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Educational Debt Burden and Career Choice: Evidence  
from a Financial Aid Experiment at NYU Law School

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## Educational Debt Burden and Career Choice: Evidence from a Financial Aid Experiment at NYU Law School

### **Abstract:**

This paper explores how the timing of career-contingent financial aid influences its effectiveness in encouraging law students to enter public interest work, and hence the isolated effect of educational debt timing on career choice. I analyze quasi-experimental data from NYU Law School's *Innovative Financial Aid Study*, in which career-contingent financial aid packages with equivalent net values but varying debt structures were randomly assigned to applicants. My results indicate that debt timing matters: law school graduates who receive tuition waivers rather than ex-post loan assistance have a 32% higher rate of first job placement in public interest law and a 91% higher rate of clerkships. Furthermore, recipients of tuition waivers are more likely to enroll in law school conditional on being admitted. Using propensity score methods to correct for sample selection bias at the matriculation stage, I find that differences in first job placement according to debt timing persist after controlling for differential enrollment rates, implying an independent post-enrollment influence of debt timing on career decisions. I present a behavioral model that rationalizes the time-inconsistency of career decisions when agents are both debt averse and loss averse.

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## 1 Introduction

As public and private sector wages continue to diverge and educational debt levels rise, a growing number of professional schools are offering career-contingent financial aid packages aimed at increasing the incentive for graduates to pursue low-paying public interest work. The majority of career-contingent aid is awarded in the form of loan repayment assistance, although a few schools also offer tuition subsidies to entering students interested in non-profit careers. Despite the fact that career-contingent aid programs by and large favor retrospective debt relief over ex-ante tuition waivers, the importance of the timing of aid – and hence, the timing of educational debt – on career choice has never been evaluated. According to standard rational choice models, if the net present values are equal, current and future debt should have identical influence on career choices. However, as will be shown in this paper, if there is debt aversion, or disutility associated with debt beyond borrowing costs, the payout schedule of educational loans could influence career decisions.<sup>1</sup> To address this question I compare the impact of career-contingent tuition and loan repayment assistance on the job sector placement of law school graduates utilizing data from a randomized allocation of financial aid packages conducted over four years at New York University’s School of Law. Comparing students’ responses to financial aid packages of comparable monetary value but distinct payout schedules provides a unique opportunity to isolate the non-financial cost of debt and study the degree to which psychological debt burden influences career choices.

Given the current social interest in encouraging public interest employment and the growing amount of funding allocated for this purpose, not only is this a relevant behavioral question, but one with important policy implications. In particular, is loan repayment the most efficient manner for a school interested in influencing career outcomes to allocate funds? Depending on the nature of debt aversion, tuition subsidies may be more effective in encouraging students to take low-paying jobs with high social value than are loan repayment programs which fail to alleviate debt burden. This policy implication is relevant in many educational settings where career-contingent financial aid is designed to steer people towards public interest work.<sup>2</sup> For instance, British public universities are considering a universal program of income-contingent educational loans (Barr, et. al. , 1998).

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<sup>1</sup> There is substantial empirical evidence of debt aversion in many settings. For instance, payoff rates of mortgages and student loans are “irrationally” rapid. See Loewenstein and Thaler (1989) and Thaler (1992) for a discussion.

<sup>2</sup> See Appendix D-E for a survey of career-contingent financial aid programs.

The first section of the paper describes the NYU financial aid experiment in detail. I then present experimental results which indicate that graduates indeed respond differently to up-front tuition subsidies and retrospective debt relief programs when making career choices. In particular, law school graduates who receive tuition waivers while in school have a significantly higher rate of first job placement in public interest law as well as a substantially higher rate of clerkships. Furthermore, debt timing appears to influence the matriculation decisions of law school applicants, such that recipients of tuition waivers are more likely to enroll conditional on being admitted. The second half of the paper disentangles the role of anticipated educational debt on enrollment decisions from the effect of debt while in school on first job choice using propensity score methods to correct for sample selection bias at the matriculation stage. Ultimately, differences in public interest law placement according to financial aid timing persist after controlling for differential matriculation rates on observables, suggesting an independent post-enrollment influence of debt aversion on career decisions. The effect of financial aid package on clerkships, however, appears to be largely explained by high-ability applicants selecting into the pool of tuition subsidy recipients during enrollment.

## 2 Project Background

### 2.1 Career-contingent Financial Aid

At the country's premier law schools, students are graduating with average educational debt between \$70,000 and \$80,000, and the figure is rising. The primary source of growing indebtedness is the rapid rise in law school tuition: As Table 1 illustrates, between 1987 and 1997, law school tuition at both private and public law schools more than doubled (Kornhauser et. al., 1995).

Table 1. Average Law School Tuition

	1987-88	1997-98
Public School	\$2810	\$7035
Private School	\$9048	\$19256

At the same time, wages in private sector and public interest jobs have steadily diverged. Table 2 reports the difference in private and public sector average starting salaries for graduates from New York University’s School of Law in the classes of 1998-2001:

Table 2. Annual Mean Starting Salaries

	Class of 1998	Class of 1999	Class of 2000	Class of 2001
Public interest law	\$34494	\$36006	\$36523	\$39922
Private sector	\$95783	\$100872	\$124355	\$123517

There is growing concern that educational debts of the current magnitude dissuade even the most dedicated lawyer from taking a public interest job. In response, many law schools have initiated career-contingent financial aid policies designed to increase incentives for public interest work by reducing educational debt burden. At present, career-contingent loan repayment assistance programs (LRAP), which are largely funded and administered by law schools, are by far the most common form of career-contingent financial aid.<sup>3</sup> Loan repayment assistance defrays or, in some instances, fully covers the educational debt payments of graduates once they enter qualifying public service jobs. While in 1986 there were only five law school LRAPs nationwide, today there are 47 law school and four state LRAPs.<sup>4</sup> In contrast, career-contingent public service scholarships (PSS) are far less common. PSS are broadly defined as tuition grants to entering law students who express interest in public service careers with conditional repayment clauses in the case that students take private sector jobs. While LRAP is at most law schools available to anyone who pursues qualifying work, PSS are almost universally offered as merit-based awards to a select few. Through the new aid packages offered under the Innovative Financial Aid Study, NYU Law School was the first and only school to offer both types of aid to interested students regardless of relative merit or need.

## 2.2 The New York University Innovative Financial Aid Study

NYU Law School's Mel and Barbara Weiss Loan Repayment Assistance Program (LRAP) was

<sup>3</sup> There are also a handful of LRAP programs sponsored by state governments and employers (see Appendix D).

<sup>4</sup> LRAP programs vary greatly in the amount of debt assistance offered and the eligibility requirements, some paying only a fraction of tuition costs while others cover the full amount. See the NAPIL web site: <[www.napil.org](http://www.napil.org)>.

among the first LRAPs in the country. A 1993 enhancement of funding made it also one of the most generous loan assistance programs anywhere. At NYU, for all graduates who choose careers in the public sector or other low paying fields of law, the majority of educational loans incurred during law school are forgiven through LRAP.<sup>5</sup> As Table 3 illustrates, it is currently the second largest loan repayment program in the country.

Table 3: Law School Loan Repayment Programs

	Total LRAP Funds Disbursed (1998-99)
Yale Law School	\$1,369,061
New York University Law School	\$1,091,579
Harvard Law School	\$1,069,081
Columbia University School of Law	\$748,179
Stanford University Law School	\$546,148
Georgetown University Law Center	\$511,034

Additionally, in 1997, NYU Law School announced a \$10 million research initiative, the Innovative Financial Aid Study (IFAS), which further expanded the amount of available career-contingent aid. The program was deemed innovative for two primary reasons. First, as mentioned in Section 2.1, in addition to LRAP, the IFAS offered two forms of career-contingent tuition subsidies to students in the NYU Law classes of 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001 interested in public service careers. The NYU public service scholarship (PSS) provided a grant of two-thirds tuition that converted to a loan in the event that a recipient did not pursue a career in public interest law.<sup>6</sup> In addition, under IFAS, NYU expanded its Root-Tilden-Kern (RTK) Scholarship program, which also provided two-thirds tuition as well as an array of public service seminars, discussion groups, and other activities at the Law School to a select group of merit-

<sup>5</sup> LRAP provides quarterly prospective funding to alumni for up to ten years following graduation, providing all other conditions are met. Full time employees who work 35 hours or more each week, and who work in a position that “involves law” as determined by NYU, are eligible for the program. The program for the Class of 2004 defines “low-paying” as an income of less than \$57,651 annually. The “qualifying income” is gross income minus adjustments made for: annual debt service on educational debts, dependents, medical expenses, other LRAP benefits, and spouse’s income.

