MASS MIGRATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE

Christopher Hale

A DISSERTATION
PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY
OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

RECOMMENDED FOR ACCEPTANCE BY
THE PROGRAM IN
POPULATION STUDIES

Adviser: Alicia Adsera

May 2021
Abstract

This dissertation looks at the association between mass migration and changes to social life. Firstly, using a constructed data set of historical mass migrations, the dissertation compares the frequency of transformative changes in political institutions in periods following decades of mass migration, to the frequency of changes following decades of low migration. The analysis shows that countries experience fewer transformative events following a decade of mass migration than following decades of low migration. Secondly, the dissertation looks at changes in global migrant stocks and in institutional scores from the Polity IV index and Freedom in the World during the period 1990-2011. The analysis shows that there are no cases of high immigration coinciding with declining institutional scores. Finally, the dissertation compares the experiences of Hong Kong and Taiwan with mass migration in the decades after 1949. This case study shows that while Taiwan experienced transformative change in its institutions Hong Kong did not.
Contents

Abstract

Acknowledgements

Chapter 1:

Introduction

Chapter 2:

Literature Review

Chapter 3:

Methodology

Chapter 4:

Mass Migration and Social Transformation

Chapter 5:

Immigration and Democratic Institutions

Chapter 6:

Case Study of Hong Kong and Taiwan

Chapter 7:

Conclusions

Appendix 1

Mass Migration Details

Appendix 2

Mass Migration and Revolutions, Tables

Appendix 3

Regression Tables

Bibliography to the Dissertation

Bibliography to the Appendix
Acknowledgements

Research reported in this publication was supported by The Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health & Human Development of the National Institutes of Health under Award Number P2CHD047879. The content is solely the responsibility of the author and does not necessarily represent the official views of the National Institutes of Health.

I thank all my colleagues at the Office of Population Research for their support during the period that I was working on this dissertation. Special mention goes to Lynne Johnson, the Graduate Program Administrator.

I also thank Fellows and everyone else involved with the Prize Fellowship in the Social Sciences, formerly known as the Fellowship of Woodrow Wilson Scholars.

A special thanks goes to the members of my dissertation committee, Douglass Massey, Alejandro Portes, and my advisor Alicia Adsera. As well as Patricia Fernandez-Kelly and Filiz Garip.

Finally, I thank my wife Taylor Maslen, whose support and companionship were a source of constant encouragement.
Chapter 1

Introduction

The impact of migration on societies is of great interest to researchers in the social sciences, policy makers, and much of the general public. As with other demographic trends, immigration could have potentially important consequences across many domains of social life. In the economic domain there has been significant research on the impacts of migration, especially on labor markets. The wider economic impacts have also been considered for both receiving and sending countries, with significant literatures on remittances, brain-drain and the impacts immigrants have on the wider economy through their contributions and the benefits they receive through the state.

Debate remains as to whether immigration is a net benefit to receiving and sending societies, how gains and losses are distributed, and how this depends on other factors such as the selectivity of migrants. But the weight of empirical evidence suggests that impacts whether negative or positive are fairly small at the macro level for people in receiving countries (Leeson and Gochenour 2015, National Academy of Sciences 2017).

However, there are far fewer rigorous evaluations of immigration’s impact on other aspects of social life in sending and receiving societies. That is to say, the laws, values, norms, political constitution, institutions and distribution of power. Economic impacts can be measured in dollars, unemployment rates, or patents. But quantifiably measuring other social changes is much harder. While the literature abounds with discussion of the profound implications that immigration has for social transformation, this discussion suffers from inconsistent or poorly defined language and a lack of clear or testable hypotheses.

One modern textbook on immigration, *Exceptional People*, devotes a chapter to the impacts of migration (Goldin, Cameron and Balarajan 2012). But in their discussion of social impacts, the authors mention only
the localized tensions that immigration might create in communities and the generalized benefits society receives from “diversity”. There is no mention of whether and under what conditions immigration might transform the wider value system or class structure of society. Likewise, Raymond Cohn’s excellent book on antebellum immigration to the United States, *Mass Migration Under Sail*, provides a chapter on the effects on the United States, but discusses almost exclusively impacts on the labor market and broader economy, with the exception of a brief discussion of nativism (Cohn 2011).

In *Immigration Economics*, Borjas notes the importance of the question of institutional impacts for economists, while highlighting the lack of concrete knowledge in this area (Borjas 2014). Although Borjas considers it “inconceivable” that significant social change would not occur, he makes it clear that this is an untested hypothesis (Borjas 2014: 169).

> For immigration to generate substantial global gains, it must be the case that billions of immigrants can move to the industrialized economies without importing the “bad” institutions that led to poor economic conditions in the source countries in the first place. It seems inconceivable that the North’s infrastructure would remain unchanged after the admission of billions of new workers. Unfortunately, remarkably little is known about the political and cultural impact of immigration on the receiving countries, and about how institutions in these receiving countries would adjust to the influx.¹

A growing body of literature has emerged in the last few years that begins to examine empirically the effect of immigration on institutions. This literature responds directly to Borjas proposition that mass

migration would transform the institutions of receiving countries and consequently reduce the productivity of those countries. This literature is based on an understanding of “institutions” common in the economics literature as the “rules of the game”, broadly any formally or informally imposed constraints on economic behavior. This conceptualization of institutions has been criticized by sociologists as incomplete and in need of fleshing out (Portes 2006, 2010). Furthermore, the economic literature is still ultimately concerned with the effect of immigration on economic output and productivity and looks at institutions only as a mediating factor. As a result, it often focuses narrowly on institutional measures related to property rights and economic freedoms, rather than considering broader social institutions. Nor does it consider what value institutional arrangements might have to a society, beyond their role in contributing to productivity.

This focus is typified by the pioneering study in this field by Clark et al. (2015), which uses the *Economic Freedom in the World* Index (Gwartney et al. 2012) as a measure of institutions. The study uses regression models to look empirically at the relationship between immigration (both stocks and flows) and this measure of economic freedom between 1990 and 2011 for 110 countries. Their results do show some evidence of a small positive relationship, suggesting that immigration may have some impact on institutions and norms of economic freedom at the margin.

In a subsequent paper, three of the authors (Powell, Clark and Nowrasteh 2017) look at the case of Israel as an example of a “natural experiment”, experiencing a sudden and large migration from the former Soviet Union during the 1990s. They conclude that mass migration to Israel had an impact on “institutions” in the narrow sense of economic freedoms, but that this impact was positive. The authors posit that the mechanism by which immigrants influenced institutional change was involvement in the political process. Nowrasteh with Forrester and Blondin (2020) also used Jordan as a case study to examine whether the impacts of a large migration would be different in a developing country with “weak” institutions. In this
case they argue that the surge in immigration was able to have important impacts on economic institutions. However, despite the fact that the migrants (Kuwati-Palestinians) came from a country with economic institutions measured as less free, their impact on Jordanian institutions was to advance liberal reforms.

Successive Jordanian governments wanted to liberalize and privatize much of the state-dominated economy prior to the surge of Kuwaiti-Palestinian refugees in 1990, but the poor economy and a strong Transjordanian-dominated political coalition halted their efforts. The surge of Kuwait-Palestinians upset the ethnic balance enough to prompt a change in the ethnic composition of the governing coalition by including Palestinians who favored liberalization and privatization. The widening of membership in the governing coalition to include a group that supported liberalization and privatization was responsible for the committed and sustained economic reforms that followed.

Although this finding is limited to a single case study, it challenges the assumption that immigrants would import institutional patterns from their country of origin. Instead, it suggests that immigration might lead to change through disruptions to established distributions of power, overcoming the persistence of inefficient institutions.

Padilla and Cachanosky (2018) look at the impact of immigration on institutions in the United States at the State level. Like Clark et al. they use a measure of economic freedom, the 2015 Economic Freedom of North America report (Stansel et al. 2016). They find the relationship between economic freedom and immigration to be “not significant or weakly significant” (Padilla and Cachanosky 2018: 392). In contrast
to the case of Jordan, this might suggest that “strong” institutions are more resilient to any impact of immigration.

A new book, *Wretched Refuse?*, by Alex Nowrasteh and Benjamin Powell (Nowrasteh and Powell 2020) presents an overview much of the recent empirical work looking at the relationship between immigration and social life. It concludes by saying “We have searched for the institutional negative externality in a variety of ways in this book. We have not found it. In fact, instead we have often found that immigration creates a positive externality that improves institutions related to productivity.” (Nowrasteh and Powell 2020: 283).

There is also a relevant literature looking at the role of ethnic, racial and religious diversity in society. For example, Alesina and Ferrara (2005) argue that public good provision is likely to be lower in heterogeneous societies. Putnam (2007) summarizes this literature and argues that while ethnic diversity in the short to medium run can “challenge social solidarity and inhibit social capital”, over the longer term these effects disappear as immigrants construct new “more encompassing” social identities (Putnam 2007: 138).

Additionally, Kesler and Bloemraad (2010) make a case that the implications of immigration on social trust are shaped by the institutional arrangements of the receiving countries. Similarly, Gesthuizen, Van Der Meer and Scheepers (2009) empirically test Putnam’s hypothesis and suggest that in the case of Europe it should be refuted, and that national histories of continuous democratic institutions are the significant factor in explaining national differences in social capital.

Like the economic literature looking at immigration and economic freedom, this literature focuses on a narrow measure of institutions conceptualized as “trust” or “social capital” and the implications for crime and the welfare state (see Kymlicka and Banting 2006).
However, while there may be many important consequences of declining trust, and social cohesion, the most important measurable symptom, crime, does not appear to generally rise with immigration. Numerous empirical studies have looked at whether immigration leads to changes in incidents of crime in the United States (e.g. Reid et al. 2005; Ousey & Kubrin 2009; Wadsworth 2010; Chalfin 2013, Stansfield et al. 2013) as well as for other immigrant receiving countries such as Spain (Alonso et al. 2008), the United Kingdom (Bell, Fasani and Manchin 2013) and Germany (Chapin 1997). Lee and Martinez (2009: 3) argue that the general consensus of this literature is that immigration “does not increase crime, and often suppresses it”. Rumbaut (2008: 18) in a paper presented to the Police Foundation National Conference made the same argument that the “cumulative weight” of the empirical evidence suggests that crime in the United States has not increased but most likely reduced as a result of immigration. The report on immigrant integration from the national Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine (2017: 7) also concludes that “increased prevalence of immigrants is associated with lower crime rates”.

There is of course also a vast literature on assimilation. Although the focus of this literature is usually on the experience of immigrants and how they change in response of living in the receiving society, this literature is of obvious importance and interest regarding the question of how immigrants impact the social structure of society. A thorough review of the literature is not possible here, but a good summary of assimilation theory as it pertains to the United States can be found in Alba and Nee (2003), Remaking the American Mainstream. Water and Jimenez (2005) also review the research on immigrant assimilation and suggest that the evidence supports the notion that the United States continues to be successful in incorporating immigrants into the social structure.

A central debate in the literature on assimilation is the extent to which some groups retain distinct ethnic identities and cultural traits. This question is also central to debates about the potential impact of immigrants, as it is often assumed that unassimilated immigrants are more likely to be agents of change (see for example Collier 2013).
Glazer and Moynihan (1963) make the case in *Beyond the Melting Pot* that in New York City immigrants had not fused into an undifferentiated American citizenry. Instead, there were distinct ethnic groups with separate communities, values and ways of life. However, they describe ethnic groups that do not simply bring institutions and culture with them, but are forced to establish new social forms as a part of their navigating American society. This is consistent with Oscar Handlin’s (1951: 166) outline of the immigrant experience in *The Uprooted*:

Becoming an American meant therefore not the simple conformity to a previous pattern, but the adjustment to the needs of a new situation. In the process the immigrants became more rather than less conscious of their own peculiarities. As the immediate environment called forth the succession of fresh institutions and novel modes of behavior, the immigrants found themselves progressively separated as groups.

What is not fully addressed by either *The Uprooted* or *Beyond the Melting Pot* is the extent to which the institutions and modes of behavior created by immigrants represents a force for change in the larger American social structure. Do the ethnic communities grow only within the constraints of the dominant society? To what extent can the social life of ethnic enclaves transform the arrangements of power in the societies of which they are a part?

While this is only a brief overview of the massive literature in immigration, it is possible to see that there are some surprising deficiencies in our knowledge of how immigrant impacts. Firstly, the majority of the work that has been carried out considers impacts at the margins. Rarely does research address, more than rhetorically, the extent to which immigration can alter the fundamental constitution and construction of a society. And secondly, we know little about whether countries experiencing mass migration go through social change that is systematically different from those which do not.
This deficiency in the empirical literature does not appear to be for a lack of interest in the question. Immigration policy in many countries appears to be significantly driven by assumptions about the potential for immigrants to have major impacts on the culture and institutions of receiving societies. Although the direct impacts on labor markets and government budgets are sometimes used to justify restrictions on immigration, it appears to be rare that states greatly expand immigration when economic evidence is favorable (DeVoretz 2006).

Furthermore, some economists have noted that the large potential benefits from immigration suggest that “keyhole” solutions, targeting specific harms, are more reasonable than sweeping restrictions that exclude most people from immigrating (Caplan & Naik 2015, Somin 2017). If productivity gains from immigration are as large as estimates suggest (e.g. Clemens 2011), current immigration policies would be trapping millions (or hundreds of millions) needlessly in poverty. Labor market effects, fiscal costs, and security are important considerations, but none of them support the type of immigration restrictions that are common at present – particularly quantitative restrictions (e.g. quotas).

Instead, the reasoning for restrictive quotas rests primarily on an unexamined principle of modern immigration policies – that countries have some kind of limit on the number of immigrants that can be admitted. But the question is rarely addressed as to what would happen if this imagined limit were to be breached. Authors that do address this question, such as Paul Collier (2013), generally assert that the consequence will be a dramatic, or far reaching, alteration of social life and institutions. And implicitly, that these alterations would be undesirable, and would be less likely to occur in the absence of immigration.

**Objective**

The objective of this dissertation is to provide a very preliminary exploration of these two question:
1. Can mass migration lead to transformative, as opposed to marginal, changes to social life in the receiving societies.

2. Does mass migration have negative impacts on democratic and developmental institutions.

As I will outline, many authors assert that immigration is important to the histories of the receiving countries and connect immigration to social changes and historical events. And of course, immigrants, by their presence in any substantial numbers, will be involved somehow in the important events of the societies in which they live. Of course, absent their presence the course of history would look quite different. But societies are in a continuous process of change, with or without immigration. The important question when it comes to immigration policy is not whether immigration will alter society, but whether immigration leads to change in certain specific directions, and whether immigration can stimulate more dramatic and rapid changes to the foundations of society.

Consider a family of two parents and two children, considering whether they should have a third child. Will it “change” their family life? Of course, an additional child would change their lives in all kinds of ways. But in terms of making the decision it is more relevant to ask, does having a third child make certain outcomes, such as divorce or job loss, more or less likely. Furthermore, could a third child truly transform family life in ways that would not be likely with only two children?

One thing that is important to remember here is that it is easy to invent hypothetical cases, or perhaps even to find anecdotal ones, where all kinds of changes occur. A divorce, or family crisis, might indeed occur as part of a chain of events dependent on the existence of a third child. But likewise, a chain of events leading to some crisis might be averted. Indeed, both might be true – a similar outcome might have occurred in either case, but through two different sequences of events. The proper way to study this would be to design some empirical model that could answer whether the addition of a child changed the probability of an event, like divorce.
Perhaps surprisingly, much of the policy debate around immigration does not make any attempt at systematically reviewing the empirical evidence, but rests on conjecture. Authors present hypothetical scenarios, sometimes back up by some supporting evidence or historical examples. But few studies attempt to look broadly at general patterns. Those which do, such as Clark et al. (2015) and others in the same vein, tend to find what has been found by economists: immigration’s macro-impacts are on average small and probably beneficial.

There is certainly a limit to how effectively questions of immigration and social change can be addressed. We cannot conduct experiments, and while some authors have used natural experiments (e.g. Powell, Clark and Nowrasteh 2017) to draw conclusions, the diversity of immigration makes it difficult to confidently draw generalizations from these case studies. However, what can be done is to look at the relationship between measures of immigration and measures of social change across a wide range of countries and time periods.

In this dissertation I do this in two different ways. Firstly, I compiled a database of mass migrations covering a substantial portion of the world going back to the mid-15th century. I then compare the frequency of transformative change in countries that experienced mass migration, and those that did not, over the decades following the migration event. Secondly, I look the relationship between the size and growth of immigrant stocks, and the change in index scores designed to measure how democratic a country’s political institutions are.

Such relationships cannot be considered an estimate of the average causal effect of immigration. Even if a robust set of controls is included, there are many unmeasurable factors that could be important. However, a systematic picture of the differences between countries of high and low immigration does at least give us a starting point. Correlation does not equal causation – but it can set some boundaries around our understanding of causation, and provide a set of substantive facts that a theory of causation must
explain. For example, in the empirical studies contained in this dissertation I find that mass migration is negatively associated with the frequency of transformative social change. This does not conclusively demonstrate that immigration is a stabilizing force, or that transformative change is more likely to occur if immigration is restricted. On the contrary, it is very likely that the direction of causation runs in the opposite direction – immigrants preferentially move to countries with strong and stable institutions that are less likely to fail. But this finding does complicate the restrictionist claim that immigration is a threat to social cohesion. Perhaps the countries of high immigration would, in its absence, be hyper stable – seeing even less change than they do now. But this still implies the effect of immigration is not all that large. Certainly not as large as some of the restrictionist rhetoric would suggest. Further it requires making some strong assumptions, making the restrictionist position possible, but rather questionable as a basis for policy.

By analogy consider a study that showed that red wine drinkers lived several years longer than those who never drank. It would be quite reasonable to be skeptical that the difference was a true health effect of wine, rather than a product of unobserved differences in the characteristics of the two populations. But such a study would be rather difficult to reconcile with a position that red wine was an extreme health hazard that required major government intervention.

However, because of the limits inherent in the empirical evidence, there will always be a place for detailed histories and case studies, properly placed in the broader context. In this dissertation I consider the particular case of Taiwan and Hong Kong in the period after 1949, when both countries experienced extremely large mass migrations from the Chinese mainland following the communist takeover. This study provides a helpful case to compare two places with very different institutional contexts at the moment of mass migration, and shows how detailed histories can provide deeper insights into the mechanisms by which institutions respond to immigration.
The Elements of Social Life

In order to approach the question of whether migration can transform the social life of societies, we require a theoretical framework of social change and definitions of terms. One of the major problems with the current literature on immigration and social change is that discussion is usually unconnected to a clear theoretical framework, and often lacks consistent terms of definitions of concepts. This creates particular difficulties for communication across disciplines, where words like “institutions” can have quite different meanings.

I begin with Portes model of social life (Portes 2010, Portes and Smith 2012), which treats culture and social structure separately. The first being the symbolic elements of society – its cognitive frameworks, values, mythology and abstract principles. The second being the actual human agents with interests, who act out roles within a structure of differential power. We could further differentiate culture between those aspects which are explicit, formal, and codified and those parts which are implicit, informal, and uncodified.

Portes arranges the elements of culture and social structure in a hierarchy of “deep” factors to “surface” phenomena.

**Figure 1.1 Elements of social life**

![Diagram of elements of social life](source, Portes 2010)
Culture and social structure emerge out of the necessity for coordinated behavior between individual in a society. The cultural and social structure elaborated by Portes is equivalent to what Douglass North (1990) calls “the institutional framework” or simply “institutions”. In the dissertation I will use Portes terminology of “social life” divided into “culture” and “social structure” and use the term “institutions” more narrowly to mean the blueprints and models for organized groups.

Values are a set of underlying principles and beliefs that can be inferred from actual norms and behaviors. It is important to note that the values in this model are not necessarily the values that the population hold privately, but rather the set of values that determine the patterns of social life. These may be the values only of the minority that hold power. They may also be historic values that perpetuate in the social structure by inertia or because of the costliness of reforming norms and institutions to more closely align with contemporary values.

Values are a deep level of culture and might only be invoked in exceptional circumstances. Rather than constructing patterns of behavior from abstract values, which would be cognitively demanding, behavior is learned as a collection of heuristics, prejudices, skills, and strategies (Swidler 1986, DiMaggio 1997, Lizardo & Strand 2010). These heuristic behavior patterns are Norms and Skill Repertoires, and they coordinate actions between agents to achieve outcomes that correspond to a society’s values. In many interactions and collective activities, it is necessary for agents to behave in distinct and complementary ways. Roles provide distinctions between agents that allow the assigning of different behaviors in given settings. Institutions represent a blueprint, or map, laying out the roles and norms of a particular type of organization of agents acting together towards some purpose, consistent with the society’s values.

The social structure exists parallel to the elements of culture. Rather than being made up of abstract rules and patterns of behavior, it consists of actual actors’ ability to coordinate, compel, or induce action. Culture (values and norms) provides a limiting framework in which power is expected to be exercised, but
its real ability to constrain exists as far as rules are enforced by those with power. In this way, the \textit{de facto} values and norms of society become those which powerful actors enforce and voluntarily follow.

Power corresponds closely to the means of production. Control of land, capital, or specialized skills and knowledge confer power. But power also relates to organization and coordination, and control of channels of information, communication. In this way, power does not exist as an isolated differential between individual actors but gives rise to social structures – “large aggregates whose possession of or exclusion from resources leads to varying life chances” (Portes and Smith 2012). Power lies beneath these aggregates of connected households, that form social classes. In turn these social networks appear visibly in the status positions individuals hold within in organizations (most prominently their occupation) and through other ascribed credentials (such as educational degrees).

Institutional Economists, following the example of North (1990), sometimes bundle all of these elements under the label of “institutions” which is defined as all constraints on economic choices, sometimes referred to as the “rules of the game”. This definition of institutions is very broad, covering any customs, norms, laws, attitudes, and so on. Later economists have sometimes distinguished between “formal institutions” sometimes just called “institutions”, and “informal institutions” or “culture” (Alesina and Guiliano 2015). Formal institutions are durable, legal structures (Glaeser et al. 2004) and include constitutional constraints of government, statute laws, and other codified regulations. Although this comes closer to the sociological model of social life laid out by Portes, it still lacks a full distinction between the cultural and structural domains, or a clear hierarchical modeling of the elements of social life.\footnote{It should also be noted that the use of the term “institutions” in the economic literature is not always used consistently and is often differently defined or used without any clear definition.}

For example, cultural norms and institutions do not only create behavioral constraints, they also provide models to organize and coordinate action. They make available prefabricated patterns of behavior, a
structural scaffolding, that allows individuals to navigate situations (Lizardo and Strand 2010). This is important, both because as Swidler (1986: 276) notes: “people do not, indeed cannot, build up a sequence of actions piece by piece, striving with each act to maximize a given outcome”. To do so would be too cognitively demanding. Further, these cultural repertoires of behavior are necessary for coordination among many actors. Game theory provides plenty of examples of models where optimal outcomes depend on being able to predict the behavior of the other player. A simple example is which side of the road to drive on. In this way culture is not so much the “rules of the game” as the playbook.

**Change and Transformation of Social Life**

The elements of social life are not static. Both culture and social structure are in constant flux. One important and basic cause of change is human mortality. Power is held by actual actors, who eventually grow old and die. To establish continuity, societies must institutionalize systems that replicate culture and structure across generations. Such systems include norms of inheritance that allow the replication of social structure over time. Schools or religious institutions are established for the purposes of socializing the next generation in the norms and values of society. Cultural artifacts (songs, folktales, art, monuments etc.) also provide a transgenerational continuity. As Portes (2010: 1539) notes: “Stabilising major processes of social change consists precisely in institutionalising their consequences.”

However, these institutions do not perfectly replicate social life. Even absent other causes of change, the process of cultural replication across time is subject to drift. This can be seen readily in language for example. The inheritance of property also leads to drifts, as family lines die out, merge through marriage, or estates are split up among multiple heirs. Such change is not necessarily fast. Clark and Cummins (2014) have suggested that the relative status of families (based on surnames in England) could persist over hundreds of years, with status more strongly inherited than even biological characteristics like height.
A second source of change is the contradictions that are endogenous to social life. Power is not merely held and passed but is also fought over. Actors compete to elevate their position, for example by accumulating resources, or establishing alliances. Such competition is especially evident at the moments where power is generationally transferred, as can be seen in the numerous succession crises in history, as well as the more mundane family squabbles of inheritances.

At the micro-level such competition leads to only marginal change, as families gradually move up or down the social ladder, or political control shifts from one faction to another. The changes might be of great importance and significance to the individuals involved, but do not alter the deeper structures of society. The struggle between classes, however, is widely seen by historians and sociologists as driving force of social transformation.

These competitive struggles in the social structure result in a parallel struggle in the cultural elements of social life. As one group or class attempts to gain an advantage over another, they do so in part by molding values, norms, and institutions to legitimize their power plays – to confer upon their behavior authority (see Portes 2012: 5). Boorstin (1965), in discussing the Southern culture of “honor” in the ante-Bellum period remarks: “among the Southern gentlemen, ‘honor’ became less an ideal toward which they strove than an idealization of their actual conduct.”

As described by Mills (1940) “Under the aegis of religious institutions, men use vocabularies of moral motives: they call acts and programs "good" and "bad," and impute these qualities to the soul. Such lingual behavior is part of the process of social control. Institutional practices and their vocabularies of motive exercise control over delimited ranges of possible situation.”

In addition to replicating social life, institutions also provide a protective web, that is used to constrain actions that threaten the established social structure and the normative culture that legitimizes the
positions of power within that structure. Again, this protective function is imperfect, and actors do in fact succeed in maneuvering within the constraints to gain power.

In addition to the continuous drift and competitive churn of societies, social life is also impacted by historical events. These include “shocks” such as a war, pandemic, or important technological discovery. But they also include changes that play out over longer time periods such as the demographic transition, urbanization, or the spread of literacy.

Such events alter the fundamental parameters of social life, including the relative value of factors of production. North (1990: 83-86) puts this in economic terms, that changes in social life arise from changes in prices. This includes “changes in the ratio of factor prices” (that is land, labor and capital), but he also mentions changes in the price of information, and of military technology. For example, forces of modernization over the past two centuries have increasingly shifted power from the owners of land to the owners of capital (including “human capital”).

The causes of change are always present, and so social life is never static. But just as there is change in social life, there is also continuity. Any study of social change should distinguish between incremental changes at the margin, and transformational changes that fundamentally reorder power structures and institutional frameworks.

Economists and sociologists are in agreement that the ordinarily changes in social life are gradual and incremental, occurring at the margins. North (1990: 89) argues that “institutional change is overwhelmingly incremental” and involves gradual restructuring within the system of institutionalized rules. Likewise, Protes and Smith (2012: 15) say: “It is a fact that, at the surface level of social life, change tends to be gradual, with patterned ways of doing things largely determining the future course of events.”

However, discontinuous, or transformational, social change can also occur. North (1990: 89) describes such change as “radical change in the formal rules, usually as a result of conquest or revolution”. Portes
and Smith (2012: 15) note that such “drastic and nonevolutionary outcomes” are a consequence of changes at the deeper levels of social life—in values and power. While the ultimate causes of revolutionary change may be traced to long term processes, the actual visible changes can occur rapidly and violently. Such examples include religious awakenings and political revolutions.

Differences between marginal and transformational change are regularly made by historians regarding certain events. For example, Wood’s classic work, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution*, attempts to layout the case for the American Revolution as “the most radical and far-reaching event in American history” (Wood [1993] 2011: 8), one which completely and fundamentally altered the social relationships of all people in America.

On first consideration, the difference between marginal and transformational change, may appear to be only one of magnitude and scope—the difference between slow, small, limited changes, and fast, large, sweeping changes. However, the model of social life can allow a clearer distinction that recognizes there are distinct ways in which societies change, rather than just being periods of more or less change. From this perspective, marginal change can include periods where visible changes occur quite rapidly, and have important, wide ranging, impacts. Rather the key distinctions are that transformational changes have impacts at the deep levels of social life (power and values), and they occur outside the framework of customary and institutional constraints.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Changes to Social Life</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>Visible and</td>
<td>Reform and restructuring mediated by customs and institutions</td>
<td>The New Deal (US), Reform Act 1867 (UK), Economic Liberalization in India 1990s</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Transformational changes act at the deepest levels of social life – something that is missed by a model of social life that does not distinguish institutions from norms and values. Such changes by their nature impact the upstream elements of social life, resulting in dramatic visible changes. In contrast, marginal change rarely penetrates much below the surface. Norms and institutions act as a protective shell against efforts to alter the deep levels of social life, because they provide the structural scaffolding for behavior, which includes constraints on behaviors that challenge (intentionally or not) the foundations of social life. Marginal changes may lead to quite substantial visible impacts, but they leave the underlying foundations largely unmoved.

While marginal change occurs within institutional constraints (and customary norms), transformational change, by its nature, requires actors to act outside of the framework of existing social life. Such actors can always be found at the periphery of society, exemplified by extreme outsiders like Diogenes. Occasionally such individuals will attract a following, and if they have sufficient charisma, they might spark the beginning of a revolutionary movement. Revolutionaries do not act within the system to make change – they ignore institutionalized authority and instead resort to use of actual power. Generally, this means either violence or mass civil disobedience.

Transformational change can also occur through invasion and occupation. Like revolutions, these invasions generally involve violent action to kill or subjugate the existing ruling class, which is then
replaced by the invaders. The Yuan dynasty in China, the Norman’s in England, or the Mughals in India, are all examples of ruling classes that originated from invading groups.

**Perspective on Immigration and Social Change**

The first central question of this dissertation is whether immigration can lead to transformative rather than marginal change in the social life of receiving societies. This question is at the heart of immigration policy and the Restrictionist arguments to reduce and control immigration flows. As noted by Portes (2010: 1544):

> Effects [of migration] may simply scratch the surface of society, affecting some economic organisations, role expectations, or norms. On the other hand, they may go deep into the culture, transforming the value system, or into the social structure, transforming the distribution of power. Such possibly profound transformations are precisely what opponents of migration in receiving societies fear and what they have traditionally opposed.

Immigration has often been credited with decisively altering the receiving country’s culture, society and politics at this profound level. For example, Hirschman (2005) credits the New Deal and Civil rights movements in large part to the children and grandchildren of late 19th and early 20th century immigrants. In addition to their role in politics, Hirschman notes the significance of immigrants in entertainment, sports and academia. He summarizes by saying that the period of mass migration between 1880 and 1924 “profoundly altered the structure and culture of American society” (Hirschman 2005: 614).

In his classic work *American Immigration*, Maldwyn Jones ([1960] 1992) credits immigrants with a similar decisive role in the shaping of American culture. In the first sentence of his introduction, he calls
immigration “the most persistent and the most pervasive influence in [America’s] development”. He goes on:

The whole history of the United States during the past three and a half centuries has been molded by successive waves of immigrants who responded to the lure of the New Word and whose labors, together with those of their descendants, have transformed an almost empty continent into the world’s most powerful nation. The population of the United States today, except for the Indians, consists entirely of immigrants and of the descendants of immigrants. American society, economic life, politics, religion, and thought all bear witness to the fact that the United States has been the principal beneficiary of the greatest folk-migration in human history.

Michael Barone (2013) takes a similar view in his book Shaping our Nation, the subtitle of which is: “How surges of migration transformed America and its politics”. Barone (2013: 119) gives as examples the Irish role in developing “two fundamental American institutions, the urban political machine (usually but not always Democratic) and the American Roman Catholic Church.” Like Hirschman, he notes the role that the immigrants played in American culture by referencing the role of Jewish immigrants in the movie industry (Barone 2013: 177) and the earlier role of the Irish in entertainment and sports (Barone 2013: 135).

This transformative view of immigration does not usually make the distinction between marginal and transformational change, but they do assert that changes (or at least the sum of those changes) are pervasive and fundamental to the social structure rather than being merely scratches on the surface or cosmetic changes layered upon an enduring substructure.
Others have taken a similar view of the importance of immigrants but described their impact in terms of “contributions” that were not necessarily transformative but rather additive. Robert Fleegler (2013: 2) calls this view “contributionist”:

The contributionist ideology suggested that recent immigrants brought important cultural and economic benefits to the country and strengthened the nation. Those expressing this view repeatedly suggested that the U.S. was enhanced by the presence of the Ellis Island immigrants.

Fleegler makes a case that, in America, this view came especially to prominence in the 1950s and 1960s but notes that it had important precedents going back to Hector St. John de Crevecoeur (Letters from an American Farmer).

This contributionist perspective is perhaps best typified by John F. Kennedy’s A Nation of Immigrants. In the introduction to this book Kennedy says that “Everywhere immigrants have enriched and strengthened the fabric of American life.” (Kennedy 1964). The role of immigrants in American history according to Kennedy has not been to transform American society, but rather to reinforce the social structure through building upon and replicating existing foundations, perhaps in a reformed and improved form, but true to the original values of the founding generation.

The English, the numerical majority of the first settlers, gave America the basic foundation of its institutions: our form of government, our common law, our language, our tradition of freedom of religious worship. Some of these concepts have been modified as the nation has grown, but the basic elements remain. Those who came later built upon these foundations. (Kennedy 1964: 11)
This perspective has to a significant extent become an entrenched part of the American mythos. At a Senate hearing in 1997 (symbolically held at Ellis Island) Republican Senator Spencer Abraham, Democratic Senator Frank Lautenberg, and New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, all spoke of the role of immigration in replicating and preserving American society. The politicians declared that immigrants are “an important asset”, who make “enormous contributions” and are responsible for “cultural revitalization”. Giuliani went as far as to suggest that immigrants might understand America and American values more deeply than those who were born and raised there (U.S. Government Staff 1997).

There is also a healthy body of scholarly works that could be described as contributionist. Carl Wittke’s (1939) history of immigration makes apparent its contributionist stance in the very title: *We Who Built America*. The book devotes a chapter to describing the ways in which immigrants have added to American culture:

> It is to be regretted that many immigrants conform so quickly and completely in all respects to “American standards” and become genuinely ashamed of their heritage. The man with two cultural homes is much less to be feared than the man who has none at all. In the pages that follow, some effort will be made to present, at least in a general way, a picture of some of the values European immigrants brought with them to enrich our American civilization.

The contributions that Wittke goes on to describe cover many notable achievements in the arts and industry. It is perhaps significant to note that many of the artistic contributions Wittke highlights were works that depicted thoroughly American subjects: Emmanuel Leutze’s *Washington Crossing the Delaware*, Karl Bitter’s “close interpretation of Americanism”, or Charles Mulligan’s *Lincoln the Rail Splitter* sculpture in Chicago.
Contributionist sentiments are not only found regarding American immigration. *Exceptional People* (Goldin, Cameron and Balarajan 2011) also adopts what might be considered a contributionist tone, making a case in favor of more open immigration globally.

It could be argued that the only difference between the contributionist and transformative perspectives is the use of language. In particular, the preference of politicians to talk about immigrant “contributions” versus “transformations” may reflect a conscious attempt to describe immigrant impacts on society in positive terms. Never-the-less, it is worth noting that the additive perspective much more explicitly argues for a continuity of underlying values or national identity.

Others have seen historical immigration to the United States as less consequential. They emphasize the continuity of institutions and values originating at the time of America’s foundation and argue that the mass waves of immigrants have been largely assimilated into this durable American society. They may not disagree with the notion that immigrants have made valuable contributions, but they tend not to place much importance on this for explaining the fundamental characteristics of American social life. Russel Kirk (1992: 7) epitomizes this perspective:

> Of course it is true that into the culture, the British culture, of North America have entered large elements, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, of other major cultures. Chiefly from Europe – but also, and increasingly, from China, Japan, the Levant, Mexico, Puerto Rico, and (quite recently) Korea and Indochina. But these and other cultures from abroad have been peacefully incorporated into the dominant British culture of North America.

Boorstin (1953: 30) in *The Genius of American Politics* argues that in contrast to the history of other regions America’s history has a “remarkable continuity or homogeneity” uninterrupted by regime changes or
violent revolution (with the notable exception of the Civil War). Fischer (1989: 6) claims that despite immigration producing an American population that has only a minority of British ancestry, “in a cultural sense most Americans are Albion’s seed, no matter who their own forebears may have been”. His book *Albion’s Seed* is based on the premise that the legacy of four distinct British “folkways” is still “the most powerful determinant of voluntary society” in the modern United States.

Portes and Rumbaut (2014) make a similar claim, that despite the concerns of nativists the mass migrations to America have left the value system, class structure and constitutional order “largely intact”. Assimilation was rather one directional – society transformed immigrants much more than immigrants transformed society. While the children and grandchildren of these immigrants often went on to play important roles in American history, they did so only after first being “thoroughly acculturated”.

Similar views have been expressed regarding the impact of immigration on other destination countries. For example, Carl Ipsen (2007) argues that despite the fears of Argentinians, and the hopes of some Italians, mass migration of Italians to Argentina did not lead to an Italianization of the country, but rather the assimilation of Italians into Argentine society. And despite a shift in Australia’s immigration policy since 1972, radically altering the ethnic composition of the immigrant arrivals, Castles (1992: 560) asserts that “major Australian institutions in both the public and private sectors are still based on British, US and – to a lesser extent – Western European models.”

This perspective of immigration is characterized by distinguishing surface level changes from deeper changes to the structure; the former inevitable and the latter doubtful. Lucassen (2005: 212-213) provides a typical example:

---

3 Fischer defines “folkway” as “the normative structure of values, customs and meanings that exist in any culture.”
Through immigration from other parts of the world, cultural diversity has increased considerably and these new influences will change the face of western European societies, if only by increasing diversity of religions, of which Islam is the most important. Whether this proliferation of cultures will, in the end, also lead to the persistence of distinct ethnic cultures separate from the established society, whose members over generations will continue to identify as separate, is doubtful.

...

The fear on the part of the rabid opponents to the multicultural ideal that fundamentalist Muslim immigrants will act as a sort of fifth column, undermining the secular and liberal values of the West, is ... unfounded and unrealistic, at least as migration history is concerned.

...

In the long run they [immigrants] will blend into western European societies, adding to it new flavors and colors, as so many migrants have done in the remote and recent past.

Some restrictionists, who see a potential threat from modern immigration, share the perspective that under certain circumstances or at certain times in history immigration can be absorbed by receiving countries without major consequences for their social structure and culture. This group typically argue that past immigrants to the United States possessed certain characteristics or motivations that allowed them to effectively assimilate into the dominant American Anglo-Protestant culture, but that modern immigrants are fundamentally different and unlikely to easily be incorporated into the existing society (Brimelow 1995, Buchanan 2002, Huntington 2004). “Let’s be clear about this” says Brimelow (himself an
immigrant, but among the most strident of the restrictionists), “the American experience [with immigration] has been a triumphant success.” But he goes on to say that the reasons for this success no longer exist.

Some of the most common concerns are related to the specifics of Islamic and Mexican migration. Buchanan and Huntington see a difference in Mexican immigration to past immigration in their settling of a region bordering their native country; much of which was historically part of Mexico. More broadly, the magnitude of current migration, the extent of unauthorized entry, the racial distinctiveness and the multicultural philosophies of American liberals are all given as additional reasons that assimilation cannot be expected to be as successful as in the past. Generally, restrictionists emphasize the difference of the immigrants, however, changes that have occurred in American society are sometimes also addressed. Mark Krikorian (2008) for example claims that modern immigration is not different from historical immigration in important ways, but that mass immigration belonged to a certain stage in the development of American society, a stage that has now past, making modern immigration harmful to American society.

Since the September 11th attacks there has been an increasing attention on Muslim immigrants. This concern is often directed towards European countries where Muslims are a much larger component of the immigration flow than in America.

“By the early 1990s two-thirds of migrants in Europe were Muslim, and European concern with immigration is above all concern with Muslim immigration” says Huntington (1996: 200) in his most well know work The Clash of Civilizations. Buchanan (2002) calls Europe a “dead man walking”, demographically doomed by a combination of low birth rates and mass migrations from the Islamic world. Coleman (2006) calls this combination a third demographic transition, and while he is more restrained than Buchanan in discussing the implications for European society, he likewise primarily pays attention to Muslim immigrants.
The European restrictionist literature will sometimes also distinguish between destinations like the United States and Canada, with long histories or receiving and assimilating immigrants, and the European experience as a historical region of emigration. Caldwell (2009) for example breaks with restrictionists like Huntington and Buchanan by arguing that Mexican migration to the United States is similar to past migrations and likely to be readily incorporated, whereas he joins them in identifying Islamic immigration as posing a challenge. He argues that Islam is a “hyper-identity” that prevents most Muslim immigrants from ever fully assimilating into their host societies.

Not all restrictionists view the historical immigration waves as benign. In *The Case Against Immigration*, Beck (1996: 46) writes:

> In 1910, the fears of many Yankee settlers of Wausau, Wisconsin, came true. For years, they had worried that they would be overwhelmed by the German, Polish, and other immigrants pouring into town as part of what we now call the Great Wave of immigration. By 1910, the demographic takeover had occurred: immigrants and their children were in the majority. They changed the local culture, totally reversed the ruling political ideology, and by 1918 had taken over nearly every elected office in the county. Communities all across America similarly were caught in the social, economic, and political undertow of the Great Wave.

Beck criticizes the views of other restrictionists who see the Ellis Island period as a golden age of assimilation calling this a “rose-colored” and “dewy-eyed” fiction. Stacy and Lutton's *The Immigration Time Bomb* (1985) has an equally unfavorable tone towards the mass migration after 1880, regarding these new arrivals as clustering in ethnic enclaves of abject poverty, becoming pawns of corrupt urban political machines or bringing with them the “alien political doctrines” of anarchism and socialism.
There is some overlap between this latter group of restrictionists and others, more sympathetic to immigrants, who see in American immigration a deliberate policy of recruitment and exploitation by American capitalism. Stacy and Lutton (1985: 4) and Beck (1996: 43-45) make the same claim as authors such as Calavita (1984) and Zolberg (2006) that immigration in the late 19th century was used by manufacturers to create labor surplus and undermine the bargaining power of workers.

This perspective of immigrant exploitation argues that immigration was used to reinforce the capitalist structure by undermining attempts of the proletariat to organize and oppose the status quo. This “immigration by design” does not entirely exclude the possibility of immigration being transformative but emphasizes the way in which policy has been used to produce immigration flows that are beneficial to the existing power structure. In one respect this perspective turns the idea of assimilation on its head, arguing that unassimilated immigrants reinforced the existing social structure, but over time they were assimilated into the labor movement and became a threat rather than an asset for the beneficiaries of the capitalist structure (Calavita 1984, Barrett 1992).

White (2018), also interprets American immigration policy as having deliberately controlled flows in a way to deliberately shape American culture to remain European. White, however, places more emphasis on “discrimination, prejudice, and bias” than capitalist interests. He also makes an attempt to actually measure the cultural impact of immigration using indexes of cultural values to measure the distance between the US and other cultures.

Jupp’s description of Australian immigration history (2007) echoes Zolberg’s description of an immigrant society deliberately created through “conscious social engineering” and White’s thesis of an immigration policy that preserves the dominant culture. Jupp argues that immigration policy has created in Australia (and New Zealand) a long history of British immigration, leading to homogeneity and cultural continuity. Non-British migrants may have played a role in shaping Australian society, for example by creating a
political base for the labor movement. But Jupp claims that before the 1970s naturalized ethnics (non-British immigrants) were too few to make much electoral difference and rarely formed new political movements but rather were assimilated into existing reformist parties.

Even more than Australia, migration to New Zealand has been historically dominated by a homogenous flow of British and Irish with substantial immigration from other countries not beginning until the abandonment of pro-white immigration policies in the late 1980s (Spoonley and Bedford 2012). Despite emphasizing this fact, Spoonley and Bedford argue that immigration has “always provided a key contribution to change” – although in reference to the more recent and diverse migration their language is more emphatic, saying that it had “transformed the cultural demography of New Zealand” (my emphasis). Like Hirschmann and Barone, Spoonley and Bedford note the substantial cultural contributions of immigrants in “fashion, music, sports, television, radio and film” (Spoonley and Bedford 2012: 141).

Throughout the vast literature on immigration, spanning many disciplines, there are inevitably a multitude of nuanced views on the relationship between immigration, institutions and social structure. Collapsing these perspectives into categories is necessarily reductionist but can give a rough portrait of some of the differing assumptions and preconceptions that can be found within different parts of the immigration literature. The following table offers a partial summary that provides a starting point for understanding how different authors have approached the question of societal impacts from immigration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspective</th>
<th>Key Arguments</th>
<th>Does Immigration Lead to Societal Change</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transformative</td>
<td>In the societies that have received large numbers of</td>
<td>Yes, but possibly the effect is cumulative</td>
<td>Barone, Hirschmann, Jones</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
immigrants they have had a profound role in shaping the history, institutions and social structure of those societies.

**Contributionist**

Immigrants enrich and contribute to the societies they arrive in over a long period rather than suddenly. Without radically transforming their core values, structures and institutions, they enrich and contribute to the societies they arrive in without radically transforming their core values, structures and institutions.

**Surface Change**

Immigrants have a fairly limited impact on the deeper structures of society and assimilation tends to be a one-way process. Changes mostly occur at the surface of society. Deeper change is very limited.

**Restrictionist**

Restrictionist

Societies are limited in their capacity to receive immigration. Under certain conditions, larger or more culturally distant flows disrupt social structures and culture. Immigration is likely to lead to radical change or weaken existing structures rather than transforming them.

---

4 Although it is not discussed in this literature review there is also a fringe literature within the restrictionist literature that argues differences between societies are in large part determined by biological differences and that immigrants pose a threat to the developed countries not only because of cultural traits they bring with them but also immutable biological traits. Prominent advocates of this position include retired psychologists Richard Lynn and Byron Roth.
These various perspectives can be arranged along two dimensions, which capture the major components of the immigration debate. Along one dimension is the whether the impacts of immigration are seen as harmful, neutral, or beneficial. While along the other dimension is the degree to which immigration is seen as a transformative force in society. Below is a rough sketch of how a typical example of each of the perspectives I have identified might fall along those dimensions.

From the perspective of public policy, the debate is largely between those whose position fall in the bottom right of this framework (restrictionists), and those whose positions fall more towards the left and top. While there are important differences between schools of thought in their arguments about
immigration, the policy debate can be summarized in this two-dimensional divide, with one side favoring greatly reduced immigration, and the other favoring relatively open immigration policies.

In recent years the administration of Donald Trump, the departure of Britain from the European Union, and the rise of new nationalist parties in Eastern Europe, has demonstrated the importance on restrictionist ideas in public debate. While many restrictionist authors and pundits are not major influences on academic scholarship, their arguments receive substantial attention at the highest levels in government. And restrictionist perspectives do sometimes find a prominent place in academic discourse, for example in the works of Borjas, Collier, and Huntington.

Restrictionist ideas also have a long lineage and have played an important role in the formation of immigration policy throughout modern history. Explicitly, or implicitly, restrictionist arguments have been the foundation of most immigration policy globally since around the 1920s. Even where countries have allowed large numbers of foreign workers to enter, out of economic necessity, the policy makers have done so assuming (often wrongly) that these immigrants would only remain temporarily. Even most liberal immigration policy has tended to implicitly accept the Restrictionist argument that greater immigration leads to social challenges, and framed immigration as something like a form of charity – to be extended as much as possible out of generosity, but with an understanding that there are limits to the capacity of a country to receive foreigners.

**Immigrants as Agents of Change**

Arguments that immigration is a threat to social life rests on three major propositions, which are asserted by almost all restrictionists. firstly, that immigrants carry with them the culture of their origin society. Secondly, that immigrant cultures frequently conflict with the culture of natives, or relatedly that the lack of a shared culture undermines cooperative behavior. Thirdly, that only through complete assimilation will social stability be achieved. While the more serious restrictionist theories of Collier (2013) and Borjas
(2015) suggest this may usually lead to more modest marginal changes, the typical position of restrictionist pundits and authors outside of academia is that there is a substantial threat of transformational changes under certain conditions.

While restrictionist pundits often see the conditions for transformative change as being present only in the time and place in which they find themselves, there is actually a remarkable consistency about what those conditions are. The conditions typically considered are the size and speed of the immigration, the cultural distance of the immigrants from the native population, and the speed of assimilation.

From the perspective of the model of social life, this implies that immigrants have fundamentally different values, and behave according to a different set of norms and roles. If immigrants arrive in substantial numbers, the presence is expected to undermine values and norms that provide the foundation of productive economic institutions and liberal democratic political institutions.

Although they do not use a hierarchical model of social life, there is an implicit understanding in restrictionist arguments that a foundation of values and basic principles underpins institutions. Restrictionists assume that since immigrants have been socialized in a different social context, that they will retain the values and norms of the society they come from, and their behavior in the receiving society will continue to be patterned accordingly. From this they infer that unless immigrants are assimilated quickly, they will change the deep level values and norms of social life, leading to transformational change throughout the system.

In contrast, Portes (2010) argues that the deeper levels of the structure (the value system that underpins norms, and distribution of power) is not easily changed by immigrants, who come up against established institutions and organizations. Accommodations, reforms, and other marginal changes might occur at the institutional/organizational level, especially those elements that are directly involved with the incorporation of immigrants. But a “thick institutional web” maintains the integrity of the deeper core
culture and social structure. Although the interaction between immigrants and institutions involves a
dynamic relationship in which institutions must respond and adapt the pressure is much greater on
immigrants to accommodate and comply with the expectations of the host society, in other words to
assimilate.

Michel Crozier in *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon* ([1964] 2009: 195) explains the problem of change in
large organizations, with well-articulated institutional blueprints.

Constant transformations affect a modern organization. They concern
the services it provides the customers and the public with whom it has to
deal, the techniques of performance, and even the attitudes and
capacities of the personnel it employs. Adjustment to these
transformations can be gradual and more or less constant, if the agents
of the organization who are at the level where necessity of these changes
is more obvious can introduce the wanted innovations or obtain such
innovations from the competent authorities. But, as we have already
pointed out, a bureaucratic organization does not allow for such initiative
at the lower echelons; decisions must be made where power is located,
i.e., on top.

This last point is important and demonstrates why an understanding of the separate domains of culture
and social structural is necessary for a theory of social change. Restrictionists imply that the mere
presence of immigrants is sufficient for their values and norms to play an active role in the construction
of social life. However, sociological theory suggests that the process by which value systems become
institutionalized and shape social life is dependent on power. It is the values of those with power that
matter most.
Although immigrants are not necessarily the poorest or lowest status members of a society, as a group they tend to be especially unlikely to have the kind of power that can be channeled into social change. And in order to achieve positions of power and influence, immigrants must almost always first assimilate into the mainstream culture. Portes (2010) notes that immigrants may follow two paths, either rising up within the social hierarchy through successfully conforming to the established social order or remaining marginalized within subcultural enclaves.

While ethnic enclaves may form pockets in which immigrants are able to perpetuate a parallel social life (and particularly the use of their own languages), the power differential between native and immigrant cultures is clear. While enclaves have successfully established some institutions such as schools, charitable organizations, clubs, and especially churches - these primarily serve and support the immigrant community. Rarely do they challenge the mainstream society, except perhaps to advocate marginal changes in the same way as numerous native interest groups. Diffusion of culture from enclaves to the mainstream is limited outside of a few welcome contributions such as food, festivities, or music. Enclaves remain distinctly a subculture embedded in, and subordinate to, the more powerful mainstream.

Even if immigration is massive, numbers alone are not necessarily as great a source of power as they might appear. To make use of numbers requires organization. Such organization often first comes from native groups, or earlier co-ethnics who have already assimilated into the mainstream. Historically in the United States for example, where immigrant groups played important roles in politics, it was through being organized as a voting block for one of the existing native political parties. Likewise, immigrant labor has been competed over by industrialists and established labor groups, each trying to recruit immigrants (Barrett 1992).

As Gordon (1964) lays out, the process of assimilation is a process of multiple stages. Generally, the first stages of assimilation are what he calls acculturation and civic assimilation. These are assimilation into
the cultural norms and values of the native society. Only after these have been largely completed are immigrants accepted into the private networks of native society, what Gordon calls *structural assimilation* and *amalgamation* (the latter specifically relating to intermarriage). Because power is organized in networked amalgamations (the class structure), it is only at this point of structural assimilation that immigrants are able to play a more significant role in shaping social life.

This alternative view of immigration, laid out by Portes (2010), is what I have termed the “Surface Change” perspective. Although it is based on a more solid foundation of theoretical literature than the restrictionist perspective, it has not been supported by any substantial body of systematic empirical work. This dissertation will provide some important first steps in examining the empirical evidence and comparing it to the competing restrictionists and surface change perspectives. Since the implications for immigration policy are profound, it is important that policy makers know where the evidence stands.
Chapter 2

The Case of America

As the largest receiver of immigrants, contemporary and historic, it is worth examining briefly the American experience with immigrants and whether it is consistent with the theoretical discussion outlined in the previous chapter. Although a cursory historical overview is no substitute for more systematic empirical work in terms of testing the theory, it can be illustrative.

At a glance, America’s experience with immigration fits comfortably into the theoretical framework discussed, and supports the thesis that immigrants are limited in their ability to enact social change. Despite massive migration for most of the period from 1840 to 1920, and further substantial immigration since the 1970s, social life in America has not experienced a transformational event. The United States did experience a major Civil War, which had some important impacts on social life. But at most the Civil War transformed the regional institutions and social life of the South, and an examination of the history following Reconstruction shows that many of the features of Southern social life stubbornly persisted or were re-established in new forms.

While the core values and power structure of American society have not been static, there is a general continuity over time. The Constitution has been amended, and the balance of power between States and the Federal government has shifted (most significantly with the 14th Amendment). But in most respects governing institutions have been robust, and the core value structure ("The American Creed") has not fundamentally changed. The United States is still a representative democracy, a republic, and a federation of states. Power is still divided between three branches of government, maintaining significant degrees of independence. The position of the English language, despite the anxieties of a few, is still quite secure.
The Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights and most of the other founding documents still have a very immediate relevance to most contemporary Americans. In some cases, the continuity has been stronger than in Britain. While both the British and American Bill of Rights include the notion of a right to bear arms, only in the United States has this endured as an important cultural value up to the modern day.

Some substantial changes have occurred such as the growth and modernization of the administrative bureaucracy, the substantial extension of suffrage, and of course the abolition of slavery. However, these changes were occurring across the Western world at roughly the same time. And although they coincide with a period of significant immigration there is not much evidence that they were driven by immigrants or would have failed to occur in the absence of immigration.

