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Title: The Antifederalist Irony: How the Bill of Rights Opened the Door to the Nationalization of Policy-Making via the Federal Judiciary
Authors: Brazer, Drew
Advisors: George, Robert
Department: Politics
Class Year: 2019
Abstract: In the following thesis, I argue that the ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791 opened the door to the nationalization of policy-making via the federal judiciary. Herein lies the Antifederalist irony: The Bill of Rights (for which the Antifederalists so strongly advocated) precipitated the growth of national power at the expense of the states. Consequently, nine unelected, unaccountable, life-tenured, ivy-league lawyers on the U.S. Supreme Court now dictate national policy with respect to abortion, same-sex marriage, free speech, gun control, campaign financing, capital punishment, assisted suicide, etc. Had the Bill of Rights never been ratified, these issues would instead be resolved democratically by the state legislatures (in keeping with the Antifederalists’ preference for decentralized government).
Type of Material: Princeton University Senior Theses
Language: en
Appears in Collections:Politics, 1927-2021

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