The Effect of 'Parapolitics' on Paramilitary Violence in Colombia

Abstract

This paper studies the effect on violence in Colombia of the involvement of paramilitary groups in electoral politics. More specifically, it explores how the collusion between paramilitary groups and elected House representatives and governors in the first decade of the 2000s affected the levels of paramilitary violence in the regions of those elected politicians. Using electoral data from the National Civil Registry, data on violence from the National Center for Historical Memory, and a self-developed database on the links of politicians with paramilitaries, I find that the election of a House representative with links to paramilitaries is associated with a 21% decline in the number of paramilitary massacres in the region of the elected representative. I find similar results for other measures of paramilitary violence. These results are consistent with the notion that politicians and paramilitaries entered into a quid pro quo in which they mutually helped each other in order to preserve their own power.