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Title: On the Problem of Moral Supervenience for Moral Non-Naturalism
Authors: Branch, Clair
Advisors: Rosen, Gideon
Department: Philosophy
Class Year: 2014
Abstract: Moral supervenience states that no two entities can share all their natural properties without possessing the same moral properties. I argue that non-reductive naturalists cannot explain the truth of moral supervenience. Given the importance of moral supervenience for any functioning ethical system, this is a reason to reject non-reductive naturalism.
Extent: 73
Type of Material: Princeton University Senior Theses
Language: en_US
Appears in Collections:Philosophy, 1924-2017

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