authors who inspired ancient commentaries (\textit{Apol.} 1.16), Ovid’s name is noticeably absent. Cameron (2004) 3-32 argues that the so-called “Lactantian” \textit{Narrationes}, a collection of prose summaries of the \textit{Metamorphoses}, are not in fact based on a late antique commentary, as had been previously supposed.
\end{itemize}
onwards: praise and imitation on the one hand, and disapproval and avoidance on the other.97 Even during and soon after his own lifetime, his poems did not escape the censure of critics. Augustus, of course, had his own reasons for being less than enamored of this self-proclaimed “poet of my own naughtiness” (nequitiae . . . poeta meae, Am. 2.1.2) and “playful poet of tender passions” (tenerorum lusor amorum, Tr. 4.10.1). But passages in the works of the Elder and Younger Senecas and Quintilian, too, indicate that the poet’s distinctive style failed to meet with the taste or requirements of some members of his audience, who leveled charges of frivolity, childishness, and self-indulgence against him.98

Nor was it only the biting words of the critics to which Ovid’s books were susceptible; like any ancient text, they were also vulnerable to physical damage and destruction. Papyrus rolls lived under the constant threat of theft, fire, stains, rips, mold, textual corruption, and even extinction, and were exposed to predators of both the human and animal variety, recycled as fish wrappers or nibbled by insects and rodents.99 Changing literary tastes and fashions, meanwhile, meant that works could fall out of both favor and circulation, eventually disappearing altogether if conditions and circumstances conspired against them.100 A case study of the vicissitudes of textual transmission is provided by Epistulae ex Ponto 4.16, in which Ovid lists around thirty contemporary poets, among whom

98 Sen., Controv. 2.2.12, 3.7, 9.5.17; Sen., Q. Nat. 3.27.13-14; Quint., Inst. 4.1.77, 10.1.88, 10.1.93, 10.1.98. These authors do, however, also note that the poet was talented and had laudable qualities. On Ovid’s critics, see Elliott (1985), Anderson (1995b), and Morgan (2003).
99 Fish wrappers: Catull., 95.8; bookworms/insects: Hor., Ep. 1.20.12, and Ovid, Pont. 1.1.72. On the fragility of ancient books and the many hazards to which they were vulnerable, see Kenney (1982) 23-27, Dupont (2009), Farrell (2009), and Frösén (2009) 79. On book burning as a deliberate means of destruction, see Cramer (1945), and Parker (2009) 216 n. 129, citing Sen., Controv. 10 praef. 8 on Labienus and Tac., Ann. 4.35 on Cordus.
100 On extinction, see Cicero’s remark, cited in Starr (1987) 218, on the difficulty of tracking down copies of the orations of C. Fimbria, which he used to read as a boy (Brut. 129). Ironically enough, the immense popularity and success of Cicero’s own works contributed to the disappearance of almost all speeches by other Roman orators, both before and after him.
he had counted himself while at Rome. Of these, only a single work by a single author, Grattius’ Cyneggetica, has survived. Even a writer as popular and widely read as Ovid himself was not immune to the vagaries of time and transmission, as the loss of his only tragedy, Medea, attests.

That Ovid was alert to the vulnerability of his poetry books is clear from the opening elegies of both collections from exile, in which he displays a keen awareness of the fragile material nature of his text. The Tristia begins with an extended description of the physical condition of the papyrus roll (Tr. 1.1.5-14), which, the poet claims, has been marred by his own tears (Tr. 1.1.13-14). Meanwhile, in the first poem of the Epistulae ex Ponto, he declares that banishment has caused his heart to be eroded by sorrow, “just as a book, stored away, is gnawed by the teeth of the worm” (conditus ut tineae carpitur ore liber, Pont. 1.1.72). Given the self-declared function of this very elegy - a request to his friend to store away his books at home - the simile is a particularly troubling one.

And high stakes were involved in his books’ survival since, as Ovid well knew, their fate was inextricable from his own. While his preoccupation with his literary afterlife is attested from his earliest works onwards, his banishment from Rome in his later years and the

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101 See Johnson (2008) 17-19. It is difficult to gauge whether Ovid’s commemoration of these poets is intended to be ironic or sincere: many of individuals named here are otherwise unknown, but at least several, such as L. Varius Rufus, ranked as important and distinguished authors. Tarrant (2002b) 31 wonders if Ovid is “pretending to be impressed by this throng of nonentities” or “nostalgically recreating the literary scene from which he had been ejected.”

102 On the Medea, see Holzberg (2002) 34-36, who remains doubtful as to its authenticity. Also lost is part of the Medicamina Faciei Femineae and the first edition of the Amores - if, indeed, there ever was one. On the questionable existence of this text, see Barchiesi (2001) 159-61, Holzberg (2002) 31-34.

103 Cf. Tr. 3.1.15-16.

104 Gaertner (2005) 132 ad loc notes that the comparison may revive the elegy’s opening questions of “whether Brutus will receive the Epistulae ex Ponto and where he will store them.”

105 This merging of poet and poem finds vivid expression in the first elegy of the Tristia. Having been urged to return home to Ovid’s bookcases at Rome, the personified volume is instructed to tell its “brother,” the Metamorphoses, to add the exiled author’s own changed fortune to its tales of transformed figures (his mando dicas, inter mutata referri fortunae uultum corpora posses meae, Tr. 1.1.119-20). On this passage, see Hinds (1985) 20-21, Hinds (1999a) 48-49.
attendant uncertainty over the future brought this into sharper focus than ever before.\textsuperscript{106} That his references to his eternal fame and name become more frequent towards the end of his career may betray a growing preoccupation with, if not a growing unease\textsuperscript{107} about, his place in the literary tradition, and Augustus’ ban on some or all of his works from the public libraries (where they might otherwise have been preserved) must have done nothing to ease his mind. There is a certain sense of reciprocation in the way that this course of events unfolded. By questioning and dismantling the rhetoric of exemplarity, the poet implicitly undermines the emperor’s ability to control his own exemplary legacy; by barring the poet from Rome and his books from the official collections, the emperor not so implicitly repays the favor.

Exemplarity is, by nature, an inherently self-generating phenomenon. To be deemed suitable for imitation, an action or individual must be judged by an audience to be extraordinary or worthy of note in some respect; at the same time, the very selection of that action or individual as an object of imitation serves as the ultimate endorsement of its distinction.\textsuperscript{108} This self-generating quality is also characteristic of the process of poetic production, reception, and imitation: only an outstanding work is considered worthy of imitation in the first place; meanwhile, the very act of imitation – whether physical (via the replication of material copies) or literary (via allusion) – itself augments the imitated text’s status as an outstanding work, by authorizing its reputation as an exceptional piece of

\textsuperscript{106} See Tarrant (2002b) 30-31.
\textsuperscript{107} See Feldherr (2010) 63-83 on the problems of survival via purely textual means, and Ovid’s “anxiety that he has made himself emperor of nothing, that the type of immortality he creates for himself depends entirely on his own words” (65).
\textsuperscript{108} Cf. van der Blom (2010) 322: “Cicero’s ceaseless efforts to set himself up as an exemplum were related to his desire for a lasting memory.”
literature suitable for reproduction. If, in accordance with Quintilian’s recommendations in the *Institutio Oratoria*, only the best authors should serve as models for imitation, then the reverse must also be true: to serve as a model for imitation must signal that the author was ranked among the best.

It was a principle on which Ovid, a diligent pupil in the rhetorical schools,\(^{109}\) must have been raised, and one which assumed all the more importance and urgency at the end of his career. In the wake of his metaphorical death in exile, two distinct but related paths to a long literary afterlife for his book-child, the *Metamorphoses*, remained available to him, each involving *exempla*. Ever the doting parent, he took pains to achieve both, by ensuring that the epic (among his other books) would remain extant in Rome in the form of copies (*exempla*) for physical imitation, and by establishing his verses as models (*exempla*) for literary imitation through self-citation.

