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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp013484zk346
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dc.contributorGreen, Matthew-
dc.contributor.advisorAppel, Andrew-
dc.contributor.authorYe, Katherine-
dc.date.accessioned2016-06-22T14:45:48Z-
dc.date.available2016-06-22T14:45:48Z-
dc.date.created2016-04-29-
dc.date.issued2016-06-22-
dc.identifier.urihttp://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp013484zk346-
dc.description.abstractWe have proved, with machine-checked proofs, that the output produced by HMAC-DRBG is indistinguishable from random by a computationally bounded adversary. We proved this about a high-level specification of a simplified version of HMAC-DRBG written in the probabilistic language provided by the Foundational Cryptography Framework (FCF), which is embedded in the Coq proof assistant. We have also proven on paper that HMAC-DRBG is backtrackingresistant. Our work comprises the first formal verification of a real-world PRG. Our functional specification can be then linked to a proof of functional correctness of mbedTLS’s C implementation of HMAC-DRBG, allowing our proofs of cryptographic security properties to transfer to this implementation. Thus, this will create the first fully verified real-world DRBG.en_US
dc.format.extent73 pages*
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.titleTHE NOTORIOUS PRG:FORMAL VERIFICATION OF THE HMAC-DRBG PSEUDORANDOM NUMBER GENERATORen_US
dc.typePrinceton University Senior Theses-
pu.date.classyear2016en_US
pu.departmentComputer Scienceen_US
pu.pdf.coverpageSeniorThesisCoverPage-
Appears in Collections:Computer Science, 1987-2023

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