<sup>6</sup> Specifically, a legally binding contract stipulated that any PSS recipient who took a non qualifying job during the first ten years of his or her career had to repay a prorated fraction of the scholarship according to a repayment schedule matching federal loan terms. Graduates who leave public interest work prior to the required ten years must pay back the amortized portion of their tuition scholarship corresponding to the portion of time spent in the private sector.

eligible applicants.<sup>7</sup>

The key innovation of the IFAS, however, was the randomized allocation of all PSS and a subset of RTK grants. Each year of the study, PSS were randomly assigned by lottery across the entire pool of (admitted) applicants and RTK grants assigned by lottery to all merit-eligible applicants.<sup>8</sup> All lottery winners received scholarships of two-thirds tuition for three years of law school, while lottery losers received no tuition subsidy but were eligible to apply for two- and one-year PSS scholarships during their second and third years of law school. More importantly, all participants including lottery losers who entered public interest work were also eligible for LRAP for any portion of tuition loans not covered by subsidy. In total, 179 lottery winners were selected from the pool of 321 applicants, consisting in 102 three-year (PSS0 and RTK), 57 two-year (PSS1), and 20 one-year (PSS2) scholarships.<sup>9</sup>

As part of the IFAS study, data was collected on all members of the four participating law school classes from six separate university sources: law school applications; financial aid applications; law school academic records from the registrar's office; first-year entry surveys on work experience; personal debt; career goals and job preferences; third-year exit surveys with data identical to the entry survey but also including school and summer activity information; and work experience surveys mailed biennially to alumni for ten years following graduation.

### **3 Conceptual Framework: LRAP versus PSS**

The key characteristic of the IFAS lotteries and the most important feature to note in comparing the two loan options is the fact that the two packages were designed to be equivalent in net present value. To illustrate, the following expense sheet available from the law school's Office of Financial Aid gives an idea

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<sup>7</sup> As opposed to debt conversion specified in a legally binding contract, RTK graduates have a "moral obligation" to repay their grants through charitable donations to the school if they earn a salary greater than the prevailing public interest salary during the first ten years after graduation. In this sense, RTK scholarships differ most markedly from the PSS in that they involve no legally binding obligation on the part of the recipient to repay the loan in the event that they leave or do not enter the public sector. Almost all RTK activities are open to the public.

<sup>8</sup> Only applicants meeting a merit-based criteria entered the RTK lottery. Among this pool, roughly 15% of applicants in the highest merit category were automatically awarded RTK scholarships and are thus excluded from my experimental analysis.

<sup>9</sup> Students who dropped out or failed to graduate within three years are excluded from these figures and the proceeding analysis.

of the relative debt burden faced by PSS recipients versus students eligible for LRAP only:

Figure 1. 2000-2001 Federal Student Expense Budget:

	Full Tuition + LRAP	Tuition Waiver (PSS) + LRAP
Annual Debt	\$ 48,550	\$ 29,183
Total Debt [Annual x 3 years]:	\$ 145,650	\$ 87,550
Total Amount of Available LRAP:	\$ 145,650	\$ 87,550

While the first row of Figure 1 reveals a significant difference in annual student debt, due to the existence of LRAP and the career-contingent nature of PSS, *there is no difference in the monetary values of the two financial aid packages.*<sup>10</sup> Because PSS job eligibility requirements are identical to those of LRAP, and because PSS recipients are also eligible for LRAP for the portion of expenses financed by loans, the PSS is essentially loan forgiveness in reverse. To illustrate, assuming an annual tuition expense of \$30,000, the expected cost of tuition, and therefore the monetary value to law school entrants of the two financial aid programs, can be written as:

Figure 2: Expected cost of tuition by lottery outcome

<p>PSS lottery winners:</p> <p>(1) <math>E[\text{Tuition} PSS+LRAP] = \\$30,000 + p_l (-\\$30,000) + (1 - p_l)*(\\$60,000)</math></p> <p>PSS lottery losers:</p> <p>(2) <math>E[\text{Tuition} LRAP \text{ only}] = \\$90,000 + p_l (-\\$90,000) + (1 - p_l)*(0)</math></p> <p>where <math>p_l</math> is the probability that a student takes an LRAP-qualifying job.</p>
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In equation (1), because two-thirds is covered by the PSS, lottery winners are only responsible for \$30,000 tuition while in school, which is repaid after they graduate if they take an LRAP-qualifying job. If they do not, they must repay the \$60,000 loan after graduation. Equation (2) states that lottery losers are responsible for all \$90,000 tuition in period 1, all of which is repaid in period 2 if they work in public interest law. As the above expressions are equivalent, economic theory predicts a Von Neumann-

<sup>10</sup> Conditional on the availability of federal loans free of interest during school. Indeed, all applicants in the study received interest-free loans covering tuition through the school financial aid office.



Morgenstern utility-maximizing individual to be indifferent between winning and losing the financial aid lottery. Hence, because both packages place the same financial penalty on private sector work, an individual should respond identically to the two forms of aid when choosing whether to take a public interest law job. Nonetheless, two distinct aspects of debt timing have the potential to generate differences in students' valuations of the programs and corresponding differences in the likelihood of choosing public interest work in response to lottery outcome.

#### 1. Risk value of debt

If students perceive earlier debt to be costlier, they may require more financial compensation under an LRAP program to enter low-paying public interest work and therefore be less likely to choose a public sector job than are PSS recipients. The only difference in the real financial value of the two aid packages is the potential risk associated with the non-binding nature of the LRAP agreement. Unlike under a contractual agreement such as the PSS entails, neither the existence of the LRAP program, nor the formula used by the program in a given year is guaranteed to remain constant by the time law school applicants enter the job market. Thus, any uncertainty regarding continuation of the program, change in benefit amount, change in eligibility requirements, or change in tax treatment of loan payments could cause risk-averse students with debt to refocus their career towards the financially secure private sector. In spite of this potential uncertainty, given that NYU's LRAP is one of the oldest and most established loan programs in the country and NYU Law School sells itself as a school committed to public interest law, program discontinuation or cutbacks should be evaluated as highly unlikely by incoming students.<sup>11</sup>

Even if changes in the program are deemed unlikely, there are other potential financial costs of holding debt for three years. For instance, debt could limit access to credit for students considering large non-educational loan needs such as purchasing a house which may arise during law school. Finally, though it is reasonable to assume that law school entrants have substantial access to both private and public loans free of interest while in school, it is possible that applicants perceive themselves to be credit constrained. For example, since applicants may not receive federal loan application results as quickly as admissions

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<sup>11</sup> In fact, according to program coordinators, the school's commitment to providing loan assistance was particularly emphasized to students in IFAS classes.

decisions, anticipation of credit constraints could also influence applicant's preferences over the two types of financial aid.

