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Title: Executive Compensation and Incentives: The Impact of Takeover Legislation
Authors: Bertrand, Marianne
Mullainathan, Sendhil
Keywords: executive compensation
incentives & takeover lows
Issue Date: 1-Oct-1998
Series/Report no.: Working Papers (Princeton University. Industrial Relations Section) ; 404
Abstract: We investigate the impact of changes in states’ anti-takeover legislation on executive compensation. We find that both pay for performance sensitivities and mean pay increase for the firms affected by the legislation (relative to a control group). These findings are partially consistent with an optimal contracting model of CEO pay as well as with a skimming model in which reduced takeover fears allow CEOs to skim more. We compute lower bounds on the relative risk aversion coefficients implied by our findings. These lower bounds are relatively high, indicating that the increase in mean pay may have been more than needed to maintain CEOs’ individual rationality constraints. Under both models however, our evidence shows that the increased pay for performance offsets some of the incentive reduction caused by lower takeover threats.
Appears in Collections:IRS Working Papers

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