Skip navigation
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp013f4627787
Title: Disclosure and Dissuasion
Authors: Siliciano, Robert L.
Advisors: Morris, Stephen E.
Department: Economics
Class Year: 2015
Abstract: What can a social planner do to help decision makers when relevant information is held by biased parties? I consider a second-best policy of simple taxes to change the decision maker's preferences when a mandatory disclosure policy is not available to the social planner. Changing a decision maker's preferences induces di erent persuasion from informed but biased parties. I develop a model to show how these taxes can achieve enough information revelation to implement the e cient decision, and then extend it to the applications of sales and grading standards.
Extent: 45 pages
URI: http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp013f4627787
Type of Material: Princeton University Senior Theses
Language: en_US
Appears in Collections:Economics, 1927-2016

Files in This Item:
File SizeFormat 
PUTheses2015-Siliciano_Robert_L..pdf379.69 kBAdobe PDF    Request a copy


Items in Dataspace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.