Consistent with Portes theoretical framework, immigration to the US has had the most noticeable impact on certain institutions with which they have had close interactions. Immigrants have been very active in both the Catholic Church and urban political parties. Immigrant communities have also often established ethnic newspapers, schools and charities, although over time these have tended to either fade away or lose their ethnic distinctiveness.

Notably, however, these institutional impacts have been within the boundaries set by American values. Although there was significant nativist hostility to Catholic immigration, the growth of the Catholic Church did not undermine the republican constitution as some had feared. Immigrants have been able to change the religious landscape because they have done so within the confines the foundational values of separation of Church and State, and freedom of individual conscience.

The incorporation of immigrants into party politics can also be seen as more of a process of immigrant assimilation than induced change. Anton Cermak, the Czech born mayor of Chicago, is representative of an immigrant politician raised up from a base of immigrant support in the urban political machine of
Chicago. But his campaign for mayor rested not only on his appeal to immigrants and their values but also through careful cultivation of support from the established and powerful business community and civic organizations (Gottfried 1962). And to the extent that the political machines worked in the interests of immigrants it was more through patronage – access to upward mobility within the existing hierarchy of roles – not through contesting underlying norms and values. Only in his stance against Prohibition could Cermak be seen as an advocate for immigrant values.

Of all the immigrant groups that come to the United States, the Irish stand out as the most active in politics and institution building (establishing Catholic parishes and schools). Historians have tended to see this active involvement in social and political life as an important part of the Irish-American experience, but usually it is seen as contributing to the Americanization of the Irish, rather than the importation to America of Irish social life.

The Irish were immensely successful in politics. They ran the city. But the very parochialism and bureaucracy that enabled them to succeed in politics prevented them from doing much with government. In all those sixty or seventy years in which they could have done almost anything they wanted in politics, they did very little. (Glazer and Moynihan 1963: 228)

Politics was, for the Irish, about patronage and jobs, not social change. Likewise, the Catholic Parishes did more to change the Irish than to change America. Far from challenging mainstream society, they were “a powerful force in transforming peasants into devout, disciplined urban dwellers.” (McCaffrey et al. 1987)

While the urban political machines and Catholic institutions may have contributed to an enduring ethnic consciousness among the Irish, they also shaped that Irish-American identity into one that was comfortably incorporated into the existing social order.
Perhaps the most enduring changes brought by immigrants are their contributions to America’s cuisine and festivals. But these cosmetic changes are easily grafted onto American society without disturbing the invisible foundations of social life. Each year the Chicago River is dyed green for St Patrick’s Day. It is a visually spectacular event, but it does not change the river’s course or transform it in any other functionally important way. It is a fitting metaphor for the impact of immigration: the food, fashions, and festivals imported by immigrants change the color of American life but leave its course unchanged.

This is not to say that ethnic holidays, cuisine or other ‘street-level’ phenomena are not important. They can be important parts of the construction of ethnic identity and play an integral role in developing a vibrant community life. Indeed, in this way such manifestations of immigrant ethnicity allow immigrants to participate in mainstream American life, values, and social structures, as well as gain acceptance for their communities as legitimate members of the American national fabric. Ellen Litwicki (2000: 115-125) describes ethnic holidays in this way, as a constructed feature of immigrant assimilation into American middle-class values, not an imported tradition based on the values of immigrant countries of origin:

Turn-of-the-century nationalism and, thus, ethnicity were preeminently middle-class phenomena. Immigrant nationalists, like their American counterparts, espoused a liberal bourgeois vision of the nation that linked progress, enlightenment, and middle-class morality. The fraternal, musical, military, religious, and gymnastic organizations that sponsored ethnic celebrations tended to be middle class in membership, leadership, and outlook (with the exception of socialist organizations).
As proponents of liberal political principles of the age and their adopted land, immigrant nationalists constructed their nations as models of liberal democracy and their people as inherently liberty-loving and virtuous.

... Holiday celebrations presided over by ethnic nationalists were subject to the same strict codes of public behavior as other middle-class institutions. Ethnic leaders revealed a preoccupation with order and proper behavior on holidays and throughout the year. A Norwegian minister, for example, explained to children at a 1905 independence celebration "the necessity of obeying the law and keeping order."

The enduring visible evidence of immigration most closely fits with the Kennedy vision of immigrant waves contributing to the richness of American culture in an additive way, rather than being a transformative force changing the American "way of life".

Only in the South, with the abolition of slavery, has there been anything that could be considered a true transformation of the social structure – and much of that structure survived in an adapted form even after the Civil War, being substantially reproduced through policies of segregation and the sharecropping system. Furthermore, this transformation came about not from a shift in values that occurred during the period of immigration, but as the result of a long standing conflict over core values going back to the foundation of the United States. Although immigrants settled in much larger numbers in the North, they were not generally important leaders of anti-immigrant causes. On the contrary, immigrant populations were often ambivalent or divided over the question of slavery and were in some cases hostile towards the abolitionists (Wittke 1939, Jones 1960, Brands 2011, Anderson 2016).
The overall role of immigrants in American history can certainly be described as important. American history would not be the same without them. But immigrants have not transformed the foundations of American social life. Power structures and organizing values have changed only slowly, with a strong line of continuity running from 1776 to the present. Where immigrants have influenced the path of American history it has not broken this line of continuity.

As previously mentioned, this is a fact on which restrictionists have generally agreed. Indeed, the idea of immigration presenting a threat to America is generally premised on the notion that the America being threatened is the America of the Founding Fathers. This shows the problem of looking only at a particular case. Even though America has arguably more experience with immigration than any other country, it is still possible for restrictionists to argue that the history of the United States is not generalizable to all immigration – or even to contemporary immigration in the US. Perhaps, for some of them, no amount of historical evidence can be considered sufficient. If modern immigration is considered truly unprecedented, then we can learn nothing from the past. But by reviewing the historical evidence systematically across as many mass migrations as possible, we can provide a much more complete picture of what the possible outcomes of immigration might be.

**A Systematic Empirical Approach**

There is a great wealth of research on the history of immigration in many countries, and across many periods. Studies of the roles that immigrants have played in the histories of individual societies can be illuminating for the immigration debate, as well as important in their own right.

However, any attempt to understand the impact of immigration through case studies is limited unless there is an understanding of the larger picture. The impact of immigration in any particular case will be quite different. The question that we really want to answer is whether a priori permitting very high
levels of immigration is likely to present an increased risk of social transformation, or the erosion of liberal democratic institutions.

Ideally to test this we would like to be able to investigate mass migration as a randomly assigned treatment variable in an experimental study and compare a set of countries with mass migration against a control group that did not experience mass migration. While the studies in this dissertation take a similar approach, they lack important elements of an experimental design, or even a quasi-experimental design, and so cannot provide accurate estimates of the impact of immigration.

The primary difficulty here is that there is no way to construct an accurate counterfactual through a control group or comparison group. We can systematically compare countries with and without mass migration, but the “treatment” is never randomly assigned. Immigrants do not move to countries randomly. There are therefore likely to be substantial differences between countries that receive immigrants and those that do not. These confounding variables make it impossible to attribute the differences between countries to mass migration with any confidence.

As research in this area progresses, it may be possible to carry out an analysis of mass migrations through history and control for other observable characteristics of countries. However, such an effort would require the efforts of many researchers to collect data spanning globally and across centuries. Much of the data we might care about, such as the demographic and economic characteristics of countries, may indeed be possible to collect and presents a relatively straightforward expansion of the work contained in this dissertation. However, even these variables can become quite difficult to collect as we move further into the past. And taking a historical view over a long period is necessary for a more complete picture. Mass migrations and social transformations are rare events, and the impact of immigration may play out over decades, or even generations. Of course, even if we are able to construct reasonable estimates of immigration’s impact in the past, there is no certainty that such impacts would
be consistent moving forward. In this sense it will never be possible to refute the restrictionist argument that immigration will be different and is threatening this time.

What I present in this dissertation is a much more modest analysis. It does not aim to estimate the causal effect of immigration, but rather to provide a descriptive account of the empirical evidence (i.e., what has actually happened in history). This allows us to answer questions of the type “Have countries experiencing mass migration had more revolutions in the following decades?”, but not question of the type “Are countries that experience mass migration more likely to have a revolution in the following decades?” or to estimate what the outcome of any specific mass migration might be.

This is done through two quantitative studies. For the primary study, I built a database of mass migration events by decade, between 1450 and 2010, inclusive of as many countries as possible (given the limitations of the historical record and my own time and expertise). The data set does not include every state, and especially before 1800 includes only a more modest proportion of the world. It also does not include Sub-Saharan Africa, due to the challenges of collecting data there. However, this is an addition that will be necessary to improve the data set moving forward and should be feasible with sufficient investigative effort. The data set considers immigration only as a binary. Where the number of immigrants over a decade is greater than a threshold of 5% of the population at the beginning of the decade, this is coded as a mass migration. Where the number of immigrants is lower, it is coded as having no mass migration. In cases where the estimates make it unclear whether the threshold has been crossed the data set codes the decade as possibly including a mass migration. In many cases a mass migration may span multiple decades – in which case each decade where the threshold is met is coded as having a mass migration event. In the following chapter I discuss in detail the construction of this data set, and the definitions used. At the end of this dissertation are histories of most of the states included in the data set that lay out the specific evidence, assumptions, and judgements, used in each case.
To accompany this data set I have produced a similar data set, coding decades in which a revolutionary transformation of government occurred. These events include those that appear to meet the criteria set out for a transformational (as opposed to marginal) social change: they occur outside of the established constitutional framework, and they involve change at deep levels of both power and values. This is quite a restrictive definition, for example it excludes major constitutional changes that occur within the established framework such as the Reform Acts in England that substantially increased the democratic franchise, or the economic reforms in China that occurred during the 1980s. It also excludes coups and other extraconstitutional events where there was no fundamental change in the deep levels of power and values. For example, many Latin American countries experienced numerous military coups during the 19th and 20th centuries, but these often represent conflicts between factions, with underlying class structures and value systems remaining relatively constant. However, since it is often not straightforward to make an objective judgement, I have also added an additional code for coups, succession crises, and other discontinuities in government that were resolved outside of the constitutional framework. This allows the analysis to also consider this broader set of events.

With these two data sets it is possible to look at the “survival” of countries following mass migration. We can look at the proportion of countries that experience a transformation in the decades following mass migration and compare this to all country-decades in which there was not a mass migration. I find that countries with mass migration tend to experience fewer revolutions in the following decades than other countries.

In addition to comparing transformations in social life, I also use the Polity IV index which scores countries by how democratic or autocratic their institutions are. Using this index, we can add some additional insights. The data is only available since 1800, but while this reduces the mass migration data that can be used, there are actually very few mass migrations that occur before 1800. Using the Polity IV data, we can create an alternative operationalization of “social transformation” that considers sharp
discontinuities in the nature of institutions (a large change in Polity scores between decades), and we can also distinguish between transformative changes that lead to more democratic political arrangements, and those that lead to more autocratic arrangements. It can also be used to look at the general trend in political institutions, giving some evidence as to whether democratic “backsliding”, which might occur through marginal change, is typical following mass migration. Finally, the use of the Polity IV scores allows us to compare the types of countries that experience mass migration, showing that countries of mass migration tend to have more democratic institutions.

While this analysis cannot be used predict the precise impact of immigration policies, it can still be informative and useful in several ways. Firstly, a systematic analysis that covers a large proportion of the world across a long period of history can give context to case studies that may be able to provide more detailed pictures of how mass migration may play out. It allows us to see the overall pattern of mass migrations and social transformation in other parts of the world. In this dissertation I include one case study which demonstrates the advantage of using more detailed qualitative studies in fleshing out the wider empirical picture. But it is only the context of the larger historical view that allows this case study to be properly conceived. While the narrow view provides detailed clues to understand processes and mechanisms, the wide view helps in recognizing what features of each case are peculiar and which are more generalizable.

Secondly a historical overview provides some boundaries around our expectations for immigration. For example, if mass migration were almost always followed by instability and revolution within a few decades, we could not say with confidence that these things were caused by immigration, or that restricting immigration would have prevented them – but it would be certainly consistent with the restrictionist position and lend it prima facie support.
What is actually seen from the empirical evidence collected in this dissertation is that countries that have experienced a recent mass migration are less likely to go through a social transformation in the following decades. They do sometimes go through transformations, and perhaps in the absence of mass migration these incidences would have been even lower. But this means that any theory that predicts a serious threat to social life from immigration must also account for this fact. It also cast doubt on the most extreme claims – there is an upper boundary for the historical effect size from mass migration based on the hypothetical that all revolutions in countries of mass migration are a result of the mass migration (that is to say mass migration are always into otherwise stable societies). Even in this extreme case we see that the effect is not large enough to close the gap with the average rate of transformative change.

The second empirical study in this data set also uses the Polity IV scores, along with indices from the Freedom in the World report, to look at changes over a much shorter period (1990 to 2011). This study is able to look at a more complete set of countries, and to consider both the immigrant stock, and the change in stock, as continuous variables. The study follows a very similar approach to Clark et al. (2015) but looks at institutional indices that are intended to measure liberal democratic values, rather than economic freedom.

Looking at a short period does not allow the identification of impacts that play out over long periods but it has the benefit of directly addressing what is occurring in contemporary immigrant receiving countries. Despite claims by many restrictionists that modern immigration is different and threatening in a way many historic migrations were not, the study finds no evidence that democratic countries receiving large numbers of immigrants are suffering any decline in the democratic quality of their political institutions. Although it does find that more autocratic countries (mostly in the Gulf), that experienced mass migration, largely failed to make substantial democratic gains – unlike many other countries during this period.
Again, it is not possible to make causal inferences about the effect of immigration. However, the data is extreme, showing no countries with strong democratic institutions at the beginning of the period that experience significant democratic backsliding. This is consistent with other findings that democratic failures tend to involve a combination of structural factors (Diskin et al. 2005, Lambach et al. 2013), and contradicts restrictionist assumptions that democratic institutions are vulnerable to immigration.

I finish the dissertation with a qualitative study comparing the experiences of Taiwan and Hong Kong in the 20th century following the mass migration of refugees from communist China. Despite the importance of quantitative studies, this kind of case study is the most effective way to investigate in detail the impacts of immigration. Although there are ways that quantitative studies of multiple countries could be improved to provide stronger evidence for causal claims, ultimately identifying the mechanisms by which immigration is related to change (or through which institutions prevent immigrants from creating change) can only be seen through detailed case studies. While it is important to understand these case studies in context, they will remain a vital compliment to other empirical work in answering questions of how and why we see the larger patterns evident in larger historical and global reviews.

**Literature Review**

The literature on immigration is vast and covers many disciplines. While some of the important perspectives on immigration are covered in the introduction, it is necessary expand upon these and to provide an overview of some of the other relevant literature that relates to the discussion around the impact of immigration on social life. In particular, I approach this literature by looking at it in relation to the dominant perspective in policy making, which is the restrictionist view.

**The Restrictionist Perspective**
Restrictionist ideas play an important role in the formation of immigration policy, both in the US and in almost every other nation. In recent years the administration of Donald Trump, the departure of Britain from the European Union, and the rise of new nationalist parties in Eastern Europe, has demonstrated the importance of restrictionist ideas in contemporary public affairs.

While I give more attention to the written literature (especially the academic arguments of Borjas and Collier) that falls under the umbrella of the restrictionist perspective, this represents only a small segment of the diverse restrictionist ecosystem. In addition to a large body of popular books and journalistic articles, the restrictionist argument is disseminated through talk radio, television punditry, viral social media posts, and political stump speeches. Together these make up what I call the “restrictionist perspective”, which is best understood not as a coherent theoretical conceptualization of immigration, but rather a set of arguments, underlying claims, and sentiments, that are consistently used to advocate for aggressively restricting immigration through quotas and narrow eligibility requirements.

The restrictionist perspective includes both arguments about immigrant impacts on the economy and on culture, as well as related concerns about security and crime. While the economic arguments are an important component of the restrictionist literature, there is already a large empirical literature that considers these claims. The focus of this dissertation is on the broader impacts on social life, and so I largely limit my discussion of the literature to these arguments.

The restrictionist perspective argues that immigration is inherently, or under certain conditions, disruptive to social life. The core arguments of Restrictionists are: firstly, that immigrants carry with them the culture of their origin society. Secondly, that immigrant cultures frequently conflict with the culture of natives, or relatedly that the lack of a shared culture undermines cooperative behavior. And thirdly, that only through more or less total assimilation will social stability be achieved. It is generally
argued that such assimilation requires restrictions on the number and type of immigrants, and an
assertive government policy of encouraging and facilitating assimilation. Although the restrictionist
literature is quite varied, these core ideas are remarkably consistent.

Although restrictionists sometimes argue broadly that immigration is an inherently disruptive and
dangerous force, the more common position is to identify immigration as being a threat under certain
conditions. For example, Brimelow (1995), Buchanan, and Huntington (2004) argue that immigration to
the United States since in the period after 1965 has been a threat – but that historical immigrations to
the United States were at least benign. Brimelow goes as far as to call the historical immigration
experience “a triumphant success” (Brimelow 1995) but says the conditions for that success no longer
exist.

In most cases this argument emphasizes differences between current and former immigrant flows. But
differences in the context of reception are also often considered. Mark Krikorian (2008) breaks with
most other Restrictionists in claiming that modern immigrants to the United States are not especially
different from past cohorts but considers their assimilation problematic due to differences in the United
States stage in its historical development. Whereas a growing, young and expansionist America was able
to accept and absorb many new arrivals, a mature America is unable to create meaningful opportunities
for a mass of new immigrants.

Restrictionists may also distinguish between different types of contemporary immigrant flows. For
example Caldwell (2009) argues that a substantial Islamic population living in the “West” is a threat due
to historical enmity between Christian Europe and Islam and irreconcilable values regarding issues such
as women’s rights. Additionally, he believes that Muslims are more resistant to assimilation for a variety
of reasons, such as the importance of religion as a “hyper-identity” that commands greater loyalty than
any national identity. Caldwell also argues that Europe has a policy of multiculturalism and political
correctness that is unwilling to promote assimilation, coupled with an “Adversary culture” among Muslims grounded in contempt, resentment, and a sense of alienation.

In contrast Caldwell sees other contemporary immigrations as benign. Both immigration between European countries, and also, in contrast to other contemporary restrictionists, Hispanic immigration to the United States. Caldwell says the latter pose relatively few problems as Hispanics tend to be similar to previous cohorts of working class, Catholic immigrants, making them a suitable fit for American society.

Although it might seem surprising, restrictionists across time and place tend to identify a common set of characteristics that make immigration undesirable:

- The size of immigration flow
- How long the flow continues uninterrupted
- The “cultural distance” of the immigrants
- The “quality” of immigrants
- The concentration of immigrants

The uniting theme of these characteristics is their supposed influence on the rate of assimilation. Restrictionists conceptualize societies as having some capacity to absorb immigrants through assimilation. If immigration exceeds this level, they predict vague scenarios of crisis and collapse.

A challenge for restrictionists is that the catastrophic outcomes they hypothesize have not come to pass following the historically well-known mass migrations to the United States in the 19th century and early 20th century. While other mass migrations are less well known, and might therefore be ignored, the movement of millions of Europeans to America is common knowledge. Within some of the Commonwealth countries, and some Latin American countries, their own histories of mass migration may also be quite familiar, which local restrictionists need to similarly account for.
The scale of immigration to America before 1920 was far greater proportionally than modern immigration to America. Even in absolute terms, the highest years of immigration in the early 20th century were as high or higher than the number of immigrants in recent years. One way this is approached is to draw attention to lower birthrates in modern America (e.g., Huntington 2004) and perhaps to the difference in immigrant and native birthrates. In this way immigrants make up a much larger share of population growth and have a larger demographic impact on the population over the long run. However, this argument has limitations, and is almost always secondary to the claim that modern immigrants are relatively less assimilable to earlier immigrants.

The largely European immigration before 1965 is seen as more assimilable, either because the immigrants came from cultures that were less distant culturally, or because the particular cultural norms and behaviors they brought with them were relatively commendable and conductive to success in America. In contrast contemporary immigrants are deemed to be inherently more different, or simply inferior, in their cultural characteristics. This may be attributed to the origin of the immigrants, or the particular characteristics of the immigrants (implying negative selectivity).

Some restrictionist pundits and policy makers are extremely explicit in arguing the inferiority or incompatibility of contemporary immigrants. At the most polemical end of the spectrum are pundits such as Ann Coulter who says in her book *Adios America* (2015):

> Despite a hegemonic propaganda campaign about all cultures being equal, they aren’t. Americans are utterly unprepared for the cultures being imposed on them, and the media cover-up can’t hide the truth forever. People notice when their little girls are raped and killed by Mexicans, their Arab shopkeepers commit honor killings, their Hmong neighbors are pimping out little girls and clubbing German shepherd
puppies to death, their Indian landlord is importing concubines, and
their Chinese acquaintances are murdering their wives out of
“humiliation”.

As absurd as this screed is, Coulter has substantial influence in the mainstream of American conservatism. Nor are her comments exceptional. The former Republican President, Donald Trump, made a similar infamous statement during his primary campaign:

When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. They're not sending you. They're not sending you. They're sending people that have lots of problems, and they're bringing those problems with us [sic]. They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists. And some, I assume, are good people. But I speak to border guards and they tell us what we're getting. (Washington Post 2015)

Of course, such virulently degrading comments are not representative of the wider restrictionist discourse. However, even among those who would undoubtedly object to these characterizations of immigrants, there is often still some kind of assumption of inferiority. For example, both Borjas and Collier make arguments that are ultimately dependent on the assumption that immigrants have a set of norms and cultural characteristics that are less conducive to economic productivity (although they do not necessarily characterize immigrants are inferior per se). Collier (2013) for example argues that “migrants are essentially escaping from countries with dysfunctional social models”. Likewise, Borjas (2015) says that immigrants bring their “inefficient organizations and institutions” that were previously confined to their own countries.

Citing evidence from game theory and experimental economics, Collier (2013) argues that cooperative behavior is fragile and can be easily undermined by the entry of no-cooperative players into the game.
Borjas (2015) simply suggests that it is “inconceivable” that the production function remains unchanged after the entry of many new immigrants, while acknowledging the relationship between immigrants and institutions is poorly understood. He supposes that immigrants must shift the total factor productivity of the receiving society towards the lower productivity found in the countries of origin. Neither Borjas nor Collier give any estimates of the size of the economic loss to natives, but both suggest that it could become large if immigration were relatively unrestricted.

Another common line of argument is that cultural difference is harmful in itself, regardless of whether the foreign cultural traits are positive in their original contexts. A sense of shared identity is said to be important for cooperative and prosocial interaction (such as economic redistribution), as well as social stability (Brimelow 1995, Collier 2013). This does not require that each individual be precisely alike, but it does require at least a common set of values and norms. Significantly, there must be a shared belief in the group, and shared expectations about the roles, obligations, and privileges of group members.

The success of historic mass migrations to America (and elsewhere) is credited to the closer cultural similarity of those immigrants, or to superior characteristics of the immigrants themselves. Buchanan (2006) for example says of the European immigrants coming to America, that they had “a burning desire to be part of the American people”, in contrast he claims “many Mexicans are not assimilating, they are self-segregating, forming their own towns within our cities, maintaining their language and identifying with one another, not America.” However, the pre-1965 immigration that some restrictionists look back fondly on, was met by precisely the same concerns.

The sociologist, Edward Alsworth Ross, wrote in 1914 that due to their awakened sense of nationality “the patriotic Bohemian or Pole is bound to resist absorption here.” Like later restrictionists, Ross feared that while previous immigrant streams had eventually ebbed, the East European stream might persist
due to population pressure at the origin. He gave attention to the difference in birth rates between immigrant Slavs and the native stocks that he considered to have “high standards” (Ross 1914).

Ross also made claims about the inferior character of specific immigrant groups. For example, he claimed that while Jews had strong close-knit families and communities, they were contemptuous of the law, the rights of others, and had disregard for the customs of trade. “Physicians and lawyers complain that their Jewish colleagues tend to break down the ethics of their professions.”

Like many modern restrictionists Ross distinguished the immigration of his time to that of even early periods in American history. Whereas pervious immigrants, he said, had come seeking religious and political liberty, the new immigrants were interested only in personal gain.

Ross was not alone in his belief that immigration in his time was fundamentally different from previous American immigration. His contemporaries, Jenks and Lauck (1912), said “the new immigration differs much more radically in type from the earlier American residents than did the old immigration”. They believed these differences, along with the larger numbers of immigrants, would make assimilation vastly more challenging than it had been in the past.

And yet as we continue to move backwards, we find critics of each earlier immigration flow, leveling many of the same criticisms against the immigrants of their day. In the 19th century Samuel Morse argued that Catholic immigration from Europe was a plot by the conservative powers, which were hostile to the liberal and democratic values of America:

> The arbitrary governments of Europe – those governments who keep the people in the most abject obedience at the point of the bayonet, with Austria at their head, have combined to attack us in every vulnerable point that the nation exposes to their assault. They are
compelled by self-preservation to attempt our destruction – they must destroy democracy.

...

Now emigrants are selected for a service to their tyrants, and by their tyrants; not for their affinity to liberty, but for their mental servitude, and their docility in obeying the orders of their priests. (quoted in Bischoff 2002)

The hostility to Catholic (especially Irish) immigration was so strong that it led to the establishment of a nativist political party – the Native American Party, often referred to as the “Know Nothings”. To the restrictionist Americans of the 1850s, Catholicism implied a completely different and unassimilable set of values and customs. Only in retrospect, after the assimilation of foreign groups, have their differences come to be seen as less threatening and incompatible.

A few restrictionists do take a more broadly negative view of immigration both contemporary and historic. In *The Case Against Immigration*, Beck (1996) writes:

In 1910, the fears of many Yankee settlers of Wausau, Wisconsin, came true. For years, they had worried that they would be overwhelmed by the German, Polish, and other immigrants pouring into town as part of what we now call the Great Wave of immigration. By 1910, the demographic takeover had occurred: immigrants and their children were in the majority. They changed the local culture, totally reversed the ruling political ideology, and by 1918 had taken over nearly every elected office in the county. Communities all across America similarly were caught in the social, economic, and political undertow of the Great Wave.
Beck criticizes the views of other restrictionists who see the Ellis Island period as a golden age of assimilation calling this a “rose-colored” and “dewy-eyed” fiction. Stacy and Lutton’s *The Immigration Time Bomb* (1985) has an equally unfavorable tone towards the mass migration after 1880, regarding these new arrivals as clustering in ethnic enclaves of abject poverty, becoming pawns of corrupt urban political machines or bringing with them the “alien political doctrines” of anarchism and socialism. However, this view tends to have less resonance in public and political discourse, where people usually have a positive view of historic immigration – not least because so many are direct products of it.

**The Restrictionist View of Immigration and Social Change**

One of the first principles of the restrictionist argument is that immigrants bring with them a set of cultural traits – values, customs and norms – that derive from the context of their origin. And secondly, that this cultural baggage will impact social life in the society of reception through the behavior of immigrants, and ultimately the reshaping of political and economic institutions. This view has been expressed frequently throughout history by restrictionists and others. For example, it was the view of Thomas Jefferson:

> They will bring with them, the principles of the governments they leave, imbibed in their early youth; or, if able to throw them off, it will be in exchange for an unbounded licentiousness, passing, as is usual, from one extreme to another. It would be a miracle were they to stop precisely at the point of temperate liberty. These principles, with their language, they will transmit to their children. In proportion to their members, they will share with us the legislation. They will infuse in their spirit, warp and bias its direction, and render it a heterogeneous, incoherent, distracted mass. (Jefferson 1781)
In 1856, speaking of the Catholic immigration of his day, Samual Clagett Busey, a nativist associated with the Know-Nothing movement, expressed similar sentiments:

The circumstances under which he [the immigrant] was reared, his education, his training, the associations of his youth, have impressed upon his mind the peculiarities of his race and of his country. He has inherited the customs and habits of his parents, learned their sympathies, and imbibed their prejudices and animosities. The associations of youth stamp their impress on the character of the grown up man, and give bent to the mind. The endearments of the past cling around him in the future, and the ties of relationship and companionship cannot be severed. (Busey 1856)

More recently Steven Malanga (MacDonald et al. 2007) has argued that “while [immigrant] workers add little to our economy, they come at great cost, because they are not economic abstractions but human beings, with their own culture and ideas – often at odds with our own.” And Collier (2013) agrees saying: “Migrants bring not only the human capital generated in their own societies; they also bring the moral codes of their own societies.”

The cultural difference of immigrants is, for restrictionists, the central problem of immigration. They may argue that the presence of differences in society is harmful, and that a common set of customs and values is necessary for harmony. Or, they may argue that the customs and values of immigrants are inherently less desirable, or lead to less desirable outcomes. And often both of these arguments are made.

Social Disorganization Theory
The first of these arguments is called “social disorganization theory” by Simes and Waters (in Bucerius and Tonry 2014) and they note that it is one of the oldest hypotheses in American social science. As they explain, the theory “posits that diversity within a given locale often hinders collective community functions and certain kinds of social control, since racial and ethnic relationships are fraught with durable tension and conflict”. The connected idea is that national and community cohesion rest on a shared set of customs and values.

A classic conception of this is given by Simons (1901):

The food to be eaten, the costumes to be worn, the ceremonies to be observed, the callings to be followed, are all prescribed. This rigid custom rule accomplishes beautifully the desired end, that all within a class shall think alike, feel alike, act alike, and is appropriate to the stage of nation-making, where class-homogeneity is essential.

Miller (1995), likewise claims that a certain shared culture is an important feature of national identity:

[A] national identity requires that the people who share it should have something in common, a set of characteristics that in the past was often referred to as a ‘national character’, but which I prefer to describe as a common public culture. It is incompatible with nationality to think of the members of the nation as people who merely happen to have been thrown together in one place and forced to share a common fate, in the way that the occupants of a lifeboat, say, have been accidentally thrown together. There must be a sense that the people belong together by virtue of the characteristics that they share.
This sense of shared identity is said to be important for cooperative and prosocial interaction (such as economic redistribution), as well as social stability.

This theoretical position has given rise to some attempts at empirical investigation. One of the most notable examples is the literature on diversity and “trust”. In an influential essay, Putnam (2007) found that stated levels of social trust were lower in diverse communities. Some subsequent studies have replicated these findings in other countries, such as the Netherlands (Lancee and Dronkers 2008). Gerritsen and Lubbers (2010) also find a similar relationship between diversity and trust in the short term, and that cultural distance may matter. However, much of the literature that has further explored this issue has cast doubt on the Putnam’s hypothesis that diversity is an important factor in lowering levels of trust.

Gesthuizen et al. (2009) claim that “the main finding is that Putnam’s hypothesis on ethnic diversity must be refuted in European societies.” And Hooghe et al. (2009) similarly conclude that “the pessimistic conclusions about the negative effects of ethnic diversity on generalized trust cannot be confirmed at the aggregate level across European countries.” Schmid et al. (2014) also find that overall the impact of diversity is not necessarily negative and could even be positive.

Generally, the subsequent literature has tended to find that structural disadvantage, segregation, and inequalities are the salient factors (Gesthuizen et al. 2009, Twigg et al. 2010, Dincer 2011, Sturgis et al. 2011, Uslaner 2012). Diversity is secondary, or important only where these other issues are mapped onto ethnic differences.

A related literature looks at the provision of public services in countries with diverse populations. Alesina and Ferrara (2005) present an empirical case that public good provision is likely to be lower in heterogeneous societies. But again, subsequent studies have tended to provide mixed evidence, with
some studies supporting the hypothesis, but others disputing it (Kymlicka & Banting 2006, Auspurg et al. 2019).

However, even where empirical research has suggested impacts from immigration on trust and social cohesion, these are found to be marginal rather than transformative and temporary in their duration. Putnam (2007) for example finds the impact of diversity on trust to be a short-term effect only, a conclusion that has been validated by further research (see Ramos et al. 2019).

The evidence certainly does not support the contention of restrictionists like John Vinson of the American Immigration Control Foundation, who claims that immigration “threatens to extinguish its historic identity and character” of Europe, and “is stressing [American] national cohesion, perhaps to the breaking point” (Vinson 2017). And there is no reason to believe that tensions and discomfort with modern immigrant diversity should result in any greater catastrophe than the same sentiments around, for example, Irish immigration in the 19th century (see Handlin 1959).

It is also worth questioning whether the possible impacts suggested by some of these studies really present a compelling case for restrictive immigration policies. If there are negative impacts they appear to largely derive from xenophobic reactions to diversity, and a context of reception that discriminates against migrants. To restrict immigration because of the hostile response of natives is, bluntly, a case of blaming the victim. A more appropriate policy approach (and one often suggested by the literature) would be to confront xenophobia and hostility towards immigrant groups.

**Cultural Contagion Theory**

The “social disorganization theory” outlined above generally considers cultural difference to be problematic, rather than arguing that the culture of immigrants is inherently inferior. However, another line of argument is concerned with the actual customs of immigrants, and whether they are in
themselves conductive to desirable outcomes such as liberal democratic institutions, economic productivity, and social stability.

The simple form of this argument argues that the habitus of the immigrant leads them to behave in ways that are less productive, and more socially harmful, than native citizens. For example, higher rates of domestic abuse, bribery, shirking responsibilities, starting fights, drunkenness, or tax evasion. As these behaviors increase, the result is that the society moves towards the levels of the sending countries in terms of crime rates, productivity, and other quality of life measures. Borjas (2015) presents this as a variable lambda that could be anywhere from 0-1, with 0 being essentially no change in the institutions of the receiving countries, and 1 being a change such that the institutions are exactly as productive as in the countries of origins. He anticipates the actual figure would be somewhere in between. The equation Borjas uses is as follows:

$$\alpha^*_N = (1-\lambda) \alpha_N + \lambda \alpha_S$$

The alpha terms N and S are the inverse demand curves of the North (receiving) and South (sending) economies, with the difference being the relative institutional and technological endowments of the two regions. The equation suggests that the new demand curve in the north, alpha-star, will be somewhere between those of the receiving and sending countries. Essentially, any immigration from countries with lower productivity will spread the cultural traits that lead to that lower productivity.

The alpha term used by Borjas relates to the economy, but it is easy to see how the same hypothesis could substitute other variables such as the crime rate, fertility rate, life expectancy etc. So, for example, we could consider an equation for the expected homicide rate “H”:

$$H^*_N = (1-\lambda)H_N + \lambda H_S$$
If the homicide rate in the receiving country were 3.0 (about the current European rate) and sending country rates were on average 6.0 (around the current world rate) then the new rate in the receiving country after immigration would be anywhere from its original rate of 3.0 to the rate of 6.0. If lambda were 0.25, for example, the new rate would be: 

\[(0.75 \times 3.0) + (0.25 \times 6.0) = 3.75\]

Borjas gives no suggestion for the size of lambda, but he does assume that it must be positive, and potentially large enough to be significant. From restrictionist literature we can also infer the factors that would be most important to determining the size of lambda - the rate of assimilation and the size of the immigrant stock. If immigrants assimilate quickly, lambda will be small, because the immigrant population will quickly come to resemble the native population, with minimal changes in the attributes of natives. Where the immigrant stock is small, lambda is likewise expected to be smaller.

The $\alpha_S$ term might also be dependent on the selectivity of the immigrants. If immigrants are selected for desirable traits it could be assumed that it is as if they come from a country made of a population with such traits. Of course, immigrants could also be negatively selected, in which case if lambda were high enough the receiving countries could end up worse than those from which the immigrants came. This is sometimes seen as a theme in restrictionist writing, where countries are accused of dumping their marginal populations, but in reality immigrants are more typically positively selected.

Collier (2013) gives a somewhat more nuanced argument, which does not see immigrants as simply moving economic and social outcomes towards those found in their home countries. For cooperative behaviors that require informal sanctions and altruism, Collier suggests impacts could be triggered at certain thresholds. This is based on a large game theory literature which shows that cooperative games depend on some individuals acting as enforcers – punishing deviations from cooperative play, even at costs to themselves. While cooperative outcomes can be achieved, they exist in a relatively fragile equilibrium. A sufficient number of immigrants who lack the values and norms to play cooperatively (or
worse have a tendency to punish cooperative players and enforcers) will cause the cooperation to collapse. This would imply that certain norms and institutions would be prone to sudden failures, such as neighborhood watches, block parties, or recycling efforts.

The Borjas-Collier hypothesis is based on the assumption that the customs and values of immigrants – their cultural endowment – will alter the institutional structure of social life in the receiving countries. The same principle (that immigrant values will play a part in determining receiving country institutions) can be easily found across restrictionist literature and punditry, but I will focus on the arguments made by Borjas and Collier, which are laid out more clearly and engage with the wider academic literature. I refer to it by the term “cultural contagion theory”.

It is important to note, this argument implies that immigrants reduce the productivity of native workers. The gains to immigration could be lower than estimated if large scale immigration slowed the assimilation of immigrants (as Collier suggests it does) or led to less efficient institutional environments in immigrant enclaves. However, the restrictionist hypothesis necessarily goes further to suggest that mass immigration has the potential to reduce the efficiency of institutions broadly, thus reducing the productivity of native workers. If this were not the case, the policy rational for restricting immigration would be less clear, although a case could still be made that the presence of poor immigrants created costs for natives through redistributive policies.

**Culture: Values or Toolkit**

The cultural contagion theory makes assumptions about culture and social life that approximate the approach found in classical accounts of culture and socialization from sociologists such as Talcott Parsons. In this approach culture is treated as structured cognitive codes or value and belief systems, analogous to grammar in language (Schmid 1992). This approach suggests that children are ‘socialized’ (through family and other institutions) leaving them with a deeply embedded structured symbolic
systems of values and beliefs, which motivate and constrain behavior. DiMaggio (1997) calls this the “latent-variable” model of culture.

However, this approach to culture has been widely critiqued by sociologists and is now generally discarded in favor of approaches that are more consistent with the empirical findings of cognitive psychology. An alternative theory of culture suggests that rather than being determined by a cognitively demanding symbolic system, behavior is learned as a collection of heuristics, prejudices, skills, and strategies (Swidler 1986, DiMaggio 1997, Lizardo & Strand 2010). This approach is called the “tool-kit” theory of culture.

Tool-kit theory suggests that individuals in a society do not behave similarly because of a widely shared system of values, but rather because of the spread of behavioral strategies and patterns within populations. These behavioral repertoires include knowledge of various habits and customs that can be called like a computational function, to respond quickly to certain contexts. But they also include chains of actions, or assemblages of bundled behaviors. Swidler (1986) argues that “people do not, indeed cannot, build up a sequence of actions piece by piece, striving with each act to maximize a given outcome”. Rather than each behavior being determined by a system of cultural values and beliefs, individuals act out learned strategies structured by the institutional context and chosen to take advantage of their cultural competencies. Rather than specifying a correct set of actions, culture usually provides a repertoire of approaches to different situations. It does not so much constrain behavior, as give shape to complex patterns of behavior.

Swidler (1986) suggests that there are both settled periods, and unsettled periods in societies. In the former, traditional approaches to life are followed somewhat automatically, and gaps between behavior and explicit norms or values are easily ignored. As described by Mills (1940) “[People] live in immediate acts of experience and their attentions are directed outside themselves until acts are in some way
frustrated. It is then that awareness of self and of motive occur.” To the extent that actions are questioned, a cultural vocabulary of motives and values is used to explain behavior. These vocalized motivations, values, and beliefs – as would be reflected in cultural surveys – are not the cause of behavior, but rather a tool to verbally explain behavior. At the extreme, traditional practices may be so automatic that they are hardly questioned, and appear to be simply common sense. Even when questioned, such common sense behavior requires no vocabulary of motivation, but is just explained as “that’s just how we do it”.

In contrast, unsettled periods involve critical appraisal of behavioral norms and strategies. New habits are purposefully formulated, often from an explicit ideological basis. Struggles arise between competing groups, promoting different formulations. In these revolutionary periods, culture becomes active as a creative force in producing new modes of living.

Lizardo and Strand (2010), suggest that more generally there are contexts where institutions provide strong structural scaffolding in which prefabricated patterns of behavior are prescribed (and often enforced), and other contexts where institutional structure is lacking, and actors have more discretion in how to behave. In settled periods, unstructured contexts are limited and well defined, whereas in unsettled times institutional structures are weakened and unstructured contexts become more pervasive.

The tool-kit theory of culture has important implications for how immigration might impact receiving societies. The latent-variable model of culture would suggest that large scale immigration could shift the underlying cultural values, with knock-on effects on institutions and the economy (at least over longer periods). In contrast, the tool-kit theory of culture implies that institutions provide a strong structural context shaping behavior. Immigrants lacking the appropriate cultural competencies to navigate the new institutional context may struggle to be successful, or find themselves marginalized, but they will
adapt by changing their own strategies to work within the new environment. Only where immigrants enter into a society that is already unsettled is there a potential for them to produce pervasive changes throughout social life.

The tool-kit theory does raise some concerns around immigration. For example, poorer immigrants finding themselves in marginalized positions may be inclined to adopt behavioral strategies from native groups in similarly marginalized positions (see Portes and Zhou 1993). This could lead to downward assimilation, as immigrants adopt the behaviors of marginal groups. Although such strategies may have a certain logic, in responding to the conditions of poverty and discrimination, they may not be effective for upward mobility. However, this implies that immigrants are shaped by the context of reception, rather than creating changes through imported values.

The tool-kit theory suggests that culture and institutions should be thought of more like human capital and technology. In comparison, the latent-variable model implies that culture is imprinted through socialization as complete value system or code. From this code, the cultural life of the origin country is implanted in a new soil and will compete and conflict with the native culture. Collier calls the culture and institutions of a society their “social model”. But for this social model to manifest in the receiving country, all the requisite components would need to be coded into immigrants.

If we think of culture as a tool-kit, immigrants do not bring their social model with them, but rather an individual set of behavioral strategies or cultural repertoires. Some behavioral strategies are widely shared within a society (what we call norms and customs), for example table manners, formal greetings, or hygiene practices. But a great deal of culture in advanced societies becomes institutionalized, and important behavioral repertoires are not taught through socialization, but only through specialist training.
Immigrants cannot bring with them their entire social model because none alone have the full “code” of the model. Institutions cannot be recreated without the appropriate administrative knowledge. And beyond the dispersal of knowledge, there are other aspects of the social model that cannot be simply lifted and exported. Social life also depends on networks, connecting individuals in different roles, and physical resources – books, buildings, machines, etc. Nor are immigrants a representative sample of the societies they come from. Therefore, the cultural repertoires they bring with them may exclude customs that are fundamental to the social model of their countries of origin.

The result is, as described by Portes (2010), that rather than altering the social model of the receiving society, immigrants bump up against an existing structure of institutions. The cultural resources that immigrants bring with them, and are able to acquire after arrival, influence whether they assimilate and thrive or are marginalized and controlled. But only to a very limited degree will immigrants be actually able to alter the receiving society – mainly through creating diversity in loosely structured areas and importing some simple community based voluntary institutions such as churches and schools.

While the sociology literature does not entirely refute the hypotheses of the cultural contagion or social disorganization theories, it does challenge some of the assumptions of these theories. In particular it demonstrates that social life is not simply responsive to the underlying characteristics of the population, but that institutions also play a powerful role in structuring behavior and perpetuating the norms and values on which they are based. This is summarized by Clemens and Pritchett (2019), using the example of traffic norms to show how strongly certain elements of social life persist once they have become institutionalized:

Most models of “institutions” or “norms” exhibit multiple equilibria with high transition barriers between equilibria. Once established, norms persist even if the under-lying conditions for their creation are no longer
present. For instance, which side of the road to drive on is a norm or convention and some countries have adopted “right side” and others “left side.” Every migrant from a left-side to right-side country quickly adopts to driving on the right side. One can easily imagine two countries: A is a right-side country with 100 people and B a left-side country with 100 people. Every year 5 people move from A to B and 5 from B to A. At the end of 20 years every person in A is from B and vice versa. But it is likely that in A people still drive on the right side even though every single person in A was a “native” left hand side driver. For each set of migrants, it is immediately and permanently suboptimal to play by origin-country rules. Assimilation is instantaneous because any other strategy is a losing one. (Clemens and Pritchett 2019: 27)

The Game Theory Literature

Clemens and Pritchett use an example from game theory to demonstrate what sociologists have theorized – that institutionalized codes of conduct strongly shape individual behavior. However, this is an extreme example of a type of behavior that has little connection to any system of values, or sentiments of correct behavior. Driving on the left or right is understood by most people to be an arbitrary convention rather than a moral imperative. Furthermore, as Clemens and Pritchett note, deviation from the established strategy is immediately costly and suboptimal to all parties. So it is worth considering the game theory literature in more detail.

Collier supports his argument that immigrants may import dysfunctional social models by reference to the literature on game theory, including experiments in which real people play simple games. Two of the most studied games are the ultimatum game, and the public goods game. Collier argues that the
empirical literature shows that strategies adopted by people from different cultures demonstrate that cooperative behavior is inconsistent across cultures.

The game theory literature suggests that equilibrium strategies may result in suboptimal outcomes. Prosocial behavior can lead to cooperative arrangements that are overall more productive but require the participating actors to incur some costs. Studies show that across cultures, individuals behave altruistically, and demonstrate principles of reciprocity, even in situations where these would not appear to be maximal individual strategies. To some degree this appears to rely on a system of costly enforcement, where enforcers voluntarily incur costs to themselves in order to punish non-cooperative actors.

This is demonstrated in the ultimatum game (Guth et al. 1982). One player (the proposer) is given the opportunity to propose a division of a pot of cash between themselves and a second player (the responder). The second player then chooses to either accept the offer or reject it. If accepted, the money is split as per the offer. If the second player rejects the offer, neither player receives any money. In theory, the second players should rationally accept any offer better than zero – since this is the alternative if they reject. Knowing this, the proposer’s optimal strategy should be to split the pot to give the responder the minimum possible amount greater than zero. In real experiments, however, proposers usually offer a much more even split. And responders often reject low offers.

When played by university students, there is significant variation between the strategies of individual players, but little difference in the average offer across countries (Gintis et al. 2003). Henrich et al. (2001) found that there were substantial differences between groups, however, when the game was played by certain non-students from selected cultural groups. From this they drew the conclusion that institutions and cultural norms around fairness were significant in determining altruistic behavior.
Collier’s interpretation of this finding (which assumes a latent-variable model of culture) is that different societies have different propensities towards making and accepting fair and unfair offers. If certain norms of fairness are prerequisite for a society’s level of productivity and the functioning of its institutions, it follows that the introduction of immigrants with different fairness norms could disrupt and collapse cooperative equilibriums. From this, Collier concludes that selectivity of immigrants, limiting their numbers, and assimilating them to native norms, are important to prevent declines in productivity and effective governance.

However, the tool-kit theory of culture suggests a different interpretation of the findings. Rather than implying that offers and rejections reflect underlying norms of fairness, the theory suggests that when confronted with a novel experimental game, players adapt a strategy from their tool-kit based on similar situations they have encountered. This interpretation is offered by Henrich et al. in their study:

A plausible interpretation of our subjects’ behaviors is that when faced with a novel situation (the experiment) they looked for analogues in their daily experience, asking “what familiar situation is this game like?” and then acting in a way appropriate for the analogous situation. For instance, the hyper-fair UG offers (greater than 50 percent) and the frequent rejections of these offers among the Au and Gnau reflects the culture of gift-giving found in these societies. Among these groups, like many in New Guinea, accepting gifts, even unsolicited ones, commits one to reciprocate at some future time to be determined by the giver. Receipt of large gifts also establishes one in a subordinate position. Consequently, excessively large gifts, especially unsolicited ones, will frequently be refused because of the anxiety about the unspecific strings attached. Similarly the low offers and high rejection rates of the
Hadza appear to reflect their reluctant process of sharing (termed “tolerated theft” by a leading ethnographer of the Hadza). While the Hadza extensively share meat, many hunters look for opportunities to avoid sharing and share only because they fear the social consequences of not sharing, in the form of informal social sanctions, gossip and ostracism. This behavior is apparently transferred to the experimental setting.

This interpretation suggests that differences in behavior do not necessarily reflect fixed ideas about fairness. Rather, individuals draw as best they can from a repertoire of behaviors. The design of the experiment deliberately avoided presenting the participants with any guidance on how to play the game, making it unclear how flexible the behavior is, or how it would respond to queues from formal institutions.

The tool-kit model would suggest that rather than immigrants entering society with fixed fairness norms, they apply a cultural repertoire of behaviors to situations as best they can. As they gain familiarity and experience with their new society, they will retool themselves to behave in the same way as natives. Tool-kit theory suggests that immigrants will be responsive to social queues, guidance, and observed behavior.

There is some suggestive evidence of the malleability of immigrant behavior. One derivative of the ultimatum game is called the dictator game, where the dictator splits a pot of money with no opportunity for the other player to reject. Even though the dictator could make an unfair offer with complete impunity, studies show that at least some money is usually shared. This game has a somewhat close parallel in real life in the practice of voluntary gratuity payments for various services – “tipping”. Maynard and Mupandawana (2009) found that in Canadian restaurants, patrons whose first language
was non-native (not French or English) tipped on average almost the same as other customers (0.5 percentage points less). A study in Hong Kong by Dewald (2001) found that among tourists tipping practices of the origin country were partially replicated but there was significant adaptation to local tipping norms. Another study by Shrestha (2014) found that tipping differences between foreign and domestic customers in Oklahoma were explained not by any difference in cultural attitudes, but entirely by awareness of tipping norms.

Other evidence from ultimatum game experiments point to a malleability in strategies based on experience and context, rather than actions being derived from a fixed underlying system of cultural values. For example, both proposers and responders demonstrate flexibility in learning and adapting their behavior over time (List & Cherry 2000, Grosskopf 2003). Studies have also found that proposers tend to make more generous offers under conditions of cognitive constraint or ego depletion (Cappelletti et al. 2011, Achtziger et al. 2016), and when played by groups with the opportunity to strategize together offers tend to be lower and rejections fewer (Bornstein & Yaniv 1998). Even relatively subtle priming or differences in the game instructions can influence the way that people play the ultimatum game (Burnham et al. 2000, Hoffman et al. 2000, Tripathi 2016).

Another experimental game that has been well studied is the “public goods game”. In this game players can make voluntary contributions to a common pool which is then multiplied and redistributed. While the group benefits from making contributions, each individual has an incentive to freeride on the contributions of others. Collier argues that similar situations in the real world are important to the quality of life, and economic prosperity, of immigrant receiving nations in the West. Like the costly rejection of an unfair proposal in the ultimatum game, players in public goods games are willing to use costly enforcement to punish free riders when that option is available. Experiments show that this costly enforcement can help achieve cooperation in public goods type games (Gintis et al. 2003, Sigmund 2007). However, only a few players in public goods games are willing to incur costs to punish free-riding
behavior. These players are called “strong reciprocators” by Gintis et al. (2003) and “super-heroes” by Collier; I will hereafter refer to them as enforcers.

A large part of Collier’s argument is that the enforcement of norms can break down if anti-social punishment (punishment of the enforcers or cooperators) occurs. This kind of punishment has actually been observed in experimental games and appears to vary across cultures (Herrmann et al. 2008, Rand et al. 2010, Fehl et al. 2012). This might be expected where uncooperative actors use punishment to retaliate against the enforcers. This could result from immigration where ethnic, religious, or linguistic groups come to have a sense of shared identity and loyalty. If one member of the group is punished for deviating from a cooperative strategy, other members of the group may retaliate. Such costly revenge can be seen in “cultures of honor” in the form of duels, vendettas, and long running feuds. In theory, immigration could lead to the break down of cooperative systems by undermining enforcement, or making it prohibitively costly. Even if systems did not break down, the costs of enforcement could be significant.

However, this assumes that developed countries’ productivity and way of life is strongly dependent on cooperative systems that lack an organized institutional enforcement system. In reality, one of the important features of developed countries is that they usually have highly effective formal systems for enforcing contracts, preventing violence, and resolving disputes. Although most social and economic interactions rely on the goodwill of the persons involved, the possibility of recourse to authorities provides a strong incentive to act appropriately and gives some assurance that serious violations can be remedied. Although such enforcement is costly to the society as a whole, the enforcers themselves do not personally bear the burden of most costs, since they are overwhelming professional agents who are remunerated for their work. They are also protected from retaliation and have a significant power advantage over others. For this reason, the introduction of retaliation, except on a large and organized scale, is unlikely to lead to a collapse in the enforcement system.
The significance of enforcement is demonstrated by another study Collier cites to suggest that norms are imported. Fisman and Miguel (2007) found that foreigners with diplomatic immunity in New York tended to be more likely to violate parking laws if they were from countries with high levels of corruption. Although an interesting example of imported norms, the study also compares violations before and after enforcement (after 2002 diplomatic license plates could be confiscated) and found that there was a dramatic decline across diplomats. Institutional enforcement was extremely effective in modifying behavior. Additionally, it was found that in the pre-enforcement period diplomats from both more and less corrupt countries quite rapidly adjusted their behavior to be more likely to commit violations, suggesting that those from less corrupt cultures could flexibly adopt corrupt behaviors when enforcement was lacking.

The study is perfectly consistent with the tool-kit theory. Diplomats from corrupt countries started from a higher baseline of violations, because breaking the law with impunity was already more likely to be a developed strategy that could be readily implemented in a new environment. Diplomats from less corrupt countries were less familiar with this pattern of behavior. But both groups, responding to the institutional structure adapted their behavior to fit the enforcement environment (although not equally).

Ethnography provides further evidence that cooperative strategies can be adopted by immigrants when entering new social contexts. Flores-Yeffal (2013) found that Hispanic immigrants in the United States formed “migration-trust networks” mostly consisting of immigrant individuals from a common origin (although not usually having any relationship prior to immigrating). These networks “consist of social relationships based on an exchange of support, trust, and sustenance between residents from the place of origin and those at the place of destination”. They are vital to the success of immigrants in finding jobs, housing, and navigating life in the United States.
Flores-Yeffal (2013) found that immigrants who did not (or could not) integrate themselves into these networks often struggled in their immigrant experiences. And within the network cooperative behavior was very strong, involving significant transfers of money, providing temporary accommodation and other prosocial behaviors that were not necessarily reciprocated, but were expected to be “payed forward”. There is no evidence that these cooperative strategies were imported from the places of origin, but rather appear to be a learned and taught strategy of the immigrant communities.

In summary, while the evidence from Game Theory, including artificial and natural experiments, has been used by Collier to support a restrictionist hypothesis of cultural contagion, it can be seen as consistent with the alternative hypothesis that immigrants will ‘bump up’ against institutional constraints that channel them into behaviors and roles consistent with the receiving country’s social model.

