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Title: Inflation as Prisoner's Dilemma: The Case for Mandatory Wage-Price Controls
Authors: Maital, Shlomo
Benjamini, Yael
Issue Date: 1-Nov-1979
Citation: Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Vol. 2, No. 4, Summer 1980
Series/Report no.: Working Papers (Princeton University. Industrial Relations Section) ; 131
Abstract: Behavior toward uncertain future inflation gives rise to large diffuse externalities which result in market failure and require introduction of legal restraints -- mandatory wage—price controls. Models of wage-profit conflict and consumer vs. consumer rivalry are set out in which individual rationality leads to collective ruin (the so—called Prisoner's Dilemma). Evidence from national sample surveys indicates broad—based support for controls, and suggests some people do perceive the externalities generated by inflation.
Appears in Collections:IRS Working Papers

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