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|Title:||Responsibility, Excusing Conditions, and Neuroscience Two Essays:How Responsibility is Preserved in a Mechanistic World Through Perceived Freedom and Current Neuroscience Cannot Be the Primary Method to Determine an Excusing Condition, and It Will Be Difficult to Do So in the Future|
|Abstract:||If external physical causes determine our actions, it seems we cannot be free and morally responsible. I argue we can be free and responsible because we have perceived freedom, barring the presence of certain conditions that excuse from legal responsibility. In addition, I argue that neuroscience cannot be the primary way to determine if one has these excusing conditions, because excusing conditions are behaviorally defined.|
|Type of Material:||Princeton University Senior Theses|
|Appears in Collections:||Philosophy, 1924-2016|
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