The Resilience of Institutions

While the Game Theory literature does not necessarily provide much support for the cultural contagion hypothesis, it does not necessarily exclude this possibility. Unlike Collier, Borjas (2015) does not attempt to lay out the theoretical mechanisms by which immigration might lead to institutional change, but simply claims that it is “inconceivable” that in the case of mass migration it would not.

Borjas is not alone among restrictionists in predicting substantive impacts on institutions from mass migration without providing a theory of how immigration would actually bring about those changes. Writing under the pseudonym George Gallatin, another restrictionist argues that “as mass migrations change demography, they may also affect changes in host nations’ cultures and political economies. The specifics of these changes are exceedingly difficult to forecast, because they hinge on dozens of variables specific to the migrants, the host nation, and the scale and rate of the movements. While we
do not yet know the vector, the titanic, high velocity migration the West is currently experiencing will cause profound changes.”

Despite the common acceptance of these claims by policy makers and the public, and the confidence of their advocates that they are incontrovertible, there is a substantial political science literature on the formation and failure of democratic institutions. While Collier generally does an admirable job in engaging with the economic literature, he does not make much reference to this political science literature. And I am not aware of any other restrictionist discussions that directly reference the political science literature on democratic institutions to any substantial degree.

Restrictionist arguments take as an implicit premise that democratic institutions simply emerge from, and are dependent on, a certain set of widely held cultural values and norms. However, most work in political science points to structural factors such as the international context, and economic conditions, as being key to the formation and success of democratic institutions.

The literature on democratization identifies a clear correlation between the transition of countries to democracy and the level of income (Boix et al. 2020). This is not inconsistent with a theory that democracy requires a population with appropriate democratic values. For example, it could be the case that rising incomes tend to promote literacy and education. These in turn promote values of democratic citizenship and undermine traditional religious authorities. However, more recent literature has often tended to offer an alternative hypothesis that democracy emerges and persists not because of a particular set of underlying values, but because for political actors the costs of democracy (for example through the redistribution of wealth and power) and smaller than the costs of repression.

In the classic formation of this theory, Boix (2003, 2011) treats the problem as a game theoretic one with two classes – rich and poor – and treats the rich as having a choice between allowing democracy,
and paying the cost of a redistributive system, or enforcing their rule but paying a cost of repression (for example periodic rebellions).

Acemoglu (2015) offers an alternative taxonomy of institutions as “extractive” and “inclusive”. And with this framework in mind, a review of history suggests an alternative perspective to the two class model used by Boix (2003). Instead of a wealthy and poor class, society might be divided into an “extractive” class of rulers who rely economically on a “subject class” that represents the majority of the population. Rather than a choice between the cost of repression, or the cost of democracy, institutional change, at least in some cases, may come about as a result of the ruling class having to accept democratic institutions as a precondition of extracting urgent wealth in the form of taxes. One example of this can be seen in England in 1640 when Charles I was forced to convene Parliament because of his need for taxes to fight the Bishops War.

This leads to the perhaps surprising suggestion that democratic institutions may arise and persist because they are more effective at extracting wealth through majority support, than authoritarian regimes which extract wealth through subjugation. There is some support for this from the fact that government revenues in more democratic countries often represent a higher proportion of the GDP than in less democratic countries. This alternative perspective that looks at democracy as efficient for producing revenue also provides a possible explanation for why countries endowed with great wealth in natural resources sometimes do not transition to democracy. In these cases, governments often derive large revenues from their ownership or control of these resources, making it unnecessary to extract much wealth from the population in the form of taxes.

This economic theory of democratization does not exclude the possibility of immigration having adverse impacts on institutions, because immigration could influence the costs and benefits of repression and democracy. However, this is different from the standard restrictionist claims of cultural threat, because
the impact of immigration would be through mechanisms such as changes in the distribution of income, or the ability to organize in opposition. One possible example of this would be the Gulf States, where it could be argued that the large immigrant populations may be less likely and able to organize rebellions – this effectively lowers the costs of a repressive system of government and could explain why the Gulf States very stable and undemocratic institutions.

In addition to the observed relationship between incomes and democratization Carles Boix (2011) shows that the rate of transition depends greatly on the prevailing international order. Powerful anti-democratic regimes have had a significant impact on slowing the transition to democracy even when incomes are rising.

The “Holy Alliance” provides an illustrative example of how anti-democratic regimes historically held back democratization. It was explicitly created to uphold the divine right of kings, and Christian values. As an alliance between Protestant Prussia, Catholic Austria, and Orthodox Russia, it led to a shift away from the confessional divisions of earlier periods, towards a new alignment of monarchy and organized religion against republicanism and secularism (the values of the French Revolution). Along with the Quintuple Alliance that included France and Britain, the monarchist powers suppressed any liberal revolutions in Europe. An example of their direct intervention was the French invasion of Spain to restore the absolute monarchy of Ferdinand VII. Another example was the Austrian intervention in Naples in the 1820s. Before the 1830s the alliance included to some extent France and Britain. But France shifted after the July Revolution in 1830 and Britain was never fully aligned with the other monarchist powers. The division between East (Russia, Prussia, Austria) and West (France and Britain) was evident as early as 1820 with the Congress of Troppau. In 1849 Russia and Austria combined to suppress the Hungarian Revolution, after which martial law was implemented.
Teorell (2010) also provides empirical evidence that the international context matters, and that democratization can happen through diffusion from neighbors, and pressure from regional organizations. Hypothetically immigrants might impact institutions indirectly by creating economic and cultural ties between countries that shape the international context. There is some plausibility to this idea, as empirical evidence seems to suggest that international trade can have some role in democratization (Teorell 2010). However, history shows that international influence can be strong without any substantial migration. Countries influence others through regional power relationships (control of sea routes, ability to extend military force, economic trade etc.) and ideas may be diffused through small groups of elites, who need not even cross borders themselves, as long as their books and ideas can.

Frankenburg (2013) for example makes the argument that constitutions are not invented but reconstructed, drawing on packages of constitutional information and forms that exist in an international “reservoir”. The actual work of constitutional construction is often carried out by a small elite of “merchants of transfer”. These networks of elites are unlikely to be much affected by general immigration restrictions. There is disagreement as to whether constitutional forms can be authentically recreated outside their original context. Watson (1993) argues that constitutions can be transferred between societies, because they are not tied to the specific underlying cultural context. In this way constitutional and institutional forms are equivalent to technologies like gunpowder or printing, that once learned can spread across societies. But Legrand (1997) takes the opposite view, that constitutions are embedded in a specific context, and this context is important for endowing meaning. Legrand’s argument says that constitutional elements cannot survive transfer, because without the correct cultural context, they are incomplete. However, in either case it is not clear how large-scale immigration of ordinary people would fundamentally change the dynamics is legal transfers.
Legrand’s theory of legal transfers, when considered in light of the tool-kit theory of culture, could be adapted to argue that constitutional forms and institutions require a sufficient administrative class with the appropriate knowledge, skills, and habits, to actually put the theoretical constitutional framework into action. In this way, we might expect that in colonial territories, the importation of expatriate administrators (for example British Hong Kong) would allow the reconstruction of institutions more effectively than in countries that imported constitutional ideas but lacked any experienced administrators. In a post-colonial context, some similar influence may occur through military advisors, diplomats, NGO staff, business consultants, and other expatriate, or transnational communities.

Significantly, however, this perspective primarily implies the transfer of institutional elements from more to less developed countries. And stringent entry restrictions are almost never placed on the small foreign communities in question. Indeed, they are often not even called immigrants, but given the separate designation of “expatriates”. Instead of restrictions, most countries have specific programs to encourage the exchange of such specialists and give them special access and rights (although not necessarily including permanent settlement or naturalization).

In addition to this existing literature on the emergence and diffusion of democratic institutions, there is an important literature that looks at why some democracies are successful and stable, while other fail.

Here income levels and economic development also appear to have a role, with higher incomes and stronger property rights leading to more stable democracies (Teorell 2010, Boix 2011). Incomes may also play a role through the mechanism of declining state revenues (Lambach et al. 2013). Foreign involvement has also been found to play a role in the failure of democracies (Diskin et al. 2005).

Notably, in keeping with restrictionist predictions, the presence of minority groups (ethnic, linguistic, religious etc.) has in some cases been found to be relate to democratic failure (Diskin et al. 2005).
Likewise, a collective history, and shared national identity has been found to be a possible factor in preventing state failure (Lambach et al. 2013).

However, it may be of value to distinguish states where minority populations have been long established (such as the Kurds in Turkey, or the Basques in Spain) and those where they have been introduced through immigration (such as in Australia or Switzerland). There is some reason to think that ethnic conflicts are more likely to lead to conflict and state failure in cases where the minority is of native rather than immigrant origin. Toft (2010) presents a compelling argument that ethnic conflicts are not so much disputes between values and norms, but over sovereignty of territory. Conflicts between ethnic groups are most likely to arise where ethnic identity and history is tied to geographical territories and control over those territories is seen as fundamental to the survival or independence of the group.

The importance of the struggle for ownership over territory can be easily seen in many of the most important ethnic conflicts. While to significance of Jerusalem (for centuries) is perhaps the most well-known example, there are many other examples such as the Kurdish situation or the conflict over Cyprus between Greeks and Turks.

Immigrants do not typically have deep connections between their identity and geographical places in the receiving country. The formation of ethnic immigrant neighborhoods may lead to some tensions and backlash as community demographics change. However, the affection for these neighborhood spaces do not translate into a struggle for full sovereignty over them. Rather the connection between ethnic identity and place is primarily through the relationship with the mother country. In this way Irish-Americans showed great interest in the struggle for Irish independence and the later situation in Northern Ireland – but they did not agitate for an independent Irish homeland within America.

There could be specific situations where immigration and territorial claims do overlap. And this is sometimes raised by restrictionists as a specific concern over Mexican immigration since many of the
States in which they settle were at one time part of Mexico (e.g. Huntington 1996). However, such concerns conveniently ignore inter-European immigration, or Canadian immigration into New England and other states along the US-Canadian border (which was at one time substantial).

One remaining point is of particular relevance to the restrictionist argument: Muslim majority countries appear to have been less likely to become and remain democracies (Teorell 2010). This is consistent with a major claim of modern restrictionists, that Islamic culture specifically, is hostile to liberal democratic values. However, Diamond (2010) casts doubt on this hypothesis. Firstly, he points out that among countries with Muslim majorities and a history of Islamic rule, there is also a significant difference between the Arab world and non-Arab countries. Secondly, he shows that structural factors may provide a better explanation. One important structural factor is that the economy of the Arab world is especially oriented around oil revenues. Another (related) is the geopolitical conditions of the Middle East – where the Arab League could be compared to the Holy Alliance, as an international coalition that works to support authoritarian regimes.

To summarize the literature, a major theme that can be found throughout studies of democratization, and the stability of democratic institutions, is the role of major structural factors – particularly historic and economic ones. Analyses that have looked at multiple variables also tend to find that state failures tend to involve different combinations of factors (Diskin et al. 2005, Lambach et al. 2013, Johais & Lambach 2020). There is no single combination of factors that leads to democratic failure, and no single factor alone appears to be sufficient or necessary for failure. However, while empirical models have included ethnic division as a factor in models, there is not clear evidence of how immigration may contribute as a structural factor.

The literature does not fit easily with restrictionist claims, which typically emphasize the cultural role of immigrants on institutions, rather than any structural role. While this allows for immigration to have
negative impacts, it does not follow that the result of immigration must be to move receiving society institutions towards those of origin countries. At least in theory, immigrants could have structural impacts that are beneficial to the development or success of democratic institutions. The literature also suggests if immigration were to have a negative impact, it would be unlikely that it would lead to transformative change without the presence of other factors.

**Restrictionism and Assimilation**

Restrictionist arguments and policies are based not only on ideas of how immigrants might change society, but also about the process of assimilation of immigrants into receiving societies. Again, it is possible to find a core group of assumptions, hypotheses, or claims that repeatedly appear in restrictionist arguments.

The first of these is that countries have a limited capacity to assimilate immigrants, and if immigration exceeds that capacity it will lead to dramatic and undesirable social impacts. The capacity is believed to be determined by the quantity of immigrants, their cultural distance, and the concentration of immigrants with their co-ethnics. Sometimes restrictionists will also consider the willingness of immigrants to assimilate, or the policies of the receiving country towards encouraging and requiring assimilation.

Restrictionist theories of assimilation are important, because it is relatively rare in modern discussions to take the position that immigrants are undesirable after they have become assimilated. Restrictionists base their policy positions primarily on the perceived threats from a large unassimilated immigrant population, rather than any cultural or structural impacts of immigrants after they assimilate into the receiving society. For this reason, a major theme of restrictionist arguments is to distinguish between
benign (or beneficial) immigration of assimilable populations, and threatening immigration of unassimilable populations.

There is a large literature on assimilation, especially in the United States and Europe. On important factors such as language acquisition, the findings suggest that current immigrants in America assimilate at similar rates to those in the past (Alba & Nee 2003, Water & Jimenez 2005). A consensus study by the National Academies (2017) found that “across all measurable outcomes, integration increases over time, with immigrants becoming more like the native-born with more time in the country, and with the second and third generations becoming more like other native-born Americans than their parents were”.

Despite these encouraging findings, restrictionists often justify policies that limit immigration on the basis that higher numbers would prevent or slow assimilation of groups. This is based on a model of assimilation that assumes adjustment to native culture is in large part determined by the frequency of interactions with natives compared to other members of the diaspora. Where immigrant communities are large or concentrated, it is argued that they will have fewer opportunities to learn native norms and ways of behaving (including language), and conversely that there will be more interactions and experiences that reinforce and perpetuate the norms and behaviors of the immigrant’s country of origin. This is laid out by Collier (2013) as a model that suggests a certain threshold at which immigrant communities will grow at a rate faster than they are assimilated.

The same principle applies to later generations. If children of immigrants grow up outside of the enclave, they will have a similar experience to other children, and the only connection to their immigrant heritage will be through their parents. If instead they grow up within the enclave, the values and norms of the immigrant society can be replicated more completely across generations. The fear is that large
unassimilated populations will emerge and perpetuate themselves across generations even if immigration stops.

However, these assumptions are, once again, made without careful consideration of the extensive literature on assimilation and immigrant enclaves, which provides weak support for the notion that immigration rates and concentration could ever reach levels that would substantively hinder assimilation.

Some empirical studies have found evidence that among the first generation the concentration of immigrants has negative impacts on key markers of assimilation such as language acquisition and earnings. Chiswick and Miller (2005) for example look at concentration of immigrants at the State level in the United States, and control for whether they live in an urban or rural area. They find that these variables are “highly statistically significant”, but the effect size is small. A change in concentration (at the State level) from 0% to 7.8% (the mean) was found to reduce the probability of English fluency by just 3.1 percentage points – a relatively trivial reduction where the mean proficiency was 73%.

They also found earnings to be lower where immigrants are more concentrated. But again, the effect is not dramatic. Among Mexican immigrants, going from a concentration of 0% to 18.1% (the mean) was associated with a 6% reduction in earnings. The effect also appears to be strongly related to education, with the least educated immigrants seeing no real difference in earnings from living in States with a larger diaspora, while educated immigrants experienced larger penalties.

Studying enclaves in Canada, Warman (2007) also found negative impacts of immigrant earnings and language acquisition. The effect sizes are a little larger, but not dissimilar to those found by researchers in the US. The difference in earnings growth for an immigrant between Hong Kong in Montreal with a very low concentration of 0.27%, compared to the enclave city of Vancouver with 5.51%, was just 4 percentage points over a five-year period. The effect on language acquisition was more substantial, with
a 1% change in the immigrant population associated with a 1.2% lower probability of knowing the local native language. But the average level of knowledge was high, at around 86%, meaning that even in very large enclaves we would expect the large majority to acquire competence in the native language.

Duncan and Waldorf (2009) also show that the impact of enclaves on immigrant assimilation differ by the number of naturalized immigrants within the enclave (which they call “maturity” of the enclave). Enclaves with more naturalized citizens in turn made it more probable that new members would naturalize. This “maturity” measure was more important than the size of the immigrant enclave. And it points to an important theoretical point, that assimilation can be thought of as a group process as well as an individual one. There is in fact empirical evidence that finds positive impacts of certain enclaves when observing “natural experiments” of refugees distributed through resettlement programs (Edin et al. 2003, Damm 2009).

The experience of “model minorities” reflects the role that the diaspora can play in the assimilation and success of new immigrants. Research suggests that success among these “model minority” groups is more a consequence of selectivity, and the presence of a significant resources within the ethnic group that can be drawn upon, rather than any cultural attributes of the immigrant’s countries of origin. For example, Portes and Manning (2005) note that Jewish immigrants to the United States in the late 19th and early 20th century greatly benefitted from the economic success and resources of earlier Jewish immigrants in the mid-19th century.

Zhou and Lee (2017) argue that for some Asian-Americans, high selectivity of immigrants on education has led to communities where a “cultural frame” of academic achievement. Rather than being an inherent feature of Asian cultures, this frame is a consequence of having a high concentration of people with advanced education within many Asian-American diasporas. This human capital can be translated into resources that are available to wider co-ethnic networks, for example tutoring centers and SAT prep
courses, which may be run by ethnic entrepreneurs. Many Asian-Americans who are part of the highly selected stream nevertheless benefit from these ethnic resources as they find easy entry into co-ethnic networks.

The mixed empirical evidence does not completely refute the restrictionist theory of assimilation, but it does not provide much support for the idea that mass migration is likely to create unassimilable immigrant communities if left unchecked. Rather, we would expect assimilation to follow the historical pattern of almost complete assimilation by the third generation, and only marginal differences between immigrant groups based on size, concentration, and economic resources.

**Summary**

While restrictionist arguments are widely accepted among many policy makers and members of the public, they are at best weakly supported by the large literature on immigration. In most cases they rely on selective interpretations, or cherry-picked studies. There are cases where research aligns to some extent with restrictionist hypotheses, but typically the literature calls into question assumptions that restrictionists take for granted.

Notably where the literature does suggest possible impacts from immigration, these tend to be modest and marginal. There is no research that provides clear evidence to suggest that collapse, transformation, or profound crises, are likely outcomes of immigration.
Chapter 3

Building the Mass Migration Database

While it is not possible to measure the causal relationship between immigration and social transformation, we can gain a valuable perspective by examining the frequency of transformative events in societies that have and have not experienced mass migration. We can then discuss how well different theoretical arguments fit the empirical evidence. To do this I produced a data set of historical mass migration events across the world and compared it to a data set I produced of political revolutions (which represent the main type of transformative social change).

Because mass migrations are rare events, and their effects may unfold over long periods of time, it is necessary to collect data from as many societies and over as long of a period as possible. For my data set I look at mass migration events going back to 1450 in as many sovereign states as possible, given the limitations of the source material, and my own time and expertise. Observations are divided into decades. In 10-year periods where immigration crosses a threshold of 5% of the population at the beginning of the decade, that country-decade is coded as a mass migration. In ambiguous cases a separate code is used, and the analysis was carried out including and excluding these cases.

I do not code emigration, but the discussions included with this dissertation would provide a good starting point to produce this data, along with some additional time and research.

The Societies Observed

There are a total of 113 states in the dataset, with between 21 and 94 observed in any single decade, and a total 1,974 observed country-decades. Before 1800 the data is sparser with no more than 25 states in any decade, and a total of just 778 country-decades between 1450 and 1800.
Only independent sovereign states are included. Occupied states, colonies, and other territories that lack control of their public affairs may have different experiences with immigration. However, it is states with control of their immigration policy that are relevant to the immigration debate. Occupied territories may often undergo transformative changes due to the actions of the controlling power, and these may be accompanied by population movements (colonization). But the outcome variable that I use – political revolutions – may have a very different meaning in an occupied society. Furthermore, it becomes difficult in cases of occupation and colonization to distinguish between immigration across international borders, and internal migration or invasion.

Immigration may occur in occupied territories as a way to prop up the power of the colonizer. A prominent historical example is the plantation of Protestants in Ireland. A modern example would be the immigrations of Han Chinese into Xinjiang, or Indonesians into West Papua. These are events worthy of research and attention, but they should be analyzed separately from mass migration into sovereign societies – which is the focus of the immigration policy debate.

In most cases, I do not include colonies and occupied territories in population counts for states. Some judgement is necessary here. For example, I do not treat French Canada, the Basque region, or Wales as occupied territories, and include them in the population counts of their respective states. But I do not include the massive population of India (or other parts of the British Empire) when considering the population of Great Britain in the decades of the 19th century.

The data set also does not include Sub-Saharan Africa, due to the challenges of collecting data there before the 20th century. Many African countries were occupied by colonial powers before the 1960s, so would not be included in any case. It would not be too difficult to add African countries after 1960 to the data set, and this is an obvious place for expansion and extension of the current work.
In some cases, states that are historically connected by territory, language, and ethnic identity, are treated as separate entities. For example, Prussia, Germany, West Germany, and East Germany are all included in the data set separately. Where there is general continuity of a population and territorial extent, the territory is treated as a single observation even where the state changes. For example, the USSR and Russia are not separated. Likewise, Austria-Hungary and modern Austria are treated as a single entry. However, in cases where there is a clear discontinuity a successor state may be coded separately, for example after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey is treated as a distinct entity.

These decisions can be fairly complicated, and there is not always a clear way to determine whether one state should be seen as a continuation of a previous one. The decision can be of significance, for example the mass migrations into West Germany during the 1940s are not carried over as mass migrations to the reunited Germany – which is treated in the data as being absent in the 1940s. However, in the 1990s, when Germany was reunified, many of those immigrants were still alive, and their impact on the population and society could still be relevant. Researchers are encouraged to modify the data set to combine or separate entries to test the consequences. During my own testing of the data, I did not find that these decisions materially changed the findings in ways that would alter the conclusions.

**Who is an immigrant?**

To build a database of mass migration it is first necessary to define mass migration. Who is, and who is not an immigrant? Although in many cases data and information sources may count immigrants differently, I have tried to be consistent in estimating immigrant flows using a consistent definition. The definition of an immigrant that I have tried to use is one which I believe most closely approximates the type of immigration that is relevant to policy debates. This includes all voluntary migrants and refugees,
who cross an international border, and settle in the destination country, giving up their former domicile. Forced resettlement of slaves, or subjugated populations across international borders by the receiving society is not included. Foreigners serving in the military as mercenaries, adventurers, or partisans, are not included.

I exclude temporary migrants (workers, tourists, pilgrims, and others) who continue to have an established domicile in another country. In practice it is not always straightforward to distinguish between temporary and permanent immigrants. It is common for immigrants to travel to a foreign country for work with the intention of returning home, but who ultimately remain permanently, or at least for a long period. In other cases, immigrants may settle in a foreign country with the expectation or intention to remain permanently only to be uprooted a second time. Still others may flee to a foreign country as refugees with the hope to return to their country of origin, but the expectation that their exile may be permanent.

As a reasonable approximation of permanent migration, where the evidence shows that immigrants have remained in a country over multiple decades, I have treated them as settled immigrants. The actual behavior of immigrants is more relevant to considering their impact than their intentions, and it is also generally easier to observe. However, there still remain many difficulties in estimating the number of permanent immigrants to temporary, especially where there are large flows of migrant workers – indistinguishable in data sources – of which some remain and other return to their country of origin. In some cases, it is possible to look at arrivals and departures and find the net flow. However, it is not always clear in this type of analysis to which period the arrivals and departures belong. Migrant workers often respond to changing economic conditions. Consider the case where 100,000 immigrants arrive in a boom period in 1905 to 1910, then 80,000 of these depart during an economic crash in 1912. To calculate the net immigrants in the period 1900 to 1910 we should deduct the departures in 1912. For
this reason, it is generally not possible to simply take at face value net migration during a set period without also looking at arrivals and departures in the previous and following periods.

In other cases, rather than arrival and departure data, it might be necessary to look at changes in the total size of the immigrant population. This also raises issues. In most cases the increase in the immigrant population will underestimate the number of immigrants, since there will be some declines from mortality and emigration of earlier immigrants. But as in the previous example, the increase over a decade may appear large, only for many of those immigrants to depart in the following decade.

Other categories that are excluded as immigrants are generally easier to estimate and are often not counted by sources anyway. In some older sources in may be important to ensure that counts do not include slaves or foreigners serving in the military as mercenaries, although since the late 19th century these categories are not generally as relevant.

Wherever possible I do include undocumented and unauthorized immigrants if they fit the definition of being settled in the receiving society. In some societies these populations are substantial and may make the difference between whether a decade meets the threshold for mass migration.

Ideally, I try to measure immigration from the point of arrival, even if the act of settlement occurs later. This can occur where immigrants arrive without immigrant status (e.g. as a student) but later change their status. In practice it is often not possible to make these determinations from the data, and I do not believe there are many cases where it is likely to substantially change the proportions of immigrants in different decades.

In some cases, immigration flows include significant numbers of returning citizens. Generally, I have excluded these people as returning migrants who never intended to give up their native residency. But in a few cases immigrants may have legal citizenship of a country but have never had a settled residency there. The most notable case in the data is the Retornados – Portuguese citizens who had been long
settled in colonial territories, sometimes for multiple generations, and moved back into Portugal during the period of decolonization. In this case I have treated this as immigration.

There are also cases where immigrants move into a territory to which they have some ethnic connection or belonging, despite residing outside of it. For example, Greek communities that had been settled in Anatolia for centuries provided a mass migration in Greece during a “population exchange” between Greece and Turkey. Similarly, after the Second World War, millions of German speaking refugees, who had lived in Eastern Europe for generations, migrated to West Germany. I consider these movements to be immigration. The deciding factor here is whether the person was born and raised in a foreign society.

In some cases, immigrants of this type may be missing in the data, but usually their numbers are not substantial enough to be decisive. And where they are substantial there is usually a discussion of them in the literature.

There are also cases of migration related to changes in borders. For example, as the Ottoman Empire declined, there were large movements of Muslims who migrated from formerly Ottoman territories into the reduced Ottoman Empire. Another important case is the massive movements of Muslims and Hindus across the new borders created from the partition of India when it became independent from Great Britain. In most of these cases I have treated the movements as immigration. The exception is the movement of Karelians from Finnish territory that was invaded by Russia. These refugees who fled into Finland were clearly continuously part of Finnish society.

**A Note on Excluded Migrations**

The primary purpose of the mass migration data set is to provide evidence of whether mass migration has historically been associated with social transformation to inform modern immigration policy. For this reason, the definition of immigration used is limited to the type of population movements that policy modern states make policy around. However, some of the largest population movements in the
period covered are deliberately excluded. This means that any use of the data set for other purposes should consider whether the definition of “immigrant” is suitable.

For example in the history of migration to the Americas, Portes distinguishes several stages of migration of different types (Portes 2020). The first stage was of settler migrations. These are largely excluded from the data set because they represent population movements into colonies and territories that are not independent states. Portes notes that these initial settlers were largely motivated by the availability of land, but as the economies of the New World developed within the capitalist system, they generated a demand for laborers. Large profits could be derived from mineral extraction and cash crops like sugar, but these ventures required significant physical labor. Such labor was difficult to recruit from among the settler population or free migrants, who typically preferred to secure a plot of land and work for their own subsistence, enjoying the independence of self-sufficiency.

Therefore, to fulfill the labor needs of the New World, there was the mass importation of slaves (as well as the enslavement of many of the indigenous peoples). This massive population movement is again does not appear in the data set, as slaves are not treated as immigrants.

It is only the later stages of migration to the Americas, of recruited labor and self-motivated (spontaneous) migrants that appear in the data set. These movements, which coincided with, and were closely connected to, the emergence of industrial manufacturing and urbanization. Whereas earlier demand for labor was in the primary land sector (mining and plantations), the new demand for labor came largely from the rapidly expanding industrial sector (although the primary sector remained, and often still remains dependent of immigrant labor).

It is this last migration type that is primarily included in this data set. And for this reason, many of the conclusions and inferences are most applicable to modern migration since the later 19th century.
In addition to focusing on only specific types of global population movements, the data set also entirely excludes all internal migrations. The largest of these have been rural to urban migrations as countries go through the process of urbanization. Indeed, modern urbanization could be considered simply the mass migration of people into concentrated areas of economic activity. These internal movements have important connections to international immigration. Looked at another way, the mass migrations of the late 19th and early 20th century were simply rural to urban migrations that occurred across borders.

Because these population movements are excluded, it is important to be careful when making any generalizations or drawing inferences from the findings in chapter 4.

**Threshold for Mass Migration**

The threshold for mass migration is determined as 5% of the population at the turn of the decade. For example, if a country had a population of 3 million in 1800, the threshold for mass migration in the decade would be 150,000.

Any choice of threshold must be somewhat arbitrary. A case could be made for a higher or lower figure – say 3% or 8%. To me, five percent seemed most appropriate. It is sufficiently high that it excludes most decades. Of 1,974 country decades only 168 are coded as having mass migrations or possible mass migrations. This is still a somewhat substantial proportion (8.5%) but is both high enough to limit mass migration to high than ordinary immigration levels, and to produce a reasonable number of cases for analysis. It is also high enough to prevent a large number of boundary cases where it is unclear whether or not the threshold was crossed. It is also high enough that we can be fairly confident that immigration reaching the threshold will show at least some evidence in the historical record for most times and places in the data set.

The level also seems reasonable when compared to people’s perceptions of mass migration. It corresponds to roughly 1.6 million immigrants annually into the US, which would represent a modestly
higher rate than what has been seen in recent years. Likewise, it represents a threshold that many European countries crossed or approached in the 1990s or 2000s, a period which many consider having been one of new “mass migration”. It also captures the decades between 1840 and 1930 in the United States – the classic and archetypal mass migration – as well as the important decades of immigration into South America.

There is not necessarily a strong reason to use the population at the start of the decade to determine the threshold, as opposed to the end of the decade – and in most cases this would be approximately equivalent to raising the threshold slightly.

A case could be made to use the middle of the decade, or to estimate the annual rate across the decade. However, these methods would not produce a substantively different data set and would be in many cases the available data would not allow for such precise estimates. Generally, population data is more readily available for the beginning and end of decades.

In practice, the population is often estimated as a range, and may not be estimated for every decade. Making accurate decade by decade estimates would appear more rigorous, but in many cases is unnecessary or not possible. After 1800, and especially after 1900, more precise data is available. But often it is only necessary to know population figures within an order of magnitude. For example, if we know that the population of a state in 1500 was around 2 to 5 million, and between 8 and 12 million in 1700, it would usually be possible to say that the population across these two decades was not less than 1 million. If the largest immigration we have evidence of is around 5,000, we can be quite confident that the threshold was not crossed despite having very wide ranges of possible population figures.

Due to the wide uncertainties around population and immigration figures, there are of course some cases where it is impossible to tell whether immigration crossed the threshold or not. In these cases, the decade is coded a “P” for possible mass migration. There are 41 such decades in the data set, compared
to 127 where the evidence is sufficiently clear to make a confident determination of mass migration. In all of these cases there is evidence for substantial immigration, which if not reaching the threshold was still notable (above 2% or 3%). I prefer to include these cases in my analysis, but the findings are not meaningfully different if they are excluded.

1450 as a starting point

The data set begins in 1450, although some analysis is carried out only on the decades after 1800.

As with other decisions, there is no strong theoretical reason to being in 1450, as opposed to say 1200 or 1600. A longer period is generally desirable to provide both a larger amount of data, and greater generalizability. However, as we move further backwards in time both conceptual problems, and data collection become more complicated.

Although there is no sharp distinction, historical records tend to be better from around the 15th century. This is in part because of greater connections across the globe, so that European records of foreign countries are more available after this period (and these are often the most readily available sources for information about immigration and population).

The 15th century also represents a time of change that is often seen as separating the pre-modern and modern periods. Important events include the development of the printing press in Europe, the Age of Exploration, the rise of the Ottoman Empire, the utilization of gunpowder, and many others. The New Cambridge Modern History begins by saying: “The fall of Constantinople in 1453 and the identification at about the same time in Italy of a medium aevum separating the ancient from the contemporary world were in themselves sufficient to account for the subsequent adoption of the Renaissance as a turning point in the history of western society.” (Potter 1957: 1)
1450 also represent the beginning of the development of modern nation states. Before this date the meaning of immigration, nationality, and borders is somewhat murkier (and often remains so even after this date).

The use of 1450 as opposed to 1500 also allowed for the inclusion of two important events. The Greek refugee flows following the fall of Constantinople, and the Jewish expulsion from Spain.

In retrospect, however, the data before 1800 is possibly not especially valuable. There are few cases of mass migration until well into the 19th century, and those that occur earlier are quite different from modern immigration. They all represent cases of what would today be considered refugees. Labor migration is largely a modern phenomenon. There is a long history of immigrant artisans, but these were small populations before the 19th century. Other labor migrations tended to be tied to agriculture and were seasonal in nature. Other movements of people included slavery (excluded from the data set) or the recruitment of foreigners into the military.

The data set before 1800 also has far fewer states, with many more missing states for which I was not able to collect reliable information. And for the included states, the estimates of population and immigration are far more uncertain – in many cases speculative. For this reason of the seven potential mass migrations before 1800, six are coded as possible. The only one for which the evidence shows a clear exceeding of the threshold is the immigration into the Dutch Republic from the Southern (Spanish) Netherlands in the 1580s.

While the data before 1800 (or even before 1850) is not especially useful for the analysis, it does show that there is probably little to be gained from trying to search even further back in history for evidence of the impacts of mass migration. Such events are simply uncommon, and those which are sometimes referenced (especially the “Barbarian migrations” into the Roman Empire) are actually quite unlike modern migration, and probably would not fit the definition of immigration.
Data Sources Used

The detailed immigration histories included with this dissertation cover the specific sources used for each country, but it is worth giving an overview of the approach and types of sources used.

For many countries there are official census data available from the 19th century, and this data is more widely available from the early 20th century. Often this is a useful starting point. However, census data, especially of immigrant populations is not always reliable. In countries where there is a significant undocumented population, immigration figures may not be entirely accurate. These figures also tend to show a stock of immigrants at one point in time, although in some cases there is also information on timing of arrival. In later decades many countries also have annual data on net migration. These are not always entirely consistent, and it may be necessary to distinguish between immigrants and other arrivals.

From 1960 immigrant stock data for all countries is also available from the World Bank, and from the United Nations since 1990. These data are for stocks, which means that estimating the number of immigrants arriving in any decade requires some assumptions and knowledge of the immigrant population in each country. They also use slightly different definitions of immigrants and methods of calculating populations. However, in many cases this data can be used to quickly exclude decades – for example where the immigrant stock is far below 5%.

The most important source of information is secondary source material. These are often preferable to primary sources, either because they are more transparent in their calculations, or because they make estimates based on a range of available information. In earlier periods, and for places with more complicated immigration history, these sources are vital for getting an accurate picture of immigration. A few of these sources cover whole regions or multiple countries, but often I use sources specific to a country and time-period.
The main problem of secondary sources is that they typically focus on places and periods when immigration is substantial. In many cases, otherwise good demographic histories provide almost no details on immigration. When immigration is low it is often dismissed. It is often difficult to find clear statements that provide evidence of low levels of immigration. However, low levels of immigration can often be inferred. For example, where a historian mentions an immigration as being larger than in previous decades, we can set an upper bound on immigration rates even if we know nothing else about them (which is often sufficient for excluding mass migration). For countries included in the data set after 1940 that are not covered in the supplemental histories, this was usually the method of determining mass migration.

It is also possible to use sources to make inferences about immigrants even if they provide no estimate for total immigrant populations (or no figures at all). For example, if a source mentions that foreign communities existed in several cities, and implies no foreigners outside these places, we can estimate that the total foreign population is some fraction of the urban population. Often urban populations can be at least approximately estimated. Likewise, if the only evidence of foreigners is merchant communities, specialists, and non-immigrant travelers, we can usually exclude the possibility of mass migration. Even if we do not have estimates of the size of a merchant community, it is clear from cases where we do, that such communities are limited to being a few thousand in number in earlier periods.

Sources were found through a variety of methods. Often, I began by reviewing reference books and general histories, including country histories and immigration pages on Wikipedia. This often provides some outlines of where attention should be focused. Searches on Google Scholar, and through the Princeton Library usually provided the secondary sources from which most of the country immigration histories were constructed. I also reviewed the citations in each of these sources to find additional supporting material.
Chapter 4

Overview of the Data for Mass Migration

In total across the 1,974 country decades observed, there are 168 probable or confident cases of mass migration. Among the countries observed in the data set, there is a clear division between the period before the mid-19th century, and the period following. Before 1830 there are only seven potential mass migrations, of which six are uncertain. After 1830 there are 161 mass migrations, with at least one observed mass migration in each decade with the notable exception of the 1930s.

The 1840s are the first decade for which more than one mass migration is observed (there are two, for the United States and Uruguay). From this period there is a quick increase in the frequency of mass migrations, with a sudden halt in the 1930s, followed by a resumption in mass migrations. The highest number of mass migrations is observed in the decade 2000 to 2010, with 22 mass countries experiencing mass migration. Even when accounting for the greater number of states observed in this decade, this is still the highest proportion of countries experiencing a mass migration – a remarkable 23%.

Figure 4.1 shows the frequency of mass migrations as a proportion of the countries in the data set for each decade.
There is a clear distinction in the graph between the modern period, in which mass migrations are a persistent feature, and the pre-modern period in which they are rare events. Other than this distinct separation of modern and pre-modern, one of the most notable features of the data is the anomalous decade of the 1930s in which I found no instances of mass migration. This can probably be attributed in part to the economic crisis during this period. However, a more detailed investigation would show that what appears in the dataset as a single decade, actually represents a longer period of depressed immigration globally that began somewhat earlier in the 1920s and continued until the end of the Second World War. Countries like Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, that have had almost continuous mass migration, saw immigration fall to below the threshold of mass migration in both the 1930s and 1940s. However, in the latter decade, population movements triggered by the global disruptions of the War, raised the number of mass migrations – which often occurred in the compressed period of the five years after the end of the War (for example in Israel and Pakistan).
All of the cases before 1800 relate to what we would today call refugee movements. Two (possible) cases are to Morocco, following the mass expulsion of Jews, and later Moriscos, from Spain. Two are possible decades of mass migration of Protestants into Prussia. Another two relate to migration to the new Dutch Republic, which included some labor migration, but was also in large part a flow of Protestant refugees from the Spanish controlled southern provinces. The earliest migration included is of Greeks to Venice after the fall of Constantinople – another migration that appears to have characteristics of both labor migration and refugee flight.

The results give support to traditional views of immigration that envision a period of mass migration beginning in the 19th century, before which mass migration was uncommon. However, this needs to be qualified. The data set only includes immigrations in the modern sense of people moving non-violently into a sovereign state and permanently settling, voluntarily, within that society. It does not include other large movements of people that were common before 1800. For example, the seasonal movement of workers across borders, people traveling on pilgrimages, as part of an army, or as slaves. Nor does it include internal movements within countries, or between countries and their dependent colonies.

Some examples of important population movements before 1800, that are not included in the data set, would be the Protestant Plantations in Ireland, the early Spanish and British settlers in the Americas, and the Atlantic and Indian Ocean slave trade.

Rather than thinking of the age of mass migration creating mobility across international borders, it is better to think of it beginning a period of modern mass immigration. This modern migration consisted of persons changing their domicile (permanent residency) from one sovereign state to another, submitting to its laws and integrating into its society. While this type of migration was not entirely new, its massive scale and scope was a distinct feature of the industrial period.
When examined at the country level, the data set can also be misleading in creating the impression that mass migration during the 19th century was mostly of Europeans moving to the new frontiers in the Americas and Australasia. While this is true when we consider the large movements into sovereign states, it does not account for some large population movements into or between occupied colonies. For example, Malaysia also experienced massive labor migration in the late 19th and early 20th century but is not included in the data set as it was a British colony.

The modern period of mass migration, beginning in the 19th century, and continuing to the present, can be divided into two periods before and after the immigration slump in the 1930s. This corresponds with traditional notions of mass migration, and some distinctive features can be found for each period.

In the 1830-1930 period of mass migration there are 56 confident or possible cases. Of these 10 are in Europe (including the Ottoman Empire) although generally these are more marginal cases, with 8 of the 10 being coded as possible, rather than confident. 36 (64%) are to the Americas, and the remaining 10 are to Australia and New Zealand. The last figure would be higher if Australia were included in the dataset before 1900, when it was a collection of separate colonies (and higher still if these colonies were included individually). Five countries – the United States, Canada, Argentina, Uruguay, and New Zealand, account for 37 cases (two thirds), and experienced almost constant mass migration throughout the period.

The post-1940 period includes 105 confident or possible cases. Although this is a substantially larger number of cases, this can partly be attributed to there being more observed countries in the data set. The frequency relative to the number of country decades is more similar.

In this second period only 13 cases are in the Americas (12.4%) of which six are to Canada – the only American country to see consistent mass migration in both the pre-1930 and post-1940 periods.
Australia and New Zealand continued to see mass immigration consistently in every decade following 1950, and account for 12 cases. Europe saw 25 cases of mass migration across 17 different countries.

44 cases were to countries in the Middle East. This includes the labor migrations to the Gulf States, which have led to immigrant majorities in several countries. But they also include migration to other Middle Eastern countries such as Jordan, Syria and Israel.

The final 11 cases were in Asian countries – Pakistan, Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei.

Canada and New Zealand have been the most consistent countries of immigration, with almost continuous high levels of immigration. Only between 1930 and 1950 did immigration to New Zealand fall below the threshold for mass migration. Canada also sees migration fall below the threshold in those decades, and it may have fallen below the threshold in the 1890s and 1980s.

Outside of Canada, mass migration to the Americas was largely a phenomena of the 1830-1920 period. Uruguay, Argentina, and the United States experienced mass migration in most of the decades of this period. And several other countries in the Americas experienced at least one decade of mass migration. However, since then mass migration has been the exception. Other than Canada, only Venezuela had indisputable cases of mass migration since 1940. Even the United States was clearly below the threshold used for this study until the 1990s. After this, the number of legal permanent residents admitted continued to be somewhat below the mass migration threshold, but the threshold may well have been narrowly met when unauthorized entries are taken into account.

Likewise, the notion that European countries do not have histories of mass migration is in part confirmed. If Greece and the Ottoman Empire are excluded, only the small state of Luxembourg has clear cases of mass migration before 1930. However, immigration to Switzerland and France was sometimes substantial and may have met the threshold in some decades. Since 1940 several European countries have experienced mass migration, particularly since 1990. For countries such as Italy, Spain,
Norway, Ireland and the UK, the level of immigration experienced in the last generation almost certainly has no historical precedent.

**Overview of the Data for Revolutionary Events**

The data set of revolutionary events shows 183 events. A similar number to the total mass migration events. The data suggests that as with immigration there was an increase in the rate of revolutionary events from the mid-19th century. This should be considered with caution, as it may arise from the definition that I have used to define these events, or from bias in the construction of the data sets. Historical states that experienced revolutionary events may be more likely to have been short lived, and have less available records, and so are more likely to not have been in the data set. I have also distinguished between crises of succession (including coups and usurpations) and true revolutions. If we include these other cases that could be considered institutional discontinuity, the increase of instability in the modern period is still evident, but less pronounced.

Figure 4.2 shows the frequency of revolutionary events as a proportion of the countries in the data set for each decade.
There appear to be two distinct peaks, the first occurring in the 1840s and the second in the 1930s and 1940s. There is also a brief uptick in revolutions in the decade of the 1790s.

The correlation between the rise of mass migration and higher instability since 1800 does suggest that there is a distinct modern period with different dynamics in political forces and immigration. For this reason, looking at the history of immigration before 1800 may provide less valid information for understanding immigration in our own time.

However, simply connecting the rise in mass migration to political instability would be spurious. There were a great many changes occurring in this period, that collectively are labelled “modernization”. These include rapid increases in economic productivity, urbanization, a shift from agricultural work to manufacturing and service jobs, and the demographic transition to lower mortality and lower fertility. Interestingly in the period since 1820 there is some indications of a counter cyclical pattern of mass
migration and revolution (see Figure 4.3). The period where mass migrations peaked between 1880 and 1910 coincides with a period of relatively few revolutionary events. In comparison the 1930s, which began a period of frequent revolutions continuing into the 1940s, saw a halt to global mass migration.

Figure 4.3

The connection between 19th century mass migration and the period of political revolution in the early 20th century is also not evident when looking at the receiving countries. Between 1910 and 1950, 34 countries in the data set experienced a revolutionary event. Of these just six had been receiving countries during the period of mass migration from 1880 to 1930. One country of mass migration in this period (the Ottoman Empire) collapsed and disappears from the data set. Other countries of mass migration, Panama and Argentina, are also not coded as having experienced a revolution – but did suffer from substantial instability and multiple coups during the period.
Of the 16 countries that experienced mass migration from 1880 to 1930, at least nine experienced some degree of instability in the early 20th century (revolutions or coups). However, most of these were in Latin America, where no country went through this period without institutional discontinuity. And overall, this does not show a clear difference from countries that did not experience mass migration, of which there were 43. Among these countries, 28 experienced revolutionary events from 1910 to 1950, and several others saw coups or other forms of political instability. So far, since 1945 the frequency of mass migration has been rising, while revolutions have been declining.

**Frequency of Revolution Following a Mass Migration**

The best test of whether mass migration is threatening to national stability is to look the frequency of revolutionary events in decades following a decade of mass migration. We can then compare this to the rate of revolutionary events following decades that do not experience a mass migration. This is shown in Figure 4.4 below.

---

5 Only Honduras is not coded as having experienced any coups or revolutions, however, during the period it was occupied by US troops several times.
The most important takeaway from the graph is that the frequency of revolutions following a mass migration is distinctly lower than the frequency of revolutions where no mass migration occurred. In simple terms mass migration is associated with greater stability over the following decades. However, it is important to note this is a statistical association and does not necessarily imply any particular causal effect of mass migration.

The graph shows that revolutionary events become less likely over time. For each decade that a state “survives” we can infer that it is less likely to fail in the following decade. This could be a function of states building legitimacy and resilience over time, or it could reflect that states which survive a given decade are more likely to have already had the characteristics required for survival in following decades.

This effect is less clear in states which experience a mass migration, although the frequency of revolutions in the decade immediately succeeding a mass migration is slightly higher than in later decades, suggesting a similar effect may be in play.
The demonstrated association could be explained in several ways. Firstly, it could represent a true impact of mass migration, where high level of immigration stabilizes and reinforces existing political institutions and power structures. This would be consistent with the arguments of scholars like Calavita (1984), Zolberg (2006), Jupp (2007), and White (2018), who see certain immigration flows as having been controlled and shaped by capitalist interests.

A second explanation is that immigrants typically move to states that have strong, stable, institutions and social structures. This could either be because immigrants value stability itself, or because they value other characteristics of stable societies, such as liberal democratic institutions, high economic productivity, and low levels of interpersonal violence.

If this latter explanation is correct, the actual impact of mass migration could be neutral, or possibly even slightly destabilizing. However, there is an upper limit to the possible negative impact of mass migration. If we were to assume that societies experiencing mass migration would otherwise be so stable that they never experienced revolutions, the implied impact of mass migration would only be to increase the probability from 0 to around 0.16 over the next five decades. This may seem like a moderately severe risk, but it should be seen in the perspective that the probability of revolution in countries which do not experience mass migrations is around 0.28 over five decades.

If we limit the analysis to decades after 1800, the difference between countries of mass migration and other states actually becomes clearer.
Mass Migrations Followed by Revolutionary Events

The relative rarity of revolutionary events following a decade of mass migration mean that there are few enough of them that we can review the cases qualitatively.

I identify 14 cases where mass migration was followed by a revolutionary event in the next 50 years. In the data this appears as 20 observed decades followed by revolution events, but in several cases consecutive decades of mass migration are followed by a single revolutionary event. The 14 cases are shown in table 4.1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Revolutionary Event / Decade</th>
<th>Preceding Mass Migration / Decade(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Restoration of Monarchy and 4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; of August Regime, 1930s</td>
<td>Greek-Turkish population exchange, 1920s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>Overthrow of Milosovic, 2000s</td>
<td>Possible Mass Migration from rest of Balkans, 1990s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottoman Empire</td>
<td>Abdulaziz deposed and First Constitutional Era, 1870s</td>
<td>Possible Mass Migration from Eastern Europe, 1860s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottoman Empire</td>
<td>Young Turk Revolution, 1900s</td>
<td>Possible Mass Migration from Eastern Europe, 1870s-1880s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Wattasid dynasty replaced by Saadi dynasty, 1540s</td>
<td>Possible Mass Migration of Jewish exiles from Spain, 1490s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Lebanese Civil War, 1970s</td>
<td>Mass Migration of Palestinians, 1940s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>US Civil War 1860s</td>
<td>European Mass Migration, 1840s-1850s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>1933 Revolution (Sergeants’ Revolt), 1930s</td>
<td>Mass Migration 1900s-1920s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Time Period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>Coup and Presidency of Trujillo</td>
<td>1930s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mass Migration of Haitians</td>
<td>1920s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>Perez Deposed 1958, 1950s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Possible Mass Migration, 1940s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1930 coup, 1930s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mass Migration of Europeans,</td>
<td>1890s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>1948 Civil War, 1940s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mass Migration, 1900s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>1933 Self-Coup, 1930s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mass Migration, 1880s-1900s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1958 Coup, 1950s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Partition related population movements, 1940s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Six of these cases occurred in Latin America – and if we considered a wider set of extra-constitutional events we could add additional countries in this region. Coups, regime changes, and revolutions have been a persistent feature of Latin American history among both the countries that experienced mass migration and those that did not. For example, there were revolutionary events in countries like Honduras and El Salvador that did not receive large numbers of immigrants.

In several cases the immigration was related to expulsions, or refugee movements, and the immigrant group were culturally, ethnically, or religiously similar to the receiving society. This was especially true in the case of the “population exchanges” in Greece and Pakistan, where movements were intended to increase homogeneity of the population. The immigrants to the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century were largely Muslims from territories that had been recently controlled by the Ottomans and continued to have cultural ties to the Ottoman Empire.
The case of the United States rests on the debatable inclusion of the Civil War as a revolutionary event. And as has been mentioned previously, immigration is not generally considered an important factor leading to the Civil War.

Although this list invites further qualitative investigation of the specific histories, it does not appear to be very consistent with restrictionist hypotheses. What most of these cases appear to have in common is that mass migration occurred in a context of already weak states facing crisis or chronic issues. In some cases, the mass migrations and revolutionary events might have a common connection in regional instabilities.

**Mass Migration and Polity Scores**

Although the data set of revolutionary events is useful for looking at the relationship between mass migration and transformative change in social life, it is limited to looking at the most dramatic changes. Additionally, it does not evaluate the direction of change. Revolutionary events include both failures of liberal democracies, and the overthrow of autocratic regimes.

By using the Polity IV data, we can look at changes in political institutions that do not meet the definition of a revolutionary event but are nevertheless large shifts. It also allows us to look at whether countries experience declines, or gains, in their democratic scores, following a mass migration.

The Polity IV scores are only available from 1800, however, this still allows us to consider the whole modern period, in which most mass migrations took place. The data set from 1800 onwards includes over 100 mass migrations, and more than 1,000 country decades to be analyzed (owing to the higher number of states included in the 19\textsuperscript{th} and 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries). However, because of the shorter period, I will limit the graphs to comparisons in the six following decades.
Figure 4.6 shows the frequency of major institutional changes involving a decline in a country’s polity score by 6 points or more, or a codebook score at the beginning of a decade indicating a period of institutional transition, interregnum, or interruption (meaning foreign occupation). The overall picture is very similar to the one seen previously, with decades of mass migration being less likely to be followed by a negative institutional change. Although at six decades out the proportion of negative events is slightly higher following a mass migration, this represents a relatively small number of observations, and is not a statistically significant difference.

As before we see an indication that countries which “survive” a decade are more likely to survive the following decades, both for those which have recently experienced mass migration and those which have not.

While many of the Polity score changes overlap with the revolutionary events previously used, the correspondence is only loose. Using the alternative method of identifying institutional discontinuity with the Polity IV scores actually produces significantly fewer transformative events. This may be because it
considers only negative changes in score (changes that make a country less democratic), and also because this method considers only scores at the beginning and end of a decade. In some cases, a country may experience a revolutionary event, quickly followed by another, which may “cancel out” in terms of movements in Polity score. Finally, there may be some events that involve changes in power and institutional ideology, but which see little change along the particular dimension of autocracy and democracy, for example where a leftist dictatorship replaces a rightist dictatorship.

In total using the Polity IV scores I identify 94 discontinuities since 1800, compared to 155 in my historical review of events (covering the same set of countries). Of these 94, only 44 (47%) overlap with a revolutionary event decade. In some cases, this may be because the score change associated with an event is identified in the following decade in which it occurred. However, more generally the two methods of identifying discontinuities simply identify different historical episodes.

In some ways this is disconcerting. It demonstrates how identifying such abstract notions as “social transformation” depends strongly on the method used. However, the fact that two highly different methods of determining transformative events both produce very similar results, suggests that the association of mass migration with stable states is sound.

Using the Polity IV data, we can also observe that mass migrations are more likely to occur in democratic countries. The average Polity score of countries in the decade of mass migration is 2.8 (on a scale of -10 to 10) compared to an average score of -0.7 in country-decades without mass migration. Although there is high variance in both groups, this is a substantial difference and one that is statistically significant with more than 99% confidence.

When we compare the changes in scores over the following decades, we find that there is a trend of increasing scores – which reflects the historical progress of democratic institutions across the 19th and 20th centuries. This rise in scores occurs both following a mass migration and following a decade where
no mass migration occurred. Figure 4.7 suggests the mass migration is associated with more democratic institutions at the time of the mass migration, and that over time countries experiencing mass migration continue to maintain more democratic institutions. On average countries experiencing mass migration may even see a faster movement towards more democratic institutions.

**Figure 4.7**

![Polity Score Following Migration](image)

This effect might be in part due to mass migration occurring in later decades, with scores increasing with time and the decades of mass migration representing later start dates. To account for this, I carried out the analysis with scores normalized by decade. The results are shown in Figure 4.8, which is almost completely indistinguishable from Figure 4.7, showing that the timing of mass migrations is not important.
Conclusions

Even when looking at a large data set of mass migrations going back five centuries, we are limited in what we can learn from the data. We cannot know with any confidence what would have occurred in countries that experienced mass migration if that immigration had not occurred. However, important policy decisions must often be made with much less information. Indeed, that is what countries have been doing with immigration for many years.

What we can say with some confidence is that historically countries that experienced mass migration tended to be more successful in the following decades than other countries. They experienced fewer discontinuities in their political institutions and maintained political institutions that were more democratic. Based on the evidence from institutional scores from the Polity IV index, it appears that
these advantages were already held at the time of mass migration, but that they did not tend to diminish following a mass migration event.

