Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp013r074t956
 Title: Seniority and Distribution in a Two-Worker Trade Union Authors: Robert, JacquesKuhn, Peter Keywords: unionssenioritywageslayoffs Issue Date: 1-Jul-1988 Citation: Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 104, No. 3, August 1989 Series/Report no.: Working Papers (Princeton University. Industrial Relations Section) ; 235 Abstract: Unlike existing models which rely heavily on assumptions regarding unions’ distributional preferences, we present a very simple model in which union seniority-layoff rules and rising seniority-wage profiles result from optimal price discrimination against the firm. Surprisingly, even when cash transfers among union members are ruled out, unions’ optimal seniority-wage profiles are likely to be completely unaffected by their distributional preferences because of a kink in the utility-possibility frontier. This suggests that the simple technology of price discrimination may play a key role, hitherto unappreciated, in explaining union policies that affect the relative wellbeing of different union members. URI: http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp013r074t956 Related resource: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28198908%29104%3A3%3C485%3ASADIAT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-4 Appears in Collections: IRS Working Papers

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat