Opportunity Unbound: An Analysis of the Clinton-Era Strategy Towards Russia, 1992-2000

Abstract

Why are U.S.-Russian relations so poor today? The story of U.S.-Russian relations following the collapse of the Soviet Union provides a substantial explanation. In 1991, the future without a cold war seemed both exciting and concerning. Missiles on the former Soviet territory were now scattered between four independent states. Many Eastern European states wondered whether they would join an expanding NATO or become part of a new Euro-Atlantic security structure. Russia declared itself a newborn democracy, but what would a Russian democracy look like, and how would its institutions transition from a centrally planned economy to one governed by market principles? The United States knew what it wanted, but not how to achieve the end-state it had in mind. The uncertain variable was Russia, and how the United States would pursue its interests while it maintained a positive relationship with its former adversary. A combination of primary document content analysis, examination of memoirs from President Clinton’s staff, and review of academic theories of misperception provided a course of events that describe the decline of U.S.-Russian relations within a theoretical framework that supports Eric Grynaviski’s concept of “constructive illusions.” Pundits attribute the blame to certain policies, such as NATO expansion or not doing enough to aid the post-soviet transition. The evidence reveals that the execution of policy, rather than the policies themselves, that damaged the U.S.-Russian relationship. The Clinton administration’s policies committed several “unforced errors.” These blunders left promises unfulfilled and rational Russian interests dismissed in the fields of arms control, European security, and Russian liberalization. This resulted in a souring of relations as the two countries became more skeptical of each other’s motives. For policymakers to craft shrewd foreign policy, they must better understand the historically strained relationship between the two powers, and where the United States can “do better” in the future. This period serves as a case study of how there are no formulas for foreign policy, and that it is still very much dependent on the specific circumstances “on the ground” in an increasingly globalized world.