It is possible that in the absence of mass migration countries would have experienced even fewer failures of their institutions, and have become even more democratic, even faster. However, this requires some rather heroic assumptions – and still the negative impacts of mass migration would be less apocalyptic than the predictions of many pundits.

Where we do see revolution and institutional failure following a mass migration, we tend to see situations where regional or local conditions were already unfavorable to political and social stability. And rather than seeing this in the context of prolonged immigration of culturally different ethnic groups, it tends to have occurred mostly in the context of Latin America, or in regions where immigration was from neighboring countries, often of groups that were ethnically, religiously, or culturally similar to the population of the receiving country.

While the data cannot disprove restrictionist claims, the historical picture of immigration that emerges is far more consistent with what would be expected from a Surface Change theory of mass migration, rather than the claims of restrictionist authors.
Chapter 5

Immigration and Democratic Institutions in the period 1990 to 2011

As mentioned in the introduction to this dissertation. There has been some recent literature which attempts to address the relationship between immigration and institutions. Much of it a direct response to Borjas proposition that economic gains of immigration may be substantially reduced by the importation of institutions that lower productivity towards the levels of the immigrants’ origin countries.

Clark et al. (2015) use the *Economic Freedom of the World* Index as a measure of institutions and use regression models to look empirically at the relationship between immigration (stocks and flows) and this measure of economic freedom between 1990 and 2011 for 110 countries. Their results show some evidence of a small positive relationship.

In a subsequent paper three of the authors (Powell, Clark and Nowrasteh 2017) look at the case of Israel as an example of a “natural experiment”, experiencing a sudden and large migration from the former Soviet Union during the 1990s. They conclude that mass migration to Israel had an impact on “institutions” in the narrow sense of economic freedoms, but that this impact was positive. The authors posit that the mechanism by which immigrants influenced institutional change was involvement in the political process.

Nowrasteh, Forester and Blondin (2020) draw similar conclusions from a case study of refugee migration to Jordan in the early 1990s.

Padilla and Cachanosky (2018) look at the impact of immigration on institutions in the United States at the State level. Like Clark et al. they use a measure of economic freedom, the 2015 *Economic Freedom of North America* report (Stansel et al. 2016). They find the relationship between economic freedom and immigration to be “not significant or weakly significant”.
While these studies address Borjas primary criticism – that institutional “spill-overs” could eliminate the economic gains of open borders – they are narrowly focused on economic institutions and the subsequent impact on productivity. However, within the immigration debate there is a much broader interest in the impacts of immigration on institutions and culture within the receiving societies. In Europe and America, restrictionist arguments against immigration frequently raise concerns not only about the economic consequences of migration, but also the consequences for Western Civilization – its traditions, norms and social structure.

Quite reasonably, many in the immigrant destination countries value not only the economic institutions that have allowed high productivity, but also the liberal and democratic institutions that ensure (amongst other things) impartial justice, freedom of expression, freedom of conscience and the right to participate in political processes. Such beneficent institutions are deeply valued in and of themselves regardless of the implications for productivity and material wellbeing.

Previously I have shown that using a historical data set of mass migrations, it is possible to show that countries which experienced mass migration events have on average been less likely to experience transformational political changes, and do not typically see any declines in the democratic quality of their institutions.

There are advantages to looking over a long historical period. However, there are also some advantages to focusing more narrowly on a short period. In this chapter I follow the approach of Clark et al. (2015) and look at immigration and institutional change over the period 1990 to 2011. However, rather than using measures of institutions that are oriented around economic freedom, I use indexes that are designed to measure more broadly how free and democratic a country’s institutions.

Data and Methodology
I have followed the approach of Clark et al. (2015) using the United Nations Population Division
*International Migrant Stock* data from 2017. This is a more recent data set but I use the same time
period 1990 to 2010. Where Clark et al. use the *Economic Freedom of the World* (EFW) index as a
measure of “institutions”, I have substituted three indices: the Polity IV index, designed to measure the
extent of democratic and autocratic institution; and two indices from the Freedom in the World Report,
one for Civil Liberties and one for Political Freedoms. Each of these indices measures institutions
differently, but together they should capture the values and qualities that restrictionists claim are
threatened by immigration.

It is not necessary to make any normative assumption that countries scoring highly on these indices
have inherently superior institutions. All that is necessary is that the scores in these indices align with
the institutional forms that are supposedly protected by restrictions on free migration.

The Polity IV index ranges from -10 (entirely autocratic) to +10 (entirely democratic). There are 139
countries for which there are polity scores in 1990 and 2011 as well as migration stocks in 1990 and
2010. After excluding countries coded in Polity IV as being in a period of institutional transition or
interruption in 1990 or 2011 there are 127 remaining countries in the data set.

The Freedom in the World indices range from one to seven, with one being the most free and seven being
the least free. When combined with the UN data on migration there are 123 observations in the data set.
For clarity in this analysis I have reverse coded these scores so that one is the least free and seven is the
most free.

The stock is calculated as the number of immigrants as a percent of the total population. The stock
change is the change in percentage points of the stock as a percent of the population; this approximates
to some extent the level of net migration. However, this figure will also be influenced by the native
population growth (or decline) of the country during the period, as well as declines in the immigrant
stock through mortality and emigration. Changes in the immigrant stock from mortality can vary significantly across countries because immigrant populations are often highly concentrated within certain age groups. A country that has experienced recent immigration is likely to have a mostly young immigrant population, and the decline from mortality over a 20-year period could be very low. On the other hand a country that experienced a large wave of immigration in the 1950s would likely have many immigrants in 1990 aged 60 and older. Over a 20-year period this immigrant population could decline by a very substantial amount.

In some countries the immigrant stocks may also include large populations of immigrant workers or refugees who may be only precariously settled in the country. Major political or economic changes could prompt significant return migration from these populations, reducing the immigrant stock through emigration. For these reasons, there are a substantial number of countries in the data that have negative changes to their immigrant stock.

Although the standard approach in this type of study is to fit regression models with controls, I instead simply plot the changes in institutional measures against the stock in 1990 and change in stock. Although I have run several regression models on this data (and discuss them in an appendix to this dissertation), I believe simple scatter plots of the data are more transparent and informative here.

**Results**

Figure 1.1 shows a scatter plot with the change in polity score on the Y-axis and change in the immigrant stock (as a percentage of the total population) on the X-axis. The plot shows that the large majority of countries experienced an increase in polity scores (positive values on the Y-axis).

Rather than fitting a linear pattern, the data show that countries with high growth in immigrants (increase in the stock of immigrants by more than five percentage points) saw no change in their institutions or small improvements. In contrast countries with small or negative changes to their
immigrant stock saw a range of outcomes that include unchanging institutions, large improvements to institutions and in a few cases substantially declines in democratic institutions.

**Figure 5.1**

The graph shows that there were no examples of countries that experienced both high immigration and substantial improvements in their democratic institutions during the period. This might raise some concerns that mass immigration hinders institutional reform in autocratic countries. However, the primary concern of restrictionists is that mass immigration will erode the institutions of democratic and developed countries. There are no cases of this in the data (high immigration and a decline in polity score).
While the data do not support the conclusion that mass migration will lead to the degradation of institutions, they do raise the question of why improving institutions are not seen in conjunction with high levels of migration. This can be understood in part by the fact that most high immigration countries have no room for improvement in polity score—they are already at the highest attainable score.

Figure 1.2 show the same scatter plot with the most democratic countries marked in green (these countries have the maximum polity score of 10) and the most authoritarian countries (with the minimum possible polity score of -10) marked in red.

**Figure 5.2**
Of the 18 countries where the immigrant stock has increased by more than 5%, 12 had maximally democratic institutions in 1990. None of these countries saw any decline in the quality of their institutions.

The high immigration countries also include three that were maximally authoritarian in 1990. It is notable that these countries (Bahrain, Qatar and Oman) did not see any substantial improvements in the quality of their institutions. The remaining countries were Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and Singapore – all of which tended authoritarian (negative polity scores) and saw little or no change in their scores over the period.

The most plausible reading of the data is that migrants generally prefer countries with more democratic institutions (or that migration to these countries is less difficult or costly). The Gulf States represent a second set of countries with a very different model of immigration that has resulted in very large numbers of foreigners entering those societies. The data show that in the case of democratic countries high immigration has not caused any decline in democratic institutions. However, immigration to the Gulf States has also coincided with stable autocratic institutions, whereas the general movement of countries has been towards institutions that are more democratic.

The data are consistent with the possibility that immigration tends to slow progress in more autocratic countries towards democratic institutions. However, it is possible that high immigration and entrenched autocracy coincide in the Gulf States despite the two not being directly related. It could also be the case that immigrants tend to prefer countries with strong and stable institutions whether they are autocratic or democratic.

**Freedom in the World Index**

Figure 5.3 shows a plot of the data from the “Civil Liberties” component of the Freedom in the World Index.
We see that countries with the strongest civil liberties (green) mostly see no change in scores between 1990 and 2010. These also account for several of the countries with the highest rates of immigration. The Gulf States (Bahrain, Qatar and Oman) that were maximally authoritarian in the Polity IV data set had scores of 3 or 2, meaning that despite having relatively poor civil liberties in 1990 there was some room for the Freedom in the World index to show a worsening situation. We do see a single case of a country experiencing both high immigration and a deterioration of civil liberties – Italy, where the immigration stock increased by about 7 percentage points and civil liberties score declined from 7 (the maximum) to 6. However, the UK, which also experienced an increase in the immigrant stock of 5.6 percentage points, improved from a civil liberties score of 6 to 7.

Figure 5.4 show the “Political Rights” component of the Freedom in the World Index.
Figure 5.4

Plotting the data shows that there are no cases of countries with a maximum political rights score of 7 and high immigration (5 percentage point or greater change in immigrant stock) that see any adverse changes. There are two countries in the data set that experienced both high immigration and worsening political rights: Jordan and Singapore. Both countries began with relatively poor scores for political rights in 1990 - for Jordan a score of 3 and for Singapore a score of 4. Both experienced a decline in scores by a single point.

Countries in Transition

The Polity IV index includes some countries that are missing a polity score because of interregnum, foreign intervention or transitional governments. These countries were excluded from the data, which
could potentially bias results where such interruptions to institutions are associated with immigration. In fact, it is precisely an association with these kinds of interruptions that would most validate concerns about immigration. While this type of association was tested much more extensively in the previous chapters, it is worth briefly reviewing the countries that were coded as in “transition” during this period.

The set of excluded countries does not contain any liberal democracies. In 1990, Benin, Liberia, Gabon, Lebanon, Yemen, Kuwait and Cambodia experienced interruptions. In 2010: Haiti, Bosnia, the Ivory Coast, Somalia and Afghanistan. The excluded countries had a slightly higher mean stock of immigrants in 1990 of 9.6% of their population as opposed to 6.4% for countries included in the analysis. The excluded countries saw on average no change in their immigrant stocks whereas on average for other countries there was a slightly increase.

The higher average stock is mostly driven by the inclusion of Kuwait, which in 1990 was occupied by Iraq. Kuwait’s immigrant stock made up more than half the population in 1990. Kuwait’s immigrant stock increased by 11 percentage points over the period, a substantial amount. We do have polity scores for Kuwait in 1989 and 1991 of -10 and -9 respectively. In 2010 Kuwait’s score was -7, a two or three point improvement. This would have added a data point with high immigration and an improvement in institutional score (although a modest one).

No other country saw a substantial increase in migrant stock over the period, but three other countries had substantial migrant stocks in 1990 - Gabon, Lebanon and the Ivory Coast. Gabon saw a huge improvement of 14 points in its score between 1989 and 2011, or an improvement of 7 points if we instead compare 1991 and 2011 (still a substantial increase). Lebanon has no scores during the long running civil war there between 1975 and 2004. For the Ivory Coast, the scores are interrupted for the years 2002 to 2010. In 2011, the score was 4, an 11 point improvement over the 1990 score.

Discussion
Although the three data sets use quite different measures, they all produce a similar pattern of data. Most countries fall in the region of modest changes to the migrant stock (plus or minus 5 percentage points) and over half of the countries for which we have data saw the migrant stock change by less than 2 percentage points. In both 1990 and 2010 around two thirds of countries had migrant stocks of less than 5% of the population. It is among these low immigration countries that we often see the most dramatic changes in democratic institutions, civil liberties and political freedom.

Using the Polity IV index the country that saw the most substantial improvement in democratic institutions was Zambia, which went from almost completely autocratic (polity score of -9) to moderately democratic (polity score of 7). In 1990 Zambia was on the brink of change, with riots against dictator Kenneth Kaunda occurring in the capital that summer. In 1991 multiparty democracy was reinstated, and since then the country has held several competitive elections. Zambia saw a small decline in its migrant stock from 1990 to 2010 from about 3.5% to 1% of its population. This decline was mostly a result of refugees from Angola and Mozambique returning to their home countries.

The most dramatic deterioration of institutions was in The Gambia, which went from a +8 to a -5 score in the index. In 1990 The Gambia was under the rule of Dawda Jawara, who like Kaunda was one of the African leaders who had held power continuously from their country’s independence. However, relative to many of his contemporaries in Sub-Saharan Africa he was a moderately democratic leader. In 1994 Jawara was deposed in a bloodless coup-d’état lead by Yahya Jammeh who would take a much more aggressive stance in suppressing opposition to his rule (which lasted until 2017). Like Zambia, The Gambia saw a small decline in its immigrant stock of a little under 2 percentage points, but this was from a much higher starting point of 13% of the population. Most immigrants in 1990 were from neighboring countries, particularly Senegal, which surrounds The Gambia. Very little had changed by 2010, and the number of migrants had actually increased slightly, but not as fast as the native population growth.
Large changes also occurred in the Freedom in the World measures of civil liberties and political freedoms. The most adverse changes were for The Gambia on civil liberties and Venezuela on political freedoms. The biggest improvements were in Cape Verde (civil liberties) and Ghana (political freedom). None of these countries saw much change in their migrant stocks, which in the case of Ghana and Cape Verde were very small.

Other countries that saw their position get worse in the indexes include Fiji, Ecuador, Thailand, and Zimbabwe. Only the latter to saw any notable change in their migrant stock. In the case of Thailand, it increased from about 1% to 5% of the population (most immigrants came from neighboring Burma, Laos and Cambodia). In Zimbabwe, the migrant stock fell from 6% to 3% of the population due to refugees returning to Mozambique and native population growth.

Among the group of countries seeing major improvements in one or more of the indices were Indonesia, Guyana, Bhutan, Romania, Albania and several countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. For the most part these countries had small migrant stocks that changed little during the period. Among those that broke this pattern were countries like Malawi, Sierra Leone and Burundi, which experienced a declining migrant stock as a result of large refugee populations in 1990 (from Mozambique, Liberia and Rwanda respectively) that by 2010 had often returned to their home countries. Bhutan and Suriname saw the stock of immigrants increase slightly as a percentage of the population, but being very small countries, this represented only a very small number of migrants (tens of thousands).

Among the high immigration countries, it is much harder to find examples of change. They are notable instead for their surprising stability. In the Polity IV data set 57 of 124 countries (a little under half) saw either no change or a single point change in their score (in either direction). However, among the 18 countries where the immigrant stock increased by more than 5 percentage points all but three saw no
change. One country (Jordan) saw a one point improvement, and two countries (Bahrain and Oman) saw a two point improvement.

In the Freedom in the World indices, Singapore, Italy and Jordan scored worse in 2010 than 1990, while Qatar, Oman and the United Kingdom scored better – in all these cases by a single point on either political freedom or civil liberties.

The closest I could find to a country that experienced notable migration, and a clear deterioration of liberal democratic norms, was Ecuador. In 1990, Ecuador had only around 80,000 immigrants in a population of almost 10 million – less than 1% of the population. Most were from other South American countries, and about half from neighboring Colombia. By 2010 the number of migrants in Ecuador had risen to 330,000, with most of the increase accounted for by Colombian refugees. There was an evident weakening of democratic and liberal norms. Ecuador scored fairly well on all three measures with a Polity score of 9 and Freedom in the World scores of 6 in both civil liberties and political freedoms. By 2010, the country had fallen to a 5 in the Polity index and decreased to 5 in both Freedom in the World indices. A real if not extreme change.

These changes reflect real institutional crises. In 1996 the President Abdala Bucaram was impeached – a controversy over his successor ensued. A few years later, the presidency of Jamil Mahaud witnessed a severe economic downturn which lead to his ouster amidst a military revolt and popular protests. This would happen again in 2005 when Lucio Gutierrez was forced out of office and into political asylum in Brazil. De la Torre and Ortiz Lemos (2016) argue that this series of crises weakened liberal democratic institutions, which were then further eroded by populist Rafael Correa.

However, Ecuador hardly fits the standard scenario of immigration undermining the institutions of the receiving country that restrictionists hypothesize. Firstly, the amount of immigration was modest – far
less than in Spain, Italy and Ireland. Secondly, the immigrants were from a neighboring country with a common language, racial composition, and Catholic religion.

To put it bluntly, there is not a single data point that is consistent with the restrictionist hypothesis. If immigrants bring a different set of values and norms there is no evidence that this posed a significant risk to institutions in liberal democratic societies in the period from 1990 to 2011. Of course, this does not necessarily mean that greater numbers or different types of immigrants would not have had profoundly negative consequences. But some countries did manage large migrant stocks (Australia, Switzerland, Canada) or experience dramatic increases in those stocks (Spain, Ireland, Cyprus, Italy) and in some cases both (New Zealand, Luxembourg, United States). In most of these countries, many of the immigrants were culturally, linguistically, religiously, and racially distinct from the native population. In many cases they were also poor, with only basic skills and education (at least in comparison to the populations of the receiving countries). None of these countries saw a clear breakdown or erosion of their liberal democratic norms and institutions (see table below).

**TOP 10 Liberal Democracies by Migrant Stock as a Percent of Population in 1990**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>6:6</td>
<td>6:6</td>
<td>6:6</td>
<td>6:7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>10:10</td>
<td>7:7</td>
<td>7:7</td>
<td>7:7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>10:10</td>
<td>7:7</td>
<td>7:7</td>
<td>7:7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>10:10</td>
<td>7:7</td>
<td>7:7</td>
<td>7:7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Stock change in percentage points</td>
<td>Polity Score 1990-2010</td>
<td>Civil Liberties Score 1990-2010</td>
<td>Political Freedom Score 1990-2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>10:10</td>
<td>7:7</td>
<td>7:7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>10:10</td>
<td>7:7</td>
<td>7:7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>10:10</td>
<td>7:7</td>
<td>7:7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>9:9</td>
<td>6:7</td>
<td>7:7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>10:10</td>
<td>7:7</td>
<td>7:7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>10:10</td>
<td>7:7</td>
<td>7:7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOP 10 Liberal Democracies by Change in Migrant Stock as a Percent of Population, 1990-2010**
In three out of the four cases in these two tables, where the three index scores were not already as favorable as possible, there was an improvement in at least one measure (Israel, France, UK) with Greece as the only exception.

Only in the case of Italy was a measure worse in 2010 than 1990. And this could be considered something of a fluke. If the years of comparison were instead 1993 and 2013, Italy would have seen a 2 point improvement in its civil liberties score. In any case, if immigration were eroding Italian civil liberties it would be hard to explain why they have improved since 2010 despite the continued presence of a large recent number of immigrants, unless the impacts were extremely short term.

Conclusion

The empirical evidence available does not allow us to say with any confidence what the impacts of unrestricted mass migration would be for any particular society. The data used here covers only the period 1990-2011. During this time, most countries had in place significant controls on immigration and there are only a few cases of countries with very large migrant stocks or very large changes to the migrant stock. Under freer migration, the composition and quantity of immigrants could change substantially.

The empirical evidence does call into question whether dramatic impacts on institutions and social norms should be considered commonsense inevitabilities. Using three different measures that relate to institutional quality we find that countries with high immigration have not experienced any deterioration in the quality of their institutions. There is a possible inference that immigration might be
associated with the slower adoption of more democratic and liberal institutions and norms in more authoritarian countries, but the evidence for this is not strong or convincing.

When looking at institutions and norms from a broader perspective than economic freedom we find that the results of Clark et al. (2015) of a positive relationship between immigrants and institutions are not clearly replicated. Overall, the relationship is ambiguous, and although the data do not exclude the possibility of a positive impact of immigration, that is not the picture which emerges. High immigration countries did not see much change of institutions and norms in either direction and migrant stocks and flows did not typically show an association with changes towards greater democracy and freedom. Although, in many cases the countries of high immigration did not have the opportunity to improve their scores, as they were already at the maximum.

Overall, this evidence from a much shorter modern period fits with what was seen when looking at mass migration events over a much longer historical period. It is among low immigration societies that we see substantial social change (both positive and negative). And this is most likely a product of immigrant choices. Instability, and weak institutions, are likely to make a country less attractive as an immigrant destination. And where we do see substantial immigration coincide with institutional problems, it appears to be in places where immigrants are refugees, or from neighboring countries (e.g. Ecuador and The Gambia). In these cases, immigrants may be acting under much more constrained choices.
Chapter 6

One of the main purposes of this dissertation is to provide the big picture of immigration and social change. When looked at on a global scale, and across decades and centuries, what are the patterns that emerge. The advantage of a systematic approach compared to case studies is that it allows us to distinguish between the general and the particular. This is especially useful for policy makers when considering what the potential outcomes of hypothetical mass migrations in the future might be.

However, case studies will remain a valuable tool for studying the effects of immigration on society. The interaction of immigrants with social structures and institutions is complicated, and only through more focused case studies (qualitative and quantitative) can the processes be better understood. Rather than replacing case studies, a systematic overview provides a stronger basis on which to pursue case studies. It allows each case to be considered within a larger context.

In this chapter I provide one example of a case study that allows us to investigate more closely how mass migration connects to institutional change in two countries with much in common, but a key difference in the strength of their institutions. I compare the mass migration of Chinese refugees from the mainland to Taiwan and Hong Kong as a result of the Chinese Civil War, concentrated mainly in 1949 and the immediate years after. These migrations were numerically very large (in comparison to the populations of the receiving regions), became long-term, and were class diverse – including both lower skilled workers as well as Kuomintang officials, industrialists and a large number of soldiers. As such they are ideal cases for examining the consequences of massive migration on institutions and economic development.

Both migrations are within the criteria I set out earlier for mass migration (greater than 5% of the receiving country population over a ten-year period) – and actually much larger. They might even be
considered *telluric* migrations. A name coined by Portes (2010) to describe immigrations on a scale so large that they have major impacts at on the demography of a country.

Although important differences between the two refugee flows exist, the similarities and concurrent timing allow us to consider the differences in the contexts of reception in Hong Kong and Taiwan. While there are substantial cultural similarities between the two territories, their history before 1949 meant that at the time of the migration the social structure and institutional context of arrival was very different. Hong Kong was a British colonial possession, with strong institutions and established structure. Taiwan meanwhile had been ruled by the Japanese, and on their departure in 1945 the island became a society in transition – its traditional social structures and institutions disrupted and in a process of reconstruction.

While in previous chapters I have looked at indices that score political institutions on how well they conform to liberal democratic ideals, here I consider a slightly different perspective on institutional quality. Rather than looking at whether the institutions of these countries were liberal and democratic, I look at how they conformed to the concept of “developmental institutions” and the “developmental state”.


A developmental state may be described as one that facilitates economic growth (and broader improvements in welfare) through top down initiatives and interventions. Adopting the framework of Yu-shan Wu (2007), the characteristics of developmental states are: 1) a consensus between elites,
administrative actors and political elites; 2) a bureaucracy, or institutions, that are functional and have a deep reach into society; 3) a state that is sufficiently free of foreign and vested domestic interests to act autonomously; 4) access to international markets and information flows.

While the concept of states playing a developmental role has a long history (see for example Alexander Hamilton’s “Report of the Subject of Manufactures”) the modern conception of the developmental state originates with Chalmers Johnson’s 1982 study of the Japanese economy in MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975. Johnson raises the importance of a developmental consensus - “[a] state’s first priority will define its essence” (Johnson 1982: 305) - and bureaucratic reach, arguing that the essential features of the bureaucracy are that it is “staffed by the best” and has “sufficient scope to take initiative” (Johnson 1982: 314 - 315). It is from Johnson’s pioneering work that Wu’s four characteristics of the developmental state are ascertained (Wu 2007: 980).

Evans (1979) likewise argues that in late developing or “peripheral” regions, a strong autocratic state with a professional and wide reaching bureaucracy can play a developmental role in conjunction with local elites and international capital. Evans uses the expression “embedded autonomy” to describe the existence of a developed bureaucratic apparatus with the capacity to intervene, combined with private actors providing decentralized implementation of development (Evans 1994, 1995).

Evans also argues that Weberian bureaucracy (i.e. uncorrupt, meritocratic and professional) is in itself insufficient for a state to be developmental (Evans 1994). Portes and Smith examine this hypothesis in a study of Latin American institutions, finding that “proactivity towards external actors emerges as the central condition for a developmental institution” (Portes and Smith 2012: 178).

The restrictionist position that immigration is threatening to a country’s institutions would suggest that we should expect mass migration to work against the establishment or maintenance of a developmental state. Of particular interest then is whether the massive immigration to Taiwan and Hongkong in the
middle of the 20th century led to changes in their institutions and social structure, and whether those changes tended to be in the direction of weakening or strengthening the developmental qualities of institutions.

**Refugees of the Chinese Civil War**

After the defeat of Japan in the Second World War, China returned to civil war between the Nationalists (Kuomintang) and Communists. By 1949 the Kuomintang had been driven from Mainland China and their leader, Chang Kai-shek, fled with the remainder of his government and army to Taiwan. It is estimated that around two million or more Chinese mainlanders fled to Taiwan as a result of the Civil War, many arriving in 1949, with smaller numbers in the years before and after (Jiang et al. 1996, Fan 2011). Additionally, hundreds of thousands fled to Hong Kong, with as many as 10,000 arriving weekly during 1949 (Bouscaren 1963: 112, Burns 1987). Despite border restrictions being introduced in 1949, the flow of refugees into Hong Kong would persist in the following decades (Burns 1987).

While the total number of refugees was small in proportion to the Mainland Chinese population (some 3 million of several hundred million), in relation to the populations of Hong Kong and Taiwan the migrations were demographically enormous. Hong Kong’s pre-war population was around 1.6 to 1.8 million before the Japanese invaded after which it fell to a low of 400,000 to 600,000 at the end of the war in 1945 (Hambro 1955: 13, Vaughan and Dwyer 1966: 38, Shen 1997: 269, Hampton 2016: 15). In the immediate years after the war many of those who had fled the Japanese returned, bringing Hong Kong’s population back up to its post-war peak of around 1.8 million by 1948 (Vaughan and Dwyer 1966: 38). With the advance of Communism in 1949 many refugees entered Hong Kong and estimates from the mid 1950s put the refugee population at around 700,000 (Hambro 1955: 27, Burns 1987) almost a third of the population. While the exact figures are ambiguous, it is clear that a sizeable proportion of Hong Kong’s population was made up of mainland exiles in the 1950s. In Taiwan around two million
mainlanders arrived as a result of the Civil War swelling a native population of around 6 million (Thompson 1959: 363, Liu 1973a: 9).

While many who fled hoped they would return to the mainland, over the following decades most did not. This resulted in a truly “telluric migration”, massive in size (relative to the receiving populations) and permanent in nature.

Attention must also be given to the composition of the exile population. Amongst those fleeing to Taiwan were 1,200 members of the National Assembly, members of the administration and its agencies and the military hierarchy. Around 650,000 military personnel were evacuated to Taiwan along with a million or more civilians, including many who were well-educated professionals, teachers, journalists and industrialists (Quigley 1962); possibly two thirds of the civilian migrants were young men with specialist training (Liu 1973b: 93).

A significant proportion of those entering Hong Kong also had backgrounds as Kuomintang soldiers or police, and likewise, many were teachers or had professional or business backgrounds (Hambro 1955). Others were farmers or laborers but on the whole the refugees were more educated than the existing Chinese population of Hong Kong. An especially significant component of the migration to Hong Kong were industrialists from Shanghai who brought with them both managerial expertise and capital (Wong 1988).

**Taiwan in 1949**

At the time of the Civil War exodus, very different situations existed in Taiwan and Hong Kong.

Taiwan had been a Japanese colony since 1895 with a native population of aboriginal Taiwanese, and Han Chinese who had migrated there during the Qing dynasty beginning in the 17th century. Under colonial rule the Japanese controlled government and key areas of the economy such as sugar
production, with intimate relationships between the two sectors (Cheng 2001). During the period of their colonial authority the Japanese significantly modernized Taiwan, including the building of railroads and telecommunications infrastructure (Roy 2003, Copper 2013), they established exports of rice, bananas, sugar and pineapples, and advances were seen in education, sanitation and health (Cheng 2001, Fan 2011). During the latter part of the Japanese colonial period the native Taiwanese enjoyed a certain degree of self-government through the Consultative Council, which advised the governor-general, and local authorities that were in part democratically elected (Fan 2011). Taiwanese also played a modest role in the administration of the colony, making up as many as 27% of state employees (Cheng 2001).

The modernization of Taiwan under the Japanese, and the sheltering of Taiwan from the tumultuous events on the mainland between 1895 and 1945, inevitably led to a society that differed in significant degrees with the mainland, despite a shared heritage.

In 1945 Japan surrendered Taiwan to Chang Kai-shek, and with American support the Kuomintang established control of the island, which it administered as a province under Chen Yi. Although sovereignty of Taiwan was not technically renounced by Japan until the Treaty of San Francisco in 1952, the de facto beginning of Kuomintang rule began in 1945.

Although migration from the mainland before 1949 was modest, government was from the beginning controlled by Mainlanders. A small number of Taiwanese who had migrated to the mainland (known as Banshan Ren - “Half-Mainlanders”) tried to lay the ground-work for a post-war Chinese administration of Taiwan (Jacobs 1990), however, their efforts largely failed to influence the early administration of Chen Yi who instead treated the Taiwanese as a conquered people (Quigley 1962: 163).

The maladministration of Taiwan under Chen Yi, along with the appropriation of enterprises and the poor discipline of Kuomintang soldiers caused resentment amongst the Taiwanese culminating in violent
resistance in 1947 in The February 28 Incident (cf. Lai et al. 1991, Lin et al. 1998). The uprising was quickly put down and resulted in the execution of a large number of Taiwanese leaders (Lai et al. 1991; Ong [1970] 2015) as well as the imposition of martial law that would continue until 1987. The violent suppression of the native Taiwanese would create a tension between the mainlanders and natives (Quigley 1962, Jacobs 1990, Fan 2011) that lasted for a generation but remained below the surface – even to speak of the February 28 Incident was taboo (Lin 1998).

Although the provincial Kuomintang administration on Taiwan was weak and ineffective in the years up to 1949, the decimation of the Taiwanese elite in 1947 crippled the already weak organization of local political and social forces (Haggard 1990). The result was that in 1949 Taiwan was a society with a history of being ruled from the outside lacking local institutions. The Kuomintang provincial administration was institutionally ineffective and deeply unpopular, but through the application of force had largely secured control of government and the industrial enterprises established by the Japanese.

**Hong Kong in 1949**

Hong Kong had become a Crown Colony of the United Kingdom with the Treaty of Nanking in 1842, with territorial additions in 1860 and 1898. In the earliest period of colonial administration there were significant weaknesses of governance, not least the inability of most British administrators to communicate with the majority of the Chinese population. However, Tsang argues that during the latter part of the 19th century there were significant improvements to governance with the establishment of a more meritocratic and professional civil service and that “by the start of the twentieth century, the colonial administration in Hong Kong had already fully settled into a set of established routines, procedures and even codes of conduct among senior officials” (Tsang 2007: 42).
Also, during the late 19th century, many important economic institutions were founded in Hong Kong, including Hongkong Land (1889), the Hongkong Electric Company (1890) and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (1891).

During the war Hong Kong was occupied by Japanese forces, but despite some uncertainty about its post-war status the colony was ultimately returned to British control in 1945 and the pre-war administrative and social status quo was quickly restored.

Administration of Hong Kong under the British was centralized, with authority largely exercised by a strong Governor and a small number of senior administrators. These professional bureaucrats were generally well trained and had significant experience in colonial administration. The majority of Hong Kong’s population was largely excluded from power with the exception of British business leaders and a small group of elite Chinese (often educated in England).

Hong Kong also had a long history of transitory workers. Chinese living in Guangdong regularly migrated to Hong Kong to find temporary work in a process of circular labor migration (Lethbridge 1978). This migratory movement was accompanied by periodic waves of refugees such as in 1927 when a communist uprising and nationalist repression swept Guangzhou, and in 1938 following the city’s capture by the Japanese.

The Impact of Mass Migration on Taiwan

In 1949 as more than a million refugees poured into Taiwan the situation looked bleak. Although amongst the refugees were the military hierarchy, senior government officials and business elites, the great majority of the arrivals were ordinary soldiers or impoverished civilians. Inflation and food shortages plagued the Kuomintang both on the Mainland and Taiwan in the last years of the Civil War.
While the Kuomintang government successfully transferred its gold reserves and a great deal of valuable art to Taiwan along with the evacuation of its armed forces, many migrants left in great haste and left behind their property and even families. Civilian refugees were given little or no assistance from the government in the early years and struggled to find housing (Fan 2011).

Considering the inevitable hardships faced by an enormous refugee flow, and the poor record of the Kuomintang before 1949 it is somewhat surprising that within a few decades Taiwan would be considered one of the greatest successes of the post-war period, seeing some of the fastest economic growth rates in history.

It is quite clear that the mass exodus of the Kuomintang to Taiwan had immediate and permanent transformative effects on Taiwanese society and institutions. While economic and political power in Taiwan had already been taken over by Mainlanders following the Japanese surrender, after 1949 Taiwan went from being a province under Kuomintang control to being the full extent of their territory. As a result the national governing institutions (the five Yuan), as well as other vital institutions such as the Bank of China (split in 1949) and the Whampoa Military Academy, were relocated to Taiwan. In the words of Quigley, the national agencies were “superimposed” on the provincial and local organizations (Quigley 1962).

Scholars agree that the transfer of the Kuomintang government, and the mass migration of Mainlanders (a large proportion of whom were soldiers) allowed a consolidation of power in the hands of the Kuomintang and the Mainlander governing institutions despite the chaos caused by coping with such a large number of people in need of housing and food (Haggard 1990, Phillips 2003, Wu 2005). Indeed, the chaos of the migration, the hostility of the local population and the existential threat of defeat created a context in which autocratic rule and centralization of power could be achieved.
But the importation of the Kuomintang governing structures and their consolidation of power in Taiwan was only the first step in the transformation of both Taiwanese and Mainlander society. Over the following decades the situation created by the coexistence of Mainlanders and Taiwanese on the island would profoundly influence the development of the governing institutions and their interaction with the economic development of Taiwan. The transformation is important, because the evidence of Kuomintang rule on the mainland, and its provincial administration of Taiwan, in the period between 1945 and 1949, suggested a state that was more predatory (cf. Evans 1979) than developmental.

The fundamental driver that would determine the nature of the new society was the Kuomintang’s vision of retaking the mainland. In 1978 the President Chiang Cing-kuo told David Reed, editor of Reader’s Digest, that the success of the nation despite hardships was “because we have never abandoned our political objective, that is, to overthrow the mainland’s Communist regime and build a united, democratic China” (Chiang 1984: 139). Even though in 1978 the United States was changing its position towards the Communist government in Beijing, and a Nationalist recovery of the mainland was a fantasy, official rhetoric was still completely dominated by this theme.

A key turning point for Taiwan was the beginning of the Korean War in 1950. The war diverted the Chinese Communists attention away from Taiwan and convinced the United States of the strategic importance of protecting the island. Most scholars agree that throughout the 1950s US aid played a major role in the stabilization and recovery of the Taiwanese economy, which by 1956 had reached pre-war levels (Vogel 1991, Pang 1992, Kuo 1999, Pempel 1999, Hsueh et al. 2001). In addition the United States military protection, formalized in the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty of 1955, was vital for the continued existence of Taiwan, which likely would have been unable to repulse an invasion by the communists on its own (National Intelligence Estimate April 10, 1951; National Intelligence Estimate October 9, 1956).
The importance of US aid and protection gave the Americans significant influence in the shaping of Taiwanese economic policy and governance. The Secretary of State instructed the charge d’affaires, Robert Strong, to communicate to the Kuomintang that the US was concerned by the “misgovernment of Taiwan” and that US aid would depend on future performance of the administration in Taiwan (Acheson 1949).

The most important features of the Kuomintang’s economic policy in the 1950s were import substitution and land reform. The land reform proceeded without major difficulties but resulted in the end of Taiwan’s landed elite. Compensation was provided in the form of shares in government-controlled enterprises, making them largely dependent on the Kuomintang regime (Haggard 1990: 82, Hseuh et al. 2001, Wu 2005).

The shift to an export-oriented growth model after 1960 met some resistance from a divided technocratic elite (Wu 2005). However, the priority of economic development and securing a source of foreign exchange led to a new developmental consensus between leading technocrats, top Kuomintang leaders and the Americans (Haggard 1990: 98 – 99), in favor of economic liberalization. Wu argues: “the most important element in their [the technocrats] success was support from the highest leaders. Ciang Kai-shek and Chen Cheng’s confidence in them provided them with the political capital to legitimize their leadership role in the economic policy network.” (Wu 2005: 148 – 149)

While state enterprises continued to exist in key economic activities and heavy industries, the private sector took off, dominated by small and medium sized enterprises (Hseuh et al. 2001). Native Taiwanese dominated the new thriving private sector, creating a distinct social structure where Mainlanders had tight control over government institutions and strategic economic sectors, but the native Taiwanese, marginalized from these important positions of power, were able to fully share in the economic development of Taiwan. Although there remained deep divisions between the Mainlanders and
Taiwanese, the social structure that emerged would prove to be one that was conductive to economic growth, and eventually in the later part of the 1980s, allowed a relatively peaceful transition to a more democratic society.

Kuomintang control over society extended well beyond the economy and government institutions. Education and the media were also dominated by Mainlanders and were tightly controlled by the Kuomintang government. Winckler argues: “the interventions of the Nationalist party-state in Taiwan’s post-war cultural development have been extensive and effective” (Winckler 1994: 22). Control of cultural institutions allowed the marginalization of local Chinese dialects in favor of standard Mandarin and schools taught a China centric curriculum that promoted Nationalist views (Winckler 1994, Roy 2003). This comprehensive control over media and education was in large part possible as a result of the mass migration that brought many scholars, teachers and journalists from the mainland (Quigley 1962, Phillips 2003).

It can be argued that the end of Japanese colonial rule made social transformation of Taiwan inevitable. However, the form that the eventual transformation took was primarily shaped not by the interests and aspiration of the native Taiwanese, but rather by the émigré population that monopolized positions of political power until the 1980s.

**The Impact of Mass Migration on Hong Kong**

The demographic impact of migration into Hong Kong cannot be overstated. In the decades after 1949 the population grew by around one million per decade from a starting point of less than two million. In the 1950s and 1960s between a third and half the population were refugees from Communism (Hambro 1955, Bouscaren 1963).

However, despite this incredible migration of people the social structure of Hong Kong and its governing institutions were not fundamentally transformed. On the contrary, there was a remarkably smooth
continuation of the colonial administration, which saw only gradual incremental change in the post-war period. While there were important and significant changes during the period, the administration remained autocratic and unrepresentative (Hampton 2016), but generally effective in governing and in enabling development.

Steve Tsang (2007) discusses in details the changes that the Hong Kong civil service went through in the years after 1949. Some changes, such as reforms of administrator salaries, were significant and probably served to strengthen the quality and professionalism of the colonial administration. Others were purely cosmetic, for example: “The adoption of the new title of administrative officer in the place of cadet was most remarkable for being a ‘non-event’. It proceeded so smoothly that few even noticed it. The change in title did not change the way in which new administrative officers were selected and all new recruits were inducted into the same ethos as the old cadets.” (Tsang 2007: 72).

More radical proposals for constitutional reform and democratization, such as the Young Plan, were rejected and had little popular support from the Chinese in Hong Kong (Hampton 2016). This demonstrates the way in which migrations might have a stabilizing, or reinforcing effect on the structure of society rather than a transformative one. The popular lack of interest in constitutional reform and wider political apathy of the population in the period up to 1967 was in large part a result of the prevalence of refugees. Some were more concerned by the political situation across the border in the towns and cities they had fled from, and their choice to live in Hong Kong over Communist China leant legitimacy to the existing government.

It was only towards the end of the 1960s that a younger generation, who had grown up in Hong Kong, began to more actively engage in the politics of the colony (Tsang 2007, Hampton 2016). The watershed came in 1967 when leftist elements rioted against the colonial government. The result, however, was
not transformational change of Hong Kong’s society and institutions, but adaptation and proactive engagement leading again to the strengthening of the existing order.

One of the initiatives following the 1967 riots was the introduction of City District Officers (CDOs). The purpose of CDOs was to be accessible to the public, to assess the impact of government policies and to explain those policies to the public. This scheme to engage public is a model example of institutional proactivity – the ability of an organization to involve itself with clients (Portes and Smith 2012).

The successful adaptation of Hong Kong’s institutions to engage with elites, and after 1967 the wider population, has been characterized by Ambrose Yeo-chi King as “administrative absorption” – a process whereby government administratively captures political forces through consensus building and co-option (King 1975). The administrative absorptions of politics can be seen as a mechanism by which “embedded autonomy” is achieved.

In addition to Hong Kong’s institutions in 1949 being strong, effective, and established enough to remain untransformed by mass migration, they were also isolated from migrants. Although following the war racial segregation lost its legitimacy, and reforms removed many of its institutionalized manifestations, the administration of Hong Kong was in 1949 (and would continue to be) an almost entirely British affair. Of course, the vast majority of Civil War refugees were Chinese. As a result, while many prospered in Hong Kong, even the Chinese elites largely remained at some distance from the governing institutions. Their ability to transform institutions was as such limited, and to the extent they had influence it was usually from the outside.

The relationship between the commercial and professional class on the one hand (to which migrants could aspire), and the British officials on the other, is described by Jan Morris of being one where individuals freely mixed, but remained “consciously separate” (Morris 1997). This relationship facilitated
the forming of legitimate authority and elite consensus, while at the same time preserving state autonomy and institutional continuity.

**Economic Development: Taiwan**

Both Hong Kong and Taiwan saw significant success in developing their economies in the decades following the Civil War mass migrations.

We can use four characteristics to judge the extent to which Hong Kong and Taiwan were developmental states: elite consensus, bureaucratic reach, state autonomy and international access. Yu-Shan Wu claims that Taiwan “obviously qualified” as a developmental state and fulfilled these characteristics (Wu 2007: 980). And Evans argues that while the private sector in Taiwan is less connected to the state than in the case of Japan or Korea – the island is an example of “embedded autonomy” (Evans 1995). Pempel (1999) also notes that among the shared characteristics of Taiwan, Japan and South Korea are States “relatively free from major populist pressures” (state autonomy) pursuing “hegemonic projects” (elite consensus); in which technocrats have both power and “a wide variety of tools” (bureaucratic reach); there is “no sharp dichotomy between state and society” (embeddedness); and strong economic and security links exist with the United States (international access).

A consensus for development arose from a combination of factors in Taiwan: the necessity to build legitimacy with a hostile local population, the goal of making Taiwan a model province to demonstrate the Nationalist alternative to Communist China, the need for export earnings to replace American aid and the pressure from American allies to modernize the economy. Land reform co-opted a small Taiwanese elite into the consensus, and subsequent policies promoting the growth of the private sector
ensured that a much broader segment of the native Taiwanese population would benefit from development policies.

Regarding bureaucratic reach and institutional proactivity Yongping Wu notes, “The assumption of a monolithic, meritocratic, and capable economic bureaucracy is essential to the statist account. The evidence shows, however, that in the case of Taiwan this institution-based account of the economic bureaucracy is inaccurate and apolitical” (Wu 2005: 5 - 6). Rather than being directed by strong Weberian institutions, the most important agents in economic policy were individual technocrats such as K. Y. Yin and K. T. Li (Vogel 1991, Wu 2005). Within this technocratic elite there were divisions over economic policy, however, the developmental consensus meant that the political elite (including Chang Kai-shek and Ch’en Ch’eng) gave political backing to the export-oriented growth strategy that prevailed from the 1960 onwards.

The autonomy of the Kuomintang government in Taiwan is quite obvious. The February 28 Incident and continuing suppression of dissent under martial law and the ‘White Terror’ eliminated any organized domestic opposition. The land reform and appropriation of enterprises meant that there were no native landed class, or industrial elites except for those who owed their position to the Kuomintang government (Gold 1986). Significantly also, despite American influence, Taiwan under the Kuomintang was significantly independent from foreign economic control. Taiwan maintained barriers to cross-border mergers and acquisitions as well as placing restrictions of foreign investment (Liu 2003). Amsden goes as far as to say that “the entire government policy apparatus was geared toward promoting nationally owned firms” (Amsden and Chu 2003: 171), and that foreign investment was controlled so that domestic firms might benefit from “spillovers”. This meant that in the post-war period multinational corporations and foreign capital would not become a powerful interest group in Taiwan. Meanwhile the American government’s interests in Taiwan were largely in line with those of the
Kuomintang. Both saw the need for Taiwan to develop an export-oriented economy, reduce its dependence of US aid and raise the standard of living.

The development consensus, bureaucratic reach and autonomy of the state can all be seen as characteristics of the social structure arising from the transformation accompanying mass migration. Of course, the counterfactual society without migration may also have produced these developmental characteristics and may have had similar economic success – but the actual historical context in which economic growth occurred was strongly shaped by the migration of Mainlanders to Taiwan.

The only developmental factor that is largely unrelated to the migration is Taiwan’s connection to the outside world. Although the relationship with America may have been quite different if the Kuomintang had not retreated to the island, the geographical location of Taiwan would have remained strategically significant. The history of Japanese colonialism was also important in integrating Taiwan into a wider Pacific economy and this relationship likely would have been in fact more significant without the migration of Mainlanders and the efforts by the Kuomintang to suppress the Japanese language and culture.

**Economic Development: Hong Kong**

While Hong Kong has often been seen as a prototypical example of the laissez-faire state (for example Morris 1997: 227), Tsang characterizes the period after 1949 as one of increasingly proactive government:

If the 1950s was a decade of expansion in government activities at an unprecedented rate, it was overtaken as the next decade unfolded, a process that was repeated every subsequent decade until the end of British rule in 1997. The pace of change in Hong Kong continued to gather momentum as the postwar era deepened. The increasing
complexity of modern living, the ever growing number of people who travel far from their places of birth for work, the explosive expansion of industrial manufacturing, the steady increase in average and national income, as well as the associated rise in public expectations that followed the introduction of mass education, all caused expansion in the span and scope of government. In this respect the growth of government in Hong Kong merely occurred parallel with the same trend in the rest of the developed and developing world. Governments all over the world simply expanded massively in their scope and span in the second half of the twentieth century. (Tsang 2007: 72)

However, Tsang recognizes that to a much greater extent in Hong Kong than elsewhere, there remained a commitment to small government and non-interference. Hong Kong was at once a model of laissez-faire – providing rule of law and impartial courts, while otherwise taking a hands off economic approach – while at the same time being a society of institutions that were not only effective but also proactive and innovative. This outlook can be interpreted as a kind of developmental consensus – with the British controlled government prioritizing stability and good governance over representative democracy with a view to creating a climate in which private enterprise might flourish. The consensus can be seen in the administrations accommodating stance towards Chinese industrialists, for example in the field of labor legislation (Wong 1988).

Hong Kong also displayed examples of bureaucratic reach. The endurance and legitimacy of Hong Kong’s institutions in the face of demographic change was in large part due to their proactive orientation. The CDOs are a notable example of an initiative that boosted institutional authority through proactive developmental activities such as establishing Mutual Aid Committees (King 1975).
State autonomy was also a characteristic of Hong Kong. Mass migration likely reinforced government autonomy by creating a population that lacked historical ties to Hong Kong and was as a result politically unorganized and apathetic. The development consensus that existed between the administration and the business elites lead to what Tsang calls “accountability without democracy”, that is a government that was autonomous but acted within prescribed patterns of behavior consistent with a priority towards development (or at least stability).

And of course, Hong Kong’s colonial relationship with the United Kingdom and history as an entrepôt meant that it was intimately connected to the outside world throughout its history.

As Hong Kong did not encounter a social transformation following the Civil War migration, the developmental characteristics of the state derive much more from the existing institutions. To the extent that migration did play a role in making Hong Kong a developmental state it did so by reinforcing existing institutions and state autonomy and perhaps prompting a deepening of the developmental consensus among elites and proactivity of institutions.

However, despite the relatively small contribution of migration to shaping developmental institutions, migration did play an important role in the economic growth of Hong Kong through the mechanisms familiar to neoclassical economics – in particular by transforming the labor market and bringing in large amounts of entrepreneurial capital (as well as financial and physical capital).

The role of refugee Shanghai industrialists in Hong Kong’s development has been explored in detail by Wong Siu-Lun (1988). Shanghai’s advantageous location and access to raw materials lead to a massive industrial expansion after 1895 when foreigners were permitted to establish factories in the Chinese treaty ports (Coble 1980). Many Shanghai industrialists joined the refugee flow caused by the Civil War having both greater means to immigrate and greater reason to flee the Communists. Although many went to Taiwan and played an important role in the Taiwanese textile industry in the 1950s (Huang and
Cleveland 2002: 100), they were especially prominent in Hong Kong’s post-war economic development. Wong argues that the industrialists who migrated to Hong Kong were “the cream of private entrepreneurs, those with the experience in managing capital intensive mills” (Wong 1988: 28).

In addition to bringing entrepreneurial talent to Hong Kong, the Civil War migration also provided the labor required for rapid expansion of industry and the industrialists brought with them a great deal of financial capital as well as the best physical capital (Wong 1988).

**Comparing Hong Kong and Taiwan**

Whereas Taiwanese society and institutions were fundamentally transformed and shaped by the context of mass migration, Hong Kong was economically and demographically transformed while the essential structure of society and the governing institutions remained remarkably unchanged. Indeed, Hong Kong’s social organization and institutions appear to have been reinforced by mass migration. Jan Morris described Hong Kong as “an obsolete entity astonishingly preserved”, noting that not only was Hong Kong not transformed by migration, it failed even to keep pace with the social changes undergoing the rest of the British Empire in the post-war period (Morris 1997: 203).

These contrasting experiences demonstrate the significance of the context in which migration takes place. Hong Kong, which had strong, established institutions, largely isolated from migrants, was able to absorb an enormous refugee flow without transformative change. In contrast the Taiwanese institutions that had existed during the Japanese colonial period had for the most part either gone with the Japanese or been abruptly taken over by the Kuomintang in 1945. When Chang Kai-shek and his Kuomintang government arrived in 1949, Taiwan was something of a blank slate. Moreover, the humiliating defeat on the mainland and the new strategic context that had emerged meant a necessary transformation of the Kuomintang government’s agenda and priorities.
However, despite the different outcomes of migration, both Hong Kong and Taiwan came to fit Evans’ and Johnson’s descriptions of developmental states with “embedded autonomy”, professional administrators etc. Furthermore, institutions displayed the proactivity that Portes and Smith identify as the most important characteristic of being developmental. In this way migration whether by transforming society, or bringing about only surface level change in institutions, contributed to economic development.

However, whereas the transformation of society and creation of a developmental émigré state was the main pathway through which migration brought about economic development in Taiwan, in Hong Kong migration played a more important role through the entrepreneurial and human capital brought by immigrants. In contrast the immigrant Mainlanders in Taiwan played a much less integral role in the private economy of Taiwan, which was largely the product of native Taiwanese entrepreneurs.

**Conclusion and Lessons**

The contrasting experiences of Hong Kong and Taiwan demonstrate that even the largest mass migrations, “telluric” migrations, that transform the demographic structure will not necessarily lead to the importation of “bad” institutions into the receiving society as restrictionists have suggested. And in the case of Taiwan, we see that even when immigrants were able to shape social life and institutions, they did not replicate the dysfunctional institutions of the mainland.

Hong Kong show that such massive migration can surprisingly leave the social and institutional structure relatively unchanged. Where existing institutions are effective and enjoy a high degree of legitimacy, mass migration may even have the effect of reinforcing the existing social structure, or prompting institutional change at the surface level that strengthens deeper elements.

Where mass migration occurs in a context where the migrants are able to take on roles that entail political power (key positions in enterprise, the education system, the police and military, the media,
and government agencies) it does seem more likely that they will transform the social structure. The expulsion of the Japanese colonial authority in 1945 left a power vacuum in Taiwan that was filled by a weak provincial administration. However, the consequent mass migration in 1949 lead to not only the transformation of Taiwan, but also the Kuomintang institutions out of necessity in a dramatically different context from the mainland. Rather than importing ineffective institutions the migration led to the emergence of new developmental institutions.

This case study demonstrates the value of looking closely at particular immigration histories. However, without the context of the broader empirical picture we would be more limited in drawing lessons from this case study. We could not say whether these experiences were in any way typical.

With the benefit of a larger context we can see that Hongkong’s experience is not exceptional. Immigrants often move to places with strong and stable institutions, and when they do, those countries tend to remain stable. Taiwan’s situation on the other hand points to additional directions for empirical study. While few cases were found of revolutionary change following mass migration, the types of transformation that occurred in Taiwan did not take place through revolution.

Taiwan also presents an interesting possibility that immigrants may play a larger role in the construction of social life in cases where institutions are weak or in decline. In most cases immigration appears to move in the direction of stability, but some refugee flows are limited by proximity or ethno-cultural connections. The population exchanges of Greece-Turkey and following Indian partition are examples of these movements. In such cases, mass migration may occur in countries facing instability. It was actually found that most cases where revolutionary change occurred proceeding mass migration fit this general type, although it is not clear that immigration actually increased the probability of transformative change.
Taiwan’s experience demonstrates that while immigration in these cases may be more likely to have transformative implications, the character of these changes cannot necessarily be inferred from the institutional context of the immigrants’ place of origin. The immigration of mainlanders to Taiwan did lead to their transformation of society, but not in ways that would have been predictable from the history of Kuomintang before 1949.