## 2. Psychological debt aversion

In addition to financial considerations, behavioral responses to debt could play a role in influencing graduates' career choices. While the expected post-graduate debt payments of PSS recipients versus LRAP qualifiers are equal conditional on the probability of public interest employment, students' debt levels while in school and upon graduating differ substantially: At the end of law school, the balance sheets of non-PSS-holders register up to three years of actual debt to the federal government or private loan sources, while PSS holders face only the *risk of future debt* to the university. One possible reason that students' employment responses to LRAP and PSS could differ is that individuals are not standard expected-utility-maximizers in the sense that they evaluate going into debt and debt forgiveness asymmetrically. This possible behavioral explanation is a variation of the "loss aversion" model of Kahneman and Tversky, in which individuals associate higher disutility with a loss than the utility associated with an equivalent gain.<sup>12</sup>

Here I present a behavioral model based on this possibility that rationalizes debt aversion as a commitment device in a multi-stage decision in which individuals are subject to loss aversion, illustrated in Figure 3. The first characteristic of agents in this model is that they are debt averse. As long as going into debt is interpreted as a loss, a loss aversion framework can be applied to educational debt. While in the one-stage problem of Part A, which ignores debt experienced in the first stage, LRAP and PSS are evaluated identically, the existence of debt aversion requires modeling the financial aid lotteries as a two-stage decision problem as in Part B. As a two-stage problem, the possibility of loss aversion has important implications for individuals' response to each type of financial aid, since loss aversion has the potential to generate a preference reversal in the second stage under one financial aid package only. Thus, if debt averse individuals are also characterized by loss averse preferences, they may choose distinct careers depending on the timing of debt.


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<sup>12</sup> Kahneman and Tversky (1984) define loss aversion as "the disutility of giving up an object being greater than the utility associated with acquiring it."



This potential dynamic inconsistency can be seen by considering the job choices of a loss averse individual at Stage 2 of the decision trees in part (b). Even if in (a) an individual would choose to go into public interest work to avoid the \$90,000 loss, in the two-stage problem of (b), loss averse individuals may choose private sector over public interest work under LRAP only. Since, at the point when graduates are faced with the decision of which job sector to enter, they face a penalty in the case of PSS only, loss averse individuals will be more likely to enter the public sector under PSS than under LRAP. In other words, they choose \$0 and a private sector job over \$90,000 and a public interest job but not (-\$90,000) and private sector work over \$0 and public interest work. Whereas under LRAP, the loss associated with taking a private sector job has already been suffered so is not taken into account in the second stage, the PSS aid package avoids time-inconsistent career decisions by postponing the penalty aspect of career-contingent financial aid.

Figure 3. Job Sector Choice

A: ONE-STAGE DECISION



B: TWO-STAGE DECISION



In turn, ex-ante knowledge of this behavioral effect will cause scholarship applicants to assign higher probabilities to entering the public sector conditional on winning the PSS. As a result, students interested in committing themselves to public interest work will favor postponing debt in order to discourage themselves from entering the financially tempting private sector. In this sense, tuition subsidies may serve as a commitment device to a debt averse student cognizant of his nature.<sup>13</sup>

For the reasons outlined above, both loss averse and risk-related debt aversion have the potential to influence the career-related decision problems of financial aid recipients, generating a difference in public interest placement rates according to financial aid timing. Though not a separate causal factor, if the financial aid packages are *perceived* to be different on account of either factor, the expected matriculation rates among admitted applicants will differ according to debt timing. In this manner, a difference in job outcomes related to financial aid package will be generally associated with a corresponding difference in enrollment propensities.

#### **4 Construction of Control Group**

Participants in the experimental component of the IFAS included a total of 102 3-year, 57 2-year and 20 1-year scholarships assigned by lottery to the pool of 321 matriculating applicants from the classes of 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001. Appendix A presents the distribution of applicant winners and losers. Constructing unbiased experimental groups was complicated by the fact that losers could reapply for a PSS scholarship in their second (PSS1) and third (PSS2) years of law school. To address this complication, two steps were taken in assigning lottery participants to control and treatment groups. First, only an individual's lottery outcome the *first* time they apply for a PSS was taken into account. The treatment group then consists of all first-time applicant winners. The analogous control group is comprised of all those not awarded a scholarship the first time they apply. However, due to the possibility of reapplying, this group includes 51 lottery losers that receive scholarships at a later stage, which

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<sup>13</sup> This idea has intuitive appeal in explaining why some people considering professional schools express the seemingly irrational fear of getting “sucked into the private sector.”

contaminates identification of the treatment effect.<sup>14</sup> To eliminate this bias, those 51 original losers who eventually win the lottery were excluded from the control group, generating a “net control group” that includes only the lottery applicants that never won a scholarship.

However, eliminating eventual winners from the initial pool of losers introduces a potentially strong bias due to the fact that re-applicants are dropped from the control group only. If multiple applicants have different characteristics than one-time applicants, dropping a large number of these types from the control but not the treatment group will alter the equal distribution of characteristics across experimental groups achieved by random assignment. If the propensity to reapply is correlated with any individual characteristics influencing career choice (such as level of interest in public service), mean differences in job outcomes between control and treatment groups will be biased measures of program impact on career outcomes.

To eliminate this bias, sample weights were constructed to account for missing observations. Specifically, applicants who applied multiple times and repeatedly lost the lottery were over-weighted to reflect the total number of re-applicants including those who won and were dropped. Essentially, it is assumed that every applicant has an individual “type” – one-time, two-time or three-time propensity to apply. While types are unobservable among lottery winners, random assignment in second- and third-year lotteries ensures that winning re-applicants are characterized by the same type distribution as repeat losers conditional on the number of applications. In this manner, losers’ reapplication rates can be used to determine the correct distribution of types among the winners.<sup>15</sup> The weighting formulas are described in detail in the notes to Appendix A.

Second, the sample weights had to be adjusted to account for differences in the probabilities of winning according to the type of lottery to which the student first applied – PSS0, both PSS0 and RTK, PSS1 or PSS2. Because of the smaller number of PSS1 and PSS2 first-time applicants and the smaller pool of eligible RTK applicants, these participants had a higher probability of ending up in the treatment group, and therefore the treatment group is composed of a higher percentage of PSS1, PSS2 and RTK

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<sup>14</sup> In this case, it would be impossible to separate the effects of losing the PSS in an early year from winning at a later point, so that estimates of scholarship effect would be biased downwards. This is analogous to the standard problem of control group members seeking outside treatment. See Robins (1998) for a discussion.

<sup>15</sup> Hence, it was assumed that, since two-thirds of losers reapplied once and one-fourth reapplied twice, so would have the same fractions of winners.

applicants relative to PSS0 applicants. Thus, sample weights of control subjects in the last three categories were adjusted to equate the distribution of lottery types across treatment and control groups. Table 5 gives the precise sampling weights for the five types of lottery.

Table 5. Lottery Weights

	Probability of winning	# Control	# Treatment	Weight assigned to controls only	Control (weighted)
PSS0 only	0.310	109	49	1	109
RTK & PSS0	0.520	49	53	2.406	118
PSS 1	0.407	32	22	1.529	49
PSS 2	0.571	3	4	2.966	9

Finally, in constructing the comparison groups to be used in the analysis, an important concern over non-random assignment arises from the fact that many applicants for first-year scholarships did not attend NYU.<sup>16</sup> While an intent-to-treat analysis, in which all applicants are included in the study regardless of participation, would yield unbiased comparison groups, in practice, since data was only collected for NYU attendees it was necessary to exclude from the analysis all lottery applicants (both winners and losers) that failed to matriculate.<sup>17</sup> If matriculation rates are correlated with lottery outcome as well as other individual characteristics, the enrolled lottery winners and losers will not reflect a random assignment of individuals to experimental groups. For instance, if very dedicated students' acceptance decisions depend more on scholarship money, then lottery winners will have higher matriculation rates and also be, on average, more dedicated to public interest work.<sup>18</sup> Since the only difference between lottery winners and losers in the value of law school is that control group members face (interest-free) tuition debt while in school as opposed to after graduation, sample selection would only occur if applicants are characterized by time-inconsistent debt aversion. In that case, we would expect a higher matriculation rate among first year lottery winners, producing a higher average level of debt aversion within the treatment group. To the extent that

<sup>16</sup> Unfortunately, there is currently no data on enrollment according to lottery outcome available from the NYU Law School admissions office. However, anecdotal evidence from one IFAS administrator reveals surprise at “how few members of the control group actually enrolled” (Kornhauser, 2001).