And yet, even as he sought to protect his place in the literary tradition in these ways, Ovid must have been acutely aware that the fate and fame of the *Metamorphoses* and its author would ultimately depend upon others. How would he be judged by generations to come? Would future readers commemorate him by preserving his name and his books? Would later authors consider his poetry a model for their own? While these were pressing questions faced by any and all published writers,\(^{110}\) Ovid’s unusual circumstances – his enforced separation from the thriving literary scene at Rome and the banning of his work

\(^{109}\) Sen., *Controv.* 2.2.8-12. Holzberg (2002) 21, however, sensibly warns against putting too much faith in Seneca as a historical source: “Seneca had come to know the poet’s celebrated oeuvre and was manifestly projecting his opinion of it back onto his account of Ovid’s early exercises in declamation . . . We have here an instance of the practice of drawing inferences about the past from the present that is a hallmark of ancient biography.” Tarrant (1995) 63-64 sounds a similar note of caution.

\(^{110}\) See Johnson (2010) 53.
from the city’s public libraries – can only have exacerbated the sense that he and his books were susceptible to forces beyond his control.

Ovid, then, was torn between a sense of self-confidence and self-doubt, power and powerlessness over his literary legacy. Returning for a final time to *Tristia* 1.7, we find this vacillation reflected in the grammar of the elegy, with its curious amalgamation of assertive commands and tentative conditional clauses. Directly addressing the elegy’s recipient, Ovid issues a series of imperatives - “remove!” (*deme*, *Tr*. 1.7.2), “pretend!” (*dissimula*, *Tr*. 1.7.5), “feel!” (*senti*, *Tr*. 1.7.5), “receive!” (*habe*, *Tr*. 1.7.34) - and bids (*mando*, *Tr*. 1.7.12) his audience to read the *Metamorphoses*, whatever its quality. But this prescriptive language is offset by a note of provisionality and uncertainty which pervades the poem. The indefinite pronoun *siquis* (“if anyone,” *Tr*. 1.7.1) at the beginning of the elegy, signaling any reader who might possess a portrait of the poet, heralds a sense of inconclusiveness which lingers far beyond the opening verse. Ovid will receive plentiful praise for the *Metamorphoses* if his audience forgives him its lack of revision and does not disdain him for it (*non fastiditus si . . . ero*, *Tr*. 1.7.32). The new preface will be added to the epic if this meets with the reader’s approval (*si . . . putabis*, *Tr*. 1.7.34). Ovid would have corrected that poem’s faults if he had been permitted to do so (*si licuisset*, *Tr*. 1.7.40). This string of conditional clauses drives home the contingent nature of his fortunes. And though we may be tempted to dismiss Ovid’s pose of humble subservience as a calculated move to win sympathy and indulgence from his audience,111 his sense that the survival of his masterpiece now rests on little more than the reader’s whims and the poet’s prayer (*precor ut uiuant*, *Tr*. 1.7.25) is surely not entirely groundless.

111 Wilkinson (1955) 238.
There is an aptly named grammatical form which fittingly captures the mood expressed in *Tristia* 1.7. “Conditioned futurity,” a construction discussed by Edward Sonnenschein in *The Soul of Grammar* (1927), refers to “futurity regarded as realizable only under certain conditions, expressed or implied” or, put another way, “futurity under the shadow of a mental reserve.” Such, we might imagine, is just the unstable state in which Ovid found himself in the final stages of his career and life, no more capable of controlling his reception and legacy than was any other author of an *exemplum*, be it one of the characters in his epic or Augustus himself. And in the end, of course, only time would tell if posterity would accord Ovid the coveted status of model poet. For the trouble with leading by example, as he himself was all too aware, is that there is no way of knowing who, or what, will follow.

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112 Sonnenschein (1927) 102. The concept is not unlike G. K. Chesterton’s “Doctrine of Conditional Joy,” discussed in Chapter 2 above.
non enim ibi consistunt exempla, unde coeperunt, sed quamlibet in tenuem recepta tramitem latissime euagandi sibi uiam faciunt, et ubi semel recto deerratum est, in praeceps peruenitur, nec quisquam sibi putat turpe, quod alii fuit fructuosum.

“Precedents [exempla] once set do not end where they began. No matter how narrow the path on which they embark, they open up a way of deviating from it with the greatest latitude, and once one has wandered off the right path, it is a headlong drop that lies ahead. And nobody thinks that what another has found profitable is discreditable for himself.”