The Taiwanese experience of immigrants prompting institutional changes that led to a more developmental context finds an interesting parallel in the case study by Nowrasteh, Forester and Blondin (2020) or Jordan. Such examples call into question the assumption that immigration impacts will tend to be towards social disorganization and the weakening of institutions.
Chapter 7

Conclusions

The most ardent critics of immigration are unlikely to be swayed by empirical evidence. However, the near universality of restrictionist principles in the immigration policies of almost every country, demonstrates the extent to which restrictionist thinking is at least partially accepted by many more moderate people. Among most people, it is taken for granted that unrestrained immigration must necessarily be impossibly idealistic.

However, these assumptions are increasingly at odds with the vast mountains of empirical evidence that have been produced over the last several decades. Among serious economists, there is no discussion as to whether immigration is a dire economic threat, but only whether the impacts on a small segment of low skilled labor are modest or negligible. The research on immigration and crime is fairly consistent in demonstrating that far from being a cause of neighborhoods stricken by urban blight and crime, immigrants may present a solution for reviving such places.

Meanwhile, authors such as Clemens (2011) have shown how the removal of barriers to global labor movement could do more to end poverty than almost any other policy mechanism, creating billions of dollars in increased productivity, most of which would accrue to immigrants from poor countries.

However, until recently, there was relatively little that empirical evidence regarding the potential impacts that immigrants might have on the culture and institutions of receiving countries. Such impacts have long been at the center of rhetoric from nativist pundits, but it is only recently that they have been given more rigorous theoretical expression by Borjas and Collier. Nowrasteh and Powell (2020) call their arguments the “new economic case” against immigration. They note that the old arguments around wages and fiscal impacts, which are known to be small, are poor justifications for immigration
restrictions, given the enormous potential gains in productivity for immigrants. To the extent that immigration may negatively impact small segments of the native labor force, it would be easy to use redistributive taxes on immigrants to offset any losses. In comparison, the “new economic case” presents the possibility of large economic losses through the collapse of institutions that are necessary to high productivity. In crude terms, the hypothesized threat is the of importing the economic collapses of Venezuela or Zimbabwe to America and Europe.

When I began this dissertation around 2017 a handful of new papers were being written that challenged this argument. Each year several more are being added, and in 2020, *Wretched Refuse* (Nowrasteh and Powell 2020) was published as the first major book length study to bring together the new empirical research on immigrations impacts on social life. This book did what I set out to do in 2017 - to test the theoretical arguments of Borjas and Collier against a broad base of empirical evidence. However, it did so in a way that was quite different from the approach I have taken. Nowrasteh and Powell focus primarily on data around recent immigration and from the perspective of immigrant externalities on economic productivity or deaths from terrorism.

In contrast this dissertation provides a much broader historical picture and draws more heavily on the sociological literature. In this way, where Nowrasteh and Powell present what could be considered a “new economic case” for immigration, I provide something more like the “new historical case”, or the “new sociological case”. In doing so, I also address restrictionist arguments more generally. In addition to looking at the arguments of Borjas and Collier, I also try to look at those arguments within a larger context of restrictionist thinking, which sees immigration as a disruptive social force. By doing so, I also present in this dissertation an empirical case not only against the “new economic case” for restrictions, but also the very old cultural case.
But while my approach is somewhat different from other recent empirical work, it comes to much the same conclusion: mass migration is unlikely to result in any dramatic negative consequences for society. Even at the largest scale of ‘telluric’ migration, there is reason to believe that strong institutions may be fundamentally stable in the face of major demographic change.

Mass migration, in many regards, is at a historical high, with more countries experiencing mass migration in the first decade of the 21st century than in any preceding decade. However, during this historic surge of mass migration, no leading liberal democracy experienced a significant decline in democratic institutions as a result of high immigration.

When we look back historically, mass migration is clearly associated with long term stability of countries. While it would be hasty to conclude from this that immigration has a stabilizing effect, it does suggest that we should not expect transformative change to be an inevitable, or even likely, outcome of mass migration.

There are many limitations and issues with the empirical studies presented in this dissertation. The Polity IV index and Freedom in the World indices can be criticized as a measure of institutions. Likewise, my constructed data sets rely on many subjective choices and incomplete data. Unlike the well-trodden terrain of economic impacts of immigration, the social and institutional impacts that I discuss remain a fertile area for further research. But the general outlines of the empirical evidence are hard to miss, and they clearly do not match up with the expectations and claims of restrictionist theory.

If the evidence is not consistent with restrictionist ideas, is there an alternative theoretical position that it does align with. Yes. The stability and continuity of institutions in the face of immigration was theorized by Alejandro Portes in his 2010 paper *Migration and Social Change: Some Conceptual Reflections*. In this paper Portes lays out a simple conceptual argument that I refer to as the “Surface Change” theory of immigration. This theory, which I lay out in more detail at the beginning of the
dissertation, suggests that to understand institutions we need to consider not only the norms and values of the population, but also the power structures of society. Institutions are not an indiscriminate product of a democratic average of people’s values but are strongly shaped by the interests and perspectives of groups and individuals holding positions of power and authority.

Because immigrants do not enter directly into positions of power in society, they do not influence institutions through a diffusion of their values from “above” but rather they “push from below” in the words of Portes. In this way, their ability to enact change is not through participating in the construction of institutional forms, but through the institutional adaptation and reaction. Immigrants may achieve some institutional accommodations, but the deeper levels of social life – the norms and values that shape institutional models – remain largely unaltered.

Over time immigrants, or their progeny, may establish themselves within networks of power. But the assimilation into the values and norms of the native elites is generally precondition of this access to positions of power and influence. As Portes says (2010: 1550):

[T]hese successful individuals and groups... have escalated the class hierarchy not by challenging the existing social order, but by conforming to it. Today, the CEO of a large New York corporation may be named Lowenstein rather than Johnston and the mayor of Miami-Dade County may be Alvarez rather than King, but the normative order governing the corporation, the county and the broader society in which both are embedded remain largely unchanged and distinctly American.

Put another way: Kennedy and Obama may have made history as the first Catholic, and first African-American to reach the Presidency, but as alumni of Harvard University, they were both products of a cultural establishment that had been producing American leaders since the Revolution.
The one case in this dissertation where I do find good evidence of mass migration resulting in the transformation of institutions, Taiwan, only serves to strengthen the case for the “Surface Change” theory. Unlike in most cases of mass migration, the immigrants to Taiwan included the leaders of the Nationalist institutions on the mainland. It was no values and norms that these immigrants brought, but actual institutional knowledge, specialist training, and intact organized networks. Furthermore, they arrived in a society that had no recent history of local institutions, or of a native ruling class. And finally, at the time of immigration, the immigrants were closely associated with the nominal government of Taiwan. Whereas most immigrants enter society from the margins, and either remain there, or rise up through assimilation, the immigrants to Taiwan had immediate access to positions of influence. By comparison to Hong Kong the case study shows that it was not some special characteristics of the immigrants, or even the scale of the migration, that was most important, but the context of institutions and power structures in the receiving societies.

While much remains to be learned about the impact of immigration on social life, restrictionist theories are increasingly at odds with the empirical evidence. This should call into question immigration policies that are designed to vastly limit the scale of immigration flows, and the eligibility of those who may immigrate. Today the large majority of immigrants to America are relatives of an American. Most often an immediate relative – a child, spouse, parent, or sibling. For those without an American relative, which of course represents the vast majority of the world population, the prospects of immigrating to America are low. Even among the most highly demanded workers the immigration system is designed to much more readily permit temporary entry and work, than permanent residence. And America is not unusual in its immigration policies. Only a handful of countries have more permissive immigration systems, and even these are shaped by a restrictionist logic that unrestrained immigration would be unthinkably radical.
If immigration policy were to be remade on the foundations of what the evidence actually shows, and what the best theories suggest, what might that look like?

Firstly, it would imply the elimination of quantitative restrictions. Almost all countries currently design their immigration policies explicitly or implicitly to keep immigration below a certain level. And much discussion of immigration policy rests on an almost unconscious assumption that there is some limit to the number of immigrants that can enter before something gives. Just as we use words like “flow”, “waves” and “surge”, to describe immigration, so we have become accustomed to imagining that immigration works like a real water system, that somehow the banks could burst, and the country could be “flooded”.

But there is no evidence to suggest that there is some limit at which the impacts of immigration will suddenly become negative. Hypothetically we could imagine that at some quantity the physical presence of immigrants might begin to be significant. And perhaps this is relevant from small countries like Singapore. But America could quite easily accommodate the entire global population within its borders while maintaining a population density (on average) not much greater than that of Mercer County, New Jersey.

In this dissertation I specifically focus on the size of migrations, and I find nothing to suggest that there is some point at which immigration becomes too large to handle. When looking at mass migrations that occurred in proximity to revolutionary change, size is not a distinguishing factor. And among countries that have experienced recent immigration, there is stability across liberal democracies regardless of whether their immigration levels have been modest or exceptional. Institutions are no more likely to collapse under the weight of ten million immigrants than one million immigrants, or ten thousand immigrants.
Secondly, it would focus on mitigating any marginal impacts of immigration, rather than trying to avoid transformative ones. While the empirical evidence is clear that mass migration is unlikely to transform countries, it will inevitably have structural impacts that impact the economy and institutions at the margins. These are overall likely to benefit natives more than they hurt them, but there will be points of friction. In the economy this may arise as modest declines in wages and employment opportunities within specific sectors of industry. In social life this might be seen when schools have to adjust to interacting with parents who do not speak English.

These are the “surface” changes that Portes refers to. They are not threatening from a historical perspective. They will be quickly forgotten, and their effects will be transient. But for those experiencing these changes, they may never-the-less be painful. However, a more logical policy approach would be to confront these issues through “keyhole solutions” rather than sweeping immigration restrictions. Restricting immigration requires substantial resources and has other costs for natives in terms of civil liberties and reciprocal immigration restrictions in other countries. But more importantly as long as the impacts of mass migration are marginal, there overall gains to immigrants will far outweigh any costs of mitigating their impacts. Because these gains are so large, it should be possible to use fees or taxes to redistribute some of the benefits enjoyed by immigrants, either directly to natives, or to programs designed to mitigate specific issues associated with immigration. Even where issues cannot be solved by a simple cash transfer, immigration requirements could be enacted that address a specific issue, rather than being designed to reduce overall immigration.

Finally, it would reorient border security to be about threats from an individual, rather than their immigration intentions. If the goal of border security is to prevent criminals, terrorists, illegal drugs, firearms, and other undesirable things from entering the country, it is quite unrelated to immigration policy. The two only intersect where immigrants cross the border.
A less restrictive immigration policy would narrow the scope of border security to addressing dangerous persons and items, rather than enforcing a restrictive immigration agenda. The actual requirements to physically cross the border may remain unchanged, and so open immigration need not necessarily be open borders. However, without the need to identify and apprehend unauthorized immigrants, it is quite likely that the crossing borders would become easier.

These are the policies that an evidence-based approach to policy making would suggest. These changes have the potential to lift millions of people out of poverty, by open the golden doors of the developed world. However, the greatest barrier to realizing these changes may be the lack of an invested constituency in the receiving countries. While restrictionists are not always a majority, they tend to be a vocal and motivated group, willing to invest significant resources and effort in achieving their policy goals. In contrast the major beneficiaries of a more rational immigration policy would be foreigners, who have extremely limited ability to influence policy making in the countries they would like to move to. Without enthusiastic support for changes to immigration policy, evidence of immigrations benign impacts on social life may do little to change the status quo.

For those hoping to contribute to more rational immigration policy through research it will not only be necessary to continue the work examining the logic of existing immigration policy (which is widely accepted as flawed), but also producing research that provides the justification for taking on the task of policy reform.
Appendix 1

Great Britain

England and Wales have been united under a single sovereign rule since the late 13th century, although to some extent Wales has maintained its own institutions. Scotland, remained separate until the 17th century when the Scottish and English crowns became combined in one person (James I) – a union that was to be completed in 1707. Until the 20th century, Ireland was also under British rule, although its relationship with England was quite different from those of Scotland and Wales. Scotland is included in the dataset as an independent entity until 1600.

Although there have been some important migrations to Britain since 1450, and some of substantial size. The evidence suggests that at no time before the 21st century did England experience a mass migration (using the 5% of population over a decade definition).

At the beginning of the time period under review in 1450 there were probably a modest number of immigrants. Bennett (2018) estimates that aliens in the 1450s might have made up 1 or 2% of the total population, and Thrupp (1957) considers 16,000 (probably a little less than 1% of the population) to be a conservative estimate for this period.

The most significant migrations in the pre-Industrial period were from France and the Low Countries, prompted in large part by the religious conflicts that swept the continent during the 16th and 17th centuries. These included Flemish migrants who mostly settled in the South and East, contributing useful skills in areas such as navigation, textiles and printing (Murray 1957). Luu (2005) says that the peaks of migration from the Low Countries came in 1560s and 1580s, and that these two waves amounted to around 40,000 or 50,000 persons. There was a population of 2 to 3 million in England at the time, so while it was a large migration by contemporary standards it amounted to at most around 2.5% of the
English population over two decades. Grell (2017) gives a consistent estimate of 20,000 protestant exiles in the 1580s, but notes that not all of these necessarily stayed in England.

Yungblut (1996) notes that the immigrants arriving the late 16th century concentrated in certain areas, leading to an impression of a large influx among contemporaries who saw the new arrivals as “integrimly linked with many of the rapid changes profoundly affecting and altering their world.” The immigrants included many artisans with urban backgrounds, contributing technological expertise to London. However, only in a few places like London and Norwich were immigrants a notable percentage of the population, and even here they rarely made up more than 4 or 5%.

The next notable wave of migration came in the 1680s with revocation of the Edict of Nantes. Most sources suggest the resulting exodus of French Protestants numbered between 150,000 and 200,000 (Lucassen and Penninx 1994, Moch 2003, Lachenicht 2007, Hornung 2014), of which perhaps around 50,000, came to England (Gwynn 1983, Peters 1986). As with the earlier migrations from the Low Countries, this was a large movement of people, but far short of a mass migration.

Another exodus from France a century later, after 1789, may have resulted in 25,000 or so French emigres arriving in the United Kingdom in the 1790s. It is not clear to what extent these refugees settled, and many may have later returned to France or moved to other countries. But, even if they had all become permanent immigrants, there numbers would have been much too small to constitute mass migration.

During the 19th century the United Kingdom was an exporter rather than importer of persons and there is no evidence of any substantial immigration until the 20th century. As with other European countries the UK did receive important flows of immigrants after the Second World War, mostly from its former colonies. These immigrants were notable for being of non-European origins, leading to a distinct shift in many cities towards greater racial diversity. However, before 2000, the data show that the number of
immigrants never reached 5% of the native population over one decade (World Bank Group 2011, UN 2017). In the first decade to the 21st century net migration to the UK increased significantly, with many new arrivals from Eastern European countries that had recently joined the European Union, and were able to migrate to England under the common labor market. Total net migration for the decade was almost 2 million (Hawkins 2016: 8). This figure should also be increased to discount the net emigration of British Nationals – which amounted to a little over 1 million (Hawkins 2016: 9). With a total population of just under 60 million in 2000, and likely immigration of around 3 million, the threshold for mass migration was probably just achieved. However, a fairly significant number of the immigrants in this period may have intended to remain in the UK only temporarily for work, and so the decade is coded only as a possible mass migration.

For the decades in which Scotland is included in the dataset as an independent state there is no evidence of mass migration. During this period Scotland was more likely to have been a country of emigration.

Ireland

Ireland has a long and important migration history, which continues to have implications today. At the beginning of the 21st century, the population of Ireland was lower than in the middle of the 19th century, a result of decades of mass emigration beginning with the Great Famine but continuing for more than a generation after. Further back in history, there were also important migrations into Ireland. In the 17th century thousands of English and Scottish Protestants were settled in Ireland, leading to a religious divide that has been a central feature of Irish history.

However, for the purposes of the mass migration data set, Ireland is excluded before the 1920s when it became independent from the United Kingdom. Before this Ireland was essentially an occupied colony.
of Great Britain, and so does not meet the definition of a sovereign state. The Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1921 gave southern Ireland full independence.

At that time, Ireland was still a country of emigration, although the primary destination of emigrants was shifting from the United States to Britain (Glynn 1981). Emigration was substantial enough that Ireland continued to lose population until the 1960s.

In the years after independence there was no large immigration to Ireland. The total stock did not change much between 1926 when there were about 65,000 persons born abroad and 1960 when the number had increased to a little over 70,000, about 2.5% of the population (CSO 1965, World Bank Group 2011). The majority of these were from the United Kingdom, another 30,000 or so could be included who were born in the six counties of Northern Ireland (which remained part of the UK). By 1970 the number of immigrants had increased substantially to around 110,000, about 4% of the population; and by 1980 the immigrant stock was 190,000, or 6% of the population (CSO 1996, World Bank Group 2011). The immigration flow into Ireland during the 1970s may have been as high as 100,000 persons (Kirwan 1981).

Fassmann and Munz (1992: Table 1) give a much lower foreign population in 1982 or just 69,000 (2% of the population), only about a third of the number found in the Irish census data (even when excluding those from Northern Ireland). The difference is likely explained by the fact that many of those born abroad were the children of Irish emigrants who were now returning to Ireland as economic conditions improved. The age profiles of immigrants in the early 1970s supports this (Keating 1977). These children could hold Irish nationality by descent under the 1956 Nationality and Citizenship Act and so may not be included as foreign residents by Fassmann and Munz. In any case, while the immigration of the 1970s was significant, even when using the higher figures, the number arriving over the decade falls somewhat short of mass migration.
During the 1980s the number born outside of Ireland did not see any increase. Although there was a modest increase over the decade in Fassmann and Munz figures, and in the census figures of those born in countries other than the United Kingdom and the United States. Although this uptick in migration from other places was not a mass migration it represented the beginning of Ireland’s transformation from a country of emigration to a country of immigration.

In the 1990s immigrants began arriving in Ireland in large numbers. In total the number born outside of Ireland in 2000 was around 380,000 – 390,000 (CSO 2002, World Bank Group 2011), approaching than 12% of the population. Alternatively there were about 270,000 people living in Ireland who were not Irish nationals (the difference mainly accounted for by Irish nationals born in the England and Wales). Although a majority were from other European Union countries like Germany, France, and Spain. Others came from further afield. By 2000 there were over 8,000 Nigerians, 5,000 Chinese, and 4,000 Filipinos. Almost all had arrived in the last 10 years. Overall there were more than 50,000 African and Asian immigrants, as well as many from Eastern Europe. The numbers appear to be sufficient for mass migration to have occurred in the 1990s. Some uncertainty remains, since the increase in the foreign stock was a little short of 5% and some of that addition may include temporary and circular migration. However, it seems more likely than not, that the number of immigrants arriving over the period exceeded the threshold for mass migration.

For the decade 2000-2010 there is no doubt. By the 2006 census the number born outside of Ireland had already risen to over 600,000 (CSO 2006) and by 2010 the number of immigrants was more than 700,000 (UN 2017). There is no doubt that the number of arrivals over the period exceeded the 5% threshold, which for the 2000s would have been around 190,000 immigrants.

The Netherlands
The Dutch Republic – precursor to the modern Netherlands – can be seen as beginning in 1581 with the Act of Abjuration. Several Northern provinces of the Low Countries had been in revolt against their Spanish monarch for over a decade, but the 1581 act formally declared their independence. As one of the wealthiest and most urbanized regions of Europe, the Netherlands was an important center of immigration.

Thanks, in particular, to the work of Jan and Leo Lucassen, the history of immigration is quite well documented. “Newcomers” (Lucassen and Penninx 1997), along with Jelle van Lottum’s work on immigration in the North Sea region (Van Lottum 2007), provide a detailed picture of immigration flows from 1581 up to the present, when modern statistical records are available.

It is clear that immigration was consistent throughout much of Dutch history and the foreign-born have made up between 5% and 10% of the total population in the 17th and 18th centuries. Between the early 19th century and the mid-20th century the immigrant population was at a lower 2% to 5% of the population, but in recent decades there has been a renewed inflow that has increased to foreign born population (Lucassen and Penninx 1997: Figure 1).

However, despite a long history of substantial immigration, mass immigration has not been a regular feature of Dutch history. There appears to have been more of a steady flow than a series of mass arrivals. Only in the very first decades of Dutch independence was immigration large enough to meet our criteria for mass migration. The Spanish suppression of revolt in the Low Countries which led to the Dutch Republic succeeding also resulted in a mass exodus of citizens from the south (modern Belgium), which remained under Spanish control until the 18th century. Many of the exiles were Protestants, and they included numerous merchants who brought entrepreneurial talents, networks and capital with them (Gelderblom 2003).
Lucassen and Penninx’ (1997) figures show that the largest increase in the foreign born population occurred in the late 16th century (1580s and 1590s), with an increase in the immigrant stock from about 3% of the population to 9% of the population. The total stock of immigrants would continue to grow slightly and peak at over 10% around 1620. After this, the stock declines slowly over the next century to around 6%, remaining steady during the 18th century. After 1780, the foreign population decreased to a low of less than 2% of the population in the late 19th century.

The population of the Dutch Republic was over a million in the late 16th century (Bolt et al. 2018). A migration of 50,000 or more people in one decade might constitute a mass migration. Figures from various sources suggest that in the late 16th century the number of immigrants could well have been 100,000 or more. Janssen (2017: 237) says that after 1585 “about 100,000 men and women from Flanders and Brabant moved to the rebel controlled northern provinces”. He also notes that the consensus suggests that in the urban centers, about a third of the population were refugees from Flanders and Brabant (this would be close to 50,000 people and does not include refugees outside major towns or immigrants from other places). Lottum’s figures of emigration from Belgium to the Netherlands is substantially lower, at 42,000 in 1600, but he also shows almost 30,000 immigrants from Germany and over 10,000 from Scandinavia and Great Britain (Lottum 2007: Appendix 1). Eßer (2007) estimates that in 1600 there were 30,000 immigrants in Amsterdam alone, and that substantial immigrant populations could also be found in Leiden and Haarlem. The populations of these cities doubled or tripled in in the decades following independence in 1581 (Price 1998, Eßer 2007, Janssen 2017). Maas (2013) gives the number of immigrants from the southern (Spanish) Netherlands as 150,000 in 1622.

It is conceivable the if immigration in the 1580s and 1590s totaled slightly under 100,000 and was spread evenly across the decades, that the threshold of 5% over a decade was not quite met (40,000 in one decade would probably be closer to 3% of the population). However, there is good reason to think
that immigration was concentrated in the 1580s. Janssen (2017), Eßer (2007), and Grell (2017) indicate that a large portion of the migration came in 1585 or the years immediately after as a direct consequence of the Spanish capture of Antwerp. Grell (2017) says that 38,000 left Antwerp alone in the years 1585 to 1589 (although some of these fled to England or other destinations).

Lottum’s lower bound figure of 80,000 total immigrants in the 1580s and 1590s is also likely to be an underestimate, with Lucassen and Penninx (1997: 31) claiming that 100,000 is a conservative estimate for Southern Netherlanders alone in 1600. The evidence certainly suggests that the threshold may have been met in the 1580s or 1590s; and probably was met in the ten-year period 1585 to 1595.

In the early 17th century migration continued. Lottum suggests that the stock increased from 80,000 in 1600 to 140,000 in 1650 (Lottum 2007, Lottum 2011). New immigrants included many religious refugees attracted by the Dutch Republic’s tolerant culture. Notable were Jewish migrants from Spain and Eastern Europe (Johnson 1987, Israel 1989) and the English Brownists, who would later found Plymouth Colony. However, numerically more important were those attracted by the booming Dutch economy (mostly Germans). The foreign population probably peaked around 1620, after which a steady flow maintained a substantial foreign population but one which was declining as a proportion of the total population (although probably not in absolute numbers). Lucassen and Penninx’ numbers do not suggest any mass migration. Maas (2013) mentions Huguenot migration in the late 17th century of up to 50,000. A large migration indeed for the period, but by this time the population was probably approaching 2 million and 50,000 would certainly not be as much as 5% even if the migration were concentrated in a 10-year period.

Lottum’s figures (Lottum 2007, Appendix 1) show German emigration to the Netherlands during the 18th century. This appears to have been sufficient to maintain a roughly steady immigrant stock, but there is no indication of any mass migration in this period.
Throughout the 17th and 18th century there were also tens of thousands of laborers who migrated seasonally into the Netherlands from the areas that are now Germany, Belgium and the North of France (Lucassen and Penninx 1994, Lottum 2007). These are excluded from the consideration of mass migration – although some minority undoubtedly did contribute to the stock of permanent migrants in this period.

The Netherlands in the period 1600-1800 represents a case of an immigrant country, with perhaps 600,000 foreigners entering over the two centuries. This averages to 3,000 annually or 30,000 per decade. This is substantial indeed, and almost certainly makes the Netherlands a larger receiver of immigrants than any other major European country, even those with much larger populations. However, the migrations represent at most 2 to 3% of the population in any one decade.

During the 19th century, the Dutch population grew quite rapidly from around 2.3 million in 1820 to over 5 million in 1900. Immigration did not keep pace with the growing population leading to foreigners making up a much smaller percentage of the Dutch population by the end of the century. A stagnating economy and the attractions of the Americas may have contributed to the declining importance of the Netherlands as an immigrant destination. Some immigration continued from the traditional sending countries around the North Sea, but the numbers were not great.

For the 20th century, statistics for migration to the Netherlands are available from Statistics Netherlands (CBS). Net foreign migration is the best indicator of the numbers settling permanently in the Netherlands, as the gross migration includes many short-term sojourners (such as students) who do not intend to (or perhaps are unable to) settle long term. These figures show that once again the Netherlands has become a country of immigration, with total migrant stock returning to proportions matching historic highs. In the last decades (1990s and 2000s) the number of immigrants exceeded half
a million. But with a population of 15 million in 1990 and 16 million in 2000, we can confidently say that migration was not as large as 5% of the population over any decade since 1900.

Belgium

Belgium has its origins in the Burgundian Netherlands – a number of Imperial and French fiefs that came under the control of the House of Valois-Burgundy in the 14th and 15th centuries, and passed into the control of the Habsburgs. In the 16th century the Netherlands provinces (modern Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) revolted against their Habsburg King Phillip II, leading to the Eighty Years War and the division of the Netherlands into the southern Spanish Netherlands (the predecessor of modern Belgium) and the northern Dutch Republic. The southern provinces were the site of a number of conflicts over the following centuries, and would pass from the Spanish to the Austrians, the French, and briefly were reunited with the Dutch Republic. In 1830 the Belgian Revolution led to the Independence of the southern provinces.

In the first decades of Belgian independence immigration was not substantial (Caestecker 2000), with one estimate putting the immigrant stock in 1846 at 1.76% of the total population (Everest 1857). While Caestecker (in Bade et al. 2011) claims that Belgium’s early industrialization “depended on highly skilled immigrants”, the number of immigrants was not massive. Rowntree (1911) did not believe that immigration had played on part in the population increase between 1846 and 1900. The highest figure he provides for net immigration is during the decade 1871-1880, where the annual excess of immigrant over emigrants was 4,027.

Caestecker (2011) provides percentage figures for the stock of foreigners in Belgium between 1890 and 2001. Before 1961 the number of immigrants never exceeds 5% of the total population, precluding the possibility of mass migration. When I referred to the 1930 census summary I found a different figure for
the number of foreign born to the one provided by Caestecker (Caestecker 2011, table 1) of 422,000 vs 319,000. The discrepancy may be due to Caestecker using a figure that excludes Belgian nationals born abroad. While the higher figure represents a little over 5% of the population in 1930, the difference is not large enough to suggest that mass migration occurred in the period 1890-1960. The largest immigrant group between 1960 and 2000 was Italians (World Bank Group 2011), with Spanish, French, Moroccans, Dutch, Turks, and Germans also making up substantial proportions.

The proportion of immigrants reached 9% of the population by the 1980s, then remained somewhat flat, even declining slightly in the 1990s, before increasing to around 10% in 2010 (immigration has continued to increase since then). Belgian statistics for net migration of foreigners, shows that between 1948 and 2000, the inflow of migrants never exceed the 5% threshold. In the 1960s and 1970s the total immigration did substantially exceed this threshold, but the substantial emigration of non-Belgians in this period (750,000 between 1960 and 1979) suggests a high degree of temporary or circular labor migration, which is supported by the literature (Dustmann 1996, Reniers 1999, Poulain & Perrin 2002). Only in the period 2000-2009 does net migration of foreigners reach around 5%. In this last decade, net immigration was 515,000, into a population of 10.24 million (5.03%). Because this figure is so close to the threshold, and it is difficult to determine in some of these migrants were temporary (for example arriving in 2009 and leaving in 2011), it is coded as a possible mass migration.

**Luxembourg**

Luxembourg was a Habsburg possession from the 15th century until 1795 when it was conquered and annexed by Revolutionary France. After the Congress of Vienna in 1815, Luxembourg was controlled by the Dutch. Many Luxembourgers joined the Belgian revolution in the 1830s, and subsequently it was partitioned in the Treaty of London, with much of its territory and population being incorporated in the
New Belgian state, and the remainder becoming fully sovereign, though still in personal union the King of the Netherlands.

There is no evidence of a substantial immigration in Luxembourg’s first decades, and in 1871 foreigners made up about only 3% of the population (Meriot 1914, STATEC 2019). However, after 1875, there was a dramatic increase in the number of immigrants in the years before the First World War (Caestecker 2011, STATEC 2019). By 1910 the population of foreigners was around 40,000, a substantial number in the small state, making up 12% of the total population. In the decade between 1890 and 1900 the stock of foreigners increased by 11,000 – just over 5% of the 1890 population of 211,000. This figure probably slightly underestimates the immigration over the decade as it does not take into account the decline of the 1890 immigrant stock through emigration and mortality (although it may include some non-permanent migrants).

Over the period 1900 to 1910 the immigrant stock increased by a little under 11,000 about 4.5% of the 1900 population (235,000). Although this figure is a little below the threshold, as mentioned above, it probably understates the number of new arrivals in that decade, making it a decade of possible mass migration.

In the 1910s the foreign population declined, rising again in the interwar period, before seeing another decline after 1930. The 1920s, sitting between two decades of decline, poses some difficulty, because it seems quite possible that the immigrants in this decade were more transient, with many perhaps leaving when economic conditions worsened in the 1930s. By 1935 the total number of foreigners was little more than it had been in 1922. However, the total number arriving over the course of the decade, by any estimation, was well over 5% of the population. Since it is unclear how many were temporary migrants who left Luxembourg within a few years, the decade is coded as a possible mass migration.
After 1945 immigration again resumed at a fairly substantial rate, although before the 1960s it does not appear to have met the threshold of mass migration. In the 1960s the foreign born population increased dramatically, from about 40,000 to 60,000, certainly sufficient for mass migration (Fassmann and Munz 1992, Caestecker 2011, STATEC 2019). In the 1970s this high level of immigration continued with the number of foreigners counted in the 1981 census approaching 100,000. However, there was a notable shift in the origin of immigrants. Before 1970 most immigrants had come from Italy or countries bordering Luxembourg. By 1981, the Portuguese had come to outnumber Italians and almost outnumbered all immigrants from Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands combined (Caestecker 2011).

The rate of immigration declined slightly in the 1980s, but the increase in the immigrant stock was almost exactly 5% of the 1980 population, and so we can infer the net foreign migration over the period was greater than 5%. In the 1990s the immigrant population continued to grow at similar levels to the 1960s and 1970s, increasing from 114,000 in 1991 to 162,000 in 2001, at which point immigrants accounted for 37% of the total population. In the following decade between 2000 and 2010 the immigrant population grew even more rapidly, reaching about 250,000, roughly half of the total population (UN 2017, STATEC 2019). Because of its small size and openness to European immigration, Luxembourg has one of the highest proportions of foreign born residents, and can be considered to have experienced mass migration in every decade between 1960 and 2010.

Scandinavia

In 1450 Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and what is today Finland, were in personal union under a single monarch. Although legally remaining separate kingdoms I only include Denmark in the data set from 1450, treating the other countries as non-independent. I exclude Sweden from the data set until 1523
when it rebelled and became independent. Norway is only included in the data set after 1905 when its union with Sweden was dissolved (before the 19th century union with Sweden, Norway had remained in union with Denmark). Finland, which had been under Swedish, and then Russian rule, became independent after it secured independence in 1917, following the Russian Revolution.

Lottum (2007) provides estimates of immigrant stocks in the North Sea region from 1550 to 1700. In Denmark the immigrant stock in this period was between 4,000 and 10,000. Given a population of 600,000 to 700,000 (Bolt et al. 2018) it seems probable the immigrant stock was below 2% of the total population throughout this period. Although there may have been some recruitment of skilled labor in the 17th and 18th centuries (Kjelstadli in Bade et al. 2011) there is no evidence this ever amounted to a numerically large flow of people. In 1851 the immigrant population was below 1% (Everest 1857) and there is no evidence that it had ever greatly exceeded this level. The probability of anything approaching a mass migration is very low; a conclusion supported by Lassen (1966).

For the decades 1870 to 1920, Jensen (1931) provides best guesses of immigration into Denmark, but notes that there is a lack of direct information, and so the figures should be treated with caution. For the 1870s through 1900s the number of immigrants appears to have been close to 20,000 per decade, with the highest estimate being 24,000 immigrants in the 1890s. Denmark’s population was around 1.8 million in 1870, rising to over 2.4 million in 1900, so even if Jensen’s figures are underestimates, they clearly imply the immigration was insufficient to meet the threshold of mass migration. Jensen does suggest that immigration between 1911 and 1921 could have risen to over 50,000. But by this time Denmark’s population had passed 2.7 million, and mass migration would have required well over 100,000 arrivals.

The World Bank Group (2011) puts the immigrant stock in 1960 at 94,000 – or 2% of the total population. They have this rising to 164,000, 3% of the population, in 1980. Fassmann and Munz (1992)
put the foreign born population somewhat lower at just over 100,000 people, 2% of the population, in 1982. Aagesen (1960) gives a figure of 200,000 immigrants between 1945 and 1954, but while this may have included some permanent immigrants from Scandinavia and Central Europe, it probably also includes some returning Danish emigrants, and other circular or temporary migrations. Overall the evidence strongly suggests no mass migration.

In the 1980s the immigrants stock probably increased by 60,000 to 75,000 (Fassmann and Munz 1992, World Bank Group 2011). In the 1990s and 2000s the immigrant stock rose by about 140,000 in each decade (World Bank Group 2011, United Nations 2017). Official statistics for the net immigration of foreigners show 70,000 in the 1980s, 140,000 in the 1990s, and 170,000 in the 2000s (Statistics Denmark). Into a population of over 5 million, these figures are all well short of mass migration.

In 1523 when Sweden became independent, it probably had a population of between 500,000 and 600,000 (Bolt et al. 2018). Lottum’s (2007) immigration estimates for the North Sea region indicate that the immigrant stock numbered a few thousand in the 16th through 18th centuries. Although we do not have figures for particular decades, we can conclude that the numbers were small, and never more than a few thousand. The threshold for mass migration in this period would be at least 25,000, and for most decades substantially higher. Like other European countries in the early modern period, Sweden actively recruited skilled workers and employed foreigners in the military, but few of these became long term immigrants.

By the beginning of the 19th century the Swedish population was well over 2 million (Jensen 1931, Bolt et al. 2018). Before the 1870s we do not have reliable statistics on immigration to Sweden, but there is no evidence to suggest any large immigration from overseas, instead Sweden was predominantly a country of emigration (Rogers 2007). Jensen (1931) gives a figure of only 12,000 immigrant living in
Sweden in 1870 (about 0.3% of the population) and it is likely that the foreign born population was similarly low in the earlier decades of the 19th century.

Annual figures for immigrant arrivals are available after 1875 from Statistiska Centralbyrån (SCB) the Swedish central statistics bureau. Before 1960 the SCB data show that even the total arrivals number never exceeded 5% of the population – the actual long term immigration was much lower as this figure includes both returning Swedish migrants, and short term or circular foreign immigrations (Jensen 1931, Rogers 2007). If net migration is considered instead, the figure remains below the threshold for mass migration in all decades. Hammar (1980) puts the 1960s as a turning point, before which there was limited immigration, and few academic studies of immigrants to Sweden. There were some refugees who arrived before the 1960s, for example some Jewish emigres in the 1930s and Hungarians in the 1950s but their numbers were not great.

Fassmann and Munz (1992) put the foreign born population of Sweden at 124,000 in 1950 (1.8% of the population) rising to 411,000 in 1970 (5.1% of the population). The World Bank data (World Bank Group 2011) gives the stock in 1960 as 296,000, rising to 527,000 in 1970. The World Bank shows a further rise to 625,000 by 1980, while Fassmann and Munz show no growth in the foreign population, putting it at 406,000 in 1980. For 1990 Fassmann and Munz give the figure of 484,000, compared to 778,000 from the World Bank Data. The difference in these figures is likely due to certain persons born in Finland being counted differently.

Many immigrants up to 1990 were from other Scandinavian countries (Finland, Norway and Denmark) but there were also growing communities from the Balkans and Middle East. As in other parts of Europe the immigration up to the early 1970s was mostly of labor, in the later 1970s it consisted of family reunification, and by the 1980s and 1990s refugees made up an increasing proportion of the immigrants (Borgegard et al. 1998). In the most recent decades net migration was around 200,000 in the 1990s and
near 400,000 in the 2000s (SCB). In the latter decade this approached the mass migration threshold (about 440,000). However, the actual number of foreign immigrants in these decades was likely higher than the net migration figures, since there was a net emigration of Swedish nationals.

In 2000 the foreign born population of Sweden was around 1 million (World Bank Group 2011, United Nations 2017, SCB) of these 364,000 had arrived in the previous decade. By 2010 the foreign born population had risen to 1.4 million, of which 560,000 had arrived in the 2000s. Although not all of the foreign born in 2010 were necessarily long-term immigrants, the figures suggest that in this last decade mass migration is probable.

Germany

Before 1806 the German people mostly lived within the Holy Roman Empire. For immigration purposes, it might make sense to treat the Empire as a national unit, but the constitution of the Empire did not provide for central government. The Emperor lacked much authority to directly govern the many autonomous entities of his Empire. For this reason the Holy Roman Empire is not included in the data set. Instead the modern state of Germany since its unification in 1871, along with the states of East and West Germany during the period after the Second World War before their reunification.

Before 1871 there were several significant German states that could be included, such as the Kingdoms of Saxony, Prussia, and Bavaria. Of these I have only included Prussia – the largest and most important predecessor of modern Germany. For Prussia I have considered the decades starting with the Treaty of Labiau in 1656, which formally elevated Brandenburg-Prussia to a fully sovereign status.

It is clear that Prussia was a relatively important receiver of immigrants in the 17th and 18th centuries. Many of the immigrants who arrived in this period were Protestants and other religious refugees, and
their settlement was encouraged by the state to recover the population losses of the Thirty Years War (Wilke 2004). There are several well documented examples of specific Protestant migrations to Prussia. The immigration of the Salzburg Lutherans in the early 1730s numbered in the range of 15,000 to 25,000 (Ogilvie 1995, Bade & Oltmer in Bade et al. 2011, Niggeman 2016, Schunka 2016). Hornung (2014) estimates 16,000 to 20,000 Huguenots fled to Prussia in the 1680s as a result of increased persecution in France (the *dragonnades*) and the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. Ogilvie (1995) estimates a total Huguenot migration in the late 17th and early 18th centuries of around 44,000.

Vuilleumier (in Bade et al. 2011) puts the figure for all Protestant refugees between 1680 and 1710 at 140,000, and these decades appear to be the peak of immigration to Prussia. Bade and Oltmer (in Bade et al. 2011) estimate 500,000 over the entire period 1640 to 1786. This estimate is supported by Bartlett (in Bade et al. 1979) who gives a figure of 150,000 before 1740 and 350,000 in the period 1740-1786. Lottum (2007) cites Hans Fenske’s figure of 300,000 to Prussia from other parts of Germany in the 17th and 18th centuries (Fenske 1980), the same figure is also used by Moch (2003). Wilke (2004) gives a figure of 350,000 over 120 years in the 17th and 18th centuries.

While it is not clear how many immigrants arrived in any particular decade to Prussia before the 19th century. The total figures suggest that on average immigration must have been around 20,000 to 35,000 per decade – although probably much lower in certain decades, and substantially higher in others. Based on Vuilleumier’s estimate for the period 1680 to 1710, and other evidence from the literature it seems probable that migration was somewhat higher in this period (perhaps exceeding 50,000 in the 1680s or 1690s). The population of Prussia was also growing rapidly at this time. Eddie (2013) gives figures for the Prussian territories around 1650 – which totaled around 800,000. By 1713, Ogilvie, Kupker and Maegraith (2009) put the population at 1.6 million. The uncertainty around population estimates from this period make it impossible to put a confident figure on the change in population, but it does see clear that there was substantial growth.
Into a population of 1 million, an immigration of 50,000 would constitute mass migration. This suggests that mass migration was possible in the period 1680-1710. The concentration of Huguenot migration in the 1680s and 1690s, along with the fact of increasing population, makes it much more likely this threshold was exceeded in one or both of these decades. By 1700 the population was probably well over 1 million, and the estimates suggest immigration in the decade 1700-1710 was probably not much more than 50,000. While we cannot be certain, mass migration should be considered possible for the 1680s and 1690s, but unlikely in the 1700s.

After 1740 migration may have been 70,000 or more in some decades based on Bartlett’s figures (Bartlett 1979). But the total population by this point was greater than 2 million (Ogilvie, Kupker and Maegraith 2009), making the threshold for mass migration at least 100,000, and the literature does not give evidence of such a large migration in a single decade.

In the 18th and 19th century Prussia’s population continued to expand as well as its territorial extent. By 1790 the population probably exceeded 5 million, and by 1816 had reached 10 million (Ogilvie, Kupker and Maegraith 2009). Hebeler (1847), a contemporary, put the population at 15 million, he also shows possible migration figures for the period 1816 to 1846 based on the nominal change in population, but he argues these are overestimates, suggesting there was no mass migration in this period. Burgdorfer (1931) provides more realistic figures for this period, estimating immigration at around 15,000 annually. Although this was a fairly large migration for the period, it fell far short of the 500,000 or more over a decade required for mass migration.

In the final decades before German Unification, the population continued to grow. The Statesman’s Yearbook gave the 1861 population of Prussia as 18.4 million (Martin 1864). The immigration of the earlier 19th century, most likely continued, but as German and other European emigration to North America increased, there is no reason to believe that the rates were any higher than they were before
1846. In the 1840s to the 1860s a mass migration would require hundreds of thousands of immigrants, and there is no evidence of immigration on this scale.

After 1871 Germany became a single unified state. In his famous work on immigration, Ravenstein (1889) gave the figure of 430,000 persons in Germany “born abroad”, about 1% of the total population. Hochstadt (1999) also finds that in the 19th century international migration to Germany was small compared to internal migrations. While there were some immigrants in the period between 1871 and 1914, their numbers were not very large. For example perhaps 60,000 to 80,000 Swedes arrived over a roughly 50 year period (Kjelstadli in Bade et al. 2011). Potts (1990) shows an increase in foreigners from 200,000 in 1871 to over a million in the 1900s, but with a total population of 40 million to 60 million in this period this represented well under 5% of the population.

After the First World War, Germany’s territory was somewhat reduced, and the foreign population in the Weimer Republic remained low. In 1932 there were as few as 142,000 foreign workers in Germany (Potts 1990). Although when dependents are included, the total immigrant stock would be higher, it was still not large in context of a total population greater than 60 million. There was no mass migration to united Germany before the Second World War.

After 1945 Germany was occupied split into two halves, becoming East and West Germany. Among the the great upheavals resulting from the war was the mass exodus of ethnic Germans from Eastern European lands, many who had been settled in these regions for generations, even centuries. By 1950 some 12 million Germans had fled to East and West Germany, and Austria. Most (about 10 million) came from territory that after 1945 were included in Poland (Kosinski 1969, Ahonen et al. 2008, Green 2013). Many came of their own accord, fleeing the advancing Red Army, others were forcibly transferred following the Potsdam Conference. Those classified as expellees and refuges in West Germany made up 8 million of the 48 million population, around 17% – in Eastern Germany the proportion was higher,
around 4 million in a population of 18 million, over 20% (Ahonen et al. 2008, Gatrell 2019). The movements were among the most massive in history, and easily constituted mass migration in both countries.

The movement of people continued into the 1950s, with hundreds of thousands of Germans moving from the communist East to the capitalist West. According to Potts (1990) each year between 150,000 and 200,000 were migrating into Western Germany. These figures would suggest at most immigration to West Germany in the 1950s was around 2 million, or 4% of the 1950 population. However, Green (2001) gives a figure of 2.5 million to 3 million over the slightly longer period of 1949 to 1961. These higher estimates, along with a small, but not insignificant immigration of non-Germans (perhaps as many as 200,000) make mass migration possible in the 1950s.

Aside from the initial refugees and expellees, East Germany received few immigrants before reunification, and after the 1940s certainly did not experience mass migration, so the following discussion will focus on West Germany’s immigration history.

In the 1960s West Germany began to receive a very different migration. Whereas those arriving in the 1940s and 1950s had been ethnic Germans, after 1960 there was a mass recruitment of non-German immigrant workers. They predominantly came from the countries of the Mediterranean – Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, Italy, and Spain. This population of Gastarbeiter (Guest Workers) increased from a modest 300,000 in 1960 to almost 2 million by 1970, and 2.5 million in 1973 when the oil crisis largely put an end to the recruitment of migrant labor (Potts 1990, Rudolph 1996). These migrant workers were intended to be temporary, with the expectation that they would return to their countries of origin after a few years. In fact, many remained in Germany, and subsequently brought their families to join them. The World Bank indicates about 2.8 million immigrants living in East and West Germany in 1970 (World Bank Group 2011) once those from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR are excluded (most of these
being earlier refugees and expellees). This was an increase of nearly 2 million from these countries. In addition the number of Polish, Czechoslovakian, and Soviet immigrants saw slight increases, showing that there continued to be some new arrivals from those areas. With a population over 56 million, about 2.8 million immigrants would have needed to arrive in West Germany during the 1960s. The majority of the immigrants in the World Bank data would have been in the West. However, while the threshold figure may have been approached, the evidence suggests that the number of permanent immigrants was closer to 2 million.

During the 1970s guest workers continued to arrive at the beginning of the decade. And towards the end of the decade the number of immigrants continued to rise as a result of family reunification. Between 1978 and 1981 alone there were 450,000 arrivals of family members (Jurgens 2010). Over the entire decade this secondary flow of immigrants may have kept the number of arrivals similar to the 1960s, with Turks being more heavily represented. Data from the World Bank Group shows the immigrant stock rising by around 2 million. Fassmann and Munz (1992) show a similar increase of the foreign resident population from just under 3 million in 1970 to 4.7 million in 1982. However, the evidence does not suggest that immigration in the period reached more than 3 million, as required to meet the threshold for mass migration.

In the 1980s there was an increase in asylum cases, from about 100,000 in 1980 to a peak of 440,000 in 1992 (Green 2001, Jurgens 2010). However, overall immigration was slowing during this decade and there was only a modest increase in the immigrant stock of 500,000 for East and West Germany combined in the World Bank Group data (World Bank Group 2011) or 600,000 between 1982 and 1990 using Fassmann and Munz (1992) estimates for West Germany alone. Both figures underestimate to number of arrivals due to the natural decline in the immigrant population, and this would be greater when East Germany is included, due to the older age profile of immigrants there. But even after taking
this into account it is clear that immigration was lower than in the previous two decades, and far short of mass migration.

After the reunification of Germany there were around 2 million arrivals in the 1990s and 1 million arrivals in the 2000s (Federal Office of Migration and Refugees 2016). The population of the reunified Germany was around 80 million at the beginning of the 1990s and had increased only slightly by 2000 to around 82 million.

Immigration was particularly high in the early 1990s immediately after reunification when there was a large number of asylum applications, mostly coming from the Balkans and Poland. Additionally the end of the Cold War lead to a new wave of ethnic German immigration (Munz & Ulrich 1999, Green 2001). The rate of migration in the early 1990s would, probably, have been sufficient for mass migration – but by the end of the decade there was a decline in the number of new arrivals, and foreign net migration even turned slightly negative in 1997 and 1998. Over the next decade the rate of migration remained lower, not reaching the early 1990s peak until the 2010s (not covered by this study).

**Switzerland**

The Swiss Confederacy was formed from an alliance of Cantons in the 13th and 14th centuries. After victory in the Swabian War, Switzerland was a de facto independence state, although it was not until 1648, with the treaty of Westphalia, that its independence (from the Holy Roman Empire) was formally recognized by the European countries. Functionally the Swiss Confederacy was an independent state from 1499 and is included in the data set from 1500 onwards.

In the 15th and 16th centuries most migration was internal, with substantial population movement from the lower valleys to higher regions (Head-Koenig 2011). During this period some foreigners did migrate
to Switzerland to work, for example as peddlers, and some Protestant exiles arrived from France and Italy, but there is no evidence that their numbers were large (Vuilleumier in Bade et al. 2011). The population in this period was probably between 500,000 and 1 million (Vuilleumier 2011, Bolt et al. 2018).

During the 17th century restrictions were put in place on immigration, and Switzerland throughout the 17th and 18th centuries was politically and socially closed to immigrants (Head-Koenig 2011, Vuilleumier 2011). Between 1680 and 1710 as many as 140,000 Protestant refugees passed through Switzerland, but most continued to Prussia or other German states (Vuilleumier 2011).

The population by 1700 was 1.2 million. And continued to grow to 2.3 or 2.4 million by 1850. Up to this time Switzerland was mainly a country of emigration and not a major receiver of immigrants (Riano and Wastl-Walter 2006). The foreign stock in 1851 was 72,000 - only about 3% of the total population (Everest 1857, Mayer 1966), and had probably not been much higher than this at any time earlier. By 1860 it had grown to 115,000, almost 5% of the population. By 1888 the foreign stock had doubled to 230,000, 7.9% of the total population (Mayer 1966). However, while this was an impressive growth of the immigrant population over the course of a generation, it was gradual enough that no mass migration occurred in any of these decades. The largest increase in the foreign stock was from 150,000 to 210,000 in the 1870s, a change of 60,000. Although this does not account for natural decline, these figures also include the children of immigrants, who did not receive Swiss citizenship by virtue of birth in the country.

After 1890, the rate of immigration increased. Between 1888 and 1900 the immigrant stock rose from 230,000 to over 380,000, an increase of 150,000. This figure suggests mass migration might be possible, but would require the natural rate of growth in the immigrant population to be slightly negative. In the 1900s the stock grew by 170,000 to 550,000 foreigners, almost 15% of the total population. This would
give an even better chance of mass migration but could still be somewhat short if there was also any substantial growth from natural increase. In the 1900s and 1910s mass migration is possible but not certain.

Immigration continued upwards until 1914 with the outbreak of the First World War. After the outbreak of war, about 100,000 immigrants left to join the armies of their respective nations, along with others departing this reduced the overall foreign stock to about 400,000. Restrictions on immigration were also put into place at this time (Vuilleumier 2011). The foreign population continued to decline in the 1920s and 1930s before seeing a slight rebound in the 1940s to 285,000 (Mayer 1966). There was no mass migration in these decades.

By the 1950s, however, immigration was once again increasing rapidly. Between 1950 and 1960 the foreign stock grew from 285,000 to 585,000 according to Mayer (1966). This increase of 300,000 is probably an underestimate, since by this time the foreign stock in Switzerland was almost certainly experiencing natural decline with more deaths than births as well as naturalizations being a subtraction to the stock (Mayer 1966). But even if it were a slight overestimate, 300,000 would still be easily sufficient to meet the threshold of mass migration, which at this time, with a population of 4.7 million in 1950, was about 235,000. Other sources give different figures for this decade. The World Bank (2011) shows a higher immigrant stock in 1960 of over 700,000, while the Swiss Federal Statistics Office (BFS) shows a lower figure in 1960 of 490,000. However, both of these are consistent with mass migration – with the Swiss Federal Statistics Office data showing a net migration of 280,000 people.

By the early 1960s the rate of immigration was extremely high, with the foreign stock growing to over 800,000 in just 4 years and to more than a million by the end of the decade (Mayer 1966, Vuilleumier 2011, World Bank Group 2011). Net migration is recorded at 390,000 (BFS). This was another decade of mass migration.
In response to the rapid increase in the foreign population, immigration policies became more restrictive in the 1960s and in 1970 immigrant quotas were introduced (Afonso 2004). Subsequently between 1970 and 1980 the immigrant population declined slightly, although this may have been a consequence of declining economic conditions in the 1970s rather than changes in immigration policy (World Bank Group 2011, Vuilleumier 2011).

After 1980 the foreign-born population again began to increase. Previously immigrants had mostly been from neighboring Italy, France, Austria, and Germany. And the 1960s saw Spain briefly become a major origin of immigrants. After 1980, however, immigrants mainly came from Portugal and Yugoslavia. Between 1980 and 1990 the foreign population increased by almost 130,000 according to the Federal Statistics Office – with net migration of 203,000 persons offsetting a decline though naturalization. With a total population of over 6 million in 1980, this was not enough to meet the threshold of mass migration. Net migration rose to 300,000 in the 1990s, again falling short of mass migration into a population of 6.8 million. However, in the 2000s the net migration of foreigners rose to 575,000, with especially higher rates of immigration towards the end of the decade. Into a population of 7.3 million, this was clearly mass migration.

**France**

The 15th century was an important turning point in French history, with the conclusion of the 100 years’ war and the expulsion of the English. Over the next three centuries, France would expand its territory along its eastern frontier, but there was a substantial continuity in the social and political system known as the Ancien Regime. The revolution completely altered French society, but it did not disrupt the long history of France as a unified and independent nation. Only during the Second World War was France briefly occupied and divided.
In the early modern period France had the largest population in Western Europe, already around 15 million by the end of the 15th century and more than 20 million by the 18th century (Bolt et al. 2018). Only a migration of hundreds of thousands would constitute mass migration into a society this large. Internal migration was much more significant than immigration of foreigners (Moch in Bade et al. 2011). However, Paris, like other great cities attracted migrants from great distances and probably had a notable immigrant population throughout the early modern period. These immigrants included a mix of businessmen, artisans, servants and laborers and are estimated to have made up 2-6% of the Parisian population in the 18th century, perhaps 20,000 to 25,000 people in 1789 (Roche 1987).

There was also seasonal movements of agricultural workers from Spain and Italy (Moch 2011) – while for the most part transitory movements, they may have resulted in some more permanent immigration. Refugees, including Greeks (Harris 1995), Jews (Shulvass 1951), and English Jacobites (Moch 2011), also found their way to France, but there numbers were in the thousands at most.

