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Title: The Viability of the Strong Artificial Life Hypothesis
Authors: Schwartz, Jonathan
Advisors: Harman, Gilbert
Department: Philosophy
Class Year: 2014
Abstract: Could software ever be considered alive? This is a question that has received far too little philosophical or scientific scrutiny. The claim that appropriately designed machine code is living—and not in a metaphorical sense but in the literal sense used in biology—is known as the thesis of strong artificial life. In contrast, the thesis of weak artificial life takes the stance that such software can amount to nothing more than simulations of life itself. This paper aims to develop an acceptable theory and ontology of living things and, against these, tests the viability of strong artificial life.
Extent: 33
Type of Material: Princeton University Senior Theses
Language: en_US
Appears in Collections:Philosophy, 1924-2016

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