<sup>17</sup> For a discussion of non-random non-compliance with missing data, see Tsitsi, et. al. (1999).

<sup>18</sup> On the other hand, if the correlation between matriculation rates and lottery outcome is equally distributed across all applicant types, the random assignment assumption remains valid.

debt aversion is either itself a determinant of career choice or correlated with other individual characteristics that influence job outcomes, the estimate of program impact will be biased.

While complicating the analysis of job sector outcomes, matriculation patterns according to lottery outcome constitute an important program outcome in themselves. The following section on experimental results begins by exploring the effect of lottery outcome on enrollment decisions.

## 5 Experimental Outcomes

### 5.1 Matriculation Rates

Table 7 presents unweighted summary statistics of the experimental data, providing a rough check of random assignment among matriculating applicants.<sup>19</sup> Any statistically significant differences in mean characteristics among matriculating winners and losers can be assumed for incentive reasons to imply a greater propensity to enroll among lottery winners.

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<sup>19</sup> Here, as in Tables 8-9, partial weights are applied only to equate the application lotteries in the treatment and control groups, and no control group members are excluded as in the final weighting scheme. Comparison of partially weighted and fully weighted sample means of the treatment and control groups verifies that the final weighting scheme, in which 51 eventual winners are dropped and the control group reweighted, does not alter the distribution of demographic traits.

Table 7. Sample characteristics

	N	control	treatment	$ t_{\Delta} $
Female	193/128	0.62	0.64	0.29
Age	193/128	31.2	30.9	0.71
Married	193/128	0.074	0.094	0.66
Minority	193/128	0.076	0.055	0.65
Parents' net worth	148/95	244964	151515	1.78
Parents' net income	148/95	51962	60206	0.68
Home worth	148/95	49322	39012	0.60
LSAT	193/128	167.5	168.7	<b>2.01</b>
Undergraduate GPA	193/128	3.63	3.63	0.01
Rank of undergraduate institution	193/128	4.08	4.06	0.23
Undergraduate school public	193/128	0.274	0.304	0.49
Undergraduate debt	193/128	3653.5	5037.0	1.36
Other pre-law debt	193/128	4319.5	2308.0	0.94
Years of PI experience	193/128	0.98	1.24	0.84
Foreign	193/128	0.008	0.008	0.06

The statistically significant difference between mean *Law School Admissions Test* (LSAT) scores, with lottery winners averaging 1.2 points higher than lottery losers, suggests that applicants in fact have differential enrollment rates according to lottery outcome. Thus, it appears that postponing debt encourages applicants to enroll in law school. Since lottery losers should be aware that career-contingent financial assistance with the same option value as the tuition waiver is available to them at NYU regardless of lottery outcome, a higher matriculation rate among lottery winners provides important evidence of time-inconsistent debt aversion.

Because sample selection is presumed to occur only among first-year scholarship applicants who are deciding whether and where to attend law school, I continue by comparing the following pre-law-school characteristics among the sub-sample of first-year lottery applicants only: sex, race, LSAT scores, undergraduate GPA, rank of undergraduate school, parental net worth, net parental income, undergraduate debt, and other outstanding debt.<sup>20</sup> Among the first-year matriculating applicants, the only significant differences between the experimental groups in pre-law school characteristics is in family assets.

<sup>20</sup> Table 8 is analogous to Table 7, except that only Year 0 PSS and RTK lottery participants are included.



Table 8. Sample characteristics of PSS0 and RTK applicants only

	treatment	control	$ t_{\Delta} $
Minority	0.082	0.059	0.58
Female	0.68	0.65	0.38
LSAT	168.7	167.7	1.30
Undergraduate GPA	3.63	3.66	0.71
Rank of undergraduate institution	4.09	4.13	0.35
Parental net worth	151072	267660	<b>1.96</b>
Parental net income	60475	50737	0.71
Undergraduate debt	4817	3274	1.37
Other entering debt	2358	5130	1.06

However, further dissimilarity in entering lottery participants suggestive of type differences according to lottery outcomes is evident from a comparison of correlations between pre-lottery observables, presented in Table 9. From these data, it appears that two types of sample selection are occurring at the enrollment stage. First, tuition waivers lead higher quality students to matriculate at NYU. This is evident by the fact that not only are LSAT scores lower in the control group, but LSAT scores and undergraduate GPA have reverse correlations across experimental groups. In the control group, as in the population of non-participants, these two performance measures are inversely related and thus during school on post-graduate career choice, comparing the matriculating treatment and control group members *does* provide an unbiased estimate of the “total program effect” – that is, the effect of debt burden on career decisions together with the effect of prospective debt burden on the decision to enroll. From a policy perspective, both channels of impact of offering up-front tuition waivers are of interest.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>21</sup> Aside from using the matriculating lottery losers as a control group, a different option would have been to select a matched sample from the pool of non-applicants, as in Rouse’s (1998) quasi-experimental evaluation of the Milwaukee School Choice Program. In my case, this approach is inappropriate because lottery participation is a decision variable undeniably highly correlated with job outcomes. Non-applicants who are comparable to applicants but who did not apply for some exogenous reason would be extremely difficult to identify in the data (i.e. people planning to apply but misread the application date, etc).

Table 9: Correlation between LSAT and pre-law school characteristics

	treatment	control
	<u>LSAT</u>	<u>LSAT</u>
Undergraduate GPA	0.0363	-0.2185
Rank of undergraduate institution	0.0513	0.0464
Female	-0.1744	-0.1266
Minority	-0.5062	-0.4269
Parental net worth	-0.0123	0.2274
Parental income	0.0295	-0.1098
Undergraduate debt	-0.0665	-0.1321
Other entering debt	0.0070	0.0456

In the second round of estimates, I attempt to correct for sample selectivity in order to estimate the average treatment effect of tuition waivers. In particular, I adjust for observable confounding variables arising from potentially endogenous matriculation rates by comparing control group members to a matched sub-sample of treatment group members with propensity score matching techniques. The resulting matched outcome, along with a descriptive investigation of control and treatment differences, provides inference on the size of the selection effect.<sup>22</sup>

### 5.2.1 Mean Differences in Job Placement

In comparing the impact of the two forms of loan assistance, the fundamental outcome of interest is the likelihood of pursuing a career in public interest law. To approximate long-range career paths, I look at both the first job placement of graduates as well as subjective statements of career plans from the exit survey. Unfortunately, the first job placement measure is complicated by the fact that graduates also have the third option of accepting an intermediate position as a law clerk. Mindful of this shortcoming, I begin by looking at the allocation of experimental subjects across all three sectors.<sup>23</sup> As shown in Table 10, there is a significant difference between the experimental groups in the distribution of first job placements.

<sup>22</sup> With the exception of the propensity score estimates, the sampling weights described in the previous section are applied throughout the statistical analysis.

<sup>23</sup> The eleven experimental subjects that fail to report post-graduate employment are assumed for incentive reasons to not be employed in qualifying public interest jobs.

Table 10. First job placement of graduates

	control	treatment	t <sub>Δ</sub>
Public interest law	38.6%	34.4%	0.84
Non-qualifying employment	40.1%	25.0%	2.14
Clerkship	21.3%	40.6%	3.18
N	193	128	$\chi^2=11.51$

In pair-wise comparisons, treatment group subjects are 14.9 percentage points (37.5%) less likely to take a non-qualifying job and 19.3 percentage points (91%) more likely to take a one-to-two year clerkship after leaving law school. The difference across treatment and control groups in terms of the likelihood of directly entering the public sector is small and insignificant. Nonetheless, these results indicate that, despite the equivalent net present value of these two programs, career-contingent tuition subsidies are associated with a lower rate at which law students with a self-reported interest in public sector work abandon this pursuit immediately after law school.

