Skip navigation
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Title: Job Rationing, Unemployment, and Discouraged Workers
Authors: Cave, George
Issue Date: 1-Oct-1982
Citation: Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 1, No. 3, July 1983
Series/Report no.: Working Papers (Princeton University. Industrial Relations Section) ; 156
Abstract: By combining features of rationing models and hedonic models in a novel way, this paper develops a structural model of categorical labor force behavior to help explain several puzzles in data on unemployment and discouraged workers. It traces the links among minimum wages or other rigidities, hiring and firing decisions by firms, and labor force participa- tion decisions by individuals of differing skill levels. A key comparative static result is that a rise in an effective minimum wage increases the labor force participation of more skilled marginal workers but reduces the participation of less skilled marginal workers.
Related resource:
Appears in Collections:IRS Working Papers

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
156.pdf2.36 MBAdobe PDFView/Download

Items in Dataspace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.