Deontology and the Limits of de Lazari-Radek and Singer's Sidgwickian Ethics

Abstract

In their 2014 book, The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and Contemporary Ethics, Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer (“LRS”) extend Henry Sidgwick’s (1838- 1900) arguments in The Methods of Ethics to make a case for hedonistic utilitarianism. Most notably, LRS make an ambitious attempt to resolve Sidgwick’s “Dualism of Practical Reason”— the conflict between the intuitions of “rational egoism” and “rational benevolence” (or “universal benevolence”)—advancing an evolutionary debunking argument to undermine the former, egoistic intuition. Sidgwick’s Dualism, however, is only one obstacle to hedonistic utilitarianism. As Sidgwick recognized, the intuitions of “common sense morality”—deontological intuitions— also block the path to this conclusion. Thus, even if Sidgwick and LRS can resolve the Dualism, to reach their conclusion, they must also (at least) show why hedonistic utilitarianism is preferable to deontological theories. Several commentators have argued, however, that Sidgwick’s arguments to this effect were unfair to deontology—and so unsuccessful. In this work, we consider LRS’ attempt to rehabilitate Sidgwick’s arguments against deontology and imagine how Sidgwick might have responded to his critics. We find even his strongest rebuttals wanting and conclude that LRS’ case for hedonistic utilitarianism fails. Lastly, we argue that systemic problems in LRS’ argument afford a bold conclusion: that hedonistic utilitarians should largely abandon Sidgwick’s project.