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|Title:||Take It or Leave It: Intermediation and Rent-seeking As Determined by Agents’ Toughnesses|
|Abstract:||Within this paper, I will discuss the notion of bargaining with multiple intermediaries.I will be using the notion that the bargaining power of a firm is derived from its ability to be a tough bargainer, or to make take it or leave it offers. This notion was first introduced by Farboodi, Jarosch, and Menzio.  I expand upon their model, by extending it from only taking into account two toughnesses to an n-toughness type model. We find similar results in this expansion, seeing that agents with a higher bargaining power are able to act as intermediaries in the model, and to rent seek in interactions with weaker agents.|
|Type of Material:||Princeton University Senior Theses|
|Appears in Collections:||Mathematics, 1934-2020|
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