Unfortunately, the relationship between financial aid timing and the primary outcome of interest, the long-term (post-clerkship) proportion of public interest lawyers, will depend on the rate at which clerks enter public interest work. Information on the pattern of post-clerkship employment is currently available for the classes of 1998, 1999 and 2000 from follow-up surveys mailed to graduates two years out of school. Overall, 68% of the 70 clerks in these classes transition to public interest jobs and five take second clerkships.<sup>24</sup> While the sample is small, the rate of post-clerkship public interest employment differs substantially by lottery outcome: 78% of lottery winners and only 43% of lottery losers take public interest jobs. Table 11 incorporates this data and reports the updated job sector distribution for the classes of 1998-2000 only.<sup>25</sup> Here, the same patterns as in Table 10 are observed. Members of the treatment group are roughly one-third (32%) more likely to enter public interest law after two years.

<sup>24</sup> The nine observations without follow-up data are again assumed to not be working in qualifying public interest jobs.

<sup>25</sup> Analogous weights are constructed for the participants in the classes of 1998-2000 only, described in Appendix B.

Table 11. First job placement of graduates after 2-years

	control	treatment	$ t_{\Delta} $
Public interest law	50.1%	66.0%	1.97
Non-qualifying employment	48.7%	31.9%	2.03
Second clerkship	1.2%	2.1%	0.56
N	146	94	$\chi^2=5.91$

Classifying the five students in second clerkships as public sector lawyers yields a 33% placement differential across experimental subjects in the classes of 1998-2000:<sup>26</sup>

Table 12a. Fraction in public interest law

	control	treatment	$\Delta$	$ t_{\Delta} $	N
Public interest law	51.3%	68.1%	16.8	2.03	239

Regression controlled means accounting for year of graduation, lottery type or demographic characteristics consistently produce an even larger treatment effect, ranging from 17-18 percentage points. Not surprisingly, the difference in public interest law placement is concentrated among applicants to three-year tuition lotteries among whom the debt difference is the largest. Looking only at PSS0 and RTK applicants in Table 12b, we observe an 18.6 percentage point differential in the rate of public interest law between three-year lottery winners and losers. On the other hand, the rate of clerkships among these applicants is almost identical to the sample average (18.4%). The public interest law differential among PSS1 and PSS2 individuals is 10 percentage points, although insignificant due to the small number of late applicants.

Table 12b. Fraction in public interest law, RTK and PSS0 lottery participants only

	control	treatment	$\Delta$	$ t_{\Delta} $	N
Public interest law	52.8%	71.4%	18.6	2.69	200

<sup>26</sup> Alternatively, assuming they enter the private sector gives the same treatment effect as in Table 11 – 32% with a t-statistic of 1.97. Thus we can safely assume the real effect lies between 32 and 33%. However, anecdotal evidence supports the prediction that students taking more than one clerkship disproportionately end up in public sector work.

As an approximation of final job outcomes for all four classes of study subjects, I use data on clerks in the classes of 1998-2000 to assign predicted job sectors to clerks in the class of 2001 based on a vector of coefficients from a probit estimation of public interest employment on the following individual characteristics: age, sex, minority, marital status, public interest commitment reported in the exit survey – including what fraction of the next decade a student plans to spend in a private law firm and in non-profit law, the importance of social contribution, and the importance of salary –, and first-year and second-year summer public interest employment dummies.<sup>27</sup> Based on the predicted placement data for the class of 2001, clerks in the treatment group are nearly twice as likely to enter public interest work. Incorporating predicted values for clerks in the class of 2001 to generate an expected distribution of sample-wide first job placement produces a similar estimate of program effect on public interest work for all four classes:

Table 13a. Predicted final job sector for all classes (19998-2001)

	control	treatment	$\Delta$	$ t_{\Delta} $	N
Public interest law	48.7%	64.9%	16.2	2.37	320

Table 13b shows the predicted distribution for early applicants only:

Table 13b. Predicted final job sector for all classes (19998-2001), RTK and PSS0 lottery participants only

	control	treatment	$\Delta$	$ t_{\Delta} $	N
Public interest law	50.7%	68.6%	17.9	2.30	260

As an alternative outcome measure not complicated by clerkships, I also look at exit survey data on long-term career plans among 3-year lottery participants. Specifically, students are asked about the job settings in which they plan to spend the next ten years of their careers. Table 14 reports the percentage of the next 10 years students plan to spend in private and public interest law, net of time out of the labor force. This data shows a pattern strikingly similar to the distribution of first job placement.

<sup>27</sup> Choice of covariates based on the observed probability of public interest employment post-clerkship, see Appendix C.

Table 14. 10-year career plans<sup>28</sup>

	control	treatment	$\Delta$	$ t_{\Delta} $
Percentage of years in for-profit law firm	30.2%	18.7%	-11.5%	1.99
Percentage of years in public interest law	31.2%	56.7%	25.5%	2.37
Percentage of years in clerkship	5.1%	8.8%	3.7%	1.98

Treatment group subjects report planning to spend 25.5 percentage points more of the next ten years in non-profit law, even higher than the 18.6 percentage point predicted difference in first job placement. It is also evident that this difference does not simply reflect the fact that control group subjects also plan to spend a significant less amount of time in a clerkship, which they will substitute for private sector work. As reported in Table 15, the mean differences in career settings net of planned fraction of next ten years in a clerkship is even larger.

Table 15. 10-year career plans net of clerkship time

	control	treatment	$\Delta$	$ t_{\Delta} $
Percentage of years in for-profit law firm	31.6%	19.5%	12.1%	2.10
Percentage of years in public interest law	33.5%	60.5%	27.1%	2.45

From Tables 14 and 15, it is evident that stated career plans of all participants are consistent with observed first job choice. Just as treatment group members are less likely to take an immediate private sector job and more likely to take a clerkship, so are they more likely to report a greater planned percentage of the next ten years in these settings. This is hardly surprising since most graduates have already made first job arrangements at the time of the exit survey. Nonetheless, the exit survey findings suggest that patterns of first job choice do not simply reflect a difference in the *order* of job setting, but more likely a long-term difference in career experience. In other words, there is strong evidence from these data that the timing of financial aid affects not only the likelihood that a student takes an immediate job in public interest law, but also the likelihood that he or she ever does. This implies that the long-term rate of public interest employment will depend even more on financial aid timing than the initial estimates suggest.

<sup>28</sup> Remaining time includes non-legal employment and unsure.

The exit survey also provides data on desired job characteristics. Interestingly, while both observed job choices and exit survey career plans differ substantially according to financial aid package, the pattern of preferences in job characteristics at the end of law school is remarkably similar across experimental groups. Only one of 15 job characteristics that students were asked to rank – the importance of practical experience – was significantly different at the end of law school. The fact that job preferences, including the relative importance of such factors as salary and contribution to society, are virtually equivalent between control and treatment groups, yet both stated plans and observed choices differ substantially suggests that systematic type differences in work preferences are not driving the experimental result.

### 5.2.2 Selection Correction Model

As discussed in Section 5.1, one factor plausibly driving the discrepancy in final outcomes is a difference in the matriculation rates of law school applicants according to lottery outcome. This section attempts to gauge whether or not sample selection is responsible for the previous set of job placement results. We have already observed strong evidence of sample selection in a comparison of pre-law school observables in Tables 7 and 8. In order to isolate selection bias at the matriculation stage, the earlier findings suggest the need to account for differences in nonlinear relationships between pre-treatment observable characteristics. With this in mind, I construct an alternative set of comparison groups using propensity score matching techniques to identify a set of treatment group members best matched to control group members based on non-linear relationships between variables associated with the likelihood of program participation.<sup>29</sup> Assuming that differential matriculation rates reflect lottery winners being disproportionately encouraged to attend, the control “types” are necessarily a subset of the treated. Essentially, this procedure attempts to identify that subset of treated individuals most comparable to the subset of original control group members who remain after matriculation.