In this brief but illuminating passage, Ovid’s younger contemporary, the historian Velleius Paterculus, identifies the characteristic tendency of the exemplum to break free from any limits of interpretation imposed on it. As a rhetorical or instructional gesture, the presentation of a model of behavior as an incentive or a deterrent for others has an air of authority about it. But in reality, the exemplum frequently raises more questions than answers. Will the “right” meaning (that is, the meaning which its original author intended) be preserved, or will it be lost in the telling – or, for that matter, in the hearing? Will the exemplum inspire those who encounter it to respond with the appropriate action, whether imitation or avoidance, or will it simply be ignored or derided? Will those who choose to follow the exemplum succeed in reproducing it, or will they fail?

In this study, I have suggested that Ovid’s Metamorphoses puts an inventive spin on the Romans’ cultural preoccupation with exempla. By dramatizing the many ways in which the creation and imitation of models of behavior can go awry, the poet subjects the rhetoric of exemplarity - a rhetoric which Augustus deployed extensively in the construction and consolidation of his new regime - to scrutiny, insistently questioning the capacity of exempla

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1 Vell. Pat., 2.3.4. Trans. Yardley and Barrett (2011).
to be controlled. At the same time, however, we find Ovid involved in his own literary version of exemplarity, seeking to gain authority over his legacy as a “model” poet by making arrangements for copies of his books to remain extant, and by excerpting and imitating select passages of his earlier poems in later ones.

The uncontrollable nature of exemplarity which Velleius attempts to capture in the description above, and particularly his chosen image of a deviation from the correct path, culminating in a breakneck plummet, also finds vivid expression in the Daedalus and Icarus episode in Book 8 of the Metamorphoses. In Ovid’s story, however, it is not the exemplum itself which veers off course, but rather the one who follows it – or rather, who doesn’t. That is to say, Daedalus, an exemplary character in his capacity as both an exceptionally gifted craftsman and parent (insofar as the father, in Roman culture, was held to be a model for the son), adheres closely to the predetermined route through the heavens, whereas his child chooses to abandon his guide and cut his own path.

By way of conclusion to this project, I now offer a close reading of this story, an episode which (to risk a now loaded term) exemplifies the central themes addressed by each of my four chapters: outstanding relatives and the subpar descendants who succeed them; the inadequacy of warning and the plurality of monuments; the failure of sons to follow in their fathers’ paths; and the role of the book as a substitute offspring, which can safeguard its author’s life via a literary form of exemplarity and imitation. In tying the threads of my argument together in this way, I hope to demonstrate for a final time the rich and varied

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2. For the purposes of the current discussion, I am focusing solely on Daedalus’ admirable qualities, but he also has a far more sinister side. As the designer of Minos’ labyrinth, he is at least partially responsible for the destruction of young Athenians (8.152-71), and is also guilty of the attempted murder of his nephew Perdix in a fit of jealousy (8.236-59); on the latter episode, see Faber (1998). The vengeful and hubristic elements of Daedalus’ personality are suppressed in Ovid’s earlier treatment of the story in Ars Am. 2.21-98; on the differences between the two versions of this character, see Sharrock (1994) 183-88.
potential of the exemplum as an interpretative tool for understanding both the Metamorphoses and the place which Ovid, as its author, carved out for himself and his legacy. Here, I propose that while Icarus fails to imitate his exemplary parent and even dies in the act, the father-son relationship in this episode presents an opportunity for Ovid to reflect on exemplarity and imitation of a different, though not unrelated, sort: his own aspirations to follow in the footsteps of the outstanding authors who are his predecessors.

“Very famous for his skill in craftsmanship” (ingenio fabrae celeberrimus artis, 8.159), Daedalus is renowned for designing and building the labyrinth in which the Minotaur was sequestered (8.160-61). Even the tyrant Minos’ attempt to trap him in Crete by obstructing his access to the land and sea proves no obstacle for the creative master. He simply resolves to escape by air instead (8.185-86), pursuing “unknown arts” (ignotas . . . artes, 8.188) and even altering nature itself (naturamque nouat, 8.189) by constructing wings. His work is “miraculous” (mirabile . . . | . . . opus, 8.199-200), its novelty and wondrousness evident from the reaction which it provokes from onlookers, who are stupefied by the sight of men in flight (8.217-20).