Sahlins (2004) provides some information on the number of foreigners in France from the late 16th century to 1789. In this period, there were perhaps around 50 naturalizations each year, but these made up only a very small proportion of the total number of foreigners in France, which Sahlins estimates as being in the tens of thousands.

Estimating immigration to France before 1800 is difficult but given the country’s size, the few pieces of evidence suggest that the largest migrations made up less than 1% of the population. It appears that even in the areas where we expect the highest concentration of immigrants, such as Paris, there proportion did not greatly exceed 5%. This makes is likely that no mass migration occurred in France before the 19th century.

After 1800, there is more information on immigration to France, and particularly after 1850. In the 19th century France was to become a rather important immigrant destination within Europe. Belgians, and
later Italians, were the largest groups. In the late 18th century, Belgians may have made up as much as 30% of the population of Lille (Pooley 2006). There was a particular increase during the period after 1850 as industrialization increasingly drew workers from rural areas to manufacturing jobs, often crossing borders in the process. The numbers involved were quite large, with perhaps 1 million or more foreigners living and working in France by the 1880s and as many as 50,000 arriving annually during that decade (Dignan 1981, Singer-Kerel 1991, Noiriel 1992 and 1995, Ogden 1995, Pooley 2006, Moch in Bade et al. 2011). However, given France’s population (over 35 million by 1851) the total migration in a decade would have to be well over 1 million to qualify as mass migration. It is quite clear that this was not the case.

New laws restricting immigration were enacted in the period between the 1880s and the First World War, but immigrants came in sufficient numbers to maintain and even slightly grow the foreign stock. Between the 1880s and the beginning of the First World War, the foreign population in France increased from around 1 million to 1.2 million (Moch 2011). Italians dominated the immigrant arrivals in this period, altering the composition of the immigrant stock to a much larger extent than its size, as they replaced the declining Belgian stock. In the European context, the scale of immigration was significant, but was probably somewhat lower than it had been during the 1880s, and certainly far below the threshold of mass migration. In 1911, immigrants were still no more than 3% of the total French population.

Both during and immediately after the war, the need for labor led to encouragement of immigration from places such as Greece and Portugal, there was sufficient immigration before 1921 that the immigrant population by this year had already grown to around 1.5 million (Statistique Generale 1923, Gauld & Herbert 1927). This number may have included some Russian refugees, of which 400,000 reached France in the period after 1917, most of who later left to other places (Dignan 1981). It was only in the 1920s that immigration rose to an unprecedented peak (Ogden 1995, Moch 2011) reaching
proportions that might conceivably have constituted mass migration. Over a million immigrants entered France in the first 5 years of the 1920s (Gauld & Herbert 1927), and by 1931 the number of immigrants living in France had probably risen to 3 million (Mauco 1933, Dignan 1981, Moch in Bade et al. 2011). The new wave of immigration in the 1920s consisted mostly of labor migrants, although Armenian and Russian refugees contributed to the total. Italians were still a major component of the migration flow, but Spanish, Polish and other immigrants made it a more diverse population of arrivals (Moch in Bade et al. 2011).

The threshold for mass migration in the 1920s would be just under 2 million. It seems plausible that immigration came close to this figure. In addition to extrapolations from the change in immigrant stock, Mauco (1933) provides immigration figures for the years 1920 to 1932, which show 1.7 million immigrants in the years 1920 to 1929. Complications include the possible undercounting of immigrants who were residing in the country illegally and the inclusion of some temporary workers who planned to remain only for a short period. Mauco believes unauthorized entries to be substantial, leading to a significant undercount of immigrants in the official figures. Between 1928 and 1930 around 125,000 unauthorized immigrants were regularized (Mauco 1933) suggesting the immigrant population could have been undercounted by several hundred thousand. We also know that half a million or more foreign immigrants left France in the 1930s (Moch in Bade et al. 2011), but whether these were immigrants who had come to work temporarily, or whether they were leaving only in response to changing economic conditions is hard to say. For France in the 1920s mass migration is possible, but uncertain.

After 1931, with the Great Depression and the beginning of the Second World War, immigration to France abruptly ended, and even reversed, as hundreds of thousands of immigrant workers left. By the end of the 1940s the immigrant population had fallen to around 1.8 to 2 million (Fassmann & Munz 1992, Moch in Bade et al. 2011, INSEE 2019).
After 1950, there was a new upturn in immigration to France. Most of the new immigrants came from Algeria and Portugal, with some arrivals from other parts of North Africa. Meanwhile the proportion of Italian and Polish immigrants in the total foreign born population fell substantially. By 1970 the number of foreign residents in France had risen to about 2.6 million according to Fassman & Munz (1992), this probably excludes a substantial population of naturalized immigrants, and official statistics give a somewhat larger immigrant population of 3.3 million by 1968 (INSEE 2019). These figures are fairly consistent with Ogden (1995) and Moch (2011), but differ significantly from the World Bank’s figures for 1960 and 1970 which put the immigrant population at 3.5 and 5.2 million respectively (World Bank Group 2011).

The difference in the World Bank figures is presumably explained by the inclusion of French citizens returning from Algeria, the *pieds-noirs*. These migrants, numbering around one million, were French citizens, of European ancestry, born in the French colony of Algeria. After Algeria gained independence in 1962 they moved on mass to the French mainland. While most sources apparently exclude these in immigration counts, they are treated as immigrants for the purposes of this study.

However, even with their inclusion, the total number of immigrants during the 1960s was probably below the threshold for mass migration, which would be more than 2.2 million. After 1970, the immigrant population continued to grow, but at a slower pace (Fassman & Munz 1992, Ogden 1995, Moch 2011, World Bank Group 2011, UN 2017, INSEE 2019). Overall, the evidence suggests immigration did not meet the threshold of mass migration in France in the post-War period.

**Spain and Portugal**

Spain is included in the data set from 1479 after the union of Castile and Aragon through the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella. By the end of the century the Spanish kingdoms had completed to reconquest of
southern Spain, and in the 1510s invaded and annexed the northern Kingdom of Navarre. Portugal had been an independent and sovereign kingdom from the 12th century, and is included in the data set throughout, with the exception of the period 1580 to 1640, when it was in union with Spain, and the 1810s when the Portuguese court had fled to Brazil, and the country was in essence a Protectorate of the United Kingdom.

In the 16th and 17th centuries the Spanish population was probably between 7 and 9 million (Hendricks 1860, Livi-Bacci 1968, Phillips 1987, Bolt et al. 2018). During this time there was a fairly substantial migration of French to Catalonia and in the late 16th century perhaps 20% of the population of Catalonia had been born in France (Phillips 1987, Livi-Bacci 1999, Pietschmann 2011). However, the population of Catalonia was small in comparison to the total Spanish population, with just 320,000 people in 1553 (Hendricks 1860). At the peak, the French in Spain may have number 200,000 in the 1620s (Phillips 1987), too few for mass migration even if they had arrived all in one decade and were permanent settlers.

In addition to the French migration, Spain attracted specialists, artisans, and merchants. They may have made up fairly substantial communities in the port cities, but their overall numbers proportional to the Spanish population were not large (Herzog 2008, Pietschmann 2011).

At the end of the 18th century, when the population of Spain was somewhat more than 10 million, there were 27,500 foreign households, giving a foreign stock less than 2% and perhaps less than 1% (Hume 1899 p. 5). A mass migration to Spain would have required hundreds of thousands of arrivals over a single decade, and there is no evidence of a movement on this scale. Rather than being a country of immigration, Spain was an exporter of people until very recently (Roses & Sanchez-Alonso 2004, de la Escosura 2010, Sperling 2013, Collantes et al. 2014). In addition to the mass expulsions of Jews and Moriscos, there was also a steady emigration of Spanish to the New World and other destinations. Pietschmann (2011) also claims that extensive immigration is not discernable after the middle of the 19th
century. Overall, it seems safe to conclude that there were no mass migrations to Spain between 1450 and 1950. At this later date, Fassman and Munz (1992) put the foreign resident population at 93,000, or 0.3% of the total population.

In 1960 the World Bank (2011) shows an immigrant stock of 210,000, still less than 1% of the population, which by this time was over 30 million. After this the immigrant population grew quite quickly, reaching 830,000 by 1990, an almost four-fold increase. In comparison the total population had grown by less than a third and was a little below 40 million. But, with the immigrant stock making up only a little more than 2% of the population, Spain was still far from being a country of mass migration.

It was in the 1990s that immigration really took off. Between 1990 and 2000 the immigrant stock grew from 830,000 to 1.75 million according to the World Bank (2011) figures and from 820,000 to 1.66 million according the United Nations (2017) figures. Although this was still short of mass migration (the threshold for which would be almost 2 million) it represented the beginning of Spain’s transition to a country of immigration (Arango 2000). By 2005 the number of foreigners had increased to over 4 million and by 2010 to 6.3 million (United Nations 2017). Much of this new migration came from Latin America, as well as a substantial number from Morocco. With well over 4 million immigrants coming to Spain during the 2000s, this was definitely a decade of mass migration.

Like Spain, Portugal was historically a country of emigration. In the early modern period there is no evidence of significant immigration, although there was an inflow of imported slaves (Newitt 2015). Between 1450 and 1700 the population was probably in the range of 1 to 2 million people (Bolt et al. 2018, Palma et al. 2019). Payne (1973) notes that any immigration before the 20th century was light, and not large enough to show up in genetic studies.

Portugal’s long connection to international trade ensured that Lisbon (and other urban areas) had notable communities of foreign traders (Fisher 1988, Ribeiro 2015, Bastos 2016). Among these the
English were especially prominent. But like other trading communities, their total numbers were not on the scale of mass migration. The largest group of foreigners throughout most of this period was probably Galicians, who worked as laborers in Lisbon and Porto, and in wine production in the Douro Valley. By 1800 the number in Lisbon alone may have been as many as 40,000 (Fisher 1988, Bastos 2016). But by 1800 the total population of Portugal had risen to around 3 million (Bolt et al. 2018, Palma et al. 2019), putting the threshold for mass migration between 100,000 and 150,000. It is unlikely that this many Galician’s settled in Portugal, and certainly not over a single decade. Many of the workers were temporary, or season migrants.

In the modern period all evidence suggest Portugal continued to have very low rates of immigration. In 1950 the foreign resident population of Portugal was just 21,000, about 0.3% of the population (Fassmann and Munz 1992), and in 1990 it had risen only modestly to 108,000 – 1% of the total population. This figure, however, is probably not a good count of the total immigrant population, since it excludes any immigrants holding Portuguese citizenship. The United Nations (2017) and World Bank (2011) are in agreement that the immigrant stock in 1990 was a much higher 475,000 (Pew Global 2018 gives a similar 440,000). However, with a population of about 10 million, this is still not quite 5% of the population (and they did not all arrive in the 1980s in any case).

The difference between the immigrant and foreign resident figures may be the inclusion of the Retornados. These were Portuguese citizens living in the colonies who returned to Portugal after the decolonization of its empire in the 1970s. They numbered somewhere between 500,000 and million (Piexoto 2002, David 2015), with an estimated 200,000 to 400,000 being Portuguese citizens, but born abroad. In any case, it does not appear that the total immigration in the 1970s quite reached the threshold of 450,000. The subsequent growth in the immigrant stock has been moderate, rising to 760,000 in 2010, a little over 7% of the population (United Nation 2017). But they have not been on the scale of mass migration.
Italy

Until Italy was unified in the 19th century, it consisted of a patchwork of small states – The Papal States, Genoa, Florence, Venice, Naples, Sicily, Milan, and others. These states typically had relatively dense, urbanized populations. They included major centers of learning, trade and pilgrimage. As result, they often had significant foreign communities of merchants and scholars.

Many of these small states lacked full sovereignty for much or all of the period after 1450, rather they were ruled by Spanish, French and Austrian monarchs. For this reason, only Genoa, Venice, the Papal States and the Grand Duchy of Tuscany are included in the data set. During the period there were other independent states, such as the Republic of Sienna that lasted up to the 1550s, or the small Duchy of Modena, but these are not included in the data set.

The major cities of Italy all received significant numbers of immigrants both from their immediate hinterlands and from international origins. However, for most of the early modern period these migrations were not so large as to increase the total urban populations (Bertagna and Maccari-Clayton in Bade et al. 2011).

Following the fall of Constantinople in 1453 many Greeks fled to Italy, and particularly Venice, which already had very close ties to the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean (Norwich 1977, Greene 2010). The most notable of these refugees were Greek scholars, whose knowledge of the Greek language and literature may have played a contributing role in the Italian Renaissance (Monfasani 2004, Lamers 2015), however, they also included a wider assortment of merchants, artisans and laborers (Burke 2016). In the late 15th century Venice was one of the largest cities in Europe, with a population in the region of 100,000 (Pezzolo 2013). The Republic also included other significant towns such as Verona and Padua, and a substantial hinterland.
Finding figures for the number of Greeks that fled to Venice is difficult. Harris (1995) estimates around 4,000 were living in Venice in 1478 and that the peak of the migration occurred in the 1450s. However, Monfasani (2004) and Burke (2016) argue that, rather than a sudden influx after 1453, there was a substantial long-term migration, which began much earlier and continued through the 16th century. Burke says that while estimates of the Greek population in Venice were as high as 15,000, a figure of 4,000 – 4,500 is more likely for the 16th century. Mofansi puts the Greek population in Venice at 2-3% in the period 1450 to 1600. There may have been larger migrations at this time to Venetian colonies such as Crete and Zante. However, these islands were already culturally and demographically Greek. These movements of populations within Venice’s colonial territories adds complication to the determination of mass migration.

The Greeks were not the only immigrants to Venice in this period. The city attracted (and sometimes recruited) immigrants from across Europe, and there was a notable Jewish population. Ravid (2013) summarizes the research on foreign communities in Venice showing that they may have made up 20% or more of the city’s population in the 16th century. However, not all of these were necessarily immigrants, but may also have been the descendants of earlier immigrant groups who maintained a separate ethnic and national identity. The percentage also exaggerates the total immigrant population of the Republic, as the hinterland and smaller towns very likely had smaller proportions of foreigners.

Overall, it is not possible to exclude completely an episode of mass migration for Venice. However, other than the Greek refugees in the 1450s, there does not appear to be evidence suggesting a concentration of migration in specific decades. While the Greeks were probably the largest foreign community, they alone are very unlikely to have immigrated in sufficient numbers to meet the threshold of 5% of the population over a decade. However, when combined with other groups, it is plausible that there was a mass migration in the 1450s (or another decade) if other sources of migration were also above average. Given the uncertainty around population and migration figures the 1450s could be considered a possible
decade of mass migration, but the evidence tends to suggest that mass migration was improbable in other decades.

The other Italian states in the 15th and 16th century are somewhat less likely to have experienced mass migration than Venice. Although they received a few Greek and Jewish refugees, these were not mass movements. It is unlikely that any Italian state received as many Greeks as Venice, and the number of Jews settling in Italy was probably not much more than 20,000 (Shulvass 1951) over the course of several decades. Even if a substantial number of these Jewish refugees arrived in the 1490s, their demographic impact alone would be too small to constitute mass migration.

There are a few other cases immigration worth investigating.

Livorno in the 17th century grew rapidly with both internal and international migration contributing the increase in population (Fischer and Villani 2007, Bertagna and Maccari-Clayton in Bade et al. 2011). The Jewish community may have been larger than any other in Italy besides Rome (Trivellato 2004). However, the total population of Livorno was still no more than 20,000 in 1700, compared to Florence’s population of around 70,000. And, while there is evidence of thriving foreign communities in Florence (Rosenthal 2010), there is no reason to think immigration to Florence or the rest of Tuscany was especially great in this period. While Livorno saw population growth, the other urban areas in Tuscany – Florence, Pisa and Siena – were growing only slowly (De Vries 1984). Overall, the evidence does not support the existence of a mass migration to Tuscany.

De Vries figures show a rapid increase in the population of Rome between 1550 and 1600 from 45,000 to 105,000. This growth continued at a slower rate during the 17th century. Chandler’s figures (Chandler 1987) also show this rapid population growth. The foreign population (born outside of Italy) was estimated as high as 20% in the late 15th century (Lee 1983), but whether the growth in the late 16th century was due to foreign or internal migration is unclear. The rapid rise of Ancona in the late 16th and
early 17th century, however, very likely did involve significant foreign migration in a close parallel to the emergence of Livorno (Greene 2010). The other major cities of the Papal States apparently did not grow at this time. Bologna probably had a roughly stable population between 1550 and 1750, while Ferrara and Perugia were actually in decline (De Vries 1984). For mass migration to have occurred, we would have to infer that the population growth in Rome involved a large amount of foreign migration and was concentrated in certain decades. Even then, it would have to coincide with substantial migration to other parts of the Papal States. Although it is not clear that this possibility can be entirely excluded, there does not appear to be any evidence of a particular migration fitting this description. The most reasonable conclusion is that no mass migration to the Papal States occurred.

For Genoa there is even less indication of any mass migration. Genoa may have had a very liberal policy towards foreigners and was once an important center of trade (Lopez 1964). However, by 1450 the role of maritime trade was in decline (although the city remained an important financial center). In the 1490s a many of the Jews leaving Spain may have traversed Genoa, but they did not settle there in great numbers (Moore 2001).

After Italy became unified in the 1860s, it became an important country of emigration, sending millions of people to the Americas, as well as many to France and other European countries. There was significant amount of return migration, but immigration from other countries was low. Following the Second World War, Italy took in 200,000 to 300,000 Italians from Istria and Dalmatia (Manin 2006, Corni 2011). A notable population movement, but this represented less than 1% of Italy’s total population, which was over 40 million.

By the 1970s Italy was beginning to switch from being a country of emigration to a country of immigration. By the beginning of the 1990s there were around 1 million foreigners in Italy (King 1993, Bonifazi 1994) – less than 2% of the population. After that the rate of immigration increased
significantly, with perhaps another 1 million arriving during the 1990s, and around to 3 million in the 2000s (Strozza 2016). This makes it likely that the threshold of mass migration was met in the last decade under study.

_Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia_

In the data set Austria is included from 1450. Austria became an Archduchy in 1453. Over the next centuries, through marriage and conquest the Habsburg monarchs of Austria extended their territory significantly to include Bohemia and Hungary. In 1804 these territories were incorporated by Francis II into a new Austrian Empire. In 1867 the Austro-Hungarian Compromise restructured the Empire to create two largely sovereign entities (The Austrian Empire and the Hungarian Kingdom) in personal union through the monarch. Austria-Hungary came to an end with the First World War. Most of its former territories divided into several new nations – primarily Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and independent Hungarian and Austrian states. Other territories went to Poland, Ukraine, Romania, and Italy. Hungary is included in the data set from the 1918 when it became fully separated from Austria, otherwise it is included as part of the Austrian state. Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia are also included from 1918 until they were further divided in the 1990s.

Like other European countries, most permanent immigration to Austria in the early modern period was of specialist workers and merchants, settling in cities such as Vienna. Indeed, Vienna was a major cosmopolitan center, with perhaps 25,000 foreign immigrants settling there between 1600 and 1650 (Hahn in Bade et al. 2011). Other towns also had substantial foreign communities, but the Austrian Habsburg monarchy even at its low point at the end of the Thirty Years War, in 1648, had a population of 7 million (Ingrao 2019). Any immigration in the thousands or tens of thousands was short of mass migration by an order of magnitude or more.
More significant in this period were the population movements of religious exiles. And in this case Austria, and the other Habsburg territories, mostly saw emigration of Jews and Protestants, rather than being a receiver of religious refugees (Weinryb 1973, Hahn in Bade et al. 2011).

By the end of the 18th century, with the inclusion of Hungary, the population of the Habsburg lands (soon to become the Austrian Empire) was over 25 million (Ingrao 2019). During this century Hungary may have gained as many as a million settlers as hundreds of thousands of German and Balkan colonists repopulated its frontiers (Fenske 1980, Bartlett 2010, Ingrao 2019). But even if all of these colonists came from outside of the Habsburg monarchy they were not close to constituting a mass migration – which would have required immigration on this scale over a single decade.

During the 19th century there was migration within the Austrian Empire, mostly from Hungary to Austria. But there is no evidence of mass migration from outside of the Empire. Even including Hungarians, the share of foreigners in Austria was only around 2% in the latter half of the century (Hahn in Bade et al. 2011).

After the First World War, Austria-Hungary was divided. From this point on the data set includes Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia (as well as their later successor states) separately. The much-reduced Austria had a population of just 6.5 million (Bolt et al. 2018). The disruption of the First World War did result in population movements, with as many as half a million refugees finding themselves in Vienna, but only a very small number of these remained by the end of the decade as they dispersed or returned home after the war (Hahn 2011). In the interwar period there was little immigration to Austria, and as late as 1950 the foreign resident population was still below 5% (Fassmann and Munz 1992). However, this figure does not seem to fully capture the large number refugees who found themselves in Austria in the 1940s and 1950s.
While for a great many refugees, Austria was merely a country of transit, for many German expellees it became a permanent destination. The number of these expellees remaining in the country was at least 350,000, and possibly around 500,000 (De Zayas and Loeser 1993, Hahn 2011, Radspieler 2012, Schippmann 2012). This was sufficient for mass migration during the 1940s.

In 1956 another wave of refugees arrived, this time from Hungary. Gatrell (2019) puts the number arriving by 1957 at 190,000, which is consistent with contemporary accounts (Sapir 1958). Hahn (in Bade et al. 2011) puts the figure at “more than 200,000”, but this is still some way short of mass migration. Likewise, refugee arrivals in the 1960s from Czechoslovakia, and in the 1980s from Poland, were in the 100,000 to 200,000 range. In any case, according to Hahn, only a relatively small fraction of each of these refugee waves settled permanently in Austria.

By the 1980s, however, immigration from Turkey and the Balkans was substantial with the foreign resident population rising from around 300,000 at the beginning of the 1980s to 500,000 or more by the beginning of the 1990s (Fassmann and Munz 1992, in Bade et al. Hahn 2011). This put the total foreign resident stock at over 6% of the population. In the 1990s there was again a robust increase in the foreign resident stock from 520,000 in 1991 to over 700,000 in 2001. And the total population born abroad (including naturalized immigrants) was over 1 million (Fassmann and Reeger 2008, Hahn in Bade et al. 2011).

Naturalizations between 1983 and 1991 were around 75,000, and mortality was probably low, given the age distribution of immigrants, and exceeded by births (Fassmann and Reeger 2008), the total addition through immigration during the 1980s was probably not more than 300,000, and clearly not as high as 375,000. In the 1990s naturalizations were higher, with around 18,500 annually. Births were likely higher than deaths (by 2001 there were 116,000 foreign residents born in Austria) implying that the net migration of foreigners was below 385,000 (the threshold for mass migration). For the 2000s net foreign
immigration figures are available (Statistics Austria 2020) and show the net immigration of foreigners between 2000 and 2010 as 314,000, which would not be sufficient for mass migration.

The evidence suggests that although since 1980 immigration to Austria has been substantial, and approached the threshold of mass migration, it has not exceeded it.

In the first years of its existence as an independent state, Hungary experienced a substantial immigration of ethnic Hungarians at the end of the First World War, arriving from territories in new states like Yugoslavia (Gatrell 2013). The population of Hungary after the Treaty of Trianon was a little under 8 million, within significantly reduced borders. The Hungarian refugees resettling within the new nation numbered around 350,000 (Mocsy 1983) and so were a little below the threshold for mass migration.

In the 1940s, as population were uprooted across Europe, there was again a migration of ethnic Hungarians from outside the country’s borders into Hungary (Kosinski 1969b, Gatrell 2013). The exchange of population between Czechoslovakia and Hungary appears to have involved around 100,000 Hungarians at most. Although the Hungarian population Slovakia numbered some 600,000, the Hungarians were reluctant to agree to accept an uneven exchange of population – and there were only around 120,000 Slovaks to be exchanged. Along with Hungarians from other parts of Europe, the total resettled in the 1940s and early 1950s was probably less than 250,000 and certainly not sufficient for mass migration in either decade (The World Today 1947, Schechtman 1953, Kosinski 1969a, Halpern 1975).

In the rest of the 20th century there was no substantial immigration to Hungary, and by the year 2000, the immigrant stock was around 300,000 – less than 3% of the population (World Bank Group 2011, United Nations 2017). The stock did increase somewhat in the next decade, to 440,000, but still did not reach 5% of the population.
Yugoslavia between 1918 and 1992 was a multiethnic state, but not a country of immigration. The population in 1918 was somewhere around 12 million, rising to 17 million by the 1950s (Myers & Campbell 1954). By the 1980s the population of Yugoslavia was well over 20 million (Paxton 1987).

In the 1920s and 1930s the statistics of arrivals were largely returning emigrants, from the United States or parts of Europe (Ferenczi & Wilcox 1929, Myers & Campbell 1954). During the 1940s, Yugoslavia saw tumultuous changes to its population as the occupying Nazis deported and resettled hundreds of thousands, while 120,000 Bulgarians moved into Bulgarian occupied Macedonia. After the War the Bulgarians were expelled, along with most of the pre-war German population (Sundhaussen in Bade et al. 2011). Although these displacements had important demographic impacts, the overall movement in the 1940s appears to have mostly been outwards or internal, with only a small number resettling within Yugoslavia from outside – perhaps around 40,000 from Hungary (Schechtman 1953, Halpern 1975). The population movements certainly do not appear to constitute a mass migration (requiring hundreds of thousands) into Yugoslavia.

After 1950 there was very little immigration into Yugoslavia. Rather Yugoslavians emigrated abroad to work, some resettling permanently, others returning. The country did receive around 20,000 Hungarian refugees in the 1950s, but this was far from the scale of mass migration, and these refugees did not stay long but moved on to Austria (Gatrell 2019).

Czechoslovakia at the time of its creation after the First World War had a population of around 13 million. This rose to 14.6 million in 1938 before the German invasion. Following the War, the population fell to 12.3 million in 1950. The losses came through a combination of territorial change, war mortality, and the expulsion of the German population after the War (Srb 1962). Population growth in the post-War period was fairly low, and by the time of its dissolution in the 1990s the population was around 16
million. The threshold of mass migration would be in the range of 600,000 to 800,000. And it is quite clear this was never met.

Before 1938 there was no demographically significant immigration to Czechoslovakia (Srb 1964). Like other Eastern European countries, the population of Czechoslovakia was drastically impacted by population movements in the 1940s, as a result of the Second World War. But these were primarily losses of population from the expulsion of Germans, and the ceding of Carpatho-Ukraine to the USSR. While there were some inward movements of population through ethnic exchanges with the USSR and Hungary, but these were not large, involving less than 200,000 people (Schechtman 1953, Srb 1964).

After 1950, there were foreign workers in Czechoslovakia from other communist countries such as Vietnam and Poland. However, at their peak in the 1980s, these foreign workers numbered fewer than 100,000, and many were not permanent immigrants (Drbohlav 2003, Klipa 2011, Alamgir 2017). This was clearly not on the scale of mass migration.

Poland and the Baltics

The data set includes the Poland-Lithuanian Commonwealth from 1450 to its demise in the 1790s. As a single state, Poland-Lithuania was formed by the Union of Lublin in 1569, but the two countries had been in personal union since 1385 and are treated as a single sovereign state for the period 1450 to 1569. After 1795 Poland ceased to exist as an independent national until it was recreated after the First World War – when it is again included in the data set. Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia are briefly included in the 1990s and 2000s, none of them experienced any mass migration in this period (UN 2017).

Bajer (2012) gives the population of the Commonwealth in 1580 at 7.5 million and 11 million in the 1650s. Hundert (2004) has the population in the 17th and 18th centuries at around 12 to 14 million.
Samsonowicz (1997) gives the population for the Kingdom of Poland alone (i.e. not including Lithuania) at 3.9 million in 1500. At the beginning of the period in 1450 it seems likely that the two Kingdoms combined had a population of at least 4 million. Throughout we are looking for immigration in the hundreds of thousands.

Before 1450 there was a notable migration of Roma and Germans into the territories of Poland-Lithuania (Frost 2015), with perhaps 250,000 German settlers arriving in the 13th and 14th centuries. But the German stream had long ended by 1450, and the number of Roma arrivals was in decline by this date (Mroz 2015). The two main immigrant groups mentioned in the literature after 1450 are Scots and Jews.

The Scottish migration occurred mainly in the late 16th and early 17th centuries, probably peaking around 1610. The numbers involved were fairly substantial for the early modern period, with 30,000 or 40,000 arriving over the decades 1570 to 1650 (Bieganska 1992; Smout, Landsman and Devine 1994; Frost 2001; Kowalski 2008). This figure is given some support from Lottum (2007) whose tables show 30,000 Scots in “other parts of Europe” in 1650, which presumably was primarily Poland-Lithuania.

Alone this migration would be an order of magnitude too low to meet the mass migration threshold, even if concentrated in the space of a single decade (which it was not). There probably was some additional migration of protestant exiles from Italy in the 16th century (Kostylo 2009), but total immigration was at most in the tens of thousands, and certainly not the hundreds of thousands.

Aside from the Scots, there is a substantial literature on Jews in Poland, and we can put some bounds on the number of Jewish immigrants in different periods. Friedlaender (1915) mentions there was Jewish migration at the end of the 15th century. This was mostly from neighboring parts of Europe, such as Bohemia, and the number of Jews reaching Poland as part of the exodus from Spain in the 1490s was not significant (Weinryb 1973, Hundert 2004). In 1500 the number of Jews in Poland-Lithuania was
probably in the tens of thousands (Weinryb 1973, Johnson 1987, Hundert 2004). Their number increased over the 16th and 17th centuries, perhaps reaching 100,000 or more by the end of the 16th century and 750,000 by the end of the 18th century. The growth rate of the Jewish population based on these estimates was extremely rapid, and there appears to have been some substantial immigration from other parts of Europe between 1500 and 1800. But most of the increase appears to have been a result of a high natural increase, rather than any massive migration.

While it is likely that Jewish migration was concentrated in certain decades, coinciding with persecutions in other places, it could never have been more than thousands or possibly tens of thousands. The literature of immigration to Poland-Lithuania deserves more attention and has an important place in the history of mobility in early modern Europe, but it does not include any incidence of mass migration.

Modern Poland is included in the data set from 1918 with the creation of the Second Polish republic. In 1939 Poland was invaded and occupied by Nazi Germany until 1945, after which it was restored with its modern borders. The population of Poland shown in the 1921 census was 25.7 million, rising to 31.9 million in the census of 1931. By the next census in 1950, the population was 24.8 million, with losses resulting from the genocidal occupation, as well as the movement of people and borders during and after the war. Over the next five decades the population rose to 38.5 million in the 2000 census.

Poland is known far more as a country of emigration, than immigration. And in most of the decades between the 1910s and 2000s migration into Poland was very modest. The only decade that we need to give attention to is the 1940s. During and after the end of the war there was a great upheaval of population across Central and Eastern Europe. After 1945 many ethnic Poles (and others) migrated, or were displaced, mainly from the former Polish territory lost to the USSR, and moved into the borders of the new Polish state (Gatrell 2007, Praszalowicz 2011, Gatrell 2019). Excluding this group, the migrant stock from other countries was less than 1% of the total population in the 20th century.
The population movements in the 1940s, after the end of the Second World War, were extremely large, and Poland was at the epicenter of these movements. They involved the expulsion of ethnic Germans and some other non-Polish people, and the inflow of a large number of (mostly) ethnic Poles from the USSR. Thum (2011) gives a figure of 1.5 million between 1944 and 1948, but by 1960 the World Bank Group migrant stocks indicate there were well over 2 million “immigrants” from the territories that are now Ukraine, Russia, Belarus and the Baltic states. But even at the lower estimate, 1.5 million would be sufficient for mass migration into a Polish population that was in 1945 only around 25 million.

As with other population exchanges and expulsions (such as in India, or the case of the Karelians in Finland) this mass migration was in some ways more of a forced internal migration. But on balance it fits the criteria and I have included it as a mass migration.

Russia and the USSR

Russia, and the USSR, are included in the data set as a single entity starting in 1450 as the Grand Duchy of Moscow which by that time had largely become independent of the Golden Horde, of which it had formerly been a vassal.

The population of Russia by 1550 was around 6 to 6.5 million (Crummey 2014). In 1450 the population and territory were smaller, but probably still some millions of people. By 1600 the population was around 7 million (Hellie 2011) rising to around 15 million at the beginning of the 18th century, and almost 40 million by the end of that century. By 1900 the population had surpassed 100 million. Much of this population expansion was a result of territorial growth.

From at least 1470 Russia actively recruited foreign specialists with technical skills (Bartlett 2010, Hellie 2011). But whatever importance these played in Russia’s economy and technological capability, they
were not quantitatively significant. Larger were the recruited settlers, encouraged by Russian rulers in the 18th century, such as Catherine the Great. These foreign colonists were desired to populate the low-density frontier regions of the expanding empire. In the 1760s the number of these foreign immigrants may have reached as many as 30,000 (Bartlett 2010, Livi-Bacci 2017). In the early 19th century Bulgarian refugees from the Ottoman Empire may also have numbered in the tens of thousands (Robarts 2012), although the proportion that remained permanently in Russia may not have been great. Although substantial for the period, these migrations were not close to the threshold of mass migration which would have required the immigration of hundreds of thousands or millions of people.

In the later 19th century Russia was a country of emigration, and substantial internal movements, but the number of foreigners coming into the country as immigrants was not large – and perhaps fewer than in the 18th century. As in other periods, there was some recruitment of engineers, businessmen and other specialists (Hellie 2011). Within the USSR there was significant internal migration into Russia from the other Soviet republics (as well as the reverse), but very little permanent migration from outside the USSR. The only major flow into the USSR would have been in the 1940s with the seismic movement of people in Central and Eastern Europe. Millions of citizens of the USSR were repatriated who had been forcibly deported or taken as prisoner during the war, (Ginsburgs 1957, Voisin 2007) but there were also displacements of people who had not formerly lived in the Soviet Union. In particular the formation of the new Polish state involved the displacement into the Soviet Union of some 500,000 Ukrainians (Stadnik 2009, Gousseff 2011). The numbers involved were not as large as the deportations of ethnic Germans, and with a population of almost 200 million in the USSR, they were certainly far below the threshold of mass migration.

Since the 1990s there has been a fairly substantial migration from the former Soviet Union into Russia, especially from the central Asian countries. Enumerating this migration is complicated by several factors. The migration of ethnic Russians began in the 1980s and to some extent even earlier, and continued into
the 1990s, but only after 1991 did it involve crossing an international border. The number of these refugees was perhaps around 2 million in the 1990s (Codagnone 1998; Malakhov 2014; Zaionchkovskaya, Mkrtchian, N., & Tyuryukanova, E. 2014). From the middle of the 1990s there was also a significant flow of labor migrants – in the hundreds of thousands – but most came only to work temporarily (Malakhov 2014). In total in the period 1989 to 2002 there were between 3.7 million and 5.6 million immigrants and a further 1.4 million to 2.4 million between 2003 and 2010 (Zaionchkovskaya, Mkrtchian, N., & Tyuryukanova, E. 2014), although these are upper bounds, as these figures include temporary migrants.

With a population of almost 150 million at the beginning of the 1990s, the threshold for mass migration would be around 7.5 million. Although the flow of refugees and labor migrants may have come close to this, even an upper bound estimate is no more than 7 million during the decade. The large scale of illegal migration adds some uncertainty, but the evidence does not seem to support a much higher estimate of total permanent migration. In the 2000s the number of arrivals was far fewer, and certainly not sufficient for mass migration.

**Greece**

Greece achieved its independence from the Ottomans in 1830 and is included in the data set from this decade. This first census figures from Greece taken from 1828 to 1840 show population at this time between 700,000 and 850,000. There are some notable changes between census figures, but these probably reflect territorial changes or improvements in data collection, rather than any large migration. One contemporary statistical account from the time said there was remarkably little migration (Strong 1842). Some other sources do suggest there was migration of Greeks from other parts of Ottoman territory into the newly independent Greek state (Hionidou 1999, Sundhhaussen 2011), but the
evidence doesn’t support the conclusion that this migration was sufficient to reach a threshold of 35,000 or more.

Before 1920 there is very little literature on immigration into Greece. Sundhhaussen (2011) suggest that Greece experienced some immigration in this period, and Dahinden (2013) mentions some Albanian immigration in the 19th century. But there is no indication that these flows ever amounted to mass migration, and Kasimis (2013) overview of Greek migration does not mention any substantial immigration before 1920. The population of Greece at this time was expanding, reaching a million people around the middle of the 19th century and rapidly rising to around 2.5 million by the end of the century (partly due to an increase in territory). In the early 20th century Greece was a country of emigration, with hundreds of thousands of Greek men leaving the country (Valaoras 1960). Some refugees may have come into Greece from the Ottoman Empire before the 1920s, but probably not in sufficient numbers for mass migration, and certainly not in the quantities that arrived in that decade.

In the 1920s following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and increasing hostility towards Christian minorities, there was a mass displacement of Greeks and other Orthodox Christians from Turkey. Similarly, there was an expulsion of Turks and Muslims from the Greek territories. This displacement was called a “population exchange” but might be more accurately be considered ethnic cleansing. The numbers involved were large, with perhaps 2 million people involved, 1.5 million from Turkey into Greece (Blanchard 1925, Valaoras 1960, Aktar 2003). Into a population of around 5 million, there can be no doubt that this was a mass migration.

Sources show that in the decades between the 1920s and 1980s there was no substantial immigration, with the immigrant stock never exceeding 2% of the total population (Valaoras 1960, ELSTAT 1962, World Bank Group 2011). During the 1980s the rate of immigration to Greece picked, and took off especially after 1989 (Lyberaki (2008). This new immigration was largely from Cyprus and Albania, along
with others from Turkey and Africa, and it was met with significant hostility from the native Greek population (Gatrell 2019).

The substantial proportion of undocumented migration and return migration create some uncertainty around the immigration figures after 1980, and there is a large amount of disagreement between sources on the size of the immigrant stock in this period. The numbers arriving in the 1980s was possibly in the hundreds of thousands (World Bank Group 2011, UN 2017) but do not appear to have met the threshold for mass migration. In the 1990s, however, the number of arrivals grew to around 600,000 or more, which into a population of 10 million makes mass migration very probable (Fakiolas 1999, Baldwin-Edwards 2004, Cavounidis 2015). In the 2000s immigration continued, but at a lower rate than in the 1990s, and an increase in return migration after 2008 meant that mass migration did not continue into the 21st century (Cavounidis 2015).

The Ottoman Empire and Turkey

The Ottoman Empire was named for its founder Osman Ghazi, a minor Turkish prince who successfully expanded his territories at the expense of the neighboring Byzantine Empire. Over the 14th century the Ottoman’s rapidly expanded across Anatolia and the Balkans, perhaps taking advantage of depopulation and instability caused by the Black Death (Schamiloglu 2004). In 1453, Constantinople fell to the Ottomans, cementing their position as a major world power. Over the following centuries the Ottoman borders would continue to expand, as territories in the Levant, Mesopotamia and North Africa fell under their authority. During the 17th and 18th centuries, the Empire stretched from the Caspian Sea to the Alboran Sea and ruled over the Holy cities of Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem.

The Empire had a remarkably diverse population in terms of both religion and language but given the territorial extent of the Empire, the overall population was not especially great. At its peak in the late
17th century the Empire covered around 2 million square miles (a somewhat larger than the European Union) and had a population of perhaps 30 million people. By comparison, the population of France in 1700 was probably 20 million, in a territory almost ten times smaller. The Mughal Empire (geographically smaller) had a population of over 150 million.

An important migration occurred in the 1490s after the expulsion of Jews from Spain. The total number of Jews who fled Spain is subject to a range of estimates, with the consensus lying somewhere around 100,000 to 300,000 (Kamen 1988, Shaw 1991, Edwards 1997, Moch 2003, Weisner-Hanks 2006). Some of those who left Spain went to other parts of Europe (such as Italy), but the large majority fled to North Africa, Anatolia and other parts of the Ottoman territory. Perhaps as many as 20,000 settled in the Ottoman territory of Salonica (Chandler 1987, p. 236). Shaw (1991) estimates that 250,000 Jews may have settled in the Ottoman Empire at the end of the 15th century. However, as significant as this migration was, it is unlikely that it actually met the threshold for mass migration.

The population of the Ottoman Empire at this time was probably close to 10 million with over 6 million living in Anatolia alone (Bolt et al. 2018). Shaw's figure of 250,000 (assuming they arrived in a single decade) is almost certainly too few to reach our mass migration threshold. To constitute 5% of the Ottoman population, the migration would need to be around half a million or more. This is a much larger figure than most estimates of the total Jewish emigration from Spain, and at this time North Africa (including Egypt) were not yet included in the Ottoman territory. While other migrants may also have contributed to the total immigration in this decade, I could not find evidence of any population movements large enough to add up to the half million figure.

A century later, a second migration from Spain to the Ottoman Empire occurred when Spain expelled thousands of Moriscos (Muslim converts). Like the Jews before them the Moriscos largely fled to North Africa (now mostly Ottoman) and Turkey. Jonsson (2007) estimates the number of Moriscos leaving
Spain at around 300,000. Some of these went to Morocco, maybe as many as 80,000 (García-Arenal 2014), but even if the entire number had resettled in the Ottoman Empire it would be far short of a mass migration. By the early 17th century the Ottoman population had increased substantially along with the Empire’s expansion of territory. While there is some uncertainty around population and migration figures, it is quite unlikely that the mass migration threshold could have been reached without well over half a million new arrivals – significantly more than Jonsson’s estimate.

If these two large movements of exiles did not reach the threshold of mass migration it is unlikely that it was met during any other decade in the 16th or 17th centuries. This is supported by Karpat (2002) and Issawi (1958) who mention modest migration to parts of the Ottoman Empire, but nothing on a large scale before the 19th century. While major urban centers, such as Instanbul, Cairo and Damascus, may well have had important foreign communities, the Empire as a whole is unlikely to have experienced a mass migration.

In the 19th century, the Ottomans experienced major territorial changes as well as significant population movements. Kale (2014) estimates that between 5 and 7 million Muslims immigrated to the Empire between 1829 and 1914. These migrations were in many cases Muslim refugees from territories in the Balkans and around the Black Sea, formerly within the Ottoman Empire. Karpat (1978, 1985, 2002) puts the peak of this migration in the 1860s when Russia invaded Circassia and expelled the native Muslim population. Meyer (2007) estimates Muslim migration from Russian territories in the late 19th century and early 20th century of well over one million people, with 300,000 of these coming in the 1850s during the Crimean war. Karpat (1978) gives a figure of 2 million from the Caucuses in the 1860s alone, although in a later study he provides a slightly lower figure of 1.5 million for the longer period 1859 to 1879 (Karpat 1985). For period 1875 to 1895 he suggests that all immigration may have contributed 3 million in population growth. There is also evidence of a smaller Muslim migrations in the early 19th century from Egypt to Palestine (Grossman 2017), but this did not exceed 30,000 people. The Muslim
immigration made up the vast majority during the 19th century, but there was also some Jewish
migration in this period to the Palestine region involving possibly over 100,000 people between the
1860s and 1910s (Karpat 2002).

The total population of the Ottoman Empire in the late 19th century was in the region of 20 million to 40
million, putting the threshold for mass migration as low as 1 million over a decade. While it is far from
certain that this threshold was met, it is quite possible that it was during the 1860s, and we cannot
exclude the possibility for the 1870s of 1880s. For the decades before 1860 is seems much less likely,
and the evidence does not seem to support that conclusion from the 1890s or later.

After two and a half centuries of decline the Ottoman Empire finally came to an end in the 1920s,
replaced by the Republic of Turkey.

Morocco

Morocco is included in the data set from 1450. At this time Morocco was ruled by the Marinid dynasty,
but in 1465 they were overthrown and replaced by the Wattasid dynasty. This dynasty was in turn
overthrown in the middle of the 16th century and replaced by the Saadi dynasty. In the 17th century the
Saadi’s were replaced by the Alaouite dynasty who survive as the current royal family of Morocco.
Between 1912 and 1956, Morocco became a French protectorate, and is excluded from the data set in
this period.

In the period between 1450 and 1700, the population of Morocco was probably in the range of 1 million
to 3 million (Bolt et al. 2018), giving a threshold of mass migration in the region of 50,000 to 150,000.
Although it is not possible to estimate immigration with much confidence in the early modern period,
the only evidence of movements on this scale are during the expulsions of Jews and Moriscos from
Spain. Otherwise there is no record of large permanent movements. Like other countries in this period major cities like Marrakesh, did attract artisans and merchants from abroad, but this kind of urban migration is unlikely to have been numerically large in comparison to the total population (Gottreich 2007). In a brief survey of North African migration, LeFevre-Witier (2012) makes no mention of any significant movement into Morocco.

Estimates for the number of Jews leaving Spain after 1492 range from around 100,000 to 300,000 (Kamen 1988, Shaw 1991, Edwards 1997). Many of the Jewish exiles made their way to the Ottoman territories, and perhaps other parts of North Africa such as the Kingdom of Tlemcen and Hafsid Kingdom. Many others did settle in Morocco, for example perhaps as many as 20,000 arrived in the city of Fez immediately after 1492 (Gerber 1980, Schroeter 2008, Ojeda-Mata 2020). Other urban and coastal areas, such as Marrakesh (Gottreich 2007) and Tetouan (Calvo-Serrano 2016), also received substantial numbers of Jewish refugees at this time. There total numbers Jews migrating into Morocco can be assumed to be in the tens of thousands, and largely concentrated in the decade after 1492.

In addition to these Jewish refugees, Muslims refugees from Iberia had been coming to Morocco over the 15th century as they fled the Spanish Reconquista (Ray 2013). After 1492 a steady flow of Muslims left Grenada for Morocco and other parts of North Africa (Carr 2009). Many of these Muslim exiles were from the upper classes, and there was no mass exodus comparable to that of the Jews. but they may have added a few thousand to the total immigration over the 1490s. But departures were probably concentrated in the 1490s, with thousands or even tens of thousands leaving Grenada in that decade (Garcia-Arenal 2014). The town of Tetouan, which had been destroyed earlier in the 15th century was reconstructed by Muslim immigrants, and by the early 16th century had a population of perhaps 5,000, that was probably largely made up of immigrants from Grenada (Latham 1965).
Overall, the number of Jews and Muslims arriving in Morocco in the 1490s was probably at least 30,000 and possibly more than 50,000, while the population was probably around 1.5 million. On balance the evidence appears to me to suggest the arrivals were probably someway short of the threshold, but the ranges of possible figures are large enough (both for migration and population) that mass migration could be possible in this decade and is coded to reflect this in the database.

The other large exodus from Iberia occurred after 1609, when the Moriscos (the descendants of the Muslim population that remained in Spain) were expelled. They tended to follow the existing migration routes taken by Jewish and Muslim exiles before them – to North Africa and the Ottoman Empire (Wiegers 2010). In total around 300,000 to 350,000 Moriscos left Spain in the years after 1609 (Jonsson 2007, Carr 2009), and of these around 80,000 settled in Morocco (Garcia-Arenal 2014). The population in 1610 was probably around 2 million, and perhaps higher (Bolt et al. 2018), putting the immigration over the decade at perhaps 3-4% of the population. While this would be short of mass migration, it is close enough, that given the uncertainty of the figures, mass migration could have been possible in this decade.

All evidence indicates that the 1490s and 1610s were the peak years of refugee movements. While Jewish and Morisco emigrants also arrived in other decades, there is nothing to suggest similarly large movements at other times in the period between 1450 and 1700.

European writers in the 19th century estimated the population of Morocco in the millions, but estimates ranged from less than 5 million, to more than 8 million of which the lower estimates seem more likely. These writers also provide detailed descriptions of the various populations in Morocco (Jewish, Arabic, Berber, Black etc.), but these do not mention any demographically substantial immigrant groups beyond the Jews and Moriscos (Richardson 1860, Stirling 1870, Leared 1876, De Amicis 1882). Any immigration between 1700 and 1900 would have been within North Africa, but it appears that in the region
migration patterns were probably in the opposite direction, with Morocco a net exporter of people (Refass 1992).

By 1900 the population was perhaps 5 million (Park and Boum 2006). This population grew rapidly during the 20th century, passing 20 million by the 1980s and 30 million in the 2000s. In 1960 the World Bank (2011) showed a foreign population of a little under 400,000, about 3.3% of the population, mostly from Algeria, Spain, France, and Italy. These foreign communities must largely have settled in Morocco in the period between 1921 and 1956 while it was a Protectorate of France (and therefore not included in the data set), and indeed by 1970 many of them appear to have left the country, and since then have accounted for less than 1% of the population (World Bank Group 2011, United Nations 2017).

**Egypt**

Included in the data set is the Mamluk Sultanate, from 1450 to 1517 when it was conquered by the Ottomans. The Mamluk capital was in Cairo, and their territory covered Egypt, the Levant and the Hejaz. Egypt is included from 1805 when Muhammad Ali Pasha, a commander in the Ottoman army, who took control of Egypt and established himself as governor. Egypt is excluded from the data set between 1882 and 1936 when British troops occupied the country, making it a de facto protectorate (and briefly a formal protectorate). Although some British troops remained until 1956, and Egyptian independence was formally recognized in 1922 – I use 1936, the date of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, which gave Egypt effective sovereignty over most of its affairs.

The population of Egypt during the Mamluk period was probably in the region of 3 to 4 million (Russell 1966, Ayalon 1985, Bolt et al. 2018). Chandler (1987) gives the populations in this period for Alexandria at 35,000 to 40,000; and for the capital Cairo, around 400,000. Other cities such as Asyut, Damietta, and Qus, may also have had populations in the tens of thousands. Outside of Egypt, Aleppo had a population
of more than 60,000, and Damascus was probably of a similar size while Mecca had more than 30,000 residents (Chandler 1987). The total population of the Mamluk Sultanate was probably more than 5 million.

The only potentially large migration in this period, for which I could find evidence, is of the Jewish exiles from Spain. Other migrations to Mamluk territories from neighboring Islamic countries were probably limited to a few thousand merchants and specialists (Baba 2018). The total departing Spain in this decade was probably between 100,000 and 300,000 (Kamen 1988, Shaw 1991, Edwards 1997). Of these we know that a large number went to the Ottoman territories, while others went to Morocco. Some settled in Alexandria and Cairo (Ray 2013), but even if they represented a relatively large proportion of the total, they certainly did not number much more than 100,000. Even if we assume some other migration in this period, the evidence does not support that there was a mass migration.

Muhammad Ali Pasha’s Egypt, in 1805 had a population which was likely not all that much different from what it was at the time of the Mamluks. Perhaps a little more than 4 million (McCarthy 1976), though it would rise to almost 10 million by the end of the century and to over 18 million by 1947 (Issawi 1949, Mountjoy 1949). In the whole of this period immigration was negligible (Issawi 1949, Mountjoy 1949). There does appear to have been some growth in the community of European expatriates, from 6,000 in 1840 to 80,000 in 1871 (Gombar 1991) – but even if this community were entirely permanent settlers, their numbers are not on the scale of mass migration.

In 1960 the World Bank (2011) puts the immigrant stock at 212,000, less than 1% of the population. And in subsequent decades immigrants made up a relatively smaller proportion of the population (World Bank Group 2011, United Nations 2017). Egypt was never a country of mass migration.

Jordan
Jordan became independent in 1946. Since then it has been an important receiver of refugees, especially the Palestinians.

At the time of independence, the population of Jordan was in the region of 400,000 (Steinberg 1947, Wright 1951, Baster 1955). During the Arab-Israeli War in 1948 more than 700,000 Palestinians were displaced (Lubbad 2007, Gatrell 2013), and of these around 450,000 were in Jordan in 1952 according to UNRWA records (Wright 1951, Stevens 1952, Baster 1955). Although these refugees did not intend to settle permanently, a great many of them have remained in Jordan for multiple generations. Although their situation is clearly unique, they fit the definition of immigrants used in this study, and so the 1940s is clearly a decade of mass migration.

During the 1950s the refugee population grew, but primarily from births, and there does not appear to be any substantial inflow of new refugees or other migrants (Peretz 1963, World Bank Group 2011). In the 1960s a second wave of about 300,000 Palestinian refugees arrived in 1967 when Israel occupied the West Bank (Winckler & Gilbar 1997, Gatrell 2013). Although by the 1960s the population of Jordan had increased, it was still under 1 million (Hindle 1964) and this movement would be well in excess of the threshold for mass migration.

During the 1970s Jordan began to experience economic migration of workers (Winckler 1997). This immigration is somewhat unusual in that Jordan at this time was also a major exporter of labor to the Gulf States, and cases of a country being both a major importer and exporter of workers is not common. Estimating the number of immigrants is complicated by the frequency of unauthorized arrivals, and the level of return migration among these workers. In 1975 they may have numbered around 50,000, and the 1979 census shows 89,000 (Winckler and Gilbar 1997). The scale of this migration can also be seen in the change of the World Bank’s immigrant stock figures, which increased from 26,000 in 1970 to 94,000 in 1980 (World Bank Group 2011).
The population in 1970 was 1.5 million (Bolt et al. 2018), putting the threshold for mass migration at about 75,000. The change in the immigrant stock would suggest immigration was very close to this figure, with elements of uncertainty that could put it either above or below 75,000. This is clearly a borderline case and so is coded in the data set as a possible mass migration.

In the 1980s immigration rose to higher levels and over the decade the immigrant stock increased from 94,000 to 217,000 by 1990 (World Bank Group 2011). The population in 1980 was 2.2 million (Bolt et al. 2018), and so the change in the immigrant stock would appear to be within the range of mass migration for this decade.

In the 1990s the situation is complicated by the large number of Palestinians “returned” to Jordan from Kuwait. These Palestinians held Jordanian passports, but many had been long resettled in the Kuwait, or were born there and had never lived in Jordan. In the early 1990s the number returned amounted to about 300,000 (Le Troquer and al-Oudat 1999, Chatelard 2010). There were also some Iraqi refugees from the Gulf War who passed through Jordan in this decade, but it does not appear that many remained in the country (Chatelard 2010). The figures from the World Bank (2011) show an increase in the immigrant stock of 140,000. The United Nations figures, which include Palestinians show a much greater increase over the decade of about 750,000! But even the lower figure is not far short of mass migration. Once accounting for some attrition in the existing stock of over 200,000, it seems likely there were enough immigrants for mass migration. A mass scale of migration is also supported by Winckler and Gilbar (1997) at least for the first half of the decade.

