Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp014x51hj17w
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dc.contributor.otherPolitics Departmenten_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-06-05T19:45:30Z-
dc.date.available2018-06-05T08:06:38Z-
dc.date.issued2014en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp014x51hj17w-
dc.description.abstractThis study develops and tests a theory to explain variation in the military trajectories of rising powers in the modern era, an important phenomenon overlooked in the existing international relations literature. I analyze English-, Japanese-, and Chinese-language sources to identify the causal mechanisms that have shaped leaders' military policy choices at more than two-dozen critical strategic decision points' during periods of rapid industrialization and economic growth. My case studies are Meiji Japan, Germany, and the United States during the pre-1914 period; late 20th-century Japan and Germany; and contemporary China. My findings challenge widely-held assumptions in related literatures about the primacy of structural imperatives, security concerns, and material interests in shaping military policy choices under international anarchy. I demonstrate empirically that the normative context into which a rising power emerges also has independent and significant effects on the manner in which its leaders pursue status as a great power.' This status-seeking' driver effectively functions as a powerful mechanism driving rising powers' socialization to perceived contemporaneous norms of role-appropriate great power' behavior--with consequences for better or worse for the likelihood of subsequent interstate conflict, even hegemonic war. How leaders respond to perceived contemporaneous great power' norms, however, is contingent on rising power type'; itself based on widely-held national identity within the state concerning the desirability of attaining international social status as a military great power.' Those status-seeking' rising powers in which national identity provides leaders with strong domestic political incentives to exploit surging nationalism and pursue this status often mimic the military policy profile of higher-ranked states in order to achieve social recognition as a member of the great power club.' This status-seeking driven mimicry often occurs even when the normatively-associated policies are disconnected from, or even contrary to, pressing national security and/or material interests. Conversely, leaders in status-avoiding' rising powers with widely-held national identities that have negative associations with the pursuit of status as a `military great power' have powerful domestic political incentives to eschew normatively-associated military policies. Paradoxically, these leaders often choose to do so despite recognizing these policies as being otherwise beneficial for security, material, and other interests.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherPrinceton, NJ : Princeton Universityen_US
dc.relation.isformatofThe Mudd Manuscript Library retains one bound copy of each dissertation. Search for these copies in the <a href=http://catalog.princeton.edu> library's main catalog </a>en_US
dc.subjectChinaen_US
dc.subjectJapanen_US
dc.subjectmilitaryen_US
dc.subjectnormsen_US
dc.subjectrising powersen_US
dc.subjectstatusen_US
dc.subject.classificationPolitical Scienceen_US
dc.subject.classificationInternational relationsen_US
dc.subject.classificationAsian studiesen_US
dc.titleShadowing the Hegemon? Great Power Norms, Socialization, and the Military Trajectories of Rising Powersen_US