To identify such participants, for each lottery loser I associate a match outcome by way of minimum distance estimation according to the following set of pre-treatment characteristics: graduation year, RTK applicant, LSAT score, undergraduate debt, undergraduate GPA, undergraduate school rank, whether undergraduate school is public, sex, age, minority, graduation year, prior years in public interest

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<sup>29</sup> This method follows Heckman, et. al. (1997). For an overview of matching techniques, see Meyer (1995).

employment, marital status, family net worth, family net income, and the interaction between LSAT and GPA, and LSAT and income.<sup>30</sup> In particular, a standard probit over the entire sample estimates a maximum likelihood probability that a student was a member of the control group. Predicted match scores were then calculated from the vector of coefficients on these variables and assigned to all members of the treatment and control groups. Matching outcomes were determined according to kernel-weighted average outcomes of all non-treated individuals, and all results were compared for robustness with stratified and nearest-neighbor matching.

The general technique is an inverse application of traditional propensity score methods used to estimate the average treatment effect in a population (Imbens, 1999). In my method, the difference in average job placement between the control group members and the matched subset of treatment group members instead estimates the hypothetical effect of treatment on the subgroup of individuals who would have matriculated even in the absence of the program. Hence, the difference between this estimate and the estimate of gross program effect from the previous section, which also includes an effect on the probability of participating and consequent changes in average sample characteristics, is reasonably interpreted as the “gross selection effect” – that is, the change in the distribution of average student characteristics plus the effect of treatment on these marginal participants. While I am unable to fully identify the average treatment effect, decomposing the gross program effect into these two components allows me to rule out the possibility of zero average treatment effect as long as a positive program effect is observed among the subset of the treated that would have enrolled regardless of lottery outcome.

In the case of public interest placement, that is indeed the case. Table 16 presents the estimated average program effect using kernel matching methods on the identified subset of “unconditional” participants.<sup>31</sup> Note that the control group means are identical to the previous estimate in Table 12b since the composition of the control group does not change. In contrast, individuals in the new treatment group are just as likely to enter public interest law but substantially *less* likely to take a clerkship relative to the original set of treatment individuals.

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<sup>30</sup> The sample is for obvious reasons restricted to pre-enrollment lottery applicants (PSS0 and RTK).

<sup>31</sup> Both stratification and random draw nearest neighbor matching produced the same pattern of results.



Table 16. Kernel-based matching outcomes

	Mean of matched treated	Mean of control	Average treatment effect on unconditional applicants	Bootstrapped SE
Public interest law*	0.722	0.528	- 0.194	0.096
Clerkship	0.321	0.232	- 0.089	0.067

\*Classes of 1998-2000 only.

The fact that a treatment effect on public interest employment is observed indicates that the gross program effect cannot be attributed to selection on observables. This suggests that, unless there is a significant amount of selection on unobservables occurring at matriculation, even in a scenario in which applicants are informed of the lottery outcome post-matriculation, the influence of educational debt while in school would still generate a difference in the rate of public interest placement. In fact, it appears that students encouraged to matriculate on account of tuition waivers have lower rates of public interest placement, controlling for other factors: the measured effect of treatment for this subset of lottery winners is 19.4 rather than 18.6 percentage points. Thus, sample selection out of treatment may actually bias downward the impact of financial aid timing on career choice. A reasonable explanation consistent with this observation is that treatment individuals whose enrollment decision is influenced by debt timing not only have higher undergraduate debt and higher LSAT scores, but also have lower average commitment to public interest work, controlling for these characteristics. This makes intuitive sense given that non-matriculaters are those most easily dissuaded by a difference in financial aid timing from either entering public interest law or from attending a law school with a high commitment to public interest work.

In the case of clerkships, the propensity score estimates are half as large and insignificant.<sup>32</sup> This suggests that, were matriculation rates unaffected by lottery outcomes, debt timing would be associated with less of a difference in the rate of clerkships than we observe in the presence of selection. In light of this result, sample selection on LSAT scores is a likely explanation for the extreme difference in clerkships between the original control and treatment groups, as clerkships are largely merit-based appointments. In other words, students with the best outside options lie disproportionately in the margin of influence for career-contingent aid at the enrollment stage.

<sup>32</sup> Stratified and nearest neighbor matching estimates of ATE are 3-5 percentage points and insignificant.

In sum, propensity score estimates of comparable groups of enrolled students indicate that, while sample selection on observables into treatment explains much of the difference in rates of clerkships, matriculation patterns do not account for the difference in public interest placement between the treatment and control groups. Thus, unless there is a significant degree of selection on unobservables occurring at the enrollment stage, it appears that, in addition to influencing enrollment decisions, financial aid timing has an independent effect on the career decisions of students who matriculate.

## 5.5 Job Market Signaling

Before concluding that the results of this analysis reflect a response to debt among students, it is important to eliminate the possibility of job market signals altering the relative employment prospects of treatment and control group members. Despite the fact that PSS were distributed by randomized lottery so provide no information on winners and losers, it is conceivable that public interest employers perceive career-contingent scholarships as valuable job market signals of quality and commitment to public interest work. Since lottery losers are presumably unable to indicate to employers that they applied for a PSS, winning the lottery could conceivably alter job opportunities in the public sector. This asymmetry among between winners and losers would result in higher average wage offers conditional on ability for scholarship-holders, thereby disproportionately encouraging lottery-winners to enter public interest law.

A useful way to test for this possibility would be to look at differences in callback rates and salary offers for public interest jobs according to experimental group. Unfortunately, this data is not yet available from the IFAS. A much cruder indicator of any significant demand advantage of PSS subjects is found by looking at relative wage differences in public interest versus private firms between control and treatment groups, controlling for observable measures of ability and commitment level. Assuming that all relevant characteristics which are observable to employers are contained in our data set, then a significant positive coefficient on the treatment dummy in a regression of starting salary on employee characteristics would indicate a premium on scholarship participation. However, if there are important unobservable factors influencing employment opportunities, these estimates will also suffer from selection problems so should be interpreted with caution.

From the regression results in Table 18, it appears that treatment status is unrelated to mean sector-specific salary when controlling for indicators of ability and commitment which are plausibly used by employers to evaluate candidates. While the desirability of a given job is not fully captured by starting salary, especially given the level of compression of starting salaries in all three sectors, a few factors explain most of the variation in private sector salaries – including class rank, GPA, age, and the importance of social contribution – and treatment status is not among them. This suggests that financial aid package is an unimportant signal of commitment or ability to employers.

Table 18. OLS regression of mean starting salary

	Private Sector		Non-profit Sector		Clerks	
Group mean	103061	110613	35199	35145	38418	39430
	Starting salary	t <sub>Δ</sub>	Starting salary	t <sub>Δ</sub>	Starting salary	t <sub>Δ</sub>
PSS/RTK (treatment)	-5409.52	0.86	1409.12	0.86	983.217	0.62
RTK winner	-4766.91	0.86	991.10	0.53	-891.411	0.72
LSAT	2103.20	2.65	-166.09	0.94	-89.0669	0.83
UG GPA	17987.8	1.72	-5782.70	1.10	2667.72	1.05
Rank of UG school	7589.24	1.88	940.520	0.74	-536.250	0.56
Class rank	33223.0	3.39	4242.45	0.86	588.059	0.20
Last GPA	30545.0	2.28	-7066.16	1.68	462.254	0.13
Minority	37822.4	3.62	-3701.76	0.99	2607.52	1.33
Female	15243.6	2.34	-3033.67	1.81	-224.889	0.20
Age	-176.637	0.33	-629.408	2.04	12.9679	0.07
Rank soc. contrib.	-505.445	0.53	72.7360	0.20	68.4256	0.33
Rank salary	731.023	0.68	-143.938	0.20	-133.298	0.33
% career plan in PI	-28469.1	2.86	-2568.27	1.01	-3725.14	1.70
Summer 1 PI job	6135.01	0.86	-3531.93	1.67	1091.23	0.61
Summer 2 PI job	2597.70	0.32	1260.94	0.69	873.149	0.79
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.6218		0.3753		0.1914	

## 6 Conclusions

This study has provided evidence that the timing of educational debt influences career choices. According to my results, under a career-contingent financial aid program that offers tuition waivers rather than an equivalent amount of loan repayment assistance, rates of first job placement in public interest law are roughly one third higher. Very little of this appears to be explained by differential matriculation rates according to loan package. Thus, the positive effect of the tuition subsidies on graduates' rate of public interest employment operates not through attracting students more committed to public interest work, but by altering the role of debt in students' post-enrollment career decisions. Recipients of forward looking career-contingent financial aid are also nearly twice as likely to take a competitive clerkship after law school, though much of this appears to be determined at the enrollment stage.