As in the Deucalion and Pyrrha episode (Chapter 1), however, where the world’s most pious couple created a new generation which largely failed to live up to the promise of its exemplary ancestors, we find in Daedalus and Icarus an outstanding progenitor and an unremarkable descendant. The son, playful and oblivious (8.195-200), lacks his father’s talent and work ethic, and proves deaf to his exhortations and caveats. Daedalus instructs (instruit, 8.203), commands (iubeo, 8.207), warns (moneo, 8.204; monitus, 8.210), urges (hortatur, 8.215), educates (erudit, 8.215), and transmits lessons (praeecepta . . . | tradit, 8.208-9) to his child as the pair prepare to take flight. But Icarus is no more receptive to

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3 On these observers, see Davisson (1997).
admonition than were two other headstrong young men discussed earlier in this study, Adonis (Chapter 2) and Phaethon (Chapter 3), for whom well-meaning warnings turned out to be equally futile.

In Daedalus’ attempts to persuade his son to follow his course through the sky, we may detect - again, in common with the tales of Deucalion and Pyrrha, and Sol and Phaethon⁴ - a literalization of the prevalent Roman metaphor of the older generation leading (ducere) the younger one, which follows behind (sequi) along the path (uia) of life. As the craftsman behind the Cretan labyrinth, in fact, Daedalus is supposedly the master of paths. He fills the Minotaur’s lair with “innumerable passages” (innumeris . . . uias, 8.167) and “leads the eyes astray with a maze of various paths” (lumina flexa | ducit in errorem uarias ambias uiam, 8.160-61), a network so complex that even he himself can barely find his way out (8.167-68). The poet’s language here ominously foreshadows Daedalus’ later self-appointment as Icarus’ leader along the celestial path: me duce carpe uiam (“with me as your guide, seize the way,” 8.208). Daedalus urges his son to fly “in the middle course” (medio . . . limite, 8.203), and is compared in a simile to a mother bird which has produsit (“led forth,” 8.214) her fledgling from the nest, exhorting the young one to sequi (“follow,” 8.215).⁵ The boy, however, takes his route (iter, 8.225) ever higher, deserting his ducem (“leader,” 8.224). Just as we saw in the Phaethon episode, the celebrated Roman practice of the son following in the path of his father is met with resistance, though here that

⁴ The Phaethon and Icarus episodes are frequently considered side by side in criticism on the poem, for obvious reasons. Both plots revolve around a flight undertaken by a young boy, with Phaethon riding across the universe in the chariot of the Sun, and Icarus taking to the heavens on man-made wings. Each child fails to heed his parent’s advice and meets an unhappy end as a result, tumbling out of the sky to his death. See Crabbe (1981) 2318-20, Wise (1977), Morgan (2003), Pavlock (2009) 68, and Vial (2010) 44.

⁵ Segal (1998) 16 notes the merging of tenor and vehicle created by the poet’s placement of the simile: it is unclear whether it is the mother bird or Daedalus himself who is urging the offspring to follow.
resistance is on the part of the child (Icarus’ decision to stray from Daedalus’ prescribed course) rather than the parent (Sol’s reluctance to let Phaethon undertake the solar journey).

And like Phaethon, Icarus is not fated to undergo a transformation, as characters in this epic tend to do, but instead falls to his death. His father, desperately calling out to him, finds the boy’s body floating in the ocean. He is commemorated by several monuments, signs which call him to mind: along with the tomb raised by his father, the land and sea are named after him (*aqua, quae nomen traxit ab illo*, 8.230; *est tellus a nomine dicta sepulti*, 8.235). We may recall that the last time that these two elements were mentioned in conjunction was when Daedalus, having resolved to flee Crete with his son, had declared the sky to be the only means of escape, since Minos had obstructed access to the sea and the land (‘terras licet’ inquit ‘et undas | obstruat,’ 8.185-86). Icarus’ relationship to the waters and the earth is, then, a fraught one: he perishes as a direct consequence of their being denied to him, and in death is claimed by both, drowned in the former and buried in the latter. So is his final monument, the naming of the Icarian Sea and the island of Icaria, a great honor, or rather a case of insult added to injury? Is it a fitting memorial, or a darkly ironic one - or both? As in the story of Lycaon (Chapter 2), where the metamorphosed figure of the wolf could be interpreted as either the murderous Arcadian king or the nurturing *lupa Romana* (or both), we are reminded that monuments produce a multiplicity of readings, often conflicting ones. While Icarus’ monuments, unlike the anonymous wolf, commemorate him by name and so do not entail the same element of identity loss, the sense of openness and plurality remains.

