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http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01x920g119b
Title: | Off-Path Website Fingerprinting Through Shared Hardware Bottlenecks |
Authors: | Eaton, Anna |
Advisors: | Apostolaki, Maria |
Department: | Electrical and Computer Engineering |
Class Year: | 2024 |
Abstract: | Website Fingerprinting (WF) is the practice of deanonymizing end hosts in a network connection by recognizing the time series of packets sent from a site upon load. Current WF research relies on the assumption of on-path adversaries and thus accounts only for threats where a node or link in the BGP (Border Gateway Protocol) route is compromised. This work aims to prove an off-path attack vector for WF through shared hardware resources. The attack occurs as follows: the adversary connects to a link that is also in the victim’s BGP route and weaponizes queuing in the buffer to saturate it and infer the time series of the victim packets from the inter-arrival times of adversarial packets. Then the adversary uses a trained triplet-fingerprinting model to find an embedding for the post-queue trace that best deanonymizes the end host. This work shows the efficacy of this attack in live hardware tests, and uses a simulation to analyze potential responsive queuing mechanisms in more detail. |
URI: | http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01x920g119b |
Type of Material: | Princeton University Senior Theses |
Language: | en |
Appears in Collections: | Electrical and Computer Engineering, 1932-2024 |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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EATON-ANNA-THESIS.pdf | 1.15 MB | Adobe PDF | Request a copy |
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