CAN MILITANTS MODERATE? Evaluating Shifts in Hamas’ Positions for a New U.S. Approach

Abstract

Since 2007, Hamas has been the de facto governing power in the Gaza Strip. Hamas won a majority of seats in the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, but failed to form a government in the aftermath. The international community conditioned its acceptance of this government on three Quartet principles: renunciation of violence, recognition of Israel as legitimate, and acceptance of all past diplomatic agreements. Hamas refused to accept these conditions, and soon violently took control of Gaza. In the time since, most of the international community, including the United States, has adopted a policy of isolationism and non-engagement towards Hamas. This is prompted by a conception of Hamas as solely a terrorist actor which is incapable of giving up its armed struggle against Israel. However, changes in Hamas’ positions over time contradict this monolithic perception. As it balances resistance and governance in Gaza, Hamas does not fit neatly into its characterisation as an immutable terrorist group. Instead, it poses the question this thesis seeks to evaluate: is Hamas moderating its stances?

This thesis thus explores evidence of shifts in Hamas’ position on its hard-line views. I begin with Hamas’ early transitions, describing its origins and deviation from the welfare-oriented Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, followed by its decision to participate in democratic politics. Next, I examine Hamas’ offers of concession to Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in the aftermath of its election, as well as how the policy of isolation adopted by international actors facilitated Hamas’ takeover and consolidation of power in Gaza. Finally, I evaluate Hamas on three of its key stances, inspired by the Quartet Principles: its willingness to renounce violence, accept past agreements, and recognise Israel. In light of this evidence, I argue that Hamas is moving, albeit gradually, towards moderating its hard-line stances. I contend that these shifts are motivated by political pragmatism in response to the pressures of governance on Hamas. This thesis concludes with lessons and recommendations for U.S. policy informed by a more nuanced view of Hamas.