Busted Sanctions: An Update to Third-Party Effects on U.S. Sanction Policy

Abstract

Using the novel Global Sanctions Database, this research attempts to measure the effects of third-party government intervention on the effectiveness of U.S. sanction policy. Third-party governments - termed sanction busters - undercut sanctioning efforts by providing targeted states with increased opportunities for trade. Target states that are effective at creating relationships with sanction busters face fewer economic incentives to capitulate to sanctions than those that do not. In this paper, I offer new research into the effects of sanction busters on sanction outcomes as the United States has shifted sanction policy focus from comprehensive trade sanctions towards targeted smart sanctions. Using multinomial logistic regressions, I confirm that sanction busters have a negative effect on the likelihood of success before and after the shift in sanction policy. I then measure the effect of sanction busters on different types of U.S. sanctions to determine whether a shift in sanction policy is effective in overcoming the negative effects of sanction busting. Prior to the policy shift, I find that smart sanctions, military sanctions, and arms sanctions all experience the negative effects of sanction busting while trade sanctions do not. Following the policy shift, I argue that smart sanctions are the most effective policy type since they are least likely to succumb to the negative effects of sanction busters. These findings suggest that future research is necessary to determine the impact of third-party states on the efficacy of different types of sanctions, especially as the trend of increased sanction usage and policy shifting towards smart sanctions continues into the future.