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Title: Attribution, Accountability, and Institutional Design in Bureaucratic Politics
Authors: Ruder, Alexander Irvin
Advisors: Arnold, R. Douglas
Contributors: Politics Department
Keywords: Accountability
American Politics
Mass Media
Text Analysis
Subjects: Political Science
Issue Date: 2014
Publisher: Princeton, NJ : Princeton University
Abstract: Attribution, Accountability, and Institutional Design in Bureaucratic Politics is a collection of three essays about news coverage of regulatory agencies. In a democracy, the news is a crucial source of information about public affairs for voters. The news enables accountability for elected officials such as the president and members of Congress. I ask how news coverage enables political accountability of powerful federal agencies, whose leaders are unelected and only accountable to the public only through the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. In particular, voters rely on the news to connect agency regulations and enforcements to the elected officials with formal responsibility for those agencies. If the news provides poor information, by blaming the wrong official, mischaracterizing the authorities of the president and Congress, or biasing the news to favor a particular ideology, accountability is undermined.
Alternate format: The Mudd Manuscript Library retains one bound copy of each dissertation. Search for these copies in the library's main catalog
Type of Material: Academic dissertations (Ph.D.)
Language: en
Appears in Collections:Politics

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