With Icarus dead and Daedalus bereft, it is hard to imagine how exemplarity and imitation in this episode could, at the plot level, go more badly wrong. The poet literalizes

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6 For a discussion of names in the myth of Daedalus and Icarus, see Hardie (2002a) 246-47, 294-96.
the language and metaphors of Roman ancestral exemplarity, only to expose the phenomenon itself as fragile and fallible when the son not only proves unwilling to follow in the path of his outstanding father, but even dies in the act. There is, however, another important sense in which tracing the footsteps of one’s predecessors succeeds in this passage. In recounting the tale of Daedalus and Icarus, a story of father-son exemplarity, Ovid himself engages in his own literary version of exemplarity, a process of selecting, excerpting, and imitating model passages from the texts of his poetic forebears, as well as his own Ars Amatoria. In a discussion of literary self-consciousness in the Aeneid, Philip Hardie notes that “scenes of instruction and transmission” frequently hold a metapoetic significance, representing an opportunity for Vergil, by means of allusion, to reflect on his epic predecessors and his own place among them.7 The metapoetic resonance of scenes of succession and prescription turns out to be similarly applicable to Ovid’s account of Daedalus and Icarus.8 Here, too, we find that the father’s interaction with his son functions as a vehicle for the poet’s own intertextual reflection.

Having instructed (instruit, 8.203) Icarus to follow in his path, Daedalus “gave kisses, never to be repeated, to his son” (dedit osca nato | non iterum repetenda, 8.211-12). With this tender gesture, Daedalus adds himself to a pair of notable literary fathers who kiss their

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7 Hardie (1993) 102. One such moment is the Underworld encounter between Aeneas and Anchises (Aen. 6.679-892). Here, the father teaches his son the lesson of Rome’s future glory, presenting him with a procession of the famous heroes and warriors who are to be his descendants. This theme of succession is mirrored on an intertextual level: the episode features striking references, via both direct quotation and subject matter, to the work of Vergil’s own poetic predecessor (or “father”) Ennius, author of the Annals; see Hardie (1993) 103-5. Relatedly, on child deaths in the Aeneid and the “father-son” relationship between Homer and Vergil, see O’Sullivan (2009). See Morgan (2003) on metapoetic parent-teacher imagery in Ovid’s epic, including a discussion of Daedalus and Icarus.

8 Ovid’s treatment of the Daedalus and Icarus episode in both the Metamorphoses and the Ars Amatoria (2.21-98) has been subject to a number of fruitful metapoetic readings. For a selection of interpretations in which the characters of Daedalus and/or Icarus are considered in relation to the poet himself, see Ahern (1989), Sharrock (1994) 87-195, Morgan (2003) 77-81, Pavlock (2009) 61-70, and Feldherr (2010) 110-22; on the parallel between flight and the creative process in the Metamorphoses, see Wise (1977). My interest in the episode’s metapoetic undertones in the present discussion lies not in Daedalus’ status as an artist, but rather in father-son relations.
sons goodbye before embarking on a perilous expedition: Hector in the *Iliad*, and Aeneas in the *Aeneid*. Each of these scenes, moreover, hinges on the same ideal (whether or not this ideal ever comes to fruition): the son following the example of the father.

But the author of the passage’s most obvious literary model is, of course, none other than Ovid himself. For in Daedalus’ farewell kisses to Icarus in the *Metamorphoses* (*dedit oscula nato*, 8.211) lies a direct echo of Daedalus’ farewell kisses to Icarus in the *Ars Amatoria* (*paruo dedit oscula nato*, *Ars Am.* 2.69). By alluding to his own earlier version of the myth in conjunction with the scene’s other precedents in Greek and Roman literature, Ovid implicitly aligns himself with the great authors who have come before him. He is now, like them, a “model” poet who merits imitation.