In the 2000s Jordan again received many refugees from the war in Iraq. Estimates of these refugees are uncertain as many remained in Jordan without any documentation or legal status, and of the estimates that we do have it is hard to know how many should be considered permanent immigrants. By the end of the decade the total number of Iraqis in Jordan may have been 700,000 to 800,000 and was certainly
in the hundreds of thousands (Fagen 2009). Even not including these refugees there was fairly robust labor migration to Jordan during the decade (Mryyan 2014, Wahba 2014). The threshold for mass migration in this decade would be around 230,000. Even a small fraction of the Iraqi refugee population, when combined with other immigration, would be sufficient to exceed this number. The United Nations (2017) shows more than 200,000 remaining in the country in 2017, and this may well be an under count. It seems most reasonable to conclude that the total immigration in the 2000s was enough for mass migration.

Israel

Israel is included in the data set from 1948 when it became an independent state on the termination of the British Mandate for Palestine. Immediately Israel was involved in conflicts with its Arab neighbors, and the territory controlled and occupied by Israel has changed several times over the decades. Although only 2 years are included in the 1940s, the massive immigration of Jews in these years was sufficient to reach the threshold of mass migration. Friedlander (1975) gives the number of arrivals between 1948 and 1952 as 711,000. The Jewish Virtual Library puts the figure arriving in just the two years 1948 and 1949 at 340,000 (JVL 2020). The population enumerated in the first census in 1948 was less than 900,000 – and even if this census (taken during wartime) was inaccurate, the scale of migration was clearly far above 5% of the 1940 or 1948 populations.

The extraordinary pace of immigration in Israel’s first few years could not be sustained, and after 1951 the number of immigrants arriving declined to a more modest, but still high rate. Between 1953 and 1958, around 200,000 immigrants arrived in Israel (Friedlander 1975, JVL 2020). Israel had a population of 1.3 to 1.4 million in 1950 (Bolt et al. 2018, JVL 2020), meaning that the 200,000 in these 5 years alone would have been sufficient for mass migration. When including the massive inflow from 1950 and 1951,
as well as the smaller inflow at the end of the decade, the figure is far in excess of the mass migration threshold. In total there were probably around 600,000 immigrants over the whole decade of the 1950s.

Over the 1960s immigration averaged 37,000 arrivals annually (Friedlander 1975, JVL 2020). The population in 1960 was about 2.1 million (Bolt et al. 2018, JVL 2020), making the threshold for mass migration just over 100,000. It was met easily, and several times over. During the 1970s, immigrants continued to arrive at a similar pace, with about 350,000 arrivals over the entire decade (JVL 2020). The population at the beginning of the decade was around 3 million, so once again Israel experienced immigration well above the threshold of mass migration.

By 1980, the population of Israel was approaching 4 million. The Madison Project gives a population of 3.7 million (Bolt et al. 2018) while the Jewish virtual library puts the figure a little higher at 3.9 million (JVL 2020). In either case, the immigration figure given by the Jewish Virtual Library, 153,000, is somewhat below the mass migration threshold (at least 185,000). Beenstock and Fisher (1997) state that the net rate during the 1980s was “almost zero”, with arrivals offset by emigrants (especially to the United States).

After 1989, however, Jews from the Former Soviet Union were able to emigrate freely to Israel, leading to another mass wave. Over the decade the number of arrivals was over 900,000 (JVL 2020), with an annual rate of immigration of almost 4% of the population in the first two years (Beenstock and Fisher 1997). This wave contributed to major growth of the population during the 1990s, and by the year 2000, Israel’s population had passed 6 million. As the post Cold War wave of immigration tapered off, the rate of arrivals fell again, with just 270,000 – somewhat short of the mass migration threshold, which by now was over 300,000.

Lebanon
Lebanon became an independent state at the end of the French Mandate in 1945. Unusually, Lebanon has not had an official census taken since 1932, but estimates put the population in 1950 at between 1.2 and 1.4 million (Dowson 1950, Bolt et al. 2018).

The first wave of arrivals came before 1950, when around 100,000 Palestinian refugees arrived in Lebanon in 1948 (Stevens 1952, Shafie 2007). The population in the 1940s was not likely to have been higher than in 1950, making this easily sufficient for mass migration.

Other than the Palestinians, there does not appear to have been any other substantial immigration to Lebanon in the 1940s or 1950s, with the World Bank (2011) showing an immigrant stock in 1960 of just 15,000 (less than 1% of the population). By 1970 the immigrant stock had actually declined slightly, although there may have been a larger number of Syrian migrant workers, numbering 34,000 by 1970 (Winckler 1997). These Syrian workers were mostly seasonal migrants, but even if a substantial number did settle on a more permanent basis, the threshold for mass migration was around 85,000 or 90,000 (Bolt et al. 2018). Financial problems and civil war lead to a large emigration of Lebanese in the 1970s and there is no evidence of substantial inward migration in this decade.

Between 1980 and 1990 the World Bank does show a substantial increase in the immigrant stock, from just 10,000 to 220,000. Many of these immigrants were from other Arab countries, although they also include some from India, Pakistan, and the Philippines. With a population of around 3 million in 1980 (Bolt et al. 2018), the implied immigration of over 200,000 people would be sufficient for mass migration. Even given the uncertainty around the figures (and the permanency of the immigrants) this evidence strongly implies that the 1980s was a decade of mass migration.

For the 1990s and 2000s, the World Bank (2011) and United Nations (2017) figures suggest there was some continued immigration. But much of the change in the United Nations figures is probably from
growth of the Palestinian population (many still being considered foreign nationals) rather than new immigration of Palestinians. Overall, this evidence does not suggest mass migration after 1990.

Iraq and Syria

Until the end of the First World War, Iraq and Syria were part of the Ottoman Empire. With the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire, Iraq was put under the control of the British and Syria under control of the French. Iraq became independent in 1932, and Syria in 1945, from which dates they are included in the data set.

In first decades of Iraq’s independence its population was somewhere around 4 million (Jurkat 1944), and in the 1947 was enumerated at 4.6 million—although this may have been a modest under-enumeration (Adams 1956). With the addition of nomadic Bedouin, and an adjustment for the under count, Adams (1956) claims the population in 1947 was likely more than 5 million. A mass migration in the decades between 1930 and 1960 would therefore need to be somewhere in the region of 200,000 – 250,000. The immigrant stock shown by the World Bank (2011) in 1960 was just 90,000, and I have not found any other evidence that migration was substantial in the period between 1930 and 1960. Immigration is not mentioned as a component of population growth, for example, by Adams (1956), although he discusses internal migration in some detail.

After 1960 the World Bank shows the immigrant stock steady in the range of 60,000 to 90,000 until 1990. In this period the total population of Iraq grew rapidly from under 7 million to over 18 million (Bolt et al. 2018) but this was a result of high fertility, rather than immigration. After 1970 the immigrant population was less than 1%. The data from The World bank (2011) and The United Nations (2017) do not show any substantial immigration in the 1990s or 2000s. Modern Iraq has not experienced mass migration.
At the time of independence in 1945 Syria had a population of around 3.3 to 3.4 million (Issawi and Dabezies 1951). Like other Arab countries in the region, Syria received a substantial number of Palestinian refugees in 1948. The number of refugees arriving in Syria, and settling there, appears to have been around 75,000 to 100,000 (Issawi & Dabezies 1951, Stevens 1952, Brand 1988). In 1960 the World Bank (2011) shows an immigrant stock of 160,000, including 110,000 for Palestine. Although a notable movement, this refugee migration falls short of the threshold for mass migration.

When the Palestinians are excluded, the number of immigrants in Syria, like Iraq, is not large. And implies no mass migration in the decades after 1960 (World Bank Group 2011, United Nations 2017). The Palestinian population in Syria did grow over this period, from an initial population of around 100,000, to 500,000 in 2010 (United Nations 2017). However, most of this growth appears to have been from natural increase, rather than immigration. Smaller numbers did arrive from Jordan and Lebanon in the 1970s and 1980s (Brand 1988), but there was no subsequent large immigration of Palestinians.

Another large wave of refugees did come to Syria in the 2000s, but this time from Iraq. In the middle of the decade they may have numbered over 1 million, and perhaps more than 1.5 million (Al-Miqdad 2007, Fagen 2009). Into a population of around 16 million in the year 2000, this was certainly sufficient for mass migration. However, most of these refugees were in Syria for a relatively short period. The United Nations shows a decline of Iraqis from 1.1 million in 2010 to about 250,000 in 2015. The actual number that should be counted as immigrants is therefore far less than one million, and almost certainly less than the threshold of approximately 800,000.

The Gulf States

The Gulf States in the data set as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar and Oman. Several of these states (Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE) were British Protectorates until they gained
independence in the period of decolonization in the 1960s and 1970s, after which they are included in the data set. Saudi Arabia is included going back to 1932 when Ibn Saud completed his unification of the Arabian peninsula to form the current state of Saudi Arabia. Before the 20th century only Oman is included in the data set. Oman’s inclusion begins in 1744 when Ahmad bin Said al-Busaidi assumed power and liberated the country from Persian occupation.

In the 18th and 19th centuries, Oman’s population was not large, perhaps a little over 300,000 in the early 19th century, and by 1950 it had increased only a little to around 500,000 (de C. Smiley 1960, Bolt et al. 2018). This makes the threshold for mass migration low, perhaps even below 10,000 immigrants for some decades before 1800. This makes it difficult to entirely exclude the possibility of mass migration before the 20th century, but the overall evidence does not point to a clear mass migration event.

The population of Muscat, a major trading port, certainly included many foreigners (Landen 2015 p. 127). But Heard-Bey (1972) claims that outside of the port cities, the population of the Gulf was very homogenous, with almost no foreigners before the discovery of oil in the 20th century. While Muscat had included a fairly substantial population, perhaps around 60,000 people in the 19th century (Keltie 1893, Chandler 1987), it was probably not large enough for its foreign population alone to reach 5% of the population.

The single largest foreign element appears to have been the Balochis, an Iranian people from the region of Balochistan, which spans the southwest of modern Pakistan, and a small part of the southeast of modern Iran. Peterson (2004) mentions that the migration of Balochis was ongoing from the 18th century through the the 20th century. Some came of mercenaries, while many others appear to have been brought as slaves (Peterson 2004, Floor 2012, Suzuki 2013). However, some did come as immigrants, and settled in Muscat and along the coast, having a notable presence in these areas by the 1920s (Eccles 1927). There was also a large African presence in these areas (Cox 1925, Eccles 1927), but
this population would have been almost entirely descended from slaves, rather than representing any significant African immigration.

Given the lack of a demographic imprint from the Balochis beyond a few areas along the coast, and accounting for much of this being a result of slavery rather than immigration, it does not seem likely that there was any mass migration before the later 20th century.

After the takeoff of the oil industry in the Gulf, the demand for labor began to bring large numbers of immigrants from Asia and other Arab countries. The World Bank data shows that by 1960 there were already more than 40,000 foreigners living in Oman, mostly from South Asia (World Bank Group 2011), even though major oil discoveries did not occur until after 1960. Although some immigration did occur before 1950, it was small (Seccombe 1983) implying that most of these immigrants had since 1950. With a population of around 500,000 in 1950 this would imply mass migration in the 1950s.

Over the next decade the immigrant population grew to over 60,000 – seeing a net increase of just under 20,000 (World Bank Group 2011). For this decade the threshold for mass migration would be somewhere between 25,000 and 30,000. If the 1960 included a significant number of temporary labor migrants, the total arrivals over the decade may have been substantially higher than the 20,000 change in stock – but then many of those arrivals themselves might presumably also have been temporary migrants, who should not be included in the total. Overall, the evidence for mass migration in the 1960s is much weaker than for other decades since 1950 – but there is enough uncertainty to include it as a possible decade of mass migration. After 1970, however, the growth of the immigrant population was unambiguously massive.

Between 1970 and 1980 the immigrant stock grew by more than 80,000 (World Bank Group 2011). Along with high fertility, this large inflow of immigrants raised the total population of Oman from around 800,000 to well over 1 million (Bolt et al. 2018). These arrivals represented an immigrant inflow
of more than 10% of the population at the beginning of the decade. But this paled in comparison to the scale of immigration in the following decades. Between 1980 and 1990 the immigrant stock rose by from under 146,000 to 424,000, an increase of almost 280,000 people; and between 1990 and 2000 it grew by another 200,000 (World Bank Group 2011). By the year 2000, the immigrant stock was 624,000 in a population of 2.2 million – almost 30%. The United Nations immigrant figures show a similar picture, and a continued growth of the immigrant stock to more than 800,000 in 2010 (United Nations 2017).

This mass migration to Oman in the later half of the 20th century was part of a more general mass migration to the Gulf States, driven by the growth of the oil industry. For most of the countries in the data set this period of mass migration had already begun at the time of independence. Other than Oman, Saudi Arabia was the only country where decades before 1960 are considered.

Before 1950 there were some immigrants to Saudi Arabia, mostly Arabs from former Ottoman territories. They included teachers and administrators, and perhaps as individuals played important roles in the development of the new nation – but their demographic imprint was very small (Hart 1953, Chalcraft 2011).

The oil industry started bringing in notable numbers of Americans and other foreigners in the 1940s (Hart 1953). By 1950s, Aramco (the nations major oil company) employed some 20,000 immigrant workers (Chalcraft 2011), and in 1960 the World Bank (2011) shows an immigrant stock of over 60,000, including many from South Asia. With a population of 3.9 million in 1950 (Bolt et al. 2018) this was still a relatively small immigrant population, certainly insufficient for mass migration. But by 1970 the immigrant stock had grown to 357,000, almost six times as large (World Bank Group 2011).

By 1975, Winckler (1997) says that official data showed 400,000 foreign workers, but that the real figure may already have been more than 1 million. By 1980 the World Bank (2011) shows an immigrant stock of 1.8 million. Over the 1980s the immigrant population continued to grow rapidly, reaching somewhere
around 5 million by the end of the decade (World Bank Group 2011, United Nations 2017), making them a very substantial proportion of Saudi Arabia’s total population of 16 million in 1990.

Over the decade the World Bank (2011) and United Nations (2017) figures do not show much change in the overall size of the immigrant stock. An increase of a few hundred thousand, but well below the threshold of mass migration. However, Khadria (2006) shows a much larger increase in the stock of Indian immigrants from 600,000 to 1.5 million, which even when excluding other groups would be sufficient for mass migration.

Even if the overall growth of the immigrant stock was not large, the total arrivals may have been sufficient for mass migration when accounting for attrition to the existing immigrant stock. In 1990 one of the largest components of this stock was migrant workers from Yemen. As a result of the Gulf War these Yemenis were expelled in 1990, creating a massive exodus of an estimated one million people (Hartmann 1995, Okruhlik & Conge 1997). Furthermore, the return migration of immigrants from South Asia was substantial, resulting in many new arrivals required to replace departures (Prakash 2000).

While the evidence for mass migration in the 1990s is not conclusive, it certainly cannot be ruled out, and is therefore coded as a decade of possible mass migration. Finally, between 2000 and 2010 the United Nations (2017) shows an increase in the immigrant stock of over 3 million, certainly sufficient for mass migration.

The remaining Gulf States became independent after the rapid rise of the oil industry in the region, and experienced massive migration throughout this post-independence period. Indeed, being small states, the immigration has been so large that foreigners outnumbered the natives in Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE before the end of the 20th century, and in Bahrain by 2010. In the case of Qatar and the UAE, foreigners reached more than 80% of the total population. The data from the World Bank (2011) and United Nations (2017) shows increases in the immigrant stocks in each decade, usually well above the
threshold of mass migration, with the single exception of Kuwait in the 1990s. Here the immigrant stock appears to have been roughly the same at the beginning and end of the decade. However, the stock is large enough in 1990 that mass migration could have occurred and been offset by declines in the existing immigrant stock (as may have happened in Saudi Arabia in the same decade). Deportations and return migration almost certainly resulted in large emigrations from the Gulf States, and so this decade is coded as one of possible mass migration.

While it is clear that the immigration to the Gulf States is by design intended to be temporary, many immigrants do appear to remain in the Gulf for long periods. Some may renew work visas several times before eventually returning, others bring families to live with them, some stay illegally after their visas expire; in some cases there are non-nationals who are second generation immigrants (Shah 2007). Although a more detailed study may be able to make more definite determinations of the number of true permanent migrants, the overwhelmingly massive numbers, and continuously rising migrant stocks, suggest that it is probably reasonable to include these as mass migrations.

India, Pakistan and Bangladesh

In 1450, where the data set begins, India was a patchwork of separate states and over the following centuries several states would rise and fall in the subcontinent. I have not been able to find sufficient demographic detail in the literature to include all these states in the data set.

Apart from modern India (1940s onwards), I include the Mughal Empire from the 16th century to the 1780s and three earlier states – the Bengal and Gujarat Sultanates, and the Vijayanagara Empire.
Although the Mughal Empire survived until 1858, when it was deposed by the British, I use 1784 as the end date, when the Mughal Emperors fell under the protection of the Marathas who sent a military garrison to permanently occupy the capital Delhi.

The Gujurat Sultanate is included from 1450 to the 1573 when it was conquered by the Mughal Empire under Akbar I. The Bangal Sultanate is included from 1450 to 1538 when it was conquered by Sher Shah Suri. And the Vijayanagara Empire is included from 1450 to the 1640s when the declining empire was finally conquered and split apart.

Estimating the level of migration in India before the modern era is difficult. Even total populations can only be estimated quite approximately. Dyson’s work on Indian historical demography (2018) provides an excellent overview and discussion of the literature, and it is from this starting point that I have made inferences about possible population sizes and the plausibility of mass migration.

Starting with the Bengal Sultanate: Moreland (1920) gives an estimated population for Gujarat, Bengal and Assam at the end of the 16th century of around 30-40 million and describes Bengal as “thickly populated”. Davis (1951) suggests this range may be too low and the actual population of this region could be substantially higher. In addition to Moreland’s estimate we also have some figures for specific urban areas in Bengal. For the whole of India, Dyson (2018) concludes that by the end of the 16th century the population was likely to have been greater than 100 million.

Before 1450 the capital of the Bengal Sultanate was Pandua, after which Guar became the capital. In the 1400s Pandua’s population may have been around 60,000 (Chandler 1987) including a sizable community of foreigners (Eaton 1993). The population of Guar in the 15th and 16th centuries may have been larger, probably more than 50,000 and perhaps between 100,000 and 200,000 (Chandler 1987, Ray 2008). Apart from the capitals, the other major urban center in Bengal was Saptagram (also known as
Satgaon), a major port city with a population of around 50,000 including a diverse mix of foreign traders (Chandler 1987, Ray 2008).

The communities of foreign merchants may well have been a substantial part of the populations of Saptagram and Guar, possibly numbering in the tens of thousands. But even if they had all arrived in the space of a few decades it is unlikely that the inward migration of foreigners to these cities ever numbered much higher than 10,000. Since the total population of Bengal was clearly in the millions, this could not have constituted a mass migration. The importation of slaves may have been demographically more significant than the communities of foreign merchants, but for the purposes of the data set they are not considered immigrants.

The only other mention in the literature of migration into Bengal in this period is of the Islamic ruling class (Eaton 1993). However, the period of Islamic migration appears to have been mostly prior to 1450, and their concentration in urban areas suggests that it was never massive in comparison to the large rural population of Bengal. Any mass migration in the period would have required the movements of hundreds of thousands of people, and there does not appear to be any evidence of such a large-scale event.

Gujarat, like Bengal, can be supposed to have had a population in the millions in the 15th and 16th centuries. Chandler (1987) gives the population of the capital, Ahmedabad, as 60,000 in 1487 and 180,000 in 1584. The major port of Cambay (or Khambhat) may also have had a population of around 60,000 in this period. Before the arrival of the Portuguese in the 16th century there were as many as 8,000 other smaller settlements (Basak 2014).

Sheikh (2010) has called the Gujarat Sultanate a “quintessential land of the immigrant” and provides a detailed discussion of population movement into and within Gujarat. Unfortunately Sheikh is not able to
give precise figures or dates, but it is possible to draw some conclusions as to the likelihood of mass migration.

Much of the movement of population described by Sheikh occurred before 1450, as pastoralists moved into the area in the 13th and 14th centuries. Although this settlement may have continued to some extent into the 15th century and later, it does not appear to have been so large by this time as to constitute mass migration. Furthermore, much of this population movement appears to have possibly been more of an invasion, or encroachment, rather than immigration as I have defined it – as Sheikh says: “Migrations into Gujarat were of two kinds. One was the incursion of small bands of warriors, who were often dispossessed junior relatives of established lineages in Rajasthan who arrived in search of patrons and employers and offered their military services. The other kind was the incursion of entire clans with their cattle wealth and families, who moved south due to famine, local oppression, or to find better pastures.”

Aside from these bands of adventurers and pastoralists, Sheikh and others mention migrations of Muslim scholars, merchants, priests, and a few artisans (Alpers 1976, Misra 1982, Balachandran 2012, Basak 2014). No doubt these gave the major urban centers a cosmopolitan flavor, but they would not have been quantitatively significant in comparison to the total population of the region. In conclusion the evidence suggests there probably was not any mass migration of hundreds of thousands into Gujarat in any of the decades after 1450.

Like the Sultanates, the population of Vijayanagara Empire in between 15th and 17th centuries can only be estimated very approximately. A Persian ambassador in 1443 noted that there were more than a million adult men, and that the Empire was able to raise an army of more than 300,000 (Gribble 1896). The city of Vijayanagar (the capital) in this period was certainly large, with a possible population of
400,000 to 500,000 (Chandler 1987). Ramaswamy (2017), however, puts the population of Vijayanagar at a more modest 100,000 and of the whole Empire at between 3 and 4 million in the early 16th century.

Before 1450 there was apparently a notable migration of peasants into parts of southern India, reaching a substantial proportion in the late 13th century (Gunasekaran 2017). But there is no evidence that this continued to any significant extent as late as 1450. Quantitatively the largest migrations in the two centuries after 1450 were probably those of migrant weavers. These weavers migrated across India in this period and made up perhaps as much as 5% of the capital’s population (Ramaswamy 2017).

However, although these weavers included some immigrants from beyond the borders of the Empire, many were also internal migrants, and indeed not all weavers were migrants at all. The total number of actual immigrants was probably not more than 1% or 2% in the capital and lower across the rest of the Empire. Even if this immigration were concentrated in a single decade it would fall far short of mass migration.

Before moving on to the Mughal Empire, it was worth mentioning that between the 15th and 17th there were historically important migrations of Brahmins (and priests of other religions) across India (Schmiedchen 2013). These have only been touched upon in the previous discussion, because they appear to have involved modest numbers, spread over long periods, and often involved only internal migration. Although important as part of the literature of early modern Indian migration, I have no reason to think that these movements would have resulted in any mass migrations.

The borders of the Mughal Empire (1520s-1780s in the data set) shifted a great deal during its history. But for most of its history the Empire covered the majority of Northern India, and at its height included almost the entire continent. For most of its history then, the population of the Mughal Empire was undoubtedly massive, and the threshold of mass migration would be in the millions.
For example Dyson (2018, table 4.1) provides various estimates of the Indian population around 1595. From these figures we can infer that the Mughal Empire at the time of Akbar was well over 50 million and quite possibly more than 100 million. A century later the Mughal Empire had expanded its borders to encompass much of southern India. Dyson (2018) indicates that the only substantial population movement into India between the 15th and 17th centuries was of slaves. As scarce as the evidence is on migration and population for this period, it seems unlikely that a movement of millions in a decade could have gone unnoticed.

In the 18th century as the Mughal Empire declined, it is more likely that there was net out-migration than substantial in-migration. Dyson describes the breakup of the Mughal Empire as “fairly orderly” and before 1750 there does not appear to have been significant demographic consequences. The Bengal famine in 1770 does appear to have led to significant out-migration from a population in Bengal of around 30 million. And further refugee flows may have been created by various conflicts. With a diminished territory by the 1770s the population of the Mughal Empire would also not have been so large, making the threshold for mass migration more achievable. Unfortunately, any estimate of migration from Bengal and other parts of India into the Mughal territories in the 1770s is purely speculative. To constitute mass migration it would probably have to have been several million persons. I have not found evidence to support the conclusion that there was a movement of millions at this time, and it appears probable that any migration from famine and conflict was in many or most cases a temporary movement. Although mass migration is more conceivable in the last decades of the Mughal Empire, I believe the balance of the evidence suggests no mass migration ever occurred.

There are other Indian states before 1800 that could potentially be added to the database, including several other Sultanates in the 15th and 16th centuries and the Maratha Empire/Confederacy. I was not able to find sufficient sources to draw reliable conclusions, but the general evidence available for India in this period makes me doubtful that any of these places experienced mass migration.
By the early 19th century, the whole of India was more or less under British influence. And so, it is not until the 1940s that India is again included in the data set.

In 1947 the Indian Independence Act partitioned British India into two new states, Pakistan (which would later split further into Pakistan and Bangladesh) and India. This partition was accompanied by one of the largest population exchanges in history. Around 7 million moved from what was now Pakistan into India, and another 7 million went in the opposite direction (Bharadwaj, Khwaja and Mian 2008). By total numbers this was more massive than most of the mass migrations in the data set – but by the definition of mass migration as 5% of the receiving country population, only to movement into Pakistan was sufficiently large to meet this threshold.

India’s population in 1940 was around 320 million and the first census was taken in 1951 and put the population at 361 million (Dyson 2018). The threshold for mass migration in the 1940s or 1950s would have been 15 to 18 million. Even if the migration into India was somewhat greater than the estimate of 7.3 million (which is quite possible) it was certainly far fewer than 15 million. The population movement into India was certainly an important event in the history of migration, and deserves scholarly attention, but for the purposes of this data set it does not meet the criteria for inclusion as a mass migration event.

On the other hand, the population of the new nation of Pakistan was substantially smaller. The 1951 census showed a population of around 34 million in West Pakistan and 42 million in East Pakistan (today Bangladesh) – a total of about 75 million. 7 million or more immigrants was easily sufficient then for mass migration in the 1940s. There is an argument to be made that it is wrong to treat this as an international migration when the population movement was directly after independence, and across borders that did not exist immediately prior. How many of these migrants were really relocating to a different society, as opposed to sorting themselves onto the right side of the border? It is something to
keep in mind, but it is included in the data set as consistent with the conditions set out for a mass migration event.

After this initial exchange of millions, migration between India and Pakistan (and later Bangladesh) was modest in comparison, and other international migration into these countries was not quantitatively substantial. After the 1940s there is nothing approaching mass migration in India, Pakistan, or Bangladesh (see World Bank Group 2011, UN 2017).

**China**

China is included in every decade of the data set. During this period of almost six centuries, there is no doubt that a great deal could be written regarding foreigners and immigrants in China. But it is relatively straightforward to exclude the possibility of mass migration at any time in Chinese history.

China’s population has always been very large. At the beginning of the study period in 1450 China’s population was probably at least 60 million (Durand 1960) and almost certainly was never much less than 50 million at any point during the time period. By the 19th century the population was in the range of 300 to 400 million, if not more (Durand 1960, Bolt et al. 2018). Mass migration would have required millions or tens of millions of arrivals – that is on the scale of the migrations to North America in the 19th century. Such large movements are clearly not evident in the historical record. While there certainly were some foreigners in China, they were never demographically significant.

In 1949, there were 200,000 foreigners in China in a total population of more than 500 million – or less than 0.04% of the population (Pieke 2012). Since then the immigrant population has grown, but before 2010 does not appear to have reached more than a million. And of course, such growth is orders of magnitude away from mass migration.
China has simply been too large for foreigners to have had a significant demographic impact. While internal migration has been important and substantial, immigration from outside of China has never been large relative to the Chinese population.

**Japan**

Japan is included in the data set for every decade of the study period. The population at the beginning of this period was quite possibly already more than 10 million, and by 1500 was perhaps as much as 15 million, reaching more than 18 million by 1600 (Bolt et al. 2018). However, other recent estimates put the population in 1600 somewhat lower, perhaps 10 to 12 million (Hayami 2010).

While these population estimates demonstrate a fairly large degree of uncertainty, we can be quite confident that the threshold for mass migration in the hundreds of thousands, and probably more than 500,000 for most or all of the period from 1450 to the 1600s.

Russell (2014) notes that during the period between 1450 and around 1550 there was only “very modest” immigration, and that at no time after the 7th century did immigration have a notable demographic impact on Japan. Indeed, it appears that in this period, Japan resorted to kidnapping artisans and scholars from Korea (Murphy-Shigematsu 1993) suggesting that there was little voluntary immigration to Japan even among those small groups from which we usually see some immigration before the modern period.

The period between from the 1630s to the middle of the 19th century was one in which Japan largely closed itself off to foreign entry. While some trade and cultural interactions continued with the outside world, including Korea, China, and the Dutch, it is quite clear that there was no numerically significant immigration in this period (Kazui and Videen 1982).
Between the early 18th and middle 19th century Japan’s population remained quite stable, above 25 million and perhaps reaching a little over 30 million (Taeuber & Beal 1944, Hayami 2010, Bolt et al. 2018), then towards the end of the 19th century there was a significant increase in population. By 1920 the population had grown to 56 million (Taeuber & Beal 1944, Bolt et al. 2018).

It was into this large population that a significant number of Korean workers arrived in the period of Japanese colonization between 1910 and 1945 (Komai 2000, Yamanaka 2008). Although the Korean migrants would number as many as 2 million by 1945, they arrived over a period of several decades, and even if they had not, the number falls somewhat short of the threshold for mass migration.

After 1950 we have figures for the immigrant stock from Ogawa (2011), as well as those from 1960 from the World Bank (2011) and the United Nations (2017). These show a modest migrant stock, with growth in the hundreds of thousands, and reaching over 2 million by the 21st century, but it is clear that the immigration was not on the scale of mass migration, which would have required several million arrivals over a single decade.

Korea

Korea is included in the data set from 1450 to 1910. During this period it was ruled by the Joseon dynasty, until it was annexed by the Japanese Empire in 1910. After 1950 North and South Korea are included separately in the data set.

At the beginning of the study period in 1450 the population of Korea is estimated at more than 4 million and rose to more than 6 million by the 16th century (Bohnet 2008, Jun 2019). Mass migration in this period would have required hundreds of thousands of immigrants during a single decade. While some immigrants do appear to have been accepted during this period, including from Japan (Kyung-Koo 2007),
the only discussion of any large movement of people is the several refugee flows from China, detailed by Bohnet (2008). These refugee flows, arising from conflicts in the region, peaked in the 1590s and 1620s. These refugees are estimated to have perhaps reached between 100,000 and 200,000 in the 1620s (Bohnet 2008), however, it the total number settling more permanently was almost certainly substantially lower, with many ultimately being removed, or voluntarily returning to China when they were able. With a population at this time of more than 7 million, a lower bound for mass migration would be around 350,000. It is quite clear that this threshold was not reached.

After 1637 Korea the entry of foreigners appears to have been quite limited (Hillier 1904). There does appear to have been some Chinese immigration in the later part of the 19th, but the population of Chinese immigrants did not peak until the 20th century, at around 70,000 people – a population far to small for mass migration. Immigration from Japan before 1910 appears to have been on a similar scale, with the Japanese population reaching perhaps 100,000 in 1907 (Uchida 2012). With a population well in excess of 10 million, by this period, it is clear that the immigrant population did not approach close to 5%.

After 1950, the two Koreas are included separately in the database. North Korea has not experienced any mass migration. Data from the World Bank (2011) and United Nations (2017) show that the number of foreigners in Korea has not exceeded 50,000.

South Korea in contrast has experienced some fairly notable immigration. The World Bank (2011) shows an immigrant stock in 1960 of 135,000, and by the year 2000 that had grown to 570,000. The United Nations (2017) shows a figure of 920,000 in 2010. While these are somewhat substantial numbers, at no point has the immigrant stock in South Korea come close to 5% of the population (in 2010 the population was almost 50 million) and certainly there has no been immigrant arrivals on this scale over a single decade.
Thailand

Thailand, historically also known as Siam, has seen changing territory, but has a continuous history as a state going back to the 13th century. By the 15th century, the Ayutthaya Kingdom had emerged as an important regional power, with its capital Ayutthaya becoming one of the most important cities of Asia and a center of trade. This kingdom would last until invasion by Burmese forces in 1767. Subsequently Thailand was ruled by King Taksin the Great from the new capital of Thonburi, until 1782 when the capital was moved to Bangkok when Taksin was deposed by one of his generals, who became the King of a new dynasty. Unlike other parts of South East Asia, Thailand remained independent throughout the colonial period. In 1932, a bloodless revolution ended centuries of absolute monarchy and established a new constitution.

Estimates for the population of Thailand in the 17th century range from 1 million to 3 million (Baker and Phongpaichit 2017) with many living in the capital or other towns. Before 1600 the population was probably not more than 2 million. Chularatana (2008) estimates that there may have been as many as 30,000 Muslim households in Ayutthaya in 1550, although it is unclear what proportion of these were actually immigrants, descendants of immigrants, or Thai people who had adopted Islam. In any case, while the figure suggests that immigration occurred before 1600, it is very unlikely to have been on a massive scale. Persians played an important role in the Indian Ocean trade networks at this time and are known to have been important figures in the royal court of Ayutthaya (Marcinkowski 2002) – but their numbers were never large. Subrahmanyam (1992) estimates there were only around 100 Persians resident in the 1660s, although as with other groups their numbers may have increased later.

It is clear that there was an increase in immigration during the 17th century with the rise of Ayutthaya as an important center of trade, with the Chinese probably being the most important population. Smith
(2010 and 2011) discusses the Portuguese population, which by the late 17th century was a few thousand (this included people of mixed ancestry and probably some Christian converts with no Portuguese blood). Lockard (2010) puts the number of Chinese at 3,000 to 4,000. There were also Japanese and some other Europeans and Asians, but none of these would have numbered more than a few hundred. Some of the figures may underestimate the number of foreign workers of lower status involved in shipping and other labor. But, whether many of these workers became settled migrants is unclear, and it is unlikely that there were enough to constitute a mass migration.

After 1767 and the fall of the capital, Ayutthaya, immigration may have continued but was almost certainly lower than it had been for several decades. According to James (1930), Thailand was essentially closed to foreign trade before 1851 and Vaddhanaphuti (2005) does not mention any immigrants other than the Chinese during the early 19th century. Lockard (2010) puts the number of Chinese in 1767 at 30,000.

Throughout the 19th century, there was a substantial migration of Chinese, reaching perhaps 30,000 a year entering by the end of the century (Skinner 1957, Hill 1985) and reaching a peak around the 1920s. Sternstein (1984) suggests the actual figure may be somewhat lower, but also considers the Thai population to have been previously overestimated making the immigrant proportion actually higher. He provides a possible figure of 500,000 Chinese immigrants in the period 1900-1930. After the nationalist revolution in 1932 Chinese immigration continued at a lower rate before being legally restricted in the 1940s. After this, some unauthorized migration of Chinese continued but not at the same scale as in earlier decades.

The Chinese have been an important part of the Thai population, in the 1930s there were perhaps 500,000 immigrant Chinese and as many as 2-3 million people of Chinese descent (James 1930, Vandenbosch 1947).
Although the sustained migration was significant, even if we accept Sternstein’s lower estimates for the population of Thailand (2 million in 1850 and 5 million in 1900), it is unlikely that Chinese immigration ever reached the threshold of mass migration, which would require over 100,000 in the 1850s or 250,000 in the 1900s. Although possible, it would require accepting both the low population estimates and the high immigration estimates – and even then the figures would be fairly borderline. The evidence suggests foreign-born Chinese never made up much more than 5% of the population of Thailand, and their migration is not concentrated in any single decade (James 1930, Vandenbosch 1947, Sternstein 1984).

During the 20th century, Thailand saw its population increase from 5-7 million to over 60 million, but immigration only became significant again around the turn of the millennium. The World Bank data (World Bank Group 2011) actually shows a declining immigrant stock from around 500,000 in 1960 to 300,000 in 1990. This is somewhat lower than the UN data (United Nations 2017) which shows over 500,000 immigrants, but neither figure suggest anything approaching mass migration in the later 20th century. Both the World Bank data and UN data show a substantial increase of the immigrant stock between 1990 and 2000, and for the UN data an even larger increase in the 2000s.

By the late 2010 the number of migrants in Thailand was probably over 2 million and quite possibly over 3 million (Chalamwong et al. 2012, UN data, Huguet 2014). Many of these migrants arrived in the decade after 2000, but even the higher estimates (Huguet 2014 puts the number at 3.7 million in 2013) suggest that fewer than 3 million arrived in this decade. The population of Thailand in 2000 was a little over 60 million, meaning that despite being sizable, the migration did not meet our criteria for “mass migration”.

Demographically substantial migration certainly did occur in the history of Thailand. At times in the early 20th and 21st centuries (and perhaps in the 17th century), this migration may have approached the
threshold of mass migration. But overall, the evidence does not support the occurrence of a mass migration in any decade.

**Australia**

The British first began colonizing Australia in 1788 and colonies first achieved self-governance (though not full sovereignty) in the 1850s. However, before 1901 Australia was a collection of separate colonies, and only become a unified nation in 1901. Full independence from Britain came with the Statute of Westminster 1931, which was adopted by Australia in 1942 and backdated to 1939. For purposes of the migration data set, I have used 1901 and the start date for Australia. From this date Australia was essentially self-governing, and acted independently in matters of immigration, with one of the earliest laws passed by the new Australian Commonwealth being the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901.

New Zealand received representative government in the 1850s with the passage of the New Zealand Constitution Act (1852) and the formation of a parliament, making the nation self-governing for most purposes. It is therefore included in the data set from the 1850s onwards.

Prior to 1901 the population of Australia was largely built by immigration. In each decade between 1830 and 1890 the number of new arrivals easily exceeded 5% of the existing population. In the 1850s, the discovery of gold spurred a rush of immigration, and in that decade the number of arrivals was greater than the entire white population of the colonies in 1850. If the data set were to be extended into the period before 1901, only the 1890s would fail to meet the threshold of mass migration (Borrie 1994, Richards 2017).
Borrie (1994) provides figures for immigration to Australia for the period 1900 to 1940 (page 184) and data from Australia’s Department of Home Affairs (2020) is available showing permanent arrivals since 1945.

Official data from Australia’s Department of Home Affairs show that Australia has had consistent decades of mass migration in each decade of the post-war period. After the end of the Second World War, immigration to Australia quickly grew to over 100,000 annually, and totaled 1.25 million in the 1950s. Into a population somewhat over 8 million in 1950 this represented about 15% of the population at the beginning of the decade. A similar number of immigrants arrived in the 1960s, about 1.3 million, but declined somewhat in the 1970s to just below a million. Despite the slowing of immigration in the 1970s, this number into a population of 13 million was still well above the threshold for mass migration.

The next two decades saw a steady migration of around 100,000 annually, or a million over each decade. In the first decade of the 21st century there was a notable uptick in migration with 1.7 million arriving during that decade, and over 200,000 annually in the years after 2007.

The United States

Before 1776, the United States were colonies of Great Britain, and while they enjoyed some degree of autonomy, they are treated as a sovereign state only after the Declaration of Independence.

Cohn (2009) provides authoritative immigration statistics for the United States for the period 1700-1860 that show immigration levels between the 1770s and the 1820s were relatively low, and certainly did not meet the threshold of mass migration.

After 1930, however, there was a sharp increase in the number of arrivals that marked the beginning of a period of sustained high migration to the United States. Cohn’s figures (2009, table 2.1) show an
increase from around 120,000 in the 1820s to somewhere between 500,000 and 600,000 new immigrants in the 1830s. This matches government statistics of new legal permanent residents (DHS 2016) which show 129,000 immigrants in the 1820s and 538,000 in the 1830s.

The census of 1830 put the total population of the United States at 12.9 million, putting the threshold for mass migration at over 640,000, meaning that the arrivals in that decade were somewhat short of mass migration. However, in the following decades the pace rose, with more than 1.4 million immigrants in the 1840s and a remarkable 2.8 million in the 1850s. This first great wave of immigration to the United States included many Irish families escaping the Great Famine of the late 1840s, as well as many German and British immigrants seeking a better life. Their numbers was truly massive, easily exceeding the 5% threshold. In the 1840s the number of immigrant arrivals was more than 8% of the total population in 1840, and in the 1850s about 12% of the population at the start of that decade.

In the 1860s the United States was embroiled in Civil War for half of the decade, and the number of immigrant arrivals was notably lower in these years, but quickly rebounded in the later part of the decade. Overall a little over 2 million immigrants came to America in the 1860s, still easily sufficient to meet the mass migration threshold. New immigrants numbered 2.7 million in the 1870s, 5.2 million in the 1880s, and 3.7 million in the 1890s. The population of the United States was growing rapidly during this time, but in all of these decades the scale of immigration was sufficient to meet the standard of mass migration.

By the end of the 19th century the composition of immigrants was shifting from Western and Northern European countries to Eastern and Southern European origins. In the 1900s, at the peak of the Ellis Island period, over 8 million immigrants arrived in America, a number that would not be matched again until the end of the century. Proportional to population, only the 1880s and 1850s were of similar magnitude. The quantity and perceived quality of the new immigrants became a great concern to many
Americans, and in the following decades, legal restrictions were put in place that greatly reduced the scale of immigration. In the 1910s 6.3 million immigrants arrived, still easily meeting the threshold for mass migration (about 4.6 million for this decade). But of this number, more than 5 million came before 1915. In the second half of the decade there were just 1.2 million immigrant arrivals, slightly less than for the single year of 1914.

In the past there had been similar lulls in the rate of immigration. But the Immigration Act of 1924, along with changing economic and demographic conditions, prevented a significant rebound. In the 1920s the number of immigrants fell short of the threshold for the first time since the 1830s. The 4.3 million arrivals in that decade equal just 4% of the 106 million population figure recorded in the 1920 census. The following decades were ones of extremely low immigration comparative to the century between 1830 and 1930. The 1930s saw just 700,000 new legal permanent residents – half as many as had arrived in the 1840s, and fewer than had arrived in any single year between 1903 and 1914. The number of arrivals picked up a little after the end of the Second World War, but was still fewer than one million in the 1940s, and only a modest 2.5 million in the 1950s.

By the 1960s, with the election of Kennedy and the burgeoning Civil Rights movement, there was new pressure to alter the discriminatory immigration legislation of the 1920s. The 1965 Hart-Celler Act made significant changes to immigration law, eliminating the old national quota system. While other factors (and other legislation) have also been important in determining contemporary patterns of migration to the United States, the 1965 act has been used as a convenient delineator to distinguish a new immigration period.

The increase in immigrant arrivals in the 1960s and 1970s was fairly modest, and continued a trend that had begun as early as 1945. In the 1960s there were 3.2 million new immigrants, rising to 4.2 million in the 1970s, and 6.2 million in the 1980s. Although these were substantial figures, with the United States
population passing 200 million, they were far short of mass migration. In the final decade of the 20th century, the number of legal permanent residents admitted to the United States was 9.8 million, finally exceeding in absolute numbers the record set in the first decade of the century. But by this time the population of the United States had a population over three times as large. The 9.8 million legally admitted immigrants in the 1990s, and the 10.3 million in the 2000s, approached but failed to meet the threshold for mass migration.

However, by the total immigration in these decades was somewhat higher than these figures, as they do not include unauthorized entries, or non-immigrant arrivals who stayed in the United States without legal status. In 1990 the undocumented immigrant population is estimated at 3.5 to 4.7 million, rising to as many as 10 million in the early 2000s (Hanson 2006). The average net inflow during the 1990s was probably between 350,000 and 580,000 annually, or 3.5 to 5.8 million over the decade. At the lower end of this range, this would increase the total immigration for the decade to around 13.3 million, and at the higher end 15.6 million. The threshold for mass migration, based on the population from the 1990 census, would be just under 12.5 million. There are some additional complications, for example some immigrants being admitted as permanent residents may have previously been undocumented, and should properly be subtracted. However, it seems quite likely that the total immigration was sufficient to meet the threshold in the 1990s.

Undocumented immigration continued into the 2000s, but after 2007 the net inflow dropped off sharply, and even turned negative. By 2010 the number of undocumented immigrants was probably between 10 and 12 million (Warren & Warren 2013, Warren 2017). To push the total immigration figure above the mass migration threshold, there would need to have been about 3.8 million undocumented arrivals, for total immigration of just over 14 million. Whereas in the 1990s we can be fairly confident the threshold was met, in the 2000s it may have been narrowly missed. But given the inherent uncertainty around the undocumented population, it cannot be ruled out.
Canada

In theory, Canada did not have complete sovereignty, independent of the United Kingdom until the Constitution Act of 1982. However, the real beginning of Canadian independence is more usually traced back to 1867 when the Canadian provinces were combined into an independent Dominion. Although Britain maintained control over Canadian affairs in certain ways (notably foreign policy) after 1867, this is the date used in this study for Canada to be considered an independent country.

While no decades are included in the data before the 1870s, there certainly was significant immigration before this time. In the late 18th century there was a large migration of British Loyalists from the American colonies, following their victory in the American Revolution. And immigration continued to play an important role in the peopling of Canada throughout the earlier part of the 19th century.

Statistics Canada provides official figures for the foreign-born population going back to 1871, and the number of immigrants landing annually, back to the 1850s. The arrival figures clearly correspond with those from Ferenczi & Wilcox (1929: 363) which supposedly show persons reported by agents are intending to settle in Canada, or with settlers’ goods. Immigrant passengers for the United States are shown separately, and tourists and returning Canadians are said to be excluded. However, the Statistics Canada website suggests that the figures may include persons transiting on route to the United States (or in their words “a third country”) or circular immigrants traveling back and forth.

Although the NBER count of “settlers” are explicitly defined as long-term immigrants, it seems necessary to conclude that the figures do indeed include non-immigrants. In the 1870s the immigrant arrivals are recorded at 330,000, but the change in foreign-born shows an increase of less than 10,000, from 594,000 in 1871 to 603,000 in 1881. The decline might be in part explained by mortality of an aging foreign-born population, along with emigration of longer some of the established foreign-born. But in
the 1880s the arrivals figures show 850,000 immigrants, while the total foreign-born population in 1891 is less than 650,000. It is not plausible that more than 25% of arrivals died within a few years of immigrating. Many of these must have left Canada soon after arriving.

McDougall (1961) arrives at the same conclusion, that the arrivals are not all permanent immigrants, and suspects that in part the overestimation is due to Canadian officials misreporting immigrant intentions. McDougall’s estimates of immigration between 1871 and 1880 is around 250,000, compared to the official figure of 340,000. For the decade 1881 to 1890, McDougall estimates immigration at 450,000, compared to over 880,000 in the official statistics. When comparing to the change in the foreign-born population counted in Canadian census figures, these figures still suggests a substantial rate of mortality and emigration of earlier immigrants, but they are plausible.

McDougall’s estimates remain well above the threshold required for mass migration in the 1870s and 1880s. Hatton and Williamson (1994) also provide estimates for the rate of immigration to Canada in these decades that support the conclusion of mass migration. While there remains some uncertainty, it seems reasonable to conclude that the evidence supports mass migration in these decades.

For the 1890s McDougall’s estimate of 250,000 immigrants is marginally above the threshold for mass migration of around 240,000. Likewise, Hatton and Williamson estimate immigration at 48.8 per 1,000 mean population over the decade, which likewise implies around 250,000 immigrants. Because the figures are somewhat uncertain, and the threshold only narrowly exceeded, I code this as a possible mass migration.

After 1900 the growth in the foreign-born population is almost 900,000, and McDougall estimates immigration at over 1 million. There can be no doubt of mass migration in this decade. Although in absolute terms this was a much smaller migration than into the United States in the same period, relative to the population of each country it was far larger than any decade of immigration in US history.
In the 1910s the increase in the foreign-born population alone would be sufficient for mass migration, even if we were to unreasonably assume no mortality of earlier immigrants. McDougall’s estimate of 1.4 million immigrants exceeds the threshold of 350,000 four times over.

We do not have estimates from McDougall for the 1920s. But the official statistics show 1.3 million immigrants. In previous decades, these figures appear to typically be overestimates by around 30 to 50%. Only for the years 1881-1885 are the official figures more than double McDougall’s revised estimates. The threshold for mass migration in this decade would be below 450,000, this must surely have been met.

However, in the 1930s, like other places, Canada saw a sharp decline in immigration. Around 250,000 people immigrated to Canada according to the official statistics in this decade, too few to even maintain the foreign-born population, which declined by nearly 300,000 people. It wasn’t until after 1945 that there was a significant rebound in the number of immigrant arrivals, bringing the total for the 1940s up to 430,000, still substantially below the threshold of mass migration.

However, unlike the United States, which continued to have immigration levels well below mass migration for decades after the war, Canada quickly resumed its status as a country of mass migration. Between 1950 and 1979, Canada welcomed 4.3 million new immigrants – a major contribution to the rapid population growth of the country in these years from 13.7 to 24.5 million people. For these later decades we can take the official immigration statistics at face value, and assume they are fairly close to the number of true immigrants arriving in each decade. The figures comfortably exceed the thresholds required for mass migration.

The 1980s saw immigration of just under 1,260,000. A little lower than the rate for the previous three decades. With a population of 24,520,000 in the 1980 Canadian census, the threshold for mass migration in this decade would be about 1,226,000. Assuming the figures are accurate, this was a
decade of mass migration. But the difference is narrow enough that I have coded this only as a possible mass migration. But with immigration rising to more than 200,000 per year in the 1990s and 2000s, there is no doubt that these were decades of mass migration.

Cuba

Between 1868 and 1880 Cubans seeking independence fought a costly war against the Spanish, which ultimately did not lead to a separation. A second conflict began in the 1890s, and the United States was ultimately drawn in after the explosion and sinking of the battleship Maine. The Spanish-American War lasted just a few months in 1898 and ended with the Treaty of Paris. In this treaty Spain ceded several territories and Cuba was made a protectorate of the United States. In 1902 Cuba gained formal independence, although the United States retained significant influence and control of Cuban affairs. In the data set Cuba is included from the 1900s.

The population of Cuba in 1902 was around 1.6 to 1.8 million (Gannett 1909, Alvarez 1995, Bolt et al. 2018). The rapid pace of development following independence lead to massive demand for labor, much of which was met by a large inflow of immigrants (Corbitt 1942). Between 1899 and 1905 there were perhaps 150,000 Spanish immigrants alone, and perhaps 240,000 arrivals in total over the decade 1900-1910 (Ferenczi and Willcox 1929).

In the next decade immigrant arrivals increased to 360,000 (Ferenczi and Willcox 1929) including some 150,000 Chinese, as well as Haitians, Jamaicans, Spanish and others (Corbitt 1942). In the first half of the 1920s another 150,000 immigrants arrived.

In total, between 1900 and 1930 there were as many as 800,000 Spanish entries and 600,000 from Haiti and the British West Indies (De la Fuente 1997, Mcleod 1998, Moya 2013). Although these figures
include many temporary and circular immigrants, they testify to the enormous flow of people in the first decades of the 20th century. Many of these immigrants did settle permanently, and this is reflected in the Cuban census of 1931 which shows 250,000 foreign born Spaniards and they were sufficiently settled to have 375,000 Cuban born children (Alvarez 1995). In total the 1831 shows about 440,000 foreign born.

In the decades 1900 to 1930 the threshold for mass migration was between 80,000 and 150,000. And the evidence suggests that over each of the decades immigration exceeded this.

By 1930 the population had grown to almost 4 million (1931 census, Bolt et al. 2018). At this time there was a sharp drop off in immigration as economic conditions worsened, and the foreign population probably declined in this decade from voluntary returns and deportations (Reid 1932, Mcleod 1998). By 1953 the foreign-born population had declined to just 230,000, most over the age of 40. In subsequent decades the immigrants population continued to fall, and especially after the Cuban revolution the country became one of emigration, with very few new arrivals (World Bank Group 2011, United Nations 2017). After 1930 there was certainly no mass migration to Cuba.

Haiti and the Dominican Republic

Haiti won its independence from France in 1804. At the time the population was probably somewhere between 500,000 and 700,000 (Leger 1907, Bolt et al. 2018). Haiti is included in the data set in each decade from 1800, with the exception of the 1920s when it was under occupation by the United States. The Dominican Republic covers the eastern side of the island of Hispaniola, neighboring Haiti. After gaining independence from Spain in 1821 the two parts of the island were united between 1822 and 1844 after which the Dominican Republic gained independence from Haiti and became a separate nation.
In the 19th century there was encouragement, and financing of immigration by black Americans. However, these attempts largely failed to attract substantial numbers of settlers. By the end of the 1820s between 6,000 and 13,000 black immigrants may have arrived in Haiti, not nearly enough for mass migration, even before accounting for those who returned (Leger 1907, Fanning 2007, Coupeau 2008). A small number of black Americans continued to arrive throughout the 19th century, but never in large numbers. Genetic studies of the Haitian population support the conclusion the immigration was not demographically substantial in the 19th century (Simms et al. 2010).

By the beginning of the 20th century the population of Haiti had grown to about 1.5 million. In this century emigration of Haitians for work became common (Allman & May 1979, Ferguson 2003). Many emigrants were temporary labor migrants who worked in other parts of the Caribbean, while others were educated people who left to settle permanently in the United States or Canada. Like most countries of emigration, immigration (other than returning Haitian nationals) was low. The immigrant population was never large, and probably never reached as much a 1% during the 20th century – certainly not after 1950 (Klich & Lesser 2013, World Bank Group 2011, United Nations 2017).

When the Dominican Republic gained independence in 1844 its population was small. In 1824 the population was certainly less than 100,000 (Franklin 1828) and by the 1870s it had grown to perhaps 150,000 (Fabens 1863, Hazard 1873). With such a small population, it is difficult to rule of the possibility of a “mass migration” – which in this case would require just a few thousand persons. There were some immigrants to the Dominican Republic, including from Cuba, the Levant, and the Canary Islands. However, despite some efforts to encourage this immigration, none of these communities appear to have been large in the 19th century (Hazard 1873, Nicholls 1981, Martinez-Vergne 2006).

It was not until the 20th century that we see any evidence of substantial immigration to the Dominican Republic. The census of 1920 shows a foreign-born population of around 50,000, in a total population of
900,000. The majority of these were Haitians, with most of the rest coming from Puerto Rico or other parts of the Caribbean (1920 census). Starting around 1900 thousands of Haitians and other Caribbean people engaged in circular migration or temporary work in the Dominican Republic (Grasmuck 1982, Martinez 1995, Martinez 1999, Jadotte 2009). The 1920 census figures probably capture many of these temporary immigrants, and the total number of permanent settlers was probably not sufficient for mass migration in the 1900s or 1910s.

If there was mass migration it was probably in the 1920s when there was a large immigration of Haitians. By 1926 there may have been as many as 100,000 living in the Dominican Republic, although other estimates put the figure by the mid-1930s at closer to 50,000 (Grasmuck 1982, Perusek 1984, Martinez 1999, Turits 2002). Added to this wide range of possible estimates is the difficulty in establishing how many of these Haitians can be considered permanent migrants. Mass migration seems plausible in the 1920s, but the evidence is not conclusive.

