Kidney Capitalism: Modeling a Free Market for Kidneys

Abstract

Over the last several decades, global demand for kidney transplants has increased due to advancing transplant technology, aging populations, and increasing rates of renal failure. In a global landscape that generally prohibits organ sale, despite efforts to increase altruistic donations, the organ supply shortage remains, leading to the rise of black markets, which have caused significant harms. This thesis discusses the free-market model of kidney allocation practiced by Iran, the only country in the world with a legal market for kidney transplants and the only country with no kidney transplant waitlist. The thesis then uses US transplant, health, and socioeconomic data to create models to estimate the utility or disutility experienced by kidney recipients and donors as results of their transplants, then incorporate it into a design for an arrival process discrete-time market simulation that could be harnessed to study the potential outcomes of a free market for kidneys in the United States.