Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
|Title:||Lawyers as Agents of the Devil in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game|
|Series/Report no.:||Working Papers (Princeton University. Industrial Relations Section) ; 270|
|Abstract:||The goal of this paper is to explore the possibility that the costs and benefits of legal representation are structured so that each individual party seeks legal representation in the hope of exploiting the other party, while knowing full well that failing to do so will open up the possibility of being exploited. The first part of the paper shows how the structure of the incentives faced by the parties may be estimated, and the second describes the results of empirical tests in several different settings. The empirical results strongly suggest that the parties do face "prisoner's dilemma" incentives, although no attempt is made to determine whether the parties respond to these incentives.|
|Appears in Collections:||IRS Working Papers|
Files in This Item:
|270.pdf||1.8 MB||Adobe PDF||View/Download|
Items in Dataspace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.