A Conflict of Ambiguities: Understanding the Civil War in Myanmar and Policy Responses Available to the United States

Abstract

The February 2021 Coup reasserted military rule in Myanmar for the first time in a decade and plunged the nation into chaos. As the humanitarian crisis deteriorated, parties to the conflict proliferated and quickly jockeyed for influence and position, including the military leadership, deposed government officials, ethnic armed organizations, and China. Violent as this most recent crisis is, the question remains as to why Myanmar has faced civil war for decades without relief. The different motivations and interests of each of the aforementioned actors is crucial to better understanding this question, but theoretical, historical, and geopolitical layers of analysis are also critical for answering it.

Investigation at each of these three levels reveals an ambiguity which helps explain why civil war seems so intractable in Myanmar. From a theoretical standpoint, Myanmar simultaneously hosts two distinct insurgencies with different motivations which have opted to cooperate to defeat the Tatmadaw. Myanmar’s recent violent history and systemic brutalization under colonialism and military rule have left its current leaders without indigenous characteristics with which they can model a unified national identity. Geopolitically, China appears to be repositioning in Myanmar and may be poised to invest in ethnic armed organizations at the expense of the military government.

Given these three ambiguities, any successful policy intervention must operate across these three levels. Interventions should (1) minimize the distance between the goals of the two insurgencies, (2) assist in the development of a distinct national identity, and/or (3) moderate the influence of China as it repositions. While the United States has already demonstrated interest in the conflict, it should do more given its stated motivation to compete responsibly with China in the Indo-Pacific and around the world. However, the US must judge policy by whether it meaningfully facilitates peace rather than augments involvement in the war. The US can use existing authorizations to build out a robust assistance regime for the anti-coup resistance, complemented by a reinvigorated, multilateral sanctions regime, while cutting off remaining revenue streams for the junta and further delegitimizing it.