In the 1930s Haitian immigration continued, perhaps even at a greater rate. The sudden large number of arrivals alarmed many in the Dominican Republic. As Martinez (1999) explains:

> By the 1930s, Dominican fears of Haitian military conquest or commercial domination had given way to apprehensions about "invasion pacifica" from Haiti. It was feared that Haiti might insidiously gain hegemony over all of Hispaniola via infiltration by its numerically superior population into Dominican territory. Elite observers assumed that Haitian frontier settlers would not assimilate Dominican ways and would be capable of Haitianizing the Dominicans with whom they came into contact.
In 1937 these fears prompted Trujillo, the Dominican dictator, to launch an attack on the Haitian population settled along the border region of the Dominican Republic. Thousands were massacred, and many others fled or were forcibly deported (Turits 2002). The result was the in 1940 there were almost certainly fewer Haitian immigrants than in 1930. By 1950 the Haitian immigrant population per the census was around 19,000 (Grasmuck 1982), far below its peak before Trujillo’s massacre in the 1930s. The population by this time was about 2.4 million.

The Haitian population rebounded after 1950, including many undocumented immigrants, making estimates of the immigrant population rather uncertain. The 1970 census gives a Haitian population in 1970 of around 87,000 (Grasmuck 1982), whereas the World Bank gives a higher figure of 127,000 (World Bank Group 2011). Due to the extent of circular migration, I am inclined to consider the census figures a more fair reflection of actual immigration to the Dominican Republic – but even the higher figures would probably not imply any mass migration. By the end of the 20th century and into the beginning of the 21st century, the number of Haitians was between 200,000 and 400,000 (Martinez 1995, 2010 census, World Bank Group 2011, United Nation 2017). But with a total population by this of 7 million by 1990, the threshold for mass migration was 350,000 or more. While the immigration of Haitians has been significant in size, it has not reached the threshold of mass migration in the period after 1940. Other immigration to the Dominican Republic has been modest, and not sufficient to raise the total number of immigrants over the threshold.

Mexico

After a decade long struggle, Mexico achieved independence in 1821 from Spanish rule. At this time the population was around 6.6 million (Bolt et al. 2018). Unlike other parts of the Americas, such as the
United States, Mexico lacked large amounts of good farmland, and during the 19th century attracted few immigrants (Buchenau 2001).

The migration of Americans into Texas in the 1820s and 1830s would have important consequences for this territory and were of local demographic significance. But the 30,000 or so immigrants (Nackman 1974, Buchenau 2001) in these decades was not a mass migration from the perspective of the total Mexican population. The census of 1895 showed an immigrant stock of around 50,000, in a population of 12.7 million, and it is probable that it had never much exceeded this level at any other point in the 19th century. Certainly the evidence excludes any likelihood of mass migration.

By 1930 the number of foreigners in Mexico had increased to 160,000, with immigration in the 1920s reaching new highs. This immigrant population was diverse, with sizable communities originating from the Middle East, China, and Europe. But in a population of 17 million, they made up less than 1% of the total population and were not part of any mass migration in Mexico. Over the next decades the population of Mexico grew rapidly, reaching about 20 million by 1940, 30 million in the 1950s, and 50 million around 1970 (Bolt et al. 2018). This growth, however, was driven almost entirely by native fertility rather than foreign immigration. In this period the immigrant population does not appear to have grown much larger than 200,000 people.

Since 1970 Mexico has been a major country of emigration – mostly to the United States. And like most countries of emigration, the inward flow of foreigners was modest. Although the immigrant population did grow in the late 20th century and first decade of the 21st century, reaching between 500,000 and a million, the number of arrivals was far below the threshold of mass migration (World Bank Group 2011, United Nations 2017).

Central America
Besides Mexico, the database includes six central American countries: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama. Only the small country of Belize is excluded. These countries were briefly preceded by the Federal Republic of Central America which formed in the 1820s, gaining independence from Spain. This federation quickly slid into civil war and dissolved by 1840. Although this short lived state is not included in the data set, it seems clear that migration to Central America in this period was very low (Dym 2008).

Guatemala had a population of around 800,000 in the 1850s, if not higher (Squier 1858, Bolt et al. 2018). There were proactive attempts by the government to recruit foreign settlers in the 19th century, but these amounted to little (Fuentes-Mohr 1955). The largest number of settlers were probably the Germans and Italians in the later part of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century (Rippy 1947, Schoonover and Schoonover 1989, Bruschi 2009). However, the number of immigrants was very small, with perhaps several thousand Germans settling over the course of several decades, and a similar or smaller number of Italians and other Europeans, totaling by 1911 around 14,000 (Filsinger 1911, Rosales 2016).

Throughout the 20th century the population of permanent immigrants in Guatemala remained small, making up at most around 1% of the total population (Elizaga 1965, World Bank Group 2011, United Nations 2017). There is some disagreement between the World Bank and United Nations figures for the foreign stock in 1990, but the higher figure from the UN (most likely includes Central American refugees who returned to their own countries during the 1990s and were not permanent immigrants. This is evidenced by the fact that the UN figure declines from 260,000 in 1990 to just 50,000 in the year 2000. This is consistent with the World Bank figures which show an immigrant stock of 40,000 in 1990 and just under 50,000 a decade later. In any case, even the 260,000 figure is well below 5% of the Guatemalan population in 1990, which was probably more than 8 million.
There is also no evidence of any mass migrations to Honduras. In 1850 the population was somewhat smaller than that of Guatemala, probably around 350,000 persons, rising to about 500,000 by the end of the century (Squier 1858, Euraque 1996, Bolt et al. 2018).

Immigrants to Honduras were mainly Arabs, Europeans, or from other countries in the Americas (Kaufman 1976, Crowley 1984, Euraque 1996). But Euraque (1995) shows that between 1887 and 1935 these immigrants never exceeded 10,000 persons, and before the 1880s the number was probably even lower (Ferenczi & Wilcox 1929). This is supported by Filsinger’s estimate of 5,000 foreigners in 1911 (Filsinger 1911). Later in the 20th century the number of immigrants was hardly more than this, with World Bank and UN data showing figures in the low tens of thousands – again with the exception of the UN figures for the 1990s, which like Guatemala undoubtedly include temporary refugees (World Bank Group 2011, United Nations 2017). Elizaga (1965) does show a fairly substantial migration of Salvadorans to Honduras in the decades before 1950 of around 20,000, but this is not on the scale of mass migration.

El Salvador’s population in 1850 was probably similar of slightly larger than Honduras (Squier 1858, Burns 1984, Bolt et al. 2018). Like Guatemala and Honduras, the number of immigrants was small, including some Europeans, Arabs, and Chinese (Kaufman 1976, DeLugan 2016). Some of these immigrants married into leading Salvadoran families, and were significant as powerful members of the capitalist elite, connecting El Salvador to the larger Atlantic economy, but while their economic power was significant, their numbers were not, probably not exceeding 10,000 in the 19th century or first decades of the 20th century (Filsinger 1911, Burns 1984, Brignoli 2000). Since the 1960s the stock of foreigners has been below 50,000, and was probably lower than this in the preceding decades (Neiva and Montenegro 1965, World Bank Group 2011, United Nation 2017). Like Honduras and Guatemala, it is quite clear that El Salvador did not experience any mass migration.
In 1850 the population of Costa Rica was around 100,000, increasing to around 300,000 by the end of the decade (Bolt et al. 2018). Like the other Central American countries, immigration was low in the 19th century. There were a few hundred Chinese immigrants before the 1880s, with 219 listed in the 1883 census, with perhaps 2,000 more immigrating in the following two decades (Huesmann 1991). Much more substantial was immigration from Jamaica and other parts of the Caribbean. Bourgois (1986) puts the number of Jamaican immigrants in the 1880s at 10,000. However, many of these were temporary labor migrants who did not remain in Costa Rica. In 1892 the total foreign born population was just 6,300 in a population of around 240,000, or 2.6% (Alvarenga 2011).

In the following decades the migration of Jamaican workers increased, with perhaps 43,000 coming between 1891 and 1911 (Harpelle 2002). The 1900s probably marked the peak of migration with a boom in the banana industry, in which the migrants worked, occurring around 1907 (Koch 1977). While many of these immigrants did not settle permanently in Costa Rica, a significant number did. By 1927 the Jamaican population was 19,000, and the total foreign born population 29,000, probably a little over 6% of the population (Bourgois 1986, Alvarenga 2011). The immigration was enough to grow the population of Limon, the main immigrant destination, by about 30,000 between 1883 and 1927 (Harpelle 2002).

Was there a mass migration in this period? Over the four decades 1890 to 1930 there was perhaps 30,000 immigrants. Almost all of these were Jamaicans, with perhaps a few thousand European and American expatriates (Filsinger 1911 puts the number of these foreigners in 1911 at roughly 3,000). The peak of this migration probably occurred after 1900, and most likely in either the 1900s or 1910s.

If we take the population as 240,000 in 1890, the threshold for mass migration in that decade would have been 12,000. By simple arrivals this figure may have been met, but the number of permanent immigrants was almost certainly fewer than 10,000. The population by 1900 may have been 300,000, putting the threshold for mass migration at 15,000. Even taking a liberal estimate of immigration over
the 1890-1930 period, this threshold would require that it to be quite heavily concentrated, with the 1900s accounting for about half or more of the total. Although it is a bit of a stretch, it does seem plausible that immigration was peaking during decade, and there is some uncertainty around the immigrant and population figures. This decade has been coded as a possible mass migration.

While mass migration is conceivable in the 1900s, it is distinctly less likely in the 1910s when the threshold would be somewhat higher - around 18,000 – and there is less evidence to support to conclusion that immigration was peaking at this time. Immigration in the 1900s were at best at the borderline. In the 1910s the number of immigrants may have approached the threshold, but it is unlikely it crossed it, and accordingly the decade is coded as not having any mass migration. For the 1920s mass migration is less likely still, and can be excluded quite confidently (the threshold by this decade would have been more than 20,000). After 1927 the black population fell due to emigration, and a decline in immigration (Bourgois 1986).

After 1930 the primary immigration to Costa Rica was from Nicaragua. By 1950 there was already some 18,000 or more Nicaraguans in Costa Rica (Elizaga 1965). In 1960 they made up a majority of the total 33,000 foreigners (World Bank Group 2011). The population by this time was well over a million, so the Nicaraguans represented less than 2% of the population, and the total immigrant stock was still below 3% of the population. During the 1960s the World Bank data actually shows a slight decline in the immigrant stock, including Nicaraguans, but during the 1970s their numbers began to increase.

Marquette (2006) discusses the Nicaraguan immigration in detail and shows that there was a dramatic increase in the 1990s. Even before 1990 the total immigration of Nicaraguans was quite substantial with the figures used by Marquette showing several thousand arriving annually. However, they clearly show a much smaller migration in the 1980s than the World Bank data, where the stock of Nicaraguans increased by 70,000 (World Bank Group 2011). Marquette’s figures are based on arrival dates of
Nicaraguans reporting in the 2000 census, and so are probably an undercount of the actual arrivals. Many Nicaraguans came to Costa Rica as seasonal, circular, or temporary migrants which probably explains why the World Bank and United Nations (2017) count of Nicaraguans in 1990 is higher than would be implied from Marquette’s figures. As a measure of permanent migration, Marquette’s numbers are probably more accurate (although some mortality, and reporting errors probably lead to slight underestimation), however, even the higher figure of 70,000 or more arrivals would not constitute mass migration at this period when the population of Costa Rica was over 2 million and the threshold for mass migration more than 100,000. Excluding temporary refugees there was little other migration in the 1980s, and the total permanent immigrants in this decade was certainly fewer than 100,000.

During the 1990s the number of Nicaraguan immigrants increased greatly, with Marquette showing more than 10,000 arrivals annually. The World Bank and United Nations figures also show an increase in the Nicaraguan stock from 100,000 to 230,000. Alvarenga (2011) puts the number of Nicaraguan immigrants in the 1990s at 140,000 or more. With a population of 3 million in 1990, these figures are very close to the mass migration threshold of around 150,000. Other immigration was admittedly modest, but the World Bank data shows an increase from 40,000 to 70,000 in the immigrant stock other than Nicaraguans, suggesting at least 30,000 other arrivals. Overall, the evidence would suggest a mass migration in this decade. However, the migration probably only exceeds the threshold narrowly, and there is some doubt as to the degree that Nicaraguan migrants in this decade were settling permanently. If a substantial proportion of the Nicaraguans in Costa Rica in 2000 were there only temporarily, mass migration probably cannot be said to have occurred. Therefore, the decade is only coded as a possible mass migration.

In the 2000s the increase in the immigrant stock was much more modest, with Nicaraguans increasing from 230,000 to 290,000 (United Nations 2017), and the population had increased to 3.9 million (Bolt et al. 2018). There is no reason to think that there was any mass migration in the 2000s.
1912 and 1933 the country was occupied by the United States, and so has been removed from the data set for the 1910s and 1920s, but otherwise is included for all decades after 1850.

Nicaragua in 1850 had a population of around 300,000 (Squier 1858, Bolt et al. 2018). As for other countries in Central America, there does not appear to have been substantial immigration in the 19th century. By 1911 there are estimated to have been around 2,000 foreigners living in Nicaragua in a population of 500,000 or more (Filsinger 1911) – the lowest of any of the Central American countries. There was some migration before 1860 to Bluefields and the Mosquito Coast – but at the time this was a separate territory and protectorate of the United Kingdom. It was not annexed into Nicaragua until the 1890s, and at least by this time there does not appear to have been mass migration to the region.

There appears to have been some immigration in the 20th century, with foreign communities continuing to be concentrated along the Mosquito Coast region (Adams 1957, Loveland 1973, Sollis 1989). The total number of “foreigners” may have been around 30,000 by the 1980s, but some of these were probably later generations of immigrants born in Nicaragua (Sollis 1989). The actual number of immigrants born abroad probably didn’t reach 30,000 until around the end of the 20th century (World Bank Group 2011) although as in other Central American countries, temporary refugees may have increased the total number of foreigners in Nicaragua for brief periods (United Nations 2017).

The population of Nicaragua rose from around 500,000 at the beginning of the 20th century to almost 5 million by the end of the century. The stock of immigrants might never have exceeded 1%, and certainly never reached 5%. The first decade of the 21st century continued the trend of a growing but very small immigrant stock (United Nations 2017). There were no mass migrations in the history of Nicaragua.

The final country in Central America, Panama, was until 1903 part of Colombia. Its separation was largely a result of American support of the local separatist movement, due to their desire to establish a
canal connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The Panama Canal and American influence are fundamental to the understanding of Panama’s history, including its history of immigration.

At the beginning of the 20th century the population of Panama was less than 300,000 – probably around 260,000 (Burr 1904, Bolt et al. 2018). In the first decade of independence, Panama was in the midst of a substantial migration, which peaked in the years 1904-1914 during the construction of the Panama Canal, which relied primarily on West Indian labor (Conniff 1983). Like Costa Rica, this migration included many from Jamaica and other parts of the Caribbean and was often temporary labor migration (O’Reggio 2006). The total number of arrivals in the period was truly spectacular, estimated at 150,000 between 1904 and 1914 by Conniff (1983) and at 130,000 between 1881 and 1914 by Goodin (2014). At the peak of employment in 1913, 44,711 immigrants were working for the Panama Canal and Panama Railroad (Westerman 1961). The majority of these immigrants were not permanent settlers, but a significant number did remain in Panama – between 40,000 and 50,000 (Westerman 1961, Lewis 1980, Conniff 1983).

Given a population of less than 300,000 in 1900, it is certain that Panama experienced mass migration in that decade. However, after 1914 and the completion of the canal, the rate of migration dropped off rapidly, and the number of arrivals was roughly matched by the outflow of return migrants (O’Reggio 2006). Another large inward migration did not occur until the 1940s with the beginning of construction in 1939 on a new set of locks. At the peak year of employment in 1942 there were 32,600 West Indian workers. (Westerman 1961, Conniff 1983). The population by this time was between 620,000 and 700,000, putting the threshold for mass migration somewhat above 30,000 (Weil 1972, Bolt et al. 2018). While it is possible the total arrivals exceeded this threshold, the number who remained in Panama was probably much less.
Elizaga (1965) gives figures of 17,000 Caribbean immigrants, 10,000 Colombians and 9,000 Central Americans in Panama in 1950. By 1960 the World Bank figures show about 11,000 Jamaicans, along with 3,600 immigrants from Barbados, 1,500 from Cuba and smaller numbers from other parts of the Caribbean (World Bank Group 2011). Most of these immigrants would have arrived in the 1940s, but the total falls quite short of mass migration. Based on the World Bank data, there may have been enough migrants from other countries in the Americas for the total immigrant population to reach almost 70,000 in 1960 - about 6% of the total population. But these immigrants would have had to be heavily concentrated in the 1940s to reach mass migration. Additionally, this figure includes Americans and other expatriates who were probably not permanent immigrants. The figure from the 1960 census shows somewhat fewer immigrants, just 4.4% of the population and had been in decline in each census since 1911 (Weil 1972). Overall the evidence supports the conclusion that there was no mass migration in the decades between 1920 and 1960.

Since the 1960s the stock of immigrants has not exceeded 5% of the population, and we can confidently conclude that there was no mass migration in these decades.

Venezuela

Venezuela’s declared independence from Spain in 1811 and in the 1810s there were a couple of short-lived republics. But independence from Spain was not secure until the 1820s when Venezuela joined several other South American countries to form the Republic of Gran Colombia. The union lasted until 1830 when Venezuela separated and became an independent state.

In the 1820s the population was around 700,000 to 800,000 rising to around 1 million by 1840 and 1.3 to 1.5 million in 1850 (Rasmussen 1947, Bolt et al. 2018). Like other new republics in Latin America, Venezuela wished to encourage the immigration of Europeans to grow the population, but was
relatively unsuccessful in attracting settlers (Siewers 1939, Rasmussen 1947, Berglund 1994). In the first decade the number of arrivals was only a few hundred annually, briefly rising to several thousand in the 1840s - mostly from the Canary Islands. In total only around 13,000 immigrants arrived in Venezuela up to 1860 (Rasmussen 1947, Berglund 1994).

Immigration appears to have been somewhat higher after 1860, with 26,000 immigrants arriving between 1874 and 1888. The total foreign population in the 1881 census was 35,000 and by 1891 it had grown to 43,000. Although this suggests immigration was increasing after 1860, the figures are clearly far below the threshold for mass migration, which would be around 80,000 for the 1860s. By 1880 the census shows a population of 2 million, putting the threshold at 100,000. Between 1891 and 1920 the immigrant population declined, suggesting a low number of arrivals in this period (Berglund 1994).

Reid (1932) and Siewers (1939) suggest that the first substantial migration to Venezuela started around 1918 with the early development of the oil industry. This lead to a migration boom between 1918 and 1922 with as many as 11,000 immigrants arriving annually (this is supported by figures from Ferenczi & Wilcox 1929). After 1922 this fell to around 3,000 a year – implying total migration over the 1920s of possibly 50,000 or more. This would be far short of mass migration, with the total population of Venezuela at this time between 2 and 3 million. Furthermore, much of this migration was probably not permanent (a conclusion supported by the census figures between 1920 and 1941).

Sassen-Koob (1979) states that immigration only became a major demographic factor in Venezuela starting in the 1940s. Likewise, Berglund makes the more specific claim that before 1945 the immigrant population never reached 2%.

Census figures show that between 1941 and 1950 the immigrant stock grew by about 160,000, from 50,000 to 210,000 (Grau 1994). Migration can also be estimated from the issuing of identity cards, which began in 1940. Between 1941 and 1947, 51,000 of these cards were issued to foreigners, and another
74,000 from 1948 to 1949. These 125,000 immigrants over the 1940s probably include only persons over the age of 15, and so are something of an undercount. The census gives the population in 1941 as 3.85 million, putting the threshold for mass migration in the 1940s somewhere above 180,000. It is conceivable this threshold was met. A large proportion of the foreign population enumerated in 1941 could have emigrated or died by 1950, or the 1950 enumeration could be a slight undercount. The dates also cover only 9 years (although the majority of migration for this decade was in the final years). On the other hand, the foreign population in 1950 could include some circular migrants, or the 1941 census could have undercounted the foreign population.

Overall, I am inclined to believe that an accurate figure of permanent immigrants during the 1940s would fall somewhat below the threshold, but there is enough uncertainty that mass migration cannot be confidently excluded and so the decade is coded as a possible mass migration.

The dramatic increase in immigration that had begun in the final years of the 1940s continued through the 1950s. The foreign born population between 1950 and 1961 grew by more than 330,000 (Grau 1994), and the rate of immigration implied by identity cards is even higher, with 440,000 issued to foreigners during the 1950s. Sassen-Koob (1979) also puts the immigration for 1950-1958 at around 450,000. While some immigrants did return to their countries of origin in the 1960s, most remained in Venezuela. With a total population in 1950 of about 5 million, the threshold of 250,000 was certainly exceeded.

In the 1960s the rate of immigration implied by the census figures was much lower, with an increase in the foreign-born population from 540,000 to 600,000 between 1961 and 1971 (Grau 1994). The immigrant population of 1961 was too recent for there to have been substantial attrition from mortality, although a substantial number of those enumerated probably did return to their home countries during
the decade. With a population of 7.5 million in 1960 the threshold for mass migration would be about 375,000, which is not plausible based on the recorded figures alone.

However, during the 1960s there was also a massive increase in undocumented migration. Sassen-Koob (1979) suggests that the total net migration of undocumented immigrants could have been as high as 500,000. If this is accurate it would certainly constitute a mass migration. There are no reliable figures, and it cannot be determined to what extent the undocumented migration was circular rather than permanent. For these reasons I have coded the 1960s as a possible but not certain mass migration.

Sassen-Koob (1979) puts the number of foreign residents in 1977 at 1.2 million, an increase of 700,000 since the beginning of the decade. The census figures for 1971 and 1981 show a slightly smaller increase from 600,000 to a little under 1.1 million (Grau 1994) and similar figures appear in the World Bank data (World Bank Group 2011). Van Roy (1984) also claims that undocumented migration peaked in the 1970s. The difference between Sassen-Koob’s figure of 1.2 million and the 1981 census most likely reflects a large outflow in the final years of the 1970s as the economy began to decline. The population in 1970 was between 10 and 11 million, putting the threshold for mass migration at a little above 500,000. The figures would suggest immigration probably reached this figure, especially if a significant amount of undocumented migration failed to be captured by the census figures. The conclusion is that there was a mass migration in this decade.

Venezuela’s economy, heavily dependent on oil exports, suffered in the 1980s as the price of oil collapsed. This discouraged immigration, and the immigrant population law very little growth in the 1980s, or perhaps even a slight decline (Berglund 1994, World Bank Group 2011). This trend continued into the next two decades (United Nations 2017). After 1980 there has been no mass migration to Venezuela.
Colombia declared independence in 1810, and by the 1820s had actually achieved lasting independence from Spain. In this first decade it was part of a larger union of Gran Colombia. It is included in the data set from the 1820s to the present. At this time the population was already probably more than a million and reached around 4 million by the end of the century. After that the population rose to 10 million before 1950 and approaching 40 million by the year 2000 (Bolt et al. 2018).

In the 19th century Colombia experienced very little migration, with only a few hundred immigrants by the middle of the century (Safford 1965). Although the numbers were somewhat higher later, with a few thousand Europeans, and immigrants from other countries in the Americas, at no time did the immigrant population ever reach 1% (Sanmiguel-Camargo 1999, World Bank Group 2011, United Nations 2017).

Ecuador emerged as a sovereign state in 1830 with the dissolution of Gran Colombia. It had a somewhat smaller population of around 500,000 (Bolt et al. 2018). Writing in the 1920s, Banda (1926) makes clear that any efforts to attract immigration up to that time had met with little success. Pagnotta (2011) in discussing Italian immigration in the 1930s and 1940s, also makes clear that rates of migration to Ecuador were not demographically substantial.

By 1960 the foreign population was just 24,000 in a population of over 4 million - less than 1%. The immigrant population increased over the next four decades, but may not have ever exceeded 1% of the population, and certainly did not reach as much as 2% of the population (World Bank Group 2011, United Nations 2017). By 2010 the immigrant population may have been somewhat larger, if Colombian refugees are included – who may have numbered 130,000 (Verney 2009). The United Nations gives a figure of 325,000 total foreigners in Ecuador in 2010. This is far higher than the 150,000 immigrants in
the year 2000. But with a population of over 12 million in 2000, the threshold for mass migration to Ecuador would be over 600,000.

Bolivia achieved independence in the 1820s, at which time the population was probably already greater than 1 million (Bolt et al. 2018). In common with many other Latin American countries, Bolivia struggled to attract immigrants in the 19th or early 20th centuries, and population growth was almost entirely from natural increase (Fawcett 1910, Crist 1946, Lora 2009). In the census of 1900 the number of foreigners enumerated was just 7,425 (Herranz-Loncan and Peres-Cajias 2016). Even if this is a substantial undercount, it is clear that Bolivia was not a country of mass migration.

Between 1960 and 1990s the immigrant population was in the tens of thousands, perhaps slightly exceeding 100,000 by the 21st century (World Bank Group 2011, United Nations 2017). The population in 1960 was already more than 3 million, and by 2010 was approaching 10 million. The is no evidence that the immigrant population at any time was more than 2% of the total population, and there is certainly no indication that any mass migration occurred.

Peru also consolidated its independence in the 1820s, at which time the population was 1.3 million or more (Gootenberg 1991, Bolt et al. 2018). Unlike Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador or Venezuela – Peru did experience some fairly significant immigration flows in the 19th century. Between the late 1840s and early 1870s up to 100,000 Chinese coolies were brought to Peru. And another 30,000 Chinese and Japanese workers arrived in the first three decades of the 20th century (Blanchard 1979, Hu-Dehart 1995, Narvaez 2010, Stewart 2018). In addition to these Asian immigration there were perhaps around 50,000 European immigrants during the whole of the 19th century (Radcliffe 1995).

While these are substantial numbers, they do not indicate mass migration. With a population of 1.3 million in 1820, the threshold for that decade was already 65,000. By 1850 the population had risen to 2 million (Gootenberg 1991, Bolt et al. 2018, Stewart 2018) putting the threshold at 100,000. Chang-
Rodriguez (1958) gives a breakdown of the Chinese coolie migration by decade, with 13,000 arriving in the 1850s, 39,000 in the 1860s, and 36,000 in the 1870s. Even if these figures are not entirely accurate, it is not plausible that migration reached anywhere near 100,000 in any of these decades. It is also unclear what proportion of the Chinese remained in Peru permanently. The 1876 census shows an “Asiatic” population of just 42,000, implying a high rate of return migration (or an astonishing mortality rate).

After 1875, Peru limited the importation of Chinese coolies. And while there was a notable immigration of Chinese and Japanese in later decades, the numbers do not appear to have ever approached those of the 1850-1875 period.

By the 1940 census the population of Peru had reached 7 million (Parro 1942).

Before 2010 the immigrant population of Peru does not appear to have ever reached 100,000 and since at least 1960 has not exceeded 1% of the population (World Bank Group 2011, United Nations 2017).

Brazil

Brazil’s independence from Portugal was achieved in the 1820s, although it had enjoyed a significant amount of autonomy since 1808 when the Portuguese Royal Court had fled to the colony. Unlike other Latin American countries Brazil began its history as a monarchy, only becoming a republic towards the end of the 19th century.

At the time of independence in 1822, Brazil had a population of 4 to 5 million (Bethell 1989, Bolt et al. 2018). A large proportion of this population was slaves, probably more than a million people. Unlike in North America, the slave population did not replenish itself naturally through reproduction and so was sustained by the importation of enslaved people from Africa. By the 1820s up to 30,000 slaves were
imported each year (Bethell 1989). Although quite possibly on the demographic scale of mass migration, for the purposes of the data set, slavery is not counted towards immigration.

There was a modest migration of Europeans throughout the 19th century. Klein (1995) estimates that during the 19th century 100,000 to 200,000 immigrants were supported by the Brazilian government to colonize frontier regions. Before 1880 a small number were also used as sharecroppers in the coffee fields, but it was only after 1880 with the abolition of slavery that immigration really took off (Klein 1995, Souza 2019). The census of 1872 shows an immigrant population of 3.8% (Klein 1995) and it is unlikely that there was any mass migration in the prior decades. Statistics before 1850 may not be reliable but show no more than a few thousand immigrants in any year, suggesting immigration in these decades no more than the low tens of thousands (Ferenczi and Wilcox 1929). During the 1850s immigration appears to have exceeded 100,000 reaching a peak of around 20,000 arrivals in 1859. Some proportion of these may not have been permanent immigrants, but even if they were, they were far short of mass migration into a population by this time of over 7 million.

Hatton and Williamson’s book Migration and the International Labour Market 1850-1939 (1994, table 1.2) provides immigration rates for each decade between 1860 and 1900. The table shows the rate of migration in the 1860s as 2%, rising to 4.1% in the 1870s, 7.2% in the 1880s and 3.4% in the 1890s. This would imply mass migration probably only occurred in the 1880s.

Hatton and Williamson (1994) derive their immigration rates from Ferenczi and Willcox (1929). But my perusal of this source suggests that immigration over the 1880s was around 450,000 which should give a much lower immigration rate than 7%. In comparison I find Ferenczi and Willcox’s figures for the 1890s to show about 1.2 million, giving a rate of about far higher than 3.4% of that decade (the exact rates depend on the source of the population figures used). My conclusion is that the figures in Migration and the International Labour Market 1850-1939 are transposed by one place. This is confirmed by comparing
table 2.2 in Hatton and Williamson’s later book *The Age of Mass Migration: Causes and Economic Impact* (1998), which shows the same rates, but with each assigned to the subsequent decade. That is to say, the rates are given for 1870 to 1910 rather than 1860 to 1900, with the peak in the 1890s of 7.2%.

These alternative figures also accord with Lesser (2013, table 1.1), whose source is Levy (1974). And other literature also implies that the 1890s was the peak of immigration (Merrick & Graham 1979, Bethel 1989, Klein 1995). For this reason, I have coded the 1890s, and only this decade, as having mass migration.

Although immigration remained in the hundreds of thousands per decade, it never again exceeded 1 million. In the 1900s it fell to 620,000, then rebounded somewhat to 820,000 in the 1910s and 850,000 in the 1920s (Lesser 2013). However, by 1910 the population of Brazil had passed 20 million, putting the threshold of mass migration at more than 1 million. In the 1930s immigration dropped significantly to just 330,000, although the decade is notable as the peak of Japanese immigration. By 1960 the total immigrant stock was in decline, and continued to fall in the following decades (World Bank Group 2011, United Nation 2017). There are no mass migrations to Brazil after 1900.

Argentina

Argentina’s struggle for independence began in 1810 with the May Revolution, and in 1816 the country formally declared its independence. Although fighting continued after this, I use 1816 as the start date for the country in the data set and an independent state. The population at this time was quite small, probably between 500,000 and 1 million (Peterson 1964, Bolt et al. 2018).

By the time of the first census in 1869 the population was 1.7 million (Foerster 1919), of which 12% (200,000 people) were immigrants. The majority of these probably arrived in the 1860s, when the total
number of arrivals was around 150,000 (Foerster 1919, Ferenczi & Wilcox 1929, Hatton & Williamson 1994). Most of the rest probably arrived in the 1850s, when immigration may have reached 50,000 (Ferenczi & Wilcox 1929, Hatton & Williamson 1994). Before this immigration was probably not especially large, and there is no evidence it approached the scale of mass migration.

The immigration in the 1850s was already quite substantial, possibly reaching around 4% of the 1850 population, somewhat short of the threshold for mass migration. In the subsequent decades, however, immigration rapidly increased. In the 1860s the number of immigrant arrivals was somewhere around 10% of the 1860 population. In the 1870s arrivals rose to around 250,000 and in the 1880s approached 800,000 (Ferenczi & Wilcox 1929, Hatton & Williamson 1994). There was a slight slowdown of immigration in the 1890s, but there were still over 600,000 arrivals (Ferenczi and Wilcox 1929).

However, not all of these arrivals were permanent immigrants (Foerster 1919, Germani 1966). In the 1895 census there were about a million foreign-born persons living in Argentina (Foerster 1919), giving some indication of the rate of return – although not accounting for the many thousands who had only recently arrived and not yet returned.

To account for return migration we can look at the net migration figures provided by Germani (1966) and Solberg (1982). Germani gives to following figures: 77,000 in the 1860s, 85,000 in the 1870s, 640,000 in the 1880s, and 320,000 in the 1890s. Solberg’s figures are somewhat higher: 104,000 in the 1870s, 676,000 in the 1880s, 462,000 in the 1890s.

Foerster gives the total arrivals between 1857 and 1910 as 4.5 million, with the total staying in the country as 2.5 million, meaning that between 50 and 60% of immigrant arrivals were permanent settlers. If we calculate 50-60% of the recorded arrivals (Ferenczi and Willcox 1929) and compare them to the net migration estimates from Germani and Solberg, both sets appear reasonable.
A low estimate for the 1860s and 1870s puts permanent immigration about at the threshold of mass migration. There is enough uncertainty to code these decades as only possible mass migrations, although if not reaching the threshold it can only have been by a small margin. For the 1880s and 1890s the evidence is clear – these were decades of mass migration.

Migration peaked in the 1900s, when well over a million immigrants arrived in Argentina - a country that at the turn of the century had a population of less than 5 million. Hatton and Williamson show the rate of migration for this decade as being nearly 30%. Although this figure is inflated because it does not account for the large number of immigrants returning, the scale is truly enormous. Even when we consider the net migration figure, there number of immigrants is over a million (Germani 1966, Solberg 1982) and there is no doubt that this was a decade of mass migration.

In 1908 (the peak year of the decade) there were 256,000 immigrant arrivals to Argentina (Ferenczi and Willcox 1929) compared to 783,000 to the United States. But the population of Argentina was between 6 and 6.5 million in this year, whereas the United States had a population of almost 90 million. Proportionally it would be equivalent to the United States receiving about 3.5 million immigrants that year, or more than 12 million in the year 2020.

In fact the peak year of immigration to Argentina was actually 1912 when it received an astonishing 323,000 immigrants into a population estimated at 7.4 million (Ferenczi & Willcox 1929, Bolt et al. 2018) – almost reaching the threshold of mass migration in a single year. However, total arrivals over the 1910s was slightly lower than the 1900s, with a sharp drop off after 1913. Germani (1966) shows net migration for the 1910s as just 269,000, with 151 departures for every 100 arrivals between 1914 and 1920. Solberg’s (1982) figure of net migration for the 1910s is substantially higher at 495,000, but still shows a significant decline from the previous decade.
The threshold for the 1910s would be around 340,000 – higher than the net migration figure given by Germani. But the emigration in the period 1914-1920 must include a some who arrived in the 1900s or even earlier. Given that there were about 1.4 million arrivals recorded over the decade (Ferenczi and Willcox 1929), it seems certain that the mass of departures (apparently more than a million) must have included at least 100,000 immigrants who arrived before 1910. This would mean the total immigration in the 1910s was sufficient for mass migration, even if we use Germani’s lower estimate of net migration. Solberg’s alternative estimate of net migration in this decade is well above the threshold. The evidence is strong enough to conclude that this was a decade of mass migration.

By 1922 immigration had once again picked up, with annual arrivals once again exceeding 100,000. Over the decade net migration was 878,000 (Germani 1966), easily sufficient for mass migration, even if a substantial number of these did return in the 1930s when emigration was again substantial.

Net migration in the 1930s was at most 220,000 (Solimano 2005), and possibly as low as 73,000 (Germani 1966). It rebounded to between 380,000 and 480,000 in the 1940s, but by this time the population of Argentina was over 14 million, so this was far short of mass migration. In the latter half of the 20th century Argentina did not receive large numbers of immigrants. In 1960 the country still had a significant immigrant stock of around 2.6 million – more than 12% of the population, but it was declining. After 1975, net migration was negative (Solimano 2005) and by 1990 the immigrant population had fallen to 1.6 million, about 5% of the population (World Bank Group 2011, United Nations 2017).

Since the 1940s most immigration to Argentina has been from other Latin American countries. But while there have been periods of significant immigration, there has not been any decade where immigration reached the threshold of mass migration.
Chile

Chile declared independence in 1818 and is included in the data set from the 1820s onward.

A census taken in 1813 put the population of Chile at 820,000, and the first census of the independent nation in 1835 found a population of just over a million. The population reached 3 million in the first decade of the 20th century, and by the beginning of the 21st century had grown to 15 million.

The immigrant stock in Chile never exceeded 5% (Díaz, Lüders and Wagner 2010, World Bank Group 2011, Dintrans 2014, United Nations 2017) making mass migration in any decade unlikely. This is supported by sources of immigrant arrivals (Ferenczi & Willcox 1929, Gutierrez 1989)

Paraguay

Paraguay achieved independence in 1811 at which time the population was sparse, probably not many more than 100,000 people (Oddone 2010, Bolt et al. 2018). The population grew up to the 1860s when the Paraguayan War (1864-1870) resulted in a massive population decline. The size of the population before and after the war is disputed by scholars (Whigham and Potthast 1999, Reber 2002), but the demographic impact was certainly significant. In 1864 at the beginning of the war the population may have been as high as 450,000 and by the end was less than half this (Whigham and Potthast 1999).

There is no evidence of any mass migration to Paraguay. Reber (1988) makes it clear that there was no demographically substantial migration in the decades prior to 1860. Oddone (2013) explains that despite a strategic policy of encouraging immigration, Paraguay attracted few arrivals. Between 1881 and 1930 there were just 26,000 immigrants to Paraguay.

From 1870 to 1930, immigration was only a few thousand each year, and never reached the threshold of mass migration (Pidoux 1975). Curiously the 1930s were a high point of immigration for Paraguay,
whereas this decade was generally one of low migration for most of the Americas. It was the first
decade when immigration rose above 10,000, perhaps reaching around 20,000 in total. A substantial
proportion of the migration was from Poland (Galecka and Obracht-Prondzynski 2017), and may have
made Paraguay briefly one of the leading countries in Latin America for European immigration.
However, 20,000 immigrants over the decade was well short of mass migration, when the population at
this time was over 800,000 (Bolt et al. 2018).

Since the 1930s the immigrant stock has remained below 5%, and there is no evidence of mass

Uruguay

In the 1810s Uruguay successfully revolted against Spanish rule, but was subsequently invaded by Brazil
(then still in union with Portugal) in 1816. In 1825 Uruguay declared its independence from Brazil, and
this was secured with recognition from Argentina and Brazil in the Treaty of Montevideo (1828),
mediated by the British. In the data set, Uruguay is included starting in the 1830s.

In the first decades after independence the population of Uruguay was quite small, probably between
50,000 and 100,000 in the 1830s, and not much more than 100,000 in the 1840s, reaching 132,000 by
1852 (Benton 2001, Bolt et al. 2018). By 1860 the population had increased to 220,000, much of the
growth a result of immigration.

Proportional to the small population, immigration was high from the beginning, with around 13,000
arrivals between 1835 and 1840 alone (Ferenczi and Willcox 1929). This was more than sufficient for
mass migration even disregarding any arrivals in the earlier part of the decade. In the 1840s the rate of
immigration was probably even higher, with 20,000 arrivals in just the period 1840 to 1843. By 1852 the
foreign born made up over 20% of the population (Benton 2001). A few years later in 1860 their share of the population had increased to 35% (Benton 2001, Arocena 2009). In each of the decades between 1830 and 1860 we can confidently conclude that mass migration occurred.

Uruguay continued to be a country demographically dominated by immigration during the late 19th century. In the second half of the 19th century to population grew faster than any other Latin American country, with a seven-fold increase to over 900,000 by the turn of the century (Goebel 2009). This growth was achieved through mass migration. In total figures, the 300,000 immigrants to Uruguay between 1880 and 1930 were only a small part of the massive movement of Europeans to the Americas. But proportional to the native population, immigration for much of this period was greater than to the United States (Goebel 2009).

Arrivals in the years 1866-1870 were over 60,000 – and while this figure probably overestimates the total permanent immigrants, it surely is evidence that over the whole decade total immigration was well above the threshold of 11,000. For the 1870s arrivals over the decade was more than 90,000, again certainly evidence of mass migration, even if the number of permanent immigrants was substantially less. Over the 1880s the net migration of foreigners was 67,000. This probably more accurately reflects the number of permanent immigrants and again is comfortably sufficient for mass migration. In the 1890s the net arrivals fell to just 24,000 – although this was in large part due to high departures in 1890 and 1891, most of which would necessarily have been immigrants from the 1880s. The net immigration over the 1900s was probably also somewhat lower (Ferenczi and Willcox 1929).

Oddone (1994) gives support for the late 19th century figures, saying that between 1881 and 1901 there were 50,000 Italian and 30,000 Spanish who came to Uruguay. Finch (1995) supports the conclusion that immigration was somewhat lower after the 1890s as immigrants preferred other destinations. However, Sanchez Alonso (2007) gives figures that imply a lower rate of immigration in the 1870s and 1880s, but
very high rates in the 1890s and 1900s. The lack of a total population census between 1860 and 1908 further complicates the estimation of mass migration in these decades. However, there is more complete data for Montevideo during the period.

Figures from Montevideo show the immigrant population rising from 28,000 in 1860 to 73,000 in 1884 (Beretta Curi 2014). This would imply at least 40,000 immigrants over the 1860s and 1870s – strongly suggesting mass migration in both decades (the population of Uruguay in 1870 was less likely not more than 350,000). Between 1884 and 1889 the immigrant population of Montevideo rose by a further 28,000 to 101,000 people – again strongly implying mass migration in the 1880s. However, between 1889 and 1908 there was actually a slight decline in the adult male immigrant population of Montevideo.

Overall the evidence seems to support mass migration in the three decades between 1860-1890, while mass migration is possible but not certain in the 1890s and 1900s.

Despite decades of mass migration, the proportion of the foreign-born proportion of the population in Uruguay actually fell between 1860 and 1908, according to the censuses, from over a third of the population to 17 or 18% (Camou and Pellagrino 2013). And this decline continued through the 20th century (Finch 1995, Arocena 2009).

Although years 1910-1914 saw relatively high arrivals, net migration was negative in the years 1915 to 1917 and was probably less than 30,000 for the entire decade (Ferenczi and Willcox 1929). By this time, the population of Uruguay was more than a million, making the threshold for mass migration more than 50,000. The population continued to grow, but the number of immigrants was not great, and indeed not sufficient even to maintain to immigrant stock, which between 1908 and 1963 declined from 170,000 to 130,000 (Arocena 2009). After 1960 the immigrant stock continued to decline in both proportional and absolute terms, and since at least 1980 has been less than 5% of the total population. While Uruguay
may possibly have experienced mass migration in every decade of its history in the 19th century, it may not have experienced any mass migration in the 20th century. The evidence is sufficient to conclude no mass migration in the decades after 1910.
Appendix 2

Mass Migration Tables

Key:

1 = Mass Migration (immigration equal to 5% of population at start of decade)

P = Evidence of Possible Mass Migration

0 = No Mass Migration

Note: These tables include Genoa, which was removed from the final analysis.

Mass Migrations 1450-1499

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1450-59</th>
<th>1460-70</th>
<th>1470-79</th>
<th>1480-89</th>
<th>1490-99</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venice</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuscany</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genoa</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papal States</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland-Lithuania</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia/USSR</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottoman Empire</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mamluk Sultanate</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengal Sultanate</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujarat Sultanate</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vijayanagara Empire</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseon/Korea</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siam/Thailand</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mass Migrations 1500-1549

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1500-09</th>
<th>1510-19</th>
<th>1520-29</th>
<th>1530-39</th>
<th>1540-49</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venice</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuscany</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genoa</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papal States</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland-Lithuania</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia/USSR</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottoman Empire</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mamluk Sultanate</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mughal Empire</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengal Sultunate</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujarat Sultunate</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vijiyanagara Empire</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseon/Korea</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siam/Thailand</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Mass Migrations 1550-1599**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venice</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuscany</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genoa</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papal States</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland-Lithuania</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>1600-09</td>
<td>1610-19</td>
<td>1620-29</td>
<td>1630-39</td>
<td>1640-49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venice</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuscany</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genoa</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papal States</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland-Lithuania</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia/USSR</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottoman Empire</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mughal Empire</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vijayanagara Empire</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseon/Korea</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siam/Thailand</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Mass Migrations 1650-1699**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1650-59</th>
<th>1660-69</th>
<th>1670-79</th>
<th>1680-89</th>
<th>1690-99</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prussia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>1700-09</td>
<td>1710-19</td>
<td>1720-29</td>
<td>1730-39</td>
<td>1740-49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prussia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venice</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuscany</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genoa</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papal States</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland-Lithuania</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia/USSR</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottoman Empire</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mughal Empire</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseon/Korea</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siam/Thailand</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Mass Migrations 1700-1749**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1750-59</th>
<th>1760-69</th>
<th>1770-79</th>
<th>1780-89</th>
<th>1790-99</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prussia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venice</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuscany</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genoa</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papal States</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland-Lithuania</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia/USSR</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottoman Empire</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mughal Empire</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseon/Korea</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siam/Thailand</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Mass Migrations 1800-1849**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1800-09</th>
<th>1810-19</th>
<th>1820-29</th>
<th>1830-39</th>
<th>1840-49</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prussia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prussia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papal States</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Mass Migrations 1850-1899

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papal States</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia/USSR</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottoman Empire</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persia/Iran</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseon/Korea</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siam/Thailand</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>1900-09</td>
<td>1910-19</td>
<td>1920-29</td>
<td>1930-39</td>
<td>1940-49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Mass Migrations 1900-1949**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>NA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia/USSR</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottoman Empire</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Yemen</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persia/Iran</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseon/Korea</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siam/Thailand</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Mass Migrations 1950-2009**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Russia/USSR</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia/USSR</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Yemen</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Yemen</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persia/Iran</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kandy/Sri Lanka</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Revolutionary Event Tables

**Key:**
- 1 = Revolutionary Change of Political Power and Institutions
- S = Violent Succession without Transformation of Institutions
- P = Peaceful Transformation of Political Institutions
- 0 = No Events
- M = Missing

#### Revolutionary Events 1450-1499

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1450-59</th>
<th>1460-70</th>
<th>1470-79</th>
<th>1480-89</th>
<th>1490-99</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>1500-09</td>
<td>1510-19</td>
<td>1520-29</td>
<td>1530-39</td>
<td>1540-49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venice</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuscany</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papal States</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland-Lithuania</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia/USSR</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottoman Empire</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mamluk Sultanate</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengal Sultanate</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujarati Sultanate</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vijayanagara Empire</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseon/Korea</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siam/Thailand</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Revolutionary Events 1500-1549**
### Revolutionary Events 1550-1599

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venice</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuscany</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papal States</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland-Lithuania</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia/USSR</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottoman Empire</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mughal Empire</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujarat Sultunate</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vijayanagara Empire</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseon/Korea</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siam/Thailand</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Revolutionary Events 1600-1649

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1600-09</th>
<th>1610-19</th>
<th>1620-29</th>
<th>1630-39</th>
<th>1640-49</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venice</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>1650-59</td>
<td>1660-69</td>
<td>1670-79</td>
<td>1680-89</td>
<td>1690-99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prussia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venice</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuscany</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papal States</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland-Lithuania</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia/USSR</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottoman Empire</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mughal Empire</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseon/Korea</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siam/Thailand</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Revolutionary Events 1650-1699**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1700-09</th>
<th>1710-19</th>
<th>1720-29</th>
<th>1730-39</th>
<th>1740-49</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Revolutionary Events 1750-1799

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1750-59</th>
<th>1760-69</th>
<th>1770-79</th>
<th>1780-89</th>
<th>1790-99</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prussia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venice</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuscany</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papal States</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland-Lithuania</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia/USSR</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottoman Empire</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mughal Empire</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseon/Korea</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siam/Thailand</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>1800-09</td>
<td>1810-19</td>
<td>1820-29</td>
<td>1830-39</td>
<td>1840-49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseon/Korea</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siam/Thailand</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prussia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papal States</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia/USSR</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottoman Empire</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persia/Iran</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseon/Korea</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siam/Thailand</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Revolutionary Events 1850-1899

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prussia</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papal States</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia/USSR</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottoman Empire</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persia/Iran</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseon/Korea</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siam/Thailand</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Chile
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1900-09</th>
<th>1910-19</th>
<th>1920-29</th>
<th>1930-39</th>
<th>1940-49</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Bolivia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1900-09</th>
<th>1910-19</th>
<th>1920-29</th>
<th>1930-39</th>
<th>1940-49</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Colombia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1900-09</th>
<th>1910-19</th>
<th>1920-29</th>
<th>1930-39</th>
<th>1940-49</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Ecuador

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1900-09</th>
<th>1910-19</th>
<th>1920-29</th>
<th>1930-39</th>
<th>1940-49</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Peru

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1900-09</th>
<th>1910-19</th>
<th>1920-29</th>
<th>1930-39</th>
<th>1940-49</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Uruguay

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1900-09</th>
<th>1910-19</th>
<th>1920-29</th>
<th>1930-39</th>
<th>1940-49</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Paraguay

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1900-09</th>
<th>1910-19</th>
<th>1920-29</th>
<th>1930-39</th>
<th>1940-49</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Argentina

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1900-09</th>
<th>1910-19</th>
<th>1920-29</th>
<th>1930-39</th>
<th>1940-49</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Revolutionary Events 1900-1949

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1900-09</th>
<th>1910-19</th>
<th>1920-29</th>
<th>1930-39</th>
<th>1940-49</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia/USSR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottoman Empire</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Revolutionary Events 1950-2009**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia/USSR</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Yemen</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Yemen</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persia/Iran</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kandy/Sri Lanka</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siam/Thailand</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 3

Regression Tables for Chapter 5

I fit regression models with the institutional measure in 2011 as the dependent variable. The equivalent institutional measure for 1990 is included as a predictor in each of the models. The only other variables used are the migrant stock and the change in stock along with interactions between each of the predictor variables.

Polity IV Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regression</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polity 1990</td>
<td>0.55***</td>
<td>0.59***</td>
<td>0.56***</td>
<td>0.56***</td>
<td>0.52***</td>
<td>0.52***</td>
<td>0.49***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant Stock 1990</td>
<td>-0.12***</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>-0.10**</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.11*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stock change 1990-2010</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>-0.19*</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction Change/Stock</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction Polity/Change</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>0.02*</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>0.04*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction Polity/Stock</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-way interaction</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>4.55***</td>
<td>3.97***</td>
<td>4.52***</td>
<td>4.48***</td>
<td>4.19***</td>
<td>4.39***</td>
<td>4.28***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE A3.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>R squared</th>
<th>0.56</th>
<th>0.53</th>
<th>0.56</th>
<th>0.56</th>
<th>0.58</th>
<th>0.56</th>
<th>0.59</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**0.001 significance**  **0.01 significance**  *0.05 significance*

All estimates reported to two decimal places

Looking at the models together we see that the coefficients for the migrant stock in 1990 and the change in migrant stock over the period are negative, but small, and significant only in certain specifications. We also see that the interaction terms between these migration measures and polity score are positive. This suggests that immigration to countries with more democratic institutions has a more neutral or even positive impact on those institutions.

Overall the results that we see result from a general improvement in institutions across the period (as shown by the high intercepts). High immigration countries were often already high, or top, scoring democracies, meaning that they mechanically could not improve there scores significantly. There were also a small number of very high immigration countries with highly autocratic institutions (primarily the Gulf States). These countries had significant potential to improve their scores, but generally saw little or no improvement in their scores.

This is one of the disadvantages of looking over a limited time period. Between 1990 and 2011 there were relatively few countries that had declining Polity scores. However, even if there were, the issues of ceilings and floors to score changes make this type of regression model a less effective way to analyze the relationship between immigration and institutions than the visual inspection and discussion of the scatter plot which is used in chapter 5.

The regression tables for the Freedom in the World indices are substantively similar.

**Freedom in the World Results (Civil Liberties)**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil Liberties 1990</th>
<th>0.75***</th>
<th>0.74***</th>
<th>0.73***</th>
<th>0.71***</th>
<th>0.71***</th>
<th>0.66***</th>
<th>0.63***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Migrant Stock 1990</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>-0.02*</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stock change 1990-2010</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction Change/Stock</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction CL/Change</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction CL/Stock</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-way interaction</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.63***</td>
<td>1.56***</td>
<td>1.70***</td>
<td>1.73***</td>
<td>1.73***</td>
<td>1.95***</td>
<td>2.06**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R squared</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE A3.2**  *** 0.001 significance  ** 0.01 significance  *0.05 significance

All estimates reported to two decimal places

**Freedom in the World Results (Political Rights)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regression</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Rights 1990</td>
<td>0.68***</td>
<td>0.68***</td>
<td>0.68***</td>
<td>0.65***</td>
<td>0.64***</td>
<td>0.61***</td>
<td>0.53***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant Stock</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stock change</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.19*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-2010</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change/Stock</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR/Change</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR/Stock</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-way interaction</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.83***</td>
<td>1.73***</td>
<td>1.84***</td>
<td>1.86***</td>
<td>1.88***</td>
<td>2.05***</td>
<td>2.29***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R squared</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE A3.3**  *** 0.001 significance    ** 0.01 significance    *0.05 significance

All estimates reported to two decimal places
Bibliography to the Dissertation


Buchanan, P. J. (2002). The death of the West.


Bibliography to Appendix 1


Lowe de Goodin, M. *People of African ancestry in Panama, 1501-2012*.


Narvaez, B. N. (2010). *Chinese coolies in Cuba and Peru: race, labor, and immigration, 1839-1886*. The University of Texas at Austin.


**Online Sources (accessed April 2021)**

1895 Mexico Census.

https://ipfs.io/ipfs/QmXoypizjW3WknFiJnKLwHCnL72vedxjQkDDP1mXWo6uco/wiki/1895_Mexico_Census.html


CSO (1996).


INSEE. https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/3633212#tableau-Tableau1_radio1


STATEC (2019). https://statistiques.public.lu/stat/TableViewer/tableViewHTML.aspx?ReportId=12856&IF_Language=en g&MainTheme=2&FldrName=1


Statistics Canada. https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/11-630-x/11-630-x2016006-eng.htm#def2

Statistics Denmark. https://www.statbank.dk/INDVAN (immigration)

Statistics Denmark. https://www.statbank.dk/UDVAN (emigration)