There is one further cue in the text to interpret the kisses given by Daedalus to Icarus in the *Metamorphoses* as a self-consciously literary gesture. Ovid describes them as “never to be repeated” (*oscula . . . | non iterum repetenda*, 8.211-12). This is a qualification not found in the poet’s earlier, elegiac account of the myth, and as such, has been cited by scholars as evidence for differences in the stylistic register and points of emphasis between the two versions. But in light of the long literary tradition of fatherly kisses bestowed upon

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9 Hom., *Il.* 6.474, Verg., *Aen.* 12.434. Sharrock (1994) 182, in a discussion of the Daedalus and Icarus myth in the *Ars Amatoria* and *Metamorphoses*, points out the kisses’ Homeric and Vergilian models but doesn’t elaborate on their significance, other than to note that “[i]t is a neat twist that in what is on one level an examination of different types of poetry, Ovid should choose to draw on some of the most un-epic passages of the two greatest epics.”

10 Hector expresses a wish that the infant Astyanax should grow up to be just like him or even better (*Il.* 6.476-81), although the boy is, like Icarus, doomed to die young. Aeneas hopes that Ascanius will learn courage and toil from him, and remember the precedent of his father (*Aen.* 12.435-40).


12 Hollis (1970) 60 provides a slightly different translation, glossing *repetenda* as “‘to be sought back,’ as if lent for a while.”

sons, it is tempting to read Ovid’s verb of choice, *repetere*, as an example of the so-called “Alexandrian footnote” or the “vocabulary of memory.”

A case for counting *repetere* among the “vocabulary of memory” can be made, in fact, using one of the famous epic precedents for Daedalus’ speech to Icarus, mentioned earlier in this section. In the final book of the *Aeneid*, Aeneas had exhorted Ascanius to seek inspiration from the great deeds of his predecessors: “make sure . . . that you remember, and let both your father Aeneas and uncle Hector rouse you, as you recollect the examples of your kinsmen in your mind (“*tu facito . . . | sis memor et te animo repetentem exempla tuorum | et pater Aeneas et auunculus excitet Hector*,” *Aen.* 12.438-40). Aeneas’ invocation of the power of memory here, and of the memory of the boy’s uncle in particular, has itself been recognized by scholars as a markedly allusive gesture. That is, it serves as an appeal not only for his son to recall his ancestral models, but also for the reader to recall the passage’s literary models: Hector’s prayer in the *Iliad* that the infant Astyanax be similar to and better than himself (*Il.* 6.476-80); and Andromache’s inquiry, earlier in the *Aeneid*, about whether Ascanius is stirred to greatness by the thought of Aeneas and her late husband, Hector (*Aen.* 3.343). The verb *repetere*, then, has a distinguished Vergilian pedigree as a signal of literary self-consciousness, a pedigree which Ovid has imported into his own allusive version of a father’s tender interaction with his son. And then, characteristically, he takes this Alexandrian footnote one step further: even in the process of repeating the

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14 For these terms and related bibliography, see page 178 above.
16 Cf. *Her.* 20.9 and 21.27, where, as Barchiesi (1993) 354 points out, Acontius’ and Cydippe’s use of *repetere* may be read as an intertextual gesture towards the poet’s own repetition of his literary model, Callimachus’ *Aitia*. 
kisses himself, he declares them unrepeatable (*non iterum repetenda*, 8.212). These are, he implies, quite literally the *ultimate* kisses, and not only in the sense that Daedalus will never give his doomed child any more. Once and for all, Ovid stakes a triumphant claim to the last kiss and, accordingly, the last word on the matter.

