Hegemonic Distraction and Escalation to War: The Perceived Status of the United States as Cause to Twentieth-Century Aggression

Abstract

This thesis tests a third-image hypothesis that leaders of states considering war use estimates of hegemonic distraction to gauge the odds of intervention. Would-be aggressor states are more likely to opt for war at moments when the system’s most powerful state is distracted—defined in terms of military resources, economic growth, and political stability—than when the hegemon is not distracted. It is hypothesized that any effect is greatest during unipolar years, when the hegemon’s foreign policy assumes a capricious character, so would-be aggressors cannot rule out normsenforcing interventions. As such, this thesis builds on Paul Huth’s notion of extended deterrence, arguing that a hegemon signals implied extended deterrence by presenting itself as non-distracted. That perceptions of hegemonic distraction contribute to escalation is tested against three alternative hypotheses that emphasize the roles of: perceptions of offensive military advantage; diversionary war; and perceptions of systemic instability. Process tracing tests for the causal pathway’s three observable implications within four primary cases: Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait occurred at a moment of very low American distraction. Due to pathologies of Iraq’s foreign policy leadership structure as well as American diplomats’ statements of non-interest in intra-Arab affairs, distraction estimates were set aside. The Russo-Georgian War meets the distraction hypothesis’s expectations with clarity: Moscow invaded Georgia after recognizing the United States was maximally committed to the Middle East and in the throes of recession. In the case of the Korean War, Kim Il Sung recognized American distraction as distinct from multilateral distraction, and North Korea invaded the South at a moment when American support to Seoul reached its lowest level. The ArabIsraeli War case considers counterarguments and acknowledges that when the unipolarity assumption falters, geopolitical considerations may supersede considerations of distraction in the minds of leaders considering aggression. As a concluding illustration, Chinese aggression during coronavirusinduced distraction is considered. Policy implications follow from that case, and it is suggested that a state-blind approach to norms enforcement with respect to Taiwan has the best odds at deterring Chinese aggression without invoking the security dilemma in Sino-American relations.