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Title: A Defense of Quinean Epistemology
Authors: Dworsky, David
Advisors: Harman, Gilbert H.
Contributors: Fara, Delia G.
Department: Philosophy
Class Year: 2015
Abstract: W.V. Quine’s Epistemology Naturalized (1969) has elicited a wide range of interpretations and reactions, and it is also seen as an important early form of “naturalism.” One common interpretation is that Quine was attempting to strip epistemology of its normative components. Modern day “naturalists” must indeed face the question whether normative dialogue is acceptable in a naturalistic framework. In this paper I defend Quine’s epistemological views, and argue that his version of naturalism did not renounce normativity.
Extent: 45 pages
Type of Material: Princeton University Senior Theses
Language: en_US
Appears in Collections:Philosophy, 1924-2017

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