So despite Icarus’ spectacular failure to imitate the model of his outstanding father, exemplarity and imitation is, from a *metapoetic* standpoint, a resounding success in this episode. The occasion of Daedalus’ tragic farewell to his son presents an opportunity for Ovid to follow conspicuously in the path of his illustrious poetic forebears: Homer, Vergil, and even his own elegiac self. He thereby creates tension between two different types of exemplarity, familial on the one hand (that is, sons following the models of their fathers) and literary on the other (poets following the models of their predecessors). And while Icarus himself perishes, the trope of the mythological father kissing his son farewell survives, passed down from exemplary author to exemplary author, among whom Ovid can now include himself. The episode thus epitomizes a self-evident truth about the difference between children and texts: the former die, whereas the latter live on.

This comparison between boys and books finds final expression in the collections from exile, where Ovid habitually refers to his volumes of poetry as his children (Chapter 3). The opening elegy of the *Tristia*, in particular, draws on this analogy several times, with the poet describing his works as a set of brothers (*fratres*, *Tr*. 1.1.107) and himself as their father (*parentis*, *Tr*. 1.1.115). This programmatic poem sees Ovid addressing his book directly,

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17 In the claim that the kisses are “never to be repeated,” we may also detect an inside joke for the benefit of any reader familiar with the poet’s earlier treatment of the myth in the *Ars Amatoria*, i.e., “this really is the last time!”

18 Wise (1977) 58-59 makes the related point that while Phaethon and Icarus fail in their efforts to move from one place to another (“literal transitions”), the poet succeeds in his efforts to move from one story to another (“literary transitions”).
urging it to approach the city of Rome cautiously and with humble expectations of readership (Tr. 1.1.87-88). In the verses immediately following, he reinforces this instruction by citing Icarus as a mythological exemplum: “while seeking too great heights on weak wings, Icarus gave his name to the waters of the sea” (dum petit infirmis nimium sublimia pennis | Icarus, aequoreis nomina fecit aquis, Tr. 1.1.89-90). Icarus is an example not just of a child who aimed too high, but also one who disobeyed his father’s warning. The accompanying implication is that the book, too, should listen to its “parent,” the poet, or risk dire consequences.\(^\text{19}\)

I suggested in Chapter 3 that when, at the very end of the *Metamorphoses*, Ovid predicts his own voyage above the stars in the so-called “better part of myself” (parte . . . meliore mei, Met. 15.875), he is not only referring to his book (as has been proposed in earlier scholarship), but is also imagining that book to be a substitute offspring. It is interesting to find, then, that the theme of children in flight is also associated with the *Tristia*, via the mention of Icarus’ fate. Not only that, but there has been a marked drop in altitude since the poet was last seen soaring through the heavens in the final verses of the *Metamorphoses*.\(^\text{20}\) Paradoxically, the exemplary path (that is, both the path which Ovid’s book is instructed to follow, and the path which will hopefully ensure its survival and status as an exemplum) now lies in mediocrity.

Whether Ovid had genuine reason to fear for the safety of the *Tristia* is difficult to know, and we may suspect that the concern expressed in this opening elegy is simply a


\(^{20}\) Graf (2002) 114 notes that the final verses of the *Metamorphoses*, where Ovid claims that his work will be immune from Jupiter’s anger and predicts his own lofty flight above the stars, find a neat parallel in the *Tristia*’s first mythological exempla, Phaethon and Icarus, victims of Jupiter’s anger and a lofty flight, respectively. On the connection between the poet’s flight at the end of the epic and the Icarus myth, see also Feldherr (2010) 111.
manifestation of the so-called “pose of poetic decline” detected by critics elsewhere in his works from exile. But regardless of how seriously we are to take his invocation of Icarus’ fate here, we must surely concede that Ovid’s banishment from Rome represented a very real, unexpected, and traumatic reversal of fortune for the poet. His popular success within his own lifetime and confident predictions of his future fame, not to mention our own retrospective knowledge of his immense influence on art and literature, make it easy for us to assume that his destiny as a model poet was always assured. But when it comes to exempla, there are no guarantees. The author of a poem like the Metamorphoses, with its multiple failures of exemplarity, must have been more aware of this than most, and his sense of the mutability of fortune can only have been sharpened by his exile. If the end of his epic is an expression of the heights to which poetic genius can soar (15.875-6), then the end of Ovid’s own life story is a reminder of the depths to which even the loftiest of poets can fall.

\[21\] For the phrase, see Williams (1994) 50.
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