The fact that career-contingent tuition subsidies are associated with higher rates of public interest law than are financially equivalent backward-looking loan repayment schemes provides strong evidence of time-inconsistent debt aversion.<sup>33</sup> As discussed in Section 2, there are two possible reasons debt aversion could lead students to make career choices that depend on the timing of educational debt. Either debt suffered early is perceived to be costlier, or else borrowers' preferences are characterized by loss averse debt aversion, which has the potential to generate a reversal in career preferences when debt is absorbed in the first stage. There is significant reason to be doubtful that early debt is perceived to be costlier due to the non-binding nature of LRAP. Given that NYU Law School is widely known for offering the most comprehensive public service infrastructure of any law school in the nation and actively markets itself as a public interest law school, discontinuation or reduction in LRAP benefits should be deemed highly unlikely. For these reasons, time-inconsistent debt aversion such as that which would occur if individuals were characterized by loss averse preferences is arguably a more plausible explanation.

Regardless of the mechanism, the policy implication for a school interested in increasing its supply

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<sup>33</sup> A corresponding piece of evidence on the existence of psychic disutility associated with debt is the fact that a significant number of scholarship winners choose *not* to renew their fellowships while in law school. Since students face no interest payments on the loan until they graduate, failure to renew presumably reflects a distaste for career-contingent debt once it is known to the student that it will need to be repaid (that is, once a low likelihood of taking a qualifying job is determined). Indeed, failure to renew is a near perfect predictor of immediate job in the private sector: 12 of the 14 lottery winners who fail to renew their scholarship take a job directly in a private law firm.

of graduates to the public interest sector is straightforward. By distributing career contingent scholarship funds early on in students' careers rather than after they graduate, a law school's financial aid policy is likely to generate a higher rate of public interest work among graduates. Given that retrospective debt relief is currently by far the most common form of career-contingent financial aid, these results imply that up-front tuition subsidies would be a more efficient allocation of institutional funds for this purpose. Furthermore, a move to forward-looking loans also has the potential to attract a higher *quality* pool of entering students and as a result a higher rate of clerkships, as it appears that students are willing to trade off school quality for short-term debt relief. This effect alone may be of interest to school administrators. As David W. Leebron, dean of Columbia University Law School and a 1979 Harvard Law graduate, quoted in a recent New York Times article, "There is far more competition among law schools for the best applicants than there has ever been in the past ... Students who think that a school will be too oppressive, unfriendly or impersonal are willing to turn it down — even if it is Harvard — in favor of a school perceived as more hospitable" (Glater, 2001).

From a social welfare perspective, a policy change has the potential to increase overall educational investment in job sectors with high social returns. While loan repayment encourages some level of this, results from the IFAS experiment suggest that forward-looking career-contingent subsidies, such as the type that are currently being considered in the British system, would be even more effective in encouraging this type of investment. Depending on the degree of external validity of this study, other policy programs also attempting to encourage public interest employment through educational loan assistance should bear in mind the potential benefit of providing tuition money up-front in place of promises of future payment. If other students mirror law school students in their attitudes towards debt, this relatively costless policy difference could have significant impact on program effectiveness in raising rates of first-job placement in the public interest sector.

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Appendix A: Experimental design and construction of sample weights

	Root + PSS	PSS0	Root/PSS0	PSS 1	PSS 2	Total
Number Applications <sup>†</sup>	102	158	260	132	37	429
<i>1st-time apps</i>			260	54	7	
<i>2nd-time apps</i>				78	6	
<i>3rd-time apps</i>					24	
Number Winners	53	49	102	57	20	179
<i>1st-time apps</i>			102	22	4	
<i>2nd-time apps</i>				35	2	
<i>3rd-time apps</i>					14	
Number Losers	49	109	158	75	17	250
<i>1st-time apps</i>			158	32	3	
<i>2nd-time apps</i>				43	5	
<i>3rd-time apps</i>					10	
Number Reapplicants			78	30		
<i>1st-time apps</i>			78	6		
<i>2nd-time apps</i>				24		
Treatment (1st-time apps)			<b>102</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>128</b>
Control (1st-time apps)			158	32	3	193
Eventual Winners			49	2	0	
<i>Applied twice</i>			35	2		
<i>Applied three times</i>			14			
Control net of eventual winners			<b>109</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>142</b>
<i>Applied once (unweighted)</i>			80	26	3	
<i>Applied twice (weighted)</i>			19**	4*		
<i>Applied three times (weighted)</i>			10***			
Weight (applied twice):			1.81**	1.5*		
Weight (applied three times):			4.26***			

† Includes only matriculating applicants.

\* Weight equal to total number of PSS2 first-time reapplicants (6) divided by the number who lose (4): 6/4

\*\* Weight equal to the probability of PSS1 reapplicants becoming discouraged (20/43) multiplied by the number of PSS1 reapplicant winners (35) plus the number of discouraged losers (20) all divided by the number of discouraged losers (20):  $[20+35(20/43)]/20$

\*\*\* Weight equal to the probability of reapplying for PSS2 (23/43) multiplied by the number of PSS1 reapplicant winners (35) plus the number of reapplicants (24), all divided by the number of losing reapplicants (10):  $[24+35(23/43)]/10$



Appendix B: Experimental design and construction of sample weights, Classes of 1998-2000 only

	Root + PSS	PSS0	Root/PSS0	PSS 1	PSS 2	Total
Number Applications <sup>†</sup>	79	121	200	97	37	334
1st-time apps			200	33	7	
2nd-time apps				64	6	
3rd-time apps					24	
Number Winners	44	33	77	40	20	137
1st-time apps			77	13	4	
2nd-time apps				27	2	
3rd-time apps					14	
Number Losers	35	88	123	57	17	197
1st-time apps			123	20	3	
2nd-time apps				37	4	
3rd-time apps					10	
Number Reapplicants			64	30		
1st-time apps			64	6		
2nd-time apps				24		
Treatment (1st-time apps)			<b>71</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>88</b>
Control (1st-time apps)			123	20	3	146
Eventual Winners			41	2	0	
Applied twice			27	2		
Applied three times			14			
Control net of eventual winners			<b>82</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>103</b>
Applied once (unweighted)			59	14	3	
Applied twice (weighted)			13**	4*		
Applied three times (weighted)			10***			
Weight (applied twice):			1.73**	1.5*		
Weight (applied three times):			4.15***			

† Includes only matriculating applicants.

\* Weight equal to total number of PSS2 first-time reapplicants (6) divided by the number who lose (4): 6/4

\*\* Weight equal to the probability of PSS1 reapplicants becoming discouraged (13/37) multiplied by the number of PSS1 reapplicant winners (27) plus the number of discouraged losers (13) all divided by the number of discouraged losers (13):  $[13+27(13/37)]/13$

\*\*\* Weight equal to the probability of reapplying for PSS2 (24/37) multiplied by the number of PSS1 reapplicant winners (27) plus the number of PSS2 reapplicants (24), all divided by the number of losing reapplicants (10):  $[24+27(24/37)]/10$

Appendix C: Probit Estimate of Probability of Public Interest Law

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Class of 1999	-0.1357 (0.144)
Class of 2000	-0.1214 (0.140)
Root applicant	-0.1614 (0.186)
PSS1 applicant	-0.4939 (0.314)
PSS2 applicant	-0.6636 (0.471)
Treatment group	0.1836 (0.195)
Treatment group * Root	0.0209 (0.250)
Treatment group * (PSS1/PSS2)	0.4817 (0.429)
Minority	0.1957 (0.261)
Age	0.0240 (0.023)
Married	-0.2208 (0.213)
Female	0.0617 (0.134)
Summer 1 public interest employment	0.1880 (0.136)
Summer 2 public interest employment	-0.0077 (0.143)
Planned % of career in private law firm	-0.0494 (0.164)
Planned % of career in non-profit law	0.6808 (0.221)
Importance of social contribution	0.0347 (0.019)
Importance of salary	-0.0006 (0.025)

