Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp015d86p323r
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dc.contributor.authorNeilson, Christopher-
dc.contributor.authorvan Dijk, Winnie-
dc.contributor.authorZimmerman, Seth-
dc.date.accessioned2020-09-21T17:57:59Z-
dc.date.available2020-09-21T17:57:59Z-
dc.date.issued2020-09-
dc.identifier.urihttp://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp015d86p323r-
dc.description.abstractThis paper introduces a simple school choice model in which all students have the same ordinal preferences over schools but only some have access to an outside option. Our model predicts that, under a manipulable school choice mechanism, students with the outside option are more likely to apply to popular schools. We show that while students with the outside option beneﬁt from manipulable systems, students without the outside option may experience either welfare gains or welfare losses. We evaluate the positive predictions of the model using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences design that leverages a change from the Boston mechanism to a deferred acceptance mechanism in the New Haven, Connecticut school district. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, students with an outside option are more likely to list popular, highly-rated schools under the manipulable mechanism, but this gap disappears after the switch to the deferred acceptance mechanism.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries644-
dc.subjectMatchingen_US
dc.subjectSchool Choiceen_US
dc.subjectStrategy-proofen_US
dc.subjectOutside optionsen_US
dc.subjectJEL Classiﬁcation Codes: D47, D82, I24en_US
dc.titleCentralized School Choice with Unequal Outside Optionsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:IRS Working Papers

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