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Title: A Defense of Consequentialism Against James Lenman’s Epistemic Objection
Authors: Frost, Evan
Advisors: McGrath, Sarah
Department: Philosophy
Class Year: 2013
Abstract: James Lenman objects to consequentialism’s usefulness as a decision procedure, claiming that knowable consequences make up too small a portion of total consequences to provide meaningfully large reasons for action. I respond that when we properly think about the consequentialist decision procedure, the reasons knowable consequences provide are decisive.
Extent: 39 pages
Access Restrictions: Walk-in Access. This thesis can only be viewed on computer terminals at the Mudd Manuscript Library.
Type of Material: Princeton University Senior Theses
Language: en_US
Appears in Collections:Philosophy, 1924-2017

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