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## Appendix D

### **Law Schools with LRAP:**

1. American University College of Law
2. Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law
3. Boston College Law School
4. Brooklyn Law School
5. Case Western Reserve University Law School
6. Columbia University School of Law
7. Cornell University Law School
8. Duke University School of Law
9. Fordham University School of Law
10. Franklin Pierce Law Center
11. George Washington University Law School
12. Georgetown University Law Center
13. Harvard Law School
14. Hofstra University School of Law
15. Loyola Law School, Los Angeles
16. Loyola University, Chicago School of Law
17. Loyola University, New Orleans Law School
18. New York University School of Law
19. Northeastern University School of Law
20. Northwestern School of Law
21. Pace University School of Law
22. Rutgers University School of Law, Newark
23. Santa Clara University School of Law
24. Stanford University Law School
25. Suffolk University Law School
26. Temple University Beasley School of Law
27. Tulane University School of Law
28. University of California Berkeley Law School
29. University of California, Davis Law School
30. University of California, Hastings Law School
31. University of Chicago Law School
32. University of Georgia School of Law
33. University of Iowa College of Law
34. University of Michigan Law School
35. University of the Pacific Law School
36. University of Pennsylvania Law School
37. University of San Diego School of Law
38. University of San Francisco School of Law
39. University of Southern California Law School
40. University of Toronto, Faculty of Law
41. University of Utah College of Law

42. University of Virginia School of Law
43. Valparaiso University School of Law
44. Vanderbilt University Law School
45. Vermont Law School
46. Yale Law School

### **Law School Public Interest Scholarship Programs:**

1. Boston College Law School
2. Drake University Law School
3. Fordham University School of Law
4. Georgetown University Law Center
5. Gonzaga University School of Law
6. Loyola Law School, Los Angeles
7. New York University School of Law
8. Northeastern University School of Law
9. Santa Clara University School of Law
10. Stanford University Law School
11. University of Denver College of Law
12. University of Iowa College of Law
13. University of Kansas School of Law
14. University of Pennsylvania Law School

Appendix E

## OTHER FINANCIAL AID PROGRAMS TO ENCOURAGE PUBLIC SECTOR WORK

**Loan Forgiveness/Repayment Assistance**

*US Government:* Perkins loans can be cancelled for full-time service as a teacher in a designated elementary or secondary school serving students from low-income families, special education teacher (includes teaching children with disabilities in a public or other nonprofit elementary or secondary school), qualified professional provider of early intervention services for the disabled, teacher of math, science, foreign languages, bilingual education, or other fields designated as teacher shortage areas, employee of a public or non-profit child or family service agency providing services to high-risk children and their families from low-income communities, nurse or medical technician, law enforcement or corrections officer, and staff member in the educational component of a Head Start Program, service as a Vista or Peace Corps Volunteer and service in the Armed Forces (up to 50% in areas of hostilities or imminent danger).

*Army National Guard:* Students who serve may be eligible for their Student Loan Repayment Program, which offers up to \$10,000. (Note: the military and veterans' associations provide many scholarships and tuition assistance programs.)

Students who majored in education and teach in Mississippi are eligible for the William Winter Teacher Scholar Loan. This program forgives one year of your loan in exchange for one year of service (it forgives two years of your loan if you teach in a shortage area).

*National Health Service Corps:* Offers forgiveness programs to physicians who agree to practice for a set number of years in areas that lack adequate medical care (including remote and/or economically depressed regions).

*California Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development:* Offers a State Loan Repayment Program for resident physicians involved in primary care and community health clinics.

*Maryland State Government:* State and local government employees who earn less than \$40,000 gross annually may be eligible for a loan assistance/repayment program to study law, nursing, physical and occupational therapy, social work and education.

**Public Service Scholarships (Work-contingent Tuition Assistance)**

*Harvard Kennedy School:* Robert G. Wilmers Program for State & Local Public Service Fellowships: Up to 10 Wilmers Public Service Fellows study at the Kennedy School each year. The fellowship program is designed “to encourage talented students to pursue public service careers, reward their commitment to helping others, and free them of the significant debt burden many incur in graduate school.” The fellowships cover the full cost of tuition (two semesters plus a summer session, if required) and fees, plus an annual stipend, and recipients must commit to working in public service for three years

after completing the program.

*New York Teacher's College:* Under the Peace Corps Fellows Grant, former Peace Corps volunteers receive reduced tuition at Teachers College in exchange for a two-year commitment to teach mathematics, science, bilingual/bicultural education, special education, and Teaching of English to Speakers of Other Languages (TESOL) in the New York public schools where critical shortages of qualified teachers exist in these subjects.

*Massachusetts Tomorrow's Teachers Scholarships:* Established by the state legislature in 1999, the program offers four-year scholarships to Bay State high school students in the top 25 percent of their class who enroll in a Massachusetts college or university degree program leading to teacher certification. Scholarship winners agree to teach in Massachusetts's public schools for four years upon graduation, especially in subject areas or geographical regions and school districts where there is a documented teacher shortage.

*CUNY's Teaching Opportunity Program (TOP):* Beginning in 2001, the school will provide incentive scholarships and special training to highly-qualified students who commit to pursuing teaching careers, especially in critical shortage areas such as mathematics and science. Private funding, including foundation support, has been obtained to provide tuition assistance to program entrants.

Students who commit to work off one-fifth per year as a State Trooper (or related law enforcement official) in Alaska are eligible to receive the Michael Murphy Loan to study law enforcement, law, probation and parole, penology, or other related fields.

Appendix F

## LRAP GUIDELINES\*

LRAP recognizes annual debt service on law school loans approved by NYU, generally covering three years of the student expense budget less aid received and less a student contribution calculated at the time of initial application for need-based financial aid. Participants may decide to consolidate their loans under the Federal Consolidation Loan

Program, or otherwise extend repayment periods. However, LRAP will only make disbursements to participants for actual payments made or monthly payments that would be required on a 10-year schedule (whichever is less) for up to ten years following graduation. At annual qualifying incomes of less than \$37,651, participants pay \$0 towards annual debt service on eligible loans. At annual qualifying incomes between \$37,651 and \$57,651, participants pay 40% of the income in excess of \$37,651 towards their annual debt service on eligible loans.

For example at a total debt of \$75,000:

<b>8</b>	<b>Qualifying</b>	<b>Student</b>	<b>LRAP Annual</b>
	<u>Incomes</u>	<u>Annual Disbursements</u>	
		<u>Payments</u>	
	\$36,000	\$0	\$11,043
	\$38,000	\$140	\$10,903
	\$40,000	\$ 940	\$10,103
	\$42,000	\$1,740	\$9,303
	\$44,000	\$2,540	\$8,503
	\$46,000	\$3,340	\$7,703
	\$52,000	\$5,740	\$5,303
	\$55,000	\$6,940	\$4,103

Qualifying income is adjusted annually for inflation and career progression. If graduates seeks LRAP benefits after working in a high-paying position, NYU will assume the following: during the years in which their gross income exceeded the prevailing public service salary, they contribute, toward debt service payments and prepayments of principal forty percent of the amount by which their gross income exceeded the prevailing salary. For the purposes of LRAP, the eligible debt will be reduced by the amount of such prepayments, regardless of gross income.

Exceptions for Judicial Clerks:

Alumni who work in judicial clerkships are not eligible for LRAP benefits during the year(s) of their clerkship. Graduates who complete a clerkship, and who have met all of the eligibility criteria of the program during the clerkship year(s), and who enter LRAP eligible employment immediately following the clerkship would receive LRAP benefits retroactively.

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\* Information reprinted from the Financial Aid Office of NYU Law School.