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  <title>DataSpace Community:</title>
  <link rel="alternate" href="http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01c821gj770" />
  <subtitle />
  <id>http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01c821gj770</id>
  <updated>2013-05-13T16:02:39Z</updated>
  <dc:date>2013-05-13T16:02:39Z</dc:date>
  <entry>
    <title>Lawyers as Agents of the Devil in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01pr76f348m" />
    <author>
      <name>Ashenfelter, Orley</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Bloom, David E.</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Dahl, Gordon B.</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01pr76f348m</id>
    <updated>2013-05-06T19:56:22Z</updated>
    <published>2013-04-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Lawyers as Agents of the Devil in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game
Authors: Ashenfelter, Orley; Bloom, David E.; Dahl, Gordon B.
Abstract: Do the parties in a typical dispute face incentives similar to those in the classic prisoner’s dilemma game? In this paper, we explore whether the costs and benefits of legal representation are such that each party seeks legal representation in the hope of exploiting the other party, while knowing full well that failing to do so will open up the possibility of being exploited. The paper first shows how it is possible to test for the presence of such an incentive structure in a typical dispute resolution system. It then reports estimates of the incentives for the parties to obtain legal representation in wage disputes that were settled by final-offer arbitration in New Jersey. The paper also reports briefly on similar studies of data from discharge grievances, courtannexed&#xD;
disputes in Pittsburgh, and child custody disputes in California. In each case, the data provide evidence that the parties face strong individual incentives to obtain legal representation which makes the parties jointly worse off. Using our New Jersey data, we find that expert agents may well have played a productive role in moderating the biases of their clients, but only early on in the history of the system. Over time, the parties slowly evolved to a non cooperative equilibrium where the use of lawyers becomes nearly universal, despite the fact that agreeing not to hire lawyers is cheaper and does not appear to alter arbitration outcomes.</summary>
    <dc:date>2013-04-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Do Extended Unemployment Benefits Lengthen Unemployment Spells?  Evidence from Recent Cycles in the U.S. Labor Market</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01th83kz40p" />
    <author>
      <name>Farber, Henry S.</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Valletta, Robert G.</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01th83kz40p</id>
    <updated>2013-05-06T19:56:21Z</updated>
    <published>2013-04-16T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Do Extended Unemployment Benefits Lengthen Unemployment Spells?  Evidence from Recent Cycles in the U.S. Labor Market
Authors: Farber, Henry S.; Valletta, Robert G.
Abstract: In response to the Great Recession and sustained labor market downturn, the availability of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits was extended to new historical highs in the United States, up to 99 weeks as of late 2009 into 2012. We exploit variation in the timing and size of UI benefit extensions across states to estimate the overall impact of these extensions onunemployment duration, comparing the experience with the prior extension of benefits (up to 72 weeks) during the much milder downturn in the early 2000s. Using monthly matched individual data from the U.S. Current Population Survey(CPS) for the periods 2000-2005 and 2007-2012, we estimate the effects of UI extensions on unemployment transitions and duration. We rely on individual variation in benefit availability based on the duration of unemployment spells and the length of UI benefits available in the state and month,conditional on state economic conditions and individual characteristics. We find a small&#xD;
but statistically significant reduction in the unemployment exit rate and a small increase in the expected duration of unemployment arising from both sets of UI extensions. The effect on exits and duration is primarily due to a reduction in exits from the labor force rather than a decrease in exits to employment (the job ending rate). The magnitude of the overall effect on exits and duration is similar across the two episodes of benefit extensions.&#xD;
Although the overall effect of UI extensions on exits from unemployment is small, it implies a substantial effect of extended benefits on the steady-state share of unemployment in the cross-section that is long-term.</summary>
    <dc:date>2013-04-16T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>History of the United States Department of Labor; 100 Years</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp013j3332313" />
    <author>
      <name />
    </author>
    <id>http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp013j3332313</id>
    <updated>2013-05-06T19:55:30Z</updated>
    <published>2013-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: History of the United States Department of Labor; 100 Years</summary>
    <dc:date>2013-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Remittances and Well-Being among Rural-to-Urban Migrants in China</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01cn69m419r" />
    <author>
      <name>Akay, Alpaslan</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Giulietti, Corrado</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Robalino, Juan D.</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Zimmermann, Klaus F.</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01cn69m419r</id>
    <updated>2013-04-15T18:12:26Z</updated>
    <published>2013-02-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Remittances and Well-Being among Rural-to-Urban Migrants in China
Authors: Akay, Alpaslan; Giulietti, Corrado; Robalino, Juan D.; Zimmermann, Klaus F.
Abstract: The main objective of this paper is to propose a systematic approach to empirically analyse the relationship between sending remittances and the utility of migrants, as proxied by their subjective well-being (SWB). Using data from a new survey on China, we estimate models in which a SWB measure is regressed on the level of remittances, finding a sizeable positive  correlation. The estimates vary with the socio-economic characteristics of migrants, migration experience and the  diversity of family arrangements. As a complementary objective, we use SWB measures to elicit the motivations behind remittances, finding evidence that both altruistic and contractual motivations are at work among rural-to-urban migrants in China.</summary>
    <dc:date>2013-02-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
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