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Title: Responsibility, Excusing Conditions, and Neuroscience Two Essays:How Responsibility is Preserved in a Mechanistic World Through Perceived Freedom and Current Neuroscience Cannot Be the Primary Method to Determine an Excusing Condition, and It Will Be Difficult to Do So in the Future
Authors: Jian, George
Advisors: Elga, Adam
Contributors: Kelly, Thomas
Department: Philosophy
Class Year: 2016
Abstract: If external physical causes determine our actions, it seems we cannot be free and morally responsible. I argue we can be free and responsible because we have perceived freedom, barring the presence of certain conditions that excuse from legal responsibility. In addition, I argue that neuroscience cannot be the primary way to determine if one has these excusing conditions, because excusing conditions are behaviorally defined.
Extent: 46 pages
Type of Material: Princeton University Senior Theses
Language: en_US
Appears in Collections:Philosophy, 1924-2017

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