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Title: Is Your Lawyer a Lemon? Incentives and Selection in the Public Provision of Criminal Defense
Authors: Amanda Agan
Matthew Freedman
Emily Owens
Keywords: JEL Codes: H44, H76, J15, J33, J38, K14, K42
Issue Date: Sep-2017
Series/Report no.: 613
Abstract: Governments in the U.S. must offer free legal services to low-income people accused of crimes. These services are frequently provided by assigned counsel, who handle cases for indigent defendants on a contract basis. Court-assigned attorneys generally garner worse case outcomes than privately retained attorneys. Using detailed court records from one large jurisdiction in Texas, we find that the disparities in outcomes are primarily attributable to case characteristics and within-attorney differences across cases in which they are assigned versus retained. The selection of low-quality lawyers into assigned counsel and endogenous matching in the private market contribute less to the disparities.
Appears in Collections:IRS Working Papers

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